Introduction
Japan through Russian eyes – history and context

The Russian discovery of Japan

Ever since Marco Polo reported on the ‘measureless quantities’ of gold which were supposedly to be found in Japan,¹ the country has exercised a powerful, if intermittent, fascination over European minds. It was not until the mid-sixteenth century, however, that Europeans gained any direct knowledge of Japan. Pursuing their commercial and missionary interests in the East Indies, first the Portuguese, then the Spanish and others, established both trading and cultural relations with the Japanese. Christianity, indeed, and most especially Catholicism under the energetic leadership of Francis Xavier, found fertile ground, so that at the height of early European influence there were as many as 500,000 Japanese Christians. However, as the Tokugawa government strove to assert its authority over regional centres in the first decades of the seventeenth century, it came to see Christian influence as a threat to its own hegemony. Accordingly, a series of anti-Christian and anti-European measures were introduced which severely curtailed Japanese contacts with the West. Gradually the European powers withdrew: the British voluntarily in 1624, the Spanish and Portuguese under duress in 1636 and 1638 respectively. The remaining Japanese Christians became the victims of persecution. After 1638 European ships approaching Japanese shores were turned back or destroyed and their crews risked execution; Japanese subjects were forbidden to travel abroad or to return when once they had left Japan. Only the Dutch, whose protestant religion was considered less dangerous than the militant Catholicism of the Iberian powers, were allowed to remain. Even so their freedom of action was greatly restricted. They were permitted to engage in trade only through the single port of Nagasaki, where they were confined to the tiny artificial island of Deshima. Annual formalised visits to the shogun’s court in Edo (Tokyo) were the only opportunity the Dutch were given to form any more detailed impression of Japan.²

As a result of the Tokugawa ‘seclusion policy’, for the next two hundred years contact between Japan and the countries of Europe was thus extremely limited. In Japan information about the outside world was confined largely to what could be learned through the Dutch and from Japan’s closest Asian
neighbours, the Chinese, the Koreans and the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands. In Europe knowledge about Japan was equally sketchy and limited to a handful of reports written by travellers in the employ of the Dutch and to encounters with small numbers of shipwrecked Japanese sailors.

Nevertheless, from the eighteenth century onwards, ships of other nations did increasingly approach Japanese shores, some by accident, seeking refuge from storms in the north Pacific, some by design. In 1797, for example, an American ship was used by the Dutch to transport goods from Batavia to Dushima. In 1808, following the British occupation of the Dutch East Indies during the Napoleonic Wars, HMS Phaeton entered Nagasaki harbour in pursuit of Dutch shipping. In 1813–14 Stamford Raffles led an unsuccessful commercial expedition to Japan. In subsequent years the expanding volume of whalers and other shipping in the north Pacific and later shipping in the Pacific, Japan signed a series of treaties guaranteeing foreign access in certain ports for reparation trading.

The first Japanese to visit Russia appears to have been a Christian named Nicolaus de St Augustine, who accompanied the Portuguese Augustinian priest Nicolaus de Melo on a journey from the Philippines at the very end of the sixteenth century. Passing through Russia on their way to Rome and charged with a secret diplomatic mission to promote Catholic interests against Constantinople, the pair were arrested in Moscow on suspicion of espionage, and confined for several years in a series of monasteries. They seem to have died in Russia some time between 1610 and 1616.

More regular contacts between Russians and Japanese began only towards the end of the seventeenth century, as a consequence of Russian explorations in eastern Siberia and Kamchatka. In 1697 the explorer Vladimir Atlasov encountered a shipwrecked Japanese merchant, Denbei, who had been held captive in Kamchatka by the local inhabitants. Denbei was conveyed to Moscow, where he was interviewed by Peter the Great in early 1702 and ordered to learn Russian so that he could in due course teach Japanese to Russian students. A Japanese language school was accordingly set up in St Petersburg in 1705. Denbei was also able to provide the Russians with significant information about Japan.

Russian knowledge of Japan slowly increased through the first decades of the eighteenth century as Russian adventurers, often with the assistance of the native inhabitants or of other shipwrecked Japanese, began to explore the Kurile Islands and to become better aware of the geography of the region. It was not until 1739, however, that Russians finally set foot on Japanese soil. Martin Spanberg and William Walton, the leaders of an offshoot of the government-sponsored Second Bering Expedition, were ordered to proceed to Japan, while Bering himself explored the route to America. Starting from Bol'shertsk in Kamchatka, Spanberg and Walton made a trip around the Kurile Islands in the summer of 1738 and the following year set out to look for Japan. Spanberg cruised along the north-eastern coast of Honshu, receiving Japanese visitors on board ashore. He then sailed north coast of Ezo (Hokkaido), Walton, who had become arrived at the Japanese coast fresh water. The party was; Russians returned their numerous small vessels, W continued south, obtaining again at another before resistencies in Spanberg's national methods available at of Bering's expedition, it was that it was in fact Japan that

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ashore. He then sailed north to explore the southern Kurile Islands and the
coast of Ezo (Hokkaido), before returning to Kamchatka. Meanwhile,
Walton, who had become separated from his commander during bad weather,
arrived at the Japanese coast further south and sent men on shore to obtain
fresh water. The party was received politely on land by the Japanese and the
Russians returned their hospitality on board ship. As he was surrounded by
numerous small vessels, Walton cautiously withdrew before nightfall, and
continued south, obtaining water at one further point and briefly landing
again at another before returning home. Unfortunately, because of inconsis-
tencies in Spanberg's and Walton's reports, the inaccuracy of the naviga-
tional methods available at the time and rivalries among the senior members
of Bering's expedition, it was not officially recognised until several years later
that it was in fact Japan that they had visited.7

Though Spanberg made a second, unsuccessful attempt to reach Japan in
1742, Russian activity in the region for the next fifty years was largely confined
to the Kurile Islands. Private traders in search of valuable furs gradually
became familiar with all the islands down to Ezo, where the Japanese were
also trying to extend their economic and political control over the local Ainu.

While the Russian adventurers sometimes came into open conflict with the
Kurile Ainu, whom they tried to exploit for their own benefit, they had only
tangential relations with the Japanese, whose own commercial involvement
was concentrated in the south.8

In 1771 Japan proper was briefly visited by a group of political exiles from
Kamchatka in a stolen Russian ship under the leadership of the flamboyant
Hungarian adventurer Count Mauritius Benyovszky. In his extraordinary
improvised flight from the Russian authorities, Benyovszky succeeded in
reaching Japan at a considerably more southerly point than any previous
Russian expedition. Proceeding south from Simusir (Shimushiru), the
sixteenth Kurile island, Benyovszky reached land on the Japanese island of
Shikoku in the province of Awa (now Tokushima Prefecture), where the
Russians and Japanese exchanged hospitality. A few days later, Benyovszky
continued his journey, calling briefly at Tanegashima off the southern coast of
Kyushu and for rather longer at Amami Oshima in the Ryukyu Islands, both
of which were then under control of the Japanese lord of Satsuma. The
renegades eventually reached Macao some four months after their departure
from Kamchatka. While relations between Benyovszky and the Japanese
remained amiable, the ever-scheming Benyovszky appears to have sought to
bolster his own position by leading the Japanese to believe that the Russians
were planning a military assault on Ezo. The suspicions thus aroused among
the Japanese, though unfounded, led them to act rather more circumspectly
with subsequent Russian visitors than might otherwise have been the case.9

In 1775 a concerted effort to establish commercial relations with Japan was
initiated by the commander of Kamchatka, Matvei Benm. An expedition under
Ivan Antipin was sent to establish a base for further operations on Urup
(Uruppu), and from there in 1778 the Irkutsk merchant Dmitrii Shabalin crossed over to Iturup (Etorofu) and Kunashir (Kunashir), finally arriving at the settlement of Notkome (Nokkamapu) to the east of Nemuro in Ezo. Here the Russians entered into negotiations with a Japanese official from Matsumae, who stated that he had no authority to decide on matters of trade but would bring an answer on the matter to Iturup the following year. When the Russians eventually received a reply to their proposals from the lord of Matsumae, they were told that they were not to be allowed to trade, and that they should not return to Ezo, or indeed to Iturup or Kunashir. The Russians were left with the impression, however, that they might be able to trade through Nagasaki. Shabalin returned to Urup in October 1779 for the winter, but further consolidation of the Russian position and renewed overtures to the Japanese were prevented by the devastating effects of an earthquake which struck the region early in 1780. After this, Russian involvement in the Kuriles was for a while severely curtailed.10

The government in St. Petersburg, however, and plans were made for a expedition to Japan. Neither of these plans materialized, and in 1782 Lieutenant Adam Laxman was promoted to captain and dispatched to Japan to establish a Russian settlement. So far as can be ascertained, the Ekaterina, the ship in which Laxman sailed to Japan, was a two-masted vessel of 240 tons, with a complement of 140 men. Laxman was accompanied by the officers and men of the ship, who numbered 20. He also had with him a number of Russian sailors, who had been recruited in the Pacific. The ship was armed with 12 guns, and was equipped with a large amount of provisions and supplies. The ship was commanded by Captain Peter Golovnin, who had been previously involved in the Russian embassy to Japan in 1778. Laxman was accompanied by the officers and men of the ship, who numbered 20. He also had with him a number of Russian sailors, who had been recruited in the Pacific. The ship was armed with 12 guns, and was equipped with a large amount of provisions and supplies. The ship was commanded by Captain Peter Golovnin, who had been previously involved in the Russian embassy to Japan in 1778. Laxman was accompanied by the officers and men of the ship, who numbered 20. He also had with him a number of Russian sailors, who had been recruited in the Pacific. The ship was armed with 12 guns, and was equipped with a large amount of provisions and supplies. The ship was commanded by Captain Peter Golovnin, who had been previously involved in the Russian embassy to Japan in 1778. Laxman was accompanied by the officers and men of the ship, who numbered 20. He also had with him a number of Russian sailors, who had been recruited in the Pacific. The ship was armed with 12 guns, and was equipped with a large amount of provisions and supplies. The ship was commanded by Captain Peter Golovnin, who had been previously involved in the Russian embassy to Japan in 1778. Laxman was accompanied by the officers and men of the ship, who numbered 20. He also had with him a number of Russian sailors, who had been recruited in the Pacific. The ship was armed with 12 guns, and was equipped with a large amount of provisions and supplies. The ship was commanded by Captain Peter Golovnin, who had been previously involved in the Russian embassy to Japan in 1778.

Figure 1.1 The Kurile archipelago, according to Golovnin.

The government in St Petersburg had by no means lost interest in Japan, however, and plans were made to resume formal negotiations in both 1785 and 1787. Neither of these projects came to fruition, and the first official Russian embassy to Japan did not take place until 1792, when the 26-year-old Lieutenant Adam Laxman was commissioned to return a group of Japanese castaways and to attempt to open up commercial relations. Navigation of his ship, the Ekaterina, was entrusted to Vasili Lovysov, and the expedition included the merchant Shabalin who had been in Ezo in 1778. The Russians sailed directly from Okhotsk to Iturup and then continued south-west until they reached Ezo. Landing first at the small trading post of Nishibetsu, they soon removed to the safer harbour at Nemuro, where the local Japanese agreed that they could spend the winter. Laxman’s instructions stated that he was to deliver the castaways to the Japanese capital, Edo, and a letter to that effect was delivered through the lord of Matsumae to the shogunal government. Anxious to contain the Russians in the north, the Edo authorities sent a delegation to Nemuro and invited Laxman to a formal meeting in the town of Matsumae. After lengthy discussions about whether they should travel by land with the Japanese or by sea in their own vessel, Laxman left Nemuro in the Ekaterina in June 1793 for Edomo (Muroran), where the Russians had agreed to meet the Japanese officials. Missing Edomo in the fog, however, Laxman eventually reached Hakodate, and from there continued with the Japanese in a formal procession by land to Matsumae. Here, Laxman was received by two envoys from the shogunal government who informed him that he would not be allowed to proceed to Edo, but that they were prepared to accept the returned castaways in Matsumae. Moreover, the officials took care to inform Laxman of the nature of Japanese laws forbidding the approach of foreign shipping, and refused to consider establishing any kind of formal relations with Russia. Instead, Laxman was given a permit for the admission of one Russian ship to the harbour at Nagasaki, which, he was informed, was the only place where such negotiations might take place. On this, discussions between Laxman and the Japanese were concluded, and the Russians went back overland to Hakodate to rejoin the Ekaterina. They departed Japan in August 1793, pausing to survey the southern Kurile Islands before returning to Okhotsk.

Laxman brought back from Japan not just the Nagasaki permit, but also valuable detailed first-hand information, maps, scientific specimens and samples of Japanese goods which he had received as presents. The Russian government, however, distracted from Eastern affairs by the spread of revolutionary ideas in Europe and the death of Catherine the Great in 1796, failed to exploit the impetus of Laxman’s visit. Meanwhile, the Japanese acted to curb the growth of Russian influence in the southern Kuriles. In 1795 a Russian settlement was founded on Urup with the intention of consolidating the Russian presence in the area and trading in Japanese goods from Ezo through the Ainu. The Japanese, however, who were at the same time seeking to strengthen their own authority over Ezo and the southern Kurile Islands,
blocked this initiative by forbidding the Ainu in their sphere of influence from travelling to Urup, by settling and fortifying Kunashir and Iturup themselves, and by proclaiming Urup Japanese territory and establishing an outpost there. In 1800 Tsar Paul had ruled that further approaches to the Japanese should be co-ordinated by the Russian-American Company, the organisation which had the charge of Russian commercial interests in the Aleutians, in Alaska and elsewhere on the American continent. When eventually, in the broader context of expanding Russian interests in East Asia, a Russian expedition set out in 1803 to take advantage of the Laxman permit, it was headed by the chairman of the company, Nikolai Rezanov, who was given formal authority to negotiate on behalf of the Russian government. Two ships departed from Kronstadt in July 1803 with the intention of circumnavigating the globe and visiting the company's American settlements as well as Japan. After crossing the Atlantic, and rounding Cape Horn to Hawai'i, one ship, the Neva, continued directly to America, while Rezanov on the Nadezhda, under the command of Ivan Krusenstern, sailed to Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka, and from there in September 1804 to Japan. The Nadezhda bypassed the Kurile Islands and sailed down the Japanese east coast to Kyushu, where she entered Nagasaki harbour. Although Rezanov was received courteously, and the permit accepted by the Japanese, it was several months before an envoy arrived from the capital to respond to the Russian request for trade. During this time Rezanov was at first not permitted to land, but he was eventually allocated a small walled area on which to exercise at Kibachi, and later a house at Megasaki, not far from the Dutch factory at Deshima. The Russians, however, were kept virtual prisoners at Megasaki, being allowed access neither to the town nor to the Dutch. The eventual result of Rezanov's approaches was an outright refusal from the Japanese authorities. Although they accepted the castaways Rezanov had brought with him, they rejected his offers for trade, insisting on Japan's right to keep foreigners from its borders and requiring him to leave immediately. The reasons for Rezanov's failure have been much debated, but similar approaches from the representatives of other countries were rejected at around the same time. It seems clear that the Russians had exaggerated the significance of the Laxman permit, believing it to be a guarantee of trade rather than merely an offer of the opportunity to discuss it, and that, moreover, in the interval between 1792 and 1803, the hostility of the Japanese central government to the idea of foreign trade had noticeably increased. It may well be that Rezanov's mission was doomed from the outset; Krusenstern took the opportunity, however, on the return voyage to Petropavlovsk, to survey the west coast of Japan, passing through the Tsushima and La Pérouse straits, and landing briefly on Sakhalin. From Kamchatka, Krusenstern returned to Europe, while Rezanov departed for America on another ship. 

Partly to revenge himself on the Japanese for what he saw as the insulting treatment he had received at Nagasaki, and partly hoping that a show of force would encourage the Japanese to reconsider their rejection of trade, which he believed was essential to the Company, Rezanov enlisted company, Nikolai Khvostov-Rezanov's instructions, Khvostov and Davydov together raided the quite sizeable town as far south as Hakodate, and then continued with the raiding there. Before departing they had obtained a written threat that continuing depredations on their return by the commandant of Okhotsk would be the subject of further action before the author alive to defend them, and that Japanese suspicions of the Russians would be greatly increased. The next Russian ship to command of Vasili Golovin contact with the Japanese, a 1811 to survey the southern Golovin unexpectedly treated him with some suspicion and no fresh water and provisions journey, finally reaching the negotiating for supplies. Even the local Japanese, the fortresses and Ainu inter Golovin was asked to explore Golovin and his companions to teach Russian to the Ainu and to prepare a document in which conditions improved greatly.
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alive to defend them, and the two officers escaped punishment only because of
their exemplary participation in the 1808–9 war against Sweden. Meanwhile,
Japanese suspicions of the motives of their northern neighbours had increased
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The next Russian ship to approach Japan was the Diana, under the
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Russians increasingly despaired of ever being released. In late April 1812, after nine months of detention, all but two of the Russian group escaped from their prison with the intention of stealing a boat in which to reach Russian-controlled territory. They were captured a week later, however, and returned to Matsumae. 20

Meanwhile, Petr Rikord, Golovnin’s second in command, who had remained on the Diana at the time of his captain’s arrest, had been strenuous in his attempts to get his companions released. He had returned to Okhotsk for reinforcements but, because of the war in Europe against Napoleon, had been instructed to effect Golovnin’s rescue himself, by peaceful means. This he was fortuitously able to do after lengthy negotiations facilitated by an influential Japanese merchant, Takadayu Kahei, whose ship Rikord intercepted off Ezo. In early October 1813, Rikord was finally able to deliver to the Japanese authorities the certificates they had requested from the Russian government as proof that the raids of Khvostov and Davydov had not been officially sanctioned, and Golovnin and his companions were released. 21

Paradoxically, Golovnin’s captivity did much to cement mutual respect between Russians and Japanese. In spite of the frustrations of imprisonment, the Russians were treated reasonably well, and if the Japanese learned much about Russia from their persistent questioning, Golovnin, for his part, came to feel a genuine affection for some of his captors. 22 The memoirs he published after his return to Russia included a volume on Japanese customs and institutions with information gathered from Golovnin’s Japanese acquaintances, and provided Russia with a valuable source of up-to-date information on Japan. 23

Rikord had brought with him to Hakodate a letter from the governor of Irkutsk inviting the Japanese to discuss the determination of the frontiers between Russia and Japan. He and Golovnin, however, judged it inappropriate to pursue this issue at the time of the latter’s release, but informed the Japanese that a ship would be sent to Iturup the following year for their response. The ship that was sent in 1814, however, failed to meet the Japanese and returned without landing. A second ship sent in 1815 also failed to make contact with the Japanese, though its captain returned a group of Japanese castaways to Iturup. Over the next thirty-five years Russian interest in the north Pacific gradually declined as the government in St Petersburg concentrated on trade with China and the containment of revolution in Europe. The next Russians to visit Japan did not do so until 1852, when Lindenberg sailed to the port of Shimoda to return castaways and yet again broach the subject of trade. Also in the 1850s, the Russian government placed a military outpost on southern Sakhalin, to protect Russian interests there and at the mouth of the River Amur in eastern Siberia opposite Sakhalin. This outpost continued for a while in uneasy co-existence with both the local Ainu and the Japanese settlements which had been established there. The Russians withdrew from Sakhalin in 1853 when mounting Japanese opposition to their presence combined with the difficulty of defending their position after the outbreak of the Crimean War. 24

In October 1852 Nicholas I dispensed command of Admiral Evfimii Putia planned for some time, was sent p and especially American, activity seemed likely to leave the Russians relations with Japan. Indeed, the British defeat of China in the Opium of foreign activity in the region, p military superiority. On this occasion with the West eventually came into administration. 25

The course of the negotiations however, did not run altogether smoothly, and an audience with the Tsar from the Russian foreign minister, met requesting a conference on the ports to Russian shipping. While he sailed to Shanghai for supplies and threatening to go to Edo himself if December 1853, back in Nagasaki from Edo and, after several days of letter, accepting the need for clarification of trade, while still suggesting that the continued to negotiate until retired to Edo for further instructing him to resume discussions in Putiatin called again briefly at Nsiberia. As Russia was by this time, the circumstances of Putia The four ships under his command replaced by a new and faster ship: 1811, the Diana, but Putiatin had British or French. Instead of going then to Osaka. By this time treaties March 1854, n.s.) and Britain (14) already decided to agree to a similar Putiatin was sent back to Shimoda, 1854. But shortly after meetings 1 earthquake. Most of the town was round the Izu peninsula to HIDA, on a storm and the Russians w
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In October 1852 Nicholas I dispatched a major embassy to Japan under the command of Admiral Efimov Putiatin. This expedition, although it had been planned for some time, was sent partly in response to increased European, and especially American, activity in China and the north Pacific, which seemed likely to leave the Russians at a disadvantage in initiating commercial relations with Japan. Indeed, when Putiatin arrived in Nagasaki on the Pallada with three other ships on 10 August 1853, the American Commodore Matthew Perry had already been at Edo for several weeks. In Japan the question of interaction with the West had come to the fore because of the British defeat of China in the Opium Wars of 1840–2 and the general increase of foreign activity in the region, particularly given clear evidence of Western military superiority. On this occasion the party in favour of engagement with the West eventually came into the ascendancy within the shogunal administration.

The course of the negotiations which Putiatin initiated with the Japanese, however, did not run altogether smoothly. It was almost a month before he was granted an audience with the governor of Nagasaki, who accepted a letter from the Russian foreign minister, Karl Nesselrode, to the shogunal government requesting a conference on the border issue and the opening of Japanese ports to Russian shipping. While waiting for a response from Edo, Putiatin sailed to Shanghai for supplies and news of the political situation in Europe, threatening to go to Edo himself if there were no answer by his return. On 31 December 1853, back in Nagasaki, Putiatin met four plenipotentiaries sent from Edo and, after several days of courtesies, received a reply to Nesselrode's letter, accepting the need for clarification of the borders, but rejecting the idea of trade, while still suggesting that this policy would soon be reviewed. Putiatin continued to negotiate until in late January 1854 the plenipotentiaries returned to Edo for further instructions, and he then sailed to the Philippines, intending to resume discussions in the spring at Aniwa Bay on Sakhalin.

Putiatin called again briefly at Nagasaki in April 1854, continuing to eastern Siberia. As Russia was by this time at war in the Crimea with Britain and France, the circumstances of Putiatin's mission now changed considerably.

The four ships under his command were reduced to one. The Pallada was replaced by a new and faster ship with the same name as Golovnin's ship in 1811, the Diana, but Putiatin had to be careful to avoid interception by the British or French. Instead of going to Sakhalin, he sailed to Hakodate and then to Osaka. By this time treaties had been signed with the United States (31 March 1854, n.s.) and Britain (14 October 1854, n.s.) and the Japanese had already decided to agree to a similar treaty with the Russians. From Osaka, Putiatin was sent back to Shimoda, where negotiations resumed in December 1854. But shortly after meetings had begun Shimoda was hit by a massive earthquake. Most of the town was swept away in the attendant tidal-wave and the Diana was seriously damaged. The Russians attempted to sail the vessel round the Izu peninsula to Heda, where she could be repaired, but the Diana sank in a storm and the Russians were forced to take refuge on land.
The spirit of co-operation engendered by shared hardships in the aftermath of the earthquake flowed over into the official negotiations between the Russians and Japanese, and, when the Treaty of Shimoda was eventually concluded between the two countries in January 1855, it went beyond the treaties signed with the Americans and the British. The Kurile Islands were divided, Iturup and islands to the south being given to the Japanese, while Russia was to control Urup and the islands to the north. Sakhalin was to be left in joint possession until the situation there could be considered more closely. Three ports, Shimoda, Hakodate and Nagasaki, were opened to Russian ships, and provision was made for the appointment of a consul at either Shimoda or Hakodate.

With no ship, however, Putiatin and his men faced considerable difficulty in returning to Russia. One group managed to reach Petropavlovsk on an American schooner, but the majority of the Diana’s crew was intercepted by a British warship while making for Russia on a German merchant vessel, and taken to England as prisoners-of-war. Putiatin himself, together with a proportion of the crew, was able to leave Japan on the Heda, a small ship built by the Russians and named after its place of construction, and to slip through the Anglo-French cordon to the Amur. Co-operating with the Russians on the building of the Heda, incidentally, had provided the Japanese with valuable experience in Western shipbuilding techniques.

Discussions on trade continued in the years immediately following the conclusion of Putiatin’s mission. Konstantin Pos’tev, an officer who had sailed with Putiatin, travelled back to Shimoda in October 1856 to ratify the initial treaty. In 1857 Putiatin himself returned to Japan, where he negotiated a supplementary agreement in Nagasaki, and later visited Shimoda en route to Kanagawa. From here he travelled the short distance overland to Edo, the first Russian to do so, for the completion of a more comprehensive agreement which was signed in August 1858, opening further ports and regulating Russian residence and trade.

In the years immediately following the signing of the treaties, the nature of Russian visits gradually began to change. In 1858, after conveying Putiatin to Shanghai, the frigate Askold returned for extensive repairs to Nagasaki, where the crew remained for several months, preparing the way for the later development of the Russian ‘village’ of Inosa. When, the following year, Nikolai Muravev-Amurskii brought three Russian ships to Kanagawa, his purpose was to negotiate for Russian control of Sakhalin in order to secure increasingly important interests on the Amur River, but although his rather clumsy approach failed to resolve the border issue, many Russians on the expedition now had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with Japan’s capital. The main centre of Russian activity in Japan, however, was Hakodate, where a consulate was established in 1858.

While there was much good will from the Japanese towards the Russians and other foreigners in the early period of foreign settlement, after the treaties had been signed, increased contact was not without its difficulties. Western high-handedness led to episodes such as the even the murder of Russia (Chapter 5). Moreover, in the frustration on both sides of gold and silver was quite different trading. Russian trade to Russia was prohibited by the from Japan for its Siberian Russian centres of many expensive in Japan until the. Unlike some of the other Western sides before and during the power in Japan passed from the emperor, and it has been so far. Moreover, the fit with Putiatin, was a scholar more socially acceptable to Russian influence, particularly establishment of Russian Church, under the energetic in Hakodate and later in Edo, one which has lasted to the end. Hakodate became the merchant shipping, and was enhanced by a telegraph cable laid in 1871, with an external Russian government repres A particular stage in the Russian history of several abortive attempts for amicable conclusion. Und Exchange Treaty, signed in Sakhalin, while Japan received pelago. After 1875, diplomatic relations on a stable basis as Japan attention was drawn away from Central Asia. A Japanese track the Russian communities in Even an attempt on the life of Japan in 1891 failed to do so. In 1890s, however, both Russia’s commercial interests on the eventually began to clash with contention. The first major crisis fol
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Western high-handedness and anti-Western feeling among some Japanese led to episodes such as the harassment of Russians in the streets of Edo, or even the murder of Russian sailors in Yokohama (see Kornilov extract, Chapter 5). Moreover, in the area of commerce itself there was at first much frustration on both sides over the rate of exchange, as the relative value of gold and silver was quite different in Japan and the countries with which it was now trading. Russian trade did not in fact develop very quickly, partly because Russia was prohibited by the commercial treaty of 1858 from importing grain from Japan for its Siberian colonies, and partly because the distance from Russian centres of manufacture made Russian goods uncompetitively expensive in Japan until the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway.31

Unlike some of the other Western powers, Russia remained aloof from both sides before and during the Restoration Wars of 1868–9, in which political power in Japan passed from the shogun to a new elite acting in the name of the emperor, and it has been suggested that this policy generally enhanced their prestige.32 Moreover, the first consul, Iosif Goshkevich, who had travelled with Putiatin, was a scholar rather than a merchant, and was perhaps therefore more socially acceptable to the ruling Japanese samurai class.33 Certainly, Russian influence, particularly in the north, increased rapidly, with the establishment of Russian schools and hospitals. The Russian Orthodox Church, under the energetic leadership of Father Nikolai (Ivan Kasatkin) first in Hakodate and later in Edo, succeeded in building a strong following, and one which has lasted to the present day.34 The warm water ports of Nagasaki and Hakodate became important wintering places for Russian naval and merchant shipping,35 and communications between the two countries were enhanced by a telegraph cable between Nagasaki and Vladivostok which was laid in 1871, with an extension to Tokyo completed in 1873. A permanent Russian government representative in Tokyo was appointed in 1872.36

A particular stage in Russo-Japanese relations was reached in 1875, when, after several abortive attempts, the border question was finally brought to an amicable conclusion. Under the terms of the Sakhalin-Kurile Islands Exchange Treaty, signed in St Petersburg, Russia acquired sole rights over Sakhalin, while Japan received control over the whole of the Kurile archipelago.37 After 1875, diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan continued on a stable basis as Japan concentrated on nation-building and Russia’s attention was drawn away from the Far East by interests in the Balkans and Central Asia. A Japanese trade office was set up in Vladivostok in 1876 and the Russian communities in Hakodate and Nagasaki continued to thrive. Even an attempt on the life of the future Tsar Nicholas II during a visit to Japan in 1891 failed to do any serious damage in the short term. During the 1890s, however, both Russia and Japan were pursuing military, political and commercial interests on the East Asian mainland, and the two countries eventually began to clash openly, with Korea and Manchuria as the points of contention.38

The first major crisis followed Japan’s victory over China in the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894–5. In this war, Japan eliminated China as a rival for power in Korea, and as well as a substantial indemnity gained control of two important Chinese territories: the island of Taiwan and the Liaodong peninsula in Manchuria. However, Russia acted to protect its own interests in Manchuria and, backed by France and Germany, forced Japan through the so-called Triple Intervention of 1895 to give back the Liaodong peninsula in exchange for an increased indemnity. Resentment of the European powers and suspicion of Russian motives in Japan were only increased when in 1898 Russia demanded and received from the Chinese a twenty-five-year lease of the same territory, and proceeded to establish there a major commercial and naval presence, acquiring thereby virtual monopoly rights in southern Manchuria. Japan responded by a rapid expansion in military expenditure, and by the diplomatic suggestion that Russian interests in Manchuria could be acknowledged in exchange for a free hand for Japan in Korea. This proposal was rejected by the Russian government, and when Russian forces sent to Manchuria to quell the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 failed to withdraw, the Japanese became increasingly concerned. Negotiations on power-sharing in Manchuria and Korea continued over the next few years, but the more cautious figures in the Russian government were outmanoeuvred by the expansionist party and talks finally broke down at the end of 1903. In February 1904 Japan attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, declaring war a few days later.

The surprise Japanese attack on Port Arthur effectively neutralised the Russian fleet in the Pacific, and the most critical episodes of the Russo-Japanese War took place on land. The Japanese landed in Korea and first engaged the Russians on 1 May 1904 on the Yalu River as they prepared to cross into Manchuria. This was only the first of a series of encounters in which the Russians were forced to retreat. Port Arthur fell after a lengthy siege on 1 January 1905, and the Russian army, demoralised by poor leadership and the repercussions of the 1905 revolution, was fatally undermined in the massive Battle of Mukden, which began six weeks later. The final large-scale encounter was at sea. The Russian ‘Second Pacific Squadron’, sent from Europe under Admiral Rozhestvenskii in October 1904 to relieve Port Arthur, was outmanoeuvred and ignominiously sunk at the Battle of Tsushima when passing through the Korean Strait the following May.79

This first victory of an Asian over a European power bolstered Japanese prestige at home and throughout Asia and the world enormously, though by the end of the conflict Japan’s resources were almost exhausted. Russia’s ability to continue the war was also in question since, although the Russians had much greater reserves to draw on, their ability to exploit them had been undermined by domestic political disturbances. As a result, Japan easily obtained Russian acknowledgment of Japanese rights and interests in Korea, the military evacuation of Manchuria by both sides, and control of Port Arthur and the Russian-built South Manchurian Railway. After some negotiation, the Japanese also obtained control over the southern half of Sakhalin. The end of the war was greeted by civil unrest in both countries. Strong feeling that Japan had been cheated of an indemnity, led to riots in Tokyo and strikes and demonstrations by the army as its disaffected troops were shipped home.

The Russo-Japanese War Japan moved towards complacency, consolidated its presence in the Sino-Balkan crises of 1908–13, and diplomatic activity on European relations, and the two countries collaborated in 1916 aiming to delineate their boundary. This newly negotiated rela- tionship between the two countries supported further Japanese economic supplies. The new approach to the Tsarist government in the rev-

Narratives of discovery

The narratives chosen for re-engagement were the most unequal groups. Before the World War II, Japan was very largely confined to the efforts to break into a relic of the largely unfamiliar world and to convey the accomplishments of which it was a part. The Japanese government officials of one’s own country were the most part the records of the Japanese, indirectly at seeing Japan and at perpetuating Japan, the unconscious desire to appro- ximate the culturally bounded world, to write a travel narrative of a historical description of his country as if it were written by the initial stages of looking at these early Russian narratives, the ‘contact zone’ between Russia and Japan was extremely narrow in areas of knowledge of Japan at the time.
Japan eliminated China as a rival for initial indemnity gained control of two land of Taiwan and the Liaodong peninsula to protect its own interests in Germany, forced Japan through the so-called the Liaodong peninsula in Resentment of the European powers were only increased when in 1898 eChinese a twenty-five-year lease of abolish a major commercial and monoply rights in southern expansion in military expenditure, sian interests in Manchuria could be fred for Japan in Korea. This proposal it, and when Russian forces sent to on in 1900 failed to withdraw, the d. Negotiations on power-sharing in next few years, but the more cautious outmanoeuvred by the expansionist end of 1903. In February 1904 Japan declared war a few days later. t Arthur effectively neutralised the most critical episodes of the Russo-Japanese landed in Korea and first the Yalu River as they prepared to rst of a series of encounters in which Arthur fell after a lengthy siege on 1 toralised by poor leadership and the s fatally undermined in the massive ater. The final large-scale encounter Squadron, sent from Europe under 4 to relieve Port Arthur, was out the Battle of Tsushima when passing fay. European power bolstered Japanese d the world enormously, though by s were almost exhausted. Russia's estion since, although the Russians eir ability to exploit them had been rances. As a result, Japan easily anese rights and interests in Korea, th sides, and control of Port Arthur Railway. After some negotiation, the southern half of Sakhalin. The both countries. Strong feeling that Japan had been cheated of the full fruits of victory, and particularly a cash indemnity, led to riots in Tokyo and elsewhere, while, in Russia, revolutionary strikes and demonstrations were accompanied by a mutiny in the Manchurian army as its disaffected troops returned to Europe.

The Russo-Japanese War changed the balance of power in East Asia as Japan moved towards complete control over Korea (annexed in 1910) and consolidated its presence in southern Manchuria. Russia, particularly with the Balkan crises of 1908–13, largely withdrew from East Asia to concentrate its diplomatic activity on Europe. However, both sides were anxious to stabilise relations, and the two countries signed a series of agreements between 1907 and 1916 aiming to delineate clearly their respective spheres of influence. This newly negotiated relationship of mutual respect was reinforced by the alliance of the two countries in the First World War, when Russia agreed to support further Japanese expansion into China in exchange for military supplies. The new rapprochement was terminated only by the collapse of the tsarist government in the revolutions of 1917.

Narratives of discovery

The narratives chosen for inclusion in the present anthology fall into two unequal groups. Before the Treaty of Shimoda, Russian accounts of Japan were very largely confined to descriptions of official meetings. They constitute attempts to break into a relatively unknown, relatively closed world, and to describe this largely unfamiliar world for the instruction and, especially with the later accounts, the entertainment of a Russian audience. They often contain detailed geographical and ethnographical descriptions intended to satisfy both scientific and commercial curiosity in Russia, but also focus on what is different about Japan, highlighting 'exotic' cultural practices or habits of thought. The Russian gaze on Tokugawa Japan was necessarily limited, however. The Japanese whom Russians encountered were overwhelmingly government officials of one sort or another. Moreover, because they were for the most part the records of official government expeditions aimed directly or indirectly at initiating trade relations, the early narratives cannot avoid incorporating, alongside the negotiation of cultural difference, a conscious or unconscious desire to appropriate Japan both economically and ideologically. This factor varies in importance from one text to another, but, as will be shown below, is something that can never be ignored. The early period of Russian travel writing about Japan is represented here by Laxman's journal of his 1792–3 expedition, Krusenstern's account of Rezanov's embassy of 1804–5, Golovnin's narrative of his captivity in Japan, 1811–13, and Goncharov's memoir of the initial stages of Putiatin's expedition in 1853.42

Looking at these early Russian narratives it is immediately apparent that the 'contact zone' between the European subject and the Asian focus of observation is extremely narrow. This is true in a double sense: prior Russian knowledge of Japan at the time of the expeditions was extremely limited, and
moreover the degree to which the members of the expeditions were able to form a coherent view of Japanese society was also very severely restricted. At the time of Laxman’s voyage, only two recent works on Japan existed in European languages, both written by foreigners in service with the Dutch: Engelbert Kaempfer, who had lived in Japan between 1690 and 1692, and Carl Thunberg, who visited in 1775. Laxman’s own account, which was not published until the twentieth century, does not appear to have been available to any of his immediate successors. By the time of Rezanov’s embassy, Kaempfer’s and Thunberg’s accounts were respectively over 110 and thirty-two years out of date, a point which Krusenstern makes with some force, noting the absence of any accounts of Japan by the Dutch themselves. A handful of other accounts did in fact exist, including one by Benyowsky and compilations based on earlier Jesuit sources, but Kaempfer and Thunberg were easily the most authoritative and influential. Kaempfer’s book in particular, following its first, posthumous, publication in 1727, proved enormously popular and exercised a very considerable influence over European writing on Japan for the next two hundred years.

Golovnin took Krusenstern’s published account of his experiences with him on the Diana, though he notes with some regret that at the time of his capture he had not read the second part of the work. This might indeed have been of particular interest to him as it records Krusenstern’s encounters with Japanese and Ainu in Ezo on his return trip to Russia from Nagasaki. Goncharov, writing some forty years later, had a slightly richer store of information to draw on in Golovnin’s narrative of his captivity and his volume of observations on the country and its people. Moreover, another foreign scholar working with the Dutch, the German Philip Franz von Siebold, published a description of Japan in 1832, based on his residence at Nagasaki between 1823 and 1830. Goncharov may also have been familiar with the memoir of Isaac Titsingh, head of the Dutch merchants from 1780 to 1794, whose account of his experiences in Japan was published posthumously in English and French in the early 1820s. Even with these expanded resources, however, Russian knowledge of the country at the time of the Putiatin expedition was far from either comprehensive or up to date. Russian ignorance is illustrated by Goncharov even as Putiatin’s ships entered Nagasaki harbour. The Russians noticed small model sailing boats on the water decorated with multicoloured pennants, but were quite unable to determine their significance. Goncharov reports that according to his companions the boats were associated variously with religious rites, superstitious customs, divination, or simply children’s play. Japanese knowledge of the Russians, of course, was no more advanced. When Rezanov and his companions called at northern Ezo on their return voyage to Russia, the Japanese they met there refused at first to believe that they were indeed Russians as their hair was not dressed in the queues that had been fashionable at the time of Laxman’s visit twenty years before.

As far as first-hand contact with Japanese people and customs was concerned, the accounts by Krusenstern and Goncharov were confined almost entirely to official receptions and matters and details concerning Krusenstern, indeed, explicitly accounts of Japan. At all after Goncharov makes the same point: prisoner’s diary, so little opposition around him. No member of the Dutch at Nagasaki was permitted to Rezanov were visited by representatives of此前 meeting all contacts notes that the sailors on the Dutch Batavia, were not even permitted. Laxman and Golovnin of course were not in contact with the Japanese, was able to observe their life at close hand, not a town, and the Dutch Japanese there were confined Japanese life. After he left in Hakodate and Matsumae were to officialdom. He was not allow the Russians passed through although they were formally opportunity for real contact with establish strong personal relations not just officials, but also interest in the Russians from unexpected acts of hospitality. As required by Japanese law, foreigners would be given refreshments by they passed and were thus accorded the Russian houses, the Russians were fiction was maintained that their behaviour. As it was forbidden their houses, the Russians were fiction was maintained that their because of fatigue from their refreshments had been prepared similar insistence on the letter of its harsher implications. Extensive observations were not which he and his companions were.

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Introduction  15

tally to official receptions and banquets and to communication on official matters and details concerning the reprovisioning or repair of their ships. Krusenstern, indeed, explicitly states he is unable to give any satisfactory account of Japan at all after six months’ residence in Nagasaki harbour.50 Goncharov makes the same point when he notes that his account reads like a prisoner’s diary, so little opportunity does he have to interact with the world around him.51 No members of Putiatin’s expedition were allowed to stay overnight on land and, although Rezanov fifty years earlier had been given a house on land, casual contact with Japanese citizens had been rendered impossible by his Japanese guards. Even the collection of information from the Dutch at Nagasaki was prevented. On Krusenstern’s first arrival he and Rezanov were visited by representatives of the Dutch settlement, but after this initial meeting all contacts were forbidden by the Japanese. Krusenstern notes that the sailors on the Dutch ships, as they left Nagasaki harbour for Batavia, were not even permitted to return the Russians’ shouted greetings.54

Laxman and Golovnin of course spent considerably longer in Japan than either Krusenstern or Goncharov, and Golovnin in particular was able to meet a somewhat larger range of people. At Nemuro, Laxman spent several months in close contact with the Japanese officials who came there to meet him and he was able to observe their life at close hand, but Nemuro was a small trading outpost, not a town, and the circumstances of Laxman’s interaction with the Japanese there were confined, hardly providing typical illustrations of Japanese life. After he left Nemuro, Laxman’s contacts with Japanese in Hakodate and Matsumae were even more closely controlled and still limited to officialdom. He was not allowed to walk through the town streets, and when the Russians passed through villages as they travelled overland to Matsumae, although they were formally greeted by the local elders, they had no opportunity for real contact with the villagers.55 Golovnin perhaps managed to establish strong personal relationships with a wider range of the population — not just officials, but also interpreters and guards. He notes a high degree of interest in the Russians from the wider population and records many unexpected acts of hospitality. For example, while being transported, bound, as required by Japanese law, from one part of Ezo to another, the Russians would be given refreshments by the inhabitants of the villages through which they passed and were thus allowed at least glimpses of Japanese domestic behaviour. As it was forbidden for the Japanese to receive foreigners inside their houses, the Russians were accommodated on the verandas. An official fiction was maintained that they were forced to rest wherever they could because of fatigue from their journey, but they generally found that lavish refreshments had been prepared in advance.56 Golovnin several times notes a similar insistence on the letter of the law combined with a willingness to circumvent its harsher implications in practice. Nevertheless, his most extensive observations were naturally of the different categories of prison in which he and his companions were held.

A further limitation to the ‘contact zone’ was produced in some cases by the
inadequacy of the available interpreters, which stands as a metaphor for a more general failure of cultural communication, though some of the expeditions were better prepared than others in this respect. Laxman brought with him one of the students from the Japanese language school in Irkutsk, Egor Tugolukov. Judging from Laxman’s journal, his skills in Japanese seemed to have been broadly adequate to the task, though the fact that Laxman sent him regularly to the Matsumae officials for language instruction suggests that communication was not always entirely smooth. It was a different matter with the Kurile language. Although the merchant Shabalin knew some Kurile, his knowledge was evidently insufficient for any sustained interaction, and Laxman gives this as a major reason for his inability to provide a detailed account of the Ainu. Although the Japanese at Nagasaki were known to have Dutch interpreters, Rezanov’s embassy apparently did not contain anyone who was fully conversant with Dutch. The Russians were forced to rely on the Japanese castaways they had brought with them and on the Russian these castaways had learned in exile. Written communication was even more problematic. Rezanov had brought with him a document addressed to the shogun, the Japanese military ruler, written in Russian and Japanese. The Japanese text, which had been produced by a castaway fisherman in Irkutsk, proved unintelligible to the Japanese officials and the Russians were obliged laboriously to produce a Dutch translation.

Goncharov does not highlight any difficulty in interpretation, as Putiatin’s expedition of 1853 had taken the precaution of bringing a Dutch speaker in the person of Pos’et. Golovnin, on the other hand, who had not expected to enter into any form of negotiation or explanation with the Japanese, found himself in some embarrassment. Eventually he was able to teach sufficient Russian to a Japanese volunteer, and to learn a certain amount of Japanese himself. In the early stages of his imprisonment, however, the only way he could communicate with his captors was through two Kurile interpreters, one of whom spoke broken Russian and the other broken Japanese. As neither of the Kuriles was at all well educated and the Kurile language was both unwritten and apparently lacking in terms adequate to convey complex scientific or administrative matters (or at any rate the particular Kuriles on whom Golovnin was forced to rely did not know such terms), this process proved extremely frustrating and time-consuming. Additional complications were caused by the necessity of avoiding certain common words that the interpreters did not know, and by the fact that foreigners were prohibited by law from learning the Japanese writing system. Preparing written documents was particularly onerous until the Russians managed to convince the Kurile-Japanese interpreter that word order need not be identical in Russian and Japanese. As, for example, unlike in Russian, Japanese verbs normally come at the end of the sentence and the equivalent of prepositions routinely follow the words they govern, the difficulty of achieving identical word order should not be underestimated. Krusenstern notes a similar concern among Japanese officials for formal precision in written communication. When Rezanov wished to present a report to the Nagasaki authorities, the requirement for every line was that it be written in a way that could be read and understood by all concerned.

A further difficulty with, in fact, that the political motives were not always identical, is that the interpreter Japanese by falsely accusing implication that Golovnin was for the Russians to know at least that the interpreter himself. Russian visits to Japan in the past had mostly been pacific. They were visitors would simply not a means of government to keep their covert operations in the narrative sense. Although the superiority of European authors and Golovnin’s narra writing by military or naval officers, the accounts of everyday life sensationalism or its social representations of his repeated Japanese officialdom, but his evidentiments are also clearly apparent. They gave Krusenstern some experience. Krusenstern reads Japanese, and Russians’ gun powder and fir both in Nagasaki harbour an itself not been afforded a favour. un Krusenstern himself acknowledge guard with him on shore, the inflexibility, complex division, decisions to the shogun at E obstrusive. While complain
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Wished to present a report to the shogun, as well as a translation into Dutch, the Nagasaki authorities required a copy of the Russian text ‘written with such accuracy that every line was to terminate with the same letter as the original’. 64

A further difficulty with interpretation noted by Golovnin resulted from the fact that the political motivations of the Russians and the Kurile interpreters were not always identical. In one instance, in the explanation of certain actions, one of the interpreters chose to exculpate himself in the eyes of the Japanese by falsely accusing the Russians of anti-Japanese intentions, an implication that Golovnin was very anxious to dispel. It was thus very difficult for the Russians to know at first whether their words were being deliberately distorted by the interpreter. 65

Russian visits to Japan in the first half of the nineteenth century were for the most part pacific. They were at the same time coercive in the sense that the visitors would simply not accept as legitimate the wish of the Japanese government to keep their country closed to Europeans. It is often possible to see this double-edged motivation embodied in the discourse of Russian exploration in narrative strategies that seek to construct a picture of the benignity of the European subject even as they strive to assert its authority and the superiority of European values. 66 On the one hand, Laxman’s, Krusenstern’s and Golovnin’s narratives belong to an established category of travel writing by military or naval officers, which was read at the time as much for its plain accounts of everyday life in remote parts of the world as for either its sensationalism or its social analysis. 67 In Laxman’s journal, there are certainly reflections of his repeated frustration at the obstacles put in his way by Japanese officials, but his practice is to note cultural phenomena which he evidently identifies as ‘other’ without comment. However, in the accounts of the two later diplomatic missions, which were attended by much greater expectations on the part of the Russian ambassadors, appropriate strategies are also clearly apparent. The Laxman permit carried by Rezanov certainly gave Krusenstern some expectation that his 1804 mission would be favourably received. Yet rather than treat the Japanese on terms of equality, his narrative consistently interprets Japanese difference as an assertion of hostility. He takes great exception, for example, to the Japanese style of formal salutation (touching one’s head to the ground from a prone position) and especially to the compromise adopted by the Dutch, consisting of a right-angled bow held until permission was given to straighten up, which he describes as degrading. 68

Krusenstern reads Japanese security measures, such as impounding the Russians’ gunpowder and firearms, and severely restricting their movements, both in Nagasaki harbour and on land, as insults, though in fact Rezanov had been afforded a favour unprecedented even among European nations, as Krusenstern himself acknowledges, when he was allowed to take an armed guard with him on shore. 69 Bureaucratic delays caused by procedural inflexibility, complex divisions of responsibility and the necessity of referring decisions to the shogun at Edo are also routinely interpreted as deliberately obstructive. While complaining of the mistrustfulness he sees in Japanese
behaviour, Krusenstern, like the other travellers, is quick to point out Japanese generosity in providing both provisions and materials for necessary ship repairs. On the other hand, his narrative omits events which indicate Japanese tolerance and good will: for example, the episode related by the naturalist G.H. Langsdorff, who accompanied the Rezanov expedition, in which the Russians entertained themselves by making a paper hot air balloon, but then allowed it to drift dangerously over the town.  

Goncharov’s more literary treatment of Japan shows a more nuanced approach to the understanding of cultural difference, but one that is equally dependent on an ‘orientalist’ frame of reference. He is an acute observer of the complex negotiations on matters of protocol designed to protect the dignity of both sides. Where should meetings be held? What refreshments should be offered? Should chairs be provided for the Russians? If so who should provide them? Should the Russians remove their boots in Japanese interiors? But perhaps because he was not himself a diplomat, Goncharov remains personally detached from any of these niceties and persistently asserts that beneath the surface effects of cultural difference the Japanese are identical to the Russians, or nearly so. He recognises, for example, a familiar type of an old man in the kindly and intelligent demeanour of one of the envoys from Edo and acknowledges a standard of civilisation in the Japanese, to which, apart from a few details of manners and dress, Europeans could take no exception. In several lengthy digressions Goncharov shows himself quite sensitive to the political complexities underlying Japanese attitudes to the West, and in particular to the difficulty of achieving modernisation or change within the existing political and administrative framework. Elsewhere, he is at pains to explain and justify certain Japanese cultural practices which may seem strange to the European eye – such as the custom of bowing from a kneeling position or removing one’s shoes on entering a building – in terms of the broader context of Japanese customs and social relations. At the same time, however, there is a sense in which Goncharov treats Japan as not quite belonging to the real world. Almost his first mention of the country is as ‘tridesiatoe gosudarstvo’, as a ‘far-off land’ in the expression used in Russian folklore to indicate a magical kingdom. Japan is called ‘a locked casket whose key is lost’. The Russians and the Japanese are the fox and the stork in Aesop’s fable, each unable to function within the other’s terms of reference. The Japanese officials are ‘porcelain dolls’ whose thinking cannot be penetrated; their behaviour is a ‘magical ballet’, ‘a scene taken from some fantastic ballet or opera’, which Goncharov is watching from the stalls of the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow and in the reality of which he is unable to believe.  

Goncharov treats Japanese behaviour with the devastating irony that he was accustomed to direct at other subjects in his fiction. True, Goncharov mocks Russian inability to cope with Japanese customs as well, but such comments as the following, on the imminent breakdown of the seclusion policy, show that irony can easily be used as an instrument of political self-interest. To Goncharov the Japanese are like children: pursuing their seclusion policy, they have a lack of wisdom. They are lost out of their impasse:

Like a playground intruder with the appearance of a fool, with nothing to do, we are children, without guidance of their elders...

A similar paternalism is in evidence in Nagasaki harbour. He unmediated presence of military attributes of nineteenth-century Japan in my thoughts I cubs, pavilions and ships and thickets in the city I imagined Russ...
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ise are like children: pursuing their seclusion policy, they have got out of their depth through their inexperience
and lack of wisdom. They must look now to European instructors to find a way out of their impasse:
Like a playground intrigue, [the seclusion policy] has collapsed instantly
with the appearance of the teacher. [The Japanese] are alone, without
help. There is nothing for them to do but break out in tears and say ‘we are
guilty, we are children’ and like children put themselves under the
guidance of their elders.78
A similar paternalism is indicated by Goncharov’s reaction to the scenery
of Nagasaki harbour. He feels uncomfortable with what he sees as the unmediated presence of nature and wants to tame it by introducing all the
attributes of nineteenth-century European civilisation:
[...] in my thoughts I covered all these hillocks and groves with temples,
cottages, pavilions and statues, and the waters of the harbour with steamships and thickets of masts; I populated the shores with Europeans; I
already saw paths through a park, galloping horsewomen, and closer to
the city I imagined Russian, American and English factories.79
He is offended that the Japanese do not know how to use Nagasaki ‘properly’. If it was taken away from them, he asserts, the city could become a great and bustling port in the European style.80
The reasoning behind Goncharov’s thinking here can be understood more clearly by reference to Fregat Pallada as a complete work, as a comparative interpretation of the peoples of the globe seen on a world tour. In his
work as whole Goncharov is ruled by a conception of progress and civilisation based firmly on European models and strongly linked with
Christianity. Goncharov consistently views the different nations he encounters in terms of their ‘age’ on a scale of their development towards civilisation. If the
English, with their highly developed industrial society and commercial instincts, are indisputably ‘adult’, and the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands are seen as subsisting in ‘childlike’ innocence, the Japanese occupy an
intermediate stage. While in many ways they are ‘children’, nevertheless the openness of many individuals to learning from the West suggests that they may in time emerge from their mental ‘torpor’ and, with suitable guidance, achieve equal maturity with Western nations.81
If Goncharov can be accused of presenting a superficial and often patronising account of the Japanese, Golovnin’s work has been seen as a good deal more penetrating and serious.82 On occasion he admits to a natural
impatience with the intrusive and apparently gratuitous questioning to which he is subjected during his imprisonment, and he objects, for example, to the
importunate requests made of the Russians for souvenir specimens of handwriting on fans.83 He is at the same time deeply impressed by the politeness of
his Japanese captors and strives hard to understand their motivations and laws, even when these seem considerably at odds with European values and practices. By even Golovnin, for all his sympathy with the Japanese, is not entirely immune to the ‘orientalism’ of his times, as can be seen from his actions before his capture. Proceeding circumspect about his task of charting the southern Kurile Islands, Golovnin landed on Iturup, disingenuously claiming that he expected to meet there only Kuriles, though he must surely have realised that the islands were under Japanese control. After an interview with the local Japanese commander, Golovnin was given permission to proceed to the town of Uribch to replenish his supplies. Golovnin notes that he deliberately concealed his true reason for being on Iturup (that is, surveying) on the grounds that the Japanese would be certain to treat it with suspicion, and instead of going to Uribch as instructed turned south with the intention of surveying Kunashir and the strait between that island and Ezo. Golovnin’s arrest, even if there is some question of the extent to which it was officially sanctioned, would seem a natural consequence of his flouting of Japanese laws regarding foreign shipping.

One particular feature of Golovnin’s narrative is his exposure, as here, of his conscious deception of the Japanese on certain issues. Knowing that the Japanese had a great thirst for knowledge about the West and that they were liable to ask innumerable supplementary questions if given any information at all, he deliberately gave misleading answers on some topics and concealed the true content of a particular technical book in his possession to avoid possibly days of translation and explanation. He exaggerated the number of sailors under his command, and on several occasions he deliberately provided mistranslations of documents which he thought might prove prejudicial to the Russians’ chance of release. In particular, Golovnin was concerned to dissociate himself and the Russian government from the attacks made by Khvostov and Davydov in 1807. In distorting the meaning of various papers Golovnin was of course acting in his own personal interests; he was also attempting to increase the likelihood of an eventual trading relationship with the Japanese.

Travellers and tourists

After the Treaty of Shimoda, the number of Russians visiting Japan increased rapidly; visitors came from a wider variety of backgrounds; they visited a wider range of places; and they were there for different purposes. Hakodate and Nagasaki remained the major focuses of Russian attention, but Russians visited many other parts of Japan as well. Their gaze was broader and better informed, and the ‘contact zone’ became ever larger as the nineteenth century progressed. The range and quantity of available writing on Japan grew quickly as visitors from many nations published their accounts. The nature of the ‘other’ as reflected in travel narratives also changed. While foreigners by no means became acquainted with the whole of Japanese society, the Japanese people whom the Russian servants, members of an increasing number of foreign expeditions, and other private individuals, visited, were increasingly apparent and unavoidable. Some visitors gained a better understanding of the world of the Japanese, while others remained more superficial. The largely male-dominated travel writing of the 1850s shows the hostility towards the local population.
Introduction

ard to understand their motivations and generally at odds with European values and his sympathy with the Japanese, is not at all surprising circumspectly about his task of charting Golovnin landed on Iturup, disingenuously were only Kuriles, though he must surely under Japanese control. After an interlude, Golovnin was given permission to replenish his supplies. Golovnin notes that reason for being on Iturup (that is, Japanese would be certain to treat it with rlibach as instructed turned south with the strait between that island and Ezo, the question of the extent to which it was natural consequence of his flouting of English narrative is his exposure, as here, of these on certain issues. Knowing that the edge about the West and that they were wary questions if given any information at all answers on some topics and concealed the book in his possession to avoid possibly, he exaggerated the number of sailors at occasions he deliberately provided he thought might prove prejudicial to particular, Golovnin was concerned to government from the attacks made by distorting the meaning of various papers is own personal interests; he was also of an eventual trading relationship with

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The texts presented here, chosen from the many available from this later period, show something of the diversity of the Russian experience of Japan after the middle of the nineteenth century. The immediate post-treaty period is represented by A. Kornilov, a junior naval officer with the expedition of Nikolai Murav'ev-Amurskii. His account of Kanagawa and Edo in the late 1850s shows the hostility that foreigners met with at first in the treaty ports, as well as the determination of some of them to see as much of the country as possible. At a very early stage Russians began to travel to Japan more or less as tourists, driven more by the imperatives of curiosity and the wish to write about their experiences than by the logic of government policy or trade. Sergei Maksimov, for example, visited Hakodate as part of a lengthy voyage to the Amur region and China in the late 1850s; and Ivan Zarubin took a position as doctor on board a ship travelling to Nagasaki in 1880 in a similar spirit of adventure. By the 1890s the number of such travellers had increased considerably, and with the development of steamships and railways the conditions of travel had become much easier. A. Cherevkova describes a train journey which she made alone with a small child from Tokyo to Nagoya in 1890. The writer N. Garin-Mikhailovskii visited Nagasaki, Yokohama and Tokyo in 1898, and by 1913 a group of Russians was already visiting Japan as part of an organised tour, as described by E. Kobiakova. Some travelled more in a spirit of scientific enquiry, like the botanist Andrei Krasnov, who also provides valuable insights into life in the Russian colony at Nagasaki in the 1890s. Others again found themselves in Japan against their will, like Vladimir Semenov, a naval officer who was held as a prisoner-of-war in Sasebo and Kyoto following the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. The dominant tone of these post-treaty narratives is one of mingled expectancy and bewilderment. On the whole the writers are anxious to see whatever they can of Japan, to confirm what they have learned from their reading, and to improve their knowledge. At the same time, however, they are often puzzled by what they discover, finding it difficult to assimilate to their previous understanding. Nothing in Japan ever turns out to be quite as simple or as straightforward as they would like or as they expect and, like visitors from
other European countries, Russians conceptualise Japan in ways which are often contradictory or inconsistent.96

One thing on which the Russians universally agree is the beauty of the countryside and gardens. Kornilov, who is impressed by little else in Edo, notes particularly the city's fine views and terraces.97 Maksimov enthuses at the view across Hakodate Bay, while Zarubin and Garin-Mikhailovskii similarly delight at the restful visual charms of Nagasaki.98 The botanist Krasnov describes 'spectacular panoramas' from the Nagasaki cliffs and a 'phosphorescent light' giving a picturesque appearance to the harbour at night; for Kobiakova the night-time scenery of Gifu is 'mysterious and enchanting'.99 Cherevkova refers to a 'kaleidoscope full of enchanting pictures' glimpsed from her train window, and even Semenov, whose time in Japan was spent largely in confinement, refers to the 'singular beauty' of the countryside through which he passes in the train taking him to Kyoto.100 Appreciation of Japanese scenery is often validated by favourable comparison with tourist destinations in Europe, especially Switzerland or Italy.101

Another point on which there is general agreement is the organisational ability of the Japanese and their rapid success in modernisation. While in 1860 Maksimov can admire the single-mindedness of labour directed to levelling a hill outside Hakodate in order to construct houses for the Russian and British consuls,102 later writers are impressed by the introduction of Western scientific technology. Zarubin in 1880 remarks on the newly constructed modern Nagasaki dockyard; Cherevkova is astonished to discover electric light in Nagoya in 1890; Garin-Mikhailovskii, a railway engineer himself by training, finds the 'progress and imagination' informing Japanese railway engineering greatly superior to the state of affairs prevailing in Russia in the 1890s.103

Equally, there is a consensus that Japan is 'strange', and by implication inferior to a supposed standard of European normality. The most extensive statement of this view comes from Maksimov, who, even before he has landed at Hakodate, scans the town in vain through his telescope looking for points of comparison with towns, either European or Asian, in the Russian empire. He finds no cathedrals, no minarets, not even any houses of a form he recognises, and the cognitive disjunction which this represents forms a major structural principle of his narrative. Led by an anonymous guide who is presumably an early Russian resident in the town, Maksimov and his companions pass through Hakodate finding streets with no recognisable buildings, an apparent pantomime which is revealed to be a formal greeting between two officials, a dog that doesn't bark at strangers. All of these things are presented like wonders at a Russian fairground.104 Other writers consistently express surprise and often disapproval at the circumstances of everyday Japanese life. Food is a frequent stumbling block: Kornilov, for example, limits himself to the unlikely combination of shrimps and watermelon in preference to any other dishes; Semenov is particularly scathing about his captors' attempts to feed their Russian prisoners in an acceptable style; even the normally enthusiastic Kobiakova finds Japanese sweets inedible and clearly treats her bento packed lunch with suspicion.105 Critics of Japanese-style hotels, rather than to obtain a room,106 Garin-Mikhailovskii and Western dress he sees as being in a madhouse.107 Japan not only defeats Russia and Europe, but also East Asia, gleaned from a visit to Maksimov, Japan is a sort of ugly exterior, while in his inner corruption.108 Several Chinese and Koreans.109

When considering Japan in the nineteenth century, the Russians between Japan and the West, for example, the British considered Japan to be the living em with the country for centuries ago in the West, that recalled the twelfth century or reference in their own past present day. Maksimov, it is that of medieval Russia, with the shogun, was limited by a prince.110 However, he all the vestigial 'backwater of Europe and America. He is as 'identical' to those of the Mongol occupations impractical, gaudily decorated river barges on the Volga scandalised Kipling, for example. Maksimov of both ancien remote of Russian country to strangers that he sees in years ago, and likens those Miloslavskii and Lopukhin Great in the early eighteenth century or paral-lelling the transformation 'the Japanese see this primal all people.114 Writing were reminded of Russia in the which included the emancipation embraced only by a small part of Japan the spirit of reform. Notwithstanding Japan's 0
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lunch with suspicion.\textsuperscript{105} Cherevkova is appalled at the idea of staying in a Japanese-style hotel, rather than the 'half-European' one where she eventually obtains a room.\textsuperscript{106} Garin-Mikhailovskii finds the eclectic mix of Japanese and Western dress he sees in a Japanese crowd disturbing, comparing it with a scene in a madhouse.\textsuperscript{107}

Japan not only defeats Russian travellers' expectations in comparison with Russia and Europe, but also fails to tally with their broader conceptions of East Asia, gleaned from visits to Singapore, Shanghai and other ports. For Maksimov, Japan is a sort of inverted Asia, inwardly attractive but with an ugly exterior, while in his view China is outwardly beautiful but conceals an inner corruption.\textsuperscript{108} Several writers compare the Japanese favourably with the Chinese and Koreans.\textsuperscript{109}

When considering Japan's rapid modernisation in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Russians, like other Europeans, often make comparisons between Japan and the earlier history of their own countries. But while, for example, the British consul Rutherford Alcock found pre-Restoration Japan to be 'the living embodiment of a state of society which existed many centuries ago in the West, but has long passed away utterly', a feudal society that recalled the twelfth century in Europe,\textsuperscript{101} for the Russians the points of reference in their own past were much more recent, and indeed came up to the present day. Maksimov, it is true, likens the structure of the Tokugawa state to that of medieval Russia, where the power of the grand prince, like that of the shogun, was limited by a complex network of feudal alliances with other princes.\textsuperscript{111} However, he also sees parallels between Japan's 'backwardness' and the vestigial 'backwardness' of contemporary Russia vis-à-vis Western Europe and America. He sees the narrow, inconvenient streets of Hakodate as 'identical' to those of existing parts of Moscow that date back to the time of the Mongol occupation. He sees similarities between the ungrainy, impractical, gaudily decorated junk in Hakodate harbour and the traditional river barges on the Volga. The practice of mixed bathing in Japan (which scandalised Kipling, for example, when he visited Japan in 1889) reminds Maksimov of both ancient Russia and present-day practice in the more remote of Russian country towns.\textsuperscript{112} Similarly, Kornilov compares the hostility to strangers that he sees in Japan with the situation in Russia just two hundred years ago, and likens those Japanese princes who oppose change to the noble Miloslavskii and Lopukhin families who tried to block the reforms of Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{113} Zarubin also sees events in Japan as paralleling the transformation of Russia under Peter the Great, claiming that 'the Japanese see this prince [Peter] as the ideal statesman for all ages and for all people.'\textsuperscript{114} Writing seventeen years later, in 1898, Garin-Mikhailovskii is reminded of Russia in the 1860s, a time of major reform under Alexander II which included the emancipation of the serfs. Whereas change in Russia was embraced only by a small proportion of the Russian population, he argues, in Japan the spirit of reform has been internalised at all levels of society.\textsuperscript{115}

Notwithstanding Japan's 'otherness' in relation to Europe, the modernisation
of Japan in the Meiji period was often also seen as a model for social and economic development in Russia.

That Japan is never quite 'real' for Russian observers is suggested by their self-conscious reference to what could be called the 'tourist experience' from a surprisingly early date. The quest for an authentic Japanese experience is perhaps implicit in the invariant motifs of Russian and other European travel writing from the mid-nineteenth century onwards: shopping for traditional Japanese goods such as lacquerware, porcelain or silks; the Japanese meal; the traditional entertainment provided in a tea-house or private dwelling; the visit to a shrine or temple. It is also apparent in the comment of Kornilov's companion as his party is pursued by a mob through the streets of Edo:

Gentlemen [...] console yourselves like real tourists with the thought that this is a situation you will not often manage to find yourselves in. Any English lord would pay a lot of money for the right to be in our place, but you're getting the experience for free and still complaining.  

This is meant as a joke, certainly, but it underlines a clear feeling of difference, prefiguring the gushing account of Kobiakova some sixty years later, in 1913. Unlike the other writers, Kobiakova embraces everything Japanese with enthusiasm, even looking forward to the unaccustomed experience of sleeping on the floor. Yet at the same time as she claims 'it would be better to sit on the floor and feel definitively Japanese', in preference to using the European table and chairs provided, she shows an awareness that all this is play-acting when she talks of the 'tourist' zeal with which her group approaches a Japanese meal, and their 'considered tourist' opinion of what they have eaten.

Another aspect of the search for authentic experience can be seen in the interest of some writers in Japanese antiquities, as if the past were somehow more valid than the modernising present. A nostalgia for 'old Japan' is clearly seen, for example, in Zarubin's account of his tour of Nagasaki antique sellers looking for genuine 'old lacquer', and in his complaint that the Japanese have begun making everyday objects to Western taste: 'it has become very difficult to find anything original, purely Japanese, from the native way of life.' A related yearning for the past is found in Krasnov's discussion in the 1890s of the well-established practice among a certain class of Japanese women at Inosa of hiring themselves out as temporary wives to visiting Russian sailors. Again the quality of experience has been vitiated by modernity, he reflects: with the coming of the age of steam the ships remain in harbour for much shorter periods and the 'marriages' have become a matter more of calculation than affection.

As can be seen here, part of the Russian construction of Japan as different operates on a moral plane: Western notions of morality, like Western ideas of comfort and style, are supposed not to apply. On the one hand, Japan was seen as 'yellow peril', a popular idea taken up by Russian religious philosophers from the 1890s onwards and to Christianity as a whole, in the novel Madame Chrysanthemum the Japanese were seen as and for that reason were not found intertwined in Russia and offended by what he sees life at a public execution, with a lack of emotion as pedlars of relations between the shame are understood in understood in Europe. He reader merely to the name was entertained. Garin-1890s, without admitting to the received wisdom regarding his observation of the received wisdom that all Japanese bookshop assistant he met earned her living from her particular frightening and impenetrable strong hostility to the West, Semenov, too, although in many manners of some of the Japanese thought when he complained of Major-General Okusa.

On the other hand, and influenced by an aesthetic vogue beginning in the 1870s about Japan is small, delicate, to be taken seriously. In part of the exotic gaze. This perspective narratives, is perhaps foremost to describe the elaborate and creates a characterisation of the Japan, in Europe by Loti, a Hearn and Basil Hall Chamberlain's world of sylphs and indulge in quite such flight ite in several of the texts, example, and Japanese men indeed asserts that it is in remarks on the extraordinary clumsiness and crudeness
often also seen as a model for social and
t or Russian observers is suggested by their
ld be called the ‘tourist experience’ from a
for an authentic Japanese experience is
ile of Russian and other European travelers
ntury onwards: shopping for traditional
, porcelain or silk; the Japanese meal;
led in a tea-house or private dwelling: the
obvious in the comment of Kornilov’s
am through the streets of Edo:

ves like real tourists with the thought that
often manage to find yourselves in. Any
oney for the right to be in our place, but
free and still complaining.

it underlines a clear feeling of difference,
obia and some sixty years later, in 1913,
embraces everything Japanese with
an unaccustomed experience of sleeping
claims ‘it would be better to sit on the
, in preference to using the European
an awareness that all this is play-acting
with his observation of the people around him: why, he asks, reflecting on the
received wisdom that all Japanese women are venal, should someone like the
bookshop assistant he meets sell her body when she is perfectly well able to
earn her living from her profession? Yet at the same time he detects an air of
frightening and impenetrable calculation in many Japanese faces, and fears
that in spite of Japanese fervour for the benefits of European civilisation a
strong hostility to the West remains, forty years after Putiatin and Perry.

Semenov, too, although he acknowledges the impeccable European-style
manners of some of the Japanese officers he encounters, echoes this line of
thought when he complains, for example, of the apparently studied boorish-
ness of Major-General Okama.

On the other hand, and particularly by the 1890s, the Russian texts are also
influenced by an aestheticised view of Japan, fed in part by the European
vogue beginning in the 1860s for Japonisme in art. In this vision everything
about Japan is small, delicate and elegant, doll-like and above all again not to
be taken seriously. In particular, femininity becomes the prime focus of the
exotic gaze. This perspective, altogether missing from the earliest travel
narratives, is perhaps foreshadowed in Goncharov’s use of the term ‘ballet’ to
describe the elaborate ceremonial of Japanese diplomatic hospitality, and in
his characterisation of the Japanese as ‘children’.

It was popularised particularly in Europe by Loti and by English-language writers such as Lafcadio Hearn and Basil Hall Chamberlain, who described Japan as a ‘delicate little
wonder-world of sylphs and fairies’. The Russians in this volume do not
indulge in quite such flights of fancy, but similar lines of argument are discernible in several of the texts. There is great emphasis on Japanese neatness, for example, and Japanese men are often described as effeminate; Maksimov
indeed asserts that it is impossible to tell men from women. Kobiakova
remarks on the extraordinary tidiness of Japanese farms and comments on the
crushing and crudeness of European furniture in a Japanese room. In her
account, too, the physical size of Russian people is seen as incompatible with life in Japan: their weight causes overheating in the axles of their railway carriage.\textsuperscript{129} Garin-Mikhailovskii, although in fact he eventually comes to a more complex position as suggested above, refers to ‘toy houses’ in the landscape and explicitly notes that his first views of Japanese were filtered through the lens of Loti’s \textit{Madame Chrysanthème}: ‘these are not people, but figures, figurines of yellow ivory borrowed from the shelves of art galleries, models of people and their houses, the image of that sugary pink-tinted reality so often found in elegant albums of Japanese colour photography’.\textsuperscript{130}

Russian attitudes towards Japan in the late nineteenth century are inconsistent and contradictory, partly because of the difficulty of reconciling the peculiarities of Japanese culture and civilisation to a European mindset, partly because the changes that were taking place in Japan at that time were themselves complex and difficult to assimilate, and partly because the rapidity of Japanese modernisation reinforced an underlying insecurity in Russian writers about Russia’s own place in the world and its social and economic backwardness vis-à-vis the West. It is this combination of tensions, however, which gives Russian travel writing of the period so distinctive a voice when compared to the narratives of other Europeans, and makes it so compelling, not only as a historical record, but also as a literary phenomenon.

Notes


Russian people is seen as incompatible with overheating in the axes of their railway though in fact he eventually comes to a dead above, refers to ‘toy houses’ in the t his first views of Japan were filtered Chrysanthemum: ‘these are not people, but rowed from the shelves of art galleries, he image of that sugary pink-tinted reality Japanese colour photography’.130 n in the late nineteenth century are ly because of the difficulty of reconciling t and civilisation to a European mindset, e taking place in Japan at that time were assimilate, and partly because the rapidity ed an underlying insecurity in Russian the world and its social and economic s this combination of tensions, however, f the period so distinctive a voice when Europeans, and makes it so compelling, o as a literary phenomenon.

130 Ronald Latham, Harmondsworth: introduction are due to appear in rather ly Russian Travel Writing on Japan, New coming.

131 In Japan, 1549–1650, Berkeley: University


6 RP, 26–31; ZRO, 38–66.
8 RP, 60–71; RO, 32–6; ZRO, 100–2.
9 RP, 71–84; ZRO, 103–8.
11 In some sources Lovtslov’s name is given as Grigori.
12 RP, 96–120; RO, 52–64; ZRO, 111–34.
13 RP, 121–2; RO, 68–70.
14 See Kornicki, Castaways and Orientalists, pp. 19–22.
16 ZRO, 160.
17 See RP, 177–96, on the internal debates in Japan about contact with Russia at this time.
18 RO, 95.
19 RP, 158–76; RO, 96–103; ZRO, 161–70.
20 RP, 196–222; RO, 106–9; ZRO, 170–1.
22 RP, 247.
23 V. M. Golovnin, Zapiski flota kapitana Golovnina o priklucheniiakh ego v plenu u iaponcev v 1811, 1812 i 1813 godakh, s prishcheniem Zamechaniyu ego o iaponskom posudarstve i narode, 3 vols, St Petersburg: V Morskoi tipografii, 1816.
25 RP, 308–18.
26 For the text of the Treaty of Shimoda, see RP, 475–7.
27 RP, 308–44; RO, 143–74; ZRO, 186–92.
28 For the text of the Treaty of Nagasaki, see RP, 478–93.
32 See RP, 451–2; ZRO, 199, 200–1.
35 However, the naval fleet was withdrawn from Japanese waters in 1865. See ZRO, 199.
36 See ZRO, 201.
43 ‘Contact zone’ is Pratt’s term, defined as ‘the space in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality and intractable conflict’ (Pratt, Imperial Eyes, p. 6).
44 Krusenstern, Voyage, pp. 251–3.
45 In his memoir of the Rezanov expedition, the naturalist G. H. Langsdorff also bemoans the paucity of up-to-date material on Japan: see G. H. Langsdorff, Voyages and Travels in Various Parts of the World during the Years 1803, 1804, 1805, 1806, and 1807, 2 vols, London: H. Colburn, 1813–14, vol. 1, p. 203. He notes, however, the availability of works by Pierre-Francois-Xavier de Charlevoix, evidently his Histoire de l’établissement, des progrès et la décadence du christianisme dans l’Empire du Japon, 3 vols, Rouen: J. L. Le Boullenger, 1715, and Histoire et description générale du Japon, 2 vols, Paris: J. M. Gandolin, 1736. An adaptation of this was still current in the 1840s: Histoire et description du Japon, d’après le P. Charlevoix, 4th edn, Tours: Ad. Mame, 1844. Earlier accounts by the Jesuit missionaries existed, and it seems that the Russian travellers consulted them, but these contained no information dating to later than 1638.
47 Golovnin, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 10. The second volume of Krusenstern’s memoir was published in 1810, the third 1813 respectively.
50 Goncharov, Sobrannie sochinenii, vol. 1, pp. 213–6. See, also, the Japanese understood by the Japanese.
51 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 1, pp. 118.
52 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 1, pp. 118, 147; see Langsdorff, Vö.
53 See Goncharov, Sobrannie sochinenii, vol. 1, pp. 118, 147; see Langsdorff, Vö.
54 Golovnin, Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 118, 147; see Langsdorff, Vö.
56 See, also, the Japanese understood by the Japanese.
57 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 1, pp. 118, 147; see Langsdorff, Vö.
58 S. Langsdorff, Voyages, vol. 1, pp. 118, 147; see Langsdorff, Vö.
59 Golovnin, Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 118, 147; see Langsdorff, Vö.
60 This is Pratt’s trope of an ‘almost’ differently, narrative produced is to a which the establishment of a notion of ‘difference’ is of the Travel: from Marco Polo 1996, p. viii.
61 Andreas Schönle, Authentica 1840, Cambridge, Mass.: H.
62 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 1, pp. 118, 147; see Langsdorff, Vö.
63 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 2, pp. 118, 147; see Langsdorff, Vö.
64 Langsdorff, Voyages, vol. 1, pp. 118, 147; see Langsdorff, Vö.
65 Goncharov, Sobrannie sochinenii, vol. 1, pp. 118, 147; see Langsdorff, Vö.
66 Ibid., pp. 38–43.
68 Goncharov, Sobrannie sochinenii, vol. 1, pp. 118, 147; see Langsdorff, Vö.
69 Ibid., p. 8.
70 Ibid., pp. 30, 46.
71 Ibid., pp. 44, 30; B. Enrg, krukovetskogo plavaniia’,

so-Japanese War, see V. A. Marinov, Rossilana i -14): ocherni istori oinoshenii, Moscow: Nauka,

I Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation, e following editions: A. A. Preobrazhenskii, in: Istoriicheski arhiv, 1961, no. 4, pp. 113-48

yan, Journal) is included as pp. 117–46 of this round the World in the Years 1803, 1804, 1805 & vol. 1, pp. 251–87; V. M. Golovnin, Memoirs of vols, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, chinenni v shiei tomakh, Moscow: Gos. izd-v

-73, 115–55. Krusenstern's account was first vu v 1803, 4, 5, i v 1806 godakh, 3 vols + atlas, St 1809–13. Goncharov's memoir was originally nite 1853 i v nachale 1854 godov (iz puteykh fi imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 1855, and oir of his voyage, Fregat Pallada: ocherki A. I. Glazunov, 1858.

ad as 'the space in which peoples geographi- e into contact with each other and establish conditions of coercion, radical inequality and Eyer, p. 6).

dition, the naturalist G. H. Langsdorff also material on Japan: see G. H. Langsdorff, of the World during the Years 1803, 1804, 1805, Colburn, 1813–14, vol. 1, p. 203. He notes, / Pierre-François-Xavier de Charlevoix, évi-


lish as Resan til och ur kejsardömet Japan förrättad åren 1770–1779, 4 vols, Upsala; J. senstern used the following French edition: u le Cap de Bonne-Esperance, les îles de la 796.

second volume of Krusenstern's memoir was published in 1810, the third and atlas only after Golovnin's departure, in 1812 and 1813 respectively.


54 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 1, p. 256.


57 Laksman, Journal, p. 123. Cf. RP, 43n, which states that Tugulovuk could not be understood by the Japanese.


60 RP, 147; see Langsdorff, Voyages, vol. 1, pp. 230, 234, 240.


63 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 227–31. See also vol. 2, pp. 116–17. The Japanese authorities seem to have preferred as close a correspondence as possible between original and translated texts, notwithstanding the difficulties of achieving such a result while remaining intelligible.

64 Krusenstern, Voyages, vol. 1, p. 256.

65 Golovnin, Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 176–7; see also p. 112.

66 This is Pratt's trope of 'anti-conquest': see Pratt, Imperial Eyes, p. 7. To put the matter slightly differently, in the terms proposed by Syed Manzurul Islam, the narrative produced is to a greater or lesser extent 'sedentary' travel writing in which the establishment of 'a vantage point from which to carry out a representation of difference' is of crucial importance. See Syed Manzurul Islam, The Ethics of Travel: from Marco Polo to Kafka, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996, p.viii.


70 Langsdorff, Voyages, vol. 1, p. 293.


72 Ibid., pp. 38-43.


75 Ibid., p. 8.

76 Ibid., pp. 30, 46.

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78 Goncharov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 41. See also RP, 343-4.
80 Ibid., p. 36.
81 For a detailed exegesis of this aspect of Fregat Pallada, see E. Krasnoschekova, Ivan Aleksandrovič Goncharov, pp. 134–220.
82 RP, 343-4.
83 Golovnin, Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 147–9; see also pp. 62, 156.
84 E.g., ibid., vol. 1, pp. 117–18, 140, 186, 221, 242–3.
85 See ibid., vol. 1, p. 18–20.
86 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 22.

This focus on the interplay between self and the described world was indeed a general characteristic of European and American travel writing from the middle of the nineteenth century. See Casey Blanton, Travel Writing: the Self and the World, New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 19.

97 Kornilov, Izvestiiia iz iaponii, p. 118.
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126 See note 77 above.