School of Communication and Cultural Studies

The Accidental Thesis: Playing Go with Deleuze and Guattari

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This thesis uses a reading of Deleuze and Guattarian philosophies, drawn in the main from their companion texts Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, to explore ways in which popular cultural events and texts construct the way we think. The thesis explores how popular narrative produces the conditions for thinking in terms of a state(d) model of subject-identity, which narrates desire in terms of a desire for repression. Of particular concern is the danger this thinking has in constructing a populace conductive to the formation of social conditions marked by fascistic political practices. In considering this kind of thinking and its modes of construction, Deleuze and Guattari make a significant shift away from dominant theoretical analysis of power to argue that desire and the capture of desire are the primary agents of this kind of state control.

The thesis draws on a number of popular cultural mediums and events, working towards a particular exemplary focus on the social conditions in contemporary Australian society. Integrating dialogues with several other key theorists across a broad spectrum of cultural studies concerns, it concludes that this state model reproduces itself throughout history and within different historical and cultural formations as a repetition of minority desires controlling the majority populous through refrains that appropriate plurality and difference. Further, while collective social revolutionary movements have ultimately failed to overcome this repetition, the thesis suggests that Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of becoming through a molecular revolution, aimed at re-constructing the way we think ‘difference,’ remains as a positive hope for liberation.
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The Accidental Thesis.

I was inspired to title my thesis as ‘accidental’ when at the What’s Left of Theory? Cultural Studies Conference (Hobart: University of Tasmania, December, 2001), Frederic Jameson described Deleuze and Guattari as “accidental theorists.” Not because I follow Jameson’s line of reasoning, but because ‘accidental’ seemed to me an appropriate term for my own engagement with Deleuze and Guattari. My undergraduate degree was interdisciplinary in nature, involving a double major in Creative Writing and Cultural Studies; not philosophy. Only by accident, and not design, did a minor mention of the text Anti-Oedipus catch my interest and, coupled with my then unresolved distaste for Freudian theory, lead me to an engagement with Deleuze and Guattari.

From my Creative Writing background; an interest in post-modern and experimental language writing provided me with a confrontation of traditional reading habits. This afforded a preparedness to approach a text as an open, rather than closed, set of signifiers and an avenue into Deleuze and Guattari that I may otherwise not have had. From Cultural Studies; an approach to thinking about culture in terms of popular manifestations in every-day life, reading the political and social contexts relevant to the production of popular cultural texts, considering intertextual referencing between texts, and analysis of discourse and communications models all remain relevant to this thesis¹.

In short, I inherit a creative approach both to writing and thinking theory.

The ‘accident’ of this thesis brings together an approach derived from Cultural Studies together with philosophical constructions drawn from Deleuze and Guattari. In doing so, the intertextuality inherent in the Cultural Studies approach has become incorporative of the interdisciplinary approach in Deleuze and Guattari’s writing. The politics of difference that Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophies question often leads this thesis through both dialogue and confrontation with many of the theories associated with

¹ For a more detailed summary of the background influences in the development and growth of Cultural Studies, see Graeme Turner’s British Cultural Studies: An Introduction, 1990.
Cultural Studies. Approaches to reading the popular in Cultural Studies, for example, often become subject to the habit of reading popular sub-cultural motifs as forms of subversion against dominant political ideologies. In this thesis, this subversiveness is questioned (see chapter one) in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophies and the ‘popular’ is viewed in a less segmented sense, and rather more broadly in terms of its (re)production of ‘events’ and its machinic ability to manufacture, even through subversive representation, dominant forms of thinking.

**Background:**

In the collaboration of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari we see the coming together of two bodies of work that emerge from an alternative view of philosophy (Deleuze), and from a radicalisation of psychoanalytic practice (Guattari). Paul Patton describes Deleuze’s thought along the lines of a rejection of “the ideal of philosophy as a closed system” (1996, 3). Deleuze’s work has always been engaged in a process of re-constructing the boundaries of the philosophical tradition. Guattari was also involved in a form of re-construction, not in philosophy, but in the practice of psychiatric analysis. Kaufman describes Guattari as:

> a long-time political activist and a practicing analyst at the experimental psychiatric clinic La Borde [where he] brought theory and practice together in a virtually unparalleled fashion. (7)

The interface between Deleuze and Guattari brings together two bodies of work that both desire the formation of alternative modes of thought and practice to those that have been otherwise established in their corresponding disciplines. The result of this collaboration sees the creation of schizoanalysis, which they claim is another word for the practice of pragmatics.

In *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari critique the processes and ‘modelization’ of thought and subjectivity that they claim occurs in the various interpretative modes of psychoanalysis. In the companion piece, *A Thousand Plateaus*, they move away from this critique and construct a series of creative and new forms of analysis through concepts such as faciality; nomadism, the refrain, becoming-woman/animal/other/im-
perceptible, bodies without organs, rhizomes, molar/molecular lines, smooth and striated space, schizoanalysis, and many more new and/or re-constructed philosophical concepts.

Deleuze and Guattari argue from a perspective that might be considered radical constructionism. The reason they would be considered radical in respect to other concepts of constructionism is that, unlike theories such as Lacanian psychoanalysis, for example, they refuse to limit the concept of the constructed subject within a stable model. So, where Lacan argues that a subject’s unconscious is constructed as consequence of social development, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the conceptual understanding of the unconscious is itself the social construct in/of psychoanalysis. This ‘Oedipalized’ unconscious is structured in terms that come to reflect a model of dominance in that it maintains and repeats in a code of cause and effect where both individual and collective subjectivity is determined by a desire based in lack. And it is through the model of the unconscious that psychoanalysis states and re-states a thinking that always constructs in reflection of the lack residing within the subject, but which is actually producing, with each enunciation, a capturing from without. For Deleuze and Guattari, the unconscious is a factory and not the dramatic theatre of signifying links to some internal secret that can be unravelled on the couch of psychoanalysis. “Why,” they ask in *Anti-Oedipus*, “were expressive forms and a whole theatre installed there where there were fields, workshops, factories, units of production?” (298). The political dimension and critique of power in their work suggests that, because psychoanalysis is a model readily appropriated by and interpreted in and for the maintenance of a dominant class and its political interests, the theatre installed was/is and continues to be the means by which dominant political power inscribes ideologies as if timeless, natural and internal to each and every body subjected to the singularity of its dominating logic.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that there cannot be one singular signifying practice through which we can model an interpretation of social relations, but rather, that assemblages of signification are multiple and infinite. Different assembled relations produce different signifying practices that are often impenetrable to an interpretative mode that has been formulated on the assumption of a pre-modelled understanding of subjective and social formation. The aim of their philosophical concepts is thus to be non-signifying. This is
not to deny that signification exists, but rather to attempt a form of analysis that in itself does not pre-signify and pre-model these multiplicities into a self-same system that maintains the security of a dominant and all knowing authoritative interpretation of the world.

In *Anti-Oedipus* the dominant signifying regime Deleuze and Guattari present, and critique, is one they claim hinges upon an axis between Capitalism as the external signifier of the reproduction of the social, and Oedipal lack as the internal signifier of the reproduction of the subject/ed. They call this the Capital-oedipal axiomatic. In this way, the signifying regime ensures that all subjects are brought back to an identity formulated around the dominating concept of an unconscious. The unconscious is defined by either a fear of or a manifest ‘lack’ (castration) that operates as a cause, the resolution of which effects the production of the so-called ‘normal’ subject.

The ‘normal’ subject in turn operates to support a negation of all differences, ‘abjections’ and objections alike in terms of illness, the cure for which is a re-coding/over-coding back into the dominant regime of subjective formation. Capitalism, they argue, ‘miraculates’ the body onto the signifiers of capital (i.e. the commodities), so that lacking capital becomes a symbol of social castration. The external accumulation of commodities promises the symbolic code of a completed body and the erasure of internal lack. Where this concept differs from Marxist-Freudian versions of commodity-fetishism, Deleuze and Guattari argue Capitalism does not simply appropriate an already consisting internal lack that un-problematically belongs to all subjects. They argue the production of the Oedipus myth is a social mechanism of the dominant class, used for the limiting and controlling of capitalism that in itself is limitlessly available for the return and renewal of unspecified market formations. When Marxist thought follows the narrative of Freudian logic, it participates in the capturing of the very material world it seeks to liberate. Rather than think of the internal subject as reflected in the pre-structuring of a theatre of lack, Deleuze and Guattari view it as something more akin to the simulacrum. This term, drawn from the work of Baudrillard suggests the copy of the copy with no original. Origin is implied in and through the model-copy, but it does
itself not exist in relation to the copy. There are, however, some key differences in
Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of the simulacrum.

In “Realer Than Real: The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and Guattari,” Brian
Massumi articulates this difference. He argues that for Baudrillard post modernity is an
apocalyptic scene of hyper reality where signs are “floating images that no longer bear a
relation to any reality whatsoever.” We arrive at what appears to be only two options;
that of being “a naïve realist or being a sponge.” In the first place, we naively accept
simulation as “substitution of signs of the real for the real.” In the second place, we see it
as standing only in reference “to other signs” and simply “absorb through our open eyes
and mouths [neutralising] the play of energized images in the mass entropy of the silent
majority . . . launching us into hyper cynicism” (1987,1). Massumi argues that Deleuze
and Guattari offer us a third option. While maintaining the same basic definition of the
term, they nevertheless argue that:

- beyond a certain point . . . the simulacrum is less a copy twice removed [from
its model] than a phenomenon of a different nature altogether; it undermines the
very distinction between copy and model. (1 – 2)

Massumi argues that Baudrillard avoids dealing with the question of whether simulation
“replaces a real that did indeed exist” or if it “is all there has ever been. For Massumi,
“Deleuze and Guattari say yes to both.” To read them as alternatives is false reasoning
because “simulation is a process that produces the real” (2). The simulation, Massumi
summarises:

- abstracts from bodies and things a transcendental plane of ideal identities . . .then
it folds that ideal dimension back down onto bodies and things in order to force
them to conform to the distribution of identities it lays out for them. . . This
account overcomes the polarity between the model and the copy by treating them
both as second-order productions, as working parts of the same machine. (3)

The Oedipus myth is an exemplary simulation, abstracting from bodies a transcendental
plane (the unconscious) where ideal identities are defined in a pre-modelled/interpreted
symbolic register which folds back onto the bodies subjected to its discourse as a
judgement and order to conform. It is the construction of a particular subject; first and
foremost a masculine subject, and secondly a subject of a particular familial experiential narrative that narrates the bourgeois class. The political alliance between Capitalist ideology and Oedipal mythology supports and reproduces a simulated naturalism of a middle-class patriarchal and patrilineal circulation and codification of the flows of capital. Deleuze and Guattari call it the unholy alliance between the capitalist despot and the psychoanalyst priest.

If psychoanalytic models are readily appropriated by, and incorporate capitalism’s power structures, then it becomes important for those discourses critical of capitalism to consider this. Unfortunately, the opposite has occurred. Theories critical of capitalist modes of production have not only not critically analysed the use dominant power structures make of psychoanalytic simulacrums, but have themselves become subjected to it. Psychoanalytic theory has influenced Marxist thinking and critique by ‘ordering’ the critical analysis to simultaneously produce the narration of the lacking subject within the capitalist milieu. Furthermore, this is coupled with an already established habit within Marxism of defining subjectivity in respect to a certain economic determinism. The result is a narrative that produces hermeneutic links between the Freudian dichotomy of the resolved Oedipus (normal subject) and the unresolved Oedipus (abnormal subject) alongside the Marxist dichotomy between owners of the means of production (Bourgeoisie class) and the owners of labour power (Proletariat Class). This association in itself does nothing to unsettle the social hierarchies of prejudice and the naturalisations of individual/social inadequacy that have served the status quo of the dominant – it replicates it. Marxists do take a critical, rather than a naturalistic approach to the subject, but by retaining the meta-narrative of Freudian-Lacanian lack, the very agents of their revolution become narrated as castrated, powerless subjects. Thus, the appearance that the ‘masses’ act against their own interest comes to be accounted for in Marxism as a result of ideological duping or interpellation by the dominant state, enabled by a pre-existing lack (of conscious self-knowledge). Here, subjects are narrated as being fully conscripted by ideology into their subject-identities by a culture produced solely by the desires of a dominant group whose interests are assured. The masses are seen as being duped into social reproduction against their own interests due to a lack of class-consciousness, which is meta-narrated through a pre-conceived
concept of unfulfilled familial lack/desire that can only be fulfilled a priori to the duping, by a family structure modelled on the dominating class. Therefore, revolutionary agency is denied by the logic within Marxist discourse.

There are two key directions that the Marxist theory of ideology follows in the light of psychoanalytic models: On the one hand, it becomes viewed as a form of capitalist distraction and on the other as a state apparatus, both of which interpellate power over their subject through psychological means of control. In both cases, it is assumed that the aim is to secure the dominance of a bourgeois class who are somehow in full conscious control of the means of propaganda used against the unconscious subjects of the proletarian class(es). If the psychoanalytic model of the unconscious is readily appropriated by and incorporate capitalisms power structures, then so too it has become a powerful thought-tool in the capturing of capitalist critique. Marxist analysis, seduced by the Freudian model, found in its logic a means to analyse, interpret and provide an explanation for the continuous dominance by the capitalist class and the historic failure of Marx’s own revolutionary predictions.

Freudianism provides a way of explaining a connection between individual psychology and mass phenomena. An exemplary argument of this nature is Adorno’s “Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda.” Here, Adorno illuminates Freud’s theory of group psychology, to explain the phenomena of Fascism. He argues that Fascist propaganda works on the bases of psychological calculations instigated for the purpose of creating and maintaining “the psychology of the masses”(119). Freud’s theory rejects notions of a herd instinct and argues that group psychology is based on an integration of a common libidinal bond. The Fascist, seeking to unite people for aims incompatible with their own self-interest, must create an artificial bond. This is achieved by awakening an arcane inheritance in the individual subjects of a primal father figure that is replaced with the image of the leader. That is, the leader re-enacts the mechanics of Oedipal identification in order to gain psychological control over his subjects. All this operates like a form of hypnosis gathering the masses under single images of a leader and installing a mechanism of identification that transforms libidinal energy into a bond between leader and follower. Adorno argues that these practices of
‘hypnosis’ have become standard practice in the logic of consumerism. Consumers are hypnotised into political apathy through advertising and market-logic strategies that operate in conjunction and in connection with libidinal flows and the given of Oedipal subjectivity.

In another later example, Althusser’s concept of interpellation suggests that the state operates through an act of hailing the subject in its ideological discourse. In his essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus,” Althusser says that the “existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing” (56). Ideology operates through what he terms the “ideological state apparatus” as opposed to the “repressive state apparatus” which operates through direct force. He argues that all practice is ideological and enacted both by and for the subject. This subject is duped by liberal democratic discourse to consider him/herself free, when in fact he/she is actually being inculcated in their own repression and the desire of capitalist dominance that subjects act on their own recognisance. “The individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the subject. ie. In order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection” (57). Althusser does argue that Marxists themselves became part of an “ideological exploitation” (1984,144) through revisions based on an ideological divide between themselves and Freud. He argues that this ideology operates through the language used by Freud, and not the Freudian discovery itself. For his own part, he theorises the subject, not through the categories of “biology, psychology, sociology and philosophy” which he argues were “disciplines essentially foreign” (142) to psychoanalysis, but through its reworking in Lacanian psychoanalysis, which re-situates psychoanalysis’ explanatory context for unconscious Oedipal development out of the biological ‘instinct-driven’ narratives of Freud and into an appropriation of Saussurian categories in structural linguistics. This shift allows Althusser a distinction between the actual and the ideological which is defined as “a ‘representation’ of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser:1992, 52). The main problem remains, however, because, while this linguistic approach allows a shift from an essentialist biological to a constructivist sociological paradigm, it fails to recognise that the core hypothesis of the unconscious theatre, which is repeated from Freud to Lacan, is
likewise a narrated ‘representation’ of an imaginary relationship. We have the same unconscious lack, the same Oedipal interpretation; and thus, the same theatre; only the players (the form of the signifiers) have changed. Althusser uses the linguistic turn and the structural formulation to re-assert Freud as a true science; ideologically strengthening and empowering the discourse as a proven authority. Thus the psychoanalytic, which itself has become a dominant rhetorical tool in the oppression of minorities and differences within the social, is justified through an unexamined assertion as to its scientific basis. Althusser performs this trick without ever examining the ideological aspects of scientific discourse itself.  

Deleuze and Guattari’s work problematizes the assumptions that have developed in Marxist discourse from three main points of contention: Firstly, they deny that ideology actually exists outside of its own theorisation. Secondly, they reject the notion of interpellation by a conspiring bourgeoisie against the masses and the corresponding Marxist-Hegelian dialectical hypothesis of revolution that might be born of a rise in class-consciousness. Thirdly, they confront and overturn the idea that Oedipus is somehow an a priori given aspect of subjectivity. In Anti-Oedipus, they critique Freudianism and, by implication, its use within the Marxist analyses of subjectivity. For Deleuze and Guattari there are desiring-machines and social-machines operating in a nexus of multiple desire acting through subjective assemblages that are molecular and autopoietic, but are captured, over-coded and habituated to the order of molar identification. Key theoretical categories such as class are reconceived along lines of majoritarian and minoritarianism and contemporary studies of the brain are considered.

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2 Another significant example of Marxist-Psychoanalysis that takes a slightly different direction is that of Herbert Marcuse. Here, while the consensus of a duped majority of interpellated consumers’ remains, Marcuse does acknowledge an outside in the minority groups who are racially, sexually or otherwise socially excluded. The problem here, however, is that the onus of the revolution falls onto these groups while they are likewise seen to be unconscious of their position within the struggle. From a Deleuze-Guattarian point of view this suggests a negation of responsibility by those within the dominant. For them, revolutionary desire must be thought and articulated through the minoritarianism within each of us. The responsibility thus, does not fall on the already disempowered victim of capitalism, but on the construction of desire habituated in the cultural production in which we all participate.

3 Despite this, I do utilise the term within the thesis in the sense that it signifies the definition given by Althusser as a representation of a false relationship. However, the implicit relationship narrated through Althusser between ideology and the interpellation of the subject as fulfilling unconscious relations meta-narrated in lack is denied in light of the Deleuze-Guattarian critique of power and re-analysis of desire.
more relevant to the materiality of thought than the conclusions of Freud’s dreaming; the unconscious becomes a factory, and not a pre-staged theatre of lack. Revolution will need to come in the form of a molecular, or micro-political consciousness; changing the way we have been habituated to think/desire and live in difference: It will not be found in thinking the representational/simulated model-consciousness of a molarised and homogenised class. To grasp the functioning of these changes, subjectivity needs to be thought in terms of the process of assembled becomings and autopoietic difference rather than pre-modelled and pre-conceived constructions of self-same identity such as is produced in Oedipal mythology.

In the Deleuze-Guattarian project meaning making is not simply constructive of meaning in the abstract, but constructive within and as an integral part of the multiple connections that make the material assemblages of life. Furthermore, making meaning within an assemblage that is not metaphysically disconnected from its own multiple conditions of material existence is enunciated as a creative enterprise. Creativity is seen here to be collectively and individually produced in and as a function of desire. They make the contentious claim that repression and repressive modes of thought are creatively constructed by a desire that has learnt to desire its own repression. Desire is not something that can be considered the conscious enunciation of individual or collective choice. Rather, for Deleuze and Guattari, it is a field or plane of immanence that is an active driving force; it seeks to create life and it does so within the matrix of the social eventuation through which life is expressed: “There is only desire and the social, and nothing else” (1977, 29). How and what desire manages to create and produce will thus be contingent upon the multiplicity of circumstances and available informatics/objects/subject positions etc. at any given point. Dominance is erected and maintained, therefore, through the construction and control of communication mechanisms informing and producing understandings of space and its organised contents. To speak of a desire that has learnt to desire its own repression, therefore, is not to speak of individual or collective agency that simply wants repression, but to examine the social, environmental and historical circumstances; the events that make up the assemblage in and through which desire manifests its affects.
Figurative Metonymies:
Throughout their works, Deleuze and Guattari employ what I call a mode of figurative metonymies in the construction of their arguments. These operate through abstraction, rather than analogical models, and express the character of a modality, rather than of a subject. The figurative is not metaphoric. The metaphor operates upon ‘pre-structured’ tenants; communicating messages by substituting something that is perceived as known to stand in for and interpret what is unknown. In The Dictionary of Modern Thought, it is suggested that metaphor and metonymy are:

- actually opposed, because they are generated from antithetical principals.
- Metaphor belongs . . . to the selection axis of language, allowing of the possibility of substitution. Metonymy, however, belongs to the combination axis of language allowing for the perception of contexture. (Pool, 523)

Metaphor is taught and is culturally specific, whereas metonymies are deduced from the surrounding context.

In Anti-Oedipus, for example, the ‘schizophrenic’ becomes a metonymic figure, which triggers a chain of concepts perceiving the contexture of capitalist flows. It is not operative as a metaphor because it does not stand in as a known explaining the unknown, but rather as a concept of non-linear and multiple-layered psychology as a figurative metonymy of the non-linear and multiple flows of capitalism. In A Thousand Plateaus, a multiplicity of figurations inform the plateaus: the Magician and the Legislator become figures of the binary-machine that striates the space of the state; the nomad figures movement across smooth space outside of the state; the game of Chess figures the politics of states; the game of Go figures the politics of nomads; the girl figures the movement between being and becoming in becoming-woman; the mythic warrior figures the becoming-animal of group movements; the black-hole figures the captured expression of desire; the white-wall figures the landscape of the social; the

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4 And there is, throughout their work, a refrain constantly reminding us that they are not using metaphors that ‘stand in’ for something else. For an example, see the discussion by Deleuze concerning the use of scientific concepts in A Thousand Plateaus on P29 – 30 of Negotiations.

5 This distinction is drawn in the main from, and with reference to, the work of Roman Jakobson.
despot figures the power of capitalism; the priest figures the analyst of psychology; the masochist figures the reaching toward a limit between the organic body and a Body without Organs; the tree figures the structures of arborescent state-thinking and grass the rhizomic movements of nomadic-thought; the vampire figures the expression of nomadic thinking; and God is figured as a “Lobster, or a double pincer, a double bind” (1987, 40).

For many scholars, such a methodology seems both ludicrous and/or impenetrable; there are no clear generic guidelines to help readers clearly reflect singular meaning or sets of meaning from their texts. However, this style is itself an experiment to produce a materialistic discourse actively expressing Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of interpretive modes of analysis and embodies a post-structuralist appropriation and playfulness with language and signification. One of the challenges in speaking simply in terms of a shift to a metonymic, rather than metaphoric paradigm, however, is that metonymic understanding tends to infer a ‘symbolism.’ And for Deleuze and Guattari the symbolic is likewise problematic. It is for this reason I use the term ‘figure’ or ‘figurative.’ The problem with the symbolic is that it is connected to a sign system of meaning or ‘register’ that, unlike the abstraction of a figure, imbues it with the models of cultural and historical specificity. This undermines the discussion of philosophical concepts with the over-coding of concrete specifications and the centrism of that specification. The figurative, however, remains abstract in and of itself in relation to the concept enunciated, allowing the specificity of singular events or contexts to be evidenced within the particular application and/or use of that conceptual tool.

**Secondary Readings:**

There are a significant and growing number of both major and minor projects, which interface with Deleuze and Guattari’s own vast body of collective and singular works. This thesis should not be read as an authoritative interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari’s work and it is the opinion of the writer that nor should other engagements and interfaces with their work be read as such. This is particularly so given that the act of interpretation is itself a point of critique for Deleuze and Guattari. In *Negotiations*, for example, Deleuze discusses the taking up of texts in this way:
There are, you see, two ways of reading a book: you either see it as a box with something inside and start looking for what it signifies, and then if you’re even more perverse or depraved you set off after signifiers. And you treat the next book like a box contained in the first or containing it. And you annotate and interpret and question, and write a book about the book, and so on and on. Or there’s the other way: you see the book as a little non-signifying machine, and the only question is “Does it work, and how does it work?” How does it work for you? If it doesn’t work, if nothing comes through, you try another book. This second way of reading’s intensive: something comes through or it doesn’t. There’s nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. It’s like plugging into an electric circuit. (7 – 8)

Deleuze and Guattari’s books do not work for everyone. For those whom they do not, there is often a negative and reactionary reading produced. In the survey by Best and Kellner in *Postmodern Theory*, for example, an overview reads the work without putting aside the habit of interpretation. They produce an overview that, while not without some merit, nevertheless misses the point. For example, in one line of reasoning they suggest that Deleuze and Guattari’s “positions are the theoretical and ethical equivalent of a futurist painting” and that they “have no theory of why revolutionary desire is preferable to fascist desire.” This reading draws, I would suggest, on the hitherto habituated association between futurism, fascist desire, and the obsession with what Deleuze and Guattari would section off as “technical machines” within the Futurist movement. This seems to be the simulacrum that defines Best and Kellner’s interpretation, and in doing so they completely disregard Deleuze and Guattari’s arguments that construct the machinic in a completely new and different context. In failing to take account of this difference in kind, the social and desiring machines of Deleuze and Guattari become read not as figurative metonymies of vital process, but as

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6 It should be noted that ‘interpretation’ has a specific meaning here as I understand Deleuze’s critique. For many the term is utilised in conjunction and similarly to the concept of an active construction of meaning, for Deleuze it refers to the idea of pre-empted interpretation whereby texts are understood through pre-established meaning systems that close off the ability to understand and comprehend new and original or differentiated understandings that appear only in the event of applying readings within the context of idiosyncratic applications. (See the conclusion for further elaboration and exemplification of this point)
metaphors for the sterile world of the purely mechanical. They fail to take account of their own reading practice, a habit of interpretation that is challenged by and needs to be put aside if any useful and productive engagement with the Deleuze and Guattari milieu is to be made. Others, such as Rosi Braidotti have had both reactionary and productive interfaces with Deleuze and Guattari. In her early work on the subject, Braidotti had some difficulty with the concept of becoming-woman and reading this outside the signification of women, thereby producing a critical rejection of what appeared to be implicated. In later works, however, Braidotti becomes more attracted to the concept of becoming and, despite retaining some scepticism to the concept of becoming-woman, it becomes a productive and creative element in her own work. On another line of enquiry, however, Camilla Griggers takes up the notion of Becoming-woman and writes an entire book with that title, drawing from a whole range of Deleuze and Guattarian concepts. While this is a very different approach to my own, it is nevertheless a productive use of the material. Here Griggers seems to retain the signification of the term woman as a point of enquiry into issues of the production of the woman image and makes use of the Deleuze and Guattari concept-milieu to examine the politics and very real effects of the faciality of a becoming-woman. Rather than get caught in a philosophical critique such as the early Braidotti, Griggers takes what is useful from Deleuze and Guattari and makes it work for her own project.

The manner of approach to Deleuze and Guattari need not, and in fact should not, seek a single assemblage of signified meaning that can be continuously reiterated. Philip Goodchild sees the need to preface his own book on Deleuze and Guattari with an intent of “self-effacing,” suggesting that readers refer “back to the primary texts” and not his own text in evaluating Deleuze and Guattarian thought (1986, viii). Brian Massumi subtites his engagement as a “deviation from” so that he might signal this difference. Tamsin Lorraine’s work, which brings Deleuze into a relation with Irigaray, titles her

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7 See for example “The Becoming-Woman of Philosophy: Deleuze and the Becoming-Minority of Women” in Patterns of Dissonance, published in 1991, in which Braidotti insists that ‘becoming-woman’ is a masculine tactic that seeks to erase the specificity of women.

book as “Experiments …”; Charles Stivale subtitles his engagement “intersections and animations”; and Ian Buchanan’s subtitle is “a metacommentary.” All this suggests that those working in this field or in connection with Deleuze and Guattari feel a need to specify their work against the habit of viewing secondary texts as interpretative models for the source.

The habit of viewing secondary texts as interpretive models of the source and teaching aids for the unravelling of the works of theorists and philosophers causes dilemmas. Rather than set up models or arguments that can be unpacked, Deleuze and Guattari invoke thinking-machines and provide an extensive range of conceptual tools that are developed idiosyncratically according to their mode of implementation and/or contextual connections. The concepts thus become relative to the material in and through which they are applied and connected. Secondary works, which inevitably bring their own style, are thus as likely to influence the material of Deleuze and Guattari as they are to elucidate it. Sometimes these styles operate to re-territorialise the source texts into older modes of thinking; mutating them into all that they oppose. At other times, they de-territorialise them out of the over-coding that the habitual academic system of classifications has placed them in terms of “high-brow” theorists and philosophers, and bring them back to life in new articulations. John Landau, in his short piece titled “pragmatics” suggests and advises that:

The last thing Deleuze and Guattari intended was for their work to become a finished body to discuss. If you must make a corpse of it, make it an exquisite corpse! Explore upsetting your life with the affirmation of odd connection. Link your findings back into your evaluation of the material. Bring heterogeneous discourse and experience that seems to create interesting new effects. Above all, don’t interpret their writings; set them into action! (deleuzeguattarionary, 29/10/97)

Those works that read the Deleuze and Guattarian milieu within this context of a continuum, rather than as a fixed and complete argument, are, therefore, the ones which make Deleuze and Guattari come to life within the context of their own field(s) of investigation – that make the concepts differentiate.
Desire:
To see desire in terms of lack is, for Deleuze and Guattari, to see a dominant signification that situates desire to desire its own repression. To over-code desire itself with a concept of original lack – a little like original sin – is to construct the expression of the self in terms of a fundamental absence thereby repressing the active presence of self. In Deleuze and Guattari’s conception, this is to capture desire in a signifying regime that ensures its expression in the present is reduced and nullified by a model of interpretation that over-codes with content derived from a long gone past. From this perspective, psychoanalytic theories that postulate lack continuously direct and interpret subjective desire ‘out of time’. The object of ‘lack’/ what is seen to be lacking, is postulated as being the origin in the development of the subject. The point at which we attain lack becomes synonymous with the point at which we enter into being. Thus, what we lack is always and forever in the past and can never be actualised in the present. When desire is construed in such a fashion, life is mistaken for its own antithesis. Life becomes a force seen to desire its own pre-existence, in a state of permanent nostalgia.

For Deleuze and Guattari desire lacks nothing. Rather, desire is an active and machinic essence of life itself. Life becomes the vitality of its own desire. When desire is construed as a positive and active force, its motivations must be seen in terms of being inspired by a presence. “Desire always remains in close touch with the conditions of objective existence; it embraces them and follows them, shifts when they shift, and does not outlive them” (1977, 27). When desire is turned against itself towards an absent past, desire learns to desire its own repression.

Psychoanalytic discourse meta-modelizes the entire social stratum from the perspective of lack. It has become a theory of, and a practice upon society, fixing its conclusion upon life, rather than a set of tools for exploring life. This is not to say that the tools of psychoanalysis do not have the potential for exploration, but that the insistent concept of desire as lack enforces that those tools be directed, in any exploration, through an interpretative framework that already pre-prescribes an unconscious and past ‘lack.’
construed in the theatrics of a myth, to any encounters with active desire. The theory of psychoanalysis and the employment of this theory through its practice makes it a state science, a model of over-coded expression interpreting a fixed object over and above the heterogeneity of the expressive modality in the language of its subjects. We can see a graphic example of this in Freud’s own hypothesis of dream analysis when he begins by asserting that; “the dreamer himself . . . should tell us what his dream means [sic]” only to then assert that “the dreamer always says he knows nothing” (130 my emphasis). An assertion the analyst denies in the instigation of a pre-modelled interpretive framework forces “him [sic] to discover his knowledge and communicate it” (134). The knowledge that the dreamer will be forced to acknowledge and communicate will always be based on the same model; the symbolic meaning of dream fragments reconstructed by the expert analysis through the register of Oedipus. Ultimately this is Freud’s own imaginative and active desire to create a mono-symbolic psychological understanding of life, the ‘god trick’ of authoritarian interpretation. If Freud and his psychoanalysis discover anything of desire, they do so only in order to lock it up within the confines of a prescribed statement drawn from the creative fantasy-world of the supreme analyst himself. To his priestly followers, he becomes the ‘word’ of authority and the source of their own delusional power fantasies.

For Deleuze and Guattari, this model of forcing meaning upon the unconscious is abhorrent. Their work, particularly that of Guattari, was more strongly influenced by that of R.D. Laing and the anti-psychiatry movement, whose work with schizophrenics argued that rather than psychiatric problems being based on an internal lack, it was constructed through the external social circumstances of the family. For Deleuze and Guattari, however, this never went far enough towards the outside and, for their part, the external circumstances that effect and construct problems in the individual are constitutive not simply of the familial, but of the determination of one’s situation within entire social assemblages. Theories that construct the subject in terms of lack are themselves imbricated within this social constitution of an expression of desire that

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9 The Anti-psychiatry movement, as it became termed, has predominantly become known through the literary works of English writers Laing and Cooper. It emerged in the 1960s as a critique of dominant forms of prison-style psychiatric institutionalisation. For an early discussion on his interest and involvement with this movement, see Guattari’s “Anti-Psychiatry and Anti-Psychoanalysis” in Molecular Revolution, p 45.
actively works against the truthful enunciations of the subject. Such theories and beliefs, for Deleuze and Guattari, direct desire’s active force towards a past that is absent and thus actively participate in a denial of the circumstances that remain constant in the present. Desire is socially activated, therefore, in the psychoanalytic assemblage to constitute its own repression. For Deleuze and Guattari, "the unconscious poses no problem of meaning, solely problems of use. The question posed by desire is not "What does it mean?" but rather "How does it work? How do these machines, these desiring-machines, work – yours and mine? " (1977, 109). In Dialogues, Deleuze asks:

Do you realize how simple a desire is? Sleeping is a desire. Walking is a desire. Listening to music, or making music, or writing are desires. A spring, a winter, are desires. Old age also is a desire. Even death. Desire never needs interpreting, it is it which experiments. (95)

Deleuze argues that there are three misunderstandings of desire: one relating to lack or law; another that views it as natural or spontaneous reality; and still another that sees it in terms of pleasure or the festival (103). Firstly, we have already looked intently at the misunderstandings relating to lack through Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of psychoanalysis. Here Deleuze states that “desiring is not at all easy, but this is precisely because it gives, instead of lacks” (91). Secondly, Deleuze argues desire is neither natural nor spontaneous. Rather it is constituted in and simultaneous to the construction of social assemblages. It is not something that belongs to an unproblematic subject, but is what Deleuze call a ‘haecceity’ or the subject of an event. To argue his point, Deleuze uses the simple example of someone who has been tied up and imprisoned, and suggests that within such an assemblage desire enunciates the desire to be untied. The individual does not him/herself naturally or spontaneously desire escape; rather the desire is expressive in accordance with the construction of the social assemblage in which the subject resides.

10 Haecceities (also spelt hecceity) are individuated events, such as a sunrise or a lightning storm, and refer to the character or subjectivity of an event’s duration. Rather than constructing events as being characteristics of individualised pre-scribed subjects, thus, Deleuze and Guattari allow the character of the event to belong to itself. (See p 151-152 in Dialogues for best description.)
We might consider how a naturalization of desire operates in the liberal politics of choice. In this discourse, desire is presumed to be pre-eminent to the situation of the individual subject and the subject to be the creator and constructor of his/her own desires. When desire is seen as a natural ‘choice’ of the individual subject the discursive logic is one which thereby assumes that negative or socially problematic enunciations of desire (criminal desire for example) are the full responsibility and agency of the individual subjects through whom it enunciates. Collective and social assemblages escape scrutiny and concepts of ‘otherness’ over-code and support the exclusion, control and punishment of the non-dominant social subjects. To question this assumption is not to suggest we are without agency and choice in our lives, but to comprehend that those choices are limited to the assembled social situation in which we reside and the inter-related affects of other desiring machines and assemblages with which we connect. It is also to understand those choices are not in themselves motivated by a desire belonging to us as individual agents, but are social choices, which are partial-elements in the constitution of both singular and collective desires.

Thirdly, Deleuze argues that desire is misunderstood when conceived in terms of pleasure or the festival. Pleasure, he argues, is actually that which interrupts desire. Pleasure is not the goal of desire, but this does not indicate a negative lack of pleasure; it is, rather, “by virtue of its positivity” that desire is irrelative to pleasure. By way of example, Deleuze discusses the figurative metonymy of ‘courtly love’ as an assemblage of desire. Courtly love is love that cannot be consummated and he argues that this is not “a method of deprivation” but an “immanent process of desire.” This process is “called ‘joy’, not lack or demand. Everything is permitted, except that which would come and break up the integral process of desire, the assemblage” (100). The pleasure of consummation breaks apart the assemblage of courtly love and ends the desire; the courtship is over. Desire will have to be constituted anew, autopoetic to a different social assemblage.

Deleuze and Guattari’s works seek to elucidate and analyse such processes as they occur at the micro-level of socialisation, and they refuse to accept the negative conclusion that these processes are unchangeable and inevitable. They construct a series of conceptual
modes for both analysing and recognising these thoughts in terms of repressive habits that can be broken through positive and expressive experimentation. Here we find a new theorisation of the philosophical notion of becoming, often seen as a reversed Platonism, where becoming is no longer considered to be the degradation of the ideal, but the disassembling of fixed habit and the opening towards re-assembling into new non-habitual and changeable practices. The methodological focus of analysis shifts from seeking solutions to manifest problems by tracing them back to a distant and past source event, constructing the problem in terms of cause and effect, to a consideration of the problem within the contextual agency limiting the ‘habitus’ of the present, constructing the problem in terms of an affective solution.

The State of Politics:
Deleuze and Guattari oppose what they call state-thinking, and the manifest state\textsuperscript{11} or status quo of thought that habituates the fluxes of dominant mechanisms of capture, to what they call nomadic thinking. The figurative metonymy of the nomadic is based on the construction of space that is ‘outside’ the internalising striations of the state. This smooth outside begins by warding off the construction of the state, but is inevitably over-coded and captured by the striated lines of the dominant representational state-thinking. The state machine operates its force of capture through a method of binary abstraction, or what might be described as a strategy of divide and conquer tactics. Although these lines construct themselves in terms of ideological representations, Deleuze and Guattari argue it is more a matter of the organization of space that captures desire within the image of an ideology, rather than the internal model of ideology. The state machine, or more precisely, the assemblage of state machinery, operates through an axis of power that divides in one direction (micro political) and abstracts in the other (macro political). In \textit{Dialogues} Deleuze points out that “state power [rests] on the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{11}The terms state, statement and stated are used in this thesis as indicators of state striation. Where the nomadic constructs its knowledge; the state repeats its knowledge from pre-formed stated codes: Where the nomadic conceptualises within, and in the making sense of, the material context of each event; the state draws statements from a transcended code of pre-formed common sense. I have also chosen to use a non-capitalised ‘s’ in the word state because I refer to both the state-proper and the construction of state-thinking within civil society.}
exercise of binary machines which run through us and the abstract machine which over-codes us” (141). In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari speak of this dual operative of the state through the figurative metonymy of the Magician King and Legislator.

In the Western world in general, internal state politics are conditioned around democratic ideals that are nevertheless trapped in basic two-party political systems that swing and balance between left and right alternates. It has become increasingly evident none of the factional sides within this political binary is working with the factual, material actuality of the people. Political parties, whether oriented toward the left or right, theorize upon a pre-coded abstract called the nation state. Invoking an image of this ‘imagined community,’ they then argue for their own political ideals. When empowered, the political dominant implements its theory over the concrete actuality of the people through the state apparatus of direct capture, pre-structured in the bureaucratic institutions. What defines the state form is not so much the historical specificities of ascendant ideologies within individual states, but the binary-abstract machine whose axis links the ideological representational (figured as the Magician) and the legalised institutional (figured as the legislator). Different ideologies and intensities of power within state structuring may change certain functions but they, nevertheless, operate through the same basic structural formation. Deleuze and Guattari argue the state form is ultimately always right-wing conservative in that it conserves the organs (or organizations) of the state in order to gain and maintain control. In this sense, the left is a mere oppositional force rather than an alternative counter politics to the conservative state.

The left/right binary, while structuring different ideological forms of control is therefore part of the internal striation and presents as an image of free choice within democratic states. If we consider the dual functioning of the binary-abstract machine, we can see that this binary – which pervades throughout the apparent multiplicity of choices within the scene of minor parties, which ultimately must either abstain or side with government

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12 This term is used as theorised by Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities*. 

or opposition – follows the micro-politics of personal choice, but is nevertheless abstracted under the over-coding of the whole political system of representational democracy. In this manner, the abstract machine produces the ‘majority’ out of a multiplicity of divided minorities that are nonetheless over-coded within an oppositional framework maintaining the balance of differences within a choice limited to only two: left-wing or right-wing conservatism.

If this model of representational capture operates in terms of the political field in the state-proper, then it is also the axiomatic force, which reproduces itself within the field of capitalist imagery and the political field of every day life. Capitalism is of course the dominant mode of production/consumption within the modern/post-modern state and its force of capture informs the constructions of political ideologies of both left and right wing conservatism. Capitalism, however, appears without the overt limits of political management of its flows. And it is the multiple-market axiom of capitalist desire that couples with the schizophrenic flows of desire itself. Anything and everything presents itself as a potential market for capitalist incorporation; creating a simple law of profit-commodity logic where profit is created out of all that can be commodified. But these markets are axiomatically linked to the laws of those who dominate the political-ideological field. And each field seeks its share of capture over the desiring-machines of the social, each working against and for in a balance with each other.

By reducing or tracing difference to an image, whether political-ideological or profit-commodifible, the state incorporates within the limitation of a representational field the capture of differences on a surface of signification. This brings about their negation; negating the field of immanence or desire from which they emerge allowing them to become appropriated upon the striated landscape of the state where they are subject to the repetition of the same code of control. In this way, the repetition of the state comes to function as a rendering of the same through an appropriation based on the tactic of incorporating representation and ‘appearance’ of difference.

**Constructing the Problem:**

In his work on Bergson, Deleuze defines philosophy in terms of the construction of problems, and while this definition of philosophy shifts during the course of his career, I
find elements of this argument useful in considering how Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy of the state marks an interface with Marx’s conceptions. In Bergsonism, Deleuze suggests that;

the problem always has the solution it deserves, in terms of the way in which it is stated (ie. the conditions under which it is determined as problem), and of the means and terms at our disposal for stating it. (16)

Of significance here, is Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of the Hegelian dialectic and the manner in which it differs from Marx’s own critical reformulation of Hegel. If the ‘problem’ for counter-political movements such as Marxism can be defined as the being and the repetition of the state, then the above quote from Deleuze suggests that the failure of Marx’s theorisation lies in the manner in which Marx constructed the problem of the state in terms of a dialectical materialism.

Hegel’s theory of the dialectic is a theory of the autonomous development of human consciousness and the mind. Seen as a mode of reasoning, the dialectical mode begins in the first instance of reason as the proposition of a thesis. Following this, the second mode reasons through reflection and weakens the thesis in the development of an anti-thesis to which follows further reflection the development of rational thought in the synthesis of the opposing thesis. In Hegel’s understanding, this development towards rational thought is wholly connected with a belief that ‘being’ and therefore the conscious knowledge achieved through rationalisation, belongs in the realm of transcendence. The original thesis of the mind is produced through first appearances; the anti-thesis develops in the reflections of experience and the rational synthesis develops in reflection of one’s faith in the ideal realm of a transcendent god. This model is thus, a stable one, and it is this stability which Marx’s critical revision challenges.

Marx was highly influenced by Hegelianism, but was himself an atheist who had no faith in the transcendent world of a god. Religion was, in Marx’s point of view, simply

13 This summary of Hegel is drawn from Paul Trejo’s article titled “Summary of Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind” and it should be noted that while I have reduced it to a tripartite system, as is commonly presented, Trejo’s paper does elaborate a whole series of other forms of consciousness that Hegel presents as possibilities.
a tool for political and social control over populations. This marks the critical shift between Hegel and Marx from idealism to materialism; from the rationalisation of a transcendent realm of ideal truth to the truth of the material conditions of the political and social world in which we live. In Marx, the synthesis becomes subject to the historical conditions and shifts within the material world, becoming, thus, a matter of process. Rather than a theory of the conscious mind developed within a realm of transcendent faith, the dialectic becomes a description of historical materialism and marks changing political processes of the material world.

In Deleuze’s Bergsonian methodology of recognising false problems, this recognition of Marx’s is one that fits with recognising the false problem of the first type. Here Bergson’s analysis consists in “showing that there is not less, but more in the idea of nonbeing than that of being, in disorder than in order, in the possible than in the real. In the idea of nonbeing there is in fact the idea of being” (17). The shift towards a materialist analysis of the political is a point of convergence between Deleuze and Marx. In the second type of false problem, however, the Bergson method suggests that the problem consists of “badly analysed composites that arbitrarily group things that differ in kind” (18). This in turn leads to the second rule of the method, which is to “Struggle against illusion, rediscover the true differences in kind or articulations of the real” (21). It is in this point of view we can see that Deleuze and Guattari disagree with Marx’s conceptualisation of a class system and the logic of its play within an historical dialectic. The concept of class for Deleuze and Guattari equates to a badly analysed composite in that it abstractly groups together the multiplicity of differences between human subjects based on Marx’s economic determinism. In Marx’s concept of the bourgeois and the proletariat classes, the model of the thesis/antithesis of the dialectic is mapped to positions of social-economic class, which presumes a hermeneutic model between economic positions and social desire. In a sense, while these class concepts are not of the same kind of idealism as Hegel’s transcendent, they nevertheless produce an ideal abstraction of the social that transcends difference in kind to produce a model difference in degree. The class system, which Marx argues has been the basis of historical struggle, is for Deleuze and Guattari itself a product of state power structures. To put into antithesis the ideology of one class with that of another, thus, is simply to argue for a
different image of domination through the same kind of capture in the same hierarchy of power.

The problem of Hegel nevertheless remains. For his own part, Deleuze takes a critique of Hegel from Nietzsche, who argues that the dialectical model simply accounts for the shifting from one form of nihilism to another; from the transcendence of an ideal form in God to the transcendence of an ideal form in Man. For Deleuze, Hegel and the dialectic form part of the state-thinking that operates to insert models of identity, which are likewise mapped into the abstracted field of striated control and further operate against the potential creative vitality of desire and life. True difference in kind, the kind of thinking and becoming that is outside state models of control, remains oppressed by the capturing state. Structurally, the state denies the possibility of becoming and replaces the desire of becoming with images of transcendent evil, for example the dehumanisation of minorities.

Difference in kind is, for Deleuze, a different kind of thinking to that produced by organizations of the state model. Marx does indeed think differently to the model of the state and certainly perpetuates a desire to shift outside this state. From a Deleuzian point of view and a Nietzschian critique of Hegelianism, however, this desire is itself subject to the capture of the state and remains vulnerable to reterritorialisation because it remained stated within representational terms of the state modelled class. These were terms that were available, but which were nevertheless themselves the production of a state transcendence of man into the abstract categories of identifiable class positions. It is for this reason Deleuze and Guattari find the positions of majority and minority more suitable for analysing the capture of desire. Deleuze and Guattari situate the events of constructed majoritiarianism within the state model, which opposes and captures the multiplicity of minoritarian positions.

**Revolution:**

The problem for Deleuze and Guattari is in many ways synonymous, therefore, with the problem for Marx: the understanding of the manner in which the state reproduces itself
and the desire to overcome this repetition of the same. Marxist political theory, while envisioning a utopic future beyond the state, nevertheless therefore, operates upon the epistemological models that construct the body politic through the logic and authority of a state model. Marx himself could see no other way beyond the state than through the revolutionary shift between dominant groups controlling the state. Consequently, under the image of the state, Marxist political theory fails to emerge as a counter politics outside the state and in practice has structured the left as an oppositional arm within the self-same political conservativism. This is manifest, no doubt, in the kinds of two-party political systems whereby the left wing constructs the ‘imagined’ majority as working-class, and the right as middle-class. While I would strongly disagree with enunciations that say they are the ‘same’ theories on both sides of politics, what is evident is that the state bureaucratic system ensures that it is the same authoritarian hierarchy of ‘experts’ whose role it is to implement policy programs. It is, therefore, as offensive to the autonomy of minorities to implement the benevolence of leftist theory by the state, as it is to implement right-wing theory, and we are equally silenced in enunciating our own psychological /sociological positioning under the bureaucratic systems of state authority. Marxist revolution fails because it remains pinned to the epistemological model of the state. As such, it falls into the negation of its difference and the repetition of the power of domination of one group over another.

Deleuze and Guattari are often characterized alongside post-modern theories that likewise recognise that modernist divisions of class no longer adequately describe the social world in which we live. Where Deleuze and Guattari differ from many other post-modernist theories, however, is that, while from interpretive theories of the state they are post-Marxist, they nevertheless retain a Marxist inspired desire towards the construction of a revolutionary force. Indeed, in “The Post-modern Impasse,” Guattari critiques a dominant trend in post-modern philosophy for remaining too structuralist and tending to accept “misery and unemployment . . . as necessary evils” (1996, 109). For Deleuze and Guattari, the people are not so much duped or lacking in consciousness as they are over-determined in representative economies that perform as an apparatus of capture. Desire is restrained from expression in its own right and becomes mediated through an all-encompassing face of majoritarianism. To combat this, they argue that
we need to construct new concepts of analysis, understanding, and the means through
which change can be achieved. Guattari goes on to criticise post-modern theorists such
as Lyotard and Baudrillard for concluding that the “social and political have never been
more than traps” and thus seemingly producing hypotheses of conformity and
inevitability with marketplace logic and an acceptance that change can only be local.
This leads, he argues to “an irrevocable refusal of any large-scale social undertaking”
(1996, 111). Guattari’s own hypothesis of a molecular revolution, which resonates
throughout the collaborative work with Deleuze, does not shy away from the need for,
and the real possibility of, large-scale change. Rather, they conceptualise on the level of
molecular desiring-machines that can be liberated from the habits of passive apathy and
social conformity to operate in confrontation with, and the expressed aim of
undermining, the large-scale machinery of molarised political domination. For their
part, micro-political networks operate in conjunction with macro-political abstracts in
the binarisation of thought and its abstract forms of control to form molarised (fixed)
codes stating subjects and identifications within dominant modalities of social and
political territory. The focus for the molecular revolution is one that directly acts as a
point of action aimed at deterritorialising this micro-political network of state-thinking.
It is not disconnected from the whole, but conceived of in terms of an interconnected
multiplicility that, while remaining essentially a process of heterogeneous difference,
nevertheless has machinic connections allowing collectivised action towards
revolutionary change. As Michel Foucault points out in the preface to Anti-Oedipus,
Deleuze and Guattari confront three major adversaries:

1. The political ascetics . . . who would preserve the pure order of politics and
political discourse . . . 2. The poor technician of desire . . . who would subjugate
the multiplicity of desire to the twofold law of structure and lack. [and] 3. . . .
the major enemy. . . fascism. . . And not only historical fascism. . . but also the
fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the fascism that
causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits
us. (xiii)

If revolutionary change is to be achieved, we must question the effectiveness of
established forms of analysis that situate the agency of change in icons of power and
begin with a questioning of these micro-fascisms that occur on an level of everyday
behaviour and interaction. We must find ways to get in touch with our own agency; question our own apathy; and take responsibility for the minor-connections of our own potential ability to act. The revolution becomes a matter of challenging the habits of thought that bring us back to the state as a model of identification and taking account of how these habits themselves desire our repression.

**Ethics and Becoming:**

Not all thinking outside of state habits is necessarily liberating, however, and their remains a constant danger in the becoming of the molecular revolution of constructing a thinking differently that fails to make connections with the multiple-outside and becomes only an internalised outside. Such thinking falls into the trap of catatonic withdrawal and reactionary silence and is easily dismissed under the representations of madness by the dominating state. Correspondingly, there always remains the danger of re-capture and the eruption of new power-plays returning outside thought to an internalised state, which reconstructs this outside within new forms of fascism more despotic than those originally opposed. While this revolution in thought requires passing through the dangers of critical experimentation with thinking that, under the moral organisation of the state, has been banished, it nevertheless requires an ethical basis that actively seeks to negate the imposition of new models of state capture, while nevertheless constructing a new methodology of practice.

This brings us to the influence of the third rule of the Bergsonian method, which according to Deleuze is to; “state problems and solve them in terms of time rather than of space. This rule gives the “fundamental meaning” of intuition: Intuition presupposes duration, it consists in thinking in terms of duration.” (31). Deleuze reads the ethical in terms of Spinoza’s distinction between the ethical and the moral: 14 thought in terms of solutions to the problem, the moral is the solution of the state. It is the construction of a fixed ‘space’ for any ethical debate within the state paradigm. Here, state-thinking

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14 In his book Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze reads Spinoza’s Ethics as a shift from the transcendentalism of the moral (and its domination) to an embodiment of the ethical. A reading of this is taken up in the conclusion of this thesis.
solves its ethical dilemmas with reference to dominant moralistic beliefs and practices. If the Bergsonian method requires we consider the solution in terms of time, rather than space, however, the ethical solution for the molecular revolution follows the becoming of its duration. This refers back to the differentiation between differences in kind and differences in degree. This difference is not itself simply the difference between space and time. This difference defines the locations of differences in degree (spatial) and differences in kind (durational): “There are no differences in kind except in duration – while space is nothing other than the location, the environment, the totality of differences in degree” (32).

The moral is spatial in that it is fixed within the virtual space of an ideal that is not lived in the duration of time; it becomes the cause of an effective differentiation in degree. The ethical, however, is praxis within the duration of time; it is affective within the play of differences in kind. The space of state morality marks a difference in degree between dominant morals and immorality as otherness to that domination. Ethical issues emerge in the context thus of their difference in degree to the sameness of the moral-code against which they are judged. Rather than consider an emergent issue in terms of its effect upon society, it is considered therefore, only in terms of its effect on the ideal model of the real to which the state thinker adheres and aspires. Again, we see desire desiring its own repression. In the duration of the molecular revolution, however, ethics takes account of the affect of difference in kind and not simply difference in degree. An ethics of becoming does not sit before and above (in judgement of) the duration of differences in kind, but informs the process and differentiates within the context of their becoming. In the process of an ethical becoming, intuition is “the movement by which we emerge from our own duration, by which we make use of our own duration to affirm and immediately to recognise the existence of other durations” (33).

The politics of this intuitive method of ethical becoming is opposed to the power politics of the nihilistic state. Becoming and duration cannot be represented in and of themselves; they are rather lived. In discourse, which necessarily represents itself through language, they are concepts whose abstraction differs in kind to that of the state abstract-machine: they are the abstractions of a concept rather than the abstraction to a
precept. If the problem with the state resides in the manner in which it axiomatises differences in degree, idealised through representation to repeat its nihilistic dominance in the organization of life, a specific political engagement begins in the middle of this habitualisation of thought.

**Playing Go with Deleuze and Guattari:**

It is popular-culture, defined as inclusive of all textual mediums of popular representation and narrativisation of popular discourse, that for me appears as the dominant medium of state capture. This is the social situation in which I reside and the face of the state that habituates my own life. It is through an engagement with the popular, as it appears on the surface, I begin the experiment of my thesis. This thesis uses Deleuze-Guattarian concept-tools to interrogate the political and social representations and events in popular culture whilst simultaneously producing and elucidating the writer’s own reading of the Deleuze-Guattarian project milieu.

The thesis reads popular culture along the lines of a principle based on the concept of the refrain. For Deleuze and Guattari, the refrain (or ritornello) is a territorial assemblage. Its metonymy (to the extent that I have followed it) links it to a musical/poetics understanding of the term. In sticking with the concept of a figurative metonymy, I would like to consider Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the refrain through a brief look at their figure of God; the Lobster. Here the two pincers become metonymic of content and expression:

> The distinction between the two articulations is not between forms and substances but between content and expression, expression having just as much substance as content and content just as much form as expression. (1987, 44)

If we consider this distinction between content and expression in terms of the refrain, we might usefully map a relation between the two pincers of the Lobster and two uses of the refrain. In musical and poetic terms, the refrain refers to those elements in the song or poem that repeat, such as the chorus. There are two kinds of repetition, however; one is always direct repetition, whereas the other includes elements of differentiation from the early forms of itself. In the former case, in which the repetition repeats always the same,
the expression (difference) is held-back in order to project the content (repetition). Here expression becomes subject to the sameness of the content. In the latter form, repetition differentiates and, rather than operating to holdback expression, carries it forward in a new direction. In this case, content is expressed within the rhythms of differential expression. If God (that elusive concept of life-creation itself) is here defined as a lobster articulating the dual aspects of content and expression, then we can suggest that on the one hand there are what Deleuze and Guattari would call state-refrains, which define their god within the repeated content that transcends the expression of life. On the other hand, there are the nomadic-refrains in which god becomes the immanent flow of difference within the expression of life. To express, say Deleuze and Guattari, “is to sing the glory of God.” (1987, 43). An example of these different refrains seems evident in the following extract from the Encyclopaedia Britannica on the history of music theory:

St. Augustine (AD 354–430), who was attracted by music and valued its utility to religion, was fearful of its sensuous element and anxious that the melody never take precedence over the words. These had been Plato’s concerns also. Still echoing the Greeks, Augustine, whose beliefs were reiterated by St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–74), held the basis of music to be mathematical; music reflects celestial movement and order. (Epperson)

Contrary to this theory of music, the Encyclopaedia cites Nietzsche’s theory:

Nietzsche posed an Apollonian–Dionysian dichotomy, the former representing form and rationality and the latter drunkenness and ecstasy. For Nietzsche, music was the Dionysian art par excellence . . . Nietzsche gave short shrift to mathematical aspects of music, and like Schopenhauer he deprecated blatantly programmatic music that abounds in obvious imitations of natural sounds. (Epperson)

In a more contemporary musical setting we might pragmatically differentiate the first ‘kind’ (the state-refrain) to the second (nomadic) through the difference between a national anthem – that likewise transcends its content (god the nation) over the expression of its chorus of singers (the people) – with the techno-dance music in which content is singularly constructed in and by the event(s) of the dancers/listeners and the pleasure of which is drawn from its ability to allow for the expression of difference.
In Deleuze and Guattari, the refrain is metonymic of these kinds of signification practices beyond the realm of music:

The refrain moves in the direction of the territorial assemblage and lodges itself there or leaves . . . *We call a refrain any aggregate of matters of expression that draws a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes.* (1987, 323)

The state (religious or national in form) generates its own refrains, but it also captures the nomadic refrains and refrains their expression into its own despotic content. These operate as re-writings/workings; re-drawing the desire expressed through a medium of interpretation and representing that expression as content. State history, for example, refrains the events in history within a narrative framework of cultural and national dominance. So too, interpretive modes of reading often reconstitute the expression of nomadic refrains such as techno-music and read them through psychological and/or market-identity models of sub-cultural expression, thus capturing them within the terms of a transcendent content.

The refrain territorializes, but how and to what end depends on the agency of its actualisation. On the one hand, the refrain repeats in order to contain, control, and prevent difference from emerging outside the dominant system (the state). On the other hand, the refrain can be that which returns to a point of repetition from which it then takes a different direction (nomad). Therefore, there are refrains (and uses of) that carry us forward, expanding the assemblage and becoming part of our own differential territorialisation of the social (tales of joy and becoming). Then there are those that capture us up and repeat our desire in the self-same system of dominance (narratives of power and a ‘higher’ being). In late capitalism, it is the appropriation of the former and its reproduction in the latter that represents itself as popular culture under the simulacrum of everyday life captured in its own transcendence. The dominating refrain, which Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the ‘binary-abstract-machine’ repeats the statements or the state of capitalism as a determinate condition over desire’s active force towards communication and a community of difference, into representations that bind all acceptable/legal/justified expression into repressive models of enunciation. But there are other refrains outside of the state that repeat in order to differentiate. These nomadic refrains are not to be found in the commodified logic selling the popular, but are
nevertheless of the populous – working unseen; slipping beneath the capture of the image – growing roots underground towards a molecular revolution.

In the figurative metonymy differentiating the refrains of the state and the nomadic outside, Deleuze and Guattari suggest links to the game of Chess as opposed to the game of Go. On the one hand, the state lays out its repetitious refrain on a coded territory marked with coded subjects whose movements are defined by that coded identification. In Chess “each (piece) is like a subject of the statement endowed with a relative power, and these relative powers combine in a subject of the enunciation, that is, the chess player or the games form of interiority” (1987, 352). It is the dominating individuals and groups within society who are the subjects of enunciation; the players in the game of the state. They play their games against each other, putting one power formation against another: left versus right; man versus woman; mummy versus daddy; black versus white etc… And it is the subjects of the statement; the over-coded others who become subject to the movements and results of the game-play. Chess is a game of power and it operates by deterritorialising and reterritorialising through a coding and decoding of space in a play of oppositional tactics and strategies of power. The space of chess is striated: “it’s a matter of arranging a closed space.”

On the other hand:

Go pieces . . are pellets, disks, simple arithmetic units, and have only an anonymous, collective, or third person function: “It” makes a move. “It” could be a man, a woman, a louse, an elephant. Go pieces are elements of a nonsubjectified machine assemblage with no intrinsic properties, only situational ones. (1987, 353)

Go is a game of pure strategy of desire; it operates by territorialising and deterritorialising. Go has a “milieu of exteriority” and it is a matter of making the outside a territory in space; of “arraying oneself in an open space [and] . . . maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point” and shattering the enemy territory from within. In Go “the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival.” Chess is the war-game of the state and the metonymies of its battle formation are not simply linked to the terms of a history of war-proper between states, but in terms of the semiology of state stratification
and control over its internal(ised) space. Go is the war-game of the outside and the metonymies are of the battles against state stratification and control. Go metonymises the movements of customary laws of desire and becoming as opposed to Chess and its metonymic link to the stated law of power and control: “The nomos of Go against the state of chess, nomos against polis” (1987, 353):

Go is the game that Deleuze and Guattari play in their intellectual war against state-thinking and the power of its habits. And playing Go is the game I am learning to play in this thesis. As a sub-title, I am playing Go with Deleuze and Guattari in two senses of the term ‘with.’ On the one hand, I work against a habit of setting up an antithetical polemic with their work, and rather incorporate it within an attempt to follow the advice of John Landau (as quoted earlier), to set them into action. On the other hand, I draw from their work and others ideas; quotes; statements as if a field of non-subjective ‘proper names’ informs my own connection with the abode of thought. Rather than following an organised hierarchy of logical progression through the base theoretical texts, the thesis constructs readings taken from several lines of enquiry throughout the entire milieu of: Deleuze and Guattari; Deleuze; and Guattarian bodies of work. And it connects these within a matrix of other theorists and ideas that I use within the context of the experiment within my own minor-work towards the elucidation of the problem with the state. I play Go in the sense that theory/philosophy are used as non-subjective tools; and I play Go with Deleuze and Guattari in sharing their desire, that lives beyond the statement of their bodies, towards a molecular revolution in desire against the power-play of the state that would steal from us our very lives.

The Chapters:
Chapter One looks at a popular hero myth through the Batman movies. Using the Deleuze and Guattarian concept of ‘faciality’, it shows how the expression of the individual and of individual emotion is captured under the refrains of individual psychology and Oedipal narratives. Conscious action is narrated as the effect of a cause located in an unconscious driven by ‘lack’. Opposing any reading that would narrate this as a sign of modern man’s psychology, I argue that the reproduction of such mythologies of unresolved internal trauma is mapped here to the politics of the state and
reproduces the habits of state-thinking in the hero myth. To differentiate this to internal psychological representation of the Oedipus complex narrated, I call the repetition of this refrain the Batman Simplex.

Chapter Two looks at the feminist debates and discourses surrounding Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘becoming-woman’. Employing the conceptual Molar/molecular distinction, it shows how popular feminist refrains (the third wave) capture the revolutionary aspects of women’s movements into molar categories of ‘woman’ and capitalist being. They thereby force the active politics into a repressive desire for a mirroring of patriarchal hierarchies and power structures. Opposing this state, I re-iterate my own reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis as a movement away from the transcendence of molar identity and towards the becoming of a non-subjective embodiment of thought.

Chapter Three looks at the refrains and technologies of home ownership in the modern nation state and issues of private/public state sovereignty. Using the conceptualisation of smooth and striated constructions of space, it shows how dominant codes defining property rights construct and capture the desire for free movement within, between, and across spatial territories. Here I examine the struggle over indigenous land rights in the Australian territory and the struggle over sovereign rights to property. I examine a popular re-construction and mis-interpretation/appropriation of the issues of the landmark Mabo legal case in the film The Castle, in the context of suggesting that it misconstrues the issue of legal sovereignty, which remained with the state proper, to narrate a sovereign power of interpretation over property rights in the name of private capital.

Chapter Four looks at the external relations of the state in terms of flows of people and the re-construction of human-rights considered in terms of the recent and current issue surrounding immigration and in particular the legal aspects of the Tampa affair. Here, I examine Deleuze’s argument that we are shifting towards a society of control and the generalised de-humanisation of minority groups within the internal state, which becomes intensified and played out in the dehumanising construction of the minority of asylum
seekers who emerge from the external outside. I argue that humanism can be a war-machine that opposes the state, and that it is in confrontations such as this that the state ultimately shows its face as a despotic dominator of human life.

Chapter Five discusses the ways in which the state captures and appropriates the discourses of knowledge itself in the captured formulation of science, philosophy and art. I use Deleuze and Guattari’s distinctions of these disciplines in human thought to discuss the difference between the body and the Body without Organs and its relationship to the construction of thinking subjects, suggesting a method for differentiating between nomadic thinking that liberates through communication between disciplines, and the divisional politics of the state-thinking that situates them in competitive oppositional refrains. Here I introduce arguments drawn from Zygmunt Bauman on the need to learn the lesson from the history of Fascist state and its use of eugenics discourse to justify the genetic engineering practices associated with the Holocaust. I argue that current appropriations of popular(ised) psychoanalytical discourse in the field of educational psychology are being used to justify a fascistic re-territorialisation of patriarchal family values through ‘Boys in Education’ programs that institute behavioural engineering techniques to attempt an eradication of social ambivalence and a plurality of family assemblages. Like the 1930s eugenics programs, these practices are divisive and operate upon a stereotyping of difference in which social minorities are narrated as the feared other.

In my conclusion, I review the repetition of the state in terms of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche to view its refrain as a dialectics of moral nihilism. In summarising the problems with state-thinking argued throughout the thesis, I then consider becoming and the molecular revolution through the concept of involution in a direct application to, and in differentiation from, evolution. I argue that Deleuze himself involutes the capture of Nietzsche’s concept of the overman and will to power within state-thinking, and suggest a reading of the Dionysian/Ariadne, and the overman figuration through Deleuze and Guattari’s process of becoming. I conclude that the molecular revolution aims at a becoming-imperceptible whereby thinking moves beyond the nihilism inherent in the captured structure of state-thinking to an embodied ethics of affirmation.
And, and, and, I begin in the middle . . .
Black holes on the White Wall of a Concept-City:
Faciality and the Batman Movies.

The Strategy and Tactic of the Concept City:
This chapter explores the ‘City’ and its modes of policing, containment and management. In particular, I want to mark a line of flight from de Certeau’s notion of the ‘concept-City;’ incorporating a Deleuze and Guattarian mode of analysis. De Certeau suggests that in reading the City and the practices of everyday life, we need to consider a differential between the ‘concept-city’ and the poetics of everyday life. The concept-city is the homogenised spatial reference, drawing out the desires of the political and social planners who map space in the city from a voyeuristic vantage point set ‘above’ the actuality of the streets. The poetics of the everyday, however, write space through the multiplicity of “ordinary practitioners” living “below the thresholds at which visibility begins”. On the one hand, there are the “imaginary totalizations produced by the eye;” this is the concept space fictively ‘known’ in the representations of the “space planner urbanist, city planner or cartographer.” On the other hand, there are the ‘walkers’ on the street; the bodies who “write [the urban text] without being able to read it” and this is the space of the everyday ‘ordinary’ people who create the other side of the city. “It is as though,” he suggests, “the practices organising a bustling city were characterized by their blindness” (93).

In the context of de Certeau’s arguments differentiating strategy and tactic, it becomes clear that the concept-city is the strategic operation of the dominant producers of the economic order, under which space is fixed as ‘place’ and is defined and constructed in terms of modes of dominant production and consumption. The other side to this view from above, however, is the space of the tactic, where this property (the proper place) is appropriated through an everyday “spatial acting-out of the place” and a bringing it into “relations among differentiated positions” (97 – 98). Here, the “manipulation by users who are not its makers” subvert and deflect the power of a “dominant social order” not “by rejecting or altering” but through the “innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests
and their own rules” (xiii – xiv).  These tactics of everyday life are set against a reading of the social as the simple disciplinarity of producer/consumer hierarchies, suggesting that “consumers compose the network of an antidisclipine” and that “popular culture as well as a whole literature called ‘popular’…present themselves essentially as ‘arts of making’ this or that, ie., as combinatory or utilizing modes of consumption”(xv).

The mapping of space upon the concept-city is, for de Certeau, the practice of “a scientific and political technology,” in which the space itself, the writing of space, “becomes the blind spot” (95).  The writing of space is blind to the popular that is the art of everyday life and the poetics of consumerism.  While there is little disagreement with the implication of an agency in consumerist practice, I argue that this perspective retains a certain element of what Pierre Bourdieu would call a “scholastic fallacy”.  Bourdieu suggests that:

[The] cult of ‘popular culture’ is often simply a purely verbal and inconsequential (and therefore pseudo revolutionary) inversion of the class racism which reduces working class practices to barbarism and vulgarity.

And: “just as some celebrations of femininity simply reinforce male domination,” some scholarly readings of the popular and sub-cultural operate:

in the name of a respect that is at once condescending and without consequences for cultural particularities and particularisms that are largely imposed and suffered, and which are thereby redefined as choices.

This works only to enclose “the dispossessed in their condition by failing to offer them the real means of realizing their restricted possibilities”(76).

De Certeau argues tactical appropriations of the dominant represent a marginality that is “no longer limited to minority groups. . .[suggesting that] Marginality is becoming universal.  A marginal group has now become a silent majority” (xvii).

This group is not, however, a homogeneous one, and de Certeau acknowledges a difference between what he calls “the average citizen” and “the immigrant worker” (whom we assume stands in as a minority within this universal marginal) in terms of an “inferior access” (to the products of consumption) in the following way:
Confronted by images on television, the immigrant worker does not have the same critical or creative elbow-room as the average citizen. On the same terrain, his inferior access to information, financial means, and compensations of all kinds elicits an increased deviousness, fantasy, or laughter. (xvii)

The acknowledgement of difference within the tactical multiplicity is made only to redefine difference as another agency of degree in the same tactical field, accentuated by a ‘deviousness’ but nevertheless imagined as “fantasy [and] laughter”.

This is clearly the kind of condescension Bourdieu infers, and clearly the false view from afar /above that de Certeau has himself critiqued. In his stereotypical inference to an “immigrant worker”, he invokes a universal stereotype between a ‘classified’ position (worker) and an economic position within consumer culture, and he hierarchises this in terms of an implied superiority of the non-classified ‘average’ citizen.

de Certeau is himself blinded to the ‘real political’ of the minority, imagining and mapping the plurality of marginal groups to the homogeneity of otherness conceived as the space of the tactic, and blinding the view of the minoritarian politics (that are no laughing matter) to the uniformity of a limitless and heterogeneous “silent majority” whose “tactics of consumption [make up] the ingenious ways in which the weak make use of the strong” (xvii). The universality of this assumption erases the real political condition of poor minorities who are narrated as agents of what de Certeau imagines as ‘creative consumption,’ but whom are actually caught in a struggle for survival in a capitalist commodity jungle. de Certeau fails to articulate the limits of his so-called subversion, and erases the vast differences between the creative consumerism of his exemplarily ‘housewife’ who consumes according to her own means, and the punishments of the law that will ensue if she dares to go beyond this limit. de Certeau’s everyday life is very strictly the everyday life of those who live (all be it creatively) within the means and laws of the consumer culture that is neither subverted nor countered, but passively incorporated into the habitation of their everyday lives. As he suggests of the dominant texts, the consumer “insinuates” him/herself into the “text the ruses of pleasure and appropriation…pluralizing…in it like the internal rumblings of one’s body…The readable transforms itself into the memorable . . .[And] this mutation makes the text habitable” (xxi). But this says nothing of an outside to this culture, an everyday that cannot find a habitable landscape within the texts of consumer culture.
When de Certeau searches for an outside he finds only frontiers and bridges drawn from their simulation in stories, which locate them “between a (legitimate) space and its (alien) exteriority” (126). Outside of the simulation (the narrative) there is “transformation of the void into a plenitude, of the in-between into an established place” (127) by actors who are deluded by their illusions of space into declaring the law of place. And who are, therefore, still part of the inside. de Certeau finds subversive ‘representation’ against the state in paintings and art; in the simulation of a desire to step outside the law, but it does not reside in the consumptions of everyday life.\(^{15}\)

While I agree with de Certeau that there is an agency in consumption that appropriates for individual/personal desires, I argue it is in these very privatized practices that the dominant state refrain makes its capture, and at the same time reinforces the law and order within a politics of consumption subject to the limits of public and social laws. So, while de Certeau’s concept of the tactic is aimed at conceiving a multiplicity of different practices, he does not articulate any kind of means by which consumers might overcome, in any real political fashion, the domination in which they can at best create their own individual fantasies and laws (whether they re-cognise them or not). At best, the consumer is a space where all difference is reduced to the appropriation of the act of consuming and all liberation in that act is reduced to the sphere of private and personal use. Given that this neither threatens nor significantly changes the dominant order of production and consumption, but rather simply explains the ways and means by which that dominant is appropriated and accepted within the plurality of its popular manifestations, one wonders whether this can really be described as a subversive act. How, in capitalist society, can subversion ever really be found in the act of consumerism? Individual practices are themselves not reflective of an outwardly perceived manner of use; they are not themselves replications of a homogeneous utility of consumption, but this does not negate for one second their function within the dominant as a form of consumerist practice.

\(^{15}\text{And is it not the simulacrum, (a sign of a sign with no original and the artifice of agency it narrates to consumers) that creates the illusion in de Certeau’s architect who thinks himself driven to “fill in and build up” space, but is unwittingly “working toward the political freezing of place”?}\)
Producers do in fact, actively ‘play’ on this ‘difference’ or multiple utilisation in consumer practice. They are forever taking market surveys and searching for new trends, actively inventing new ways for consumers to consume and shifting lines of product availability to both suit and suggest consumption patterns in the market. Is this not the very space, the implied agency of privatisation and self-actualisation through commodity, which drives Jameson’s reading of commodification as the myth used to create a "Utopian dimension" of renewable social order (26 - 27)? Jameson argues that:

the works of mass culture cannot be ideological without at one and the same time being implicitly or explicitly Utopian as well: they cannot manipulate unless they offer some genuine shred of content as a fantasy bribe to the public about to be so manipulated. (29)

Anxiety and hope, he argues are "two faces of the same collective consciousness" (30) and therefore, despite the structural distortion the "hopes and fantasies" of the community are given a voice in mass culture:

The drawing power of a mass cultural artefact . . . may thus be measured by its twin capacity to perform an urgent ideological function at the same time that it provides the vehicle for the investment of a desperate Utopian fantasy. (33)

Furthermore, de Certeau ignores the very real repetitions of direct violence – the discipline and punishment of the state – that is perpetrated upon those who step outside the basic structures of the laws. If as Jameson suggests, the texts of the dominant include within them a utopian dimension, then we might consider how this dimension is semiotically scripted as a refrain of creative consumption (the tactical), but not without being meta-narrated within the boundaries of state law and order. Bourdieu argues that:

Domination, even when based on naked force, that of arms or money, always has a symbolic dimension, and acts of submission, of obedience, are acts of knowledge and recognition which, as such implement cognitive structures capable of being applied to all the things of the world, and in particular to social structures. These structuring structures are historically constituted forms . . . reinforced by the action of the State, which, in differentiated societies, is able to inculcate universally, over its whole territory, a common principle of vision and division, identical or similar cognitive and evaluative structures. The State is
I agree with de Certeau that everyday life is not lived in strict accordance with the dominant ideological vision of it (as viewed from above). People are not simply duped by a desire to consume according to the false images of capitalist simulacra; and they, overall, consume within the boundaries and limits of their own personal laws and values. I disagree, however, with his presumption that this capitalist dominant ‘vision’ identifies the dominant. I find it more plausible to see the workings of social/political dominance in terms of what Deleuze and Guattari call the binary abstract-machine of the state. As I read it, this binary is axiomatic to two poles of the state, figured under the binary metonym of a Magical King/Despot and a Legislator/Priest. In the Western Capitalist system, this binary can be diagrammatically considered as being occupied by, on the one hand, a schizophrenic pole of free-market capitalism, the dominant mode of exchange and the law of economics, and on the other, a paranoid pole of social institutions, the dominant moral and ethical belief systems and the law of democracy. Power is maintained, between the pull of this two-headed/ two-faced axis of control. The “silent majority” of whom de Certeau speaks are the actual majority who live in-between, and are both captured by the pull of these two laws, whilst at the same time are the driving force of its continual reproduction; the mechanism and the organs that together make up the very body of the Capitalist state. They are not without individual agency, but this sense of agency is itself the tactic of capitalist free market signification. This apparent agency is provided by the capitalist side of the state, which promises freedom from the law of the moral, only to reign that freedom back into the law of the economic and the necessity of exchanging labour power. In doing so, consumers must re-enter the very laws of the institution from which they seek escape, and as such are caught in the structural refrain of capitalism itself and desire is caught in the trap of desiring its own repression. This is, in Bourdieu’s sense, the universal ‘habitus’ of the capitalist citizen.
Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ is a term describing the situation of cognitive habits within social assemblages. I disagree, however, with his assumption that this cognition originates in a familial habitus that is somehow prior to the habitus of the state. Bourdieu repeats a Freudian logistics of social development, suggesting that the state inculcates its domination by transforming an “original libido, that is the socialized affects constituted in the domestic field” onto “major symbolic figures.” And, in this way, transform the dispositions affected by domestic socialization – “the whole set of silent censures imposed by the very logic of domestic order” – into those of a state socialization – “a moral order” (167). He argues that this transference from paternal injunctions, prescriptions or condemnations . . . would not be so powerful or so dramatic if they were not charged with desire and, through repression, buried in the deepest level of the body where they are recorded in the form of guilt, phobias, or in a word, passion. (167)

The difficulty is not that these lines of passion occur, but that Bourdieu repeats the assumption that they originate in a familial social scene somehow prior to the state. The state is right there imposing its injunctions upon the child, through direct impositions upon the mother’s body from the moment pregnancy is confirmed. I further disagree that domestic social order necessarily includes repressive injunctions and find that the domestic for many of us is exactly that space where the social injunctions of guilt, repression, prescription and condemnation are left behind in the outside world. We close the door, and expression (beautiful as well as horrid) is allowed in the private intimacies, which can be lines of flight from the dictating codes that enforce a repressed surface of social manners/codes and politeness. Repression or at least primary repression seems to be a lie. Rather, what is primary is the ‘oppression’ of the state that enforces its rules and punishments from an outside that becomes an inside. These are mediated by the parent/authority figures within the familial who are themselves forced into being the agents of the state through the numerous micro and macro political forms of work, censorship, and judgement that are oppressive in nature – repression is a secondary, even necessary, surface expression used to avoid the direct punishments of an oppressive state. I find then, that like Freud, Bourdieu himself makes a universalising assumption, which models a domestic order upon a model of a particular familial order (that of the dominant social group) as if all domestic situations function in the same way. If we
recall, however, that Freud’s studies were socially and historically specific to a particular aristocratic/upper middle class social, then it becomes clear that this psycho-social-sexual model, if it has any validity at all, is one that belongs and embodies within it the familial habitus of the dominating social group, and is not a universal structure of private relations. If, however, this model of the family is recognised and seen in all the cultural productions of popularism, is this not because those productions are the products of the dominant?

De Certeau, differing from Boudieu, recognises that consumers do not simply identify with the products of this marketed subject and consume within the creative incorporation of their own everyday lives (their habitus). He produces, nevertheless, a scholastic fallacy in failing to recognise that this privatisation of difference is a tactic of dominance and not subversion. The laws of the state force the repressive model of the dominant psychology into the oppressive model of social and psychological judgementalism, forcing minoritarian desire into a withdrawal into the private ‘blind spots;’ the hiding places of the every day. The dramas of repression, then, are not necessarily specific to a repression within the household, but an oppression of the household. As de Certeau well knows, these differences are blinded by their view from above, and that this is always the position of social/psychological researchers who structurally/socially reside outside the underprivileged others whom they look down upon, and within the privilege of systems that characterise their own blindness. Standing securely behind the state-line on that bridge-frontier, the interpreter of difference faces the alien and alienated other and habitually constructs ‘it’ in terms of differences of degree. The habit both constructs from and adds to the popularity of stereotyped difference. The state sees off others: subcultures, plural minorities, different races, different heights etc, and then it categorises those differences and pluralities into the sameness of its method of domination. The researcher occludes the abstract-machine of domination, which operates not through the experience of the other, the difference in kind, but through the habits of his/her own privilege. Bourdieu assumes this dominant ‘view from above’ that de Certeau critiques in that he erases what is blinded to him, and inserts the view of ‘authoritative’ knowledge in his presumptions of the development of habitualisation.
In part, the problem arises in viewing the family as an institution within the state, rather than seeing it institutionalised by the state. In the dominant group, the family may well operate as an institution, but for the rest of us, the state institutionalises the family. It does so by punishing those families who do not abide by its laws in a whole micro-political field of discipline and punishment from the pre-natal classes (the disciplining of childbirth), to the baby-clinic, to the family services commissions, to the political and social propaganda, to the schoolyard and beyond. Whereas Bourdieu sees the school as being almost the first statement of the state, which transforms the desire that familial domestication has inculcated towards passive acceptance of authority, I argue that the state, both juridical and economic, has by this time already inculcated its habitus. I agree with Bourdieu, however, when he says that habitus is not destiny, and I find a commonality between this idea and Deleuze and Guattari’s concept that changing habits in thought – freeing thought from the state-thinking that passively accepts the situation(s) in terms of common sense – is part of the process towards changing the oppressive/repressive binary of this civil/civic habitus.

De Certeau does not universalise the individual consumer, and to some extent Bourdieu himself recreates the problematic of de Certeau’s “view from above” when he repeats a Freudian concept of psychological development and a discourse of “cognitive structuring” which separates dispositions constructed in the familial from their appropriation in the social. In appropriating Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus,’ I prefer to think of it in terms of the assemblage, which is always already socially imbricated and subject to the laws of the state. de Certeau’s fallacy is to ignore the repetition of this binary state already imbricated in the practices of everyday life, already structuring the cognitive structures of those whose little bit of utopia is ‘felt’ through private creation, while nevertheless habituating the repetitions of public law and order, which limits their agency to the benign politics of consumption. Strategy and tactic become less about the exploration/theorisation of what makes the weak empowered and more about a system of fixed relations. From a Deleuze and Guattarian point of view, de Certeau’s dichotomous imaginary is a manifestation of the binary-machine of the state. There is nothing ultimately subversive to capitalist domination in the act of creative consumption; it is its necessary other and the artifice of self-satisfaction. The blindness
of the consumer, who is also the partial-object in the whole machine and is both consumer and producer (to a more or less extent), is at one with the strategy of the system: it is the tactic not of the other, but of the same state. And popular culture, which itself cannot be separated from the productions and consumptions of capitalist society, is simply a multiplicity of signifying regimes, whereby the stories that would be the tactics of the everyday in de Certeau, are capitalised into the statements of capitalist enunciation. Like the city plans that take on the desires of the dominant view from above, popular texts often tell the stories that map the subversions into good and bad types and construct a common sense logistics of state-thinking.

The Signifying Regimes Constructing Popular Culture:

In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari critique the appropriation of concepts, which they consider the creative province of philosophy, through a succession of challenges that perform a transformation of their nature in “collective representations” and in discourses of:

- epistemology, or linguistics, or even of psychoanalysis and logical analysis . . .
- [And] finally, the most shameful moment [comes] when computer science, marketing, design and advertising, all the disciplines of communication [seizes] hold of the word *concept* . . . here the concept has become the set of product displays (historical, scientific, artistic, sexual, pragmatic). . . the only concepts are products that can be sold. (10)

This takeover sees that the “simulacrum, the simulation of a packet of noodles, has become the true concept; and the one who packages the product, commodity, or work of art has become the philosopher” (10). From this point of view, de Certeau’s description of a concept-city is one in which the simulacrum is conceived by the town planners and architects who are the philosophers of the concept and who then package it for the market. If, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, the event has become “the exhibition that sets up various displays and the “exchange of ideas” it is supposed to promote,” then the event of this concept-city would be in the presentation of ideas to the political bodies who likewise impose their restrictions on the design etc. I doubt that de Certeau’s ideas would be incongruous with this analysis on the level of the concept city from above, but
what about his ‘creative consumers’? Would his logic not suggest that the events occur in the everyday creative acts/modes of consumption? And yet, nothing is actually subverted outside the personal space of self-assemblage, which suggests that the philosophies of subversion are themselves the creation of a concept that is a simulacrum of the capitalist market. Is not this the very concept that we are sold repeatedly in the mass-produced products of popular-culture so-called? If the concept of the City as ‘proper place’ is a strategy of control, then the concept of the everyday consumer as ‘lived space’ is a tactical control mechanism that is likewise philosophised by a dominant creator of the simulacrum. The concept-city, as a simulacrum in and of popular culture, is both a strategy and tactic of the dominating state refrain.

We might suggest that the difference between the strategic conceptualisation and the tactical one is relative to a macro- and micro-politics of capitalist philosophy. The architects and town planners work within a field of macro-political enunciation of the city, insinuating and instituting an objective landscape of strategies and stratified space able to contain the subjective moments. The scripting of the tactical space, however, is relative to a micro-political network, which institutes and insinuates an axiomatic linkage in subjective landscape of internal relations to and within the objective landscape of the city. The concept-city has shifted then, from being the view from above by the ‘objective’ observers who are blind to the movement of poetic subjectivity below, to being the representation of the city as both objective and subjective map, which conceives for and within the bounds of the desires of a dominating capitalist state.

De Certeau’s dichotomy fails to acknowledge that popular culture is as much imbricated by a mapping of dominant desires within its construction, and impinged upon by the laws and regulations of this state as is the architectural mapping of space. Popular culture and the pass-times of the popular whether privately or publicly consumed, remain bound to the binary machine of the modern city-state. They are axiomatic with a market place of capitalist representation, which carries a whole tactics of subversive desire within the concept of the commodity, and a law policed by state enforcements that stratify, or in de Certeau’s sense strategize, those representations within the limits of dominant political and social desires. In a Deleuze and Guattarian mode of analysis, this
double-sided face of the state is habituated through the abstraction of the binary-machine which divides only to conquer through the repetition of limits that are policed with the forces of a ‘common sense’ code of good and bad subjects; good and bad spaces. This is supported by the unambiguous message of enforced punishments by the state, should those limits of consumption be crossed. The state is a binary machine stratified between the strategy of space and the tactic of privatised difference in the everyday, and this links to the axis of capitalist market consumerism and political and legal moralism, which are themselves the condition of a domination of oppressive/repressive forms of good and bad expressions. The concept-city is a habitus which includes production of a common sense view that includes tactics of private consumption within the boundaries and limits of a strategy of legalised and policed statements, repeating a code, which delivers this common sense within the very (re)production of popular culture.

De Certeau speaks of the concept-City as an abstraction of the desire of City planners and reformers, and he speaks of the other side – walking the streets; the poems that walk the street – in streams, in multitudes. This other side to the architectural view from above, however, is a political aesthetic of below. Here too a concept-City is conceived of and ordered by concepts of good/bad; system/chaos; lawful/lawless; the self/other. In other words, conceived of between a secure sameness we call ‘us’ and a different and insecure otherness marked as ‘them.’ Whether demonised or romanticised, it is a common, but nevertheless limited view of life in/as the City that divides between a ‘self’ and an ‘other.’ The City planners sit down with their maps of the City, their pencils and erasers, and their CAD software packages; drawing up their plans for containing and/or erasing the populace on the street. Soo too, the scriptwriters, filmmakers, and illustrators of the poetics walking the streets sit down with their palimpsest practices and draw in narrative lines mapping the good and bad subjects. Both are, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, part of the process of a dominant signifying regime, and both create their desires within and upon the ground of a ‘common-sense’ view that unquestioningly metatextualises a binary divide delivered as/within dominant state-thinking. Both form an interconnected assemblage based in stereo-typical abstraction that is the state of capitalist modernity; the material affectation in the everyday lives of the reality we live as we wander through the streets of the city and its suburban interface, containing
ourselves in the habitus which entertains us. We are captured through our externally
directed desires for commonality/connective-synthesis, by the reflective image in the
face of a repeating simulacrum forcing desire into the pleasure of the text and the inward
directed law making us stay within the state-refrains of limited sensibility.

**Faciality:**

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that sign-systems or regimes of
signs are multiple and infinite. They list and discuss four kinds: a signifying regime
operating through a *symbolic* code; a pre-signifying semiotic operating through a code of
*analogy*; a counter-signifying semiotic operating through a code of *strategy*; and a post-
signifying regime operating through a code of *subjectification*. While each system
contains elements working with and against the dominance of the other, it is the
signifying regime and its special relationship to the post signifying regime, that produces
and maintains what Deleuze and Guattari call the white wall/black hole system, or
‘faciality.’

Faciality is the interface whereby social signification (the signifying regime) couples
with the surface appearance of a face and produces in the process a subject (a post-
signifying regime). The lines and the winks and the glances and the grimaces and the
smiles and the laughs and . . . and . . . and . . . are all recognizable attributes of facial
expression. The recognizable becomes the identifiable as mediated through a code that
inserts an unconscious/internal axiom that is produced as co-dependent and readable
through the look/the image; the gesture of the face(s). The white wall/black hole system
is not a model of depth below surface, but rather a concept of an inscribed surface upon
surface that signifies and or codes conceptions of depth and surface. In other words,
what we are dealing with is a system of surface signification combining two different
but complementary signifying practices. It produces an inscribed and stratified image of
external relations (the landscape like a chessboard or a map) upon which there are
inscribed and subjectified images of internal relations (the occupants like pawns and
kings or traffic and shoppers).
De Certeau implies a reading of popular culture as a ‘face’ of the masses – seeing it as a tactical bricolage and creative consumerism of the people – and thereby fails to take account of the modes of production of a representational multiplicity that are merely simulacra. He fails to look beyond the face of multiplicity that uniformly appropriates the surface signifiers of everyday life and striates it upon a wall of mapped relations enforced by the dominant statement of the social. His reading, therefore, is not one that conceives the actual relations of the masses, but of their representation as already mediated by dominant modes of cultural production, which is the law of representation. The cognitive structuring is not necessarily a blind acceptance – this blindness is the premise of the dominators who are comforted by the platitudes of a “devious,” laughing minoritarianism – but rather a cognition of the necessity to represent according to the laws of dominant representation. For fear of the very real judgements and punishments that inevitably ensue both socially, politically and physically against any difference that questions the simulacrum of a dominance of demographic blindness.\(^\text{16}\)

**Batman in Gotham – The White Wall of Capitalism and the Black Hole of Oedipus:**

In the many constructions of modernity’s concept-City, it is the cinematic image, which comprises the most popular representational assemblage of signification. The white wall screen is stratified with the images of an external setting and the black holes of internal subjectivity are signified in the depth-narration of the characters. ‘The cinematic vision of the City which leaves the most lasting impression is,’ according to Peter Wollen, ‘a cartoon and comic-book vision’ (25). The concept-City I discuss is the cinematic vision of the City of Gotham and its inhabitants, a comic-book vision of the City as concept. The face of Gotham City is undeniably the face of the Batman. The face of the Bat is a masked face. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the mask has two operations, either it:

- assures the head’s belonging to the body, its becoming-animal, as was the case in primitive societies. Or, as is the case now, the mask assures the erection, the construction of the face, the facialization of the head and the body: the mask is

\(^{16}\) Zygmunt Bauman argues that it is part of the project of modernity to erase all ambivalence in the ideal of an ordered society. See *Modernity and Ambivalence*. Further discussion of this argument will be considered in chapter 5 of this thesis.
now the face itself, the abstraction or operation of the face. The inhumanity of the face.  *(A Thousand Plateaus*, 181)

The mask of the Bat constructs the entire body of the Batman character: it is the uniform and uniformity of an ideal citizenship, producing a concept of internal subjectivity reflected in the shiny black hole surface of its skin.

In viewing Gotham as a concept-City, I argue that, on the one hand, the white wall consists of the stratification and the organization of the spatial images of the city. On the other hand, the black holes consist of the characterisations conceived through an internal depth, as reflected off the surface mask of the Bat. On the white wall of the City, the Batman protagonist draws his judgements, like the pen of his creators that draw the narrative lines of concept subjects across the concept-City blueprint. The people in the streets are looked upon and interpreted from behind the blind-eyes of the bat’s face, instituting its law, judging from a conception of ‘ideal’ subjectification, and erasing the undesirable ‘abject’ to the law.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, the dominant signifying regime that Deleuze and Guattari present and critique is one that they claim hinges upon an axis between Capitalism as the external signifier of social reproduction, and Oedipal lack as the internal signifier of subjective reproduction. They call this the Capital-Oedipal axiomatic. In this way, the signifying regime ensures that all subjects are brought back to an identity formulated around the dominating concept of an unconscious. The unconscious is defined by either a fear of, or a manifest ‘lack’ (castration) that operates as a cause, the resolution of which effects the production of the so-called ‘normal’ subject. This concept in turn operates to support a negation of all differences, ‘abjections’ and objections alike in terms of illness, the cure for which is a re-coding/over-coding back into the dominant regime of subjective formation. Capitalism, they argue, ‘miraculates’ the body onto the signifiers of capital (i.e. the commodities), so that lacking capital becomes a symbol of social castration. As such, the external accumulation of commodities promises the symbolic code of a completed body and the erasure of internal lack. Where this concept differs from early Marxist versions of commodity-fetishism is that Deleuze and Guattari argue capitalism does not simply appropriate an already consisting internal lack that unproblematically
belongs to all subjects. Rather, they argue that the production of the Oedipus myth is a social mechanism of the dominant class, used for the limiting and controlling of capitalism in itself limitlessly available for the return and renewal of unspecified market formations. The Oedipus myth is the construction of a particular subject, first and foremost a masculine subject and, secondly, a subject of a particular familial experiential narrative that narrates the bourgeois class. The signified alliance between capital and Oedipus supports and reproduces the naturalism of a middle-class patriarchal and patrilineal circulation and codification of the flows of capital.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari shift the ground of their refrain and discuss the formation of internalised subjectivity in relation to an externalised landscape through their concept of ‘faciality’. The face is ‘a very special mechanism . . . situated’ at the intersection of two axes: signification and subjectification:

Signification is never without a white wall upon which it inscribes its signs and redundancies. Subjectification is never without a black hole in which it lodges its consciousness, passion, and redundancies . . . This is the ‘white wall/black hole system. (167)

The term ‘signification’ is employed by Deleuze and Guattari to express the “general formula for the signifying regime of the sign” in which “every sign refers to another sign, and only to another sign, ad infinitum.” A signifying regime operates by replacing the sign with what Deleuze and Guattari call the ‘limitlessness of signification’ (112). Signification operates as a multiplicity of free-floating or de-territorialized significations, which randomly link together in constant referral to other signs. The apparent limitlessness of signification is brought back, however, to a limited and central meaning system through the regime of a symbolic register.

In Gotham City, signification is chained to the signs of capitalism, and symbolised in the icons of wealth and status drawn upon the white wall City in the architectural structures. In the daylight, the ‘normal’ subjects of the City walk the streets dressed in the grey reflections of the face. They populate shopping malls and go to work in the buildings of industry and commercial enterprise. The news-stands signal the ‘breaks’ in the utopian ideal, and by night, the City is de-territorialized with a non-subjective flow of
capitalism: crooks and thieves running black-market enterprises; abject and colourful peoples who dance rather than walk, who steal and deal rather than earn and purchase. They cannot be trusted because they are the unknowns – abject rather than subject to the flows of capitalism.

The post-signifying regime, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is ‘defined by a unique procedure, that of ‘subjectification’ (119). On the dark streets, Batman abstracts the enunciations of the people, restates them in the statement of the law, and negates all difference in the name of order. In this sense, Batman is the faciality-machine, facializing the capital-oedipal axis through a modern signifying regime: the City. He is the black hole subject of unresolved ‘lack’ working at the limits in order to limit the flows of excess capitalist lines chained across the walls of the City.

Subjectification operates through the taking up of a point or several points combining to produce a ‘single quality’ that is stratified into a linear ‘passional line’ of departure from the signifying regime. From this:

point of subjectification issues a subject of enunciation, as a function of a mental reality determined from that point. Then from the subject of enunciation issues a subject of the statement, in other words, a subject bound to statements in conformity with a dominant reality . . . What is important, what makes the post-signifying passional line a line of subjectification or subjection, is the constitution, the doubling of the two subjects, and the recoiling of one into the other (129).

The face of Gotham City faces, on the one side, the redundant signs of excessive capitalism, symbolised in the ‘proper-name’ of Bruce Wayne the billionaire, and stratified upon the white wall ‘ideal’ of the modern City. On the other side, it faces the redundant passions of a childhood trauma, represented by the black hole subject as a passional line of departure from the wall: Batman fighting upon the dark streets of otherness beneath the City.
The Black Hole(s) of Subjectification and the Teleological Line of a Becoming-paranoid:

There is a no pain/no gain teleological narrative – the coding of the period between the (casual) event of a childhood trauma to the effect/reward of transcendence – a period in training/preparation. This pre-codification operates to install an ethic of work that moves towards the goal to become the Batman. The meta-narrative codifies the years between childhood and adulthood along a line of cause and effect, where the childhood determines the adult reaction:

    Batman’s opposition to crime and support of the status quo are clearly embedded in the character’s narrative origin . . . the origin sequence centres around the criminal act that brought the Batman into existence: interrupted in the course of strolling home from a movie, in the company of their child Bruce, Thomas and Martha Wayne, wealthy, upstanding citizens, are brutally slain by a faceless, no-name thug attempting to rob them . . . Swearing to avenge his parents’ death by dedicating his life to combating crime, young Bruce devotes his youth and early adulthood to preparing his mind and body for the fight to come, his inherited wealth enabling his single-mindedness of purpose. [My emphasis] (Boichel, 7).

The original crime can never be overcome – Oedipus must repeat itself over and over – multiply(ing) the black hole of the lacking subject in the faces that come to represent the fear of the faceless, who must be sought out, identified / marked / detected / caught and institutionalised; just like us (only different). Representing the ‘face’ of and (re)-producing the anxieties of the child become adult, Batman performs the machinic technology of self; the single-mindedness that conforms/informs with a majoritarian consciousness caught on a capital-oedipal axis. He is a faciality-machine; defined by a black hole linear narrative coding subjectivity in terms of a lack that becomes the cause towards the production of a self-driven by a paranoid fear of difference.

The face is installed in the representational subject ‘properly named’ Bruce Wayne, attached to his passional line, and interpreting from his intensive point, a teleology of cause and effect. The cause of his alter ego is anchored by the linear lines of signification to the memory of his loss, which repeats itself over and over behind the
blind eyes of the bat. He sees, in the masks that dance down the street, only the face of his parent’s killer, and reacts with the passion of a frightened child turned revengeful soldier:

He’s a man at war. An intense, obsessed soldier fulfilling an oath he’d made a lifetime ago while standing over his parents’ grave. *(Batman Annual #13 rpt Uricchio and Pearson, 196).*

The narration of the characters represents a concept that constructs a model of depth. It provides a map for reading and conceptualising the cause and effect of subject and abject alike. It narrates a logical reasoning behind crime and punishment/reward and/or tolerance:

The villains, like the Batman, frequently have their origin in a traumatic event or series of events that has forever altered their lives. In the case of the villains, however, the trauma invariably drives them to madness and a life of crime. *(Boichel, 8).*

Trauma, the intensity of experience, is significant in that it signals a change; an altercation; a becoming. In Gotham, the becomings are stratified between two possibilities – good and evil – marking the just and unjust reaction to the experience of trauma. All becomings that are not oedipally motivated are coded mad/insane/criminal. Batman acts outside the law, but he is justified in doing so because he attacks those whose desires disrupt the social order. He is a state defence mechanism, operating in tangent with the lawless, only in that he makes them bounce off the white wall in the reflection of his black hole mask. This is the production of black hole selves as/in the production of coloured (spectacularised) others: The known self defined against the unknowable other.

The black hole constructs interiority as the logic of cause and effect through the teleological narrative of Bruce Wayne. Inserted into the formation of the social subject and working for the good of the dominant code, Batman models a parallel code of self acquisition based on an original link between the proper name, and the social characterisation represented on the surface as a drive towards justice. The telling of the story behind the eyes on the face is the facialization on the surface of the screen.
Stratification on the White Wall and the Maintenance of Law and Order:

Batman: the movies/the comics/ the television series, all the various manifestations of this singular black hole, constructs the entire face, the entire body as a uniform open black-mask, making it easier to place one’s own passional line right in there. Through black hole eyes (the intensity of our own subjectivity) we look upon the City, we look upon life. We are not the Batman, not the Cat-woman or the Joker: not any of the characters on the screen. We look through the eyes of the passive, the child, the citizens of Gotham. From safely inside the arms of the familial and/or the arms of the law, we learn the concept of the dangers of stepping outside the law, a capitalist code that is naturalised through its own narration. We expect the rich to get away with lawlessness, but it’s insane for the poor to be so foolish:

> When the faciality machine translates formed contents of whatever end into a single substance of expression, it already subjugates them to the exclusive form of signifying and subjective expression. (1987, 179 – 180)

The Bat produces a law and order to the street, but he never lives on the street. He appears as mere visitor/destroyer throwing his hollow blows from behind the defence of a soldierly body – not a body at all – an armour plate of paranoia. There is no point trying to face him, he sees only the reflection of his memory, coupled with a will to bring back to life the moment before. He spreads his pain across the entire landscape/the entire City. With his disciplined body masking vulnerability, his is the quest to be undisciplined and wild like the other children on the street, but he is too afraid of his own ‘otherness:’ his lack, which he bounces off his white wall. POW; WHAM; BANG; SMASH, as difference hits the wall and falls to the floor dead; or is locked behind the bars of the prison; or is tied to the bed of catatonia in Arkahm Asylum.

A sea of colourful faces becomes axiomatized as criminality in the transcendental state of the Batman’s representation. They become refrained within the statement of his gaze and judged by the law and order of the blinded dominant. The surface signification places the black hole cape of the Batman (vigilante) on the edge of the multipliCity of uniformed police. He is the detective outside the law, working to direct the law onto the unformed mass of chaotic life surviving/living on the streets of the City. The faciality-
machine interprets through representation of the black hole on the white wall
stratification along the lines of law and order/justice and injustice/self and other/good
and bad. These simple binaries divide and conquer the fear of life, and the fear of the
faceless anonymity of the crowd.

All the characters that operate outside the law are given a reason for so doing. Some of
the reasons are justified (more or less), but only on the condition that they operate
outside the law for the sake of the law. Batman is the detective, the secret police, the
moral-right who are not the law, but narrate, inscribe, and institute the code of the law in
the faces of/in the crowd. He is like the media:

Much like local television newsmen, the Batman expends most of his energy on
crimes of violence with visual potential, ignoring the visually boring crimes of
political grafters, polluters and slum landlords. In Batman’s universe, those
criminals necessarily embodying a critique of the system remain ignored while
the violent criminals whom he fights remain divorced from the social fabric,
which produces them. (Uriccho and Pearson, 205)

With no room for the face amid the already imaged other, we get objects of knowledge
drawn from speculation and assumption. Through the eyes of the Bat, we view the
intentions of those coded ‘other’ as dangerous. Pre-coded in the chaotic sea of colour,
they are the flows we cannot facialize/codify/understand. If we can see ourselves in the
pathology of the mad, we are the mad. We know how to spot the crazy colourful people;
we know what we do not want to become – institutionalised without a face, crazy and
insignificant at the end of the day when the straight jacket goes on and ‘good’ people all
go home with their senses of security.

Deleuze and Guattari speak of the operation of the faciality machine in terms of a racism
where:

Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the
White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into
increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them at given
places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from
the wall, which never abides alterity (it’s a Jew, it’s an Arab, it’s a Negro, it’s a lunatic. . .). (1987, 178)
In terms of the work of Etienne Balibar – on the emergence of a neo-racism that operates less in terms of ‘biological heredity’ and of ‘the insurmountability of cultural differences’ — we can add to this list; a criminal; a hippy; a feral; a feminist; a joke etc. This racism is based on the rejection of peoples who do not conform to the dominating social model of the capital-oedipal subject. As Balibar points out, the ‘sociological signifier [has] definitively replace[d] the ‘biological’ one as the key representation of hatred and fear of the other’ (21).

Batman’s face is the face of the City, the state, and the nation, constructing a concept of an ideal modern subject, and his rejection of all the ‘faceless’ masks of otherness, makes him the face of racism:

From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be . . . Racism never detects the particles of the other; it propagates waves of sameness until those who resist identification have been wiped out . . . Its cruelty is equalled only by its incompetence and naiveté (1987, 178).

Reproducing Black Holes and the Incorporation of new Subject Types; or how the Face Resolves the ‘Woman’ Problem:

[T]he black hole is in constant movement on the wall and operates by binarization. Two black holes, four black holes, \( n \) black holes distribute themselves like eyes. Faciality is always a multiplicity (1987, 182). The despot and his representatives are everywhere (1987, 183).

The capital-oedipal axiomatic just keeps reproducing the same model upon different bodies. It does not have to be the same story, just the same theme of external excess/internal lack. The external excess and expansion of the markets is driven by the internal lack that cannot be resolved. Capitalism draws its lines as representations of control over the unknowable otherness that is axiomatized upon a line of internal fear of lack of self-control.
The cognitive modelling of thought occurs with the repetition of the model – in the
schools, the books, the movies, etc. – the binary model is repeated over and over:
goodies and baddies; mummies and daddies; girls and boys; teachers and parents; rich
and poor – all in their ‘proper’ place inside mediocrity – everything is stratified along
the lines of clear-cut black and white. A negation of autonomous independence (do not
think for yourself – you know nothing) erases the individual’s personal context within
society, creating a lack, which is followed by an excess of nationalism and state politics.
The subject is then projected as a future goal, drawn along a teleological lineage aimed
at ‘getting a job’ and buying status and respect in the accumulation of commodities. In
other words, they are subjected to the teleology of becoming a cog in the reproduction of
a capitalist system.

In the films, the black hole mask of the Batman is an open transcendent figure of
masculine force against the fear of an unsafe City. Allied through a relationship with
Commissioner Gordon and his uniformed bureaucrats, and working for the maintenance
of a law and order, his focus on the extinguishment of the ‘baddies’ on the street, makes
him the despotic arm of state law. The black hole/mask is the blank space for our
faces/the people within the law, so that we see ourselves (secure) in the faces/uniforms
of those who maintain the law. We, the consumers of his becoming, are a passive
citizenship.

The capital-oedipal axiomatic operates on the model of the male subject where lines of
capital exchange are patrilineal and inherited, and the Oedipal myth maps the
unconscious relations of the ‘boy’ within the formation of the familial. The origin myth
of Bruce Wayne represents an unresolved Oedipal ‘lack’ that is compensated for in his
role as the symbolic ‘father’ of Wayne Enterprises. Here we see the reproduction of the
absent father in the sense that the company is operated and maintained by others. Bruce
Wayne’s own activities centre on a philanthropic benevolence. As father figure,
therefore, we have on the one hand the signification of the gentle and nurturing Bruce
Wayne who judges and rewards the ‘good’ citizens through the funding of projects and
charities. On the other hand, we have the signification of the strong and violent Batman,
who judges and punishes the ‘bad’ citizens through his vigilante-style activities on the street.

Significantly, this dual father figure purports to hate vigilantes who take the law into their own hands, and yet is blind to his own activity as a vigilante hero. This is the signification of a symbolic patriarchalism desiring to maintain an absolute control over the forces of judgement and the codification of the law. In order to maintain this control, however, the code must appropriate and incorporate into its facialization any other signifying systems that may pose a threat to its dominance. The dual force of the absent but symbolized father, who is the son of the idealized and long-dead father whose name he bears, incorporates all otherness. Others are either stratified upon the white wall of the benevolent father’s capitalist-kingdom through Bruce Wayne’s philanthropy, or they are erased from and/or covered over by, the wall through the violent father’s passional line of revengeful departure in Batman’s subjectifying black hole.

In the second movie, *Batman Returns*, the Bat meets with the Cat, and here there is a significantly different relationship from that of the other characters on the street. Like Bruce Wayne, Selina Kyle ‘properly named’ operates in the utopian Cityscape. She is the average young woman, doing an average job, and waiting for the ‘right’ man to come home to after work. Her defining event is when she is thrown out of a window by her boss for ‘knowing too much’, for doing her job too well.

In her becoming of the cat-woman she represents the ‘face’ of and (re)-production of the anxieties of the feminine excluded from the ‘subject’ of the City. She is tolerated/black-masked just like him (“you’re just like me,” he says). Is she not the white-woman caught between the links that legitimate her (to him) and her (illegitimate) desire to escape? Is she not the codification/representation of feminism; the facialization of a ‘lacking’ woman? If only she could find a ‘good’ man – like him (if only she could escape the lack of a public-subject.) She is borderline out of place when she makes alliances with the illegitimate/but constantly brought back to her own black hole when he allows her to escape (continuously). We see an example again, of how the view from above incorporates difference only to make it subject to the same structure. Her
difference is coded thus as a difference of degree; she is ‘like’ the Batman, but different. The differences in kind (the kind of thinking the women’s movement works through) are erased/covered up by the white wall and the black-hole system. Cat woman is the becoming faciality of the radical woman; tolerated as ‘his’ other: the sexual-textual metaphor that links them together as opposites in/of the same binary code of his Oedipalisation. She becomes an adjunct to the black-hole mask; an empty space for the passions of /for difference only insofar as that difference mimics in kind the representative model of a subject based in lack:

The faciality machine is not an annex to the signifier and the subject; rather, it is subjacent (connexe) to them and is their condition of possibility. . . [it] provides the substance necessary to them. What chooses the faces is not a subject. . . it is faces that choose their subjects. What interprets. . . is not a signifier. . . it is that figure which programs the signifiers. . . there is no signifiance without a despotic assemblage, no subjectification without an authoritarian assemblage, and no mixture between the two without assemblages of power that act through signifiers and cut upon souls and subjects. (1987, 180)

The sewn-together rough-texture of the Cat-woman’s black hole mask sees her bordering between the other below the street and the face that defends the subject. She is the put-together cut and pasted plastic subject of the new-woman, not quite incorporated/appropriated by the face, but not quite other to it either. By the last movie the ‘woman’ problem is solved with the emergence of the Batgirl; the re-aligned re-folded feminine representative, brought back into a teleological line where the lack is reconceived around a familial loss rather than conceived in/as a lack caused by the masculine subject. Batman is the bachelor machine, reproducing devoid of the necessity of an embodied feminine difference. In the erasure of all natural process, he represents and reproduces the mythic utopia of a modern idealism and technological control of reproduction. Alongside Robin, Batgirl becomes one of the reproductions of the face and plays a role in becoming the face of a resolved sexual division, where the gender question is placed under erasure. Whether as Dick Grayson and Barbara Wilson, or as Robin and Batgirl, this couple, compete and support each other in a representative equilateral relationship. The conflict of difference between the masculine and feminine
is now split between a good and bad feminine as a repetition of the prevailing dominant signifying regime of patriarchy. The new seamless black-mask face of the Batgirl opposes the sexually charged and liberated woman represented by the colourful Poison Ivy. Batgirl successfully over-codes, and over-powers Ivy as a feminine other, dismissing her as out-of-date, and relegating the autonomous feminine into a distant and evil past.

So too, a new familial organization extends with the reproduction of the black holes on the white wall screen of the City. Here Alfred, the domestic servant and replacement mother/wife for Bruce Wayne, is instrumental in bringing forth the becoming of both Robin and Batgirl. His role is significant behind-the-scenes maintenance. Alfred organises and manages the affairs of both the everyday life of the proper names and the ascendency into heroism of the black holes. Alfred defines the order, as Commissioner Gordon defines the law. In the last movie, Batman and Robin, the black hole faces appropriate the technologies from outside of the law by institutionalising Dr Freeze, and allowing him the opportunity to re-birth his own wife in exchange for his life-saving serum to re-birth the dying Alfred. So the Oedipal familial continues, the father and his children run towards the screen becoming the black hole face of the City of Gotham. Maintained by the order of a masculine defined (m)othering and a uniformed alliance with the law, they aim to stamp out and/or re-code all that deviate from the oedipal-capital axis on the white wall of the City. It is a mode; a dominant mode; an operative concept that forms around the intersection of two axes: the white wall/black hole system constructing a readable concept of surface/depth. But:

only in appearance is Oedipus a beginning, either as a historical or prehistorical origin, or as a structural foundation. In reality, it is a completely ideological beginning, for the sake of ideology. Oedipus is always and solely an aggregate of destination fabricated to meet the requirements of an aggregate of departure constituted by a social formation . . . In the aggregate of departure it is . . . the social formations: the races, the classes, the continents, the peoples, the kingdoms, the sovereignties. . . In the aggregate of destination, there remains only daddy, mommy, and me. (Deleuze and Guattari 1977, 101)
In reality, there is no beginning for the individual; we are born in the middle of a ‘habitus’ of state-thinking that is neither necessary, nor without historical specificity to the forces of dominant political motives.

**The Presignifying Semiotic; the Carnivalesque and the Emergence of a Counter-Signifying Semiotic:**

Before Gotham was conceived of as a comic book City, it was a fable of a ‘town.’ The myth reads as:

Gotham /Wise Men of Gotham - fools. . . It is said that King John intended to make a progress through this town with the view of purchasing a castle and grounds. The townsmen had no desire to be saddled with this expense, and therefore when the royal messengers appeared, wherever they went they saw the people occupied in some idiotic pursuit. The king being told of it, abandoned his intention, and the ‘wise men’ of the village cunningly remarked, ‘We ween there are more fools pass through Gotham than remain in it. (Dictionary of Phrase and Fable)

Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a presignifying semiotic is defined as a pluralism that prevents any takeover through the signifier and ‘preserves expressive forms particular to content; thus forms of corporeality, gesturality, rhythm, dance and rite coexist heterogeneously with the vocal form.’ The sign in the pre-signifying semiotic:

owes its degree of relative deterritorialization not to a perpetual referral to other signs but rather to a confrontation between the territorialities and compared segments from which each sign is extracted. (1987, 117)

The fable then, can be seen to represent a pre-signifying semiotic, where the gestures of idiocy prevented a take-over by the despotic king. The deterritorialisation that prevented the takeover relates to a confrontation between the sovereign territory and the territory of the township. Foolishness becomes the sign of ‘wisdom’ when it is extracted from the towns-folk segment and re-mapped to a signification as ‘idiocy’ in the narration of the sovereign segment in the story. Idiocy de-territorialised-territorialises the wisdom of the King’s desire to occupy the town. Foolishness is thus the signified mask of the people
who wisely guard their territory using gesture as an agent that confronts and wards off the state.

This concept of Gotham continues as an underlying thread in the modern visions of Gotham City, but the idiocy becomes over-coded with the concept of insanity and the territorial town that is ‘un-controllable’ is re-conceived as the ‘dark Gothic streets’ at night in the ‘bad’ sectors of the City. Opposing this is the daylight signification of organised and ‘good’ modernity providing the sane citizens of Gotham the freedom to go about their business amid the stratification of commercial enterprise. As Peter Wollen suggests, the scenarios representing the modern or post-modern City, visions it as a ‘vertical space,’ which is ‘also a class space, with a rebellious underclass literally living underground, emerging from time to time to riot and bring terror to the above ground citizenry’ (26).

In the cinematic versions of Gotham, the representation of the riot appears under the mask(s) of the Carnivalesque. From the carnival parades of the Joker and his giant balloons, to the acrobatic carnivals of the Penguin’s hit-men and women, to the fair-ground symbols of the Riddler’s fortune-telling slot-machine, to the carnival of ice-bikies that support Dr Freeze. Each movie constructs images on the street in a manner that incorporates the dancing of clownish figures and masked parades, incorporating the forms of the pre-signifying semiotic amid a carnival atmosphere.

Bakhtin defines the Carnivelesque in relation to folk festivities and ritual spectacles that operated “as an escape from the usual way of life” (8). In Bakhtin’s historicism, the Carnivalesque is drawn as a literary mimesis reflecting the atmosphere of the events of medieval carnival rituals. He follows a history of the ‘theme’ in writing and argues that it becomes increasingly demonised both in textual representation and in interpretation.

In the textual representations of the Carnivalesque in the Gotham City of Batman there is a division between the precinct gatherings of the citizens, organized and presented by the state and the ‘dark’ Carnivalesque produced as a gothic underground. The underground masks are forever changing; in each movie, a new signification of the
chaotic flows of otherness, the uncontrolled/able forces that threaten the balance of power. The capitalist super-hero abstracts the enunciation from its content (the performance) and re-states the subject in/as an identity, signified along a teleological line of criminal-insanity.

Each new multiplication emerging from the underground operates through a performative code of analogy that brings them into a representation of a cultural theme marking an identity-crisis for the subject of modernity. In each movie, an assemblage of a collective and performative semiotic enunciates the peoples. As Bakhtin says:

The material bodily principle is contained not in the biological individual, not in the bourgeois ego, but in the people, a people who are continually growing and renewed. (19)

In the narrative, the Blind as a Bat over-codes the movement by drawing from the crowd a singular mask, turning the enunciation of a collective into the statement of a singular subject. But looking beyond the rationale of teleological identity, and to the body of enunciation, we find a playful overturning of the coded lines on the face of the pacified citizen.

If we can say that the faciality machine over-coded, despotically appropriating the territory of Gotham and driving the pre-signifying carnivals underground, then their return to the surface affect a counter-signification upon the smooth-skin face. Together they signify the polemics of a counter strategy, erupting like pimples in the black hole pores; an identity crisis for the man-about-town subject who thinks he owns the City/ the face – forcing him to fight for his wealth, his status and his sanity.

The performances of the underground Carnivalesque mark the best moments in the cinematic visions of Gotham. Batman may hold the title roll, but the masked faces of the faceless forces of otherness get all the good lines and have all the good fun – they are the ones who make us laugh and our laughter marks liberation. The gestural and performative acts in the Carnivalesque operate, according to Bakhtin, as the expressions of feelings of ‘revival and renewal that is felt by all participants’ in the carnival, or in this case, the cinema.
The counter-signifying semiotic, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is based on
distributive arrangements against the state. It is a semiotic in which the transformation
of signs operate through a polemical or strategic model. This semiotic:

- proceeds less by segmentarity than by arithmetic and numeration . . . a numerical
  sign that is not produced by something outside the system of marking it
  institutes. . . which arrives at arrangements rather than totals, distributions rather
  than collections, which operates more by breaks, transitions, migration, and
  accumulation than by combining units – a sign of this kind would appear to
  belong to the semiotic of a nomad war machine directed against the State
  apparatus. (1987, 118)

The strategy of the carnival is based predominantly in terms of parody where, according
to Bakhtin, there is a ‘suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms and
prohibitions’ and the expression of ‘free and frank communication’ (10 – 11). In this
sense, we can read each movie as a Carnivalesque appropriation of the face of the City
where the counter-signification expresses a parodic but revealing reality of the
technologies of the dominant signifying regime.

In Batman: The Movie, the assemblage of counter-signification revolves around the
carnival of the Joke. Here, the parody attacks both the traditional icons of Artistic
creation and the face of the media. In the Museum, the Joke over-codes the faces of
tradition and privilege with the real art of the City: the street-art-graffiti hits the halls of
mirror images dancing to the grooves of the pop-artist formerly known as ____. The
analogy performs a graphic example of the modern subject’s crisis with the end of his
version of ‘history’ and his drawing of culture capitalised with the face on the dollar bill.
On the television, the joke is on the face of the talking heads that begin dying from their
own laughter, and the plastic-images of perfect super-models keel over from the weight
of their repetitive smiles. The sell, sell, sell is the selling of the products of death and
the combined relation between the traditional face on the dollar bill and the mediated
advertisements of commodity reproduction become the counter-signified, all new avant-
garde death artist. So, on the one hand, the dead icons of High Art are re-signified in the
creative and liberating arts of the people alive, dancing, and productive in the streets of
the City, and on the other hand, the commodity-driven productions of the all-consuming
subjects of modern television-mediated commercialism are signified as purchasing their
own death.

In Batman Returns, the assemblage of counter-signification revolves around the issue of
the body. In the carnival of the Penguin (allied tangentially with the Cat) the
signification of the subject as superior masculinity is challenged. On the one hand, the
Bat is re-signified with the eyes of the Cat, sewn together from the body of woman. On
the other hand, the Penguin is a parody of the body politic; the ugly side of the ‘first-
born sons of the City’. The Penguin counter-signifies the surface benevolence of the
political will of the subject, who appears to emerge from the multiple undercurrents of
the state, but actually originates from the same hierarchical social structure as the
Batman himself. Here, it is the manipulative language of the body politic that pretends
to come from the people for the people, that is revealed as the mask of the same face in
the service of traditional privilege. Both the Cat and the Penguin turn out to be the
‘same’ as the Bat: the Penguin through a relation to a ‘proper name’ on the white wall
City-scape; the Cat through a relation to a similarly constructing passional line in the
black hole of subjectivity. The counter-signification reveals the external-relation to the
capitalist axiomatic as a ‘corrupt’ desire to control the City, and the internal-relation to
the oedipal-axiomatic is shown to extend past the coding of a purely masculine psyche
to incorporate a feminine-inscribed subject as lack. The subject of patriarchal and
patrilineal privilege is revealed as the mutant monster of the corrupt body politic, and the
newly forming ‘subject’ of feminism is revealed as an over-coded representative of the
women’s-movement. She is tolerated by the state/the face only insofar as it can
incorporate her back-into-the fold of an ethos of working for the maintenance of the very
law that she was trying to escape. She is Cat-woman. Hear her roar, she says, as she
benevolently rescues a woman from potential rape, only to dismiss her as pathetic and
weak who pretty-well deserves what she gets. She is the parody of a particular feminist
inscribed subject, tolerated by the face because, like the Bat, she ultimately aims her
attack at weakening of the very bodies in whose name she claims to be fighting.
In *Batman Forever* the assembled counter-signification circulates around issues of knowledge and chance. In the carnival of the Riddler and Two Face, what is revealed is the state of knowledge production and corruption. TwoFace is the corrupt cop who cannot quite make his mind up which side of the fence he is on. He has inside knowledge of the police force, but one side of him is attached to the opposing forces of evil. TwoFace makes all of his decisions with the flip of a coin and this signifies the precariousness of the power invested in the uniformed law enforcers, thereby usurping the security that the average citizen is meant to feel with the expectation that the police are on their ‘good’ side. The Riddler parodies the game-show mentality of knowledge production. It is revealed as a ‘brain-drain’ as the capitalistic Enigma enterprises competes for market supremacy against Wayne enterprises. It is the ‘breakthrough’ of pure genius; ‘a thousand frigg’n Freuds,’ he yells as the new media capitalist finds the source into a multipliCity of unconscious desires. Here we have a parody of the game-show, trivia question-and-answer-time-concept, that masturbates the egos of consumers who think themselves knowledgeable as they *come on down and compete for a new car, a washing machine or maybe even a million dollars*. What is revealed is how the ‘general knowledge’ of the contestant-consumers becomes the fodder for the inflated markets of new technologies. The Riddler sells them improved (bigger and better) media products, promising them the experience of real-life virtuality, while turning them into brain-dead consumers of the code. This questions the concept of the all-knowing subject(s) whose knowledge, produced in the every-day institutions of modern education and media systems, is nothing but trivial diatribe, useful only for the accumulation and reproduction of commodified commercialism. It is the Riddler who asks the questions, and the Riddler who parodies the active flows of capital stratified across the white wall of Gotham City. The real competition takes place between the Oedipal-king Wayne and the Riddle-prince E.Nigma: between the inhibiting of capital by the Oedipal axiom on the one hand, and the decoding flows of a schizophrenic capitalism on the other. The Riddler is the Sphinx, making a riddle out of the decoded flows and Wayne is Oedipus, solving the riddle with the axiomatic power of his corporate-capitalist solution, destroying the power of the Riddler and ascending the throne of Gotham. But there is no resolution here; the repetition of the play functions to narrate the binary machine of a
Capitalism, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, ‘axiomatizes with one hand what it decodes with the other’ (246).

In *Batman and Robin*, the assemblage of counter-signification revolves around the twin issues of environment and science. In the Carnival of Poison Ivy and Dr Freeze there is an attempted alliance between an ecological environment being choked to death by the forces of industrial capitalism and a scientific drive towards the preservation of life. The Face struggles to over-code and dismiss the emergence of environmental science through the appropriation and re-direction of the scientific drive towards an individualistic medical-science, used only to preserve the life of the face. Poison Ivy parodies the image that the environment is a cruel seductress luring innocent men to their death. Dr Freeze is a parody of scientific knowledge appropriative of the powers of evolution itself and capable of reproducing a new ice age across the City. As Poison Ivy emerges from the cutting of funds to environmental preservation by the institution, Dr Freeze is the power-knowledge of a science produced outside of the institution. What is revealed is how the Face struggles to re-capture the environment and the control of evolutionary forces in order to re-institute their desires and appropriate life itself to guard against its fear of death. In this movie the secret of the Bat is ultimately revealed by his surrogate-mother Alfred: ‘... what is Batman,’ he says to Bruce Wayne, ‘if not an effort to master the chaos that sweeps our world. An attempt to control death itself.’

And it is all a joke, because in the end we know that death and life are inseparable and the control of death is the control of life. Like the bourgeois ‘subjects’ of the state, the Batman is a paranoid delusionist hell-bent on an ego-trip. His power is the power of money, which he uses to miraculate the symbolic body of an absent father birthing the blind-eyed son of an ideal concept of the city and its citizens. He is forever destined to re-write the stratifying lines of a patriarchal law across the white wall of Gotham and to continue subjectifying to death the faceless life of otherness into his uniformed/paranoid black-hole. Caught in the unresolved Oedipus, he is the simulacrum of a bachelor-machine that marks a symbolic limit to the subject-code to which we are all captured. We can only but laugh in the face of dominance, for fear of knowing that we are those very faces of uniformity enforced to mirror-image the reflection of our own passive
acceptance (as good citizens). Alternatively, we weary the fatiguing battle for difference, which we have lost from the start against the guns and the arms of a dominant state-machine.

**From Oedipus Complex to Batman Simplex – the Statement of Consumption and the Subject of the State:**

The pre-signification of the fable and the parody of the carnival ascend into a counter-signification that must be read in terms, not of the resemblances of the people (good and bad) but the becomings of the people that are beyond the statements of the popular cultural icon. There are, of course, by the time we get to the blockbuster movie series, also pre-signifying semiotics drawing the Batman out of the more parodic and camped-up television character, the various and multiple comic-book manifestations and the infinite and un-represented popular cultural appropriations/interpretations and reconfigurations. A plethora of individual and culturally/historically/socially specific connections and becomings of Gotham, Batman and his villains that undo any singular reading as a given. The different interpretations of the texts no doubt relates to the individual history of ones association to the pre-textual history of the movies. There are, no doubt, as many different ways of reading Batman and his enemies as there are viewers. These differences are, however, irrelevant to the cultural production of the text within the social, signifying only the creative consumerism to which de Certeau refers, and that I have argued is the tactic of capitalist consumption to relegate subversion into the realm of the private, that is, within the safety of the ‘black-hole’ of individualistic passional lines.

Umberto Eco argues that: “Carnival, in order to be enjoyed, requires that rules and rituals be parodied, and that these rules and rituals already be recognized and respected” (6). Robert Stam critiques Eco, arguing that he is elitist in his criticisms of the carnival, and in equating it with the “comic,” reduces it to “a purely textual entity, forgetting that real-life carnival retains a certain dynamism” (91). This argument relies, however, on the ‘experience’ of the carnival, and does not necessarily negate a critique of its political social implications within the broader context of social order. Irrespective of this, Eco’s critique is certainly pertinent in respect to the textual entity of the Carnivalesque in the
Batman movies. He concludes that “the comic is only an instrument of social control and can never be a form of social criticism” and that “popular cultures are always determined by cultivated cultures” (7). Deleuze and Guattari argue that a certain structural determination occurs in the difference between a subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement. They offer the television as a technical machine (we might suggest tactical machine) through which:

one is subjected to TV insofar as one uses and consumes it, in the very particular situation of a subject of the statement that more or less mistakes itself for the subject of enunciation. . . the technical machine is the medium between two subjects. (1987, 458)

The mass-produced machines of popular culture which are inclusive of television, movies and other forms of cultural text, include the kind of state-sponsored versions of the carnival of which Eco is so critical, and are, likewise, the enunciations of the dominant producers (the capitalists) while the consumers are the subjects of their statements. Popular cultural formations, while allowing for the ‘pleasure’ of the carnival to be signified, do so only insofar as it is devoid of the people. It becomes enunciated by the capitalist technology machine, producing little bits of utopic pleasure in the commodified parody of the organization of the city. The people, however, remain pacified as the consumers/voyeurs of the city, mistaking themselves as being the enunciators from above; they are nevertheless stated as the consumers below.

This situation is effective, regardless of the different creative readings we might individually bring to the text (the multiplicity of the private). Broadly speaking, however, I argue that there are at least two kinds of identifications with this subject of the statement, and a return to a consideration of Bourdieu’s argument for cognitive structuring is relevant here. There are those ‘more’ likely to identify with the heroic/lawful side of the text, mistaking themselves for the subjects of its enunciation – the Batman wannabes. However, there are those who are ‘less’ likely to identify, but who nevertheless are stated as both consumers of the text and citizen-subjects of the law to which the text metonymically links us. In the case of the latter, we may well feel momentarily liberated by the fun poked at the ‘hero’ and find our subversive desires met in counter-significations of the carnival, but this is the ‘tactic’ of popular cultural
representation. It gives us the ‘pleasure’ of expressing our desire, as we sit watching it all on a screen and pay for the privilege. It remains, however, only a resemblance of subversion.

We walk out of the cinema and back onto/into the streets where we behave according to the limits of the law that have already been set down, or we suffer the consequences. In this case, as Eco suggests, the cognition of the law is already present. We enjoy the escapism of its parody, but remain, nevertheless, subject to the cognition in the order words of its statement. This is thus simply the pleasure of escape; momentary and illusionary. We have learnt through experience that the law is oppressive and cannot be broken without consequence. As discussed in the introduction, for Deleuze and Guattari, it is pleasure that ends desire. Providing subversiveness a satiation, relieving it of its desire, it interrupts the active formation of the subversive desiring-machine. When the carnival is over and order is restored, the desire must begin all over again to formulate itself. Rather than change or disrupt the order of things, thus, the carnival (like the capitalist commodity) supports the reproduction of the same state-refrain. It is a tactically provided subversion working axiomatically within the strategy of state control.

For those more inclined toward identifying with the hero, and regardless of their ‘actual’ social situation and supposed historical class alignments, the desires that identify with the heroic become the links to passional lines relegated to the service of the law and order of the state. Here, it is the children who are the most vulnerable (having little experience of the law) to being cognitively structured by the text through the repetitions of the law, which they must learn from Batman in order to read the comic parodies of the carnival. So too, it is children who are targeted by the capitalist merchandising machine, which sells them Batman masks so that they might go home and play the game and continue the cognition of the order of the state. This goodie/baddie dichotomy is almost without fail the condition of all children’s popular culture; it is a binary-machine that has been present from the beginning of the state and a homology of its numerous manifestations is self-evident. Batman is specific to a modern/post-modern state dealing with the law and order of the urbanization of culture. The children are inculcated into an identification with the hero of the text, placed as they are within the teleological model
of social/cultural development, amid the early refrains of the repetition which repeat in all their literature and schooling the necessity of being ‘good’ and not ‘bad’ subjects. Unlike the individual hero, Bruce Wayne, however, their cognition is not one derived and constructed under the condition of an unresolved Oedipal complex, but through the simplex of its ‘heroic’ repetitions in the simulacrum of state order; which include within their narrative a naturalised ‘good’ familial construction (Oedipal/Patriarchal) opposing as ‘bad’ all family narratives that differ in kind.

If Bruce Wayne was suffering from an Oedipus complex, a situation wholly constructed/produced within the matrix of his own aristocratic familialism, then I argue that the mutation of identification through the popular-cultural technology produces subjects suffering something more akin to a Batman simplex. This is how the state-thinking (the judgement of others based on dichotomies of good and bad) becomes inculcated in the populous of those who are nevertheless the subjects of the statement, but think themselves the enunciators of the dominant. It is, in Deleuze and Guattari’s hypothesis the desiring of one’s own repression. And it is the way in which the dominant procure a policing of judgments within the social everyday lives of the people, and reproduce their dominance over the habitus of the city-state. It is wrong, therefore, to suggest that representations of Oedipus relate to a ‘proof’ of Oedipus as a general condition of human psychology.\textsuperscript{17} This is to make the mistake of seeing popular culture as a reflection of the people, rather than the determining condition of their every day lives. For those of us born and bred within the habitus of popular cultural refrains, it is something more akin to what I am calling the Batman Simplex that prevents any real liberation from dominant repression. The repetition of a naturalised order of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ modelling read from external images and narrating subject-identification as a set of ‘signs’ of internal character, complete with a psycho-social histiography. This ‘kind’ of thinking, this habit of thought-image-association is a simplex, not a complex, because it derives from the simplicity of repetition. The ‘theatre’ and its image-oriented choreography (strategic expression) provide the state-machine a means to direct the associations to the images, contemporary and changeable (tactical content). There may well be those who suffer Oedipus complexes within aristocratically styled patriarchal

\textsuperscript{17} And to do so is to construct a pseudo-science.
familialisms, finding it a barrier to individual liberation, but as a generalized universal principle of human or even male psychology, its simplex external-character narrations and not its complex internal-pathology constructions operate a politics of capture. The simplex causes the crowd to divide and hide and deny their differences for and from the fear of their own familiarity with aristocratic-styled judgements; to hide behind the dominant face by repeating those very judgements and desiring their own repression. In the collective movements of the people, the Batman simplex becomes the barrier to the liberatory actions of a people who are divided and conquered by a state-thinking that captures the desires of a pacified crowd.

The state does not here act analogous to the familial in general, nor does it appropriate dispositions of the familial, which are never allowed to fully emerge within the already policed and surveyed discourses of the state. Rather, this simplex is one produced through the repetitions of the popular-cultural simulacra that have no direct relationship to an actual familialism, but have become, in post-modernity, that which has replaced the habitus of directly familial relations. What Western household does not have a television? What child is unfamiliar with the cultural collateral of the popular? How many parents can afford the time (which is money) to bring their children up without the support of the post-modern babysitter? And if they try, how many Batmen and Batgirls will come out to punish such behaviour with their state-thinking simplexes that enforce that the child needs the cultural collateral in order to be a part of the community? The punishment/oppression of exclusion is no small weapon; nor is the power of the media to cognitively construct the thinking of children. And we are back to abiding (with or without consciousness of the fact) with the order of wearing the uniform mask of the face in order to function in public spaces; privatising all difference within the black-holes of the personal self. We are all inculcated within the blindness of the dominant face that is uniformly constructing the habitus of our being citizens of the state.

**Escaping the Face: Becoming-Animal:**

So how might this habitus of the face be overcome? Is there any escape from the refrains of law and order that keep us each in our place, as decreed by the state machines? If there is no real subversion in the popular cultures of the people; no real joy
in the carnival, but merely a repetition of privatised consumption in the individual black-
holes, then we are captured in the repeating habitus of the Batman simplex.

Bourdieu suggests that habitus is not destiny and there is no necessity that it remain so, but he also argues that consciousness-raising politics, such as feminism and Marxism, themselves give way to “habits of thought” when they “expect political liberation to come from the ‘raising of consciousness.” This is to ignore, he argues, “the extraordinary inertia which results from the inscription of social structures in bodies” suggesting that “while making things explicit can help, only a thoroughgoing process of countertraining, involving repeated exercises can, like an athlete’s training, durably transform habitus.” (172). There are, however, as many problems with this notion of “countertraining” as there are with consciousness-raising. While, on the one hand, a countertraining may deal with the inertia, would it not, on the other, simply replace one form of training (state) with the statement of another? And is it not the ‘habit’ of following the orders of the dominant authority of others that sees the politics of consciousness-raising become subject to the habits of the hierarchical state; turning the politics of subversion into the politics of order? Furthermore, if counter-signification is itself already accounted and tactically used within the dominance of the habitus which we seek escape, then conscious subversion is already made benign within the binary face of the state. For Deleuze and Guattari, this state habitus or assemblage, regardless of the different faces it wears, is the condition of ‘being’ subject under the capture of the state, and for them the limits of being are transgressed only through the events of becoming. If we are discussing the becoming of the people, the crowd, the pack, then we are in Deleuze and Guattari’s conception discussing a becoming-animal.

In the movies, most of the characters resemble animals, as does the bat, and while it is possible to surmise that Batman is in fact the becoming-animal of Bruce Wayne, this is to mistake resemblance to the animal with becoming. The most obvious rejection of this reading is that Deleuze and Guattari insist that becoming-animal is related to the pack and Batman is too singular, and too uniform. At best, his is an Oedipal-animality, and through Robin and Batgirl he reproduces in his own image the makings of a family tree. The Carnivalesque and the masks of the villains gets closer to resembling the pack of
becoming-animal, but this is also brought back into the capitalist order both: through the subject of enunciation within the text – the state assemblage of Bruce Wayne/Batman and the law and order of the statesignifying them as ‘bad’; and through the subjected statement outside the concept-city and inside the state selling their subversion as capitalist commodity – the movie ticket. But, “there is a becoming-animal not content to proceed by resemblance and for which resemblance, on the contrary, would represent an obstacle or stoppage” (233)

The primitive mask (as quoted earlier) was one that, unlike the masks of modern-uniformity, assured the heads belonging to the body and its becoming-animal. If the becoming-animal rituals of the primitive ways remained part of the ‘experience’ of the Carnival to which Rabelais and Bakhtin refer, then they most certainly remain nothing but a resemblance under the public control of the modern capitalist state. No doubt, as Stam suggests, there remain Carnivals in certain cultures that retain a certain vitality of movement and dance that mimics and resembles the primitive, but it is difficult to imagine that they perform becoming-animal in the same way; reduced to the masks of difference and contained within the borders of state control. How many carnivals are devoid of police presence on the outskirts of the pre-marked and licensed streets through which they are given permission to walk? Animals do not ask permission and their becomings are marked by proximity and an “equivalence of relations” (233). The Carnival then, is unlikely to be the means by which the face can be overcome or dismantled, which is “no mean affair” and “madness is a definite danger.” It is not: a question of ‘returning’ to the presignifying and presubjective semiotics of primitive peoples. We will always be failures at playing [this role] . . . and no voyage to the South Seas, however arduous, will allow us to cross the wall, get out of the hole, or lose our face. We will never succeed in making ourselves a new primitive head and body, human, spiritual, and faceless. It would only be taking more photos and bouncing off the wall again. (188)

Becoming-animal is not a matter of resemblance of older more primitive forms of its achievement; those which have already been captured in and by the state machine, but must be found in new forms of becoming a pack that can dismantle the face:
To become is not to attain a form (identification, imitation, mimesis) but to find the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, indifferetiation where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule – neither imprecise nor general, but unforeseen and nonprexistent, singularized out of a population rather than determined in a form.

(Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 1)

Before a becoming-animal or any other becoming can be reached, however, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that all becomings pass through what they call becoming-woman. It has always seemed to me that this first point in the de-territorialisation of the face is marked by a proximity of vulnerability, and it is this Deleuzian and Guattarian concept that has been particularly vulnerable to critique and attack; a point at which I will begin discussion in Chapter Two.
Becoming-Woman: Towards a Molecular Politics.

The Politics of Becoming:
In chapter one, I considered the production of faciality as a surface upon surface
signification of subjectivity that produces a privatised black hole mapped into a fixed
relation upon the white-wall of a capitalist city-state. This production of subjectivity
and subject positions divided between bad and good, us and them; state sanctioned and
non-sanctioned subjects, is what we might call the condition or state of social ‘being’
in contemporary Western capitalism. In philosophy, the concept that describes that
which differs in kind to the reproductive status quo of ‘being’ is the process of
‘becoming’. For Deleuze and Guattari, the becoming of thinking provides ways
through which the capturing of desire by the face of state-thinking can be overcome.
This marks a key ethical difference between the kind of philosophy that Deleuze and
Guattari initiate and the traditional lines that have dominated within the field.

In his traditional philosophy of the state, Plato views becoming as that which is chaotic
and disorderly, and something that must be overcome through the power of reason.
Reason, he surmises, is located in the head and is the “director of activities and the seer
of truths.” Below reason, Plato surmises that the ‘soul’ contains the “higher-emotions”
which are located in the breast and are of a soldierly nature, obedient to the dictates of
reason. Below this, in the last section of his tripartite soul, are the “carnal lusts” located
in the belly and seen as being “rebellious and disorderly” (Armstrong, 33 – 35).
According to Plato, reason must utilize the aid of the higher emotions and work to bring
into control and subdue the undisciplined carnal lust. To do this, it must engage in a
process of training (education etc) in order that it might attain the knowledge of the
metaphysical world of forms. In this manner, the soul is the bridge between the world
of sensation and the world of forms. This process of getting to know the world of forms
is what Plato terms “dialectic”. The Platonic universe is made up of three essential
elements: the patterns in the world of forms; the cause of the intelligent soul; and the
material formed and ordered. The material world is what he calls the “receptacle” or
“nurse of becoming” and it is the irrational element possessed of unlimited chaos
without character. Plato considers this element of the universe as possessing qualities,
but not substantial realities, “becomings, not beings” (50) and this “permanent irrational . . .sort of force of blind brutal chance . . . he calls necessity” (51). The becomings are never completely mastered by “Divine Reason”, but the ‘craftsman’ works towards the best possible world, striving for the ultimate good that is modelled in the perfect world of true form. For Plato, all of life is simply a “rehearsal for death” where disembodiment allows the soul to transcend the visible and material towards its “proper destiny” shifting from its lower becoming into its higher being. Cosmologically, Plato saw the universe as structured by an eternal circling of heavenly bodies, which were to be followed by an ordering of the state. Becoming follows, thus, a cycle of decadence that is re-ordered back into the golden ages of the ordered state. As the ordered ‘golden age’ of reason is viewed as being closer to the model of the perfect forms of the metaphysical world, all change in the order is seen by Plato as “decay and degeneration”. The ideal state, thus, is one that strives toward a fixed set of relations that model the hierarchy of the soul whereby the Philosopher rules as the representative of reason, aided by the warriors representing higher emotions and ordering control over the masses representing the carnal desires. And, as previously mentioned, the philosopher maintains connection to reason through the dialectical training that provides a bridge to the world of being.

If we contrast Plato’s dialectic to that conceived through Hegelianism, which becomes an historical narrative, we might surmise the inscription of what defines the “ideal good” in the metaphysical world of forms as historically specific, although structurally of a kind. Like Plato’s binary between being and becoming, Hegelian dialectical theory retains a binary between thesis and antithesis and narrates a cyclic shift between these two states. If we take the basic tenet of this theory as a processional one through history, we might consider how Plato’s thesis of an ideal form located in the perfection of being as known in the truth of the philosopher, passed through an historical dialectic and synthesized into the ideal form of Christian being as known in the truth of the priest. Furthermore, we can suggest that in modernity this thesis passes into the ideal form of the capitalist ‘being’ as known in the truth of the capitalist success story.

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18Neo-platonic Christian influences originated in the work of St. Augustine and created a “doctrine of how God illuminates the mind to enable it to know eternal truth” (Armstrong, 41).
(captain of industry), the iconic heroes of economic success and their teleological narratives. The state of being and the metaphysical realm, while having little resemblance to Platonic ideals, is nevertheless constructed around the same hierarchical structures of state order/disorder. The tripartite soul has synthesized into the dominant model of the mind over body split. The training of this mind is disciplined through the education of order as defined by those new capitalist philosopher-priests, or more to the point psychologist/analyst-priests. “Psychoanalysis has its metaphysics – its name is Oedipus” (1987, 75) and this ‘law of the father’ functions perfectly well within the patriarchal/patrilineal structure defining the economy-machine of the capitalist state. Oedipus narrates a stable familial structure as ‘normal development’ and thus justifies the conservative state in its fascistic desires to erase/eradicate differences from that model through discourses of insanity and sickness. The metaphysical in psychoanalysis (one that also pervades and meta-texts most dominant forms of state-psychology) is the ‘same’ metaphysical model as the patriarchal-capitalist state. They are in effect co-dependent domination-machines; one constructing and castrating the internal ‘psyche’ of the subject, the other constructing and castrating the external economy. And they are both co-justified by the same law.

The ‘simalacrum’ of the popular narrates the form of the social through the dictates of a dominant model that thus meta-texts the ideal forms and the laws (moral, political and social) of the capitalist state and is therefore the realm of a contemporary metaphysics. The inscription of these codes, as I have argued in chapter one, is produced and reproduced in the cultural narratives of the popular as much as other cultural narratives, and forms a metaphysics that transcends the actuality of everyday lived experience. For Plato, the creator of metaphysical philosophy, being was defined as the being located in the true perfection of the metaphysical realm of ideal forms, and the link to this knowledge was in the teaching of transcendental philosophy. That teaching narrated a hierarchy of social positions that defined the ideal state of fixed order, and a striving for the reproduction of a golden age that is opposed to the becomings seen as degradations of the soul. In modern/post-modern society, being is defined in the ideal forms of the simulacrum images of capital success and the link to this knowledge is in the consumption of this transcendental field of representations. Its teaching, in both
popular parody and popularised educational refrains, is the narrative of a hierarchy of social positions that likewise define an ideal state of law and order, and the striving towards the fixing of this ideal to which criminal and non-compliant behaviour is viewed as a degradation to the law. The habitus has changed, but the formality of an ideal persists. As shown in the previous chapter, Batman for example, is Bruce Wayne the vigilante-philanthropist and capitalism defines his rationality, he is not the philosopher of ‘reason’. And is Batman not the warrior defined by the emotions (passional lines), and together do they not work to bring law and order to the masses who are represented as perverse in their desires? So while the philosophy has shifted within the historical dialectic, the form through which the state defines and controls becoming under the model of an ideal state of being as thought in the knowledge of a privileged ‘seer’ hierarchically placed above the knowledge(s) of the masses, remains similar in kind to the dialectic of Platonic thought. What has changed is the model of knowledge that nevertheless rules in the name of righteousness and truth. The becomings of the people remain degraded under the power of a philosopher king (for reasons of his own) and his higher emotions to which he services the desire of his reason.

From this perspective, we can consider how Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist philosophy as a philosophy of becoming seeks to overcome the order of the state, which is to say the metaphysics of ideal forms and the habit of dialectical reason. In reversing the hierarchy of Plato’s dialectic, Deleuze and Guattari emerge from a world in which the transcendent model of educational enlightenment, drawn for a silent majority, is enunciated through the popularist simulacrum of psychological reasoning. It has become a standard of everyday common sense to believe that education provides knowledge, and the higher the qualification, the higher the authority to know. In democratic societies, it is the majority and not the minority who are imaged/modelled as being ‘in the know,’ and common sense is valorised as justification of this knowledge. While carnal lusts of the body are no longer seen in quite the same derogatory fashion, providing they remain in the realm of the private, it is the breaking of law and order, the status quo of this common-sense view, that defines what is degraded, outlawed and punishable as the vulgarity that must be brought to order. This common sense is of
course the illusion of knowledge and not knowledge itself and it is promulgated predominantly through the services of state education systems and curriculum, which come to replace the philosopher king. Where the philosopher taught the ideal forms of being to which all should strive through dialectics and the priest through doctrines, the capitalist state educator teaches through institutions. The ideal of education is modelled on the ideal of capitalist production; and it performs the task of managing cultural capital in the production of a skilled work force and a compliant and loyal civil population. And it does this through a network of psychoanalytic/ psychological discourses directing behavioural management.¹⁹

When thinking breaks the habits acquired throughout the repetitious indoctrinations of the state, the process of becoming reverses the teachings of ideal being, and reconstitutes it within the material pragmatics of non-ideal realities. We might note, however, that as much as Deleuze and Guattari set up becoming as an opposition to the ‘being’ of the state, their purpose is not to re-institute Platonic dualism in simple reverse. Rather, they desire an escape from the binary thinking that has become intrinsic to a systemic force of oppositional power structures that have served the dominant minority who rule or manage the state through numerous historical manifestations. Becoming is invoked, not as a simple singular oppositional force, but as a pluralism that challenges the habit of thinking either/or:

We invoke one dualism only in order to challenge another. We employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that challenges all models. Each time, mental correctives are necessary to undo the dualisms we had no wish to construct but through which we pass. Arrive at the magic formula we all seek – PLURALISM = MONISM – through all the dualisms that are the enemy, and entirely necessary enemy, the furniture we are forever rearranging. (1987, 20–21. Their emphasis.)

The traditional model informs the production of common sense thinking habits and is based on a binary thinking that is the state-refrain meta-textualising our whole understanding of who we are as civilised. The habit perpetuates a binary-machine that

¹⁹ A point to which I shall return from within a different context in chapter 5.
divides between an infinite array of dualisms, which it produces within the context of its tactical capture, in terms of an either/or; self/other; order/chaos; state/anarchy etc., which is likewise hierarchically interpreted in terms of good/bad; right/wrong. The binary model of dualisms situates the ‘being’ of humanity as a naturalized hierarchy that is defined, nevertheless, within the realms of a transcendental field of inscriptions.

Deleuze and Guattari follow a line of thinking that moves away from the state of being altogether to reveal it as a transcendental model: the created illusion of the state magician. Deleuze and Guattari regard this as a plane of transcendence. This plane of transcendence is created, however, so as to capture the immanence of production, which is the material condition of life regarded diagrammatically by Deleuze and Guattari as a plane of immanence. In this way, transcendence becomes the immanent reproduction of state-thinking. Before entering a more detailed discussion of the process of becoming-woman, which is Deleuze and Guattari’s intellectual entry point in the revolution against transcendent ordering, I will consider their descriptions of these two planes.

**The Planes of Transcendence and Immanence:**

On the plane of transcendence, interpretation operates based on a “hidden principle.” Everything is inferred through what is absent/other, the transcendental. Here, under the force of a nominative determinism or despotic signification, each marker is “always concluded from its own effects” (1987, 266). On this plane, belief is invested in the other/in the absent principle to which we must seemingly submit. The methodology/discipline may change, but the operation is the same: “this is a structural plan(e) of formed organizations” (1987, 266).

There is no becoming transcendent, because here we already exist as known; we have already 'become' prior to our invested belief in the pre-defined subject that we inhabit. It is always an absence that defines; an otherness; a dichotomous space; binary thought processes. Here we are defined by what we are not, always less than, lacking the power of the signifier. For Deleuze and Guattari, transcendental thought defines an ego, which is situated within/as the ‘subject’. Operating through exclusionary principles, this egotistical subject is, for them, fascist. This is not simply a reference to the historical
fascism of the state formation such as experienced in Nazi Germany but, as Michel Foucault puts it in his introduction to Anti-Oedipus, the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us. (xiii)

The psychosocial model(s) that insist upon and create for us fully identifiable subject positions require that we invest desire in the ego/subject, in what Deleuze and Guattari call the molar subject of identity. The molar subject is pre-structured within the hierarchal model of teleological lines of behavioural and functional subject positions and laid out in a micro-politics of typecasting and stereotyping black-holes upon the white-wall grid of the stated landscape. For Deleuze and Guattari, uncritical acceptance and identification with these positions, something we are ‘taught’ to do within the cognising force of its repetition, explains how desire comes to operate in favour of its own repression. This thesis rests on their view that desire is ultimately about creativity and free thought. Desire cannot be considered free if it is bound by the egotistic need to maintain the appearance of subjective wholeness. If desire is directed by a necessity for specific identity, transcendental signifiers perform an arborescent and hierarchical modelization of thought.

The effect of working/thinking on/through this plane of transcendence results in a repetition/production of the signifying codes and molar subjects that come to speak though the body (of knowledge) that employs its methods. When constructed through an investment in social identity politics and subject(ed) positions within state-thinking and representation, the knowledge of self within the transcendent field of being is that which a movement towards becoming must challenge:

The Transcendental field is defined by a plane of immanence, and the plane of immanence by a life . . . A life is everywhere, in all the moments a certain living subject passes through and that certain lived objects regulate: immanent life carrying along the events or singularities which do nothing more than actualize themselves in subjects and objects. (Deleuze:1997, 4 – 5)
On the plane of immanence, we encounter the rhizome: “The rhizome includes the best and the worst . . . any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be” (1987, 7). Rather than a model that traps us inside the subject, here rhizomatic thought operates through experimental processes, flows/breaks/flows. Here we sense the danger. There are no clear guides to follow; we must discover the world for ourselves. Here we move inside/outside/in/between relations of “movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements . . . There are only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages” (1987, 266).

The plane of immanence is “the plane of consistency or composition (as opposed to the plan(e) of organization and development)” (1987, 266). This is where difference remains un-coded and of itself. In its own right, difference is forever multiplying lines of flight away from the transcendent codes brought to bear from the plane of transcendence. Freedom does not come without struggle and we must be wary, warn Deleuze and Guattari, that freedom from one code does not produce imprisonment in another. We must remain undefined, as a ‘proper name’: “not the subject of a tense but the agent of an infinitive.” Remaining indefinite/contextual:

The indefinite then has maximum determination . . . the elements in play find their individuation in the assemblage of which they are a part, independent of the form of the concept and the subjectivity of their person (1987, 264).

It is within this free flow of life that we travel rhizomatically through a series of alliances and create new forms of thinking and acting within the world. “The plane is not a principle of organization but a means of transportation” (1987, 268). It is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a space containing infinite creative potential where all things are possible.

If subjectivity on the transcendental plane is teleological and molar, on the plane of immanence it is what Guattari calls “autopoetic” and molecular. Subjectivity follows rhizomic lines that are not teleologically drawn on a pre-mapped landscape, but pertain “to a map that must be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable, connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits”(1987, 21). It
has no beginning or end point, but is always in the middle of a multiplicity connecting “any point to any other point . . . The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple” (21). Subjectivity is a living line of autopoesis that assembles and reassembles a plane of immanence from a field of molecular flux in continual process of construction. In the position of being refrained within the repetition of the state habitus, captured in the black hole of identity and faciality, we are multiply/individually subjected to the same Oneness of being. In other words, “to attain the multiple, one must have a method that effectively constructs it” (1987, 22). Becoming is the method proposed by Deleuze and Guattari. It takes place in the middle of the multiplicity of immanence and is ultimately aimed at a becoming-imperceptible (to the identity codes of the state).

Becomings occur along rhizomatic lines of flight as intensities in the bodymind (there is no split for Deleuze and Guattari). They are experiential events causing a change of direction and/or a re-configuration of thought. The rhizome is the in-between, the line between the two states of molar transcendentalism and molecular immanence. The term conceptualises the processional nature of life and analytic thought. Becomings (intensities in the body) create new lines, sprouting off from the rhizomatic line, taking it in different directions. There is always the necessity to co-construct an ethics to oppose the order of morals that belong to the field of molarity. This will help to avoid the constant danger that becoming faces in the image of a fixed morality that will turn it into a becoming-fascist and bring subjectivity straight back to the transcendent over-coding of the plane. Here the process can once again become an arborescent model of hierarchical structuring, where the lines are re-territorialised under a new (or even the old – conservative-becomings) transcendental signifier.

Becoming, as a reversed Platonism and a movement away from the fascist identification with transcendental subjectivity is then, for Deleuze and Guattari, the process that defines the way in which we find a path towards rhizomic events and overcome the molarity of stated identities. In invoking dualisms only to overcome all dualisms, the opposite of molar is molecular, and the first molecularization of the molar subject of historical man’s identity is for Deleuze and Guattari a becoming-woman. Becoming-
woman, they suggest, is a point all becomings must first pass through before they can reach the autopoesis of the rhizome.

**Why pass through Woman?:**

The issue of becoming-woman and its conceptual implications has probably been the most contentious of all the Deleuze and Guattarian concepts, particularly for feminist academics, who have been ambivalent about its interpretation. Perhaps the most interesting of feminist commentators is Rosi Braidotti, who has both celebrated and engaged with Deleuzian theory, while nevertheless critiquing ‘becoming-woman.’ In *Patterns of Dissonance*, for example, she argues it is a masculine tactic that seeks to erase the specificity of women. She interprets the concept as being about the production of a model that has “gender bias” and reinforces “women’s subordinate position” (121). For Braidotti, there are serious problems with Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming-minority of women,” because she says it is “desexualization [that] annihilates sexual difference, attributing the same destiny to men and women alike” (119). As society is not yet based on an equality of the sexes, she finds this a difficult concept to swallow and claims that Deleuze:

overlooks [the fact that the] women’s movement came into being on a consensus about women’s right to control their own bodies, their sexuality. The demand for autonomy in the social and sexual sphere is the starting point for feminist consciousness” (119).

Braidotti quotes Deleuze’s own defence to this kinds of argument, where he articulates the notion of a “non-Oedipal woman . . . as real production of a daughter borne without a mother” (119). She goes on to say, “for feminists, woman’s becoming consists precisely of expressing the feminine through a non-dualistic redefinition of alterity. The mother-daughter relation . . . constitutes an essential stage in the process of this becoming: the possibility of an ‘other’ form of relation between women, and therefore an ‘other relation to filiation.’” She claims that “none of these elements . . . is taken into account by the theory of the desiring machine” (119), and goes on to quote Luce Irigaray: “and doesn’t the ‘desiring machine’ still partly take the place of woman or the
feminine? . . . For [women] isn’t the organless body a historical condition? 20 Deleuze and Guattari’s Becoming-woman, she then concludes, cannot be “confused with women and their struggles” because it “involves everyone:”

Insofar as Man is the main pole of reference in a centuries-old binary opposition that has turned woman into the other, there is no possible ‘becoming man’ . . . the escape lines or lines of deterritorialization rather point to the becoming-woman as a path of liberation. The ‘woman’ in question here, however does not refer to empirical females, but rather to a position and a mode of relation to the activity of thinking: woman is the nomadic mode (116).

For Deleuze, she says “the Women’s Liberation Movement is mistaken in its assertion of a specifically feminine sexuality: women should rather draw on the multisexual structure of the human being and claim all the sexes of which they have been deprived” (116). This leads, says Braidotti, to a conclusion that “the demand for a sexed feminine specificity in politics or in discourse . . . has nothing profoundly subversive about it.” In following his ideas, she says that women become potential agents for revolution, but only on the condition that they acquire “a consciousness which is not specifically feminine” (117).

Braidotti goes on to argue that, like Foucault’s notion of local resistance, Deleuze’s “articulation of molecular revolutions” denotes an important shift from “the macro-model . . . to the micro-model”(118). I would suggest that this interpretation is exactly the point that causes a problem for Braidotti. The micro-political and its differentiation to the macro-political is not necessarily a difference in kind when thought of in terms of the plane of transcendence. It is certainly fair to suggest that most feminist struggles occur within the micro-political field and this is signified by the catch-cry that the ‘personal is political’. The Deleuzian and Guattarian concept of molecular becoming upon a plane of immanence or consistency is not or should not, however, be thought of as being synonymous with the micro-political. There is a significant difference in kind. The micro- and macro- are distinctions in scale and not necessarily in kind. To conflate molar and molecular with micro- and macro- is itself to interpret upon the transcendent

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20 I think it important to note that the origin of these comments by Irigaray appear without direct reference to Deleuze and Guattari and as open questions. It is only through their re-quotation and appropriation in Braidotti that the whole of Irigary comes to be linked with an opposition to Deleuze and Guattari.
plane of analogous relations and therefore miss the point in the argument. All political struggles have their micro-model of proliferation, but this does not prevent them from containing molar unities that subject their participants to the over-coding of identity and transcendent subjectification. Feminism, which likes to make much of its micro-political field, is in fact a case in point that demonstrates the very workings and interplay between the molarity of identity coupled with a micro-political proliferation. I would argue that Braidotti is an example of this, instituting a model of liberation for women that meta-textualises a relationship to/with the mother that mirrors the patrilineal acquisition of subjectivity in patriarchal discourse (whether oedipally narrated or simply assumed as a necessary position of role modelling). While arguing in favour of difference, she nevertheless retains a mythic relationship between mother/daughter reflecting an entire topology of feminist mythologies of the female subject, that like the masculinity of oedipal mythology, institutes a model of subjective development that insists sexuality and one’s sexual specificity is related to a linearity of relationships with the same-sex parent.

Feminism, as a concept and as a group of intellectual texts and inter-texts, is a field of pluralities. In a different universe, at a different time, different women write from different positions within different fields of social concern. If ‘becoming-woman’ is something that is available to both men and women, then clearly, we are not talking in terms of anatomical bodies. ‘Woman’ in terms of a sexual division based on a man/woman dualism, appears to become then, a sexually neutral figure in itself. In her critique, Braidotti says: “only a man would idealize sexual neutrality” (1991,121). While Braidotti nevertheless views the Deleuzian concepts as “quite remarkable,” she questions “whether the theory of positive and multiple desire does not finally result in women’s disappearance from the scene of history, their fading-out as agents of history…[and] whether women [can] rediscover their bodies . . . in . . .[this] mechanized vision of desire” (1991,119). In other uses, however, Braidotti adopts the philosophy of becoming, but only based on a critique against ‘becoming-woman.’

21 This comment puzzled me; what, I thought, is the sexual specificity of the Cyborg? Would Braidotti consider Haraway to be a man? And if she did, would this not be, paradoxically, a confirmation of Deleuze and Guattari’s reconfiguration of the man/woman dualism?
Deleuze’s “becoming-woman” amalgamates men and women into a new, supposedly beyond gender sexuality and this is problematic . . . [However,] the more I read Deleuze, the more I am struck by the real, that is, conceptually plausible notion that the process of becoming, far from being the dissolution of all identities in a flux where different forms and connections will emerge, may itself be sex-specific, sexually differentiated and consequently take different forms according to different gendered positions. (1993, 51 – 52)

My concern is that while this is one way of making use of the concept of becoming as a theoretical tool, it effectively bypasses a consideration of the significance of becoming-woman.

In her own exploration of the issue, Elizabeth Grosz points out that criticisms levelled at Deleuze and Guattari by feminists such as Braidotti and Jardine are not clearly justified. They “are the kinds of objections that can with equal validity be directed to virtually any male philosopher – and a good many female philosophers as well” (1994, 163 – 164). Grosz does remain sceptical to a point, however, saying that Deleuze and Guattari “seem to have little if any awareness of the masculinity of their pronouncements, of the sexual particularity of their own theoretical positions” (1994, 182). So, a problem remains, but there is a shift in perspective. The first perspective cites a bias in the text; the second situates it in the authors of the text, or at least in the theoretical position from which they speak. But this second position seems to me to also miss the point. What would an awareness of one’s masculinity achieve? How can this be partaken without reinstating the gender binary? And is it not the irony of feminism and feminist discourse, while seeking to erase the hierarchy implicit within the binary, that they nevertheless demand its reinstitution in demanding that an authors’ sexual positioning within it be declared?

It seems to me, in consideration of their other work, Deleuze and Guattari play with and subvert the dominant signifiers of man and woman in an attempt to move away from all forms of biological essentialism. Like many feminists, they view the dominant ‘subject’ in history and philosophy as being coded masculine/as ‘man.’ Likewise, they speak against the dominant, which speaks a binary logic of hierarchies, and they re-code the minority term of the gendered binary between man and woman – that is ‘woman’ – as a
site of embodied multiplicities. In his summation of the concept, Philip Goodchild makes a comparison between Deleuze and Guattari and the work of Luce Irigaray. He says that if she “avoids biological essentialism,” she does so by “regarding the sexual difference as something which has to be constructed by the women’s movement” [my emphasis]. Deleuze and Guattari, he suggests, simply extend this ‘becoming-woman’ “as a task which is necessary for both women and men” (1986, 137). There comes a point when thinking through the conception of biological men ‘becoming-woman’ that we are forced to question the assumed link between the word and the body it claims to represent. In Deleuze and Guattari, the terms are completely severed from any biological link, from the teleological narrative that models the organism to its subject. In his summation of feminist criticisms, Goodchild says that to consider becoming-woman “as a move towards a ‘neuter’ sex . . . is certainly a misreading, for Deleuze and Guattari write about a multiplicity of sexes . . . they aim to multiply differences, not efface them” (1986, 137). In my own reading, I find I am in agreement with Goodchild.

Similarly, for me, the liberating affect of Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto” is that it provides the conceptual possibility to work/think/write from within a post-gendered subject that is in and of itself evacuated of all pre-coded gender signification; like the man ‘becoming-woman’, no teleological narrative can pin us down to pre-sexed origins. The Cyborg is a figure open to a multiplicity of codifications and manipulations. There are links here between two positions that, on the surface, are worlds and genders apart. Both positions express a desire to move away from pre-coded and gendered subject restraints while supporting a belief that we are active agents in the construction of meanings and affects. Following a line of similarities between their political and ethical positions, I want to suggest that the ‘subjectless embodiment’ proposed in Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘becoming-woman’ is conceptually correlative to the ‘embodied objectivity’ proposed in Haraway’s “Situated Knowledges.” On the one hand, the particularity emerges from a position facialised under the dominant subject of masculine disembodied ‘man’, while on the other it emerges from a position facialised under the feminist subject of the feminine subjective embodiment.
For Deleuze and Guattari ‘woman’ “is merely the first coherent multiplicity” (Goodchild: 1986, 137).

Becomings – they are the thing which is the most imperceptible, they are acts which can only be contained in a life and expressed in a style. Styles are not constructions, any more than are modes of life. In style it is not the words which count, nor the sentences, nor the rhythms and figures. In life it is not the stories, nor the principles, nor the consequences. You can always replace one word with another. If you don’t like that one, if it doesn’t suit you, take another, put another in its place. If each one of us makes this effort, everyone can understand one another and there is scarcely any reason to ask questions or to raise objections (Deleuze, Dialogues, 3).

In understanding the process by which Deleuze and Guattari suggest that all becomings pass through a becoming-woman, it is interesting to consider swapping the word ‘woman’ with its connotations within the dominant binary. The binary code that creates all the dualisms is one that has been well critiqued in feminist discourse. A mainstay of the critique is that, as a patriarchal system, the dualisms invoke a hierarchy of relations whereby a masculinized side of the dichotomy always dominates a subordinated feminised side. Cixous argues, “Organization by hierarchy makes all conceptual organization subject to man” (147). Feminist critiques of dominant culture argue that thought ‘worked through opposition’ follows lines of homology that link one side as a series of active, positive terms under ‘man’, as opposed to a passive, negative series of terms cast as ‘woman’. Under the dominance of a mind/body dualism, linked to a culture/nature division, all thought belongs to the universalised subject-identity of men and all embodiment belongs to that of woman. This hierarchy between a virtual figure of the mind (man) and the material figure of the body (woman) homologizes the Platonic pre-scription of a hierarchy of the soul. Woman becomes the figure of the body and its carnal desires that must be brought under control by the ruling/thinking and rational mind, figured as Man. In Deleuze and Guattari’s conception, this state-thinking constructs its power by determining the conditions of the social. The women’s movement is a movement within these social conditions, fighting against the consequences of this thinking. Becoming-woman in philosophy, however, is a concept
fighting against this hierarchical state construction of the affective medium; the transcendent over-coding of the immanence of thought production. The capture of thought by transcendence defines the being of man; a disempowering hierarchy that we are all made subject to. It is through the rejected/abjected positioning of the material body, which is signified by woman, through which thought must travel from within the state habitus towards a becoming-outside where such dichotomies no longer over-power desire. If we want to swap the term woman for another then, we might well suggest that it is a becoming-embodied, although it is certainly not a becoming-passive, which would be an oxymoron. As Braidotti suggests becoming-woman leads to “a redefinition of the embodied subject in terms of desire and affectivity” (1991, 112). The subject itself is the point of re-definition as it is erased from transcendent markers of identity and brought into the field of desire and affect.

We might consider that Haraway and her becoming-cyborg present an example that has already passed through a becoming-woman, and creates its autopoesis on the rhizomic plane of construction/immanence. Having passed through the embodiment (situated knowledge) of her own position, Haraway has bypassed and confronted the transcendent model of feminist discourse (the personal is political), retained embodiment but sought objectivity from that situated position, and has deterritorialized the demands for identified subjectivity implied in the model. If becoming-woman is a concept describing the event of nomadic thinking passing through the body – the effect of which is to dislodge (deterritorialize) molar thought patterns (habits of thought) – then Haraway seems to present an example of a woman whose work has passed through this embodiment (situated knowledge), and her Cyborg myth constructs a new becoming that has shifted thought beyond the old binary. When Grosz points out that it is clear what ‘becoming-woman’ means for men, “but exactly what this means for women remains disturbingly unclear” (177), I argue that Haraway clarifies the disturbance. Elizabeth Grosz comments that:

If molar unities, like the divisions of classes, races, and sexes, attempt to form
and stabilize an identity, a fixity, a system that functions homeostatically, sealing in its energies and intensities, molecular becomings traverse, create a path, destabilize, energize instabilities, vulnerabilities of the molar unities. (1994, 172)

The body and embodiment are sites of vulnerability for transcendental molarities; egoistic identification with transcendent subject positions is always at its most vulnerable when connected to a materiality of the body. We might suggest, therefore, that for Deleuze and Guattari the embodiment of their objective presents a confrontation with the disembodied subject of historical ‘man,’ and for Haraway, the objectivity of embodiment presents a confrontation with the subjective subject of feminism.

**The Molar and Molecular:**

‘Becoming-woman’ is most significant because it is about the process through which becoming is the movement of thought through a relationship that locates it in the body and challenges the dominant mind/body dualism. Becoming-woman is about creating a bridge between the two planes, and ‘woman’ for Deleuze and Guattari is the signifier of embodiment. “It is necessary to conceive [they say] of a molecular women’s politics that slips into molar confrontations, and passes under or through them . . . The question is fundamentally that of the body – the body they steal from us in order to fabricate opposable organisms” (1987, 276).

In their quest against the ‘subject,’ Deleuze and Guattari send out a warning to feminism about the creation of a ‘subject’ position. They claim that a ‘subject’ acts to close off multiplicities rather than provide a space for their production. Haraway likewise questions a feminist reliance on a notion of what ‘woman’ might be. She claims that gender consciousness is something that has been enforced by the “terrible historical experience of the contradictory realities of patriarchy . . . Painful fragmentation among feminists (not to mention among women) along every possible fault line has made the concept of woman elusive, an excuse for the matrix of women’s dominations of each other” (13). Of what Deleuze and Guattari warn, Haraway cites as having already occurred. ‘Woman’ can no longer be considered (at least not in the discourse of
feminism) a minoritarian position. For women, ‘she’ is a ‘subject,’ and ‘she’ is causing problems. Haraway suggests, “It is not just that “god” is dead; so is the “goddess”” (204). These comments need to be considered within the context of Haraway’s position of having already passed through a becoming-woman and residing within a cyborg-becoming where there are certainly no gods or goddesses. The vast majority of people, however, remain subjected to the habitus of state-thinking, where the magic of gods and goddesses are simulacra and the capitalist magician captures and over-codes desiring-machines as it enraptures peoples’ desire to be just like their image-idols.

I would now like to re-engage with discourses of popularism to discuss the construction of a feminist faciality that belongs both within, and as an enunciation of, this dominating mode of social subjectification. Feminism, while erupting within the field of immanence as a protest against intolerable positions for female bodies under patriarchy, has, under Western Capitalism, become increasingly appropriated into a faciality that ensures and reproduces a class dominance by enunciating the faciality of the male subject. For some commentators this is called post-feminism, but mostly it becomes narrated as the third wave. In the habitus of state-thinking, it employs an historical dialectic to synthesise the prior antithetical nature of feminist discourse into a new breed of hierarchical power politics. And furthermore, it institutes a transcendental field of iconic women positioned to act as ‘feminist/feminine’ role models, which women should, as with Plato’s dialectic, seek to emulate.

Working from the narrow social space of those who have benefited, the third wave reinstitutes feminism within the very patriarchal structures that early forms of feminism explicitly critiqued. As it does this, something is revealed about that model that was not visible through first and second wave arguments. In instituting feminism along lines of hierarchical privilege and power politics, it shows women something of the ‘truth’ of patriarchy. It is not the simple ‘other’ in a binary between one group (women) and another (men), but a hierarchical system that is, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, an abstract-machine capturing and conditioning desire and organising it into power. Just as the power-feminists ‘utilise’ ‘women’ as a pejorative power term in their own thirst for power, so too the patriarchs use ‘men’ for a similarly structured game of political
dominance. Ultimately, neither patriarchy nor feminism is about the desires of either men or women. Rather, they are different degrees of the same faciality machine that bring into being the same formation of state power; desire is, thus, divided and conquered. Third wave feminism, which has developed post 1970s (generally speaking) narrates the ‘naturalisation’ in popular culture of a subject signified as ‘woman’: this subject is defined complete with a teleology and a faciality of desire that is attributed to the unconscious desire of anatomical women. In considering the becoming of women, as the ‘event’ of a movement of women (a desiring-machine) into this being of women, as a popular feminism (a faciality-machine), we begin to see the problem we began with in a different kind of way. Rather than the problem residing in the power of patriarchal binary-thinking, and its effective division transcending masculine desire over feminine passivity; we learn that the problem is the affect of hierarchical binary-thinking, and its machinic division transcending representational power over desire that cannot, in and of itself, be represented as gendered.

Rather than making distinctions between a patriarchal politics and a feminist politics, Deleuze and Guattari make a distinction between a molar and a molecular politics coupled with their corresponding distinction between the molar 'subject' as historical man and their concept of becoming-woman, a signification of a move towards a molecularization of this subject. In a brief but significant address to the issues this raises for the women's movement, they make the following statement:

> It is, of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity . . . But it is dangerous to confine oneself to such a subject, which does not function without drying up a spring or stopping a flow. (1987, 276)

Deleuze and Guattari agree that women must “conduct a molar politics,” but warn
against the dangers of becoming confined within the created subject. As Haraway says, 
the problem for feminisms (women’s molar politics) has been where each stream of 
feminism appears to encompass the experiences of the whole (either all women or all 
the women it claims to categorise). “Taxonomies of feminism produce epistemologies to police deviation from official women’s experience” (1990, 198).

**Molarity and the Over-coding of the Women’s Movement:**

In “Many Politics,” Deleuze argues that as “individuals or groups, we are made up of lines” (124). Deleuze lists three kinds of line: the molar, the molecular, and lines of flight. These lines form what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as an assemblage rather than a fixed subject. It is the molar lines, however, that represent us in terms of the subject. Molarity, as Brian Massumi puts it, "presents itself as a stasis," as the normalization of the status quo – just the way things are – but is in fact "a productive process: a making-the-same" (106). Molarity operates on the level of the organism and by way of identification with whole units or bodies of organization. Deleuze says that molar lines operate on the basis of a "rigid segmentarity" and they move from one segment to the next; from baby to child to teenager to young adult to adult to middle-age to old-age would be one example of a segmented line. They do not always follow a logic of progression, however, and another example might be from junior to clerk to senior to unemployed to clerk. These segmented lines operate in terms of both an individual and a collective representation of subjectivity. We each have our own molar lines as well as the molar lines of collective enunciation. The latter is of significance, in particular, because the broadest of collective human molarity is conceived of as ‘man’, or historical man.

Deleuze lists three characteristics of molar-lines to explain "their functioning in the assemblages of which they form part." The first characteristic is that the “segments depend on binary machines” (128). The binary machine in the traditional concept of molar man operates primarily in terms of his differentiation to ‘woman’. Here, woman appears only as man’s ‘other.’ She performs a role that is part of man’s molar being and in effect operates as an appendage to his organization: the material body out of which he is born and through which he reproduces himself. Man, in this model, always
signifies the active subject in pursuit of his own transcendence, whereas woman, along with the so-called natural world, is the passive material upon, and through which man organises his journey. The logic of such a model marks the political and social history of the Western world in which women were excluded from both the powers and responsibilities of a public life, from holding a vote, from owning property, receiving formal education, and from speaking in their own name.

Feminism is the term used to describe the political movement of women that has challenged the model in which all power and responsibility of public life was deemed to be the sole province of men. Women have thus far won the privilege to vote, to own property, to be educated and to speak in their own name. Technically, in Western societies (and in general terms) feminism has won the right for women to obtain many of the subjective rights that were once the sole privilege of men. That this success fails to fulfil and liberate all women, or that many women and men retain a negative view of feminism, or that the very presence of this subject becomes a tool against much feminist discourse, is not to deny that such a subject exists. Deleuze argues that the binary-machine upon which the segmented molar lines operate is not only dichotomous, but also operates “diachronically (if you are neither a nor b then you are c: dualism has shifted, and no longer relates to simultaneous elements to choose between, but successive choices)” (128). Thus, feminism, which operates in confrontation with the first dichotomy of the binary-machine, nevertheless, is caught up in its abstract operation. Feminism’s attempt to critique the binary does little to actually dispense with its mode, and in fact only confirms and repeats its operation while adding an alternative ‘subject’ choice or molar segment to the subjective line. The term ‘feminist’ becomes colloquially used to describe women who do not conform to the traditional role of man’s ‘other.’ It is a term that can be both positively and negatively appropriated, but is used, nevertheless, to signify a subject differentiated to the conceptualised ‘woman’ whose subjectivity is inscribed in terms of her relationship to man. Hence, if not man or woman then your feminist becomes the continuum of the logic of molar codification. This is a machinic operation, the underlying principle of which is a code of identification.
The second characteristic of molar lines is that "segments…imply devices of power . . .
each fixing the code and the territory of the corresponding segment" (128). Devices of
power are connected with an abstract machine that over-codes and regulates. The
apparatus of the State is the "concrete assemblage which realizes the machine of over-
coding of a society" (129) It is not the state itself then, but the:

abstract machine which organizes the dominant utterances and the established
order of a society, the dominant languages and knowledge, conformist actions
and feelings, the segments which prevail over the others… It does not depend
on the State, but its effectiveness depends on the State as the assemblage which
realizes it in a social field. (129)

In other words, the State is the concrete application of an abstraction-machine of
dominant political trends in the same way that, although the effects are of a different
line of segmentarity, the fashion industry is the concrete assemblage realizing the
abstraction-machine of dominant trends in fashion. What dominates is not necessarily
that which is in the best interests of the majority, however, although it is what is
accepted as the norm by a majoritarian collective.

Feminist discourse has and continues to bring to the surface attention of social
representation both a women's history and the stories of women’s involvement in
history. The abstract-machine of molarity, however, over-codes the positive passions
and struggles of women's movements into a normalising and stable representative
'subject' no longer oppositional to the status quo, but fully incorporated into the
maintenance of that status quo. Feminism, as the politics of women’s liberation, has
been narrated and historicized in terms of waves. Both first and second wave feminism
narrate stories of an oppositional struggle for the rights of women in a patriarchal and
misogynist social structure. Periodisations of social movements are always a reduction
of the multiple struggles and events that took place in the changing of the social world
in which we live. It is, however, undeniable that these feminisms of opposition have
become written down as historical discourses of past struggles. First wave feminism is
reduced primarily to the struggle for a political subject and the right to vote is seen as
the significant achievement of that era of women’s liberation. Second wave feminism,
while more recent and perhaps yet to be completely reduced (particularly in the
Third wave feminism takes the lines of established subjective desire from both first and second wave as a pre-given, continuing to insist on women’s rights to both a public political voice as well as a personal choice over sexuality and the body. Despite the continuance of these lines, however, what becomes mediated as significant in third wave feminism is not the struggles it wages against the dominant, but its struggle to insinuate feminism within and alongside mainstream political dominance. Its oppositional status thus, becomes part of the binary state model whereby its ‘others’ are, like its patriarchal counterpart, all of those (men and women) who are non-compliant to the dictates of its psychosocial\textsuperscript{22} model. Here, we can see the logic of Deleuze and Guattari’s much earlier warning to the women’s movement of the dangers in developing the molar subject. The molar subject of feminism is of course the capitalist feminist.

While several prominent feminists speak on behalf of the third wave, it is, as the feminist web site named “The Third Wave” suggests, Naomi Wolf who is “one of the most outspoken and powerful voices of [this] Generation X feminism.” The site promotes Wolf’s ‘best-selling’ book, Fire with Fire, as a text which “focuses on the paradigm shift . . . from second wave to third wave” feminism. As a very public face, Wolf comes to inscribe the subjectivity of the contemporary ‘feminist,’ representing and speaking for the so-called third-wave. Regularly appearing in the pages and on the covers of popular women’s magazines, Wolf has published several well-known pop-feminist polemics, which, like her own identity, are strategically marketed along with other popular genre texts. The thesis behind her argument for a shift from second to third wave feminism is a corresponding shift from what she calls the ‘victim feminist’ to the new ‘power feminist’. Wolf sees the image of this power feminist in women like Madonna and Rosanne Arnold, popular icons who she claims “women identify intensely with” as opposed to the visions within an organised “feminist movement”

\textsuperscript{22} I should note that this model tends to operate closer to a Lacanian psychoanalytic influence than a purely Freudian one, focusing on the sign-system of unconscious intent/desire in a linguistic paradigm. Thus, the mutation of this understanding/interpretation of feminist inspired critique has developed social order-words that come to be colloquially termed ‘political correctness,’ instituting its power-capture over linguistic rather than biological/somatic signifiers.
As much as I disagree with Wolf’s positive and ecstatic promotion of this kind of feminism, I do agree that it is these popular and powerful female icons that the abstract-machine produces as the face of feminism for the eyes of the majority. If ‘feminism’ is no longer a dirty word, this is because it is now conceived of from ‘inside’ and is thus no longer ‘outside’ the dominant code.

The third characteristic of molar lines cited by Deleuze, is that they all enclose what he terms a plane of organization "which concerns both forms and their development, subjects and their formation." This plane "has at its disposal a supplementary dimension (over-coding)" (130). The plane of organization that dominates and permeates all the molar lines in this world of the power-feminist is the organising principal of capitalism. Here, there is no longer any prejudice between man and woman as sexual subjects, but only a principal of organization in terms of capitalist accumulation. The power feminist as prescribed by Wolf is also a subject of and in capitalist society, and she herself is far from opposed to capital accumulation, having made a lucrative career from a wholesale capitalising of feminism, turning it into little more than another pop-fiction genre.

“Women” according to Wolf “should be free to exploit or save, give or take, destroy or build, to exactly the same extent that men are” (151). In capitalism, providing they have the capital with which to begin, they have exactly that freedom. As Deleuze and Guattari say in Anti-Oedipus, capitalism itself is non-signifying, its “productive essence . . . ‘speaks’ only in the language of signs imposed on it by . . . the axiomatic of the market” (241). Feminism as a commodified market production is just one more axis on the abstract-machine of late capitalist over-production. The subject behind its enunciation remains the dominant subject; whether it speaks from the face of a woman or a man, it is the subject of a dominating logic of capitalist accumulation. In other words, it remains the molar line of a public subject of historical man, even if he is a woman, and his/her other.

In terms of a molar line, feminism becomes historic narrative of a developmental subject that has emerged, like its patriarchal counterpart, as a simulacrum issuing power and influence within a hierarchal structure of those that have and those that do not. Icons, such as Madonna and Arnold have become the rich and powerful simulations of
women who are worshipped by those who desire in their image. This kind of feminist politics of idealists, identity, and identification, comes to dominate the actual real political concerns of women in the everyday, because it is aligned with the dominant mode of production and consumption, and its success is proliferated by the very market it supports. This feminist becomes the dominant subject who speaks for and over-codes the speech of women who oppose traditional positions within patriarchal codification, and in doing so, ironically, performs the very same kind of appropriation that women’s struggle has opposed. It is no less frustrating to be spoken for by powerful women as it is by powerful men: This is the power of a molar subject.

**Becoming-Woman – Between the Segments of Man and Woman:**

In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between the creation of concepts as “doing philosophy” and the marketing strategies of capitalism that create concepts purely as a means through which to sell commodities. As already suggested, I view the so-called third wave feminism and icons it idolizes as an incorporated trope of the latter. Here the concept of woman is drawn from an organised molarity and sold as a commodity alongside other patriarchal appropriations of the same image. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that “the strength of capitalism indeed resides in the fact that its axiomatic is never saturated, that it is always capable of adding a new axiom to the previous ones” (1977, 250). This feminism contests other more negative manifestations of a female image, but this does not detract from the fact that it still competes, alongside such images, as another axiom in a capitalist market. In this sense, we might discuss the concept of a becoming-woman of the subject or the face of capitalism, but this is of course the capture of becoming in the resurrection of a new look or gaze upon the face. As Camilla Griggers points out,” the public face of white femininity is a highly regulated, mass-produced organization of signifiers and interpretations” (2.1). To contest this organization, Deleuze and Guattari construct a philosophical concept of becoming-woman that in essence has nothing directly to do with anatomical women and/or the image of a woman’s body.

I suggest that Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the terms ‘man’ and ‘woman’ construct a
direct attempt to disrupt the molar code of segmentation. In this sense, their use is itself an example of a becoming-woman. The term ‘man’ incorporates, as its generic use in traditional historical language claims, both men and women as molar subjects of history, ‘woman,’ therefore, as a term generally signifying otherness becomes positively appropriated as the first movement in the process of becoming-other to the molar subject of historical man. I call it a becoming-woman because it embodies its own argument by confusing and disrupting the assumed flows of coded signifiers between the anatomical sexed bodies and the generalised and transcendental terms man and woman. Becoming-woman’s argument is concerned with the embodiment of the assemblage and a movement toward molecular lines, as opposed to the disembodiment and over-coding of the rigid and restrictive molar subject.

In an early essay on the subject, Guattari argues, "women are the only authorized repositories of the process of becoming a sexed body" (234). In other words, woman is the only signifier of a materiality of the body. Guattari argues that:

If man breaks away from the phallic rat race inherent in all power formations, he will become involved in various possible ways in . . . [a] feminine becoming. (1984, 234)

This statement reminds me of the ways in which male children are policed in their behaviour through taunts such as 'girl' or 'sissy' etc. whenever they display emotional behaviour that is not considered properly masculine. In this sense, therefore, I understand Deleuze and Guattari's concept of becoming-woman as a movement outside the accepted, constructed and socially enforced 'norms' of masculine subjectivity.

If, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, women are also caught up in the molarizing subject of historical man, we need to take account of how this first binary segmentation operates on a molar line that differentiates the working of the molar codes in terms of this split. If becoming-woman is the pivot-point of becoming, between the molar and the molecular, then the differential relationship the molar code impinges upon the bodies of men and women will likewise assume a differential requirement through which to break that code.

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari say that the little girl’s body is the first to
be stolen. At first, this may seem to contradict earlier versions of Guattari’s thesis. If the little girl has lost her body, how then does woman become the bearer of embodiment and sexuality? The point is that she becomes the embodiment of sexuality only in terms of the patriarchal model that abstracts from her the autonomy of her own sexed body and territorializes her body under the codes of its dominating norms. In the patriarchal model of gendered subjectivity, this dominating code is one that models the expression of feminine sexuality under the dictates of a masculine economy of the body. In other words, the female side of the dichotomy can and must express sexual embodiment, but only on the grounds that its expression seeks fulfilment through an active appropriation by a male counterpart. This is the logic of the abstract-machine of patriarchal gender relations: the dominating ‘norm’ of traditional heterosexuality appropriates all embodied relations and codes them according to the dictates of a masculinized active and a feminised passive. But, as much as boys and men who act outside the dictated ‘norms’ are punished through a rejection of their embodied status as men and boys, so too girls and women who act outside these norms have been punished through a rejection of their status as girls and women. And is not Freud’s theory of ‘penis envy’ a graphic example of just this form of cultural punishment against women who step outside this norm?

The point at which I take exception to Deleuze and Guattari’s hypothesis is the concept that girls are the first to have their bodies stolen, and correspondingly that women are best situated to first enter a becoming-woman. In the way that I conceive the debate, the molar code of man relies on the relationship to both gendered roles – the coding of man IS the coding of woman. Just as boys and men are policed by the abstract-codes that operate to deny them their masculinity when they step outside the codes organising that masculinity in terms of a denied embodiment, girls and women are also policed when they step outside the codes that organise their femininity in terms of a denied self-embodiment and an enforced masculine one.

When woman breaks away from the phallic rat race and the acceptance of her role
within its logic of operation, she invariably hits the brick-wall of molar men’s compliance. When woman is not to man the body necessary for him to achieve his transcendence, then man must become his own woman (express sexuality through his own body). But if a man’s psychosocial identity is predicated on the dominant model, the refusal of his necessary other to play the game results in an identity crisis, and he expresses the desire that she embody him as a state of panic. Dominant man’s need to maintain and control the situation, as he has been habituated to do, results in an experience whereby he experiences his sexuality as a rejection, rather than an expression, of the body. And as woman is the matter upon which his transcendent identity insists he act out his desires, it is woman whom he rejects, often in a very violent way. For both the woman and the man who express sexuality that is not that sanctioned by, and expressive of, a mediation of the phallic, the results can be very dangerous. Here I would cite everything from ‘poofter’ bashing and school bullying to rape and domestic violence as cases in hand of the limit experiences of the enforcement of that gendered code of phallocentric logic.

Gender roles are policed and inscribed in such a way as to model them to the code of heterosexual norms whereby the little girl becomes the model of a masculine sexuality which he himself must repudiate as his own and she must repudiate her own sexuality in order to model his. The becoming-woman of men is, therefore, as it is of women, the expression of their own embodiment and sexuality. In both cases, it is a concept that describes the struggle to wrestle back the body from the codes of molar/historical man, a process that begins and is based on an originating binary-code between man and woman/ boy and girl. Deleuze and Guattari’s positive hypothesis of becoming begins with a becoming-woman that is not an appropriation of women and their bodies, but quite the opposite. An act of purposeful deviation from the habits of molar-codes and thought processes and a political rejection of inscribed gender ‘norms’ denies and appropriates the sexed bodies of both men and women by abstractly coding them in terms of patriarchal/phallocentric logic. Becoming-Woman is about a re-appropriation of the body from the transcendence of its dominant inscription and the model of coded binary opposition; it’s about experiencing the events of embodiment on and through their own terms. It is not, however, about alternative identities, as the logic of ‘identity’
has always been, according to Deleuze and Guattari philosophy, the problem from which we need to remove our habits. The logic of identity allows feminism to be appropriated by the feminist who, when taken up by the dictates of a capitalist abstract-machine, turns out to be little different to the despotic patriarch she was supposed to be opposing.

Towards a Molecular politics – Feminism without the Feminist:

“Becoming-woman is the first quantum, or molecular segment” followed by other becomings along molecular lines that differentiate in kind to the molar lines of organised subjectivity. All becomings, according to Deleuze and Guattari, are “moving toward becoming-imperceptible. The imperceptible is the immanent end of becoming” (1987, 279). There are three kinds of line that make up the assemblage; we have discussed the molar and will now discuss the molecular, lines of flight, however, cannot be discussed as they belong to that immanent end of becoming, are collectively imperceptible, and what cannot be perceived cannot be represented.

The molecular lines operate altogether differentially to the molar lines, and are rather "molecular fluxes with thresholds or quanta. A threshold is crossed, which does not necessarily coincide with a segment of more visible lines." Here, there are "blocs of becoming, marking continuums of intensity, combinations of fluxes" (130). On these lines, Deleuze says, many things happen: "becomings, micro-becomings, which don't even have the same rhythm as our 'history'." (124). If the molar lines' rhythms can be said to go by the way of repetitious refrains of over-coding, then the molecular line's rhythm is a syncopated beat that disrupts that rhythm by degrees of more or less intensity. The level of intensity is contingent with the strengths and weaknesses of all the different lines that make up the assemblage. The abstract-machine on a molecular line operates by way of mutation and not the over-coding of molar abstracts:

molecular lines make fluxes of deterritorialization shoot between the segment, fluxes which no longer belong to one or the other, but which constitute an asymmetrical becoming of the two (131).

And the molecular lines are laid on a plane of consistency or immanence, and not an
organisational plane of transcendence. Here then, rather than organised segments assembled in a 'subject', we have mutant becomings consistent with an assemblage.

Becoming is not the formation of a way we should or could operate, but is Deleuze and Guattari's conceptual theorization of the way we do operate on a molecular level. Becomings do not always necessarily produce a positive and productive revolution against the molar-codes. While they are events that effect a de-territorialization of the 'subject', the molar-lines are always operating to re-territorialize; to make the same; to cut a new segment. Through the abstraction of representation, and retrospective consumption, the events become signed into the segments of the molar. In other words, they become organised by the segments that dominate and over-code. There is, therefore, a constant need to confront and address the molar over-codifications of a molecular political struggle. Furthermore, becomings are not always revolutionary, there is a becoming-fascist and a becoming-despot and a becoming-rapist etc. These micro-fascisms cannot be revolutionized without first taking account of the movement of becoming. And these micro-fascist tendencies can all too easily become habitual nuances, in both individual and collective assemblages, regardless of the molar lines that identify them as man or woman.

If becoming-woman is a molecular segment, it is only a segment because it retains some closeness to the molar lines, within the boundaries of embodiment, from which it attempts a shift. If becoming itself is beyond the subject, then the shift 'between' is the autopoiesis of subjectivity; the line of subjective becoming that is woman in so far as it retains closeness to the embodiment of the subject is a first struggle against, and a movement away from, the transcendent identity of the molar subject, producing the flux of an in-between being of ‘a’ subject and the multiplicity of molecular and autopoetic creation of non-subjective becomings. The transcendent face is molecularised within the assembling of singular events of embodiment. They appear as the ‘changes’ that cause ripples upon the face; the twitches and the pimples that erupt as a becoming
before the face readjusts its gaze to capture them in the axiom of being and incorporating their ‘surface’ difference only to appropriate any real difference into an axis of the same habit of being.

The molecular line of becoming and the autopoesis of subjectivity is then the embodied view of subjectivity as it is lived; the changes and fluctuations of the multiple assemblage of becoming. Where this multiplicity was something to be ‘overcome’ in Plato, in Deleuze and Guattari it is something to be lived – it is the pragmatist view rather than the idealist’s view of the world; materialism not transcendentalism. For Guattari, autopoesis is the manner in which “one creates new modalities of subjectivity in the same way that an artist creates new forms from the palette” (17). Like Haraway’s Cyborg, Guattari’s “transversalist conception” suggests that this takes place in an assemblage where “technological machines of information and communication operate at the heart of human subjectivity” (4) and is therefore created in a space that is not organic and that opposes the hierarchical purity of the human organism. Embodiment is not an anatomical molar organism, but the embodiment of the assembled multiplicity of molecular fluxes.

The ‘Cyborg,’ as Haraway narrates it, is autopoetic subjectivity immanent to the embodiment of a society in which the technical machine proliferates as an extension of the human body in the pragmatics of post-modern everyday life. This does not prevent the takeover of the signifiers of that subjectivity by the over-coding state whereby transcendent identity is cut up into fixed types of being. So while Haraway wrote in the 1980’s of this new subjective autopoesis, the proliferation of its imag(in)ing was taking place in the popular cultural simulacrum. In representation, the cyborg gets over-coded by the state identity-machine within a field already inscribed by moral/immoral or good/bad subject positions and already prescribed to the micro-politics of typecasting identities mapped to the wall of a macro-political state of being. Again, a new axiom of molarity fixes the difference in kind into an integrated image of difference (simulacrum) while nevertheless narrating it within a logic of organised body types (sexed and classified) and thereby appropriating its autopoesis into the structure that prestates the same binary machine. The repetition of good cop/bad cop in the
Terminator movies, for example, over-codes the differences in kind between cyborg and man with the differences in degree between what is the good or bad of man. Another example can be drawn from the social typecasting of the Replicants in Bladerunner, who can never escape their state-function and inbuilt limits of construction. They become metonyms for the construction of stereotyped and socially functioning subjects of the state. They are all made to be functioning workers; replacements for, and metonyms of, the working classes. And their ‘out-law’ status relates the habitus of its order of divide and conquer, pitting one constructed subject against another.

Molecular lines and the blocs of becoming that define them are characterized by Deleuze in terms of events and affects. They produce subjectivities that are, in Guattari’s terms, autopoietic assemblages. These assemblages of subjectivity become subjected andover-coded, nevertheless, by their image as subject-identities within the state refrains: molarity occurs when the state refrain repeats the expression of the event and thus captures the molecular within the abstract-machine defining content through pre-coded identity classification. Autopoiesis has no identity, not because it lacks, but because it has yet to be forced into the situation of lacking its own becoming. This occurs only in reflection of the images of identity that come to bring autopoietic movements into line with transcendent representationalism and molar codification. If becoming-woman is the negation of lack in a movement beyond identity politics, then a molecular feminism, based on an autopoietic subjectivity, would not be defined in terms of the molar-codification of the bodies that participate – i.e. in terms of sex-specific anatomical identity, but in terms of the affective production of events. In this sense, lines of molecular feminism passes through and between all autopoietic assemblages, disrupting the traditional patriarchal codes machining the molar dictates of a generic ‘man’. A molecular feminism cannot belong to any one or group identity. It has no icons, Heroes or Heroines, as these all belong to the politics of molarity and fixed subjectivity, and it contains no teleological code of acquisition to an order. It is a politics operating in the interests of liberation from the patriarchal code, which constructs a binary-code fixing all difference in opposition to a hierarchy of transcendent man. It recognises that the molar codification, whether named and facialized by a body sexed man or woman, is the production of hierarchies of both. It,
therefore, opposes the molar politics that asks us to supplicate to idols and identifications, rather than participate in our own liberation. The positive aim of a molecular politics of becoming-woman is a “politics that slips into molar confrontations, and passes under or through them” (1987, 276), leaving them de-territorialized, but its task is never complete because the state-identity machine will always re-code through its own processes of de- and reterritorialization to institute the organised body of transcendent law.

Of course, we cannot yet function in a world habituated and structured by state-thinking without a connection to the molar subject, but we should remember that this is just a face that carries us through. We need to constantly deterritorialize the ego function of identity. And it is only from positions whereby we overcome the micro-fascism in our own heads – the black-holes of the Batman simplex that produces both god and goddess tricks of blind authority and judgement – that we can re-engage in a collective enunciation that is not in danger of becoming the macro-fascism of stated exclusivity. On another plane, embodied, we can then draw our own molecular lines, ‘becoming-woman’ and living and affecting a real liberation in the events that we create not by our selves, but apart from and moving away from the self-identity that limits and restricts our becoming.

In *Negotiations*, Deleuze says of *A Thousand Plateaus*, that it “sets out in many different directions”, but there are three main ones. Firstly:

think any society is defined not so much by its contradictions as by its lines of flight, it flees all over the place, and it’s very interesting to try and follow the lines of flight taking shape at some particular moment or other. (171)

Secondly, they argue a need to think in terms of “minorities rather than classes.”

And thirdly, it takes a:

direction, which amounts to finding a characterization of “war machines” that’s nothing to do with war but to do with a particular way of occupying, taking up, space-time, or inventing new space-times: revolutionary movements… but artistic movements too, are war-machines in this sense. (172)

Having considered in previous chapters the formation of transcendent subjectivity as gendered and individualised on the simulacrum landscape of the city-state, in this chapter I will explore the transcendent codes of traditional and private rights and the manner in which they construct striated territory as laid out in the legal refrains of the nation-state. I begin with a brief review of Deleuze and Guattari’s outline of state development as an effect-response to historical ‘lines of flight’ before integrating a reading of minoritarianism and war-machines to consider how, in the development of the Australian nation-state, private rights become coded around dominant enunciations of home ownership. The chapter then explores the cultural anxiety provoked by the Mabo case in Australia and its re-establishment of traditional rights, through a critical analysis of the facialised reterritorialization and re-presentation of the legal issues in the popular film *The Castle*.

If the war-machine is a particular way of occupying space-time, it is an occupation that differentiates to the way space-time is occupied in terms of state codification and regulation. The war-machine is “outside” and prior to the stratification of state apparatus. There is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, “no universal State, but the outside of states cannot be reduced to…a set of relations among states” (1987, 360). When they talk of an ‘outside’ to the state, therefore, they are not speaking of the way
different states regulate and function along different lines and through different political apparatuses. Issues of dominating political statehood and/or the difference between lifestyles and cultural practice from one state to another are not the issue. In looking at the way Deleuze and Guattari’s view of state machinery operates, I will draw on my own situated knowledge within the model of the Australian nation-State.

**Capitalism and the State:**
As mentioned earlier, in *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari speak of political domination as having two heads metonymically figured by the Magician-King and the Jurist-priest, also described as the despot and the legislator; the binder and the organizer; the bond and the pact. These are the “principal elements of State apparatus that proceeds by a one-two, distributes binary distinctions, and forms a milieu of interiority” (352). If these are the principal elements, then the way the interiority operates has developed, according to Deleuze and Guattari, through three significant forms. In the first instance, the “archaic imperial state” operates by over-coding the codes of territoriality in so-called primitive societies. It operates by means of an “apparatus of capture” that structures a society in terms of a “machinic enslavement.” In summary, this functions through bureaucratic control of labour through public works; control of wealth through monetary flows mediated through rent, profit and above all taxation; and the control of land/territory in the creation of public property.

Deleuze and Guattari argue, however, that; “the overcoding of the archaic State itself makes possible and gives rise to new flows that escape from it” (449). Independent labour and flows of money escape the bureaucratic and taxation system and, “above all” a system of public property is not created:

without a flow of private appropriation growing up beside it, then beginning to pass beyond its grasp; this private property does not itself issue from the archaic system but is constituted on the margin, all the more necessarily and inevitably, slipping through the net of overcoding. (449)

The “State apparatus is faced with a new task, which consists less in overcoding already coded flows than in organizing conjunctions of decoded flows as such.” This form of the state operates by replacing machinic enslavement with a “regime of social subjection . . .
this yields the public-private mixes constitutive of the modern world. *The bond becomes personal*” (451). Deleuze and Guattari argue this produces a diversity of states, “evolved empires, autonomous cities, feudal systems, monarchies” in which decoded flows are “qualified” through “subjectification and subjection” (459). There is a shift from a generalized slavery or “the public availability of the communal worker” to a privatised slavery where “private property is applied to individual workers” (451). The personal bond for the state subject is one of “dependence, both between owners (contracts) and between owned and owners (conventions)” (451).

Processes of subjectification, however, do not prevent “decoded flows from continuing to flow.” The single subject becomes expressed in terms of its objective wealth, and labour becomes generalized in terms of its materialization, the product. On the one hand, wealth shifts from its determination as “merchant’s or landed wealth” to “become pure homogeneous and independent capital” and on the other hand, labour is no longer determined by slavery or serfdom and becomes “naked and free labour” (452). Capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari go on to argue, “forms when the flow of unqualified wealth encounters the flow of unqualified labour and conjugates with it” and thus “forms with a general axiomatic of decoded flows.” Private property and capital no longer form a condition of dependence, but now constitute the “sole bond” on an independent subject. The state “increasingly assumes the direct form and immediate characteristics of an axiomatic, as evidenced in our civil “code” (453). The state, while based on a form of de- and re-territorialization is nevertheless a form of territoriality, whereas capitalism is not territorial. The object of capitalism is not the earth/ territory, but “materialized labor,” that is, the commodity. “Private property is no longer ownership of the land or the soil, nor even the means of production as such, but of convertible abstract rights” (454).

The capitalist axiom is an abstract-machine, its code is mathematical in that it counts or takes account of its flows in terms of numbers; if its object is the ‘commodity’, then its subject is money. The capitalist refrain is one that takes place between the subject of money and the object of commodities. Capitalism functions in a rhythm of numbers of commodities (objects) in relation to numbers/amounts of money. Money is used to
acquire labour, which is used to materialize a commodity, which is used to make more money, which is used to materialize (purchase) commodities that signify wealth (i.e. money). The general rule of the axis is to engage with the flows of money and commodity/subject and object in order to profit. That is, to ‘capitalise’. To capitalise is to make something of the situation. Those who make the most of the situation are those whose personal accumulations of commodities (assets) signify the most wealth – these are the most successful capitalists.

If this is the refrain of capitalism, then it operates as much with a conjugation of the molecular abstract-machine of mutation, as it does with the molar abstract-machine of identification. Capitalism is full of stories of poor pub-singers mutated into rich pop-stars, and then there are the failed becomings of capitalism – turning rich aristocrats into bankrupts. “In Capitalism only one thing is universal, the market” (Negotiations, 173).

The refrain fixes only the formula, for and not the character of, its subject:

When the flow reach this capitalist threshold of decoding and deterritorlization (naked labor, independent capital), it seems that there is no longer a need for a State, for distinct juridical and political domination, in order to ensure appropriation, which has become directly economic” (Deleuze and Guattari: 1987, 453).

Deleuze and Guattari argue, however, that this is not the case, as this capitalist axiom is only a “partial aspect of capital” and one distinguished from “all manner of codes, overcoding and recodings:”

The imminent axiomatic finds in the domains it moves through so many models, termed models of realization. It could similarly be said that capital as a right . . . is realized in sectors and means of production (or that ‘unified capital’ is realized in ‘differentiated capital’). However, the different sectors are not alone is serving as models of realization – The States do too. Each of them groups together and combines several sectors, according to its resources, population, wealth, industrial capacity, etc. Thus the States in capitalism are not canceled out but change form and take on a new meaning: models of realization for a worldwide axiomatic that exceeds them. (1987, 454)
To exceed, they point out, is “not at all the same thing as doing without . . . capitalism proceeds” they argue “by way of the State-form” (454). “What is called a nation-state, in the most diverse forms, is precisely the State as a model of realization” (456). The state de-territorializes to moderate capitalist deterritorialization and provides “compensatory reterritorializations” to the capitalist. Accumulation is limited in growth only to the extent that a level of risk is removed in the maintaining of that point of accumulation. Protection against loss is offset against moderation of gain. Compensation from the state consists in the regulation of flows of labour through state institutions and through codes of behaviour set down in the code of the law and maintained in the refrains of the institution. State molar codes fix the subject in and for the benefit of the dominant class. Codes are continually under threat, not only by the capitalist-becomings that exceed the state, but also the molecular-becomings traversing and/or attacking from the outside. The capitalist formula is one based on risk – the subject reads the flows of the market and risks one’s private property (wealth or labour; money or skill and usually a combination of both) with the hope on accumulating wealth and the risk of decelerating wealth. Capitalist success or failure is gauged, therefore, on the store or accumulation of wealth (signified both in terms of available capital and commodity accumulation):

In effect, capital acts as the point of subjectification that constitutes all human beings as subjects; but some, the “capitalists,” are subjects of enunciation that form the private subjectivity of capital, while the others, the “proletarians,” are subjects of the statement, subjected to the technical machines in which constant capital is effectuated. (1987, 457)

The state directs public education towards the production of labour for the markets (specialized skills); property rights are modelled on the basis of capitalist ‘property’ – that is private commodities; public architecture is directed toward the taste and life-style of dominant minority. While the state moderates the success of individuals and groups in capitalist markets through higher taxes on personal income over a certain level and company tax systems etc., it compensates by re-territorializing economic superiority into subjective superiority. It does this by constructing, or more to the point coding, the subject of/in the ‘majority’ based on the model of the successful capitalist. “What
defines the majority is a model you have to conform to” (Deleuze: 1995, 173). While successful capitalists may not have direct political power over flows of labour and capital, they are compensated for in gaining the power of public territory (the territory of the state) – that is private value systems and lifestyles become publicly valued as the face of the ideal citizen. Public institutions operate to support the social rights/human rights of this ‘model’ subject. The institutions may encompass the heterogeneity of minorities, but they do so in order to direct and conscript them in relation to a model majority. The right to define that model is the compensation afforded the capitalist whose private growth is moderated just as their public value (face) is accelerated. The markets are an “extraordinary generator of both wealth and misery [and] there is no democratic state that’s not compromised to the very core by its part in generating human misery” (Deleuze: 1995, 172 – 173). It is in the form of the “nation-state” that the state is the “model of realization for the capitalist axiomatic” (Deleuze and Guattari:1987, 456).

The nation, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is constituted not just in terms of an “active struggle against imperial or evolved systems, the feudal systems, and the autonomous cities, but they crush their own “minorities,” in other words, minoritarian phenomena that could be termed “nationalitarian.” The nation is constituted by “the “natal,” which is not necessarily innate, and the “popular,” which is not necessarily pre-given.” The problem “of the nation” is the problem of constructing a refrain of the people and a land; where the land “implies a certain deterritorialization of the territories . . . and the people, a decoding of the population.” In capitalism it is “the flow of naked labor that makes the people, just as it is the flow of Capital that makes the land and its industrial base” (1987, 456).

**Minorities and Majorities – Constructing a Molar-code of Australian Identity:**

In their plateau on the refrain, Deleuze and Guattari begin by speaking about the child who:

in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself [sic] by singing under his breath.
He walks and halts to his song. . . The song is like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos. . . the song itself. . .
jumps from chaos to the beginnings of order in chaos and is in danger of breaking apart at any moment. (1987, 311)

The refrain gives us a home amid the chaos of life. In the fear of an unsure moment, children create a refrain to get themselves through. From the indistinguishable, it creates repetitions of the same – something to recognise and hold on to, a solid home in a sea of change. For the most part, and if we are lucky, we are born into a ready-made social with secure refrains. If the beginning (which is in the middle) of the refrain is the heartbeat, the sound of life itself, what Deleuze and Guattari call the desiring machine, then it is the repetition of our name that marks the first insertion into the social code; the first refrained territory. We mark a point within a pre-assembled mix of desire(ing), strung together in refrains of family and television and school and and and – the point becomes a line – our world grows larger and – the line becomes a rhizome – our home grows more complex and – the rhizome becomes refrained – our home takes shape upon/within the territory. Security is in the repetitions that we incorporate, and are incorporated into; fear is in the unknown – in the syncopated events that send the rhythms reeling. As adults, we share with each other memories that become part of the refrain of a wider assemblage; similar experiences occurring in a regulated and common social experience. For example; when a child is lost from their guardian, how do they find their way home? Is it not the refrain that carries them back; a name and address memorised or marked on the clothes for the purpose of just such an event? The refrain is a territorial assemblage: from the inside it carries outward; from the outside it carries us back home. *There’s no place like home.* Home is where the heart is and the heart is refrained within the body (first name); named within the household (surname); located within the territory (address), and refrained by the nation state (*Give me a home among the gum trees*).

Desire desires a home, fixes itself to a refrain of that home and goes ahead and assembles its territory around and through that refrained desire. *There’s no place like home.* If we are not born into a readily refrained-environment we nevertheless find for ourselves a home amid the chaos. We find refrains to hold onto when no body is around – the rhythm of the beating/repeating heart: the m/other we cling onto may just as easily
be the repetition of a television refrain; or a song on the radio; or a story that protects us in the dark.

In Australian cultural mythology, one of the key characterisations of life in Australia is the perceived freedom for the majority of citizens to own their own home. Home-ownership has, and continues to be, represented as the ‘Great Australian Dream’. The politics of home-ownership and the right for all Australians to access the dream is a central issue in political debate and the governmentality of the Australian state. We come with a desire for a home, but to access that space we must conform to the laws coded by and through this model-majority. Being, or being in the process of becoming, a ‘home owner’, seems to be a pre requisite to being considered (and therefore to considering yourself) part of the mainstream or middle Australia that is the inclusive focus of dominant political discourse.

The model majority assumes a primary status, but is in fact a secondary refrain. Those who are born into an assemblage that reflects/informs this model are those most likely doomed to a life of naïve passivity. And why would they not be naïve? For them the model always works and they have little opportunity to understand the other outside of the self. Their own faces construct the image of the majority and do not see that they are but a minority. Like the rest of us they are captured, but for them it is the capture of narcissus. The home is always secured/repeated in the social-machines of their being because when the state institutes the protection of private rights, those rights are always interpreted on the self-same model. They are the private rights of a politically dominant minority who facialize the entire social spectrum through the simulacrum of a model-majority. The actual majority, made up of a plethora of minoritarian differences, are born into assemblages that only partially – more or less – inform the model. The private property rights for most of us have to be fought for rather than simply existing as primary and protected. In order to benefit from the protection of rights supported by the state, we must first achieve as best we can the primary status of identification as part of the model majority. We must achieve (or at least approximate on the face of things) the ‘property’ of this model as our own in order that ‘it’ then is protected as our home/our person, under the terms of social and democratic rights.
The politics of legislation and organization – how the state organises this dominant desire – then become the ground (or at least part thereof) for competing political interests within the state. In terms of this dominant desire, political parties then must compete for electoral support on the basis of arguing that the institution of its policies will best allow that desire its fruition; to provide the infrastructure and apparatus that will allow the maximum number of individuals in the community to participate in the dream. The key issues in political debate in Australian politics; interest rates, employment, education and health, all assemble to indicate the conditions that allow access to or prevent access from participating in the dream of the majoritarian.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that the capitalist axiomatic, of which the states are models of realization,

restores or reinvents, in new and now technical forms, an entire system of machinic enslavement. . . it is the reinvention of a machine of which human beings are constituent parts, instead of subjected workers or users. . . the relation between human and machine is based on internal, mutual communication, and no longer on usage or action. (1987, 458)

Popular culture, drawn from the desires of the people and sold back to them in the images re-mixed and over-coded by dominant culture, produces a simulacrum in which the refrains of minority workers are narrated within a landscaped image of space that locates them within refrains of the model majority. Consuming the popular image of ourselves, we see ourselves from the outside as an internal part of the majority model. In the events with which we identify in the television sitcom for example, we see analogies to our own everyday life, but these stories and tales are framed within the discourse of a narrated teleology of subjectivity sub-structured within the landscape of the dominant. Desire becomes refrained by the over-coded values that frame the stories. The people are provided with a land/a territory in and as the rights to private property only so long as that ‘private’ occupation is modelled in terms of a majority drawn from the capitalist classes.
If television and the media are an example of technological enslavement (as discussed in chapter one), then it is one that encompasses and is related to a whole assemblage of technologies that bounce between the axiomatised market-refrains of capitalism and the legal-refrains of the state, and the popular-refrains of the people. Between the enunciating and the stated, popular-refrains are captured in the collectivity of a technological enslavement in and by their attempts to take up social subjective rights. I suggest that popular refrains form what Foucault terms “technologies of self.” These serve as functional refrains, technological apparatuses that allow us to enunciate ourselves as capitalists (that is accumulators) while simultaneously and actively submitting to the regime of proletariatism. The refrains of these technologies (popular-refrains) become the homes of desiring-machines.

The way individuals’ access this dream is through a relation then to current legislative infrastructure and state apparatus. Through these politics, we must participate to achieve the desired goal. In doing so, we must acquiesce to what Foucault calls a technology of self, which is itself a form of state apparatus and marks not only our access to the dream, but also constructs us into and out of prescribed molar subjects of the state. Technologies of the self, says Foucault:

> permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (1988, 206)

While becoming a homeowner may not promise you immortality, it does promise in its imagery a certain state of happiness that comes with the knowledge of owning your own home. It promises a sense of security, and in a discourse that is strongly tied to the nuclear family, it also promises you an investment for the future: something to leave to the kids when you are gone; to support you through retirement, even a ticket into a nursing home.

23 Technologies of self, for Foucault, relate to the ways and means by which we can choose to become subjected for the purposes of creating a desired subject type. Where this differs from autopoesis in the Guattarian sense, is that the technologies and the subject types available are pre-constructed, rather than assembled within the process itself.
Foucault’s theory revolves around three main lines of enquiry to be asked of any discourse and/or practice of a technology of the self. The first surrounds the practice of confession and he asks: “how have certain kinds of interdictions required the price of certain kinds of knowledge about oneself?” and, “what must one know about oneself in order to be willing to renounce anything?” (205). In the technology of home ownership, having already been sold on the ideal, the confession takes place in the bank manager’s office. In this discourse the bank manager replaces the priest where the interested parties must confess their financial status, their job status, their gender etc…. You will have to know yourself (through the mediation of the set application forms) well enough to prove yourself worthy of the bank’s trust. You are then left to commit yourselves to the given penance/judgment of the holy bank, usually 25 - 30 years. You will have to commit, that is, to give up a significant part (if not all) of your future to the process of investing your time, income and social interests to the building, maintenance and paying off of your investment. The criteria that must be met in order to achieve the loan will be judged on the information provided. The bank calculates primarily on income and job security, but also on past credit references to judge the assumed capability of the client managing the loan repayments. Current interest rates will have a bearing on how much you can afford to borrow. The bank will also perform a market-analysis on the property you wish to purchase to ensure the amount of the loan given is considered congruent with the property value should for any reason they need to re-possess in the future. In this way, the market-place restricts the choices as to how the individual purchaser can spend their loan. If the property chosen is not considered to be of equal value to the loan, the loan will be refused. Also, this self-same market-place restricts the value for which a property can be sold.

Bank criteria restrict access based on its assessment procedures and is not purely based on income, but on the kind of income. The banks do not consider, for example, income derived from welfare, child-support, scholarships or other non-taxable sources. Nor do they assess casual income that is not guaranteed by an employment contract. People on low incomes, or whose income is not derived primarily from regular paid employment do not fit the criteria and find themselves excluded from obtaining bank loans. In Western Australia, the government does provide a separate system, which
accommodates many of those who fall outside the private money market. The criteria for these home loans are, however, subject to the policies of incumbent governments. Under Liberal Party policy, for example, a greater flexibility in allowing non-taxable income to be assessed was instituted, but interest rates were between 1 – 1.5% higher than market averages. When the Labour Party took office, interest rates were reduced and brought into line with market averages, but the assessment criteria were tightened. This technology is one way that a social hierarchy is maintained and transferred into material possessions. The ideal subject is one whose income and assets are maintained in income earned primarily by wage-labour and/or economic investments and inherited assets. For both private bank and government-assisted loans, the applicant must establish a deposit and thereby prove that they have the capacity to save and accumulate above everyday subsistence expenditure. All household relations become, in the act of this confession, relations of economics. Gaining access to the dream is differentially achievable based on the manner in which household economics are managed, maintained and sourced.

The second issue relative to technologies of the self concerns what Foucault calls “truth games”, which are related “to specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves”. The truth games of this discourse revolve around the twin issues of security and status. We are promised financial security through our investment, with the knowledge the better we maintain the premises (through improvement and general maintenance) the more likely we are to secure that investment. As Foucault says, there are others who will help you on your journey: beside the bank (and often connected to it) there will be the insurance companies, and home improvement companies, and security companies, etc. House insurance is, of course, a requirement of the lending institution, which will value the premises and set a minimum amount to be insured. Above this, security companies will all play on the need to secure your premises against outside forces. Home improvement companies play on the perceived need to maintain a certain status and/or living standard. It is through these narratives that the ‘truth’ of the homeowner as the subject of consumption beyond the basic need for shelter operates as part of maintaining the lifestyle associated with the dream. If accessing the property provides security, then it is the maintenance, home-improvement, and the development
of life-style, that provides for, and is encompassed in, a politics of status. The social status of the homeowner is structured in several ways, many of which can be considered matters of changing fashions and issues of supposed taste, but probably the most predominant, and certainly the most fixed, is locality. The ‘truth’ of one’s social status, at least on the face of it, is signified by one’s address. While the economic investment may be as well served in the long term through the purchase of a larger property in a cheaper area, one’s immediate signification of status will be better served with the purchase of a smaller property in a more ‘valued’ locality. This leads us then, to the third issue of self-technology in the politics of home-ownership.

The third issue is that of “governmentality”, the “contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self” (Foucault: 1988, 206) or, how the governing of the self is related to the governing of others. In order for the home owners to protect their investment and their life-style, they have an interest in considering issues such as the building of public housing, mental hospitals, youth centres etc., which due to dominant paranoia and real estate practice will have an effect on the value of properties in the surrounding areas. While the people involved may approve of the need for such institutions in society, they rarely feel comfortable having them in the same street as their residence. The homeowner will join with other homeowners in the area to protest against the building, or at least the local placement, of such buildings that will do nothing to improve (and perhaps downgrade) the status of the area. In this way they become part of the dominant force that governs the lives of others.

If home ownership is a keystone of Australian national identity, the subject of that identity is imbricated in a hierarchy of social space. Occupation of space is stratified and organised along lines of economic and social privilege in terms of differential localities signifying both wealth and lifestyle. The subject is the state-subject whose time is spent alternating between the workplace; maintaining the economic income to sustain and pay for the property, and the home; maintaining and/or attaining a lifestyle that goes hand in hand with the dream. We can see that our multiple and minoritarian desires become twisted under the capture that facialises our lives as part of
majoritarian conditioning, and which makes us conform to its desire through technologies of self and the habitus of the state.

Home is where the heart is, and the heart is refrained within the body; named within the household; located within the territory of the nation – the state. It is not so much a natural hierarchy as the immanence of integrating, sometimes harmonising and sometimes syncopating refrains. Desire is fed as it is captured by the dominant forces/refrains, and when it is starved without a home, homeless desire is a war-machine.
In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise the state in terms of a construction of striated space enabled by an apparatus of territorial capture. Outside of this space, they conceive space as being smooth and movement across it as nomadic deterritorialisation. They call the constitution of this outside space the war-machine. The war-machine, in one sense of the term, precedes the state. Here, the construction of smooth space refers to the movements of different tribal groups across territory, and the constitution of a multiplicity of incompatible customary laws. The meeting of rival customs and the possibility of war between nomad tribes is a common and haphazard feature of smooth space figured as un-coded movements through territory. Deleuze and Guattari refute the assumption that state logic evolves out of this kind of situation in some kind of natural progression towards peaceful relationships. They argue, rather, the state is defined by the imposition of an abstract-machine that with a single stroke institutes a coded milieu of relations forming the organs of the state machine. All movement within the state is captured by a single set of laws expressing and repressing it according to the limits of a sedentary code. Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between the war-machine and the state by way of describing the different ways in which a space/time construction is achieved. The state constructs what they call striated space/time, whereas the war-machine constructs a smooth space/time. This extends the distinction between the teleological and hierarchical construction of the molar, majoritarian model of state technologies, and the nomadic construction of molecular, minoritarian technologies that confront those state habits.

Thus far, I have argued that the discourse of home ownership, construed as the Great Australian Dream, marks the dominant construct of the subject of Australian cultural participation. This dream it would seem, in the Deleuze and Guattari sense, is that of sedentaries of the state, as distinguished from the nomadic relation to a home constructed as a war machine. They make the distinction directly when discussing differential relations to technology in the following way:

> among sedentaries, clothes-fabric and tapestry-fabric tend to annex the body and exterior space, respectively to the immobile house . . . the weaving of the nomad
indexes clothing and the house itself to the space of the outside, to the open smooth space in which the body moves. (1987, 476)

Deleuze and Guattari elaborate the contrast differences through a series of different models; Technological, Musical, Maritime, Mathematical, Physical and Aesthetic. The differences are not oppositions or contradictions, but different occupational refrains of space:

Smooth space and striated space – nomad space and sedentary space – the space in which the war machine develops and the space instituted by the State apparatus – are not of the same nature. (1987, 474)

Further, they are neither opposed nor contradictory in time: while the war machine is ‘outside and prior’ to the state, it is not a dead past relegated to the pages of history. Rather:

the two spaces in fact exist only in mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space. (1987, 474)

Keeping this in mind and noting the process as inevitably reductive, I have drawn the following chart of distinctive qualities that differentiate between the nomadic and the sedentary occupation of space:

**SPACE/TIME OCCUPATION:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developing War-Machine</th>
<th>Instituted State Apparatus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nomads</td>
<td>Sedentaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uncoded occupants</td>
<td>coded players</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free action</td>
<td>work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open unlimited/borderless</td>
<td>closed/framed/limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uncounted</td>
<td>counted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
extensive  intensive
fractal          whole numbers
heterogeneous  homogeneous
close-range/haptic  long-distance/optical
rhizomic         aborescent

The war machine occupies space through mobile territoriality, de-territorializing as its refrains move on through/in space/time. The state apparatus, in contrast, occupies space/time through a mobile deterritoriality (everything belongs to the state – as demonstrated in colonialism/imperialism) and a fixed reterritorialization (in forms such as abstract rights) that pre-constructs structural refrains that capture and code all nomadic movement through and within the range of closed borders.24

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the war machine is “set against the State apparatus in a struggle that is lost from the start” (1987, 355). In other words, the state always wins out against the de-territorializing effect of the war-machine. This is achieved in the operation of capture whereby the state appropriates difference in kind and reads that difference against a transcendent model and re-enunciates it as a difference in degree.

24 While Deleuze and Guattari cannot be said to go to pains to point it out, they do note that their distinctions are not judgments of better or worse, but the concatenation of differing refrains. When discussing the appropriation of the nomad warrior of the war machine into the institutionalised soldier of state war, they argue:
We certainly would not say that discipline is what defines a war machine: discipline is the characteristic required of armies after the State has appropriated them. The war machine answers to other rules. We are not saying that they are better of course, only that they animate a fundamental indiscipline of the warrior, a questioning of hierarchy, perpetual blackmail by abandonment or betrayal, and a very volatile sense of honor, all of which, once again, impedes the formation of the State. (358)

This is reiterated in the closing line of “The Smooth and the Striated”; “Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us” (500). I wanted to highlight these comments because it seems to me that in much of the secondary commentary on Deleuze and Guattarian thought, distinctions such as the smooth and the striated as well as the body/Body without Organs, molar/molecular etc. are all too easily recuperated by binary distinctions carrying pre-coded judgments of good and evil/ right and wrong. This leads at times to readings that view their thought in terms of an ecstatic desire for the purely nomadic as somehow a revolutionary moment/movement in itself. Rather, it seems to me, that Deleuze and Guattari’s aim is to construct new ways of revealing the operational constructions/disruptions/ flows and blocks of social processes.
Thus, difference is accommodated within state representation (on the surface) at the same time as it is erased through its appropriation into the internal striation of the dominant model. This process, however, is never a completed task: the war-machine is forever re-erupting or producing lines of flight from the internalising mechanisms of the state. We live in-between a continual concatenation between the re-impartation of smooth space and its re-capture by the striating state.

A major difference between smooth and striated space is the presence of a coded disciplinarity. The state appropriates the nomadic war-machine and captures it in the disciplined codes of a military complex. Not only does this refer to the literal practice of disciplining individual desire into the subject of soldier, but it also refers to the ways in which this model of disciplining functions throughout all state institutions and technologies as a means to train and striate desire into state-sanctioned subjectivity. The structure of nation states has developed alongside the cultural narratives of modernity. Zygmunt Bauman argues that modernisation, which industrialises the population, saw a shift from a pre-industrial situation whereby ‘craftsmen’ [sic] who had hitherto been in control of their own labour turned into factory workers:

The problem which the pioneers of modernization confronted was the need to force people, used to putting meaning into their work…to expend their skill and their work capacity in the implementation of tasks which were now set and controlled by others… The way to solve this problem was a blind drill aimed at habitualizing the workers to an unthinking obedience, while at the same time being denied pride in a job well done and performing a task the sense of which escaped them. (1998, 7)

According to Bauman, the institution of a work ethic “was, basically, about the surrender of freedom” (1998, 7). If we consider this implementation of a work ethic next to Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the military complex we can draw an analogy in terms of state functioning, on the bases of the concatenation between the smooth and striated. As the warrior becomes striated to the constitutions of the soldier-ethic and disciplinarity, the captured war-machine is directed to re-impart smooth space in a particular direction – the battlefield. The worker, operating in a different state regime, becomes striated to the conditions of a work ethic, but the smooth space must
also be somehow re-imparted. I argue that in the case of internal state politics and on the level of individualism, the ‘space’ provided for this re-imparted smooth increasingly becomes the ‘private sphere’.

**Accessing Rights Between the Two Heads of Sovereignty:**

As previously mentioned, the operation of state coding is based, according to Deleuze and Guattari, on a binary form of political domination, figured under the two heads of sovereignty – the magical capture and the legal codification of space. The magical power of the institution of the state de-territorializes all prior associations to the territory and simultaneously the legal code re-territorializes and self-justifies an enforced institution of this code. Peace is enforced by the conquering state and space is striated through a de- and re-territorializing codification that internalises the flows of movement within the borders of its statement. Australia is a rather obvious example of this process. The British Empire State, with a single phrase “terra nullius” de-territorialized the nomadic flow of all prior occupation and began the process of re-territorializing through the instituting of its common code of law.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that the “principal elements of State apparatus . . . forms a milieu of interiority”(1987, 353). The war-machine is NOT contained within the state, but is outside and existed prior to its law. To differentiate between the space/time of the war-machine and the state, Deleuze and Guattari draw on the genre of games. Here the manner of play or the field of struggle that ensues within the striated state is figuratively conceived as a game of Chess, and in the smooth space of the war-machine the figuration is the game of Go. While chess is a game of war it is “an institutionalised, regulated, coded war, with a front, a rear, battles . . . chess codes and decodes space” (1987, 353). The play then is one institutionalised between the two heads of sovereignty; the one that defines the public state and is laid down by the legislators of the law and the other that defines the private state and is defined by the dominant interests enunciated by, and through, the private desires of the public. If the institution of state territory is coded figuratively like a chessboard across the landscape, then this formation marks playing field for the two heads of sovereignty: on the one side, the
fixed or imposed legal sovereignty constituted in the law of the land; on the other side, the mobile sovereignty of the magician constituted in the rights to occupy and use the land. The legal sovereignty of the landscape originates in the constitution proper, laying down the legal tenants of state territorial codes and forming one side of the binary abstract-machine. The social sovereignty of the majority originates in the constitution of dominant ideologies, which access and occupy that coded territory under the abstraction of territorial rights forming the other side of the binary.

When disputes arise as to the rightful occupation of territory, the law is brought into play and asked to make a judgment. Both sides of the dispute must play the game of establishing their rights within the tenets of the legal refrains. In this way the sovereignty of occupational rights are maintained and established through their ability to access and mobilise a link to the fixed sovereignty of the constitutional legal code of the state proper. The legal battles, even when they are between two private concerns, are inculcated within a judgment system concerned with the best interests of the public as defined within the constitutional refrain.

In 1992 Eddie Mabo and the Meriam people of the Murray Islands successfully won a High Court battle to establish the traditional rights of native title over their lands. However, they were unsuccessful in establishing full legal sovereignty, which remained with the crown. The outcome of this landmark decision led to an intense negotiation between the then Labour government and Aboriginal representative groups to the establishment of the Native Title Legislation which set down in law the legal rights of traditional cultures over access and occupation of lands. In terms of my reading of the two heads of sovereignty, thus, these events provided a means by which traditional native culture, which had hitherto been excluded from having any cultural rights in their own right, be incorporated into an axiom of the Australian political landscape. At the same time, however, any claim to ultimate sovereignty was negated as the crown was confirmed as having, as it does over all territory whether tenured as pastoral, private, commercial or any other title, the right to compulsorily acquire land, so long as it does so in accordance with the law. The constitution provides for such acts by state or federal governments on the basis that such acquisition be made only on the basis that it is in the
public interest and that it be done so on “just terms”. Those provisions, as defined in section 51 of the constitution, state that:

The Parliament shall, subject to this constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the commonwealth with respect to:

(31.) The acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect to which the Parliament has power to make laws.  (Saunders, 171 – 172)

Any act by the crown to compulsorily acquire land must therefore be negotiated with regard to that constitutional requirement and issues of what does and does not meet ‘just terms’ are individually assessed and negotiated. Exactly what defines just terms is dependent upon the kind of land tenure or lease being extinguished and the consequences upon interested parties. The Mabo decision protected the Murray Island inhabitants from losing the right for ‘just compensation’ from any land that the state wanted to acquire. The Queensland Government may not have been so keen to acquire the land when required to pay compensation for it, but they retained the sovereign right to do so under the constitution. Therefore, Native Title legislation brought the traditional rights of indigenous culture into the playing field of social sovereignty and the common law rights of citizenship.

There was never any question from within the boundaries of the law, as it already stood that free-hold title extinguished rights to native title. Within the legal refrains of the established law of the Commonwealth, the parliament would have to actively pass legislation to enable any such rights. Any doubt about this in the public imagination, should have been eradicated when the requirements for establishing and maintaining native title was clearly set out in the Mabo decision as follows:

to establish native title at common law, a claimant group must show, on the balance of probabilities:

* that the claimants are descended from or otherwise related to the group that held native title at the time the British Crown asserted sovereignty; non-extinguishment of native title since that time; the existence of a coherent group of Aboriginals or Torres Strait Islanders,
* the membership of which is based on mutual recognition and recognition by persons enjoying traditional authority among the group;
* that the group possesses and acknowledges traditional laws and customs which entitle them to enjoy the land claimed. It is acceptable for the laws and customs to have undergone some changes since the Crown acquired sovereignty, provided the general nature of the connection between the Indigenous people and the land remains; and
* that the group continues to practice its traditional laws and customs, as far as possible, and has maintained its connection with the land.

At common law, occupation is the cornerstone of native title rights…

(Kauffman, 9)

Therefore, only those Aboriginal groups who had hitherto been allowed throughout the history of white colonisation and development to remain on their lands, could access the rights of traditional occupation. For those who had been removed and for whom settlement and public works had instigated freehold tenure and built up public infrastructure connected to the development of the colonising culture, there is no established legal access to native title rights.

As traditional Aboriginal peoples have long held connections to the land that span the entire territory of Australia, many miners and pastoral leaseholders were concerned about the effect this would have upon their rights. In the time between the establishment of the Native Title legislation and the Wik decision, the question of when and where native title had been extinguished in respect to pastoral and mining leases was unsettled. The Wik decision in the High Court (1996) settled the issue by confirming that both pastoral and mining leases could co-exist with native title. The 1993 act had provided the right for native titleholders to negotiate with the government “before certain permissible future acts, such as mining, take place on their land” (Kauffman, 8). Despite the fact that this act allowed for a workable form of negotiation between different uses of the land, many of the wealthy industrialists and conservative nationalists were offended by this step towards social and political inclusion. An ideological campaign characterised by racist rhetoric was then instigated through Australian politics in which a powerful minority manipulated the facts for the sake of using democracy against the
very people political representatives claim to govern. The Howard Government appropriated the rhetoric of a propaganda campaign instigated by the Federal Farmers Association, which spent large sums of money on public advertising, lobbying against native title rights by misrepresenting the consequences of Mabo to the public. This alliance between the economic rationalists and the industrial capitalists marks the capitalist dominance over public faciality in facts of the law. The Howard government won office, at least in part, based on a campaign that manipulated the facts as an either/or; black and white basis and instigated a micro-politics of fear in the hearts of private leaseholders that their own homes were at risk of native title claims.

In Deleuze and Guattari’s conception, this process examplifies their argument in *Anti-Oedipus* that suggests that capitalism does not so much “initiate a making public of the private so much as a privatisation of the public: the whole world unfolds right at home, without one’s having to leave the t.v. screen” (251). Capitalists control the ability to facialise those images on the screen through the sheer ability to afford air-time. The fear campaign that was run through repeated advertising, coupled with the propaganda campaign of the government became a mainstay of capital’s ability to enact a magical capture over the hearts and minds of a fearful electorate and, thus, control the social sovereignty endowed in the democratic system. The majority of private (freehold lease) home-owners were stated as under threat in a capture enunciated by a self-interested, wealthy minority and their political allies.

Despite this faciality, and the partial success of an attempted implementation of a later “10 point plan” by John Howard that was aimed at watering down the rights won by Aboriginal people, native title remains and has become an organ of the state machine that provides some legally limited rights of traditional ownership. Many claims have, and continue to be, settled and negotiated without any of the legal or social problems that were predicted by the scaremongers. The faciality of the issue in dominant representations of popular culture has therefore shifted its gaze, as the Australian population has been habituated to accept a feared other as legitimate co-title holders.
The binary state machine operates by way of de- and reterritorialization. If the propaganda campaign marked one point of magical capture by de-territorializing land rights (through an ideological misconstruing of the issue) for the sake of gaining maximum leverage in the legal and political battle over social sovereignty for capitalists, I argue that the popular film The Castle marks the reterritorialization of that struggle for capitalist dominance within the social sovereignty or faciality of the people.

The Castle, which tells the story of the Kerrigans, an English-Australian family, and the ordeal faced when their house is subject to a compulsory acquisition order, re-territorializes the events of Mabo and land-rights by ideologically representing the traditional land rights struggle synonymous with the private rights of capitalist defined property rights. While Mabo’s struggle for sovereignty over the land was lost, a traditional right to native title was established that provided native title with the same right to compensation, should the sovereign state seek acquisition, as is constitutionally afforded all private property title. In this sense, although the occupation rights are different – one afforded through private capital and the other by traditional lineage – they are legally established within the same sovereign territory of the Australian state.

In the film, the surface appearance of the characters and the setting present a stereotypical image of the face of the working poor. This image is used throughout the plot to signify an analogy between the Kerrigan’s ordeal and the indigenous population’s fight for land-rights. The struggles of both are then enunciated in the service of the dominant enunciation of private rights to represent a struggle for legal sovereignty for the private market. While remaining an untenable fantasy in proper legal terms, the film represents another instance of popular-cultural over-coding of the majority working populous into the ideological struggles of the capitalist dominant in that it re-institutes a sovereign right for private property defined as the sedentary home.

On the surface, the Kerrigan family are represented, and in keeping with the promotion of The Castle, as an “ordinary family.” The idiosyncrasies of character thus appear as differences in degree within a general condition of the ordinary hard-working family (what John Howard would call “Battlers”). If we consider their actual structural
positioning within the statistical demographics of the community, however, we find that they actually represent a difference in kind within that generalised majority. The representational mechanism appears to be one in which the minority positions of the working poor are used to facialize a jurisprudence of the dominant minority, and this becomes a simulacrum of majoritarian consciousness. When we consider the statistics of home ownership (and the dominant focus on the issue of why we are told this story is in terms of home ownership), the Kerrigans appear to be representative of 70% of the population. When we then consider the characteristic elements used to construct the characters in the assemblage, however, they represent the structural situation of the dominant capitalist. Key to this representation is that the Kerrigans are unquestionably out-right owners of their home. Demographically, however, they do not fit the statistic of out-right home-owners. So, while on the surface they appear to represent the ‘ordinary’ Australian family (one of the 70% of home-owner-occupiers), structurally they belong to a privileged minority. According to the Bureau of Statistics, in 1997/98 only 39% of that 70% of homeowners own their home outright. Of those 39% (or 27.3% of total population) “almost one-third … were couples with no children”, 7% were one-parent households and 26% were lone person household. That means that traditional families owning their own home amount, at the most, to 34% of out-right owners; and only 9.3% of the total population. The Kerrigans are therefore a statistical minority. If we were to add in other factors, such as distribution of this statistic across the entire country and within different neighbourhoods, and then the specific construction of the family (there is only one main bread-winner in the family) the likelihood of finding such a family, (despite the low property prices in the represented neighbourhood) would become even more improbable, making this family and their situation very much a minority position within the fabric of Australian life.

The Kerrigans not only own the house in question, but they own a holiday home, a boat, and several cars. The family is structured as a model of patriarchal hierarchies that are culturally drawn from the dominant/traditional model (economic signifiers): the father is also an owner-worker of his own business, the mother stays at home and maintains the running of the household, and they run greyhounds as a hobby. Structurally, the familial structure presents a metonymic parody of the British Royal household itself, which
signifies their representation to the lineage of British-Australian immigration. This
signification relates to the analogy being drawn in the film between the land rights issues
of the indigenous minority and the private property rights of the colonising majority.
While the Kerrigans live in a non-affluent suburb, they nevertheless live an affluent life-
style. Culturally, however, they are constructed by the statistical positioning of a
working poor: the poor suburb; the son in jail; the petty criminal activity; the low level
of formal education. The film, therefore, represents a middle-class stereotyping of the
working poor who are shown and parodied as intellectually underprivileged but
materially privileged. The working poor are shown to be more stupid than poor, while at
the same time the productions of economic affluence and the products of capitalist
accumulation are naturalised as the innocent by-products of ordinary Australian family
life (even in the poorest of suburbs). These privileges are naturalised as available
products of everyday-life amongst the working poor. Thus, the real political issues of
the working poor are erased as they become the over-coded representational agents of a
middle-class, capitalist argument analogising the desires of private property
accumulation with the struggles of indigenous land rights.

The film produces empathy between the audience and the statement of two different
minority positions, Mabo and Kerrigan. These different political struggles are not only
homologised with each other, but also enunciated through the voice of a dominant
minority that both appears and appeals as the enunciation of a collective majoritarian
assemblage. The film tells the story of a specific singularity of events occurring in and
through an idiosyncratic assemblage of characters. However, the film narrates those
characters upon a set of cultural narratives that are neither idiosyncratic nor singular, but
stereotypical and ideological. The film unashamedly sets out to make a political point
through its narrative.

The Kerrigans find themselves subjected to a compulsory acquisition order and the plot
follows their consequent battle against the state to retain what to them is not a house but
a home. The narrative analogises this individual struggle to the very different struggle
undertaken by Eddie Mabo who took his people’s land rights claims to the High Court.
The analogy produces empathy between Darryl Kerrigan and Eddie Mabo in terms of
their emotional attachment to a sense of place: drawing lines of empathy forms an
axiomatic interpretation allowing one group to acknowledge and respect the rights of
another only by understanding those rights in terms of their own. The simple message is
then, Aboriginal land-rights is akin to mainstream private-property rights or for the
aboriginal people the right to their land is like our assumed right to our private property
and their attachment to their space is emotionally akin to the attachments we have to
ours. The difficulty, however, is not in this relatively simple analogy, but that those
private-property rights to which the analogy is made akin are not represented by a
mainstream majority, whose empathy/understanding is most politically necessary for
reconciliation between these two different occupations of Australian territory. Rather,
those characterisations of idiosyncratic singularity that tell the tale, become narrated
along another cultural narrative – the stereotypical narration of the Australian white
working class. The political majority (as opposed to the majority of people) in Australia
are a business class.

We have a representational assemblage that emerges from a class of social
commentators working in the mainstream entertainment industry. The film was written
and produced by “Working Dog Productions” headed by Rob Sitch and Tom Gliesner,
who are popular television personalities in Australia. They are well known for
producing popular political satire through lightweight comic parody. In terms of using
popular mediums of entertainment in new and creative ways, these faces have become
known through a series of different media manifestations that all in some way operate
and entertain through this mix of political satire and parodic humour. In The Castle,
parodic representation of the working classes both ridicules the lifestyle of the characters
and their sensibilities as much as it ridicules the likelihood of such a struggle ever
achieving the legal success portrayed in the outcome of the narrative. Alongside and
intermixed, however, the political satire and the sense of what is right and just narrated
in the telling of the tale allow the audience to like the characters – they are the likeable
fools.

The dominant class thereby re-impress a utopic ideal through the abstract-machine of
liberal humanism which becomes manifested in the legal materiality of private rights of
the individual and/or minority assemblage, while nevertheless concurrently re-instituting a hierarchy of cultural dominance whereby the rights of the other is only acknowledged legally so long as the culture of the other is discredited as foolish. From a position of social divisions between a white coloniser and a black colonized, the films mainstream representation supports aboriginal politics – accepts the legal outcome of their rights under the law – only insofar as their culture as a whole is discredited and consumed under the face of a foolish minority. The film manages to achieve this discrimination by way of producing an analogy to a parodic face of another minority group within the white population. The sub-narrative of Mabo and the empathetic connection between the Aboriginal people and the Kerrigans therefore produces aboriginality as a collective as much as it produces the white working class as the likeable fools. I see this politically/socially as a concession and humanist motivated concern for the political and social rights of others (minority groups) by a particular voice in majoritarian/mainstream Australia. The concession being one where political, structural and legal rights are acknowledged in terms of a right to equitable access to the law by minority groups only insofar as a cultural discrimination as to the content of those assemblages is intensified.

By considering the legal arguments in the Mabo case and in the Kerrigan case in terms of what kind of rights were established and how they differ, we can consider how both cases involve the establishing of ‘traditional rights’ in that “traditional rights are mainly rights of the individual against the state, or rights to a preventative say in state policy” (Gaze and Jones, 478) and, secondarily, both relate to the jurisprudence of those traditional rights in terms of property: “One of the essential traditional civil rights was, and still is, the right to property” (478). In the Mabo case, however, the right to property sought and won was a right fulfilled and, therefore, not at issue in the Kerrigan case – that is the right of establishing ownership upon the property in question. Both narratives share a story of the continued occupation of the property in question. In the Mabo case the enunciation was required in order to establish, in law, that the Meriam people had traditional land rights and therefore current legal title. The case in question, the event that brought those rights into question and required them to be proved, was the state’s claim that as a consequence of being annexed to Queensland in 1879, the “Crown acquired absolute ownership of, legal possession of, and exclusive power to confer title
to, all land in the Murray Islands” (Butt and Eagleson, 17). This was despite earlier legislation set down in 1875, which “expressly disclaimed any title or sovereignty over the islands and any intention to detract from the sovereign rights of the tribes who inhabited them” (12). In 1982, the Meriam people, represented most predominantly in the media by Eddie Mabo, requested that the High Court declare them as being “entitled to the Murray Islands as owners; or as possessors; or as occupiers; or as persons entitled to use and enjoy the Islands” (8). Mabo also requested that the state of Queensland be declared as having “no power to extinguish the Meriam people’s title” (8). According to the High Court ruling, the Mabo people won on the first account, but failed on the second. The Court decided:

1. The Meriam people are entitled to possess, occupy, use and enjoy the Murray islands. (The Court left open the position regarding certain land that had been leased, and other land used for government administrative purposes.)

2. The State of Queensland has the power to extinguish the Meriam people’s title, as long as it exercises that power validly and in a manner consistent with Commonwealth laws. (Butt and Eagleson, 9)

The consequence is one in which the Meriam people are legally entitled, under Commonwealth laws, the same rights as any other title holder over property under the constitution. Therefore, while the way in which the people hold title differs from the property title of an individual over private land, the rights in respect to the states power (the traditional right of property) is established in accordance with the same laws.

Mabo protected the Murray Island inhabitants from losing the right for ‘just compensation’ from any land that the state wanted to acquire. The Queensland government may not have been so keen to acquire the land when required to pay compensation for it, but they retained the sovereign right to do so under the constitution.

Those laws, as defined in section 51 of the constitution, state that:

The Parliament shall, subject to this constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the commonwealth with respect to:
(31.) The acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect to which the Parliament has power to make laws. (Saunders, 171 – 172)

While the Mabo decision is completely different to the Kerrigans, the analogy draws on a shared emotional sense of place (the refrain of home) to establish a discourse of social jurisprudence, but fantasises the case’s success as one of a full sovereignty that was explicitly denied the Meriam people. In The Castle, the Queens Council acknowledges that he is testing a part of the constitution that has not been tested before – thus the film attempts to construct a testing of a different part of the constitution. This marks the ideological formation of what is already dominant within social sovereignty (the authority of enunciation) in that this fantasised testing of constitutional law is itself an ideological re-assertion of individual rights over the majority.

If we look at the Kerrigan case, we see that traditional right is taken a step further in the law. It argues the second claim of the Meriam people, the one that they lost. It is both a fantasy of, and an argument for, the rights of full legal sovereignty to be passed into the hands of the private occupier of territory. It argues against the state’s right to have any power over private property at all. What is curious about the make-up of the subjects used to make this claim to property rights is that it is facialised (on the surface) by images and locations of the very demographic whose rights are sought, not against the state, but as a call for the state to intervene in providing those rights. As previously mentioned, the Kerrigans represent a parody of the working poor, however, the Kerrigans’ legal argument reflects their structural position as owners of capital and small business operators. While the refrain of ‘love and memories’ becomes the terms upon which justice is sought, the legal claim behind this jurisprudence is manifested upon the value of the house/address itself. In capitalist society, we tend to naturalise the concept of property in terms of an economic value, that is, in terms of our material possessions and their value as commodities:

By examining the origins of modern property theory [it can be demonstrated] that the term property included . . . more than material possessions. Individual property included ones person, ones capacities, and ones rights and liberties . . .
the narrowing of the concept of property corresponded to the rise of the market society; instead of material property being the result of self, material goods became the source of self. Arguably, if the concept of property can be narrowed to suit the development of capitalism, it can be broadened to meet the needs of modern industrial society. (Gaze & Jones, 478 – 479)

This fantasy obscures any legal bond between the state and private capital, and reduces the power the state may have in fulfilling any claim to civil property rights on the basis of the state’s responsibility to provide for its people the means by which to enjoy such rights. All property becomes privatised, thereby extinguishing not only the state’s power to abuse its sovereign right, but to use it for the purposes for which they were established in the first place.

The law protects private ownership insofar as owners have the right to ‘just compensation’ (generally accepted as an economic exchange reflective of current market value) if, and when, the state initiates its sovereign right over their property. The law does not technically, however, protect the unhindered occupation of that space should it be deemed necessary for the ‘public good’ to change its codification, therefore conferring the right to code, de-code and re-code the categorical occupation (as private or public) to the state.

The fantasy ‘outcome’ portrayed in The Castle fails to reveal that a legal win of this nature, while supporting the private rights of the individual against a capitalist state, would simultaneously give rights to the individual capitalist, who also seeks freedom from state control. As much as this text rightly critiques the dominating rights of big-business capital in the Australian political process, it does so by promoting the rights of private (small-business) capital, while structurally ignoring the state’s responsibility to accommodate the rights of non-capitalised citizens, who are the actual majority occupying space, not under their own ownership, but under the credit terms of mortgages or rental agreements that fall under the ownership of either or both public and private capital. The civil code protecting traditional property rights is interpreted in the film with respect to the private property of the homeowner. The fantasy of full sovereignty for those rights sees the legal state relinquished not only of its right to
interfere in those private rights, but of its responsibility to obtain public property and provide the means through which non-home-owner civilians may secure non-commodifiable private property rights.

As long as private property is interpreted under the dominance of capitalist signification, the significance of full private-realm sovereignty would see further power reside with the banks and the insurance brokers etc., whose contractual rights over property mediate the occupation rights of the purchaser. The state would not only lose its power to mediate on behalf of big business taking control of private enterprises/property/land, but it would lose its power to mediate on behalf of the people. As is, the state can rule on the mortgage or rental contract taken between the bank/landlord (private owner) and the purchaser/tenant. Tenants and purchasers who fulfil their obligations to the contract have (technically) legal right to occupy that property without hindrance or interference. If the state relinquishes its sovereign right over private property on the basis of ownership, then would it not open the way for private enterprise to have a free reign on the organization over the occupation of that property?

The struggle by the indigenous population for full legal sovereignty is of course a very different one in that they are in a sense fighting for a collective cultural right to define their own state against the sovereignty of the colonizing state. The Meriam people sought sovereignty as a socially cohesive unit of their own traditions and systems of law. In The Castle, the Kerrigan case implications are very different. Here, the struggle for full sovereignty, given that the request signifies a nullifying of state sovereign power, is one conferred on the individual homeowner. If sovereign power were to be conferred upon private ownership, this would give owners the right to make laws and organise private space according to their own will. The confusion with occupation rights (as private property rights) in the telling of the story becomes evident when we consider the wider implications of such a decision. Giving sovereign rights to the Murray Islanders would be one thing, effectively creating a new state formation, and while this did not happen, it could have conceivably been possible without disturbing the Australian constitution, but only insofar as its sovereignty did not extend to all native title claims.
upon the mainland. To allow sovereign rights based on private ownership of space, however, would effectively create a situation whereby owners of property (those with capital to purchase that property) would effectively destroy the current binary state and the civil code in favour of a pure despotic power of capitalism. The legal implications of this fantasy would promote, therefore, the very threat the government and ideological powers of capitalism promoted as belonging to the indigenous struggle for rights. In the current conditions, despite capitalist ideology remaining the dominant, the people nevertheless have some legal protection.

In conclusion, *The Castle*, by failing to situate the legal argument in terms of the misuse of powers by state, and instead constructing the narrative along the lines of individual private rights against the state, unties the bond between corporate capitalist enterprise and public state politics only to retie it between the more abstract lines of private capital rights and constitutional law. Although the Kerrigans are given the right to occupy their own territory (and this seems fair and just), the legal implication of such a win would not only reduce the power of the state to make pacts with capitalism’s majoritarian image of big-business in the acquisition, expansion, and creation of public territory over and above the individual rights of the private home owner (which is the point of empathy that we are likely to share with the characters). It would also reduce the state’s structural capacity (and responsibility) to protect the disadvantaged minorities, who have no ownership of private property, from dominant minority groups who would use economic advantage to expand their ‘private’ territory over and through the occupational refrains of non-owners.

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25 It should be noted, however, that such a move would have to take place through parliamentary relinquishment of crown title and could not be determined by the High Court. This is because the High Court’s power exists only within the symbolic confines of the ‘crown’s ultimate sovereign power. To rule against the sovereignty of the crown would be, therefore, to deny the High Court its own legitimacy and thus a legal impossibility for the court itself.
When Power Confronts Desire: The Society of Control
and the Right to be Human.

If home ownership is seen as an accessible property right within Australian culture, one of the key mythologies accompanying this image is the concept of the humanitarian state. But what, you might ask, does being humanitarian mean? The myth goes hand in hand with concepts of freedom and democracy, and narrates the state as a form that is necessary to protect and provide conditions for human freedom. However, it enunciates a meta-narrative that justifies the imprisonment of ‘some’ human beings by the state on the basis that their actions impede the freedom of others. On the surface, this seems fair and just. What does it mean, then, when the state imprisons human beings who have not broken any laws, nor threatened others, but who are themselves seeking protection from the actions of non-humanitarian states? In this chapter, I argue that the recent events surrounding the Refugee crisis in Australia, set against a background of an ongoing implementation of welfare reforms under the Howard government, demonstrate that the concept of a humanitarian state is oxymoronic. I will address this through a reading of Deleuze’s argument that there has been a shift from a disciplinary society to a society of control and his differentiation between viewing society through a diagram of desire and a diagram of power. I consider humanism as a diagram of desire forming a nomadic war-machine against the state, and the rhetoric of humanitarianism as a diagram of power forming the state capture of this desire. Further, I will consider how this confrontation between desire and power is played out in a struggle to define the expanse and limits of human rights.

Where private property rights have become interpreted in terms of an economic materialism, as argued in the previous chapter, human rights emerge to re-institute the older concept of civil rights to property as a “natural right necessarily required by the right to life or by the right to a free or genuinely human life”(Gaze and Jones, 478). And where private and traditional rights are secured against interference by, and therefore as an oppositional axis to, the state-proper, these:

newer economic and social rights are claimed as material benefits (income, social security, leisure) that ought to be provided to all individuals by the state . .
[and] while there is no logical disparity between the civil right to property and the newly claimed economic and social rights, there is a real incompatibility between the capitalist property right and the new social and economic rights. Those who are concerned to protect the right of private capital accumulation are quite correct in seeing that that right is threatened by the new social and economic rights claims. (Gaze & Jones, 478)

Under the Howard government in Australia, these basic human rights, delivered as state services, are being diminished due to an increase in capitalist despotic power. Just as property rights have been instituted under the interpretative refrain of capitalist property, so too human rights are becoming articulated under an interpretation imposed by a state regime defining humanity in terms of economic rationalism. If the land rights win was an example of how the becoming of a call for humanist consideration is articulated, in the battle fought with the state, human rights discourse became articulated as a right to traditional culture. The instituting of that right, however, limited those indigenous people who could access this right through the state institution to a requirement of proof within the model that constructs an image pre-defining the existence of that culture. Those indigenous people who do not fit this model remain outside the rights afforded by the state and therefore become a minority within a minority. And it is many of these peoples who remain in the de-territorialized space of the re-imparted smooth, stripped of continuous relationship to the land and their own traditions, and abjectly coded as an other within the dominant traditions of the colonising culture.

**From Discipline to Control:**

In *Negotiations*, Deleuze draws on Foucault’s work to consider the change in society from a model of discipline to a code of control. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault outlines a shift from sovereign societies characterised by a punitive system of public spectacle on the scaffold, to a disciplinary societies characterised by a punitive system of private surveillance in the correctional institutions, notably the prison. In sovereign societies, the power of law was established and re-established in the public executions aimed at disciplining society through the order of direct physical torture as punishment against those bodies that disobeyed the law. In this society, power resided solely with the King or Sovereign and:
although it is true that he delegated to the courts the task of exercising his power to dispense justice, he had not transferred it; he retained it in its entirety and he could suspend the sentence or increase it at will... It was logically inscribed in a system of punishment, in which the sovereign, directly or indirectly, demanded, decided and carried out punishments. (Foucault: 1979, 53)

With the rise of disciplinary societies, however, the power of the Sovereign has been abstracted into the legal constitution of the state and this is established and re-established through the legalised institutions of the state. The rise of this society is marked by the rise of the penal institution. In this model, “the least act of disobedience is punished and the best way of avoiding serious offences is to punish the most minor offences very severely” (1979, 294). Foucault argues that this carceral system is based on a disciplinary normalisation and is marked by the “formation and growth of psychology” in which appears the “professionals of discipline, normality and subjection” (1979, 296).

Foucault argues, furthermore, that there occurred a “carceral continuum that diffused penitentiary techniques into the most innocent disciplines, transmitting disciplinary norms into the very heart of the penal system and placing over the slightest illegality, the smallest irregularity, deviation or anomaly, the threat of delinquency” (1979, 297). This saw the transportation of a technique developed within the penal system, to one instituted across the entire social body. “Replacing the adversary of the sovereign, the social enemy was transformed into a deviant, who brought with him the multiple danger of disorder, crime and madness” (1979, 299 – 300). The management of deviancy is maintained through state institutions that discipline and punish through modes of surveillance and correction, forming the technologies of self or methods of behavioural engineering characterising the state of disciplinary society. Deleuze suggests, however, that Foucault himself was aware of a movement away from this disciplinary model. In disciplinary society, each institution tailored the model for their specific purposes, and thus the model operated “by organising major sites of confinement [where] individuals are always going from one closed site to another” (Deleuze: 1995, 177). The shift, however, sees the institution of “free floating control” whereby the same model insinuates itself across the entire social spectrum.
For Foucault, the rise and spread of this model of discipline and punishment throughout the state institutions suggests the spread of a network of relations in which there is no outside. “It takes back with one hand what it seems to exclude with the other. It saves everything, including what it punishes” (1979, 301). This suggests a contradiction to Deleuze and Guattari’s assertion that the state has both an internal and an external outside. There is no contradiction, however, if we take into account Deleuze’s own exposition of a significant difference between his own and Foucault’s thinking. In “Desire and Pleasure,” Deleuze identifies his primary difference in that, unlike Foucault, he is “not sure that micro-systems can be described in terms of power” and this relates to his and Guattari’s conception of “desiring-assemblages.” For Deleuze, “a desiring-assemblage will include power systems . . . but they would have to be situated in relation to the different components of the assemblage”(4). Whereas Foucault “says that [systems of power] normalise and discipline” Deleuze argues, “that they code and re-territorialise”(5). From this point of view, if we return to Deleuze’s text on “Control Societies,” we can surmise that he accepts Foucault’s historical exposition of a shift from sovereign to disciplinary societies. And he sees it as a shift represented by the micro-political effects of power to normalise and discipline, but achieved by the mechanisms that code and re-territorialise desire as a method of capture in a molecular field. This field is forever forming new lines of escape necessitating the mechanics of new forms of capture and changing systems of power and control. This, as we saw in chapter three, is the concatenation of the smooth and the striated, which is a constant in the development of the state. And it is because these “movements of deterritorialisation, as collective historical determinations, do not seem to [Deleuze] to have any equivalent in [Foucault’s] work” that he suggests that “the political problem will not be the same” (7). For Foucault, the problem is concerned primarily with power, but for Deleuze it is a question of desire. It is on the level of desire, Deleuze suggests, that lines of flight escape and de-territorialise the power and status quo of the coding-mechanisms of the state, and forces the desire for state-control to de- and re-territorialise desire in new models of power. This does not end the state institution, but forces a change in the way it operates and its mode of functioning.
When we invoke Foucault’s theory of a “technology of self” in terms of home-ownership, for example, we can see that we likewise invoke an institution: the Australian institution of home ownership. But the development of this institution, while marked by lines of capitalist power and state-capture, nevertheless occurred within a refrain that is the desire for a home. And integral to the capture of this desire was the image or faciality of the self the technology promised to achieve. The technology would not work if it did not capture the desire; it would be purely despotic and its desiring machine would be ‘outside’ the body captured. While we might suggest the prison may capture the body as a desire to disempower and overpower, the technology of home ownership is driven by a desire of the body to empower, but becomes captured when enacted within a system that disempowers to overpower. This is how Deleuze and Guattari come to speak of desire that desires its own repression: the state captures active, nomadic desire when desire acquiesces to the technologies of self that promise fulfilment, but becomes subject to discipline and punishment.

**Diagrams of Power and Desire:**

Deleuze deals with his difference to Foucault, without denying anything that Foucault has said, by suggesting the diagrammatic. On the one hand, the state diagram is a “diagram of power.” The power of the state has two directions: the micro-political systems, and the “abstract diagram which covers the whole of the social field.” On the other hand, the diagram of the war-machine is a “diagram of lines of flight” or resistance. The state diagram brings into play, but is not identical with, a “transcendent plane of organization against the immanent plane of assemblages” linked to the war machine (9). This state diagram is synonymous with the striated lines of the chess metonym Deleuze and Guattari invoke in *A Thousand Plateaus*, and it maps the kinds of struggles within the state-machine and the maintenance of power. The diagram of the war machine, however, refers to the outside that is both internal and external to the state. In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari invoke its movements as metonymic with a game of Go. Here the pieces are un-coded, and the ‘events’ of the war-machine are marked by the “historical confrontations” with the diverse form of the state. For Deleuze, Foucault’s primary analysis of power therefore implies an analysis of the state
In Michael Hardt’s summation of Deleuze’s argument, he proposes that we are seeing the formation of a “post-civil society.” This argument only seems to hold, however, from the point of view of the civil model idealised in the image of the modern state: the argument becomes homologous with arguments about the shift from a modern to a post-modern society. But this diagram of change is a state one, a shift from one form of control to another. Hardt maintains an interpretation of the issues, as he himself states, “in the context of traditional problematics in political philosophy” (1998, 23). He situates the change within the context of the Hegelian dialectic, and defines his terms within this situated paradigm. On this diagrammatic, his interpretation is drawn up in and from a particular model situating a primary contrast between “civil society and political society,” (1998, 24) where the ‘state’ is invoked to signify reference only to the latter. And it is from this point of view that the modern institutions are seen to be withering. From Deleuze’s perspective, however, the repetition of the state operates through the de-coding and re-coding of civil society. The withering of the institutions, therefore, while a disintegration of the modern ideal/image/desire, is not an end of the civil-code, but a re-coding of its manner of functioning. Rather than an end to civil society, we have an end, or more to the point, a crisis-situation for the ‘modern’ model upon which the binary functioning of the state operates. The state, as we have already seen, is for Deleuze and Guattari, an assemblage of desire and a politics of capture that cannot be understood in the divisional model that separates off civil society from the state-proper. This division, in their thinking, is understood more along the lines of a striated set of lines upon the state-diagram situating the tactical capture of society within the overall strategised landscape of state power. And it is in the history of the strategic mode of the binary abstract-machine that, as the power to control through these lines of capture diminishes, a new set of tactical forms of capture become drawn to image and organise the state. The strategy is basic and simple in its diagrammatic form: divide and conquer through de- and reterritorialising society. The tactical model that emerges under the society of control is one that replaces the old discipline and punish model of
the institution with the business model. The transformation is linked, according to Deleuze, to “a mutation of capitalism” (1995, 180).

In the development of disciplinary society, capitalism was:

directed toward production . . . But capitalism in its present form is no longer directed toward production, which is often transferred to remote parts of the Third World . . . It’s directed toward metaproduction . . . What it seeks to sell is services, and what it seeks to buy, activities. (1995, 181)

This shift likewise marks a shift in the diagrammatic model of the state, which sees the power of disciplinary society diminish within a landscape of increasing globalisation. Disciplinary society models its populous on the internal landscape of the state and marks its axiom of control between the confined spaces of the school, the factory, the prison, linking the relationship between institutional confinements to the functioning of a production model of capitalism, and the coded subject positions of owner of capital and owner of labour. The chessboard metonymy is therefore drawn out within the borders of the individual state territorial landscape. In Control societies, however, the factory model of internal production gives way to the business model. The institutions:

are no longer so many analogous but different sites converging in an owner, whether the state or some private power, but transmutable or transformable coded configurations of a single business where the only people left are administrators. (1995, 181)

The single business is of course the business of the state, and its administrative role is relative to its positioning within the game of global relations: the relevant diagrammatic landscape of power relationships that is drawn from outside the individual states, and between relationships with different state formations. If the factories and sites of production are increasingly established in third world environments, then the kinds of historical flows between states likewise shifts in focus.

The balance of the internal nation state is based on a civil-code articulated through a private/public binary formation. As we saw in chapter three, property rights, that were initially conceived in terms of the individual, have become increasingly dominated by the sovereignty of interpretation habituated under the logic of a capitalist, and therefore
commodified, state(ment). They become articulated in terms of private property rights objectified in terms of the commodity: one’s property is seen exclusively as the objects of economic value to which one can claim/prove the title of ownership.

While the rhetorical stance of the democratic state is based on a civil model that espouses rights and responsibilities as an axis between the state and the individual, as we have seen, the capitalist mode of production imposes a becoming of that model within its coded binary of public/private. The ideal model functions as a simulacrum in a system actuated by an increasing dominance of free market capitalism, which secures a sovereignty of interpretation over individual rights and makes them synonymous with the development of the private economy. Individual responsibilities to pay taxes, for example, are accepted only alongside sovereignty over the individual rights of the economic value as a demand they be spent for the benefit of private economy. The effect on the public institutions is one of economic withdrawal. It is not, however, the end of the public institution so much as a change in its functioning. The civil code remains the abstracted logic removed from the material and economic reality of this division, while paradoxically justifying the continued repetition of its divisions through the materiality of economic power – both in terms of defining the model of rights and the demand for public displays of responsibility. Just as the interpretation of private property rights has increasingly drawn its diagram from an economic model, the concept of a right to one’s self, once inscribed in those rights, has increasingly expressed its desire as a demand for human rights. And if the capitalist state has succeeded in winning the battle over the interpretation of property, when rights are constructed under the auspice of the ‘human’, the state works its magic to code a model of humanity that is synonymous with its own privilege. The capitalist state is ultimately opposed to the principles espoused in the concepts of human liberty but appropriates its rhetoric, nevertheless, as a mechanism for supporting its own desires.

In the ideal of a state civil model, individual rights are weighted against the rights of the group and therefore one’s responsibility towards the rights of others. Rights have always been balanced against responsibilities. The right for one’s individual property is justified by the responsibility towards the property of others. This sounds simple and
sound enough, and its principle is the basis of criminal law. The increasing dominance of the sovereignty of what I have called capitalist rights of interpretation marks a shift of intensity in the maintenance of this civil code within the internal nation-state. Here, the division between public and private corresponds with an intensity of the division between rights and responsibilities. Deleuze argues that the shift toward the business model introduces “an inexorable rivalry presented as healthy competition, a wonderful motivation that sets individuals against one another” (1995, 179). This competitive spirit becomes manifest within the structural implication of the civil code. Deleuze argues that “codes are passwords” and the “digital language of control is made up of codes indicating whether access to some information should be allowed or denied” (1995, 180). Deleuze offers the example of education, but we might also consider how these control systems operate throughout the so-called public service, which becomes a network of individuals set up within competitive frameworks. In particular, I want to consider how this competitive network and model of control insinuates its power within the welfare sector, resulting in a diminution of civil and human rights.

The Business of Internal Networks of Control:

In Australia, these changes have occurred under the intensity of sweeping changes across the board of social institutions under the governance of the conservative Howard government. One of the key catch-cries of its rhetoric has been a discourse around ‘mutual obligation,’ which invokes the concept of both rights and responsibilities. This began with a ‘work-for-the-dole’ program targeting 18 – 21 year olds, whereby the recipients of youth allowance are required to ‘volunteer’ for a minimum amount of hours per fortnight, set by the government, in one or other of a set of approved activities, or have their payments reduced. These activities include work-for-the-dole schemes, part-time employment, approved voluntary work in the community, and participation in the Army Reserves. In July 2002, this program was extended to recipients aged 21 – 39. In September 2002, these reforms and breaching rules further extend to a graduated introduction of varied reforms targeting recipients of disability and parenting payments. The definition of an activity breach is as follows:

An activity test breach occurs when a customer does one of the following:
refuses or fails to attend a job interview without sufficient reason, OR
fails to complete a labour market program without sufficient reason, OR
is dismissed from a labour market program for misconduct, OR
refuses to declare, or fails to correctly declare earnings from employment, OR
becomes unemployed voluntarily without sufficient reason, OR
becomes unemployed due to misconduct, OR
fails to accept suitable job offers without sufficient reason, OR
has not applied for a particular number of job vacancies.


Alongside these reforms, we need to note that the government has also been reforming industrial relations legislation in support of individual contracts. Further, while currently unsuccessful, it has been attempting to pass legislation that would see small businesses exempted from unfair dismissal laws. While individual contracts can have a positive effect for those with the ability, skill, experience and confidence to negotiate for themselves (those with adequate ‘business’ skills) young inexperienced workers are those most vulnerable to exploitation. And if the government is successful in passing its ironically named “fair dismissal bill” through parliament, the rights of small-business employees to establish unfair dismissal will be negated. The punitive effect of incurring an activity breach is as follows:

<table>
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<th>If…</th>
<th>Then…</th>
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<tr>
<td>it is the first activity test breach within a 2 year period,</td>
<td>the customer’s basic rate of payment will be reduced by 18% for a period of 26 weeks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>it is a second activity test breach within a 2 year period,</td>
<td>the customer’s basic rate of payment will be reduced by 24% for a period of 26 weeks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>it is a third or subsequent activity test breach within a 2 year period,</td>
<td>a non-payment period will apply for 8 weeks.</td>
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When we consider the network of these relations, we can clearly see a situation whereby the public rights of employees and job seekers are diminishing alongside an increasing
support for the private rights of capitalist business enterprise. The unemployed are situated in a no-win situation; if they fail with comply to the demands of private employers (and the privately run work-for-the-dole schemes and work programs) then they are subject to the economic punishments of the public state.

Included in these welfare reforms and the policy of “activity-test breaching” for non-compliance is also the “administrative-test breach.” Here, welfare recipients are subject to the same set of punitive measures as activity breaches for failing to directly comply with the following set of criteria:

<table>
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<th>Breach</th>
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<tr>
<td>Failure to attend an interview.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Failure to contact to arrange an interview.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-return of correspondence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to provide a required Tax File Number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to nominate a required account.</td>
</tr>
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In September 2002, the Federal government also introduced a program, which was recently reported in the Sunday Times (21st April, 2002) under the title “Jobseekers to get mental test,” and in which all recipients of welfare may be subjected to psychological testing. Failure to agree voluntarily to these tests will result in administrative breaches being recorded and funding cut. On the surface, these measures are also being implemented as benevolent, functional ways in which the government can best identify the needs of the clients and thus better place them for work or work experience. They include, however, the ability to force clients to have state-employed counselling under the same threat of breaching for non-compliance. According to “Centrelink National Manager Peter Bickerton” each office will have a staff psychologist whose “role is to provide high-quality assessments for customers with special needs.” Amanda Vanstone, Minister for Family and Community Services is quoted as saying these “personal
advisers will work with [recipients] to identify goals and agree to a plan”(Kearney, 21). Psychological tests can range in scope from intelligence or cognitive reasoning profiles to personality and social profiles, and structured to identify traits in respect to a specific purpose. Exactly what and how these “jobseeker” tests will be organised remains to be seen, but one thing for certain is that the power to define what is and is not identified as a ‘problem’ and the model of its solution will be enforced by the punitive effect of breaching for any non-compliance.

In addition, and alongside these reforms, it should be noted that most of the services that were hitherto the responsibility of the state-proper, from training services to job-placement agencies, have been privatised. In terms of a network of control, we see a government body actively articulating a model of punitive/corrective measures in conjunction with the financing of a private sector industry in the management of public services. The model imposed is a business model based on the concept of ‘outcomes.’ And it is the ‘business’ of these agencies to decrease welfare spending, and unemployment figures, by getting as many claimants as possible off the list. Rhetorically of course, the aim is to get them into employment, but they have been supported by the imposition of a punitive framework that sees benefit recipients ‘breached’ and economically punished for the slightest sign of non-compliance. In the business competition between agencies, and coupled with the power of authority imbued by the state, Australians on social welfare benefits face a situation whereby agencies get paid in terms the quantity of names they can remove from their lists, and not the quality of jobs or services they deliver. Further, work-for-the-dole programs provide both private and government institutions with free (disciplined) labour in exchange for abstract reference to experience, and this decreases the pressure upon the government to create quality paid employment opportunities.

I suggested earlier in the chapter that welfare rights, as civil rights demanded from the state, are in direct competition with the rights of private capital, and these directly relate to a humanist desire for ‘human rights.’ We have seen that one of the ways the private sector secures its sovereignty over interpretations is through ideological representation.
We have also seen an increased representation of welfare groups being ‘de-humanised’ through rhetorical discriminations and stereotypical manufacturing in the media.

Deleuze argues that one of the tenets of this shift to a control society is the “turning education into a business” (1995, 179). And education is one of the key areas in which welfare recipients can meet their mutual obligations for receiving benefits. Thus, we have a network of control supplying a constant supply of students for the education business, for which students must either pay up-front fees, or accumulate long-term debt under the Higher Education Contribution Scheme deferral and student loan scheme services. Deleuze argues, “even the state education system has been looking at the principle of ‘getting paid for results’” (1995, 179). In Australia, this concept has become part of the format of educational funding and results in a situation where, much like the employment service industry, there is an implicit pressure towards producing sufficient quantity (of passing grades) rather than quality, defined by the necessity for continued survival in what is now a competitive economic market. “Markets are won by taking control rather than by establishing a discipline, by fixing rates rather than by reducing costs, by transforming products rather than by specializing production . . . The sales department becomes a business centre.” (1995, 181). The new marketing of education becomes controlled by the necessity to meet bottom-line ‘outcome’ targets to ensure continued funding; students become transformed from individuals seeking skills and knowledge into indivisuals supplied through a streamlined network of relational pressures in job-market and welfare reforms, enforcing a competition for quantities of certification; and schools and universities spend more time, effort and money on advertising than they do on quality staffing and programs.

The Return of Sovereignty:
Deleuze suggests that Foucault himself was aware that the institutions, through which the model of power in disciplinary society is reproduced, are in crisis. Kafka is the writer, who for Deleuze, stands “at the point of transition between the two kinds of

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26 To be a dividual is to be the object of subjectivity; divided, distinct and distributed by it. This is as differentiated to an individual, who is the subject of their own autopoetic subjectivity.
27 It becomes more about building impressive Curriculum Vitae, than the quality of learning.
society” and his novel *The Trial* describes their two different “judicial expressions.” On the one hand, an “apparent acquittal (between two confinements) in disciplinary societies, and [on the other hand] endless post-ponement in (constantly changing) control societies.” Deleuze argues that “if our legal system is tottering, is itself breaking down, it’s because we’re going from one to the other” (1995, 179). Deleuze argues that the disciplinary societies, which societies of control replace, are predominantly those of the eighteenth and nineteenth century and that prior to this modernity we lived in sovereign societies. He suggests, furthermore, that it “may be that older means of control, borrowed from the old sovereign societies, will come back into play, adapted as necessary” (1995, 182).

As we have seen in Deleuze’s argument, Foucault’s work is based on a historicism that reveals for us a shift from sovereign societies to disciplinary societies. In the context of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the two-headed state, contained within a binary model that repeats itself throughout different state formations, we should think of this change as one which ‘names’ different formations. The basic binary striation is a repeated structure throughout different state formations. In the sovereign society, Deleuze’s two heads of sovereignty are occupied by the magical capture declared by a sovereign King or ruler who dictates the law through his/her Army of loyal subjects. In the disciplinary society, the two heads are re-functioned and are constituted in the formation of the nation-state through practices of legislation and bureaucracy.

In the Mabo case, discussed in chapter three for example, the sovereign power invested in the legal institution was articulated with consideration of, and in opposition to, a traditional right that was nevertheless contemporarily established within the political structure of the nation state of Australia. The disciplinary model of enclosure enforcing Aboriginal peoples to live in the cultural containment of the colonising culture was challenged through an appeal to the sovereign laws of that same culture, and certain limited rights were established. From the point of view of the dominant state, the institution of the law was no longer operating to secure, but to weaken control, over territory. As we saw in *The Castle*, however, this dominance over the legal interpretation and struggle for power over sovereign rights was re-established by/as the
capitalist subject in the fictional refrains that magically captured the hearts and minds of
the people. This represents an exemplary event in the shift in the forms of control
exerted by the state from an institutional refrain to the “new system of domination”
(1995, 182) which likewise follows the shift from a capitalism directed by production to
one directed towards “sales or markets”(1995, 181). When the established legal
discipline failed to establish the sovereign authority of private commodity rights, the
ideology re-asserted itself through a selling of ideas in the popular culture market. And
although private property title wins hold no more legal sovereignty over land than
traditional title, the successful marketing of this idea(l) assures the capturing of desire in
support of a free-market capitalism. The different titles of occupation are made
synonymous on the level of desire to protect the sovereignty of the private market (and
its technology of self) against an outside to which the legal state is imaged as protecting
rights through its system of justice. The people, who see their property rights as defined
within the private institutions of capital, likewise demand the protection of those rights
as a responsibility of the public institutions. The rights and responsibilities of the civil
code become the rights of the private market and the responsibilities of the public.
Discipline/training for the private state of the free market are supported by the punitive
threats of the public state.

“Control” Deleuze argues, “is short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the same time
continuous and unbounded” (1995, 181). If this is achieved through a control of
communications networks, which we have been articulating in terms of popular cultural
representations, then there is one thing this control mechanism “hasn’t changed –
capitalism still keeps three quarters of humanity in extreme poverty, too poor to have
debts and too numerous to be confined: control will have to deal not only with vanishing
frontiers, but with mushrooming shantytowns and ghettos” (1995, 181). This is the space
of the internal outside, which in the context of the arguments I have been presenting
become the sites of ‘dehumanisation’ from which the dominant demand of the state
proper protection. If Mabo marked a certain internal confrontation for the state,
whereby the internal outside found a way inside, it nevertheless left a significant social
problem with an Aboriginal ‘outside’ often facialised by the urban Aboriginal, who have
historically been over-determinedly represented in spaces that become ‘problem
suburbs.’ While Aboriginal peoples are not by any means the only demographic within this outside, they have historically been overburdened with its representation, and issues of criminal disorder often habitually correspond with stereotyped images of the criminal subject behind an indigenous face. This face, however, is also easily transposed onto other minority groups, and the non-English speaking or originating immigrant becomes another vulnerable target. We have seen that Mabo was re-territorialised and recoded through the control of communications and the production of popular cultural narratives that mark a re-assertion of the sovereignty of occupation rights in the private market. Correspondingly, there has been an increased demand for the protection of this market that has called upon the state to ‘do something’ about the ‘outsiders.’ In the shift from a disciplinary society to a control society, the something to be done no longer pretends, however, to produce reformed subjects through education and surveillance who can re-integrate with society at large (although this model is yet to completely vanish). Containment, on the one hand, sees an increased desire (and call) to turn the old reform prison into a boot camp, and on the other, the public institutions increasingly come to model the military institution. We are, with the privatising of public institutions, moving toward a public state whose primary institution is the military complex.

If, the model for disciplinary society was the prison becoming the institution, the model for control society becomes the military complex becoming the business. To this end, Deleuze finds in the work of Paul Virilio (rather than Foucault) an analysis of “the forms of apparently free-floating control that are taking over from the old disciplines” (1995, 178). Virilio’s concept of “dromology” seems most relevant here. In Speed and Politics (1986), Virilio outlines both the history and the movements of military forms of control and the rise of a military class. If we consider the suggestion of a diagrammatic, we might consider how Virilio draws a diagram of state power that follows the rise of the state’s war-machine in a history that overlaps Foucault’s diagram of the declining power of the institution. For Deleuze and Guattari, both the military complex and the institution are already confrontations and modes of capture on the diagram of immanent desire that sees the power of the state appropriate the smooth space of the war-machine. The power of the state military complex and the mode of capture is striated and disciplined for the very sake of protecting territorial borders.
We saw in the last chapter how the state manages to capture the war-machine through mechanisms of internalisation, and then we suggested that these mechanisms nevertheless produce minorities within re-imparted smooth spaces outside the legal refrains of rights. If the institutions under the disciplinary model directly capture desire, it is re-imparted from the collapsing institutions and re-captured by the communications networks in a society of control. If the Mabo case and the struggle for land-rights represented an event marking the confrontation and capture of an internal war-machine, the issue for Australia’s so-called refugee crisis is different. Here, we have to move to the relationship between states, which is not the same as the ‘outside’ but infers an external state of capitalism (global capitalism) and a new confrontation of the war machine, and it is here that the legal case invokes and re-asserts a different sovereignty that draws its striation from the older sovereign society.

Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between an internal and an external war-machine. The internal being characterised by the “local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities, which continue to affirm the rights of segmentary societies in oppositions to the organs of state power.” The external is characterised by:

huge worldwide machines . . . which enjoy a large measure of autonomy in relation to the States (for example, commercial organization of the ‘multi-national’ type, or industrial complexes, or even religious formations like Christianity, Islam, certain prophetic or messianic movements, etc.). (1987, 360)

At the borders of both the internal and the external outside, an appropriated war-machine, or military, is instituted to de- and re-territorialize the smooth space of the war-machine. “Who but the police and armed forces,” Deleuze and Guattari rhetorically ask, “can control and manage poverty and the deterritorialization-reterritorialization of shanty towns? What social democracy has not given the order to fire when the poor come out of their territory or ghetto?” (1994, 107)

If states capture the war-machine, then I would suggest this happens in terms of both imprisonment and segregation of local minorities; and also through an ideological capture of those worldwide mechanisms that become subject to the function of the state.
From this point of view, it seems clear that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, who structured a totalitarian state formation, did so by capturing the external war-machine of Islam and striating its beliefs to the organs of a ruling state power. So too, Australia’s myth of being a state based in humanitarian practice is one of a captured war-machine, striated to the state and subject to the abstract-machine of capitalism. Here, “human rights are axioms [that] can coexist on the market with many other axioms” (Deleuze and Guattari:1994, 107). We have them, but they are structurally striated to the imposition of capitalist hierarchies and are therefore commodities on the worldwide market. Rather than speak of humanism in terms of rights, therefore, I want to consider it as a war-machine outside the binary state machine. And in doing so, consider another legal case, which like the legal battle for land rights became a tool of political propaganda of the Howard government’s divide and conquer tactics articulated to confuse for the sake of maintaining government. Just as the internal demand for civil (human) rights have become striated to the discourse of “mutual obligation” and a system of control whereby all the responsibility rests with the dividualised (dehumanised) public minorities and all the rights become adhered to the dictates of the private commodity market, the refugee crisis has seen a dominant control over communications effect a dehumanising representation of refugees seeking asylum, in the justification of inhumane practices of brutal imprisonment by privately-run detention centres.

Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the modern nation state assumes the characteristics of an axiomatic coding of the flows of wealth and labour, which conjugate to form capitalist production. In effect, nation states are what Deleuze and Guattari call the axioms of the capitalist form. They argue that:

\[
\text{to the extent that capitalism constitutes an axiomatic (production for the market), all states and all social formations tend to become isomorphic in their capacity as models of realization: there is but one centered world market, the capitalist one.}
\]

They go on to suggest that “when international organization becomes the capitalist axiomatic, it continues to imply a heterogeneity of social formations,[and] gives rise to and organizes its “Third World” (1987, 436 – 437).
While there are significant differences and effects between different state formations (democratic states are very different to totalitarian states), there is, nevertheless, a binary abstract-machine that is the same kind of structure. The state, in all its different forms, is ultimately based on a mechanism of capture and striation and if its occupants fail to obey the law, then the state operates more overtly as an oppressive means of capture whereby the outside is directly imprisoned or otherwise dispensed with. The threat of the totalitarian state is, therefore, more overt, and it is under the imposition of such state forms in several Middle Eastern countries, that a line of escape provides for the re-imparted smooth space of the current refugee crisis.

The conditions of the re-imparted smooth space are of course significantly different to the conditions of the smooth space that precedes the state. Most notably, in this sense there is no territory, and rather than de-territorialised movement across nomadically occupied territory, or the coded movements within state occupied territory, the refugee becomes the homeless nomad in-between territory. It is from this point in the never-land of a refugee camp, that such peoples may well look to the image of ‘humanitarian’ states and see a freedom in the multi-cultural diversity of the democratic state form. The refugee crisis is simultaneously a humanitarian crisis, and it is in the lines of flight (becoming flows of so-called ‘boat people’ who travel by the codes and conducts of the outlaw capitalists selling passage to the door of so-called humanitarian states), that Australia finds the war-machine of humanism itself erupting through the surface of its ideological self-image.

The common law of Australia is precedent by and within the sovereign structure of the system and code it inherits from, and remains within, that which was laid down under the Royal Sovereignty of Great Britain. The Empire may have diminished, but Australia retains direct links to the precedence of sovereignty through its constitutional refrain. This refrain ensures that Australia is both independent in its political development, while retaining access to the structures and legal forces of sovereign power. While the Governor General is, like the Queen, largely a figurehead and not a direct political player, the position or office functions as a ‘proper name’ metonymic of the sovereign power used as a tool of governmental actions within the law; utilised and
placed on legal documents that both defend and act in the name of the legislative state proper in battles over common rights within the state. And it was with appeal to this sovereign power, instituted by the older Empire state form, that the Howard government, desperate for re-election, and representing the Australian nation state acted to de- and re-territorialise the deterritorial effects of the re-imparted smooth space of the Refugee crisis.

**The External State – A Historic Diagram of Flows:**

In looking to the external relationship between states, the historical diagram tells the story of flows of trade, information and people. For the purposes of this essay it is the latter of these, the control and structuring of human flows, or the capturing nomadology of the masses, that is of importance. If the refugee crisis is erupting in Australia at the same time as we are moving into a society of control, then we can trace a historic line defining the political and social desires of the state, through the changing demographic of these flows from Australia’s inception as a colony of the British Empire, which occurs at a time when sovereign society was itself giving way to disciplinary society.

In Robert Hughes’ history of Australian colonization, *The Fatal Shore*, he traces the background situation within the British Isles that led to the colonizing of Australia as a prison colony. The historic time-period in which these settlements took place was the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: the same period that Foucault cites as the rise of the disciplinary society. In reading Hughes’ book, it becomes clear that the shift from one system to the other took place not only over a significant period of time, but in response to shifting desires within society itself. In the eighteenth century, Britain had seen the rise of what became termed the “criminal class” which was marked in the main by offences against commodity-property. The legal system in Britain was itself seen as one in which “detection and arrest were feeble and trials tenderly fair,” (29) but against this the system of public execution (hanging) was still in place in the belief it “would reform those who saw it” (31). Hughes notes that “between the enthronement of Charles II in 1660 and the middle of George IV’s reign in 1819, 187 new capital statutes became law . . . to protect property, rather than human life” (29). These kinds of changes saw a huge rise in defined criminal activities that were lawfully sentenced to the gallows.
These hangings were, according to Hughes research, “clearly the most popular mass spectacle in England” (31), drawing large crowds to witness the punishment. The law itself, to which judge and criminal alike were beholden, forced the judiciary to sentence to death many petty criminals, who were, in the main, in desperate poverty. The only way of avoiding these death sentences was through receiving a “Royal Prerogative of Mercy” given by the executive power of the King. This sovereign punitive system of public hangings grew increasingly problematic, however, when angry mobs protested over the ownership of the bodies of family members. The people would go to the executions not only for the spectacle but “to mourn, to reclaim the body of their friend or relative, to give the corpse its due dignity.” The law, however, “did not recognise the relatives’ rights to the hanged corpse. It gave the body to the Royal College of Physicians for dissection.” This angered the people and public hangings often became the site of “brawls and riots . . . as the “mob” battled with the surgeons’ corpse-takers for possession of the bodies” (34). Consequently, “public execution, meant to terrify the populace, enabled the “mob” to show its defiance of authority” (35). The King, who took his Royal Prerogative very seriously and used it to commute death sentences to prison sentences, increasingly did so as a way of showing his love of the people and maintaining popular support. This, together with a rising leniency in the judiciary, who often mis-construed the value of stolen goods so that it fell below the legal threshold requiring the death sentence, saw a steady decline in executions from nearly 70% of convicted crimes in the period 1749 –58, to less that 16% in the period 1799 – 1808 (35).

It was in a matrix of rising desire for leniency and declining desire by the sovereign to enforce public execution, coupled with a rising desire to identify crime and clean up the streets, that the bodies of crime overcrowded the prison system. Half of the prisons at this time were run privately, and not through the state, and they were places where “one simply rotted away” as well as institutions “meant to turn a profit” (37). The initial solution was found in the system of transportation. Death sentences were routinely commuted to transportation to the British colonies abroad, this:

supplied Britain with a large labour force, consisting of people who, having forfeited their rights, could be sent to distant colonies of a growing Empire to
work at jobs that no free settler would do . . . English jailers did excellent business by selling these luckless colonists to shipping contractors, who in turn sold . . . the rights to their labour. . . to plantation-owners in the Caribbean and America. (40 - 41)

After the American revolution however, this means of making profit from convict labour could no longer be sustained. America already had an established trade in African slaves, who, unlike convicts did not have a limited sentence that would eventually end and reinstate their rights, but provided an ongoing system of enforced labour. This loss of a market in convict labour trade, led in turn to the drawing up of the “Hulks Act” (1776) which allowed convicts sentenced to transportation to be kept in anchored ships off the coast of Britain while the government decided what to do about them (Hughes, 41).

In Deleuzian terms, this mass of criminal bodies is the space of the re-imparted smooth and the site of an internal outside re-imparted from the old system of sovereign punishment, resulting in a crisis for the state. It was largely due to a necessity to deal with this re-imparted smooth space that the British Empire decided to establish a prison colony on the shores of what was seen as a barren and harsh no-land, Australia. According to Hughes:

For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more that 160,000 men, women and children . . . in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history ( 2).

Synonymous with this crisis was the political activities of a group known as the Abolitionists, who protested against the transportation of convict labour to the colonies. The argument went alongside protests against slavery, to which it was analogised. Hughes argues that this was mistaken as convicts, unlike slaves, did have a limited sentence and could live, therefore, in hope of an end to their slavish conditions. The Abolitionists eventually won their cause, and transportation ended in 1868. And the reimported smooth flows from the old sovereign society became subject to the rise of the striated order of a disciplinary society.
Foucault argues that the Panopticon became the model that is metonymic of disciplinary society. Its designer, Jeremy Bentham, was politically active as part of the Abolitionists. Bentham’s Panopticon was never actually built, but as Foucault demonstrates, the idea behind prisons as centres of reform and the spread of disciplinary society grew up alongside the rise of nation-states. The history of Australian convicts, who became, at the commutation of their sentences, incorporated within the growing settler society, draws a line from the non-subjective re-impacted smooth space of British sovereign society to the new subjects of a rising disciplinary society. With the end of convict-labour, however, the emerging Australian nation state and its capitalist conjugation still required a labour force to build its infrastructure and populate its growth. Transportation of convict labour is replaced with the immigration of working class labour, and the smooth becomes striated as Australia increasingly becomes seen as a desirable location, a new-world settlement promising bountiful work, and your own quarter acre block. The external face shifts from being the face-less other of the British Empire, to the face of a young nation promising a prosperous new life to working-class British migrants.

The history of Australian immigration follows its own twisted line of conflicting desires. One model of discipline was based on a policy known as the “white Australia” policy, which was laid down during the Federation of the states in 1901 under the “Immigration Restriction Act.” The aim of this act was to legally enshrine the growth of the nation within a dominantly British and certainly white settlement. As Jock Collins puts it, the “Australian immigration story is inextricably linked with racist laws and practices” (103). This policy ensured that the vast majority of migrants were, by 1947, of British origin. In the post-war period, however, Australia undertook a massive immigration program under the catchcry of the first minister for immigration, Arthur Calwell’s “populate or perish.” In his summation of Australia’s immigration history, Collins argues that although:

the Australian immigration experience is notable not only for its relative size, but also for the ethnic diversity of its post-war migrant intake . . . this was not the intention of the architects of the post-war immigration program. (104)
The intention was to maintain the white Australia policy, but “immigration in Australia is closely tied to labour market needs” (105) and it was by default to these needs that saw an increased expansion of cultural diversity. There were insufficient numbers of available British migrants and this led Calwell to turn to “Eastern Europe and the ‘Displaced Persons’ (refugees from the Second World War) to fill immigration targets” (104).

As an axiomatic of capitalism, the Australian nation state requires flows of capital and labour, a requirement subject to the needs of the current market. In the years post the Second World War, it was both convenient and useful for burgeoning nation states such as Australia to take in large numbers of migrant workers. This intake, however, as the history of the white Australia policy demonstrates, has always been taken in consideration of a desire to select the origin of the flows. During this period of high ideals, the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees was drawn up and committed to as an international agreement subject to international law.

The influence of the ideological desire for British, white, and definitely English speaking migrants, nevertheless had the consequence of setting up structural hierarchies among migrants who came from non-English-speaking backgrounds. The lack of formal acknowledgement or social acceptance of these migrants ensured they became “disproportionately concentrated in the “dirty jobs” of unskilled or semi-skilled manual work” and, as a consequence, demographically had “the lowest income, highest incidence of poverty, and highest rate of unemployment in non-Aboriginal Australia” (Collins, 105-106). The onus on assimilating was on the migrant, and racist attitudes critiqued those who were seen not to do so. The problem, however, was that in the early years migrants “were not given any special support in this process.” The white Australia policy did not formally end until 1972, and it was not until the mid-1970s that “special migrant assistance in areas such as education, health and welfare was being demanded” (Collins, 111). This demand, while hardly mapping an easy road for migrants, nevertheless saw the enactment of government support to help migrants assimilate within the social matrix of the Australian community. Collins argues that, “the mass settlement of migrants from a wide range of countries has made the overt maintenance
of a racist definition of the nation and of the Australian type impossible” (132). The
faciality, born of the necessity to accommodate the multi-racial ‘image’ of Australia and
Australians, has never exactly eradicated old racisms however, and there has remained
an underlying attitude (an abstract-machine) generally associated with, although far from
being exclusive to, conservative political ideologies that desire a re-territorialisation of a
homogenised society modelled on a mono-cultural over-coding of the multi-racial
image.

We might consider that a demand from the public for migrant services, like Mabo’s
appropriation of the law, shifts the function of educational disciplines, for example, from
being institutions securing the dominance of the hierarchical state, to one in which the
institution becomes a service providing enabling skills to a multi-cultural landscape of
minority needs. The dehumanising effect of enforced assimilation no longer applies
when the technologies of the institution become appropriated by the desires of the
people and, like other forms of demand for state services, invokes a civil and human
right driven by the war-machine of humanist desire. From this position, however, the
functioning of social institutions read as a failure on the diagram of power relations for
the dominant state political. The desires of a multi-cultural plurality de-territorialises the
disciplinary power the old hierarchies had over state institutional apparatus. Thus the
economic business model of the despotic capitalist state emerges to invoke increased
pressure on and from economic-rationalist governments to decrease institutional ‘public’
spending. The consequent fall-out of social support in assimilation programs, not only
marks an element of the shift to a society of control, but also a new over-coding by the
despotic state machine. New intensities of isolation and poverty emerge within sub-
cultural, socially disabled environments, and old hierarchies are re-asserted. Changes
from capitalist production to consumption models in the globalised state, also see a
weakening need/desire for migrant workers and a growing desire to cut immigration
numbers entering the nation state. The business of the state now desires consumers, not
producers: capital, not labour.

In the new markets, the state’s desire for intake of people-flows becomes a desire for the
tourist and the tourist dollar. Deleuze argues that, “markets are won by taking control
rather than establishing a discipline” (1995, 182). Australia is in the process, therefore, of changing its external face from a welcoming paradise for workers and attracting disciplined lines of migrant workers, to creating itself through a business model selling scenic landscapes for tourist dollars, and investment opportunity for overseas capital. And it is in the emerging shift from disciplinary society, to a society of control, that the pre-established international agreements for refugee intake are no longer convenient or desired, and from which the latest refugees (no longer European, but Middle-Eastern in origin) become a new re-imparted smooth.

Communications and the Confrontation of Desire and Power:
In principle, the United Nations Refugee Convention committed signatory states to protecting people who had been persecuted under the regime of their own governments. The Convention is itself a part of the founding of an ideological divide facialising a difference between humanitarian states and totalitarian ones. It specifically defines refugees in terms of political persecution: the condition of poverty and starvation is in and of itself not a qualifying reason for seeking asylum in wealthier countries. This construction is metonymic with Australia’s own internal anti-discrimination laws, whereby economic discrimination (the most dominant of all internal and external discriminating factors in capitalism) does not exist as a point of law, and points to the fact that there is a meta-ideology incorporated within the Convention based on the logic of free market capitalism. Nevertheless, this humanitarian face is now a cause of concern for the Australian state.

Deleuze and Guattari say: “The State is sovereignty, but sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of internalizing; of appropriating locally” (1987, 360). And this is the problem for Australia when it comes to refugees, the entire existence of these people and their condition of desperation is a matter of issues that are foreign to the locality of the Australian state. The eruption of events both inside and spilling outside contained flows within the state of detention/processing centres represents, in the terms of this chapter, an eruption of an internal war-machine against the state. The news-media coverage that these events attracted, lead to the telling of human life stories, which in turn lead to the questioning of the Howard government’s handling of the detention and processing
system. The non-human face (the contained and imprisoned outside) showed itself to be human. These events enacted a deterritorialisation of a coded mask of human rights and revealed a failure by the state to deal with these issues humanely. The government response that followed de- and re-territorialised the situation by blocking and controlling media images of the crisis and ideologically dehumanising the imprisoned occupants through a propaganda campaign that represented them as threatening. In order to control and maintain this stand off, however, the government needed to stem the flow from outside the state.

Australian public debate had been questioning the entire issue of immigration for some time, and specifically issues of ‘illegal’ immigration. The unregulated and disorganised flows of boat people, who have not gone through the ‘proper’ channels, de-territorialise the state’s desires to control and choose who does and does not come into the country. Under the Convention, Australia agrees to take in a portion of refugees and this is factored in by the state in terms of immigration policy and coded within legal refrains set down in the statutes and regulations defined within the migration act. The problem for the state, whose aim is one of control, is that it wants to maintain immigrant intake in economic rationalist terms. In an environment where public services are being diminished and an already multi-cultural society is being forced into mirroring the codes of a mono-cultural conservativism, the power brokers perceive the integration of a new cultural difference as a threat. For humanism, seen as a war machine against this power diagram, the nomadology of cultural difference is both desired and treasured in and for itself, and acts of abuse perpetrated in refugee camps are viewed as inhumane and unjust. One of the key tools of control society is the appropriation and use of “information technology” (Deleuze: 1995, 180), and it was through a privileged access to communication networks, dominated by a focus-interest in the forthcoming election, that the Howard government manipulated images, facts and rhetoric to instigate what Guy Rundle has called a “triumph of reaction.”

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The prejudice invoked against these people is not, I want to suggest, simply racist\textsuperscript{29} but what we might call culturalist. During his time as Prime Minister, Howard has strongly invoked on many occasions the idiom that we are a Christian country, and despite strong criticism, used his parliamentary power to ideologically symbolise this personal belief with the appointment of a Christian religious leader as Governor General. This enacts a symbolic over-coding of contemporary multi-cultural secularity by the imposition of a moral order specific to Christian doctrine.\textsuperscript{30} The majority of these refugees emerge from Muslim countries and thus inherit a Muslim, not Christian, cultural background. And, like the articulation of racism and xenophobic fear of the other ideologically manipulated during the lands rights issue, the invocation of cultural difference became a tool of political propaganda. In media enunciations, John Howard repeatedly stated throughout this debate that he wanted to send the message that we are not going to welcome people fleeing middle-eastern countries with an open-door policy, insisting on a right to ‘choose’ who does and does not enter the country. He may temper this with claims that there are ‘proper channels’ through which they can apply, but the reality is that “Australia does not have any form of diplomatic representation in Iraq and Afghanistan, let along facilities where applicants can form a line and have their requests considered in an orderly manner” (MacCallum, 42). According to reports in the New Internationalist, in these countries where requests have been registered, “there is at least a three-year waiting list and only three families from Afghanistan have been accepted this year [2001] through this process” (17). One can hardly call this a generous rate of acceptance. Clearly, the Australian state wants to ensure that the humanitarian crisis remain a distant ‘other’.

\textsuperscript{29} This is unless we understand the term through Balibar’s reconfiguration (see chapter one), rather than as a purely genetic inscription.

\textsuperscript{30} By multi-cultural secularity I refer not only to multi-culturalism in a secular state, but also to what has been a steady decline of all traditional belief systems among the contemporary populous. While many of us inherit a Christian cultural heritage through familial genealogies, the values that have been dominantly retained within secular life are humanist in nature, and correspond to Christianity only as cultural aspects of, rather than strict doctrinal faith in, Christian teachings. Furthermore, these broad humanist values are generally shared across multiple cultural heritages regardless of the traditional religious proximities associated with different cultural backgrounds. And, even with Christian cultural heritages, a multiplicity of forms and church-doctrines circulate within a plural society. The institution of Howard’s political refraining of Christian culture as Australian culture not only abjects all non-Christian cultural heritage as ‘other,’ but both homogenises the plurality of Christian belief systems under the specific doctrine of Howard’s own interpretation, as well as capturing and over-coding the war-machine of humanism, under the limited reference to its Christian expressions and the statement of a religious state.
From the point of view of the capitalist nation state, immigration is and always has been related and narrated as relative to the production and the maintenance of a labour force. With the mutation of capitalist formation, however, that desire is less orientated to traditional labour requirements and more interested in direct economic investment and business interests. As MacCallum points out, “our whole Business Immigration Program is based on luring as many wealthy go-getters as possible to our shores” (43). The economic state prejudice wants to ‘choose’ who does and does not enter the country based on what business skills or economic benefit they might bring. The private prejudice of the dominant minority governing the state, however, wants to manage those flows based on its own cultural dominance. In 1999, the government released a report titled “Boat People, Illegal Migration and Asylum Seekers: in Perspective.” The report argues that “the ‘illegal’ population comprises, in migration terms, predominantly unskilled or lower skilled people who would not qualify under current entry criteria” (Millbank, 5). This reported demographic, however, directly contravenes one of the ideological representations the government promulgated in the media during the event, that these people were “economically privileged” ‘queue jumpers’ (i.e. professionals). This rhetoric during and leading up to an election campaign was of no small significance, and the concept of the wealthy buying a privilege to migrate was used to offend the internal mythology of the egalitarian state. That capitalist ‘queue jumping’ occurs as a matter of structural state support within the system, and thus the hypocrisy of this position, is of little consequence for the government. As the report states, the vast majority of illegal immigrants are made up of tourists who overstay their visa restrictions. Further, this group subsequently have the highest success rate in attaining permanent residence when applications are made through the system, and they do so without ever being locked up behind barbed wire fencing.

As with other businesses in the society of control, the government’s aim is to win a market. The winning of votes and the political electioneering game uses what is perhaps the most unethical of methodologies. If there was one representation of these refugees that communicated an idea abhorrent to the general populous (voters) it was the manufactured image of children being thrown overboard, which was a spectacle event repeated continuously through the popular media. In this incident, the sovereignty over
communications and the control over the image-making machine ensured that if the populous were not fully convinced, they were certainly confused. When, in the midst of this manufactured confusion, the twin-towers in New York were brought down by suicide bombers identified with Middle-Eastern terrorism, it did not take a lot of effort to instigate a fear that this seemingly unthinkable act was synonymous with the entire culture of people who would throw their own children into the water. The government knew all along, as the Australian people have now been made aware through the subsequent enquiry, that this was simply not true, but this did not prevent them from manufacturing its perception for maximum benefit in their election campaign. As Deleuze suggests, under the society of control “corruption . . . takes on a new power, [and] marketing is now the instrument of social control [that] produces the arrogant breed who are our masters” (1995, 181).

The desire of asylum seekers and their supporters marks the eruption of humanism’s external war-machine against the ideological face of the so-called humanitarian state. It confronts what it is to be humanitarian and actually act in accordance with the projected self-image of the human. The events surrounding the Tampa affair were clearly part of a pre-structured desire by the government, bound to the international refugee convention, to have the convention scrapped and/or reworked. The 1999 government report goes on to complain:

the boat arrivals in particular provide a very public demonstration of how options for dealing with people unlawfully in Australia are constrained by the international asylum system, and the way that the UN Refugee Convention obligations have been written into Australian migration law (6). Further, along with noting that Middle Eastern asylum seekers from Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan succeed gaining refugee status under these laws over 90 percent of the time (7), the report concludes that it “is questionable whether many countries . . . would sign up to the 1951 international refugee convention today” (10).

The ‘Tampa’ affair presented the government with an opportunity to change the situation whereby flows of unwanted cultural difference into the country could be redirected to remain outside the state. The seeking of asylum by ‘boat-people’ refugees
enacts a deterritorialising flow on the state system, preventing the state machinery from controlling and identifying which immigrant populations it wants and which it does not. They bypass the ‘proper’ channels, which hardly exist in the first place, but through which, as the government report itself admits, they would not be admitted. That this has been managed is due to the ability of the people, once inside the migration zone, to access legal rights under the state’s refugee convention obligations. The rescued boat people on board the ‘Tampa’ provided the government with the opportunity to instigate a situation whereby the legal codes that were hampering their desire to control and pre-identify the flows of people into the country could be re-worked. In effect, the state enacted its own war-machine; the military were sent to the border to ensure that these people did not enter the migration zone, thereby deterritorialising the flow. There would have been little doubt for the government that the legality of these acts would have been challenged, and it was always going to be a test case for them. They very nearly lost, winning on appeal two to one in favour, and supported no doubt by the heightened sense of confusion and fear set loose by the interim events of the September 11th tragedy. Nevertheless, even had the government lost the legal battle over the ‘Tampa’ refugees, the smooth deterritorialisation of the flows of asylum seekers provided them with the opportunity to re-territorialise with the implementation of new legislation.

The law is the abstract-machine that de-territorialises the earth and re-territorialises it under the codes of a sovereign power. And it was based on a return to ultimate sovereignty that the Australian Government de- and re-territorialised the statutes of law allowing asylum seekers to seek refuge in Australian territory. The government’s legal case was won on a point of common law derived from the colonising British Empire state. It gives the state “royal prerogative” under sovereign power to prevent all unwanted aliens from entering through its borders. The difficulty presented by the case was whether statutes in law that define specific situations, such as migration and border control, override, as they have generally been seen to do so, this sovereign power. In the midst of this legal battle, which highlighted both the power itself and the difficulty current statutes present to its utilisation, a re-writing of the legislation ensured that current statutes in law reflect more overtly this very power. The “Border Protection Bill” writes this power into the migration and customs act, thereby side stepping international
obligations under the Refugee Convention. In effect, Australia has now closed its borders to, and sent a clear message, tagged to the guns of SAS troops if necessary, that “boat people,” which is to say refugees, are not welcome.

The side effect of this move troubled some within the dominant state demographic however. Notably, representatives from the business community enunciated concern through the popular media that the new international image might deter the migrants Australia does want, that is, the cashed up and/or skilled up workers whom business capitalism does have a need and use for. I would suggest that this demonstrates that Australia does not desire to be a closed state per se, but a discriminatory one: everyone is welcome, just so long as they can pay the entry fee. This enunciation marks a facial re-territorialisation of the state and the workers desired are those of the professional business class, who, like flows of cash, operate on a global network of exchange. The governmental legal side, however, continues on its path to re-direct flows of refugees with new ‘outpost’ detention centres. And, just as the Australian colonies began as a way to rid the British Empire a re-imparted smooth, over-coded as an unwanted criminal class, the small island of Nauru has become the convenient outpost for the re-imparted smooth, over-coded as unwanted boat people. Of course, if Australia began in the shift towards disciplinary societies, it befitted the territorial structure of an enclosed land of containment, whereas Nauru has been established within the shift toward a control society, as a processing point within the network of international flows.

Despite the face of humanism and freedom that have been the tools of ideological self-imagining by states such as Australia, we must now face the fact that the state form is humanitarian only insofar as the flows of humanity are synonymous with the flows of capital and marketable labour. In the shift to a society of control, we see the state diminish the human rights for both an internal civilian population and an external population of refuge seekers; that is, the most vulnerable people of all. We have all become subjected to being dividuals in the business of global capitalist enterprise. If, as I have suggested, these events have enacted an external war-machine of humanism, then they also show that captured under capitalism, humanism becomes de- and re-territorialised into the statement of ‘human rights’ that are like the many other
commodities that the market produces – you can have them just so long as you can afford the privilege. While outside of these privileges, humanity seems destined to occupy the re-imparted smooth of the never lands of poverty and dehumanisation. If the state always wins out over the war-machine, it would appear that there is no hope, but Deleuze and Guattari suggest otherwise. The war-machine, which has the “power of metamorphosis” as opposed to the states “apparatus of identity” has the ability to mutate:

at the moment [it] ceases to exist…displays to the utmost its irreducibility, that is scatters into thinking, loving, dying, or creating machines that have at their disposal vital or revolutionary powers capable of challenging the conquering state (1987, 356).

If humanist desire has become captured under the oxymoron of the humanist-state and humanity itself reduced to the rationale of economic privilege, perhaps it is time for us to mutate our creative machines into something beyond human; to enter into a becoming alien to the state.

The question remains, however, on how to proceed with such a becoming and avoid the dangers that becoming presents. One of the key sites for cultural and social change has always been through the academic arena and the emergence of new forms of thinking. These sites of research and communication sit, often ambivalently, between the diagrams of power and desire and can become the tool of both. If in disciplinary society we can suggest that these sites became appropriated as tools for the enclosed institutions of power, then in the society of control they become appropriated as tools for the networks of control. There has always been, however, an element of anarchic desire within traditions of knowledge. I questioned Hardt’s insistence on reading Deleuze through this tradition earlier in this chapter but, nevertheless in his own book Gilles Deleuze, he recognises that is through an “affirmation of [this] (discontinuous, but coherent) line of thought that has remained suppressed and dormant” that Deleuze draws his inspiration. In making his reading from the dominance of the diagram of power and tradition, Hardt argues that the shift to a society of control is a move beyond the Hegelian dialectic; “not limiting but perfecting the state’s rule” (1993, 33). In the context of desire, however, rather than a dissolution of civil society, we see a shifting
desire and a de/reterritorialisation of its functioning. It remains a dialectical shift when we consider that Deleuze reads the dialectic through Nietzsche and in terms of oppositional refrains that continually synthesises states of nihilism; a point I will return to in my conclusion. In my next chapter, I will consider the ways the state forms a habitus of thinking through popular discourses permeating primary education networks that directly construct sociological typecasting through misappropriations of academic, and particularly scientific discourse, in practices of behavioural engineering. Further, I will consider the connection this practice has to the micro-fascisms and fascistic desires of the state desire to eradicate the ambivalence of becoming.
Philosophy, Science and Art: The Stated Body and the Body without Organs of thinking.

One of the criticisms many people voiced to me about Deleuze and Guattari when I first began engaging with their material was that they appear to utilise many popular science terminologies as metaphors for seemingly unrelated arguments. Thus, there is a perception that they are simply exploiting science terminology as popular fashion. This rejection and dismissal of their work seems to emerge, however, from the difficulty many readers and academics have in actually understanding their material and their different ways of thinking about the world. Deleuze and Guattari’s style of expression does not appear easily accessible because it embodies its own ethic and actively confronts the habits of academic consumption. They demand that we play Go when entering into a dialogue with their work, where we are used to playing Chess: they demand that we think it through our own becomings, our own minoritarian space, where we have been trained to consume and deconstruct texts according to the majoritarian constructed space. Deleuze and Guattari operate within the paradigm of philosophy and, as I shall show in this chapter, they use these terms in respect to their conceptual rather than functional basis, as is the purpose in scientific paradigms. This use, therefore, does not deny or pervert scientific constructions, uses, or meanings, so much as suggest a metonymic link between different paradigmatic constructions. It is, thus, part of a connective exercise in inter-disciplinary thought.

For Deleuze and Guattari, the mode or process of the state-machine functions through a binary form of capture and the primary objective is the capture of thinking; the way we think about the world is primary to our relationship with it and how we act and react to our experience of it. Thinking communicates between our desires and our actions and affects our constructive and productive embodiment. Deleuze and Guattari do not operate within a paradigm of thinking that segregates its activity from the body, but are contemporaneous with a post-Cartesian landscape where thinking of the mind as being other to the body or visa-versa no longer holds. If we consider that in many ways the concept of thought as being a primary element of desire and action is also implicit in the
psychoanalytic thinking that Deleuze and Guattari critique, we should note that what is different here is the landscape upon which that thinking constructs its knowing. While Freud operates with respect to a biological/material reference, he does so in a world where modern biological science is in its infancy and thus the reference operates upon a theoretical network dominated by hypotheses that no longer operate within the field. His reference point is a simulacrum of the body; a copy of a model with no original, and Freud’s mind is necessarily separate from it. His own consciousness of the body is over-coded by the model, and thus he projects its expression onto the screen he calls the unconscious. He grafts on his own expression to the model, and thus the simulacrum comes to subject all other bodies to Freud’s body, which is to say his ‘unconscious’. Deleuze and Guattari, however, have the privilege of contemporary science. Contemporary knowledge has overturned the old hypothesis by showing that actions in the mind are actions in the body, and that the relationships between them are idiosyncratic to the event in the context of a chaotic set of variables. Post chaos-theory, science no longer understands the world through the old opposition, chaos versus order or the random versus the predictable system. Rather, it is seen in terms of the order of chaos, the predictability of the random system. Contemporaneous with this shift in scientific narratives, Deleuze and Guattari bring a new understanding to the old opposition in philosophy between being and becoming. Thus, we have the being of becoming as with the body of the mind.

This marks a significant shift in thinking to the oppositional thinking that functions to maintain the state order through binary refrains of power, which continue the status quo. In effect, these post-modern discourses break down oppositional thought and require a differential approach to understanding the information that is nevertheless produced. Old habits die hard, however, and despite these shifts, scientific representation/reasoning remains for the most part appropriated by the either/or oppositional thinking of traditional power diagramatics. In cultural studies, and particularly in terms of gender debates, the problem is considered in terms of representations and a differentiation between essentialist and constructionist understandings of the world. Essentialism is here understood to be narratives that link biological actuality (the field of the natural sciences) to a pre-coded socio-psychological destiny. These narratives are shown,
however, to be social constructs that change over time according to dominant political desires. They operate to ‘interpret’ biological facts such as sexual difference in terms of a naturalized order that defines ‘normal’ development against definitions of abnormality. Freud is seen as an essentialist, for example, because the Oedipal model of psychosexual familial-based development he narrates is produced as an essential technology of self in the maintenance of ‘healthy’ subjectivity. Cultural studies’ considers this in terms of what it calls the sex/gender system. In psychoanalysis, the sexed body is subjected to the constructed model of gender narrated through Freud’s creative interpretation of the Oedipal myth. The sex/gender system, as I have come to understand/appropriate it, does not consider sex or sexuality to be essential or pre-determinant of social becoming and I see no reason why this is antithetical to scientific knowledge narrating sex in terms of its biological construction through ‘accidental’ combinations of genetic data and hormonal environments. As I understand contemporary science on this subject, while hormone levels are seen to have distinct effect on foetal development and the experience of the biological body, they are also influenced by and are produced by and in the body in response to environmental conditions. As social gender constructions influence and make up the determinate conditions of the environment they also, therefore, potentially influence the constructing development of biology. Differentiations between sex and gender cannot be seen, thus, as an either/or but as interrelated modes of construction. While essentialist discourse utilizes scientific signifiers and references as tools to reproduce its messages within the popular imagination, and these essentialist believes often mediate popular representations of science, it is important to remember that, even when repeated by those who work within fields defined scientifically, the narrative is not itself science, but a (re)construction of the data and facts that science discovers through the discourse of essentialism. Essentialism is itself a constructed narrative that is utilized in different ways for different purposes, but always in terms of a desire to control and influence the ongoing processes of construction. This kind of thinking is not isolated to science discourse, but permeates all areas of cultural and social endeavour, operating through numerous appropriations in the service of despotic over-codings of life. It is the popularity and repetition of these narratives, however, that form a faciality/a mask that reproduces science most predominantly in terms of the
technological off-spins both in terms of commodity production and scientifically
discoursed technologies of self.

In the Introduction, I discussed the problem of the state and employed Deleuze’s work
on Bergson to suggest that the solution to a problem is related to the manner in which it
is constructed. Further, I argued that for Deleuze and Guattari one of key problems is
the particular effect of fascistic thinking. Historically, the experience of the Holocaust
marks a key event that defines for Western thought the rise and formation of a fascist
state. Nazi Germany has become a modern representative example of a society that we
wish never to experience again. Fascism is explained in Freud’s psychoanalytic model
as an effect of the powerful mastery of Hitler, who established and manipulated libidinal
ties with the citizens of his nation and thus bent them to his own, more powerful will.

Deleuze and Guattari, who reject this explanation and its assumption that desire is based
on a lack, argue rather, that the people actually came to desire fascism and that desire is
determined within the determinate conditions of its formation. Furthermore, they
suggest that fascist desire is something that can and does form within all of our psyches
and if we wish to fight against it and avoid its manifestation on a macro-political level,
we must be aware and struggle against it on this micro-level of socialization. As I have
been elaborating throughout the thesis, for Deleuze and Guattari, the revolution against
the conditions that structure this kind of despotic political formation, the state, is waged
in the paradigm of thinking. It is the state-refrains that define and identify both self and
other, and the explicit limitation this model enforces upon thoughts – the labels of
madness, badness and/or otherness – that ensure a habituated order to stay within its
boundaries. These refrains have been inscribed and taught within the habitus under
hierarchies of expert-authority, accepted as common sense without question. On a
molecular level, they become the thought refrains that structure the formation of our
brains, which is to say our bodies. For Deleuze and Guattari, corresponding to each and
every body, be it organic or non-organically organized, individual or collective, there is
a Body without Organs screening the construction of its assemblage.

This chapter explores Deleuze and Guattari’s re-working of the conceptual categories of
knowledge in Philosophy, Science and Art alongside their distinctions between nomadic
and state-thinking and its relationship to the concept of a Body without Organs. In conjunction with this, I draw on the work of Zygmunt Bauman, who analyses how the narratives of modernity function to reproduce the power of the state and to provide the justification for fascistic state practices. In doing so, I argue that if we are to learn the lessons of the Holocaust as Bauman suggests, we need to consider, not only how the state used science in the past through racist inspired eugenics programs, but consider how it is being utilized in the present under contemporary forms of socially-prejudiced programs narrating socio-biological essentialism. One such example being employed in state education thinking, inspired by Steve Biddulph, family therapy and the popularist face of men’s movement, is to institute ‘boys in education’ programs in our schools. Rather than being justified on theories of genetic biological difference, however, these programs justify their fascistic practices through socio-biological difference extrapolated along an institution of the binary-abstract-machine of middle-class, hetero-sexual modelled, gender relations. The micro-politics of German fascism sought the solution to its manufactured problem of ‘Jews’ in terms of discriminative solution through genetic engineering, an idea which molecularised the thoughts of millions of German people and state practitioners who ultimately became the agents of the collective and molar fascism that led to the atrocities of the Holocaust. In the micro-politics of contemporary Australia, educational refrains mark a limited example of the multiple social sites in which these processes occur, and where fascistic thinking is being manufactured as a problem with ‘boys’ in terms of discriminative solution narrated through essentialist discourse and instituted through practices of behavioural engineering. This idea, I will argue, is molecularising the thoughts of Australian state practitioners (teachers and schools) who are in danger (along with other public service practitioners) of becoming the agents of what may well become a new manifestation of collective, molar fascism. One clear difference, however, is the historical landscape upon which these processes occur: where the German solution sought an eradication of a sub-set of human bodies (all that was deemed Jewish) within the social landscape, the Australian solution is to seek an eradication of a sub-set of non-patriarchal social practices. Rather than eradicate bodies, therefore, this new threatening manifestation of state fascism seeks to re-construct them into conformist ‘male’ behaviour. As I shall argue, this re-construction is based on a conservative re-territorialisation of patriarchal power diagrams, drawn as
conservative ‘family values’ and its enemy is the plural and multi-cultural practices of an ambivalent and polymorphous social landscape.

Thinking – the Body without Organs:
For Deleuze and Guattari, the embodied production of habits manifests itself in terms of the thinking; the mindfulness that is not separate or distinct from the body but constructs and instructs within the assemblage of the body. The brain is not the centre of the organic body; it is one vital organ among others, but it is, according to Deleuze and Guattari the surface that registers both the inscriptions and descriptions in the movement of thought. And it is the ‘vitality’ or life produced and screened on this surface that Deleuze and Guattari conceive of as the Body without Organs. A vitality that is not exclusive to the productions of organic life, however, as “not every organism has a brain, and not all life is organic, but everywhere there are forces that constitute micro-brains, or an inorganic life of things” (1994, 213). To this extent, we need to understand that the assemblage on the surface of the brain-organ is the ‘life’ of things produced as a Body without Organs that is not itself synonymous with the brain-organ, which constructs a reference point for and from our own bodies as to the attainment of the Body without Organs. In a sense then, this concept replaces the psychoanalytic transcendental conception of the unconscious, which is seen within the overpowering force of an organised body of anatomic and social specificity that models and restricts its becoming. The Body without Organs, however, exists as a screen-surface for all bodies, not as a universalising concept such as the ‘collective unconscious’, but as a constituting surface. For example, Deleuze and Guattari suggest in Anti Oedipus that capital is the Body without Organs of the capitalist, but the capitalist is not a body-brain so much as a subject-type. The capitalist state constructs and reconstructs the subject through the narration of capitalist codes upon the Body without Organs and this simulacrum or faciality inscribes the surface of the brain with thought refrains that enunciate the body within the logic of an economic rationalism. It becomes a refrain of habituation that is insinuated within the logical processes of thought production through its own repetition, secured as a common sense or naturalized cultural narrative in the minds of all participating social subjects.
Importantly, this does not indicate a split between body and mind. Rather, this split is itself one of the thought-codes inscribed by the uniform face of state-thinking, which inscribes its surface though a binary refrain or abstract-machine. What is of the body is of the mind and visa-versa; the body is an assemblage. The body is made up of an interconnection of organ-machines, but not every body is anatomical and not every body has a brain-organ. Every body, however, does have a Body without Organs that “is always swinging between the surfaces that stratify it and the plane that sets it free” (1987, 161). The plane that sets it free is, in Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation, “the plane of consistency, which frees the Body without Organs, cutting across and dismantling all of the strata, and the surfaces of stratification that block it or make it recoil.” It is not opposed, therefore, to the organs of the body, which “must be composed and positioned on its plane” but it does oppose the organism or “the organic organization of the organs” which Deleuze and Guattari describe as “the judgment of God, from which medical doctors benefit and on which they base their power.” In other words, the stratification of the body is organised as an organic whole as one of the lines of simulation of the dominant and dominating statement. This organism, which is a faciality, is:

not at all the body, the Body without Organs; rather, it is a stratum on the Body without Organs, imposes upon it forms, functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchalized organizations, organized transcendences . . . The Body without Organs howls: “They’ve made me an organism! They’ve wrongfully folded me! They’ve stolen my body!” The judgement of God uproots it from its immanence and makes it an organism, a signification, a subject . . . We are continually being stratified. (1987, 159)

The plane of consistency is also referred to in A Thousand Plateaus as the field of immanence and in What is Philosophy?, is considered alongside another two planes: the plane of reference and the plane of construction; the “brain is the junction – not the unity – of the three planes” (208). The refrain of the state is the brain-screen/Body without Organs striated by the binary model; over-coding the speeds of chaos with a
uniform concept of the face with surface and depth and re-imparting the smooth flows into the black-holes of an unconscious. It is the laying down of state-desired blind spots, and corresponding to the function of a dualism (the organising game-play discoursed between a model of right and left brain thinking). The state refrained brain is then a matter of dis-junction in that it attempts to unify all thought/thinking into its binary model splitting the mind from the body. Each plane corresponds to the three thought disciplines of Philosophy, Science and Art: Philosophy corresponding to the plane of immanence; Science to the plane of reference and Art to the plane of construction. If Art marks a plane of construction, we might suggest that the state constructs in terms of striated lines on a pre-conceived body of binary/divisive directives, while the nomadic constructs on a Body without Organs. I will return to a discussion of this plane later in the chapter, and consider now the differential relationship between Philosophy and Science before applying them to the territorial distinctions between the state and the nomadic.

In *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari argue that there are three main differences between Science and Philosophy; firstly they suggest that Science and Philosophy approach chaos in an “almost opposite way” (118). They define chaos, “not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void that is not a nothingness but a virtual” (117 – 118). Science constructs a “plane of reference” (119) which “relinquishes the . . . infinite speed, in order to gain a reference able to actualise the virtual . . . through functions.” The ‘function in Science determines a state of affairs, thing, or body”. Philosophy, on the other hand, wants to retain the infinite speed of chaos and in doing so, “gives consistency to the virtual through concepts” (118). The “concept in philosophy expresses an event that gives consistency to the virtual on a plane of immanence” (133). Secondly, in Science there are independent variables “in relationships that can be conditioned [and are] essential to the function” (126). In philosophy, however, there are inseparable variations, which are purely creative events. Thirdly, there is a difference in the “mode of enunciation”. In Science, “the role of a partial observer is to perceive and to experience…the things
studied” (130). In Philosophy, the “conceptual personae” enters a different “mode of perception” through which “concepts are not only thought but perceived and felt” (131).

Deleuze and Guattari insist that both Science and Philosophy are “fields of creation.” In summary: Science creates functions, contextualises in terms of a finite, and is always, therefore, provisional concrete knowledge. Provisional, that is, to the plane of reference of its original context (human biology, for example, and its knowledge of the human body cannot be applied in geology to a rock formation, although both planes may utilise the knowledge of physics). Philosophy creates conceptual knowledge; works in the context of an infinite; and creates non-provisionally on a plane of immanence that is always being re-constructed. The non-provisional abstractness of philosophy allows it to be applied ad-infinitum and requires no pre-requisites that limit that application. For example, despite the obvious cultural objections, Eastern religious philosophies can be applied to Western societies just as easily as Western religious philosophies can be applied to the East and there is no internal limit within either philosophy that prevents it from being so.

The brain sits between the internal functioning of the physical body and the external functioning of the environment. The biological actuality of the brain as a vital organ of the human physiological functioning literally operates as a network of desiring machines emanating from and between organic and non-organic life. Thinking is a Body without Organs self-constructing alongside each body with organs, be it mechanically or organically organised in nature, and thus each individual body/brain assemblage links to a Body without Organs whenever it thinks, and with each recollection of data/knowledge/experience/memory that passes through the organised body, a reconstruction of the Body without Organs occurs. If you think of the Body without Organs as differentiated from the body via the oppositional framework of either/or then you construct state-thinking. Deleuze and Guattari say that the less we think the more we think in line with the State – that’s because the state will always do the thinking for you – and state-thinking orders thought along essentialist lines that pre-determines subject-identities as role-players or pawns in the dominant power-models, over-coding life processes into figures in the oppositional Chess games of state politics/policies.
State and Nomadic Thinking:

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the different regimes of state-thinking and Nomadic thinking, while they make no direct reference to a differential between state and nomadic philosophy, they certainly critique political philosophers such as Hegel for being state thinkers. If we accept that philosophy is related to the construction of concepts on a plane of immanence, then we might suggest that a state philosophy is one whose concepts are made immanent to the state form and as such, the thinking inherent in such a philosophy is one that thinks from the point of view of the state. Deleuze and Guattari argue, “the less people take thought seriously, the more they think in conformity with what the state wants” (376). This is differentiated from nomadic philosophy, whose conceptual personae is a “private thinker”. The term private thinker is used here conditionally by Deleuze and Guattari to describe a kind of thinking that is not interior as ‘private’ would seem to suggest, but is “thought in an immediate relation with the outside” (376 – 377), and while it does “attest to an absolute solitude, it is an extremely populous solitude…intertwined with a people to come,[and] one that invokes and awaits that people . . . Every thought is already a tribe, the opposite of a state.”

State-thinking becomes itself a method for the striation of space, drawing “a path that must be followed from one point to another.” It is the methodological striation of state-thought that captures nomadic thinking, forcing it to see Philosophy’s plane of immanence through the image of the state and thus improperly constructing its concepts through the blinding and binding model of the state’s image. Of the nomadic, on the other hand, “Thought is like the Vampire, it has no image, either to constitute a model or to copy” (377).

Rather than analyzing the world into discrete components, reducing their manyness to the One of identity, and ordering them by rank, [nomadic thinking] sums up a set of disparate circumstances . . . It synthesizes a multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future rearranging. (1977, xiii)
Deleuze and Guattari do make a direct distinction in Science between the nomadic and the state. Here, state science is again striated to the state, not in terms of its relationship to internal/external thinking, but in terms of its mode of functioning:

What we have…are two formally different conceptions of science, and, ontologically, a single field of interaction in which royal [state] science continually appropriates the contents of vague or nomad science while nomad science continually cuts the contents of royal science loose. (1987, 367)

The state regulates production of scientific facts; instituting and controlling the direction of both public and private research, legislating over the rights and uses of knowledge both in terms of production and accessibility, and excluding and/or refuting facts that might usurp its own political endeavours:

State science continually imposes its form of sovereignty on the inventions of nomad science. State science retains of nomad science only what it can appropriate; it turns the rest into a set of strictly limited formulas without any real scientific status, or else simply represses and bans it. (1987, 362)

In Against Method, Paul Feyerabend, who identifies as a philosopher of “anarchic science,” suggests that on the one hand, in the familiar rules seen as the “the essence of empiricism” in science, it:

is ‘experience’, or ‘facts’, or ‘experimental results’ which measure the success of . . . theories, that agreement between a theory and the ‘data’ favours the theory (leaves the situation unchanged) while disagreement endangers it, and perhaps even forces us to eliminate it. (20)

On the other hand, however, he suggests that in science their exists a “’counterrule’ [which] advises [scientists] to introduce and elaborate hypotheses which are inconsistent with well-established theories and/or well-established facts. It advises [scientists] to proceed,” he argues, “counterinductively.” Feyerabend argues against the popular advice in science, which he says “goes back to Newton” and suggests that scientists “use alternatives only when refutations have already discredited the orthodox theory.” This method, he argues, “puts the cart before the horse . . . A scientist who wishes to maximize the empirical content of the views he holds . . . must . . . introduce other views; that is, he must adopt a pluralistic methodology” (20 – 21). And:
knowledge so conceived is not a series of self-consistent theories that converges towards an ideal view. . .[but] rather an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives, each single theory, each fairy-tale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing the others into greater articulation and all of them contributing, through this process of competition, to the development of our consciousness. Nothing is ever settled. (21) [Feyerabend’s emphasis]

If we consider Feyerabend’s conception of science next to Deleuze and Guattari’s differentiation between state and nomad science, it appears that we have two ideas in close proximity. The state science of Deleuze and Guattari, and their critique thereof, can be considered in proximity to Feyerabend’s critique of inductive methods with popularly held and advised rules of empiricism; whereas the nomad science in Deleuze and Guattari has proximity to Feyerabend’s notion of the counter inductive “anarchistic” mode in science. Additionally, Deleuze and Guattari conceive of science outside the divisions between state/nomad in terms of the actuality of ‘functions,’ which cut off and limit the infinite, thereby implying a sense of the internal limits of science knowledge. Likewise, Feyerabend insists that his intention is to “convince the reader that all methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have their limits” (23). Simultaneously, Feyerabend conceives the philosophy of science (as differentiated to the side-effects of its activity, which we might suggest is its representation) in a way not incompatible with Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of a philosophy that seeks to retain the wholeness of infinity. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze philosophises, for example, the concept of a non-representational power that “on the basis of which it is deployed and deploys all its power . . .the smallest becomes equivalent to the largest once it is not separated from what it can do”(37) And this seems to resonate for me with Feyerabend’s comment that: the task of the scientist...is no longer ‘to search for the truth’, or ‘to praise god’, or ‘to systematize observations’, or ‘to improve predictions’. These are but side effects of an activity to which his attention is now mainly directed and which is to make the weaker case the stronger’ as the sophists said, and thereby to sustain the motion of the whole (21).

Feyerabend has, therefore, a similar (or an approximately similar) conception to Deleuze and Guattari of a difference between the movement of science theories (what Deleuze
and Guattari speak of as science functions) that become finite and multiply differentiated, and a philosophy of science whose movement is towards a conception of a whole that is in motion (what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the infinite speed of chaos or the “One-All” of Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*). As much as the nomadic sciences are subjected to the sovereignty of state legislation, the state is also caught up in processes of appropriation of ‘bad science;’ those conjectures and opinions that utilise scientific discourse in order to justify what is in effect bad scientific reasoning and/or bad communication and understanding of the contingency and provisional status of scientific data.  

The state appropriates the mythic power of scientific speculation, in particular the myth of progress, but it is not interested in the limited but actual knowledge that science produces as a pragmatic practice within a plural society. In *Farewell to Reason*, Feyerabend suggests that:

> there is no [real] conflict between scientific practice and cultural pluralism. Conflict arises only when results that might be regarded as local and preliminary and methods that can be interpreted as rules of thumb without ceasing to be scientific are frozen and turned into measures of everything else – that is, when good science is turned into bad, because barren, ideology. (38)

He goes on to suggest that; “many large-scale enterprises use this ideology as one of their main intellectual weapons against opponents” (38 – 39). Much of what goes under the various titles of the social sciences is particularly in danger of being taken up by political practices that appropriate limited results to inscribe whole demographics, which they wish to control. Because the social body is so important to the political, the mutation of the social sciences becomes specifically good fodder for the state’s justification in the domination over certain sections of that populous. The state’s proliferation and communication of scientific data extracts it from the provisional status

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31 One of the things that strikes me about the scientific method, regardless of whether it takes an inductive or counter inductive approach to the questions or hypothesis it establishes is that its logical basis has its roots in Socratic traditions and the Socratic method. That is, good science approaches its experimentation as an attempt to disprove the hypothetical statement, and the establishment and function of knowledge is therefore always contingent on the variety of experiments conducted. If new experiments disprove the established hypothesis, then the original statement cannot be held as factual knowledge. And it is these limits within the process that state-science refuses to acknowledge; using limited results when and where they suit its political and ideological purposes.
of the scientific enquiry, and retracts them into tools of dominance over the body politic it governs.

If “many large enterprises” manipulate this ideological projection of science “as a weapon,” then this relates on the one hand to the private capitalist market, where companies compete for the consumer dollar. Here, the ideological myth of science is a tool employed in advertising hyperbole, which manipulates the desires of the general populous for the sole purpose of increasing profit margins for the companies. Products are sold, in other words, based on being scientifically tested/approved where science is projected as a unified authoritative knowledge. But this is only one side of the state; on the other side, there is the public mix, whereby government institutions operate as the legislators. Here science discourse is likewise appropriated and applied to manipulate the desires of the populace but, rather than private advertising, it becomes the systemic propaganda of institutions. The kinds of science discourses appropriated by the state differ to some extent from the private market in that they aim not at enticing money out of the private economic markets, but at justifying direct control over the social and physical development, or welfare of the people.

These ideological applications of social science drawn under the discourse categories of social-psychology are used to justify the implementation of programs in public schools, community policing; government welfare agencies that operate in a kind of punitive-corrective (therapeutic) mix. In theory, based on the knowledge internally accredited, such programs often appear to be both sound and well intentioned, and many such programs contain within them a left identified politics claiming to support minority issues. They appear, therefore, to be benevolent and altruistically motivated with a rhetorical promotion of community welfare and egalitarianism. However, the very institution of such programs eradicates the limits of any actual science. Expert administrators, ironically named civil servants, employ the supposed expert knowledge of the discourses, which appropriate theory to pre-model the subject outside of his/her own contingent social or psychological assemblage. Both the administrators and the subjects to whom they administer their expertise are removed from any actual knowledge of the science that thereby becomes the “barren ideology” that defines their
relationship. The state structure ensures a hierarchy between the administrator expert (the implementer of the ideology) and the social-subjects over whom they are employed to institute the programs. The state over-codes the limits of science with limits of its own, and the civil servant, whose expertise and employment opportunities lie in their administration abilities and not the scientific knowledge, which nevertheless imbues them with ideological power.

In *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that there is less of an issue between science and philosophy than there is between science and religion. I argue that to some extent, this is to forget that organised religion too has its relationship to philosophy in a particular manner that is not unlike in application to state philosophy. Certainly, it seems to me that the capitalist state we now reside in was once a religious state – an earlier formation of the state machine. Religious organization is in effect a form of state-thinking in that it captures the desires of nomadic spirituality and disciplines it to a set of laws and doctrines. And while the religious state-proper is pre-modern, it remains for many a statement of personal belief and practice. Its organised doctrines and transcendent laws remain, therefore, a dominant force over the sovereignty of a private state. Drawing on that element of anti-Platonism in Deleuze’s own philosophy, what differentiates the kind of philosophy that Deleuze wants to construct as an immanent plane of the whole of philosophy itself and the state philosophy (or thinking of philosophy) that he critiques, is that the latter, both in religious or capitalist forms, operates upon a thinking that adheres to a transcendental over-coding by a “higher” and hierarchalising power, whereas the former thinks through the immanent materialism of lived desire. State philosophy, whether religiously or economically miraculated, is therefore transcendental. And the sovereign power of both transcends and captures the nomadic desires of the people. Nomadic philosophy, on the other hand, does not transcend the plane of immanence it constructs, but operates within and ‘between’ its abstract actuality and the materiality of the people it seeks to bring forth. I would, therefore, re-contextualise the purpose of philosophy alongside Feyerabend’s comments, and suggest that there is less of an issue between nomadic science and philosophy, which are actually a complementary materialist politics, than there is between nomadic science/philosophy and transcendent state science/philosophy.
**Science and the Modern State:**

In *Modernity and Ambivalence*, Zygmunt Bauman argues that the project of modernity emerges as the result of a “genuine affinity between legislating ambitions of critical philosophy and the designing intentions of the rising modern state” (23). Following Richard Rorty, Bauman cites the metaphysical enlightenment philosophers; Kant, Descartes and Lock as having “joint responsibility for imposing the model on the following two hundred years of philosophical history.” This ideological assemblage, Rorty dubbed “*foundational philosophy*” (25).

Bauman argues that foundational philosophy produced a scientific mentality that was at one with the mentality of a modern state whose desire was to rid itself of ambivalence in the pursuit of perfection. What Nazi Germany represents, he argues, cannot be dismissed as a “barbaric, irrational” event within the project of modernity, but that it drew its:

- vision of a harmonious, orderly, deviation-free society . . . from such views and beliefs already firmly entrenched in the public mind through the century and a half of post-Enlightenment history, filled with scientistic propaganda and the visual display of the wondrous potency of modern technology. (29)

He argues that when the Holocaust is viewed as a “*one-off historical episode*” and interpreted as a “specifically *Jewish*” or “specifically *German* affair,” it is because there is “resistance to accept the lesson . . . of the Holocaust” (18 –19). Furthermore, he dismisses arguments that suggest this was a perversion of these modern thinkers:

> Regardless of the conscious purposes of the thinkers, the legislative reason of modern philosophy and of the modern scientific mentality in general were resonant with the practical tasks posited by the modern state. (26)

From the point of view of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisations, the foundational philosophers that Bauman sites were/are state-thinkers and the foundational philosophy constructing the modern state was/is a state-philosophy. What is not clear in Bauman’s argument, however, is the positioning of science. He calls it “scientific propaganda” but does not provide the background influences of this propaganda, insinuating that it is simply convergent with the emergent state philosophy.
The rise of this modern scientific mentality, as Bauman shows, was characterised by the development and institutional practices of Eugenics. Here, the narrative of enlightenment and progress justified research and development through scientific experimentation, and the application of scientific knowledge through technological procedures, upon the bodies of humans whose social difference was theorised as genetically inferior. This application of scientific technology derived its propaganda and authority from what in scientific literature, is derided as ‘social Darwinism’. In “Darwin’s Influence on Modern Thought,” Ernst Mayr argues from a position, and within a context, that suggests by ‘modern’ he means contemporary. Bauman’s use of the term, however, is historical in context and suggests the rise of modernity as an historical epoch. Mayr’s article outlines, from a retrospective position within contemporary science knowledge, the importance of Darwin’s thesis. One of the important things to note in positioning this summation next to Bauman’s arguments is that Mayr specifically argues that the principles espoused by Darwin overturned preceding ideologies and methods that had accompanied the “architects of the scientific revolution.” It was, according to Mayr, these older ideas that led social architects to construct “a worldview based on physicalism (a reduction to spatiotemporal things or events or their properties), teleology, determinism and other basic principles” (69). Mayr cites Kant as one of the philosophers who “invoked teleological forces” to explain “biological phenomena” (70). Thus both Bauman and Mayr share a certain critique of Kantian style ‘modern’ philosophy. One idea that no longer functions in scientific thought post-Darwin is, according to Mayr, “typological thinking,” which produced a “general concept of the diversity of the world [through a thinking that] emphasised its invariance and stability” (69) and, according to Mayr, this thinking is “unable to accommodate variation,” which is, for contemporary science, a key tenet of Darwin’s evolutionary theory. As a result, typology:

- gives rise to a misleading conception of human races. For the typologist, Caucasians, Africans, Asians or Inuits are types that conspicuously differ from other human ethnic groups. This mode of thinking leads to racism. (70)

Mayr argues, therefore, that it is this topological thinking and not Darwin’s theory of evolution that is responsible for producing biological racism, and that the phenomena
which has become known as “social Darwinism” is, according to Mayr, an “ignorant misapplication of evolutionary theory” (70). A literary analytical approach may object to this accusation of ignorance, however, by citing Darwin’s writings and producing quoted statements that are undoubtedly racist within contemporary communications. But, just as Freud’s writings and communications are re-contextualised within contemporary psychoanalytic paradigms, and re-worked to apply to that environment, so too evolution theory is re-worked in a contemporary science context. One of the problems we seem to be facing here, thus, is the different understandings/interpretations of Darwin’s writings from two different contemporary perspectives. Whether we accept this argument in terms of Darwin himself or not, it remains that contemporary science writing/thinking, for which Mayr is here a metonymic example, seeks to distance itself from the conceptualisations that have become associated with social Darwinism and its accompanying typological modelling of biological difference.

If we return to Bauman’s historicism of the state, we can surmise that the ideas and scientific reasoning that legitimated Kant and the foundational philosophers, according to the contemporary reasoning of Mayr, were based on an “ignorant misapplication” of evolutionary theory. This misapplication, however, is not, as Mayr’s rhetorical structure appears to suggest, simply a problem outside of the realm of contemporary science, and his understanding of evolution is not universal across the myriad of scientific fields of application. In John Gribbin’s generalist introductory book, Almost Everyone’s Guide to Science, he discusses the problem of “the continuing resistance to Darwinian ideas” in relations to differences within the broad spectrum of scientific disciplines. Gribbin argues that “non-biologists sometimes fail to comprehend how evolution works” and this, he argues, results in mis-applications. He explains thus:

Chemists who invented new pesticides were astonished when populations of insects developed resistance to them, but the whole point about evolution is that any new method of killing things will, unless it completely wipes out a species, give rise to a population resistant to the killer. One result is that cotton farmers in the very States of the US where resistance to Darwinian ideas is at its strongest

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32 Lacan, for example, contemporises psychoanalytic theory in the context of linguistics, and this follows, at least in one direction, the path of what has been a literary, rather than scientific, refrain(ing) of psychoanalytic mythologies.
are struggling every season with the consequences of evolution at work in their own fields. In hospitals, bacteria that cause diseases are increasingly resistant to drugs such as penicillin, for the same reason . . . The surprise, to an evolutionary biologist, is not that after half a century of use penicillin is losing its effectiveness, but rather that it retains any effectiveness at all. (129)

The problem, Gribbin seems to be suggesting, is not so much a misapplication of evolutionary theory, such as Mayr would level at the social philosophers aka social Darwinists, but a misapplication of technologies developed in one field of science, were there exists a simple ignorance of the implications of evolutionary knowledge. This suggests that it is the dis-unity of differences between both philosophical and technological applications of science knowledge (facialised in the terms of this thesis as state-sciences) and the actual knowledge nomadically produced through scientific investigation. Further, there is here suggested a problem of communication. If the facts of evolution are mis-understood, and this mis-understanding is based on naïve assumptions and/or ignorance about the microbiological (the genetic), then we might presume that the solution is to improve, through education, the understanding of biological evolutionary processes. This suggests than an inter-textual and inter-disciplinary approach to education where differentiated disciplines, not only different strands within the paradigm of science, but also between different epistemological paradigms, can communicate and share knowledge. Unfortunately, the base building blocks of educational knowledge are run by state institutions whose thinking is sedentarily fixed on the segregation and division of all bodies (including bodies of knowledge) in order that they be accountably identifiable as separate and controllable/manageable/ordered subjects with clear borders.

In Deleuzian terms, it is a state-science interpreted and used in the application of a desire for power through the eradication of ambivalence. The point in raising this distinction is to question the interpretation of the lesson Bauman wants us to learn from the history of fascism. As he argues, it was within a “socio-biological framework” that these discourses of power justified their applications and actions as eugenicists. He asks us to consider the implication of contemporary work in genetic research and the fascistic potential of genetic engineering. If, however, as Mayr’s work suggests, this field of
research is taking place in a post-Darwinian understanding of evolution, are the same dangers present now as they were a century ago? Is Bauman himself relying on misunderstandings of contemporary evolutionary science?

In *Genome*, Matt Ridley addresses the issue of eugenics in the history of science and argues against contemporary scientists dismissing it as a pseudo-science. He argues that the central flaw:

> was not that it was based on faulty science, nor that it was impractical, but that it was fundamentally oppressive and cruel [and] required the full power of the state to be asserted over the rights of the individual. (295)

Ridley concludes, thus, that “what is wrong with eugenics is not the science, but the coercion . . . It is a humanitarian, not a scientific crime” (297). Ridley goes on to distinguish between a state-sanctioned program of eugenics and the rise of personal and individual choice. He points out that aborting a fetus because it has Downs Syndrome is a form of eugenics. By implication, the abortion of unwanted pregnancies, argued by feminists as the right of a woman to choose, would also amount to eugenics. The ethical question here, as Ridley puts it: “have we rejected government eugenics merely to fall into the trap of allowing private eugenics?” Like the feminist pro-abortion argument, Ridley justifies the latter on the grounds of personal choice of the individual. From the context of this thesis, this puts the question of eugenics in the realm of the private state, and suggests that it has become in some forms a desired commodity. The justifications for individual desires to access such technology are idiosyncratic to each individual case. While this hardly eradicates the need for ethical debate on the issue, it does shift the ground significantly in terms of Bauman’s arguments. The question of accessing and using these technologies, and the desire to do so, returns to the need to consider how the social constructs the production of that desire. In other words, it becomes a matter of questioning the sociological formation, or determinate conditions of desire, rather than the technological apparatus. In my theses I have purposely utilized the small ‘s’ in state to signify the relationship between social/individualistically derived desire and the

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33 It should be pointed out that Ridley discusses the topic within the context of genetic knowledge in terms of knowing one’s own propensity to inherited disease caused by mutant sequencing. He does not, however, deal with the issue of a desire to engineer for the purposes of cosmetic surgery, an issue which raises a different set of ethical issues regarding the social pressures put upon desires to emulate iconic images of contemporary inscriptions of external beauty, for example.
power that dominant formations of this have in the shaping of the state proper. Thus, the shifting of the eugenics issue into the realm of private choice nevertheless remains an issue in terms of the influence this has over political pressure for research funding and technological development in directions that satisfy the desires and commodity choices of dominant ‘capitalist’ minorities, rather than focusing on those that would benefit the wider needs of the general population.

If, as Ridley argues, genetic engineering has become a desired tool of the private state, and is therefore differentially utilised, this does not prevent them from passing back into the state proper. Seen in light of a privileged commodity, there is always the danger that the political minorities who facialise the majority can turn such desires into dominant enunciations that come to demand them as a state practice. And while Ridley may have a fair point in justifying the rights of individual choice for this social demographic, we cannot ignore the power of dominant minorities to justify their own personal choices as reasons to diminish the conditions that would allow the same choices to others. Therefore, a political/ethical debate on the issue must, should, and does continue to monitor the private uses and demands for genetic engineering technology.

Putting this issue aside, however, and not to diminish the critique, if contemporary genetic engineering is no longer managed by the public state, and no longer on the agenda of public programming, does this necessarily mean that the desire of the modern state-proper to eradicate ambivalence has disappeared? If we are to follow Bauman and learn from the lessons of the past, should we not do so within its application to the present? The present state of eugenics is not of the same nature as it was during its state-sanctioned applications that led ultimately to the formation of the Nazi fascist state. Contemporary understandings of evolution within the biological-sciences may have largely shifted from the topological inspired ideologies that led them to support and cohort with the rise of the fascist state, but the essentialising topological/modern thinking nevertheless persists within the social applications that appropriate that knowledge (even within the thinking of the scientists who work directly in the field). Rather than consider the problem with a singular focus on genetic science, as if it exists separately to the sociological network in which the desire for its technology develops, I
want to consider and question the effect and practices of the institution of a differently focused socio-biological determinism that seems to have developed unhindered by this ethical critique and concern over eugenics.

Ridley’s position, in terms of contemporary understandings of biological evolution theory, in which biology is not seen as being determined by topological linearity, but within a matrix of environmental influences, suggests that sociological choices and practices are themselves in a continuous practical state of eugenics. Here I see an argumentative link between Ridley and B.F. Skinner. If Ridley argues that eugenics is already a matter of individualized every-day life choices, as grounds to justify an appropriation by scientific technological practice for the private state of individual choice, then Skinner argues that the ‘linear programming’ of behavioural engineering is already a practice of every-day life to justify his development of these techniques for specific educational institutional purposes. Skinner’s technologies have become an incorporative tool in the institutional practices of education. In the Deleuze and Guattarian terms used in this theses, both arguments follow and deal with the appropriation of nomadic refrains of desire by a capturing and organizing state-machine - one constructing its technologies and justifications for the private realm (and invocations of a capitalist statement in the freedom of choice to purchase genetic engineering) and the other for the public realm (and the invocations of a collective statement in the order to utilize these technologies for social engineering).

Skinner’s linear programming and behavioural/cognitive engineering technologies have provided a grounding formation for state educational institutions that provide, in this argument, the conditions for the rise of micro fascistic practices under the support and protection of the molar-state. If we consider that state-philosophy and genetic science were, in early-modernity, co-conspirators in the desire for ridding the social of ambivalence through misguided evolutionary typologies justifying public eugenics programs; then in late-modernity or post-modernity, this same desire is being reasserted through psychological typologies predicated on essentialist constructions of gender in public education programs. Rather than concentrate critique and attention purely on the field of genetics, thus, we need to consider the state uses of psychology. In questioning
the personal desires of those who directly seek eugenics technology (and they are ethically debateable, despite Ridley’s justifications), we might consider how the same desire to eradicate the ambivalence of life through socio-biolgocal technologies are formed within the psychological realm. Here, the typological thinking that Mayr argues has been replaced by Darwin’s “population theory” in contemporary evolutionary biology persists as a psychosocial hermeneutics in contemporary psycho-sociological theory.

We might consider how, in Australia’s history, the events that have now become known and discussed in relationship to the Stolen Generation, were partaken within the realm of eugenics theory. Practices of the state, in segregating children with white paternity from their aboriginal mothers, were based on racial hierarchies and prejudicial beliefs coupled with a desire to out-breed Aboriginality. In contemporary politics, there has been an argument raging for some time demanding that the government reconcile the past by apologizing for these events, which are now considered to have been unacceptable. The Howard government has been characterized, in many ways, by their refusal to enunciate such an apology, arguing that these were the ideas of the day and individuals in the present should not be held responsible. To put aside the politics of the apology, not because it is not important, but because it does not relate directly to the argument, it is notable that the past is justified under the excuse of having faith that they were doing the right thing at the time. These beliefs, held up in the past, not only affected the Aboriginal minorities, but were utilized against other minority groups; single mothers, for example, were actively coerced into giving their children up for adoption under fascistic coding of the same kind of traditional family values that invoked a negative reading of Aboriginal kinship.

This was all done, we are now told, under the projected believe and faith in the system. If we accept this argument, then we also have to accept the lesson that it teaches about what governments believe (or present) as the right thing or perform as an act of benevolence, are not necessarily so. While Aboriginal children are no longer taken directly away from their parents, and unmarried mothers no longer forced into giving their children up for adoption, the current state, supported by the political conditions
constructed by the Howard Government, is nevertheless constructing thinking producing ideologies and programs promoting the same kind of prejudices that lead to this desire to eradicate different familial and social constructions within the community. And, if an ill-conceived misunderstanding and translation of biological evolution informed the popular formation and belief system that allowed these ‘sorry’ practices to be instituted, sanctioned by a powerful ‘democratic’ state,’ then can we not see that a popular belief system informing the understanding of psychological development likewise carries the same danger when instituted by the same state machine? In other words, the lessons of the past should teach us to be aware of having blind faith in the authority of governments to understand the society, which they nevertheless govern. It is my argument that the kind of pop-psychology and its influence in pedagogical programs currently being instituted against boys in school so-called behavioural programs, are not unlike in kind to what we might call a pop-biology (social Darwinism) and its influence in eugenics programs in 1930s Germany and Australia. Not to be over-dramatic, however, these programs have certainly not reached the level of fascist molarity that has come to characterize the image of Nazi Germany and its anti-Semitism, but then nor did the eugenics programs utilized by Australia at that same time ever manifest in a fully fascist State-proper. This does not prevent, however, the full intensity of fascist ideology from inscribing itself within the minds of those subjects affected by the abjectivity of these minor-fascist becomings circulating behind the benevolent face of the protected institutions and their pseudo-scientific methodologies.

34 This assertion is, however, qualified in terms that it is based on the narratives that come to define the State in terms of broad historical identification. Those peoples who experienced the violence of such State programmes may beg to differ, and I would not argue. From the point of view of the excluded/abjected minority, the molecular fascisms that breed alongside and within the development of the State on a broader view are no doubt productive of individual experiences of the State (a particular manifestation of its power) as fully fascistic in nature.
Educational Psychology: Constructing a plane of reference:

One key to connecting these contemporary practices to Bauman’s piece is his reference to “Skinner’s Walden Two” as an “outspoken example of [the] latest manifestations” of the modernist dream that “has never stopped being dreamed” (39). Skinner, along with Piaget and to a lesser extent Freud, make up some of the key theoretical references/influences that have informed the development, understanding, and teaching of educational child psychology. Like state-evolutionary theory, these thinkers all theorize teleological and typological narratives to produce psychological stage-models of child development. Within educational training, Skinner is presented as one method among others for teaching desired outcomes to children, and while he is not necessarily an enforced methodology, his has certainly proved extremely popular, both in informing other theories and in developing educational tools.

Skinner’s utopian novel was first published in 1948 to a non-appreciative audience. The text narrates a community utopian fantasy where order and the utopian vision is maintained through the use of ‘behavioural conditioning.’ Central to its methodology was an experimental regime of child rearing and education whereby the children were separated from their parents at an early age and classrooms resembled scientific laboratories in which the children were, basically, the lab-rats. The initial distaste for the utopian novel was, according to Krishan Kumar, relative to its proximity to the post second world war era:

The Western world had just witnessed the horrors of two ‘utopian’ social experiments – the Nazi and the Soviet – and was in no mood for further utopian offerings, still less for one that boasted of its ‘scientific’ basis with a confidence reminiscent of nazism and communism. (348)

As Kumar’s summary of Skinner goes on to discuss, however, in 1971 Skinner published “a summary of his life’s work” entitled Beyond Freedom and Dignity and at this time, when “the purely historical antipathy to utopianism had long since passed,” sales of Walden Two, coupled with a renewed interest in other utopian writing, began to flourish. “Moreover, there was now actually in existence a number of communities
explicitly founded on the principles” of Skinner’s fiction (348). In line with the utopic fantasy, these communities were based on a shared set of values agreed to by all consenting ‘adult’ participants, to which the scientific methodologies developed by Skinner were applied as a means to ‘reinforce’ those values.

From a Deleuze and Guattarian point of view, this kind of communitarian appropriation of science may be seen as socially nomadic in that it springs up of its own accord separately and self-definitionally to the state-managed system. And, so long as all community members share the same set of values within each community where participants are free to come and leave as they please, any critical questioning of such communities would have to be idiosyncratic to the value system they espouse. When does a community become a cult? for example. Is the ‘becoming’ revolutionary or fascist in character? Leaving these kinds of questions aside, however, my concern is with the capturing of this nomadism by the over-coding state machine. As Kumar says:

The techniques of operant conditioning have been widely applied in schools in the United States, especially in such elementary areas as learning to read and write. (Skinner has even patented a ‘teaching machine’ to this end). They have been put to work in prisons, in psychiatric wards of hospitals, in schools for delinquent teenagers, in mental health communities and, on a smaller scale, in factories and offices. In every case, the attempt is made to change or confirm attitudes and behaviour by the use of reinforcing techniques. (373)

These techniques have also become a mainstay of education within the Australian context. As a state science it forms a significant elements of the functional refrain layed out on the plane of reference and the thus the tool by which it justifies the implementation of, and determines the subject-bodies with, state philosophies in educational practice.

Skinner’s methodology is called “linear programming,” which:

involves the immediate reinforcement of the ‘correct’ response to a given stimulus. ‘Correct’, in this context, means that response which the experimenter wishes to evoke. ‘Incorrect’, or undesired responses, are not reinforced and
gradually drop out of the behavioural repertoire until only the desired responses remain. (Stones, 231)

Skinner’s approach also includes the necessity that these responses be formulated within a “sequential presentation of the material” programmed to embody “a gradual progression from simple to complex behaviour” (234). Thus, this technology performs the task of constructing a desired learning ‘outcome’ without ever having to explain the actual content or necessity for the lesson learnt. The term ‘linear programming’ also has meaning within the field of mathematics, and here in the virtual space of numbers it functions as a nomadic refrain utilized within an abstract field. When Skinner applies it as a methodology in teaching, however, its function is no longer abstract, but becomes a materialist methodology and a state-refrain capturing a virtual ideology and inscribing repetitious lines into the minds of students. Thus, while it may be an appropriate learning methodology for abstract, functionally expressive subjects such as maths, it becomes problematic when applied to subjects in the humanities where multiple and debatable contents should properly be enunciated through the expression of the multiplicity of humanity itself. In other words, the expressive element of the refrain becomes over-coded with the content desired by the state. It is, in this context, a psychological method that promotes, and can operate as, what is colloquially known as ‘brain-washing’ in that it programs children to respond to the desire and expression prescribed by the content, rather than teaching them to work answers out, which is to say, think for themselves.

As mentioned earlier, I see a certain correlation between Skinner’s arguments for the appropriation and control of cognitive/linear programming and those of Ridley for the control of eugenics. They both argue that their practices already exist in one form or another, but where Ridley argues for a technological control to be provided as a free choice for the individual (the private state), Skinner argues against the ideology of liberalism and individual choice calling it a “weak method of control” which leaves controlling factors to other ‘inconspicuous’ conditions. “When we seem to turn control over to a person himself, we simply shift from one mode of control to another . . . A permissive government is a government that leaves control to other sources” (qtd Kumar, 371). In terms of this thesis, and as elaborated in chapter one, this marks the
binary refrain between a private/public mix. Once we break down the binary, and consider the relationship structured between these two heads of state, the faciality of individualism and the state (the magician and the legislator) we see an oppositional refrain that in both cases supports the state of productions of control. Further, if we break down the binary between the body and the Body without Organs, seen in terms of a relationship to constructing the way thinking develops, we see that both construct the state – one private, one public – upon a Body without Organs as a means for controlling the thinking-machines and thus the desires of others.

Education, whether private or public, is a key institution in which both the private desires of those capitalized individual subjects, as well as the publicly defined appropriation of desire, performs its controlling mechanisms. If Skinner techniques of behavioural construction and control are performed through educational psychology as one form of standard practice to produce desired subjects of the state, then appropriations of clinical psychology are also being utilized and appropriated as a state-science. Through the construction of the relatively new subject-identity formation of the child deemed to have ‘Attention Deficit Disorder,’ parents and teachers are being provided a choice of methodologies to control childhood behaviour through both psychological engineering and the medical technology of a chemical compound solution, Ritalin. In Ridley’s arguments, the individual choices made to agree to medicate the ‘problem’ would also amount to a form of eugenics, changing and manipulating the chemical environment of the brain through the experimental input of synthetic chemical agents will inevitably have unforeseen effects on the evolution of those biological bodies if not the genetic sequences that they may one day pass-on through reproductive process. In cases where the standard forms of cognitive structuring of students is deemed not to be working, this methodology is being actively offered as an alternative choice in Western Australian schools.

In the field of application, Clinical psychology, like therapeutic genetics, provides and searches for both identification and explanation of abnormality and a therapeutic solution. We might suggest that as the genome operates within genetics as the materialist base for a plane of reference, the brain operates within psychology.
Furthermore, we might suggest, that is only with the locating of this materiality that genetic science shifts from being a theoretical hypothesis (a belief) towards becoming a science of actual knowledge.\textsuperscript{35} This science, in terms of its knowledge base, is actually known within the field to be in its infancy. Identifying the genome is akin to finding the key to understanding the code and provides a material plane of reference for that understanding to formulate its knowledge. Thus, the importance of this project in the biological sciences is marked by its maturity from the unlimited realm of transcendent speculation into the limited realm of material knowledge. And, it is within the methods of this limitation that theories formed based on speculative reading of the transcendent as the factual are proved wrong. Speculative opinion gives way to factual knowledge.

For example, the speculations that behaviour has a genetic basis and the eugenic conclusion that behaviour could thus be bred in or out of the gene pool through engineering reproduction have been proven wrong. The desire to prove a simple link between behaviour and genetic (DNA) markers has proven futile and contemporary speculation on the subject from within science has shifted into the field of neurological biology. It is here, in the clinical paradigm that discourses in cognitive psychology now understand behaviour in relationship the materiality of the brain and the environment in which it develops. As with the field of genetics, the replacing of the speculative transcendent plane of reference, drawn from theories of the unconscious, with the material plane of the brain, limits it to an actual material basis and thus provides a means to establish known relationships between behaviour and the brain. Latest research suggests that trauma, particularly childhood trauma, can significantly change the way the brain functions/develops. In a recent article, Martin Teicher outlines the research he has been involved in this area and argues that such changes form patterns of ‘adaptation’ to environment. He concludes that:

\begin{quote}
Society reaps what it sows in the way it nurtures its children. Stress sculpts the brain to exhibit various antisocial, thought adaptive behaviors. Whether it comes
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{35} The ethical questions for genetic engineering are now differentially conceived; not around issues of race or ones placement within a social hierarchy, but in terms of ones relationship to those diseases that have thus far been, and expect to be identified on the genetic map. They are hierarchies of health and ethical questions relate to a whole field of medical knowledge and the rights of private citizens versus the rights of governments and corporations to that information.
in the form of physical, emotional or sexual trauma or through exposure to warfare, famine or pestilence, stress can set off a ripple of hormonal changes that permanently wire a child’s brain to cope with a malevolent world. (61)

While it remains noted that Teichner’s proposition of permanency relates to the extremity of the trauma’s present in the subjects studied, and cognitive restructuring therapy would suggest that in general this dictate is not destiny, this kind of research provides a material basis for science to understand brain function, suggesting that so-called antisocial behaviour is a result of a ‘normal’ function of adaptation to environment. Thus, this kind of scientific research confirms the propositions of constructionists who argue against the bio-genetic essentialist narratives that link behaviour to genetic inheritance and fail to acknowledge the manner in which social and political processes construct the environments, or in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, the determinate conditions of behaviour. The way we understand and interact with the world is contingent upon our experiences and the experiences of childhood mark the laying down of basic cognitive structures that provide us with the means to negotiate the world we live in. In Deleuze-Guattarian terms, the nomadic becomings of everyday life, which include all forms of becoming, traumatic or otherwise, produce refrains that construct thinking that surfaces the Body without Organs and instructs the assemblage and organization of the organic body (when thus connected to one). The traumatic refrains are spoken about by Deleuze and Guattari as the ‘childhood block’ which I understand as a refrain that repeats itself on the Body without Organs like a stuck record forcing the cognitive development to arrest in the environment of the trauma and preventing the necessary break-through into the present for the subject. Thus, as in Teicher’s summation, the adaptive behaviour is ‘normal’ in the contextual assemblage of a Body without Organs or brain screen that has been botched by the imposition of a traumatic experience.

In theory, the materiality neurobiology, as with genetic engineering, is aimed at identifying a specific problem and finding solutions to that problem. In genetics, the materialistic problem is on the molecular level of gene sequencing; in cognitive psychology, the materialistic problem is on the molecular level of brain-chemical processes. Identifying the gene-sequence mutation that leads to Alzheimer’s in a lab
tells us nothing about who has such a mutation; genetic testing provides the possibility of that knowledge. In these circumstances, the ethical debate revolves not around the process of identification but around issues of who does and does not have right to the knowledge of that identification. The technological process for identifying gene sequences in a material/factual plane of reference eradicates the kind of racially and social prejudice inspired identification of genetic disorder. The gene that links to skin colour is not defined within genetic science as a disorder, and the lessons of state-eugenics can be seen retrospectively to be an act of social inhumanity and not ethical scientific practice. Hypothetically, brain and neurological science promises the same kind of material basis in identifying brain-function (psychological) disorders. As with early theories of genetics it promises the surety of a materialist basis. Such knowledge however, is not yet available, and there are currently no commonly available technologies for identifying such disorders. And yet, like genetic science in the 1930s, we are in the grip of a non-scientific appropriation of this hypothetical speculation about the future of psychological therapeutics. This state-science utilises the hypothesis of materiality but identifies the problem based on transcendent codes of disorder. As such, as with state-eugenics in the past, state-psychology operates as a weapon against minorities and unwanted molar(ised) subjects and not as a molecular materialistic science.

One very graphic example of this occurring in the transition into educational psychology has been the methodological practice among teachers, parents and state psychologists in identifying ADD or Attention Deficit Disorder. In a conference paper presented at Curtin University’s post-graduate research conference, On The Edge, in 2000, educational psychologist Mark Bivens promoted the use of an identification process based on teachers and parents agreeing that a child fitted into a particular set of pre-defined criteria defined by a simple set of abstract questions. The procedure and the resulting outcomes of this identification, which included both cognitive restructuring and drug therapy, was justified on the bases of hypothetical probability of brain-chemical imbalance. Bivens provided in his paper, a diagram of the brain and identified the location within it that neurobiologists were suggesting caused the disorder. When asked whether actual brain scans were taking place in these identified children to confirm that
the problem did actually, physically, exist as hypothesised, the answer was a resounding no; the technology was not available. As such, while the practice is being justified based on the possibility of material identification, it is being taken out under the identification of transcendent opinions. It was noted by almost everyone present at this paper that the written criteria was such that any one of us could identify ourselves or our children into most or all of its points. In the same session, a paper given by Robynne Burrows, employing a Foucauldian methodology, argued that the methodology of identification was a form of social construction and did not equate to a scientifically based fact of identification. The danger of over-medicating and/or mis-medicating children on such flimsy evidence appears inevitable. Despite the clear scientific disagreement that this discussion exampled regarding the limits of this ADD identification methodology, this concern has not prevented it from being employed ‘authoritatively’ as scientific fact within educational institutions in Western Australia. This form of identification of a yes/no, right/wrong, is/isn’t through the ticking of boxes and/or filling in the blanks of a pre-set criteria as a method in educational thinking brings us back to the influence of Skinner and the kind of thinking his methodologies produce.

Skinner’s method of teaching, when constructed through pre-set curriculum materials means that even the teacher need not understand the reasons or logic behind why one answer is correct and another incorrect. The graphic example provided by Stones of how this method looks to students is the ‘fill-in-the blanks’ question sheet. Thus, the student is firstly told what to think and secondly tested as to their ability to memorize the ordered thinking presented. If the students get it wrong, the process is repeated until they learn to present the desired response. This methodology is one that has become standardized as one of the basic educational tools, the administration of which marks a skill in the teacher, and certainly features as a common format within the Western Australian primary school education system. With the introduction of a new Curriculum framework in 1998, the focus on ‘outcomes’ further invokes the Skinner style methodology as an integral part in educational thinking. This new curriculum model, however, makes some significant shifts that correspond, in the terms of this thesis, with the shift to a society of control. While it incorporates a Skinner methodology and focus on ordered ‘outcomes’ by the state-proper, it also invokes the kind of liberal
individualism that Skinner critiques in that both curriculum development as well as administration becomes the responsibility of individual teachers and schools. Thus, while in disciplinary society teachers professionalism was predicated on their ability to institute a pre-constructed curriculum written and organized by a different set of professionals, the new curriculum conflates these two roles and puts the onus on the teachers to both construct and instruct according to their own individual ability. The public system has likewise been subjected to new funding imperatives that force it to compete with and mimic a private school landscape whereby individual schools, which have become more reliant on fee-paying parents to boost funding lost to the private system, are forced into the business of capitalist desires to market and sell themselves as a product. This is of course highly problematic for a public system that is nevertheless required by law to accept students from all social demographics in that children from the poorer households are, from the point of view of the economic rationalism invoked, less desired. State control, however, is not diminished and the government is not simply permitting control to be taken up wholeheartedly by individual schools. Rather, the changes in the system that appear to be permissive in this sense on the face of things are merely an act of de-territorialising the institutions as a determinant condition for the re-territorialisation of the order of the military complex as suggested in chapter four. And it is in the context of this shift coupled with the habit of a masculinized military model that therefore sees the focus in terms of the school system being constructed as a problem with boys.

One graphic example of how the Howard Government is nevertheless instituting this new form of control, which as I elaborated in chapter four, relates to a communications model, is the offer of funding opportunities to schools in exchange for developing curriculum specifically designed to deal with the so-called problem with boys. The “Commonwealth Government’s Boys’ Education Lighthouse School Program” invites “all Australian Schools” to “apply for grants up to $5000 to document and showcase successful practices in boys’ education.” The model of the program intends to award its chosen “lighthouse” schools not only with the funding, but with the task of then acting to “support the professional development of teachers in schools around them.” These comments, quoted from the Commonwealth Education Minister, Brendon Nelson’s
preamble on the web-site advertising the program to schools and teachers, elaborate the problem in terms of the popular concern over literacy levels in schools. The turning of the problem into being specific to ‘boys’ is referenced to statistics taken from ‘benchmark’ testing conducted by the government in recent years. According to Nelson, 89.6% of girls reached the benchmark compared with 85.2% of boys. Thus a mere 4.4% differential between male and female students, compared with an overall 12.6% differential between those who did and those who didn’t reach the benchmark somehow magically defines the problem as relative only to male students. What about the 10.4% of female students who failed to reach the benchmark? It seems clear to me that the governments interest here is not concerned with the educational problem of illiteracy, so much as with invoking a manufactured problem with boys.

If fascist desire in 1930s instituted its power-politics through the enclosed institutions in the disciplinary society and focused its engineering directly upon the biological matter and presumed racial traits of genetic inheritance; the invocation of fascist desire which I see prevalent in contemporary politics is instituting its power-politics through the society of control and focuses its engineering indirectly through the psychoanalytic meta-modellising of social stereotypes, and the primary binary refrain that captures all bodies in this discourse is that invoked by gender type-casting and biological essentialism. Given the reliance teachers and schools must now put on their own volition to construct the curriculum models for ‘boys-centred’ programs and the necessity to therefore differentiate these from non-gendered literacy programs, it is not surprising that they become subject to the corresponding invocations manufacturing the problem in popular discourses. These discourses, I want to suggest, may well be the origin of the myth that the government is subsequently appropriating to over-code the real ‘educational’ issue of illiteracy. In Deleuze-Guattarian terms the behavioural engineering techniques, whether via linear or chemical programming marks a state-science. What the behavioural outcome desired of boys is, however, is marked by the creation of a popular state-philosophy.
Boys in Education: constructing an event on the state’s plane of immanence:
If educational psychology constructs itself as a functioning science on the state’s plane of reference, and Skinner marks a popular faciality of this technology, then on the state’s plane of consistency, or immanence, the conceptual philosophies in education revolve around the popular facialities producing a concept of the child as the desired outcome to be produced through the implementation of the functional technologies of education.
For Deleuze and Guattari, as discussed earlier in the chapter, philosophy constructs conceptual knowledge. I suggested that we consider state philosophy as one in which state-thinking and the state form capture the concept under the transcendence of stated images or models. Deleuze and Guattari do not deal in subject identities, as does the state, rather they construct nomadic philosophy as a plane of immanence that is always being constructed. Of the becomings that they construct, the becoming child, like the becoming woman, has no direct correspondence to a fixed image or representation of a child, (this is the over-coding by the state), but to what they call “question-machines.” They argue that “children’s questions are poorly understood” if they are not seen in this way (A Thousand Plateaus, 256). It is these very question-machines, the becoming child of the child, however, that are repressed and over-coded by the state’s mechanisms in educating the child. Children are not exactly banned from asking questions in the classroom but they are surveyed and disciplined as to the kind of questions they are permitted to ask. Classroom discipline dictates that they must stay on ‘topic’ and the question-machines that immanently follow rhizomic lines connecting to multiplicities will, if enunciated, be one of the signifiers for the linear aborescent model of state knowledge of misbehaviour or anti-sociability. The question-machines disrupt the lesson-plan and the linear programming set down by the organizing state-machine.

The manner in which this state-thinking completely disregards the actual experience and the voices of children has become even more intense with the imposition of “Boys in
Education” programs. It should be noted that the majority of identified ADD children identified in the practices I have been describing were boys. So where and how did ‘boys’ become seen as being such a problem? The answer to that question lies in considering the discourses of the rise and state-capture of refrains emerging from a multiplicity of voices coalescing under the broad terminology of the men’s movement. Like the women’s movement, this phenomena contains a multiplicity of voices and dialogues over a plurality of issues concerning and between men. These dialogues have been around for some time and are studied at universities under ‘masculinities’ courses, which, alongside feminist courses, provide access to male and female students alike to critically and analytically consider the variety of political, social and psychological issues emerging from and through gender relationships in society. As with feminism, however, those aspects of this movement that are being taken up, promoted and proliferated by the state are those discourses which suit the purposes of the dominant capitalists.

In chapter two I considered the capture of multiple feminist concerns and philosophies by the faciality of the power-feminist or capitalist feminist as popularised and enunciated by Naomi Wolf. Here I would like to consider the capture of men’s movement by the state-machine as facialised by the father-teacher as is being popularised and enunciated by Steve Biddulph. Here, the homologising of men’s issues is over-coded by Biddulph’s minority position and projected into the content of a majoritarian problem, constructed as an event over-coding philosophies plane of immanence in terms of a perceived problem with boys, the solution to which is the ‘father-teacher’. The repetition of this refrain in educational circles reproduces and replicates Biddulph’s own Batman Simplex, constructing a benevolent and loving father-image as the public face of a private vigilante-machine aimed against familial constructions and value systems that do not replicate his biologically essentialist,

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36 I should note that this program follows on from earlier concerns about girls and science education, and programs designed to encourage increased participation. Like the boys in education, however, these discourses, which were likewise positively enunciated in their rhetoric, often resulted in forms of exclusion of boys who became the undesired subjects of the teaching program. Thus, they become subject to the Batman simplex of state thinking-state-thinking and its pedagogical socialisation of gender-specific formation. That the paradigmatic associations of gender differ from those that came before does not prevent the repetition of the same binary divide being instituted by the abstract-machine of the state. It’s the same divide and conquer strategy employing a different tactic of division.
psychoanalytically meta-modelled beliefs and values. Further, this narrative institutes a narrative that de-territorialises both social and scientific knowledge questioning the effects environmental/social construction and re-territorialises it with a model of social pre-determination that begins with the invocation of a binary divide and the institution of educational technologies of self constructing sex as gendered destiny. Thus, this abstract-machine re-constructs the repetition of the same old ‘patriarchal’ desire to control the populous through the eradication of ambivalence and different familial structured households.

Any serious consideration that Biddulph should define curriculum in the education system seems absurd, and yet teachers can be heard quoting him and schools are filling library shelves with his books for teachers to consume in the name of curriculum support. This is despite the fact that Biddulph has no credentials in the field of education and his philosophy of the teacher as substitute parent is not consistent with either the enunciated professional role of the teacher, or the situated ability of those individuals who take up these positions to perform the function he dictates for them. Parenting, in terms of its effect on child-psychology is related to the environment specific to the role performed by the prime-care-givers whether biologically related to the child or not, and regardless of gender identification. In the context of addressing men as parents and publishing a book dialoguing the issues for men, Biddulph is just one voice among many. He shares his opinions in a market full of pop-psychology and parenting philosophy, each drawing a different problem with a different set of solutions and selling their ideas in the market of self-help consumerism. Biddulph has effectively constructed his market by constructing a problem with men who needed to purchase and read his book to find out the solution offered. But this private market of individualist free choice in consumerism becomes something very different when it finds itself in the conditions to manifest its utopic fantasies in the no-choice public consumerism of the state education system.

Throughout Biddulph’s popular book entitled *Manhood*, a tone and rhetoric of authority is utilised to make a series of over-arching simplifications and socially prejudicial universalisations through the abstract simulation of his characterisations. In this book
the ‘father’ figure comes under much scrutiny, but only insofar as he has affected the lives of sons. Daughters, who might share the same father, are somehow less affected by fathering because of their gender. These universalised and stereotypical representations are not limited to fathers, however. Biddulph sets up a landscape of subject-identities beginning with a rather pathetic and sad characterisation of men as “confused and numb” people (1). He asserts that:

Men are hurting. They are also hurting others. Physical violence against spouses, and horrific incidence of child sexual abuse, point to something badly wrong with large numbers of men. (2)

Biddulph goes on to suggest that this problem with men is caused by the fact that “boys are horrendously under-fathered “ thus growing into “phony men who act out a role – a complete façade” (3). Thus, men are characterised firstly as perpetrators of abuse and secondly as victims of their own fathers lacking parental skills and mentorship. After this rather sad introduction, the text goes on to present a “Seven steps to Manhood” program, which is outlined at the beginning and extrapolated throughout the text. In examining exactly what and how Biddulph constructs boys as a problem, I will address the book by critically examining each of these points as follows:

1)“‘Fixing it’ with your father” whereby men are told they “cannot get on with [their] life successfully until [they] have understood him, forgiven him and come, in some way, to respect him”(13). This statement belies Biddulph’s uncompromising belief that a relationship between a father and a son is essential to the psychological health of men. It further relegates the ‘problem’ he defined as being common among men to the past, which is both forgiven and further respected for the sake of the future in the ‘son’. Thus, the difference between bad or absent fathering and good, present fathering is relegated to a generational shift. Given that, on close inspection, the model that Biddulph then defines as ‘good’ fathering is constructed in terms of a disciplinarian misogyny, this rhetorical ploy is somewhat ironic.

In a an article published in the West Australian entitled “No dad is like no leg – author,” (26th August, 2000), Biddulph takes rhetorical advantage of a public debate surrounding a single woman’s desire and legal battle to utilise IVF (In Vitro Fertilisation) technology, to further publicise his propaganda. In this article,
Biddulph is quoted as saying “If you choose to have a child without a father it is like choosing to have a baby without a leg” (37). The analogy suggests that fatherless children, growing up in female-headed households, are disabled. This kind of simplistic logic begs the question, however: doesn’t it depend on who your father is? Are children who are sexually abused, or physically abused, or psychologically abused by fathers (or mothers or teachers for that matter) being enabled? Are children, male and female, not likely to be significantly enabled by the removal or avoidance of a violent or abusive father? Further, this rhetoric suggests that women who choose to continue with pregnancies when their male counter-parts refuse to take responsibility are in effect disabling their unborn child. Such assumptions are not only completely naïve, but construct a diagram of power for men and men’s choices as paramount to those of women over issues of children.

From a Deleuze-Guattarian point of view, this diagram of power eradicates the multiplicity of desire, both negative and positive, and constructs a pre-defined assumption as to the well being of a child based on the choices of men and men alone. Biddulph’s text is completely blind to the possibility that choosing to have or bring up a child outside of the influence of his/her biological father is in many cases the most responsible thing to do by the child. The model of power drawn and invoked over-codes the multiple possible assemblages of the household as necessarily disabled without the presence of a perceived phallic-power. It denies the specificity of each household and forces all assemblages to be judged against by a patriarchal image as idealised fatherhood. This model pre-defines and constructs as ‘disabled’ all children, particularly boys, whose fathers do not replicate this image, even before they are born. This belies a fundamental hypocrisy in Biddulph’s rhetoric given that he begins his text defining men as having a problem with violence only to then idealise them in the role of fatherhood. Further, it invokes a negative and patronising over-codification of those children who do indeed have disabilities as likewise being a problem, revealing an underlying prejudice and hierarchical thinking invoked, not only between differently formed households, but between different bodies in terms of both gender and stereotypically perceived physical ability.
2) “Finding sacredness in your sexuality” which Biddulph equates to a dichotomised choice between giving your sexuality “away to women” and being “sleazy and obsessive” or relocating “sexual energy in yourself” as a “powerful source of wellbeing . . . Then you need to learn the art of the chase – the specific role a man must take in the dance of male and female.” There is, Biddulph argues, no “in-between,” no room for ambivalence here. There is also a clear hetero-sexual assumption being made here. As a representation of the men’s movement, this assumption over-codes the movement and negates by erasure a multiplicity of voices from homosexual men who may have something very different to say about (their) male sexuality for themselves. Furthermore, it re-asserts a binary-machine suggesting as good the passive sexual position for women who are presumed to be waiting on the chase, or alternatively they belonging to the category of “sleaze.” This sentiment is further elaborated in comments throughout the text such as those suggesting that to be a good father to a daughter it is important that a man show that he “can’t be seduced” by his wife. The implication is that all acts of sexual seduction or desire is the rightful province of, and should be instigated by, the man. Any reversal or imbalance of this model equates with a loss of masculinity and a bad role model on behalf of the father and the mother. Thus, any representation or act of female sexual desire, for Biddulph, is considered an emasculating force.

Paradoxically, Biddulph fails to consider the possibility that in an ambivalent world, sometimes men ‘chasing’ women equates with unwanted harassment, and not a desired ‘dance.’

This arrogant and misogynist attitude toward women’s sexuality is further elaborated when Biddulph actively suggest that men should support and encourage their sons to

37 To be fair, Biddulph does consider the issue of homosexuality later in the book when directly advising fathers on parenting their sons. He does so, however, by asserting that young men are most likely to turn out gay through a combination of “a remote, critical father, and an over involved mother” and that “there is a quality in many gay relationships of young men seeking in their lover the father who never loved them. This can lead to immature relationships…”(116). Thus his corresponding words of support for gay rights, enunciated on the same page, seem somewhat hollow given that he has just invoked their sexuality as “immature” and as a fault of their parents inability to mimic his ideal model. Thus, the compensatory comments of support for gay rights seem a little ironic, given that their entire sexuality has been categorised under the ‘fatherless’ category for which Biddulphs entire project desires to correct.
“read and absorb quality erotica” as a positive form of sexual development. While Biddulph might negate any accusation of promoting pornography wholesale by suggesting this erotica should show “men and women in equal and enjoyable contact” (114), this suggestion still justifies the development of a male sexuality produced through the fantasy ‘object’ images of women, rather than in anything resembling an actual relationship. It does, therefore support the replication of an age-old homo-social development of male sexual desire based on the idealised images of a fantasised world absent of real bodies. Again, this shows Biddulph’s rhetoric and his ‘men’s movement’ to be an over-coding of other male voices that have more favourably emerged in gender studies.

As with my critique of Wolfs popularised capitalist-feminism in chapter two, I would likewise critique Biddulph as a popular homogenisation and simplification of the multiple voices of men. Where Biddulph arrogantly dismisses feminism as women’s business, despite concessions such as acknowledging that “Equality for women is still a distant dream”(19), other voices within masculinities studies have taken on board the confrontations and criticisms that emerged from earlier versions of the women’s movement. Andy Moye, in The Sexuality of Men, for example, deals with the issue of pornography and its effect on men’s psychology in a rather more negative light to Biddulph. While Biddulph may rhetorically avoid direct correlation to pornography by naming his masturbatory tools with the more feminist friendly term ‘erotica,’ the lack of specificity as to what texts he is referring, coupled with his general attitude towards women throughout his text would suggest, if we follow Moye’s arguments, that he is himself subject to the psychology constructed for men in these texts.

In his chapter titled “Pornography,” Moye argues through an analysis of both hard and soft-core mass-market pornographic texts operate as “a distinct structuring of men’s desires.” This structure is one that produces what he calls an effect of “doubly alienated embodiment” for men from both the truth about women and themselves. Moye counter-confronts certain feminist readings of men’s sexuality through pornography where the representations translate and “underscore the
conservative assumption that masculine sexuality and identity is natural and pre-
given, and that pornography expresses the truth about men” (46). Thus, where
feminists have challenged the truth presented of women’s desire in pornographic
representation, Moye likewise challenges its representation of men’s desire. He goes
on to critically analyse the genre in terms of its phallocentric discursive that
produces an image and an idea of men’s sexuality in terms of disembodiment and
“nothing more than the rhythms of his erection”(57). Further, it narrates women as
passive recipients of this phallic pleasure who nevertheless actively demand and
expect men to fulfil the dictates of the mythical phallus. The texts are full of
“explicit misogyny” which “target women as objects of contempt and ridicule . . .
These targets represent the fearful world outside the neat boundaries evoked by
pornography, a world peopled by women who are not all young and large-breasted
and waiting quietly in the nude to give a man ‘what he wants most’” (64 – 65).

Moye further considers the effects of the alienation produced in pornographic texts
and their relationship to capitalism, not simply in terms of the magazine sales, but in
terms of the way the text produces anxieties in the reader regarding sexual
“mechanical dysfunction” and the textual solution offered through the advertising of
sex-aids (63). Pornography, he argues:

works to assert that there are no problems. By doing so, it publicly perpetuates a
collective lie about women and, as fundamentally, perpetuates the lie that our
[sic] alienation as men is a natural state that can be magically dissolved in a fuck.
In shoring up the structure of traditional masculine authority, soft pornography
serves to reproduce the grounds for our continued alienation – a twist that
provides the pornographers with high sales and fat profits. (69)

In the context of these arguments, Biddulph’s own replication of a naturalised male
sexuality and its relationship to ‘erotica’ and his refusal to engage with the voices of
women, appears to narrate him as a subject desiring his own repression through
alienation. Rather than a molecular movement and revolution against the dictates of
a capitalist appropriation of the body (a becoming-woman /situated /embodied),
Biddulph merely marks a conservative re-territorialisation both of women’s
becomings and of those voices within masculinities such as Moye’s that seek to de-territorialise the pornographic refrains of alienation and disembodiment.

3) “Meeting your wife on equal terms”(13). And 4) “Engaging actively with your kids.” I coupled these two points because they seem to me to directly contradict each other. What for example does Biddulph mean by equal terms? On the one hand I would agree with his call for men to communicate, but on the other hand, the specificity of differential communication is then erased when Biddulph makes sweeping over-arching statements about women’s capabilities, thus constructing pre-structured ideas about women - the first being that they are in fact ‘wives’ – that presume universal and biologically essentialist assumptions. Wives are represented as being incapable of adequately disciplining their children, for example, without the participation of their husband (106). Men are advised that they “can’t leave it all to your wife – because woman doesn’t have all the ingredients needed . . . This is especially important for your sons, who will need many hours a day of your care”(13). This statement is reiterated later in the text in terms of direct biological essentialism when Biddulph suggests that; “boys have biological need of several hours of one-to-one male contact per day” (100). Further, he suggests that men need to discipline their sons so that the wife “can remain more loving” (107). The sexual division of labour being meta-narrated here institutes a stereotypical binary divide of ‘soft’ mother-love against the ‘tough-love’ of the father. Biddulph's concept of equality thus is quite consciously one in which the “balance is skewed toward the father being harder” (107).

Further, the assumption being made here, at the expense of acknowledging women’s ability to care for their children, is that the male subject being addressed can afford ‘many hours every day’. This belies the social prejudice Biddulph blindly brings to his arguments, assuming a subject whose work obligations and financial position can afford such luxuries of time. This may be fine for men whose jobs allow the flexibility and economic remuneration required to make such a daily commitment, but such jobs are the province of the privileged few. It also assumes that this time spent will be positive and beneficial, defining fathering in terms of quantity and not
quality of time spent. And the kinds of activity that Biddulph does qualify do not seem to equate with the kinds of activities that would help mothers and women out in terms of anything resembling ‘equality.’ Rather than ask men to participate in washing the dishes or cleaning the bathroom or even mowing the lawn (if one has to be gendered about divisions of household labour), Biddulph defines men’s involvement in terms of child discipline, play-wrestling and, most horrifying of all for a self-respecting woman desiring self-respecting men, supporting of their sons involvement with misogynist and mysandronist sexual commodification and objectification in so-called ‘erotic’, or otherwise named soft-core pornographic texts.

The kind of play that Biddulph suggests is “play-wrestling” and, in general, I have no problem with this idea, what I don’t understand is why this is seen as a father’s or even a son’s sole province. Biddulph does say that “children of both sexes love to get down on the floor and play rough and tumble” and I agree, but he then states that “boys who feel secure will especially love their fathers or other men to do this with them and they thrive on the competition” (103). Is the suggestion meant to imply that boys who play wrestle with their mothers or sisters are insecure? And why is it about ‘competition’? While I agree with Biddulph’s implication that this kind of play is a good way to teach your children to learn their own strength and take responsibility for it, I would argue that play-wrestling is less about competition and more about finding ways, whether with mum or dad or friends, adult or child, male or female, to enjoy close personal contact in a non-passive ‘fun’ way – it is not an activity exclusive to a male province, and women who allow the likes of Biddulph to code these kinds of activities as ‘boys stuff’ are missing out.

Biddulph would no doubt find the idea of women playing with their sons a threatening prospect, as his psycho-analytic meta-modelling of the world insists that “As early as six or seven years of age, the primary identification of the boy must switch. He will love and relate intensely to is mother but he is not ‘hers’ any more” (103). This suggests that Biddulph sees children as objects to be owned and passed over from one person to another, it also institutes a theory of identification as if this process is natural and pre-given and necessarily Oedipal in character. Coupled with
the naturalised idea that men and boys need ‘competitive’ play, and the support for
the commodification of sexuality, this commodified idea of the child as an object of
belonging belies the thinking dominant in the capitalist mind-set. And its
implications inflect on another social problem involving men that Biddulph fails to
address when marriages or relationships involving children break down. That is the
growing number of men, many of which share their bitterness within broader context
the men’s-movement that Biddulph represents, who refuse to maintain and/or fight
taking either financial or social responsibility for their children as revenge
against the loss of their objectified wives and full control over their objectified
children. Biddulph does claim, but fails to reference, a study “that found that after
one year following divorce, over thirty percent of fathers had no further contact with
their children,” but only to make another unsubstantiated assertion that “teenage
gangs are made up of boys whose fathers are . . . absent” (100). He further claims
that “peer-group pressure . . . only has a problematic effect on those who have a poor
relationship with their same-sex parent” on the assumption that boys look to gang
leaders as father substitutes. What, however, is the difference between this gang-
model and the men’s group-model Biddulph is presenting as a solution? Both
institute homo-social/hetero-sexual masculinity, and Biddulph himself, acting as
symbolic leader of the ‘gang’/men’s movement, actively seeks to peer-group
pressure men through his own brand of rhetorical persuasion to see themselves as
fatherless victims of their mothers love, after which he orders them into action as
agents of recruitment into the order of men. Not only are the voices of women and
girls erased from his text, but so too voices of the boys he nevertheless presumes to
‘know’ the needs of. Biddulph rallies all who will join his gang of merry-men to
attend according to the orders of a biologically essentialist patriarchy. He fails to
back up any of his claims with researched data, statistics, or anything resembling
professional research. This only re-asserts the blindness of his Batman Simplex and
his projection of this blindness drawn from the outmoded pseudo-scientific
psychoanalytic models to which his propaganda meta-narrates.

38 This is not to usurp those masculinities studies or the possibility that there are other elements of what
becomes broadly termed the ‘men’s movement’ that may be working in more self-reflexive ways. Much
discussion of men’s health, for example, is relative to over-coming traditional masculinities. But, while
there are elements of Biddulph that can ‘fit’ and be interpreted with this possibility, so too it’s simplicity
provides structural means for the invocation of the very gang mentality he purports to oppose.
5) “Learning to have real male friends. You will have to get emotional support from other men and find out how to complete your own initiation into manhood”(14). What could more indicative of gang-mentality than the idea of ‘initiation?’

6) “Finding your heart in your work”. Here, Biddulph says men need to find work that they believe in, again making a middle-class assumption regarding the subjects ability to have such choices. To be fair, in the newspaper article quoted above, Biddulph does suggest that; “we need to have a 30 hour week as an option for young men”(37). But why just for men? Why not lobby for shorter working weeks for everyone and free up the whole population, increase employment opportunities and give us all more time to spend with our families, children and friends? But to suggest this would require a confrontation with the entire capitalist system and demand that those middle-class well-paid professions share their economic privilege. And any hope of this egalitarian dream seems unlikely while we live under the Howard Governments divide and conquer models of making the rich richer through tax cuts at the expense of the poor minorities through welfare cuts.

7) “Freeing your wild spirit.” In this step, men are told that “the god of men does not dwell in the suburbs or the office towers . . . You will need to find a spiritual bases for your inner life that is specifically masculine and based in nature.” This statement thus requires that the subject have a transcendental ‘religious’ belief system, perhaps not necessarily Christian, but certainly patriarchal, and constructs a naturalisation that there is a ‘god of men’ (14). But if the “god of men” resides in nature, where is the god of women? Is there one? Or is Biddulph simply reasserting the age-old patriarchal over-coding of spirituality by a ‘specifically masculine’ desire to mimic the power of God? Given the false authority that his entire text rhetorically insinuates, we might suggest that Biddulph himself is enacting the ‘god trick’ to which Donna Harroway refers.

Biddulph models his arguments on a middle-class landscape where political issues that affect different socio-economic groups are erased in favour of a landscape that, whether
criticised or applauded, is naturalised as being universal. These stereotypical presumptions construct a series of universal givens to a series of differences that are categorised under subject-identity positions. There is no discussion in this book of issues of race or class differences, only a repetitious binary refrain segregating men from women. The seven step solution Biddulph initiates to the problem he constructs with men requires that they replicate the image and desires of a white, middle-class professional heterosexual, patriarchal-spiritualist with a sexually passive wife and children (preferably male), who plays initiation games with his mates and can economically afford the luxury and flexibility of several hours per day to play with the kids. And this, presumably, will be in the big house with a nice back yard and lots of space to kick the footy and wrestle with the boys. For the vast majority, Biddulph operates in a landscape ‘fantasy-land’ that seems to emulate something from the idealistic images of an advertising campaign, presuming that these minority privileges are in the reach of all men and women. Further, he makes some pretty naïve assumptions about the desires not only of men, but also of women and children and meta-narrates the order words of Oedipalisation. I would argue that it is the sheer arrogance of this authoritative, presumptive attitude and its technology of over-coding the plural and multi-cultural society by the middle-class values Biddulph aspires, as if they were universally desired, that has more to do with the production of problems for men, women and children. If men are homosexual or bi-sexual or single or un-married or without a father or working-class or even professional but without flexible working hours, atheistic, or economically underprivileged, then they are incapable, in Biddulphs logic, of being anything but inadequate fathers and their sons are deemed to be ‘underfathered’.

Having outlined his, not so new, model of the ideal ‘good’ man and father in a way that constructs the vast majority of men and fathers and all women and mothers as negative role models for boys, Biddulph makes a further universalised assumption. Here he constructs a subject-identity for the male teacher as the ‘surrogate father’ for underfathered boys. In instituting and replicating his own Batman Simplex, Biddulph suggests that male teachers be recruited and trained to act as substitute fathers for, in particular, those boys “who have no male figures at home and no men active in their
lives” (118). And, it is this suggestion that the state education system has taken up with
gusto in recent years. There has been and continues an ongoing recruitment program for
male primary school teachers, advertised for on the basis of Biddulph’s claim that under-
fathered boys need father substitutes.

Biddulph critiques “gender equity” programs as being “in practice, improving things for
girls” and applauds this initiative (118). However, he argues that; “feminist educators
walk a fine line between advancing the cause of girls and the realm of abusing or
denigrating boys” (121). To a point, I agree with Biddulph here, but it has to be said that
if this kind of abuse emerges from so-called feminist teachers is caused by them
mimicking mysandronist ‘power feminism’ (their own Bat-girl simplexes) and begs the
question of the ‘quality’ of their teaching. Bringing in the Batmen to counter the
minority of bad female teachers, only replicates the same problem by instituting the idea
that girls and boys are fundamentally different and need to be educated and treated
differently in the classroom. This is, in Deleuze-Guattarian terms the refrain of a state-
thinking and links to the binary abstract machine of divide and conquer. If difference is
really to be understood, we need to see children in all their myriad of difference and not
be instituting the same old binary difference that fixes them to pre-constructed linear
models of gender acquisition based on a single anatomical (genetic) difference.

As another piece of parenting pop-psychology and men’s movement propaganda on the
shelves of bookstores Biddulph is one thing, as a curriculum format for teachers it is
quite another. As schools and teachers seek out models for implementing boy-specific
programs to compete for funding opportunities, however, experiments are being
conducted in classrooms utilizing forms of teaching inspired by Biddulph’s Batman
simplex approach. Coupled with the working conditions of the Curriculum framework,
and the ever present rhetoric in education and welfare circles narrating an order for
teachers to seek methods of prevention, and thus prediction, of social problems, these
experiments position the teacher and schools employing them as agents of Biddulph’s
vigilante desire against his personal construction of the problem in so-called ‘under-
fathered boys.’ Teachers who are empowered with the faciality of professionalism are
thus being supported and encouraged by the rhetoric facialising the education system’s
apparent benevolent concern with boys to instigate their own solutions. For those men and women who have been seduced by the traditional comforts of stereotypes and the over-arching simplicity of his Batman Simplex, Biddulph is providing fuel in the construction of their desire to continue their job of curriculum administrator as the desire for their own repression as professional educators.

When the program was introduced into the Fremantle Education District in 2001, for example, the local government school that my son was attending under the so-called professional guidance of the year 6/7 male teacher, instituted changes, which he justified to parents in reference to having read Biddulph. The changes included: sex-specific activities whereby boys were given career advice from pre-selected (exclusively middle-class) ‘role-models’ and girls were taught to organize a cooking spree to sell at lunchtime to raise funds; male children where encouraged and allowed to download pornography off the internet directly into the classroom; physical (arm-pinching) discipline of boys behaviour replaced usual forms of warning/parent involvement follow-up procedures; and, no-doubt coupling with the teachers own Batman Simplex, male children from single-mother households were forced to attend a lunch-time ‘talk-group’ where they were taught that their mothers didn’t really love them, but only had them to receive maintenance from their victimized absent fathers. All of these changes took place without any consultation or information being provided to parents – or certainly not mothers. When complaints were levelled against the teacher, I was personally threatened with legal action being taken against me for questioning the professionalism of the teacher and, in the case of those children isolated from single-mother households, every single one withdrew their children from the school. When formal complaints were then submitted to the Education department district office, regarding the use of Biddulph as an authority the following response was received by the writer:

Concern about boys in education has grown in education circles and the broader community for a number of years. Whilst you may dispute the credibility of Steve Biddulph and his views about boys’ education, the adoption of his philosophies in the classroom is an approach which is used by many teachers in good faith. [my emphasis] (Billing, May, 2002)
Obviously, this is a graphic example of only one teacher supported by only one school, and it does not indicate that the program is being instituted in this manner, or at all, in all State primary schools. But, as the education department statement indicates, and along with further attempts to take the complaints to the education minister, the department supported its own workers to the exclusion of the rights of both parents and the children involved. Whether the refusal and the cover-up of these events was merely part of the departments agenda to ‘save face’ in an environment where the public system is forced to compete with the private one, I can only speculate.

What I can confirm, however, is that the experience was and remains felt as being a fully fascistic event for those parents and children who were traumatized not only by the in-class events, but by the denial of their rights to be heard in the subsequent investigation and the education department response, which appeared to condone the behaviour of the teacher and the school. The manner in which the complaints were handled (which is to say, ignored) and the excuses made under the dictate of acting in “good faith” clearly replicate the kinds of excuses provided for the practitioners of eugenics in the 1930s.

If feminist teachers walk a fine line between supporting girls and abusing boys, the same accusation can be levelled at masculinist teachers in reverse. Ultimately, however, the problem is not with the gender of the students, but with the gender battles of the becoming-fascistic men and women who want to project their own power desires onto and into the bodies of the children whom they are entrusted to teach. Teachers who behave this way are, in my opinion, bad teachers. They fail to comprehend or understand their role in society and have little respect for their job as educators. Good teachers teach; they don’t attempt to use children as pawns to play their private ‘adult’ gender wars.

Not all teachers are necessarily this egotistic or naïvely unprofessional, and we would hope that those who take their professional status seriously do so with an understanding that gender equity is about not making pre-constructed judgments of children based on their gender. Further, however, it has to be said that programs aimed at improving girls
outcomes in traditionally male subjects is not the same thing as programs aimed at ‘surrogate fathering.’

In theory at least, gender equity programs focused on providing girls with ‘educational’ opportunities that boys were already perceived as having. Biddulph’s program, however, has little to do with educational outcomes and focuses primarily on providing ‘social-familial’ opportunities that boys’ are speculated as not having. Thus, while I wouldn’t necessarily recoil from critiquing individualist feminist desires and their over-coding the education arena, there is a fundamental difference in the focus of these two programs, not simply in terms of gender difference, but in terms of suitability for the arena in which they are played out. If some egotistical feminists nevertheless take up gender equity as an excuse to institute their own personal desires and fantasies, Biddulph institutes this as a pre-requisite in his program for male schoolteachers. Thus, the game of Chess that is being laid out by Biddulph’s philosophy is one that situates teachers and schools (male and female) as the pawns in a battle between the abstracted desires of the right wing ‘family values’ ideologies and the multiple and polymorphous becomings of the household/family.

The bodies and the futures of the children, through an inscription upon the Body without Organs, is the playing field upon which this war is being waged. The becoming child; the question machines and their desire to learn are being over-coded by the transcendent model that inscribes this disruption to the plan as bad behaviour and a reflection of Biddulph’s fantasy of the unconscious desire of/for a father. More frightening, however, teachers and schools are segregating and psychologically attacking children who show no educational difficulties whatsoever on the bases of their private household assemblage where there is a perceived ‘absence’ of a patriarchal father-figure. A fantasy drawn from the minority desires of a familial assemblage organized to conform to a territorial landscape divided into a gendered division in the labour of parenting, which is itself meta-narrated as a technology of self instituted in marriage as the order of a psychoanalytic meta-model of Oedipalised psycho-social development crowned by the law of the father. This mythic fantasy becomes fascistic in nature when it couples with the social abstract-machine as an axis of justification for utilizing the pragmatic
functions and expressive refrains of the state education-machine and institutes as order-words its content refrains onto and into the bodies of our children through educational technologies that provide the conditions of brain washing (de- and re-territorialising).

The state-thinkers with their Batman simplexes replicate the desires of a state that wishes to eradicate from its territorial landscape the ambivalence of life. Repeating the refrain of under-fathered boys through the benevolent face of Biddulph’s “book about setting men free” (front cover) while instituting his vigilante desires to control the sexuality, psychology, and familial landscape of men and women, which is to say, to control through the law and order of the abstract-machine of a transcendental father image the binary code that ensures its continuous power. If we accept this, if we are seduced by Biddulph’s benevolent face, we desire our own repression. And schools and teachers who do so, desire the repression of education and its ability to provide our children (which is to say, the collective us) with the communicative means of expression that will be necessary if we are to free ourselves from the dictates of the divide and conquer mechanisms of dominating patriarchal/matriarchal control.

The Plane of Construction: The State Art of Faciality and the Nomadic Art of Education:

In discussing Art as one of the three disciplines related to the three planes, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that it belongs to the plane of construction. Like the other two planes, it too has its relationship to chaos but rather than concepts or functions, art constructs sensations. Where concepts are forms, and functions are known, sensations are forces, and it is the force of the sensation that for Deleuze and Guattari defines the work of art: “We paint, sculpt, compose, and write with sensations” (1994, 166). Sensation, they suggest, is “pure contemplation [and] it is still necessary to discover, beneath the noise of actions, those internal creative sensations or those silent contemplations that bear witness to a brain” (212 – 213). These silent contemplations form the artistry on the plane of construction in the making yourself a Body without Organs; which “is not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, a set of practices. You never reach the Body
without Organs, you can’t reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit” (1987, 149 - 150). If nomadic thinking is thought without an image and the Body without Organs is the surface of the brain defined, but not imagined, by the three planes, and the brain cannot be seen within the image of a split between mind and body, then; ‘the Body without Organs . . . is the body without an image’ (1977, 8). The Body without Organs is constructed and is therefore attained through the creative art of sensation contemplated on the plane of construction.

The artist or aesthetic figure in art, like the philosopher and the scientist, shifts through chaos, but where they bring back variations laid out on a plane of immanence and variables on a plane of reference correspondingly, the artist brings back:

*varieties* that no longer constitute a reproduction of the sensory in the organ but set up a being of the sensory, a being of sensation, on an anorganic plane of composition that is able to restore the infinite (1994, 202 – 203).

In the context of the differentiation between state and Nomad, this description refers to the nomadic art that Deleuze and Guattari celebrate. In the interconnection with all three planes and their corresponding disciplines as nomadic thinking they suggest that the “struggle against chaos” is likewise taken within “the struggle against opinion, which claims to protect us from chaos itself” (203). And it is opinion, fixed against the chaos and preventing the movement of becomings, which defines the forms of state-thinking.

If desires are determined by the conditions of the social, then the determination of societies collectively enunciated desire is a representational formulation in the discourses of popular culture. I suggested earlier that the art of the state constructs on a pre-organised landscape of striated lines whereas the nomadic art constructs a Body without Organs. In the introduction, I also suggested that the formation of the state refrain relates to the repression of the expressive and the imposition of pre-structured content. I want to consider here how the sensations of state art manifest through representations of science that function to narrate a content of fearful intent in respect to genetic engineering and the scientist, while narrating a benevolent one in respect to psychology and the teacher. And while I am not suggesting that these correspondences be reversed or that we should not be aware of the dangers of genetic manipulation, I am
suggesting that this habitus supports the growth of behavioural engineering and the naïve rise of its fascist desire against difference in that it constructs a benevolent face that the likes of Biddulph and his gang of Batman-simplex teachers hide themselves behind.

If I can return briefly to the example of the scientific becoming in reproductive technologies, and the nomadic field of science to which they link, we might consider how popular cultural representations and science fictions are more often than not produced through a state-thinking. *Alien Resurrection*, for example, comes to mind as a representation that narrates the developments of such technologies as dystopic mutations of the body. The protagonist, Ripley represents an image of the cloned human and is horrified to discover all the accidents of previous clones of herself as a room full of monstrous bodies. In the film, the monstrous element is the alien other, who, through the greed of the corporate capitalist state has been genetically reconstructed through DNA technology and cloning techniques. This representation of science is again wholly conceived within the model of an artificial evolution seeking an ideal model of a higher human species, and the experimentation is likened to the process of accidental selection. The eradication of the fearful other is secured only with the metaphorical abortion of the monstrous other before the dramatic return home to the safety of earth. The sensation produced in this construction is one that invokes a fear of scientific advancement and human cloning, and while it nevertheless narrates this story along lines of greed and power, it hides its own relationship to these aspects of capitalism; as the continuum of the same theme as a fourth in a line of blockbuster big-dollar movie ventures:

Capitalism institutes or restores all sorts of residual and artificial, imaginary, or symbolic territorialities, thereby attempting, as best it can, to recode, to rechannel persons who have been defined in terms of abstract quantities. Everything returns or recurs: states, nations, families. That is what makes the ideology of capitalism “a motley painting of everything that has ever been believed.” The real is not impossible; it is simply more and more artificial. (1977, 34)

While the scientific discourse that is represented is one devoid of ethical debate, and this is the real issue relative in science, it nevertheless fails to separate the science from the behaviour of the state (both legal and financial) appropriation. The fear of the state is
made synonymous with the fear of scientific experimentation. While the narrative is itself an artificial production of the issues, what is not artificial is this construction of fear as a sensation that becomes part of the habitus of state-thinking. The logical cognition within the limits of this narrative is thus; if we avoid genetic experimentation, we will avoid the fascism of the despotic state.

A different message is meta-textualised in the film, *Gattaca*, where the narrative follows the desire in terms of the private state and the private desires. Here, we are presented with the fear of genetically modified human beings becoming a standard access code to societal participation itself, and thus the fear of it being used as a competitive tool within capitalism's free market. *Gattaca*, which achieved considerably less popularity than the *Alien* series, is a more astute consideration of the real dangers at hand and the ethical questions surrounding desire for genetic engineering. It centres its critique not only around the private desires, but also on issues of the use of genetic information by corporate capitalism and the state. Nevertheless, however, it fails to distinguish between a genetic technology aimed at medical intervention – the eradication of defective gene-sequence mutations – and a genetic technology utilised to produce a super-human species. The two procedures are conflated in the representation. And while I don’t mean to suggest that medical uses are without the need for ethical critique and debate, I do think that a fundamental ethical difference exists between a desire aimed at eradicating debilitating disease and those fascistic desires for super bodies. In both these movies, there is a sense of technological determinism being narrated and naturalised concerning the possibilities of these new technologies. As Raymond Williams has argued:

> The real situation is not one of technological determinism, even in some refined version. The sense of some new technology as inevitable or unstoppable is a product of the over and covert marketing of the relevant interests. Yet in practice it is powerfully assisted by a mode of cultural pessimism, among quite different and even apparently opposed people. (123)

Williams goes on to suggest that it is not the technology so much as it is the use of technology; the cultural desire directing its development that matters. “New technologies could be quite differently used, by starting from different basic social and cultural positions” (136). It is not inevitable, therefore, that genetic science be used as either a
tool of eugenic advantage by the private economy or that it become a tool of the eugenic
disadvantage within the public landscape. That these are the dominant understandings,
however, means that these are the determinate conditions of its understanding and thus
both the desire to advance or cut off its processes. And while these questions and issues
are being considered in respect to genetic science, the same issues in terms of the
application of psychological technique and behavioural engineering are not.

In the state art(ifice) narrating the sensation/sensibility of socio-psychology as a
technique of the teacher, we find cultural and social representations are almost purely
benevolent. Like Batman in chapter one, the teacher is often narrated as a kind of
justified vigilante fighting against an evil with good intentions. This is often represented,
therefore, within an oppositional refrain against older stereotypes of the teacher as stern
disciplinarian and always against stereotypes of inadequate parenting technique. In
Dead Poets Society, for example, Robin Williams plays the benevolent teacher who
brings new unconventional methods into play to endear and encourage his all male
students to follow desires and passions that their parents do not approve. Much like the
narrative implicit in Stephen Biddulph’s work, parents are narrated as being absent
and/or having no understanding of the needs and best interests of their children, and the
teacher is narrated as the benevolent mentor and personal saviour of these interests.
While this film focuses upon the stereotypes of aristocratic children, however, another
example of the saviour teacher focuses upon under-privileged children. In Dangerous
Minds, Michelle Pfieffer plays the ex-marine who follows her own passion to teach.
Despite being under-qualified for the position, she is given a full-time position teaching
the “academy class” of special students. Here she also employs unconventional methods
to teach a class of stereotypically narrated minorities that learning is a choice they must
make for their own self-improvement. The film, therefore, narrates education as means
to escape socially determinate conditions. The interesting relationship between these
two films is that in both cases poetry and literature form the nexus of their teaching
methodologies. This reflects an idea that, rather than being unconventional, formed the
bases of the development of English studies dating back to the work of Mathew Arnold
in the late-19th century. Arnold is a “representative figure” of this tradition in which the
teaching of literature and the literary tradition are seen as a means to critically analyse
and re-install cultural values in a modern world of cultural decline. One difference, however, is that where Arnold was seen to produce an elitism that critiqued the rise of the middle-classes, in both of these films, the teachers use the teaching of literature to substantiate a contemporary ideology that belies a middle-class elitism; the concept of ‘choice.’ In Dead Poets Society, the teacher encourages the boys to choose for themselves paths that their parents may not approve, and thus to make a choice whether or not to subject themselves to the familial traditions. In Dangerous Minds, the teacher tells the students that they have already made the choice to improve their lives by coming to school in the first place.

In the context of disciplinary society, the code of what educational responses teachers were required to produce was dictated by a specified and unified curriculum. In the shift to a society of control, however, teachers have been given increasing responsibility to dictate these required responses according to their own presumed professionalism. While the popular image of teachers, particularly those instituting non-traditional curriculum, is the faciality of benevolence, the sensation produced by these artistic representations is one of trust. One of the important aspects of education psychology that is rarely enunciated, however, is the effect and role played by the idiosyncratic behaviour of the teachers and schools. Psychological testing, like all scientifically enunciated studies, is limited in the kind of results it produces by the hypothesis proposed in the first place. The vast majority of studies focus on the child, but there have also been studies taken out on the effect of the school and the teachers that question the promulgated assumption that all behaviour problems in class-rooms are child/student related and/or born of influences in the private, home environment.

In studies undertaken by Michael Rutter in the early 1980s, a list of factors influencing the best outcomes for overall student performance were measured. According to this study, those factors that turned out to appear unimportant included:

- the amount of money per pupil allocated to a school,
- the number of books in the school library,
- the size and luxuriousness of the school building and the schoolrooms,
- the proportion of teachers with advanced degrees . . . where some schools are co-ed and others are segregated by sex,
effect on school achievement. Even the size of classes . . . mattered much less than one would expect. It was only in the first few years of schooling, for the teaching beginning reading and math, that a small class size provided a real advantage. (Harris and Leibert, 399)

Of those factors that did turn out to be important:

The attitude of the teachers and administrators, the overall atmosphere and spirit of the school. The successful schools, through the behavior and attitude of its staff, fostered a sense of purpose, a love of learning. In the successful schools, teachers took their jobs seriously: they arrived on time, assigned and graded homework papers, and spent a larger proportion of their time in actual teaching than the teachers in less successful schools . . . there was not an excessive emphasis on punishment. Students who did well were publicly praised for their achievements, and all the students were given opportunities to take on responsibilities and to participate in school activities. (399)

The results of this extensive study suggests that the behaviour of teachers and schools have significant effect on both the behaviour and the educational outcomes achieved by the students in their care. This does not negate, however, the reality that some students bring behaviour problems to the classroom that may be beyond the ability of the teacher to accommodate, but it does question the blanket assumption that classroom behaviour is purely a problem of children. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, the classroom structure, like the home refrains of households, operates as an assemblage that either functions or dysfunctions in relation to the kinds of refrains instituted.

Rutter listed three main influences where teachers directly influence the class. The first involves “classroom management” in which it was shown that interruptions of any kind “tend to interfere with the class’s concentration on the subject matter.” And, when these “involve discipline and reprimands, they’re likely to have a negative effect” (399). The second influence of teachers is as:

role models. . . . where teachers are frequently late, attendance is likely to be poorer . . . where the teachers don’t bother about the maintenance of school property [there are] higher rates of vandalism . . . [when] teachers break the rules
by slapping or shoving their students [they] are likely to have higher rates of student misbehavior. (399 – 400).

Obviously the role to which Rutter refers teachers should model is the role of the teacher and not the parent. It seems obvious that where teachers attempt to play parental models, bringing their own personal familial family values, they become bad role models as teachers. And, as I have been arguing, this is a clear problem with the kinds of programs being instituted by Biddulph-style boys in education refrains. Thus, teachers who naively take up Biddulph’s call to arms desire their own repression as teachers in that they act un-professionally. The third influence Rutter states is related to teachers’ expectations; “teachers who expect their students to do well tend to have students with good motivation – students who do, in fact, do well” (401). Conversely, if teachers are applying Batman-simplex models that pre-scribe students from differential household backgrounds in terms of stereotypes of expected behaviour problems, is it not the case they therefore construct those problems themselves? This was certainly the effect on students who were isolated in the classroom example I provided earlier where, naturally enough, the students rebelled against the fascistic propaganda being forced upon them by the teacher and, utilizing their own nomadic intellectual abilities/politics, even rallied the entire class into a full-scale rebellion against the teacher. It was only at this point that parents were informed in such a way as their children were defined as having behaviour problems and, as these were not the normative personalities of these children, questions were asked. These questions revealed to the parents involved what the teacher was actually doing and this in turn lead to the withdrawal of children and formal complaints being submitted. The teacher involved, in Deleuze-Guattarian terms, effectively desired his own repression as a teacher by instating himself as a parent substitute.

We can see from this study, then, that the behaviour of students cannot simply be linked to genetic or social models that insinuate parent and home influence, but must be considered in terms of the assembled relation between students and the kinds of role-modelling individual teachers bring to influence classroom attitudes. When the role of the teacher is interpreted through Biddulph’s invocation of the men’s movement, there is a specific ideological desire to enforce a mono-cultural value system that is hyper-
conservative in nature and fascist in practice. Teachers, particularly male teachers, are being recruited within this popular-enunciated framework to act as the agents of this fascism. If and when they are seduced into accepting this as a ‘professional’ act, they not only join Biddulph’s movement (gang), but enter the becoming of a molecular fascism becoming molar under the protection of the state.

As Rutter’s study shows, the attitudes and behaviours of teachers in classrooms can have a direct effect on those of the children/students. The segregation and special attention given to children from non-patriarchal structured households, and the teaching of the traditional model as a family value system to children within the plural classroom, sets up divisions that define good and bad family values. Children from non-traditional family households are being isolated not only through the punitive enforcement to enter “talk groups” but also through the rhetoric of the lesson plans being instituted, which explicitly exclude their ability to participate in a positive manner. This practice, supported by the philosophies of Biddulph’s psychological model, and instituted within the state-science appropriation of Skinner’s psychological technologies, is not, I find, dissimilar to classroom practices instituted in Nazi Germany under the logic of eugenics. The logic of Aryan supremacy instituted a hierarchy that was then demonstrated through the making example of Jewish children in front of the whole class. As with Biddulph-style education, the focus is not on the educational outcomes of the child, but based on a pre-defined and fascist prejudice and a binary model narrating a biological essentialism. While the fascist desire here applied is not, as yet, of the same molar proportion as that which resulted in the horrors of Nazi Germany, it does inflect an internal-state-thinking that links, through the society of control, to other kinds of fascist practices such as those practiced in the detention centres (as discussed in chapter four), which usurp the humanity of refugees, turning them into over-coded individuals. This thinking promises to promulgate its propaganda, hidden and facialised behind the rhetorical mask of benevolent education programs, and will, if left unchecked and supported by politically motivated legal shifts instituted by the Howard Government, lead to new forms of molar fascism. Biddulph’s program not only de- and re-territorialises the role of the teacher from educator to agent of this fascist replication, but by extension, usurps and over-codes both the nomadic humanity, molarised as rights
and responsibilities, that parents and care-givers have towards the children we have the
privilege to love in the nomadic art of life educating us to the joyous sensation of their
difference.
The Being Ethical of a Becoming-imperceptible: Negating the Dialectics of Nihilism

The Dialectic of Moral Nihilism and the Ethics of the Body:
In the Introduction to the thesis, I outlined Deleuze’s concept of the problem, drawn from Bergsonism, whereby he argues that problems are constructed in ways that produce their own solution. I suggested that for Deleuze and Guattari the problem with revolutionary politics was a habitual reliance on dialectical thinking, and I have argued throughout the thesis that this kind of thinking is synonymous with the construction of the state, which oppresses desire. Through a journey employing the tools of a Deleuze-Guattarian concept milieu, I have explored how the state refrains desire into the construction of a problem in which hierarchical control and authoritative oppression by the state machine produces and enforces a solution. In chapter one, the problem begins with the faciality and the states’ construction of what I have called a Batman simplex; in chapter two, the problem moves through becoming-woman and reconstructs the simplex as molar identity; in chapter three, the problem moves through nomadic territory and reconstructs the simplex as property rights; in chapter four, the problem moves through a war-machine of human desire and reconstructs the simplex as a sovereign control; in chapter five the problem moves through the ambivalence of a Body without Organs and reconstructs the simplex as a fascist body. Conceptually, the Batman Simplex refers not to the figure, but to the metonymy implied through its construction of a model of the modern/post-modern subject-identity. This state-thinking machine and its repetition as a refrain abstractly connects to numerous representations of popular culture. Its repetition is always the same simple binary capturing the desire for difference into a degree of sameness upon an axis of identity. In each state refrain, the same transcendent over-coding leads to the striation of desire into a form of its own repression. From a Nietzschean perspective, the affective production of this kind of refrain, which repeats itself throughout the dialectical modelling of the state-thinking, is called nihilism.

In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze defines nihilism as the denial and depreciation of life that “takes on the value of nil” through the means of fiction by which “one falsifies and depreciates . . . The whole of life then becomes unreal, it is represented as
appearance.” The values that are represented as “superior to life are inseparable from their effect: the depreciation of life,” whereby the will to achieve the ideals of representation is not so much a “will that denies itself in higher values” as it is the “higher values that are related to a will to deny, to annihilate life” (147). Deleuze suggests that Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism has three aspects: the first aspect of this nihilism relates to what we might call pre-modern conceptions of transcendent values and ideals and the belief in a higher formation or Being developed into a unified ‘God’. This Deleuze calls “negative nihilism.” In its second aspect, nihilism relates to the modern/post-modern transcendent images presented as simulacra and this he calls “reactive nihilism”:

This second sense would be familiar but no less incomprehensible if we did not see how it derives from and presupposes the first. Previously life was depreciated from the height of higher values, it was denied in the name of these values. Here, on the contrary, only life remains, but it is still a depreciated life which now continues in a world without values, stripped of meaning and purpose, sliding ever further towards its nothingness. Previously essence was opposed to appearance, life was turned into an appearance. Now essence is denied but appearance is retained: everything is merely appearance, life which is left to us remains for itself an appearance. (148)

The third aspect is called passive nihilism: the acceptance of death as the proof of his [God’s] doctrine” (155). From this reading of the three aspects of nihilism, Deleuze goes on to critique the Hegelian dialectic. “We must not” he suggests “see this philosophy of history and religion as a revival or even a caricature of Hegel’s views” (156). Nietzsche, according to Deleuze, opposes “the whole romantic movement” and the dialectic in mistrusting “the death of God” in philosophy, viewing it only as “an apparent and abstract death.” Hegel, however, interprets the death of Christ as a “superseded opposition [and] the reconciliation of [the] finite and infinite, the unity of God and individual, of changeless and particular” (156). Deleuze argues Hegel deals in “mere appearances” and his “universal and singular, changeless and particular, infinite and finite [are] nothing but symptoms.” The Hegelian dialectic proceeds, he argues, by the development of opposition into a contradiction which in turn leads to a solution of the contradiction, whilst nevertheless remaining in the domain of symptoms and never
aware “of the real element from which forces, their qualities and their relations derive” (157). For Deleuze, the problem is one of difference in kind rather than simply a difference in appearance. The oppositional mode of dialectical thought, he argues is “the law of the relation between abstract products” and merely the appearance of difference and not difference in itself. The dialectical moment thus, marks an apparent opposition and shift that is ultimately no different at all in that it marks only the shift from one form of nihilism to another: “Transcendence remains transcendent at the heart of the immanent” (161). It is, then, from this position of a continual state of nihilism where change is reduced to the shifting of appearances (differences in degree) and prevented from the becoming of real difference (difference in kind).

Even the differences in kind between scientific, evolutionary explanations for the becoming of life and the religious, transcendental creationist explanations, can appear to be reconciled within the state refrain. This conflation and appropriation of difference in kind is related, I suggest, to the shift from one form of nihilism to the other. Negative nihilism simply accepts the will of a higher power and the religious state functions to mediate this will into its laws and systems of control. When evolutionary discoveries de-territorialise the presumed essence of moral agency imbued in this higher power, reactive nihilism recaptures it under the simulacra or appearance of ‘man’ as the agency of moral being, and the state continues to function in the same way; the difference is reduced to a difference in degree. If we consider this as marking a shift from the religious to the secular state, or from the pre-modern to the modern, then in the post-modern landscape, in which the state faces a new crisis in its ability to maintain the faith of the people, the third passive nihilism comes into play as the failure of the secular state produces a passive, even nostalgic, acceptance and retrerritorialisation of older forms of transcendent belief. Science and human endeavour still retain a power of creation, and the state still mediates, directs and controls the development and use of its technological inventions. This state, whether directly espousing a religious doctrine or indirectly espousing the same nihilism through political doctrine, performs its mediations through the discourse of morality. Within the infrastructure of the state, legal and social sanctions are defined and considered within the broad context of ethical debate, and as with new technologies (reproductive technology, for example), the state establishes
ethics committees to influence and decide the legality of new technologies. The problem, however, is that in practice these committees rarely base the issues on a level of ethics, because they remain within a nihilism defining them as moral dilemmas. In the history of traditional/state philosophy, ethics and morals are conflated and once again, a real difference in nature is erased in apparent synthesis.

For his part, Deleuze reads Spinoza’s thesis of “parallelism” to draw this differentiation:

> The practical significance of parallelism is manifested in the reversal of the traditional principle on which Morality was founded as an enterprise of domination of the passions by consciousness. (Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 18)

According to Spinoza’s “Ethics, on the contrary, what is an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body as well.” So too, the passions of the body are “necessarily…in the mind” (18). We can see then, how the ‘Moral’ and the idea of morality is a transcendent and therefore nihilistic model of judgement, whereas the ethical is a principle of embodied action. We might reconsider the problem raised throughout the thesis, from the over-coded reactions of Batman’s others through the protests of the women’s movement, the politics of land rights, the desires of welfare recipients and refugees, and the discourses of contemporary science practice, as enunciations of a difference in kind, desiring inclusion of their plurality within society. In each case, the state machine subjects these differences to degrees of opposition within its binary refrain and to a code of moral judgement, defined by minority power brokers, but justified by a striated hierarchy, whether that be founded on the nihilism of a transcendent god or the simulacra of transcendent ‘man.’ From an ethical point of view, these issues are already part of the multiple desires of the social landscape: it is through state-thinking that differences become subjected to a morality that institutes an exclusive and discriminating state. In Deleuze and Guattari’s arguments, it is through the politics of a molecular revolution and its production of a new kind of thinking that this status quo of dialectical nihilism can be challenged. But the suggestion is not one that is purely anarchical without a need for ethics, rather its anarchy is opposed to transcendent morals that over-code and dehumanise the multiplicity of social embodiment. Becoming is the methodology, as differentiated to a model, of the molecular revolution; and the Body without Organs is the landscape of its nomadic thinking, as differentiated to the
striated organisation of afterthought. To interrogate these differences in kind within the limits of science as example, following from chapter five, I would now like to consider becoming-animal as a multiplicity that de-territorialises the state striation of evolutionary knowledge through what Deleuze and Guattari term involution.

**Becoming-Animal: Involution versus Evolution:**

Deleuze and Guattari define becoming-animal as a becoming that “always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short a multiplicity.” If for Deleuze and Guattari ‘becoming-woman’ is the first movement in overcoming the face of individualised subjectivity, then it is their concept of ‘becoming-animal’ that marks the collective movement of an overcoming the face of the state. As seen in chapter five, working within the limited example of science, we might consider how the shifts in conceptions of evolution mark a certain becoming-animal. For their part, Deleuze and Guattari, use the term ‘involution’ as a means to signify this difference, whereas scientific discourse itself retains the term evolution. Involution, they argue is the form of evolution that marks a becoming and “becoming is a rhizome, not a classificatory or genealogical tree . . . [it] is certainly not imitating, or identifying.” The differentiation between involution and evolution, correspondingly links to a difference between “descent . . . filiation” and “alliance” (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 238 – 239). The evolutionary model critiqued defines itself on the basis of genealogical descent through filiation, and interprets natural selection and the development of the species within enlightenment ideals that transcend an image of progression in reflection with a concept of ideal human embodiment. The very naturalisation of this genetic filiation is confronted, however, by new reproductive technologies beginning with artificial insemination and developing into a range of different reproductive therapies, which currently border the availability of certain genetic selection techniques.

These technologies are not themselves the whole of involution, but mark what Deleuze and Guattari call the “anomalous position” that borders the becoming-animal of science in the field of creative involution, on the one hand, and the state science of pre-coded evolutionary linearity, on the other. Their existence relates to a contemporary shift in knowledge born of the involution of evolutionary theory and evolutionary biology.
Where these theories retain discourses of filiation and descent, in their use within modernist discourses of the state remains identified with an ideology of progress. In contemporary fields of evolutionary biology, such as Mayr’s position for example, Darwinian theories are expounded as the key marker of this shift in knowledge, as outlined in chapter five. What is often not acknowledged in these discourses, however, is that despite this revolutionary influence, the language and social prejudices of Darwin himself (the state-thinking of the day) was as imbued with misconceived and ideologically inflected speculations about the meaning of his own discovery as many of those discourses that science now dismisses as social Darwinism. An example of this is clearly enunciated in the Encyclopaedia Britannica’s overview of his work, which speculates on how Darwin’s writings assume that males are superior and more evolutionary advanced than females, and concludes that, “His attitude toward women coloured his scientific insights” (Kevles). At this point I would like to refer again to Deleuze’s critique of ‘interpretation’ as quoted in the introduction (18). For Mayr and the contemporary views of ‘evolution’ he expounds, Darwin’s discovery should not be fixed to Darwin’s own interpretation and the implications of linearity it implies (as a prescription). Rather, in these discourses, evolution is understood and read within a different milieu of socially and scientifically known multiplicities or variables. Evolutionary knowledge has thus, in Deleuze and Guattarian terms been involuted within and as a nomadic science: Its Body without Organs has been re-constructed. This involution takes place within the involved context of non-linear philosophies and counter-inductive experimentation. State-thinking retains the habit of its blinded mask, however, whether as rejection or appropriation of linear molarities of filiation and descent, because these simplistic diagrams provide it with a justification of its fascistic desire to control and perfect humanity according to an image of its own making.

Deleuze and Guattari suggest through their figurative metonymies that a becoming-animal of the human is figured by the werewolf or, as mentioned earlier, the vampire, which is metonymic to nomadic thinking itself in that it contains no image. “Werewolves are bands, and vampires too, and . . . bands transform themselves into one another.” The metonymy here with the figures of the werewolf and the vampire is, therefore, the relationship to transformation and contagion:
We oppose epidemic to filiation, contagion to heredity, peopling by contagion to sexual reproduction, sexual production. Bands, human or animal, proliferate by contagion, epidemics, battlefields and catastrophes. (241)

The vampire, they suggest, “does not filiate, it infects” (242). The contagion of the pack is Deleuze and Guattari’s first principle of becoming-animal; the second is that of the “leader of the pack” or the “anomalous” (243). Defined as “the cutting edge of deterritorialisation . . . the anomalous is a position or set of positions in relation to a multiplicity” (244). It “is neither an individual nor a species…[but] a phenomenon of bordering” (245). And in this sense that the emergence of new reproductive technologies mark an anomalous position between the border of becoming-animal in nomadic science and the state science that nevertheless over-codes by de- and re-territorialising their functions to the familial model through a micro-politics of moral judgement.

The institutionalisation of technologies such as IVF and the so-called ethical concerns that surround them, show how the two heads of state influence and control who can and cannot access such technologies. On the one hand, the private capitalist machine, which has no social prejudice of its own, appropriates it as a commodified service industry marketed for the profit of commercial interests. On the other hand, the legislative machine defines the conditions identifying subjects whom are deemed deserving of its availability. Through this binary mix, the nomadic possibilities become de- and re-territorialised within the codes of public health issues, and IVF is naturalised as a sellable cure for infertile couples and genetic disorders. The dominant subject and state-thinking definition of evolutionary processes within social codes of genealogical filiation (even if not directly biological) are maintained through the institution of a model of evolutionary linearity and economic privilege.

The becoming-animal of science and its involutionary nomadology is what Deleuze and Guattari suggest undermines the pack:

by extremely varied forces that establish in them interior centers of the conjugal, familial, or state type, and that make them pass into an entirely
different form of sociability, replacing pack affects with family feelings or state intelligibilities. The center, or internal black holes, assumes the principal role. This is what evolutionism sees as progress. (246)

If the state were truly ethical, there would be no need for such complex ‘committee’ procedures or legal limitations. Rather, it would work its jurisprudence on the simple principle of whether or not such technology is a positive or negative affirmation of human extension.

The Botched Body without Organs: Becoming without the Body:

Through the opinions formulated in the habits of this organised and organising body of molar thought and state being, the construction of a Body without Organs can provide a means of molecular becoming and lines of escape. This process, however, is one of experimentation containing certain dangers: “in dismantling the organism there are times one courts death, in slipping away from signifiance and subjection one courts falsehood, illusion and hallucination and psychic death” (160). On the Body without Organs all forms of becoming come to pass as sensations contemplated: becoming-woman; becoming-animal; becoming-imperceptible etc. “What comes to pass on the BwO is not exactly the same as how you make yourself one. However, one is included in the other” (A Thousand Plateaus, 152). This is important for understanding how you can botch the Body without Organs and, rather than construct new becomings, find yourself brought back to the domain of opinion and all the micro-fascist becomings that oppose the molecular revolution.

If we consider the representations of science used by the state as sensations of fear against the function of science, I suggest these imaginings are based not on positive becomings, cut off or limited to dominant appropriations, but based on becomings that botch the Body without Organs. The botched Body without Organs is the badly constructed or wrongly contemplated sensation. Deleuze and Guattari suggest several examples of botched Body without Organs: the masochist who causes only intensities of pain to pass; the schizophrenic who causes only catatonia; the drug addict, the paranoiac and the hypochondriac, and worst of all the “cancerous BwO of the fascist” (163). At this point we might consider Deleuze and Guattari’s suggestion that “Spinoza’s Ethics
[is] the great book of the BwO” (153) and this brings us back to the body and to the ethical necessity of an inseparable relationship between thought and the body. Therefore, I suggest, any becoming attempted without having first passed through becoming-woman causes the Body without Organs to be botched. As examples: the masochist situates the body in the sadistic body; the drug addict in the drug; the schizophrenic in the delusion, the paranoiac and the hypochondriac in the fear and the fascist in the desire to control. Their desires are all unethical; they know nothing of the multiplicity of life; the joy and the love of life; they remain negated in the nihilistic habit and seek to escape the organs of the state only to find themselves pulled right back by failing to dissolve this negative tie. Rather than moving from an evolutionary code to an involutionary involvement, the botched Body without Organs becomes the devolutionary process; passing the rights of the body onto the object of the drug/delusion/fear/money and falling into the passive nihilism without affection.

If we return to the film Alien Resurrection discussed in chapter five, we can see that the desire that motivates the experiment with cloning is one that is disembodied. The scientific knowledge functioning in the film is disconnected from the involutionary comprehension within the scientific paradigm in which it was created. The scientists are like hired monkeys, having made no embodied connection to the affective productions of their experimentations; no connection with the whole of the Body without Organs. They are represented as being amoral, but it is not their lack of morality that counts, it is their lack of connection to the ethical body. The embodiment of scientific functions botches their functioning within a social landscape. They remain, as do their employers/commanders, subject to the transcendent codes of economic and symbolic greed. So too, teachers and psychologists botch the Body without Organs when they employ techniques based on transcendent principals of subjectivity and not in relation to the actual children they teach. This botching is the effect of the implementation of Biddulph-style pop-psychology, based on political propaganda that narrates behavioural problems, not on the basis of actual behaviour, but on a prescribed assumption and linear model of social evolution that diagrammatically determines the perceived onset of problems based on the degree of ‘absence’ and/or social codification of a biological father. Further, it presumes to prevent the non-manifest problem from occurring by
attempting to fill this perceived lack through behavioural engineering techniques, which become the actual source of problems that did not necessarily exist in the first place. This state-thinking and the kinds of behaviour-based educational methodology is not new, however, and nor is it specific to the example I have elaborated in chapter five. R.D Laing, in The Politics of Experience, published in 1967, critiques the rise in popularity of behavioural centred psychology and its effects as follows:

A child born today in the U.K. stands a ten times greater chance of being admitted to a mental hospital than to a university, and about one fifth of mental hospital admissions are diagnosed schizophrenic. This can be taken as an indication that we are driving our children mad more effectively than we are genuinely educating them. Perhaps it is our very way of educating them that is driving them mad. (87)

This is another way of saying that this kind of educational technique is botching the Body with Organs, which is to say the thinking of our children.

We might summarise, then, that the state makes science a function of a philosophy of nihilism and negation by forcing desire into a moral model constructed through botched becomings. If we accept in the construction of the Body without Organs that sensation must first pass through a becoming-woman and link to the ethics of embodiment, how then do we overcome the incessant nihilism of the state? While ethics is the first means by which we ensure the becoming does not botch the making of a Body without Organs, and becoming-animal marks the emergence of a multiplicity of involutionary thought opposing the moral codes, this does not yet prevent the state from over-coding and enforcing limits. In effect, we are returned to the articulation of a war-machine in which positive involution is prevented or restricted in its ability to enable the freedom of the people by the nihilism of the state model. In Chapter Four, I noted Deleuze and Guattari as saying the state always wins out over the war-machine, but that it nevertheless mutates at its moment of capture into new forms of creation that oppose the state form. The danger, of course, remains the dialectical thinking that makes the appropriation of this outside into the inside a matter of synthesis through new forms of nihilism, and therefore another repetition of the same. We might now suggest, through the very possibilities of new thinking about the Body without Organs, which cannot be forced
into submission, that these revolutionary becomings can enter into a becoming molecular. The refusal of the organism has often been forced into acceptance of the state; but perhaps it then constructs itself on the Body without Organs and begins afresh the battle against the state by de-territorialising habits of thought that naturalise and habituate our acceptance of state authoritarianism. This process, a battle against nihilism, can be considered in terms of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s “sense of affirmation” through the dual concepts of the overman and transmutation.

Constructing the Overman and the Becoming-Imperceptible of Transmutation:
Deleuze and Guattari suggest at the end of *What is Philosophy?* that the three planes and their respective disciplines have nonlocalised ‘interferences’ not with each other, but “in relation with a negative” at the point of comprehension “found where the plane confronts chaos. *Philosophy needs a nonphilosophy that comprehends it; it needs nonphilosophical comprehension just as art needs nonart and science needs nonscience.*” This, they suggest is a pedagogy that is only possible so far as each discipline has:

an essential relationship with the No that concerns it . . . [but] they do not need the No as beginning, or as the end in which they would be called upon to disappear by being realized, but at every moment of their becoming or their development. . . It is here that concepts, sensations, and functions become undecidable, at the same time as philosophy, art and science become indiscernible, as if they shared the same shadow that extends itself across their different nature and constantly accompanies them” (217 – 218)

The state inserts its No at the beginning, transforming philosophical concepts into ideologies; functional knowledge into administrative technologies, and artistic sensation into fear of difference. In place of pedagogy, it has systems of education through which this nihilistic No erases (or attempts to erase) all personal bonds of love and experience, replacing them with the content of pre-coded behaviour and subject-identity.

The methodology for inserting the No that does not begin nor end, but constructs the moment of becoming itself within the indiscernible relationship between the three planes
on the Body without Organs is, at least in one possible formation, that which Deleuze, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, suggests by drawing a figurative metonymy from Nietzsche’s writing. If becoming-woman is related to anti-dialects, forming the reversal of Plato’s transcendent nihilism and becoming-animal the multiplicity of becoming, then it is in the becoming-imperceptible that inserts the No in relation to the state identity-machine. In Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, the formulation of this anti-dialectical movement is figured in Nietzsche’s concept of “affirmation,” which “includes two negations.” This double negation, which is nevertheless the formulation of an affirmative politics set against the dialectics of nihilism, is metonymically figured in the concepts of Dionysus, the overman, and Ariadne, the transmutation.

In the first negation, I read Dionysus as the metonymy of becoming-woman and the negation of man’s transcendent identity. “The Dionysian yes . . . knows how to say no: it is pure affirmation” (185). In the context of this reading, Dionysus is the conceptual negation of transcendent embodiment and the affirmation of becoming embodied. In the tale, he is countered to Theseus (Batman), the hero who lacks “the sense of the earth” (187). This is the figuration, therefore, of the movement towards the ethical body of becoming and the negation of transcendent morality and heroic identity of both negative and reactive nihilism. Dionysus is the reversed Platonism of becoming in the becoming-woman, which is becoming as “primary affirmation” (186):

*To affirm is not to take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but to release, to set free what lives.* To affirm is to unburden: not to load life with the weight of higher values, but to create new values which are those of life, which make life light and active. There is creation . . . insofar as we make use of excess in order to invent new forms of life rather than separating life from what it can do. (185)

This primary affirmation, however, “demands another affirmation which takes it as its object” (187). This is the second affirmation, which is correspondingly the second negation figured through Ariadne.

In the second negation, Ariadne is the metonymy of an affirmation that affirms the ‘being’ of the becoming and thereby negates the capture of nomadic thinking within
codes of transcendence. Ariadne is the figure of transmutation, which negates the appropriation of the primary becoming within a hierarchical structure, and transforms that negation into a negation of transcendent being itself, thereby affirming the being of becoming. In the tale, Ariadne begins in love with Theseus, the hero; the “higher man . . . who takes up burdens and defeats monsters” but:

as long as woman loves [this higher] man, as long as she is mother, sister, wife of man . . . she is only the feminine image of man: the feminine power remains fettered in man. (187)

To negate by becoming reactive whilst remaining in this role only “represents the spirit of revenge.” Ariadne, however, shifts, retaining her affirmation of being but transmuting its negation from the negation of herself and woman to the negating of the higher man and an affirmation of Dionysus, the becoming-woman. Affirmation, as this double-negation is “affirmation as object of affirmation” and “this is being” in the sense that it is “the being of becoming . . . In itself and as primary affirmation, it is becoming [Dionysus]. But it is being insofar as it is the object of another affirmation [Ariadne] which raises becoming to being” (186- 187). Transcendent being, therefore, no longer has an affirmation; the love of higher power has transmuted into the affirmation and love of being as becoming. That is to say, the love of nihilism and the habit of the Hegelian dialectical, transforming and recapturing difference back into the same rejection of life, is transmuted into the love of life itself; the becoming of life.

The reign of the negative is the reign of powerful beasts, Churches and states, which fetter us to their own ends. The murderer of God committed a sad crime because his motivation was sad: he wanted to take God’s place . . . he remained in the negative . . . The death of God needs time finally to find its essence and become a joyful event . . . This time is the cycle of the eternal return. (190)

Together, the figurative marriage of Dionysus and Ariadne, is one that figures the eternal return of the Body without Organs as an affirmation of life and joy and the creative power of life’s involutorial becoming. And through this union of the double negation of affirmation Nietzsche senses the bringing forth of the overman. The desire then, of this will to power, is of an altogether different nature to the will of the state that wills control through its binary-machine of divide and conquer: It is the will to power of life
itself – the difference in kind that is eternally becoming-imperceptible to the identity and the over-coding of the will towards transcendence.

To bring this back to the Body without Organs and its relationship to the brain, we can see that what differs between state and nomad thinking is not the shift from one icon to the next, but a different formation of desire itself. State-thinking divides difference into forms of axiomatic oppositions and insists on an either/or; unifying one against the other. Nomad thinking understands life as difference and a play of multiplicity and chance. Further, the reading of the figurative as metonymy rather than metaphor allows for this creative principle of involution to take place. We can see that Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche is involutionary in the sense that it de-territorialises the habits of a state over-coding. In state-thinking, Nietzsche’s overman has become habitually translated as the superman and his will to power as the power of the state; his philosophy has been captured by the very fascism that Deleuze’s reading sets it against. In the context of this thesis, this botched becoming of the overman is appropriated for the being of the transcendental state. Deleuze’s reading reinstalls Nietzsche on the Body without Organs, and involves a nomadic thinking that returns the eternal return of the being of becoming: the power of a creative will.

For Deleuze and Guattari, the molecular revolution constructs a thinking that therefore reverses the habit of dialectical nihilism and moves beyond its transcendent dictates. They do this from within their own philosophical paradigm by examining and critiquing the bases and background that has formulated state-thinking, revealing the ambivalence beneath its surety and the power-function that this methodological lie provides in the management and control of the multiple desires of the populace. Becoming, as the being of the molecular revolution, is for Deleuze and Guattari the means by which thinking wards off the state-refrain, and thus changes the habituated orders that the state imposes upon the entire assemblage of the body. But it is not an evolution; it will not happen on its own. Rather it is an involution, requiring the involvement of an ethics of the body actively negating the nihilism of state dialectics. The molecular revolution, which counters this repetition of the same, involutes its metaphors into an ethical, materialist embodiment of a becoming-imperceptible to its nihilistic judgements.
Pragmatically speaking, becoming teaches us to affirm and desire our own situated knowledge. The molecular revolution says ‘no’ to being subject to the identification of a situation effectively titled by diagrams of moral power to say ‘yes’ to becoming situated as a subjectivity affectionately known through the ethical desires of a proper-name: signing a singularity differentiated within the whole, one and all, of life’s difference. The molecular revolution says ‘no’ to being ‘the’ Man or Woman and/or Mother or Father and/or Child or Adult and/or Son or Daughter and/or Wife or Husband and/or Individual or Group and/or any other axiom of binary power over-coding life through representational order to says ‘yes’ to ‘a’ becoming situated, embodied as children and adults and parents and friends and lovers and neighbours and humans and . . . and . . . and . . . constantly creating/changing/constructing/involving the event(s) of life, imperceptible to the codes that immanently transcend the pluralities of us.


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