

School of Built Environment

Short-term custodial design is outdated: developing knowledge and initiatives for future research and a specialised strategic architecture for Police Custodial Facilities.

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Declaration: To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgment has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university.

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Content Index

Preliminaries	Page
Title page	
Acknowledgements	i
List of Figures	iii
Definitions	iv
Timeline of penal events	vii
Abstract	1
Introduction	2
Chapter	
1. History of Punishment and WA Policing	19
2. Architectural Response: WA Prison Facilities	62
3. Architectural Response: Police Custodial Facilities	75
4. Case Study: Questionnaire, Site Analysis and Fieldwork Methodology	86
5. Survey and Site Visit Findings	128
6. Surveillance Principles	175
Conclusion	199
Reference List	206
Appendices	220

List of Figures

- Figure 1. Page 22. Bridewell plan similar to Eaton and Buckinghamshire
- Figure 2. Page 23. Proposed Fremantle Poorhouse
- Figure 3. Page 24. Mt Eliza Lock-up and Guard Room
- Figure 4. Page 47. York Court House and Police Lock-up/Police Gaol
- Figure 5. Page 49. Old Perth Police Lock-up and Juvenile Lock-up (Beaufort St, Perth)
- Figure 6. Page 52. Example of a Lock-up in the Perth Metropolitan Area
- Figure 7. Page 53. Example of a Lock-up in the Perth Metropolitan Area
- Figure 8. Page 54. Example of a Lock-up in the Perth Metropolitan Area
- Figure 9. Page 55. Example of a Lock-up in the Perth Metropolitan Area
- Figure 10. Page 56. Example of a Lock-up in the Perth Metropolitan Area
- Figure 11. Page 64. Perth Waterside Lock-up/Police Gaol (St Georges Terrace, Perth)
- Figure 12. Page 67. Guildford Lock-up/Police Gaol
- Figure 13. Page 68. Old Perth Gaol (Beaufort St, Perth)
- Figure 14. Page 145. Example of a Lock-up in the Perth Metropolitan Area
- Figure 15. Page 181. Example of a Lock-up in the Perth Metropolitan Area

Definitions

ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
Auxiliary Officer	Officer appointed under the <i>Police Act</i> to provide support to sworn police officers with custodial duties as well as a range of other support tasks using specific police powers and training
BCA	Building Code of Australia
BMW	Building Management and Works
Bridewell	The royal palace's detention facility originally named after the nearby 16 th century Well of St Bride. Bridewells came to be recognised as custodial facilities and similar subsequent facilities were referred to as Bridewells. The term 'Bridewell' is still used today in reference to some police station holding facilities throughout the United Kingdom.
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television or recordable security vision
CDG	Custodial Design Guidelines
CJS	Criminal Justice System
Cross-talk	Ability to communicate via unconventional and unintended methods due to poor sound isolation, including physical separation, mechanical ducts, pipework etc.
COPs	Commissioner's Orders and Procedures
Custodial Officer	A category of police employed under a civilian agreement attached to the Perth Watch House providing custodial support. WAP no longer recruits personnel to form part of this category.
Dado Line	A horizontal line created where two colours meet, usually 1200mm above a finished floor level creating a two-tone colour scheme

Direct supervision	Constant surveillance applied in New Generation prisons achieving continual contact and interaction with all prisoners at all times
DCS	Department of Corrective Services
Exercise yard	A generally well-proportioned breakout area for detainees usually with access to natural light, ventilation and sometimes a view to the sky and outdoor sounds
Houses of Correction	(See Workhouses)
HR	Human Resources
JPA	Joondalup Police Academy
LMP	London Metropolitan Police
New Generation	(Design) A strategic and unique spatial layout associated with prison environments beginning in the 1980s.
OIC	Officer In Charge of a facility, shift or station, usually a sergeant or above but on occasion or in specific locations an experienced senior constable.
Panopticon	A panopticon is a type of building that allows a watchman to observe all inmates of an institution without them being able to tell if they are being watched.
PCF/s	Police Custodial Facility[ies]
Police 'Gaols'	Historically refers to facilities used for holding criminals awaiting trial or those convicted of relatively minor crimes serving short sentences, similar to the American jails that serve a similar purpose. Confinement and isolation in such facilities are at best short-term security measures (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 2).
Police Lock-up	A generic term for a short-term police custodial facility used for temporary holding

Regimental Numbers	Unique official identification numbers (usually affixed to the breast or collar of military and police uniforms) which identify its individual members
Poorhouses	Publicly funded, privately administered institutions for living for the poor and destitute (who are typically) unable to work.
PWH (existing)	Perth Watch House (WA Police Complex between Hay Street and Adelaide Terrace, East Perth) previously named East Perth Lock-up
PWH (proposed new)	Perth Watch House (Cnr Fitzgerald and Roe streets, Perth)
RE	Royal Engineer
RCIADIC	Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody
Sally Port	A secure vehicular annex and entry point associated with custodial facilities for secure transfer of people from a vehicle to the facility
Silhouette Line	(See Dado line)
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
STCF/s	Short-Term Custodial Facility[ies], a custodial facility specifically intended to temporarily hold people – PCFs, detention centres, remand centres or other similar facilities
Trustee Prisoner	or ‘Trusty’ prisoner – a low-risk and DCS/WA Police approved person who for the remainder of their short custodial sentence lives in a PCF instead of prison, with some autonomy in return for domestic labour
Tun	A facility for temporary overnight confinement of people arrested during the hours of darkness
Workhouses	Publicly funded, privately administered institutions where debtors would live and work with the intention of paying off debts and the indigent laboured for food
WACJS	West Australian Criminal Justice System

Timeline of penal events

- **1704** Fraud's Workhouse a basis model for RCC custodial facilities
- **1764** Cesare Beccaria's *Dei Delitti e Delle Pene* published
- **1791** Bentham's Panopticon drawings completed by Willey Reveley
- **1812-21** Millbank Prison construction period (part facility open in 1816)
- **1826** WA first settled in King George Sound (near current Albany)
- **1829** Swan River Colony (SRC) first settled
- **1829** London Metropolitan Police established by Sir Robert Peel
- **1829** Henry Willey Reveley first civil engineer to SRC (son of Willey Reveley)
- **1830-31** Round House construction complete
- **1830** Perth Waterside Lock-up completed (St Georges Terrace)
- **1830-48** Public executions and chain gangs to be phased out
- **1838-49** Rottneest Prison completed and functional
- **1840-42** Pentonville Prison construction period (still in operation)
- **1841** Guildford Lock-up/Gaol opened
- **1842** Thomas Hill Dixon, member of London Metropolitan Police [LMP] (later Superintendent of Convicts - WA)
- **1849-56** Rottneest Prison unused in this period
- **1851-59** Fremantle Prison constructed under EYW Henderson
- **1852** Richard Roach Jewell becomes the Director of Public Works
- **1852** York Lock-up/Gaol constructed
- **1853** WA Police considered as a structured organisation
- **1854-66** Perth Gaol construction works
- **1855** Perth Waterside Lock-up closed
- **1856** Mt Eliza Lock-up/Gaol operational
- **1863-69** EYW Henderson prisons Surveyor General & Military Prisons Inspector General
- **1864** Fremantle Asylum construction complete
- **1869-86** EYW Henderson Commissioner of LMP
- **1871** Quad Native Prison built Rottneest Island
- **1874** Poor House proposed for Fremantle
- **1888** Perth Gaol last prisoner transferred to Fremantle Prison

- **1890** Millbank Prison closed
- **1897** Perth Lock-up construction complete Cnr Roe and Beaufort streets
- **1898** Royal Commission Fremantle instigated by facility conditions
- **1901** Federation
- **1902** Rottnest no longer officially recognised as a prison island
- **1903** Prisons Act
- **1904-07** Circular panoptic exercise yard built at Fremantle Prison
- **1909** Fremantle Asylum designated to be used as a Poor House
- **1909** Last female executed in WA, Fremantle Prison
- **1911** Royal Commission Fremantle
- **1920s** Prison farm alternative gains popularity
- **1925** Stateville Prison USA opened (still operational)
- **1941** Fremantle Asylum no longer used as a poor house
- **1942** Barton's Mill classified as a prison (perimeter fence with tents)
- **1960s** Reformatory prison philosophy generates momentum
- **1961** Last execution at Pentonville Prison
- **1964** Last execution in WA, Fremantle Prison
- **1965** East Perth Lock-up construction complete
- **1970** Women transferred from Fremantle Prison to Bandyup Prison
- **1980s** Direct Supervision prison design a new direction in prison design
- **1989** Barton's Mill closed
- **1991** Fremantle Prison closed – prisoners to Casuarina
- **1994** Rangeview Juvenile Detention and Remand Centre opens
- **1997** Banksia Hill Juvenile Detention and Remand Centre opens
- **2000** Hakea Prison and Remand Centre opens
- **2001** Acacia Prison, first privately run prison, opens
- **2004** Boronia Pre-Release Centre for women open
- **2005-14** Banksia Hill Detention Centre expansion
Acacia Prison expansion
Series of new prison work camps at Warburton and Wyndham
Expanded prison work camps at Walpole, Pardelup and Roebourne
West Kimberley Regional Prison – Aboriginal culture specific prison
Eastern Goldfields Regional Prison replacement
Wandoo Reintegration Facility (second privately run prison)
New Perth Police Complex completion anticipated

Abstract

Evolving from Colonisation and the transfer of associated knowledge, attitudes and societal norms, early West Australian (WA) penal architecture and philosophy, and hence some aspects of the WA Criminal Justice System (CJS), has an English ancestry. As a consequence of this, and stagnancy in penal reform progress, severe deficiency in specialist literature, incompatible spatial strategies and insufficient relevant architectural research, contemporary carcerative facilities, including Police Custodial Facilities (PCFs), continue to reflect many outdated design principles and philosophies promoted by early prison ideas and reformers. PCFs perform the unique function of temporarily detaining suspects and provide an integral interface to other allied resources and sectors of the CJS. Paucity in PCF associated research suggests a lack of consideration and critical knowledge of the requirements for specialised spatial relationships and robust architectural theory relating specifically to PCFs and has rendered them an under-developed critical functional component in the WA CJS. This research is therefore concerned with developing a specialised body of knowledge and understanding of the requirements of PCF spaces that maintain and enhance the capacity for dignity where necessary, and serve the needs of the custodian and those held.

Introduction

Police Custodial Facilities (PCFs) in the West Australian Criminal Justice System (WACJS) perform the unique and specialised function of *temporarily* detaining or holding suspects. However, due to a severe deficiency in specialist literature, incompatible spatial models and strategies and insufficient relevant architectural research and government funding, current PCFs continue to reflect prison philosophies and building designs that are in need of review and fresh resource investment. Further, the fundamental operational requirements of Short-Term Custodial Facilities (STCFs), are based on entirely different parameters and a separate and unique set of functions in the WACJS in comparison with prison institutions. As a consequence of focusing on prison models for STCFs, this suggests a misalignment of spatial provision and rationale when existing architectural outcomes are considered in conjunction with the distinct operational needs and specific procedures, policies and regulations governing contemporary police custody. This disparity implies a legacy gap in critical knowledge and consideration of the requirements for specialised spatial relationships and robust architectural theory relating specifically to PCFs, resulting in less than ideal architectural composition of the WACJS. This research is therefore concerned with advancing our understanding and developing specialist knowledge and architectural strategies to reduce the contemporary incompatibility between architectural brief-given functional requirements of PCF spaces and prescribed application of police policy and procedure.

In respect to STCFs, this research seeks to bring the two seemingly unrelated disciplines of architecture and policing to the forefront of a specific analytical undertaking which aims to discover and understand custodial spatial requirements from a custodian's tactical and operational perspective. This is achieved through analytical discourse and narratives as well as related analyses of physical sites, and historical, intermediate and contemporary theories and philosophies to make associations between organisational relationships, training, procedure and architecture. The scope of this thesis is to identify critical flaws within components of existing PCFs and suggest improved alternative design or operational solutions that could be developed to inform design of a successful local or state-level operational PCF environments which is humane for its detainees, staff and visitors and offers an environment which is conducive to a reduction in stress and anxiety. Therefore,

the aim of this research is twofold: first, to highlight some key issues that may help reduce assaults, self harm and violence in PCFs and help staff to carry out their duties while adhering to policy and procedures; second, to advance the understanding of carceral architecture, specifically PCFs and their associated operational requirements. In his book *Buildings and power; freedom and control in the origin of modern building types* Markus (1993, 25) notes that hierarchies of authority and control exist in all architecture (buildings) as the melange of different entities and their component relationships are defined and informed by carefully orchestrated spatial strategies. Therefore it is not a question of the existence of surveillance in this context, but by whom and for what purpose surveillance is undertaken. As such, strategically designed spatial programs that facilitate surveillance are not restricted to the confines of custodial facilities, but rather the need for observation exists in all buildings such as schools, hospitals, museums and libraries etc, but for different purposes. PCFs and other non-penal facilities stand to benefit from surveillance to ensure safety, whereas penal institutions might use surveillance as a rehabilitative instrument to help modify behaviour.

Analytical research can be considered a critical link between theory and architectural practice, and is essential to derive informed conclusions and innovative (and sensible) new theories, and in the context of this research, the specific application of forms of surveillance that are beneficial to both the observer and the observed within PCFs. Additionally, re-evaluation of practice or, in essence, performance must also be considered, for as Einstein aptly concluded, the definition of insanity would be “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results” (Calaprice 2011, 474). Considering this, Schön (2004, 4) states that:

“[P]rofessionally designed solutions to public problems have had unanticipated consequences, sometimes worse than the problems they were designed to solve. Newly invented technologies, professionally conceived and evaluated, have turned out to produce unintended side-effects unacceptable to large segments of our society.”

Improvements in the design of PCFs should therefore aim at, but not be limited to, reducing risk for detainees and staff, while also maintaining security integrity, maximising efficiency, humanising the experiential quality of the space for all personnel (including detainees) in

the space, and assist officers to adhere to policies and procedures.¹ This strategy, therefore, disassociates itself from the conventional architectural understanding of panoptic environments that seek to achieve surveillance at all costs to an administration that facilitate “surveillance, transparency, security, efficiency, and knowledge” (Foucault 1975, 249), which in part form the backbone of short-term custodial function (for terms relating to panoptic see ‘Panopticon’ in definitions section).

Panoptic principles in carcerative contexts essentially seek to produce a self-regulatory response in one’s conduct by means of misdirection and psychological conditioning. In such spaces the ‘observed’ must assume the existence of actual or perceived constant surveillance by a strategically positioned ‘observer’ in the prescribed space. This suitably modifies inmate behaviour to achieve conformity. Rigorous and long-standing application of panoptic principles is readily associated with prison design despite negative psychological implications in long-term custodial facilities. Yet a paucity in research aligned with implementing or considering panoptic spaces in PCFs suggests that despite the beneficial superior levels of surveillance able to be achieved with relatively benign psychological effects, such architectural expressions in contemporary carcerative institutions that challenge the wellbeing of detainees and staff. It could be argued that contemporary society’s perception of surveillance and understanding of the true implications of *Big Brother* can be directly apportioned to, and have been intensified through published literature. Reference made to the application of the omnipotent Big Brother is over-inflated and, moreover, is of fictional proportions more relevant to social and public contexts. Therefore, societal sentiment to surveillance is generalised and has been significantly influenced by myth resulting in a common belief that does not relate to a considered and research-led approach to its application in PCFs and forms no relationship to Orwell’s classic *Nineteen Eighty-four: a novel*, in which he writes:

“He took a twenty-five cent piece out of his pocket. There, too, in tiny clear lettering, the same slogans were inscribed, and on the other face of the coin the head of Big Brother. Even from the coin the eyes pursued you. On coins, on stamps, on the covers of books, on banners, on posters, and on the wrappings of a cigarette packet – everywhere. Always the eyes watching you and the voice enveloping you. Asleep or awake, working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in the bath or in bed –

¹ COPs Commissioners Orders and Procedures manual & SOPs Standard Operating Procedures manual for specific locations

no escape. Nothing was your own except the few cubic centimetres inside your skull” (Orwell 1949, 72).

This insight is indicative of a situation whereby having succumbed to Big Brother’s oppressive matrix, as a system of measures, Orwell describes a world of fear which is utterly devoid of individuality, privacy, opinion and where one could be made to “disappear” (Orwell 1949, 67). As this is a classic text that indiscriminately approaches the notion of surveillance as intrusive and inherently problematic, it is used here to illustrate that texts with such a perspective towards surveillance could have the capacity to form a generalised sentiment towards the term within society. It cannot be overstated that within the context of this research and where surveillance refers to that within PCFs, the term surveillance should not be equated with Orwellian or similar texts. This, fictional, broad-brush, and exaggerated position on all-powerful and all-seeing surveillance does over time influence and perpetuate the sentiment of other authors and thus society who develop a position inspired by this nuance. Consequently, panoptic considerations, even in STCFs, a completely different typology with unique functions, appear to be abhorrent and incomprehensible.

Nevertheless, as this thesis will demonstrate, there *is* potential merit in the retrofitting of some key component surveillance-based principles in carcerative institutions, specifically in STCFs and not in prisons as has historically been the case. It is also the case that law and order significantly benefits from CCTV surveillance in banks, trains and other public locations from a level of surveillance that provides an increase in public safety. This form of surveillance is not applied to reform or rehabilitate, but provides a necessary medium designed to protect all parties in public and private spaces in urban environments. The premise upon which surveillance is argued in this thesis is supported by Zimbardo and Leippe’s (1991, 132-133) observations that to minimise the risk of persecution and maintain their position on contentious matters, people seek the association and reassurance of like-minded people. Similarly, Brown (1977, 8) summarises *Nineteen Eighty-four* by suggesting that Orwell believed that “public opinion can put a human being under continuous pressure to make him behave and think in exactly the same way as everybody else.” Set against different ideas and arguments, many people will formulate their own conclusions based on assessment of specific critical investigation and research of historical and contemporary discourse as “new information may prove old beliefs wrong” (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 145). This being considered, institutions, architects and researchers must collaborate and

share knowledge to ensure a more comprehensive, integrated and holistic approach to facility design that is compliant with legislation and government standards.

In every instance, proposed new short-term custodial facilities present momentous opportunities for the implementation of research, specialised architectural strategies and philosophical solutions inclusive of and beyond mere standards and legislative compliance. Consequently, Schön (2002, 77) states that evidence which suggests that there is an “increasing . . . tendency to think of policies, institutions, and behaviour in itself, as objects of design” already exists.

For the purpose of this research, the lack of specialised STCFs in Perth has been highlighted by studying existing district level custodial facilities² and the current designated police state lock-up facility, the Perth Watch House, in Adelaide Terrace, East Perth. It should, however, be noted that PWH is outdated due to its age (40 years) leading to the building of a replacement in Northbridge. What should be emphasised here is that architecture does not provide the whole solution, but is a critical component which must operate in conjunction with other factors to offer better functional solutions and create effective operational PCFs.

Fundamentally, architectural briefs for custodial facilities (specifically PCFs), are a product of many divergent yet interrelated issues associated with societal attitudes towards law and order, philosophies on crime and punishment, government persuasion, research, and funding which directly impacts on the quality of PCF architecture in terms of physical size, finishes specification, and project delivery. Governments have failed to empower practitioners to resolve complex issues or find alternative means to adapt to rapid changes in societal attitudes, technology and policing through conventional means and thought. Increasingly there is a “tendency to think of policies, institutions, and behaviour as objects of design” (Schön 2004, 77). These determinants inform the essence of prescriptive specifications drafted vicariously by the specifier and through the pen of the architect. However, this process is without critical research, specialist contributions and reflective practice, or as for architecture, the process of stringent reflective evaluation which can be directly associated with improved knowledge (Schön 1983, 69). The apparent paucity in such assessment predicated the foundation of the (following) objectives and aims of this research.

² District-level Lock-up refer to PCFs that are contained within the largest police station building for that district, e.g. East Metropolitan District refers to Midland Police Station

Aims and purpose of the study

Preamble - Preliminary Investigations (Masters Dissertation)

The rationale of this research is derived from findings of my undergraduate Architectural Masters Dissertation completed in 2008. This undertook limited comparative analysis and consideration of significant components of PCFs in contrast to historical advances in prison and other forms of custodial facility design to ascertain if PCF design shared similar architectural and philosophical roots with prisons, psychiatric facilities and hospitals. On completion, it was established that PCFs and prisons perform different functions in the Criminal Justice System (CJS) and people held in PCFs by definition are not similarly classified as those held in prison institutions or held for the same purpose. As a consequence, detainees held in PCFs require different accommodative structures, and to facilitate strategic police operational requirements, distinctive and specialised architectural forms.³

This research shares in WA Police's acknowledgement that the existing Perth Watch House is outdated. It is also noted that design of a new Watch House had started during the course of the study. As a part of this, a theoretical comparative analysis was conducted by visiting and examining Brisbane's Roma Street Watch House and Justice Complex, a PCF considered an exemplar for the new Perth Watch House and contemporary PCF design (R.21 2008). Staff in the Brisbane Watch House were also interviewed in relation to the operational, procedural and philosophical aspects of the facility as a way of determining if the architecture and its occupational use formed beneficial or counterproductive relationships. Additionally, a site visit and interviews were conducted at the Joondalup Police Academy's custodial 'simulation' facility which was examined to also determine if there was a disparity or correspondence between training, the training environment and the reality of operational facilities experienced on a recruit's graduation to operational policing.

This research determined that existing Watch-house or lock-up facilities available to WA Police were not significantly dissimilar to functional philosophies reflective of a legacy of now outdated prison design. This reiterates the need for the new customised facility that has been commissioned for construction in Northbridge. Additionally, it was determined that further investigation is required to understand the causes of the similarities between

³ This suggested further investigation assisted in developing the focus of this research.

PCFs and other custodial facilities and philosophical and historical discourse associated with crime, punishment, carcerative architecture and the inception of WA Police.⁴ It is the background of these findings that have formed the basis of my objectives and aims of this research which initially traces the history and defines the origins of WA Police and the role of police in the CJS.

A historical contextual analysis was undertaken to distinguish significant chronological threads and the organisation's historical relationships pre and post West Australian colonisation, from frontier to contemporary policing. Further, this research has analysed Perth Watch House, WA's *state* PCF, discovering its fundamental responsibility as an integral platform and initial interface into the WACJS, and investigated existing examples of WA metropolitan district PCFs formulating a functional, organisational and architectural datum as a baseline for historical and contemporary comparison. Finally, this dissertation undertook critical analyses of typical WA PCF architecture and spatial strategies to determine the relevance of current PCF design, appropriateness of spatial form, and compatibility with critical functional and ethical requirements. These PCFs have been represented in a way that is intentionally diagrammatic in this thesis and are not intended to be read as building drawings but as spatial relationships and layout patterns, for obvious security reasons.

Overview of the study

(Chapters 1-3) Background

Research of published works pertinent to the history and establishment of the WA Police, PCFs and prison facilities, as well the corresponding international architectural standards, was undertaken as well as research of literature relating to historical and contemporary philosophical discourse relating to incarcerative architecture, crime and punishment, psychology of space and the principles of control architecture relating to custodial facilities. Historical Beccarian and Benthamite texts and more contemporary Foucauldian literature on crime and punishment, prisons and the ideals of Jeremy Bentham on incarcerative philosophy are referenced as an instrumental component of early prison institutional architecture, judicial reform, retributive penalty and philosophical and physical control, which arguably continues to influence existing and enduring custodial facility design.

⁴ While research undertaken within disciplines of architecture relating to carceral contexts exist and utilise similar research of methods, the methods adopted specifically for this research are adapted from diverse interdisciplinary frameworks and structured to a local WA and PCF specific setting.

Government and semi-government reports and publications such as royal commissions and inquests into specific incidents which offer findings and design, policy and procedural recommendations are used as a marker to ascertain disparities in recommendation and implementation or time-lag to its implementation.

Police guidelines were analysed in relation to the comparative functional capacity of current PCFs and historical police custodial architecture. The Australian Bureau of Statistics, the census and archives also form a valuable resource of historical data for illustrating critical patterns and trends. The Heritage Council of Australia, State Records Library, Broome Museum, and WA Police Historical Society were also excellent sources of historical data and oral histories which have directly assisted in mounting a more expansive understanding of historical, hereditary and contemporary issues relative to this research and its objectives.

These chapters therefore examine the philosophical history of punishment and its associated philosophical discourse and trends to develop an understanding of the relationships between societal attitudes and their embodiment in carceral perspectives and their subsequent manifestations in architecture. In particular, those drawing from English examples of legislation, government and attitudes towards crime, punishment and incarceration relate to and inform similar developments in many Australian contexts.

Philosophical and architectural discourse is examined to determine their convergence into an association with the WA prison facilities platform. This is a localised contextual analysis of the unique developments on which prison system facilities were established and philosophies subsequently transformed. Colonial rule governing law and order and the development of an official WA Police organisation is similarly assessed adjacent to London police models, to determine if its foundation has been modelled on this Anglo example but consolidated in its current form due to unique local conditions.

(Chapter 4) Case Study: Questionnaire, Site Analysis, and Fieldwork Methodology

What chapter 4 demonstrates is that insufficient police training and the inability to update some police facilities to meet their needs as required have challenged the WA Police organisation from its inception. In examining existing facilities through observation and analysis of contemporary narratives of personnel associated with PCFs, policy and operational procedure, it would appear to a degree that it continues to do so, and although progress has been made, fiscal and strategic government inefficiencies and insufficiencies

promote a continuance in these inadequacies, and further, establishes that internationally a disparity in progress exists between prison and police facilities, particularly around the implementation of innovative architectural solutions and new conceptual notions.

A more cohesive and effective custodial training matrix, requiring partnership with regulations and policy and associated operational PCF design, may be determined by developing an understanding of (existing) collective custodial attitudes and socio-organisational constructs and relationships as a product of custodian training relevant to the requirements of operational PCF design.

This research thus examines attitudes towards PCFs and short-term custodial duties as a way of understanding how sensitive contemporary conceptions could be translated into tangible architectural solutions. From this, assessment is made of existing custodial infrastructure in the context of future considerations that are based on international-styled strategies.

These strategies are centred on privatisation of law and order, personnel, custodial transport, provisions and infrastructure developments and argue that any human resource and economic benefits achieved by outsourcing, restructuring or distancing the police organisation's custodial systems and accountabilities may manifest as negative outcomes, particularly if tendered to private corporations, which as business enterprises operate under entirely different ideologies.


To inform my objectives, which are based on architectural, sociological, historical and human relationships and multi-faceted architectural research, both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies were deemed necessary. These methods were applied to three specific areas of concern: philosophy (of punishment – historical and present), architecture (response – historical and contemporary) and police (custodial training, policies and legal procedures – historical and contemporary).

This research does not intend to consider the minutiae of every aspect of PCF design, custodial training, operational PCF policies and procedures, but rather undertake critical assessment of specific areas to develop a critical understanding and new knowledge relating to custodial spatial requirements and organisational relationships specific to existing operational WA PCFs. This can be interpreted and adapted to inform alternative future PCF architecture, design concepts, models and functional spatial components that are humane and provide safety for all occupants through adequate surveillance.

To achieve these aims this research is composed of three sub-categories, each with constituent parts: examination of literature, conducting interviews and undertaking site visits and mapping.

The following illustration represents this process as a collection of key descriptor words that summarise the detailed explanation to follow.

Diagrammatic outline of research



An investigation of existing theories, narratives and experiential analyses was required to develop design and project specific knowledge relating to particular historical and contemporary police facilities and to increase knowledge in a related area to empower decision-making involving non-project specific design (Downton 2003, 18). Specific methodological application involved architectural analysis via site visits and mapping of existing district level PCFs and the existing PWH where facilities were examined to observe design changes through habitation, drawing, measuring, occupying and experience, and critical investigation of relevant theories and review of prison history and architectural custodial history.

Furthermore, philosophy of crime and punishment, police history, police policy and procedure, training, architectural briefs, guidelines, statistics and facts and approved semi-

structured exclusive interviews of police, custody and auxiliary officers were also conducted.

Architectural briefs, and thus strategic spatial decision-making, are not entirely subject to historical precedents, architectural pedagogy, cultural intuition or the free will of the architect, but rather clear instructions informed by clients, economic constraints and specific language guiding architectural decisions, of which the occupiers of space are generally not associated with the documentation and discourse before its construction. However, these dialogues or narratives are the basis on which architectural decisions materialise into design strategies which inherently determine functionality and experience (Markus and Cameron 2002, 16). This means that in most cases the occupiers will inhabit the building after the fact, so the pre-design, design and construction phases to which they had no input precedes them and, as a result, none of their concerns, knowledge or experience is considered relevant.

In the context of this research, narrative analysis is the process by which professional experience and its essential relevance to the research is converted into meaningful material. Narrative analysis and its documentation has been defined as “systematic theory of narrative” by Genette (1980, 7) and by Markus and Cameron (2002, 12-13) as “the power to represent reality in a particular way and [have] it be accepted as ‘the truth’ . . . a neutral version of reality . . . which seeks to discover specific patterns which contribute to a particular construction of reality being represented” associated with the pertinent research. Contributing to this, narrative or discourse analysis is used to not only analyse field research data, but also interpret the subtle human nuances of the content, such as grammar, carriage and formal and informal demeanour, tone and vocabulary of professionals, specialists and of the recorded text (Markus and Cameron 2002, 8). Therefore, theoretical discourse, perceptions and knowledge attributed to narratives, are significantly more rigorous and form a holistic approach to architectural resolution by incorporating “methodological discussion” with its past, present and future inhabitants (Genette 1980, 7: 28-29).

Interviews - Group 1, Police, Custody and Auxiliary Officers

This stage began through a series of semi-structured interviews that were undertaken with highly experienced police officers as well as retired police and people who had previously served as sworn police officers. Consent was sought from WA Police Academic Research

Administration Unit (ARAU) to allow this research to be conducted and to authorise interviews with serving police organisation personnel.

This was not only necessary to facilitate interviews, but also to gain access to police buildings and sites to undertake site visits and analysis. These visits were to be coordinated with the interviewee at the time of visit such that they took place either before or after the interview had been completed. A meeting was held with staff at the ARAU to which a proposal was submitted outlining the investigative objectives associated with this research before the start of systematic exploration, evaluation and observation. Further to this, the questionnaire intended for use as a guide to my proposed semi-structured interviews was discussed with the unit staff that subsequently supported and approved the research questionnaire. The questionnaire was structured into six sub-components comprising a total of 38 questions (*see Chapter 4*). The six sub-components include: *Experience, Organisational Relationships, Custodian Training, Facilities Considerations, PCF Violence and Risk Management, On Dignity, and HR and Facility Management*. The Academic Research Administration Unit staff kindly offered to facilitate the process by obtaining authorisation from the Assistant Commissioner and organising district commissioned officer approvals to start facility site visits and interviews.

Comprehensive contextual analysis was achieved through narratives drawn from the interview of a broad spectrum of serving officers. These involved sworn officers-in-charge (OIC) of police stations containing PCFs, sworn or unsworn officers-in-charge of 'shifts' of police stations containing PCFs or the PWH, and officers with significant current or previous experience in PCFs or the PWH. These represented an assortment of officers with varying backgrounds, cultural and social upbringings, training, life and policing experiences that as a collective forms a somewhat microcosmic representation of the organisation as a whole.

From the outset, it was decided that officers with modest policing experience would not be interviewed as they would not have enough depth or consistent specialist knowledge. It must be noted it was not possible to interview equal proportions of male and female OICs as only four female officers were in or had previously acted in the position of OIC of a shift at the permitted research sites. Therefore, female officers were also included in this research where present. Although there appeared to be a distinct paucity of female OICs at district level police station lock-ups, which confirms the existence of an uneven distribution

or representation of female personnel at this level, within PWH there appears to be a more even representation of male and female shift OICs and personnel.

The overall aim was to discover how individual attitudes towards pre-operational and operational training, situation specific experiences, and organisational relationships contribute to the understanding of the lock-up function, psychology of carcerative space, operational preparedness and sensitivity to social conduct and detainee dignity. Individuals were encouraged to talk about their own attitudes and perceptions towards policing, training, custodial care, hierarchy, facility issues, morale, organisational relationships, career stress and satisfaction or any other issues that arose from the interviews. Consent to participate in this research originally included the approval for tape recording of the interviews, but due to the topics discussed it was decided that hand written notes alone would be sufficient. The nature of the research was explained at considerable length by referring to the information provided in the participant information sheet before requesting their consent to participate in the voluntary interview which assured the participants of the research intent.⁵

Twenty interviews were conducted in 2010 and 2011, each taking an hour to 90 minutes, followed by a one-hour on-site analysis and a further one-hour (off-site) synopsis where supplementary explicative notes were made and then converted into summarised transcript. The transcript was later extrapolated into an interpretative matrix model providing a visual composition of representative consistencies and antithesis which required a degree of interpretive and subjective judgement to allow for an (empirical) numerical score ranging from one to nine (1-9) to be tendered for each question based on the preceding narrative discourse with critical narratives themselves serving as qualification for empirical data.

The interviews produced invaluable critical knowledge and both empirical and non-empirical data pertinent to complementing my understanding when considered in combination with other background research.⁶ This holistic mode of understanding is relevant to effect a reduction in the lack of adequate existing knowledge and research which would otherwise rely on the analysis of predominantly empirical data which is unlikely to adequately capture or significantly complement our understanding of the subtle organisational and spatial relationships that exist in PCF contexts.

⁵ These records are stored in accordance guidelines set out in Ethics Approval.

⁶ The text contained in Chapter 4 is a summarised version of the interviews conducted. Actual interview answers are de-identified and can be found in the appendix section of this research.

Staff at each of the police custodial facilities graciously volunteered their time in relaying their unique experiences and knowledge, perceptiveness and professional sensibilities around the facilities' 'perceived' operational inadequacies and distinctions, functionality, and ability to facilitate custodial care initiatives and adherence to official procedure from a police perspective. Out of this I gained an accumulation of experience in excess of 300 years of service. I should note that this research does not include or intend to seek or obtain responses or conduct interviews with any detainees. To have incorporated such parameters would require an entirely different study.

Interview - Group 2 Non-Police (Ancillary personnel).

An interview was conducted with an unsworn member of this group from the WA Police Land and Building Services. This was structured to gain insight into the proposed intent and limitations associated with the design briefs for building alterations and additions to existing PCFs and to proposed new facilities. This interview sought to determine which policies or what sociological, economic or external factors (including design related constraints) influence the overriding architectural language already adopted by WA PCFs. This interview further advanced my understanding of the requirements, impositions and legislatively enforced constraints. It also provided knowledge of the capacity and willingness of architects to undertake and incorporate sufficient *pre*-design research, and their intent on creating the most appropriate and specialised spaces beyond operational expectation based on existing knowledge or to determine if the objective appeared to simply meet the requirements of regulations, design brief, budget, timetable and current trends or standards.

Site Analysis

For the site analysis stage of my research, the WA Police Academic Research Administration Unit gave approval to visit seven PCFs for empirical and non-empirical architectural analysis. Such site visits were conducted (post-interview) with the permission and in coordination with the OIC of the authorised location, which comprised six district level police station PCFs and the Perth Watch House – WA's state level PCF.

Before undertaking this research it was decided that design of juvenile detention and facilities specifically intended for defined user groups such as those attributed to ethnicity and cultural difference, which offer specific additional challenges for architects such as indigenous-specific design, was outside the scope of this research. It became evident,

nonetheless, that existing facilities addressing accommodation requirements for these user groups are in much the same way worthy of further prospective research.

Site visits were also conducted at other locations taking into account the diversity and dissimilarities of existing custodial facilities. Both contemporary and historical examples of custodial local, national and international facilities and typologies were researched to acquire an understanding of the array of physiological, psychological and organisational relationships associated with custodial architecture. The facilities visited included Broome Regional Prison, Fremantle Prison, Brisbane Watch House, Old York Gaol, Old Guildford Gaol, the Round House and Rottneest Island's Quad Prison site. By investigating prison, gaol and PCF custodial typologies as well as facilities which have been used for both long-term and short-term and police and Prison Department purposes, I was able to develop an understanding the spatial relationships that are shared by different typologies and recognise similarities in design that permeate prisons and PCFs.

The combination of literature-derived background knowledge with physical (architectural) site analysis provides an essential and comprehensive appreciation of the condition and advancement of PCF design in their current and historical contexts. This component of research became crucial in understanding the relationships between disparities in historical precedence, societal attitudes, literature, architectural spatial strategies, typology specific ideologies and guidelines. Site analyses will focus on gathering specific contextual information such as location, site constraints, architectural language, spatial strategy and spatial programs, capacity and surveillance capabilities such as direct, passive and electronic. Analyses of physical and experiential qualities were also conducted. This included materiality, security, spatial quality, lighting quality and source, acoustic control, and thermal comfort.

Comparisons between design intent and actual performance were analysed in combination with the operational guidelines and the narratives of the custodial personnel associated with the analysed space. Physical and experiential analyses were compared with other custodial typologies to determine if similarities in design existed among institutions of dissimilar systems, function and philosophy. Methods of evaluating and documenting site analyses include photography, sketches, flow diagramming and measurements, situational perspectives and sensorial perception. To appreciate the sense of proportion of the different cells at the various locations visited, I inhabited them to measure them empirically

and to gain a sense of proportion of the volume of the space in relation to my physical presence in it.

(Chapter 5) Survey and Site Visit Findings

The purpose of this chapter is to define the organisational relationships and dynamics that develop specific to PCF environments and understand ways in which location-specific conventions and behaviours develop independently by the personnel who inhabit these insular policing locations. The intention of this chapter is to develop an understanding of WA Police's organisational, social, cultural, procedural, philosophical and operational conditions specific to PCFs which directly inform the associated specific long-term spatial needs of the custodians who inhabit PCFs and facilitate custodial care. The chapter also establishes whether one 'police personality' exists or whether location specific legacies influence sentiment that affect police conduct, and further, whether custodian training is lock-up specific or what could be defined as 'specialised'. This is discussed next to what can be defined as pre-existing location-specific organisational relationship legacies that define sentiment and operational approach separate to formal training, discussions that highlight issues of dignity and finally on amenity and specific components of PCFs. This is achieved through analysis of discussions with police interviewees and through the capturing of both empirical and non-empirical experiences through site visits to approved metropolitan PCFs.

(Chapter 6) Surveillance Principles

This chapter discusses the disparity between the perceived and the reality of surveillance in general and its application in highly specialised environments such as PCFs.⁷ To further highlight the significance of surveillance in such contexts, this discussion refers to select fundamental components of panoptic philosophy, which, if it weren't for its namesake being problematic, could be considered in short-term custody such as PCFs. Therefore Jeremy Bentham's philosophies on the panopticon and surveillance are discussed with reference to PCF perspectives and analysed on the basis of it being either a theoretical or effective model, in other words whether it could conceivably function as intended or not.

In addition to this, further surveillance principles such as initiatives before entry and acceptance in to the PCF are discussed. These are referred to as Pre-Lock-up Screening areas that propose to act as a diversionary instrument that help minimise risk by

⁷ It must be noted that in disciplines such as Critical Criminology surveillance is a highly contested terrain.

recognising detainees that should not be held in PCFs but ought to be assessed and cared for by other allied services.

Limitations

A research proposal was submitted to the Strategic Planning and Review Committee in the Department of Corrective Services as it was intended that empirical and non-empirical architectural analyses of contemporary prison facilities could be made to evaluate the evolutionary progression of long-term custodial facilities in contrast to short-term custodial facilities as existing literatures and historical discourse suggest that both typologies share a common ancestry.

It was intended that site visits at prison facilities and interviews be conducted with prison personnel as it was envisaged that their operational experience, training and knowledge of prison facilities and professional opinions would contribute a more holistic context to this research. Associated data was proposed to help determine comparative contemporary disparities between police and prison facilities' functionality, facilitating respective personnel compliance with operational guidelines, and further, to gauge the facilities' adoption of 'architectural surveillance'. It was intended that a comparative analysis of interviewee answers and reactions to the same or similar questions be made by evaluating answers given by respondents employed in differing custodial typologies. It was anticipated that this could establish whether organisational relationships and sentiment towards their institutional environment, occupation, and interpersonal relationships developed in a way that was similar or dissimilar when compared with employees from other custodial facility typologies.

For the purposes of this research, it was not necessary to physically inspect prisons given sufficient existing examples, studies and historical and contemporary literature as well as empirical data exists in relation to both WA and international prison facilities. It is evident that sufficient prison-related research on architecture, sociology, psychology and various other humanities and social science disciplines has already been undertaken. For the purpose of this research, this was determined to be adequate in lieu of access to WA prison facilities by DCS. Though this situation is not of significant consequence, it does in part begin to substantiate my position that there is a need for a willingness to contribute to inter-organisational knowledge and cross-disciplinary understanding for the betterment of the entire system: a 'system' in which all departments are dependent on each other to succeed as a 'justice system'.

Chapter 1

Background/Literature review

The Philosophical and Architectural History of Punishment

Prisons

Incarceration as we now know it was not inherently a common form of punishment and its conception cannot be outwardly attributed to any one country or individual. Rather, it has been described as a “primitive inclination” of authority where one and all generally remained unsegregated irrespective of age, record, offence or gender (Babington 1971, 3-6). Webb and Webb (1922, 8), described the notion of basic early imprisonment as not a “punishment any more than chaining up a dog” and “simply a method of detention” to avoid escape and ensure the custodian could easily retrieve the offender and put him before a judge the following day or as required. Further, it would appear to be an impossible task to accurately date specific institutional penal markers, as trends associated with philosophical, architectural and legislative advancement and modernisation of countries did not occur simultaneously. Rather, a more linear country-specific tendency existed in isolation with some time lag in the advancement or adoption of the changing philosophies between countries.

This is in keeping with the limited methods available for the transfer of information, technology and knowledge through earlier centuries in comparison with near instantaneous contemporary means. Acknowledging this, incarceration in itself was uncommon without direct association to other additional forms of retributive physical punishment. Punishment was defined as a “stimulus whose occurrence following a behaviour leads to a decrease in that behaviour” (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 49). Thus, early imprisonment is to be considered simply temporary detention before a trial, at which time the actual punishment would be handed down. Consequently, it is the concept of punishment and prison ideology which has evolved, not the institutions that facilitate temporary custody of untried people which essentially continue to serve the same function, albeit under slightly improved conditions and moreover specifically associated, for the purposes of this research, with police custody or Department of Corrective Services administered remand facilities.

In England, Henry II's sovereignty was associated with the development of effective enforcement of *Royal Justice* and of the *King's Peace*. His period in power coincided with legislation to provide detention facilities for pre-trial detainees. Further, Henry made significant inroads in developing an established trial by jury framework through the Assize of Clarendon in 1166, which also commanded counties to build gaols if suitable provisions for detention did not exist. Conditions in these provisional or new facilities were "indescribably squalid because few were built originally for the function . . . any building, whether suitable or not, was adapted for the purpose" (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 14). Following this, the Mayor of London, Henry le Walleis, 1281-83 (Lord Mayors of the city of London from 1354-2010, 1) caused a building to be known as the *Tun-Upon-Cornhill* due to its shape and location to be built in 1283 for the temporary overnight confinement of people arrested during the hours of darkness, which Babington (1971, 20) attests to being the basis on which Bridewells and houses of correction facilities would be later conceived. The Tun was used for this purpose until the royal castle was subsequently presented to the City of London as an alternative facility for the provision predominantly of short-term detention (Babington 1971, 20) largely for people accused of minor offences (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 14).

Following this, reformatory measures introduced by Henry VIII, which involved the closing of many monasteries once used as places of detention for religious offences, under *Canon Law*, led to an increased pressure to find alternative facilities to fulfil this initial function. According to United States Bureau of Prisons (1949, 18) being near the 16th century Well of St Bride, (now Bridewell Place, City of London) the palace's detention facility itself was found to suit such a purpose and became recognised as an entity about 1557 and it is believed that because the Well was close to the detention place it came to be referred to as Bridewell. This pressure instigated a requirement of many more 'Bridewells' as a distinct custodial typology which was adopted as a designated custodial model to account for the reformatory action, and for Crown and civil offences throughout Europe but especially in Holland and Germany (United States Bureau of Prisons 1949, 18). Webb and Webb (1922, 2) attest to this and maintain that;

"For the safe custody of a person apprehended, the constable . . . was he himself responsible, whether or not they would provide a Watch House or temporary Lock-up. These lawful places of detention were, down to the 16th century, only the common [municipal and franchise] gaols. From 1557 and 1576 onwards there

existed also an increasing number of prisons bearing another name, and maintained under different statutes, known as Houses of Correction or Bridewells.”

However, Bridewell facilities, were also adopted for similar and other purposes and all people – whether untried, sentenced, the poor for default or non-payment of fines, private debtors, people arrested on civil process and even entirely innocent witnesses held only to ensure their whereabouts when required for trial – were “exposed to practically identical treatment” (Webb and Webb 1922, 24: 77). Some 400 years before this, Justices of the Peace were charged with the power to be the overseers of what could be colloquially and loosely referred to as early ‘law and order’ and administrators of punishment, and the “marshals of England [held] the traditional right of detaining in custody all prisoners who were awaiting trial” (Babington 1971, 20). They sentenced prisoners of the king's central courts inside Marshalsea Prison on the banks of the River Thames, Southwark. This period preceded the formation of an organised and funded police force in London by more than 650 years.

This is an early example of an attempt to specifically legislate certain practices relating to the provision of custody in non-specific facilities. Common goals more closely resemble US jail models which temporarily hold people awaiting trial, as well as people sentenced to short-term imprisonment, usually less than 30 days (Carter, Glaser and Wilkins 1972, 71-73). This was also similar to the function of ‘The Clink’, accepted as having been a non-police administered short-term “lock-up for minor offenders” (Babington 1971, 20). Nonetheless, the definition of ‘short-term’ is rather arbitrary when used in reference to early facilities, which also held debtors, instigating the inception of work houses (some time later) which were publicly funded institutions (Collins Australian Dictionary 2003, 1849) where debtors would live and work to pay off debts and the indigent would labour for food. These facilities were privately administered, and there was no incentive to intervene when it became apparent that some prisoners would never be able to leave based on the repayment structure set by their creditors. While facilities preceding work houses might not have been intended to operate as such, the prospect of extra financial remuneration by way of inducement for poorly paid administrators dictated otherwise (Morris and Rothman 1998, 119).

Destitute people deemed to be elderly, sick or insane or subject to any other consequence that rendered them unable to work “were frequently forced to seek poor relief or entry into a Poor House, a national system of poor relief introduced in England at the end of the

Sixteenth Century” (Hetherington 2009, 11). It should be noted that this system and new associated facilities were considered for WA during the initial colonisation, and although consideration was given to this issue of a severe lack of facilities which could be used to shelter the poor, little evidence of any concerted efforts made by the government to circumvent this problem exists and as a consequence of this, “the insane were also regularly sent either to gaols or to a hospital” (Hetherington 2009, 9-11).

Against this background in WA, the (now defunct) Public Works Department (PWD) proposed a purpose-built *Poor House* be constructed in North Fremantle in 1874, for the poor and destitute and debilitated men (Le Page 1986, 114), which clearly adopted and resembled the spatial format and philosophy of countless existing examples of international work houses/Bridewells preceding its proposal (see Fig. 1).




Fig. 1 Bridewell plans showing linearity of form, cell arrangement and terms of reference similar to other custodial typologies with different functions.

The need to separate ‘insane’ prisoners from the general prison population was also more readily appreciated and temporarily catered for during early colonisation by housing those with mental illness at Scott’s Warehouse (Ellis 1984, 15-18), which at the time was little more than a sparse and under-developed site owned by Captain Daniel Scott. This came before the completion of the Fremantle Asylum in 1865 (Ellis 1984, 15-18: Le Page 1986, 87).

Subsequent functional reassignment of Fremantle Asylum saw it reclassified as a facility for poor and elderly women in 1909 (Hutchison 1970, 12) after its occupants were transferred to the new Claremont Hospital for the Insane completed in 1903 (Register of heritage places - assessment documentation Graylands Hospital 2002, 2).




Fig. 2 Poor House plan illustrating linearity of form and repetitive cell arrangement and philosophies similar to other historical and existing custodial typologies.

This might have temporarily alleviated and circumvented the government’s commitment to and expense of providing the proposed new Poor House and thus one was never built (see Fig. 2). Next to this, the Mount Eliza Depot buildings (see Fig. 3) “were transferred to the Colonial government” in 1868 for the purpose of functioning as an asylum for old and incapacitated paupers, in other words, a poorhouse (Matthews 2007, 9).



Fig. 3 An example of early STCFs in WA featuring 3 cells arrangement in a linear formation serviced by a corridor.

Clearly, there appeared to be a concerted endeavour to address the spatial requirements associated with contemporaneous social issues and with WA’s own *Lunacy Act* passed by Parliament in 1871. But the cost implications and expediency of new construction outweighed the straightforwardness of delegating functional reassignment of pre-existing infrastructure and in so doing disregarded the required distinction and specific requirements of the dissimilar categories of people held, inclusive of the poor, the young and those with mental disability. This situation appears to have been a recognised concern with *The West Australian* newspaper publishing;

“The proposal to remove the 'Invalids' from the colonial depot under Mount Eliza, and from the convict depot at Fremantle and to unite them in one establishment at Freshwater Bay, is to be commended, although difficulty may be found in the classification of its in-mates when they are brought together.

“This must prove advantageous economically, because the cost of government and service will be lessened, and socially because the inhabitants of Perth will no longer be annoyed by those from Mount Eliza” (*The West Australian*, August 13, 1886).

And further, in an excerpt of a report submitted by the Superintendent of Poor Houses, dated and titled *Perth Poor House, March 31st, 1888*;

“I have the honour to submit the following remarks on the Poor Relief Department under my charge, for the year ending December 31st, 1887, and do append the Returns, showing comparison with the year 1886. These Returns show an increase over those in previous years, and as I have pointed out in former reports, will continue to do so for some years to come. The Royal Commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor, in December, 1887, for the purpose of making a full lot investigation into the administration of certain departments in the Public Service, reported on the Mount Eliza Poor House as follows:

“A marked increase of late years has taken place in the admissions into the Invalid Depot . . . as previously stated, the number of inmates has been yearly growing greater . . . who, if kept in their respective districts, would entail a much greater expense to the Colony . . . these remarks are applicable now, and explain in a great measure the principal cause of the present great increase of paupers in that Institution” (*The West Australian*, April 16, 1888).

And yet while Matthews (2007, 9) notes that “the poorhouse was to be perceived as an instrument for moral reformation”, this appears to be an unlikely objective, and would be more appropriately used to remove from sight what might be considered visual pollution to other members of society and social order. Nevertheless, the facilities were indiscriminate in their use for holding people afflicted with mental conditions due to an insufficiency of options.

The distinction of suitable medical treatment for mentally ill people did not eventuate until the passing of the *Lunacy Act 1903* and the later inception of mental health services in WA. At the same time, although the dire situation was apparent to the Government and prison officials, a lack of funding did not allow for a permanent purpose-built facility (Ellis 1984, 12-25: 27-50). With this, mental illness would require specific medical assessment, treatment and facilities and not the former practice consisting essentially of providing a

place of detention. Significant advancement in mental health specialisation progressed over the next 60 years. Further advancement saw the *Lunacy Act 1903* repealed in 1966 by the *Mental Health Act 1962* (Ellis 1984, 129) leading to, and more closely resembling WA's contemporary Department of Health, the Mental Health Commission.

Nevertheless, improved screening and more effective alternatives are still required, as illustrated by a recent article *Jail used to house disabled for years* relating to "five intellectually disabled men [having] spent a total of 30 years in WA Prisons without having been convicted of crimes" (*The West Australian*, August 11, 2011). Furthermore, confusion arises with the interchangeable use of terms such as Bridewell and work house, or prison and gaol due to the disparity between their defined intended use and actual use being subjective and indistinct for a significant portion of early custodial history. The problem of transposable terminology used for specific functions and room types across all custodial typologies is still evident as it is still used today.

This is due in part to only modest development in philosophical principles and none in architecture. These adaptive re-use exemplars and operational methods (in relation to later more purposeful proposed facilities) having few redeeming features worthy of inheritance (Johnston 1973, 11). Nevertheless, a measure of clarity was achieved nationally, though internationally significant confusion and interchangeable reference continued among dissimilar custodial models as it does to this day. And although repealed by the wording of the *Prison Act 1865*, the term Bridewell continues to be used in association with PCFs as in the case of Bristol and Leeds' Bridewell Police Station. The name was also applied over centuries to countless similar facilities which accompanied judicial process (of temporarily detaining people) across England (Thomas 1972, 10).

Notwithstanding this, Bridewells, within the meaning of the *Prison Act 1865*, were no longer recognised as an official form of custodial facility and (by repeal) it was demanded that prisoners held in such facilities be removed and held in 'prisons' as soon as they had become available. This suggests that this now defunct facility typology might have inadvertently and by default been to some degree an adjunct predecessor of more recent short-term custodial facilities for unsentenced people by having some aspects of a functional and associative pedigree still in keeping with current short-term PCFs, which serve a similar purpose. This suggests that legislative imposition dictated some order of separation and distinction among some custodial models. It also appears that this emphasised the development and advancement of prison facilities at the expense of the

Bridewell and to the detriment of the evolution of short-term PCFs. It is from this that it becomes evident that associated developments in relation to PCFs are a result of an imposition born out of the specialisation of prison systems and change in societal attitudes which serendipitously coincided with the period that saw the formalisation of the first police in England. Therefore, a once locally administered set of facilities which served all purposes and held all types of prisoners whether sentenced or unsentenced, mentally ill or awaiting trial, was now subject to classification of its subjects and specific function. Webb and Webb (1922, 126) state that police stations which now processed unconvicted prisoners, upon apprehension had “means of separation so defective, that he may be confined with the drunkards, burglars and pickpockets” with whom he had to be confined overnight or possibly for days where it had been known that prisoners were sometimes robbed by other prisoners in the lock-up.

Nevertheless, Sir Robert Peel instigated the inauguration and formation of the first professional police force in England, the London Metropolitan Police, in 1829. Peel further proposed that for the sake of prison discipline and uniformity the centralisation of power and national dispersion of costs and authority associated with prison systems should occur. England was one of the last European countries to break away from local control over punishment, though unsentenced prisoners remained the responsibility of the localities (Morris and Rothman 1998, 125-126). “Almost the beginning of departmental supervision of prison administration” can be attributed to Peel (Webb and Webb 1922, 107), the argument being that;

“it is inequitable that similar crimes should be punished in a dissimilar way. Why should a mere geography determine the amount and type of punishment? The Inspectorate of prisons and the proliferation of laws and national regulations on imprisonment had largely been born out of this concern, parity in sentencing and punishment had wide political appeal and no theoretical opposition” (Morris and Rothman 1998, 127).

Short-term custody was locally financed and administered (about 1842) and long-term prison custody was now overseen by government which was made possible, moreover, by better rail transport and therefore the ability to better provide food for prisons which had always seen significant crises while locally administered with many prisoners succumbing to starvation if they did not have family members to provide for them (Morris and Rothman 1998, 126-128).

Elsewhere, existing evidence suggests that the first purpose-built prisons, "the first true models of a new field of architecture," were constructed in the early 17th century. Of particular interest are prisons in Rome and Milan built about 1628, of which comprehensive preservation and historical analysis suggest that the concept of the prison was more a design response to a general requirement for functional structures for industrial institutions. Although the process of industrialisation is manifest in prison architecture, sequential and methodical evolution is not typologically apparent before the 18th century (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 8). Prison buildings in the 17th and 18th centuries were usually;

“two or three-storey structures arranged in a rather haphazard way to enclose one or more courts, which were used for exercise. Often these erections were never designed to house prisoners in the first place and many unsuitable rooms and buildings quickly developed into fetid dens where men, women and children were confined together like wild beasts. Certainly none of the prisons had been built to take as many prisoners as were later forced into them. To these miseries must be added the corrupt practices of the jailers, who exacted fees from the prisoners for their food and keep, and made life insupportable for those who could not pay. So lucrative was the post of jailer that when one left the jail or died his job was given to the highest bidder” (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 15).

At the turning point of the 18th century a limited yet influential number of enlightened reformers advocated a humanitarian and somewhat revolutionary position towards imprisonment and punishment. For countless years beforehand, and for several years during this period of reform, many prisoners endured hopelessness, torture, malnourishment and execution while held in contemptible conditions until the sentiments of society and that of law-makers adjusted.

A testament to the ideology quoted above from Zimbardo and Leippe is the Catholic Church, which as early as 1704 augmented the idea of incarceration with contemplation and penitence, instigating a specialised architectural response influenced by philosophical operation and function requirements. Influenced by Fraud's Workhouse in Florence, Pope Clement XI (1649-1721) commissioned architect Carlo Fontana to design a hospice/prison addition to St Michael's Hospital in Rome. All individual cells "looked out onto a central corridor toward an altar with solitude allowing for reflection on misdeeds." This architectural response was based on a design brief that inaugurated a cellular prison

blueprint which more specifically acknowledged the requirement to detain adults and juveniles separately,⁸ a design and philosophical ideology that influenced prison spatial programs and architecture for the next 200 years (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 15).

Following this, Pope Clement XII commissioned many facilities in Venice, Milan, Naples, Turin and Florence, which significantly contributed towards the evolution of an organised and distinguishable penal structure over 70 years. Following St Michael's Prison, Rome (with the exception of Milan Prison), Ghent Prison in Belgium was regarded as the earliest large-scale penal institution that made a conscious attempt to use prison architecture and philosophy as a form of rehabilitative treatment (Johnston 1973, 13). This was arguably the most "significant penal building within the 70 year period with Milan being an intermediate configuration between St Michael and Ghent Prison" (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 15-16). However, the philosophy associated with the central corridor in this facility appears to more closely resemble that which is aligned with panoptic surveillance ideals and not penitence.

Further developments of the criminal justice system are attributable to Cesare Beccaria (1738-94), an Italian philosopher and avant-garde intellectual who argued against capital punishment and torture. Beccaria outlined his philosophies in *Dei delitti e delle pene* in 1764. This was later translated and published as *On Crimes and Punishments* in 1880 and epitomised his fundamental ideologies and advocated utilitarian-imposed imprisonment as punishment and deterrence. Beccaria was ardently against capital punishment or torture as retribution for crime, but rather advocated that the severity of punishment should proportionately relate to the gravity of the crime. Further to this, societal inclinations relating to prisons as institutions, coincidentally associated them as ". . . metaphors for constraints on freedom, both literal and symbolic" (Zimbardo 2007, 21).

Beccarian philosophies and documented papers appear to have profoundly influenced Jeremy Bentham's principles toward crime, punishment, discipline and imprisonment, which is evident from his published works. Philosophically aligned, Beccaria and Bentham argued against publicly exhibited and prolonged humiliation and merciless barbaric torture of "criminals." Punishment in the form of lethal, pugnacious and torturous practice lasted

⁸ This instigated further refinement to custodial institutions and associated legislation that ultimately led to separate facilities specifically for juveniles (United States Bureau of Prisons 1949, 134).

until the end of the 18th century. Due in part to their philosophies, though not geographically concurrent, revolutionary trends in international penal philosophy were initiated, inducing a paradigm shift in the philosophy of punishment and, in particular, the “theatrical representation of pain” with the disappearance of the “great spectacle of physical punishment” (Foucault 1975, 14).

Public execution preceded by torture and public exhibition and ridicule of “chain-gang” labour were also phased out between 1830 and 1848. The early part of the 19th century saw public executions performed swiftly (by guillotine) with the offender being veiled as a way of implying that “crime is to be faceless” (Foucault 1975, 7-14). Guillotines and other methods of execution were, however, being moved behind prison walls in the 19th century in Europe and in France by the 1930s, which saw the beginning of the end of public executions in the West, with the last public execution by guillotine occurring in France in 1939.⁹

This consolidated philosophical manifestation was a concatenation of the preceding period of “enlightenment” which saw altered persuasions transposed into concomitant forms of punishment just before the turn of the 19th century, constructed on human perceptions of time, space and liberty. Thus, in discussing the disjointed demise of the guillotine it is evident that globally, physical, political, and philosophical progress does not occur concurrently. This is made further apparent by the 2011 figures that indicate that 58 countries retain the death penalty, though fewer than this continue to execute prisoners. Of these, the United States is the only Western country that continues this ultimate form of punishment (Amnesty International 2011). Irrespective of these contemporary statistics, incarceration became recognised and adopted as the new standard form of punishment towards the end of the 18th century¹⁰ and was eagerly endorsed by many philosophers, including Beccaria, François-Marie Voltaire, Samuel Romilly, John Howard and Bentham.

The emerging belief was that restricting a person's liberty would itself be significant retribution for crime, and that a measured amount of time served could be assigned in proportion to the severity of the crime (Beccaria 1764, 150). The trend became not to punish the body through pain and indignity, but rather the mind and soul through

⁹ This method of execution continued within the confines of prisons until much more recently with Hamida Djandonbi being the last to be executed in Baumettes Prison, Marseilles on 10th September 1977. Francois Mitterrand abolished the death penalty in France in 1981, “relegating the guillotine to the museum” (Mercer 2008, 268-276: 283).

¹⁰ Incarceration as a punishment has remained virtually unchanged since this time and continues to be the existing preferred form of custodial punishment.

deprivation of liberty (Foucault 1975, 11). Justification for the duration of a penalty was not to be regarded as a proportionate retributive exchange of time for the crime committed, but rather a period adjusted to achieve the “useful transformation of the offender during his term of imprisonment” (Foucault 1975, 244). While imprisoned, inmates were expected to work to alleviate idleness of body and mind. Prison work associated with the separate, silent prisons (such as Fremantle and Pentonville) was never intended to be productive, “rather to expend energy at a disproportionate rate to the return” (Melossi and Pavarini 1981, 156).

Bentham was a 19th century British philosopher whose ideas on crime and punishment influenced and shaped both architectural and philosophical responses to jurisprudence. His scriptures on law, democracy, utilitarianism and government significantly influenced societies’ attitudes towards crime, criminals and punishment, and were underpinned by similar ideals of transformation and self-imposed behavioural regulation. Bentham documented his many theories in letters and books, and of particular relevance, drawings of the panopticon, an idea in architecture that was drawn on his behalf by English architect Willey Reveley in 1791.¹¹

Reveley did more than translate Bentham’s panopticon into drawings; the pair appeared to work together on translating philosophy into an architectural response. Bentham (1787b, 97-114) referred to Reveley’s “ingenuity in his capacity as his professional adviser to whom he was indebted” for his input with reference to several key ideas that Reveley proposed to make plausible the workings of a panoptic architectural model. Of particular interest to WA penal history is that Henry Willey Reveley, Willey Reveley’s son, became the first civil engineer at the Swan River settlement in 1829.

He completed many structures, including the Round House in Fremantle (1830-31) and the Old Perth Courthouse in Perth and oversaw the construction of Fremantle Prison. When Reveley left this position it was renamed Superintendent of Public Works, later the Public Works Department.

Ultimately, the Quad Native Prison was built in 1871 with Henry Vincent appointed in 1839 as superintendent of the Native Establishment on Rottnest Island (Ferguson 1986, 13: 41). The Quad had a remarkable resemblance to many other prison structures influenced by

¹¹ Willey Reveley is father to Henry Willey Reveley, an English-Australian colonial engineer in Perth in the 1830s. Henry Reveley would go on to design a number of prominent buildings in Perth that have a clear spatial pattern and form that suggest a Bentham-like influence.

panoptic philosophy in architecture, both internationally and locally. About 19km away, Fremantle's Round House, is one of countless examples of architecture and architectural theory significantly influenced by precedent – essentially a scaled sub-study of the octagonal (and cellular) prison in Ghent, Belgium 1773 (United States Bureau of Prisons 1949, 22) which precedes Bentham's Panopticon model consisting of an architectural spatial arrangement which appears to have manifest in more modern day *direct supervision* prison models. This particular historical (philosophical and architectural) thread suggests that Henry Willey Reveley had been influenced by his father, Willey Reveley, who in turn was influenced by people who associated, worked, and were influenced by Bentham, and so on.

Bentham's theories have been studied extensively by libertarians and philosophers, particularly French philosopher Michel Foucault, who can be credited with interpreting Bentham's theories into contemporary cognoscence with reference to the function of modern society. Bentham's *panopticon* was never realised, but as an operational concept in architecture it has had an overriding influence on early prison design. It is unmistakably manifest, for example, in Stateville Prison, Illinois built in 1925, essentially personifying Bentham's contraption in architecture 134 years after Bentham's papers were published.¹²

Coinciding institutional trends and attitudes in the 1930s, deviated toward a preference for rural settings such as San Quentin State Prison, California, and Sing Sing Correctional Facility, New York State. It is assumed that through site, architecture and improved day-lighting (as significant components) these facilities would improve prisoner rehabilitation and provide a less oppressive atmosphere compared with an asphyxiating sense of self-containment in 'round-house' expressions of panoptic architecture. With this, rectangular and radial prison spatial arrangements complete the scope of existing archetype within which these custodial facilities were classified.

The word panopticon comes from two Greek words meaning "everything" and "sight" and was originally a design initiative conceived by Bentham's brother, Samuel, to increase worker productivity in a large workshop in Russia, by facilitating better management of the workers through observational transparency (Steintrager 1977, 79). The precise origins of

¹² Panopticon-inspired architectural variations include Arnhem, Breda and Haarlem Prison in Holland; Carabanchel Prison in Spain; Chi Hoa Prison in Vietnam; Caseros Prison in Argentina; Huron Historic Gaol in Canada; Millbank Prison, England; Mount Eden Prison in New Zealand; Old Provost Prison, South Africa; Palacio de Lecumberri in Mexico; Presidio Modelo, Cuba; Round House and The Quad, Australia; and the Twin Towers Correctional Facility in the US.

panoptic theory are uncertain, but it is accepted that its origins pre-date the philosophical conceptualisation articulated and expressed by Bentham.

Its existence throughout society is evident in number and diversity that challenge our perception of it, notwithstanding this we are socially pre-conditioned to an extent that its imposed effects are sub-conscious. To this extent, it is plausible that the un-published theory may have been inadvertently yet strategically applied, as early as the 17th century to manage the spread of the plague, where urban panoptic surveillance was managed via quadrant division and segmentation. The applied means was achieved through distribution of distinct compartmentalised quarters to individual administrators where isolated streets were superintended and surveyed by individual *syndics*, onerously and exclusively securing each house, setting the street under his control into lock-down (Foucault 1975, 195).

Implemented as a panoptic mechanism, efficient surveillance ensured differentiation and classification enough to ensure that unauthorised people did not enter quarantined areas. In this context the situational response was not contemporarily considered as such, though it bears a significant resemblance to operational control in prison institutions.

Bentham, however, sought to introduce panoptic theory into a variety of building and institutional typologies such as hospitals, asylums, schools, production factories and other institutions (predominantly prisons) where control over surveillance was the prime objective. Bentham believed that the panopticon could be used to reform the morals and psychological state of the individual by way of behavioural self-modification, “efficient as prisoners would soon come to expect continuous surveillance” (Gandy 1993, 22).

It is described as an architectural “apparatus” by Foucault (1975, 203), and not as something that was ever intended to be a beautiful piece of architecture used to establish co-lateral relationships of power, irrespective of the positions of people involved.¹³

However, the success of panoptic theory is predominantly based on fiction and illusion. The relationship between the observer and the observed and the belief that one is always under observation is critical. The architectural response of the panopticon is initiated by specific light, space, proportion, and positioning to allow total surveillance of all the subjects by one centrally positioned inspector from the required components to achieve this principle. The back-lit subjects could not see into the inspector’s darkened central observation point, so

¹³ Foucault describes the panopticon as a “utilitarian mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form” and as “being seen and never seeing or always seeing and never being seen” (Foucault 1975, 203-205).

had to assume they were always under his gaze and would regulate their behaviour based on this assumption. It is in this context that the apparent presence or absence is translated into divine superintendence: he is nowhere and thus he is everywhere (Bozovic 1995, 9). Bentham saw significant potential in criminal “reform” attributed to self-modification of one’s behaviour should the panopticon be incorporated into prison design and operation (Atkinson 1969, 141). Foucault (1975) argued on this background that disciplinary systems and prisons in particular with the panopticon as the ideal were social failures. He considered that the way in which disciplinary systems crush individuality and individual freedom negates positive social endeavours such as rehabilitation and calm relations between individuals, describing it as a “machine to carry out experiments, alter behaviour and allow continuous examination” (Foucault 1975, 203).

This notion has been further highlighted in the *Stanford Prison Experiment* (Zimbardo 1971) and movies such as *Das Experiment* (2001), based on the Stanford experiment, directed by Oliver Hirschbiegel and starring Moritz Bleibtreu, Christian Berkel and Oliver Stokowski. This film, set in a German research centre, engages male participants for two weeks to adopt the role of prisoners or guards in a simulated prison, facilitated by cells and surveillance cameras for their randomly computer selected roles. The ‘guards’ only instruction is to preserve order in the prison without use of violence, while the ‘prisoners’, being locked up, are only instructed to comply with orders. From the outset the disposition of the groups, while initially apprehensive, changes into a complete immersion into social and hierarchical behaviours similar to real prisons.

Almost immediately the warders began to exhibit contempt and resentment towards the prisoners for what they, the guards, see as defiance and disrespect for their authority. Promptly adopting increasingly drastic measures of punishment, warders soon border on employing sadistic torment to assert their authority and maintain order.

Bentham believed that the “punishment is less for the punished, but for the deterrence of society” and accordingly the punishment should produce what appears to be extensive suffering, with the least amount of actual physical pain (Bozovic 1995, 5).

Bentham’s ideologies were so profoundly aligned with perception, illusion and behavioural self-regulation that his scheme, in relation to released and so called reformed prisoners was financially dependent on the indoctrinating and inculcating attributes of the panopticon having instilled a form of neurosis in released *long-term* custodial prisoners where the sense of being observed continued upon release from the institution. To this extent,

ongoing episodes of self-regulatory situational responses would be considered a 'desirable' disorder on release into society, a disorder that could be proclaimed as a rehabilitative response. Bentham was to pay a penalty for every instance in which a released person would reoffend (Semple 1993, 159).

In light of this, while there are detrimental side-effects to an individual's mental and physical wellbeing in long-term custodial prisoners, architectural panoptic ideologies appear better aligned to short-term custodial facilities – observation, self-regulation and a decreased likelihood of assaults and self harm in police Lock-ups. Short-term custodial facilities may provide a setting more appropriate and conducive to exploiting some of the observational benefits that panoptic architecture could provide, avoiding long-term psychological detriment pertinent to short-term custody. Bentham (1787a, 78), makes specific philosophical reference to appropriate operational and architectural application of a panopticon for use with unsentenced or uncharged people, but none of the theories appear have been implemented or critically analysed for congruity to the specialised functions of a police Lock-up, a facility which has a unique role in the criminal justice system: to temporarily accommodate "civilians" whose guilt has not yet been determined by a court and are to be presumed innocent.

Both Director General Eriksson of the Swedish correctional system and Leroy's article on the psychological impact of confinement purport that;

"very little is known about the psychological impact of physical prison conditions. It is by now fairly clear that the main hypothesis proposed a century or so ago—confinement and isolation invite reflection and amendment—has been disproved. Confinement and isolation are at best short-term security measures [and emphasises importance of a relevant study] which could and should be researched" (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 2).

Nevertheless, Bentham proposed his idea in architecture, keenly adopted by philosophers for speculation, ridicule and research, and used (in some form) in a misguided way. The accumulation of Benthamite literature is a testament to a consistent modus operandus which essentially seeks to discredit Bentham's theories while offering a general (author's perspective) overview of his life and works based on the overviews of others. It is astounding that the preponderance of existing works and research has been dedicated to the relevance of panoptic theory in prison architecture and institutions and not to short-term custodial facilities, to which Bentham makes specific, albeit brief reference.

It is perhaps in consideration of the inadequate acknowledgement and brief nature of his almost fleeting suggestion relating to the implementation of panoptic architecture into other types of facilities, in particular short-term custodial facilities, that little, if any, existing published investigative works relate to the possibility that there may be considerable relevance to the use of an entirely architectural panoptic response in short-term custodial facilities, more so than the risk of ridicule for considering or proposing such a notion on seemingly antecedent philosophy.

A panoptic architectural response, it would appear, could be of benefit to the spatial rationale associated with police Lock-up facilities, which only require exceptional levels of surveillance when used short-term. Although, *prima facie*, police Lock-ups or short-term custodial facilities appear to share a common historical thread, contemporary institutional requirements for short-term detention or for sentenced prisoners require significantly dissimilar architectural and philosophical typology and strategies.

Therefore one key responsibility of an architect is to offer a humane environment that respects the dignity of those detained, staff and visitors, while also providing the exceptionally high level of tactical parameters required. Despite this, and in acknowledgement of infinite individual, cultural, societal and situational variables, architectural environments alone cannot guarantee that every philosophically motivated design manifestation explored will achieve the anticipated outcome, but should inherently facilitate the organisation's function *au minimum* (Fairweather and McConville 2000, 48). Having a duty of care, innovative design considerations which ameliorate incidents of depression, isolation, stress, anxiety and violence are to be vigorously considered as beneficial strategies for complying with statutory requirements. The architect in Lock-up design should therefore not discount the concerns of human respect and dignity, but promote and conceptualise advanced organisation-specific strategies to deal with specialised requirements relative to a facility's unique function. Ability to maintain constant control to ensure safe conditions for both prisoners and staff is paramount to both police Lock-ups and prisons, but it appears that from an architectural standpoint, social and functional relationships continue to be secondary considerations to security when this need not be.

The external visual language of prison architecture – the extensive scale, mass, hardness and articulation was and is still used to convey a perception of overbearing and dominance of institution over the powerlessness, isolation and anonymity of the prisoner. In parallel

with the notion of using architectural expression as a means to produce a particular emotional and psychological response, in the case of the internal program and spatial layout, the penal system further evolved with the influence of a number of key intellectuals and reformers¹⁴ into a diverse arrangement of institutions with unique spatial characteristics. The architectural response articulated in these institutions were based upon a variety of emerging philosophies, societal attitudes, architectural knowledge and technologies that had predominantly developed from the 17th century onwards, although even these examples appear to have inherited preceding historical threads that are indicative of a particular intent or requirements deemed appropriate at that time.

As a consequence of the unique architectural spatial layout and articulation characteristics and operational philosophies that have been introduced into penal systems, the human factor within institutional facilities such as prisons also develop definable institutional relationships and groupings. 'Prison culture'¹⁵ is the product of the (non-voluntary) confinement of an assortment of populations with complex sub-groups and social structures that as a collective form an overriding insular society within specific long-term criminal (institutional) facilities within penal systems.

The influences and ideals that contribute significantly to development of un-spoken rules and the values of prison cultures are predominantly counterproductive as they generally anti-establishment. Similarly, the warders are considered the 'enemy', being instruments of control of the establishment (Haney 2006, 289-293). This doctrine is indicative of an uncooperative position which facilitates violence, intimidation and gangs to proliferate and condemns any genuine positive associations with prison staff generally construed as the trait of an informant otherwise referred to in prison contexts as a 'snitch' or 'dog', making any attempt to rehabilitate virtually impossible (Haney 2006, 265-269: 273-274). For inmates that would consider 'working with the system' rather than against it, this culture creates a setting that further reinforces rejection; by other individual offenders, by specific groups, by the institution and general society. Small-scale prisons evoke a more advantageous environment and are easier to integrate into urban locations, where predominant community support resources are available.

¹⁴ Further discussions relating to specific reformers are discussed elsewhere in this chapter and chapter 2.

¹⁵ For the purpose of this research prison cultures are considered as groups of prisoners that have developed and adhere to a set of values shared in common with other prisoners but not with officials. These values tend to be concerned with being outside of the laws that intends to govern them.

Irrespective of the context, be they urban or regional, numbers totalling a maximum of 300 inmates are more conducive to maintaining a safer, productive and positive environment, and further, it should be noted that if lower prisoner numbers were considered, this would present modern cities and urban environments with significant opportunities to incorporate high-rise prison structures which are cheaper to build, more conveniently located and have better access and proximity to other infrastructure. Considering this, it is imperative that this intensive style of facility be operated as intended – in keeping with its principal inherent design limitation which is more appropriately aligned with only remand and short-sentence prisoners as this style of facility is not suitable for housing prisoners serving long sentences (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 30: 211). By way of example, one of the tallest prisons, Western Correctional Centre in Burke County, North Carolina, proclaims many advantages associated specifically with high-rise prisons.¹⁶ Some of these include security of building and site because of reduced perimeter lengths externally and the ability to integrate the prison's footprint and architectural articulation within a city's constrained urban geography and the ability to effect multiple level lock-down. This is achieved by means of added consecutive levels of security internally, and an enhanced capacity to classify and segregate within limited spaces without compromising administration and supervision (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 30).

Prisons form part of a broader set of disciplinary institutions that accommodate, and generally speaking, try to manage a diversity of people that as a collective forms a quasi-society within society itself. Prisons and thus its inhabitants are governed by both official and unofficial codes of conduct, hierarchies, rules, regulations, guidelines, employment and currencies. In opposition to this, there are exponential differences in function, operation and circumstance between prison institutions and police facilities that exist with the intent to temporarily detain – not imprison.

Through trial and error and extensive research, modern prisons have significantly evolved into a typology aligned with specific functional requirements, which is no longer to rehabilitate but to securely detain prisoners for the benefit of society's safety. Subsequent architectural approaches much more closely achieve the goal of total surveillance by using cells around an open dayroom with a central observation point to achieve nearly total visibility. This style of prison is known as *New Generation* design,¹⁷ which implements a

¹⁶ Also see works by Yvonne Jewkes and Helen Johnston 2007: Berit Johnsen, Per Kristian Granheim and Janne Helgesen 2011: Alison Liebling and David Price 2001.

¹⁷ New Generation prison design is further discussed in Chapter 2.

direct or indirect supervision philosophy of greater staff involvement with inmates. It is claimed that with this style of prison there have been significant reductions in violent conflicts among staff and prisoners and reduced isolation, as distinct to the inmate cultures and hierarchies constituted within radial, axial and linear plans due to the fact that “greater staff inmate contact leads to positive relations” and more effective surveillance (Fairweather and McConville 2000, 35). In short-term custodial facilities, this philosophy does not associate itself with issues of institutional cultures and hierarchies, but the reduction of assaults and violence against staff and other detainees.

It appears that contemporary philosophies have had little influence on current WA Police Lock-up design as these parameters appear to be suitably aligned to significantly benefit the unique function and requirements of STCFs, namely PCFs. Further to this, the philosophical substance that informs New Generation design ought to be considered for implementation in PCFs in particular used in conjunction with *Direct Supervision* of staff over detainees. Certainly, minor interventions have, in the form of add-ons, been implemented due to coroners’ recommendations and due to advances in technology. But the overriding philosophy of intent, the core ideas and overriding principles of these institutions do not appear consistent with significant changes in policy, training, procedure and accountability of the custodians who work within them and the expectations and values of contemporary society, and could benefit from operational and architectural reconsideration and restructure.

It may be a *faux pas* to mention the panopticon in association with contemporary architectural or theoretical consideration, seeing that at one point in time it was considered at the cutting edge of penal reform and a positive step away from torture and death as forms of punishment. The rehabilitative aspirations associated with Bentham’s *Panopticon* represented a paradigm shift in penal philosophy. Bentham believed that the panopticon could be used to reform the morals and psychological state of individuals by way of behavioural self-modification (Kerr 1989, 4) and so doing, promised to restore the deterioration of societal weakness. The concept of Panopticism and the way in which it was communicated as an idea, promised exponential potential in modifying behaviour, and through this, rehabilitation. Furthermore, it was suggested that the concept could be applied among a variety of different architectural typologies and urban environments, though for the purpose of this research, its intended application within long-term custody penal systems, it was believed, would crush the human spirit and create psychological distress if it were ever built (Atkinson 1969, 141). Therefore, even though a considerable

number of international examples already exist that clearly resemble the formal physical architecture, spatial pattern and operational components of Bentham's Panoptic apparatus (*discussed elsewhere in this chapter*) an actual Panopticon that incorporated all of the components Bentham had envisaged was never built.

In reality, panoptic spaces saturate our society, and the key principle, surveillance is criticised by contemporary societies and some intellectuals that apply sophisticated layers of artificially overly-libertarian ideals to something that is inherent in all living beings. To feel secure, fight or flight or to kill or be killed relies on hardwired instincts to observe subtleties ahead of one's observer. In *Exquisite corpse: writing on buildings*, Sorkin offers an example that ridicules and belittles both the design of an affluent estate (Williams Island, Don Johnson City Miami), and regrettably, moreover, its residents stating that in their desire to "feel secure" they submit "to a Draconian, Sovietique, surveillance" (Sorkin 1991, 200-01).

It is regrettable that, irrespective of wealth, one should belittle the desire of others to keep themselves and their family safe in order to compose an overarching argument contemptuous of the Panopticon. Sorkin's position on all things panoptic is not unique, however, this all-encompassing argument is limited in its failure to appreciate some of the positive functional and operational benefits of panoptic spaces within some specific contexts such as banks, malls, trains, streets and PCFs. Within this context, the temporary loss of privacy, not dignity, due to intensive levels of surveillance over short periods of time is easily rescinded by the ability to offer improved safety, and in relation to PCFs, custodial care and make every effort to ensure preservation of life. Social influence (of social norms) is extensive and indiscriminate, and opposing such norms and beliefs invites social castigation, so to maintain these norms and social acceptance, people will go against their own beliefs, attitudes and understanding of fact. For most people, "what others think of us and the way they act towards us are extremely potent sources of influence over behaviour" (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 53-61).

In thinking of an issue in a particular way, our attitudes can be described as in the sense of an "evaluative disposition", that is, our attitudes are susceptible to the social influence of what others say or do (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 31-36), however, this research challenges the commonly held all-encompassing position that panoptic spaces are somewhat evil, perverse and draconian. Rather, it evaluates panoptic ideals on its empirical qualities to argue that there exists a potential benefit in selective consideration of its

observational theory component. Of the many, and some inconceivable interrelated elements nominated by Bentham to complete the *Panopticon* model, intensive surveillance, is the singular constituent that has the potential for unique application in an intelligent and considered manner in areas of areas of PCFs that require exceptional observational capabilities.

Of particular relevance, attitudes can be dramatically influenced through diversity of effective literary forms (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 22-30), suggesting that considerable academic and social rhetoric surrounding Bentham's panopticon and ideals could be attributed to an accumulation of negatively under-toned literature, whereby to be anti-conformist to contemporary attitudes would almost certainly preclude acceptance of one's position on the matter. Zimbardo and Leippe (1991, 37) note that within social situations there exist the power and capacity to override ingrained differences of thought between people, uniting them so that they respond in the same way in a given situation, even if the situation appears to defy logical reasoning. Zimbardo and Leippe (1991, 18-21), cite the Jonestown mass suicides as an example of social conditioning over individual attitudes and beliefs. Additionally, Stanley Milgram's fifty-year-old *Obedience Experiment*, is still adapted and refurbished to modern requirements and continues to exemplify how people are conditioned to observe blind obedience to people in positions of power and authority¹⁸ as a *normal* example of social influence (Milgram 1963, 371-378).

However, as contemporarily objectionable as the panopticon's association may be to architectural or theoretical discourse, such as Sorkin's position in *Exquisite corpse: writing on buildings* (Sorkin 1991, 200-201) as previously discussed, and Oscar Gandy's *The panoptic sort: a political economy of personal information*, Foucault accurately concludes our society already exists and ultimately functions as a panoptic machine (Foucault 1975, 217). It is upon this notion that imperceivable panoptic spaces exists, surreptitiously yet methodically surveying habitual and perfunctory routines of society. 'Active' panoptic spaces instil within society a manner of conduct which conforms to an acceptable norm. This would include for example, libraries, public foyers and public squares where behaviour is modified and adapted to an appropriate standard due to situational and observational vulnerability or social gaze. Contemporary urban societies coordinate a hierarchy of sophisticated surveillance matrices including passive surveillance (physical human

¹⁸ Also see *Lord of the flies* by William Golding.

observation and strategic urban design), monitored mechanical devices (CCTV, radar, laser and biometric systems), global positioning systems and satellite triangulation technologies (via cellular telephone signal, smartcards, software applications, and digital fingerprinting via one's computer or Smartphone and any other electronic transactions).

Correspondingly, "observation is no longer limited to line of sight or limited to a single open building" (Gandy 1993, 23), as evident in the way in which panoptic spaces facilitate accumulation of data collection. Our very preferences are defined from our observed and analysed responses to marketing, shopping and similar activities, with information in response to this behaviour used to inform specialised capitalist-driven architectural responses and strategic considerations directed at collective society (Lyon 1994, 4: 71-75). With this, it can be seen that panoptic ideals are already used with subterfuge, for capitalist ends, personal gain and other inappropriate ways which would be considered unwanted. Notwithstanding this, with ethical, considered and sensitive application as argued, panoptic spaces do have a legitimate place and can positively contribute in circumstances of specific contexts. Most critics, however, do not mention whether their overriding analysis of this idea in architecture has considered all of its potential applications and benefits within the relatively un-researched extent of PCF architecture.

WA Police

The historical discourse in this chapter is associated with relatively recent chronological threads relating to the formal inauguration of the WA Police in the early 1850s. For the purpose of qualitative and theoretical analysis of the WA Police's adaptation to specific and unique Western Australian conditions, this research takes a specific and relevant period into account, that is, from the early 17th century to now. The following account is distilled of the unnecessary complexities that generally surround the convoluted reality of intercontinental and cross-cultural policing that has evolved due to different situational circumstances and operational requirements between English and WA policing. Further to this, "Australian police forces are today distinguishable by a particular relation to government which can be traced in its legal form to statutes of the mid-nineteenth century" (Finnane 1994, 14).

Historically, policing and upholding a society's moral and social norms, generally speaking, were administered by a part-time quasi-police operation usually comprising designated constables and night-watchmen. Serving unpaid and untrained for a year and

predominantly concentrating on maintaining peace, these officers carried out routine surveillance over the small precinct in which they served using a variety of powers which derived from common law and a range of statutes, and their own discretion, however ambiguous its application (Beattie 2001, 120). A lack of clear written guidelines and operating procedures made it all the more difficult for those serving¹⁹ for fear of a lawsuit, creating an approach to policing that was flawed at best as those exercising power would return after their year's service to the very community they had been policing, often meeting resistance and threats of recourse on completion of 'official' service (Beattie 2001, 122). Until the more established and professional police forces of the 19th century, police were not expected to perform a significant role in gathering and evaluating evidence, investigating offences or prosecuting suspects. Prosecution, as well as the associated financial burden of it, ultimately rested upon the victim of the crime. Furthermore, the victim of crime is faced with the additional disincentive to prosecute should he be inadvertently found guilty of perjury which at the time was punishable by death. This festered within society, a reluctance to engage in such a speculative and portentous undertaking (Beattie 2001, 131: 226). One of the most significant transformations to come, however, relating to professionalization, was accountability to the state rather than the community and the creation of a more intimidating 'force' rather than a passive collective (Reiner 1996, 10: 11).

Colonial

WA Police history, as well as that of other early Australian police forces and 19th century police histories generally, is indicative of institutions whose organisational structure and machinations were consciously formulated and modelled on the fundamental principles of the inaugural London Metropolitan Police and, to a lesser degree, the Irish Constabulary, founded in 1829 and 1836 respectively (Finnane 1987, 16). Increases in population in London in the early 19th century resulted in the need to manage increases in crime, therefore, there was a specific need for a 'metropolitan' response. With this, it appears, that a conscious decision to distance itself from what could be construed as a paramilitary entity. Specifically, where uniform, appearance, rank and structure are concerned these

¹⁹ 'Officers' were usually an elected householder with little more than local knowledge but were charged with powers of arrest and entering premises (Beattie 2001, 120).

police forces clearly identify themselves as a body of civilian extraction.²⁰ This is particularly apparent in British colonies, but hardships attributed to the unique and harsh geographical conditions found in the early settlement period of WA, and a different demographic where cities were developed from the outset, have contributed to some significant differences. Consequently, colonial police forces such as that which first existed in WA and in turn formed part of the foundation of the WA Police as we would more readily recognise today can be described as “a compromise between military and civil authority models” (Finnane 1987, 4-9), and further:

“the nature of the frontier profoundly affected the pattern of law enforcement in Australia. Policing in Australia was also shaped largely by conditions on the frontier. Nevertheless, in most communities it was the city that seemed to harbour the most dangerous criminal. From the beginning of the century cities appeared increasingly unstable and socially fragmented” (Finnane 1987, 16).

It is against this background, that police as an institution have been described as completely “dependent upon the values and social structure of a particular society” (Mosse 1975, 1). It is upon this notion that together with a gazetted code of conduct and formal command structure that the WA Police was officially established as an organisation in 1853. Therefore police organisations tend to be somewhat vernacular, differing from community to community according to their associated social norms and expectations.

Frontier policing could thus be considered a symptom of necessity of which the primary cause – colonisation – was induced by British desire for urban development and need to increase demand in domestic industries. Bipartisan trade between England and Australia (WA) ensured the colonial demand was conveniently and directly provisioned by an obliging and enterprising British supply: an artificially implemented unilateral trade arrangement (Finnane 1994, 66). Colonial frontier-policing, though crude, harsh and indisputably physical and as a consequence psychologically challenging, was indeed straightforward and unsophisticated next to the multitude of functions and expectations placed on modern police by modern society.

²⁰ WA Police continues to share similarities in rank, structure, appearance, terms of reference and function. The official newspaper of the WA Police Historical Society, for example is the ‘Peelers Gazette’.

John Augustus Conroy was the first WA Commissioner, with backgrounds in both army and aristocracy. Inevitably, previous service in the armed forces became a common thread among many who held commissioned officer positions; John Henry Porter was the last WA Commissioner to have served in the armed forces. Porter left the WA Police Force to serve in World War II with the RAAF, later returning to the Police Force and many years later taking up the Office of Commissioner from 1981 to 1985 (WA Police n.d.[a]).²¹

An affinitive connection to the armed forces continued to exist throughout the organisation²² with many serving police being ex-servicemen and women and or reservists. With this, Regimental numbers still issued to police today are a direct legacy of military origin; however, it would take until 1898 before the first Police Regimental numbers were issued to identify individual police officers. Individual numbers promoted greater personal and professional pride and individual accountability, but, their use and a rigid rank structure were symbolic of an organisation that associated itself with the armed forces. Nonetheless, organisational dissatisfaction persisted because of unfavourable working conditions, which in turn created an atmosphere that was not conducive to attracting 'quality' recruits. Ever-present organisational camaraderie and unity in expression of grievances to parliament resulted in the formation of the world's first Police Association in 1912, which successfully campaigned on behalf of officers, achieving many positive changes (Lawrence 1979, 23).

Robert Connell was appointed Commissioner of Police in the same year and served in the role for 21 years, managing the organisation at a time when, as McArthur (1993, 483) states, "significant innovations were introduced that revolutionised local police practices, such as the introduction of fingerprinting and motorised transport."

Connell further developed the fundamental structure of the former WA 'force' into the organisational model we see today. These advances were made despite detrimental changes to fiscal policies and monetary cutbacks resulting from World War I until about 1928, a difficult period when 70 per cent of WA jails were converted for use as 'police jails'. This was motivated by the logic that significantly fewer resources were needed to operate a facility administered by police. Unfortunately, in addition to being ill equipped, unsuitably

²¹ This link with the military is worthy of further interrogation in reference to the degree of paramilitary cultural transference that WA Police has incurred.

²² A considerable number of sworn WA Police with a military background continue to serve and the profession appears to continue to appeal to ex-military personnel (R.13, Personal Communication March 18, 2011).

trained and without appropriate facilities, police could do little more than detain prisoners (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 103).

The military contributed significantly to the WA Police Force's organisational attitudes in the inter-war period (c.1915-c.1940) when significant numbers of ex-servicemen were to be later instated into commanding, high-ranking positions in Australian police forces²³; this disciplined mentality playing a significant and critical pre-policing preparatory function and rigid behavioural expectations (Finnane 1994, 135).²⁴

Ending in 1933, Commissioner Connell's term in office coincided with the Great Depression, a period that brought severe reductions in government funding for the WA prison system and later, in 1939, considerable strain on the WA Police with widespread resignations due to a "common desire to enlist for overseas service in World War II" (Lawrence 1979, 34).

²³ It was relatively common for sworn officers to leave the police force to fight in the world wars; it is also still relatively common for police officers to be reservists in the armed forces (R.13, Personal Communication March 18, 2011).

²⁴ Arguably, this discipline may be a critical factor in being able to carry out one's duties without question and while not necessarily having access to optimal conditions or facilities in which to perform them.



Fig. 4 Early Lock-up facilities attached to courthouse in York, WA showing linear layout and cell arrangement. A number of early facilities also served as gaols for short sentences.

Before 1942, York’s police custodial facility (see Fig. 4) had been assigned as a prison to hold Fremantle Prison’s female prisoners during the war, a decision that appears to have been made at short notice.

Male prisoners about the same time were transferred to Barton’s Mill Prison, which was little more than a series of tents secured by a perimeter fence (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 159). The post-war period did not bring with it any new police-specific premises intended to allow WA Police to grow, develop and modernise into specialised units or departments as was envisaged and desired, with many of the existing facilities being described by Lawrence (1979, 35) as “cramped and dilapidated”, causing extensive relocation and readjustment in and around the city into an assortment of different yet equally inappropriate sites (Heritage

Council of Western Australia 2002). However, the 1950s *did* herald significant advances in vehicular and telecommunications technology.

The early 1960s brought a gradual decrease in the number of 'police jails' (police administered jails) in WA, reinstating a more desirable ratio between typical PCFs to Prison Department jails, although a surge in prisoner numbers in the late 1960s, saw the Kalgoorlie PCF proclaimed a Prison Department administered jail as late as 1967 (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 159). In comparison to police facilities in existence, according to Thomas and Stewart (1978, 162), "the number of 'common gaols' in existence more than doubled" by 1971. This period coincided with the conversion of hospital facilities in Wooroloo into the current Wooroloo Prison and the proposal for a police facility 'built by design' near the Causeway in East Perth.

The proposed 'purpose-built' police headquarters complex in East Perth was announced by the Minister of Police in 1960 (Heritage Council of Western Australia 2002), though cost would be cited as the reason for delaying its commencement almost immediately. The lack of adequate facilities over such an extended period, however, provided sufficient 'motivation' to reapprove the project in 1962 for construction, which started in 1963. Perth Watch House,²⁵ and adjoining police station were completed in 1965 and the Perth Police Headquarters building in 1975 by architects attached to the Public Works Department (P.W.D.) inclusive of Stanley Buckingham Cann – Principal Architect of the P.W.D. 1968 – 1980 (Le Page 1986, 591) and was considered at the time to be the "most technologically advanced police building in Australia" (Lawrence 1979, 39). In what could be considered a more humorous sense, its form and many windows overlooking the *Causeway* has more recently been described as a panoptic instrument of surveillance; a gatekeeper for a 'police city' for all that approach to enter its realm, and its stature likened to that of "Ceausescu's balcony" (J. Stratton, personal communication May 23, 2012).

Such conceptions appear made in jest, as the reality of the typical office activities that occur behind this glazed facade²⁶ quickly dispel any association with evil undertones that could be suggested.

²⁵ Perth Watch House was formerly named and is at times still referred to as the East Perth Lock-up

²⁶ Observations made during authorised site visit to PWH, where interviews were conducted in the Headquarters building.




Fig. 5 Early Lock-ups in Perth showing similarities in layout, naming of functions and spatial relationships similar to those found in existing PCFs and other custodial typologies.

The Perth Watch House component of the headquarters complex continues to be the principal holding and processing facility for police in WA. The facility receives – directly or via transfer from suburban police stations – people arrested in Perth metropolitan areas who are refused bail, unable to obtain bail, or arrested on a warrant. It also provides custodial facilities for terrorism suspects, temporary detention of transferred interstate prisoners, and a temporary holding facility for the Australian Federal Police.

Incompatible conversion and poor coordination of facility and resource use between the WA Police and the prison system of the day, with countless other examples of ‘make do’ initiatives, such as Hillgrove ‘Lock-up’ – a Lock-up in a tree trunk, and insufficient funding both past and present, have clearly influenced and distorted the unique spatial

requirements of police Lock-ups, morphing them into a shape based on characteristics inherited from prison architecture (*see Fig. 5*). Contemporary codes and SOPs clearly guide police in their duties and define acceptable practices and principles of custodial care. These early conditions highlight early WA Police's ability to continue to operate irrespective of a clear lack of any infrastructure. This make-do attitude that appears to be clearly evident in early WA police that are of military extraction undoubtedly influences and lends itself to formulate the underpinnings of a unique, hardened organisational culture, and with similar approaches in resourcefulness where facilities are yet to attain a desired level of functionality and receive necessary upgrades, it appears that this adaptable approach is still in existence.

Early Australian convict and colonial history is demonstrative of an era in which immediate and improvised solutions were of predominant importance to achieving authority and order; compromise, taking priority over discussion, analysis and design to achieve a straightforward solution, often in lieu of necessarily the most considered solution (Finnane 1987, 4: 16). Similarly, early WA Police administrative and organisational patterns would have been largely guided by and based on the history, traditions and needs of early West Australian society.²⁷ Likewise, current societal trends and attitudes towards policing, crime, and the facilities in which police *custodial* services are provided may also form a link to how the government that the society elects approaches the issue. While there are people that will still form a view that custodial facilities such as PCFs should be harsh, or rather, basic, a more informed view may influence the willingness of government to be proactive in its approach to offer sufficient funding to allow WA Police to undertake whatever refurbishments might be necessary to meet their needs and perform optimally. Next to this, if the government of the day is a representation of its society, it appears that it is not serving the needs of the society it governs and the needs of its police with insufficient funding where required. This attitude appears to be out of touch with society which in turn does not appear to bode favourably for modern WA Police (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 71).

²⁷ An example of this might be a number of specialised units and departments set up to perform specific functions required at point in time. These may or may not still resemble their original form or perform the same function; stock squad, gold stealing squad, mounted police, water police could be considered examples of these.

In the same way, it appears that coronial criticism aimed at the WA Police for some of its shortcomings could have equally been aimed at the WA Government, which by failing to offer sufficient funding for modern, purpose-built and state-of-the-art PCFs has resulted in facilities being 'dilapidated, appalling' and requiring replacement for decades (Dean 2004, 5).

Despite this, WA is the world's largest single policing jurisdiction, the state being about 10 times the size of the United Kingdom, divided into two primary regions in the metropolitan area, the North and South Metropolitan Regions. These comprise six sub-districts and one division: the South-East, South, North-West, East, West and Central Metropolitan Districts. The Office of the Metropolitan Regional Coordinator is a division that also forms part of the conglomerate regional structure, having direct management and authority over the Perth Watch House and the WA state PCF (Cottman 2007).

The following diagrammatic plans have been have been intentionally drawn in such a way that it constitutes a graphical representation of the actual PCF. These are operational facilities and thus the integrity of their security dictates that minimal annotation, orientation, and spatial relationships to the entire complex are paramount.

For the purpose of this section, the following figures named as 'Lock-ups within the Perth Metropolitan Area' do not require specific identification as their intended purpose is to illustrate their general form, layout, spatial rationale, types of space and spatial relationships between various zones and functions (*see Fig. 6 – Fig 10*).



Fig. 6 An operational Lock-up facility located in Perth which has a disjointed layout consisting of 2 wings is no longer used as designed with a number of compliant cells now consolidated to a single area, though still not in direct physical view from an observation point relying on electronic surveillance and regular cell checks to maintain sufficient observation. Narrow corridors lead to non-compliant and disused exercise yard an showering areas.





Fig. 7 An operational Lock-up facility located in Perth which has a disjointed layout consisting different wings which are disused. As with other operational district level facilities Juveniles are processed but not held in PCFs. Should detention be required, juveniles are escorted to Juvenile detention facilities under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrective services. Narrow corridors link this excessively long facility with disused exercise yards and juvenile areas.



<i>Lockup in Perth Metropolitan Area</i>			
Emil Jonescu 2011. Reproduced from hand sketches and photographs taken during site visit.			
	Diagrammatic	NTS	

Fig. 8 An operational Lock-up facility located in Perth which showing a narrow linear corridor and cell arrangement with a potential observation area at an axis point. This area however does not provide a vantage point from which to see detainees without physically walking along corridors or the use of electronic surveillance.





Fig. 9 An operational Lock-up located in Perth which has similar issues already discussed in figures 6-8 in relation to facilitating sufficient physical observation. This location also has a vulnerable 'passage-like' control area that is poorly considered in terms of officer safety and narrow corridors.



<i>Lockup in Perth Metropolitan Area</i>			
Emil Jonescu 2011. Reproduced from hand sketches and photographs taken during site visit.			
	Diagrammatic	NTS	

Fig. 10 An operational Lock-up facility located in Perth which has a number of compliant cells that are not allocated as being gender specific. Though this facility is relatively modern, spacious and clean, with wider corridors and better ambiance, there is no provision for a dedicated search room. As with the other Lock-up examples illustrated, direct physical view is not possible from the observation point.

Nationally, Australian PCFs represent a small yet fundamental subdivision of the WACJS, yet their significance cannot be overstated. It appears that this critical portion of the WACJS has been marginalised, neglected and has not benefited from critical architectural investigation to such an extent that custodial facility architecture fails to perform some of the basic functions it was designed to achieve. As a result, the Perth Watch House has been described as ‘obsolete, inadequate and non-compliant’, which is due only in part to its age (Dean 2004). This has resulted in the detention of people in custodial facilities that do not meet the specific needs of police and highlights the need for new purpose built facilities based on a design intended for short-term police custody, rather than PWH which is more

suiting to sentenced prisoners in long-term custody.²⁸ It appears that WA is not unique in its 'make do with status quo' mentality. Police organisations worldwide appear to suffer comparable insufficient funding, resources and research and lack the urgency required to tackle and 'make good' deficient existing custodial facilities.

South American correctional facilities have been heavily and erroneously criticised over time in American literature – inaccurate to the extent that a great deal of this literature does not make the distinction between PCFs and prisons 'even though the difference in the conditions between these two types of facilities is in South America immense' (Tomlin 1995, 135). In the United States, 'jails' are unequivocally *the* holding facility for "untried people" and for people serving short-terms of imprisonment. The significance of jails within the U.S CJS cannot be underestimated; being described as:

"reception units for a greater variety and number of offenders than will be found in any other segment of the correctional process, and it is at this point that the greatest opportunity is offered to make sound decisions on the offenders next step in the correction process. Indeed, the availability of qualified services at this point could result in promptly removing many from the correctional process who have been swept in unnoticed and undetected and who are more in need of protective, medical, and mental care from welfare and health agencies than they are in need of custodial care" (Carter, Glaser and Wilkins 1972, 71-72).

Although critical of others, these short-term custodial facilities in the U.S have also drawn criticism when comparative analysis is conducted across the U.S CJS where "the vast majority of city and county jails and local short-term institutions" have shown little or no improvement in "50 years" (Carter, Glaser & Wilkins 1972, 36: 71). Although the operational levels of humaneness and dignity might have improved ahead of architectural development in the U.S and other countries, the same cannot be said in relation to PCFs in some parts of South America which harbour deplorable living conditions in violation of basic human rights. Tomlin (1995, 133) describes Brazilian and Salvadorian PCFs²⁹ as bleak, appalling and overcrowded due to indifference toward maintaining adequate facilities where the concrete floor forms the bed upon which the detainee will sit in a barely lit cell,

²⁸ It should be noted that the new PCF situated in Northbridge is designed to achieve the specific needs of police.

²⁹ Here PCFs provide the role similar to that of Perth's historical police gaols where offenders can be detained temporarily, remanded for trial or imprisoned for short sentences for up to 80 days. Existing correctional facility crowding, however, often makes it impossible for residents to be released within that time frame (Tomlin 1995, 134).

and where regularly, “seven men are housed in a cell designed for two.” In addition, Tomlin maintains that policy and procedure (relating to dignity) in such facilities are also in dire need of review. A clear example of this relates to the fact that the only allowable clothing for detainees in such places is underwear. Brazilian and Salvadorian PCF conditions, therefore, appear to be unpardonable. On the other hand, prisons across the world appear to be humane and organised; even those found in Brazil and El Salvador are generally sanitary with sufficient natural and artificial lighting and access to private showers and toilets (Tomlin 1995, 134).

Brazilian and Salvadorian PCFs, like WA PCFs, also temporarily detain people while they await trial. However, the state of the criminal justice systems in these countries, Tomlin (1995, 133) explains, “has caused instances where police are unable to transfer sentenced prisoners to a prison facility, leading to cases where prisoners have been housed in PCFs for seven months.” The situation in which people are held for any length of time – particularly for ‘simple’ offences – poses significant increased risk, not only in South America, but other parts of the world, especially Australia with its distinct indigenous populations, and in WA, where indigenous people in police custody are significantly over-represented as a proportion of the total population. Aboriginal people are often less able to tolerate isolation in custody, so face greater risk of suicide or self-harm (Biles 1988, 17).

Indigenous people in WA constitute 45.9 percent of people in police custody. The state is second in this respect to the Northern Territory (Australian Institute of Criminology 2002, 12), despite the fact that 31.6 percent of the Northern Territory's population is indigenous compared with only 3.8 percent in WA. These statistics clearly indicate a disproportionate representation of indigenous people held in custody in comparison with other states (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006, 5).

The precarious reality of this situation is that 63 percent of Aboriginal deaths in custody occur in PCFs. As well, 80 percent of non-Aboriginal deaths in custody occur in the first 24 hours of detention, implying that the highest level of risk for self-harm and related causes of death in police custody occur within a short period after admission (Biles, McDonald and Fleming 1988, 129). Reser (1989, 161) referring to a national study by Hayes (1983), states that “the pattern of deaths in custody clearly indicates that police custody poses more risks than prison incarceration” and further, that there is a disparity in suicide rates between prison and police custody “with suicide rates in police custody being as much as five times greater than corresponding prison rates: this pattern being observed both in Australia and

overseas.” Next to this, other significant changes and concerns have also emerged within the US and the UK CJSs commencing in the 1970s. Predominantly associated with economy, efficiency and commercialisation of crime control, power and responsibility of certain aspects of law and order have been increasingly transferred to profit-driven commercial enterprises and private security firms with potentially unlimited vested commercial interests restricted only by adherence to contractual compliance (Garland 2001, 116).

With this, ever-increasing fiscally motivated governments appear to over-rely on private sector custodial management companies and private security firms which suggest that as with any profit driven structure, inequalities of access to acceptable levels of services will inevitably occur (Garland 2001, 117).

Although on a superficial level it might not be evident that the direction of privatising law and order should be a need for concern, it must be considered that the distinction between the function of policing, transportation, imprisonment, custodial services and security in certain circumstances are increasingly distorted. For example, a number of functions and responsibilities no-longer apply primarily to police and are now predominantly municipal bodies and private security functions, and as such, various communities and groups within society become subject to the risk of substandard access to equitable levels of service in comparison with those with higher levels of affluence. It is within this context, that it is evident that in-spite of initial humble beginnings and make-shift frontier-policing, through a period of 160 years of official history, WA Police have developed and achieved significant level of professionalism and excellence with many highly specialised sections; at times with a scarcity of funding and insufficient provision of appropriate facility and space or training.³⁰ Next to this, and following the lead of other societies a growing trend is emerging to deviate from some aspects of traditional policing practices to an increasingly blurred composite private and government system which clearly comprises of two opposing entity types with different underlying social and fiscal interests. In this instance, police should ensure that the potential for unjustified criticism by association with an underperforming allied service provider is mitigated wherever possible where transfer of authority and responsibility of some services to private industry have occurred on the basis of economic management and efficiency.

³⁰ Police Operations Centre, Traffic Enforcement Group (TEG) and Police Forensics Complex are all examples of specialised sections of police where it is evident that there has been a focus on providing state of the art facilities.

Furthermore, the WA Police organisation maintains a relatively unchanged component of sworn personnel irrespective of a WA which continues to rapidly expand in both population and physical development placing additional pressure on government to either invest in the WA Police to further develop and adequately manage future challenges. Based on international trends that sees capital cities growing and regional areas in decline, coupled with exponential increases set to occur in global population which relies so heavily on resources, it seems unlikely that any investment to increase the capacity of WA Police will be anything other than money well spent. Conversely, either an inevitable return to previously adopted make-do initiatives will eventuate or increasingly, additional responsibility and function will be transferred to private enterprise raising significant ethical concerns surrounding accountability, impartiality and accessibility to police services for all sectors within society.

As an overview, the focus of this chapter has been to outline of some of the philosophical and architectural aspects that relate to the history of incarceration, punishment generally, and the transfer of these characteristics, knowledge, and ideals to the WA context.

This chapter has established that penal history pre-dating some of the emerging prison and law reformers of the enlightenment period was based upon a subjective and sometimes agenda-based construct associated with the public theatre of barbaric and torturous punishments and death. From an architectural perspective a variety of spaces have been shown to be adapted, rather than specifically designed for imprisonment until philosophies toward punishment of crime by an apportioned sentence of incarceration and associated legislative frameworks developed. This framework led to architecture that began to distinguish specific institutional structures and relevant administrators such as Prison, Asylums (Psychiatric Institutions), Poor Houses, and Workhouses. Further legislative Acts as well as the inception of Police Forces restructured and rationalised crime and punishment into a considerably more specialised Criminal Justice System.

Although this chapter has outlined some of the architectural and philosophical knowledge that has evolved with some adaptations into the WA context out of the English, some WA Prison Facilities continue to develop both architecturally and administratively from what this research has revealed to be a Benthamite inspired inception. As a result of WA being colonised, a direct lineage exists between early Australian architects, public works engineers, and Bentham and his ideals. This chapter outlines this association, and in turn,

the underlying influence of other noteworthy reformers such as Joshua Jebb, Carlo Fontana and Cesare Beccaria.

Many developing townships throughout WA undertook construction of Police Gaols, Lock-ups, and court facilities as priority infrastructure due to the frontier nature of early WA settlement. Later, post-war hardships saw some of these earliest examples of *Police Gaol* facilities used for purposes of both long and short-term detention and administered as required until sufficient prison-specific facilities were built. This adaptive use of facilities for whatever purpose required highlighted attitudes towards custodial facilities similar to those of earlier centuries where anything that could be used for the purpose would be sufficient.

This chapter describes early Fremantle and Perth as being foremost considered as a prison and later a police town, inspired by the first significant building in this location being a prison and other key facilities for the purpose of detention, with clear physical and spatial similarities to English models. Some of these include Bridewells and Workhouses, which this chapter highlights as sharing spatial relationships similar to those found in current WA PCFs. In-so-doing, this chapter has shown that generally, WA Prison facilities continue to present an international perspective on carcerative architectural trends, however, PCFs have stopped far short adopting a position as a world leader as a custodial typology with others being significantly more progressive. The architectural outcomes that have resulted from these historical influences and trends are discussed further in chapter 2.

Chapter 2

Architectural Response

WA Prison Facilities

This chapter seeks to demonstrate a direct transfer of institutional knowledge and attitudes towards crime and punishment in particular those between England and WA, by outlining the historical chronology associated with the inception of Prison Facilities in WA, focusing on the inherited international aspects of function, philosophy and architectural expression. This chapter establishes WA institutional pedagogy as a derivative of the social engineering and developments of some of the 18th century's most prominent intellectuals and reformers such as John Howard, Cesare Beccaria, François-Marie (Arouet) Voltaire, Samuel Romilly and Jeremy Bentham.

Bentham passionately opposed penal colonies, being in favour of imprisonment as the preferred form of punishment: prisoner transportation to penal colonies was contradictory to his ideals and push for penal reform. From its inauguration, Bentham, as well as other like-minded intellectuals opposed settlement on the basis that transportation was not only expensive and inefficient but an entirely inappropriate method for punishing convicts, primarily as this was inconsistent with his theory that the significance of punishment should be that it deter greater society from similar acts “by making an example of convicts in a strictly run penitentiary” and not by “shipping them off to the other side of the world” (Kerr 1989, 5), which would not achieve the desired deterrence.³¹

³¹ Bentham's views, however biased by personal and financial motives relating to his impending plans to construct and administer a panoptic penitentiary which he hoped would attest to the pertinence of his penal philosophies and authoritative power of his proposed panoptic prisons (Jackson 1998, 371) relate to colonies in general (including Australian colonies).

The way in which Australia was considered around this time, and for many years post colonisation, significantly impacted on Australia's own sense of self which was partly conditioned by the dialogue of such distant intellectuals who assumed the notion that Australia would not amount to anything other than an austere and atrocious prison island.

Lord Bacon's sentiments are clearly outlined in his remarks that:

"It is a shameful and unblessed thing to take the scum of people, and wicked condemned men, to be the people with whom you plant; and not only so, but it spoiled the plantation: for they will ever look like rogues, and not fall to work, but be lazy, and do mischief, and spend victuals, and be quickly weary: and then certify over to their country, to the discredit of the plantation" (Thompson 1794, 38).

This attitude was ever-present in Australia's psyche significantly impacting the society's sense of place, translating into Australia's existing examples of imprisonment architecture (Kerr 1989, 8) within WA and in particular, Perth and Fremantle being some of the earliest original settlements with early infrastructure, planning and construction being overseen by English civil engineer, Henry Willey Reveley, the son of Willey Reveley, who arrived in Fremantle in 1829.

Over a period of ten years to follow, Reveley, as the civil engineer to the Swan River settlement oversaw the implementation of buildings and structures inclusive of but not limited to the *Round House* in Fremantle and the *Old Perth Courthouse* in Perth among other less prominent projects such as roads, bridges, jetties and tunnels (Barker 2000, 10).

The first Gaol in Perth was established in 1830 (*see Fig. 11*) and operated until 1855.³²

³² This facility was situated next to St Georges Cathedral and opposite to Government House. It is serviced by St Georges Terrace and is now site to the *Deanery*.




Fig. 11 An example of an early Perth Lock-up facility that also served as a gaol for short sentences. As per existing operational PCFs this facility also comprises different wings for males and females, along with exercise yards and linear corridors with no observation area for officers.

In 1852 a recently completed gaol facility situated next to the Courthouse on Beaufort Street shared whole responsibility of holding detainees awaiting trial from the Roundhouse, which at the time primarily served as a short-term detention facility for “white prisoners under sentence, aboriginal prisoners awaiting transportation to Rottneest Island” (Barker 2000, 10).

Grant (2008) states that the Rottneest Island Gaol was an early recognition of the:

“difficulties of providing custodial environments for aboriginal prisoners [however], local initiatives arose across Australia. In Western Australia, the ill-fated Rottneest Island Gaol was established in 1838 as an alternative to incarcerating aboriginal prisoners in Fremantle Gaol. Exile was seen as a preferable method to facilitate greater personal freedom while reducing the risk of escape” Grant (2008, 66).

However, it is not entirely a convincing argument that the decision to transport aboriginal prisoners to an Island-Prison (from 1838), proclaimed as such by enactment (and lasting) for a period of over sixty years (1841 to 1903), within a relatively convenient distance from main-land Fremantle, was entirely based upon what was perceived at the time to be best practice for aboriginal prisoners (O’Toole 2006, 187). Rather, what was best for the colony, the economy and the ‘visual and ethnic integrity of the mainland’ – a more socially acceptable form of ethnic cleansing.

Rottneest Gaol was closed in 1849 and remained disused for a period during which all prisoners were returned to Fremantle, however, the Rottneest facility was brought back into operation in 1856 as it was determined the move to Fremantle was unviable as a permanent solution. Further to this, it was recommended that Rottneest no longer be deemed an Island-Prison in early 1902,³³ however, it was still considered an integral outpost of Fremantle Prison and although it was no-longer used to incarcerate aboriginal prisoners specifically, it continued to be used until 1932, concurrently as a gaol and also as a place for tourist recreation (Ferguson 1996, 77).

Along with Rottneest’s increasing popularity as a health resort within reach of the mainland, subdivisions of land into residential allotments as well as into potential farming plots became a more economically attractive endeavour for the State, making the islands new direction incompatible with existing practice of on-site imprisonment. Therefore, if “exile to this island was seen as a preferable method to greater personal freedom while reducing the risk of escape” for aboriginal prisoners (Grant 2008, 66), why disband the entire enterprise and send the remaining aboriginal prisoners elsewhere to “northern gaols, climatically more suited to natives” (Ferguson 1996, 77) where neither the Rottneest nor the ‘northerly gaol’ solutions address significance placed upon aboriginal attachment to ‘country’.

The design of the subsequent *Quad* Native Prison, built on Rottneest (1871) is similarly

³³ It took until 1904 for the recommendation to be ratified (O’Toole 2006, 187).

implausible in its design intent – that it be proposed to address requirements specific to aboriginal prisoners, as this is an architectural example whose form is clearly a slightly larger version of the design of the Roundhouse in Fremantle, which, as previously mentioned was primarily used to detain white prisoners on a short-term basis and temporarily hold aboriginal prisoners before transportation to Rottneest (Barker 2000, 10).

Perth Gaol (see Fig. 13) operated under Convict Establishment authority from 1858-1888, with all prisoners being transferred to Fremantle Prison. It was designed by Comptroller General Edmund Yeamans Walcott Henderson with construction (1851-1859)³⁴ overseen by Henry Wray (R.E.) (Morrison and White 1979, 94).

The design of Fremantle Prison was significantly influenced by Henderson's association with Joshua Jebb, who assisted Henderson with professional guidance³⁵. Jebb's own rationale for Pentonville's design had in turn been influenced by William Williams' Millbank Prison, London. Millbank was widely regarded as first modern prison³⁶, though equally, it was considered indescribably unattractive and "one of the most costly of all the buildings the world had ever seen since the pyramids of Egypt" (Webb and Webb 1922, 49). This design implemented some of Jeremy Bentham's principles outlined in Willey Reveley's Panopticon drawings for Bentham – completed in 1791 (Tomlinson 1980, 99-101), but it was the philosophy that underpinned Millbank's operational rationale that predominantly influenced the design of Fremantle Prison.

Fremantle Prison was administered as a *silent prison* by Superintendent of Convicts, Thomas Hill Dixon for nine years (Stebbing 1999, 612–628), using a strategic *separate system* design. Previously, Hill had also served as a member of the London Metropolitan Police Force in 1842, and also Deputy Governor at London's Millbank Prison (Barker 2000, 53; Bosworth 2004, 7). Henderson later returned to England and was awarded the role of Prisons Surveyor General and Military Prisons Inspector General in 1863 upon Jebb's death till 1869, and later Chief Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police (1869 – 1886) "credited with establishing Scotland Yard" (Le Page 1986, 83). Circumstances related to the handling of the Trafalgar Square riots in 1886 saw Henderson tender his resignation.

This led to new direction in appointment of Commissioners for Police where having a military background was sought after as desirable attribute for any subsequent holders of


³⁴ Fremantle Prison was officially closed in 1991.

³⁵ Jebb also involved with the design of Portland Prison in Dorset and accommodation for Parkhurst Prison on the Isle of Wight (www.fremantleprison.com.au).

³⁶ Construction of Millbank Prison commenced in 1812 and was completed in 1821.

that office (Metropolitan Police 2010). Of particular interest, WA Police have seen no fewer than six previous commissioners of police serving in the armed forces, and significantly more commissioned officers sharing military backgrounds (WA Police 2010a) this suggests a clear top-down structure of ranking personnel might have been required where it was believed that the difficult decisions required of such an Office required the decisiveness and fortitude of ex-military servicemen.


Settling in WA in 1852 after he was appointed as Director of Public Works, English born colonial architect Richard Roach Jewell designed many prominent buildings throughout Perth. However it is in relation to custodial facilities that Jewell significantly contributed to the WA CJS by designing many regional Police Gaols such as Guildford (see Fig. 12), Toodyay, Roebourne and Greenough (Oldham 1972, 481).



<i>Guildford Police Lock-Up/Gaol</i>			
Emil Jonescu 2011. Reproduced from hand sketches and photographs taken during site visit.			
Diagrammatic	NTS	C.1841	

Fig. 12 An example of an early Perth Lock-up facility that also served as a gaol for short sentences. This facility comprises exercise yards and very narrow linear corridors. Interestingly, this facility has a very generous outdoor area which is still secure.

Additional Police Gaols were also built in Northam, Albany, York, Busselton, and Port Gregory – all serving as police administered gaols for sentences of less than one week, with the exception of Albany and Port Gregory. Prisoners sentenced for a period of more than one week would be transferred to Perth Gaol (Barker 2000, 10) see Fig. 13.



<i>Old Perth Gaol</i>			
Emil Jonescu 2011. Reproduced from hand sketches and photographs from site visit and with the assistance of SRO.			
	Diagrammatic	NTS	C.1854

Fig. 13 An example of an early Perth gaol. This facility has a number of wings and dedicated exercise yards. Long, narrow, linear corridors connect all areas of this facility which is almost identically mirrored over 2 floors. This facility shares design layout and functional terminology that is still consistent with some existing Lock-ups and prisons.

Prison design appears to have been the dominant influence on all types of custodial architecture in WA, evident in the significance placed upon the completion of the Roundhouse as one of the first prominent public buildings constructed in Fremantle, along with a series of other temporary prisons and entire streets dedicated to warden accommodation. The completion of the Fremantle Prison which operated for almost 140 years, as well as the water police and other special constables saw Fremantle labelled a “prison, police and military town” (Bosworth 2004, 69). Further to this Bosworth (2004, 40) describes Fremantle Prison as a facility designed to confine and control, intimidate, punish, redeem and improve the individual. It was also stipulated that it had to be plain, functional and not too expensive. This specification was not uncommon and apparently still in keeping with current construction prerequisites and practices, facilitating the construction of facilities with a unique ‘West Aussie’ flavour, where we strive for specific design intent and almost achieve it.

The importance we place upon a public facility and its funding should be proportional to the importance of its function and obligations to the society in which it is built, such as providing custodial duty of care. In other words, if Fremantle Prison were to be considered without the aid of romanticised literature it would be apparent that the design brief was unequivocally and grotesquely inadequate. The overwhelmingly misjudged and miscalculated requirements saw a facility realised which would be utterly substandard and sub-humane almost immediately and would inexplicably be permitted to continue as an operational facility under such conditions for many years, suggesting incompetence though more likely, ignorance among administration. Deplorable living conditions deficient in “sanitation, undersized cells³⁷ with little or no ventilation, poor food quality and extremely harsh punishments for prison offences” were eventually the catalyst leading to two Royal Commissions (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 50). The first Royal Commission conducted in 1898 issued its recommendations which were predominantly architecture-related.

Among other recommendations, the commission prescribed a series of alterations; including the construction of new walls in the main cell block facilitating the categorisation and separation of incompatible prisoners, and further, the demolishing of walls between every second cell to create improved and substantially larger standard cells with better

³⁷ The original design of Fremantle Prison provided only for single person cells in keeping with design following design which was required to achieve appropriate conditions for a separate silent system. Prisoners were expected to work and not inhabit their cells for anything other than to retire at night, thus it was deemed acceptable to provide such space.

ventilation. The second Royal Commission conducted in 1911 primarily concerned itself with the restructure of the administration and operation of the Fremantle Prison (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 50–54).

The Royal Commissions instigated many changes both built and administrative, but the introduction of the *Prisons Act 1903* was a critical milestone in WA prison history, which empowered both staff and prisoners to better understand their institutional position, duties and expectations; this act still forms the fundamental building blocks of current prison administration. The act which did not stipulate that there be a permanent official to head the WA prison service, did on the other hand, allow for a *Comptroller General*;³⁸ an office which took charge over multiple sectors of the CJS (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 77). Nevertheless, the very next year (1904-1907) a circular panoptic inspired exercise compound was built within the walls of the Fremantle prison site (Australia. Department of Treasury and Finance 2010, 13) closely resembling a bicycle wheel complete with spokes radiating out from the central hub – each segment being surveilled by a guard located within the central hub.

Prison facilities in the mid 1920s saw a trend towards a *reformatory* philosophy in design, with the emergence of *Prison Farms* such as Pardelup Prison Farm, and later, Barton’s Mill Prison, Karnet Prison Farm and Wooroloo Prison Farm and a host of other work camps associated with WA Regional Prisons. WA was deemed to be at the pinnacle of modern penology and criminology at an international level on the basis of this trend. Pardelup Prison Farm opened in 1927 and quickly developed into the exemplar of the prison system, being established ahead of similar initiatives in other countries and ten years earlier than England. These ‘open’ prisons were deemed to be a “turning point in prison history encouraged by the economic benefits resulting from work on the farm, though the economic benefits were always more easily measured than the reformatory performance of the facility” (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 110).

A major consideration and anomaly with open prison systems is that they are intended for minimum security prisoners, which are least likely to require reformation, thus the recidivist prisoners who would most benefit from this initiative are the least likely to be sent to a prison farm to receive it. Thomas and Stewart (1978, 110) argued that prison farm economics appeared to be the only instigator which appeared to generate parliamentary

³⁸ It would appear that this role was implemented as a cost cutting exercise (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 77).

discussion that encouraged or lead to any change and thus these early facilities operated (and continue to operate) as a quasi enterprise and appear to provide little reformatory benefit, rather, financial sustenance to the government and the greater CJS. Barton's Mill was established as a prison in 1942–1989 (Heritage Council of Western Australia 1998), coinciding with the beginning of World War II, receiving all of the male prisoners from Fremantle Prison and Broome Regional Prison while they were under the control of military authorities. Thomas and Stewart (1978, 117) state that the post war period indicate an era of neglect from 1945–1951 with the Department of Prisons seldom submitting yearly reports to the government, and with no further changes of significance until the introduction of parole in the early 1960's.

Attitudes towards prisons and their role within society continued to change and adapt both locally and internationally in the early 1960s, reflecting a shift in societal and political perspectives on imprisonment centered upon *rehabilitative* aspirations. This rationale initiated the manifestation of *reformatory* style facilities in the United States (Wirkler 1995, 86). Development in prison farms continued with Karnet Prison Farm which opened in 1963 doubling as a specialist alcoholic's facility, and Wooroloo Prison Farm established in 1970, which are both grounded on rehabilitative ideals in an *open-style* prison here in WA.

Thomas and Stewart (1978, 112) affirm that the novelty of this type of facility was short-lived for both prisoners and custodians. Consequently, an increase in the number of 'escapes' from these open prisons resulted in subsequent fencing of these types of facilities (Department of Corrective services 2008).

By the 1980s In the United States, and shortly thereafter in the United Kingdom, innovative and alternative style of prison facilities were being introduced and adopted. "Direct supervision" requires that constant control of all areas within the facility be attained through "direct and continual contact" with all detainees at all times, achieved through increased levels of interaction between staff and prisoners (Wirkler 1995, 86). Additional benefits of a direct supervision model include the significant consolidation of staff provisions associated with special needs prisoners that require intensive observation (Fairweather and McConville 2000, 31). This prison administration and supervision style does nonetheless, require a *New Generation* architectural program, instigating an entirely new classification of prison facilities in these countries and subsequently internationally, with claims of astonishing success (Fairweather and McConville 2000, 31).

As described by Thomas and Stewart (1978, 161) 19th century prisons were “built to last forever”, advancing little flexibility for future additions, alterations and changes in society or philosophy. Therefore, as a modern and educated society, equipped with the benefit of hindsight, we ought to be substantiating our contemporary institutional (architectural and philosophical) positions in their entirety. Yet, it appears that WA’s state funding for public facilities is reflective of a political culture where facilities continue to be built down to a cost and not up to a standard, a sentiment to which Knapel (1993, 4) also observed, stating that as a rule, decisions associated with issuing of construction contracts for correction facilities are determined and appointed according to lowest price.

Contemporary developments continue to reflect an increasingly disturbing trend which had been commented upon by nonconformist reformer John Howard (1726 – 1790) over 200 years ago, stating that in relation to custodial matters, he had seen “enough to determine him on reform. To his simple mind it seemed obvious that the root of all the evils of management was the fact that it was allowed to be a profit-making business” (Webb and Webb 1922, 34), the empowering of private companies to take control over what Garland (2001, 18) states would ideally be considered the role of the state; the establishment of increasing numbers of private prisons, an irrefutable indication that rehabilitative philosophy and endeavours of prisoner reform have been disbanded.

With this, McDonald et al. (1998, 4-5) argue that although not a new concept, in the years leading up to the 1980s, sub-standard conditions found throughout the US government prison system, offered potential private contractors the political platform required to propose a (more cost efficient) private prison alternative to a system clearly in need of improvement while assuring adherence to obligatory statutory requirements. Over the ten year period following this (1988-1998), privately operated prisons have seldom been examined in the US to determine the overall success of their integration within the previously government-run system, and of those which have, to date, have not demonstrated significant advantages over government run facilities, with McDonald et al. stating that:

“Perhaps the most striking aspect of this research literature is that it is so sparse and that so few government agencies have chosen to evaluate the performance of their contractors formally. Even though there exist over a hundred privately operated secure confinement facilities, there have been very few systematic attempts to compare their performance to that of public facilities. Most

government agencies have been satisfied with monitoring compliance with the terms of the contracts” (McDonald et al. 1998, 54-56).

Rapid increases in prisoner volumes next to an existing system mired in futility compelled the US government to seek the unencumbered and efficient procedure with which private entities undertake the design and construction of their detention facilities (McDonald et al. 1998, 7) especially as the excessive bureaucratic processes which underlie every minutia of government process can be excluded. This trend appears to be surreptitiously infiltrating the infrastructure and consciousness of WA society, with a measured and gradual conversion to privatised custodial services for the WA Police Department and courts as well as provision of food, hygiene among many other services found catering for needs within PWH such as custodial transportation services between Department of Corrective Services’ facilities and WA Police facilities. Further to this, the Department of Corrective Services (Acacia Prison) is the first privately administered prison by Serco. Though this research will not directly examine this shift in detainee processing in Australia, its operational benefits, and associated costs are not a trivial matter and is worthy of further research.

Present-day prison management objectives envisage its primary role as a public protector “by holding offenders securely in custody³⁹ and no longer pretend to be capable of bringing about rehabilitative effects,” and further, common forms of de-individualising and de-humanising employed as a method for attaining and maintaining power in custodial facilities is contrary to the desired processes of rehabilitation anticipated to occur within prisons (Garland 2001, 18). De-humanised relationships are “objectifying, analytical and empty of emotional and empathetic content” (Zimbardo 2007, 222-223), and accordingly, it is noted that as early as 1726, a writer described *prison* as “a place fitter to make a rogue than reform him” (Web and Web 1922, 21). In-so-doing, this perspective suitably predicts the ensuing delusions of the next 280 years that rehabilitative outcomes could be achieved. This reformative objective has only recently been acknowledged as futile.

As a result, it appears that imprisonment, the ineffective vehicle once used by reformers to persuade society in relation to the transformation and correction of those people that might contaminate societal morality and while ambitious in its progressive intentions, now requires an unqualified deviation in philosophy as do PCFs which as a custodial institution

³⁹ Within this context Garland refers to keeping offenders away from general society.

share historical parallels with prison institutions, though arguably, are indicative of less advancement than latter.

Although this chapter has shown that architectural knowledge relating to custodial facilities was transferred from England to WA, the content outlines a timeline and discusses some of WAs early carcerative facilities and their functions. This includes Rottnest Island facilities, which, like the Roundhouse in Fremantle, convey an architectural language consistent with having panoptic influence. Further links to English penal architecture are demonstrated through those that designed and administration of Fremantle Prison, both of these people having an association with Bentham, Bentham's ideologies, and the London Metropolitan Police Force.

This chapter also illustrates some of the key spatial similarities that can be found in existing PCFs when compared with police gaols by means of diagrammatic architectural plans and discusses some of the more contemporary penal trends and attitudes to imprisonment, and the underwhelming level of government initiative shown relating to improvement of PCFs and associated knowledge.

While this chapter has discussed many aspects relating to carcerative architecture and WA prisons facilities in general, the following chapter will further elaborate upon development, specifically, in relation to the evolution of PCFs, moving toward a WA context.

Chapter 3

Architectural Response

Police Custodial Facilities (PCFs)

This chapter's interpretation of PCF development historically is indicative of a custodial typology that appears to have largely developed by default or indirectly as a consequence of advancement in prison philosophy and architecture. This establishes that dissimilar institutional typologies share similar historical, and to some degree, architectural threads based upon interrelated views of criminals and criminality.

Whether tried by a court or traditionally by our peers, as a place of detention for the accused, Lock-up style holding facilities can be traced back to our earliest civilisations, however, few if any were originally built for this specific function. Any building whether suitable or not was adapted for the purpose. Early attitudes towards the criminal element was that of absolute rejection "to be got rid of at least cost, clarifying the fundamental motivation persuading authorities to make use of pre-existing structures; whether dilapidated or outmoded, they could serve no better use" (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 8) in the hope that these detention places effected physical manifestations of psychological punishment (Foucault 1975, 239). This clearly illustrates the disdain once reserved for prisoners, clearly, this was also reflected in early places of detention.

By this definition, very early detention-places served no other purpose than to hold people for indefinite periods of time and thus do not offer direct relevance to this research. However, a contemporary reference to the term *imprisonment*, which is for the purpose of punishment⁴⁰ and thus the beginning of a conscious endeavour to develop specialised architectural forms and spatial solutions of the late 18th - 19th century needs to be considered.

This does in some way require one to consider facilities which preceded this period such as the Bastille, built as a fortress predominantly between 1357 to 1370,⁴¹ whose primary initial function was to hold upper-class prisoners, and later as a general prison. Other, significantly

⁴⁰ Also see '*holding for sentence versus holding as sentence*' later in this chapter.

⁴¹ The Bastille's construction continued on beyond this date (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 8-14).

older examples dating back to B.C.E also exist, though Johnston (1973) mentions that the Mamertine Prison, Rome, is one example of a detention place for which sufficient quality physical and literary documentation still exists and is thus able to be studied.⁴² Although this example will not be described in detail in this thesis, it serves as a well-documented example of a preserved and tangible ancient detention place that substantially precedes Common Era.

Mamertine Prison, like other early examples of spaces built or adapted for the purpose of imprisonment required little if any other functional and operational capability other than secure detention, and as detention itself and its duration was not considered punishment, any attempt to make a categorical inference between the specific functions of ancient and contemporary facilities with any plausible or acceptable level of accuracy upon this basis would prove impossible, and thus does not form part of this research. Nevertheless, it would appear that detention facilities, irrespective of form and institutional identity, have one of the longest histories among all institutions – ironically dissimilar to the architectural advancement associated with prison institutions, where reform is well documented. It appears that detention facilities continue to be the institution about which the least is known, and consequently, this custodial typology has until recently continued to function in a relatively rudimentary way, ‘evolving largely by default’ (Mattick 1974, 782–785).

Unlike Mamertine Prison, records do not always allow for dependable images of primitive detention-places, though research would suggest that so long as documentation exists (as ancient as it may be) reference can be directly associated to the detention of captive people, be it in caves, rickety timber cages or ‘gibbets’ cage, deep dug-out pits, strong poles, cellars, gate houses, castles, manors or convents, altered for the new function formed a small part of many crude and primitive detention edifices (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 8-14 : Pashley 2000, 22).

“Many city gates were used to house prisoners, some being enlarged or rebuilt to provide the necessary accommodation. During the next three or four centuries this rudimentary penal system showed no signs of developing into anything more progressive. Jails continued to be established in grim, forbidding rooms, cellars, gate houses and castles: all were used mostly for detention rather than punishment” (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975, 14).

⁴² Johnston (1973, 5) mentions that sufficient substantiating literature suggests that completion of this structure dates back to approximately the 6th century B.C.E.

All of the aforementioned examples are indicative of structures that have undergone or out-rightly involve some manner of human intervention that have resulted in built forms able to be adapted or used for the purpose of detention.

WA Short-term Custodial Facilities (STCF)

Documented examples of WAs inceptive; makeshift and primitive STCFs around the time of colonisation and for some time to follow, suggests that conditions under which detainees were held, and police were expected to function, were crude and extraordinarily difficult. WA has seen many police 'Lock-ups' come and go, predominantly borne out of exigent necessity. The majority of these were hastily built from whatever local materials could be sourced or specific to Perth, adaptive re-use by using the hull of moored ships upon the Swan River. While only the largest towns were afforded more resilient and sturdy materials such as brick, timber, steel and iron, small early 1800s country settlements usually relied on brushwood and canvas and while this only protected them from the sun and rain, those detained, *were so* by chain not the edifice itself. Though basic, inexpensive and inappropriate it was an improvement in comparison with existing practices, inclusive of chaining detainees to tree trunks, within tree trunks, to heavy logs or a spike in the ground without relief from the harsh Australian sun and rain (Pashley 2000, 27).

Significant advancement in regulations and laws have since been enacted by government such as The Criminal Investigation Act 2006, Criminal Code, Police Act and scores of others that outline what Police can do in a particular situation, though, police do have discretionary powers. The 'Commissioner's Orders and Procedures' (COPs) Manual, forms the foundation of best practice police procedures. In short, the COPs Manual outlines appropriate police procedure, taking into account the many acts, regulations and other guidelines against which police are bound. What is certain is that PCFs perform an integral contributory function within the Criminal Justice System. They are not intended nor designed to be an instrument of correction or punishment, simply, they serve to assist police to *temporarily* detain people for a variety of reasons. Police custodial facilities form a fundamental link to other divisions of the Western Australian Criminal Justice System (WACJS) acting as an associated interface within a matrix of divisions of the system. As a result of the pivotal function police facilities play within the WACJS, complex issues deserving of serious consideration and comprehension require critical analysis during pre-design planning in order to propose a rigorous and specialised architectural response.

Nevertheless, one may question the likelihood of a future to help combat issues of overcrowding in prisons, similar to that of the United States where police operate *hybrid detention facilities*. These appear to have evolved from the need to have police Lock-up facilities and a place for detention, for questioning, and pre-trial detention purposes. These facilities perform a function akin to what was formerly referred to as *Police Gaols; holding detainees and housing sentenced prisoners* (Mattick 1974, 783-785). Arguably, within contemporary law, there exists a vast area of uncertainty and interpretation, and thus the amalgamation of the two custodial typologies could conceivably be achieved as it once did in WA, and as it continues to do so elsewhere in the world such as the US. Notwithstanding this, the existing Perth Watch House already errs on the side of an unwilling participant in the detention of people on return to prison warrants for longer than required. This occurs in order to conform to prison intake hours which more appropriately resemble business office hours. Although PWH has not held detainees for short sentence purposes for many years, it does however, reluctantly hold unsentenced drunken detainees as a last resort, predominantly due to a paucity of alternative options. This in no way suggests that functional generalisations associated with short-term custodial architecture are to be made in the belief that an all-encompassing solution is remotely plausible (Hall et al. 1985), rather, PCFs require the support of other divisions within the CJS and its partners. Critically, it appears that many of the support agencies such as those within the Department of Health are also underfunded (The ABC, April 18, 2012), as is the Salvation Army (The Age, September 11, 2012) who administers the Western Australian Network of Alcohol and other Drug Agencies (WANADA). This significantly impacts on the subsequent performance of the WA Police's PCFs and use of resources where short-comings and difficulties experienced in other sectors are directly transferred to police who are required to hold them for their own safety where alternative more suitable custodians are unavailable. To accommodate such people where appropriate care and observation can be made, police may place them in PCFs until they are deemed sober enough to be released or alternative accommodation can be sourced.

This is a direct consequence of large numbers of people that come to the attention of police who could and should be relinquished to the care of other allied professionals that are for the most part better equipped and trained to assist in many instances.

For example, drug and alcohol centres, psychiatric clinics, medical practitioners, guidance counsellors, guardians and parental care, and Department for Child Protection etc. At times

people who come into contact with police should not be in active custody in a PCF or more loosely in police 'custody' by association (R.13 2011).⁴³

Further to this, the apparent magnitude of societal unawareness to the diversity of functions performed by the various sectors of the WACJS is demonstrative of apathy and indifference. Similarly, the function of police custodial facilities, jails and prison are frequently misunderstood, and are regularly referred to interchangeably, which is comparative to a perceptible deficiency in research literature and procedures specific to police custodial facility architecture. It appears a preposterous and arrogant ambition when considering the infinite number of variables such as unique histories, languages and multiple cultures in existence within modern society, to aspire to remedy this undervalued and misinterpreted subsection of the criminal justice system with an all-encompassing architectural solution. Considering this, Klofas (1990, 71) notes that the application of specific, case-by-case research in every instance where PCFs are to be considered appears the most logical and effective process whereby specialised solutions can be established and implemented.

Architecture

From an architectural perspective, the WA PCFs visited were expected to account for compliant, non-compliant, non-compliant who are violent and combative, and suicidal or at risk of self-harm categories of detainee. To achieve this for all these different detainee types, WA PCFs provide three categories of cells, being, predominantly glazed (Perspex) temporary holding pods, standard finish holding cells and padded cells. Sub-categories of these cells do exist, however, in most circumstances they were found to be obsolete in terms of their design compliance, were not provided due to the size and location of the facility, or were inaccessible due to facility design when assessed alongside available human resources. Thus, police are restricted to detaining; male, female, transgendered, intoxicated (drugs or alcohol), serious to relatively more minor offenders, and culturally diverse groups of the abovementioned categories within a very limited set of accommodative provisions. Juvenile cells also present in most existing facilities, however, most, if not all, are now

⁴³ In this instance, custody is generally defined by most dictionaries as being in the presence of, being stopped by, or being spoken to by police and feeling that if one was to attempt to leave they would be prohibited from doing so.

disused as policies on detaining juveniles have changed over time favouring escort and accommodation at a juvenile detention facility, such as Rangeview, over police detention.

It would be impossible to specifically cater for all groups at an individual level, hence what is provided, intends simply to address the minimum safe human requirement for relatively short periods of detention. However, different solutions can be considered in the sense that they address the specific requirements of regions, districts, countries or cultures, as in reality individual solutions are not only impractical but impossible.

This research does not intend to suggest that a single all-encompassing design solution is even remotely possible for PCFs, in fact, this research suggests quite the opposite, that a specialised set of design considerations are required but they must respond and be relative to the situational context in which it is located.

In the case of PWH this is achieved by providing minimal space, fixtures and stimulation. What is provided here, in a standard holding cell is a platform to take a single foldable mattress, a flush mounted emergency communications button, a flush mounted stainless steel toilet pan and flush mounted stainless steel drinking spout and drain combination. Some cells at some station level PCFs have access to a fixed window for natural lighting.⁴⁴ Some station PCFs do not provide a specific area for mattresses but have an oversized transition space that could accommodate this function and flush moulded formed seating which highlights the notion of 'temporary' detention. All cells have a transition space that allows for negotiating between sitting, sleeping, drinking and toileting activities, though when accounting for the proportions of the cell, this space,⁴⁵ makes up a considerable proportion of the overall cell area. It must be remembered that at peak period times, this space is likely to be taken up by an additional mattress and a detainee, a circumstance that this specific space within cells was not intended nor designed for.⁴⁶

Primarily, PCF spaces aim to ensure as much as practicable that detainees cannot harm themselves or others. All items other than blankets and mattresses are provided as fixtures and other than these two items, nothing within the cells can be moved or modified. While this cannot be considered as of a concern in STCF due to the minimal length of stay, what

⁴⁴ This is not the case at PWH where natural light permeates into the exercise yard and some of the office areas only as all cells are contained in the core of the building.

⁴⁵ A walkway that performs as a corridor would in a domestic context.

⁴⁶ Also see *Chapter 5* on overcrowding.

needs to be considered is that there were no pacifying or diversionary measures within any of the locations visited, particularly pertinent to PWH which holds detainees overnight and for slightly longer than station PCFs as they are not adequately equipped to do so. Other than a high level convex mirror, and more recently a camera to nullify any blind spots, padded cells have no fixtures whatsoever.⁴⁷

In general, PCFs provide a bland environment devoid of any visual or auditory stimulus. Granted, these facilities provide short-term custodial solutions, however, a myriad of architectural considerations as well as pacifying instruments could provide the necessary diversionary and pacifying stimulus required to alleviate boredom and potentially violence at little if any additional cost.

Individual access to open air exercise yard, natural light, dimmable artificial lighting with override in case of misuse, use of colour, television, radio, magazines and reading material was not available. To some, this might appear as an undeserved and unnecessary luxury, however, irrespective of the fact that detainees have not yet been determined as guilty, what such considerations aim to achieve are more convivial PCF spaces that offer what could be considered environments that are less stressful and encourage behaviours that are more amenable.

It is suggested that behavioural modifications that can be achieved by these means should be sought and not from high levels of surveillance. Consequently, any behaviour that can be improved (or good behaviours maintained) by good design might assist officers to carry out their duties more efficiently due to an increase in detainee compliance. This notion in effecting a change in behaviour seeks 'real' or 'sustainable' modification, whereas panoptic spaces as that which Bentham advocated required a belief that one was being constantly observed, therefore it could be said that behavioural self-modification hinged on this belief alone and without this conviction the theory no longer applies.

Physical interventions and design strategies, however, it would seem, could encourage effective solutions that are inherent within the form and architectural articulation; it is real and exists in continuum irrespective of the existence of cameras or presence of custodial officers.

⁴⁷ This is to ensure that the potential for injury and self harm through fixtures and fittings is minimised.

What this offers to the profession of architecture is a more holistic and considered way of looking at some of the additional aspects other than merely the primary components of function and security, that could and should influence decision making for the purpose of design. Furthermore, it demonstrates that there is a significantly greater level of knowledge that is required to understand the critical existing spatial and behavioural relationships that that could empower architects to not only develop more holistic design briefs to the comprehensive level that this research will suggest, but highlights a gap and potentially, a unique opportunity for architects to undertake a more active and central role in delivering strategic education to end users, key stakeholders operational personnel.

In terms of architectural briefs, what is required, it is suggested, is a brief based on a body of knowledge that that is reflective of interdisciplinary research. With this, one is more likely to achieve architecture that create spaces which promote suitable spatial relationships for all of the facilities occupants, best considers all of their specific needs, and meets the necessary functional and operational requirements.

The profession of architecture and architectural research also stands to greatly benefit from additional collaborative discourse with WA Police to further develop an in-depth, quality body of knowledge that can be built upon and formulated into an-almanac of data. This knowledge could be used by architects to assist police with future facility design that is better considered and relates to real police needs rather than perceived requirements. In partnership with spatial, behavioural and environmental architectural knowledge that architects possess, this data represents additional layers of knowledge that architects can utilise in the development of deliverable instructional and educational précis to specific user groups. This new knowledge could offer WA Police an additional set of intellectual tools that facilitate more efficient use of custodial spaces, and equally, highlight concerns of effective use of space in providing custodial care, and maintaining a safe working environment through an enhanced understanding of it. This notion should not necessarily be limited to the confines of specific buildings in which specific police groups inhabit, but could equally be applied to urban environments and other spatial typologies.

In this capacity, architects could offer a basic level of understanding of how space within different contexts can be interpreted to formulate a greater appreciation of behaviours that occur relative to the environment in which they occur, relative to anticipated societal behavioural norms. From this perspective, architects are able to offer a specialist form of spatial knowledge that is able to adapted and applied to assist police function and in-so-

doing, promote new platforms for architectural research, education and knowledge, and potentially formulate a more specialised sub-component of the profession of architecture.

Holding as a sentence and holding for sentence

As the only western society that still retains and utilises the death penalty, the US presents what appears to be an anomaly in progression to our contemporary understanding of punishment, being, a prescribed period of incarceration determined by the severity and type of crime committed. Death row inmates are on average held for 10 years (Hudson 2000, 834-835) before execution and are a particular deviation from conventional contemporary understanding of the definition of imprisonment and punishment. As the actual punishment in this instance is death, this raises the question; what then is the extensive period of imprisonment preceding the capital punishment? In this case it would appear that this is merely an extraordinarily excessive period of detention for the purpose of carrying out what is considered the actual punishment; the death penalty. Ethically, this raises many questions of what occurs should the 'accused' be found innocent and exonerated, for example, what should the term of imprisonment served be considered in this instance?

In answering this question it must be considered that “over 100 people have been exonerated of charges for which they had been imprisoned awaiting execution and released from death row since 1973” and although a valuable tool, DNA testing is only partly responsible for “proving innocence” (American Civil Liberties Union 2003).

The US criminal justice system has been described as;

“[A] broken machine that wrongfully convicts innocent people, sentencing thousands of people to prison or to death for the crimes of others, as a new study reveals. The University of Michigan law school and Northwestern University have compiled a new National Registry of Exonerations – a database of over 2,000

prisoners exonerated between 1989 and the present day, when DNA evidence has been widely used to clear the names of innocent people convicted of rape and murder”

and further...

“Death row inmates were exonerated nine times more frequently than others convicted of murder. One-fourth of those exonerated of murder had received a death sentence, while half of those who had been wrongfully convicted of rape or murder faced death or a life behind bars. Ten of the inmates went to their grave before their names were cleared” (The Guardian 2012).

“Many of the releases of innocent defendants from death row coming about as a result of factors outside of the justice system ... such as students who had been assigned to investigate cases where people were to be executed, after the system of appeals had rejected legal claims,” thus, “people have been spared because of the informal efforts of concerned citizens, not because of the justice system” (Michigan State University 2004).

Although prisoner types associated with US prisons differ, the Bastille was similarly used for holding prisoners for future execution during the French revolution and beyond. This suggests that in principle, the humanity of the US criminal justice model has not progressed to the same extent as it has politically and economically when compared with other countries. While this position does not form a significant component of this thesis, it does highlight that although as a contemporary society we have advanced in many ways, in other ways, such as our moral stance on punishment for redemption, punishment for rehabilitation, imprisonment for punishment or as the punishment and the way in which facilities are used remain rather rudimentary, ill-considered and primitive at best.

Although this chapter has shown that custodial facilities share common ancestries well beyond the 18th - 19th centuries when one did not consider imprisonment as a form of punishment nor were any facilities built specifically for this purpose. Very early facilities were merely adapted for this purpose, therefore a ‘deviation period’ was sought to determine the point at which the attributes of either prisons or PCFs appeared to specialise. This established that the specialisation of prison institutions occurred more readily, with PCFs developing largely by default. Further to this, a more structured system of government institutional provision and various new Acts further contributed to a divergence of services performed by prison institutions into more specialised and function-specific architectural and spatial responses. Consequently, the current WACJS is indicative of significant system-specific specialisation of operational function which has incrementally developed since colonisation. However, further PCF specific research is required to develop the architectural, spatial and strategic conditions appropriate to this under-appreciated and unique custodial typology. Therefore, a research questionnaire that intends to develop a

more in-depth understanding and knowledge of PCFs and the personnel that functions within them has been formulated and follows in chapter 4.

Chapter 4

Case Study: Questionnaire, Site Analysis and Fieldwork Methodology.

Summary

This chapter seeks to develop a better understanding of specific issues relating to PCF design and the processes and organisational relationships of the personnel attached to these locations. This chapter recognises that contemporary architectural research requires a better understanding of a number of design related issues and solutions require analysis which is not limited purely to built fabric, but subject to a complex matrix of philosophical, historical, cultural and socio-organisational interactions in addition to architectural reflective practice and critical analysis of space.

Waid and Clements (2001, 1), in reference to architectural design of correctional facilities, state that “few criminal justice scholars have pursued this topic as a research interest.” It appears, however, that fewer still, do so specifically with respect to short-term PCFs, thus it is against this background that there currently appear to be clear disparities between custodial training and the requirements of the position before operational undertaking of service within PCFs, and between policies and procedures associated with PCFs and the functional ability of the PCF to facilitate them. In addition, inconsistencies exist between design intent and the operational utilisation of PCF space through make do ad-hoc initiatives forcing the facility be used in a way in which it was not intended – a way in which did not form part of the original design brief which initiated the existent design response.

This research focuses on translation and inevitable and sometimes regrettable transfer of philosophical, cultural and historical custodial nuances into current PCFs. This research also aims to determine if PCF personnel consider current custodial training sufficient to achieve a sense of operational preparedness in PCF staff and discusses a potentially more effective training environment requiring full utilisation of the existing PWH or specific design rationale for future facilities in addition to a symbiotic correlation with regulations, policy and operational PCF procedure.

Additionally, this chapter discusses the potential for developing functional *specialised* component architectural strategies that embody acceptable levels of dignity and security while addressing the physical and psychological welfare of all occupants for STC

environments. This requires a more comprehensive consideration of contextual analyses which contributes to an understanding of all of the spatial qualities and human sensibilities (specific custodial intra-organisational relationships) associated with PCFs to affect this objective through a carefully structured and approved face to face questionnaire.

This questionnaire was divided into its six (6) essential sub-categories to aid presentation of narrative discourse associated with the empirical data collected from fieldwork conducted. This structure grouped related topics which allowed for a more fluid process of discussion with interviewees that had a logical sequence; this ensured that a consistent approach was able to be applied in each interview. The questionnaire used for this research is as follows:

Approved Research Questions

Experience:

- 1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer?*
- 2. How long have you worked at a police Lock-up or other short-term custodial facility (please indicate type) and where?*
- 3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it?*

Organisational Relationships:

- 4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think this method works?*
- 5. Are organisational relationships different in the Lock-up compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how?*
- 6. Is staff moral high or low within the working Lock-up environment and why do you think this is the case?*
- 7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward Lock-up/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how?*

Custodian Training:

- 8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/Lock-up training before working in a Lock-up facility/environment?*
- 9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to Lock-up/custodial staff? Explain your answer*
- 10. Do you feel that the Lock-up should be a specialist area? Explain your answer.*

Facilities Considerations:

11. *Do you think that the way in which the Lock-up is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how?*
12. *Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not?*
13. *How could the Lock-up operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain your answer.*
14. *Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the Lock-up design (perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer.*
15. *In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this?*
16. *Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer.*
17. *Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lock-ups, could they be made better, how?*
18. *Is the Lock-up observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved?*
19. *Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved?*
20. *What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the Lock-up?*

PCF Violence + Risk Management:

21. *What do you think about the violence in Lock-ups?*
22. *Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee?*
23. *In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc?*
24. *Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer.*
25. *Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the Lock-up was designed or laid out differently, and if so how?*

On Dignity:

26. *What do you think about single person cells for all detainees?*
27. *Is contraband easily hidden (within a Lock-up), if so where is it usually found?*
28. *What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the Lock-up?*
29. *How is medical attention given to detainees who need it?*
30. *What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity?*

31. *Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? Explain your answer*
32. *In your opinion, how does drugs and alcohol effected detainees determine the way the Lock-up facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee?*
33. *Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the Lock-up easily allow for this?*
34. *Does Lock-up design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer.*
35. *How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when?*

HR and Facility Management:

36. *Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed?*
37. *Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer.*
38. *Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer.*

Questionnaire Interviews

Although all interviews and questions were structured in the same way, the format of answers that were offered varied greatly, ranging from to-the-point to very forthcoming and engaging, and ranged from 60-90 minutes in duration.

Before all interviews and obtaining *Consent to Participate*, all respondents were issued with a *Participant Information Sheet* which was read and discussed. This outlined their role in the research and how their information would be used and protected by way of privacy and confidentiality. To protect the identity of respondents that participated in the interviews, all have been de-identified and where reference to specific discussions are made, they are mentioned by a respondent code, a number and the year in which the interview was conducted, for example 'R.17 2011'. It must be noted that none of the interviews were recorded in any way other than hand written notes.

A scale method was developed by which to be able to allocate a numerical value to dialogue in a consistent way. This scale applied relationship values from 1 - 9, where '1' was equivalent to 'Disagree' or 'No', with '5' being equivalent to 'Neutral' or 'Maybe' and '9' being 'Strongly Agree' or 'Yes'. This made it possible to determine trends, averages, establish a graphical representation to verbal answers given by respondents. Numerical scores are presented as a factor out of nine (9) and thus an equivalent percentage.

In the same way that the questionnaire has been structured into related groups, the Summary of Questionnaire Interviews are similarly structured into sections as follows:

Experience – Questionnaire Component [sections 1 to 3]

Organisational Relationships – Questionnaire Component [sections 4 to 7]

Custodian Training – Questionnaire Component [sections 8 to 10]

Facilities Considerations – Questionnaire Component [sections 11 to 20 & 35]

PCF Violence + Risk Management – Questionnaire Component [sections 21 to 25]

On Dignity – Questionnaire Component [sections 26 to 34]

HR and Facility Management – Questionnaire Component [sections 36 to 38]

Summary of Questionnaire Interviews

Experience [1-3]

- Relating to length of service [**average length of service 21 years**]
- PCF specific experience [**average length of service in PCFs 3.5 years**]
- **Level of stress requiring coping mechanisms** [factor of 6.7/9 equivalent to 74%]

All interviewees other than R.8 (2010) and R.13 (2011) stated that they felt stress at work however most stated that the stress related to hierarchically (instigated) pressures placed upon them which related to a seemingly ever-increasing administrative workload rather than operational pressures. In all instances within PCFs associated with Police Station, varying levels of responsibility for observation of detainees rests with the Station OIC and shift OICs (in some instances full responsibility) which in-turn impacts on having appropriate level of custodial surveillance by virtue of the administrative expectations placed upon them which must be completed concurrently. This is entirely a HR issue as during the course of this research there were no dedicated Custody or Auxiliary Officers attached to the Station's PCF which could take 'ownership' of the station-level PCF and taking a more direct approach to custodial observation and care – in lieu of the current CCTV approach conducted from other parts of the building. Additionally OICs could not see an alternative as the working day was finite with no prospect for completing excessive workloads on overtime thus placing them in a difficult position of balancing work and life.

Those attached to the PWH – as the state's operational PCF stated that stress was experienced in a number of ways hierarchical, direct – operational, working within a facility under permanent surveillance, and from a prevailing sense of being under constant scrutiny from investigative bodies whose deliberations promote uncertainty particularly among new custodial staff. As a result, staff become hesitant to respond as they should or seek to avoid any contentious, hostile and difficult situations which might instigate potential disciplinary or legal ramifications. This situation is amplified by a sense of training related un-preparedness (Note: see section

relating to training). All respondents indicated that they could not de-stress at work having to de-stress outside of work time as best they could using a variety of approaches as they felt there was no respite or appropriate provision for respite or retreat within the facility.

Organisational Relationships [4-7]

- **Issues relating to ease of making and outcome of grievances process and the appropriateness of this method** [factor of 6.4/9 equivalent to 71%]

In general, most supervisors felt that existing grievance processes encourages staff to come forward and discuss specific or general issues which require a grievance process. It appeared that many of the supervisors took a proactive approach in monitoring shift issues, discussing these as a way of moving forward, with most of these OICs being visibly proud of being able to be a part of what might create favourable morale, and a strong unified team. Some of those interviewed, who alluded to having made a grievance themselves at some point in their career offered further comment in relation to the appropriateness of this method, stating that the process outcomes can be quite subjective and that sometimes the process did not appear to be unbiased with a conflict of interest when a complaint might be made against a high-ranking officer. Nevertheless, it appears that the general attitude of all people involved in the interviews was that the grievance process had improved over time to such a degree that officers no longer felt that the first recourse of making a grievance would be ridicule. Interestingly, (sworn police) respondents felt that many more grievances were being lodged by civilian personnel in the workplace, however, civilian supervisors did not make mention of this being an issue, rather, they felt that in general civilian personnel addressed grievance-worthy issues whereas when a complaint is made to sworn police the problem just tends to be shifted around.

Undoubtedly, the vast majority of all respondents stated that new technologies such as social networking, namely Facebook posed serious concerns as a tool which has the potential to and is being used to extend intra-organisational issues beyond the confines of the workplace. In

particular this refers to 'throw-away' comments being posted in the virtual world regarding work related issues or about other staff having significant impact in fracturing real workplace relations. Social networking has been further described as a significant contributor to inter-shift fracturing allowing exclusive 'cliques' to develop.

- **Confidence that PCF organisational relationships differ to those of other areas of WA Police** [factor of 6.2/9 equivalent to 69%]

The majority of people interviewed particularly those from PWH believed that location specific organisational relationships associated to PCFs did exist resulting from the unique working conditions and environment associated with this work. This appears to be more pertinent to the facility when staffed by sworn police.

Civilian supervisors feel, however, that the culture within the PWH has changed now that it is predominantly staffed by civilians doing a police job. Further to this, there was an overt distinction made by one or two sworn officers interviewed who suggested that civilian supervisors are inferior to sworn police in PCF contexts – suggesting the existence of an 'us-and-them' attitude, however, this sentiment was not shared by the majority of interviewees. It was suggested that this manifested itself as sworn arresting, corroborating or transporting officers always seeking the advice of a sworn supervisor on contentious issues and in doing so circumventing civilian officers, leading towards a detrimental effect on staff dignity and morale. This is not the case between staff attached to the PCF, but sworn officers from outside of the facility bringing in detainees and who are challenged in regard to operational and custodial procedure. (Note: see following question of further discussion).

- **Perception of existing PCF morale and staff dignity** [factor of 5.2/9 equivalent to 57%]

Generally, interviewees had different opinions on staff morale, which became evident among different shifts within the same facility.

Respondents indicated that staff morale was almost exclusively attributed to their direct supervisor. Shifts with 'good' supervisors had good morale and teamwork. However, custodial and auxiliary officers had added issues which require consideration.

A small number of current custodial staff, predominantly civilian and auxiliary, suggested that sworn officers saw them as working for them, 'The Police' in police facilities, and as such imposed upon them at will to carry out functions on their behalf and where civilians staff did not agree with what sworn officers required of them, sworn officers would seek a sworn supervisor to confer with (R.18 2011, however, civilian staff were aware of grievance processes available to them should they feel aggrieved (Note: further reference to this discussion made in 'Police Morale and Location Specific Cultural Legacies' within the discussions chapter).

- **perceptions of an attitude shift toward custodial duties and PCFs over time** [factor of 7.3/9 equivalent to 81%]

It is apparent that PCF staff sentiment towards custodial obligations is now better than it had been previously when fully undertaken by sworn personnel only. At the time many members of staff were there by default fulfilling their country service obligations, as punishment or as part of probationary experience and in essence, did not wish to be there and did not see or appreciate the significance of this aspect of policing.

Most of the sworn police interviewed believed that general professionalism and attitudes towards custody has improved since The Royal Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths In Custody due to increased scrutiny by internal and external investigative bodies, and public and media attention. (Note: further discussion relating to current opportunities to further improve and professionalise not only PCFs but also attitudes towards the significance of their specialist function in discussions chapter).

Custodial Officer [Police / Auxiliary / Custody] Training [8-10]

- **Perception of operational preparedness upon deployment to PCFs** [factor of 2.6/9 equivalent to 28%]

In general sworn police staff felt that custodial training currently received is greatly improved and considerably more specialised when compared to 20 years ago. It was believed that back then little time was apportioned to custodial training considering importance and frequency of performing custodial duties, risk to self, detainee and the organisation's reputation due to incompetence. This is in consideration of the portion of an officer's career dedicated specifically to custodial duties which is disproportionate to the investment made in time, training and resources by the organisation, however, the training that is currently received throughout the recruit training process continues to stop well short of achieving a sense of operational preparedness upon graduation.

Some respondents felt that although training felt specific and specialised for custodial environments it was insufficient and sometimes irrelevant with regard to some contemporary social, cultural, and psychological issues. Most feel that they receive a grounding or an introduction but competency will only come with on-the-job training (Note: for further discussion see 'Custodian Training' in the discussions chapter).

- **On ongoing training specific to PCF and custodial duties** [factor of 3.6/9 equivalent to 40%]

Respondents attached to district station PCF's indicated that they received little if any ongoing custodial training however some OICs believe what recruits are taught these days far surpasses what they were taught when they were recruits or junior constables.

OICs attached to Perth Watch House indicated that they had a dedicated custody Trainer attached to the section and that consistent training and instruction was given and is available to all staff attached to PWH.

The Trainer position is intended to address any specific and non-specific operational issues which may require further training or revision and facilitate critical areas training. However, some supervisors attached to the PWH indicated that they had hardly come into contact with the trainer for any specific issues which would normally be addressed during a short period of flexitime which could be used for training purposes.

- **Regarding specialisation of PCFs [factor of 8/9 equivalent to 88%]**

Many of the respondents did not appear to be fully conversant or appreciative of the significance of PCFs or the PWH as components within the WACJS and appeared to be initially uncertain as to how to respond to this question, however, upon discussion regarding the operational and functional responsibilities - once articulated, almost all of the respondents stated that they felt that PCFs should be classified as a specialist area. However, due to the potential long-term psychological implications of working within such a facility a qualification was made that the position of custodian within the PWH as a 24 hour facility ought to be subject to tenure.

A small number of respondents stated that they believed that custodial responsibilities of WA Police has already seen a significant degree of specialisation through the implementation of custody officers initially and more recently auxiliary officers into PCFs. Many auxiliary officers, however were able to use Watch House training and experience to set up a platform to apply for entry into the WA Police Academy to become sworn police (R.14 2011).

Facilities Considerations: cells + spaces + surveillance [11 to 20 & 35]

- **Lock-up design assisting performance of duties [1.5/9 equivalent to 16%]**

The overwhelming majority of respondents stated that they felt that in general the overall design of each of the facilities visited were subject to

many flaws in either design, fittings or equipment or the way it was being used which impacted on their performance.

The following range of issues, some serious, suggests that an audit or issues associated with the facilities visited ought to be conducted. The issues discussed with respondents include:

- *illogical or prison style layout*
- *inappropriate spatial organisation*
- *multiple stories*
- *number of and cell sizes*
- *insufficient number of approved cells*
- *inability to see if detainees are asleep therefore cell doors must be opened and officers must enter to check which is not only dangerous but disturbs an otherwise quiet detainee*
- *doorway and circulation space length that are too long*
- *door and corridor widths too narrow*
- *glass that can be reached (PWH)*
- *floor finishes that are too slippery when urinated on and grip the skin too much when dry if dragged upon*
- *the removal or decommissioning of showers (particularly since capsicum spray introduced unable to properly administer after-care)*
- *some district Lock-ups have panic buttons that are in ill positioned*
- *no pacifying instruments such as TV radio or reading material*
- *protruding fixtures and outdated equipment*
- *electronic door release issues in particular for outsider staff bringing detainees to some district level PCFs where it has been noted that there is a potential for an officer to lock themselves within in the Sally Port if the door should close intentionally or unintentionally between them and the detainee leaving the detainee within the reception area which could be unattended*
- *areas where CCTV are overlooked*
- *doors able to be used as weapons as cannot be anchored open*
- *fixtures which allow officers to catch themselves*
- *sharp angles causing injury during struggles*

- *no dedicated strip search room within one facility thus rooms able to be used are fitted with CCTV which is able to be viewed outside of the confines of the PCF (within the police station office area) causing issues of dignity (Note: for further discussion see 'Lack of Amenity' within the discussions chapter). This might not be in keeping with Section 72 Criminal Investigation Act 2006 – provision of reasonable privacy for strip searches.*
- **on being forthcoming on new ideas relating to PCF design**
 [5.2/9 equivalent to 57%]

The overall outcome of the questionnaire conducted relating to this question suggested that many of the respondents were more than willing to make suggestions or report faults and issues that required repair or consideration. Initially, however, the vast majority stated that nowadays they would not bother as nothing ever appears to happen to rectify the situation, we just make do establishing a sense of complacency regarding the quality of the environment. Further to this, those respondents who elaborated further stated that one of the benefits of being a supervisor or having a higher rank was that they felt that they were better able to effect change and that a number of suggestions made while being in a position of a higher rank have been taken on board, subject to funding.

This sentiment appeared to be consistent across the spectrum of respondents. Respondents also seemed rather sceptical and cynical in discussing budget related issues associated with suggestions and complaints regarding PCF design. Considering this, respondents were well aware of some of the constraints such as the expense of moving walls and structural members et cetera, however made mention that issues that they had brought to attention were simply cosmetic and superficial such as cleaning, painting and the like but would raise the standard of the space somewhat and indicate the detainees that the space was cared for and that it ought to be treated with respect. An issue that had been raised by a number of respondents was that design of some PCFs did not take into account future expansion.

- **on promoting efficiency through design** [5.8/9 equivalent to 64%]

R.3 (2010) suggested that significantly more post-occupancy study was required in order to evaluate the success of the design of PCFs with data made available to subsequent architects so that they weren't always starting from scratch or looking at precedents unnecessarily.

Comment has also been made that it would be impossible to design a Lock-up for every conceivable scenario but a solution where detainees were more easily observed while still offering an acceptable level of dignity to detainees particularly females and showering and toileting facilities should be considered.

Further comments have been made that at some district PCFs there is nowhere for officers doing custodial duties to sit where they could also be productive while occupying the PCF area, and further, from an operational standpoint some officers, in particular detectives who bring detainees into the PCF expect that they can leave them under the care and supervision of General Duties staff as they are the ones with the monitoring equipment and therefore should be responsible. Further comments made also include making the spatial layout more open plan and that there ought to be a more logical way of processing detainees that made it more efficient.

- **on specific negative issues associated with PCF design** [7.1/9 equivalent to 78%]

On the dining area

A location mentioned by all respondents attached to the PWH as being of particular concern was the potential (and at times actual) risk of violence within the meals area. This area is where pent-up anger and any antagonism experienced over-night could be acted out between detainees and formed an area of significant risk to staff as it an area which sees the largest gatherings of separated and unrestrained detainees and usually where the ratio of staff to detainees numbers are most imbalanced.

On corridors

A major concern apparent to all respondents other than R.10 (2010), but in particular to those attached to the PWH relates to the width of corridors

and doorways which service detainee holding areas – one respondent from PWH attesting to existing corridors not allowing for standard sized medical stretchers to enter all the way into cells.

In discussion, interviewees believed that a consideration was required – weighing up ‘sufficient space’ – increasing these movement spaces such that it accounts for a detainee’s ability of gain momentum if moving to strike, charge or attack with offering sufficient space for the required number of staff to manoeuvre around a detainee to appropriately restrain them without causing injury to either the detainee or staff involved. To achieve this most respondents suggested that a corridor should be wide enough for a minimum of three person (staff/detainee/staff) particularly as altercations frequently required three or four staff members to safely restrain some detainees – up to one for each limb.

Doorway openings would also ideally accommodate three people shoulder to shoulder as many injuries occur when struggling in doorways. The current situation At the PWH sees three people shoulder to shoulder unable to fit in corridors or doorways, this is a particular problem with the padded cell whose doorway should obviously be wider as this is where those who are most non-compliant and requiring restraint are escorted.

Note: for other general issues raised while discussing this question with respondents see points within this category (facilities Considerations: cells + spaces + surveillance) to follow.

- **on issues of excessive overreliance on CCTV surveillance** [4.2/9 equivalent to 46%]

This particular question divided the respondents clearly – dependent upon which type of PCF they were associated, with those respondents attached to district PCFs stating that CCTV was over-used to varying degrees and was due to operational and administrative productivity pressures placed upon them and that they had to multitask at all times due to a lack of human resources which would allow them to place staff within the PCF on a permanent basis while detainees were present.

Those respondents attached to the Perth Watch House all stated that they believed that CCTV was not over-used for surveillance purposes but rather was instrumental in maintaining an environment which was safe for both staff and detainees particularly should allegations be made. Nevertheless, staff from the PWH stated that electronic surveillance was dual edged. While protecting officers and detainees, it could be simultaneously used as an instrument to surreptitiously leave one's self (officers) open to disciplinary action particularly due to conduct within the facility during periods of down-time where officers might let their guard down and let off steam. Respondents attached to the PWH stated that letting off steam was critical to maintaining psychological health by opening up in discussing hardships and stressful circumstances with colleagues or a somewhat informal and impromptu debrief.

One respondent strongly believed that working within a facility that was constantly under surveillance was not a healthy environment for anyone over extended periods of time.

- **On understanding the working environment and facility** [4.2/9 equivalent to 46%]

Respondents to this question were undecided as to whether the working environment of the facility was enjoyable. The general attitude from respondents suggested that a degree of indifference existed among custodial staff. It did not appear that this was due to satisfaction; rather due to a sense of inability to change the status quo (with reference to question No. 12 previously) and conforming to existing organisational attitudes.

This was not always the case in relation to civilian officers who did speak out in relation to working conditions whereas it was mentioned that sworn staff did not. This particular attitude was expressed by a number of supervisors and conferred on behalf of their staff members stating that they believed staff in general were not happy and things could be better but you just get on with the job and make do with what you have. Similarly other respondents stated that although things could always be improved, it is better now than many years back when they themselves were in the position that their subordinates are in now.

One respondent stated they believed that although the built environment might not be in a position to be altered, their staff were pleased with the increased technology introduced in the workplace which is intended to make their work more streamlined and productive. New technologies must be thoroughly assessed to determine if the introduction of additional administrative requirements and training associated with implementing new technologies made it beneficial or counter-productive. Further to this discussion, R2 (2010) stated that while the working environment and facility in particular relating to the PWH was unsatisfactory, some incentives attracted a number of potentially unsuitable people to this location when it was difficult to attract people to the Watch House by temporarily classifying this location as a country posting. This offered officers who did not wish to fulfil their country service obligations in a country location, the opportunity to comply with this requirement while working at the PWH. Of the respondents interviewed, R1 (2010) had sought a term of employment at PWH to comply with country service obligations. Other staff that traditionally come directly from the Academy had no idea what the working environment and conditions would be like.

- **on Sally Ports** [3.3/9 equivalent to 36%]

Although in general respondents did not make sweeping suggestions on how best to address Sally Port design, certain issues were consistently mentioned. In particular these issues were concerned with proximity of the police vehicle to the area where police officers un-holstered their firearms and remove their Taser, pepper spray, and extendable baton and secure them. From this position detainees had a line of sight and in close range to observe methods for removal of weaponry.

Respondents felt that this appeared to be unprofessional and was tactically inappropriate, particularly as people who were brought to PCFs on a regular basis (as a detainee) were able to study police protocols, method of

accoutrement removal and the location of weaponry storage.⁴⁸ This, however appeared to be more an issue that resulted due to the design of the sally port that did not readily allow for discreetness and is not reflective of common practice but isolate incidents.

Other issues surrounded the vehicular movement through the Sally Port and its general size with particular respect to the PWH facility which caused some significant issues in particular on busy evening periods where ‘ramping’ occurs as there is only sufficient space for one vehicle. Arresting officers must park outside the Sally Port, but within the facility compound, and physically walk their detainee in to the PWH requiring coordination whereby entry of one set of arresting officers and detainees into the facility must be effected before opening the Sally Port roller door which is required to allow the next arresting officers and detainee to enter. Once inside, the roller door must be closed behind them before opening the electronic door accessing the reception area. One respondent stated that they knew of instances where the roller door was raised and detainees had been escorted through while the previous arresting officers within the Sally Port were in the process of locking weaponry away.⁴⁹

Another issue, understandably not able to be addressed due to its existing design, and that of all other Sally Ports observed, is that there is no provision for unidirectional vehicular travel of the arresting vehicle through the Sally port; rather the vehicle is required to reverse out of its location within the Sally Port to depart or to allow another vehicle to take its place, which is a particular hindrance at the PWH which regularly receives multiple detainees compounding the situation.

Additionally, police vehicles have restricted vision creating difficulties in negotiating the PWH Sally Port area in its current state. Issues relating to

⁴⁸ Although this issue is covered in the PWH Standard Operating Procedures it only requires that officers remove firearms and secure them in the firearms cabinet in the sally port. There are clear protocols and training in the method of holstering and ‘clearing’ firearms, however it is up to the individual officer to use best judgment in terms of being discreet in doing so

⁴⁹ This is a risk management issue reflective of isolated incidents only that may have established protocols to mitigate.

the width of the corridor and doorway leading to the PWH reception area and distance and number of corridors leading to the padded cells from this point have also been raised (see discussions regarding corridors and doorways in question No. 14) and some respondents have mentioned that the CCTV positioning within the this Sally Port is not appropriate in its current location.

- **Regarding benefits of exercise yards [7.2/9 equivalent to 80%]**

All respondents stated that exercise yards provided a valuable tool which benefited both the detainee and by default – staff members; unfortunately all exercise yards at the locations visited were deemed non-compliant with current standards and therefore with inadequate human resources to situate a staff member permanently outside an exercise yard to be able to offer this benefit to detainees, these facilities as described by respondents, and their associated benefits remain idle and unused and generally appear to be in a state of disrepair. Further to this some respondents stated that they believed that all exercise yards within the state with the exception of regional PCF exercise yards might be non-compliant.

Exercise yards have a completely different feel to general cells, and have been described as extremely beneficial. Exercise yards were described as tending to have a pacifying effect for detainees as it offering them a sense of release and a degree of openness, being of particular benefit for those held for extended weekend periods particularly in instances where weekend court was unavailable.

Exercise yards were also used as overflow during exceptionally busy periods within the PWH, however, it has been mentioned that it is critical to consider that numbers within them should be kept to a minimum so that the occupational, ratio the amount of detainees held within the yard in comparison to the number of officers overseeing it, and the potential of injury to staff should violence break out among a number of detainees is managed. Minimising the number of detainees held within exercise yards

also ensures that sufficient personal space is available and the ability to move around is not compromised.

- **On the observation cell [2.7/9 equivalent to 30%]**

The observation cell within PWH has been described by respondents attached to this facility as both appropriate and inappropriate in a number of ways. Issues relating to strategic location, spatial qualities, size and proximity to staff administrative area have been mentioned as areas of significant concern which required consideration.

The current PWH observation cell is located to ensure some degree of visibility from the bail area. This area serves to process detainees to bail and return a detainees property, however, is also used by staff for administrative duties, however, staff are recurrently antagonised and provoked by detainees with distractive behaviour from this cell via an inadequately sized observation window which is intended to allow one-way observation, thus affecting their administrative duties and productivity with inadequate acoustic separation further compounding the problem (R.19 2011). See also question No. 20 'on lighting and acoustics'.

Entry to this cell is off the corridor and directly opposite to it is a non-compliant holding cell which is inappropriate due to the exchanges that can occur between occupants of the two opposing cells. In addition, this observation cell is the only one designated as such located in the male section of the facility, and should ideally cater for a specific maximum No of detainees.

There appeared to be no specific number that respondents could nominate as the maximum that should be held within the observation cell as this was dependent upon operational requirements and discretion of the individual shift supervisors. Consequently R.2 (2010) made mention that it is imperative when sizing cells to consider the procedural aspects associated the organisation which suggest that it would be better to make observation cells of smaller proportions to better serve their purpose as this particular respondents felt that if cells were made larger shortcomings operational

resources would translate into cells being used to hold more people (with reference to the organisational make do mentality also found elsewhere in this section). R.1 (2010) stated that the observation cell was too small as a single open cell, however, in explanation stated that they had previously seen up to ten (10) detainees held within the observation cell at one time with over-flow being held in 'H1' (holding cell No.1 which at the time of interview was deemed non-compliant) – which appears to be consistent with views held by R.2 (2010) regarding occupancy versus cell size.

Other respondents who participated in this research who were attached to district level police buildings containing a PCF indicated that they did not have what would be considered a dedicated observation cell but considered them to be a valuable asset and would welcome their inclusion within their PCF should they be made available and some indicated that they did have an observation cell. However, this was not the case as it was merely a custody pod.

- **On issues regarding the placement and design of the padded cell [3.4/9 equivalent to 37%]**

In general, most of the respondents stated that the design of padded cells and the way in which they are used is effective; however, a number of issues were raised at various locations specifically relating to ease of access. Concerns were raised by all respondents attached to the PWH regarding the location and access to the padded cells within this facility.

Of particular concern was the distance from the reception area to the padded cell, a part height wall to the corridor leading to the padded cell posed an injury risk when struggling with detainees on the way to the corridor leading to the padded cell, the corridor width itself is too narrow (as previously mentioned in question No. 14) and the width of the doorway to the padded cell was also considered to be too narrow to allow enough officers to escort a combative detainee into the cell. The distance between the padded cell and the strip search room was also mentioned as being too excessive.

A variety of other concerns were mentioned at various locations, including mirrors installed within padded cells that could be reached, poor lighting, padded or all skin being too loose and subject to vandalism, and at one location – mechanical calling installed within the PCF causing sufficient air pressure to force the padded cell door to slam closed and thus an operational risk should staff be struggling with a combative detainee within the padded cell should this occur. The padded cell within this particular PCF had a ceiling height of 2400 mm which is easily reached and is of particular concern.

A respondent attached to another district level PCF mention specific issues relating to their padded cell where the cell door swings freely and surrounding the entry, inappropriately located fixtures overhead gave detainees the opportunity to hang on with their hands – freeing their legs and thus presenting a capacity to kick out at officers who would then be forced to approach detainees while being kicked in order to pull them away from the fixture. This respondent felt that these fixtures were located in one of the most inappropriate locations available seeing that the most non-compliant detainees were the ones escorted to this location. However, the respondent was pleased with a new flush mounted stainless steel water hose enclosure affixed within the wall immediately outside the padded cell door which was installed for ease of sanitation and cleaning of urine and excrement from the cell into a grate beneath the cell door threshold.

Another non-directly related issue of concern to supervisory staff attached to the PWH which they felt the Police Department ought to consider related to the cleaning of cells (of a minor nature) should they be soiled with urine or faeces, which is currently undertaken by trustee prisoners who reside within the PWH facility (under the authority of the Prison Act 1981 and regulations in conjunction with the Police Lock-up Manual). PWH trustees are considered invaluable to PWH staff, forming a beneficial two-way relationship with the Police Department where among other menial tasks within the PWH, minor cleaning is exchanged for what is considered a much safer alternative to imprisonment for the trustee when compared to the sentence being carried out solely within a state prison.

PWH staff mentioned they could foresee something that would be of particular concern for the future Perth Police Precinct Watch House, a belief that a trustee program would no longer exist and thus trustees would no longer be accepted in the new state facility. With this, respondents stated that their understanding was that the cleaning of soiled cells at the future PWH facility (currently under construction) would be undertaken by external contractors. Respondents raised an example of such an incident taking place at 3 or 4 AM and therefore the resultant time and cost implications, mentioning that at present the clean-up would occur almost immediately, however, they felt that if a contractor had to be called out after hours the padded cell and other cells might be left usable for extended periods of time which would be unacceptable particularly during busy periods. Further to this, the respondents also mentioned that it would also be unacceptable and unreasonable to ask their staff members to clean something that they wouldn't want to clean themselves, especially bio hazardous material.⁵⁰

- **On the qualities of facility lighting and acoustics** [2.7/9 equivalent to 30%]

Acoustics

All respondents other than R.15 (2011) who saw some benefit to the custodian being able to hear everything that was occurring in the facility stated that PCF acoustics in general were unacceptable particularly with regard to acoustic separation between male and female, observation, segregation, and administrative areas within PCFs. At district PCFs detainees that shout, swear and are generally disruptive within the custodial area can be heard throughout the police station due to insufficient sound attenuation and proximity to office areas.

PWH respondents mentioned that areas where mixing of detainees occurred such as bail and reception areas posed the undignified prospect of private details furnished by detainees to facility staff during questioning being overheard by other detainees. This highlights the need for design that

⁵⁰ SOPs allow for procedures in the event of both "significant" bio hazard and "minor" spills. In the absence of the PWH OIC, the Shift Supervisor must be advised of any biohazard spills.

addresses issues of confidentiality. Designated areas with a suitable level of acoustic attenuation or separation from 'common' areas might suit here.⁵¹

Other points made related to acoustic quality of the PWH facility as unsuited to facilitating audio recordings of an acceptable quality which were necessary to protect the integrity of all occupants. The way in which one respondent described the PWH during busy periods as a consequence of poor acoustics suggested that the facility took on an asylum like quality with a number of respondents making reference to issues associated with acoustic separation when many family members or other large associated group were held at the facility, and separated, as this instigated screaming that could be heard throughout the facility causing unwanted disruption and anxiety among other detainees who are trying to sleep. This causes antagonism overnight which can sometimes lead to violence at breakfast time where all of the detainees are in one dining room at the same time (See dining room in question No. 14).

Lighting

Lighting was described by respondents as being sufficient, although some detainees could reach surface mounted lighting fixtures at some locations posing some concerns. Some respondents stated that although artificial lighting was sufficient natural lighting and direct natural lighting was insufficient.

An issue mentioned by R.15 (2011) which relates to all PCFs visited, concerned the inability to dim any of the lights in cells which they believed could pose a negative situation psychologically for detainees, particularly as complaints had been made by detainees regarding excessively bright lighting within cells particularly during extended periods of detention when detainees were trying to sleep.

⁵¹ See also Chapter 5 'Survey and site visit findings' for further discussion

PCF violence + Risk Management [21 to 25]

- **violence in general** [no score given]

None of the respondents stated that they were happy with the level of violence in PCF. In fact the majority of respondents stated that violence is excessive, and unfortunately to be expected as part of the job. Some of those interviewed stated that the level of violence appears to be getting worse and that they believe the recent increase in the number of detainees brought into the Lock-up which are not only alcohol affected but also drug affected, and further, a high proportion of these are found to have underlying mental issues.

Respondents did, however, appreciate that the point of being brought to and detained within PCFs was when detainees were at their worst and could exhibit some of the most awful traits of human behaviour, but were usually entirely different in the morning. With this, the behaviour of some detainees in the morning could be subject to what had occurred overnight (see question No. 14 'Dining room' and No. 20 'Acoustics' relating to detainee v detainee antagonism). It was felt that general violence was directed more so towards arresting officers bringing detainees into the facility rather than towards custody staff but this is not always the case. With this, a measure which appears to have some influence on violence towards officers within the PWH is bringing to the attention of the detainee that officers are not police they are 'custody' officers who are there to look after them – this distinction appears to hold some weight with a number of detainees.

- **Location of violence** [no score given]

Predominantly at rear of van while in the Sally Port – when detainees are asked to exit the rear of the vehicle, and in the area leading up to the entry door.

Another location where a significant proportion of violence is acted out used in the reception area which has been described as inadequate as the benches where multiple detainees are made to wait for their turn to be

processed are to close in proximity to other detainees in the same position and the distance from this point to the reception counter where sensitive information is discussed with the receiving officers is also inadequate, with one respondent stating that the waiting area ought to be outside or separate and then each person is asked to come in one of the time (also see question No. 20 'Acoustics' and discussions contained within 'Dignity in the PCF').

Violence also occurs in the dining room sometimes (see question No. 14 'Dining room'), in the exercise yard when they were being used and sometimes within cells one respondent making reference to an incident where one detainee attacked another rather badly and refused to stop in the presence of staff outside the door, who had to wait for the door in the trial cell to be opened remotely due to the way it was configured, having to be physically removed from the other who was cowering on the floor.

- **Type of violence - methods used in acting out** [no score given]

The way in which violence could be and had previously been acted out according to respondents, involved physical, verbal, psychological, racial and sexual.

- **Risk minimisation through experience** [6.6/9 equivalent to 73%]

while most of the respondents believed that experienced officers could control certain situations with a more developed set of personal strategies to form a rapport with detainees and an ability to analyse and intervene in situations which had the potential to escalate into violence are the respondents stated that it came down to how well the individual officers communicated, and the interpersonal/social and life skills that they could draw upon which made them 'good operators'. Further to this, the risk of being highly experienced comes with a reduced level of tolerance and cynicism toward detainees and thus in the way in which experienced officers relate to them.

The general feeling was that younger male officers and not necessarily a lack of experience was the cause of some circumstances escalating into violence whereas female officers and older or more experienced male and female officers had more patience and spoke to the detainees in such a way that it showed empathy and did not react in haste to non-compliance nor to the degree as others might. This did not appear to be in any way related to a predisposition to move towards violence, rather, perhaps more experienced officers had a more diverse set of life experiences and skills that could be drawn on in difficult situations. This was also the sentiment of R.10 (2010) who stated that these days officers do not talk to detainees as much as they should in order to resolve things verbally. However, some respondents made it clear that there are instances in which nothing could be said or done to placate certain detainees.

R.14 (2011) mentioned that volatile situations could be defused with good communication and that the presence of female officers who could achieve compliance through the verbal negotiation, a tool developed according to some female respondents as necessary to compensate for a lesser physical presence was a valuable asset in PCF environments.

Female respondents in general felt that irrespective of the length of time required; achieving compliance through verbal communication and showing some compassion was a more mature, consistent and effectively method that compensated for lower levels of physical strength, next to their male counterparts, and would be the preferred method on every occasion.

R.19 (2011) eluded to a culture predominantly among young male officers for action – evident when the compliant behaviour of detainees normally renowned for being violent when brought to PCFs result in obvious disappointment and a sentiment toward a detainee that they are ‘pussy’. With these types of detainees the arresting or escorting officers will pre-notify PCF staff that a detainee likely to be violent at the point of exiting the vehicle and during processing will be transported to the facility and as a consequence up to six officers might come together and wait for the detainee who may turn out to be completely compliant by the time they arrive.

- **violence and design** [5.5/9 equivalent to 61%]

Most of the respondents stated that they did not believe that violence could be avoided or excluded through design especially with drug and alcohol affected detainees, but rather could have the effects of risk of injury minimised by design and avoided through training. The only way respondents could see the risk of physical violence being removed from PCF environments was if there was no contact required.

It has also been mentioned that it was not only up to design but many other factors including procedure such as occupancy levels and length of stay which in turn is of particular concern at the PWH which is left with detainees on occasion, who are on a 'Return to Prison Warrant'. The cause of this appears to be related to prison protocol where detainees who would be escorted back to prison after hours are not accepted, leaving PWH staff to hold them longer than they should and increasing risk to the police Department. This is also the case when there is no weekend court sitting. Respondents generally made reference to resolving all of the issues mentioned in the answers they previously furnished in questions No. 13-20.

R.14 (2011) mentioned that selecting the appropriate candidates to work within these facilities was an important consideration to avoiding violence.

R.15 (2011) felt that the PWH ought to be used in the way in which it was designed with a separate high, medium and low risk sections as some detainees should never be placed next to some high risk detainees or with extensive records and previous prison experience.

It was also stated that particular attention had to be paid to general areas where there was a potential for large gatherings of detainees to occur such as the dining room where as many as 20 detainees could be locked in the one room at the same time with access to utensils. Once everyone was sitting and eating the door to this room is locked and staff return downstairs. When issues arise, staff are required to run back upstairs and unlock the door which takes time and prolongs the potential length of violence.

On Dignity [26 to 34]

- **On single person cells [7.5/9 equivalent to 83%]**

All of the respondents could see (to varying degrees) operational as well as functional benefits associated with the inclusion of single person cells in conjunction with a mix of other cell options. They were, nevertheless sceptical that the many benefits these cells could offer a PCF would ever persuade government in respect to substantive costs.

Most respondents stated that a number of single person cells would provide more options to better segregate sensitive people and also for isolating detainees with contagious medical conditions increasing overall prisoner safety. Respondents attached to the PWH having had access to peruse over plans of the proposed new Perth Police Precinct Watch House made reference to custody pod cells as single person cells, however, these are not intended to be used for anything other than immediate supervised control and only for very short periods of time. R.19 (2011) said that detainees were not held within this type of cell for any longer than necessary. Although there is no specific limit set on the amount of time a detainee can be held in what has been referred to as the 'fishbowl' holding cell. Again, this too is subject to operational requirements and individual supervisor discretion under any given set of circumstances.

(See question No. 18 'Observation Cells' in relation to a misunderstanding of the definition of single person cells). R.18 (2011) stated that the key issue already mentioned was the non-existence of any pacifying strategies such as TV or radio to alleviate boredom especially for those held for extended periods with literally nothing to do other than sit, wait and conjure up an ailment that might get them taken out of the cell and to a hospital.

- **On issues relating to secretion of contraband [2.2/9 equivalent to 24%]**

Respondents stated that contraband was very difficult to get into PCFs and further that there wouldn't be much chance of it as most detainees were brought in straight off the street and thus do not have a chance to prepare.

If contraband did happen to make it into the PCF (PWH) it would most likely be found at the time of strip search, in the rear of the police vehicle, the exercise yard or in a mattress. It would be more likely that this occur in prison within facilities where there could be a level of preparedness, anticipation and purpose for the contraband.

Thorough searches are conducted of people lodged at PCFs, a cursory pat search before being placed into the police vehicle and again by PCF staff. This is followed by a more thorough search before being placed into a cell. Searches are also conducted each time a detainee re-enters the PCF following return from having been 'outside' (hospital, court or visits).

R.1 (2010) stated that it would be impossible to completely rule out contraband being present within the body without biometric scanning.

- **On other external agencies assisting PCFs**

All respondents were familiar with external agencies working in partnership with PCFs such as Department of Corrective Services (DCS) including Special Operations Group (SOG), G4S for secure transport between police and prison, Cultural Diversity Unit, Aboriginal Visitors Scheme (AVS), Mental Health Emergency Response Line (MHERL), Choice One nursing staff, Salvation Army, Bridge House, Drug Use Monitoring in Australia (DUMA) through National Drug Research Institute, Mental Health Emergency Response Line, although still referred to by Respondents as Psychiatric Emergency Team Service (PETS), Bail Co-ordinator, Mental Health Nurse, Justices' of the Peace (J.P's), St. John Ambulance (SJA), and Sanitary contractors.

- **on a forwarding appropriate medical attention**

All respondents were well versed with the requirements of giving medical care, be it a band aid to St. Johns Ambulance (SJA) or the associated local hospital within the district. Specifically relating to the PWH, nurses were

rostered on duty to work within this PCF six days a week from 8 PM to 4 AM and Sundays from 10 PM to 4 AM.

- **on maintaining detainees dignity (also see training)**

Most respondents did not appear to fully understand nor appreciate issues relating to detainee dignity and how this could be afforded to them nor the significance of its potential influence on detainee behaviour.

Collectively, respondent answers amounted to and were in keeping with the general outlines of 'Rules for Searching' (Criminal Investigation Act 2006) sections 63, 64, 70, 71, 72, and 13. These include reference to searches being conducted by same sex (unless a nurse or doctor), as quickly as reasonably practicable, with the least required amount of intrusiveness and visual inspection, and with the minimum number of people required present as safety permitted.

It should be noted that none of the respondents interviewed made reference to the prohibition of questioning of people being searched (during the course of the search) pertaining to offences the detainee might be suspected of having committed Section 70 (Criminal Investigation Act 2006).

R.13 (2011) stated that there was no defined way of offering dignity just one's own perceived understanding of it, therefore the range of responses ranged considerably from not being able to identify how dignity could be afforded without compromise in safety and security to a reasonable set of personally imposed strategies. Strategies ranged from the environmental qualities themselves such as the condition of the PCF being clean fresh and well lit with natural lighting (R.10 2010) and more aligned to procedural measures.

R.19 (2011) mentioned that tactical communications were taught though not specifically in relation to affording dignity, this respondent further appeared to have reasonable comprehension regarding a specific group which might need to be considered if subjected to strip searches (victims of sexual abuse) as they would be particularly self-conscious and thus this type

of search would be more difficult for them and possibly misconstrued as non-compliance or hindering officers instructions if not promptly followed.

R.19 (2011) stated that understanding would be required, allowing sufficient time or allowing them to turn around to remove clothing and then turn briefly to follow any instructions required.

R.18's (2011) philosophical view was that dignity must always be present from the outset and then a portion of the onus rested with the detainee to retain it through compliance. R.18 (2011) communicated this principle to other staff (inclusive of other respondents), however, conceded that dignity is soon lost during strip searches. Further to this all detainees are treated the same irrespective of any socio-economic or cultural background and every effort is made to maintain dignity by communicating the processes that must occur and the consequences of not complying with the detainee.

R.15 (2011) mentioned that PCF staff should treat all detainees as if they were someone they knew while R.2's (2010) understanding was predominantly connected to strip searches – believing that assessments ought to be made on an individual basis in relation to the requirement for strip searches which was referred to as something that should not be mandatory seeing the wording in the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 uses the wording 'may' be strip searched, particularly for minor offences where risk is not posed to any party. However, as this decision is up to the discretion of the OIC the decision was not always up to the individual officers conducting the search. Further to this, professionalism and politeness during strip searches was described as imperative particularly without making derogatory comments. Further reference relating to professionalism while conducting strip searches was made by R.1, R.5, R.8 (2010) stating that dignity was partially maintained by not having cameras in strip search rooms.

Other than this, R.5 and R.7 (2010) believed that dignity was being afforded and no other feasible measures could be decided upon during the interview that did not compromise safety. R.9 (2010) similarly believed that a temporary loss in dignity was a small price to pay in order to decrease the

risk of death in custody and a simple consideration might be making every effort to place detainees with appropriate other detainees.

R.1 (2010) and R.15 (2011) added that female sanitary pads were offered as required and clothing was supplied to detainees who came in partly/un-clothed while Respondent No.9 indicated that female toileting was an issue where some modesty was required but little or no mention was ever made in relation to male toileting or showering.

R.14 (2011) mentioned the need for contemporary policies for transgender people and gay and lesbian people to reflect contemporary life due to contradictions between the different policies, procedures and statutes And other initiatives include buying temporary hairnets for those who wear turbans, and prayer mats for Muslims (other respondents mentioned cultural initiatives such as prayer mats which were not brought up during this question see question No.33)

- **On specific requirements for intoxicated detainees [7.5/9 equivalent to 83%]**

Intoxicated people were generally described by all respondents as being more labour-intensive requiring greater supervision and in particular those that appear to be severely inebriated were best examined by medical practitioner in order to be given clearance for 'fit for custody' but this also took up a valuable time when considering the minimal resources sometimes available.

R.1 (2010) estimated that no less than 50 to 60% of all detainees brought into the PWH were either alcohol or drug affected or both especially in relation to late night or early morning arrests.

Intoxicated people are separated from other detainees whenever possible as they are extremely disruptive and combative – waking up other detainees causing fighting and violence with what would otherwise be quiet and compliant detainees.

R.18 (2011) mentioned that sober detainees are different from those that are intoxicated by generally being cooperative and quiet. This point of view

is corroborated by other respondents such as R.8 (2010) who described intoxicated and drug affected detainees as unhelpful and belligerent particularly during questioning and as being non-compliant, difficult, loud and aggressive by R.11 (2011).

R.13 (2011) referred to intoxicated detainees as obnoxious, however, R.15 (2011) although sharing the same opinion, reiterated that detainees should not be judged based on the state that are brought in (see question No. 30).

It is noted from discussions with all respondents that heavily intoxicated people pose a particular policy and procedural issues for PCFs. Simply being drunk in public is no longer an offence in WA. On the other hand, such people may be a danger to themselves and (once upon a time) these people were taken to a PCF and lodged as a drunken detainee and held within the PCF for a period of time sufficient to satisfy the Lock-up keeper that they would be safe to release (these are not charged people). This type of detainee poses a significant increase in risk to deaths in custody within PCFs and use up valuable human resources and facility space. For this reason drunken detainees are reluctantly and rarely accepted at PCFs.

This is a 'Catch-22' situation where police have a duty of care to people that are intoxicated to a point where they cannot care for themselves. Hospitals and other facilities might not take them due to insufficient resources leaving police personnel with a difficult situation where that had to live by the decisions they made increasing associated risks within the PCF or risk of injury or death to the intoxicated person should they not be accepted (R.7 2010).

- **On design and intoxication** [6.3/9 equivalent to 70%]

A number of respondents made particular mention of design related issues which are impacted directly by the way in which intoxicated detainees behave within PCFs. In particular, comments made relate to the existing PWH as the behaviour of these detainees affects a much larger population of other detainees and staff, however, these comments are also relevant to district PCFs which follow a similar design ethos.

Most of the respondents attached to the PWH cited significant problems in design related to acoustic separation when combined with intoxicated detainees (see previous discussion regarding 'Acoustics', 'Specific Requirements for Intoxicated Detainees' and 'Violence in General' and 'Location of Violence') where screaming and swearing could be heard throughout the entire facility and as previously mentioned causing serious irritation to other detainees. Most of the respondents directed reference back to previous questions in order to answer this question (see questions No. 13 to 25).

R.15 (2011) stated that the design of the PWH did not appear to be of assistance with intoxicated detainees but rather, appeared to be designed to cater for sober detainees, and further, R.20 (2011) stated that PCF design should reflect the worst possible detainees and the worst conceivable circumstances in terms of acoustics and non-compliance and therefore by default would also suit compliant and quiet detainees.

- **Design for detainees within specific categories [3.3/9 equivalent to 36%]**

While R.4 (2010) stated that police had a tendency to be very dismissive of any requests even if easily addressed, respondents felt that generic design of PCF's ought to reflect the overall majority of people held within PCF within that region and not be expected to cater for and operate on a minority basis. R.6 (2010) felt that this would not be much of a short-term issue but rather something that might come up in prison in PCFs occasionally detainees might not eat something - usually preferring to go without if we cannot offer an alternative.

Certain procedural initiatives had been implemented in most of the locations visited in order to cater for Muslim prayer and the PWH accounted for not only this but hairnets for Sheikh males also some specific dietary requirements. R.10 (2010) referred to institutional racism where no provision is made to address specific requirements where it clearly ought to be, stating that clearly some level of flexibility to provide for some of these requirements must be offered to staff attached to both district PCFs and the

PWH. This might include a variety of food options to better cater for the diversity of people held in PCFs.

R.18 (2011) referred not to the physical provision of initiatives to cater for race, religion or specific groups but to a lack of training that addresses contemporary society stating that training which specifically considers current issues such as an increase in the African component brought into PCFs; stating that a key concern currently within PCFs was how to best deal with African detainees as they are so combative and believes that due to the background where human life and dignity appeared to be irrelevant, there was little incentive within PCFs to behave otherwise, as their attitude reflected a position where it did not matter what they did and how they behaved. This attitude was described as one where the African detainees felt that Australian authorities could not physically harm them. Respondents felt that the nonchalant attitude taken by this group towards requiring any form adherence to authority was exploitatively measured by the non-violent nature of policing compared to the brutality that they would normally experience in the country from which they came.

R.18 (2011) felt that a lot of training which related to aboriginal people was also somewhat irrelevant as it generally applied to traditional aboriginals from other parts of Western Australia and not the ones from the metropolitan area. It seems apparent that PWH staff is seeking some form of concrete guidance – procedurally legally and politically on dealing with Muslim people within WA PCFs. R.15 (2011) stated that regularly, male Muslims would not comply or take orders from female officers and on another occasion a Muslim woman who was repeatedly asked to leave the backdoor of the outside of facility and given many warnings was about to be arrested. Here, the respondent's greatest concern was what to do in regards to the head wear should this woman be arrested. It is inexcusable of the Department not to provide direction or amnesty in its absence where it is clearly required on such a politically and religiously sensitive issue.

- **Appropriateness of procedure and spatial arrangement relating to genders in PCFs**
[2.5/9 equivalent to 27%]

Significant issues mentioned by all respondents attached to the PWH are concerned with the spatial arrangement's inability to adequately acoustically separate different components of the facility and further, due to its linear nature sensitive people are required to be walked past general cells or general detainees must be walked past areas where sensitive people are held, as there is no separate wing: being incorporated within the existing linear corridor spatial arrangement. This was also the case at PCFs mentioned by R.6 & R.10 (2010) stating that within these PCFs there were no separate sections for male, female or juvenile cells and therefore could not be adequately separated requiring these different groups to traverse past each other's cells while being escorted to their respective holding cell.

Further to this, R.10 (2010) mentioned that in the case of the PCF under their authority, there was no designated search room, therefore searches had to be carried out in rooms and cells that were all fitted with CCTV which the respondent referred to as unfortunate due to the footage being linked to the monitors within the main station, which was a serious concern for the detainees dignity. This respondent further commented within the facility there was no provision for specific high risk or low-risk cells which would be beneficial.

Dignity was also an issue mentioned by R.2 (2010) who discussed their concerns regarding the use of cameras in the shower area (of the PWH) which both male and female staff are expected to supervise, creating issues of dignity.

R.8 (2010) mentioned that issues of gender and dignity and risk begin in the reception area through the physical occupation and mixing of different groups of people in the one space. This also occurs in the cells areas due to insufficient provision of compliant cells and the distance between them which is amplified by inappropriate acoustic separation in most station level PCFs. This respondent also mentioned potential issues should a male, female, juvenile and transgendered person be in the Lock-up area at the

same time, and while this might appear unlikely there is every possibility that it could and does.

Another specific issue raised by R.1 (2010) relates to the searching of transgender people. Although procedurally it appears to be straightforward and most respondents that had stated that they had not yet experienced issues with transgendered people believed that the policy in relation to searching was clear. In reality it is not so. R.1 (2010) stated that male officers are required to search the male portion of the person, and female officers search female portion – requiring the male officer to step out of room thus leaving the female officer vulnerable while conducting her part of the search. However, issues arise where transgendered people might be ‘pre-op’ or ‘post-op’ and although some might be pre-op, perhaps through hormone therapy, are clearly extremely feminine (R.14 2011). Furthermore there are differences between the policies of WA Police and that of the Department of Corrective Services which directs the administration of transgendered people. These relate to procedures on how searches are to be carried out, and appropriate placement in the facility.

R.1 (2010) mentioned that transgendered people who are pre-op but clearly feminine as previously mentioned have served prison sentences in Bandyup Women's Prison and during the sentence have been searched by female staff. These same people since their release and reintroduction into the police system, are expected to be searched subject to police policies and procedures.

R.7 (2010) raised concerns regarding the placement of detainees with the minimal provision of compliant cells, only 2, as there are no provisions for single person cells. As a result, officers must make a decision on the most appropriate cell to hold multiple detainees, where on occasion a cell to one person is required. This leaves no further flexibility should the other cell be occupied and either a juvenile or another male be brought in during the same period. A juvenile male and a female will go into the two different cells, if we get an adult male at the same time or someone who might be classified as a sensitive person we will have a problem, it does happen and ideally 3-4 cells would be better.

HR and Facility Management [36 to 38]

- **Issues associated with detainee volume** [5.3/9 equivalent to 59%]

Most of the issues associated with overcrowding were addressed by staff attached to the PWH. The supervisors interviewed mentioned that there were times when overcrowding was an issue particularly on Sundays, long weekends and during periods where festivities such as New Year's Eve and Australia Day causes a significant increase in the number of detainees held. Generally standard cells are intended to hold three to a maximum of four detainees.

In relation to the PWH a number of respondents make specific suggestions relating to how overcrowding could be managed. The exercise yard, which is now no longer deemed compliant, can be used to hold a significant number of people so long as custodial staff are positioned outside and as previously mentioned up to 10 detainees can be held in the observation cell and if more is required detainees could be held in cell 'H1'.

Next to this, R.20 (2011) stated that there was also the option of initially placing the most compliant detainees five to a cell. The next measure would entail taking the most compliant detainees upstairs to the non-compliant cells on the floor above, with officers positioned there permanently. R.18 (2011) corroborated all of these points but added that five detainees per cell would feel rather overcrowded, however, would rather this temporary discomfort for detainees rather than the operational risks associated with splitting the shift among different levels of the PWH and losing staff permanently to those levels.

R.15 (2011) made similar comments in relation to the division of staff which usually occurred if any more than twenty three (23) lodged males were being held, stating that it was the preference on the balance of risk to place more detainees in the exercise yard on individual mattresses rather than splitting the shift over two floors of the facility. R.14 (2011) mentioned that if the Watch House was crowded to a point where it was deemed that it ought to be considered a "full house" occurring at around "fifty

overnighters” (R.13 2011), there was the provision to take detainees or overflow from the watch house to district PCFs which R.13 (2011) stated was to Fremantle Police Station PCF in the first instance, however, this has not yet occurred during the Respondent’s posting at the PWH.

R.13 (2011) also mentioned that capacity had to be considered in relation to “drop and goes”, detainees that are processed and are considered lodged but go directly to bail and do not take up cell space. The limit was also defined by R.13 (2011) as circumstances that would cause for more than 4 people to be held a standard cell once any overflow measures had been exhausted. These responses suggest that in actual fact issues of overcrowding have the potential to present themselves on a weekly occasion or at least on regular occasions and are generally managed in a haphazard way making do with the existing facilities. Next to this, there is a provision to place excess detainees within district PCFs however this comes with a significant impact on resources required to transport (escort) detainees to these other sites or causes difficulties for arresting officers who are required to divert to other sites particularly as in the case of some arrests where the paperwork required to accompany the detainee, such as warrants, are located in the Police Headquarters Building situated next to the PWH.

Overcrowding could also occur by another definition whereby specific groups such as juveniles might reach the maximum supportable number – in the case of PWH SOP (2011) dictate that a number not greater than six juveniles are to be held at any one time pending no available vacancies at Banksia Hill or Rangeview.

- **Perceptions of shift experience and capabilities** [5.7/9 equivalent to 63%]

While there was a discrepancy in what each shift supervisor deemed as sufficient numbers of staff, the general response from those interviewed attached to the PWH was that they felt that there were sufficient numbers of staff on each shift with sufficient experience. This was not always the

case when custody or staff were required to perform other tasks such as 'pickups' (R.19 2011).

On Friday and Saturday nights two shifts were rostered on at the same time – the second shift starting at 9:00 PM (R.20 2011). R.18 (2011) stated that while there were sufficient numbers of staff at the moment attached to the PWH, this came at a cost of bringing all Auxiliary officers back from district PCFs to PWH to make up for a shortfall due to a large number of resignations, and further, that the problem might actually be within the different districts and not at the PWH. This position was corroborated by district PCF OICs during interviews, stating that the Auxiliary officers from the particular PCFs had been recalled back to PWH and as a consequence they and other district PCF OICs felt that they did not have sufficient staffing specifically for PCF duties. They had been promised that the Auxiliary officers would be returned to the PCF sometime later, though a specific date was never mentioned.

- **PCF specific rules or ethos for detainees to follow** [2.3/9 equivalent to 25%]

The 'your rights in custody' notices found adhered to many surfaces and locations throughout the different PCFs visited were also referred to by most of the Respondents when this question was posed. These notices did not meet the criteria of the question posed which more specifically sought to determine if there were any published notifications anywhere in PCFs that specifically related to what polices' expectations would be required of the detainee in regards to behaviour.

All of the respondents mentioned that there were no defined and published 'rules' positioned anywhere within PWH or district PCFs for detainees that defined or outlined what conduct was expected of them while in custody. PWH did have some instruction regarding what procedures were required to be carried out and what processes were required to be carried out by police and consequently the detainees would be going through.

This chapter did not intend to undertake a study of every aspect concerned with PCF design, custodial training, operational PCF policies and procedures. What this chapter has highlighted, however, are critical issues that relate to PCF design, police processes, and organisational relationships that impact on custodial care through a series of interviews that took place between January 2010 and May 2011.

This has been a starting point in a quest to develop an understanding and critical new knowledge of what is required of architecture in order to better facilitate PCF custodial function, and also, promote better sentiment towards custodial duties, professionalism and organisational relationships. This chapter has been presented as series of summarised accounts, leading to insightful details not only worthy considering for design but ongoing procedural improvement.

The following Chapter (5) develops further upon a number of key issues that have arisen from the case studies and interviews.

Chapter 5

Survey and Site Visit Findings

Police morale, location specific cultural legacies and the Lock-up

The purpose of this chapter is to establish whether general organisation-wide police culture and attitudes exist or whether PCF location-specific cultures develop independently by the personnel who inhabit these policing locations. Note, while not architectural, the following analysis is necessary to understand and bridge the nexus between WA Police's (organisational) social, cultural, procedural, philosophical and operational conditions which directly inform associated specific spatial requirements PCFs. Further to this, it is necessary to discover if location-specific relationships form a component of an overriding homogenous organisation-wide culture or if they develop as fragmented sub-groups. This will make it possible to determine whether similarities or differences in organisational relationships exist between various policing locations, districts and regions. Next to this, the chapter also establishes pre-existing location-specific organisational relationships which may preclude prospective personnel from appropriately engaging with Watch House or Lock-up environments. Here, duties and situations require acceptable operational conduct to be performed in a manner which may or may not be fully informed by policy and procedure alone but subject to local and individual practice.

To achieve this, this chapter seeks to define what organisational culture is and via discussions with police interviewees, attempts to establish individual perspectives on existing organisational relationships both at their current policing location (PCFs), and at their previous policing location other than PCFs. For the purpose of this and all other chapters, it was important that interviewees be sufficiently experienced by having served in a variety of policing roles and locations, having a considerable length of service, or by existing or previous exclusive assignment to a PCF. The premise of either extensive or intensive practice under PCF circumstances is that experience attained under such conditions would be conducive to an adherence to existing organisational relationships (cultures) or the formation of new sub-cultures.

Schein (1985, 17) defines 'organisational culture' as a set of beliefs and values that are shared in common by members of an organisation. This being the case, Watson (1998, 2) describes the value system of the WA Police as "multi-tiered and hierarchical" consisting of

a number of key features, including; “risk avoidance, comradeship, masculinity, professionalism, opportunism and community standing.” Consequently, and irrespective of their combination, these values are considered to form the consistent overarching structure of organisational relationships within the WA Police. These attributes could also create negative conditions such as codes of silence, misconduct, and risk avoidance including disciplinary and legal consequences associated with being caught engaging in misconduct (Watson 1998, 145). Undoubtedly, to have the capacity to observe the functionality of police personnel devoid of the existing hierarchal environment and without existing obstructive intra-organisational encumbrances and agendas would be useful albeit seemingly impossible. A comparative analysis of the aforementioned illusory condition would prove impossible in reality as the two conditions do not occur concurrently.

The WA Police organisation exists upon the basis of its progressive historical thread that has developed incrementally since formation that separated it from colonial administration. It should not be considered an experimental entity for the benefit of comparative retrospection, but one that ensures a measured approach to reform. Based upon preliminary fieldwork conducted at the early stages of this research, it became evident that morale and its impacts on specific attitudes toward and within PCFs and Watch House facilities would be required as a result of discussions with retired police which suggested that some existing individual and group dynamics had the potential to negatively influence organisational relationships at specific locations.⁵² This existing dynamic may be a consequence of a recent circumstantial inclusion of incompatible personalities, opinions or work ethics, or the un-biased attitudes of new personnel, impaired by existing cultural legacies to which they felt an underlying requirement to adopt. Overall, staff morale and contentment was shown to be directly influenced by the existing location-specific sentiment, and consequently, in relation to PCFs, generally manifested itself as apathy towards Lock-up functions, facilities and conduct.

Existing organisational relationships found within WA PCFs, in particular the Perth Watch House are specific and sophisticated, and the subtle nuances are not easily appreciated nor understood by those with without specialist knowledge of or previous operational service in PCFs (Markus and Cameron 2002, 68-69). Interestingly, as a result of discussion with a broad spectrum of senior police members, it appears that WA Police as an organisation do

⁵² Morale can have a significant impact on the way in which police view people in general, criminals and also affects the way in which they view police training, education and performance. It could also negatively impact on the operational sentiment of the policing location.

not have one distinct organisational culture, rather a multitude of evolving complex organisational relationship layers attributable to the many departments that developed over time almost independently of other locations and their individual issues, an assortment of situational, social, cultural, personal, experiential, scholastic, hierarchical and training derivatives. This creates different attitudes towards specific circumstances.⁵³ Therefore the notion of an all-encompassing 'Police Culture' appears to be little more than an over-simplified preconceived lay-interpretation predominantly exacerbated by 'popular culture' within many societies.

Police officers tend to combine their individual identities with the views and the generic location specific "working personality" and attitudes of the organisation's many sections, stations and departments (Chan 1997, 61). Staff morale has been shown to comprise of unspoken legacies which directly affect the productive capacity of a collective group of officers, which in itself is a significant consideration. Staff morale therefore, becomes a significant component that directly influences the way in which officers portray themselves, behave within PCFs and also in the way in which detainees are treated. A socio-organisational construct based upon a collective philosophy and more cohesive custodial training structure in partnership with regulations and policy could identify key requirements associated with operational PCF design.

Both at a station PCF and Perth Watch House level – staff moral appears to be directly related to the way in which shift supervisors both run their shift and treat staff (R.1, R.2, R.14, R.15 2011). Moreover, the morale of the Officer in Charge (OIC) is not directly related to that of his or her staff, rather, district level administrative and operational pressures attributable to a perceived excess in accountability, insufficient levels of human resources and legitimate work-hours available (R.2 - R.11 2010-2011). For officers of all ranks, it appears that occupational pressures are internally generated, rather than the function of policing itself. This pressure and frustration directly relates to policing location or specific departments, not to the architectural spatial qualities of police facilities. Upon investigation into the motivational factors driving resignation, the majority of respondents indicated that fiscal remuneration is seldom the singular catalyst for resignation. Rather, significant job dissatisfaction was due to paucity in appropriate reward and recognition at all levels and a

⁵³ An example of this might be where specialist sections are involved in specific type of work, i.e. Tactical Response Group's work, specialised, training, or detectives investigating complex cases compared to what might be considered more general policing which is the type of policing most of the public can relate to.

sense of excessive and obstructive micro-management derived from an overly hierarchical management structure.

Inadequate administrative support further contributes to discontentment considering the contemporary climate of constant “community, media, Corruption and Crime Commission, Ombudsman and internal” scrutiny (McNamara 2006, 9).

Factors specifically affecting morale in PCFs, suggests a similar correlation to that of any other policing department and locations where the proportion of all personnel is comprised of a majority of subordinate officers. For a considerable numbers of officers, this type of socio-organisational construct and environment will be experienced at their first ‘posting’ (R.3 2010). These officers require varying degrees of guidance and further on-the-job training and find that morale among different shifts varies and is not only significantly dependent upon their direct supervisor and the way in which they are guided in their early career, but also that they will also be absorbed into the existing morale structure and specific culture of the location (R.15 2011). This is of particular concern as a disregard of one’s environment developed through the influence of others has the potential to promote a continuation of apathy towards facility maintenance, speaking out about ideas and concerns, and the significance of the very function PCFs, and in turn, they as officers perform within the CJS.

Interestingly sworn police do not appear to or choose not to understand some of the issues experienced by non-sworn supervisors within PCFs or the Perth Watch House, believing that entire *teams* that have low morale within these facilities are associated with inappropriate leadership, namely, management by non-sworn OICs (R.15, 2011). Although custodial and auxiliary officers are trained to work within PCFs a small number of non-sworn respondents felt that they have had their authority undermined by sworn arresting officers who at times have disregarded their direction (R.18 2011). Notwithstanding this, non-sworn officers appeared to be aware of procedures that exist to address these isolated occurrences. Arresting officers, it would appear, intentionally seek instruction from senior sworn officers while in the presence of custody and auxiliary officers who are of an equivalent rank to sworn officers being sought. This suggests a lack of understanding, sensitivity or disinterest in how this might affect the dignity and morale of the custodial and auxiliary officers involved directly and indirectly in custodial processes causing negative sentiments that permeates throughout the shift.

Some supervisors have been described as very dismissive, and disinterested towards probationers (R.1 2010: R.15 2011), while others may be very approachable to *all* staff irrespective of whom their actual supervisor is. Some OIC's and shift supervisors employ a militant approach towards Lock-up management with some describing working conditions and atmosphere as being 'barracks-like' (R.2, R.15 2010). On the other hand, detective and specialist areas appear to have a casual hierarchy promoting a sense of equality and more relaxed working environment where staff feel more valued, their opinions listened to or at least debated (R.3, R.4 2010). This appears to be to the contrary to what occurs at a suburban station level which contain PCFs and locations comprising significant levels of subordinate staff and the Perth Watch House, where conduct appears to be intrinsically hierarchical (R.3 2010). Further to this, one person having command over all police, has been described by Finnane (1994, 15) as a means to a "hierarchical and increasingly bureaucratic organisation."

In this setting, politics intrudes into every aspect of policing, creating a less autonomous operational environment (Milte and Weber 1977, 202: R.6 2010: R.15 2011). The structure of the WA Police organisation is one that is multi-directorate which suggests that a spectrum of organisational relationships exists within an analogous framework where disparate "systems create hierarchies of dominance with influence and communication going down, rarely up-the line" (Zimbardo 2007, 10). Large organisations are in themselves a relatively homogeneous and insular fragment of society, comprising of conglomerated, separate yet interconnected sub-sections whose anomalous culture is undoubtedly attributed to specific institutional situational stimulus, suggesting that;

"at some point, the System may become an autonomous entity, independent of those who originally started it or even of those in apparent authority within its power structure [as] Systems provide the institutional support, authority, and resources that allow situations to operate as they do; each system comes to develop a culture of its own, as many Systems collectively come to contribute to the culture of a society" (Zimbardo 2007, 179: 227).

Traditionally, locations such as Perth Watch House would not have been generally considered prestigious⁵⁴ and on the priority list for officers looking to establish themselves. Likewise, this perception also applies to established officers or police in specialised sections where cultural legacies continue to formulate conceptions that supervisors attached to these 'less desirable' locations are so by default or due to reprimand. As such, PWH is one location that is regarded as performing a subordinate policing function (R.1, R.2 2020: R.15 2011). This finding is consistent with Commonwealth and Law Enforcement Ombudsman's Review of ACT's Policing Watch House Operations' Report (2007, 79) where the review team, in discussion with Watch House staff established that "working in the Watch House was perceived to be among the least important jobs in Policing" with almost all people interviewed regarding deployment to the Watch House as a "form of punishment for poor performance" and did not want to be there. This mentality in conjunction with little preparatory or ongoing training and negative disinterested supervisory exchanges appear to be significant factors contributing to staff resentment and apathy toward proactively offering suggestions for improving facility conditions or operational processes.

As previously mentioned this perceived indifference to what might be of critical operational significance become motivational factors driving resignation among custody and auxiliary officers who might not have the opportunity to transfer.

Before this, custody and auxiliary officers in operational control of Perth Watch House adopted the classification required to be defined as a 'country posting' and became a catalyst for sworn officers' obligatory compliance with 'country service' during times of insufficient human resources and when it proved difficult to attract sworn personnel. Under these circumstances, sworn officers who had not previously completed any other country service and transferred to PWH would be deemed to have met this requirement. However, this appears to have attracted some personnel who ought to be considered inappropriate based upon their motivations, which appears to have further compounded upon existing problematic moral and location-specific relationships leading to discontentment and a desire for transfer (R.2 2010: R.13, R.14 2011).

It became apparent that the point of view of inappropriate motivations for transfer to PWH was not held by officers with any form of conviction before being interviewed and the

⁵⁴ Over the years PWH was also a 'learning' location with many graduating recruits sent to the location as a first posting where experience is gained away from the general public and work is conducted in teams rather than individually or with a partner. Other such locations include the Breath Section's 'Booze Bus' and Perth Central Law Courts.

essential role that PCFs played in the CJS had not been given much consideration. A more specific position on the matter was, however, derived as interviewees articulated their thoughts during discussions regarding PWH and other PCFs' functional and associated operational requirements, with all officers surveyed unanimously taking the position that PCFs performed a critical role in policing and agreeing that PCFs should legitimately be considered as a specialist section. Respondents suggested that for the psychological wellbeing of officers, if PWH was to be officially deemed as a specialist section, it should be provisional to tenure, particularly in light of the psychologically relentless nature of custodial environments which do not easily accommodate for staff respite as would general un-confined⁵⁵ policing (R.8, R.10 2010: R.14, R.15 2011).

Respondents R.13, R.14, R.15, R.19 (2011) raised concerns on the psychological implications of PCF design which does not appropriately address access to appropriate breakout spaces for personnel. This was said in respect to the psychological impact associated with operational custodial duties (in large Watch Houses) being relentlessly noisy, violent, antagonistic and stressful. All respondents generally adopted this position while discussing the operational complexities, function and responsibilities of PCFs as an integral component of the entire criminal justice system. Simply, the respondents appeared to have had a revelation during the interview process, where for the first time, it appears, the PCF was being considered as an important entity performing a function worthy of special consideration and not a policing location of lesser status. During the interview the respondents' point of view appeared to shift from one that more aligned with the collective location-specific cultural legacies and wider negative organisational attitudes towards custodial training to a more considered position.

Reiner (1996, 178) similarly asserts that "too many policemen are contemptuous towards the people with whom they deal and oblivious to the seriousness of their tasks" and further, that when police perform tasks which they feel they ought not be doing, they have a tendency to take exception to what they do "day-in-day-out with the necessity of doing it" (Reiner 1996, 178) and thus lose sight of the significance of the *holistic* office of policing (R.10 2010). Regardless of the location, police work in general is stressful by nature and officers commonly claim that they receive little if any recognition of this. It has been widely

⁵⁵ This refers to policing locations that are not restricted to one location to carry out its primary function, e.g. general duties, traffic, detectives and mounted section. It is rare to have policing locations that come into physical contact with the public but all functions are confined to one building.

asserted that officers find the ever increasing number of ‘watch dogs’, or investigative bodies, appointed to scrutinise critical split second decisions frequently made under extreme duress, from the comfort and serenity of an office environment, equally, if not more stressful than policing itself (R.2 2010). Furthermore, these bodies have an abundance of time to contemplate every minutia of detail pertinent to the decision while many of the situations in which police are placed derive as a result of “the policies, operating practices, and inadequacies of other public agencies” (Reiner 1996, 199). Consequently, this appears to have created an atmosphere of negativity and resentment among personnel that feel that they work with the best intentions but are constantly pored over (R.2 2010).

Affirmation of this internal pressure is found in both PCF and external environments by virtue of the way in which staff are increasingly hesitant to engage in frequently precarious situations due to potential implication of self in the event of a possible investigation,⁵⁶ especially in relation to matters involving use of force (R.2 2010). Some officers cite ‘political correctness’ as another trend which has transformed the organisation’s operational ‘front-line’ practices. An increasingly hesitant approach is being adopted by officers that are hesitant to take decisive action (R.5 2010: R.15 2011). This is further asserted by Bryett and Lewis (1994, 100) who state that as a result of an increased number of civilian review bodies, some police are reluctant to perform in an operational capacity for fear of complaint or allegation, which however frivolous, must be investigated and leads to unnecessary additional stress for the officer involved.

Lock-up specific training

Additionally, it is widely accepted that this sensibility is further exacerbated by the fact that officers feel, in hindsight, they had not received sufficient situation-specific training before working within PCFs and due to enduring police legacies, feel that grievance-making does not come without some form of consequence or dishonour (R.3 2010: R.14 2011) particularly by confrontational supervisors who command their environment – in a quasi-barracks-style. Furthermore, Loveday (2007, 364) argues that there is great difficulty in achieving reform within policing institutions, attributed to their internalised operational cultures and wider political factors, with Barton (2003, 346-58) indicating that police

⁵⁶ This finding is corroborated by ACT’s Policing Watch House Operations’ report which found that poor morale was further negatively impacted by internal investigations into the activities of Watch House staff with officers in this jurisdiction similarly citing role-uncertainty and anxiety relating to a seemingly constant scrutiny as considerable constituents directly related to poor morale among Watch House personnel (Commonwealth and Law Enforcement Ombudsman’s 2007, 80).

possess inward-facing occupational cultures due to factors such as “wide discretion in interpreting the law, and robust mutual collective solidarity occasioned by the dangers of police work.” Solidarity of the institution against the dangers of policing and occupational norms, *could* instigate circumstances where police, guardians or custodian who are entrusted to care for detainees or arrestees surrender to ignorance, arrogance and adherence to specific situational cultures and exploit this localised divisional morale to create an indifference to, and a psychological barrier between themselves and detainees who are frequently viewed as belligerent and antagonistic (R.4, R.8 2010: R14, R.18, R.19, R20 2011). These psychological barriers are therefore used as a buffer between what the physical barrier (attributed to the built environment) can control, and detainee behaviour the aspect of custody the custodian isn’t able to control.

This type of camaraderie appears to be emulated and perpetrated by those less experienced or conformist to divisional cultures or by officers trying to establish a reputation as ‘hard-nosed’ at the expense of the detainee, effectively discrediting police integrity as a respectable custodian. Furthermore, this mind-set precludes custodial staff from admitting, believing or even considering that significant deficiencies in custodial training, function and organisational relationships exist at an elementary level. Moreover, the status quo, operationally, has generally not been questioned by police PCF staff until more recently with the introduction of custodial and auxiliary officers. Before the introduction of these new types of custodial personnel, no significant changes had occurred to give rise to challenge latent mores which suggest that questioning convention or raising issues will be met with apathy and indifference and furthermore subjects the individual to future reprisal or being stereotyped as flaccid and a complainer. Wilson (1968, 271-298) mentions that police behaviour is not attributed to pre-existing personality traits but rather to the culture found within the organisation and therefore “individual differences” were of no consequence as the specific departmental cultures would in a relatively short period of time, determine officers overriding policing style and attitudes.

Bartol (1996, 86) found that it is common for individuals to be “regarded as a failure in one but a success in another” department. It would also appear to be the case that although rare, certain individuals have traits that do not ‘click’ well within any cohort or policing (group) or team structures. Officers with such personalities, it appears, are considered in much the same way as a minority of officers with tarnished reputations which are not tolerated within the WA Police organisation. The tarnished reputation of these few has the

ability to burden them in future appointments (R.1 2010). Interestingly, it appears that through attaining a *critical mass*, different personnel types comprising of younger generation police officers and the introduction of auxiliary officers have contributed to a paradigm shift in a sense of entitlement to express personal opinion, and in more recent years have come to question the status quo and direction, in particular to this research, the policies, processes and qualities of existing PCF working environments (R.13, R.14, R.15 2011). Achieving this shift in perception was also achieved through the considerable number of officers employed under the Direct Entry Accelerated Training (DEAT) program, similar to a method of recruitment used in the 1930s by both WA Police and Prisons Department. This program implemented by WA Police sought to recruit and infuse internationally experienced and trained officers into its ranks to bolster a deficiency in staffing strength or insufficiencies in knowledge and expertise within specific departments, which has also contributed to this rapid and progressive cultural shift.

Direct Entry Accelerated Training

The influx of internationally recruited officers into WA Police, under DEAT has influenced the local culture of policing, it would generally appear, in a positive way (R.2 2010). DEAT officers having diverse organisational and cultural backgrounds albeit still in policing, and with this, as important as it is to introduce fresh ideas, initiatives and relationships, it is crucial that these policing cultures be cohesive with that of the WA Police which is essentially reflective of insular evolution,⁵⁷ specific to local conditions. In more recent years, the WA Police organisation has become increasingly focused upon professional accountability and community partnerships (Jonescu 2008, 34). Recently, WA Police have looked to increase the level and diversity of skill of its organisation by importing this proficiency from overseas. Indeed, Officers from abroad were tempted by a number of incentives during WA Police's international recruitment-drives (R.1, R.2, R.4 2010), one such incentive being evident encapsulated within the program's namesake 'Direct Entry Accelerated Training' (DEAT).

Until more recently, WA Police as a collective have had rather an inward-looking disposition with some members exhibiting what might resemble a more military-like attitude. This mind-set is better suited the organisation's earlier history, and less appropriate and representative of contemporary attitudes. Historically, length of service almost

⁵⁷ Within this context insular refers to evolution by means of recruitment of new police primarily from within W.A. regardless that this form of recruitment still captures a diversity of ethnicities and cultural backgrounds.

unquestionably equated to promotion, and with this length-of-service based promotion, offering an assortment of sought after positions. Conversely what has challenged a small number of respondents (R.1 – R.4 2010) is a sense of a lack of opportunities forthcoming to them while in parallel, DEAT officers appear to have their rank validated and skills recognised *con brio*, and presented with “plum” opportunities (R.1 2010) and attaining positions within highly sought after locations and access to desirable courses (R.1 – R.4, R.7 2010). Given the relatively little reasoning given by these officers who have expressed this sentiment, it would appear that they are isolated and do not necessarily reflect the views of the majority of police. This shift in recognition, which was once predominantly length-of-service based to a more skills and performance based platform, places significant value on university qualifications and is considered a genuine means to Fast-Tracking one’s career and promotion. Unequivocally, officers with the right skill-set and experience regardless of where (in the world) it is gained could and should do the job, however, McNamara (2006) expands on this, stating that;

“[sic.] the State Government appears clueless when it comes to attraction and retention of public sector employees. The situation with police is well known – conditions and pay for some time have not been sufficiently attractive to fill recruits schools so WA Police has had to go overseas to find new officers. Organisations need such attributes as performance-based rewards and recognition system, acknowledge employees for their contributions, have open lines of communication, high levels of employee engagement, competitive remuneration and strive for a work/live balance, unfortunately, it appears that WA Police does not have these attributes” (McNamara 2006, 8).

DEAT as a strategy has changed local WA Police culture, which although not homogenous is distinctive, demonstrating that the transposing of one country’s *police culture* into that of another in anticipation that they be cohesive is an unrealistic expectation in the short-term. A proportion of local officers find fault in DEAT officers for their tendency to make continual comparison with the operational methods and facilities associated with policing in their native country, finding that this constant comparison is indicative of an attitude which is less than accommodating of local methods and therefore undermining beliefs and common practices held by the local majority (R.1, R4. 2010). While this is not exclusively pertinent to PCFs and attitudes toward custodial responsibility, it is significant to intra-organisational relationships and sentiment as a whole.

Further differences in culture stem from a historical perspective; the organisation's roots and inception. Consequently, a police organisation of military extraction and conditioned through the adversities of frontier policing will bear dissimilar cultural traits from those that arise from civilian origins. These characteristics may also be found in the mentality, approach, skill-set and training of internationally acquired personnel who may be totally different and not necessarily cohesive with some of the local issues encountered in WA (R.1, R.4 2010). The (generally) impenetrable and insular nature of police organisations, and it has been suggested, a seeming reluctance among experienced international participants to fully assimilate to existing local policing cultures is further compounded by the creation of Custody Officers, via a now obsolete program and more recently, auxiliary officers. Psychological and behavioural pre-employment profiling for appropriate candidates and employee selection processes for some specific operational locations, has permitted further hybrid cultures to develop, formulating sub-groups of an overall 'culture' which is forever evolving.

Police personality

Next to this, Ho (2001, 318) mentions that modern day police organisations (world-wide) adopt the services of psychologists to administer their pre-employment, candidate psychological screening, where intensive psychological examinations are required to eliminate police applicants who are psychologically unfit to serve, due to incompatible personality traits. Psychoanalysis aims to select candidates most likely to maintain a consistent psychological profile into the future (McQuilkin et al. 1990, 293). Balch (1972, 106-119) notes that among research into the 'police personality', there exists a common understanding that characteristics usually associated with police personalities include machismo, authoritarianism, cynicism, aggression, suspiciousness and pro-camaraderie. Unusually high levels of occupational solidarity and inward facing organisational cultures develop with little or no conscious effort on the part of individual officers, a situation intensified by the perilous nature of police work which serves to unite police as a faction yet concurrently divide them from the society (Skolnick 1977, 53). It has been argued, moreover, that cynicism is a distinct characteristic of the 'police personality' developing as a result of burnout and stress principally caused by the excessive demands and nature of police work and furthermore, has been distinguished as a precursor to misconduct, unnecessary mistreatment, torment and corruptive behaviour (Twersky-Glasner 2005, 62).

Authoritarianism by its very nature further separates and isolates police from society. Consequently, this initiates and establishes an 'us and them' attitude further underpinning the emotion of solidarity between police colleagues. This situation is exponentially amplified in precarious situations and instances where police officers as a group, experience "hostility from the public" (Skolnick 1977, 44-51). Circumstances such as these lay the foundation for differentiation between honour and trust, internal police and external society perspectives, and as a consequence, police officers enshroud themselves in what Kureczka (2002, 20) refers to as "image armour", police using this vicariously as a 'martyr's' shield to stave off expression of emotion, a common attitude among police where showing vulnerability and emotion is deemed equivalent to what has been described as being a "soft-cock" (R.1 2010). Officers that are considered "slackers" (R.1, 2010) or those that consistently complain are also regarded with contempt.

With a blatant emphasis on the danger and unpredictability of police work as a precursor, a quasi-generic organisational culture can be associated with most policing organisations which is attributable to officers' predominant overreliance on collegial loyalty and support. This is also due in part to the guarded and, in some circumstances well-regarded suspicious nature of the police personality. As such, officers are reluctant to entrust confidence in non-police others including auxiliary personnel, and therefore have a tendency to isolate their feelings (Miller 2004, 37). In addition to this, uniformed staff appear to exude an inherent attitude which is manifest in a form of aversion of non-uniformed police, commissioned officers and external professionals with Thomas and Stewart (1978, 179) explaining that uniformed officers see the non-uniformed staff as "just like the critics in society who are against them and that their dull and pedestrian routine is viewed by them with disdain." At the same time, the presence of non-uniformed police and non-police professionals equate to un-warranted and un-wanted modifications in outcomes expected of the uniformed and thus a change in procedure which therefore inevitably impacts directly on them (Thomas and Stewart 1978, 180).

Appropriate custodial care in PCFs requires adequate numbers of qualified and appropriate staff subject to a considered selection process of candidates cognisant of the importance of PCF function and value associated with human dignity, whereas errors in the selection process and applications of convenience, which directly impact on productivity should be regard as unacceptable, circumventing desired performance standards.

It is evident that the WA Police is undergoing a significant organisational metamorphosis which is not limited by location, rather, austerity measures and the need to keep in step with a new technologies and new issues and types of crimes or social implications they bring with them. The organisation has been addressing this in a number of ways, specifically professionalization of the organisation, through progressively more specialised training, supervision and the introduction of various programs such as DEAT, custody officers and more recently auxiliary officers. This strategic intent is in contrast to the organisations corresponding modest historical derivation. It is apparent that a singular overriding police personality and attitude does not exist, rather, a general pre-selection matrix is employed to screen prospective officers for employment with WA Police and in some instances for transition to specific policing locations based upon particular suitability and predispositions which ought to preclude others in light of the operational requirements and function of the exacting policing location. Training and instruction as well as psychological requirements or assessments should therefore be sufficiently specific to specialised environments, policing locations, and functional and procedural requirements. This might also water down the notion of a general 'police personality' that exists upon the basis that the majority of the organisation adhere to quasi-collective attitudes created out of imposed selective processes and a 'one-size-fits-all' training regime.

Based upon interviews conducted within this research, findings suggest a consistency in understanding among personnel relating to specific determining factors that might impact on a shift or location's morale. Existing morale was found to vary significantly subject to the various locations visited with a range of despondent perceptions among PCF and Watch House facility groups, which predominantly cited morale to be inherently a direct reflection of supervisor-specific issues, attitudes and approach to the management of the shift. Incompatible personalities and neo-inter-organisational attitudes also resulted in various detrimental location-specific organisational relationships, further influenced by existing location-specific cultural legacies which manifest as an indifference towards individual obligation and conduct and an appreciation of the significance of their role within PCF functions. These findings are specific to PCFs and initiate what could be described as a non-defined inherent identity; a cohort of individual and collective personnel qualities, attitudes, and personalities forming a constituent extract of any one of many WA Police location-specific organisational relationships and associated morale.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Morale here infers neither poor nor good morale, rather, is used to indicate that morale's exist in all locations and is a product of the particular relationships and circumstances at each location.

Custodian Training

The custodial training received as perceived by officers and the way in which it is applied in the varied number of circumstances officers encounter it, may be directly related to either individual situational or collective attitudes. In order to determine what microcosmic socio-organisational construct exist relevant to the requirements of operational PCF design through police custodial training, this chapter seeks to determine the sense of operational preparedness experienced by members of the WA Police. This is discussed on the basis of training received immediately preceding appointment to a Watch House or being assigned to Lock-up duties within station PCFs, and whether this sentiment differs subject to PCF type, Watch House or Lock-up, and between custody, auxiliary and sworn police officers through specific PCF organisational relationships.

This distinction is clearly required since it has been the intention of most police forces to eliminate functions that “do not directly contribute to public safety such as prisoner transport, guarding duties, court duties and Lock-up duties” with government-vested-interest in a police commitment to “doing worthwhile things at least cost” (Bryett and Lewis 1994, 134). In line with this; modernisation of the WA Police and to make significant budgetary reductions the role of Custodian of the existing Perth Watch House and any subsequent WA State facility has seen the implementation of custody and auxiliary officers who’s primary role is to deliver custodial care and comply with policy and Lock-up or Watch House procedures as well as a number of other relevant functions in order to manage people in custody and external visitors to the PCFs.

This initiative is now singularly aligned with the recruitment of auxiliary officers as their appointment allows for greater human resource flexibility authorised under the *Police Act* to undertake considerably diverse responsibilities. Thus their employment locations are not solely limited to the confines of PCFs as would a custody officer. Responsibilities of both designations within PCFs include administrative and operational requirements relating to detainee admission, during custody and release and administrative functions such as obtaining accurate data for detainee record files and documenting property. It is a fundamental role which must adhere to official custodial processes in the same manner as if the function were to be conducted by general sworn police, requiring at times what might appear to be an overly invasive if unavoidable measure of physical contact with detainees. This includes general and strip searches that occur with, or without compliance when required.

According to Bertoldo (2012, 10) auxiliary officers, which now consist of over one hundred and fifty officers⁵⁹ are generally charged with performing many of what was once considered police specific administrative tasks relevant to particular areas of employment. For the purpose of this research, is considered in relation to the context of custodial care and within the confines of police district-level Lock-ups or the PWH. In these contexts, it is a requirement that auxiliary officers assist police officers by carrying out functions that “do not require full police powers” (Bertoldo 2012, 11) but could be considered as more of a specialised support task. This includes location specific functions such as identification of detainees during admission; involving the obtaining of DNA samples, fingerprints, and photographs. At times these functions must be carried out with coercion should detainees be non-compliant.

Nevertheless, officers must be cognisant that all detainees within PCFs are ‘people’ (and it could be said, forms the core business) and therefore thorough and competent officers are required who present an unbiased attitude and a sensitivity towards cultural and socio-economic diversity. Further to this, officers are required to monitor detainee health, safety, security and well-being by conducting regular cell checks while continuously screening with a focus on establishing an individual detainee’s level of risk with dignity and comfort always being mentioned as having to be balanced against safety and security (SOP 2011).


The Commissioner’s Orders and Procedures (1995) otherwise referred to as the COPs manual is intended to provide police guidance and a set of instructions for effective management of police functions and maintain quality assurance of procedural performance and accountability. This also defines all pertinent aspects relating to the duties of a member in charge or Lock-up keeper (LP – 1.1 *Responsibilities*). *Welfare Screening* LP – 4.11, directs that “all prisoners admitted into custody [be] adequately screened to assess their needs” and further, *Management of Self Harm – Detainees* (LP – 3.6) refers to a requirement to perform regular cell checks of detainees who are determined to be at risk of self harm during the admission process into the Lock-up or Watch House facility as well as to re-evaluate the risk and likelihood of “self harm.” LP – 3.4 *Surveillance Until Release or Discharge* states that the custodian is to ensure continuous surveillance is effected of detainees who have attempted self harm in police Lock-up and that *Records of Checks and*

⁵⁹ Officers, however, feel that this is insufficient at best considering the number of policing locations in WA. This does not even represent one officer per location policing location (R.1, Personal Communications January 5, 2013).

Observations (LP – 10.3) made by *Members*⁶⁰ are to be appropriately recorded, inclusive of the time and the specific type of cell check conducted on each detainee including “physical arousal of . . . apparently unconscious detainee prisoner[s] if it is necessary to ensure health and safety” as this is Welfare Screening and Management of Self Harm dependant.

The primary management strategy of risk reduction requires consistent assessment of detainee behaviour inclusive of their physical and psychological condition. Therefore a spatial program which facilitates a reduction in risk by offering the potential of applying constant physical surveillance ought to be considered. And in light of the volatility and risk of self harm in PCFs, if such a spatial program is implemented it should be used accordingly as a fundamental requirement. Detainees who verbally disclose or exhibit suicidal behaviour, appear volatile, are violent, or suffering medical conditions or are possibly the carriers of contagious disease can be competently assessed. Appropriate spatial program and suitable policy and procedure would facilitate better classification and segregation where necessary to reduce risks to all occupants within the PCF. This fundamental requirement is complicated by existing inadequacies in PCF design which do not allow for constant physical surveillance of detainees within in the existing Perth Watch House due to the layout of a disjointed linear system of critical spaces. This facility also comprises a number of disused areas and floors which are unable to be used due to having not been upgraded to current compliance standards and insufficient staffing levels to adequately manage the facility if it had been made fully compliant (*see example Fig. 14*).

⁶⁰ Refers to police personnel recording of information on a form ‘P 10A’



<i>Lockup in Perth Metropolitan Area</i>			
Emil Jonescu 2011. Reproduced from sketches taken during site visit and with the assistance of WA Police.			
	Diagrammatic	NTS	C.1965

Fig. 14 An example of an operational Perth PCF. This facility has a number of wings and is designed to operate over a number of floors. It has dedicated exercise yards. Long, narrow, linear corridors that connect all areas of this facility. There are a number of areas that are redundant and disused due to changes in policy and insufficient HR. This facility shares design layout and functional terminology that is consistent with some existing prisons and historical gaols and Lock-ups.

Station level PCFs are similarly designed and reflect comparable concerns in relation to the inability for this *linear* layout to achieve adequate physical surveillance without CCTV assistance or increase in dedicated human resources. This suggests that current PCF design is not appropriate and compatible with the critical functional requirements unless it is augmented with significant CCTV capabilities. This is also the case with District level Police Station PCFs to varying degrees, and while electronic surveillance is beneficial for safety and welfare purposes, it ought not to be a substitute or compensate for incompatible spatial architectural strategies, which would otherwise afford custodial officers the enhanced ability to comply with custodial procedure and ethical requirements.

Most of the respondents interviewed mentioned that the main benefit of CCTV was not for observing detainees but to provide evidence of actual events should complaints be made against police. CCTV therefore protects all parties concerned in relation to allegations made within PCFs, and as such, have been retrospectively fitted within all PCFs visited.

Initiatives to comply with statutory requirements have also been undertaken to a degree, in order to make the minimum number of cells compliant within each district and the PWH with outcomes that amount to little more than for cosmetic interventions. Nevertheless, from a historical perspective significant changes to organisational practices have occurred. "Custody Officers have their own trainer and participate in considerably more specialised job specific training than general police, such as cell extraction studies and close-quarters 'empty hand' technique training" (R.13 - R.15 2011). Sworn police officers, however, believe the recruitment processes for Custody Officers did not procure suitable personnel, rather, civilian-minded people returning to the workforce or seeking a career change who may not have the right disposition for Watch House or Lock-up environments. Respondents describing the recruitment of people that do not have a 'police mindset', understanding and accepting of some of the behaviours of offenders and detainees who are non-compliant or drug and alcohol affected (R.13 - R.15 2011). Comments have been made that "some of the Custodial Officer recruits have been grossly obese and unable to complete some of the most basic components of physical training required (R.4 2010). This was also a particular concern during the '500 Plan' which commenced in the mid 1990s⁶¹ where were the government declared that WA Police would add 500 new police officers to the force.⁶²

⁶¹ Under the command of Robert Falconer, Commissioner for Police 1994 - 1999.

⁶² Interestingly this same election promise has been recycled and presented as an initiative more recently in the State election in 2013.

What eventuated as a result of this plan was little if any more police, merely *new* police.⁶³ In fact what transpired amounts to a proportionate replacement of experience with naïveté. This initiative in recruitment procured significant numbers of inappropriate personality types due to a softening in what would normally be a more rigorous recruitment process particularly in the psychological evaluation (R.22 2012). Perhaps what is required are psychiatric examinations conducted by (experienced) professionals with both a relevant degree and a policing background rather than recent university graduates with little general let alone policing experience (R.22, 2012).

Additionally, the once stringent nature of police training appears to have gradually eased, with little opportunity for expulsion of recruits particularly at times when the organisation requires significant rapid increases in HR (R.22, 2012).

In some cases where physical requirements were not met by a majority of the recruits, the Police Department's demand for recruitment were such that the physical requirements were removed to expedite the process rather than fail the group or prolong their training till the required standard could be met" (R.4 2010). A contributing factor to this issue might be at the point of recruiting where "they are advised that they are suitable but shortly-thereafter cannot even pass basic physical requirements, inciting recruits to complain that they had been deemed suitable but the training required once recruited was beyond their capabilities" (R.4 2010).

Desired qualities sought-after when recruiting prospective Police and Auxiliary Police applicants, and an expectation among existing sworn police, include resilience and tolerance to stress – police are expected to possess an extensive array of redeeming qualities and a particular disposition considered commensurate with policing. An excerpt of WA Police Recruiting Section's publication entitled *The Constable: a profile* outlines specifically that prospective Police applicants must;

“Handle disappointment, frustration and/or dejection while maintaining effective performance whilst providing high standard working conditions and benefits for employees, the WA Police Service does not profess to provide a Utopian employment situation. Some constables may experience disappointment, frustration or dejection caused by perceived imperfect working conditions or

⁶³ Due to the number of ongoing resignations that took place during the same period as the plan. Large numbers of resignations have since occurred at various times within the last 10 years.

equipment; a large quantity of paperwork needing to be completed; or shift work interfering with personal life. Despite this constables should overcome these feelings and not allow them to affect their job performance” (WA Police. n.d., 3).

It is also anticipated that potential officers should be able to;

“Maintain composure and effective performance while under stress. Studies have shown that police officers suffer from job-related stress more than most other occupations. A frequent situation which causes stress to constables is attendance at violent or potentially violent domestic arguments. They may also suffer stress when faced with a heavy workload or a large volume of paperwork; attending a situation involving risk or physical injury; searching a building for a suspect; or attending a death scene.

This dimension emphasises the need for constables to handle the stress which they may experience and not allow it to affect their performance” (WA Police. n.d., 3).

The aforementioned behavioural and psychological expectations which are not too dissimilar to the expectations expressed in WA Police Recruiting Section’s publication entitled *‘The Police Auxiliary Officer: a Profile’* clearly suggests that WA Police seek to recruit prospective officers from specific groupings. Applicants with particular capabilities, discipline and dispositions are highly regarded. This desired disposition (It must be assumed), however, is equally relevant to the preponderance of policing locations, as additional – more refined psychological assessments and occupation specific profiling for approval to undertake occupation within a number of other departmental locations are not undertaken.

All of the respondents interviewed stated that they had not received any additional specific and specialised psychological analysis before working within station-level Lock-ups or Perth Watch House. What could be regard as utopian policing – a scenario consisting of general autonomous freedom with unrestricted movement to undertake operational duties with full hierarchical support, appropriate praise, noticeable community respect and minimal paper-work does not exist within PCFs. What exists here, is a unique environment and operational requirements of a habitable ‘vault-like’ secured enclosure without respite, escape, freedom of movement or recourse; with endless, seemingly mundane processes while constantly under surveillance and scrutiny and frequently subject to investigation. Considering this, re-evaluation of psychological assessments and occupation specific

profiling for Watch House and Lock-up specific appointment should be considered essential.

Technology appears to significantly contribute to a shift in policing methodologies and to individual and collective ideologies within the organisation. It appears that technology has promoted a cyclical effect on police where a lack of technology once provided police with significant capacity for self-directed autonomy, exponential advancement in technology, social networking and a more business-like approach to policing appears to be perpetuating apprehension among some police personnel and inducing an increasingly closed and objectionable mentality or antagonistic disposition based upon the organisations intent and objectives (R.3 2010).

This position and sentiment is consistent with other police, apprehensive of the surreptitious nature in which technology could be manipulated by the organisation or investigative bodies to facilitate gathering of incriminating evidence against officers by using contemporary technology's recording capabilities. Against this, technology is considered by WA Police personnel to be a perilous yet necessary factor which concurrently facilitates primary police functions and potentially, gathers evidence which might implicate and substantiate allegations made against them. Officers are appreciative of technological benefits while being reluctant to accept technologies which compromise discretion and autonomy – surveillance technology within PCFs are similarly regarded. It has been made clear that even with the advent of new technologies, which is intended to make work more efficient, in actuality more work is created through increased paperwork requirements associated with that technology.

As a consequence of the changing staffing matrix, observational capabilities and recruitment processes undertaken by WA Police to undertake the organisational and functional responsibilities within WA Police Lock-ups and Watch House, participants were asked if they felt that they had received sufficient specific physical, psychological and practical training to work in these facilities. All police respondents who work or had previously worked in PCFs strenuously indicated that to varying degrees, this was not the case and that all that was offered to them was a grounding or a "foundation" (R.4 – R.9 2010: R.13 – R.15, R.17, R.19 2011). Education and training of an appropriate method and type appears to be severely deficient, for sworn police Lock-up staff. O'Callaghan (1997, 300) further refers to police education and training as an issue which "continues to be an ongoing concern with officers frequently feeling under-prepared for their role due to a

considerable disparity between societal and philosophical advancements to how and what police officers are taught in preparation for their role.” However, in addition it appears that, although important, disproportionate distinction is apportioned to criminal law education and other forms of training (R1. 2010) which could be considered to be a compulsory ongoing extracurricular activity in light of the significant proportion of additional functions police perform and thus training would better serve. A condensed recruit training period sees a curriculum where social, inter-cultural and community relations, custodial functions and the multi-faceted disciplines of psychology, to name but a few, are allocated secondary acknowledgement at best.

In addition to this, a disparity exists between recruitment for the purpose of adequate human resources while at the same time aspiring for an organisation which continually seeks improvement in competency, specialisation and professionalism around what appears to be an enduring contempt for academic constituents over applied practical training among a multitude of senior ranking officers. Notwithstanding this, it is imperative that the instructors are themselves sufficiently versed in their field of expertise to train and suitably prepare officers for operational policing. The position of educator and trainer should not be undertaken by employees who are predominantly attracted to the idea of a non-operational non-shift-worker ‘nine to five’ lifestyle (R.4 2010). WA Police Academy’s state-of-the-art new training facilities, location and ambiance is more than ever aligned with that of a university campus being situated within the Joondalup Edith Cowan University precinct. The consolidation of an educational culture and training received at the Joondalup Police Academy (JPA) being a paradigm shift from the various locations and training previously provided since the organisation’s foundation, including Joondalup’s predecessor, the Maylands Police Academy.⁶⁴

Before the inception of the JPA, Maylands Police Academy was a relatively separatist and insular facility, which until recently, offered a rather more rudimentary and militarised setting with a more disciplinary approach to training. G.M. O’Brien, a former Public Relations Police Officer with the Victoria Police Force and author of *The Australian Police Forces* states that significant emphasis in Human Relations training was being developed in police forces in all states of Australia around the 1960s (O’Brien 1960, 10). Perhaps this was

⁶⁴ Maylands Police Academy site once functioned as “Perth's main airport until after World War II, and remained the centre for general aviation operators until June 1963 (Royal Australian Air Force Association, 2013). The Maylands site has more recently attracted controversy over asbestos contained within the aircraft hangars though other buildings are still used today for ancillary police functions.

the case, or rather, a distorted partisan perception as ironically in the following fifty year period this training appears to be non-existent let-alone improved upon. Further to this, the overwhelming majority of police respondents indicated that this aspect of educational instruction continues to be inadequate. Coincidentally, Commissioner of Police Karl O'Callaghan (1997, 300: 270) refers to many facets of police training as "being out of step with changing social trends over the last few decades", and further, exhibit a "stagnancy in response to implementing change" for which they are criticised. Nevertheless, unquestionable progress has occurred as evident in the divisions of rank which are largely dissolved and 'given-orders' now questioned, whereas previously this would be unconscionable and considered insubordination, carrying with it, considerable and sometimes physically stringent consequences particularly at and academy level (R.4 2010). To establish these claims, one need not look any further than the current police commissioner who is against 'standing fast'. This typically refers to standing up, if seated when a commissioned officer enters a room or 'bracing up', a formal postural gesture while in stride as a sign of respect for the rank of the person passing within close proximity to one's presence. Nevertheless, other individuals and sections might still enforce this conduct, yet this level of veneration is now only an explicit requirement at a police academy level (R.3, R.4 2010).

Training

Acknowledging the insufficient practical experience officers might have upon leaving the police Academy, directives dictate that when working in teams of two, probationary officers should not work with other probationary officers in isolation ensuring junior officers are able to be guided by more experienced officers as they attain practical experience. A number of respondents recall doing just that, some recalling having done this even on the first day on the job (R.4 2010), this, however is isolated and due to a lack of resources which may be experienced at some locations due to aforementioned austerity measures. Therefore, it is apparent that at times skills-sets are not evenly dispersed among the organisation, for example 'General Duties'⁶⁵ sections normally comprise of a large pool of inexperienced officers with a lesser number of slightly more senior officers and an even smaller number of experienced officers one or two per shift. This is a scenario being no different to that of PCFs where respondents stated that occasionally, both the operational

⁶⁵ General Duties police attend all tasks and are commonly the first in attendance. From here specialist assistance can be requested but sufficient experience is required to manage a variety of situations in the first instance.

staff and the shift sergeant are inexperienced in their role. Findings within ACT's police Lock-ups subject to a Commonwealth and Law Enforcement Ombudsman investigation similarly attest to a serious deficiency in relevant experience among officers commencing custodial duties within PCFs, stating that "relatively new members had 'no idea' when it came to entering a cell with a detainee" (Commonwealth and Law Enforcement Ombudsman 2007, 20). This report distinguishes that duty of care is;

"integral to all police training and should be understood by all members. However, the review found many Watch House staff had a limited understanding of duty of care in a custodial environment [with] staff focused primarily on the secure custody of detainees, and gave little attention to maintaining detainee well-being (Commonwealth and Law Enforcement Ombudsman 2007, 21).

One of the most dangerous situations that could occur within PCFs is for there to be a lack of clear guidelines, rules or procedures in place, for deficiencies in competent understanding or insufficient training; in addition to ambiguous and or inappropriate direction presented as on-the-job training to carry out custodial responsibilities. Without a specialised training program for PCFs, alternative modus operandus emerge propagated among new officers through on-the-job training, posing significant risk of recourse should this instruction be inconsistent with policy and official procedure. The Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE), a study conducted in 1971 by professor Zimbardo and a team of other psychologists at Stanford University clearly demonstrates what can occur under such conditions. For the purpose of the SPE, a group of volunteers were enlisted and randomly assigned the role of either prisoner or guard within a controlled environment; a make shift prison which incorporates cells and surveillance cameras within a purpose-modified building on the university campus.

The SPE controllers intentionally did not offer any decisive instruction, direction or formal training relating to how either control group should behave in either role. Guards (and prisoners) almost immediately made up their own *ersatz* rules and standard procedures with alarming and regrettable consequences. Both control groups adapted to their roles with such conviction that the experiment had to be ceased prematurely due to psychological distress among the participants (Zimbardo 1971). Based upon the SPE, *Das Experiment*,⁶⁶ similarly stages a simulated prison within a research centre for a period of two weeks. Male participants adopt the role of prisoners or guards, their roles allocated

⁶⁶ *Das Experiment*, 2001. A movie Directed by Oliver Hirschbiegel.

randomly by computer. The 'guards' are told simply to retain order without violence and the 'prisoners' are locked-up and have to comply with the guards instructions which initially appear to be a set of blasé rules. From the outset both groups exhibit an apprehensive disposition toward the other, sentiments which quickly transformed into a power-struggle for dominance. The guards quickly devise increasingly drastic and de-humanising punishments bordering on sadistic torment to affirm their authority and maintain 'perceived' order.

While these are fictional accounts, de-humanising by means of humiliation as a method for attaining and maintaining power in custodial facilities is contrary to the desired process of rehabilitation ambitiously anticipated to occur in prisons, cooperation, and reduction in PCF violence. This is due to dehumanised relationships that are "objectifying, analytical and empty of emotional and empathetic content" (Zimbardo 2007, 222-223). Hooding, masking, numbering, and head-shaving of prisoners are examples of other forms of de-individualising and de-humanising measures employed by other agencies.

Similarly Zimbardo (2007, 324-379) notes that situational parallels can be inferred to the devastating humanitarian crimes perpetrated at Abu Ghraib detention facility where officials operated under secrecy and anonymity seemingly without guidelines and pertinent formal training (Zimbardo 2007, 346). Further to this, professional identity under such circumstances is paramount, as "any situation that make people feel anonymous as though no one knows who they are or cares to know reduces their sense of personal accountability," this is further intensified if a supplementary component is added, or the circumstances are such that organisations are permitted to engage others with force (Zimbardo 2007, 301). Oscar Wilde appropriately observed, that "man is least himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a mask, and he will tell you the truth" (Ellmann 1982, 185). Therefore while significant attention is accredited to strategic design considerations and planning considerations of site and internal and external spaces, (including site selection, site context, vehicular parking and egress, security, link to external services and proximity to public transport and the community, external envelope, internal environmental quality, strategic placement of rooms and adherence with all relevant codes as required), it is of concern that the qualitative component of 'dignity' are less prescriptive. Furthermore, WA Police custodial training content, it appears, is remiss in its capacity to equip the custodian with the capacity to appreciate its bearing or recognition of the value of the provision of individual care addressing specific individual requirements

which ensure greater detainee compliance and a thus safer working and custodial environment.

Custodial training is perceived by both Police and Auxiliary officers in two different ways. Police officers feel that current custodial training practices given to Auxiliary officers are far more specialised and comprehensive in comparison to what is or had previously been offered to general police officers, however, what is currently offered to general sworn police is a significant improvement on previous practices preceding the late 1980s before the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC). However, as a collective, Auxiliary Officers feel that the training they receive is still insufficient. Perhaps the sense of operational preparedness experienced by members of the WA Police organisation both police and auxiliary, with respect to training received, cannot be placated due to an infinite number variables and circumstances officers encounter. The fear of the unknown or if one will be suitably prepared with the skill-set they possess before working within a Watch House or PCF is a common concern (R.13, 2011). This suggests that confidence in one's own abilities and sense of purpose is predominantly developed on-the-job which is at times optimistic and subject to the guidance, influence and sometimes improper practices of other more experienced staff who themselves have been subjected to informal training and streamlined practices. This perpetuates location-specific collective cultural legacies associated with operational practice.

Police training currently relies on simulated operational training known as Patrol and Investigation (P & I) which was implemented as a pilot program in the 1990s. For the most part, it has been suggested that a recruit's performance while in the line of duty could be better determined during P & I as it is during this simulated operational policing environment that 'cracks' in personalities appear (R.22 2012). This suggests that there are inconsistencies between the actual and the recruitment-process-derived psychological examination's determination of a person's character that do not appear until recruits are faced with real-life scenarios. This component of recruit training is insufficient and occurs towards the end of the recruit training process; furthermore, specific to this research, it would be difficult to assess how prospective recruit's will engage with detainees within a PCF based on in-class textbook learning with one or two hours of simulated real-life training (P & I). On-the-job experience is certainly of significant benefit, however, the circumstances have to be carefully considered in light of potential litigation should somebody sue the organisation or the officer. Therefore it becomes imperative that near-graduated recruits

are not to be used during some of the busiest days for police, such as Christmas, New Year and Australia Day as the demands on police HR during these circumstances inevitably leads to anyone in police uniform being used irrespective of ability and thus exposing their naïveté to potential litigation (R.22, 2012).

Specific to this research, WA Police ought to reconsider custodial (P & I) training limitations (R.4 2010) in favour of a more comprehensive 'live' training component which would be permissible if detainee categorisation allowed for more predictable, lower risk detainees to be presented to officers for pre-graduation training. This could be achieved if future Watch House facilities, as is current in PWH, incorporate and in particular, utilise a segregating spatial program for detainees of differing level of risk (*see Chapter 6*). Segregation by this means is additional to the directives outlined within the *Commissioner's Orders and Procedures (1995)* LP – 12.1 *Categories of Prisoners*, which directs segregation of prisoners to be predicated upon adult males, adult females, juvenile males and juvenile females⁶⁷ and LP – 12.2 *Aboriginal Prisoners*, which allows for segregation of aboriginal prisoners in the event of tribal conflicts whereas “otherwise they should if possible be encouraged to share a cell with other aboriginal prisoners.” Though not specifically mentioned within *Categories of Prisoners* COPs does account for other sensitive groups which will require segregation and or careful placement within PCFs such as homosexual and transsexuals as well as public figures and people charged with specific offences, however, within the typical cross-section of detainees exists further and more specific classifiable categories.

The existing PWH spatial strategy although “outdated and in need of being replaced” (Dean 2004, 5), would accommodate the above-mentioned live-training regimen, however, due to current policy and procedure the facility is not used as was intended by the architects employed within the former Public Works Department (PWD),⁶⁸ the state government department responsible for the design of the facility.

To this end, Conway (1974) mentions that when architects design buildings;

“we want people to use them, hopefully, properly. The more they use it in the way that it is intended, or manipulate it, it becomes good, it becomes meaningful and useful and something for people to benefit by” . . . “It seems to me a building can be judged on how well it serves the people. If the building doesn't do that, we have failed somewhere” (Conway 1974, 7).

⁶⁷ Note that juveniles are arrested and processed but are no longer held in PCFs.

⁶⁸ PWD has undergone many name changes but is currently Building Management and Works.

The original PWH architectural design brief accounted for more specific classifiable categories based upon risk minimisation of different detainees by physically separating them among different levels of the PWH building. This initiative might present concomitant benefits of a reduction in anxiety experienced by recent graduates who are normally thrust into the 'system' and from the outset, subject to detainees of all types, some of whom will be intimidating and be more familiar with the system's parameters than the graduates themselves who coordinate and work within it. This "entry shock" coined by Gibbs (1982, 99) refers to the experience of entering a custodial area from the perspective of the prisoner, however, this experience could be equally comparable to graduates with respect to the level of abusive and intimidating language, violence and threatening behaviour experienced by entering PCFs for the first time. Accordingly, this experience could be significantly reduced if new officers were incrementally acclimatised into their new roles, being a party to all types of situations. This includes high risk detainees, not in direct contact, but rather on the periphery, observing, experiencing and assisting rather than necessarily controlling and being reluctant to act or respond appropriately. In this way, officers might be more readily desensitised and better equipped to circumvent inherent abusive and intimidating conduct found within PCFs. This benefits both the individual officer to acclimatise to PCF environments and the organisation in retaining the very human resources it invests time and money into recruiting and training.

Before the introduction of Auxiliary Officers into the WA Police organisation, the issue of desensitisation was a lesser concern with sworn police, having experienced this form of behaviour in the course of their duty and therefore it is unsurprising to them that the same behaviours, if not worse, are encountered in PCFs, and having already developed a "thick skin" (R.15, 2011), are reasonably unmoved by such conduct. All participants involved in a questionnaire indicated that the Lock-up should be a specialist area, however those who elaborated on this during the interviews, indicated that due to the persistent and relentless abusive and violent behaviour custodial staff are subjected to within PCFs, associated psychological issues may be experienced and work-related stresses would become unavoidable to some members of staff. These stresses are associated to specific operational factors that occur within PCFs that are impossible to anticipate or simulate until one commences work within a PCF. Such working environments can only be appreciated once experienced in the first person.

The inability to moderate operational stress for officers that work in Watch House environments can be attributed to inadequate access to separate staff-only zones, whereas

station level PCFs are contained within a greater context. The current PWH design does not adequately address staff-only 'break-out' space for temporary respite for its staff away from the hostilities and stress of the custodial environment. Consequently, sworn police officers feel that they themselves are better equipped to accept operational PCF environments in comparison to auxiliary and custodial officers.

Custodial officers, a position recently outmoded in favour of Auxiliary officers, do not have the option of working outside of the confines of a PCF, whereas Auxiliary officers are subject to tenure, and are able to work in other locations (R.14, R.15 2011). The ability to maintain psychological health, should Custodial and Auxiliary officers feel overwhelmed by the working conditions at the PCF, addresses the very core of respondents' proviso in stating that PCFs ought to be a specialist location, in other words, the prospect of transfer should be fundamental requirement associated with the Custodial officers position description, which currently do not have. Nevertheless, many of the existing issues attributed to the disassociation between training and custodial environment could be overcome should police consider modifying their existing training philosophies. This requires specialised training be conducted in a 'live' environment rather than in isolation using substitute propositions. This approach to training could be easily afforded to officers in the current PWH as the design strategy embedded into the facility would allow for further and more specific separation of different categories of detainees. The capacity to do so, while currently not making the most of this, however, sees the facility being under-used.

Furthermore, if the police organisation is reliant upon on-the-job training to complete officer training to a point of competency – why not commence this component of training at a much earlier stage in conjunction with Academy training personnel. Impressionable recruits could be more appropriately navigated around some of the more abrasive and problematic organisational legacies while concurrently being eased into their respective operational custodial function. This would be in opposition to the surrogate approach where once graduation has occurred recruit training becomes the undertaking of others who are not trained nor necessarily equipped to carry out this ongoing training and support without the presence of biases infused with issues of situational morale, legacy and substitute practices.

Lack of amenity

This section seeks to understand the complexities surrounding the provision of adequate facilities not only for custodial personnel but for detainees and other sectors which

contribute to an operational PCF and also for recruit training purposes. Undoubtedly, over a period of operational service as lengthy as that of the existing Perth Watch House, alternative or additional provisions will be required in-keeping with changes in policy and procedures which are subject to revision for the purpose of improved practice or other pressures such as internal or external political issues. This is a critical issue from which critical lessons can be learnt from the existing situation, where the current PWH continues to be operational irrespective of extensive criticism and acknowledgement as being “outdated and in need of replacement” (Dean 2004, 5). This chapter will look at some of the make-do initiatives which have, and in some instances continue to contribute to a lack of sufficient and at times inappropriate amenity.

Indeed, regardless of the location or the age of the facility, it appears that police amenity is consistently compromised by funding, ultimately translating into inappropriately designed or provisioned spaces and once occupied, personnel are forced to utilise spaces in ways contrary to those initially intended. For example, space allocation is generally provisioned to accommodate for a set of requirements which can often be rendered as operationally insufficient before building occupation. This is in keeping with Conway’s position relating to ensuring that design facilitates the occupant as much as possible to utilise given spaces, as it was intended to be according to the design brief (discussed earlier in this chapter). In these circumstances, however, it is not necessarily the design itself that falls short of providing adequate facilities, but the funding allocated for the provision of the facilities.

In certain circumstances, due to the time-lag between proposal, approval, and works being undertaken to a stage of completion; upon building occupation, there is already a need to increase human resources. At times, this occurs as a necessity to meet operational requirements particularly in locations experiencing rapid growth or development and had been deprived of any previous police facilities such as suburban police stations in the Perth’s Northern Corridor (R.3 2010). To date, planning provision for expansion in design, and modification to facilities based upon requirements both operational and architectural, have generally occurred at what appears a disproportionate rate to that of actual revision and conversion. As a consequence, to accommodate additional resources, officers are frequently required to restructure spatial resources in order to accommodate transiency. A common form of this is evident at policing locations which predominantly provides for shift-

work and multi-disciplinary policing.⁶⁹ In such locations, the functional capacity of spatial arrangements is particularly demanding around shift change-over when the volume of staff within the office is at its highest (R.3 2010).⁷⁰ Generally, these facilities are rarely designed with a capacity to provide individual workstations for all staff. Though it is reasonable to accept that to do so would be impractical, this situation does, however, de-value the fundamentals of a working environment and is demonstrative of a method by which the importance apportioned to officer comfort, is translated to them through a spatial program built upon a deficient ill-considered and underfunded system, one lacking a determined effort to by government to sufficiently fund and future-proof facilities for an acceptable period of time (R.3 2010).

Similarly, all respondents were asked should the need arise, if they were willing to make or had made suggestions or reported any perceived shortcomings in design or facility provision. It became clear that in general, the more subordinate the officer the less likely they would be to bring issues to the attention of a supervisor. However, in explanation it appears that it is not due to an unwillingness to make suggestions or report, it is due to the way in which their suggestions are either out-rightly disregarded by a supervisor or inaction, formulating individual opinions aligned with an already existing legacy where 'nothing ever gets done so why bother' (R1. 2010). In contrast to this, a number of senior respondents mentioned that they much preferred being in a higher ranking position as they felt that with this they had have a lot more authority to effect change (R.13, R.14, R.15 2011).

To foster strong and healthy working organisational relationships, policing environments should ideally adopt approaches which promote working environments which are easily identified by its occupants as convivial spaces which encourage some personalisation and flexibility where appropriate. Existing police attitudes toward their immediate facilities were found to differ from indifference to contempt, but, it was considered as government property devoid of any capacity for personalisation and therefore not appropriately respected (R.4 2010). Consequently, some officers cited having observed conscious destructive behaviour toward their work environment and police property, supporting the

⁶⁹ For example, such locations allocate 'hot desk' workstations are used particularly by staff completing paper-work, administrative staff and officers assigned to office duties at any particular time. These workstations are altogether, no-one's and every-one's workstations negating any opportunity for personalisation and sense of belonging and permanency.

⁷⁰ This is due to staggered start and finish times at shift change-over to provide sufficient operational cover.

notion that architectural worth (as is interpreted by the architect) is devalued, upon occupation by the user (Hill 1998, 3).

Similarly, compromised vehicular structural integrity arising out of mistreatment or minor undocumented incidents that are not outwardly apparent to subsequent users due to the rotational nature of vehicular use, was described as being of particular concern. Some incidents of vehicle damage, it was suggested, remained unreported due to potential disciplinary action, thus posing significantly higher risk for other officers unsuspectingly using the vehicle (R.4, 2010). In addition to officers, members of the public who might be in the vicinity of an incident relating to a subsequent malfunction of a police vehicle due to unreported mechanical or structural faults are also inadvertently subjected to these risks. This WA Police example closely resembles that of some international organisational examples where Klofas (1990, 88) states that American facilities owe their unique organisational characteristics, inadequate budgets and facilities to government “which has neither the interest nor resources to fundamentally alter its purpose, organisation, management, or operation.”

Until recently, support of this argument was evidenced by the condition of a number of current purpose-built police stations and many examples of adaptively re-used facilities.⁷¹ In addition to this, alternative premises types have also been used offering little flexibility, such as shopping centre units being used for the purpose of providing a police presence.⁷²

Irrespective of these examples, it appears that new police stations and other specialist facilities, for example, Police Operations Centre, Forensics Division, and State Traffic Operations in Midland, are increasingly purposeful. Their design is contemporary, sophisticated, and informed by operational requirement and compliance with the Building Code of Australia (BCA) and appears to be aligned with best practice as opposed to minimal cost.

New police stations and custodial facilities are also required to comply with the BCA and Annexure 1 of the Code, *‘Building Code Alternative Solution for Custodial Accommodation Police Stations Condensed Report’*.⁷³ Irrespective of building type, compliance with the BCA

⁷¹ Some of these examples include outdated buildings such as the former Lockridge Police Station, North Perth Police Station and countless others still in operation.

⁷² The former Ballajura Police Station is an example of a shop-front police station.

⁷³ The BCA differentiates PCFs into two categories; Class 3, Cell areas and Class 5, Office components, an office building used for associated professional or commercial purposes.

can be achieved in either of two ways, by meeting established performance requirements or by a Deem to Satisfy provision. As a consequence the quantity, type, configuration and qualities of police stations, cells and cell areas differ in orders of magnitude from location to location, however it is accepted that particular operational assessment criterion must be considered to determine specific strategic relationships between facility requirements and site suitability. Although compliance with specific codes is a requirement, as previously discussed with respect to time-lag from planning to procurement and occupation, it is unclear in certain circumstances, if this statutory compliance also translates to operational and occupational safety and health regulations compliance.

Procurement of appropriate sites for future police facilities appears to be an overly convoluted, arduous and protracted process normally involving what appears to be an excessive complement of stakeholders including Police Land & Building Management Branch, District Office and a multitude of state government departments, Control Groups, Project Leaders, committees and user-groups. Preceding formal acquisition, comprehensive analysis is undertaken by Building Management and Works (BMW) to establish and address an extensive number of critical issues associated with the proposed site including but not limited to site appropriateness, capabilities, capacity, convenience, link to other services and communities, ability to integrate, and aspect visibility. Additionally, it is evident that Police facilities and their site are subject to not only strategic decisions but also sensitive political, environmental and social issues irrespective of the project being categorised as a small, medium, large, district, or state level complex.⁷⁴

The PCF component within WA Police complexes are categorised dependent upon locality being either; remote, country or city facilities, overnight or non-overnight, irrespective of location, must adhere to the essence of established current design standards contained within the BCA and WA Police Building Code's; Custodial Design Guidelines (CDG).

The standards found within this guideline are directly attributable to recommendations of the RCIADIC conducted in late 1980s and in combination with the Lock-up Management Manual. This facilitates implementation of specialised technical requirements for the design of PCFs, for which the Project Brief Development process appears to be an undertaking equally as onerous as that for site procurement. This process is inclusive of many similar stakeholders, and in addition, architects, Project Control Groups, commissioned consultants, Client Managers, Cost Managers, and Specialist Police Groups – to name just a

⁷⁴ A comprehensive list of criterion is outlined in the WA Police Building Code 'Planning Guidelines'

few. With respect to PCFs, it is essential that the critical functional pre-design requirements for a custodial facility's articulation be understood and be appraised as an immediate extension of the site planning and procurement stage of any new or proposed alteration and additions police facility works, and as such mitigate potential site imposed restrictions which may influence or inhibit desired future outcomes.

Lighting

This section discusses the importance of light in PCFs and the significant role it plays which is sometimes underappreciated. To do this, the following example is discusses the critical function specifically relating to natural PCF lighting, with solar orientation being a fundamental factor in allowing for the capture of 'best light' for a PCF component within a police complex. Moreover, as natural lighting induces a reduction in stress, vandalism, and likelihood of assaults, particularly in custodial facilities which Kessler (2000, 89-98) states that light "is the lifeblood of prison architecture, and it should be a primary consideration," yet this notion can equally be applied to all custodial typologies not just prisons. It is further imperative to consider that PCF staff will spend significantly lengthier periods within the confines of a Lock-up facility. Therefore, both detainees and staff within these facilities, (particularly Watch Houses), stand to benefit from the advantages of natural light within PCF environments.

Correspondingly, dignity should be designated as the fundamental human component crucial to Lock-up functional philosophy which although complimented by architecture is initiated and sustained by the custodian as are initiatives concerning the educational and instructive process of the rules and behavioural expectations acceptable within PCFs. Brisbane's Roma Street Watch House has incorporated comparable initiatives in the form of 'house rules' as a way of promoting a standard or level of acceptable detainee behaviour.⁷⁵ This arises as it is recognised that a vast proportion of understanding and learning is not due to action but learnt behavioural rules via verbal or written instructions, such rules being a set of behavioural guidelines in relation to an expected standard of behaviour for a certain set of circumstances (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991, 45). Coincidentally, social conditioning further influences human response to immediate environment, evident within a Lock-up setting where detainees in-general, better respect the facility when the

⁷⁵ This affords the custodian tangible bilateral lay-guidelines by which to professionally negotiate and ameliorate conduct through cause and effect. Detainees also feel a sense of obligation to not impact on other detainees' privileges that might be withdrawn due to their own behaviour.

architecture communicates to them that they in-turn will be treated with respect (Fairweather and McConville 2000, 39). Research by Fairweather and McConville (2000, 39) indicates that there have been positive outcomes where carcerative environments have presented a more “standardised setting”, over that which resembles a ‘human cage’. Inevitably, this would also be true for staff undertaking lengthy employment within PCFs where consideration ought to be given to design for the intrinsic purpose of dignity for all occupants. This becomes more critical in PCFs where the relative opposite of what occurs in prisons takes place. In prisons, prisoners are incarcerated long-term while in comparison, staff work relatively short periods, whereas in PCFs, detainees are held for relatively short periods of time and staff have long-term tenures of employment.

Dignity

Dignity by design is therefore coined as a term associated with conceptual design strategies constituted upon concepts proposed for dignity embedded into architecture, examples of which include (but are not limited to) affording genuine adequate physical circulation, acoustic and physical separation of incompatible groups (R.15 2011) such as sex offenders, males and females, juveniles and sensitive people, in order to minimise harassment and intimidation and as a simple gesture of an environment which is humane. Furthermore, it is important to present a clean freshly painted setting devoid of foul odours with adequate thermal comfort and good lighting that is able to be dimmed offering some semblance of perceived self-control, a set of parameters which detainees can control (R.15 2011). While the separation of male and female detainees *is* required, visually and acoustically this does not occur at most facilities and of primary concern in most WA PCF reception areas. Additionally, facilities where searches are conducted for both general and strip and the procedures for searching could be reviewed.

For example, is it necessary that all detainees be subjected to searches that require undress or physical contact in instances where ‘mum and dad’ types are processed for non-violent, drug or weapon offences? Categorically and unanimously all police personnel involved in discussions indicated that under these circumstances it would not be appreciated by any respondents if it were *their* parents involved. Further to this, privacy while being admitted in the reception area is not guaranteed and standard admission questioning is less than confidential, intrusive and debatably undignified. These relate to medical and psychiatric history, alcohol and drug use, medication, transmissible diseases, and next of kin among many others questions. At this time, detainees are also required to relinquish all property

including jewellery and potentially sensitive property to police who ledger the items and return or transfer the property as required.

Medical facilities within a Watch House, while making allowance for security and safety, should offer some level of privacy which also respects the dignity of the nurse, doctor and patient confidentiality. Notwithstanding this, the overriding *design standards* ethos is conditioned by recognition of detainee's fundamental entitlements of being secured in a safe environment, supportive and respectful of human dignity. However, Architecture is greater than itself, in that it is not just a metaphor of physical construction, but rather, the essential, distinctive and experiential relationship between the user and the material reality of the building. Without the critical relationships that are promoted between inhabitant and space, architecture would equate to an artistic interpretation of brief without soul (Hill 1998, 5-6). Therefore, competent understanding of architectural discourse requires acknowledgement of the social and psychological relationships between the user and the inhabited space which architecture provides. Moreover, Carter, Glaser & Wilkins state that;

“Planners who have little or no experience working with an architect should recognise that he is a planning specialist. It should be expected that, whether he may not be experienced in designing correctional facilities, he will apply his knowledge and skills to the problems and needs at hand rather than rely on stereotypes of other structures. Since program planners and managers are not always as certain as they should be of the program desired and the specific functions involved, the architect may find himself confronted with an information vacuum; to fill this vacuum, consciously or not, he may resort to stereotype design” (Carter, Glaser & Wilkins 1972, 395).

PCFs are required to accommodate the majority of detainees accounting for diversities in cultural backgrounds inherent in Australian society where possible, and further, incorporate distinct location-specific characteristics. As a consequence, it is imperative to understand a facility's operational success through increased post occupancy research and evaluation. W.A Police must be the custodian of the data and findings that arise from these evaluations so that for future projects, they are able to present this information to whichever architectural practice may be involved. Accordingly, subsequent design briefs are able to be informed by the successes and failures of previous projects. In consideration of this, it is disappointing that propositions for considerable shifts in architectural norms (relating to police buildings) be openly considered akin to non-conformist trends in architecture by

those specifying police facilities who require rather, architecture that is “timeless and well mannered” (Western Australia 1995b, 1). This architectural expression is arguably a somewhat subjective and moderately pedestrian architectural panacea reliant upon predictability and conformity.

Clearly, an imposition of architectural expressions of power creating an authoritarian impression is not socially accepted in contemporary societies. Local evidence supporting this is substantiated by considerable public opposition to the proposed site for the new Perth City Police and Watch House facility, expressing concern that this type of facility will transform this particular location in Northbridge into an authoritarian ‘gateway to the city’. It is for the prevention of these types of circumstances, that current guidelines stipulated within the WA Police Building Code insist on design that is compatible with the sensibilities of the immediate urban fabric yet still uniquely distinguishable. Internationally, contemporary architectural examples associated with police and Lock-up facility appearance have taken its urban context into account and do conform and complement existing urban fabric, scale, materiality, colours and perceived finishes. The building envelope although sensitive to context is also the first line of security for a police facility and the Lock-up and therefore must also be sufficiently robust to fulfil this requirement. For the greater part of society, the exterior of police buildings and indeed PCFs will be the only aspect by which to formulate an opinion. Therefore, it is incumbent that it make an impression representative of an organisations ethos and standards and not appear institutional as might be expected.

Design Guidelines

An admirable contemporary example which attempts to address Police, Court and Watch House contextual design sensitivities is evident in Brisbane’s Roma Street Justice Complex. This comprises of a Police Station, Watch House and Court House. The Court foyer is administered by both civilian and private security staff creating a more liberal ambiance and while the level of passive, electronic and observational surveillance in combination with perceivable security personnel is high it does not feel overbearing. However, there appears to be little impetus for aspiring progressive architectural proposals which conflict with status quo, as current planning doctrines are axioms of existing attitudes of conformism.

In its exhaustive comprehensiveness, that sets out many prescriptive design requirements for PCFs in specific detail the WA Police Building Code is to a point, regrettably inhibiting of implementing new cutting-edge theories and critical knowledge, in particular, as this all-encompassing dossier – which incorporates Custodial Design Guidelines risks authoritative contemporary architectural attitudes being transposed into reluctance to adopt initiatives other than sheltered and antiquated prescriptive recommendations. In such cases where alternative solutions or new theories and technologies are available it becomes more difficult to have these implemented where it is not specifically mentioned in a prescriptive specification. Non-project-specific briefs are sometimes written in the form of a prescriptive design guideline by architects who may be experienced in the field of architectural practice in the relevant field, but may not necessarily apply any significant researched knowledge. In relation to custodial facilities, design guidelines are written by architects for architects, at times forming the basis upon which associated enacted legislation is drawn (Markus and Cameron 2002, 36). Markus and Cameron (2002, 36) describe official design guidelines as an initiative with “ideological assumptions” of the associated discipline, function, utilisation and occupants which has “continued *almost* to the present day”, yet it *has* continued to the present day and will continue to do so into the future not in the least with the advent of the Police Building Code, Custodial Design Guidelines and other legally imposed regulations. It is not entirely subject to the rigidity of the finishes and the fixings, but rather the physical and psychological ambience and thus the quality of the spatial experience which is in question. This is a condition which must be addressed, but one which fall outside of the empirical scope of architectural requirements. In addition to the corresponding policy and procedures, this condition supports the police including custodial officers and detainees, to the two main constituents of PCFs.

Functions

Ideally, a genuine means for testing and implementing innovative proposals should be encouraged as equally as the research preceding its inception. For example, although it has been established that the place and point where the highest risks of detainee versus detainee violence occurs with the greatest risk to incompatible staff to detainee ratio to control such violence is at meal time – in the Watch House dining room, little appears to have been done to address this. In accordance with the published data available (United Nations Social Defence Research Institute 1975: United States Bureau of Prisons 1949) communal meals, dining, and mess areas have much the same spatial arrangement, finish

and philosophy across many examples of dissimilar custodial types.⁷⁶ This suggests that this spatial one-size-fits-all solution to communal dining was more of an indiscriminate solution to the requirements of the various different custodial typologies which had dissimilar functions and operational requirements. Similarly it appears that an average single person cell size of five square meters is shared in common among many examples of custodial facility types. International contemporary and historical (Watch House, Jails and prison) examples studied, such as those found in the U.S. and Europe, tabled in the United Nations Social Defence Research Institute (1975) and the United States Bureau of Prisons (1949) publications indicate that there provision for single person cells have been made. Although there are some potential benefits in using single person cells in the short-term, Altman (1975, 23), stresses that “forced separation, such as solitary confinement in prison, that is likely to be harmful to people in the long run” is very serious when used as a punishment and is something that should be considered before it is put into practice.

It must be noted that forced separation for the purpose of solitary confinement and punishment is not the same as single person cells in the general population of prison environments. What this analysis has determined, is that single cell examples for general population environments within *prison* are on average, similarly proportioned to those found within the existing PWH. However, within PCFs, the short-term context associated with single cells does not convey the same sentiment of being detained within them as a form of punishment. This situation appears to arise out of social structures and spatial relationships found within long-term carcerative environments which are diametrically opposed to PCFs. This suggests that a pre-determined acceptable minimum single person cells size may exist irrespective of custodial typology which may be based upon the proportions of the human body and perception of personal space.

One of the substantial differences between two different typology environments exists in the social interactions that develop into acquaintances, friendships, alliances and other forms of social relationships. Many social relationships that exist within prison environments have prescribed spatial relationships such as territories whereby ownership of certain spaces can be asserted by different groups or alliances via occupation. Markers or physical inhabitation by these groups suggest “the environment becomes an extension” of

⁷⁶ Several examples are offered within the *Handbook of correctional institutional design and correction* (United States Bureau of Prisons 1949) exemplifying many prison facilities predating 1949 with comparable functional strategies for communal dining. These share a similar spatial rational as that observed at PWH.

the collective groups ability to exhibit power and control of specific spaces through “territorial behaviours” (Altman 1975, 107: 206). Within this context it is understandable that to be removed from such a social and spatial set of connections is tantamount to further imprisonment within the prison itself. This implies, however, a degree of disregard of the significance of the functional distinction between prison and police, temporary short-term, remand, medium-term and long-term custody. This is in addition to the relative levels of risk and different categories of people detained such as sentenced prisoners and charged detainees.

Although a considered spatial provision and shift in operational philosophy would be required, communal meals area, it appears in PCFs, where concerns of psychological detriment attributed to non-socialising,⁷⁷ would be better suited if subdivided into smaller specific clusters such as on the basis of risk classification. Perhaps if the original operational concept of the PWH was reintroduced, given appropriate human resources, low medium and high risk detainee holding areas and associated meals area could be provided for as separate clusters. This would effect a reduction in significant risk at meal times due to incompatible detainees being in the same area while unrestrained. In addition, it would also create a safer operational matrix for staff that would be more readily able to manage reduced numbers and more specific types of detainees and assign a more appropriate staff to detainee ratio.

Undoubtedly, however, negotiating an effective balance between security, non-institutional articulation and convivial atmosphere with the practicalities of operational requirements specific to PCFs is critical. Further to this, it is also more-than-ever achievable with access to data, knowledge, historical precedents and other first-rate examples. These sources can also be complimented by dedicated research which suggest that particular spatial strategies, although cost effective have traditionally been and continue to be operationally problematic with increased inherent risk of violence irrespective of custodial typology. Changes in operational philosophy and thus spatial requirements are more easily achieved and sustained through contemporary architecture, technology, finishes and structural options limited only by innovation, imposed specification or policy and procedure. Consoli (2005, 223) validates this proposition, stating that non-prescriptive design briefs allow for more innovation in design and construction stages of a project with non-prescriptive briefs

⁷⁷ Compared with prisoners serving long-term sentences in other types of institutions where socialising is a necessity, in PCFs the need to socialise is not as critical a requirement which ought to offer some flexibility in the practice and management of meal time.

further urging architects to better understand strategic and operational requirements specific to the organisation, operator or manager of the facilities in order to transpose them into architectural responses.

What is required to formulate further specialised strategies and decisions relating to PCFs are a two-fold robust mechanism for obtaining spatial and architecture related post-occupancy data and narratives of both detainees and staff.

This information serves to facilitate non-project specific tactical architectural advancement and related operational strategies by means of interpretation by both architects and a delegated research contingent. It is suggested that both disciplines should be required and incorporated in a constructive and collaborative environment to share in a common objective of innovation and progress. The inclusion of this non-project specific cohort of police, architects and architectural researchers could offer the added incentive of formulating non-partisan related decisions and judgement which allows for less biased and more comprehensive analysis. This arises out of insufficient partnerships that currently exist between architectural practice and academia where significant opportunities to develop more specialised and considered architectural and operational models for PCFs which better reflect organisational policies, operational mandates and the organisations specific cultural matrix exist.

The detainee receives custodial component

The arrangements of the arrivals area for all facilities visited were similar including PWH. In considering this, it is more pertinent to state-level facilities that unidirectional Sally Port design be incorporated to streamline and make safe the process of lodging detainees to the Watch House. Further to this, contained within the Sally Port, the location of disarming needs to be revised so that method and action of disarming is not visible to detainees secured within the police vehicle contained within the same space. The current practice is rather rudimentary and presents itself to be un-professional and further, offers detainees the opportunity to study the movements and protocols relating to disarming and the removal of police accoutrements.

Respondents generally felt that the spatial layout of the custodial environment should be more open-plan rather than as compartmented as they are (R.13, R.14 2011). In particular, the existing PWH and state-level facilities which process large numbers of detainees have been described as being in need of a more logical program for processing of detainees. This

may conceivably suggest a number of processing areas that form different parts of the receivals process be situated along the way to the cells area, rather than one receivals area that is restricted to one room where all detainees and arresting officers must congregate.⁷⁸ Multiple processing areas would allow for better separation of detainees along a sequentially distributed processing framework through PCFs. However, this will require a major shift in operational procedure and organisational commitment in the provision of adequate human resources to service such an arrangement which would account for the entire custodial process from receivals area to the bail area.

Bail area

Areas used by staff for administrative duties must also be reconsidered as staff administrative duties and productivity is directly affected by provocative detainee behaviour towards staff due to the location of the observation cell, which is directly opposite the bail area separated only by a narrow corridor (R.19 2011). It would, therefore, be imperative to maintain visual connection and acoustic separation of observation areas while minimising potential distractions. It would be highly desirable to have more observation cells and better account for cross-talk.⁷⁹ Constant effective observation of detainees must be ensured by staff or a designated observer from tactically vantage positions to assure detainees within cells know they were constantly being supervised as the entire premise for having been placed in such cells in the first place is on the basis that they will require maximum supervision due to their risk and therefore enhanced ability to conduct supervision is essential. With this, respondents mentioned that larger and more appropriately positioned viewing aperture panels of appropriate transparent glazing should be considered where current PWH observation cells do not facilitate adequate surveillance capabilities due to inadequate viewing aperture panels. In addition, this would also be beneficial in standard and padded cells, limiting the necessity to enter cells to check on detainee that might be sleeping in a position where they cannot be sufficiently observed through current viewing apertures.

⁷⁸ The current PWH receivals area was described as a space that is too confined and often congested, allowing for incompatible groups of detainees to be in contact with each other particularly during busy periods, or when multiple arrests of people related to the same offence are made and brought to Watch House at the same time (R.2, R.8, R.9 2010).

⁷⁹ In custodial contexts, cross-talk refers to the ability to communicate via unconventional and unintended methods due to poor sound isolation, including; physical separation, mechanical ducts, pipe work etc between segregation cells, male and female areas and the observation cells.

Padded Cell

Further to this, it was felt that padded cells must be positioned in much closer proximity to the reception area to minimise the need to negotiate already narrow doorways and corridors in order to escort detainees to the padded cell (R.1, R.8-R.9 2010: R.13-R.15 2011: R.18-20 2011). Furthermore, egress from either side of the padded cell could be provided, and with this, servicing both the reception area and internalised areas. The approach to the padded cell and doorway servicing it was described as a particular hindrance as this location is where detainees who are most non-compliant and in need of restraint are escorted (R.10 2010).

Corridors and doorways

Another similar and equally problematic concern expressed by all of the Respondents attached to the PWH relates to the width of corridors and doorways that service all other areas of the facility, which suggests that staff consider all other corridors and doorways as inadequate, both, being described as too narrow, and further, corridors too long. Sufficient space is required to achieve adequate manoeuvrability around a combative detainee and reduce the likelihood of impact injury into walls and doorway openings.

Respondents suggest that a corridor (and ideally doorways) sufficiently sized for a minimum of three people shoulder-to-shoulder, i.e. two staff and detainee. On the other hand, an increase in space has to be counterbalanced by a potential increase in a detainee's ability of strike, charge or attack as a consequence of increased space. This ratio is not only considered to be the appropriate number of personnel required to gain sufficient control of a combative detainee, but is equal to the minimum required staff to detainee ratio by PWH and Lock-up standard operating procedures to escort one person. In reality, to successfully gain compliance without the risk of injury to either detainee or staff requires greater numbers of staff to restrain and escort non-compliant detainees. Some exchanges frequently require three, four or more staff members to safely, manually restrain some detainees.

Notwithstanding this, each of the facilities visited had some noticeable fault in either design, or the way in which personnel were able to interpret the design intent. This is further compounded by procedure or policy which might not be supported by the existing spatial configuration of the space. This is inclusive of but is not limited to fittings or equipment impacting on performance and causing potential risks. The following issues

were both observed and noted during the course of the site visit or were communicated by respondents and while they do not alter the position of this research in terms of the overall philosophy for PCFs, they are indicative of the existence of a number of key issues which continue to exist throughout metropolitan PCFs. In addition to the following, for further specific details (*also see Chapter 4*). At some stages of the research between 2010 - 2011, some PCFs had an inappropriate number of and sizes of approved cells and no approved exercise yards. Some progress in the number of cells is noted at one facility which was re-visited upon invitation, it is unclear, however, if similar improvements have occurred elsewhere. At the time of conducting site visits, all locations had showers removed from their facilities. No sites had any form of pacifying instruments such as TV, radio or reading material which was more of a concern for PWH where detainees are detained for longer periods when compared with district Lock-ups.

West Metropolitan District, was observed to have unsuitably positioned firearm cabinets and panic buttons throughout, protruding fixtures in corridors outside cells, obsolete equipment, proximity door release issues whereby non-district staff without proximity access could inadvertently be locked within the Sally Port should the door close intentionally or unintentionally between them and the detainee with the potential for the detainee to be separated from the arresting officers between the Sally Port and the reception area during a struggle. There were also blind-spots without CCTV coverage, doors that were able to be used as impact weapons as they could not be anchored open when required, fixtures which allow officers to catch themselves, and sharp angles causing risk of injury. The West Metropolitan District also did not have a separate male and female holding area or a dedicated strip search room. The rooms used instead are fitted with CCTV which is able to be viewed outside of the confines of the PCF causing issues of dignity whereas COPs manual LP – 4.5 Strip Searches specifically states that;

“A duty of care prevails and as such, strip searches are to be conducted in privacy and in a humane manner with due regard for the prisoners human dignity. If the location chosen the strip search is capable of being monitored by cameras those cameras should not be monitoring that location while the strip search is being conducted” (WA Police 1995a).

Safety

Tactical safety concerns were also observed at a number of locations in relation to the proximity of pins, sharp instruments and other items that could be used as impact weapons within confined areas such as fingerprint rooms, and behind poorly positioned and designed reception counters as found in the East Metropolitan District. Ceiling heights at various district facilities were also either too low or excessively high.

It is evident from the abovementioned summary of some of the issues observed that a disjunction exists between model and actual operational PCF environments in WA where adequate facilities are not provided for custodial personnel or detainees. Basic working environments and amenity are non-verbal cues relating to employee worth and organisational commitment to provide comfort and a sense of belonging and permanency for personnel, and it is without doubt that regardless of the location or the age of the facility, amenity appears to be repeatedly compromised by funding and changes in policy that can't keep up and be properly implemented. This, in due course delivers inappropriately designed or provisioned spaces. Consequently, upon tenancy it becomes necessary that these spaces be used by alternative means to those initially intended by the architect. It is also apparent that key opportunities for realistic recruit training are lost as a result of the current training matrix in combination with the underutilisation of the existing PWH facility leading, potentially, to recruit entry shock that could impact on career longevity and employee retention.

As with many large organisations that face on-going issues of staff retention, WA Police undoubtedly identify and allocate resources in an effort to retain the expertise, experience and resources to which a significant portion of police funding is allocated. Accordingly, retaining the organisations most valuable assets through a more considered transition methodology from recruit to operational officer by using suitably designed operational PCFs in a way that apports risk with experience has the potential to form the basis for future research.

This chapter sought to define the organisational relationships and dynamics that develop specific to PCF environments to develop an understanding of behaviours and organisational relationships within PCFs and if they developed independently by the personnel who inhabit these insular policing locations. In doing so, this chapter has identified paucity in some specific aspects that relate to Watch House operations and understanding of duty of

care in relation to the provision of dignity. This was achieved through analysis of interviews conducted with WA Police and through the recording of information during site visits to approved metropolitan PCFs.

Due to the unique nature of PCFs which provide physically and psychologically challenging environments, this chapter has highlighted a number of key issues of concern for officers as well as for the organisation to consider, in particular, relating to surveillance, the number of state-level Watch Houses, and considering the implementation of a pre-Lock-up screening and assessment section comprising specialist professionals which is discussed further in chapter 6.

Chapter 6

Surveillance Principles

Effective and Theoretical Surveillance

Having observed the historical and contemporary aspects of policing and PCFs and conducting architectural analysis of such facilities, this chapter discusses the disparity that exists between a potentially more specialised PCF model and actual PCF environments where suitable operational facilities are not provided for custodial personnel or detainees as a consequence of out-dated design philosophies, ill-informed decisions made subject to legacies of long-standing beliefs. Furthermore this chapter proposes that select fundamental components of panoptic philosophy ought to be considered in short-term custodial models such as PCFs. For this research, one critical and pertinent element contained within Bentham's philosophies on the panopticon, surveillance, is discussed with relevance to observation in PCF contexts. Irrespective of setting or the age of the facility, the problem that continues to confront PCF design is that it is based upon linear prison design and little if any research appears to have been undertaken to determine ways to deviate away from this design principle or formulate more specialised facilities and functional parameters.

Consequently, effective surveillance settings such as observation areas, have some semblance of a PCF philosophy based upon perpetual supervision without the need for digital apparatus. This type of model could provide operational as well as other, more far-reaching and less perceptible and specialised benefits for the organisation. Consideration of the spatial arrangement which is required to facilitate this 'model's' function is able to be substantiated upon analysis of inherent benefits. If indeed, as some respondents have suggested staff do not excessively rely on CCTV to provide adequate surveillance and only value CCTV as they provide valuable evidentiary material, how is continuous observation in real-terms able to be achieved in linear or spine designed facilities with limited human resources.

To achieve complete human-level observation in existing WA PCF environments would require officers be permanently positioned outside each cell which is unproductive if it were possible, but in reality it is unlikely due to insufficient HR to do so. Thus, acceptable observation may be achievable, but continuous surveillance is not, as direct human

surveillance currently entails walking along lengthy corridors and turning at a perpendicular angle to look into cells that adjoin it. What must be taken into account, however, is the fallibility of the human factor associated with PCF administration. Engagement of unsuitable and insufficiently trained officers who are deficient in social and operational skill can contribute to custodial associated risks within PCFs (R.1, R.2, R.3, R.4 2010).⁸⁰

From discussions with operational respondents which comprise a total of 400 years of combined service experience It has become apparent that some key issues exist in relation to the layout of the existing PWH and the basic smaller-scaled district PCFs which are designed around similar principles (R.14 2011) having been described as illogical with an inappropriate spatial organisation and “prison-layout” (R.15 2011). Long spinal corridors with a string of cells branching off to either side forms the basis of existing PCF spatial programs where, as Respondents have commented, the layout should be more open-plan (R.13, R.14 2011) as detainees cannot be observed sufficiently without the use of CCTV or physical inspection.

Superior observational capacity within carcerative spaces, and in particular, PCFs where considerable risks of self harm exists, is necessary to ensure the safety of both detainees and staff can be adequately managed. Within the PCF context, however, as opposed to Bentham’s notion for the need for surveillance, is to ensure the safety of detainees and staff, not to change behaviour. Similar observational strategies already exist in the facilities of other institutions such as schools, hospitals, production factories, laboratories and urban spaces. Yet within these examples the thought of observation, it appears, is perceived to be less perverse than when considered within custodial contexts.

A select fundamental component of panoptic philosophy and its benefits, could be considered in short-term custodial models such as PCFs, but not as Bentham would have anticipated. Bentham (1787a, 78), makes specific reference to the application of panoptic philosophy for use with unsentenced or uncharged people in short-term custodial facilities.

Accordingly, within the scope of this research, this consideration is suggested with complete assurance that many other ancillary and sometimes absurd inclusions⁸¹

⁸⁰ Also see *Chapter 4*.

⁸¹ These include things such as skeletons along passages leading to cells, and sombre music being played while in procession to one’s cell for the first time and screams of apparent pain and torture being heard. Bentham’s concept and the way in which it was proposed in terms of the observational capacity of panoptic spaces is sophisticated, however, these superfluous items render it difficult to attain credibility when the unnecessary inclusions constitute a charade.

prescribed as necessary by Bentham for the purpose of intensifying the detained people experience within the Panopticon are discounted from this proposal. The preoccupation with the inclusion of a circular spatial form is also not included here.

The concluding philosophical position itself relating to the potential advantage of constant surveillance is sound, but must be tempered by an appropriate operational and architectural application for use in short-term facilities: a setting more appropriate and conducive to the advantages of some of the observational benefits of panoptic architecture where superior levels of surveillance are essential. Panoptic ideologies of an architectural nature appear better suited to short-term facilities requiring exceptional levels of observation and a decreased likelihood of assaults and self harm in the short-term (PCFs) without the associated detrimental side-effects to an individual's mental and physical wellbeing in long-term facilities.

This chapter suggests that there is marked dissimilarity between Bentham's panoptic philosophies and of what could be considered an effective panoptic ideal which seeks to utilise and exploit the surveillance capabilities alone of such a model without what could be considered the adjunct superfluous and illusionary make-believe Bentham also considered necessary. It is noted however as Schön (2004) cautions;

“Professionally designed solutions to public problems have had unanticipated consequences, sometimes worse than the problems they were designed to solve. Newly invented technologies, professionally conceived and evaluated, have turned out to produce unintended side-effects unacceptable to large segments of our society” (Schön 2004, 4).

Bentham's panopticon is a theoretical model based upon the principle of the all-seeing eye. In architecture, however, his theory is based entirely upon assumption, for in reality, it is impossible for a single centrally positioned guard to see all who are detained at any one time, even if, as Bentham stipulated, his architectural model was to be articulated as a circular space of 360°.

Humans possess visual capabilities that diminish as objects move further to the back of us beyond our peripheral vision. In other words, for the purpose of executing directional surveillance, human sight, has a limited range in which it is most effective. Anything situated beyond such field of vision remains temporarily imperceptible. Consequently, as an architectural construct Bentham's proposition is not plausible in reality but credible only in

theory, to the extent that a guard cannot occupy the central observation point indefinitely, but by the prisoner's belief that they were. In opposition to this, I will refer to an alternative proposition, being, an 'effective'⁸² panoptic model which would base its principles upon the human-biological limitations of sight; a quantifiable measure which directly informs the level of theoretical relevance. Panoptic theory continues to form a relevant component of the functional requirement of surveillance within observation spaces, though unlike Bentham's Panoptic Model, it is not the exclusive architectural principle, or else the model would otherwise be severely compromised working in theory and only to a degree, in practice. For a theoretical model to address the functional requirements in actuality, require that it function both in theory and practice, particularly in short-term custodial facilities where facilitation of superior levels of observation is desirable. Competent articulation of an Effective Panoptic Model in short-term custodial architecture could translate into facilities that are beneficial to all occupants in respectively appropriate ways minimising the prospect of creating uncontrollable environments where the weak or different can be victimised: PCFs are not places for serendipitous punishment (by other detainees).

The articulation of effective observation spaces should not surpass the observers expected ability to utilise its architectural intent in facilitating observation. When the architectural ability to facilitate observation greatly exceeds physical human limitation and capacity to harness and utilise architectural intent based upon surveillance, the integral framework diminishes in reality, to a mere and mainly ineffective theory. In contemporary PCFs, any human limitations are compensated for through the implementation of technology. At times, and overreliance on surveillance technologies exist mostly within station-level PCFs (R.7, R.8, R.10 2010: R.11 2011) and less likely at PWH. This is indicative of an architectural rationale that is deficient in its ability to facilitate basic observation and minimise risk. This situation is compounded by what appears to be an unworkable number of responsibilities placed upon OICs during the course of a normal shift (R.6 2010). This expectation of OICs is still relevant in addition to caring for any detainees that are being held. This is irrespective of, at times, being the only officer within the station (R.8, R.10 2010). In this context, CCTV surveillance is equivalent only to pseudo-control, a stop-gap measure that allows for additional concurrent administrative tasks to occur for officers to comply with their required duties.

⁸² This is a term I have conceptualised predicated upon the more realistic set of parameters when compared with Bentham's theoretical method of application.

Additionally, it has been argued that superficiality, indifference and paucity in contemporary culture stems from technology's "dominance over humanity" (Hill 1998, 2).

In order to compliment observational capacity, the WA Police (1995b, 25) '*Custodial Design Guidelines*' component of the *WA Police Building Code*, similar to the premise associated with Bentham's Panopticon, require specific illumination within WA PCFs. The premise for implementing specific lighting rationale, however, is entirely different. Adequate surveillance of detainees within PCFs calls for lesser levels of tertiary illumination at the observer's position. Secondary illumination of corridors leading to cells are required to be brighter than that of the observer's position and cells are in-turn required to have either equal to but ideally a higher level of primary illumination than that of the corridors. Furthermore, cells are finished with a bi-coloured paint, contrasting wall scheme with the convergence point of the two colours at a height of 1200mm creating a horizontal dado-line, providing a fixed visual reference point for intoxicated detainees. The WA Police Building Code requires that colour schemes be 'psychologically neutral' which are believed to have neither positive nor negative psychological significance. However, more focus could be apportioned to the specifics of the converging colours that create the dado-line which could be further researched and be valuable to the extent that it further supplements observational capacity. In relation to this, an experiment could be conducted to gather a greater appreciation and understanding of decisions associated with tactical use of colour, and sightlines in combination with illumination in PCFs rather than it simply being described as beneficial for the purpose of orientating intoxicated detainees and requiring psychological neutrality (WA Police 1995b, 22). It is acknowledged that an entire existing component of research and body of knowledge is devoted to colour theory relating to the understanding of the psychological impact of colour on human emotion and behaviour though this does not form part of this study.

While the psychological implications that relate to strategic application of colours for psychological neutrality are noted, the resultant discourse contained within this research simply intends to emphasise the possibility of a more strategic and tactical application of colour related to enhancing peripheral and observational perception in PCFs which appears to be mostly under-used. Furthermore, it is suggested that certain colours should not be considered for this purpose as back-drops in PCFs, particularly in high observation areas where they will compete with the observer's eye should they be used. Within the context


of this, a competitive colour is considered as one which adds yet another distinguishable element to the internal fabric.

Thus colours which least compete with the observers attention should be favoured as a back-drop upon which to observe the subject with sufficient luminance to increase surface light reflectance thus creating an enhanced silhouette line. As a tactical strategy, a dado line comprising of three prescribed colours could further minimise the probability of detainee clothing creating analogous colour relationships within the observation back-drop area and appearing to the observer as somewhat camouflaged. Using three strategically positioned colours applied in a horizontal plane to a height of approximately 1.83 metres (6'0") aims to eliminate any possibility of concealment, obscurity and subterfuge through inadvertent camouflage. Additionally, a set-height tricoloured contrast scheme could again have a more advantageous intent. This would provide both a reference point for inebriated detainees, or a tactical back-drop to enhance observation, and to further enhance the observers perceptual capacity by providing a series of datum points to appreciate position, posture and carriage and therefore offering a more comprehensive rationale for arriving at the most beneficial and suitable 'canvass' upon which to observe a subject within PCFs.

The only District's PCF visited which attempts or at one point in its history attempted to address a higher level of observational capacity through an architectural program that had adopted, whether intentionally or unintentionally, a quasi-panoptic spatial arrangement is the North Metropolitan District (Joondalup). However, it is unfortunate that the only segment of the PCF which exhibits a panoptic disposition, labelled the 'Observation Post', is non-compliant and due to the facility layout, is situated on either side of two corridor spines and is disjointed from the observational capacity of the rest of the facility.

This section of the PCF is surrounded by what appears to be other examples of long-disused components of the facility. This seems evident from the adaptive reuse of a significant proportion of the custodial constituent of the facility for storage. Consequently, the architectural panoptic principle associated with this specific model is compromised, although theoretically conceivable in principle but unrealistic in practice. This model would be considerably more feasible if the 'observation post' facilitated administrative efficiency, for example, if the position comprised of some form of workstation such as bail, property, reserve or Lock-up-keeper, rather than merely a point of observation situated among the male and female cells area. Rather, it is situated some distance away to a separate perpendicularly orientated admission and Lock-up keeper's area with many interceding

doorways separating the two areas. The observer's room is flanked by two corridors to either side and by the observation cells to the front and rear. Therefore, with this spatial arrangement both the architectural and philosophical intent cannot be considered an *effective* panoptotic strategy. It is, nevertheless, indicative of some significant and insightful consideration of the importance and necessity of adequate surveillance of detainees especially for those deemed at risk and requiring placement within observation cells (see Fig. 15).



<i>Lockup in the Perth Metropolitan Area</i>		
Emil Jonescu 2012. Reproduced from hand sketches and photographs taken during site visit.		
	Diagrammatic	NTS

Fig. 15 An example of an operational Perth PCF. This facility has a undergone a number of changes to bring about a better level of compliance. It was designed with 2 dedicated exercise yards but is serviced by long, narrow, linear corridors. There are many disused areas that are used for other purposes.

Subject to adequate allocation of resources and irrespective of design and layout, based upon provision of space and allocation of required functional ancillary rooms alone, the Joondalup PCF is in all probability, sufficiently sized that it would be plausible to consider the prospect of it being part of a linked state-level PCF system. In consideration of the physical distances associated with WA Policing and thus accumulated time and resources used to access a single state-level Watch House, a more practical and strategic approach might be to consider a system of satellite Watch Houses which operate independently yet as interconnected subcomponents of one entity. With competent management of facilities and human resources, any circumstances where disproportionate levels of either personnel or detainees present among multiple facilities could be resolved through considered redeployment of resources as required to increase efficiency and maintain a balanced and more safe environment for all occupants. With this, it is suggested that police custodial facility function and efficiency within the CJS could be improved if capacity and operational responsibility could be distributed over more than one state level Lock-up.

Conceivably, state-level PCFs could be situated in the north, south and central metropolitan regions. This format (of satellite facilities) could ease processing and custodial congestion, would reduce travelling time and do away with smaller suburban facilities in lieu of more fiscally and logistically favourable hubs. However, paradigm transformations such as this would dictate significant operational and procedural implications which would require a shift from procedures formulated upon the status quo, a culmination of many years of unchanged practices and mind-set. This notion was supported by R.3 (2010) due to the cost implications associated with providing Lock-up facilities within smaller stations such as Clarkson Police Station which was described as unnecessary and costly and remained mostly idle. A system which comprises a North, South and Central state PCF might offer an expanded service platform particularly in consideration of the next fifty years as the population of Perth “is projected to experience the highest percentage growth (116%) of Australia's capital cities, increasing from 1.6 million people at 30 June 2007 to 3.4 million in 2056” (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011), and the north-south corridor continues to expand to accommodate.

For such an arrangement, a night-shift scenario, depending upon the specific offence, regularly sees the arresting officer and the corroborating officer not only attend and conduct preliminary investigation but also detain, search, transport, process and lodge the arrestee at a police out-station. Once held within the PCF (in the absence of other staff) the

arresting officer completes all paper-work required and conducts further investigations before any potential video record of interviews and subsequent formal charging. Further custodial paper-work is completed upon which the detainee is finally escorted to the Perth Watch House if bail has been refused where they will be re-processed and re-searched upon arrival. This is essentially a duplication of a component of process already undertaken by the arresting and corroborating officers which has the potential to cultivate an antagonistic disposition among some detainees as a consequence of what appear to be unnecessarily repetitive inquiries and physical processes. One need look no further than a recent incident involving preventable death 'Mr Ward' (The ABC, May 6, 2011) and other incidents of injury that arise during transport between different custodial facilities and between custodial facilities and court. Mr Ward's first name is not used for cultural reasons, but his death after having been transported in the rear of a prison transit vehicle highlights the very real risks involved in negotiating prisoner transport. Furthermore, circumstances where detainees are removed from the relative safety of a fully surveilled facility for transfer to another location or to seek medical care, in itself, greatly increases the risk of unnecessary allegations to be made against police personnel. This safety, provided by surveillance within PCFs protects both detainees and staff, therefore, minimising the need to transport detainees between facilities has the potential to reduce operational risk. Acknowledgement of this situation is further highlighted by medical services being provided within PWH, and in so doing, reducing the increased level of risk of mobilising detainees outside of the Watch House for medical treatment where there are increased risks of escape and assault (R.13-R.15 2011: R.17-R.20 2011) which is uncorroborated by surveillance.

Clearly this would require a comprehensive shift in mind-set and procedure since the status quo has operated as such for an exceedingly long period and as such procedure has been formulated around these practices. Nevertheless, with contemporary digital information, data and court brief systems much of the existing procedural requirements concerning lodging of paper-work, warrants, and court briefs and actual court of appearance are out-dated and in need of re-evaluation. This requires a progressive approach and cooperation between a number of components within the CJS, in particular, relevant departments within WA Police.⁸³

⁸³ These include, Prosecution Branch, DPP, Offender Information Bureau, district police stations and the Courts, as well as Department of Corrective Services, and ancillary services.

Provided that sufficient HR are assigned to appropriately designed multiple Watch Houses, the need to transport between out-stations and district stations to these strategically located state-level facilities should be considered, as so long as PCFs are designed to securely detain and surveil, the detained will devise ways in which to try to escape. Detainees merely require the “IAMO, the Intent, Ability, Means and Opportunity” (P. Zieger, Personal Communication 1996) to attempt to escape police custody, cause harm to police or self harm. Although these situations are not devoid from PCFs, they can be recorded on facility surveillance and generally, sufficient staff is within a reasonable proximity to manage such incidents, whereas in transit this is not the case.

Implementing sentiment-modifying strategies

Although custodian sentiments toward custodial care within PCFs appears to have encountered significant change over recent years; notably with the introduction of Auxiliary and Custody Officers into PCFs, the greatest existing opportunity for implementing change to existing location-specific PCF cultural legacies and organisational relationships with a minimised risk of resistance towards it, would be via saturation or *en masse* introduction of Auxiliary and Custodial Officers into that location. Further to this, WA Police have an even more potent opportunity to create a productive, desirable and cohesive environment which awaits them upon the completion of the new Perth City Police Station and Watch House currently under construction.

This, as a strategic manoeuvre and opportunity, in combination with new specialist facilities, revised operational use and other initiatives such as “new social relations” (Markus and Cameron 2002, 47) might be further augmented through the implementation of strategic police-relevant spatial terminology which could create subliminal purposeful and positive new relationships between the main constituent occupiers of the space; the custodian and detainee, in keeping with an alternative inference towards organisational attitudes specific to PCFs. Notionally, this could be achieved by referring to particular spaces in police-relevant terms rather than what has been traditionally used. In other words, re-assigning traditional terms of reference used for some PCF areas may promote a more favourable rhetoric, perhaps one that more readily reflects the temporary and presumed-innocent nature of PCF custody.

Existing terms used for many PCF spaces are the same terms used to define spaces found within prison contexts. Existing terminology is passé, and to date, reflects little intention to

consider an alternative naming convention that starts to become reflective of a more specialised custodial typology and of the police organisation. This communicative layer of dialogue could be considered as just one of many interpretative layers forming a contextual shift from a WA PCF legacy defined upon the underpinnings of a carcerative history from which it has not substantially deviated. This simple notion suggests a more considered police-specific approach to specialised PCF functions, for example; Alcoves, Units, Areas, Bays, Walks, and Zones that are named in lieu of generic terms such as Cells, Padded Cells, Sally-Ports, Crib Rooms, Lock-ups, Exercise Yards, Infirmaries, Corridors and Observation Cells.

Contemporary PCF design is more-than-ever intent on providing facilities that are more refined and comprise of many layers of physical safety for detainees, yet countless detained will continue to seek means by which to harm and selfharm and passive will encounter the aggressive. Re-considering PCF naming strategies and terminology aims to eliminate the some of the negative undertones that exist in a subliminal capacity in common with prisons and jails by introducing a more intellectual layer that can be readily achieved at no additional cost. There truly are no 'reasonable' design strategies to stop an exceptionally determined, able bodied person from committing suicide or at the very least, self harm, only ways to minimise the potential risk and gravity of injury. This is achieved by reconsidering what measures already exist, why it was created and implemented in the first place, what purpose does it serve, is it still relevant and can it be augmented to achieve a purpose greater than itself. The psychologically and professionally unfamiliar will look at a particular situation and deem that it must be safe, it has to be, it's just a box, while the learned and scholarly will undoubtedly look to solve the problem by 'looking outside of the box'. Experience and expertise would dictate, however, that the 'box', in all probability, should not have been initially created as such.

These are but fragmentary examples of inevitable dichotomies that produce a unique environment specific to PCFs to which policy and procedure must be engineered and to which training and personnel as well as the system itself must adapt to best address existing as well as potential future expansion, improvement and innovation. This research does not intend to anticipate the adequacy of the proposed new Perth Watch House to address the abovementioned increase in Perth's population. Historically, however, trends associated with the existing Perth Watch House suggest that a building life expectancy of a similar period, greater than forty years, would reasonably be expected from the future

Perth facility. Consequently, this comprehensively coincides with the abovementioned Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) predictions which are indicative of a potentially significant concurrent increase in PCF spatial requirements or a re-examination of prospective human resources and infrastructure distribution matrix.

Pre-Lock-up screening section

This section discusses the potential for a shift in custodial process and operational alternatives which intend to address existing quality of custodial service, effect a reduction in risk, and potentially increase productivity through streamlining of infrastructure and facility specialisation.

In terms of architectural advancement, particularly due to the frugality of government around the inter and post-war periods (as previous discussed), WA Police, it appears, had been subjected to a paucity in investment to development new specialised police facilities resulting an approach to accommodation that was not ideal but make-do.. Historically, adaptive-reuse of existing buildings not designed or intended for police, have been occupied and used for police business with what appears to be little regard for whether the premises will facilitate police adherence with their policies and procedures. Although it is acknowledged that a lack of funding available for this purpose, steady increases in police personnel, and an expanding city has dictated many decisions relating to accommodation with little appropriate infrastructure to choose from, this has resulted in missed opportunities to trial and consider more unconventional and progressive variations in accommodative structures, process and operational procedures. This would have provided a broader set of spatial circumstances that could have been analysed in terms of their post occupancy and operational success to better substantiate future propositions. While the previous chapter discussed a system of state-level WA Police Watch Houses that follows the north-south development corridor, this chapter proposes a specialist adjunct to state-level PCFs as an integrated component which undertakes Pre-Lock-up Screening.

The undemanding notion of 'inching' forward, making inroads and changes to a basic template in custodial architecture and its related operating procedures in a linear and at times a rather lethargic rate is undesirable. Equally so is the idea that archaic practices and procedures should find themselves adapted into new versions of facilities or systems and be expected to be cohesive or become the basis upon which the new facility becomes inefficient and underused. This circumstance would resemble the suggestion of using a

gramophone operating brochure as a comprehensive manual for the functionality of an iPod and subsequently contemplate why the instructions seem irrelevant and ambiguous.

Likewise, what is required in order to achieve significant advancements in PCF architecture is a deviation from existing conventional examples and archetypal solutions found in what has been a slow progression of successive PCF initiative in architecture. Alternative new ideas and innovative proposals are required to develop a progressively more specialised and professional WA Police PCF matrix. The implementation of an integrated pre-Lock-up screening component within a state-level PCF system is anticipated to facilitate a singular; safer, streamlined, rigorous and potentially perform as a triage-style buffer allowing for sequential multi-station detainee receivals at state level Watch Houses. This simple endeavour has also been serendipitously linked to a significant reduction in the number of incidents which require coercive force due to a more organised processes and improved staff efficiency in some facilities (Cox, Glewwe and Dunning 2010, 49). Furthermore, this could conceivably alleviate many situations of violence resulting from incompatible placement of detainee types and proficient determination of detainees' psychological and medical requirements. This proposed system could also minimise the negative experiences associated with being subjected to several sessions of un-dignified strip searches and sensitive questioning resulting from multiple processes for lodgement currently required when transferring detainees across a number of facilities.

Interviews conducted specific to PCF process and detainee dignity, suggest that currently, sworn police officers are not in a conducive position to appropriately appreciate the implication of the Lock-up environment to a person's sense of vulnerability and absolute powerlessness which permeates throughout every aspect of essential police Lock-up procedures and for the duration of intake process. This is a process to which police must adhere, and to do so, requires detainee compliance. It appears that the term dignity itself and strategies relating to associated means in which detainees could be afforded 'dignity retention' are not clearly understood, appreciated and applied. In essence, a contemptuous and a deliberately inefficiency approach to addressing detainee requests (R.4 2010), reduces one's dignity and perpetuates a sense of irrelevance to one's sincere concerns or requests unnecessarily promoting further denigration in what is an already police-dominant environment causing resentment. Arguably, resentment experienced by those powerless within volatile systems or environments such as PCFs might be enacted as violence towards

self, or those in dominant positions, where it appears that although discretionary capacity exists to minimise perceived oppression, it is not exercised.

A comparable example of such disregard to the existence of a sense of powerlessness exists in the patient-doctor relationship throughout the medical profession. This is attributable to stereotypically perceived and inherent existing lack of understanding and compassion by doctors toward patients in *hospes* environments.⁸⁴ Interestingly, role-reversal training *has* been designed to emphasise and mitigate this situational issue in medicine, yet to date it has not been undertaken by WA PCF for training and education purposes, and it is unclear if a similar regimen has been conducted within other police organisations elsewhere. Clearly to the participants such initiatives are merely representative of situational protocols and mores. If the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) was to be considered a similar schema, the desired comprehension of a detainee's powerlessness would arise almost immediately, particularly if experimental parameters of a similar nature were employed. This powerlessness is transferable, to such an extent that people who fail to obtain bail from a PCF or a police Watch House are inevitably transferred to remand where a gamut of dissimilar yet interconnected issues ensue. This is true not only of PCFs but also relates to issues associated with remand custody: another short-term custody program directly associated with PCFs.

According to the Auditor General Performance Examination (1997, 3), in the first 5 year period of the early nineties, the number of people being held on remand had increased by 200 per cent, most of whom were held in maximum security prisons or remand centres such as the male Campbell Remand Centre and Bandyup women's prison. It has been pointed out during discussions with senior personnel working within PCFs that the psychological impact to some people held for the first time within PCFs is so severe that it changes them, their view of things, of the police, and their perspective in general (R.13 2011). In every instance where discretion exists where the defendant does not pose a risk to self, others or the associated investigation the defendant should be allowed to retain his or her liberty. Police have significant discretionary powers to grant bail⁸⁵ for minor offences or arrest in the first instance in favour of proceeding by summons. The arrestee can be released from police custody via three forms of bail: first, a Personal Undertaking to attend court with no monetary bail; second, Personal Bail as with personal undertaking, however,

⁸⁴ Edelsteina and Baiderb. 1982. Role Reversal: When doctors become patients.

⁸⁵ Bail is essentially a contract where the alleged enters into an undertaking to appear in court at a set time and date, in return for release from custody.

the alleged agrees to forfeit a prescribed monetary penalty if the bail undertaking is breached; and three, Personal Bail with Surety where both the alleged and another person as surety are required to forfeit a prescribed monetary penalty if the bail undertaking is breached.

Failure to obtain or meet the requirements for conditions of bail previously mentioned, result in the alleged being held in custody in either a PCF or at a remand centre or prison until such time as their court appearance. Typically this is the day of the court's next sitting, at which time the court can over-ride police imposed bail refusal and grant bail or remand the alleged in further custody.

The standard guidelines for corrections in Australia requires that prisoners be classified such that they are held at the lowest security level for which they qualify, however, the Director General Prison Rules requires that *Remand* prisoners be classified as maximum security prisoners and be held in maximum security prisons (Auditor General Performance Examination 1997, 26). Reassessment of remand prisoners can be made in order to re-classify their security rating based upon a number of factors as set out in the Director General Prison Rules including whether bail was set or granted and if so the amount, the nature of the alleged offence, prior escape history, prisoner welfare, prison accommodative inadequacies, and prisoner 'attitude'. It is clear that a number of the categories used for prisoner assessment are rather subjective, and as a result of re-assessments conducted, less than one per cent of remand prisoners are held in minimum security prisons (Auditor General Performance Examination 1997, 26). As a consequence, many undergo 'induction' which involves being strip searched (yet again, if arriving from a PCF), deloused and interviewed by prison officers and medical staff simply as a consequence of their inability to promptly arrange bail. A number of these people will have only committed relatively minor, non-violent offences and a further portion will not receive a custodial sentence, suggesting that out of process-generated indignity, the possibility for resentment against authority may be justified, even in non-obstinately recalcitrant people (Auditor General Performance Examination 1997, 29).

The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has introduced a bail coordinators position to assist in obtaining, organising and facilitating bail. This position appears to be successful at assisting the provision of bail within Remand institutions rather than in PCFs, which suggests that this initiative does little to circumvent unnecessary inter-organisational transfer of detainees and subjection to repetitive undignified processes. Such is the risk and burden of

duty of care in both PCFs and remand centres, that it would seem unconscionable that additional measures have not been implemented to expedite this process.

While the concept of a pre-Lock-up screening section does not intend to make the intake process more expedient for detainees being processed, it also does not intend to elongate or prolong the process unnecessarily. However, over time efficiencies will develop by default as pre-Lock-up screening seeks to address inherent flaws within a system that currently accepts detainees that ought not to be. A number of detainees who should not be in custody or incorporated within the system such as people with mental health issues, and inebriated and drug affected detainees form a large component of people brought to PCFs (R.1 2010) and could be more readily identified and excluded from PCFs favouring other more appropriate care, and in so doing, effect a reduction the volume of detainee intake and in turn demands on limited resources. This suggests that the preponderance of prospective PCF detainees are therefore better administered by assessment under the management and placement of appropriate health care and other service providers with specialised training, appropriate facilities to manage what appears to be an unnecessarily excessive level of risk.

It should be kept in mind that police are a unique organisation with year-round availability and they are predominantly the first and generally the only emergency service to respond and attend a scene where someone is “acting irrationally or likely to present a danger to themselves or others” (Burgess 2007, 1). Intervening between the prevalence of societies’ mental health issues and a seeming inability or unwillingness of the wider social system to cope or proactively intercede. The police are the primary emergency response organisation to which members of the public turn in time of crisis with front line policing of people with severe mental illness being empowered by legislation – the Mental health Act 1996 (section 195). This Act provides for the apprehension of a person for the purpose of being examined by a medical or authorised mental health practitioner if an officer suspects that the person has a mental illness and requires apprehension to protect the health or safety of that person or any other person or prevent serious damage to property. The officer is authorised to use sufficient force and enter upon premises for the purposes of apprehending a person under this Act, and further, are required to expediently facilitate examination of detained people, who may be referred for further examination by a psychiatrist and possibly committed or charged or both.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, police appear to

⁸⁶ The provisions for people already in police custody are also contained within the act.

have insufficient mental health training to manage and accommodate such people which inadvertently constitutes a major component of people brought into police custody (R.1 2010) and it is, therefore, more appropriate that it be managed by pre-Lock-up screening professionals.

Furthermore, Cox, Landsberg & Pavarati (1989, 111) argue that short-term custodial facilities do not offer sufficient mental health observation, screening or treatment in comparison to that of prison facilities. Legislative influence does not deter from the fact that detainees with mental health concerns pose a significant risk of suicide or self harm in PCFs, thus a quintessential PCF model proposes to expeditiously prioritise professional preliminary detainee assessment with detainees determined to be incompatible with custodial environments (police) relinquished from police custody as soon as practicable if not formally charged and expediently transported to a suitable management facility. Interestingly, having received no formal psycho-analytical instruction in order to substantiate the determination of a person's mental wellbeing other than a lay-people diagnostic interpretation, experienced police personnel are reasonably accurate in relation to the vast majority of detainees they present before appropriate health professionals for assessment (Bean 1996, 59). This is perhaps attributable to occupationally acquired experience and understanding of behavioural norms. cursory police determination of existing mental health issues is often sufficient to require further professional investigative analysis as required by the Mental Health Act 1996.

A professionally administered pre-Lock-up screening integrated component, as a concept, is directly related to findings into police aptitudes and resources in confronting issues relating to intoxication without charge and mental health, which as separate issues or in combination present the greatest indirect and direct risk of "irrational and self-destructive behaviour" (Giles and Sandrin 1992, 671).

Serious concern of unnecessary increased risk of suicide or self harm in police custody PCF can be directly attributed to the large component of highly intoxicated (drug and alcohol) people brought to, accepted and lodged in PCFs by police personnel, notwithstanding the considerable increase in risk attributed to mental health.

The physical design and layout of PCFs as a strategic spatial program, forms the fundamental basis on which supplementary architectural, spatial and material requirements are incorporated. Consequently, the architectural rationale and functional and procedural matrix of an operational PCF are co-dependent to the degree that

operational and requirements must inform the architectural brief, in order to develop a cohesive and symbiotically relationship of form and function. The combination of architectural, operational, procedural and human relationships correspondingly determine PCF performance, and as previously discussed, facilitates superior levels of observation and surveillance which are the most critical means by which to minimise risk of self-harm and suicide in PCFs. However, it has long been established that the majority of successful suicide attempts within PCFs occur within a relatively shortly period of time (48 hours) after detainee intake. Biles, McDonald and Flemming (1989b, 217) found that half of the deaths occurred “within 5 hours” in a study conducted as a result of the RCIADIC commencing in 1988.

This research further noted that at the time, aboriginal detainees were “approximately 20 times more likely than non-aboriginal people” to be held in police custody (Biles, McDonald and Flemming 1989a, 120), and that at the time “aboriginal people who die in custody are more likely to die in [PCFs] than in prisons” (Biles, McDonald and Flemming 1989a, 120).⁸⁷ Before and following the RCIADIC, the percentage of aboriginal people within the total Australian population has remained constant, approximately three per cent, while aboriginal people continue to be “over-represented in all areas of the criminal justice system” currently comprising 33 per cent (Australian Institute of Criminology 2011, 24).

Following the RCIADIC the Australian Institute of Criminology set up the National Deaths in Custody Program (NDICP) an initiative which oversees the gathering of data associated with all deaths in custody in Australia and since its inception, deaths in police custody have been sub-categorised into category 1a and 1b and category 2 situations allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of circumstances surrounding deaths in custody. For the purpose of this research category 1a refers to PCFs such as police stations Lock-ups, Watch Houses as well as “police vehicles, during transfer to or from such an institution, or in hospitals, following transfer from an institution” (Australian Institute of Criminology 2006, 4). The institute’s *‘Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice: Deaths in custody in Australia 1990–2004’* report concludes that;

“Although the majority of Australian deaths in custody occurred in police custody between 1980 and 1989, the trend in the 15 years since the RCIADIC reveals a different picture. Prison custody deaths account for the majority of deaths in custody since 1990 and have exceeded all other deaths each year. Furthermore,

⁸⁷ 63 per cent (Biles, McDonald and Flemming 1989a, 120).

while deaths in police custody have decreased since 1990 [36 per cent to 2004], deaths in police operations have been increasing. This decline in police custody deaths may be due in part to the redesign of police cells to reduce points from which detainees can hang or harm themselves. Being able to identify such a decline in police custody deaths is one of the clear benefits of the NDICP and this finding shows that progress has been made since the RCIADIC relating to deaths specifically occurring in police custody” (Australian Institute of Criminology 2006, 5).

This suggests that on-going further specialisation and consideration of design, training and operational parameters might further reduce the risk of self harm and deaths in PCF as the above findings conclude. This research, however, seeks to also promote a more realistic, live training program subject to operational facility capacity and increase efficiency through a reduction in incompatible placement through an integrated professional pre-entry screening process in order to provide a more comprehensive custodial service. Where appropriate, prevention, divergence and a considered approach at the point of and immediately following intake through professionally administered screening intends to accommodate or channel detainees to appropriate holding areas, alternative Lock-ups, departments, clinics, hospitals or institutions.

A proposed pre-Lock-up section of police custodial facilities, aspires to identify those arrested individuals who are either suitable for immediate release, those not fit to be held in police custody, those requiring further assessment or to be immediately transferred before admission. An early and more robust assessment protocol could facilitate staff in better determining problematic behaviour and in-turn segregate incompatible people within the Lock-up, and thus offer and maintain the most appropriate service at an individual level as de-individualisation and “de-humanisation typically facilitates abusive and destructive actions towards those objectified” (Zimbardo 2007, 223).

A person held in Police custody as a detainee as specified within the COPs manual should not be detained in a Lock-up facility unless absolutely necessary especially as some PCFs are modelled upon design specifically intended for sentenced prisoners in long-term custody. It is imperative that cognoscence of each detainee’s individuality is sustained throughout the custodial term, and via this, structure a management strategy centred upon early, customised, thorough and competent screening program focusing upon establishing each individual detainee’s level of risk. In addition, risk reduction management requires consistent re-evaluation of individual detainee behaviour as well as their physical and

psychological condition. Constant surveillance during each period of detention is a fundamental requirement taking into account what police would colloquially refer to as 'time, place and circumstance' evaluation.

At a preliminary level, individual detainees' infinite spectrum of plausible circumstances varies as significantly as the reason for being detained. In state Watch House facilities where greater volumes of detainees are held, these individuals are accommodated together. Moreover, this results in detainees who are ultimately determined to be guilty and those that are innocent (Klofas 1990, 69) being collectively detained. It would appear inappropriate, therefore, to support circumstances where the detention of innocent people, in residence with seasoned criminals knowingly occurs, albeit a placement strategy that is considered and calculated. Moreover, the initiative of professional individual assessment of prospective detainees before entering the Lock-up proper, ought to be of fundamental importance as a 'civilian', by W.A Police definition who has not yet been put before a court to have their guilt determined, should not be held within the confines of a PCF, unless in not doing so, causes a genuine risk to self, public, police or property. A further overall reduction in risk to both staff and detainees could be achieved before prospective detention within PCFs, and in turn mitigating many other associated consequential risks that emerge through the entire custodial process such as induction, overcrowding, potential violence, etc.

The police custodial setting can be perceived as extremely traumatic and stressful which is experienced particularly at the time of admission and initial detention. Coincidentally, this is also the time when detainees are most violent as a result of feeling threatened and anxious (Fairweather and McConville 2000, 38-45). Gibbs (1982, 99) defines this stage as "entry shock" with resultant symptoms of suicidal and self-injurious tendencies and "serious psychological disturbances" in some detainees as a result of an abrupt and un-controllable change in a person's circumstances. To this end, Reser (1989, 167)⁸⁸ defines two critically disparate control mechanisms found within custodial environments; "institutional control", and "personal control." Recognition of the existence of (the two) forms of control are required in order to appreciate how their potential application can be used to promote beneficial incidence within PCFs.

⁸⁸ Citing Cox, Paulus and McCain (1984, 1148-60), Ruback, Carr and Hopper (1986, 375-386) and Ruback and Innes (1988, 683-693).

Personal control relates to the intentional provision of a semblance of one's own *perceived* control over his or her own environment or actions, and to this end, Resser attests that even minimal (apparent) control over one's immediate environment is particularly critical in appeasing a sense of despair and stress in custodial facilities (Resser 1989, 168).

Conversely, formal charges, a distortion in one's perspective of time, orientation within the facility, temperature, lighting, placement (with others) are among countless examples of pernicious institutional controls which are subject to design, procedure and operation; with some examples considered beyond both institutional and personal control as neither has the ability to circumvent rigidity beyond control and form the basis upon which anxiety experienced within PCFs are articulated. Resser (1989, 168) suggests that "research into the importance of perceived control in custodial settings indicates that perceived control is significantly related to the level of stress and physical symptoms experienced and violence." Further to this, Hayes (1989, 7) concluded that PCFs have higher mortality rates than other custodial settings, such as prisons due to the "unique characteristics of the Lock-up environment which enhances suicidal impulses."

Indeed for specific groups there is an increased risk of suicide or self harm, such as drug and or alcohol affected people and according to Giles & Sandrin (1992, 670-672), people who have previous suicidal tendencies and those with mental health issues. Ironically, people representative of these groups comprise the majority of all people held within PCFs. PCFs reflect a significantly more perilous and volatile environment than other custodial institutions. Subject to the findings of the RCIADIC indicating that the highest level of risk of self harm and death in custody Reser's findings support the notion that it is within the first few hours of detention, that the loss of perceived personal control over self and environment, which directly contributes to feelings of despair and stress in PCFs, particularly when imminent charges, court appearances and uncertainty are considered (Reser 1989, 13). Additionally, custodial environments in which the custodians distance themselves from detainees contribute to a response aligned with that of alienation where one will be required to fend for themselves, therefore, detainees that feel relatively safe due to actual or perceived appropriate levels of staffing, interaction and inclusion will generally experience reduced anxieties and uncertainty at the time of admission and initial detention, the same period associated with increased aggression and violence (Fairweather and McConville 2000, 38-45).

In spite of this, larger PCFs have been determined to have the capacity to provide better quality of care albeit de-individualised, detached and dispassionate (Blaauw, Kerhof & Vermunt 1996, 66-68). The majority of WA Police district level PCFs predominantly comprise of only 2-3 compliant multiple occupancy cells, at most, and while preferred from an economic standpoint, are not always appropriate particularly in the larger Watch House PCFs where considerable admission related risks exist around insufficient knowledge of a detainee's character, general demeanour, predisposition to violence, weapon and drug history, mental health, contagious diseases or special skills for example. Moreover these are risks particularly inherent to short-term custody as prison institutions are generally better equipped to have a more comprehensive knowledge and understanding of prisoner dispositions through long-term observation and prisoner-guard rapport. The gathering of intelligence relating to inmate attributes within prison facilities is partly facilitated by the observations, notes and oral recordings made by WA Police personnel during the induction process and detention period within the PCFs before prison transfer.

Prison contexts have the added benefit of being in a position to make observation of a *subject* over an extended period of time, subsequent to initial incarcerative shock and the dissipation of the physiological and psychological effects caused by the substances the prisoner might have been under. Further to this, large prisons provide facilities and professional personnel for specifically for initial medical and psychological assessment in addition to prison-exclusive ongoing care, which, other than a duty nurse, PCFs do not currently provide such comprehensive services, without the need for transfer to external facilities.

In order to manage critical personnel safety and that of other detainees both with or without a pre-Lock-up screening, the provision and use of single occupancy cells should be a consideration for short-term custody where significant operational and strategic funding attributable to a blend of more diverse cell types including single occupancy cells can compensate for higher initial costs. The existing Perth Watch House does not utilise the opportunity provided by the blend of cells contained within it due to operational and resource determined factors. Yet, their very existence suggests that the importance and the implication of a diversity of cell types was once appreciated. Unfortunately, the overall design layout as a system does not adequately address surveillance and other operational requirements associated with PCFs, nor function as intended without adequate human resources and appropriate policy and procedure in place. Single occupancy cells are not *cell docks* similar to the Perspex interventions located near the admissions and reception areas

of most PCFs visited. Rather, what is essential is an appropriately sized and provisioned cell for *one* which could offer an increased ability to prevent physical assaults and maintain acceptable contact ratios; allow for medical and psychological isolation; reduce risk of litigation due to inability to provide an environment safe from other detainees; and allow for *protective custody* for 'at risk' or 'sensitive' people.

Having discussed the potential implications of considering or actually implementing single occupancy cells with all respondents, only one respondent indicated that the existing Perth Watch House did in fact already have provision for such facilities in existence on a disused upper floor (R.15 2011). A subsequent visit to the PWH confirmed this to be the case. It was also evident that this portion of the Watch House facility which in addition to single cells comprised of two-person cells and semi-self-contained cells. This was described by R. 15 (2011) as a provision originally intended for holding detainees under a Warrant of Commitment or for sensitive people, but had been disused for many years. This perceptible arrangement suggests design intent based upon an operational and procedural requirement that detainees of dissimilar classification such as low risk, first offence, sensitive people or warrant of commitment detainees were to be detained separately to high risk, violent and recidivist offenders. Unfortunately, it appears that long-term abandonment of not only valuable *real estate* but an operational rationale which intended to afford a level of dignity and safety compatible with functional and ethical requirements among entire categories of detainees has been justified by infrastructure related fiscal considerations and insufficient human resources to safely and adequately operate the Watch House as intended.

Interestingly, the majority of officers interviewed either alluded to or directly suggested that PCF staff made every effort to categorise, effectively separate and accordingly place detainees, though it would appear that the outcome of this situation culminates in an inability to use the facility as proposed. Instead custodial staff are required to manage the situation which is circumstantially and inherently disadvantaged through post-occupancy re-interpretation of space. It is suggested here, that in order to allow for improved operational management and to facilitate safety and psychological well being of both detainees and staff and reduce risk of violence toward staff and between detainees, more distinction and classification of dissimilar constituent detainees is required which must be supported by a spatial program and associated policies, operational procedure and training program. This spatial program has the capacity to better address safety for detainees from

other more violent detainees with greater certainty, minimise entry-shock for first-time detainees and equally for inexperienced police personnel.

This chapter sought to address the notion of surveillance and its application in highly specialised environments such as PCFs. This chapter is significant in drawing attention to the fact that surveillance is not in itself malicious, and in certain contexts high levels of surveillance provides all occupants with a capacity for safety with acceptable loss of privacy for short periods of time. This chapter challenges the idea that panoptic spaces seek absolute control and behavioural self-modification to further highlight the significance of surveillance in such PCFs. This refers to the essential component of panoptic philosophy which is generally referenced in disdain – surveillance.

This chapter considers higher levels of surveillance in short-term custody such as PCFs as a necessity, and with this, Bentham's philosophies on the panopticon and surveillance are discussed as an important philosophy that could have benefited STCFs, rather than in prisons as Bentham intended.

Significantly, this chapter suggests consideration of Pre-Lock-up screening areas that could provide a diversionary function that could assist in reducing custodial risk by detecting detainees that should not be held in PCFs and require further assessment and care by other linked services. In concluding this chapter, this pre-Lock-up component, it is suggested, would also perform a secondary function of providing additional passive surveillance and data gathering capabilities through a professional level examination of mannerisms, conduct, speech and so forth, and line of inquiry.

Conclusion

The aim of this research was to develop a critical understanding and new knowledge relating to custodial spatial requirements and organisational relationships specific to existing operational WA PCFs that has the capacity to be interpreted and adapted to inform alternative future PCF architecture, design concepts, models and functional spatial components that are humane and provide safety for all occupants through adequate surveillance.

A thorough contextual analysis of architecture cannot be undertaken without analysis of the spatial relationships and site to which it relates. Equally, so too are analyses of specific groups without seeking candid responses to questions that relate to real-life human interpersonal relationships within them. This research, therefore, sought to investigate fundamental aspects specific to PCFs such as WA Police custodial attitudes, morale, custodial training relevant to the requirements of operational PCF design, and operational preparedness to work in PCFs. These were considered as some of the key attributes that could be considered in conjunction with design to achieve a reduction in risk of assaults, self harm and violence by detainees and to facilitate a more cohesive and effective custodial training matrix that supported adherence to policy and procedures for the custodian from a tactical and operational perspective.

A historical contextual analysis of the WA Police's history was conducted to distinguish between significant chronological threads and the organisations historical and functional relationships compared with developments that have occurred within other carcerative typologies. In addition, to determine the contemporary functional, organisational and architectural context required an in-depth analysis of Perth Watch House the current WA state PCF. This was fundamental in highlighting the unique function the PWH plays as an integral interface between different components of the WA CJS and other existing WA metropolitan district PCFs. This led me to investigate the architectural design approach of a number of approved WA PCFs and offer a critical analysis of the spatial strategies to determine if current PCF design was compatible with critical operational procedure and policy requirements based upon PCFs within the CJS.

Carcerative architecture shares a common historical thread to a point in history where imprisonment was not considered a punishment but for the purpose of holding for other more physical punishment, and thus there was no need for a specialised architectural

response until the concept of imprisonment was considered a form of punishment in its own right. With it came many theories of how best to use architecture applied to physical body as well as to facilitate specific forms of administration to achieve rehabilitation, such as panoptic design, Pennsylvania System, Prison Farms, Psychiatric Prisons, New Generation Design, to name a few. The significance of considering architectural and spatial rationale to support rehabilitation by modifying behaviour while imprisoned within early prisons brought with it a sense of excitement and a source of inspiration for a dedicated line of investigation among many early intellectuals and reformers. Though contemporary societal attitudes find offence toward some institutions and perceived over-surveillance in modern life, most modern societies already exist within built environments where such conditions already exist. Equally we as consumers are also surveilled in our every-day lives through other less obvious electronic means by corporations such as Google, Facebook, transport systems, mobile phones and other networks. Although the term 'surveillance' once suggested physical observation or cameras it now defines parameters that are more diverse in the digital age, the notion that surveillance means the use of cameras has become less relevant. The fictional and perverse aspect of Bentham's panopticon made the concept repugnant, and since, has led to similar all-encompassing attitudes that the application of omnipotent surveillance is pernicious. This may well be the case if such an all-encompassing system were to be introduced. However, this research finds that in specialised circumstances surveillance as means of deterrence in various situations is neither intrusive nor damaging. Surveillance, for the purpose of facilitating observation in PCFs, is not only beneficial but necessary to provide safety and reduce risk to all occupants and is a worthy subject for future investigation.

From an architectural perspective, PCFs have not been greatly researched. Historically, having evolved out of a once all-encompassing typology, police facilities have seen little significant advancement. Distinction in PCF architecture, as a typology, occurred more by default, a remnant among other institutions that have since specialised physically and philosophically in comparison to PCFs due to advancements in law, specialisation and societal attitudes. Due to insufficient government funding at certain points in history, WA Police have at time had to make do with adaptive reuse of facilities that did not always fit the purpose and was not desirable from a police perspective. Without significant modification to suit and with staff expressing a sense of futility in voicing concerns, relating to unsuitable and outdated building like the PWH, frustrations have recently culminated in the establishment of the new state-of-the-art facility in Northbridge.

PWH, designed as a state-of-the-art purpose built facility for its time, was found not to be used as originally intended due to changes in policy, procedure, and a lack of funding to meet compliance standards or adequate human resources. WA Police acknowledge that current Perth Watch House facilities are unacceptable and are in the process of being replaced with new facilities (Dean 2004, 5) elsewhere in Perth, however, what is of concern is the disproportionately prolonged period between acknowledgment, funding, and action. PWH does, however, have the capacity to be used in a way that more closely resembles intent while also, due to its spatial program, and in a non-operational and disused (vacated) capacity it could still provide an ideal real-life training platform and a place in which new ideas and technologies could be safely tested before being considered for use in an operational location. A facility that has the capacity to provide such a setting is of significant benefit to the WA Police organisation if it could be retained for such purposes as in this capacity it has the capability to be used to provide a specialised training environment. This consideration could complement existing training where serious concerns existed among police personnel who felt inadequately prepared for custody-specific and operational duties. Even though it had been suggested that training had improved over time, training lacks specificity to realistic PCF environments. In particular, some of the areas that require further improvement relate to aspects considered critical to PCF settings. This includes the prevalence of mental illness among detainees held within PCFs, and a better police understanding of the significance of preserving detainee dignity in PCF settings.

Superseded design and incompatible spatial relationships do not assist officers with carrying out their duties efficiently and provide custodial care. The greater proportion of existing metropolitan PCF cells and exercise yards being non-compliant further exacerbates this concern. Moreover, all existing WA Police facilities visited had varying issues of concern and suffered from an inability to sufficiently observe detainees without electronic surveillance due to linear layout and inappropriate spatial relationships. Observation is paramount for the safety of all people in PCFs due to inherent risk of self harm violence towards police. However, even PCFs that had the potential for improved observation were circumvented by unrealistic administrative pressures and other tasks that are required of insufficient staff. At times, these expectations require un-related administrative tasks to be undertaken concurrent with custodial duties such as observation of detainees being held. On the other hand, what does appear to have improved as a result of RCIADIC and due to change of PCF administration from sworn police to custody and auxiliary officers, are attitudes and professionalization towards custodial care.

Irrespective of PCF administrations, however, a shift's morale which is entirely connected to job satisfaction and a significant factor that can influence the way in which detainees are treated, was, and continues to be largely left to the supervisor and the level of support they provide their staff. This suggests that there are many HR issues and interpersonal relationship layers that must be considered in appraising staff satisfaction, morale, and potential for resignation. A superior's indifference to individual officer's abilities, requirements, training, validation of ideas as well as self-confidence in the capacity to perform in an already hostile environment are all additional, and moreover, pertinent to a more holistic analysis and understanding of the somewhat undocumented intricacies that are embodied within the organisational relationships of the 'custodian' element within PCF environments.

This tells us that PCF architecture and spatial requirements for this specific typology are informed by a multitude of complex behavioural and organisational relationships, and operational and procedural considerations that are unique to police contexts. Accordingly, this custodial typology cannot be designed in isolation of the needs of all human occupants and functional aspects which is integral to the strategic planning processes and implementation of PCF architecture and specialised spatial program. With this, a singular all-encompassing design solution for ideal components within PCFs are not feasible, rather, existing standard PCF components that are required (as well as new components suggested in this research) require individual consideration.

Rather than an architecture that is restrictive by way of indiscriminate forms of control over its occupants and the manner in which space is ultimately used, it is the flesh and blood constituents within these unique institutional mechanisms that must have their requirements fulfilled, and with this, inform the design rationale of PCF architecture.

Although research-based representations make significant contributions to the field of architecture, and strategic planning, these disciplines cannot be understood in abstract terms alone. To suitably understand the implications of architecture, design and spatial relationships require critical analyses of Post Occupancy Evaluations. Post Occupancy Evaluation research is required to understand the practical application and consequence of PCF architecture and spatial strategies within operational contexts.

The means by which this data could be collected and implemented to further develop spatial-behavioural considerations and PCF specific expertise in architecture and diversify the specialised knowledge base of a strategic category of architecture and planning could

be the basis for future research. This knowledge has the potential to be of real value to the decision making processes of various stakeholders, organisations, the professions of architecture and planning, and vicariously, the WA Police by means of increasingly more progressive, refined and specialised facilities.

A number of additional matters worthy of future research also arise from a state-level Watch House facility that has the capacity to accommodate for detainees of varying risk and pre and post-graduation staff of varying skill levels, and subject to optimal operational requirements being met, is able to be used as intended. Controlled, real-life training environments that promote a measured release into custodial policing could reduce the sense of having a lack of proficiency by minimising unexpected disparity between simulated training and reality. This could offer an alternative training context that could translate into strategies for WA Police to assist with staff retention by allowing for the 'easing in' of police into challenging environments such as PCFs rather than graduate from the Academy on Friday and commence duty in such environments on Monday where the full extent of the realities within PCFs will be captured in a single first real-life experience which may be overwhelming. Knowing the full extents of what the job entails delivered in a measured approach, in a more realistic once-operational facility could potentially be more beneficial than the graduation approach where significant funding is committed to prospective employees that might quickly decide that working in PCFs was not what they had envisioned.

The future Watch House currently under construction has potential to contribute to significant change in PCF attitudes that influence organisational relationships and also assist with staff retention. Upon completion, Auxiliary personnel will be the primary occupiers and administrators of the new state-level PCF. This removes the latent historical legacies that exists at PWH which associates the facility as being a police building in which Auxiliary staff work for and are subservient to sworn police who originally occupied and administered it. As the primary occupiers of a new facility, future research that explores the performance outcomes, attitudes towards custodial duties, specialisation, and morale of personnel within the facility is imperative to form a comparative context. It is anticipated that much of the existing sentiment will be neutralised due to this new direction in PCF administration, however, from this study, one is better positioned to determine whether the position description of 'Auxiliary' or 'Custody' officer continues to be considered as subservient as implied by the demeanour and conduct of sworn officers that exudes a sense of entitlement over auxiliary officers in PCF environments (particularly PWH).

Understanding the changes may provide additional layers of background knowledge that could inform more appropriate group-specific strategies in architecture.

Consideration of design longevity not only in terms of individual building performance but also its operational capacity and relevance within the WA Police organisation also requires further analytical studies. This would be worthy of future research by means of quantitative and qualitative post occupational analysis. This could be approached from an observational perspective observing staff using the space, forming a 'snag list' of critical obvious issues such as looking at areas where the building deteriorates more than others as a marker of performance or future design consideration or to develop a maintenance plan. As with this research, staff could be also be interviewed to obtain a variety of qualitative perspectives and other more statistical research could also be considered. These are but a few suggestions that are aimed at developing a whole-of-life analysis of PCF spaces that could assist make better design decisions and predict future changes in operational requirements, developments and demographics. A study that investigates the feasibility of multiple, perhaps north, south and central state-level Watch Houses instead of small PCFs attached to many individual police stations that for the majority of the time remain vacant ought to be considered. This could assist in considerations of planning and architecture that extend the operational life and functional performance of PCFs, and make more efficient use of custody related funding.

Additionally, further research that examines the implications a new spatial intervention and potential for pre-admission screening conducted within a new sub-component incorporated within PCFs could be considered. This could have far-reaching implications in significantly reducing custodial risk to WA Police by considering in-house specialist's recommendations for the most appropriate course of action for each individual detainee case. This study could be undertaken in conjunction with the concept of forming multiple intake areas that requires a sequential administrative process of each detainee. This has the potential to reduce the concentration of detainees that are at times found within the existing PWH reception area in which a multitude of processes are undertaken and further minimise operational risk.

It has been established that to ensure the safety of all occupants in PCFs, and in particular, Watch House environments, the significance of surveillance cannot be overstated as observation within such facilities is essential. Spatial strategies that enable direct lines of human-level observation that are less reliant on electronic mechanisms between the

custodian and detainees require further consideration for research. The observer's role should not be undermined by excessive additional tasks that are required to be performed concurrently and it should be noted that within this context the observer should be situated such that the position becomes function-specific and the role itself be considered as the primary purpose.

Finally more work that relates to the distinct nature of PCFs as a design typology among other institutional settings would advance further our understanding of this type of architecture and formulate a nexus between human behaviour and built space that will achieve a more rigorous knowledge of architecture and how it performs and impacts on individuals. Further interviews with WA Police will be required to develop a substantial body of knowledge of attitudes, organizational and spatial relationships and data that will assist in developing our understanding for design of PCFs. The abovementioned further future research seeks to develop a specialised form of strategic planning and a tactical category of architecture specific to PCFs and in so doing, improve our understanding of architecture in particular and in general.

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Interview R.1. 2010. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. January 4. Mount Lawley, Perth, Western Australia.

Interview R.2. 2010. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. January 14. Thornlie, Perth, Western Australia.

Interview R.3. 2010. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Tape recording. January 15. Ocean Reef, Perth, Western Australia.

Interview R.4. 2010. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. January 16. Dianella, Perth, Western Australia.

Interview R.5. 2010. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Tape recording. March 2. Kensington, Perth, Western Australia.

Interview R.6. 2010. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. November 5. Fremantle, Perth, Western Australia.

Interview R.7. 2010. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. November 19. Joondalup, Perth, Western Australia.

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Interview R.9. 2010. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. December 3. Armadale, Perth, Western Australia.

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Interview R.14. 2011. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. March 25. Perth City, Perth, Western Australia.

Interview R.15. 2011. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. April 8. Warwick, Perth, Western Australia.

Interview R.16. 2011. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. January 4.
Perth City, Perth, Western Australia.

Interview R.17. 2011. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Electronic Written recording. April 12.
Midland, Perth, Western Australia.

Interview R.18. 2011. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. April 20.
Perth City, Perth, Western Australia.

Interview R.19. 2011. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. April 20.
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Interview R.20. 2011. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. April 20.
Perth City, Perth, Western Australia.

Interview R.21. 2008. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording. July 1.
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Interview R.22. 2012. Interview by E. Jonsescu. Written recording, February 3.
Undisclosed.

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Appendices

Appendices 1 – Questionnaire Graphical Representation [figure 1 – figure 8]




Figure 1.




Figure 2.

Questionnaire Results




Figure 3.

Questionnaire Results




Figure 4.

Questionnaire Results




Figure 5.

Questionnaire Results




Figure 6.

Questionnaire Results




Figure 7.

Questionnaire Results




Figure 8.

Interviews

Interview 1 (11.01.2010)

1. How long have you been a police officer? 14 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? 2.5 years while at central and 2.5 years full time lockup tenure.
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? You can get stressed without even knowing it, it's good to get out of the building and go for walks near work (Queens Gdns) or talk to others.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think this method works? It depends a lot on the supervisor, some do nothing and are very dismissive and disinterested towards probationers but others may be keen to help.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? I think the relationships are the same in that everyone gives everyone shit just like out on the road; it's just the atmosphere and environment which makes is different in the lockup
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? Again it depends a lot on the supervisor, my team were very good, no slackers or soft cocks or chucking sickies all the time, the supervisor and level of staffing can make or break the whole experience is what I have come to learn.
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? DEAT officers can be slack and always have to make comparisons to home, there is some resentment towards them due to plum spots they are given and then they disappear. It appears that they get preferential treatment which can be seen by the postings they get.
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? Nil Received.
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain your answer. ½ hour fingerprint machine course at academy and cell extraction course after 1 year at the lockup.
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes definitely due to the unique environment and function.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? No it's a shocking building – corridors are too narrow, doors don't allow passage, too many sharp angles, bars on doors and glass can be reached through bars, slippery floor when urinated on and too sticky if skin is dragged upon.

12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? Yes I mentioned glass windows on WACA side can be smashed or seen through as it is unprotected. 2 years later they put a roller blind on the inside which still doesn't fix the problem, I don't bother anymore.
13. Have you ever thought that the lockup would work better if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. You would need to start over.
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design? Explain your answer. Lack of observation cell space, sometimes up to 10 detainees in obs cell at a time then overflow to cell H1 which is then used for same purpose but has bars and no acoustic separation.
15. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? No cell checks are done every 20 minutes; they are used to supplement physical checks.
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. I don't think they know any better.
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? The PWH one is terrible; entry should be taller and wider as trucks don't fit. Need more room on sides of vehicles. Tactile or painted markers on walls or ground as police vehicles have restricted vision. Separate areas for multiple arrests especially while unloading firearms etc. It happens that sometimes other arrestees are brought through while officers are unloading weapons.
18. Is the Lockup observation cell effective, how could it be improved? Too small, bad location, window too small detainees disruptive to staff doing paperwork or similar, needs full length glass at some point. Females do not have an obs cell
19. Is the padded cell/s effective, how could they be improved? Either the cell itself or their location. Should be able to be accessed from strip search room and cells area possibly 2 doors and the doors should be wider as pack of officers carrying or dragging detainee can't fit through door way.
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Terrible acoustics. Nil between male /female and sensitive people must be walked past everyone to get to cell SC5 (which also has no acoustic separation). Private details in mixing areas (bail and reception area)
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? Unavoidable and just a part of the job
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how? Detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? detainee v police at reception and when removed from van and strip search room. detainee v detainee in cells but staff have problems in exercise yard due to large number of detainees to staff ratio.
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? All of the above.

24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Yes, especially as some young staff can incite 'egg on' violent behaviour, but experienced officers have a different way of speaking with detainees and 'clients' in general and are able to build a rapport with those who come into contact with police.
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed differently, and if so how? Maybe not avoided but minimise the risk of injury.
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Not all of them should be but there definitely should be some. Some (a large portion) of detainees say please don't put me by myself and prefer to be co-habitate.
27. Is contraband easily hidden, if so where it is usually found? It can be hidden but usually found during strip search, sometimes left (rarer now due to van design) in the rear of the van, but it's almost impossible to stop all contraband without biometric scanning.
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? Bail Co-ordinator, Nurses, Mental Health Nurse, J.P, G4S (security), PETS, SJA, SOGS, Sanitary contractors.
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Thurs/Fri/Sat – 20:00 onwards nurse on site makes assessment, at any other time supervisor can make assessment whether to take to RPH for clearance for 'fit to stay in custody'. This is a problem in itself as these are the busiest for emergency staff at RPH also.
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? Detainees are supplied with clothing if come in part or unclothed, females are given sanitary provisions, and strip searches are a no 'stare' affair.
31. Are drug and alcohol affected detainees treated any differently? Explain your answer. I'd say 50-60% of all detainees come in either alcohol or drug affected – especially late at night or early hours, we try to separate them as much as possible from other detainees as they are usually much louder and sometimes screaming, swearing and carrying on at the top of their voice. This can wake up sleeping detainees and start fights with otherwise quiet detainees.
32. In your opinion, how much does drugs and alcohol affect the way the lockup either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? Completely affects it because in PWH you can't block out noise from different areas and all other issues already mentioned in Q.15 & 21.
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? Yes, Muslims want to know which way Mecca is, they want single cells and won't eat any of the food prepared for them.
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it easy to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. No, as searching can be an issue and sensitive people must be either walked past general detainees and can't separate acoustically male to female areas.

Male search male part female search female part – male must step out of room leaving female officer vulnerable.

35. Does the use of exercise yards cause any problems or are they beneficial and when? They are beneficial to detainees as it allows them fresh air and a release, but can be dangerous for staff when numbers of detainees are high to low ratio of officers. All in fights have occurred and can become dangerous for officers to become involved.
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Managed by staff usually 3-4 in a cell overflow into H1 or exercise yard (where blankets and mattresses aren't usually allowed (but is in this circumstance) sometimes up to 10 in obs cell, so yeah there can be problems with overcrowding especially NYE, Australia Day and long weekends.
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Staffing levels are generally adequate, but can get caught out sometimes. Can be team dependant, some take sickies due to moral and supervisor on their individual teams.
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. I think they are only made aware of their rights and that's about it, sometimes it's like a free for all like a zoo. I don't think there is anything written anywhere outlining how they should conduct themselves.

Interview 2 (14.01.2010)

1. How long have you been a police officer? 30 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? 15 years full time
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Never really with detainees or trustees, actually its mainly internal pressure its only stressful if you have to keep work related secrets from peers such as if there are UCO's in or high profile detainees.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think this method works? Never saw or heard of grievances – probably due to the way the culture is and some supervisors are ex-army and run the lockup in the same way.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? It is different probably due to the type of work and the type of people who works in there.
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? Again it depends a lot on the OIC it come in phases where it can be great or terrible depending if they try to operate it like an army barracks.
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? Yes – too many watch dogs and rules and

regulations, it honestly makes young guys not know what the hell to get involved in or not in case it turns to shit and they are implicated.

8. What is your opinion about DEAT (Direct Entry Accelerated Training) and overseas officers - has this changed W.A Police culture and how? Yes DEAT has changed culture, due to their preferential treatment but some do have good work experience. Within the lockup they have generally been o.k.
9. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? We never had any, you just learnt on the job. Sometimes there may be inappropriate use of force due to lack of training and sometimes officers are scared to do anything due to the watch dogs.
10. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain your answer. Cell extraction, lifesaving refresher and fire emergency.
11. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes probably should be. Detainees in lockup can be completely different to what they were like as offenders out on the street. Assessments need to be made and there is a different psychology in a state lockup over suburban station lockups due to the unique environment and function.
12. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? No the current lockup looks like its designed to be a prison, lockup should be maximum 3 night (currently there is no set length of time depends on discretion of supervisors).
13. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? No – nothing would change anyway
14. Have you ever thought that the lockup would work better if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. Yes it could work better and a step in the right direction would be to speak with people who have worked there for many years.
15. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design? Explain your answer. Reception area and bail area allows mixing of male/female and incompatible groups which causes problems which is not right. Also not being able to control noise and due to this, segregating of sensitive people can be virtually impossible.
16. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? They probably do these days; it needs to be more hands on.
17. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. Some do not because of the environment but the 'sweeteners' used to entice (not always the right types of) officers such as country service at lockup.
18. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? Weapons area should be separate from car area.

19. Is the Lockup observation cell effective, how could it be improved? It should be a little more restrictive so that there is less room to lash out and swing. The bigger they make it the more people they will put in there.
20. Is the padded cell/s effective, how could they be improved? Either the cell itself or their location. I think officers tend to strip search too much. Camera, mirror and ledge can be reached (in the past) even though situated very high.
21. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Terrible acoustics. Lighting is not too bad, but detainees can get to them as they are surface mounted.
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? Detainee V Detainee mainly in exercise.
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? All of the above.
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Yes, some officers 'arc them up' while experienced officer generally build a rapport with detainees and get them to comply that way, much less stressful method.
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed differently, and if so how? Only if there was no contact.
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? They may be good but costly. No single officer should have keys so ambush for keys is not an option.
27. Is contraband easily hidden, if so where it is usually found? Generally on the person or exercise yard. Safe cells are best as there are no mattresses – mattresses can be used to hide contraband.
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? Salvo's, FESA, AV Scheme, DUMAR, Prisons Dept., Court Staff, J.P's and medical staff.
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Weekend nurses and PETS for psych assessments. Minor issues at any other times are at police discretion.
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? Assessments should be made on individual basis for strip search, should not be mandatory especially for minor offences where they do not pose a risk to anyone.
31. Are drug and alcohol affected detainees treated any differently? Explain your answer. Need to be watched more intently. Manual states they should be assessed for fitness to stay in police custody
32. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? Yes, Muslims with headwear and meals and do-gooders are right outside the door waiting to criticise if everyone is treated the same and

equally on one hand they should and on the other they shouldn't you can never please everyone.

33. Does lockup design or procedures make it easy to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. No acoustic separation, cameras in the showers creates issues of dignity with male and female staff able and expected to view.
34. Does the use of exercise yards cause any problems or are they beneficial and when? They are beneficial but could be better designed. Generally it's good that it is long as detainees can move around and have own space unless overcrowded.
35. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Overcrowding is difficult and risky – mainly placed in exercise yards NYE, Aust Day and long weekends can be a real problem.
36. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Staffing used to be o.k with WAPS, now with 'special constables' we will see, as senior is still a police supervisor.
37. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. There may be something on the wall, I am not sure, but if there isn't there should be.

Interview 3 (15.01.2010)

1. How long have you been a police officer? 25 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? 6 months full time and several years as a supervisor in a suburban police station containing a small lockup.
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? May not notice stress at work but may notice it at leave time and when they return to work.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think this method works? There is but it's not used well as it could and there is a reluctance and unwillingness to speak out due to a lack of confidence in managers to treat confidentially or fairly. They tend to bottle it up.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? A culture in police is interesting, eg. Detectives have a broken-down hierarchy so everyone is more on the same level, more relaxed and staff are more valued, their opinions are listened to and debated (at least have a say). I could only assume that the lockup would be the total opposite as it is at a lot of suburban stations or locations where there is a lot of junior staff where they are treated like children. Uniformed areas tend to be hierarchical.
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? Again moral can be influenced by the type of work, amount of ownership/autonomy in investigations, the workload for detectives for e.g. and other areas can be high but receive little recognition.

Also the amenity is always compromised by funding say office space for e.g. the space would be at the minimum requirement for let's say 4 officers, and once occupied there may need to fit another 3 officers in so they squeeze them in, just a small way of devaluing the working environment and translates to value of officers comfort.

7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? Yes, DEAT has changed culture, but there still is a paramilitary attitude in the police dept. You can see the change even in the new commissioner who is against standing fast . . . but individual sections might still enforce it. Technology is also changing culture. It seems to have gone through a cycle where there was a lot of control and tight reigns then there was a more businesslike teamwork approach and now due to rapid increase and change in technology creating a fear so it's sort of going back to a more closed mentality. Any officer with the skill doesn't matter where in the world it is gained, could and should do the job. The problem is the culture was always so insular where if you did your time you would get made up and get good postings, where DEAT are coming in and being made up rapidly and getting the good spots putting local police off side as feel as the dept. is not showing loyalty to them (but it is skills based and police may not be comparing apples with apples)
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? Definitely not, even as an OIC I still didn't know all the rules and procedures were and you could really get caught out. Liberty is a very precarious thing and young officers/people may not really appreciate fully the terms of bail etc. (esp. at suburban lockups) when they may be sending to or refusing bail.
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain your answer. Generally we do the essentials and that's it, you are new and you are expected to know everything. Example: brand new – just graduated police placed on night shift security at Head Quarters, with no training on what to look out for how to carry out security checks, who to check (do we check even detectives in plain clothes?) you used to get your months of training then your uniform and then expected to get out there and work.
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes I definitely think it should be. I think that having 'special constables' is a move in the right direction. I think it's important that they get the 'levels' v rank right depending on their experience.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? If someone wanted to hang themselves in any cell where they are able to (even with 20 minute checks) it would be all over. Makes mention of hospital ER where central point for staff and obs cubicles around this core. One thing that I find annoying is as a culture police take great pride in being able to tarnish/not look after the property without real repercussions . . . e.g. sloshing coffee into carpet when walking, or black marks on wall from boots, or sticky-taping to walls removing paint. But it's like graffiti it needs to be removed or cleaned otherwise it breeds a similar attitude to the property.
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? -

13. Have you ever thought that the lockup would work better if it was designed differently and do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. I remember many instances where an old house was converted into a station and one of the bedrooms was converted into a cell (old Lockridge, North Perth & Bayswater). So it seems new stations are becoming more purposeful but we need to do more studies and write down the evaluation post occupancy, we always get a new architect in who wasn't on the original design so are not privy to the information; bits are missed out as no one writes it down (it was designed this way because . . .). Info should be owned by or held by police as it can be provided to subsequent architects as a brief.

Lockups could be improved if there wasn't just one lockup maybe there was a north south and central lockup. It could ease congestion (satellite lockups). Would reduce travelling time, costs involved, officer off road times. Should do away with suburban lockups like Clarkson, Midland etc. and have a hub (North South etc.).

There could be directions to get out of van move here or there – do this do that rather than the officer needing to physically remove them from the van which can be a problem. There should be a vestibule system where they are directed all the way to vestibule door system from the van.

14. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Yes, experienced officer generally build a rapport with people.
15. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Sometimes there are problems with an officer who has been to a station for one year being the most experience officer on the shift due to how much movement there is due to tenure.
16. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. There should definitely be a list of rules to know that there may be consequences for my actions. I think this is really good a good idea especially if there are things in place which can be used as leverage i.e. TV, radio etc.

Interview 4 (26.01.2010)

1. How long have you been a police officer? 9 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? Only in a suburban police station containing a lockup – involved in officer physical training
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes definitely – I usually speak with colleagues and do a lot of exercise which is a personal decision but also helps cope with stress
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think this method works? Yes there is but no one or very few make a proactive effort to make a complaint.

5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? Yes there are definite differences in police cultures – detectives are more career-focused and may feel like they come under more scrutiny and do more to protect themselves and colleagues from investigative bodies. Seems areas which invest more time and money and equipment in staff generally feel more appreciated and culture is better. Training now is more like university culture than military culture therefore divisions of rank are dissolved and orders are now questioned.
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? Again. This is position specific and very much OIC related or whether you fit into the team. Pressures and workloads and nature of work at location all make a difference. The time of the year e.g. near Christmas time and NYE you are reminded of just how much you miss out on.
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? Yes the organisation has changed, and it has caused some problems, for example with overseas police, you can't take one police culture and drop it in another culture/country and expect it to be cohesive. DE officers continue to compare everything to home and seem resistant to change from their country's way of doing things (MO) or outlook on issues (their mentality, skill set and training is totally different and not necessarily appropriate). It is true that they receive preferential treatment and that would be that during the recruitment drive carried out in their country by WAP they were promised the world and told how easy training is and that it would be easy to be accelerated in rank – so when some require extra training to bring up to local speed they are resistant and protestant. They also seem to get on all of the 'plum' courses which locals find very difficult to get onto like TRG, Water, Police, K-9, etc.
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? Absolutely not: but custody officers have their own trainer - they do cell extraction and empty hand but the bigger problem is that the people in this position (level 2) are not necessarily suitable – mums who have returned to workforce etc. may not have the right mindset for this (lockup) environment – they don't have a police mindset which is understanding and accepting of some of the behaviours of offenders and detainees who are non-compliant or drug and alcohol affected. Some that have come through have been grossly obese and unable to even complete the first 5 mins of training required. In certain groups that went through the physical requirements were not met by a lot of the recruits, however, the Police Department's demand for staff numbers were such that the physical requirements were removed to allow the group to pass rather than fail the group or prolong their training till they could meet the standard. This is similar to what happened with the 500 plan where the process was eased up to let more recruits through. Integrity and psych tests may also be an issue but the main issue is at recruiting they are being told they are suitable but then cannot even pass the physical requirement. The recruits then complain as 'we were told we were suitable . . . and the training you make us do is beyond what we are capable of'.
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain your answer. Email respondent re this question for further information.
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes it should be – it could be run by the prisons service or similar but it comes down to money and this

reflects on the applicants (it is a level 2 so an 'unskilled' people without tertiary qualifications).

11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? I actually think the introduction of CCTV is a good thing as it makes officers more accountable – now actually do their 20 min checks as it is filmed . . . not just write it down as done on running sheet. Poor design can be that you can't see in if they are asleep or hiding – need to open door and go in so it's a bit risky.
12. Have you ever thought that the lockup would work better if it was designed differently and do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. I have made comments but nothing ever gets done. Police mentality is its govt property and there is little personalisation so not respected. Bravado causes issues with being destructive of property – I have observed a game of who could shred the biggest thing, and if it isn't bolted down or new and shiny its fair game. Cars can be thrashed quite a bit as well and as long as damage isn't visible it just goes unnoticed but dangerous for subsequent used of vehicle.
13. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? At the moment its only 1 car at a time with cars waiting outside possibly non secure detective vehicle and weapons removal should be in a lockable area out of view.
14. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? When removing offenders from the back of the van but I always thought the worst place of all was the tunnel leading to court from lockup its long narrow and as soon as around corner no one can see you it's like running the gauntlet. People have been called off patrol to escort in this tunnel and the ratio is not necessarily correct.
15. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Yes, but depending on individual as some can be antagonistic.
16. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees. Might be good for prisoner safety but if lockups were used as just for holding then they shouldn't need too many of them.
17. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? Same sex searches.
18. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? No, but police can become very dismissive for requests that are out of the ordinary even if the request could easily be met. It is easier for a person in a position of authority to always say no. But in certain circumstances e.g. if you are trying to get information out of people, if you help of get chatting you can get so much more than if you always play the 'no..no' game. Just going into the exercise yard and having a smoke with an offender can build a very strong rapport very quickly.
19. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Sometimes there is enough, but I can remember when I first came out there was a direction that no 'probie' was to work with another 'probie' but on my first day out

that is exactly what happened and it still happens. Sometimes skills are not evenly dispersed for example GD's is usually a pool of very new officers and some more senior officers who are disgruntled or haven't put in any effort to progress into a more specialised area, but these and traffic police are the police most people will ever see . . . and they speak and deal with people quite differently than detectives. Some of the teachers are not qualified enough to teach what they are teaching, they are just officer who want the 8-4 lifestyle and not to be operational.

20. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. It's a good idea; it's just part of the education process which puts the detainee into the process not just a part of a process conducted on them. It's like the breath test instruction you tell them what the process is and what the consequence is for failure to comply. It gives police more options for non-compliance and offenders will know where they stand.

Interview 5 (02.03.2010)

1. How long have you been a police officer? 36 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? 2 years
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Unwind with family. Look forward to coming home. Used to have a beer at the police canteen. Medication. Political reasons do not allow for police canteen.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think this method works? Never made a grievance doesn't really have an issue. Gets dealt with confrontationally.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? No not the culture but the work is different.
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? Again. Gets down to the team and the individuals. Describes his team as high but some have very low. Happy to work there because of the moral.
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? Yes, it is to do with political correctness. Some say its due to DE officers but there's nothing new about DEAT's, my grandfather was Irish cop and came here. Lockup has hopeless DEATS *and* hopeless locals. Some of them are given too much rank without having local knowledge. Local knowledge is underrated.
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? No, but it not rocket science but he is unsure if it is necessary.
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain your answer. Some - Cell extraction training which is routine. Respondent states he has not done it though.

10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Some do not join the police force to be in this area but there is no harm in making it a specialised area. Is it a fair pay compared to other officers??
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? It's an out of date design that is very basic. Been in the lockup at Detroit – good setup. EPLU is wrong no single cells, multistorey. Take them up to feed them, should be single story. Not safe cells upstairs and it gets used for overflow. Expressed concerns to DO but was advised to continue.
12. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? No they don't rely too much they are a useful tool, you can see more though them then in direct observation.
13. Is the Lockup observation cell effective, how could it be improved? Works reasonably well. Entry to it was no good because it was directly opposite the holding cell. Could sort of see it from the reception. Had wooden benches.
14. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? No good in terms of recordings. Need egg carton stuff. Cleaning would be an issue though. Good recording is important for our own protection. Ideally when you shut a cell door it should be sound proof. It's like a mad house.
15. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? Wrestle in a skinny corridor. Reception bench not adequate, crims sitting next to each other. Pluck one at a time from outside and process individually. No privacy for personal questions like psych issues and others listening. Hard to get a perfect design wrestle in and out of a cell.
16. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. No doubt at all, some juniors are surprisingly good. More mature generally better. Able to talk people into what they want as he has been around "the old bloke".
17. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse Thurs, Fri, Sat from 1900-0400. At any other time it is the discretion of the OIC of who we take and don't take. Arresting officer to sort it out. Obvious benefit for a nurse to be there 24hrs/7days. Sun is a definite day; some prisoners have been there since Fri. Maybe even every night Mon to Wed.
18. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? Nothing that he is aware of and can imagine anything feasible. Dangerous things can be hidden on the body. Strip searching sometimes has to be done and done properly. No cameras in the strip search room.
19. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees. Might be good for prisoner safety but if lockups were used as just for holding then they shouldn't need too many of them.

20. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? Nothing comes to mind and no facilities are provided. Aware of stories from England. We get by, don't keep the detainees that long.
21. Does the use of exercise yards cause any problems or are they beneficial and when? Does not work for smoko, there is no smoking. They work, they keep them happy as there is more room. The cells are small. Problem is you don't want too many in the yard at one time (However sometimes used as overflow).
22. Does lockup design or procedures make it easy to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. No provisions for single cells officers have to make a call where is most appropriate. On occasions have given them a cell to themselves.
23. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Extra mattresses on the floor, used upstairs to overflow. Depending on the prisoner and the weather we use the exercise yard.
24. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. We never had too many issues. Main issue of our leadership people. Should have had minimum numbers but requests went unheard. While we were there we down to 9 minimum and do at least one escort. Not good enough for busy times. 2 or 3 'probies', once I was there by myself! Experience is helpful but numbers are still numbers as long as you stuck to the 9 minimum. Admin had to recall. 3 out of 9 is only 33%.
25. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? A locking arrangement should be in the car, you shouldn't have to get out of the car with it. The Sally port works. Everything in EPLU is an afterthought. The glass holding box is tacked on. The glass box is more useful as an overflow if it is busy inside they leave them longer in the glass box.
26. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid out differently, and if so how? They might work but there are other factors. It depends how they manage the numbers. Depends how long you keep them for. Return to prison warrant if after hours prisons won't take them (nurse isn't there) no nurse in lockup either. We are a lockup not a prison. Would apply more to the long-term people. But why are we keeping them so long, there is a Sat court so why isn't there a Sun court. EPLU isn't accredited to hold overflow from prison.
27. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. It's a good idea; it's just part of the education process which puts the detainee into the process not just a part of a process conducted on them. It's like the breath test instruction you tell them what the process is and what the consequence is for failure to comply. It gives police more options for non-compliance and offenders will know where they stand.

Interview 6 (05.11.2010)

1. How long have you been a police officer? 30 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? Never attached to permanent lockup
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes, you just adjust and cope with it as it becomes the assumed norm. It's the administrative and accountability pressures that cause stress I find not the job itself.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think this method works? Yes but not many have been made in the last few years.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? -
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? I think its ok here; less people seem to come through the lockup these days due to the summons in first instance stance.
7. Do you think organisational attitudes towards lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time and how? No one really likes to do lockup duties, but they still do a good job of it, they like it for other reasons though, in that they can catch up on their outstanding admin duties.
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? They seem to be trained to a degree, but most of the knowledge required to perform well in a lockup it is on- the- job training and a lot is common sense
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain your answer. It is pretty rare, it might be offered once a year but with limited numbers in the end you just have to make do with what you have at your disposal with the minimal risk possible
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes definitely, the function should specialise more towards mental health assessments experience in assessing demeanour.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? We make do with what we have, I think it's ok, maybe that they are taking away the showers in the lockups we need showers esp. if pepper spray is involved or they have shat themselves etc.
12. Have you ever expressed concerns regarding this, if yes what was the outcome, if no why not? Not as such, but it seems when they design things or refurbish things they never get it right it ends up being a rabbit warren and they don't end the design such that it can easily be extended or added to in the future.

13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way? Not sure for existing but design such that it can easily be extended or added to in the future.
14. Can you think of any aspect of the lockup which hinders your duties? No they are pretty good here I think, just the air con makes doors slam shut on their own.
15. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? – needed more so for evidence and to keep an eye on all cells at the same time and everyone’s safety
16. Do you think that staff enjoy their work environment? So so, we had recent refurbishments but space is always an issue especially if we had to change the roster system at the moment with a 5 panel roster we are just o.k.
17. Do Sally port entries work well in Police Lockups, could they be improved and how?
18. Are Lockup observation cell effective, how could it be improved? We don’t have an observation cell as such we have a dock cell that’s quite good its small and easy to get people out of it, it’s good for controlling or separating until you are ready for them
19. Is the lockup padded cell and its location effective, how could they be improved? This one here the door slams shut when you don’t want it to because of the air pressure from the air conditioning
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Lighting is o.k but the sound travels out into the office.
21. What do you think about violence in lockups?
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? Receiving area always we try to make use of the dock and not have more than 2 detainees out in the area at a time
23. -
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Yes definitely we do a lot of pacifying before even arriving to the lockup these days and also received fewer complaints. One problem is that some of the experience squads like DIV 79 and MIG no longer exist and day to day it’s a really young force.
25. –
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Could be a good option.
27. –
28. –

29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? If they sneeze they get taken to hospital. If they complain of injury, if we suspect injury straight to hospital.
30. –
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees determine the way in which the lockup works? No they are treated in the same way
32. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? Generally not as it is short-term you might get the odd one that won't eat something but if we can offer anything other, usually they are happy to go without
33. Does lockup design or procedures make it easy to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. No there isn't a separate section of cells for different sexes any and one or either have to pass cells of either or.
34. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? -
35. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Yes just enough at the moment with this unforgiving roster would be better when we eventually have some auxiliary officers come our way
36. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. Yes minimal (was taken over to cell and shown 'do not graffiti sign' in cells).

Interview 7 (19.11.2010)

1. How long have you been a police officer? 29 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? 2 years
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Get headaches I usually eat something and have some tea, I find I don't identify well with when I am stressed or what pushes my buttons.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think this method works? Yes there is and it's usually the more confident ones that come forward the timid ones usually keep quiet, but problems fester, personal relationships and how comfortable they are with the OIC.
5. Is 'police culture' different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? I think they are but they shouldn't be as it is a very critical part of our work (custodial care) and they should be mindful of what can happen when not enough emphasis is placed upon lockup work (deaths in custody).
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? Again. Very low here and its due to the lack of staff numbers making operational policing difficult.

7. Do you think organisational attitudes towards lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time and how? Yes especially due to deaths in custody I did lockup in 1981 when many of these issues were current. Detainees were treated very differently and the way in which custodial care was viewed was quite different, though some attitudes have remained the same that you're stuck inside the office and it's a second class task.
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? No, new recruits maybe otherwise on the job or through policy and procedure.
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain your answer. None apart from on the job, but custodial care should be on the critical list, it could be on blackboard and examined every 6 months (theory exam)
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes and they should specialise with psych training and testing, ordinary officers can get too blaze with lockup duties.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? It would be impossible without the cameras we now have here, you would need someone in there permanently watching the detainees if it were to be done properly.
12. Have you ever expressed concerns regarding this, if yes what was the outcome, if no why not? Yes but it's a HR issue not enough sergeants on shift to take on the amount of responsibility given to just one sergeants, it's hard to get good sergeants into the station scenario as they know what that there are so many facets of responsibility upon their shoulders all at the same time as well as keep an eye on the lockup screen. It only becomes an issue when something happens but by then it's too late. In the UK they have a shift sergeant, a radio sergeant, an operations sergeant and a beat sergeant.
13. -
14. Can you think of any aspect of the lockup which hinders your duties? Yes the cells are too far from the Sally-port door you have to go through 2 corridors and we only have 2 safe compliant cells out of such a large lockup area.
15. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? Yes it's all good until something happens it would be better to have someone there to observe but again limited resources don't allow for adequate performance especially if you have a high demand detainee constantly ringing the bell and you have so many other administrative and operational duties to do in a limited amount of time.
16. Do you think that staff enjoy their working environment? They should because if they don't they won't get much better but they still hate doing office and lockup duties.
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? All stations should have a Sally-port Warwick doesn't and people have jumped on top of the cars and over the fence, what the cost of a lockable cage over re-capture?

18. Is the Lockup observation cell effective, how could it be improved? Don't have one but if we did you would need someone to watch it to be effective again a HR issue.
19. Is the padded cell and its location effective, how could they be improved? They are OK here they should be a standard item.
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? No good shouting goes right through the station.
21. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? Reception and admission area
22. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Yes
23. Do you think violence could be avoided if the lockup was designed differently? Yes if we didn't have to walk them so far to get to the cells
24. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? A mix would be better multi cells would be better for suicidal people not to feel so isolated, however, I think it would be ideal to have no more than 2 detainees in one cell at a time.
25. Is contraband easily hidden (within the lockup) and if so where? It's not too bad possibly more so on their person and it is up to the officers' experience to find that.
26. What are some of the other agencies that work with your lockup? None any more we used to work with court custody transport but now they take morning prisoners from prison directly to court holding and not via the lockup, should have happened a long time ago.
27. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Joondalup hospital or ambulance
28. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? No cameras in the strip search room.
29. Do drug or alcohol affected detainees require dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? It's a judgement call may need medical attention or ok in a cell, we rarely take a drunk detainee but there are no sober centres up this way so not many options and you have to live by the decisions you make sometimes under difficult circumstances.
30. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? Not that I am aware of.
31. Does lockup design or procedures make it easy to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. No we only have 2 safe cells (in such a large lockup) to use if we have a juvenile male and a female they will go into different cells, if we get an adult male at the same time we will have a problem, it can happen and ideally 3-4 cells would be better.
32. Does the use of exercise yards cause any problems or are they beneficial and when? We have 2 of them but cannot use them as they are not rated as safe, I can't think of any in the state that might be compliant, but in the bush they may still be held for 2-3 days in them.

33. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? It's not really an issue here especially since they finally directed prison transfers straight to court holding and not via the lockup in the mornings.
34. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. No especially not custody management staff and if we used Joondalup as an indicator it would suggest that there are too many junior officers in the metro area, I don't know where all the coppers go they just vanish here and there like bush and never come back. New high level positions are also created, filled by experienced sworn officers, and placed behind a desk
35. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. No.

Interview 8 (26.11.2010)

1. How long have you been a police officer? 23 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup and where? Never attached to permanent lockup
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? No I don't think I feel stressed because of work
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how and do you think this method works? Yes this method works well depending on the type of complaint. If it is significant then it will go to D.O but if it is minor it can be dealt with at station level and the outcome may be adequate and not resolved properly.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? Yes they would be they are different in all locations as it is environment dependant they breed different camaraderie's and work ethics. Staff at a watch house have to put up with the same constant barrage from detainees day in and day out in a confined building whereas at least we get some variety and get to go out on the road etc.-
6. Is staff moral high or low and why do you think this is the case? It's low here and that's due to a lack of staff and support.
7. Do you think organisational attitudes towards lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time and how? Yes it has especially towards duty of care and responsibilities within the lockup; however, it has also changed due to policy where arrest rates have been impacted upon due to preference to summons CIA 2006 and also due to deaths in custody.
8. Do you feel that police receive enough lockup training before working in a lockup? Not really most of it seems to be learnt on the job.

9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup staff? Explain your answer. We recently did course on removing detainees from a cell ranging from compliant (verbal instruction) to non-compliant detainees (shield and baton extraction) at the academy.
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes definitely, but considering what has to be put up with every day perhaps tenure should be in place as listening to detainees every day would wear you down mentally.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? No it's a hindrance, it has been improved a little with some technology but even that is now out-dated and more of a hindrance (changing recoding tapes). Call buttons and alarms and a safe cell (cube) has been installed but we only have 2 approved cells to use the rest are non-compliant.
12. Have you ever expressed concerns regarding this, if yes what was the outcome, if no why not? The money is there but nothing gets done so I don't waste my breath more than likely it may get done but I won't be around to see it I don't think.
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way? It could be more like the cells at the courthouse. Our cells are too far from the receival area and too many corridors to walk down to get to them.
14. Can you think of any aspect of the lockup which hinders your duties? The counter layout and receival area is very small and the benches have no provision for restraints like Perth Watch House does.
15. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? Yes and I am guilty of it too. It's very difficult with lack of staff especially when you consider on night shift there might be only the SGT in here who is supposed to do everything in the station, his duties and keep an eye on the surveillance monitor. It shouldn't replace physical checks.
16. Do you think that staff enjoy their work environment? Overall they do but there are areas that need work and are quite poor, I think some is supposed to be happening in the main floor area of the station.
17. Do Sally port entries work well in Police Lockups, could they be improved and how? I think it works well but I don't think it's a good idea to let detainees see you loading and unloading firearms etc., even if they are locked in the back of the vehicle, this just shouldn't happen in the same area.
18. Are Lockup observation cell effective, how could it be improved? We don't have an observation cell.
19. Is the lockup padded cell and its location effective, how could they be improved? It shouldn't be where it is (in a corridor close to a walkway) and if someone is in the padded cell I believe that there should be a permanent watchman there at all times.
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Not flash you can hear them all the way out into the station especially if they are a drunk that's going off.

21. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? Receiving and processing area detainee v police!
22. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Yes but there are some detainees that no matter what you do you cannot make them happy or get through to them.
23. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed differently? Yes as we previously discussed re it being a hindrance (see Q. 14)
24. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Some might be useful, but we try to only use this lockup as a staging area before we take them to Perth Watch House.
25. Is contraband easily hidden and if so where is it usually found? I don't think it's that easily hidden anywhere that I can think of.
26. What are some of the other agencies that work with or assist in the lockup? None, if we need any one it's on an as needs basis and we call them in e.g. PETS
27. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Swan Districts Hospital or call SJA or if it's minor like a cut etc. we can clean it up and band aid it ourselves.
28. How does staff ensure that they allow detainees to maintain their dignity? They try to be professional when doing strip searches or if they are getting changed
29. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees determine the way in which the lockup works? They may be a little more labour intensive, unhelpful, verbal or belligerent especially if you are trying to get on with your job or ask questions.
30. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? Only when I worked up north where you had Australian protesters at the detention centres, they all seem to be vegan and the detainees if Muslim also had issues with food.
31. Does lockup design or procedures make it easy to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. Not really male and female are always an issue mostly in the reception area and in the cells due to the lack of cells we have there isn't much distance between them, I haven't had issues with transgendered people yet so I can't say but my opinion would be that the policy is fairly clear in terms of searching but there may be issues if we had a male, female, juvenile and transgendered person in the lockup area all at the same time.
32. Are the use of exercise yards beneficial or do they cause problems? Ours is non-compliant so we are not supposed to use it, but I know of them to be very useful in keeping or calming detainees down as it has a very different feel to the cells environment, you get some sense of openness due to being able to feel the breeze and hear the sounds from outside.
33. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? No

34. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. No
35. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. No not here, perhaps at the Perth Watch House, I seem to remember something but nothing significant.

Interview 9 (03.12.2010)

1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 24 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please indicate type) and where? EPLU and Court security 1 year total
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Sort of, you self-manage it through friends and family and discussion. Further to this for other staff in general depression is becoming a major issue. Perhaps it was always this way it's just now more acceptable to voice it openly, so I always liaise with health and welfare proactively on behalf of other staff this way they can keep face with the other staff and I will take the blame for calling them in which I am happy to do.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think this method works? Yes, it depends what it's for so most of the time we try to nip it in the bud and not let it fester into a problem, sometimes the grievance process isn't independent enough. New age issues of social networking and cyber bullying in private life have a tendency to surface as animosities at work.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? It depends on the length of time at the location and environment, e.g. a GD's officer going to Detectives will still be sympathetic to GD's and how things are there but after say 6 months they won't be thinking or associating themselves so much with their former role or peers or relationships. There are different relationships between GD's of different sub-stations within the same district. I try to break this up at district level rather than individual station level. I find it more acceptable if there are differences between districts but not within the district.
6. Is staff moral high or low within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is the case? The conditions here can be pretty shitty but generally the morale is O.K. More staff and better equipment don't necessarily mean better morale as most people would like to believe, I remember working at the old Nollamara Police Station years back and it was appalling but there was such great morale between the staff there due to the hardships. Morale is more about the people and the amount of support you are given by your peers and management.
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? It has a bit, there is a lot of focus placed on custodial care. There are cameras and audio now as standard but the physical checks need to be made and entered into an electronic custody system which can be checked live

anywhere in the state. It is also very procedural since CIA 2006 can't put suspects in holding they must go into a 'room' that doesn't feel like a cell.

8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a lockup facility/environment? No most of it is on the job, it would be hard to do as the number of scenarios could never be duplicated.
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? Explain your answer. Not much – maybe cell extraction, but we do some local drills though (rarely though) there isn't much time for it.
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Not sure, as I think the working environment is not healthy, it could be but you would need rotations as the amount of abuse received would wear you down pretty quickly. Most police do not join the job to baby sit. It is a confined environment and I think the role should be shorter term than long-term.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? No its a hindrance, if there were no cameras you would need someone permanently in the lockup area and be walking up and down the corridors (which are too narrow) and doorways are also too narrow. The corridors are too long from the reception point. Not enough safe cells. Need pacifying tools such as televisions (EJ discusses that this is not a luxury as everyone has a TV and this was proposed in Masters Diss.)
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? No because I know what the answer will be, the money required to redo the lockup would never be spent.
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. There must be better solutions but I still think you could never design a one fits all lockup. We have issues with needing to be able to observe thoroughly in conjunction with the detainees privacy especially with the toilet and females.
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer. Long narrow passageways and doorways, its really designed for a compliant detainee, once there is a struggle or non-compliance there are difficulties due to these constraints. Doors should be a lot wider ideally if 3 people could fit through and the same with the corridors.
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? No as they also have to do physical checks
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. It's generally not too bad but it could be improved, from what I have seen its not that bad so they are probably O.K with it.
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? Our vans fit O.K but the prisons trucks do not. They need to be brought in one by one. It could be longer higher and wider.

18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? We don't have one but it would be great to have one
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? No it should be closer to the reception point and the ceiling is too low (EJ site visit measured to be approx. 2400)
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Lighting is adequate but acoustics is not (screaming can be heard right into station).
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? Still there which is just accepted, but more violent now probably due to drugs in their system
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? Mainly detainee v staff and usually either at exit from van (so in Sally Port) or in the charge / reception area.
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? All of the above
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Sometimes, but its more up to the individual personalities, they could be both experienced officers but one will click better with some detainees and others detainees will click with the other officer. Some officers may be calmer but less experienced. Perhaps too the auxiliary officers epaulettes being different (purple) is more assuring to a detainee also
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid out differently, and if so how? Shorter and wider corridors and doorways for a start.
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Some would be good, a combination of facilities for flexibility it would be more appropriate when we only have 2 approved cells as soon as you get juveniles mixed with adults and male and female there will be issues. Also it would allow for placement of sex offenders and ordinary 'mum and dad' types (maybe a fatal crash related) who really don't belong with other offenders (say burglars, recidivist offenders and violent types)
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? Toilets (the rim) and 'S' bend and on the person (body cavity)
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? Nil – officers do most of the cleaning; unless it is a bio hazard then we get contractors in.
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Armadale hospital or SJA
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? It depends on their behaviour and demeanour as to how much latitude they are given but the issue of toilet and female privacy is an issue which comes up. We try to place detainees with appropriate other detainees (try to be mindful) at the end of the day some dignity must be lost in order to decrease the risk of DIC which is far worse.

31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? Explain your answer Yes they are more labour intensive, need more monitoring, may need assessment at hospital for fit to hold from medical opinion but this can take time away from officers when it is already short it makes for difficult and complex decisions as to the best solution with minimal resources
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol effected detainees determine the way the lockup facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? They can be violent and non-compliant and just drop on you and the corridors are too long and narrow same with doors again too narrow, if they are very violent or a danger to themselves they may go into the padded cell but it is la long distance from the Sally Port and reception and very confined and the ceiling is too low.
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? No not as yet
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. Difficult to segregate at the moment but hopefully when two get 2 more safe cells that should be alleviated
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? I know that they can work well for pacifying but procedure these day doesn't allow for it especially any discussions which might take place 'off the record' and the officer these day don't have the time to sit there with them for 10 minutes either
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Not really when two get 2 more safe cells any crowding should be alleviated
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Not enough experienced staff I have 10 staff with less than 4 years experience and only a couple of more senior officers
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. Only the 'your rights in custody'

Interview 10 (06.12.2010)

1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 26 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please indicate type) and where? <1
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes and dealt with by discussion with family, other police and sports etc.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think this method works? Yes, there is a grievance process but the method is dependent upon the

type of complaint re what happens or how it is handled, it could be by discussion over the table or to the OIC and further to DO.

5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? There would have to be just like any other location.
6. Is staff moral high or low within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is the case? Pretty low, we are told that we are at capacity re staffing levels but where are they?
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? It has changed as we have become more concerned about DIC and custodial care but I think the attitude towards lockup duties may have a lot to do with the environment in which we have to work e.g. if it is meant to be or taken to be so important this is lost by virtue of the fact that officers have to contend with a variety of other distracting (although legitimate) functions, such as attend to the counter, answer phones and prepare associated paperwork, therefore as a direct consequence, the primary role cannot conceivably be custodial care.
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a lockup facility/environment? It's hard to say, I know there is training out there but I haven't personally had the opportunity to do some of it most of the experience gained it is on the job
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? Explain your answer. Most of it has been local updates on procedures as a result of a number of incidents which have occurred in the last number of months.
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Not at station level, perhaps at the main watch houses. At station level we just need the HR to be able to provide an appropriate level of CC.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? More so related to lack of HR, we also need more monitoring, it's a bit piecemeal with some areas being covered and others not. Some areas have doors which self-close and proximity card access which could be a problem for arrestees by non-station staff. The Sally port roller door cannot be opened from inside the Sally port or from the main office where the monitoring, staff and OIC is situated. It is operated by a button on the inside of the entry door from Sally port to receival area (conceivably an officer could be locked in the Sally port and his arrest in the receival area without a way of opening the door himself and only able to ask for assistance from someone in the office [provided it is attended and not on comfort break as an example]). No window on door from main office corridor into the cells area corridor. No area for officers to put firearms before entering the lockup. Sally port roller door no sufficiently high for a prisons truck to enter. Area for un-arming at entry from Sally port to lockup is inappropriate. The location of panic button in Sally port is inappropriate will be behind opening area for detainee to alight from vehicle. The vehicle in the Sally port creates a confining space should an altercation arise. No cameras in hallways of the cells area and at front of the padded cell. No room for conducting searches or strip searches, no separate male – female – juvenile areas. Protruding fixtures on walls within corridors of cells area

pose a risk of injury to officers and detainees. Doors not able to be strap bolted and thus able to be used as a weapon or in the case of the cell doors cause significant injury should the door be slammed onto hands or fingers of either officer or detainee in a struggle. Padded cell skin material too loose and not resilient enough having been patched on a number of occasions. Charge area is insufficiently sized for more than 1 and max 2 offenders at a time.

12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? Yes, it always comes down to funding, or until something happens, but then it's too late isn't it.
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. See all points in Q.11 (EJ notes on site visit the corridor widths are good 1770 wide) we also need more monitors for prisoners as when other sections e.g. detectives bring a prisoner in they expect that because we have monitors in the GD's area we are the ones to be looking after them. There is nowhere for an officer to sit and be productive if they were to be positioned in the lockup permanently during the shift.
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer. See points in Q.11 and also the size of the receival area - unable to have appropriate personal space (EJ which should be more generous in receival custodial environments where questions about health, mental health, removal of property, photographing etc. take place).
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? No doubt and its down to a low HR level needed to fulfil the legal procedures required.
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. I don't think they are happy but there is some works due to happen
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? See points in Q.11
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? We don't have one but it would be great to have one but we would need to have the staff for it to be able to be used as one.
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? Location is O.K but the materials are not appropriate, the door swings freely and there are fixtures on the wall right outside the door and generally the non-compliant detainees are placed in there so these are inappropriately placed here. One is a SS box with hose fixture in case of excrement in padded cell to wash out into grate right at door threshold to padded cell. The other is an old monitor above it which could be hung onto and then be able to kick out from thus officers would have to pull the detainee away from it.
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Lighting good acoustics are O.K (EJ all cells having compliant doors sound is better retarded and each cell having highlight windows to outside).
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? Pretty much the same.

22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? Mainly detainee v staff and usually either at exit from van (so in Sally Port) or in the charge / reception area.
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? All of the above
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. That's a judgement call and very subjective sometimes common sense is just as important as experience. The other thing is these days they don't talk to arrestees enough and resolve things verbally its straight to some other form of compliance.
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid out differently, and if so how? Not reduce the violence but minimise the risk to all involved. See Q.11
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? A mix would be O.K
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? No
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? Meals from MOJ.
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? SJA
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? The condition of the lockup is fresh and new and not like a dungeon, it's well-lit (naturally) in a proposed search room the video might be separate recording to the main office or even be able to be stopped while audio continues.
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? Explain your answer. Only if they are extremely intoxicated as happened here where they required SJA attend (Sally port injury – drunk unsteady on feet and struck wall with head, while officers had to contend with inappropriate doorway from SP to receival area holding it open and other officer momentarily letting go to close rear of vehicle door).
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? The level of risk is increased further.
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? No not as yet but I have a prayer mat and a Koran here just in case, there is such a thing as institutional racism, where no provision is made where clearly there might be an issue, we would also need some flexibility in the meals we have as we only have meat pies and no vegetarian or halal type food. I might not be racist but as an organisation it can be due to the lack of provision of alternatives.

34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. It is difficult as there is no dedicated male and female or juvenile area and no search room with independent recording capability. Searches therefore must be carried out in the cells but they have cameras out to the main office and the pint room likewise. No high risk/low risk cells.
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? We don't have an exercise yard.
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? No
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Again, that's a judgement call see Q.24 we were meant to have 4 auxiliary officers sent here in September but they have been taken up by Perth Watch House.
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Explain your answer. Only the 'your rights in custody' stuck on the window of every cell looking in towards the detainee and in the reception area.

Interview 11 (07.01.2011)

1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 27 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please indicate type) and where? Nil
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes: I am heavily into sports, so I try to relax that way. Most is pressure from hierarchy as it is like running a business with targets and goals – each person's target and outcomes relies on the performance of others under them.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think this method works? Yes, but there aren't many, if any - I try to look after the staff and care for them really well which might help.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? Not sure
6. Is staff morale high or low within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is the case? It's not too bad we have pretty adequate staffing numbers here
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? Probably has for the better?
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a lockup facility/environment? None personally being ex forensics. Difficult to comment, I haven't seen staff that don't seem to be competent – most try really hard to do a good job.

9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? Explain your answer. Not sure of any – there might be some on blackboard
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Perhaps at the watch house facility.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? In general more difficult depending on how well observation can take place. This one has been improved significantly to what it was when I first came here it was a disgrace.
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? Yes, significant monies spent on capital works to bring up to a standard which is also acceptable to DCS.
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. Need a few more cells or options as no juvenile area and cameras have blind spot at female corridor area.
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer. See above.13.
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? Yes but if they are in a doc or obs cell an officer physically stays with them so not on these occasions. We have a good camera system beamed to SGTS office.
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. Facilities are ok but they don't like the shift (3 panel)
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? Yes and we double ours for training purposes – Taser and the like (see blue target outline on wall)
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? Yes it is in the station area so can keep eye on detainee at all times and conduct enquiries it is a dock not a safe holding cell.
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? Yes its effective and it has cctv.
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Unsure but states that sound travels into station – (EJ observes: lighting is sufficient in new cells but not so much in corridors)
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? Very common I have 2 staff on leave at the moment with injuries and it always seems linked to alcohol and drugs.
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? -

23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc?
physically
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. No doubt, experienced communicator but no matter how experienced some people you cannot reach usually due to drugs or alcohol.
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid out differently, and if so how? Minimised not avoided
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Good idea for option and a mix of facilities
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? Not aware of it happening
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? DCS does a bit of liaising and provides clean mattresses and blankets. This lockup must stay approved by DCS as an emergency overflow facility for them.
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Peel health campus via SJA
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? They are as helpful and considerate as they can be to keep detainees comfortable.
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? Explain your answer. YES more non-compliant and difficult and loud and aggressive and uncooperative.
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? -
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? No but the demographics is changing a little in secret harbour somewhat with many African and New Zealander families moving in.
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. We just deal with situations according to policy and procedure.
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? We have 2 they are beneficial but they are non-compliant so if we ever allow someone some fresh air an officer must stay with them at all times.
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Yes there is some overcrowding sometimes especially when a juvenile comes in as it affects how the rest of the facility is used- we have 1 male, 1 female, 1 padded, 1 holding call and 1 holding dock only – the rest are non-compliant. We do not have any trustees.

37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Yes we do but no Auxiliary officers only promise of them
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? No.

Interview 12 (14.01.2011)

1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 30 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please indicate type) and where? 15-20 years
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? other.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think this method works? Yes, but it only works to a point.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? No
6. Is staff moral high or low within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is the case? High
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? Yes likely
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a lockup facility/environment? maybe just enough to a satisfactory job
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? Explain your answer. Maybe a little at firearms re-qual but not specific
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? Makes it more difficult.
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? Yes.
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. Not sure exactly how it would be designed to achieve this but it could for sure
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer. Temporary pods and concrete walls
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? No

16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. Situational
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? Pretty much.
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? Pretty much.
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? situational
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Unsure
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? Getting worse.
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? Reception area
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? Verbally
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Possibly
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid out differently, and if so how? Possibly
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Yes good idea
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? No
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? None that I can think of at station level.
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Local hospital of SJA
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? Situational
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? Explain your answer. Yes
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? Yes
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? No.
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. Possibly – not sure

35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? Beneficial.
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Sometimes – situational solutions.
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Generally.
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Yes – situational at various locations more so at stations.

Interview 13 (18.03.2011)

1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 25years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please indicate type) and where? 6 months
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? There is a lot to learn but no.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think this method works? Yes, but there are differences now with Auxiliary and custody officers due to EBA and unions and this behind the scenes stuff can be niggling and an issue regarding who's who and under what.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? Different but same. Also there are issues which arose from custody officers being recruited by an external agency and Auxiliary being recruited by police – seems that custody officers in general bring more 'issues' with them, but it doesn't mean there are not some good operators among them.
6. Is staff moral high or low within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is the case? I think it's better since custody officers and Auxiliary took over, they feel and are resided to this being their job not as a punishment or a place to hide for 12 months to get out of country which attracted the wrong type of sworn staff. I have also implemented a social club and asked for reps from each team to form a committee with a focus on family and friends not booze parties or 'police' club. We look for consistency between shifts and the way they are run we don't want particular issues or instigators causing problems due to their own issues so we have weekly supervisors meetings to discuss.
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? More so now with the changeover of staff type they appear not to be so blaze about their job and take the job more seriously as if it's important not just a transitional spot.

8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a lockup facility/environment? They get a foundation that is all – enough to get them started then that's why they have their probationary period where they learn on the job. They get more specialised training these days specific to custodial environments – close quarter and effective communications
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? Explain your answer. Judicial services have a dedicated trainer and a 1.5 hour shift overlap where staff can do refresher training where they can refresh on say search procedures or empty hand techniques. Otherwise I also encourage them to either work, train or go to the police gym in the time and make the most of it or become a part of the fit for life program; which offers free blood tests, cholesterol tests, health appraisals and can do up training programs for staff.
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes and no it would be a harsh environment to be in for long periods of time so while the training required would be specialised and the facilities should be I'm not so sure about long-term secondments to a WH.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? Well this one doesn't help but we have a prototype of a type of cell proposed for the new PWH so we are trialling it and tweaking it before committing to the final type. We do a lot of experimenting these days but it's not so 'give it a go' it's well considered.
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? Yes, we work closely with land and buildings and we have a decent budget to make some changes – within reason.
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. More open plan not so compartmented.
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer. Some cells not compliant and ex yards not compliant require staff be there at all times. There will be no trustees in new WH all cleaning and soiling by contractors – consider calling contractors out at 3am due to someone soiling the cells or padded cell it will be a problem and the trustee mutually beneficial relationship works well.
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? No they don't but they usually forget the cameras are there and do some silly things which could be questionable if the footage was to ever get called up.
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. For the time being it is what it is, staff more so don't like the new shifts but it's necessary sometimes to get a good gender balance and to break up little comfortable clicks which develop. Staff just don't like change

17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? The location of the cell dock could be better located away from the firearm unloading area and Taser area and procedures must be adhered to lock the dock before unloading.
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? You can't see in to it very well its location could be better but not in the layout we have.
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? Easier access required not around the corner from the admissions area, either reposition or addition of another.
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Light is a bit dim in the ex-yard but ok in the cells and the sound is always an issue even in the trial cell – the door seals are good but the ventilation grate is quite large and open to noise. The new facility will be air-conditioned and should hopefully be better on noise.
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? Reception area and sometimes it's a detainee who's had enough another detainee if they are constantly mouthing off. To some degree – with the detainees who actually listen – having custody officers helps as they say I am not police I am custody – I am only here to look after you.
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee?
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc?
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. I think the more experienced officer may have more communication skills but it's more the hesitation to get involved in things that inexperienced officers might perceive as potentially able to get them investigated due to levels of accountability and thus stand-offish. It's also important to have 2:1 ratio officers to detainees.
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid out differently, and if so how? Perhaps minimised by design and avoided by training
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Good – I think there may be some in the new PWH (referring to drop off cells [but these are not single person cells by definition])
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found?
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? DCS G4S, Cultural diversity Unit, AVS – aboriginal visitors scheme, MHERL – mental health emergency response, Choice One – nursing staff, Salvation Army, Bridge House, DUMAR through ECU.
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? On-call or duty Nurse or RPH
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? Discussion had regarding the understanding of what dignity is and what is perceived as offering dignity

and the difficulty of dignity v operational safety in WH environments. And that there is no defined way of offering dignity just ones perceived understanding. How do you strip search someone with dignity – is this taught?

31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? Explain your answer. Yes they may require FFC clearance if very intoxicated and then require more obs they are usually louder and more obnoxious
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? -
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? Somewhat we have prayer mats delivered here. African detainees seem not too worried about what the conditions are like in here I am guessing that they have seen much worse so this is nothing to them.
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. Females are provided sanitary products (but bins for the same it is not so clear)
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? They have their place with some benefits but officer must stay with them at all times as they are not compliant.
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Not really we have 50 max overnighters and more capacity of considering 'drop and goes' if they are going to bail but if we get to our limit and we would not want more than 4 to a cell - we can take overflow to Fremantle (first port of call) or any district level lock-up.
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Yes we do but no Auxiliary officers only promise of them
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Not exactly but what to expect and the procedure of what will be happening while in the lockup has been posted in the reception area facing the reception seating benches.

Nurses are now on 7 days a week on nights 2000 – 0400 and Sunday day shift 1000 – 1800 and 1800 – 0200 afternoon shifts (Sunday). And an on call set-up extended to metro lock-ups. Nurses mean they can FFC can be signed with ease of not taking to emergency and wasting time

Assigned a reserve officer (Auxiliary) to take administrative pressure off the shift sergeant – they do BAMR, admin duties relating to WH operation. SGT is equivalent to a Level 4 Custody Officer [civil service] and a 'band' 3 Auxiliary Officer [police act]

New PWH no parking for staff major issues for staff finishing work late and expected to take public transport. We are trialling electronic opening cell doors or electronic swipe ID when doing cell checks and electronic information boards over white boards.

Any pre-lockup unit mustn't make it less expedient to process detainees.

Interview 14 (25.03.2011)

1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 15 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please indicate type) and where? Two years - at the moment my position is such that it acts as the hub of the lock-up, I am in charge of operations, I act as a filter, I audit, and authorise.
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Sometimes but it's got a little bit better since the reserve officers being implemented. Now as a sergeant I also feel that I can make a difference I feel that I can implement changes at this rank.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think this method works? Is there are ways but the success of how it turns out can vary, and this is dependent on what level the grievance is made, for example; if the complaint is about the sergeant the investigating officer may know the person and therefore the investigation is compromised. The only issue is the police mentality is such that if you make a grievance you will always be known as someone complains and therefore no one will want to work with you will really trust you again for fear of complaining against them.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? Your organisational relationships are different because the general frontline Copper thinks differently most of the people that work in the watch house now are not police officers and therefore have a different perspective on their work, location, relationships, and the importance they place upon their function.
6. Is staff moral high or within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is the case? Definitely better particularly now that auxiliary and custodial officers work within the lock-up, they see their duties as being significant and important as opposed to previously, when the watch house was staffed by police where their belief was that they were being punished, doing babysitting, or undertook duties there to get out of doing country service.
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? Attitudes towards custodial duties has changed in two ways; firstly as a result of the deaths in custody investigations police took the duty somewhat more seriously, and since the introduction of auxiliary officers and custodial officers to the lock-up, attitudes have changed significantly. We also have women in leadership programs it appears that some leaders do not agree with this and they just accept it because they have to do because the Commissioner has implemented it our ratio here is approximately 50-50 male to female. Otherwise the organisation is still quite male dominated. I know that among police some feel that I have been made up to a sergeant to make up for it requirements for females however I would much rather be regarded upon my merits as a police officer than as a female and it's difficult for other coppers to understand that. This doesn't appear to be such an issue within the lock-up now that it is employed with auxiliary officers and custodial officers.

8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a lockup facility/environment? I didn't receive any formal training specific for the lock-up, rather, just the training received when one goes through the police Academy.
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? Explain your answer. Staff now receive one and a half hour training session is specific towards issues that arise for example if we have an issue where some contraband manages to get through our judicial training officer will conduct training specific for this. Otherwise, staff can go to the gym during this time, keep working or undertake any other specific training.
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer the lock-up could be a specialist area, however there are issues psychological issues that are quite relevant to lock-up can be found quite stressful to some people and I think one of the main issues are, that until you work inside a lock-up or a watch house it would be almost impossible to appreciate what the working environment would actually be like. For this reason I think that police are better equipped to accept the working environment more so than auxiliary officers or custodial officers. However, custodial officers don't have an option they will only work in a lock-up, and this is the reason why from this point on there will be no further custodial officers employed they will all be auxiliary officers. Auxiliary officers are subject to tenure, whereas custodial officers are not and many auxiliary officers use their role as a stepping stone to becoming a sworn police officer.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? Well this particular lock-up certainly does not help perform function without you asking me the biggest problem that I can see at the moment is the reception area and also the location of the padded cell. There are many aspects obviously that will be much better in the new facility and it's a good thing that we're trialling a cell which is intended for use in the new facility, however, it could have been placed in a much better location perhaps one of the first cells not the last cell as that was the only one which had a Perspex door.
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? Yes and of lot of what I have mentioned is noted, however within reason it is looked into. It is much better as a sergeant and I much prefer being a sergeant since becoming a sergeant I feel that I have a lot more authority to effect change.
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. Yes and I think that the problem is that it's a very old design and most of the lock-ups are designed around similar principles as the Perth Watch House. Hopefully the new facility will be much more functional for our needs I think it will be its open plan.
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer. Yes the main thing that comes to mind is the layout and where the padded cell is located. I think the padded cell should be much closer to the reception area and the second padded cell should be somewhere in the middle not at the end we only use the second padded cell sometimes went very busy.
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? No I don't think they do not what they do is sometimes forget that it's even their and

then sometimes do silly things that this credit is then should the tape CCTV footage be downloaded all that they do in the background and all that they say is also recorded and it might not always be appropriate or professional.

16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. I think staff generally make do with what they have I think they enjoy the fact that technology can help them particularly in a new facility in we're trialling many new instruments of technology and they should make work much more efficient, however, with this the police Department always seems to introduce new formats of paperwork irrespective of new technology or associated with the new technology and so although technology makes life easier it tends to be inherently increased workload in its inception.
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how?
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? Generally it's not too bad however this is the cell that should have been made the trial cell.
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? Definitely not see answers to previous questions
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? There are always issues with acoustics especially when family members come in and start screaming to each other from the male side to the female side. Acoustics are also a problem at the reception counter especially when there are many people in, you can overhear what people are saying especially medical related questions and this is the place where male and female people are sometimes in the same place at the same time. The lighting is generally okay in the rooms and the cells however not too good in exercise areas.
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? We have specific ratios of 2 to 1 whereas if he went regional sometimes you have 1 to 6 which is a problem but we won't go there, you cannot stop violence in the lock-up but you can minimise it I think being a good communicator definitely helps and there are some very good communicators and some very bad ones in the lock-up.
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? Most of the violence can happen in the reception area although it can also happen in cells and in the exercise yard space but here it's more detainee versus detainee. Reception areas and Sally Port areas is usually versus police or others involved in the incident such as another party.
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc?
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Good communicators tend to defuse the situation much more readily and sometimes I find that female officers can talk their way to compliance without having to resort to physical confrontation but not always, I find that a female officer such as myself, I am not as strong as the male, I cannot fight, and not even interested in that, so if it takes me longer in achieving what I want by talking, I don't care I will choose that every time. I feel that female sergeants and staff in general can be more patient and

more compassionate towards detainees. At the end of the day as long as we get compliance and the job gets done I don't care if I am disregarded as being just a female by detainees.

25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid out differently, and if so how? Perhaps it could be minimised through appropriate training and perhaps selecting the right candidates for the job in the first place. Design certainly has a place but I'm not so sure about that, that's probably something I'd leave up to you.
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? I think single person cells definitely be an advantage particularly for people with infectious diseases, you would want to make sure that if the cells were sized for one person that they would not feel claustrophobic, space again, I would leave that up to professionals like you.
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? The cells are checked when empty it is rare but sometimes you might find something in the cells once empty but more so you might find it in the kitchen after breakfast or G4S might find it when research in a detainee, if this is the case this might be the reason we would have specific training on searching.
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? DCS G4S, Cultural diversity Unit, AVS – aboriginal visitors scheme, MHERL – mental health emergency response, Choice One – nursing staff, Salvation Army, Bridge House, DUMAR through ECU.
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse or RPH
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? In relation to this I am in the middle of formulating new policy for transgender people and gay and lesbian people to reflect contemporary life for example to ask who would you like to be searched by as before it was the male would search the male parts and a female would search the female parts but there is a disparity between the different policies and different statutes. The lock-up at your pin reviewed at the moment as for example there is a contradiction between the misuse of drugs and that fee by a and lock-up procedures. Other initiatives include buying temporary hairnets for those who wear turbans, and prayer mats for Muslims, these issues have not come up much but at least we will be prepared and it's the least I think that we could do.
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? Explain your answer. Generally yes so that the detainees are generally more compliant and quieter time drunken detainees came to the obnoxious and the loud.
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? The lockup design here seems to be based on a compliant and sober detainee
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? Not really
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. No it doesn't hopefully the new facility will deal with this much better it couldn't be any worse.

35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? They can be beneficial but at the moment they are non-compliant, and we would need to have staff there all the time.
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Generally not as we have overflow procedures in place where our excess detainees can be taken to district lock-ups.
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Yes we have a mixture of auxiliary officers and custody or offices here, custody officers are dying breed has there will be no more custody officers from now on there will only be auxiliary offices who offer much more flexibility
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Not exactly.

Health unit might be the person to talk about in relation to psychological screening.

I think that each team in the lock-up do not operate the same way particularly as they have different sergeants, we have female sergeants as well as male and I think that they operate their shift slightly differently. I think female sergeants showed more concern for their staff and feel more comfortable in asking if staff is okay word as men do not seem as open.

Auxiliary officers have an induction day before working in the lock-up this is where they might get some specialised communications training before working in the lock-up. You might want to ask the training officer what the difference is between specialised training for lock-up work and general training for police officers. You might also ask what the difference is between a general police recruitment psychological requirements and psychological requirements and testing for custodial staff or auxiliary staff.

You can speak to health and welfare branch regarding the recruitment of custody officers and their associated psychological testing.

Interview 15 (08.04.2011)

1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 31 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please indicate type) and where? At the moment I'm a shift sergeant, and have been so to 3 1/2 years before that I have worked in the old East Perth lock-up for six months in 1992 and in Halls Creek which had a large lock-up for two years.
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? I don't get stressed often at work however, if I do is HR related - I am the only sworn police officer on my shift the rest of all public service type of personalities then mentality sometimes causes stress. Sworn police officers generally don't question as much as an sworn do an sworn tend to have the attitude of it's not my business I don't get paid to do that it's not my job description were as sworn police generally just getting there and do it. They have an opinion about everything that is broken or doesn't seem right to complain about it all the

time, police such as myself we generally just get on and do the job and when something is broken we just get it fixed. Police generally have a make it to mentality and generally have fewer issues whereas civilian generally have lots of personal reactions and fights.

4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think this method works? There are definitely more grievances these days civilians generally make mountains out of molehills I had an unfounded complaint against me as it was reported formally when ought not to be. It was an assault complaint against me by a male officer as I gave him a jovial punch to the arm.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? The organisational relationships are different particularly now with auxiliary officers but they generally come around eventually and take on the police culture this might be because most of them may have wanted to become coppers but missed out and maybe come or try out later they use auxiliary as a stepping stone towards becoming an sworn officer.
6. Is staff moral high or within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is the case? Morale in the lock-up is definitely dependent upon the shift supervisor, I know that other shifts have very low morale and some have very high morale, at the moment I feel that the morale my shift is generally quite good. The shifts that have low morale are generally the ones without much leadership and also tend to afflict those that do not have a police officer who is sworn in charge. Other issues related to this are that police officers that bring in arrests from the street always look for a sworn police officer to give them direction or advice they do not feel comfortable taking advice or direction from a level 4 civilian. There are currently five shifts of which three are run by sworn sergeants and to buy level 4 civilian supervisors
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? Attitudes towards custodial care have definitely changed over the years particularly as the term duty of care has actually been defined used to be just an art covering exercise but now it has a name. People generally now more aware also of the significance of what the job is detainees are much more aware of their rights at all levels of custody is generally more transparent.
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a lockup facility/environment? No, I didn't receive any formal training and I didn't receive much training at the academy either back then is more than induction thing not training.
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? Explain your answer. I don't know that staff receive any theory but they do receive re-qualification training every 12 months – critical training such as life-support and hands-on physical training is much more specialised and reflective of the environment in which they will be working ie. enclosed spaces.
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer the I think the lock-up could definitely be a specialist area as it requires online shift from goodies and baddies staff need to treat everybody with dignity treat them as they are relative. Not to judge them on their character when they first walk in the door when a drunk and humiliated etc. And you can't react to what they are like at that point you will retaliation

reaction must be something like I have a life on the outside that some people in here will never have and you must also have a high level of compassion than the copper out on the street.

11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? No definitely not, we find that this layout splits the staff up during busy times especially if upstairs and downstairs are used I would much rather have detainees inside the exercise yard on mattresses and devote one person to constantly watch over them than to have them upstairs in the cells with staff split among different levels.
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? Yes and of lot of what I have mentioned is noted, however within reason it is looked into. It is much better as a sergeant and I much prefer being a sergeant since becoming a sergeant I feel that I have a lot more authority to effect change.
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. The watch house could be more efficient however the efficiency is limited by the capacity and ability to process detainees. When the capacity is surpassed there are many idle hands waiting for the next person to be brought in.
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer. The worst thing and most annoying thing at the moment about the design that I can think of is that when ambulances come the stretch that is not fit into the cell because the corridors are too narrow and they cannot swing into the doorway the last time we had a death in custody it was very undignified that the person had to be dragged out of the cell on a mattress while the people were working on the person to get them out to the stretcher in the reception area. Having said that during the investigation three other detainees testified to how much effort the officers put in to trying to bring the person back and that they did everything they could. Another issue which is not design related but procedural relates to the amount of people these days being brought into the lock-up who require medication to things such as diabetes and epilepsy we need something similar to a dispensary.
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? I don't think staff rely on cameras too much but I do feel there are issues for example, when time is quiet staff sometimes sit around a common table and chat just to blow off some steam and sometimes they might be discussing things which are recorded and the other problem is they might be letting off steam in relation to a particular sergeant, now this sergeant has access to playing back what the discussion was about and using the technology as an instrument such as Big Brother which has happened.
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. No I don't think they do and it's been made quite clear by the civilian staff. Small offices generally didn't say anything they just got on with the job.
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? The biggest problem with the Sally port is the width of the entry door to the reception area is too narrow you can only fit to people through at once and it should be wide enough in three so that you can have the offender Central to an officer on either side.

18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? The location is not too bad but the design of the cell is not so good.
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? No it's in the wrong spot because you have two marched through the small corridor with the half height wall which you can also not fit three people wide through in order to get into the padded cell.
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? The biggest problem I can see is that the lights cannot be dimmed and I think this is psychologically bad for detainees particularly in the cells I have heard many complaints about it being too bright. The problem with sound is that as an operational officer you want to be able to hear everything you want to hear a door slamming upstairs you want to hear a door slamming at the other end of the building so you know what's going on, but this is conflicting to detainees hearing and screaming and waking up detainees are trying to sleep. This causes anxiety problems within the lock-up which is unwanted.
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? There is not much violence between prisoners more so between prisoners and staff the biggest problem with had with the cell set up to mimic the cell in the new facility is that there was no provision for electronic opening at the site of the door; opening of the door it was electronically operated from the control centre. In this instance one detainees was kicking the shit of the other person in the cell and would not stop we had to open the door with a key and almost Taser the guy to get him to step away from the other guy.
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? Between the back of the van and the reception area and also in the strip search room which is a problem in itself because it has a door which can be closed we once had female officers being attacked behind a closed-door and we had to get the male officer to kick the door down the problem is for him to kick the door in people are struggling behind the door for people to try to get out they have to pull the door open..
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? All of the above
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. I think it comes down more so to life experience than job experience and patients males usually take longer to learn patience skills.
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid out differently, and if so how? I think if the lock-up was split into two sections such as a high risk section and a general section for people on warrants of commitment or mum and dad types and limit their number of areas where large gatherings of detainees occur the worst is the eating room where once everyone is sat down and eating the door is closed and staff go downstairs if there is an issue staff have to run upstairs to unlock the door which takes time and is a risk to inter prisoner violence. At this time there could be as many as 20 prisoners locked in one room at one time with access to utensils.

26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Single person cells would be a great idea it would give you flexibility to isolate certain people without compromising space.
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? We don't usually find much contraband comes through the lock-up this is predominantly because people are bought in at very short notice generally off the street if they were planning to come through they were generally not produce contraband within the lock-up more than likely if they knew the light coming through the lock-up that would be intending to get the contraband through to prison so then they would find the knife they could stick up the ass.
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup? DCS G4S, Cultural diversity Unit, AVS – aboriginal visitors scheme, MHERL – mental health emergency response, Choice One – nursing staff, Salvation Army, Bridge House, DUMAR through ECU.
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse or RPH
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? They look to treat people as if they were someone they knew, they don't make derogatory comments during strip searches, they have spoken to politely. Sanitary pads are offered for women however I will have to look into that SOP's for disposal provisions. I think at the moment they tied into the latex glove and dispose of it but I'm not sure.
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? Explain your answer. They are not really themselves at that time and can be quite different in the morning when I say can I please have a cup of tea in such important to treat them as if you would want to be treated you cannot judge them based on what they are like when they are bought in.
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? The design is not good for non-compliant detainees it relies on orderly behaviour
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? We have had issues with Muslims that have dietary issues and specific requirements and male Muslims will not take orders or comply with what female officers asked of them we also had a Muslim woman that refuse to leave the outside backdoor and she was given several warnings to do so, my biggest concern was what the hell do we do if we have to lock her up, as her gear I was dreading to tell her that she would not be allowed to wear, we asked the direction should this incident have happened however we were never given any.
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. If any transgendered people or sensitive groups come in they are generally placed in isolation on the female wing which is F04..
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? Exercise yards are very beneficial however they have been deemed non-compliant and if I am to have anyone in there I must commit a person to watch over them at all times. They are beneficial in that at worst people can be stuck in a very small cell for a period of 48 hours with no diversionary instruments such as television and radio or magazines, at least in

the exercise yards people could get some fresh air, and the sound is different it doesn't resonate and drive you mad.

36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Sometimes they are problems of overcrowding the most we can fit in at 23 males full-time but this means some must go upstairs which divides my staff and I would rather risk placing more in the exercise yard on mattresses.
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. I believe that I have sufficient staff with 12, however for some sergeants they want about 15 and for some it's never enough.
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? No.

I think strip searching should be more common-sense for example if you had a 50-year-old woman who was brought in on unpaid fines I would say she should not be strip-searched other sergeants such as civilians go by the book and strip-searched everybody. We need more autonomy on what happens I think most women will want to give or make a decision on who is strip-searched.

The current Perth Watch House feels even more claustrophobic when it is empty and devoid of human life and not used for its purpose.

The least handling and movement is best

Auxiliary officers have an induction in which they are taken through the entire process from the moment they arrive in the Sally port to the charge counter to the cells where their job starts and finishes and what is entailed at every stage of the lodging process.

Each team does not operate in the same way on one you might have some crusty old sergeant that sits in his office and does nothing who is just looking to retire another you might have a micromanager type who is very anal and nit-picky who goes by the book and makes people take annual leave days to attend the funeral.

I think that our policy is sometimes very out-dated I think the aboriginal sensitivity thing has been done to death as their culture here in the metro area is rather diluted and is more pertinent to those in country areas for example up north. We have a changing population and require a change in policy and procedure. We need more in relation to Sudanese and other African peoples who now form a large component detainees brought through the lock-up with obvious signs of physical torture from their homeland these people particularly males do not talk or open up and to have some assistance from some of their groups would be of great advantage. When people are drunk culture means nothing to them we don't ask about mixing only when it relates to male-female, after the last getting custody we were supposedly to have a smoking ceremony of the watch house-which didn't happen, and supposedly aboriginal people were not going to want to be in the cell where the death occurred this also hasn't happened. So the do-gooders and policy makers make it into a much bigger issue than what it is in comparison to other contemporary issues.

The current watch house design rationale is based on old prison design it's intimidating, demoralising and isolating. It is not conducive to observation there is little interaction without opening the cell doors and when somebody else is placed in a cell that person

already within its new thinking who is he? And what is he going to do to me? Isolation in lock-ups or watch houses should not happen either for the staff or the detainees staff also need to be able to gather some way without causing isolation – and it is not a healthy environment for the good guys to be constantly recorded and under surveillance.

Officers are now trained in how to carry out strip searches but you ask if this is done has the procedure alone or whether the issue of affording dignity is of concern in this training – there is no dignity in strip searching and everyone that comes into the watch house is strip-searched the procedure is explained and they are advised that it is non-invasive unless they are non-compliant where their clothing will be forcibly removed from them, otherwise it is non-invasive.

Interview 16 (04.01.2011)

1. How long have you been working at Land and Buildings? 25 years
2. How is section structured and what type of staff do you have? We have a few Architects, accountants, IT personnel and people with experience in building maintenance and minor works. All other Consultants, engineers, QS's etc. are external and sourced as part of the project architects role.
3. What are the positives and negatives of working with architects on police projects? Architects are still very concerned with how the building looks and winning accolades and competitions, so there are some heated debates sometimes balancing up our budget, and our department being aware of some of the more 'architectural details' the architects generally specify in order to achieve a certain look relation to maintaining the budget and maximising functional space for our staff.
4. Do you have in-house trades? No we use external trades
5. How busy is the section? We are usually extremely busy, particularly due to the number of User-Groups, Project Control Groups, 'Steering Committees' (outside consultants i.e. superintendents, OIC's, BMW, Director General, Dept. of Attorney General, finance, media, a variety of representatives for who the building will be built, native liaison and various other stakeholders involved). The process becomes very lengthy and arduous and therefore some big projects such as the new Perth Watch House planning commenced 5 years before any real commencement.
6. What type of work does the section undertake and what are some of the main current issues? We are involved in large projects all the way down to small maintenance works both metro and regional – police stations and lock-ups and we are involved with the design or procurement of new Perth Watch house. At the moment we have been requested to provide surveillance to all stations with charge areas with CCTV at all points of the charge process.
7. To what extent is staff in this office involved in the various stages of a project? Hands-on usually in the early stages only, we appoint a project leader or for large capital works a project manager who establishes an architect and all sub-consultants. We also do the lists

of recommendations Project Definition Plans 'PDP' for proposed works and currently trying to implement a refurbishment program to upgrade office and lock-ups in one go (this is on the current business management plan)

8. Staff here also prepares Concept Plans, Business Case Studies and Project Definition Plans, some of these can be found in the Strategic Asset Management Framework: Govt. Publication
9. How often is an architect involved? They are involved with almost all projects even the refurbishment works to convert existing cells into safe cells.
10. How is the scheduling of a project determined i.e. Prioritised? We compile a recommendation list for works to PDP and this is re-visited as required.
11. How or who decided on the capital works budget? We have a current Budget for maintenance and faults etc., and a Capital works budget for specific larger projects – it is under the capital works budget that we also do our office and custodial facility upgrades. Building and Land has some minor control but larger projects are always referred to the BMW (Building Management and Works).
12. What are some of the policies in place for obtaining quotations or tendering? Tender evaluations are made by the BMW and the architect and must be approved by police as police hold the budget
13. Who has the final say on project proposals or design brief and signs off on them? BMW for allocation of funds and also for design and the police as holder of those funds.
14. We expect that the new Watch House will facilitate staff procedures and that they (lock-up procedures) won't need to change to suit.
15. We have a palette of available colours we can use as a dado wall colour scheme but I am not sure if we will be using a dado in the new PWH – which is based upon Brisbane's Roma St Watch House.

Interview 17 (12.04.2011)

1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 15 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please indicate type) and where? 3 years.
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think this method works? yes to approach a direct supervisor

5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? Yes – morale and most people don't want to be there.
6. Is staff moral high or within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is the case? I'd say it would be about average and due to older staff having been in this job for a long time
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? A bit more professional about it these days so much scrutiny.
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a lockup facility/environment? Mostly but most you have to learn on the job.
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? Explain your answer. No ongoing training really just requalification, most training sessions are rushed and you are normally overdue for re training.
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. It could be but you wouldn't want to be stuck there for your whole career it's not why become a copper.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? I can only relate to East Perth where the padded cell was too far away and a person resisting would have to be taken some distance before being put in a cell. The corridors were also quite narrow making it hard to manoeuvre
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? No
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. Cells closer to reception area, wider corridors, sound proofing, sharp edging to door and window surrounds.
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer. I didn't find anything good about working there (it was over 14 yrs. ago though)
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? No
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. I'm not sure I don't think so
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? Too small and have to reverse out – bad image to let people see you take out weapons.
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? It's annoying for when you try to do your paper work

19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? No they are not in a good spot too far away from reception
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? Terrible sound quality too noisy
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups?
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? Reception or at rear of van
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? Physically and verbally
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. I feel that mediocre staff performance is sometimes rewarded while hard workers are sometimes overlooked so it is not always so clear cut that experience is either better or worse just how well you promote yourself and who you know.
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid out differently, and if so how? See question 13.
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Good idea to have a few
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? No
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup?
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse or RPH
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity?
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? Explain your answer. Yes see Question 32
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? advantage of long-term custody is they generally behave better and are no longer under any drug/alcohol influences and their mind set is different once they are aware of what's happening, e.g. how long their sentence will be in short-term custody it is the opposite and its when people are at their worst (behaviour) so drugs and alcohol make them play up even more meaning that the design is more important.
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? Not really
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. No because of the sound quality they can yell to each other can arc each other up

35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? They are beneficial
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Sometimes
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Generally O.K.
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? Not aware of any.

Interview 18 (20.05.2011)

1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 3 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please indicate type) and where? 3 years.
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think this method works? There are grievances in relation to what some people say or talk among staff we generally sort them out in a fairly straightforward way
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? It can be said that this is public doing a police job at the beginning there was definitely an, 'us and them feel' and a sense that police could direct us anywhere and asked us to do anything and when we don't agree with what they say they always call the authority card on us.
6. Is staff moral high or within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is the case? Losing a lot of staff lately and the prospect of losing more staff soon has lots to do with low morale also differences of opinions and issues to do with police not listening or using their authority when we don't agree with something contributes to it. A lot of custody officers are looking to convert to auxiliary officers and auxiliary are using their position as a stepping stone to policing. We don't wear stripes on a uniform so part of the problem and something that does affect everyone is that police always try to go over our heads to try to get the answers they want it's difficult for them to see the experience that we have just by the uniform that we have said are always looking around for someone with stripes like a sergeant when we don't agree with something they want and a sergeant walks past and doesn't disagree with what we said that's usually enough for the police to accept what we said is correct if they had not walked past they would asked to see a sergeant.
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how?
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a lockup facility/environment? I didn't feel the conditions that we were trained in were relevant and some of the things that we were taught were over emphasised when in

hindsight we do very little relating to that training more training could have been given to other things, things that we do all the time.

9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? Explain your answer. We are supposed to have ongoing training but there isn't much that goes on, some of us do after work training as I haven't seen much of our special dedicated trainer. Our role now has also hybrid to a degree meaning that we are taking on more responsibility than I think it was intended for us, police are using us in ways not only as custody officers but also similar to what the CSO might do at a station level. We sometimes get stupid training advice from the office things like tilt your head to the side when he speaks aboriginals or if aboriginal is not feeling well to ask them is your spirit seek to how it is relevant to aboriginals that live in the city most of them think you're an idiot of doing these kind of things we need more training for problems of today such as dealing with Africans.
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. It sort of already heading that way since custody took over.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? No everything is so narrow and all over the place doesn't seem to have a logical order about it, something should be in places where they are not, like the padded cells and we can't use certain things like the exercise yard.
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? No not really because is only so much that can be done you would need to start over and when you make suggestions nothing really happens
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. I think there should be some logic to the way in which people are processed from the time they are brought in to the time they leave should be in some sort of order it would make more efficient.
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer. Just that it's all over the place and there is an enough room if there is a struggle to have enough offices around the detainees
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? No not really
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. I'm not sure I don't think that they think too much about it and I'm sure that they don't because they don't know what to compare it to
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? I guess they work okay but this one you have to drive in and reverse out it would be good if they could drive in and out in one direction but you can't do that with this current building
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? It's effective for observation but it's in a bad spot because when detainees see staff behind the counter they keep distracting them and they can't do their work officers then have to do

purposely look away or ignore them to get on with their work which is not the idea of observation

19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? No they are not in a good spot but they are effective
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? It's not very good you can hear people shouting all over the place and sometimes when you bring a group of people in they keep yelling to each other especially if there are males and females involved. The lighting seems to be okay but its all neon lighting it'd be nice if there were some sunshine.
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? The violence in the lock-up is very prevalent and it seems that you just can't get away from it.
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? In the reception area that in this area it is not usually directed at us it could be to the PTA officer for example, for bringing a detainee in or underpaid train tickets connected to say an arrest warrant.
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? Physically and verbally mainly
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Not really most of the people that come in are under the influence of drugs and alcohol not sober people and this makes a difference.
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid out differently, and if so how? I don't think you could ever reduce the violence because alcohol and drug affected people are in different to measures that you might put in place by what you could do is reduce the likelihood of injuries to both detainees and staff if it was better laid out and if there was a bit more room to work with, there's a fine line between too much room which gives people too much momentum in a struggle and enough room to allow enough staff to get around a violent detainees to restrain them without injuries.
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? We should have a few or a couple but the biggest problem is we don't have anything at radio or anything else to keep them from being extremely bored especially for those that have been held over the weekend is literally nothing for them to do except sit there and think what can I complain about to get taken to the hospital just to get out of the cell
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? No not really
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup?
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse or RPH
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? The way I see it in the way try to get my staff to see it is that dignity is always there in the beginning and then part of it is up to the detainees to keep it as soon as they start to not comply

especially with things such as strip searches dignity begins to get lost. Every effort is made to allow detainees to keep his dignity we usually try to discuss all advise them of the consequences of not complying and that it would be much easier for all parties involved if the processes required are simply carried out as they are required to be carried out in any event. We treat everyone the same whether they're homeless or a businessman.

31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? Explain your answer. Yes they are totally different so the detainees are not usually the violent ones generally never the violent and combatant types are usually always intoxicated or on some form of drugs.
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? Yes this is precisely what determines whether it works or doesn't, so the detainees generally comply and a coherent and the layout that we have in this lock-up works very well when people are sober because we can let them know what is going on and they generally follow instructions. Drug and alcohol effected detainees are completely the opposite and with some they come in kicking and screaming and they are pretty much like that the whole time they are here.
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? Not really the majority of it use dietary we do have a pram out but I wish in regards to training we had more training to do with dealing with Africans rather than aboriginals at the moment the biggest issue we have is with Africans in the lock-up they will always fight you we have a lot of training in regulations aboriginals but most of it is irrelevant and only applies to perhaps say traditional aboriginals from the far north not the ones in the city and generally not the ones that we get in the lock-up here.
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. Your training goes straight out the door when you're dealing with transgendered people because there are so many different scenarios and options and different stages and one person's preference at a certain stage might be different to another's and this will always cause issues as procedure and policy is so black and white.
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? It sucks that we no longer have use of exercise yards, I don't think there was ever a hanging in an exercise yard in 50 years it's a shame because they're very valuable especially over long weekends or when people are held in a long queue of time.
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? There is sometimes overcrowding but there are options like using some of the cells upstairs but officers must stay up there all the time but at a push you can put five people per cell as in five mattresses but there won't be much room to move, having said that I would rather have five per cell than further split the shift among different levels and lose staff permanently to those levels.
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. There is enough staff now but I don't think there are at outstations, all the outstation staff was called back to the Perth Watch House as the loss of staff from here had left quite a hole. There certainly was quite a bit of staff turnover and were expecting quite a large turnover again soon.

38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? No and there are no other forms of pacifying detainees no TV no radio no reading material.

Interview 19 (20.05.2011)

1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 3 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please indicate type) and where? To do half years and is at the police operations centre before that
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes, but I think I cope with it well I have I think self-control which comes from martial arts training that I do outside of work
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think this method works? There are grievances but we try to deal with them in the same way it usually doesn't go very far in this sorted out relatively quickly sometimes there just misunderstanding
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? Every team is different some are very social some socialise at the police social clubs and some go to barbecues and then there are some inter – shift clicks like boys clubs. I sometimes have issues with the fact that I'm very young and the supervisor some of the older police don't want to listen to anything I say. The fact that I am a female this doesn't make it any easier
6. Is staff moral high or within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is the case? It's different on all shifts some people flow well and some don't.
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? I think that there's more respect to sworn officers therefore morale might be higher in a lock-up when sworn officers work in there.
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a lockup facility/environment? Not really could have done more video scenarios perhaps like where they stop the video and say okay what would you have done their we didn't have any practice in the lock-up itself, and also we had to rely on what the trainers were telling us the lock-up environment was going to be like perhaps they tried to make it seem like the worst-case scenario, we were always waiting for the worst to happen, for someone to arc up as we knew it would happen we were just waiting to get it out the way, but it's not like they said it was going to be. What this did is we were always waiting for the worst to happen An interesting thing that has occurred since not long ago his police are not allowed to carry at Taser or OC in the lock-up but auxiliary and custody officers can.
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? Explain your answer. We hardly see the trainer I don't know what he supposed to do and the classes seem pointless some training seems irrelevant.

10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes I could see it happening it's kind of already happening but we are doing more work is similar to that of an auxiliary Officer.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? The design of this one is pathetic big issues are things like belts getting caught on parts of doors and things he have to step back to retrace your steps the corridors are way too narrow this lock-up is designed to someone that is compliant not someone that struggling and needs for officers to carry a limb each down narrow corridors all the way to the end.
12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? Yes I have but I don't expect much can be done about things that are set in stone
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. Perhaps more space would be good
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer. The size mostly
15. In your opinion does staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? Yes and no sometimes the camera is used unfortunately surreptitiously by some staff, they can gesture with facial expressions to a detainees that is already agitated instigating a physical confrontation but the camera will only catch the confrontation not the subtle gestures that incited the fight. They feel that the camera in this case will keep them protected because it looks just like struggle.
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. I'm not sure probably not
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? The problem with the Sally port is the camera only faces the back of the van so camera placement is important. The firearm cabinet is too small and has been known that some officers have put their belt and weapons in the boot of the car, would be much better if it was bigger. Cameras are need to be well placed, the facilities need to be to be improved and the shape of the Sally port is one-way directional.
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? The observation cell location is okay but the problem is the detainees always provoke staff that sit at a desk and do their work there is always someone that has to be at his desk so when there are people in the observation cell this always happens because the one-way glass can be seen through.
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? No it is too far away and the corridors to get there are too narrow
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup? The sound quality is terrible that there is a lot of Crosstalk there can be a lot of antagonism overnight which sometimes leads to big problems and fights at breakfast time where all of the detainees are

in one eating dining room at the same time. I'm not sure what the rules are on eating in your cell this could be an option if there was an opening midway up the door I don't think it looks good to serve people underneath that all it was seem a bit animal like.

21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? There is too much of it and I don't know how you would stop it unless you could stop the problem of so much alcohol and drug use.
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? At reception it usually involves the arresting officers and the detainees or sometimes detainees themselves.
23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? Physically and racially
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Yes sometimes that sometimes you never know because when a very violent person or someone who is known to be violent is brought in there are usually about six officers waiting for them to come in and then sometimes they are completely compliant an issue related to this is that sometimes officers are disappointed about this that was no action and it's like they're not violent they are a pussy
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid out differently, and if so how? Yes designed differently and bigger wider circulation
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Sometimes they would be good
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? No I don't think so
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup?
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? He learned tactical communications but you don't get taught specifically had to give dignity or maintain he have to be sensitive for example some people that have been sexually abused will have issues during strip searches they might be very self-conscious and it might be a very difficult thing to do and there has to be an understanding of this so I would give them plenty of time and even allowed them to turn around to take their clothes off and then get them to turn around or allow them to keep their hands over their private areas while getting undressed and then asking them to quickly remove. I'm not sure that everyone is so understanding
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? Explain your answer. Yes they generally do because they don't listen and I don't follow instruction and they generally don't comply
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? Yes because they are non-compliant all of the issues relating to insufficient space come into play

33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? No not yet not really
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. I haven't personally come across this issue yet.
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? We can't use them unfortunately as we don't have enough human resources however they could be very useful.
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Yes there are mainly on Sundays..
37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. Sometimes we don't have enough staff sometimes were down to as little as nine especially when people are out doing pick-ups and the like and I could say honestly I trust three people on my team the rest I would feel like they have to check up on all the time some have no clue some are just give the money.
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? No

Notes from clarification questions sent via email 24 June 2011:

“The first is regarding the number of people that can be held in the obs cell at one time is there a specific number or is it up to operational requirements or up to the supervisor?”

No, there is no a specific number as to how people can be in the cell at any one time. It is up to operational requirements as well as the Supervisors on shift. It also depends on who is in the cell and their demeanour, charges, or other occurring incidents in Perth Watch House at that time.

“Is H1 compliant - I don't remember it being so, but I can't remember . . . ” No, it is not because of the bars on the door. If a detainee is in H1 then there is to be an officer standing outside the cell door constantly monitoring the detainee. The same is for the Male and Female Exercise Yards.

“Finally, is there a specific maximum length of time the holding dock cell can be used to hold a detainee (the one within the Sally Port just outside the entry door to the charge area)?” No, there is not a specific maximum length of time for the “fishbowl” holding cell. Obviously it depends on what is currently happening within the Reception area as well as the person in fishbowl's demeanour. We do not hold detainees in the fishbowl any longer that what is required at that time.

Interview 20 (20.05.2011)

1. How long have you been a Police Officer/Auxiliary Officer? 2 1/2 years
2. How long have you worked at a police lockup or other short-term custodial facility (please indicate type) and where? 2 1/2 years and I've been associated with WA police in total to 12 years as a camera operator
3. Have you ever felt stressed at work and if so how do you cope with it? Yes, I talk about it to my partner but I don't go into much detail as it's too difficult to paint an entire picture. I usually wait till I get home to de-stress I don't feel that there is a way to really de-stress at work just cope with that.
4. Is there a way in which staff can feel free to make a grievance? if yes, how well do you think this method works? Most grievances are sorted out fairly well and fairly quickly where as I feel and I'm not sure about this but it seems that police tend to shift the problem from place to place.
5. Are organisational relationships different in the lockup compared to other areas such as general duties or traffic and if so, how? There is a real us and them mentality from my point of view I think most police think that custody or auxiliary officers want to be police just couldn't make the grade, the truth is I never wanted to be a police officer, I didn't want to be an auxiliary officer and I still don't, and I won't unless I am forced to you might have heard that custody officers no longer exist per se we might be allowed to just stay and live out our days so to speak or we might be forced to convert to auxiliary or leave.
6. Is staff moral high or within the working lockup environment and why do you think this is the case? It's down to the particular shift but I feel that it's a very negative environment it's important to try to keep morale up sometimes issues with personalities and with different sergeants affect this.
7. Do you think that organisational attitudes toward lockup/custodial duties and associated facilities has changed over time, and how? I am not sure I can answer that
8. Do you feel that you have received enough custodial/lockup training before working in a lockup facility/environment? We did our physical training at the corrective services Academy due to issues with limited space at Joondalup I felt confident with the training I had received in dealing with some detainees which might be very difficult. You can't be trained for every circumstance and we only received an induction to the lock-up before starting here - we never set foot in the Perth watch House for training purposes.
9. What type of on-going training, either physical or theory is given to lockup/custodial staff? Explain your answer. We sometimes do mini training things such as shields, pattern, most of everything happens on the job.
10. Do you feel that the lockup should be a specialist area? Explain your answer. Yes I think it should be.
11. Do you think that the way in which the lockup is designed helps you to perform your duties or does it make it more difficult and how? It hinders your work but then again much has changed over time in policing and within the life of this lock-up.

12. Have you ever expressed any concerns regarding this? If yes what was the outcome? If no why not? Yes and a reasonably good about some things I understand some things can't be changed and some things it would be too expensive to change but for the most part apart from a couple of occasions that I can think of they have been reasonably okay
13. How could the lockup operate in a more efficient way, if it was designed differently? Explain your answer. I think it could become safer and staff if there was more room to manoeuvre it would make it easier to have the right number of staff around the detainees was violent
14. Can you think of anything which is/was really annoying about the lockup design (perhaps hindering your duties) Explain your answer. Probably the condition that it in and that a lot of it is non-compliant
15. In your opinion do staff rely on cameras to supervise detainees and how do you feel about this? No I don't feel that we do there is a provision on the custody computer system to do remote cell checks or physical cell checks we generally always do physical cell checks even to the point that if were uncertain if someone is breathing we will get a second officer opened the cell On the shoulder just to make sure that is if we can't see their chest rising and falling clearly enough. I feel that probably outstations might rely on this type of check that is remote checks more often.
16. Do you think that the staff enjoy their working environment and facilities? Explain your answer. I think most do some wouldn't have a clue what to expect and that what they're in for before leaving the Academy
17. Do Sally Port entries work well in Police Lockup's, could they be made better, how? I'm not sure how you could make it better perhaps if the areas where officers disarm were separate to where they leave the vehicle that might be better the doorway from the Sally Port into the reception by the way could be improved.
18. Is the Lockup observation cell and its location effective, how could it be improved? It's reasonably central and works reasonably well but the one-way glass doesn't work and detainees in that always distract staff behind the counter.
19. Is the padded cell/s and their location effective, how could they be improved? No it is not ideal especially PC2 because if PC1 is being used PC2 is a long way away at the end of a number of narrow corridors.
20. What do you think about the lighting and sound quality in the lockup it's a bit off-putting because is no natural light or very little the only natural light that comes in is very dim as well this is from the exercise yard which we can't use anyway.
21. What do you think about the violence in lockups? It's deplorable and happens too often and unfortunately it's to be expected.
22. Where does most of the violence happen and how: detainee v staff and detainee v detainee? Most of it happens in the reception area and there I say it that usually comes from aboriginal females.

23. In which way is violence mainly acted out verbally, physically, sexually, racially etc? Most of it is verbal some racial not so much physical, whereas males are more physical and verbal.
24. Do you sometimes think violence could be avoided if more experienced staff were handling the situation? Explain your answer. Yes in general
25. Do you think that violence could sometimes be avoided if the lockup was designed or laid out differently? Yes
26. What do you think about single person cells for all detainees? Yes in an ideal world
27. Is contraband easily hidden (within a lockup), if so where is it usually found? No
28. What are some of the other agencies which work within or assist the lockup?
29. How is medical attention given to detainees who need it? Nurse predominantly she's here six days a week from 8 PM to 4 AM and Sundays from 10 PM to 4 AM.
30. What do staff members do to ensure that a detainee can maintain their dignity? We are very discretionary in the way we place different people for example elderly or sensitive groups.
31. Do drug and alcohol affected detainees required dissimilar treatment to those that are sober? Explain your answer. Yes so the detainees are much easier to handle and more compliant, alcohol affected but especially drug affected ones can be incoherent and want to fight everyone and anyone they come in contact with.
32. In your opinion, how do drugs and alcohol affected detainees determine the way the lockup facility either works or does not work compared to a sober detainee? yes of course you should design the facility so that it caters for the worst possible drug and alcohol effected and then it will be appropriate for one else but if you design it just for compliant detainees then for all others it will not be appropriate.
33. Has race or religion ever played a part in a detainee requiring special facility and if so how? Does the lockup easily allow for this? We have prayer mats this is usually a make do scenario this hasn't been a major issue to date.
34. Does lockup design or procedures make it equally straightforward to deal with both genders and transgender people? Explain your answer. I haven't come across this issue yet.
35. How does the use of an exercise yard cause problems or are they beneficial and when? They are a great tool that we are not allowed to use we don't have it at our disposal if we do to waste of staff.
36. Are there problems of overcrowding and how is this managed? Yes there are mainly on Sundays, there are a couple of ways to deal with these and I would think in this order number one you put five people to cell, to you take the most compliant detainees to the non-compliant cells on the floor above with officers up there permanently, and three you have a full house any close the lock-up and then use outstations lock-ups that this hasn't happened yet.

37. Are there sufficient staffing levels including experienced officers, if not why not? Explain your answer. I feel that we have sufficient experience but not enough staff. On Friday and Saturday nights we have two shifts one shift is a drop in go and the other starts at 9:00 PM.
38. Are there rules in place for what is expected of detainee behaviour? No.

Interview 21 (01.07.2008)

1. How long have you been a police officer for? 30 years.
2. How long have you worked in a Lock-up? For 8-10 years over career.
3. What is the level of professionalism of staff in comparison to a traditional Lock-up set up? I think the level of professionalism has definitely improved, I think the surroundings, equipment and general setting raises the expectations of staff, in other words they have to raise the bar in a more professional environment.
4. Are there any apparent shortcomings of the new generation design, related to the arresting officers doing their duties and how? Nothing that I can think of at the moment.
5. What are the major benefits you can think of this new design brings? We have much better surveillance and because of this, it is much safer. We are able to see every inch of this Lock-up and were able to control everything in it from one place. It has three levels of security from the outside in just to get in.
6. Are there any major flaws? We haven't found any flaws yet.
7. How could it be made better operationally? For the time being I would say the building is just fine to make it better operationally you would have to look at officer training and the training they received before they get here.
8. What are your views on surveillance? In a Lock-up surveillance ensures everybody's safety so it is imperative.
9. What's special about your strip-searched rooms? They are light, private, and provide dignity.
10. What's special about your padded cells? They are a light cream in colour but nothing out of the ordinary.
11. What size cells do you have? Our minimum cell size is 2.5x2.5 m minimum, and we have a 3.0x3.0 m preferred cell size.
12. What is your average ceiling height? It ranges from 2.7 m minimum to 3 m maximum.
13. What can you tell me about the materials used? We have a lot of stainless steel, Poly Glass with metal frame, all corners are moulded, everything is counter sunk and we have moulded one-piece furniture in each cell that can be used for either bed or bench and this has intercom and panic buttons counter sunk into it.

14. What's special about the layout and sightlines? We have excellent sightlines because of the circular layout the way I would describe it is like a series of cells around an open area in the middle and then she pictured it like an orange with a core and sells around it and then cut it into quarters each quarter would have an open centre which sells around it and we are in the middle.
15. Is there anything in particular about the ambience that you find appealing in the new Lock-up? There are no prison smells; we have good bio filters with 85% recycled air.
16. How else is comfort maintained in the new Lock-up? The temperature is 23° constant.
17. What can you tell me about the lighting? We have a combination of artificial and natural, there is lots of light in this new Lock-up it makes it feel much fresher and airy and definitely not as dreary as most other Lock-ups I have seen.
18. What else can you tell me about the operation of your new Lock-up? it doesn't look like a watch house from the outside we have very good access to rail buffs and other transport.

Interview 22 (03.02.2012)

1. How long were you a police officer in Western Australia? 16 years.
2. What is your opinion of having a live training platform? The biggest liability and issue with recruits in live training would be liability. The problem is, they need on-the-job experience and current training only provides a basic level of skill. In the mid-90s they had what was referred to as 500 plan this was a good tool that was implemented (P and I) as it weeded out those people who were considered not to be appropriate. P and I was a good tool to find any cracks psychologically. I definitely think there is merit in a restructured training program but you would need someone that has more than just a slight degree or more than just a policing background someone that has a well-rounded knowledge of many disciplines should be putting something together.
3. What are some of the issues with current training? I think the problem is the training that is delivered now has become a bit too soft and a bit too 'educational' before we use to break them down (recruits) we wanted them to all hate the instructors as a team, then upon graduation bring them into the fold with the instructors. That was how we built a team, that was how we built camaraderie, and that is how we kept morale high. I think things have become a bit too individual now. The problem I had was voicing my opinion and standing up and saying certain things were not right it didn't do much for my career.
4. Where can improvements in training be made? Issues that I can think of at not to let desperation or pressures reduce the level required, I can remember a time where recruits had to pass at all costs, an approach to training where physical obstacles were reduced in height, size and weight to make it easier to pass.
5. Could you make any comparison between the training within the W a police and any other police force you have been involved with? I have been involved with police in south-east Asia and they are not as heavy as they are made out to be but they have the respect and there is a sentiment that they are hard, and because they have this they do not need to be. Crime still happens but it's pretty safe, murders still happen but it's usually because of

infighting between specific groups and not the greater society itself it exists in some sub-cultures but if you didn't know about these you would think nothing ever happens at all.

The only problem is here the government monitor everything phone, Internet, listening devices in outside public areas, SMS, and other forms of electronic data gathering such as toll booths, extensive network of cameras, many undercover plainclothes police on public transport. While this must seem over the top it is not knowing whether you are being listened to all watched that makes everyone behave especially in public, actually it's a small price to pay to feel safe and for your family to feel safe. You just learn to deal with it (said in hush tone).