## Introduction

Japan through Russian eyes – history and context

### The Russian discovery of Japan

Ever since Marco Polo reported on the 'measureless quantities' of gold which were supposedly to be found in Japan,1 the country has exercised a powerful, if intermittent, fascination over European minds. It was not until the midsixteenth century, however, that Europeans gained any direct knowledge of Japan. Pursuing their commercial and missionary interests in the East Indies, first the Portuguese, then the Spanish and others, established both trading and cultural relations with the Japanese. Christianity, indeed, and most especially Catholicism under the energetic leadership of Francis Xavier, found fertile ground, so that at the height of early European influence there were as many as 500,000 Japanese Christians. However, as the Tokugawa government strove to assert its authority over regional centres in the first decades of the seventeenth century, it came to see Christian influence as a threat to its own hegemony. Accordingly, a series of anti-Christian and anti-European measures were introduced which severely curtailed Japanese contacts with the West. Gradually the European powers withdrew: the British voluntarily in 1624, the Spanish and Portuguese under duress in 1636 and 1638 respectively. The remaining Japanese Christians became the victims of persecution. After 1638 European ships approaching Japanese shores were turned back or destroyed and their crews risked execution; Japanese subjects were forbidden to travel abroad or to return when once they had left Japan. Only the Dutch, whose protestant religion was considered less dangerous than the militant Catholicism of the Iberian powers, were allowed to remain. Even so their freedom of action was greatly restricted. They were permitted to engage in trade only through the single port of Nagasaki, where they were confined to the tiny artificial island of Deshima. Annual formalised visits to the shogun's court in Edo (Tokyo) were the only opportunity the Dutch were given to form any more detailed impression of Japan.2

As a result of the Tokugawa 'seclusion policy', for the next two hundred years contact between Japan and the countries of Europe was thus extremely limited. In Japan information about the outside world was confined largely to what could be learned through the Dutch and from Japan's closest Asian

neighbours, the Chinese, the Koreans and the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands. In Europe knowledge about Japan was equally sketchy and limited to a handful of reports written by travellers in the employ of the Dutch and to encounters with small numbers of shipwrecked Japanese sailors.

Nevertheless, from the eighteenth century onwards, ships of other nations did increasingly approach Japanese shores, some by accident, seeking refuge from storms in the north Pacific, some by design. In 1797, for example, an American ship was used by the Dutch to transport goods from Batavia to Deshima. In 1808, following the British occupation of the Dutch East Indies during the Napoleonic Wars, HMS *Phaeton* entered Nagasaki harbour in pursuit of Dutch shipping. In 1813–14 Stamford Raffles led an unsuccessful commercial expedition to Japan. In subsequent years the expanding volume of whalers and other shipping in the north Pacific led to further and more determined approaches by Western powers until, following pressure particularly by the United States in the 1850s, Japan signed a series of treaties guaranteeing foreign access to certain ports for reprovisioning and trade.<sup>3</sup>

The first Japanese to visit Russia appears to have been a Christian known as Nicolaus de St Augustino, who accompanied the Portuguese Augustinian priest Nicolaus de Melo on a journey from the Philippines at the very end of the sixteenth century. Passing through Russia on their way to Rome and charged with a secret diplomatic mission to promote Catholic interests against Constantinople, the pair were arrested in Moscow on suspicion of espionage, and confined for several years in a series of monasteries. They seem to have died in Russia some time between 1610 and 1616.<sup>4</sup>

More regular contacts between Russians and Japanese began only towards the end of the seventeenth century, as a consequence of Russian explorations in eastern Siberia and Kamchatka.<sup>5</sup> In 1697 the explorer Vladimir Atlasov encountered a shipwrecked Japanese merchant, Denbei, who had been held captive in Kamchatka by the local inhabitants. Denbei was conveyed to Moscow, where he was interviewed by Peter the Great in early 1702 and ordered to learn Russian so that he could in due course teach Japanese to Russian students. A Japanese language school was accordingly set up in St Petersburg in 1705. Denbei was also able to provide the Russians with significant information about Japan.<sup>6</sup>

Russian knowledge of Japan slowly increased through the first decades of the eighteenth century as Russian adventurers, often with the assistance of the native inhabitants or of other shipwrecked Japanese, began to explore the Kurile Islands and to become better aware of the geography of the region. It was not until 1739, however, that Russians finally set foot on Japanese soil. Martin Spanberg and William Walton, the leaders of an offshoot of the government-sponsored Second Bering Expedition, were ordered to proceed to Japan, while Bering himself explored the route to America. Starting from Bol'sheretsk in Kamchatka, Spanberg and Walton made a trip around the Kurile Islands in the summer of 1738 and the following year set out to look for Japan. Spanberg cruised along the north-eastern coast of Honshu, receiving

Japanese visitors on board a ashore. He then sailed nort coast of Ezo (Hokkaido), Walton, who had become se arrived at the Japanese coafresh water. The party was Russians returned their ho numerous small vessels, W continued south, obtaining again at another before re sistencies in Spanberg's an tional methods available at of Bering's expedition, it was that it was in fact Japan tha

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Japanese visitors on board at several points, but not himself sending anyone ashore. He then sailed north to explore the southern Kurile Islands and the coast of Ezo (Hokkaido), before returning to Kamchatka. Meanwhile, Walton, who had become separated from his commander during bad weather, arrived at the Japanese coast further south and sent men on shore to obtain fresh water. The party was received politely on land by the Japanese and the Russians returned their hospitality on board ship. As he was surrounded by numerous small vessels, Walton cautiously withdrew before nightfall, and continued south, obtaining water at one further point and briefly landing again at another before returning home. Unfortunately, because of inconsistencies in Spanberg's and Walton's reports, the inaccuracy of the navigational methods available at the time and rivalries among the senior members of Bering's expedition, it was not officially recognised until several years later that it was in fact Japan that they had visited.7

Though Spanberg made a second, unsuccessful attempt to reach Japan in 1742, Russian activity in the region for the next fifty years was largely confined to the Kurile Islands. Private traders in search of valuable furs gradually became familiar with all the islands down to Ezo, where the Japanese were also trying to extend their economic and political control over the local Ainu. While the Russian adventurers sometimes came into open conflict with the Kurile Ainu, whom they tried to exploit for their own benefit, they had only tangential relations with the Japanese, whose own commercial involvement was concentrated in the south.8

In 1771 Japan proper was briefly visited by a group of political exiles from Kamchatka in a stolen Russian ship under the leadership of the flamboyant Hungarian adventurer Count Mauritius Benyovszky. In his extraordinary improvised flight from the Russian authorities, Benyovszky succeeded in reaching Japan at a considerably more southerly point than any previous Russian expedition. Proceeding south from Simusir (Shimushiru), the sixteenth Kurile island, Benyovszky reached land on the Japanese island of Shikoku in the province of Awa (now Tokushima Prefecture), where the Russians and Japanese exchanged hospitality. A few days later, Benyovszky continued his journey, calling briefly at Tanegashima off the southern coast of Kyushu and for rather longer at Amami Oshima in the Ryukyu Islands, both of which were then under control of the Japanese lord of Satsuma. The renegades eventually reached Macao some four months after their departure from Kamchatka. While relations between Benyovszky and the Japanese remained amiable, the ever-scheming Benyovszky appears to have sought to bolster his own position by leading the Japanese to believe that the Russians were planning a military assault on Ezo. The suspicions thus aroused among the Japanese, though unfounded, led them to act rather more circumspectly with subsequent Russian visitors than might otherwise have been the case.9

In 1775 a concerted effort to establish commercial relations with Japan was initiated by the commander of Kamchatka, Matvei Bem. An expedition under Ivan Antipin was sent to establish a base for further operations on Urup

(Uruppu), and from there in 1778 the Irkutsk merchant Dmitrii Shabalin crossed over to Iturup (Etorofu) and Kunashir (Kunashiri), finally arriving at the settlement of Notkome (Nokkamapu) to the east of Nemuro in Ezo. Here the Russians entered into negotiations with a Japanese official from Matsumae, who stated that he had no authority to decide on matters of trade but would bring an answer on the matter to Iturup the following year. When the Russians eventually received a reply to their proposals from the lord of Matsumae, they were told that they were not to be allowed to trade, and that they should not return to Ezo, or indeed to Iturup or Kunashir. The Russians were left with the impression, however, that they might be able to trade through Nagasaki. Shabalin returned to Urup in October 1779 for the winter, but further consolidation of the Russian position and renewed overtures to the Japanese were prevented by the devastating effects of an earthquake which struck the region early in 1780. After this, Russian involvement in the Kuriles was for a while severely curtailed. 10




Figure I.1 The Kurile archipelago, according to Golovnin.

Source: George Alexander Lensen, *The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations*, 1697–1875, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 33.

The government in St Pe however, and plans were m and 1787. Neither of these Russian embassy to Japan d Lieutenant Adam Laxman castaways and to attempt to ship, the Ekaterina, was er included the merchant Shal sailed directly from Okhots they reached Ezo. Landing they soon removed to the sa agreed that they could spen was to deliver the castaways effect was delivered thro government. Anxious to con sent a delegation to Nemur town of Matsumae. After travel by land with the Jap Nemuro in the Ekaterina i Russians had agreed to mee however, Laxman eventual with the Japanese in a forma was received by two envoys: that he would not be allowed accept the returned castawa to inform Laxman of the na foreign shipping, and refu relations with Russia. Instea one Russian ship to the harl only place where such neg between Laxman and the J back overland to Hakodate August 1793, pausing to sui to Okhotsk.12

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The government in St Petersburg had by no means lost interest in Japan, however, and plans were made to resume formal negotiations in both 1785 and 1787. Neither of these projects came to fruition, and the first official Russian embassy to Japan did not take place until 1792, when the 26-year-old Lieutenant Adam Laxman was commissioned to return a group of Japanese castaways and to attempt to open up commercial relations. Navigation of his ship, the Ekaterina, was entrusted to Vasilii Lovtsov, 11 and the expedition included the merchant Shabalin who had been in Ezo in 1778. The Russians sailed directly from Okhotsk to Iturup and then continued south-west until they reached Ezo. Landing first at the small trading outpost of Nishibetsu, they soon removed to the safer harbour at Nemuro, where the local Japanese agreed that they could spend the winter. Laxman's instructions stated that he was to deliver the castaways to the Japanese capital, Edo, and a letter to that effect was delivered through the lord of Matsumae to the shogunal government. Anxious to contain the Russians in the north, the Edo authorities sent a delegation to Nemuro and invited Laxman to a formal meeting in the town of Matsumae. After lengthy discussions about whether they should travel by land with the Japanese or by sea in their own vessel, Laxman left Nemuro in the Ekaterina in June 1793 for Edomo (Muroran), where the Russians had agreed to meet the Japanese officials. Missing Edomo in the fog, however, Laxman eventually reached Hakodate, and from there continued with the Japanese in a formal procession by land to Matsumae. Here, Laxman was received by two envoys from the shogunal government who informed him that he would not be allowed to proceed to Edo, but that they were prepared to accept the returned castaways in Matsumae. Moreover, the officials took care to inform Laxman of the nature of Japanese laws forbidding the approach of foreign shipping, and refused to consider establishing any kind of formal relations with Russia. Instead, Laxman was given a permit for the admission of one Russian ship to the harbour at Nagasaki, which, he was informed, was the only place where such negotiations might take place. On this, discussions between Laxman and the Japanese were concluded, and the Russians went back overland to Hakodate to rejoin the Ekaterina. They departed Japan in August 1793, pausing to survey the southern Kurile Islands before returning to Okhotsk.12

Laxman brought back from Japan not just the Nagasaki permit, but also valuable detailed first-hand information, maps, scientific specimens and samples of Japanese goods which he had received as presents. The Russian government, however, distracted from Eastern affairs by the spread of revolutionary ideas in Europe and the death of Catherine the Great in 1796, failed to exploit the impetus of Laxman's visit. Meanwhile, the Japanese acted to curb the growth of Russian influence in the southern Kuriles. In 1795 a Russian settlement was founded on Urup with the intention of consolidating the Russian presence in the area and trading in Japanese goods from Ezo through the Ainu. The Japanese, however, who were at the same time seeking to strengthen their own authority over Ezo and the southern Kurile Islands,

h Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese

ty Press, 1959, p. 33.

blocked this initiative by forbidding the Ainu in their sphere of influence from travelling to Urup, by settling and fortifying Kunashir and Iturup themselves, and by proclaiming Urup Japanese territory and establishing an outpost there.<sup>13</sup>

In 1800 Tsar Paul had ruled that further approaches to the Japanese should be co-ordinated by the Russian-American Company, the organisation which had the charge of Russian commercial interests in the Aleutians, in Alaska and elsewhere on the American continent. When eventually, in the broader context of expanding Russian interests in East Asia, 14 a Russian expedition set out in 1803 to take advantage of the Laxman permit, it was headed by the chairman of the company, Nikolai Rezanov, who was given formal authority to negotiate on behalf of the Russian government. Two ships departed from Kronstadt in July 1803 with the intention of circumnavigating the globe and visiting the company's American settlements as well as Japan. After crossing the Atlantic, and rounding Cape Horn to Hawai'i, one ship, the Neva, continued directly to America, while Rezanov on the Nadezhda, under the command of Ivan Krusenstern, sailed to Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka, and from there in September 1804 to Japan. The Nadezhda bypassed the Kurile Islands and sailed down the Japanese east coast to Kyushu, where she entered Nagasaki harbour. Although Rezanov was received courteously, and the permit accepted by the Japanese, it was several months before an envoy arrived from the capital to respond to the Russian request for trade. During this time Rezanov was at first not permitted to land, but he was eventually allocated a small palisaded area on which to exercise at Kibachi, and later a house at Megasaki, not far from the Dutch factory at Deshima. The Russians, however, were kept virtual prisoners at Megasaki, being allowed access neither to the town nor to the Dutch. The eventual result of Rezanov's approaches was an outright refusal from the Japanese authorities. Although they accepted the castaways Rezanov had brought with him, they rejected his overtures for trade, insisting on Japan's right to keep foreigners from its borders and requiring him to leave immediately.15

The reasons for Rezanov's failure have been much debated, but similar approaches from the representatives of other countries were rejected at around the same time.16 It seems clear that the Russians had exaggerated the significance of the Laxman permit, believing it to be a guarantee of trade rather than merely an offer of the opportunity to discuss it, and that, moreover, in the interval between 1792 and 1803, the hostility of the Japanese central government to the idea of foreign trade had noticeably increased.17 It may well be that Rezanov's mission was doomed from the outset; Krusenstern took the opportunity, however, on the return voyage to Petropavlovsk, to survey the west coast of Japan, passing through the Tsushima and La Pérouse straits, and landing briefly on Sakhalin. From Kamchatka, Krusenstern returned to Europe, while Rezanov departed for America on another ship.

Partly to revenge himself on the Japanese for what he saw as the insulting treatment he had received at Nagasaki, and partly hoping that a show of force would encourage the Japanese to reconsider their rejection of trade, which he

believed was essential to th Company,18 Rezanov enliste company, Nikolai Khvostov Rezanov's instructions, Khv capturing some Japanese buildings. He left a plaque th denied, but avoided harmin Davydov together raided 1 routing the quite sizeable ga as far south as Hakodate, w and then continued with 1 northern Ezo. Before depa written threat that continui depredations. On their retur by the commandant of Okl which they had plundered fr their case before the author alive to defend them, and the their exemplary participatic Japanese suspicions of the m greatly.19

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believed was essential to the long-term interest of the Russian-American Company,18 Rezanov enlisted the aid of two naval officers attached to the company, Nikolai Khvostov and Gavriil Davydov. In October 1806, following Rezanov's instructions, Khvostov raided a Japanese settlement on Sakhalin, capturing some Japanese guards, seizing provisions and setting fire to buildings. He left a plaque threatening further attacks if trade continued to be denied, but avoided harming the local Ainu. In May 1807, Khvostov and Davydov together raided the Japanese colony on Iturup, succeeding in routing the quite sizeable garrison at Shana. The Russians afterwards sailed as far south as Hakodate, where they attacked and looted a merchant vessel, and then continued with further raids on Sakhalin and on shipping off northern Ezo. Before departing the area for Okhotsk, they left a further written threat that continuing refusal to trade would be met with additional depredations. On their return to Russia, Khvostov and Davydov were arrested by the commandant of Okhotsk, who proceeded to appropriate the goods which they had plundered from the Japanese. They eventually managed to put their case before the authorities in St Petersburg, but Rezanov was no longer alive to defend them, and the two officers escaped punishment only because of their exemplary participation in the 1808-9 war against Sweden. Meanwhile, Japanese suspicions of the motives of their northern neighbours had increased greatly.19

The next Russian ship to approach Japan was the Diana, under the command of Vasilii Golovnin. This expedition had no intention of making contact with the Japanese, but was sent by the Russian navy in the summer of 1811 to survey the southern Kurile Islands. Landing on Iturup, however, Golovnin unexpectedly encountered a group of Japanese soldiers, who treated him with some suspicion, but promised that he would be able to obtain fresh water and provisions further along the coast. Golovnin continued his journey, finally reaching the island of Kunashir, where he began cautiously to negotiate for supplies. Eventually he was persuaded to visit the commander of the local Japanese fortress on shore, and landed with two other officers, four sailors and an Ainu interpreter. After a period of discussion, in which Golovnin was asked to explain the earlier Russian attacks, the Russians were overpowered and taken prisoner. Tightly bound, they were transported across to Ezo and then by land and boat to Hakodate. Here they were interrogated closely and at length about the Khvostov-Davydov raids and their own intentions. After several weeks the Russians were transferred to Matsumae, where they were brought before the governor and informed that they would be released if it could be satisfactorily established that the raids of 1806 and 1807 had not been sanctioned by the Russian government. The Japanese made the most of the opportunity to obtain information about Russia, questioning Golovnin and his companions on all aspects of Russian life, and persuading them to teach Russian to two interpreters. Once the prisoners had laboriously prepared a document in their own defence to be sent to Edo, their material conditions improved greatly but, as consideration of their case dragged on, the Russians increasingly despaired of ever being released. In late April 1812, after nine months of detention, all but two of the Russian group escaped from their prison with the intention of stealing a boat in which to reach Russian-controlled territory. They were captured a week later, however, and returned to Matsumae.<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile, Petr Rikord, Golovnin's second in command, who had remained on the *Diana* at the time of his captain's arrest, had been strenuous in his attempts to get his companions released. He had returned to Okhotsk for reinforcements but, because of the war in Europe against Napoleon, had been instructed to effect Golovnin's rescue himself, by peaceful means. This he was fortuitously able to do after lengthy negotiations facilitated by an influential Japanese merchant, Takadaya Kahei, whose ship Rikord intercepted off Ezo. In early October 1813, Rikord was finally able to deliver to the Japanese authorities the certificates they had requested from the Russian government as proof that the raids of Khvostov and Davydov had not been officially sanctioned, and Golovnin and his companions were released.<sup>21</sup>

Paradoxically, Golovnin's captivity did much to cement mutual respect between Russians and Japanese. In spite of the frustrations of imprisonment, the Russians were treated reasonably well, and if the Japanese learned much about Russia from their persistent questioning, Golovnin, for his part, came to feel a genuine affection for some of his captors.<sup>22</sup> The memoirs he published after his return to Russia included a volume on Japanese customs and institutions with information gathered from Golovnin's Japanese acquaintances, and provided Russia with a valuable source of up-to-date information on Japan.<sup>23</sup>

Rikord had brought with him to Hakodate a letter from the governor of Irkutsk inviting the Japanese to discuss the determination of the frontiers between Russia and Japan. He and Golovnin, however, judged it inappropriate to pursue this issue at the time of the latter's release, but informed the Japanese that a ship would be sent to Iturup the following year for their response. The ship that was sent in 1814, however, failed to meet the Japanese and returned without landing. A second ship sent in 1815 also failed to make contact with the Japanese, though its captain returned a group of Japanese castaways to Iturup. Over the next thirty-five years Russian interest in the north Pacific gradually declined as the government in St Petersburg concentrated on trade with China and the containment of revolution in Europe. The next Russians to visit Japan did not do so until 1852, when Lindenberg sailed to the port of Shimoda to return castaways and yet again broach the subject of trade. Also in the 1850s, the Russian government placed a military outpost on southern Sakhalin, to protect Russian interests there and at the mouth of the River Amur in eastern Siberia opposite Sakhalin. This outpost continued for a while in uneasy co-existence with both the local Ainu and the Japanese settlements which had been established there. The Russians withdrew from Sakhalin in 1853 when mounting Japanese opposition to their presence combined with the difficulty of defending their position after the outbreak of the Crimean War.24

In October 1852 Nicholas I dispa command of Admiral Efvimii Putia planned for some time, was sent p and especially American, activity seemed likely to leave the Russians relations with Japan. Indeed, wh *Pallada* with three other ships on 16 Matthew Perry had already been question of interaction with the W British defeat of China in the Opiur of foreign activity in the region, pamilitary superiority. On this occa with the West eventually came in administration.<sup>25</sup>

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In October 1852 Nicholas I dispatched a major embassy to Japan under the command of Admiral Efvimii Putiatin. This expedition, although it had been planned for some time, was sent partly in response to increased European, and especially American, activity in China and the north Pacific, which seemed likely to leave the Russians at a disadvantage in initiating commercial relations with Japan. Indeed, when Putiatin arrived in Nagasaki on the Pallada with three other ships on 10 August 1853, the American Commodore Matthew Perry had already been at Edo for several weeks. In Japan the question of interaction with the West had come to the fore because of the British defeat of China in the Opium Wars of 1840-2 and the general increase of foreign activity in the region, particularly given clear evidence of Western military superiority. On this occasion the party in favour of engagement with the West eventually came into the ascendancy within the shogunal administration.25

The course of the negotiations which Putiatin initiated with the Japanese, however, did not run altogether smoothly. It was almost a month before he was granted an audience with the governor of Nagasaki, who accepted a letter from the Russian foreign minister, Karl Nesselrode, to the shogunal government requesting a conference on the border issue and the opening of Japanese ports to Russian shipping. While waiting for a response from Edo, Putiatin sailed to Shanghai for supplies and news of the political situation in Europe, threatening to go to Edo himself if there were no answer by his return. On 31 December 1853, back in Nagasaki, Putiatin met four plenipotentiaries sent from Edo and, after several days of courtesies, received a reply to Nesselrode's letter, accepting the need for clarification of the borders, but rejecting the idea of trade, while still suggesting that this policy would soon be reviewed. Putiatin continued to negotiate until in late January 1854 the plenipotentiaries returned to Edo for further instructions, and he then sailed to the Philippines, intending to resume discussions in the spring at Aniwa Bay on Sakhalin.

Putiatin called again briefly at Nagasaki in April 1854, continuing to eastern Siberia. As Russia was by this time at war in the Crimea with Britain and France, the circumstances of Putiatin's mission now changed considerably. The four ships under his command were reduced to one. The Pallada was replaced by a new and faster ship with the same name as Golovnin's ship in 1811, the Diana, but Putiatin had to be careful to avoid interception by the British or French. Instead of going to Sakhalin, he sailed to Hakodate and then to Osaka. By this time treaties had been signed with the United States (31 March 1854, n.s.) and Britain (14 October 1854, n.s.) and the Japanese had already decided to agree to a similar treaty with the Russians. From Osaka, Putiatin was sent back to Shimoda, where negotiations resumed in December 1854. But shortly after meetings had begun Shimoda was hit by a massive earthquake. Most of the town was swept away in the attendant tidal-wave and the Diana was seriously damaged. The Russians attempted to sail the vessel round the Izu peninsula to Heda, where she could be repaired, but the Diana sank in a storm and the Russians were forced to take refuge on land.

The spirit of co-operation engendered by shared hardships in the aftermath of the earthquake flowed over into the official negotiations between the Russians and Japanese, and, when the Treaty of Shimoda was eventually concluded between the two countries in January 1855, it went beyond the treaties signed with the Americans and the British. <sup>26</sup> The Kurile Islands were divided, Iturup and islands to the south being given to the Japanese, while Russia was to control Urup and the islands to the north. Sakhalin was to be left in joint possession until the situation there could be considered more closely. Three ports, Shimoda, Hakodate and Nagasaki, were opened to Russian ships, and provision was made for the appointment of a consul at either Shimoda or Hakodate.

With no ship, however, Putiatin and his men faced considerable difficulty in returning to Russia. One group managed to reach Petropavlovsk on an American schooner, but the majority of the *Diana*'s crew was intercepted by a British warship while making for Russia on a German merchant vessel, and taken to England as prisoners-of-war. Putiatin himself, together with a proportion of the crew, was able to leave Japan on the *Heda*, a small ship built by the Russians and named after its place of construction, and to slip through the Anglo-French cordon to the Amur. Co-operating with the Russians on the building of the *Heda*, incidentally, had provided the Japanese with valuable experience in Western shipbuilding techniques.<sup>27</sup>

Discussions on trade continued in the years immediately following the conclusion of Putiatin's mission. Konstantin Pos'et, an officer who had sailed with Putiatin, travelled back to Shimoda in October 1856 to ratify the initial treaty. In 1857 Putiatin himself returned to Japan, where he negotiated a supplementary agreement in Nagasaki, and later visited Shimoda en route to Kanagawa. From here he travelled the short distance overland to Edo, the first Russian to do so, for the completion of a more comprehensive agreement which was signed in August 1858, opening further ports and regulating Russian residence and trade. Post of the completion of a more comprehensive agreement which was signed in August 1858, opening further ports and regulating Russian residence and trade.

In the years immediately following the signing of the treaties, the nature of Russian visits gradually began to change. In 1858, after conveying Putiatin to Shanghai, the frigate *Askol'd* returned for extensive repairs to Nagasaki, where the crew remained for several months, preparing the way for the later development of the Russian 'village' of Inosa. When, the following year, Nikolai Murav'ev-Amurskii brought three Russian ships to Kanagawa, his purpose was to negotiate for Russian control of Sakhalin in order to secure increasingly important interests on the Amur River, but although his rather clumsy approach failed to resolve the border issue, many Russians on the expedition now had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with Japan's capital. The main centre of Russian activity in Japan, however, was Hakodate, where a consulate was established in 1858.<sup>30</sup>

While there was much good will from the Japanese towards the Russians and other foreigners in the early period of foreign settlement, after the treaties had been signed, increased contact was not without its difficulties.

Western high-handedness a led to episodes such as the even the murder of Russi Chapter 5). Moreover, in th frustration on both sides or gold and silver was quite diff now trading. Russian trade of Russia was prohibited by the from Japan for its Siberian Russian centres of manu expensive in Japan until th Unlike some of the other W sides before and during the power in Japan passed from emperor, and it has been su prestige.32 Moreover, the fi with Putiatin, was a scholar r more socially acceptable to Russian influence, particu establishment of Russian Church, under the energetic in Hakodate and later in Ed one which has lasted to the and Hakodate became imp merchant shipping,35 and co enhanced by a telegraph cal laid in 1871, with an extens Russian government represe

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Western high-handedness and anti-Western feeling among some Japanese led to episodes such as the harassment of Russians in the streets of Edo, or even the murder of Russian sailors in Yokohama (see Kornilov extract, Chapter 5). Moreover, in the area of commerce itself there was at first much frustration on both sides over the rate of exchange, as the relative value of gold and silver was quite different in Japan and the countries with which it was now trading. Russian trade did not in fact develop very quickly, partly because Russia was prohibited by the commercial treaty of 1858 from importing grain from Japan for its Siberian colonies, and partly because the distance from Russian centres of manufacture made Russian goods uncompetitively expensive in Japan until the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway.31 Unlike some of the other Western powers, Russia remained aloof from both sides before and during the Restoration Wars of 1868-9, in which political power in Japan passed from the shogun to a new elite acting in the name of the emperor, and it has been suggested that this policy generally enhanced their prestige.32 Moreover, the first consul, Iosif Goshkevich, who had travelled with Putiatin, was a scholar rather than a merchant, and was perhaps therefore more socially acceptable to the ruling Japanese samurai class.<sup>33</sup> Certainly, Russian influence, particularly in the north, increased rapidly, with the establishment of Russian schools and hospitals. The Russian Orthodox Church, under the energetic leadership of Father Nikolai (Ivan Kasatkin) first in Hakodate and later in Edo, succeeded in building a strong following, and one which has lasted to the present day.34 The warm water ports of Nagasaki and Hakodate became important wintering places for Russian naval and merchant shipping,35 and communications between the two countries were enhanced by a telegraph cable between Nagasaki and Vladivostok which was laid in 1871, with an extension to Tokyo completed in 1873. A permanent Russian government representative in Tokyo was appointed in 1872.<sup>36</sup>

A particular stage in Russo-Japanese relations was reached in 1875, when, after several abortive attempts, the border question was finally brought to an amicable conclusion. Under the terms of the Sakhalin-Kurile Islands Exchange Treaty, signed in St Petersburg, Russia acquired sole rights over Sakhalin, while Japan received control over the whole of the Kurile archipelago.<sup>37</sup> After 1875, diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan continued on a stable basis as Japan concentrated on nation-building and Russia's attention was drawn away from the Far East by interests in the Balkans and Central Asia. A Japanese trade office was set up in Vladivostok in 1876 and the Russian communities in Hakodate and Nagasaki continued to thrive. Even an attempt on the life of the future Tsar Nicholas II during a visit to Japan in 1891 failed to do any serious damage in the short term. During the 1890s, however, both Russia and Japan were pursuing military, political and commercial interests on the East Asian mainland, and the two countries eventually began to clash openly, with Korea and Manchuria as the points of contention.38

The first major crisis followed Japan's victory over China in the Sino-

Japanese War of 1894-5. In this war, Japan eliminated China as a rival for power in Korea, and as well as a substantial indemnity gained control of two important Chinese territories: the island of Taiwan and the Liaodong peninsula in Manchuria. However, Russia acted to protect its own interests in Manchuria and, backed by France and Germany, forced Japan through the socalled Triple Intervention of 1895 to give back the Liaodong peninsula in exchange for an increased indemnity. Resentment of the European powers and suspicion of Russian motives in Japan were only increased when in 1898 Russia demanded and received from the Chinese a twenty-five-year lease of the same territory, and proceeded to establish there a major commercial and naval presence, acquiring thereby virtual monopoly rights in southern Manchuria. Japan responded by a rapid expansion in military expenditure, and by the diplomatic suggestion that Russian interests in Manchuria could be acknowledged in exchange for a free hand for Japan in Korea. This proposal was rejected by the Russian government, and when Russian forces sent to Manchuria to quell the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 failed to withdraw, the Japanese became increasingly concerned. Negotiations on power-sharing in Manchuria and Korea continued over the next few years, but the more cautious figures in the Russian government were outmanoeuvred by the expansionist party and talks finally broke down at the end of 1903. In February 1904 Japan attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, declaring war a few days later.

The surprise Japanese attack on Port Arthur effectively neutralised the Russian fleet in the Pacific, and the most critical episodes of the Russo-Japanese War took place on land. The Japanese landed in Korea and first engaged the Russians on 1 May 1904 on the Yalu River as they prepared to cross into Manchuria. This was only the first of a series of encounters in which the Russians were forced to retreat. Port Arthur fell after a lengthy siege on 1 January 1905, and the Russian army, demoralised by poor leadership and the repercussions of the 1905 revolution, was fatally undermined in the massive Battle of Mukden, which began six weeks later. The final large-scale encounter was at sea. The Russian 'Second Pacific Squadron', sent from Europe under Admiral Rozhestvenskii in October 1904 to relieve Port Arthur, was outmanoeuvred and ignominiously sunk at the Battle of Tsushima when passing through the Korean Strait the following May.<sup>39</sup>

This first victory of an Asian over a European power bolstered Japanese prestige at home and throughout Asia and the world enormously, though by the end of the conflict Japan's resources were almost exhausted. Russia's ability to continue the war was also in question since, although the Russians had much greater reserves to draw on, their ability to exploit them had been undermined by domestic political disturbances. As a result, Japan easily obtained Russian acknowledgment of Japanese rights and interests in Korea, the military evacuation of Manchuria by both sides, and control of Port Arthur and the Russian-built South Manchurian Railway. After some negotiation, the Japanese also obtained control over the southern half of Sakhalin. The end of the war was greeted by civil unrest in both countries. Strong feeling that

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The Russo-Japanese War Japan moved towards compl consolidated its presence in so Balkan crises of 1908–13, larg diplomatic activity on Europe relations, and the two countr and 1916 aiming to delineate This newly negotiated relational alliance of the two countries support further Japanese exceptions. The new rapproche training to the revolution of the two countries supports further Japanese exceptions. The new rapproche training to the revolution of the two countries supports further Japanese exceptions.

#### Narratives of discovery

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Japan had been cheated of the full fruits of victory, and particularly a cash indemnity, led to riots in Tokyo and elsewhere, while, in Russia, revolutionary strikes and demonstrations were accompanied by a mutiny in the Manchurian army as its disaffected troops returned to Europe.

The Russo-Japanese War changed the balance of power in East Asia as Japan moved towards complete control over Korea (annexed in 1910) and consolidated its presence in southern Manchuria. Russia, particularly with the Balkan crises of 1908–13, largely withdrew from East Asia to concentrate its diplomatic activity on Europe. However, both sides were anxious to stabilise relations, and the two countries signed a series of agreements between 1907 and 1916 aiming to delineate clearly their respective spheres of influence.40 This newly negotiated relationship of mutual respect was reinforced by the alliance of the two countries in the First World War, when Russia agreed to support further Japanese expansion into China in exchange for military supplies. The new rapprochement was terminated only by the collapse of the tsarist government in the revolutions of 1917.

### Narratives of discovery

The narratives chosen for inclusion in the present anthology fall into two unequal groups. Before the Treaty of Shimoda, Russian accounts of Japan were very largely confined to descriptions of official meetings. They constitute attempts to break into a relatively unknown, relatively closed world, and to describe this largely unfamiliar world for the instruction and, especially with the later accounts, the entertainment of a Russian audience. They often contain detailed geographical and ethnographical descriptions intended to satisfy both scientific and commercial curiosity in Russia, but also focus on what is different about Japan, highlighting 'exotic' cultural practices or habits of thought. The Russian gaze on Tokugawa Japan was necessarily limited, however. The Japanese whom Russians encountered were overwhelmingly government officials of one sort or another. Moreover, because they were for the most part the records of official government expeditions aimed directly or indirectly at initiating trade relations, the early narratives cannot avoid incorporating, alongside the negotiation of cultural difference, a conscious or unconscious desire to appropriate Japan both economically and ideologically. This factor varies in importance from one text to another, but, as will be shown below, is something that can never be ignored.<sup>41</sup> The early period of Russian travel writing about Japan is represented here by Laxman's journal of his 1792–3 expedition, Krusenstern's account of Rezanov's embassy of 1804–5, Golovnin's narrative of his captivity in Japan, 1811-13, and Goncharov's memoir of the initial stages of Putiatin's expedition in 1853.42

Looking at these early Russian narratives it is immediately apparent that the 'contact zone' between the European subject and the Asian focus of observation is extremely narrow.<sup>43</sup> This is true in a double sense: prior Russian knowledge of Japan at the time of the expeditions was extremely limited, and

moreover the degree to which the members of the expeditions were able to form a coherent view of Japanese society was also very severely restricted. At the time of Laxman's voyage, only two recent works on Japan existed in European languages, both written by foreigners in service with the Dutch: Engelbert Kaempfer, who had lived in Japan between 1690 and 1692, and Carl Thunberg, who visited in 1775. Laxman's own account, which was not published until the twentieth century, does not appear to have been available to any of his immediate successors. By the time of Rezanov's embassy, Kaempfer's and Thunberg's accounts were respectively over 110 and thirtytwo years out of date, a point which Krusenstern makes with some force, noting the absence of any accounts of Japan by the Dutch themselves.44 A handful of other accounts did in fact exist, including one by Benyovszky and compilations based on earlier Jesuit sources, but Kaempfer and Thunberg were easily the most authoritative and influential.45 Kaempfer's book in particular, following its first, posthumous, publication in 1727, proved enormously popular and exercised a very considerable influence over European writing on Japan for the next two hundred years.46

Golovnin took Krusenstern's published account of his experiences with him on the Diana, though he notes with some regret that at the time of his capture he had not read the second part of the work.47 This might indeed have been of particular interest to him as it records Krusenstern's encounters with Japanese and Ainu in Ezo on his return trip to Russia from Nagasaki. Goncharov, writing some forty years later, had a slightly richer store of information to draw on in Golovnin's narrative of his captivity and his volume of observations on the country and its people. Moreover, another foreign scholar working with the Dutch, the German Philip Franz von Siebold, published a description of Japan in 1832, based on his residence at Nagasaki between 1823 and 1830.48 Goncharov may also have been familiar with the memoir of Isaac Titsingh, head of the Dutch merchants from 1780 to 1794, whose account of his experiences in Japan was published posthumously in English and French in the early 1820s.49 Even with these expanded resources, however, Russian knowledge of the country at the time of the Putiatin expedition was far from either comprehensive or up to date. Russian ignorance is illustrated by Goncharov even as Putiatin's ships entered Nagasaki harbour. The Russians noticed small model sailing boats on the water decorated with multicoloured pennants, but were quite unable to determine their significance. Goncharov reports that according to his companions the boats were associated variously with religious rites, superstitious customs, divination, or simply children's play. 50 Japanese knowledge of the Russians, of course, was no more advanced. When Rezanov and his companions called at northern Ezo on their return voyage to Russia, the Japanese they met there refused at first to believe that they were indeed Russians as their hair was not dressed in the queues that had been fashionable at the time of Laxman's visit twenty years before.51

As far as first-hand contact with Japanese people and customs was concerned, the accounts by Krusenstern and Goncharov were confined almost

entirely to official receptions a matters and details concerning Krusenstern, indeed, explicitly account of Japan at all after a Goncharov makes the same poprisoner's diary, so little oppor around him. <sup>53</sup> No members of overnight on land and, althoughouse on land, casual contact impossible by his Japanese guathe Dutch at Nagasaki was pre Rezanov were visited by reprethis initial meeting all contacts notes that the sailors on the D Batavia, were not even permitted.

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entirely to official receptions and banquets and to communication on official matters and details concerning the reprovisioning or repair of their ships. Krusenstern, indeed, explicitly states he is unable to give any satisfactory account of Japan at all after six months' residence in Nagasaki harbour.52 Goncharov makes the same point when he notes that his account reads like a prisoner's diary, so little opportunity does he have to interact with the world around him.53 No members of Putiatin's expedition were allowed to stay overnight on land and, although Rezanov fifty years earlier had been given a house on land, casual contact with Japanese citizens had been rendered impossible by his Japanese guards. Even the collection of information from the Dutch at Nagasaki was prevented. On Krusenstern's first arrival he and Rezanov were visited by representatives of the Dutch settlement, but after this initial meeting all contacts were forbidden by the Japanese. Krusenstern notes that the sailors on the Dutch ships, as they left Nagasaki harbour for Batavia, were not even permitted to return the Russians' shouted greetings.<sup>54</sup>

Laxman and Golovnin of course spent considerably longer in Japan than either Krusenstern or Goncharov, and Golovnin in particular was able to meet a somewhat larger range of people. At Nemuro, Laxman spent several months in close contact with the Japanese officials who came there to meet him and he was able to observe their life at close hand, but Nemuro was a small trading outpost, not a town, and the circumstances of Laxman's interaction with the Japanese there were confined, hardly providing typical illustrations of Japanese life. After he left Nemuro, Laxman's contacts with Japanese in Hakodate and Matsumae were even more closely controlled and still limited to officialdom. He was not allowed to walk through the town streets, and when the Russians passed through villages as they travelled overland to Matsumae, although they were formally greeted by the local elders, they had no opportunity for real contact with the villagers. 55 Golovnin perhaps managed to establish strong personal relationships with a wider range of the population – not just officials, but also interpreters and guards. He notes a high degree of interest in the Russians from the wider population and records many unexpected acts of hospitality. For example, while being transported, bound, as required by Japanese law, from one part of Ezo to another, the Russians would be given refreshments by the inhabitants of the villages through which they passed and were thus allowed at least glimpses of Japanese domestic behaviour. As it was forbidden for the Japanese to receive foreigners inside their houses, the Russians were accommodated on the verandahs. An official fiction was maintained that they were forced to rest wherever they could because of fatigue from their journey, but they generally found that lavish refreshments had been prepared in advance. 56 Golovnin several times notes a similar insistence on the letter of the law combined with a willingness to circumvent its harsher implications in practice. Nevertheless, his most extensive observations were naturally of the different categories of prison in which he and his companions were held.

A further limitation to the 'contact zone' was produced in some cases by the

inadequacy of the available interpreters, which stands as a metaphor for a more general failure of cultural communication, though some of the expeditions were better prepared than others in this respect. Laxman brought with him one of the students from the Japanese language school in Irkutsk, Egor Tugolukov. Judging from Laxman's journal, his skills in Japanese seem to have been broadly adequate to the task, though the fact that Laxman sent him regularly to the Matsumae officials for language instruction suggests that communication was not always entirely smooth.<sup>57</sup> It was a different matter with the Kurile language. Although the merchant Shabalin knew some Kurile, his knowledge was evidently insufficient for any sustained interaction, and Laxman gives this as a major reason for his inability to provide a detailed account of the Ainu.58 Although the Japanese at Nagasaki were known to have Dutch interpreters, Rezanov's embassy apparently did not contain anyone who was fully conversant with Dutch.59 The Russians were forced to rely on the Japanese castaways they had brought with them and on the Russian these castaways had learned in exile. Written communication was even more problematic. Rezanov had brought with him a document addressed to the shogun, the Japanese military ruler, written in Russian and Japanese. The Japanese text, which had been produced by a castaway fisherman in Irkutsk, proved unintelligible to the Japanese officials and the Russians were obliged laboriously to produce a Dutch translation.60

Goncharov does not highlight any difficulty in interpretation, as Putiatin's expedition of 1853 had taken the precaution of bringing a Dutch speaker in the person of Pos'et.61 Golovnin, on the other hand, who had not expected to enter into any form of negotiation or explanation with the Japanese, found himself in some embarrassment. Eventually he was able to teach sufficient Russian to a Japanese volunteer, and to learn a certain amount of Japanese himself. In the early stages of his imprisonment, however, the only way he could communicate with his captors was through two Kurile interpreters, one of whom spoke broken Russian and the other broken Japanese. As neither of the Kuriles was at all well educated and the Kurile language was both unwritten and apparently lacking in terms adequate to convey complex scientific or administrative matters (or at any rate the particular Kuriles on whom Golovnin was forced to rely did not know such terms), this process proved extremely frustrating and time-consuming. Additional complications were caused by the necessity of avoiding certain common words that the interpreters did not know, and by the fact that foreigners were prohibited by law from learning the Japanese writing system. 62 Preparing written documents was particularly onerous until the Russians managed to convince the Kurile-Japanese interpreter that word order need not be identical in Russian and Japanese. 63 As, for example, unlike in Russian, Japanese verbs normally come at the end of the sentence and the equivalent of prepositions routinely follow the words they govern, the difficulty of achieving identical word order should not be underestimated. Krusenstern notes a similar concern among Japanese officials for formal precision in written communication. When Rezanov

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difficulty in interpretation, as Putiatin's ecaution of bringing a Dutch speaker in he other hand, who had not expected to r explanation with the Japanese, found entually he was able to teach sufficient I to learn a certain amount of Japanese iprisonment, however, the only way he vas through two Kurile interpreters, one ne other broken Japanese. As neither of ed and the Kurile language was both n terms adequate to convey complex or at any rate the particular Kuriles on lid not know such terms), this process e-consuming. Additional complications iding certain common words that the fact that foreigners were prohibited by system. 62 Preparing written documents sians managed to convince the Kurileneed not be identical in Russian and Russian, Japanese verbs normally come ivalent of prepositions routinely follow fachieving identical word order should otes a similar concern among Japanese tten communication. When Rezanov

wished to present a report to the shogun, as well as a translation into Dutch, the Nagasaki authorities required a copy of the Russian text 'written with such accuracy that every line was to terminate with the same letter as the original'.<sup>64</sup>

A further difficulty with interpretation noted by Golovnin resulted from the fact that the political motivations of the Russians and the Kurile interpreters were not always identical. In one instance, in the explanation of certain actions, one of the interpreters chose to exculpate himself in the eyes of the Japanese by falsely accusing the Russians of anti-Japanese intentions, an implication that Golovnin was very anxious to dispel. It was thus very difficult for the Russians to know at first whether their words were being deliberately distorted by the interpreter.<sup>65</sup>

Russian visits to Japan in the first half of the nineteenth century were for the most part pacific. They were at the same time coercive in the sense that the visitors would simply not accept as legitimate the wish of the Japanese government to keep their country closed to Europeans. It is often possible to see this double-edged motivation embodied in the discourse of Russian exploration in narrative strategies that seek to construct a picture of the benignity of the European subject even as they strive to assert its authority and the superiority of European values.66 On the one hand, Laxman's, Krusenstern's and Golovnin's narratives belong to an established category of travel writing by military or naval officers, which was read at the time as much for its plain accounts of everyday life in remote parts of the world as for either its sensationalism or its social analysis.<sup>67</sup> In Laxman's journal, there are certainly reflections of his repeated frustration at the obstacles put in his way by Japanese officialdom, but his practice is to note cultural phenomena which he evidently identifies as 'other' without comment. However, in the accounts of the two later diplomatic missions, which were attended by much greater expectations on the part of the Russian ambassadors, appropriative strategies are also clearly apparent. The Laxman permit carried by Rezanov certainly gave Krusenstern some expectation that his 1804 mission would be favourably received. Yet rather than treat the Japanese on terms of equality, his narrative persistently interprets Japanese difference as an assertion of hostility. He takes great exception, for example, to the Japanese style of formal salutation (touching one's head to the ground from a prone position) and especially to the compromise adopted by the Dutch, consisting of a right-angled bow held until permission was given to straighten up, which he describes as degrading.68 Krusenstern reads Japanese security measures, such as impounding the Russians' gunpowder and firearms, and severely restricting their movements, both in Nagasaki harbour and on land, as insults, though in fact Rezanov had been afforded a favour unprecedented even among European nations, as Krusenstern himself acknowledges, when he was allowed to take an armed guard with him on shore.69 Bureaucratic delays caused by procedural inflexibility, complex divisions of responsibility and the necessity of referring decisions to the shogun at Edo are also routinely interpreted as deliberately obstructive. While complaining of the mistrustfulness he sees in Japanese

Goncharov's more literary treatment of Japan shows a more nuanced approach to the understanding of cultural difference, but one that is equally dependent on an 'orientalist' frame of reference. He is an acute observer of the complex negotiations on matters of protocol designed to protect the dignity of both sides. Where should meetings be held? What refreshments should be offered? Should chairs be provided for the Russians? If so who should provide them? Should the Russians remove their boots in Japanese interiors? But perhaps because he was not himself a diplomat, Goncharov remains personally detached from any of these niceties and persistently asserts that beneath the surface effects of cultural difference the Japanese are identical to the Russians, or nearly so. He recognises, for example, a familiar type of an old man in the kindly and intelligent demeanour of one of the envoys from Edo and acknowledges a standard of civilisation in the Japanese, to which, apart from a few details of manners and dress, Europeans could take no exception.71 In several lengthy digressions Goncharov shows himself quite sensitive to the political complexities underlying Japanese attitudes to the West, and in particular to the difficulty of achieving modernisation or change within the existing political and administrative framework. 72 Elsewhere, he is at pains to explain and justify certain Japanese cultural practices which may seem strange to the European eye - such as the custom of bowing from a kneeling position or removing one's shoes on entering a building - in terms of the broader context of Japanese customs and social relations.73 At the same time, however, there is a sense in which Goncharov treats Japan as not quite belonging to the real world. Almost his first mention of the country is as 'tridesiatoe gosudarstvo', as a 'far-off land' in the expression used in Russian folklore to indicate a magical kingdom.74 Japan is called 'a locked casket whose key is lost'.75 The Russians and the Japanese are the fox and the stork in Aesop's fable, each unable to function within the other's terms of reference.76 The Japanese officials are 'porcelain dolls' whose thinking cannot be penetrated; their behaviour is a 'magical ballet', 'a scene taken from some fantastic ballet or opera', which Goncharov is watching from the stalls of the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow and in the reality of which he is unable to believe.77

Goncharov treats Japanese behaviour with the devastating irony that he was accustomed to direct at other subjects in his fiction. True, Goncharov mocks Russian inability to cope with Japanese customs as well, but such comments as the following, on the imminent breakdown of the seclusion policy, show that irony can easily be used as an instrument of political self-interest. To Goncharov the Japanese are like children: pursuing their

seclusion policy, they have and lack of wisdom. They m out of their impasse:

Like a playground intri with the appearance of help. There is nothing f guilty, we are childre guidance of their elders

A similar paternalism is in of Nagasaki harbour. He unmediated presence of na attributes of nineteenth-cer

[...] in my thoughts I c cottages, pavilions and ships and thickets of a already saw paths thro the city I imagined Rus

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If Goncharov can be patronising account of the 3 deal more penetrating an impatience with the intrusi he is subjected during his i importunate requests mad writing on fans. 83 He is at the

other travellers, is quick to point out th provisions and materials for necessary is narrative omits events which indicate for example, the episode related by the ecompanied the Rezanov expedition, in iselves by making a paper hot air balloon, sly over the town.70

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seclusion policy, they have got out of their depth through their inexperience and lack of wisdom. They must look now to European instructors to find a way out of their impasse:

Like a playground intrigue, [the seclusion policy] has collapsed instantly with the appearance of the teacher. [The Japanese] are alone, without help. There is nothing for them to do but break out in tears and say 'we are guilty, we are children' and like children put themselves under the guidance of their elders.78

A similar paternalism is indicated by Goncharov's reaction to the scenery of Nagasaki harbour. He feels uncomfortable with what he sees as the unmediated presence of nature and wants to tame it by introducing all the attributes of nineteenth-century European civilisation:

[...] in my thoughts I covered all these hillocks and groves with temples, cottages, pavilions and statues, and the waters of the harbour with steamships and thickets of masts; I populated the shores with Europeans; I already saw paths through a park, galloping horsewomen, and closer to the city I imagined Russian, American and English factories.79

He is offended that the Japanese do not know how to use Nagasaki 'properly'. If it was taken away from them, he asserts, the city could become a great and bustling port in the European style.80

The reasoning behind Goncharov's thinking here can be understood more clearly by reference to Fregat Pallada as a complete work, as a comparative interpretation of the peoples of the globe seen on a world tour. In his travelogue as a whole Goncharov is ruled by a conception of progress and civilisation based firmly on European models and strongly linked with Christianity. Goncharov consistently views the different nations he encounters in terms of their 'age' on a scale of their development towards civilisation. If the English, with their highly developed industrial society and commercial instincts, are indisputably 'adult', and the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands are seen as subsisting in 'childlike' innocence, the Japanese occupy an intermediate stage. While in many ways they are 'children', nevertheless the openness of many individuals to learning from the West suggests that they may in time emerge from their mental 'torpor' and, with suitable guidance, achieve equal maturity with Western nations.81

If Goncharov can be accused of presenting a superficial and often patronising account of the Japanese, Golovnin's work has been seen as a good deal more penetrating and serious.82 On occasion he admits to a natural impatience with the intrusive and apparently gratuitous questioning to which he is subjected during his imprisonment, and he objects, for example, to the importunate requests made of the Russians for souvenir specimens of handwriting on fans. 83 He is at the same time deeply impressed by the politeness of

his Japanese captors and strives hard to understand their motivations and laws, even when these seem considerably at odds with European values and practices.84 Yet even Golovnin, for all his sympathy with the Japanese, is not entirely immune to the 'orientalism' of his times, as can be seen from his actions before his capture. Proceeding circumspectly about his task of charting the southern Kurile Islands, Golovnin landed on Iturup, disingenuously claiming that he expected to meet there only Kuriles, though he must surely have realised that the islands were under Japanese control. 85 After an interview with the local Japanese commander, Golovnin was given permission to proceed to the town of Urbich to replenish his supplies. Golovnin notes that he deliberately concealed his true reason for being on Iturup (that is, surveying) on the grounds that the Japanese would be certain to treat it with suspicion, 86 and instead of going to Urbich as instructed turned south with the intention of surveying Kunashir and the strait between that island and Ezo. Golovnin's arrest, even if there is some question of the extent to which it was officially sanctioned, would seem a natural consequence of his flouting of Japanese laws regarding foreign shipping.

One particular feature of Golovnin's narrative is his exposure, as here, of his conscious deception of the Japanese on certain issues. Knowing that the Japanese had a great thirst for knowledge about the West and that they were liable to ask innumerable supplementary questions if given any information at all, he deliberately gave misleading answers on some topics and concealed the true content of a particular technical book in his possession to avoid possibly days of translation and explanation.<sup>87</sup> He exaggerated the number of sailors under his command, and on several occasions he deliberately provided mistranslations of documents which he thought might prove prejudicial to the Russians' chance of release. In particular, Golovnin was concerned to dissociate himself and the Russian government from the attacks made by Khvostov and Davydov in 1807. In distorting the meaning of various papers Golovnin was of course acting in his own personal interests; he was also attempting to increase the likelihood of an eventual trading relationship with the Japanese.

#### Travellers and tourists

After the Treaty of Shimoda, the number of Russians visiting Japan increased rapidly; visitors came from a wider variety of backgrounds; they visited a wider range of places; and they were there for different purposes. Hakodate and Nagasaki remained the major focuses of Russian attention, but Russians visited many other parts of Japan as well. Their gaze was broader and better informed, and the 'contact zone' became ever larger as the nineteenth century progressed. The range and quantity of available writing on Japan grew quickly as visitors from many nations published their accounts. The nature of the 'other' as reflected in travel narratives also changed. While foreigners by no means became acquainted with the whole of Japanese society, the Japanese

people whom the Russian servants, members of an isc foreigners and kept them at increasingly and unavoidal and other private individua basis. The largely male wor female entertainers, tempordinary women. The Russ but an economic and increasin short were now in a diffe travel writing continues to a Japan, there is a new, refle on the travellers themselve.

The texts presented here period, show something of after the middle of the nine is represented by A. Korn Nikolai Murav'ev-Amursk 1850s shows the hostility th well as the determination possible.90 At a very early st as tourists, driven more by about their experiences tha Maksimov, for example, vi Amur region and China in doctor on board a ship tra adventure.91 By the 1890. considerably, and with th conditions of travel had bed journey which she made a 1890.92 The writer N. Gari Tokyo in 1898, and by 1913 part of an organised tour, more in a spirit of scientif also provides valuable insi the 1890s.94 Others again Vladimir Semenov, a nav Sasebo and Kyoto followir tone of these post-treaty bewilderment. On the who of Japan, to confirm wha improve their knowledge... by what they discover, fir understanding. Nothing in straightforward as they we

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people whom the Russians did meet were no longer chiefly officials and servants, members of an isolated bureaucratic world which was often wary of foreigners and kept them at arm's length. Russian visitors and residents came increasingly and unavoidably in contact with hotel managers, shopkeepers and other private individuals, and dealt with them on a personal and everyday basis. The largely male world seen by the early visitors was now enlivened by female entertainers, temporary 'wives', waitresses, shopgirls and other ordinary women. The Russians were no longer supplicants at Japan's door, but an economic and increasingly a cultural presence in Japan itself. Russians in short were now in a different sort of relationship with the Japanese. While travel writing continues to dwell on what is different from Russia or Europe in Japan, there is a new, reflexive interest in some writers in the effect of travel on the travellers themselves.89

The texts presented here, chosen from the many available from this later period, show something of the diversity of the Russian experience of Japan after the middle of the nineteenth century. The immediate post-treaty period is represented by A. Kornilov, a junior naval officer with the expedition of Nikolai Murav'ev-Amurskii. His account of Kanagawa and Edo in the late 1850s shows the hostility that foreigners met with at first in the treaty ports, as well as the determination of some of them to see as much of the country as possible. 90 At a very early stage Russians began to travel to Japan more or less as tourists, driven more by the imperatives of curiosity and the wish to write about their experiences than by the logic of government policy or trade. Sergei Maksimov, for example, visited Hakodate as part of a lengthy voyage to the Amur region and China in the late 1850s; and Ivan Zarubin took a position as doctor on board a ship travelling to Nagasaki in 1880 in a similar spirit of adventure.91 By the 1890s the number of such travellers had increased considerably, and with the development of steamships and railways the conditions of travel had become much easier. A. Cherevkova describes a train journey which she made alone with a small child from Tokyo to Nagoya in 1890.92 The writer N. Garin-Mikhailovskii visited Nagasaki, Yokohama and Tokyo in 1898, and by 1913 a group of Russians was already visiting Japan as part of an organised tour, as described by E. Kobiakova. 93 Some travelled more in a spirit of scientific enquiry, like the botanist Andrei Krasnov, who also provides valuable insights into life in the Russian colony at Nagasaki in the 1890s.44 Others again found themselves in Japan against their will, like Vladimir Semenov, a naval officer who was held as a prisoner-of-war in Sasebo and Kyoto following the Battle of Tsushima in 1905.95 The dominant tone of these post-treaty narratives is one of mingled expectancy and bewilderment. On the whole the writers are anxious to see whatever they can of Japan, to confirm what they have learned from their reading, and to improve their knowledge. At the same time, however, they are often puzzled by what they discover, finding it difficult to assimilate to their previous understanding. Nothing in Japan ever turns out to be quite as simple or as straightforward as they would like or as they expect and, like visitors from

other European countries, Russians conceptualise Japan in ways which are often contradictory or inconsistent.96

One thing on which the Russians universally agree is the beauty of the countryside and gardens. Kornilov, who is impressed by little else in Edo. notes particularly the city's fine views and terraces. 97 Maksimov enthuses at the view across Hakodate Bay, while Zarubin and Garin-Mikhailovskii similarly delight at the restful visual charms of Nagasaki.98 The botanist Krasnov describes 'spectacular panoramas' from the Nagasaki cliffs and a 'phosphorescent light' giving a picturesque appearance to the harbour at night; for Kobiakova the night-time scenery of Gifu is 'mysterious and enchanting'.99 Cherevkova refers to a 'kaleidoscope full of enchanting pictures' glimpsed from her train window, and even Semenov, whose time in Japan was spent largely in confinement, refers to the 'singular beauty' of the countryside through which he passes in the train taking him to Kvoto.100 Appreciation of Japanese scenery is often validated by favourable comparison with tourist destinations in Europe, especially Switzerland or Italy.<sup>101</sup>

Another point on which there is general agreement is the organisational ability of the Japanese and their rapid success in modernisation. While in 1860 Maksimov can admire the single-mindedness of labour directed to levelling a hill outside Hakodate in order to construct houses for the Russian and British consuls, 102 later writers are impressed by the introduction of Western scientific technology. Zarubin in 1880 remarks on the newly constructed modern Nagasaki dockyard; Cherevkova is astonished to discover electric light in Nagoya in 1890; Garin-Mikhailovskii, a railway engineer himself by training. finds the 'progress and imagination' informing Japanese railway engineering greatly superior to the state of affairs prevailing in Russia in the 1890s. 103

Equally, there is a consensus that Japan is 'strange', and by implication inferior to a supposed standard of European normality. The most extensive statement of this view comes from Maksimov, who, even before he has landed at Hakodate, scans the town in vain through his telescope looking for points of comparison with towns, either European or Asian, in the Russian empire. He finds no cathedrals, no minarets, not even any houses of a form he recognises, and the cognitive disjunction which this represents forms a major structural principle of his narrative. Led by an anonymous guide who is presumably an early Russian resident in the town, Maksimov and his companions pass through Hakodate finding streets with no recognisable buildings, an apparent pantomime which is revealed to be a formal greeting between two officials, a dog that doesn't bark at strangers. All of these things are presented like wonders at a Russian fairground. 104 Other writers consistently express surprise and often disapproval at the circumstances of everyday Japanese life. Food is a frequent stumbling block: Kornilov, for example, limits himself to the unlikely combination of shrimps and water melon in preference to any other dishes; Semenov is particularly scathing about his captors' attempts to feed their Russian prisoners in an acceptable style; even the normally enthusiastic Kobiakova finds Japanese sweets inedible and clearly treats her bento packed

lunch with suspicion.105 C. Japanese-style hotel, rathe ally obtains a room. 106 Gar and Western dress he sees scene in a madhouse.107

Japan not only defeats F Russia and Europe, but al East Asia, gleaned from v Maksimov, Japan is a sort ugly exterior, while in his inner corruption. 108 Severa Chinese and Koreans. 109

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lunch with suspicion. 105 Cherevkova is appalled at the idea of staying in a Japanese-style hotel, rather than the 'half-European' one where she eventually obtains a room. 106 Garin-Mikhailovskii finds the eclectic mix of Japanese and Western dress he sees in a Japanese crowd disturbing, comparing it with a scene in a madhouse.107

Japan not only defeats Russian travellers' expectations in comparison with Russia and Europe, but also fails to tally with their broader conceptions of East Asia, gleaned from visits to Singapore, Shanghai and other ports. For Maksimov, Japan is a sort of inverted Asia, inwardly attractive but with an ugly exterior, while in his view China is outwardly beautiful but conceals an inner corruption. 108 Several writers compare the Japanese favourably with the Chinese and Koreans. 109

When considering Japan's rapid modernisation in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Russians, like other Europeans, often make comparisons between Japan and the earlier history of their own countries. But while, for example, the British consul Rutherford Alcock found pre-Restoration Japan to be 'the living embodiment of a state of society which existed many centuries ago in the West, but has long passed away utterly', a feudal society that recalled the twelfth century in Europe, 110 for the Russians the points of reference in their own past were much more recent, and indeed came up to the present day. Maksimov, it is true, likens the structure of the Tokugawa state to that of medieval Russia, where the power of the grand prince, like that of the shogun, was limited by a complex network of feudal alliances with other princes.<sup>111</sup> However, he also sees parallels between Japan's 'backwardness' and the vestigial 'backwardness' of contemporary Russia vis-à-vis Western Europe and America. He sees the narrow, inconvenient streets of Hakodate as 'identical' to those of existing parts of Moscow that date back to the time of the Mongol occupation. He sees similarities between the ungainly, impractical, gaudily decorated junks in Hakodate harbour and the traditional river barges on the Volga. The practice of mixed bathing in Japan (which scandalised Kipling, for example, when he visited Japan in 1889) reminds Maksimov of both ancient Russia and present-day practice in the more remote of Russian country towns. 112 Similarly, Kornilov compares the hostility to strangers that he sees in Japan with the situation in Russia just two hundred years ago, and likens those Japanese princes who oppose change to the noble Miloslavskii and Lopukhin families who tried to block the reforms of Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century. 113 Zarubin also sees events in Japan as paralleling the transformation of Russia under Peter the Great, claiming that 'the Japanese see this prince [Peter] as the ideal statesman for all ages and for all people.'114 Writing seventeen years later, in 1898, Garin-Mikhailovskii is reminded of Russia in the 1860s, a time of major reform under Alexander II which included the emancipation of the serfs. Whereas change in Russia was embraced only by a small proportion of the Russian population, he argues, in Japan the spirit of reform has been internalised at all levels of society. 115 Notwithstanding Japan's 'otherness' in relation to Europe, the modernisation

of Japan in the Meiji period was often also seen as a model for social and economic development in Russia.

That Japan is never quite 'real' for Russian observers is suggested by their self-conscious reference to what could be called the 'tourist experience' from a surprisingly early date. The quest for an authentic Japanese experience is perhaps implicit in the invariant motifs of Russian and other European travel writing from the mid-nineteenth century onwards: shopping for traditional Japanese goods such as lacquerware, porcelain or silks; the Japanese meal; the traditional entertainment provided in a tea-house or private dwelling; the visit to a shrine or temple. It is also apparent in the comment of Kornilov's companion as his party is pursued by a mob through the streets of Edo:

Gentlemen [...] console yourselves like real tourists with the thought that this is a situation you will not often manage to find yourselves in. Any English lord would pay a lot of money for the right to be in our place, but you're getting the experience for free and still complaining.<sup>116</sup>

This is meant as a joke, certainly, but it underlines a clear feeling of difference, prefiguring the gushing account of Kobiakova some sixty years later, in 1913. Unlike the other writers, Kobiakova embraces everything Japanese with enthusiasm, even looking forward to the unaccustomed experience of sleeping on the floor. Yet at the same time as she claims 'it would be better to sit on the floor and feel definitively Japanese', in preference to using the European table and chairs provided, she shows an awareness that all this is play-acting when she talks of the "tourist" zeal' with which her group approaches a Japanese meal, and their 'considered "tourist" opinion' of what they have eaten. 117

Another aspect of the search for authentic experience can be seen in the interest of some writers in Japanese antiquities, as if the past were somehow more valid than the modernising present. A nostalgia for 'old Japan' is clearly seen, for example, in Zarubin's account of his tour of Nagasaki antique sellers looking for genuine 'old lacquer', and in his complaint that the Japanese have begun making everyday objects to Western taste: 'it has become very difficult to find anything original, purely Japanese, from the native way of life.'<sup>118</sup> A related yearning for the past is found in Krasnov's discussion in the 1890s of the well-established practice among a certain class of Japanese women at Inosa of hiring themselves out as temporary wives to visiting Russian sailors. Again the quality of experience has been vitiated by modernity, he reflects: with the coming of the age of steam the ships remain in harbour for much shorter periods and the 'marriages' have become a matter more of calculation than affection.<sup>119</sup>

As can be seen here, part of the Russian construction of Japan as different operates on a moral plane: Western notions of morality, like Western ideas of comfort and style, are supposed not to apply. On the one hand, Japan was seen as 'yellow peril', a popular idea taken up by Russian religious philosophers

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uthentic experience can be seen in the intiquities, as if the past were somehow ent. A nostalgia for 'old Japan' is clearly it of his tour of Nagasaki antique sellers in his complaint that the Japanese have stern taste: 'it has become very difficult nese, from the native way of life.' 118 A in Krasnov's discussion in the 1890s of a certain class of Japanese women at horary wives to visiting Russian sailors, een vitiated by modernity, he reflects: the ships remain in harbour for much become a matter more of calculation

sian construction of Japan as different tions of morality, like Western ideas of apply. On the one hand, Japan was seen up by Russian religious philosophers

from the 1890s onwards and refashioned into a perceived threat to Russia and to Christianity as a whole. 120 On the other hand, as portrayed in Pierre Loti's novel Madame Chrysanthème (Paris, 1887), a work widely known in Russia, the Japanese were seen as morally and intellectually inferior to Europeans, and for that reason were not to be taken seriously. The two perspectives are found intertwined in Russian travel narratives. Thus, Maksimov, for example, is offended by what he sees as Japanese callousness and indifference to human life at a public execution, which the crowd watches with a 'lifelessly insulting lack of emotion' as pedlars hawk snacks and cups of tea. 121 Writing specifically of relations between the sexes, Zarubin notes that 'morality, propriety and shame are understood in Japan quite differently from the way they are understood in Europe.' He coyly declines to elaborate, referring the knowing reader merely to the names of some apparently dubious dances with which he was entertained.122 Garin-Mikhailovskii alludes to similar spectacles in the 1890s, without admitting to being present himself. However, he also questions the received wisdom regarding Japanese immorality, which he finds at odds with his observation of the people around him: why, he asks, reflecting on the received wisdom that all Japanese women are venal, should someone like the bookshop assistant he meets sell her body when she is perfectly well able to earn her living from her profession? Yet at the same time he detects an air of frightening and impenetrable calculation in many Japanese faces, and fears that in spite of Japanese fervour for the benefits of European civilisation a strong hostility to the West remains, forty years after Putiatin and Perry. 123 Semenov, too, although he acknowledges the impeccable European-style manners of some of the Japanese officers he encounters, echoes this line of thought when he complains, for example, of the apparently studied boorishness of Major-General Okama. 124

On the other hand, and particularly by the 1890s, the Russian texts are also influenced by an aestheticised view of Japan, fed in part by the European vogue beginning in the 1860s for Japonisme in art. 125 In this vision everything about Japan is small, delicate and elegant, doll-like and above all again not to be taken seriously. In particular, femininity becomes the prime focus of the exotic gaze. This perspective, altogether missing from the earliest travel narratives, is perhaps foreshadowed in Goncharov's use of the term 'ballet' to describe the elaborate ceremonial of Japanese diplomatic hospitality, and in his characterisation of the Japanese as 'children'. 126 It was popularised particularly in Europe by Loti and by English-language writers such as Lafcadio Hearn and Basil Hall Chamberlain, who described Japan as a 'delicate little wonder-world of sylphs and fairies'.127 The Russians in this volume do not indulge in quite such flights of fancy, but similar lines of argument are discernible in several of the texts. There is great emphasis on Japanese neatness, for example, and Japanese men are often described as effeminate; Maksimov indeed asserts that it is impossible to tell men from women. 128 Kobiakova remarks on the extraordinary tidiness of Japanese farms and comments on the clumsiness and crudeness of European furniture in a Japanese room. In her account, too, the physical size of Russian people is seen as incompatible with life in Japan: their weight causes overheating in the axles of their railway carriage. 129 Garin-Mikhailovskii, although in fact he eventually comes to a more complex position as suggested above, refers to 'toy houses' in the landscape and explicitly notes that his first views of Japan were filtered through the lens of Loti's Madame Chrysanthème: 'these are not people, but figures, figurines of yellow ivory borrowed from the shelves of art galleries, models of people and their houses, the image of that sugary pink-tinted reality so often found in elegant albums of Japanese colour photography'. 130

Russian attitudes towards Japan in the late nineteenth century are inconsistent and contradictory, partly because of the difficulty of reconciling the peculiarities of Japanese culture and civilisation to a European mindset, partly because the changes that were taking place in Japan at that time were themselves complex and difficult to assimilate, and partly because the rapidity of Japanese modernisation reinforced an underlying insecurity in Russian writers about Russia's own place in the world and its social and economic backwardness vis-à-vis the West. It is this combination of tensions, however, which gives Russian travel writing of the period so distinctive a voice when compared to the narratives of other Europeans, and makes it so compelling, not only as a historical record, but also as a literary phenomenon.

#### Notes

1 The Travels of Marco Polo, trans. and introd. Ronald Latham, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958, p. 244. Parts of this introduction are due to appear in rather different form as David Wells, 'Early Russian Travel Writing on Japan', New Zealand Slavonic Journal, 2004, forthcoming.

2 See C. R. Boxer, The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650, Berkeley: University

of California Press, 1951.

3 For general surveys of Japanese relations with European countries, see G. B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan: a Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures, Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1977; W. G. Beasley, 'The Foreign Threat and the Opening of Japan', in Marius B. Jansen (ed.), The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 5, The Nineteenth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1989, pp. 259-307. 4 K. E. Cherevko, Zarozhdenie russko-iaponskikh otnoshenii XVII-XIX veka,

Moscow: Nauka, 1999, 14-21.

The following account of the early history of relations between Russia and Japan is drawn largely from George Alexander Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959 (hereafter RP); Esfir Fainberg, Russko-iaponskie otnosheniia v 1697-1875 gg., Moscow: Izd-vo vostochnoi lit-ry, 1960 (hereafter RO); and K. E. Cherevko, Zarozhdenie russko-iaponskikh otnoshenii XVII-XIX veka (hereafter ZRO). On early contact in the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin, see John J. Stephan, The Kurile Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974, pp. 36-50, 61-5, 73-80; John J. Stephan, Sakhalin: a History, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971, pp. 31-56. See also G. A. Lensen, Russia's Japan Expedition of 1852-1855, Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1955; Peter Kornicki, Castaways and Orientalists: the Russian Route to Japan in the Early Nineteenth Century, Venice: Università Ca' Foscari, 2001.

- 6 RP, 26-31; ZRO, 38-66.
- 7 RP, 46-60; RO, 21-32; ZR
- 8 RP, 60-71; RO, 32-6; ZRC
- 9 RP, 71-84; ZRO, 103-8. 10 RP, 84-95; RO, 36-40; ZR
- 11 In some sources Lovtsov's 12 RP, 96-120; RO, 52-64; Z.
- 13 RP, 121-2; RO, 68-70.
- 14 See Kornicki, Castaways ar
- 15 RP, 124-58; RO, 71-86; Z
- 16 ZRO, 160.
- 17 See RP, 177-96, on the inte time.
- 18 RO. 95.
- 19 RP, 158-76; RO, 96-103; 3
- 20 RP, 196-222; RO, 106-9;
- 21 RP, 223-46; RO, 109-12; 1
- 22 RP, 247.
- 23 V. M. Golovnin, Zapiski fl iapontsev v 1811, 1812 i iaponskom gosudarstve i na
- 24 RP, 243, 261-307; RO, 11 sion in the Amur region, Imagination and Geograp Cambridge: Cambridge U
- 25 RP, 308-18.
- 26 For the text of the Treaty
- 27 RP, 308-44; RO, 143-74;
- 28 For the text of the Treaty 29 RP, 344-54; RO, 174-8, 18
- RP. 484-94. 30 On Russian activity in Japa
- 31 See RP, 389-90, 421-4, Moscow: Nauka, 1988, pp
- 32 See RP, 451-2; ZRO, 199 33 RP, 388. On Goshkevich a
- Ivanova, Russkie v Iaponii 34 See Ivanova, Russkie v I Russkoi dukhovnoi missi religioznykh, kul'turnykh i XX vekakh: sbornik nauci
- Pravoslavnoi tserkvi, 1998 35 However, the naval fleet 199.
- 36 See ZRO, 201.
- 37 RP, 425-6; RO, 280-5. Fe
- 38 For a summary of Russ Sandra Wilson and David The Russo-Japanese W Macmillan, 1999, pp. 4-Status', in The Cambridge Iaponiia, pp. 217-31; Da Sun: Russian Ideologies

Northern Illinois Univer-

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6 RP, 26-31; ZRO, 38-66.

7 RP, 46-60; RO, 21-32; ZRO, 67-78, 83-99.

8 RP, 60-71; RO, 32-6; ZRO, 100-2.

9 RP, 71-84; ZRO, 103-8.

10 RP, 84-95; RO, 36-40; ZRO, 108-10.

11 In some sources Lovtsov's name is given as Grigorii.

12 RP, 96-120; RO, 52-64; ZRO, 111-34.

13 RP, 121-2; RO, 68-70.

14 See Kornicki, Castaways and Orientalists, pp. 19-22.

15 RP, 124-58; RO, 71-86; ZRO, 145-60.

16 ZRO, 160.

17 See RP, 177–96, on the internal debates in Japan about contact with Russia at this time.

18 RO, 95.

19 RP, 158-76; RO, 96-103; ZRO, 161-70.

20 RP, 196-222; RO, 106-9; ZRO, 170-1.

21 RP, 223-46; RO, 109-12; ZRO, 171-2.

22 RP, 247.

23 V. M. Golovnin, Zapiski flota kapitana Golovnina o prikliucheniiakh ego v plenu u iapontsev v 1811, 1812 i 1813 godakh, s priobshcheniem Zamechanii ego o iaponskom gosudarstve i narode, 3 vols, St Petersburg: V Morskoi tipografii, 1816.

24 RP, 243, 261–307; RO, 112–13; ZRO, 273–8. On the context of Russian expansion in the Amur region, see especially Mark Bassin, *Imperial Views: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840–1865*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

25 RP, 308-18.

26 For the text of the Treaty of Shimoda, see RP, 475-7.

27 RP, 308-44; RO, 143-74; ZRO, 186-92.

28 For the text of the Treaty of Nagasaki, see RP, 478-93.

29 RP, 344–54; RO, 174–8, 180–5; ZRO, 193–4. For the text of the Treaty of Edo, see RP, 484–94.

30 On Russian activity in Japan in the immediate post-treaty period, see RP, 355-424.

31 See RP, 389–90, 421–4, 487; ZRO, 201–3; L. N. Kutakov, Rossiia i Iaponiia, Moscow: Nauka, 1988, pp. 207–11.

32 See RP, 451-2; ZRO, 199, 200-1.

33 RP, 388. On Goshkevich and the early years of the Hakodate consulate, see G. D. Ivanova, *Russkie v Iaponii XIX-nachala XX v.*, Moscow: Nauka, 1993, pp. 24–44.

34 See Ivanova, *Russkie v Iaponii*, pp. 45–55; A. M. Bogoliubov, 'Pressa Rossii o Russkoi dukhovnoi missii v Iaponii (period Meidzi, 1867–1912 gg.)', in *Iz istorii religioznykh, kul'turnykh i politicheskikh vzaimootnoshenii Rossii i Iaponii v XIX–XX vekakh: sbornik nauchnykh trudov*, St Petersburg: Fond po izucheniiu istorii Pravoslavnoi tserkvi, 1998, pp. 69–82; RP, 400–16.

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36 See ZRO, 201.

37 RP, 425-6; RO, 280-5. For the text of the treaty, see RP, 501-4.

38 For a summary of Russo-Japanese competition in Manchuria and Korea, see Sandra Wilson and David Wells, 'Introduction', in D. Wells and S. Wilson (eds), The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904–05, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 4–9. See also Akira Iriye, 'Japan's Drive to Great Power Status', in The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 5, pp. 747–82; Kutakov, Rossiia i Iaponiia, pp. 217–31; David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan, DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001, pp. 111–95.

39 On the course of the Russo-Japanese War, see J. N. Westwood, Russia against Japan: a New Look at the Russo-Japanese War, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986; R. M. Connaughton, The War of the Rising Sun and the Tumbling Bear: a Military History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5, London: Routledge, 1988.

40 On rapprochement after the Russo-Japanese War, see V. A. Marinov, Rossila i Iaponiia pered mirovoi voiny (1905–14): ocherki istorii otnoshenii, Moscow: Nauka,

41 See Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation, London: Routledge, 1992.

42 The texts are cited here from the following editions: A. A. Preobrazhenskii, 'Pervoe russkoe posol'stvo v Iaponiiu', *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 1961, no. 4, pp. 113-48 (Laxman's journal (hereafter Laxman, *Journal*) is included as pp. 117-46 of this article); A. J. Krusenstern, *Voyage Round the World in the Years 1803*, 1804, 1805 & 1806, London: John Murray, 1813, vol. 1, pp. 251-87; V. M. Golovnin, *Memoirs of a Captivity in Japan*, 1811-1813, 3 vols, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1973; I. A. Goncharov, *Sobranie sochinenii v shesti tomakh*, Moscow: Gos. izd-vo khudozh. lit-ry, 1959, vol. 3, pp. 7-73, 115-55. Krusenstern's account was first published as *Puteshestvie vokrug sveta v 1803*, 4, 5, i 1806 godakh, 3 vols + atlas, St Petersburg: V Morskoi tipografii, 1809-13. Goncharov's memoir was originally published as *Russkie v Iaponii v kontse 1853 i v nachale 1854 godov (iz putevykh zametok*), St Petersburg: V Tipografii Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1855, and later included in his fuller memoir of his voyage, *Fregat Pallada: ocherki puteshestviia*, 2 vols, St Petersburg: A. I. Glazunov, 1858.

43 'Contact zone' is Pratt's term, defined as 'the space in which peoples geographic ally and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality and intractable conflict' (Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*, p. 6).

44 Krusenstern, Voyage, pp. 251-3.

45 In his memoir of the Rezanov expedition, the naturalist G. H. Langsdorff also bemoans the paucity of up-to-date material on Japan: see G. H. Langsdorff, Voyages and Travels in Various Parts of the World during the Years 1803, 1804, 1805, 1806, and 1807, 2 vols, London: H. Colburn, 1813–14, vol. 1, p. 203. He notes, however, the availability of works by Pierre-François-Xavier de Charlevoix, evidently his Histoire de l'établissement, des progrès et la décadence du Christianisme dans l'Empire du Japon, 3 vols, Rouen: J. J. Le Boullenger, 1715, and Histoire et description générale du Japon, 2 vols, Paris: J. M. Gandouin, 1736. An adaptation of this was still current in the 1840s: Histoire et description du Japon, d'après le P. Charlevoix, 4th edn, Tours: Ad. Mame, 1844. Earlier accounts by the Jesuit missionaries existed, and it seems that the Russian travellers consulted them, but these contained no information dating to later than 1638.

46 Kaempfer's work on Japan did not appear in his lifetime, but was first published, in English translation, in 1727 (E. Kaempfer, *The History of Japan*, trans. J. G. Scheuchzer, London: The Translator, 1727). Versions in other European languages appeared not long afterwards. For a brief account of the book's publication history and for notes on its reliability as a historical source and on ideological accretions in the first English translation, see E. Kaempfer, *Kaempfer's Japan: Tokugawa Culture Observed*, ed., trans. and annot. Beatrice M. Bodart-Bailey, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999, pp. 7–11, 20-1. Thunberg was published first in Swedish as *Resan til och uti kejsaredömet Japan* (vol. 3 of *Resa uti Europa*, *Africa*, *Asia*, *förrättad åren 1770–1779*, 4 vols, Upsala: J. Edman, 1788–93). It is likely that Krusenstern used the following French edition: Voyages de C. P. Thunberg au Japon par le Cap de Bonne-Esperance, les Isles de la Sonde, etc., 3 vols, Paris: B. Dandre, 1796.

47 Golovnin, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 10. The second volume of Krusenstern's memoir was

published in 1810, the third 1813 respectively.

48 Philip Franz von Siebold, Leyden: The Author, 1832. 1600–1853, Richmond, Suri

49 Isaac Titsingh, Mémoires e souverains du Japon, Paris, mann, 1822.

50 Goncharov, Sobranie sochin 51 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 2,

52 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 1,

53 Goncharov, Sobranie sochin 54 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 1,

55 Laksman, Journal, pp. 136,

56 Golovnin, Memoirs, vol. 1, 1 57 Laksman, Journal, p. 123. C

understood by the Japanese 58 Laksman, *Journal*, pp. 118,

59 Langsdorff, Voyages, vol. 1,

60 RP, 147; see Langsdorff, Vo

61 See Goncharov, Sobranie se 62 Golovnin, Memoirs, vol. 1, 1

63 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 227–31. S seem to have preferred as and translated texts, notwing while remaining intelligible 64 Krusenstern, *Voyages*, vol.

65 Golovnin, Memoirs, vol. 1,

66 This is Pratt's trope of 'an matter slightly differently, narrative produced is to a which the establishment of tation of difference' is of cr of Travel: from Marco Pole 1996, p. viii.

67 Andreas Schönle, Authenti 1840, Cambridge, Mass.: H

68 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 1

69 Krusenstern, Voyage, pp. 270 Langsdorff, Voyages, vol. 1

71 Goncharov, Sobranie sochi

72 Ibid., pp. 38-43.

73 Ibid., pp. 49–50. It has been of the exotic, contains a pioneered by Goethe and Milton Ehre, *Oblomov an* Princeton: Princeton Univ kova, *Ivan Aleksandrovich* fond, 1997, pp. 153–67.

74 Goncharov, Sobranie sochi

75 Ibid., p. 8.

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77 Ibid., pp. 44, 30; B. Eng krugosvetnogo plavaniia',

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49 Isaac Titsingh, Mémoires et anecdotes sur la dynastie régnante des Djogouns, souverains du Japon, Paris, 1820, and Illustrations of Japan, London: R. Ackermann, 1822.

50 Goncharov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, pp. 8-9.

51 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 2, p. 51. See also Golovnin, Memoirs, vol. 1, p. 142.

52 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 1, p. 253.

53 Goncharov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 56.

54 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 1, p. 256.

55 Laksman, *Journal*, pp. 136, 137.56 Golovnin, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, pp. 308–9.

57 Laksman, *Journal*, p. 123. Cf. RP, 43n, which states that Tugolukov could not be understood by the Japanese.

58 Laksman, Journal, pp. 118, 126.

59 Langsdorff, *Voyages*, vol. 1, pp. 231–2.60 RP, 147; see Langsdorff, *Voyages*, vol. 1, pp. 230, 234, 240.

61 See Goncharov, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 3, p. 30. 62 Golovnin, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, p. 227; vol. 2, p. 80.

63 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 227–31. See also vol. 2, pp. 116–17. The Japanese authorities seem to have preferred as close a correspondence as possible between original and translated texts, notwithstanding the difficulties of achieving such a result while remaining intelligible.

64 Krusenstern, Voyages, vol. 1, p. 256.

65 Golovnin, Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 176-7; see also p. 112.

66 This is Pratt's trope of 'anti-conquest': see Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*, p. 7. To put the matter slightly differently, in the terms proposed by Syed Manzurul Islam, the narrative produced is to a greater or lesser extent 'sedentary' travel writing in which the establishment of 'a vantage point from which to carry out a representation of difference' is of crucial importance. See Syed Manzurul Islam, *The Ethics of Travel: from Marco Polo to Kafka*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996, p. viii.

67 Andreas Schönle, Authenticity and Fiction in the Russian Literary Journey, 1790–1840, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 6–7.

68 Krusenstern, Voyage, vol. 1, pp. 261-2; see Langsdorff, Voyages, p. 232.

69 Krusenstern, *Voyage*, pp. 254–9. 70 Langsdorff, *Voyages*, vol. 1, p. 293.

71 Goncharov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, pp. 127, 19.

72 Ibid., pp. 38-43.

- 73 Ibid., pp. 49–50. It has been suggested that Fregat Pallada, with its constant denial of the exotic, contains a parody of the 'sentimental' style of travel writing pioneered by Goethe and espoused particularly in Russia by Nikolai Karamzin: Milton Ehre, Oblomov and his Creator: the Life and Art of Ivan Goncharov, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, pp. 142–53. See also Krasnoshchekova, Ivan Aleksandrovich Goncharov: mir tvorchestva, St Petersburg: Pushkinskii fond, 1997, pp. 153–67.
- 74 Goncharov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 7.

75 Ibid., p. 8.

76 Ibid., pp. 30, 46.

77 Ibid., pp. 44, 30; B. Engel'gardt (ed.), 'Putevye pis'ma I.A. Goncharova iz krugosvetnogo plavaniia', *Literaturnoe nasledstvo*, vol. 22–4, 1935, p. 397.

- 78 Goncharov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 41. See also RP, 343-4.
- 79 Goncharov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 124.
- 80 Ibid., p. 36.
- 81 For a detailed exegesis of this aspect of Fregat Pallada, see E. Krasnoshchekova Ivan Aleksandrovich Goncharov, pp. 134-220.
- 82 RP, 343-4.
- 83 Golovnin, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, pp. 147-9; see also pp. 62, 156.
- 84 E.g., ibid., vol. 1, pp. 117-18, 140, 186, 221, 242-3.
- 85 See ibid., vol. 1, pp. 18-20.
- 86 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 22.
- 87 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 169, 213-14.
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