People, Place and Power:
Australia and the Asia Pacific

Edited by
Dawn Bennett, Jaya Earnest and Miyume Tanji
STUDIES IN AUSTRALIA, ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

This series draws primarily on the research of scholars working with the Centre for Advanced Studies in Australia, Asia and the Pacific at Curtin University of Technology. Books in the series include a range of historical and contemporary topics and issues relating to social-cultural, economic, political and environmental change in Australia, Asia and the Southwest Pacific, as well as relations within and between the countries of the region. Graham Seal is General Editor of the series.

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Abstract

Recognising that there are times of radical breakthrough and change within all societies, this book uses the concepts of people, place and power to probe the depths of such transformation. The chapters in the book argue that it is no longer sufficient to study factors associated with the success or failure of transformation, reform, innovation or policy. It is no longer acceptable to separate planned change from seemingly spontaneous transformations. It is only by raising our consciousness and seeking insights into the totality of the change process that we can begin to understand and contextualise change (Fullan, 1998).

Starting with an introduction to the research themes and foci of the Centre for Advanced Studies in Australia, Asia and Pacific (CASAAP) at Curtin University of Technology, this first chapter provides the context for the book and discusses the place of academic research, dialogue and theory building relating to Australia, Asia and the Pacific. We then introduce the chapters, which represent the interdisciplinary work of Centre members and associates within the key research themes of cultural identities, regional transformations, and international and inter-regional relations. Our chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of the CASAAP group in facilitating and encouraging interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and collaborative research within the evolving Australian research paradigm.

Introduction

The Centre for Advanced Studies in Australia, Asia and Pacific (CASAAP) was established in 2006 as a key Humanities research centre. Members are drawn from many disciplines and intellectual orientations within the Humanities. As such, the Centre’s values and research practices stem from the broad research traditions of the Humanities and the Social Sciences, valuing collegiality, critical analysis, intellectual engagement and the communication of knowledge throughout the academy and beyond. Members collaborate on research within three main themes:

- Social-cultural, economic, political and environmental change in Australia, Asia and the Pacific;
• Asian, Southwest Pacific and related ethnic communities within Australia and the region; and
• Changing relations between Australia, Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

In pursuing the three themes, an important aim of the Centre is to foster closer links between Australia, Asia and the Pacific through relevant research and activities. This is achieved through an ongoing seminar series, of which this book is one outcome, as well as through a sustained series of publications and national and international research projects. The cross-disciplinary framework of the Centre facilitates a range of specialist activities, multidisciplinary research and academic expertises with a focus on the three major research foci of cultural identities, regional transformations, and international and inter-regional relations. Members of the Centre are mostly involved in two, sometimes three of these foci, providing for cross-disciplinary research with both academic and applied outcomes. This volume is organised around the three research foci.

**Theme one: Cultural identities**

*Cultural identity is not just about being, but becoming.* (Hall, 1990, p. 223)

The Centre’s focus on cultural identities reflects interest in investigating the historical and contemporary bases and consequences of identity formation in relation to, inter alia, ethnicity, gender, nation and class. It involves consideration of representation, equity and mythologisation, and utilises a range of theoretical approaches drawing on archival and documentary sources, applied fieldwork and development projects. Current research includes work on creative industries, travel and literary tourism, labour history, sustainable community development, regional security relations, citizenship, ethnicity and race, and children’s traditions.

The first two papers have a common interest in the Australian national identity. In 1915, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) set out to capture Constantinople. Landing at Gallipoli on April 25 in what was expected to be a relatively quick operation, the campaign lasted for eight months and cost the lives of more than 8,000 ANZAC soldiers. Although April 25 was officially named Anzac Day the following year, the events at Gallipoli became an important part of Australian national identity. As a result, the meaning of the day has, over time, been broadened to commemorate Australians killed in all military operations.
Writing on the community significance of war memorials and commemoration in Western Australia, John Stephens takes us on a journey of commemorative places, practices and meanings. Stephens argues that despite recent transformations in the physical form of memorials and the mythology surrounding Anzac and its meanings, the commemorative spaces are still underpinned by traditional commemorative meanings and symbolism. Next, Graham Seal takes as his focus a Western Australian suburban memorial erected in 1915 and known as Anzac Cottage. The history of the Cottage becomes a case study for examination of the mythology of Anzac, of which the Cottage is one of the first tangible objects. Seal extends the discussion of the memorial’s history and folklore to the dominant discourse of Australian national identity and describes the use of archival and fieldwork techniques as a method for studying and interpreting the community, state and national significance of such semiophores.

Dawn Bennett places the concept of ‘culture’ within the context of the arts and culture with a light-hearted look at the changing labour market through the eyes of a virtual musician, highlighting particular challenges for educators and governments as a result of the reduction in full-time, permanent positions and the associated rise of contractual and casual employment. Bennett posits that creative practitioners are a valuable source of much-needed skills such as those in teamwork, adaptability, resilience and creative thinking. A little creative thinking on the part of employers, she argues, would both facilitate flexible employment options for creative practitioners and ease the current shortage of skilled labour.

The final paper within the cultural identities theme focuses on Japan, which has a history of intense nationalism within which two of the major themes have been loyalty to the State and ethnic nationalisation focused on the shared history and culture of the Japanese people. In their paper, Simon Bytheway and Michael Schiltz explore these issues from the perspective of Japanese financial policy within the context of the country’s political economy, pursuit of Empire, and East Asian imperialism.

The desire to retain national identity whilst adapting to and seeking to benefit from the changing world is an almost universal goal: hence the question of cultural identities is related to current and future possibilities for regional transformation in Australia, Asia and the Pacific. It is to this theme that we turn next.

Theme two: Regional transformations

In many parts of the world, the past two decades have been a time of rapid and, quite often, radical political, socio-cultural and economic change. Common issues in all regions include
the impacts of climatic and environmental change, responses to man-made and natural disasters, balancing of local and political needs, and the need to produce a generation of young educated minds who can both resolve and respond to issues within their country and provide leadership at the global level (Mutua & Sunal, 2004). As well as on-the-ground initiatives in many locations, CASAAP members are actively involved in producing publications and other research outputs that aim to influence official policy, industry activity and community attitudes. Centre members are currently engaged in transformation projects in Papua New Guinea, East Timor, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Okinawa, Guam, and the Philippines.

In his paper, Ian Chalmers traces the transformation of the border between ethnic and religious affiliation, comparing the historical relationship between Islam and ethnicity in three provinces: West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan. Using a socio-historical approach, Chalmers finds that this border has become less transparent and describes how increasing numbers of Dayaks identify as Muslim. He also notes that religion is generally a key component of ethnic identity in Southeast Asia. The chapter concludes that this recasting of the borders between Dayak and Malay identities is injecting a greater degree of flexibility into the definition of what it means to be Muslim in Borneo.

In the next chapter, Sekhar Bandyopadhyay looks critically at the recent historiography of nationalism in India and seeks to demonstrate that in Asian post-colonial nations like India, where community structures and historical trajectories have been significantly different from those of Europe, there can be alternative ways of conceptualizing nation, disentangled from the history of the nation-state. In such models of nationhood, homogeneity is not imposed from above, pluralism is celebrated, and a nation is allowed to speak in many voices, as those voices do not necessarily challenge the sovereignty of the state.

In her chapter, Miyume Tanji critically evaluates the experience of Yomitan village, which is commonly depicted as a successful case of economic and community development combined with a reduction of US military presence. The chapter argues that this representation of Yomitan omits a crucial ingredient: namely the traumatic trajectory of war and US occupation specific to Yomitan. The village historiography inspires ongoing political opposition to economic development supported by militarism, which involves destruction of the environment and traditional community life.

The final chapter in the section on regional transformations, by Jaya Earnest and Pat Faulkner, draws on a framework of vulnerability and resilience from the perspective of
humanitarian and social change. The chapter reports findings from a study undertaken in Timor-Leste in 2008 that examined the resilience of internally displaced communities to respond to the events following the political conflict of 2006. The research findings documented that communities had concerns regarding future stability in the country, governance issues, the lack of demonstrable progress in health, education and infrastructure, and future employment opportunities especially for the youth. A key research finding identified by communities and participants themselves was the need for sustained and prolonged peace and responsible governance to ensure progress and development.

Fundamental to regional transformations and concerns are global interregional relationships and the final theme in this book addresses the fluidity and complexity of international relations.

**Theme three: International relations**

Global international relations are manifested through issues including regional security, terrorism, sustainability, refugees, immigration, social and political movements, and the challenges of global environmental change. Through their work in areas including human rights, government policy, regional development, housing, and nuclear proliferation, CASAAP researchers aspire to making positive contributions to interregional governmental, industry and community understandings. The final four chapters in this volume are an eclectic mix that illustrates the multiple trajectories of international relations. The first two chapters deal with the human dimension of asylum seekers and refugees. The third chapter deals with a complex social and political period in Chile with significant human implications. The final chapter examines the political and defence relationship between Indonesia and Russia. Thus on their own, each chapter examines the notion of international relations from Australian, regional and international perspectives.

In the first chapter under this theme, **Linda Briskman** and **Lucy Fiske** explore the ongoing cultural, economic and ideological impact of the British Empire in Australia. Using as a case study Australia’s history of immigration and its more recent response to asylum seekers under the former government of Prime Minister John Howard, the authors contend that the “end of empire” has not yet come; rather, “empire thinking” is thriving, and heavily influences global refugee movements and international politics. Empire, the authors argue, has been divorced from the overt evidence of its existence, enabling racism and capitalism to
be redeployed in a postmodern guise to continue the economic, cultural and political domination of people.

Continuing the theme of refugees and asylum seekers, the next chapter by **Linda Briskman** explores the role of academic and professional groups in speaking out against injustices and human rights violations that flow from existing mandatory detention policies. Two interrelated case studies are provided: The People’s Inquiry into Detention and Caring for Asylum Seekers in Australia and Bioethics and Human Rights, which present an overview of the treatment of asylum seekers in their rights-seeking pursuits. The authors then discuss the convergence of ethical responsibility and moral courage to restore transparent processes at a time when civil liberties and human rights are increasingly eroded.

The next chapter, by **Antonio Traverso**, details the history of Chilean documentary films and their engagement with social and political reality. Traverso describes the changing approaches of Chilean documentary filmmakers as they responded to the extraordinary political events that stirred the social life of the country in the early 1970s and 1980s. The author explains the basic concepts that motivate the ongoing discussion of cinematic texts in the field of studies of trauma culture, and provides a detailed analysis of Giachino’s *Reinalda del Carmen*.

The final chapter in this volume, written by **Alexey Muraviev** and **Colin Brown**, examines the evolution of the Russia-Indonesia relationship, setting it against the background of the history of defence and broader political relations since 1945. The past decade has seen a significant increase in defence cooperation between Russia and Indonesia, to the extent that Russia has become a major supplier of sophisticated weapons systems to Indonesia. To date, though, this cooperation has received little scholarly attention. The chapter concludes that in its current state this is a relationship of mutual convenience, rather than of strategic alliance. It is, nonetheless, one that could have a significant impact on the strategic environment of Southeast Asia and nearby regions.

**The way forward**

The cooperative research environment of the CASAAP group encompasses development funding, mentoring, research training and workshops. The annual seminar series commenced in 2007 with the aim of showcasing the research of members and visiting scholars on processes of transformation and change, the latter encompassing political, social, cultural and environmental considerations. In addition to bringing together a diverse range of scholars,
these broader exchanges have drawn out the theoretical and practical implications of research in Australia, Asia and the Pacific region. For Australian scholars, one of the most fundamental changes of recent times is the introduction of a new research framework, announced in February 2008 by the then new Australian federal Labor Government and being fully implemented in 2010. The significance of the new framework merits some discussion.

Excellence for Research in Australia (ERA) aims to “identify and promote excellence across the full spectrum of research activity, including discovery and applied research, in Australia’s higher education institutions” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 6). To achieve this, ERA established an evaluation framework to identify research strengths and development opportunities, identify research excellence, and enable comparisons of Australia’s research both nationally and internationally (Bennett, Blom and Wright, in press). ERA defines research as “the creation of new knowledge and/or the use of existing knowledge in a new and creative way so as to generate new concepts, methodologies and understandings” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 10). The new ERA proposes to be streamlined, employing eight clusters that comprise:

1. Physics, Chemistry and Geosciences;
2. Humanities and Creative Arts;
3. Engineering and Environmental Sciences;
4. Social, Behavioural and Economic Sciences;
5. Mathematics, information and Communication Sciences;
6. Biological Sciences and Biotechnology;
7. Biomedical and Clinical Research; and
8. Public and Allied Health and Health Sciences.

The Australian Research Council (ARC) is the lead agency for the ERA and works in conjunction with the Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research (DIISR) and the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC). ERA will utilise measures of research quality that can be benchmarked internationally; it will recognise the validity of a suite of indicators appropriate to different disciplines; utilise experts in each discipline who have the background to ensure that discipline-specific issues in compiled data are identified and addressed; and build on the enormous body of work done to date by institutions and others such as the learned academies (Carr, 2008).

In February 2009, the Minister announced trials for Cluster One (Physical, Chemical & Earth Science) and Cluster Two (Humanities and Creative Arts) in 2009. As this book goes to print, CASAAP members, researchers and collaborators—along with other Australian
scholars—are assessing their preparedness and the preparedness of their academic institutions to meet the challenges of a new, as yet untested, framework; and, as the ERA framework proposes, to:

- Compare our research efforts against international benchmarks;
- Identify emerging research areas and opportunities;
- Promote collaboration; and
- Facilitate interdisciplinary research (ARC, 2008, p. 6)

**In conclusion**

The interdisciplinary and collaborative contributions to this book demonstrate the possibilities for existing and new research approaches and paradigms to contribute to interregional understanding. An important part of such understanding is to know ourselves and, as such, an appreciation of the Australian experience and orientation is valuable not only within Australia and the Asia-Pacific region but also internationally. Likewise, each country and culture within these regions can benefit from investigating both itself and the complex relationships with others. Investigating the local and the national becomes an essential step towards a greater understanding of other experiences. Bringing such understandings together from a variety of perspectives is, therefore, a crucial contribution to regional and interregional harmony.

We hope that this book will make an important contribution to academics, researchers, scholars, students, practitioners, and global citizens in providing a comprehensive, timely and practice-based source of information on the broad and inter-related research foci of CASAAP. The book endeavours to be a platform for sharing knowledge, theory and research stemming from the authors’ areas of strengths and expertise. If, through reading the chapters of the book, the capacity to learn from and build on experience is enhanced in any small way, we are satisfied that the aim of the book has been achieved.
References


THEME ONE:

CULTURAL IDENTITIES
Changing landscapes of war commemoration in Western Australia

John Stephens

Abstract

This chapter outlines aspects of research by the Remembering the Wars project team into the community meaning of war memorials and commemoration in Western Australia. Since the battles at Gallipoli in 1915, war commemoration has been an integral part of our national identity and psyche. War memorials have provided communities with a focus for their personal memory, grief and loss, as well as a place for ceremony. However, commemorative places and practices transform over time as personal memories fade and meanings shift to cater for the needs of new generations. While individual meaning and connections to memorial sites remain, this has been largely replaced by a more generic significance strongly linked to Anzac, identity and the search for a national story. There has also been a general acceptance of non-traditional and largely abstract war memorials as a focus for revitalized Anzac ceremonies. Through a discussion of the role of Anzac in current commemorative forms and memorial case studies, this chapter explains how this research is illuminating the changing landscape of war commemoration in Western Australia.

Introduction

Reporting in a local newspaper on the 1930 Anzac Day at the Victoria Park War Memorial, columnist “The Lamplighter” (1930) reminisces about the remembrance ceremonies that preceded Anzac Day. He relates that before the Returned Sailors’, Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Imperial League of Australia (RSS&AILA), later to become the Returned and Services League (RSL), was established in Victoria Park, a grieving mother advanced the idea of holding a commemorative service where she could lay a wreath at the memorial to her soldier son buried in France. This idea grew into Wreath Day, which was organised and attended by parents and relatives of dead soldiers and assisted by the district clergy. The local RSS&AILA sub-branch eventually took over the organisation of the ceremony, which was subsequently subsumed into the more nationally focussed Anzac Day service. Lamplighter claims that, to the participants, Wreath Day was a more personal service than Anzac Day and
was better placed to “dull the edge of their sorrow” (1930, n. p). The move from Wreath Day to Anzac Day at the Victoria Park War Memorial marked a shift in commemorative focus from an intensely personal expression of grief to a one that marked a wider national sorrow and entwined collective remembrance and state objectives and ambitions. While this did not necessarily mean that the memorial or the Anzac Day ceremony had lost the capacity for individual remembrance, it did mean that the focus changed from grieving relatives and a service concentrated on their loss, to the soldiers and their experiences.

This story helps illustrate the nature of the project “Remembering the Wars: Community Meaning of Western Australian War Memorials”. Broadly, the project aims to uncover what war memorials mean to communities and how the designs of these places have been shaped by national and community commemorative practices. A particular aspect of the project has been to expose the changing nature of commemoration in communities, especially change and transition in the production of new memorial spaces. Narrative is a strong element of these places because war memorials are both memory landscapes and narratives of commemorative activity. By focussing on case studies of two Western Australian war memorials—Canning War Memorial (1921, moved in 1956) and the Mandurah War Memorial (2005)—this chapter teases out particular aspects of transformation and change in narratives that have occurred both in war commemorative practice and in the design and use of war memorials in Western Australia since the First World War. Specifically these may be manifest in the events that cause memorial relocation or reconstruction, the shifting role of a memorial as an advertisement for citizenship or as a place of reflection, and in debates about traditional versus modern memorial forms.

**Commemoration**

The landing of Australian troops at Gallipoli on April 25, 1915 was quickly seen as a significant moment in the nation’s history. Much has been written about the battles at Gallipoli and the subsequent campaigns in Europe and the Middle East as defining Australian soldiery in terms of bravery, resourcefulness, mateship and self-sacrifice. These characteristics appeared to embody the Australian character and became promoted as national traits.

Soldierly attributes of steadfastness and self-sacrifice were among those promoted to future generations at the ceremonies of Anzac Day held annually on the anniversary of the Gallipoli landing. The keepers of the Anzac traditions, the RSS&AILA, held up these
attributes as a pattern for citizenship. The Anzac Day ceremony was often conducted at a local war memorial, which was the product of community effort to honour the war service of survivors and dead of the district. Traditionally the design of war memorials in Australia have been borrowed from long established funereal and cemetery forms such as the cross, obelisk, urns, gates (to the afterlife) and the broken pillar. Other familiar forms, including arches, walls and statues such as the figure of peace at the Midland Railway Workshops, were also pressed into service. Modernist and abstract forms were generally not used, especially after World War One when most memorials were built, because architectural modernism did not yet have the same expressive power of well-understood traditional forms and symbols (Stamp, 2005). Most memorials were monumental in form; however, memorials also took the form of honour boards erected in local halls, or were utilitarian, such as memorial hospitals. Honour avenues and groves were also constructed using trees to symbolise dead soldiery and the promise of their resurrection.

Another important function of the war memorial was to provide a focus of grief for the relatives of the dead inscribed on the memorial. This had great communal significance for the bereaved because there were no bodies over which to grieve and, as a result, no personal burial rites could be performed. Through private and public ceremony, war memorials offered a community focus for the remembrance of the dead and were instrumental in the personal consolation of survivors (Winter, 1995). Some observers such as Inglis (2005) and Jalland (2006) have questioned the claim that memorials have the power to alleviate personal grief. However, as indicated by the ceremony of Wreath Day, it can be argued that while elite interest groups sometimes dominated local memorialisation and political motivations had much to do with national memorials, local memorials could genuinely offer solace to the bereaved (Scates, 2006; Stephens, 2007).

War memorials are more than sculptural objects in the landscape: they are a specific class of ‘place’ at a complex intersection of citizenship, sacrifice, memory and grief and their meaning shifts from generation to generation. Monumental war memorials exist in settings that can give a physical focus and act as a ground for the rituals and ceremony associated with Anzac and personal consolation. This setting is important for conveying narratives that complement and reinforce the iconography of the memorial and the rituals that it supports.

Shifts in community commemorative practices such as the transition from Wreath Day to Anzac Day at Victoria Park help to mark movements in meaning and emphasis at war memorials and in commemorative practices. As previously discussed, the subsuming of Wreath Day into Anzac Day was an indication of a shift of focus in ceremony from grieving
women and fathers to the soldiers. Originally appreciative of the public and official acknowledgement of their sacrifice, the mourners soon felt ignored in commemoration (Damousi, 1999). A more recent change in commemorative practice in Western Australia has been the shift in focus from individual soldiers to a generic population of “fallen” or those who “served” for “served” This has been stimulated by the gradual fading of direct memory of those involved in both First and Second World Wars and in the re-imagining of war commemoration by new generations. In recent years commemoration in Australia and the western world at large has been on the rise, evidenced by increasing Anzac Day attendances in Australia and abroad, notably at Anzac Cove Gallipoli in Turkey (Scates, 2006).

Historian Jay Winter (2001) points out that we are experiencing a “memory boom” that has fuelled this new interest in war memory, and that many commemorative projects seek to provide a point of stability as a response to globalisation and national security issues. O’Keeffe (2007) reinforced this voice; taking his inspiration from Nora, he argues the importance of rupture as a trigger for change and impetus in collective memory. Rupture, he explains, is the point at which “social stress or fracture ignite desires to collect memories that can be shared” (p. 6). In this context, the First and Second World Wars offer cataclysmic ruptures that triggered an impetus in collective memory and memorialisation. Similarly, the threats offered by our own time are a background for the rise in commemorative interest that is intimately linked to a search for a national identity.

When Inglis started his celebrated survey of war memorials in Australia in 1983, war commemoration was in decline. However, by the time he published Sacred Places: War Memorials in the Australian Landscape, twenty years later, there had been resurgence in commemorative life. Anzac as a purveyor of national ideals and values was revitalised (Inglis, 2005). This has been manifest in Western Australia through increasing attendances at commemorative functions and in a proliferation of new war memorials. Since the “Australia Remembers” campaign in 1995, numerous government grants have also been available for the construction of plaques and the building of new war memorials.

The resurgence of commemoration in Western Australia and increasing numbers at ceremonies has placed pressure upon memorial sites. This pressure often acts as a trigger for the development of new memorial spaces to accommodate larger numbers of people and to improve the performance of ceremonies. Other issues to challenge and transform memorial landscapes have been the question of site ownership and the change in patterns of use. Change can also come from difficulties imposed by inappropriate adjacent development and
community arguments about the nature of memorial locations, appropriate physical form and landscaping.

**Narratives**

The concept of narrative to describe the way that objects and places convey meaning is a feature of a number of disciplines including landscape and architecture (Borden, 1996); as Raivo (2007) points out, a war memorial is an historical landscape that is “both material and meaning” (p. 2). Memorials are landscapes with the physical marks of their history and their related meanings, which help to reinforce and validate collective and personal memory of that place. In this context landscapes are important narrators. As Potteiger and Purinton (1998) write, “it is through narrative that we interpret the processes and events of a place” (p. 6); landscapes convey stories and trigger memory through narrative tropes such as metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche. In these contexts, war memorials and their garden settings narrate stories and meanings about their purpose as a commemorative site. Narratives, no matter how abstract or personal, are critical in the making of places: “it is through narrative that we interpret the processes and events of a place. We come to know a place, because of its stories” (Potteiger & Purinton, 1998, p. 6). But there is often no single correct message, and multiple messages can be mixed or ambiguous.

Within such a terrain there is a mutual relationship between the landscape and its users that ensures a constant exchange of information about the meaning embedded in our experience and understanding of the place. In the context of war memorials, landscapes have the ability to combine time and space so that memory and events can be physically and metaphorically inscribed on the memorial and its setting. It is the combination of the physical memorial, its setting and the cultural practices employed at the place that is important to stories conveyed by the memorial.

Setting is a critical element in the maintenance of commemorative narratives. Douglas (1978) argues that purity and order are the circumstances needed to reinforce moral ritual conditions. This is especially important to spaces such as war memorials in order to instil a sense of sacredness and to support ceremony and ritual. Order is also a key element in narrative and helps to make sense of our experience of space. Disordered spaces are often disorienting and, by inference (in this particular context), not a moral space for ritual. Anzac Day rituals need a moral space that reinforces the messages they convey. The order of Anzac rituals is strengthened and legitimised through the ordering of the spaces that it traverses as
much as through the consensus of the participants to engage in a ceremony. Most memorial spaces designed for ceremony, even if on a very small plot of land, are planned with a clear axis of approach to reinforce this notion of order. The ceremonial approach to a memorial is often a path, in some cases bordered by small trees or plants, forming a sort of sacred way. In Collie, for instance, the path to the memorial obelisk is bordered by camphor laurel, which gives the effect of a *via dolorosa*. In both Anzac and Remembrance Day observances, wreaths are laid at the foot of monuments as an offering to the soldiers whose lives have been lost. The wreath is also a comment on the vulnerability of human existence because the flowers will wither and die. The tropes evoked by vegetation are an important ingredient in many memorial designs.

As Mosse (1990) claims, nature and the idea of the pastoral are a common and evocative method of commemorating the war dead: nature “is constantly used not only to symbolise hope but also to induce tranquillity, to calm anxiety and fear, a function it fulfilled in war cemeteries as well” (p. 129). Further, Mosse argues, commemorative gardens obscure and transfigure war death by representing it as natural and eternal. Emanating from the Park Cemetery Movement in nineteenth-century USA, vegetation was used as an appropriate setting for remembrance and commemoration. Besides providing a traditional place of reflection, gardens are also important in troping the notions of decay and cyclic regeneration (Gough, 2004). These aspects are important to those who grieve for relatives lost in war because they reinforce the notion that life is, like nature, fragile; but that through regeneration there is resurrection. Analogies can also be made between the sacrifice of Christ on the cross and soldiers who sacrificed their lives so that others might live, a point strongly made in early Anzac ceremonies and reflected in current ceremonies (Collette, 1928). In this context, natural settings become a metaphor for the life, death and resurrection of the fallen and support commemorative rituals. This is key for honour avenues and heroes’ groves where each tree can represent a soldier, planted and nurtured by relatives.

Formal ceremonies are an important part of maintaining narratives at a war memorial. Although memory may fade of the soldiers that a memorial was originally intended to honour, memorials may still operate as a physical focus of remembrance further charged by each ceremony. In this sense the memorial place is being continually “reconstructed in the context of the present” (Osborne, 1998, p. 432). Memorials may be experienced as an interactive theatre that, reinforced by the formal arrangement of its elements, is a stage set for commemorative drama connecting material characteristics and commemorative practice.
Canning war memorial

The Canning War Memorial (Figure 1) stands on the corner of Albany Highway and Manning Road in Bentley, having been relocated there in 1956. As a case study, it offers a space to discuss the relocation and meaning of a traditional war memorial and acts as a foil to the Mandurah War Memorial discussed later.

Figure 1: Canning War Memorial

The Canning War Memorial was originally built outside the Canning Town Hall on Albany Highway in 1921. It was initiated by the local branch of the Returned Servicemen’s Association, which approached the Queens Park Road Board in 1919 to suggest the erection of a permanent memorial to the fallen. The Roads Board had actively supported recruiting rallies during the war and had presided over meetings addressed by members of the military (Queens Park Roads Board, n. d.). Consequently the district volunteered 230 men, nearly all of those available, to the war (Queens Park Soldiers Memorial, 1921). At the instigation of the Roads Board, each contingent was given a rousing send off as they were “prepared to give all to keep our homes intact, and our womenfolk and children inviolate” (Marriott, 1916, p. 1). Forty-three men died in active service or afterwards of their wounds.

Fundraising for the memorial was a community affair through the holding of dances, balls and concerts in the Canning Town Hall on Albany Road, now Albany Highway (Minute Book, 1919-1921). These were organised by local women, reinforcing the view that, as in other parts of Australia, it was women who engaged most closely in fundraising for memorials (Inglis, 2005). The Governor, Sir Francis Newdegate, laid the foundation stone in
February 1921 and the memorial was completed soon after this. The memorial took the form of a soldier’s arch constructed of Donnybrook stone and designed by the architect R. B. Downes (Minute Book, 1922-1924). It straddled the path to the Hall so that patrons would pass under the inscription “Lest We Forget” on both sides of the arch. On either side were marble tablets with the names of the fallen of the district.

Later, two machine gun trophies were mounted on the top of the arch. Trophies were captured guns or other war paraphernalia used as militaristic decoration on Australian war memorials. Although a lack of conflict was not uncommon, disagreement over the location and design of a memorial was a frequent feature of memorial projects across Commonwealth countries including Britain, New Zealand and Canada (Inglis, 2005; King, 1998; Maclean and Phillips, 1990; Shipley, 1987). In Western Australia, for instance, the erection of the Wagin War Memorial was dogged by a vitriolic contest over two proposed sites. Opposing war memorial committees sought to claim ultimate authority for the erection of the memorial and its preferred site with the flames of this conflict fanned by the local Argus newspaper. However, there is no record in either the minutes or newspapers of any conflict over the siting of the Canning War Memorial. As McQuilton (2001) indicates in the context of Victorian war memorials, conflict wasn’t always the case and there were instances where agreement was reached amicably.

In her survey of war memorials in Western Australia, Richards (1995) labels this memorial as a “victory” arch. However, this is an unlikely tag because it was unusual for memorials to be triumphal or to glorify war. War memorial committees and designers were usually at pains to cause no offence through overt religious sentiment or the depiction of war and suffering. The usual intent was sober reflection (Jeans, 1988; King, 1998). In its position on the pathway to the Town Hall, the arch functioned as a form of entry or gate. Gates were sometimes employed as memorials to represent the gates through which the fallen had passed into the hereafter (Jeans, 1988). The power of this symbolism is also attested by Luckins (2004) in her study of the gates at Woolloomooloo. These timber gates to the wharf at Woolloomooloo were popularly known as “the gates of memory”. It was through these gates that soldiers had marched on their way to the transport ships in the First World War. This was the last time that many mothers and wives saw their menfolk, and the gates came to be treated as a memorial.

The Canning War Memorial remained in its location outside the Town Hall until after the Second World War, when additions to the hall exacerbated problems in holding Anzac Day services. Minor vandalism was also being experienced (Carden, 1968). At this time, the
Town Hall was being used as a picture theatre and young patrons were rubbing up against the memorial and damaging the names of soldiers during petting sessions at intermission (J. Parker, personal communication, April 8, 2005). In addition to the damage, the local RSL branch considered that this was a disrespectful practice and not an appropriate way to treat a memorial to the fallen. It called for the memorial to be moved. In what appears to have been a significant community based effort, the memorial was disassembled and removed to a new spacious location on the corner of the Albany Highway and Manning Road. In this new setting, it was set well back within a large grassed area and on a diagonal to the road intersection. A small pillar with the names of the fallen from the Second World War was placed behind the arch. An apron of concrete slabs was placed in front with bordering rose gardens and a flagpole at the end of the apron, and the first Anzac service at the new site was held in 1956. Over the years, trees and other garden beds were introduced and the apron was enlarged and replaced with brick paving. The place is now replete with mature plantings of trees, hibiscus bushes and well-tended roses, although located within a commercial landscape of car yards and other business buildings. Shown at Figure 2, Anzac Day ceremonies attract large gatherings where people spill over the boundaries on to the road.

Figure 2: Canning War Memorial, Anzac Day 2005

The arch of the Canning War Memorial is the focal point of a traditionally verdant memorial setting. The formal planning supports ceremony, emphasises order, and reinforces aspects of the morality that Anzac promulgates. In concert with this aspect is the narrative conveyed by the garden setting. As previously mentioned, vegetation has long been associated with commemoration and aspects of death, and certain species have taken particular attributes.
Examples include the cypress (death or melancholy), pine (mortality), weeping willow (grief), and rosemary (memory). In many Western Australian memorial gardens, the pencil pine (*cupressus sempervirens*) replaces the cypress. At the Canning memorial, pencil pines flank the arch. Rosemary, neatly trimmed, grows at the foot of the paved apron near the flagpole. Roses, indicative of peace, flank the approach to the memorial. The rose garden also holds the ashes of a number of ex-servicemen. The environment of the Canning memorial at the crossroads of two busy thoroughfares is exposed and noisy. Although the memorial is beautifully set in its garden surrounds and it advertises its intent very well, quiet reflection in this noisy setting is difficult.

**The Mandurah war memorial**

The recently constructed Mandurah War Memorial (Figure 3) offers a different commemorative landscape to that of the Canning memorial and is chosen as a case study to discuss the conflicts and tensions that can arise during the planning of new memorial spaces in a developing township. However, although this memorial landscape is largely abstract and is not traditional, it provides a narrative that is still strongly anchored in the traditions of Anzac and conventional commemorative metaphors.

![Mandurah war memorial](image)

**Figure 3: Mandurah war memorial, constructed in 2005**

The Mandurah war memorial, designed by Hames Sharley Architects, is on a large grassed field on the western foreshore of the Mandurah estuary on the opposite side of the water to the town site. Composed of long lines of upright white square pillars, the memorial rises out of
the estuary water and reaches seven metres high at the centre of the lines. It then diminishes in height as it marches across the field towards an adjacent canal. The undulating line of pillars represents the rise and crescendo of battle and then survival and loss on its decline and the memorial is oriented towards the rising sun on Anzac Day. A series of platforms in stone cradle a pool from which water flows down to the estuary, representing the tears of survivors. Intersecting this is a long promenade, Anzac Walk, where New Zealand Christmas trees and rosemary bushes are arranged in a tight architectural formation into a garden of memory.

There is no other planting directly adjacent to the memorial so that it sits stark and impressive in its exposed environment. Planning is tightly controlled with the axis of the columns and path forming a space for ceremony. The memorial incorporates specific places for a choir and catafalque guard around a black stylised obelisk. The memorial is dedicated to those who served and died in wars from the Sudan (1885) through to Afghanistan (2001). Individual names of the fallen are inscribed on plaques placed in the garden of memory. The narrative aspects of the memorial are abstract and take meaning and form from an anonymous Australian poem titled “At the Going down of the Sun” (not to be confused with Laurence Binyon’s poem “For the Fallen”), which talks of the service, death and sacrifice of the Australian soldier and of the soldier as an “Everyman”. The poem makes no mention of women’s contributions. Not all in the Mandurah community agreed with this abstraction, some advocating for a more traditional form such as an obelisk, which had established meaning.

The original war memorial in Mandurah was removed from the eastern foreshore of the estuary to make way for roadwork in about 1997 (City of Mandurah, 2005). The RSL was promised a new memorial to which the City Council would provide a financial contribution (Carew-Hopkins, 2001). Meanwhile, an existing rotunda in the parkland of the eastern foreshore near the town was used as a site for Anzac ceremonies, although an interim war memorial in cream block work was built beside the RSL Mandurah headquarters. There was a paved apron in front of the rotunda for ceremonies and a spot for demountable flagpoles. Liking this place, the RSL suggested this as the site of the new memorial in 2001 (R. White, personal communication, May 10, 2007; W. Holding, personal communication, June 8, 2007).

The proposal consisted of a circular promontory into the estuary at Mandjar Bay linked to the shore opposite the rotunda by a causeway. In the centre of the promontory would be the war memorial located close to town life and given visibility without any interference with activities on the foreshore. Restricted access to the memorial via the causeway would also help to prevent vandalism. In January 2001, the City Council agreed that the memorial
site should be on the eastern side of the estuary, where the RSL wanted it, and offered $30,000 towards the cost although they were at pains to avoid naming a specific site. Unluckily, the RSL faced opposition from the Peel Inlet Management Authority (PIMA), which controlled estuary development and refused the application to build the memorial. PIMA stated that it would resist any “piecemeal reclamation” that encroached on the waters of the estuary (Carew-Hopkins, 2001). An appeal to PIMA made in early 2002 was unsuccessful. Adding fuel to RSL frustration and growing public controversy, the Authority declared that it favoured another location near the town.

Meanwhile, a number of city councillors had suggested an alternative site on the western foreshore to avoid parking problems and the closure of traffic in the town area during Anzac ceremonies. The RSL opposed this, believing that the western foreshore location would place the memorial out of sight and render it remote from the life of the town (R. White, personal communication, May 10, 2007; W. Holding, personal communication, June 8, 2007). Controversy raged and the community appeared to be divided on the issue. The RSL conducted a survey to determine public thinking and appeared to confirm extensive support for the RSL’s preferred eastern foreshore site. Letters from the Minister for the Environment also appeared to favour this site (Unmack & Unmack, 2003). A special electors’ meeting in May 2003 recommended to the City Council that the RSL’s site be accepted.

By July, concerned that a war memorial could stymie any future development on the eastern foreshore, the City Council voted, by a narrow majority, to hold a referendum on the issue of the memorial site. The RSL was concerned but confident, from the results of previous surveys, that public opinion backed their proposal (Unmack & Unmack, 2003). However, councillors committed to a western foreshore site were very active in persuading the community otherwise, to the extent of providing transport for infirm voters on polling day. The RSL lost their preferred site by eleven votes (Newman, 2003), and controversy on the memorial’s design and meaning continued well into construction (Shine, 2004; Wayne, 2004). The resultant memorial (Figure 4) is entirely visible from the eastern foreshore and the site allows a much larger memorial than had been originally envisaged at the eastern foreshore site. The RSL is now reconciled to the new memorial and is clearly proud of it. Its location and design comfortably accommodates the growing number of people attending Anzac Day services.
What the RSL had wanted was a memorial close to the activities of the town so that its didactic purpose was highly visible to the residents of Mandurah. As discussed, memorials historically project the ideals of citizenship, sacrifice and embodied memory, which are important aspects reinforced though ritual. However, others in the community were concerned that the memorial would have to compete with other attractions on the eastern foreshore. Some were also concerned that noise and distractions such as traffic and deliberate interruptions from bikers on Anzac Day would be detrimental to ceremony and reflection. Conflict over the siting of war memorials often coalesce around the memorial as a function of the competing values of public acknowledgement and visibility, and an appropriate and moral setting for reflection and ceremony.

In physical terms the Mandurah War Memorial is connected to Anzac’s concepts of sacrifice, remembrance and citizenship through its design and materiality. The concept of sacrifice emerges through the ritual of tribute, usually in the form of flowers and wreaths as an offering to those who have sacrificed their lives. Such an activity demands a dedicated space to ceremonially place wreaths (often upright) in public view. As mentioned previously, it also suggests that a memorial should be designed to be approached in ceremonial fashion, that is, to employ a formal axis to give a focus to the structure to lay offerings. Remembrance and the persistence of memory, as embodied in the words Lest We Forget, are managed through the solidity of the memorial and the symbolism linked to vegetation. The solidity of the memorial indicates its ability to carry the message of Anzac and memory across time, hence the use of hard materials such as rock, concrete and masonry to suggest permanence and eternity.
Temporal attributes are also embodied in the use of vegetation (the eternal regeneration of
nature) and the use of rosemary (symbolic of remembrance). The practice of interring the
ashes of diggers at memorial sites such as the Canning War Memorial strengthens this link to
regeneration and eternity. Aspects of citizenship are not as self evident as the previous values
but are conveyed through the production of the memorial and its life as a ceremonial space.
Memorial production, which includes the processes of initiating and advancing the memorial
idea and its construction, is in effect an act of citizenship as it embodies a common goal and a
common will to remember. The presence of the memorial in the landscape as a significant
object with meanings related to protecting the nation signifies that there are certain
responsibilities accompanying citizenship. The use of the memorial for ceremony, through a
common consensus of those involved to participate, is an act of citizenship. Continued use of
the place as a ceremonial space is not only contingent on a willing population but also a
planned, safe, convenient and moral space to conduct a ceremony. The Mandurah War
Memorial manages these values through its attributes of design, formal planning and
materiality.

The location and setting of the memorial is important for narrating a sliding scale of
stories recounting sacrifice and duty at one end and grief and memory on the other. However,
memorial settings are also contingent on what stories are told and how well they support its
commemorative functions. As previously mentioned, most Western Australian war memorials
have relied on traditional funeral and classical forms. The transition from traditional to
abstract form in Western Australian war memorials is fairly recent. Although there was
resistance to the abstract form of the Mandurah War Memorial, with some complaining that
the design did not symbolise Anzac Day and calling instead for a statue (Mandurah Mail,
2004), RSL members now enthusiastically talk to school groups during the lead up to Anzac
Day to explain the meaning of the Mandurah War Memorial in terms of the Anzac values of
sacrifice and citizenship.

**Conclusion**

The settings and physical forms of the Mandurah and Canning memorials are very different,
although both spring from the same need to convey narratives about their purpose. Although
in different settings—the Canning memorial at a busy traffic intersection and the Mandurah
memorial in largely isolated parkland—both provide a dramaturgical setting for ritual. They
tap into the vegetative tropes of recycling and regeneration that Mosse (1990) claims are a
feature of memorial setting elsewhere. At the Canning memorial a traditional rose garden, pencil pines and hibiscus bushes formally laid out provide the tropes. At the Mandurah memorial, rosemary is extensively used in a formal architectural manner to evoke the metaphor of memory. The traditional forms of Anzac ceremony, which usually include a march to the memorial by the RSL and other community groups, and a quasi-religious ceremony involving the ceremonial laying of wreaths as offerings, are supported in both memorials through their formal planning. The dramaturgical potential of both places, emphasised as ritualised places of performance for Anzac Day ceremonies, reinforces their claim as moral spaces through formal planning, regenerative tropes and constant commemorative use.

Both memorials are the product of transitions from one location to another and the shifts in meaning that this brings. The problem of siting a memorial in a quiet reflective place or an alternative visible and active place is one of the core aspects of the process of memorial location globally. This hinges chiefly on its dual purpose as a place of sorrow and as an advertisement for citizenship. The relocated Canning memorial was situated so that people travelling the Albany Highway could see it, although it was a quieter place when the memorial was moved there in the 1950s. It was re-sited because wayward behaviour and a setting incompatible with its purpose threatened its moral ground. The transition to a new setting has compromised its original meaning as a symbolic gateway because it is no longer a thoroughfare. However, the memorial has taken on new meanings in its ordered and formal garden setting, which now contains the ashes of deceased diggers, making it sacred ground. It is not lost in the dissonance of the surrounding landscape, but is assertive enough to be a prominent landmark and serves as a didactic advertisement for the citizenship values of Anzac.

At the Mandurah memorial, the setting is an open area of grass in which the memorial dominates as an abstract sculptural form and as a series of axis that direct both eye and physical movement through paths, lines of columns and focal points produced by curvature in the structure. The Mandurah War Memorial illustrates a transition of acceptance from the traditional memorial form to a modern abstract form. However, the key is that both traditional and modern forms need to be narrative in order to reinforce remembrance and ritual. The Mandurah War Memorial tells the story of battle and grief through the metaphors of its structure. It provides a place of quiet, almost lonely, contemplation that is not generally possible at the Canning memorial. However, it has the same accoutrements of commemoration through ordered planning and symbolic vegetation, albeit planted and
trimmed to fit the rhythms of the monument and its approaches. It is moral ground that has been consecrated through Christian ritual and an Aboriginal smoking ceremony, claiming a more universal sacredness than most war memorials in Australia.

Despite being a modern design and landscape, it still embodies traditional narrative; however, its patterns of use differ greatly through its emphasis on interactivity. What the RSL had wanted was a memorial that would be interactive with the community and its commemorative needs (R. White, personal communication, May 10, 2007). At the end of Anzac ceremonies, members of the public are encouraged to experience the spaces of the memorial and move through the forest of white concrete piers emblazoned with sections of the poem previously mentioned. This is a unique feature that taps into international memorials such as Peter Eisenman’s Berlin Holocaust Memorial (2005) where the structure of the memorial provides a deliberate sensory experience meant to invoke loss. In this sense the memorial is not just an object that is to be looked at, but where spaces are to be bodily experienced as part of the commemorative process. This challenges traditional assumptions about the purpose and role of war memorials as an object or shrine that is purely the theatrical focus of a commemorative experience.

What both memorials show is that the key aspects of a memorial setting include how it physically supports its commemorative functions and how the narratives that each hold are reinforced through embedded metaphor and the retelling of the meaning of Anzac. Despite recent transformations in memorial landscapes in Western Australia, commemorative spaces are still largely underpinned and reinforced by traditional commemorative meanings and symbolism.

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Remembering and forgetting ANZAC Cottage:
Interpreting the community significance of war memorials
since World War One

Graham Seal

Abstract

This paper presents a method for studying and interpreting the community significance of Australian war memorials since 1914. It discusses the history of a suburban memorial erected in 1915 and known as Anzac Cottage. This history is then interrogated with a number of concepts, including Pomian’s notion of the “semiophore” and some new approaches termed “forgettance” and “constituencies of meaning”. An interlinked group of convenient fictions is identified in the construction of the current meanings of this particular memorial leading to an understanding of the relationships between the local and the national, the official and the unofficial, and the past and the present. While the approach taken here is a case study of one particular memorial, the techniques are applicable to other Australian post-1914 war memorials.

Introduction

Interpreting the community significance of post-1915 Australian war memorials involves investigation of the relationships between a number of complex factors including the local, often the familial, the historical, the folkloric and the national (Inglis, 1998). The nature of Australia’s historical experience of war is intimately bound with dominant notions of national identity and the related mythology of Anzac and its hero, the digger (Seal, 2004). Only when all these are taken into account is it possible to determine the community significance of any post-1914 memorial, both in the present and over time.

Accordingly, it is necessary to develop a methodological and interpretative approach that takes these factors and their interrelationships into account to arrive at a coherent analysis of the undoubted cultural power that war memorials hold for many, perhaps most, of those who identify themselves as Australian. This approach needs to be capable of comprehending the dynamic of significant community (as opposed to individual) interactions and imperatives, both over time and at any given moment in the history of the memorial and its community.
The approach also needs to be incisive enough to differentiate the groups that have agency within a memorial’s community. Each of these groups, while belonging to or having some relationship to a local community, will have its own interests and aims in relation to its memorial. The notion of community is not in itself a useful analytic concept and it is necessary to avoid its monolithic and homogenous implications. A more precise concept that provides an understanding of the dynamic and heterogeneous nature of a local community is required. Such a concept is presented below.

In pursuing these matters, this paper presents a case study of a West Australian Gallipoli memorial that attempts to answer some related research questions and, in doing so, to develop an interpretative framework that might be applied to analysing the community significance of other Australian memorials from 1915. The three specific research questions addressed here are:

- What is the meaning of the history and folklore of Anzac Cottage in its local and national contexts?
- What meanings does it invoke for its various interest groups or constituencies?
- What is the story of and about Anzac Cottage? What interests does it serve? How, and why?

The various parameters of the subject that are engaged for this exercise include history and mythology in relation to Anzac and its essential hero, the digger and the relationship(s) between the local and the national evocations of Anzac. The paper begins with a brief account of the building and history of Anzac Cottage, then moves to an interpretation of its significance utilising a number of new and existing theoretical concepts to answer these questions. One of these is Krzysztof Ponian’s (1990) notion of semiophores. Two other terms: “constituencies of meaning” and “forgettance”, are also introduced as being useful in attaining the ends of this analysis, as is the understanding of the story of the cottage as it is currently promulgated as a linked collection of convenient fictions.

**Brief history of a monument**

Western Australia’s earliest Great War memorial, and Australia’s first Gallipoli memorial, is an unassuming suburban structure known as Anzac Cottage. Its building was initiated in late 1915 through local community donations of land, money, goods and labour, initiated by the Labor-dominated Mt Hawthorn Progress Association. It was constructed, allegedly, in just one day in February 1916, as a home for an Anzac hero and family to inhabit forever.
The intention to build the cottage was announced in the December 17, 1915 edition of *The Westralian Worker*, a newspaper of the Labor and union movement:

Mount Hawthorn is going to do something big - it is going to erect a monument - a monument to the honor [sic] and glorious memory of those gallant and fearless representatives of Australia who brought imperishable renown to this young nation 'neath the Southern Cross on the morning of the 25th of April, in the year nineteen hundred and fifteen. (“Mt Hawthorn,” 1915, p. 5)

The article went on to name the fortunate recipient of this honour and the exact nature of the monument:

One of those who took his place in the attack on April 25, and who has returned to us disabled for life is private John Porter, and it is intended that the monument to be erected should take the form of a house for Mr Porter and his wife and child. (“Who Has Returned,” 1915, p. 5)

The selection of the Kalgoorlie Street site for the cottage was also announced. Although the area had been sub-divided into residential estates, much was still original blocks of bushland. In the spirit of the pioneer settlers of the Swan there was to be a working bee to clear the block of timber. It would start at 4am on Saturday, January 29 and would be a symbolic replication of the Gallipoli landing: “The workers, who are giving their labour freely, will make their ‘attack’ on ‘Anzac Cottage’ at the same hour as the men they desire to honour made their wonderful attack on Anzac Beach - 4am” (“Make Their attack,” 1916, p. 2). About 30 men turned up for the block clearing, armed with shovels, saws and axes. “At 4 O’ clock the Ladies Patriotic Guild regaled the workers with afternoon tea” and there was “a special decoction for the drones” (p. 2). After this the last standing tree, called the “Lone Pine” after the name of the famous Gallipoli engagement, was felled. By nightfall it had become a stack of firewood, also to be used for fundraising.

The following Saturday, February 5, 1916, seventy drays loaded with donated building materials formed a half-mile procession through James Street, Perth, accompanied by about 150 men, all on their way to the Mt Hawthorn building site. The goods were unloaded in readiness for the erection. On Saturday, February 12, the “busy bee” construction of the house commenced at 3.30am. By 1pm the number of workmen on the site had reached two hundred: “like a swarm of bees, the volunteers laid turf, plastered walls and laid row after row of red
Marseilles tiles” (“Row After Row,” 1916, p. 4). Hot dinners were provided for the tradesmen by “a score of ladies” (p. 4), who served up well over 400 meals before the day ended.

Although the Anzac Cottage Souvenir Booklet (1916) states that the house was built by “bed time”, a careful reading of the souvenir booklet and The Westralian Worker reveals that, like some other elements of the story, this is not true: the external walls were substantially finished, with the rest of the work completed over the next few weeks. Still, most of the memorial was up by the day’s end, certainly enough of it to satisfy the dreams and aspirations of its builders. It stood “in a clearing, which a fortnight ago was the border of fairly heavily timbered country” (“In a Clearing,” 1916, p. 2).

Over the next few weeks Anzac Cottage was completed. The substantial house erected for Private Porter and his family, “the prettiest house of its size in the district”, was valued at six hundred pounds. Leaded glass side-panels of crossed sabres graced the front door, surmounted by a fanlight with Anzac Cottage spelled in coloured glass. A feature noted at the time was that every room had electric light. The buffalo-grass front lawn also featured the letters Anzac Cottage laid out centrally in ornamental flowers. A flagpole had been built in the front garden upon which the Australian flag, bearing the motto “Anzac”, was to be hoisted at each Anzac Day at 4.30am.

The cottage was officially opened on April 15 (Figure 1). Premier Scaddan and Mrs Scaddan headed the long list of distinguished invitees. The Premier spoke, addressing an issue that had been raised with him. As reported by the Westralian Worker, Premier Scaddan said that he had been asked “why Private Porter had been given the cottage and not some other Gallipoli hero” (“Stamped Private” 1916, p. 2). This was an allusion to the gossip about Porter. He was not from the local community and, while he had been present at the Gallipoli landings with the 11th Battalion, he was wounded on the first day and evacuated within four days. Presumably to quash this muttering, Scaddan said he was able to reveal that Private Porter had approached the War Council to intervene in the proceedings, saying that he did not wish to have anything that his mates could not have. With difficulty, the Council had persuaded him to accept Anzac Cottage. “That fact alone stamped Private Porter doubly a hero, worthy of the monument which had been erected to the heroes of Anzac (Applause)” (“Stamped Private,” 1916, p. 2).

Anzac Cottage was a primal element of the then protean Anzac mythology, as expressed at the local community level in Western Australia. It was conceived and erected at the same historical moment as was born the myth it invokes and supports. That myth has become central to the Australian sense of nation providing a narrative, a heroic type
representative of the nation, and a point of meaningful reference for generations of Australians and their experience of war. Its history and, for the purposes of the present discussion, its current significance, is inextricably entwined with the evolution of the dominant interpretation of Australian national identity. Studying these events and their meanings allows us to understand the processes by and through which the national and the local work powerfully together to maintain the essential myth of Anzac, both as an official contrivance and as a profound grassroots belief.

Figure 1: Raising of the ‘Anzac’ flag at the opening ceremony

After a lengthy history during which the occupying family of Gallipoli veteran Private Porter raised the Australian flag emblazoned with Anzac each Anzac Day dawn, the elder Porters died, the children left, and the cottage fell into decay from the 1970s (Figure 2). The issue of ownership had continually bedevilled the cottage from its inception and the Porter family had taken out several caveats, or legal instruments, to protect their ownership of the property (Office of State Corporate Affairs Caveat 1772/1967). These issues came to a head after the cottage had been empty for some years and a local real estate agent attempted to take ownership. After a number of legal battles between the agent and the Porter family, the cottage was eventually vested in the state government, which offered it to the Returned and Services League of Australia, Western Australian Branch (RSLWA). This was managed legally on September 4, 1991, via a Statutory Declaration in the Office of State Corporate Affairs (Statutory Declaration of John Metaxas, 1991)³ and an official Transfer of Land instrument. The RSLWA declined the opportunity and the Cottage was offered to the (Vietnam Veterans of Australia, Western Australian Branch (VVAVA), the “Last Anzacs” as
they refer to themselves⁴, who gladly accepted the building, being in need of premises for their pastoral work.⁵ In partnership with a local community heritage group (Gray, 1996) the cottage was restored with Lottery funds and reopened in 1996 (Seal, 2004). Since then the cottage has been increasingly recognised within and beyond its immediate community as a significant site and structure related to its origins and history.

Figure 2: Anzac Cottage derelict in 1996

During this period, Australia participated in World War Two (1939-1945), the Malaysian ‘emergency’, the Korean War, and the war in Vietnam. These experiences and their consequences produced further evolutions of the Anzac mythology, reinforcing the relationship between national identity and wartime sacrifice. Over that time, Anzac Day became established as the single most important day in the Australian civic calendar and the commemorative modes associated with it. The Australian War Memorial in Canberra and the many memorials around the country became increasingly, if sporadically, important to large numbers of Australians. While attendances at Anzac Day events fell away in the 1960s and 1970s, since the 1980s there has been a rediscovery of Anzac that has taken the tradition and the meanings that Australians wish to give it to new levels of intensity, both at home and abroad (Scates, 2006). The rediscovery of Anzac Cottage that took place from the early 1990s is but one small but significant manifestation of this larger recrudescence.
Interpreting the intangible

How might the conception, origins and history of this structure be usefully interpreted in the light of the brief history of the cottage and its context outlined above? What is its current significance for the community in which it stands? What is the relationship between these meanings and the broader national mythology of Anzac, which the building invokes, celebrates and perpetuates in its local milieu?

Following the Polish historian Pomian, we can usefully interpret Anzac Cottage as a semiophore, an object (in this case a structure) that mediates between what can be seen and touched and the intangible but powerful meanings it evokes. The tangible object acquires meanings through its relationship with its constituencies (Pomian, 1990).

Pomian’s term was originally developed in relation to museum collections to refer to objects that acquired a value of sign while losing their usage value as they passed from their original everyday function to museum objects of research, preservation and display. The notion seems as applicable to structures such as Anzac Cottage, which combines the functional commodity of a home and a mythic site, a special form of preservation and display. And, of course, it was effectively decommoditised from its inception as a wholly donated structure on donated land.

Semiophores operate in various ways. They mediate between past and present, being infused with the accreted meanings of successive constituencies and their interpretations and uses of the object. Sometimes these meanings are complementary, sometimes antagonistic. Often they are a blend of both. In the case of Anzac Cottage there are both consonant and dissonant aspects. Most of the dissonant ones are submerged through the mythologisation process but can be retrieved through historical and folkloric excavation involving fieldwork and archival work. Semiophores also mediate between objects and their communities, between themselves and the Anzac mythology, between the local and the not-so, in this case the national: an especially potent aspect, given Western Australia’s problematic relationship with the rest of the Commonwealth, politically and spatially. And they mediate between the often-murky boundaries between the official and the unofficial.6

Understanding war memorials as semiophores also helps us approach the problem of saying what we mean by ‘community’. This term is often used in relation to heritage and it clearly has powerful connotations when applied to Australian war memorials. It is, though, an extremely blunt and bland tool for analytical purposes. A more incisive concept will identify the main groups within and beyond the immediate suburban community with a vested interest.
in semiophores like Anzac Cottage. Research undertaken as part of the Remembering the Wars project reveals that, while memorials usually have strong local significance, they may also resonate with groups beyond the immediate local community. Accordingly, it is necessary to understand how all these groups interact with the memorial, with each other and with the national mythology and ideology of Anzac. A ‘constituency of meaning’ is the term offered for this purpose.

Constituency is used here in something like its political sense. Political constituencies have certain things in common, such as location, tastes, interests, needs, and, to a varying extent, ideologies. The individuals and interest groups who make up a political constituency may be known to each other, but not necessarily, and only coalesce in a functional sense at elections and at certain other significant, sometimes ritual, moments. While constituencies include committed groups and individuals who are party members, fund-raisers, etc., many of those who vote for a candidate are not actively involved in such activities and are usually unseen and silent. Nevertheless, they find a meaning in a candidate and vote for the policies he or she represents. Applying this flexible notion to the community of war memorials allows us to identify and analyse the various groups and interests who relate to that particular semiophore. What are the interest groups that make up the constituency of meaning for Anzac Cottage?

It is important to note that in the context of any war memorial, an important element of its constituency will be the war dead. The wartime sacrifices (as they are conceived in the Anzac mythology) of previous generations and present relations give the war dead a powerful role in the present world of the living. In the case of Anzac Cottage, this includes the entire number of war dead since World War One: a large group who weigh heavily in the discourses of Anzac at national, state and local levels as in the ritual invocations “lest we forget” and “we will remember them”.

In addition to the war dead, a number of other groups make up the constituency of meaning in relation to the particular semiophore of Anzac Cottage. These include members of the local suburban community with an interest in history and heritage; state and federal government heritage apparatuses; the Porter family; the VVAWA; and the RSLWA. For each of these overlapping and occasionally interacting groups (for instance, on Anzac Day and the ceremonial re-opening and other related events at Anzac Cottage), the semiophore of Anzac Cottage motivates and invokes a set of connected, but not necessarily identical, meanings. Each of those meanings is particular to one of these groups and also links them to the broader Anzac mythology. These considerations involve memory in one form or another and
memorialisation and remembrance. An often-overlooked element of remembrance is its opposite, what we could call “forgettance” to indicate a process of active marginalization, suppression and forgetting that is the inevitable accompaniment of remembrance.

It is important to know what has been remembered and why. But it is equally important, perhaps more so, to know what has been forgotten and why (Batten, 2005; Moriarty, 1997; Winter, 1995). In the case of Anzac Cottage a number of historical elements and details have been suppressed, marginalised or simply left out in the construction of its current meanings. These include the fact that the Porters were not married at the time they received the Cottage (Death Certificate of J. Porter, Perth Registry 3779/64). This was known in the local community. While it would be of no consequence today, de facto arrangements were then a significant social stigma and one element in the ongoing local community ambivalence toward Anzac Cottage. Closely related to this was local resentment against Porter getting the cottage because he was not from Mt Hawthorn. Premier Scaddan referred to these local mutterings in his opening address, as quoted earlier. They were still present in oral tradition in the 1990s.

Although it was said in the press, in speeches and in oral tradition that the structure was completed in one day, a careful reading of the documentary evidence reveals that this was not true. The persistence of this belief seems to be a necessary fiction related to the simultaneous secular-sacred aura of the building, an ambivalence that is itself a palpable element of the Anzac mythology (Seal, 2007).

These suppressions, absences and persistent fictions were part of the local community’s forgettance of the cottage in the decades after World War One. The existence and significance of the memorial was also mostly forgotten in the municipality and the state until the legal ructions over its ownership brought it to official attention. An especially revealing element of forgettance is the ignoring of Western Australia’s earliest First World War memorial and the country’s first Gallipoli memorial by the heritage apparatus of state and federal governments. At the time of the handover to the VVAAWA, the cottage was not even listed on the State’s heritage register, nor had it ever been proposed to the Register of the National Estate. It did not achieve recognition in these official heritage discourses until the late 1990s when the VVAAWA in cooperation with the local Heritage group nominated the cottage.

The problem here is related to the inability of the heritage industry to deal with structures that are not of special architectural merit and memorials that are not obelisks, sculptures or some other form of obviously commemorative erection, and whose significance
derives from their community meaning rather than the imputed value of their style, design, conception or construction. Unlike many later manifestations of wartime memorialisation, Anzac Cottage was practical as well as symbolic: “Utility ... is the dominant feature of the design”, emphasised the Anzac Cottage Souvenir Booklet (1916), and “Anzac Cottage stands as a practical monument to commemorate the greatest deed of valor [sic] in Australia’s history”. Anzac Cottage was a simple local gesture that expressed state and national gratitude and sympathy in a practical and unofficial way, rather than in the grand statements of official memorials. As well, it demonstrated the desire to perpetuate in physical structures and in symbolic forms, the Anzac experience and its significance.

This raises the awkward issue of official and unofficial war memorials. Anzac Cottage originated as a grassroots response to an unprecedented historical moment that Australians immediately invested with nationalistic significance. The war dragged on and became far worse over the following three years, engulfing communities around the country, decimating families and generating a host of commemorative movements, structures, rituals and rhetoric, including the erection of official state memorials. The humble cottage in the suburban street was lost in the wake of all this commemorative noise, which also saw Anzac itself move from a spontaneous expression of national wartime sentiment to an official ideology, the very word itself protected by Commonwealth legislation as well as within various subsequent items of legislation at both state and federal levels (Topperwien, 1997; War Precautions Act Repeal Act, 1920). The needs of the state to appropriate, shape and control Anzac had the effect of concentrating commemorative attention on official memorials and state-sponsored rituals such as the Anzac Day march.

What can the deployment of the notion of semiophores, constituencies of meaning and forgettance tell us about the story of Anzac Cottage? Is there a master narrative that has emerged from the complex history briefly outlined here? And how do these aspects relate to the national mythology of Anzac? These questions can be approached through a consideration of the interest of the various groups who make up the cottage’s constituency.

‘The last Anzacs’

For the Vietnam Veterans, Anzac Cottage provides a sense of community belonging that was denied to them by the circumstances of their homecoming in the 1970s. There was tension between Vietnam veterans and those of previous wars who were mostly members of the RSL. This led the Vietnam veterans to establish their own organisations to carry out the pastoral,
commemorative and politicking roles that the RSL had pursued since the First World War. And while tensions have dissipated since the return, particularly after the acknowledgement of the Vietnam veterans by then Prime Minister Hawke in 1987, there is still a perceptible difference in attitude between members of the respective returned organisations, even though many Vietnam veterans now belong to the RSL.

In this context, the “last Anzacs” have valorised the Anzac and familial aspects of the cottage as part of their story. The commemorative display erected within the cottage understandably emphasizes the Vietnam War experience in the context of Australia’s wartime history and the role of the Porter family. In this narrative there is limited attention paid to the history of the cottage in its local setting.

The family

The Porter family is content to have their part in the public story left as a fitting memorial to the memory of their parents/grandparents, etc. For them, though one branch of the family still claims ownership, the cottage is a family home. The marriage details of the Porters are suppressed and ownership disputes are never mentioned in the contemporary discourse of the cottage. The generation of the local community most directly connected with the building of the cottage and its habitation by the Porters is now gone. The details and, by now, even the existence of local resentment have almost been forgotten, allowing the family to be happily incorporated into the narrative of Anzac Cottage currently in favour.

The new gentry

For the current local community, the increasingly gentrifying suburb has rediscovered Anzac Cottage. It is open irregularly for visits, including expeditions from the local primary school. A children’s book has been published about the cottage (furthering the myth that it was built in one day) (Everett, 2007) and it appears in the council’s local heritage information (“A Brief History,” 2005). Neighbours have looked out for vandalism. A number of residents took part as volunteers in the restoration of the place through the mid- to late 1990s and some local businesses contributed goods, skills and labour to its restoration. It now has a very contemporary, middle-class heritage value that masks its origins as a working class, local Labor Party initiative.
The war dead

The interests of the dead are served through their remembrance by the living and the commemoration of their deeds in the semiophore of Anzac Cottage. A fundamental notion in this relationship is that of sacrifice on behalf of country, community and family. This is one of the central tenets of the official mythology of Anzac and one that resonates most potently at the grassroots level. It has been nurtured by a number of major wars and generations of official rhetoric, educational inculcation and popular sentiment. Reinforced on April 25, Anzac is personified by the heroic digger, the Australian Everyman in uniform.

The story of Anzac Cottage is not, then, a monolithic master narrative but a shared collection of convenient fictions linked together by the heroic dead digger and related to, and through, the semiophoric significance of the memorial. Each of the groups that make up the cottage’s constituency of meaning has a version of its past and its present significance. Regardless of whether these are consonant or dissonant, they are mediated through the Anzac mythology and the role and meaning of the cottage in relation to that national mythology. They operate together, colluding and occasionally colliding, their dynamics supplying the narrative energy that powers the continuation of the Anzac Cottage story.

The ritual moment

These mingling meanings and narrative fissions are brought powerfully into focus at one ritual moment on April 25 each year at the Sunset Service (Figure 3). Representatives of each of the groups that make up the cottage’s constituency of meaning show up to pay their respects to Anzac, the diggers and, in a slightly awkward way, to each other.

The Dawn Service is the most characteristically simple element of Anzac Day (Mayes, 2009). From 1996, aspects of the Dawn Service such as wreath laying, playing of the “Last Post” and a short, non-religious reading, were appropriated and adapted into a Sunset Service, again forging the links with all that is signified by Anzac, Gallipoli and the digger (Seal, 2009). This established a new local tradition that at once acknowledged the local and state associations of the memorial, mediated and temporarily resolved them and also firmly located the cottage within the national mythology. The Dawn Service is one of the more folkloric elements of Anzac Day observance, long prized for its lack of formality and pomp, and its simple and powerful evocation of the moment when the first Anzacs landed at Gallipoli in 1915. It was thus especially appropriate that it was adopted as the public affirmation of the unofficial nature of the cottage’s origins and of the various fictions that make up its story.
Conclusion

Having analysed the history and community significance of Anzac Cottage, it is now possible to approach informed answers to the initial research questions posed. Retrieving the meaning of the history and folklore of Anzac Cottage in its local and national contexts is possible using the archival and fieldwork techniques mentioned. The cottage is the result of a grateful local community’s dedication to its soldiers—their Mt Hawthorn boys—at an unprecedented moment of national and state crisis and shock. It is one of the earliest tangible objects of the mythology that was then in formation and which would go on to become the central Australian myth of nation. The various significances the cottage invokes for its constituency of interests have been highlighted above. Understanding these processes allows us to approach an answer to the third question of identifying the dominant narrative of and about Anzac Cottage: what, and whose, interests does it serve, and why?

Ultimately, all these meanings coalesce towards the one convenient fiction that is the dominant narrative of Anzac Cottage. That is the Australian need, nationally and locally: to see ourselves as a common community, a modern nation state with a coherent and homogenous identity. Anzac is central in Australian society not only because of its relationship to national history and wartime sacrifice but also because of the role of those
events in identity formation and maintenance. It is our central myth because we have no other
to do the job. The semiophore of Anzac Cottage, with its constituency of meaning, powerfully
focuses that need in a physical structure, in its ongoing celebration and in the annual ritual
moment of the Sunset Service: the last Anzac Day event on the continent before the sun sets
symbolically in the west.

Whose interests does this serve? Almost everyone’s. It is the genius of the Anzac
mythology to, eventually, appropriate and incorporate all useful and necessary elements, even
those that are apparently antagonistic to it; remembering and forgetting work together to
construct a grassroots narrative version of the Anzac mythology. But unlike the official, far
away focus of Anzac, this is a local community and familial evocation of the myth. It allows
deviation and even antagonism, as in the constituency of the VVAWA, to come together in a
harmonious way that connects the Western Australian perspective to the larger national
mythology.

In short, it allows the official Anzac mythology and ideology to be mediated through
the meanings that these things have for the various constituencies in the community. Anzac
Cottage focuses the local and the unofficial and connects these meaningfully to the national
and the official. In this process, the tension created between the dualities of remembrance and
forgettance, between the semiophore of Anzac Cottage and the meanings invested in it by its
constituency, provides the energy that gives this memorial its “critical mass”, its self-
sustaining cultural power.7

Anzac Cottage restored
Notes

1 It is also noted here that “A suggestion was made to the Progress Association that an
endeavour be made to provide Mr Porter with a home.”

2 Born in Peckham, London, to Edward and Gertrude Porter, Cuthbert John Porter arrived in
Western Australia in 1904 at the age of about 23. He had served a five-year apprenticeship
in carpentry at Holloway Brothers, London. Not unusually for the period, he also found
time to train in the London Territorials. He enlisted in the 11th Battalion, 3rd Brigade on
September 3, 1915. His number was 1013.

3 Again there seem to have been problems with the paperwork as the land was not vested with
the Commissioner for Corporate Affairs until December 13, 1991; Application E765933.

4 Because Vietnam was the last war in which Australian and New Zealand troops fought
together under one command, as was the case at the foundation event of the mythology,
Gallipoli.

5 While the ownership issues surrounding Anzac Cottage are too involved for full discussion
here, they can be understood as a consequence of its decommoditised origins. The land,
design, materials and labour to build it were all donated. Thus Anzac Cottage was, from
its inception, a ‘special’ and ‘different’ place, in accordance with Pomian’s notion of a
semiophore. Ownership of the cottage has recently passed from the VVAWA to the Town
of Vincent.

6 And while Anzac Cottage is an especially apt example of a semiophore, the concept can also
be applied usefully to other war memorials. From the moment of their conception, through
their erection and then subsequent existence, war memorials are by their nature ‘special’,
usually marked out as sacralised spaces, inscribed with the names of the honoured dead
(sometimes the wounded and/or simply those who served).

7 A term from the field of socio-dynamics or social dynamics. It refers to the ability of a
social system/s to develop enough momentum to be self-sustaining and to power its own
growth.
References


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Creativity and ‘new’ careers: What can we learn from the creative industries?

Dawn Bennett

Abstract

The term ‘creative industries’ generally refers to sectors of the economy that utilise individual creativity, skill and talent to create, produce and commercialise cultural goods and services. Given the general debate about innovation and creativity, it is useful to consider how the creativity, skills and talents that drive the creative industries might be applicable and useful to the general economy. This paper draws upon the adventures of a virtual musician to illustrate the broad range of skills and attributes employed by creative industry practitioners. Findings suggest strong alignment of these skills with the critical skills shortages identified by Australian businesses as impeding Australia’s innovative ability. The potential for creatives to relieve these skilled labour shortages is largely unrealised.

The creative industries

In the context of rapid labour market change incorporating the decline of the traditional linear career, this paper considers the relevance of creative industries practice to the general labour market. In 1997 the UK Creative Industries Taskforce adopted for policy use the term ‘creative industries’, in which it included thirteen sectors on the basis of “activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property” (British Council, 1999). It could be argued that innovation and creativity within any field would meet this definition; however within the UK definition (as elsewhere in the world), industries are deemed to be ‘creative’ on the basis that their products are perceived to be cultural. Drawing on the work of Bourdieu, Gibson (2003, p. 203) clarifies this concept by explaining that “specific forms of value are attached to the creative component of ‘cultural’ industries, not least of which are the various forms of symbolic capital claimed and defended by those involved in film, art, music or fashion”. Accordingly, the thirteen sectors within the UK definition include advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design,
designer fashion, film, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software, television and radio, heritage and tourism services.

The term ‘cultural industries’ preceded ‘creative industries’ and there is often confusion between the two, which as Hesmondhalgh (2008) notes come from very different theoretical bases and policy contexts. Adding to the confusion within and between the two terms, the term cultural industries has been used to refer both to activities which attract an exclusive ‘cultured elite’ in the form of ‘high culture’ and, reflecting Florida’s (2002) concept of a creative class and Throsby’s (2006) argument that cultural policy should represent society’s whole way of life, to an inclusive cohort described as “artists, designers, scientists, researchers and others whose work generates new ideas, new processes and new products” (Throsby and Hollister, 2003, p. 11).

On the whole, the term ‘creative industries’ has enabled a broad and inclusive definition and has been particularly useful in policy terms, although one of the more obvious difficulties with the model is that it mixes products, inputs and services “in ways that make it uneconomical from a traditional economics point of view: a rather incoherent definition” (Cunningham, 2003, p. 1). Despite attempts to reach a coherent definition, multiple terms continue to be used to describe elements of the creative industries, and many of the inconsistencies appear within reports generated by governments or by publicly funded agencies. The terms applied arts, applied arts and cultural activity, arts, arts and crafts, arts and culture, content, creative, creative arts, cultural, culture and leisure, culture and recreation, entertainment, future-oriented, high arts, leisure, music, performing arts, sunrise, and visual arts are all commonly used, and more generic terms such as performing arts are themselves defined in many different ways according to the parameters of each publication. In order to understand these complex industries, the focus of an increasing amount of research is the individuals whose activities make up this exciting and diverse sector.

**Creatives and the labour market**

Much of the research focusing on the creative workforce includes people whose creativity is embedded in the activities of other industry sectors; however the reliance on statistical data which are fragmentary and incomplete has led to widespread calls for focussed research on specialist creatives: namely the individuals whose activities focus on specialist creative fields. Employment for specialist creatives is intermittent, complex and challenging, and creatives lead a growing sector of the workforce within which casualisation and multiple employments
are rife. This career type is relatively new to many fields and is often described as a ‘new’
careerist model. In fact, the creative workforce together with professional athletes and small
business owners pre-empt employment trends in many Western countries, and creatives
represent an ideal study group for more general labour market and career development
research (Bridgstock, 2005).

The decision to pursue a career in the creative industries is most often the result of
successful engagement with a creative activity, and compensation can be evaluated quite
differently to traditional considerations such as linear career advancement or monetary
reward. The traditional, linear career model has little relevance to the creative sector wherein
people self-manage their careers and expand their work behaviours, competencies and
connections in search of success that is determined in terms of self-identity, psychological
(intrinsic) success and meeting personal and professional needs. However, success is also
determined by the acceptance of (and demand for) creative work by significant others, social
groups and community. Accordingly, individuals look increasingly outwards for affirmation
of their identities.

Psychological success requires the continued expansion of identity in line with each
new challenge. Exciting though this is in its potential for holistic, less hierarchical ideals of
success, the common usage of the term ‘artist’ to indicate a creator or performer highlights
immediate problems for practitioners. In a constructivist approach to career development,
self-identity influences one’s perceived ability to undertake new tasks; thus identity, merged
with career, becomes a moving construct according to activities and interactions. The most
common terms applied to these careers include portfolio, which refers to multiple concurrent
roles, boundaryless, being those not bounded within traditional employment, and protean,
which is the term adopted by this paper. Protean careers are at the extreme end of portfolio
careers and are named after the mythological Greek sea god Proteus who was able to change
form at will in order to avoid danger, which is something that increasing numbers of people
need to do in order to remain employable.

Despite the continued growth of Australia’s creative economy, the median income of
artists continues to decline; Throsby and Hollister (2003) conclude that only 30% of artists
can meet their minimum income needs from their arts work, and non-arts work provides twice
the amount of income for the same amount of committed time. Creatives tend not to be paid
for all of their work; however the anecdotal evidence of high unemployment for arts graduates
is misleading because data collections measure only full-time employment in a single role. In
fact, many arts graduates forge careers as protean careerists and are often fully employed
within a number of different roles. Of particular concern is that creatives often reduce or cease creative activities in their mid-thirties as career and residential mobility decline, and performing artists are much less likely than other creatives to obtain skilled secondary positions through which they can sustain their presence in the creative industries. These circumstances heighten the continued attrition from Australia’s creative labour market, both within the creative industries and within the general workforce. This is in spite of the general labour market shortage of skilled people who can think creatively and innovatively.

Australia has for many years experienced a critical shortage of skilled labour. An Australian Industry Group study conducted in 2007 (AIG, 2008) assessed the extent of the Australian skills shortage and sought to identify the skills most lacking. The study involved 492 Chief Executive Officers whose companies represented almost 100,000 people, and almost 70% of the respondents stated that their business had been impacted by skills shortages during the previous twelve months, identifying “a clear link between skills shortages and a lack of innovative ability in Australian firms” (p. 21). AIG concluded that Australian businesses “are finding it increasingly difficult to attract and retain the skilled workers needed to survive and prosper in today’s economic climate” (p. 18).

As companies diminish in size, people become responsible for a broad range of tasks previously managed by the company. Typical examples include budgeting, occupational health and safety and customer relations (Martin and Healey, 2006). The skills shortages most impacting the competitiveness of Australian businesses were identified by the AIG study as communication skills (54% of firms); the ability to adapt to change (47%); and teamwork and problem-solving skills (32%). Although formal and informal professional development initiatives for existing staff are important strategies for businesses, the study recommended businesses to seek alternative sources of skills and attributes: additional human capital. Logically, businesses would look to sectors in which the required skills are highly developed.

A criticism of existing research on the careers of creatives is that the majority of this work is bounded by artform or genre, and is reliant on problematic statistical data collections that measure only primary occupations. But similarity between the practice of creatives from multiple disciplines suggests that a holistic, empirical approach will be effective in uncovering this complex sector (Benhamou, 2003; Brown, 2007). The holistic approach is supported by research which has uncovered broad alignment across the creative industries in relation to career trajectories, impacts of industry change, globalisation, attrition, professional development needs, and the personal attributes, skills and knowledge required to achieve sustainable practice (Bennett, 2004; 2007). Drawing on this research, the current chapter will
relate the experiences of a virtual musician whose activities illustrate the broad range of skills and attributes utilised by creative industry practitioners, and their potential value to the general economy.

**Process**

Clari the virtual musician was devised as a tool with which to explore the activities of a first-year Bachelor of Music (BMus) graduate. Clari (a clarinettist) graduated in 2003 with the skills and knowledge of the core (compulsory) units from all of Australia’s 23 BMus degrees. As such, her competencies became resources on which she could readily draw. Analysis of degree content revealed that an average of 84.6% of undergraduate performance students’ time is directed towards practical training, core studies such as history, theory and harmony. Of concern within existing courses is the minimal emphasis given to teaching skills (1.1%), research and self-directed study (0.5%), industry experience and awareness (0.7%), business skills (0.5%), and music technologies (1.6%). The reasons for this concern will become clear as Clari’s activities unfold.

In preparation for the study and to demonstrate the probability of Clari gaining a full-time orchestral position, orchestral vacancies in multiple countries were tracked for seven months from June until December 2004 using the e-bulletins of the Australian Music Council. There were 405 orchestral vacancies in the 28 represented countries, which included the major European centres for classical music. Only fifteen of the vacancies worldwide were for clarinettists. In addition to these vacancies and in stark contrast with the demise of several orchestras during the previous decade, a call was made in October 2004 for musicians to apply for positions in a new orchestra in Hyogo, Japan. Although the employment figures are from 2004, they are indicative of the employment situation for instrumental graduates; MyAuditions.com, which lists orchestral vacancies worldwide, listed only 94 full-time vacancies in the three months to July 2007, and a proportion of the advertised positions had been carried over from previous unsuccessful audition rounds. The figures illustrate the likelihood for music graduates to work within protean careers, and similar examples could be given across the arts.

Informal focus group interviews were held with music performance students and new graduates (n=23) to determine the most common activities during the year following graduation, and emerging themes were cross-checked with seven established musicians. The
two most common activities formed the basis for Clari’s adventures: to provide the music for an outside wedding, and to organise a concert performance.

Each task utilised the skills and attributes from the BMus core units as detailed at Figure 1, and Clari sought additional assistance via the Internet, the telephone and in person. At each point of contact the researcher explained her ‘alias’ and the background of the study prior to asking Clari’s questions. Participants were given consent and information forms and were advised of their right to withdraw from the study at any time. Participants were also advised that their comments would remain anonymous. Analysis comprised colour coding of qualitative data from which an initial coding booklet was developed. Inductive coding was employed to expand each of the emerging themes, which were cross-referenced with the skills and attributes identified within the BMus degrees. Quasi-quantification enabled information to be entered into an SPSS database for further analysis (SPSS, 2008).

Clari

In addition to her skills and attributes, Clari was allocated personal and professional characteristics identified from the literature and from the interviews with students and musicians. Her employment profile reflected the rarity of full-time positions in the arts, which results in the majority of creatives adopting multiple roles and utilising a broad and changing suite of skills. In addition, the study drew on research that has shown that 75% of performing artists work outside of the arts either full time or part time, and that performing artists are more likely than other artists to work in low skilled and unrelated jobs (Bennett, 2008). Low-skilled work is very common for creatives because it provides flexibility within which artistic work can be accommodated. The job most commonly mentioned by students in the preliminary interviews was hospitality; hence Clari’s profile also included work at a restaurant three evenings each week. Alongside performance, teaching is the most common source of regular income for both contemporary and classically trained musicians (Bennett, 2008; Traasdahl, 1996); thus Clari’s profile included instrumental tuition, which necessitated the establishment of a teaching practice. This was in itself problematic given that, despite the prevalence of teaching within musicians’ careers, only one percent of the BMus core course time was allocated to pedagogy.

Given that she was a new graduate, Clari’s profile did not include children. This is important because there are specific gendered differences in music careers, which are compounded by family commitments. Another consideration was injury, which impacts the
large majority of musicians. There is a higher proportion of injury amongst musicians than athletes, and injury prevention strategies are of paramount importance. Given Clari’s age and the focus of the study, it was decided not to factor in any physical injury or weakness.

Clari was assigned the two tasks most common to new graduates, and this paper will focus on just one of those tasks: that of organising a concert performance. Graduates are most likely to obtain focussed performance work in recital situations, and the organisers of these events are more often than not the musicians themselves. Clari’s mission was to organise a single performance, without a corresponding tour, at a venue within driving distance. To make things easy there were only two other musicians involved, there was to be no recording or broadcast, there were no copyright issues, and the weather had been pre-booked for 26 degrees and sunny.

Results and discussion

General dictionaries describe a musician as ‘one who performs’ and an artist as ‘one who practices in one of the fine arts’ or within a ‘histrionic profession’ such as acting or singing. Similarly, education and training tends to focus on the creative aspects of the artform and steers students towards careers within which their creativity will be at the fore. The curricular emphasis on creative skills within specialist arts courses is to be expected considering the competitive nature and high standards of the sector; however artistic creation will be the major, or the sole, source of economic activity for only a minuscule proportion of graduates. In the case of that small proportion, creative work is extremely unlikely to remain the sole focus throughout an entire career; thus a vast range of additional and complementary skills and knowledge is essential to achieving a sustainable career (Johansson, 1996). Of particular interest to this study were the ways in which these competencies are utilised beyond the creative act.

The basic formula for a successful concert is a venue, music, musicians and an audience, and there follows a summary of Clari’s activities as she put together the concert. Concerts require external funding, a guaranteed audience or an underwriter; hence Clari developed a business plan that she could take to sponsors, venues and musicians. The plan included a project overview, a detailed budget and a marketing plan. Clari found business plan templates on the Internet and received advice from an arts organisation. She also called an established musician for help. Typical of a protean careerist, the established musician ran a home studio for instrumental teaching and performed as a chamber musician. She also ran a
quartet, which combined poetry, stories and music to provide innovative concerts and workshops for children and adults in myriad settings.

Clari tried to secure a place within a concert society’s season of concerts, which would have meant everything was arranged for her; however as she had no professional reviews or a track record she was not successful. The next step was to secure a grant, which was required at the commencement of the project as the venue would not take a booking without a deposit. Clari located several possible funding programs; but the grants were found largely within strategies for broader social initiatives, which required the artistic elements of the grant proposal to be shrouded in terms of the funding strategy’s non-arts objectives. Furthermore, many grants were centred on the community cultural development (CCD) concept. To obtain one of these grants, Clari needed to demonstrate experience in working with communities to create a program with a community up-skilling component.

Few emerging artists possess the skills and political knowledge to write such proposals, notwithstanding the skills and experience required to manage a program of social change. Moreover, there is inadequate availability of skills training in requisite community development and social improvement, which places many funding strategies beyond the reach of individual artists. Ironically, it would seem that individual artists such as Clari are not the only ones to struggle; a British survey found that 89% of music institutions require outside, specialist assistance to access funding (Metier, 2001). To proceed with the project, Clari undertook professional development in grant writing and project development with a community arts organisation.

Most venues provide insurance in case of accidents such as an audience member falling down the steps, but Clari found that she was not insured for scenarios such as an audience member falling over equipment belonging to the musicians. As a result, and to meet the requirements of the venue, Clari arranged insurance for the musicians, their equipment and the audience. Clari also developed the technical skills needed to set up a PA system. The recital required a piano accompanist and a flautist, and Clari drew on her established network to secure the two other musicians. A rehearsal schedule was drawn up with the musicians and Clari had to decide how they would be employed. She learned that, whether or not there was anything in writing, this type of engagement constitutes a legal partnership between the three musicians. As is most often the case, the contract with the venue was in a single name, which meant that in contractual terms Clari was sub-contracting the other musicians. Legally, even if the venue paid all three musicians separately they would be considered a partnership, and a partnership exposes all partners to legal action that places personal assets at risk.
Clari went to speak with an arts union and was advised to set up a limited liability company, for which she visited a community legal service. The union representative told Clari that if he could have one morning with every arts student during their training, he could avoid 95% of the legal action with which the union became involved on behalf of its members. A visit to an accountancy service revealed that if Clari went on to work regularly with the musicians she would become responsible for their workers’ compensation insurance, taxation and superannuation. At the end of June came the end of financial year and the development of a range of strategies for future record keeping and financial management.

During her twelve-month virtual existence, Clari gave performances in line with the dictionary definition of a musician as a performer. Illustrated at Figure 2, her transition from clarinettist to musician was quite profound; however her task was relatively simple compared to the myriad activities of practising creatives. Even so, Clari developed skills in communication, project and time management, scheduling, customer relations, marketing, grant writing, financial management, insurance, and aspects of employment law. These skills are highly valued by employers, as are the characteristics or personal attributes required to sustain such a career. One such attribute is resilience, and Clari’s activities illustrate the resilience needed to overcome common barriers. The most crucial attribute for employers appears to be passion, and it is passion that drives creatives through each barrier towards a successful outcome; a study of almost 300 creatives found passion to be at the core of creative practice; passion drives motivation, confidence, resilience and determination, inner strength, self-discipline, independent thinking, and openness or adaptability to change (Bennett, 2008). The passion for creative practice is transferred into other workplace contexts and is a powerful resource.

Figure 2: Clari’s transition from clarinettist to musician and protean careerist
Conclusion

Akin to most creatives, Clari functioned as an unintended entrepreneur. Although she represents a case study of classically trained instrumental musicians, similar studies with musicians and other creatives indicate that many of the career characteristics, skills and attributes are similar across the creative industries (Bennett, 2004; Mills & Smith, 2000).

Protean careers necessitate the continual development of new opportunities and the attainment of the corresponding skills required to meet each challenge. The skills which Clari developed add strength to the argument that a musician should be redefined as someone who practises within the profession of music in one or more specialist fields, with a similar approach taken to defining those who work in other creative fields. This broader definition comes closer to recognising the high level of transferable skills possessed by creatives; as Costantoura (2000, p. 65) suggests, “success as a professional artist in Australia involves at least the same suite of skills expected of any person who chooses to set up a small business”.

In reality, the generic skills required to build a sustainable career in the creative industries go far beyond the creative. These skills and attributes are rarely considered within the wider business environment or, indeed, by creatives themselves, with the result that creatives often take low-skilled work, which doesn’t capitalise on their abilities. Particularly affected are performative artists such as dancers, whose practice is project-based and embodied. Arts organisations and educators need to empower creatives with the knowledge that their ‘other’ skills are much sought-after within the broader economic context. This empowerment will lead many more creatives to engage with high-skilled roles and to be recognised and respected for their contributions.

Australian businesses and governments stand to benefit from employing creatives who can bring their expertise to flexible and intensive periods of work, and businesses should consider the potential for protean careerists such as those within the creative industries to relieve existing skills shortages. The independent mindset of individual creatives makes them ideal candidates for work requiring little supervision, and businesses need to think flexibly about their employment needs in order to utilise this labour resource. For example, rather than employ someone on the basis of set working hours, it may be possible to think in terms of goal-oriented, flexible employment arrangements. Equally, creatives who work on sporadic artistic projects are often able to commit intensive periods of time to project work in another setting, which can result in a fast turn-around for business.
As traditional linear careers and permanent positions continue to decline, more people are adopting protean careers in which they juggle multiple employments and evaluate their careers in terms of intrinsic satisfaction. As these creative thinkers embrace new ways of working and as skills shortages are exacerbated, employers need to consider the source of potential employees. The creative industries are an obvious place to begin.

References


The dynamics of wakon yōsai (Japanese spirit, Western technology):
The paradoxes and challenges of financial policy in an industrializing Japan, 1854-1939

Simon Bytheway
Michael Schiltz

Abstract

This article argues that Japan’s early modern financial political economy is insufficiently understood by means of the bulk of Western economic vocabulary. In particular, Japan’s apparently contradictory policy of ‘financial autonomy through dependence’ must be understood as a natural ramification of social Darwinist semantics of “catching up” with the Western powers. For Japan, as a late developing country, the significance of its financial development as exemplified through its adoption of the gold standard was that it allowed the large-scale import of foreign capital for modernisation through industrialisation, the conduct of large-scale wars, and the pursuit of empire.

Introduction

Traditionally, Japanese economic planning has been described in terms of its self-proclaimed objectives: an efficient and calculated—that is centrally regulated—employment of the means of production and capital and consequent economic growth. Yet, a seminal aspect of early Japanese industrialisation has its essence in what seems to contradict the objective of regulation. Matsukata Masayoshi, Japan’s Minister of Finance during most of the last two decades of the nineteenth century was known for his appreciation of entrepreneurship and his use of the privatisation of formerly state-owned enterprises as a reference point for his deflationary policies of the 1880s. In this context, it can be argued that Japan’s late nineteenth-century preference for planning was not an ideological antipode of liberalism. Rather, it was informed by the Gerschenkronian projection of Japan’s backwardness vis-à-vis the Great Powers, and its endangered position within the dynamics of imperialism in East Asia. Planning, therefore, did not extend into all fields of economic life, but was centred on
technology and knowledge. We argue that finance should also be treated as a technology to be appropriated in order to secure the state’s survival. Furthermore, as the paper notes, the political economy of catching up was fuelled by the paradoxes associated with the state’s independence. In the cosmopolitan field of finance, autonomy crucially implied access to, and thus dependence on, foreign financial technology, especially foreign capital markets for foreign loans.

A focal point of this analysis is semantics, a general term for a body of ideas and concepts associated with political economy and the state, as evidenced in policy documents, memoranda, diaries and historiographies produced at the time. Our concern has been to approach the latter functionally (contrary to taking them at face value, as being true, or not, in terms of their spelled-out ambitions, objectives and, to a lesser degree, their characteristics). That is to say, we pay particular attention to their apparent contradictions and paradoxical traits, and the employment of the latter, to mobilise trust and legitimacy.

The seminal event of Japan’s “opening up”, from 1854, marks the birth of Japan’s modern political economy. Although the concepts may have drawn on pre-existent scholarly debates, it was consolidated and reinforced at the grassroots level by traumatic experiences associated with forced opening, and the realisation of technological inferiority. Social Darwinism was to permeate political economic practice and its institutions, and translated into an obsession with knowledge, technology and innovation, in order to catch up with Western developments; but it also produced a paradoxical policy path of autonomy through dependence. Importantly, innovation was not limited to technologies and production modes, but also stretched into the domains of finance and monetary policy. Here, the paradox of autonomy through dependence was met in an accrued fashion: sound financial and economic development implied not only access to financial technology, but also access to foreign loans from the world’s premier financial markets.

**Memories of Japan’s forced opening, 1854-1884**

As has been argued elsewhere, the reality of late nineteenth-century Japanese politics and social organisation is one of exceptional turmoil and difficult experiment, underlain by harsh economic reform (Frost, 1970; Ishii & Sekiguchi, 1999; Norman, 1940; Schiltz, 2006). The story begins around 1854, with the brusque opening up of the country after two-and-a-half centuries of political, economic and cultural isolation. The opening up of Japan, through the imposition of treaty ports, and more importantly its confrontation with the realities of the
world economy at the time, were profoundly destabilising. Japan’s monetary system in particular, a system with some remarkably modern traits but built on the very premise of the country’s closure (Metzler, 2006), was unstable at its very core. Political friction with the Great Powers, revolving around questions of free trade, was followed by incessant inflation and destructive speculation, with the most visible result being the wholesale export of Japan’s specie reserves by Western merchants. Ill-conceived attempts at financial and monetary reform further deepened the crisis confronting the Shogun’s government, the so-called bakufu, which would end with the demise of Japan’s feudal order.¹

For our present discussion, the ideological or semantic context of the crisis and consequent reform carries particular relevance. Nowhere else were the forced opening and consequential trauma, with respect to foreign dependence, as striking as in nineteenth-century Japan. It was opening up to the West, and the long, frustrating trade negotiations, that had led to the bakufu’s financial and political impasse in the first place. In addition, the bakufu, and the Meiji regime that replaced it, regarded the Western banks that opened their business in the treaty ports with contempt, as they threatened to erode the regime’s control over financial matters (Tamaki, 1995; Tatewaki, 1987). Moreover, experiences with dishonest Western intermediaries had installed a deep distrust of international commerce; put anachronistically, liberalism and openness were perceived as an imperialist threat (Gallagher & Robinson, 1953). The famous Lay Affair (1870), a case in which the Meiji regime had been deceived by a former member of the British consulate in China (Horatio Nelson Lay) in regard to floating a Japanese loan on the London financial market, especially reminded the regime’s policy makers of the danger of foreign loans and foreign dependence, that is economic colonisation (Tatewaki, 1987).

It has been extensively documented that Japan’s experience of so-called national seclusion (sakoku) and its subsequent forced opening encouraged the growth and development of mercantilist ideas. Furthermore, clusters of mercantilist slogans of modernisation were formative in shaping and legitimising Japanese political and economic decision-making from the early Meiji period up until the Second World War. The concrete policy for achieving national wealth and strength was called shokusan kōgyō: literally translated as ‘promoting production’, but better understood as ‘nurturing and stimulating domestic industry’. Very quickly though, this policy slogan would be outdated by another that, in a remarkable way, came to represent the spirit of the times: fukoku kyōhei (rich nation, strong army). The rationale was simple, and deeply mercantilist: Japan had to be a wealthy nation in order to be militarily and, hence, politically, strong. It served the people, as their
wealth was believed to be the cornerstone of national strength; and it served the modernising elites as it allowed them to dissolve the feudal system and to bring military force and, to a lesser degree, industrial production under the guidance of the state.\(^2\)

### The political economy of ‘catching up’, 1884-1897

Underpinning the above slogans were the semantics of ‘catching up with and surpassing’ \((oitsu\,kose)\) the Great Powers. From the outset of its early modernisation, Japanese political economy came to be driven by an unquenchable thirst for learning, especially in the fields of technology and innovation (Westney, 1987). Numerous foreigners were hired as “live machines” in order to teach the methods of Western advances and state of the art machinery. At the same time, a large number of Japanese official and non-official missions embarked on a quest to discover new ideas and the latest Western institutional models (Jones, 1980). On returning to Japanese shores, the acquired foreign institutional models, practices and ideas, were put to the test of adoption; but always in close reference to the Japanese context. From the time of Japan’s opening in 1854 it was imperative that Japan adopt foreign knowledge and, as the slogan \(wakon\,yōsai\) (Japanese spirit, Western technology) proclaimed, imbue it with the Japanese soul. This notion is not, in any way, unique to the Japanese. Intellectuals were saying much the same thing, at much the same time, in all those parts of the world confronted by the might of the industrialised economies.

Visions of Japanese political-economic development tended to flock around rationalized definitions of the state and its components. As argued by John Sagers (2006), there certainly exists an etymological reason for the phenomena. In negotiating and shaping the semantics of what is nowadays referred to as economics, or \(keizai\) in Japanese, reformers and ideologists had to turn to other vocabularies at hand. Somewhat overshadowed by its adoption as the translation of the English word economics, \(keizai\) still carried the Confucian connotation of \(keisei\,saimin\), ‘government administration [in the interests of] helping the people’. According to this connotation, conceptions of a free market could not have a place, except for being wasteful, and against the natural ecology of the state, whose duty it was to oversee the distribution of material wealth. The latter idea was typically visualised in a highly organic way, most often as a human body in which all organs and components have a function and role; and being a body, it should not be exposed to excess or deprivation, as they may threaten its health. A similarly holistic, albeit different, view also dominated several Western European debates, especially the old French tradition of economics dating back to François
Quesnay and the physiocrats of the eighteenth century, and represented in the nineteenth century by, among others, Clément Juglar. As Flandreau (2003, p. 2) argues, these economists preferred to look at the economic organization of a given country as a consistent whole, just as the human organism, and favoured inference. ... Economic crisis such as exchange crises were the symptoms of deeper flaws which economists as doctors had to address.

The writings of Japan’s long-standing Minister of Finance, Matsukata Masayoshi, on the economy of the country, also reveal particular attention to the balanced relationship between its institutions or ‘organs’ and, by extension, to a healthy circulation of what feeds them:

The monetary circulation of a community may fitly be compared to the circulation of blood in a human body. If there is congestion in one part, and depletion in another part, very soon the congested part suffers from boils or the part where the blood is inadequate becomes torpid. If, on the contrary, we find the blood flowing evenly throughout the whole body, we can trace that in all cases to the healthy action of the heart. In financial matters, the heart cannot be other than the central bank, for to regulate the circulation of the currency of a country, to call it in to a place where it is wanting, and to send it out from a place where there is a surplus, thus to keep even and steady the constant flow of the currency – this is the office of the central bank in a country. (Matsukata, 1899, p. 96)

Initially, the Meiji reformers had looked to the United States’ national banking system as a development model for its own banks, funding their establishment with a single issue of hereditary pension bonds (*kinroku kosai*) to the de-classed *samurai* (Bytheway, 2005). Inflation generated by the issue of an enormous amount of pension bonds, when combined with increasingly more liberal national banking regulations, however, ultimately forced Matsukata and his cadre to turn to the Belgian paradigm in order to establish their vision of a rationalised financial structure with a firmly established central bank at its core. In this context, financial historians refer to Matsukata’s study in Paris (from March to December 1878), during which the French Minister of Finance, Léon Say, pointedly discouraged Matsukata from studying the Bank of France, as Matsukata had originally intended. Say instead praised the recently established National Bank of Belgium (BNB) as it was “of very recent date” (Nihon Ginkō, 1982, p. 119) and he is quoted as having said that it “is unrivalled when it comes to orderly arrangement and perfect organization” (Nihon Ginkō, 1982, p. 119). Impressed by Say’s statement, Matsukata left his aide, Katō Wataru, behind in Brussels, charging him with the task of studying the history of the BNB as well as its organisation. After a three-year stay in Belgium, Katō returned to Japan, where he played an important role...
in the discussions that led to the establishment of Japan’s central bank. Japanese indebtedness to the National Bank of Belgium is, indeed, impressive and visible. An official history of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) explains at length how Matsukata and his reformers followed the regulations (jōrei) and statutes (teikan) of its Belgian peer, literally word-by-word and article-for-article. The Bank of Japan thus naturally inherited the state-interventionist character of the BNB (Nihon Ginkō, 1982).

Seen in the wider context of the history of ideas, the Belgian paradigm can be said to have exercised an even greater role in informing Japanese finance. From Matsukata’s main writings, the larger part of which was most probably written by Katō Wataru (Nihon Ginkō, 1982), one understands the obvious parallels between Matsukata’s reform and the overall design of the policies of Walthère Frère-Orban, the one-time Belgian Minister of Finance and spiritual father of the BNB. The Report on the Adoption of the Gold Standard in Japan (Matsukata, 1899) and policy documents relating to the BOJ’s establishment, explain not only the necessity of establishing a central bank, but also the need for additional financial institutions to strengthen the financial structure formed around the central bank (Nihon Ginkō, 1982). As Matsukata (1899, p. 66) writes:

Industry and thrift are two chief factors in the production of national wealth, and the savings bank has for its aim the encouragement of the spirit of thrift, while the industrial bank seeks to encourage industry among the agricultural and manufacturing classes. And what the industrial bank seeks to do among the agricultural and manufacturing classes, the Central Bank tries to accomplish among the commercial classes. These three kinds of banks, therefore, while their organizations are distinct and different so that they may never be brought within one organization, are yet closely dependent upon each other, and by mutual support work together toward the increase of national prosperity.

Augmenting the Yokohama Specie Bank (established in 1880) and the Bank of Japan (1882), seven ‘special’ semi-government banks were chartered in the latter part of the Meiji and Taisho periods. Radiating out from the main Japanese island of Honshu, to Hokkaido, and then on to the colonies of Taiwan and Korea, they were the Hypothec Bank of Japan (1897), the Agricultural Bank of Japan (1898), the Industrial Bank of Japan (1902), the Bank of Taiwan (formerly the Bank of Formosa, 1899), the Hokkaido Colonial Bank (1900), the Bank of Chosen (formerly the Bank of Korea, 1909), and the Industrial Promotion Bank of Chosen (1918) (Bytheway, 2005). In addition, we should note that the establishment of the Postal Savings System (PSS) in 1873 and, as of 1885, the Ministry of Finance’s channelling of these
funds into a separate account, gave rise to the Deposits Bureau (yokinbu), which served to undergird Japan’s burgeoning financial infrastructure as its ‘Second’ Bank of Japan (Ferber, 2002).

It is very hard, if not impossible to trace the exact ideological origins of the above described financial infrastructure and what the Japanese would later refer to as ‘special banks’ (tokushu ginkō). Most probably, such ideas were en vogue in Continental Europe during the early nineteenth century, and may very well have no particular author. Frère-Orban was certainly well aware of French monetary theory and economics (for example, the ideas of French statesman Adolphe Thiers and several French historians), although he did not have a specific historical example for his central bank (Kau, 1950). Frère-Orban also knew of the authors of the newly developing field of monetary economics such as Thornton (1802), through the writings of the Count de Mollien with which he was thoroughly acquainted (Mollien, 1845); but apparently he was a man more easily influenced by the results of peer policy makers. His inspiration for the Caisse Générale d’Epargne et de Retraite (general bank of savings and pensions), established in 1865 was, we surmise, also born out by popular ideologies of saving and thrift in nineteenth-century Continental Europe.

As explained by Helena Van Molle, the semantics of thrift were so predominant as they managed to represent the interests of individuals, families, society and the state alike (Van Molle, 2002). Whereas saving was encouraged as self-help, it could also be used as a term designating one’s civil virtue, the elevation of the masses (volksverheffing), and one’s duty versus one’s country, not unlike the ideological use of notions of thrift by later consecutive governments of Japan (Garon, 1998). Frère-Orban would add the interest of the state; by attracting the capital from all classes of society, he intended to promote further investment in industry, thus coupling his liberalist ideas of development with his ideas of economic intervention.

**Autonomy through dependence, 1897-1930**

Whereas the significance of foreign models in the establishment of Japan’s financial structure may have only recently been highlighted, the political economics of emulation and the appropriation of foreign knowledge have been given due attention.Certainly, after Westney’s influential study it has become commonplace to highlight the profuse and convoluted nature of the process of emulation (Westney, 1987). Detailed research into the mechanisms of appropriating technology has been done by Richard Samuels and in his
sensitive exploration of Japanese technology policy, Samuels argues that Japan’s technological ideology revolved around three constants: *kokusanka*, or the struggle for technological autonomy through indigenisation; *hakyū*, or the coordinated effort to diffuse knowledge and technological practice throughout the economy; and *ikusei*, or the commitment to nurture and further develop the acquired knowledge on the national, regional, local, and corporate levels. This three-note chord resonates throughout the institutions associated with technological production on the basis of a set of compositional techniques or protocols linking producers, consumers, policy-makers and eventually the nation (Samuels, 1994).

The merit of Samuels’s analysis lies, however, not so much with his study of Japanese successes with indigenisation, but with his demonstration of the way in which the dynamics of appropriation cut across a range of distinctions that Western theories of political economy have falsely come to define as immutable and beyond the contingencies of evolution. The core of his argument, therefore, concerns some paradoxes: the fact that, in the post-war period, Japan managed to reach a position of global pre-eminence in military technologies without making significant investments in the military economy (Samuels, 1994), for instance, or the observation that the Japanese mode of technology production does not exclude competition to the advantage of control or coordination. Of critical importance to this argument, Samuels also demonstrates that (technological) autonomy should not be taken to imply autarky, but that it is entirely compatible with dependence on the knowledge and manufacturing techniques of core foreign partners (of which the slogan *wakon yōsai*, cited above, was the semantic expression). Consequently, Japan’s technology policy has revolved around the dilemma, or trade-off, of balancing independence with reciprocity, and, possibly, sacrificing certain amounts of competitive edge and competitiveness in the exchange. Green (1995) mounts a compelling argument in the context of military technology and alliance management.

**Finance as national learning and the adoption of the gold standard, 1882-1897**

As explained above, financial and monetary technologies have been an integral part of the quest for knowledge and learning. Unfortunately, the few studies that have to some degree come to recognise finance as a central pillar of the newly developing doctrines of the Japanese state, with its geopolitical ambitions, remain silent about how this process has
involved the complex semantic arrangements that have been noted above. An important exception is Meiji zaiseishi hensankai, in 1927.

This is deplorable for the aforementioned paradoxes of late development are nowhere as pervasive and compelling as in the case of Japanese finance. In the following discussion, therefore, we are concerned with a more tangible and much less studied version of the paradox of technological dependence, especially Matsukata Masayoshi’s preoccupation with replacing Japan’s silver-standard with a gold standard. This has sometimes been considered as a riddle, particularly in view of the clear advantages Japanese exporters enjoyed throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century owing to the sustained deflation of silver prices.

Consider, for instance, the following French report of that time:

Will Japan, when abandoning the silver standard for the gold standard, lose the benefits of this former situation in its commercial contacts with Europe and the United States? Will it do all this to bring itself in line/put itself on the same rank with the Great Western Powers, in monetary terms as well as in other matters? That would be extraordinary indeed, and we may assume, before even inquiring into the matter, and if only considering that the Japanese themselves have been one of the main causes of their prosperity, that the statesmen of this country are too well informed to sacrifice a sure advantage for the vain satisfaction of possessing the same money as those peoples enjoying commercial hegemony. (Bourguin, 1897, p. 836)

The solution to the riddle must be found in the often-misunderstood merit of maintaining a gold standard. By moving onto the gold standard, Japan aspired to be recognised as a financially prudent member of the select gold club of countries dominating the world’s economic and political scene, and was competing for vast territories yet unclaimed by the imperialist Great Powers. In this respect, the gold standard served as a “guarantee of financial rectitude” (Bordo & Rockoff, 1996). What is more, however, the gold standard opened the door to foreign credit, as moving onto the gold standard meant that Japan would avoid the risks associated with fluctuations in the exchange rates between gold and silver currencies, and the disadvantages of clinging to the increasingly unattractive silver monometallism, especially prevalent at the time of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Capital imports would be used for financing industrialisation, that is, to pay for the import of foreign technology needed to facilitate further economic reform and modernisation; and they also fitted into a larger scheme of empire building (in the colonies of Taiwan, Korea, Karafuto, Nanyō and Manchuria). Railroad technology, a key component of Japan’s strategy
in the occupation of Manchuria, was first zealously imported from Great Britain (Ericson, 1998). For the Imperial Japanese army and navy, even more important items of expenditure were considered, especially those costs associated with the purchase of foreign (British) naval technology (Kobayashi, 1922). Not surprisingly, prior to the adoption of the gold standard, Matsukata had urged Ōyama Iwao, the then Minister of War, to use caution when ordering munitions from Western countries, in consideration of the ever-declining value of silver (Matsukata, 1887).

In building a modern navy, the role of gold standard in allowing the import of foreign capital was particularly important. Ever since the fall of the bakufu, Japan’s dependence on British naval technology was substantial both for acquiring state-of-the-art equipment through direct import and in enhancing Japan’s technology base, that is, through experimenting with new production modes, maintenance schedules and so on (Nagura et al., 2003). Of importance to our discussion, Matsukata’s policies were formulated in the 1882-1897 period when Japan’s dependence on British armaments was particularly marked. Although Japanese shipbuilders had been able to, more or less, provide for Japan’s navy by the time of the early 1880s, the advent of iron-clad steamships as the symbol of modern navy, and the development of revolutionary new strategies and technologies, once more forced the Japanese military into an undesirable, but necessary, large-scale reliance on, and collaboration with, major English arms producers, such as Vickers, Armstrong, and Nobel. The share of British makers in the production of Japanese naval technology in the period between 1880 and 1900 was almost fifty per cent, subsuming the role of the Japanese domestic ship-building industry to that of a mere subcontractor (18.7 % in 1890).

Despite the significance of the monetary values expressed, however, the foreign wave of innovation and investment must be regarded as a vector the value of which it is impossible to express in numbers and percentages (Suzuki, 1998). There is an interesting anecdote illustrating awareness hereof. When Takahashi Korekiyo discussed the possibility of a large war loan with Kuhn Loeb’s manager, Jacob Schiff, the latter inquired what could serve as security. Barings’ Lord Revelstoke, Takahashi’s associate at the time, replied “warships!” and Schiff immediately appeared to be convinced by that one word: a word “effectively embodying the unity of the gold standard, foreign investment, and imperialism” (Takahashi, 2001, p. 206).
Japan’s predicament: The lack of capital, 1897-1939

Japan’s political economic choices, encompassing industrialisation and empire, entailed a formidable dependence on foreign loans and capital, the constraints and importance of which would become clear with the militarist hijacking of all domains of social organisation in the 1930s (Shimazaki, 1998). Before that time, however, there was an uneasy consensus about the degrees of dependence to maintain, even if such originally contradicted policy makers’ intentions. The previously mentioned Report on the Adoption of the Gold Standard in Japan (Matsukata, 1899) is a testament of the hard-fought implementation of Matsukata’s policies. It is also an impressive public relations initiative by one of Japan’s leading modernisers seeking to win understanding and confidence from his foreign counterparts and the Western public, especially Western bankers and investors. In its foreword, Matsukata explains why this confidence was so badly needed:

Judging from the condition of things after October, 1897, I can not but think that at least a part of the object aimed at has been attained. One good effect of the coinage reform is seen in the steadiness of the exchange value of money. ... For [this reason] the industrial classes need be now no longer under constant apprehension of some unexpected changes in the value of money. The hope of inviting capital at a low rate of interest from gold standard countries, in order to help on the industrial growth of the country, will doubtless be realized before very long. (Matsukata, 1899, p. xii)

This and other statements, in combination with the abstention from foreign loans between 1873 and 1897, have led several (mainly Japanese) authors to perceive a distinction between autonomous finance (jiritsu zaisei) and dependent finance (jūzoku zaisei), roughly correlating with the period of Matsukata’s reign as minister of finance (1881-1892) on the one hand, and the era of proactive Japanese imperialism (1894-1945) on the other (Muroyama, 2004). Yet, this dichotomy is flawed at best. Although the Meiji regime did indeed refrain from floating any loans on foreign capital markets after 1873, autarky was never an objective of Matsukata’s policies, as his quotation above demonstrates. Neither was it an option for the Japanese Government to retreat from its large-scale borrowing of foreign capital, once the loans were floated their creditors demanded long-term repayment, as recent research makes clear (Bytheway, 2005). Indigenously generated capital was at no point sufficient for Japan’s ambitious industrialisation programs, both in terms of quantity and its purchasing power for acquiring foreign technology and foreign knowledge. More importantly, financial autarky would never have been capable of solving Japan’s daunting currency problems, which were
the largest hindrance to creating credit and capital in the first place. The country had been
drained of bullion and specie, and until monetary matters were steadied, and the bullion and
specie replaced, Japan could not even dream of embarking on the journey of industrialisation
and modernity.

The genius of Matsukata’s policies lie in his realisation of this fact, and in coming to
grips with a concrete means, a toolkit for bringing the dreams of industrialisation and
modernity closer. In many respects, his stratagems echo Fukuzawa Yukichi’s famous call for
Japan to “leave Asia and enter the West” (datsua nyūō) (Metzler, 2006, p. 40); associating
with the silver standard countries of East Asia would merely result in giving Japan the bad
name of the company it enjoyed, and thus, in financial terms, a low status of creditworthiness
(Bordo & Rockoff, 1996). Matsukata’s schemes laid the foundations of Japan’s monetary and
financial journey into the West, which was to be heralded by its adoption of the gold standard
in 1897.

**Foreign loans, 1897-1939**

In briefly considering the Japanese adoption of the gold standard, it is important to note that
Japan’s gold and currency reserves were held in London, and that the finance associated with
the gold standard’s adoption played an understated, and largely unknown, role during the
years of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Rapid industrialisation had allowed Japan to
ambitiously use the gold standard to import capital for economic development and military
expansion; that is, asserting autonomy whilst being dependent upon the supply of foreign
capital.

Following the adoption of the gold standard in 1897, the Japanese Government
employed foreign capital throughout Japan’s cities, country, and empire, in the form of
government, municipal, and company loans. These loans were to provide the financial basis of
an extensive program of public works, electricity generation, and investments in infrastructure
for Japan’s major cities; working capital for the provision, extension, and nationalisation of
railways throughout the Japanese mainland, Hokkaido, and the colonies of Korea, Manchuria
and Taiwan; and, above all, fund the huge financial costs generated by Japan’s wars against
China and Russia (Bytheway, 2005).

Until the outbreak of the First World War, Japanese Government borrowing was by far
the most important avenue chosen for the introduction of foreign capital, accounting for some
82.5% of the period’s 2.27 billion yen gross total with borrowing by companies at 9%, municipal
borrowing at 7.8%, and with direct foreign investment accounting for the remaining 0.7%. After the First World War, however, the Japanese Government was less able, and less inclined, to be seen as playing the leading role in Japanese capital imports, and a new generation of loans extended to semi-government and private companies were to come to the fore, along with an increase in direct foreign investment and joint ventures. From the first foreign loan to the Meiji Regime in 1870 to the last joint venture in 1939, Japanese Government borrowing accounted for 68.3% of the period’s 3.39 billion yen gross total of foreign capital imports, with borrowing by companies increasing to 22.3%, with municipal borrowing steady at 8%, and with direct foreign investment accounting for the remaining 1.4% (Bytheway, 2005).

We must also consider that the overwhelming bulk of all types of foreign borrowing, some 87.1% of gross total foreign borrowing, were denominated in pounds and issued on the London financial market, through the services of the London Group in the case of government borrowing, and mainly through the services of the Industrial Bank of Japan and the London Group in the cases of municipal and company loans. In the period that followed the signing of the Franco-Japanese Agreement in 1909, the Paris financial market emerged as the only credible competitor to the market of London, with 12.9% of gross total borrowing being denominated in francs by the time of the outbreak of the First World War. Owing to a repayment dispute, Japan was prohibited from dealing on the Paris financial market in the years after the First World War. The financial market of New York, however, more than made up for the loss of French credit, and, indeed, overtook the London financial market as the leading supplier of foreign capital to the Japanese market up until the outbreak of war in the 1930s (Bytheway, 2005).

Initial borrowing after the adoption of the gold standard was undertaken expressly for the provision of infrastructure, that is, for the establishment of the Yahata Steelworks, extension of telephone services and, particularly, in railway construction (Spalding, 1917). The outbreak of war with Russia in 1904, however, had put enormous pressure upon Japan’s financial resources, which were already strained from the debts incurred from the previous war with China. In this connection the intimate relationship between the financial authorities of Britain and Japan, cemented by the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, was of great benefit to Japan’s war effort. War against Russia would require vast amount of foreign capital for armaments⁵, and Japan had exclusive access to British capital that was provided in the form of government loans. Indeed, these wartime government loans accounted for some 30.9% of gross total government borrowing between 1870-1930. Of greatest importance, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance can be seen as having allowed Japan to enter into a series of wars that enabled it to take over the protection of British interests in East Asia, and eventually to attempt to achieve hegemony.
there (Overlach, 1976). Furthermore, debt accumulated primarily from the servicing of these wartime loans required conversion loans, at lower rates of interest, and these conversion loans which continued to be raised until 1930 accounted for 57.2% of gross total government borrowing, leaving loans for infrastructure to account for the remaining 11.9% (Bytheway, 2005).

What is immediately striking about the issues of foreign capital to Japanese cities and companies is that, when taken as a whole, the majority of loans to Japanese cities and companies were in service of, or came to serve, the needs of the Japanese state. In reality, very few private companies were to benefit from foreign loans until after the First World War, whereas semi-government organs, particularly those involved in Japan’s imperialist expansionism, such as the South Manchurian Railway Company and the Oriental Development Company, issued debentures guaranteed by the Japanese Government. Moreover, in the period from 1899 to 1931 the Japanese Government channelled the bulk of the loans, that is 88.5% of municipal loans, and 52.8% of company loans, through its own financial organ, the Industrial Bank of Japan, thus serving the dual purpose of replenishing Japan’s foreign specie reserves and supplying capital to domestic industry and the cities (Bytheway, 2005). Most of these were issued as government-guaranteed debentures, and in the case of the loan to Taiwan Electric of July 1931; the Japanese Government replaced the IBJ with the Yokohama Specie Bank (YSB).

The operation of the Industrial Bank, and its relationship to the Japanese Government, brings into question the validity of the loans themselves. Were municipal and company loans the outcome of genuine requests from independent municipalities and private companies eager for foreign capital, or did the Japanese Government carefully orchestrate the loans through its own semi-government organs, in a cynical attempt to balance its books, and help win support for its colonial and expansionist adventurism in Asia? In seeking to answer such questions, elements from both sets of suppositions are relevant. With the amount of information we have at present, however, it is most important to stress the reality of the municipal and company loans, and to recognise the important role played by these loans in providing infrastructure to Japan’s cities, railways, and electric power industry, whilst duly acknowledging the overwhelming official, or semi-government, presence of the Japanese Government, 87.1% by volume in all forms of foreign borrowing. Outside of the framework of the semi-government agencies, only the so-called Great Five electric power companies were permitted to issue large loans on the international financial markets, which they frequently did from June 1923 to July 1931 (Bytheway, 2005). Furthermore, it should be noted that of all Japan’s big industrial concerns, or
zaibatsu, only the Mitsui Bank and the Mitsui Trust Company were directly involved, and even that involvement was limited to a small number of company loans (Kikkawa, 1995).

We should then seek to conceptualise and quantify the amount of capital borrowed by Japan’s government, municipalities and companies in the period from 1870 to the outbreak of the First World War, and by extension, until the start of the Second World War in 1939. The incidence of Japanese Government borrowing sheds light on its fiscal priorities during the period in question and on its financial position in relation to foreign capital. Initially, in the period after the adoption of the gold standard, foreign capital was needed to defray the costs associated with the Sino-Japanese War, and to finance the provision of infrastructure. The Russo-Japanese War required a huge amount of foreign capital from 1904 to 1905, and the inability of the Japanese Government to repay previous borrowings necessitated a series of conversion loans in 1907, 1910, 1924 and 1930 (Bytheway, 2005). Finally, costs associated with the nationalisation of Japan’s railways required short-term borrowing in the financial markets of both London and Paris from 1913 to 1915. In total, Japanese Government borrowing in the period from 1870 to 1939 reached a gross sum of 2,728 million yen, or 281 million pounds (Bytheway, 2005). The pound sterling figures for all the final totals presented here are calculated using the official exchange rate of the pound sterling throughout the First World War, with one yen equivalent to 0.105625 pounds.

Loans extended to municipalities were most significant during 1902, 1909, 1912, and for earthquake reconstruction in 1926 and 1927 (Bytheway, 2005), and totalled 317,460,000 yen, or 32,483,200 pounds; while loans to companies, most notably to the South Manchurian Railway Company, totalled some 890 million yen, or 91 million pounds. British loans to the South Manchurian Railway Company alone totalled 175,734,000 yen, or 18 million pounds. Hence, it was often said that the British paid for Japan’s railways in China (Overlach, 1976). The electric power loans, the dominant form of Japanese borrowing in the inter-war period, totalled 523 million yen or 54 million pounds, accounting for some 58.7% of the total amount loaned to Japanese companies in the 1899 to 1931 period (Bytheway, 2005).

When we combine these totals with the approximate total of direct foreign investment in the period from 1899 to 1939 of 57 million yen, or 6 million pounds, total import of foreign capital reached a figure of 3,992 million yen, or 422 million pounds (Bytheway, 2005). We can then compare the total value of capital imports to the total value of Japan’s commodity imports, for example, capital imports averaged 41.2% of the total value of Japan’s commodity imports in the decade prior to the outbreak of the First World War, and 7.4% in the decade prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and war in China. Moreover, in the same two ten-year
periods, capital imports averaged 361.3% and 49.5% of the balance of payments deficits recorded in those two periods (see Figure 1 and Table 1). The enormity of Japan’s import of foreign capital, particularly in the lead up to the First World War, needs to be acknowledged in clear and unqualified terms.

Figure 1: Total capital imports versus total imports, 1897-1939
Source: Bytheway, 2005, p. 199.
Table 1: Total imports and balance of trade versus total capital imports, 1870-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total imports</th>
<th>Trade balance</th>
<th>Total capital imports</th>
<th>Trade balance versus total capital imports</th>
<th>Total imports versus total capital imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C/B</td>
<td>C/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>33,741.6</td>
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<td>-6,475.2</td>
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<td>-76.69%</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>294,377.6</td>
<td>-115,804.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>234,675.0</td>
<td>-8,652.5</td>
<td>97,988.0</td>
<td>-1132.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>300,832.5</td>
<td>-85,870.4</td>
<td>5,250.0</td>
<td>-6.11%</td>
</tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>268,626.4</td>
<td>-8,042.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>281,831.8</td>
<td>-9,804.5</td>
<td>52,900.0</td>
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<td>4,002.0</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>383,950.7</td>
<td>-52,402.5</td>
<td>214,786.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>499,501.9</td>
<td>-167,338.7</td>
<td>830,005.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>431,521.6</td>
<td>2,012.4</td>
<td>34,606.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1907</td>
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<td>272,611.0</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>453,332.2</td>
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<td>60,578.0</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>1909</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1910</td>
<td>498,521.0</td>
<td>-23,570.7</td>
<td>287,126.0</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>553,390.0</td>
<td>-87,264.1</td>
<td>58,578.0</td>
<td>-67.13%</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>664,658.8</td>
<td>-117,100.2</td>
<td>92,714.0</td>
<td>-79.17%</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>779,073.9</td>
<td>-127,749.5</td>
<td>126,038.0</td>
<td>-98.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1914</td>
<td>633,397.5</td>
<td>-22,865.3</td>
<td>24,307.0</td>
<td>-106.31%</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>563,391.2</td>
<td>169,665.6</td>
<td>29,289.0</td>
<td>17.26%</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>794,532.8</td>
<td>379,442.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1,088,306.8</td>
<td>575,147.3</td>
<td>1,250.0</td>
<td>0.22%</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1,744,849.9</td>
<td>269,342.9</td>
<td>1,050.0</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2,335,751.7</td>
<td>-179,158.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2,502,716.3</td>
<td>-491,509.6</td>
<td>250.0</td>
<td>-0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1,730,487.1</td>
<td>-433,223.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>2,023,027.9</td>
<td>-337,522.9</td>
<td>400.0</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>1923</td>
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<td>619,201.0</td>
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<td>1925</td>
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<td>-356,780.3</td>
<td>146,186.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1926</td>
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<td>-444,727.5</td>
<td>118,240.0</td>
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<td>1927</td>
<td>2,359,130.8</td>
<td>-294,041.7</td>
<td>69,754.0</td>
<td>-23.72%</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>2,372,999.4</td>
<td>-334,904.8</td>
<td>244,816.0</td>
<td>-73.10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>2,389,175.3</td>
<td>-171,517.3</td>
<td>24,969.0</td>
<td>-14.56%</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,680,314.1</td>
<td>-161,740.1</td>
<td>264,463.0</td>
<td>-163.51%</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,319,405.8</td>
<td>-140,194.5</td>
<td>67,132.0</td>
<td>-47.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1,524,321.0</td>
<td>-67,225.2</td>
<td>2,400.0</td>
<td>-3.57%</td>
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<td>1933</td>
<td>2,017,503.9</td>
<td>-85,434.8</td>
<td>750.0</td>
<td>-0.88%</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>2,400,494.6</td>
<td>-142,414.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>2,618,406.0</td>
<td>-15,254.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>2,927,975.3</td>
<td>-130,376.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3,954,725.6</td>
<td>-635,905.3</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>-0.08%</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>2,836,327.5</td>
<td>60,427.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>3,127,475.7</td>
<td>805,444.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Unit: 1,000 yen.

Conclusion

To recapitulate and summarise, the seven disparate, but inter-related parts of this paper deal with aspects, or rather, phases, of Japan’s pragmatic answer to the challenge and threat of Western capitalism: that is wakon yōsai. Attention is focused on the inherent paradoxes and challenges of financial policy in Japan during the period of its industrialisation, broadly from the forced opening of its ports by coercive treaties in 1854, to the last year of its receipt of direct foreign investment in 1939. We start, in the introduction, from the basic premise that Japan’s financial development in the periods before the Second World War cannot be understood by drawing distinctions between the liberal versus the planned economy, or between autonomous versus dependent economic growth and development. Paying particular attention to the views of those involved in formulating financial policy during those years when Japan's modern political economy took form, our study has argued the preference for planning was informed by Japan’s sense of backwardness vis-à-vis the leading Western economies, and its endangered position within the dynamics of imperialism in East Asia.

In the second part, Memories of Japan’s forced opening, 1854-1884, the fear of foreign dependence is seen as a potent force in the development of the mercantilist thinking which reigned throughout the period. State-led initiatives aimed at nurturing or promoting domestic and regional industries were soon waylaid by a larger drive to bring military force and, to a lesser degree, industrial production under the rubric of state guidance. Underpinning the above processes were the semantics of catching up with and surpassing the leading capitalist economies of the West. Part three, The political economy of catching up, 1884-1897, then turns from this discussion to describe how French economic thought informed, and appealed to, Japan’s Confucian-based conceptions of finance and economy. Ultimately, we find that the Meiji reformers adopted the Belgian model as an archetype of a central bank, as they attempted to establish a modern financial structure in their own country. The new central bank was then augmented by a complex array of state-directed special banks, in accordance with contemporaneous Continental financial theory.

The fourth part, Autonomy through dependence, 1897-1930, discusses the merit of Samuels’s analysis on the mechanisms of appropriating technology and his claim that technological autonomy should not be taken to imply autarky, but that it is entirely compatible with dependence on the knowledge and manufacturing techniques of core foreign partners. Taking our cue from Samuels’s insights, we then go on to apply them to Japan’s financial context. The fifth part, finance as national learning and the adoption of the gold
standard in the years 1882-1897, explains why Japan went to ‘all the trouble’ of adopting and maintaining a gold standard. The import of foreign capital is found to be central to its explanation, and, as the title of the sixth part, Japan’s predicament: the lack of capital, 1897-1939, reveals financial autarky would never have been capable of solving Japan’s daunting financial malaise. Moreover, the need for foreign capital, to help propel and stabilise economic growth, became more pronounced the further Japan travelled along on its journey of industrialisation and modernity. The seventh part, foreign loans 1897-1939, reviews the Japanese experience of foreign borrowing in terms of government, municipal and company lending (along with direct foreign investment), and serves to conclude our discussion by furnishing it with a firm empirical base. Necessarily, it deals with a tumultuous forty-two year period, distinguished by rapid economic growth and punctuated by natural disaster and war, in a general and succinct manner. It ends by asking the reader to acknowledge unequivocally the enormity of Japan’s import of foreign capital, particularly in the period between 1897 and 1914.

Using both primary archival and secondary sources, we have tried throughout the paper to follow an inductive approach, rather than project modern theories and frameworks onto historical data, in order to reconstruct the semantics of the state, its economic development and the imperialism of the period under study. Accordingly, we claim (not without acknowledgement of our intellectual debts) that our work is innovative in its method, original in its findings, and, thus, largely free of repeating the mantras of pre-established traditions in economic history. In earlier studies, we have clearly surveyed the existing literature, and documented how these studies in Japanese economic history have neglected to discuss the importance of the adoption and maintenance of the gold standard, and Japan’s subsequent large-scale import of foreign capital (Bytheway, 2005). Evidently, there is a need, therefore, for this paper to examine a hitherto unexplored dynamic of wakon yōsai. The result is a more intricate, yet empirically less problematic, picture in which politics and economics appear to both mingle and collide, producing both new policy problems and new solutions for dealing with these problems.

Planning, centred on the acquisition of technology and knowledge, necessarily included an understanding of financial technology, in order that Japan could further its economic growth and development. We have shown that for Japan, as a late developing country, the significance of Japan's adoption of the gold standard was that it allowed the large-scale import of foreign capital for modernisation through industrialisation, the conduct of large-scale war, and the pursuit of empire. These were goals for autonomy that could only
be achieved at the cost of dependence on what it was competing against: Western technological, political, and financial superiority.

Notes

1 See Bytheway (2005).
2 After the famous Principles of Promoting the Industries (shokusan kōgyō ni kan suru kengi) by Ōkubo Toshimichi. For the full text version, see Nakamura et al., (2000).
5 Japan’s total expenditure for the Russo-Japanese War was 1,639,267,194 yen (Ono, 1922).
6 Prior to the First World War, 85.9% of company loans were associated with the IBJ, while only 42.9% of company loans were associated with the IBJ in the inter-war period.

「和魂洋才」のダイナミックス：明治期日本における財政政策の矛盾と挑戦

要約：本稿では、近代日本の政治経済が、西洋の経済学的文脈によって十分に理解されていないことを明らかにする。とくに「従属を通しての財政的な自治」という一見矛盾している政策は、西洋強大国で「追いつけ」という社会的ダービニズムの自然的結果として理解されなければなりません。著者は、途上国としての日本にとって金本位制の採用が、近代化や戦争や帝国や体制維持のために行われた大規模な外貨輸入を可能にするうえで、いかに重要であったかを説明いたします。
References


THEME TWO:

REGIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS
Intersecting Islamic and ethnic identities in Kalimantan, Indonesia
Ian Chalmers

Abstract

Religion is generally a key component of ethnic identity in Southeast Asia. This is also the case in Borneo, where conversion often also involves a change in ethnicity. Specifically, until recently most converts to Islam underwent a process known as masuk Melayu, ‘entering Malaydom’. However, in much of Kalimantan the close affinity between Islam and Malayness has become more fluid in recent decades. This paper traces the transformation of the border between ethnic and religious affiliation, comparing the historical relationship between Islam and ethnicity in three provinces: West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan. Using a socio-historical approach, the paper finds that this border has become more blurred and describes how increasing numbers of Dayaks are identifying as Muslim. It also notes how some populations that previously considered themselves to be Malay are now assimilating to a Dayak identity, building on specific local Muslim Dayak traditions. The chapter concludes that this recasting of the borders between Dayak and Malay identities is injecting a greater degree of flexibility into the definition of what it means to be Muslim in Borneo.

Intersecting Islamic and ethnic identities in Kalimantan

This study explores the factors that shape identity in a part of Indonesia that is particularly socially diverse, focusing on the formation of religious and ethnic identities. Ethnic descriptors are widely used to categorise different groups of people, but ethnicity is inevitably a rather slippery concept: a particular ethnic category will comprise a cluster of distinct physical, ancestral, linguistic, regional and religious attributes, each of which can change over time. In addition, the emphasis given to any of these attributes will vary, depending on this changing political and social context. In some cases a definition of ethnicity might be imposed externally in a situation of political struggle, as one group seeks to dominate another. More often, an ethnicity will be generated internally and over a longer period of time as a group of people arrive at an understanding that they share various traits. It is this latter
definition of ethnicity that will be employed here to describe and compare changing structures of identity in three neighbouring provinces in Kalimantan, the largest of Indonesia’s many islands.

Religion is one of the more important cultural markers constituting the identity of a group of people, and social scientists generally subsume belief systems under the category of ethnicity. But in Indonesia, ethnic identity and religious affiliation are differentiated, and considered separate elements in an individual’s social identity. Certainly, there are those communities for which ethnic identity does connote religious affiliation. Most Balinese are Hindu; almost all Acehnese are Muslim; the dominant religion of the Papuans is Catholicism. But there are other ethnic groups that are more diverse in religious terms. The Bataks of northern Sumatra, for example, comprise about equal numbers of Muslims and Protestants; the ethnic Chinese population is especially diverse religiously, and includes many practising Christians, devout Muslims, and followers of a particularly Indonesian blend of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism, the Tri-Dharma (Brown, 1989, pp. 107-108).

Perhaps it is more significant that even those communities that are dominated by one faith generally contain sizeable and influential religious minorities. The Javanese comprise about half of Indonesia’s total population, and are overwhelmingly Muslim. But in central Java there is a well-established Catholic tradition, and there are growing numbers of protestant Javanese; ancient forms of mysticism commonly known as Javanism are also widely practised. Amongst the Balinese, too, there are substantial Christian and Muslim minorities, while in recent decades many coastal Papuans have converted to Islam. In a country in which the politics of identity is so important, common discourse thus emphasises ethnicity and religion as two separate components of an individual’s social identity. The result is a complex matrix of intersecting ethnic and religious identities.  

Kalimantan is an appropriate site to explore the relationship between religion and ethnicity. The island of Borneo is marked by an exceptional degree of ethnic diversity, with over one hundred distinct ethnic communities. In addition, all the major global religions have touched different parts of the island at different times, such that each of its myriad local belief systems has adopted, to a varying degree, the cosmology and doctrines of one of the universal religions. There is perhaps nowhere in Indonesia where local and global belief systems have intersected in more complex ways.

The growth of the Muslim community in Kalimantan is especially interesting in this context. Although this Indonesian part of Borneo is evidently becoming more Islamic, both in terms of official statistics and observed religious practice, the nature and impact of the
religion’s diffusion has not been uniform. In some regions Islam has become a key ingredient in the ethnic identification of a group of people, while elsewhere other ethnic groups have defined themselves in contradistinction to their Muslim neighbours. In yet other areas religion is not a particularly important ethnic marker, with people holding to different belief systems living together in the same community, and often under the one roof. It is described below how the Islamisation of Kalimantan has been associated with the emergence of different socio-religious formations. To state my conclusion at the outset, it is proposed here that Islamic religious practices on the island have become more diverse as a consequence of the interaction with different ethnic communities.

Later sections will examine the interaction between Islam and social formations in West, South, and finally Central Kalimantan. In order to establish the context for this study, the following section describes the tradition by which conversion to Islam involved the adoption of a distinct ethnic identity.

**Converging identities: The *Masuk Melayu* tradition of conversion**

Islamisation can have a variety of meanings. It sometimes simply means the formal adoption of Islam, and entails initially little more than the memorisation and utterance of the *syahadat*, an Arabic phrase affirming that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is his prophet. In Muslim circles the term implies a growing commitment to perceived Islamic values and the gradual accretion of spiritual knowledge, as one grows closer to God. In this chapter, however, the term is used in a purely sociological sense: it refers to the process whereby a whole community comes to consider itself Muslim, and within which there is social pressure to adhere to defined Islamic norms and behaviour. The cases discussed here thus concern the spread of what Ellen terms practical Islam, namely the religious symbols and practices that ordinary people use to organise the world in which they live (Ellen, 1983).

As is well known, the Islamisation of most of the Malay-Indonesia archipelago took place over many centuries and is generally understood to have entailed two processes (Federspiel, 2007; Riddell, 2001). It often began in a top-down fashion after the conversion of local rulers allowed visiting Muslim clerics to propagate the faith. More noteworthy was the process that occurred at the societal level, as traders and other Muslim wayfarers settled in port cities and then won local converts in the surrounding community. Such conversions may have occurred through inter-marriage, because of the authority of religious example, or simply because the association with trade brought heightened socio-economic status and
greater political opportunity, facilitating trading relationships and social mobility. This chapter focuses on this latter process, for it marked “the real acceptance of Islam” and the adoption of a common faith by communities that had previously adhered to localised belief systems (Federspiel, 2007, p. 35).

The relevance of this sociological perspective on the process of Islamisation is that in many islands of western Indonesia this process was marked by a wholesale change in ethnic identity. In contrast to the rather indeterminate relationship between ethnicity and religion that prevails in much of Indonesia, in the western part of the archipelago there is curious synchronicity between Malay identity and Islam. In Borneo, the Riau Archipelago, in parts of Sumatra and in peninsular Malaysia to be Malay means that one is automatically a Muslim; Malays who are Christian or Hindu are virtually unknown. Indeed, throughout much of Southeast Asia there is a well-established tradition whereby people of diverse ethnic origins become Malay or enter Malaydom (masuk Melayu) upon conversion to Islam.

There is some uncertainty over who the first Malays were, and where they originated. There is linguistic evidence that the Malay language evolved in western Borneo, then spread southward and westward to Sumatra, the Riau Archipelago and the Malay Peninsula (Collins, 2004). It is likely that the first Malay-speaking kingdom in the region was the maritime empire of Srivijaya based in South-eastern Sumatra. During its heyday between the eighth and fourteenth centuries this Buddhist kingdom dominated regional trading networks, thereby spreading Malay language and culture throughout the archipelago. But by the fifteenth century the Islamic court of Malacca had become the dominant socio-cultural centre and political authority in Southeast Asia. It attracted people from around the region, and its population also included many Arabs, Chinese and Indians. For our purposes, a defining moment in the expansion of Malay cultural influence was the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511. Following this defeat, Malacca’s population was dispersed around the archipelago. Significantly, the people of this community of “wonderfully mixed ethnic origins” came to be known collectively as Malays (orang Melayu), and by the seventeenth century seemed “to have evolved towards the idea of orang Melayu as a distinct ethnie” (Reid, 2004, p. 8).

We can thus consider the gradual evolution of the Malay ethnic grouping to be an early example of the complex process by which an ethnic category evolves. Initially, diverse peoples are brought together by common economic and/or political interests. It is likely that a common language will evolve from the necessity to conduct trade and diplomatic negotiations, while other ethnic markers will also gradually emerge. In the case of the Malays,
by the seventeenth century a characteristic of this community, and which served to distinguish them from their diverse neighbours, was adherence to Islam.

From the outset, the construction of this Malay identity had highly political overtones. During those centuries when the port city of Malacca had dominated the region Malayness was associated with the authority of the political and cultural centre. Following Malacca’s defeat, the dispersion of its Malay Diaspora began a process of socio-cultural diffusion: many of the groups with which they came into contact also sought to associate themselves with the cultural status of these people. In the following centuries communities of diverse backgrounds imitated a Malay lifestyle and adopted its values, a culture that opened up a world beyond the confines of local life. The most important element in this process of Malayanisation, and often the final stage, was the adoption of Islam. The defining feature of the process of becoming Malay, of masuk Melayu was thus conversion to Islam.

This tradition was later reinforced by the colonial authorities, which generally favoured groups that had adopted a global religion (Milner, 2008). In the colonial worldview, ethnic ascriptions separated civilised from uncivilised peoples; Malays were generally considered more modern in outlook, so the logical choice for upwardly mobile indigenes was the adoption of Malay mores and values. As Reid (2004, p. 15) notes, Malayness brought association with the urban super-culture of the colonial authority; in eastern Indonesia to masuk Melayu meant to become Christian. Here, it was conversion to the religion of the culturally dominant Europeans that opened up paths of social mobility. Throughout most of the archipelago, however, it was generally conversion to Islam that marked this change in social status. In other words, even though the Malay ethnic group came to be intimately associated with Islam, the dynamic behind the growth of this ethnic ascription was essentially socio-cultural rather than religious.

The masuk Melayu tradition came under challenge as various social movements gained ground in the early to mid-twentieth century, especially in Indonesia. In nationalist political discourse hierarchical ethnic categories were associated with the colonial past, and various non-Malay ethnic groups asserted their cultural autonomy. For example, in the 1950s the devoutly Muslim Mandailing Bataks of north-central Sumatra sought to exit Malaydom (keluar Melayu) as a means of marking their distinctiveness from the Malays of southeast Sumatra (Lubis, 2005). Today, the Malays are just one of Indonesias many ethnic groups; their home region is the Riau Archipelago and South-eastern Sumatra.

In other regions, the association of Malayness with improved socio-cultural status persisted into the post-colonial period. Although the masuk Melayu tradition also came under
pressure in Malaysia, especially after the granting of independence in 1957, here the situation is more complex. Certain indigenous groups in western Malaysia that converted to Islam reject a Malay identity, which they associate with the forces responsible for their political and social marginalisation. Other groups have become Malay, but refuse to adopt Islam (Kroes, 2002). The more common pattern, however, conforms to the established historical tradition: many indigenous groups choose to adopt a full Malay identity, for access to political authority brings tangible social benefits. On the Malay Peninsula, Malayanisation thus involves three elements: the use of the Malay language, acceptance of socio-political hierarchy, and conversion to Islam (Benjamin and Chou, 2002). In Thailand, most converts to Islam retain a Thai identity, but in the south many Malay-speaking converts also *masuk Melayu* (i.e. become Malay) (Albritton, 1999).

In Borneo, too, both Dutch and British colonialism strengthened the *masuk Melayu* tradition, for the authorities reinforced a socio-cultural hierarchy based on racial stereotypes. The term Dayak was a derogatory category used by the colonial authorities to refer to the peoples of the interior whom they considered primitive (King, 1993). An article published in the last decades of colonial rule and summarising much nineteenth-century writing on Borneo illustrates how this hierarchy created an incentive for Dayaks to become Malay. The author focuses on western Borneo, namely the region along the Kapuas River and parts of Sarawak. She contrasts the Dayak native savages with Malays who had adopted Islam. Although noting that the Islam brought from the Middle East was no longer pure because it had been diluted by local customs, they had thus achieved a higher stage of civilisation: the “inducement for the Dayaks was that a man by adopting the Malay religion and manner of life could raise himself to the status of the superior, dominant race” (Scott, 1913, p. 341). In a social climate dominated by Europeans, it is not surprising that many pagan Dayaks adopted the dress codes, values and religion of these semi-civilised Malays. Although the article is imbued with values that are not acceptable today, it contains the important insight that the interaction with local communities caused Islam in Borneo to take on highly localised forms: “Malay is in Borneo the great amalgam of race, language, and ideas” (Scott, 1913, p. 322).

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the forms that Islam has taken in the states of northern Borneo (Sarawak, Sabah, Brunei); yet it is clear that the *masuk Melayu* tradition has persisted in Kalimantan, where it is one of a number of Islamic socio-cultural traditions. This diversity of traditions is partly related to the regions geographical location, caught as it is between the different national political cultures of Malaysia and Indonesia.
However, the construction of local ethnicities is also important, for the social context in which Islamisation occurred has also shaped its practice.

**The primacy of ethnic politics in West Kalimantan**

The ethnic makeup of West Kalimantan is quite different from the rest of Kalimantan; so too is its social history. As is well known, the people of this province are sharply divided into the so-called three pillars (tiga tiang) of ethnicity. According to official figures, its population of four million is 41% Dayak, 39% Malay, and 12% Chinese (Collins, 2004). The continued separateness of these ethnic communities has been a feature of the province, for each has a distinct political and social identity; cultural discourse is thus largely conducted within one of these three groupings. For our purposes, the significance of this ethnic division is that it also extends to religious affiliation: Malays are overwhelmingly Muslim; the Chinese hold to a mixture of Confucian and Buddhist beliefs, with increasing numbers adopting Christianity; the Dayak communities sustain a mixture of Christian and indigenous belief systems, but one in which Islam is becoming more widespread. Of the four provinces of Kalimantan, it is in the West that the tradition of *masuk Melayu* is most firmly entrenched.

Islam was first introduced to Borneo following contact with groups from outside the region, as local leaders adopted the faith of more powerful and wealthy newcomers. No one knows with any certainty when Islam first appeared on the western coast, but the colonial historian P. J. Veth recorded that the Muslim dynasties of Sambas, Sukadana and Landak were established in the early sixteenth century (in Ave, King & Wit, 1983). The founding of these small Islamic states on the coast set the precondition for Islam’s penetration of the hinterland, as Moslem traders established commercial networks extending far inland.

After contacts with incoming Javanese, Malays, or Bugis, the conversion of these princes or coastal tribal chiefs to Islam allowed for the emergence of Moslem dynasties whose power dwelled primarily on economic bases: a harbour town, located at the mouth of a major river and open to maritime trade, controlled the trade routes of forest products from the interior (Sellato, 2002).

In this context, a particularly significant development was the founding of the sultanate of Pontianak at the mouth of Kapuas river by Arab and Buginese traders in the late eighteenth century (Somers Heidhues, 1998).

Not only did the forces that introduced Islam come from outside geographically: they also came from above socially. The access of these small coastal sultanates to symbols of
religious authority in Brunei, Java, Sumatra and the Holy Land of western Asia was augmented by their greater socio-economic status. The religion was thus associated with wealth, modernity and religio-political authority, and individuals who sought to improve their status were attracted to the lifestyle and worldview of this new social elite. This status gradually became an ethnic identity: although the coastal sultanates had been established by people who were generally of mixed ethnic backgrounds, in the decades and centuries following their foundation their ruling elites increasingly came to identify as Malay.

The conversion to Islam of large sections of the populous inland regions took place in the nineteenth century, and occurred via the massive Kapuas River that dominates the geography and cultural life of western Borneo. Leaders of a number of kingdoms on the Upper Kapuas adopted Islam, thereby consolidating trading links with Pontianak (Sellato, 2002). This change set the preconditions for the second societal stage of Islamisation, as whole Dayak communities around the trading centres scattered along the Kapuas adopted the religion that had been newly embraced by their leaders. Importantly, these mass conversions also involved large-scale changes in ethnic identity as these communities gradually became Malay.

The influence of the leaders of these trading centres had previously been measured in terms of the numbers of Dayaks from whom they could extract tribute. Most indigenous people maintained, and still maintain, a range of local belief systems that generally are not acceptable to devout Muslims. Some Dayaks nevertheless sought to associate themselves more closely with these Malays in order to take advantage of the new life opportunities that had opened up. It is not surprising that well into the twentieth century the adoption of a Malay identity was a common path of social mobility. The spread of Islam along the course of the river system thus involved the gradual top-down Malayisation of society.

At this point mention should be made of the third pillar of society in western Borneo, the Chinese. Popular legend has it that the first large Chinese migration followed the unsuccessful attack on East Java by Kublai Khan in 1292, after which many of the hundreds of retreating vessels in his massive armada were marooned on the west Borneo coast (Coedes, 1968). However, most Chinese migrants came centuries later. In her study of the population of the Chinese districts in northern West Kalimantan, Somers Heidhues (2003) describes how large numbers of Teo-chiu and Hakka-speaking Chinese began arriving in the mid-eighteenth century. Evading the control of their Malay overlords, they settled in both rural and urban areas as farmers, goldminers and petty traders. They often formed trade relations with inland Dayaks; some inter-married. The nature of their arrival left a lasting
legacy, and a distinctive feature of West Kalimantan today remains the wide range of economic activities in which Chinese are involved, from mining and rice farming to cash cropping and retail.

A second and more significant legacy of the manner in which Chinese settlers moved to Borneo was the limited social interaction with the politically-dominant Malays (Somers Heidhues, 2003). Whereas both the Malay/Dayak and Chinese/Dayak ethnic divides were somewhat porous, there has, historically, been a high degree of insulation between the Chinese and Malay communities. And whereas the other Straits Chinese groups of Southeast Asia generally acculturated with locals, creating the so-called peranakan or baba cultural blends, the Chinese ethnic groups that settled in Borneo tended to maintain exclusivist social ties (Carstens, 2005).

To sum up this socio-ethnic history of West Kalimantan prior to independence, a relatively distinct division between three ethnic groupings had evolved. Initially defined by different degrees of access to political patronage, the Dayak, Malay and Chinese communities were also differentiated on a socio-economic basis. This tri-partite divide was further reinforced by religious differences. As we have seen, the defining feature of the Malays was that they were Muslim. The Chinese generally maintained their distinct mixture of Confucianism and Buddhism, although significant numbers became Christian during the colonial era; virtually none adopted Islam. Finally, many Dayak communities remained largely untouched by the universal religions, although Christianity began to make significant inroads during the late colonial period. There was thus a great degree of overlap between religious and ethnic identities, more than elsewhere in Kalimantan and, perhaps, in the whole of Indonesia.

Ethnic divisions between Malays, Dayaks and Chinese actually deepened after independence, and especially during the three decades of the New Order. At the national level the Suharto regime sought to suppress ethnic differences, pursuing what has been called a vision of ethnic blindness in order to concentrate on economic development (Kipp, 1996). But in West Kalimantan these development policies accentuated ethnic divisions, for these three communities had differing access to economic resources, and thus different roles in the development process. Chinese business groups took on new and more lucrative economic activities, while Malays continued to dominate politics and the state apparatus. By contrast, many Dayaks felt marginalised both politically and economically, a sentiment often said to be the underlying cause of the violent ethnic conflicts that broke out between Dayaks and Madurese in the final years of the New Order, and which have been extensively described...
(Davidson, 2003a; Dove, 1997; Human Rights Watch Asia, 1997; International Crisis Group, 2001; Klinken, 2006; Schiller & Garang, 2002).

Since the New Order came to an end there has been cultural revival in West Kalimantan, a flowering of local cultural symbols. But this revival has largely taken place within distinct communities, and it is not at all clear that it will erode ethnic divisions. The most recent such revival has taken place within the Malay community, with festivals and conferences celebrating the role of local sultanates in the evolution of a regional Malay identity (Reid, 2004). Religion is an important part of such cultural celebrations, with Malay political leaders emphasising their links to the pioneers who brought Islam to the region. As al-Attas (1963) has shown, the heterodox forms of Sufism that spread throughout the archipelago in earlier centuries persisted. The forms of Islam adhered to today are still strongly mystical, appealing to popular Malay cultural traditions. In the case of the Chinese community, there has been a similar resurgence of local cultural identity, notably in the revived celebrations of Chinese New Year, imlek. However, the most assertive of these ethnic cultural revivals has taken place within the Dayak community, and has taken an overtly political form.

The background to the revival of Dayak cultural identity is a deep sense of political disempowerment, a feeling that can be traced to the demise of the Dayak Unity Party (Partai Dayak). This ethnic-based party had been formed soon after independence, grew rapidly in the 1950s, but disappeared as a political force in the face of central state opposition in the 1960s (Davidson, 2003b). Generally isolated from formal political influence, the Dayak community’s economic marginalisation and lack of access to resources during the New Order period compounded this discontent. In this context, a landmark event was the National Seminar on Dayak Cultures held in Pontianak in 1992, a conference organised by the newly established Institute of Dayakology. Ever since it was founded, this NGO has played a leading role in promoting the awareness of Dayak culture, finding national and international support for its various research and development activities (Florus, Djuweng, Bamba & Andasputra, 1994).

A growing awareness of indigenous belief systems has been an important element in the Dayak revival, but seems to have hardened the ethnic divide between Dayaks and Malays. The Institute of Dayakology activists who have become perhaps the most important spokespeople for this cultural revival maintain a distinctly negative attitude towards world religions. A founding member of the Institute, and one of the editors of its founding 1994 publication, argues that state support for the universal religions colonised local belief systems,
stunting their ability to serve Dayak spiritual and social needs (Djuweng, 2001). Elsewhere, the Institutes director suggests that both Muslim and Christian faiths, supported by the state, were partly responsible for the destruction of indigenous Dayak cultures (Bamba, 2004).

This discussion thus indicates that religious affiliation in West Kalimantan is still strongly linked to ethnic identity, a conceptual structure that has dominated socio-cultural discourse ever since the time of the sultanates. In the case of Islam, the strength of the masuk Malau tradition means that the increase in the number of Muslims has been virtually synonymous with the expansion of the Malay community.

There are indications, however, that religious faith might be becoming less subject to such social constructions of ethnicity. Two cracks in the wall of this tripartite ethnic discourse have recently appeared.

The first factor that is eroding the dominant ethnic discourse involves the changing national context for religious instruction. In the past, the ethnic insulation of the Malay population allowed religious leaders to sustain local mystical practices, as we have seen. But the influence of normative and more universal Islamic teachings is being increasingly felt through organisations that are national in scope and international in orientation. For example, it often used to be the case that local religious boarding schools (pesantren) and educational institutes became vehicles for local figures to establish their own loyal following. But the fourteen State Institutes for Islamic Studies (IAIN) and thirty-three State Colleges for Islamic Studies (STAIN) in Indonesia now teach curricula that are designed by the national Ministry for National Education and expose students to various academic traditions, including Western traditions (Meuleman, 2002). There are several such institutions within West Kalimantan, and their educational efforts would seem to be, gradually moving Islam towards a more Universalist orientation, and away from its association with Malay magical elements.

The second crack in the armour of the tri-partite ethnic discourse on religion is related to the first, but is perhaps the more important. A small but growing number of Chinese are converting to Islam, while increasing numbers of Dayaks who convert are refusing to become Malay. The Association for Muslim Dayak Families (IKDI) was established in the late 1990s, but in the early 2000s began organising politically, motivated by the frustration of Muslim Dayak politicians who found themselves unable to represent their communities because of ethnic loyalties. Since national laws for local autonomy came into effect IKDI's activities have become increasingly effective. The inclusion of more Dayaks and Chinese in the Muslim community will undoubtedly erode Islam’s close association with Malayness, while
political assertions of ethnic identity as separate from faith challenge the discourse on ethnicity that has dominated in this part of Kalimantan.

To conclude this section on West Kalimantan, it has been shown that Islam first established a strong local presence when political leaders sought access to symbols of spiritual and secular authority. The second societal stage was linked to western Borneo’s incorporation into global markets, when Islam penetrated into the hinterland, carried by the marketing networks established by Malay traders. This stage is still continuing, as evinced by the continuing celebration of the close link between Islam and Malay political, economic and cultural authority. However, this region may be entering a third stage of Islamisation, one in which the religion is breaking free of structures of ethnic identification.

The Muslim Banjarese of South Kalimantan

The province of South Kalimantan is widely considered to be the homeland of the Banjarese, the urang Banjar. The Banjarese are usually classified as a Malay ethnic group, albeit one with strongly localised characteristics. Like the Malays of western Borneo, the origins of the Banjarese also lie within the political and economic elite, and the evolution of this ethnic category is best understood from a socio-historical perspective. But unlike the Malays of West Kalimantan, the Banjarese numerically dominate the province of South Kalimantan. According to official statistics, they make up over 76% of its population of three million, with the remainder made up of Javanese (13%), Buginese (2%) and Madurese, Bakumpai and Sundanese (each 1%) (Suryadinata, Ananta & Arifin, 2003, p. 25). Most importantly, it is overwhelmingly the Banjarese who dominate local cultural and political expression.

The Banjarese community is syncretic: a result of the blending that took place in the past between Malays and different local Dayak peoples. The original Banjarese probably lived in the region surrounding Martapura, a small city on the Barito floodplain fifty kilometres inland from Banjarmasin. We know that small communities of Malay seafarers, traders and fisher people had settled near the coast before the 15th century, and were later joined by smaller numbers of Javanese. These communities that gradually expanded inland and pushed out local groups: many Ngaju people of the lower Barito and Negara river systems moved westward; the Meratus people (formerly called Bukit Dayaks) retreated northwards and eastward into the Meratus mountains (Tsing, 1993); the Maanyan Dayaks who had originally occupied all of the upriver Hulu Sungai region were forced northwards and westward (Hudson, 1967). But some of the indigenous peoples stayed, and adopted
Malay language and cultural norms. For their part, the new arrivals gradually absorbed many of the attributes of the various Dayak communities into which they had settled; their Malayness was diluted, eventually evolving into a distinct local community.

The Banjarese thus trace their ancestry to a variety of bloodlines: Malay, various Dayak communities, Javanese and, to a lesser extent, Bugis. Clearly, they cannot be considered a primordial category in the same sense as many other ethnic groups, which have specific cultural markers extending back thousands of years. Local historians suggest that the formation of the Banjar ethnic category commenced after the early 16th century.

According to the late Alfani Daud, three sub-ethnic categories emerged from this process of acculturation (Daud, 1997). The first group to emerge was the Pahuluan Banjarese, who evolved from the Meratus Dayaks of upland South Kalimantan. There followed the Batang Banyu Banjarese who evolved from the Maanyan Dayaks, an acculturation process centred on the ancient riverine Hindu kingdoms of Dipa and Daha. Finally, the coastal Banjares (Banjar Kuala) are more identifiably Malay in culture, but blended with Ngaju Dayak groups. As noted, some Ngaju moved westward, and had been largely replaced by Banjarese around Banjarmasin and the lower reaches of the Barito and Kapuas rivers by the mid-nineteenth century. But most stayed and blended with Malay settlers, who adopted local cultural practices. Indeed, the very term Banjarmasin is a mixture of Malay and Ngaju, meaning village of Malays.5

The internal diversity of the Banjarese has given rise to some doubt about the boundaries of this ethnic category. An official history of the Banjarese notes that it is debatable whether the urang Banjar constitute a separate ethnic category (tim editor [editorial team], 2003). Idwar Saleh has argued that the Banjarese are not distinct at all, but a community that expresses elements of Javanese, Ngaju and Malay cultures (in Mahin, 2004). Nevertheless, Banjarese political leaders and social commentators consider themselves to be representatives of a distinct community, and in recent years a number of events celebrating Banjar culture and values have occurred. For example, in 2002 a quality Indonesian-language journal (Kandil) focusing on Banjar culture was launched by the Non Government Organisation, LK3, the ‘Institute for Islamic and Social Research’. Each issue of Kandil, (lantern) contains articles examining a specific aspect of Banjar society; topics covered include Banjarese Islam (no. 6), Social Movements (no. 10), and Conflict and Local adat (no. 13). In October, 2007 a Banjar Cultural Conference was opened by Governor Rudy Arifin, with the theme of raising the submerged pole, a metaphor for the supports of a traditional
Banjar riverside house (Kongres Budaya Banjar, n. d.). These are only recent manifestations of the heightened self-awareness of Banjarese ethnic identity that has emerged.

Two factors are often said to mark this community’s distinctiveness. The most important characteristic of this ethnic group is its religious identity, for the Banjarese frequently proclaim that the Islamic faith is one of their defining features. There are many indications of this religious piety. Over 97% of the province’s population is Muslim, a figure that has remained unchanged for decades. There is a prayer house (langgar) in virtually every village, and a great many mosques in the major towns, especially Banjarmasin, Amuntai, Nagara and Martapura. Perhaps the most impressive indication of local devoutness is the regularity with which locals have long performed the expensive and dangerous pilgrimage to Arabia, the haj. Banjarmasin became a major port of embarkation for visitors to the Holy Land centuries ago, and by the nineteenth century was already the city that sent the largest number of pilgrims from the Indies. In the early decades of the twentieth century the expansion of the local economy permitted about 10,000 devout pilgrims to leave for Arabia each year. “Southeast Kalimantan suddenly counted the highest proportion of hajis in the entire Islamic world” (Lindblad & Verhagen, 1988). It is still the case today that many pious Banjarese use their life savings to perform this religious duty. Despite its low average per capita income and although it accounts for less than two percent of the nation’s population, South Kalimantan sends the third-largest number of pilgrims each year; only Jakarta and Aceh send more (Hawkins, 2000).

The second characteristic often used to mark the distinctiveness of the Banjarese is the language, which is a variety of Malay with many local and outside borrowings. This linguistic blending is reflected in the language used in the Hikayat Banjar, the tale of origin of the Banjar court dating from about the seventeenth century. A noted linguist who has written one of the most important texts on Banjar culture concludes that it was written in “a rather archaic type of Malay, superimposed on a substratum of Dayak dialects, with an admixture of Javanese” (Ras, 1968, p. 8). Although this tale consists of many local myths and popular legends, it is a contemporaneous document and is recognised as an important historical record. It tells us that even by the seventeenth century the Banjar language reflected a range of cultural influences: Javanese, Bugis, Ngaju, Meratus, Maanyan, and Malay. In the following centuries this language evolved into a distinct tongue, and has now become a key component of Banjarese ethnic identity.

One measure of the importance of the language in this context is provided by an often-cited text entitled Some Banjarese Cultural Issues. This book contains twenty-three chapters,
each of which deals with a different aspect of the language: its script, spelling, morphology, common proverbs, as well as the correct forms to be used in poetry, marriages, laws, government decrees, and formal correspondence. The recurring issue identified by the author is the need to standardise the use of correct Banjarese language, which he recognises is a difficult task because the language is in fact a mixture of various tongues (Artha, 1974). The emphasis placed on the language in such semi-official documents indicates how it serves to unite an otherwise diverse people. Just as the project to build an Indonesian nation from its many ethnic groups was a project that gathered pace in the early decades of the twentieth century, so is the construction of the Banjarese community also an aspiration to unite diverse peoples. What brought these influences together? And if the origins of these people are so diverse, why then is the religion adhered to by about 90% of Indonesians such an important component of their identity today?

Perhaps the most common explanation emphasises the impact of migration, suggesting that the religion was brought by Malays drawn to the region’s economic wealth. After the seventeenth century the region became a major producer of pepper, later a centre for trade in textiles, and then a centre for the manufacture of metal goods (Hall, 1996; Reid, 1984). This economic wealth attracted many newcomers, mostly Malays but also Buginese and Javanese. These groups had access to new cultural resources which, over time, were adopted by the local community: “[e]ven though more Dayak blood may flow in the body of certain Banjarese communities, the culture which they promote remains the culture of the newcomers” (Daud, 1997, p. 4). On this view, the spread of Islam is associated with the gradual Malayanisation of local communities: “Islam became the distinctive characteristic of Banjarese society: there are no Banjarese [today] who have not already embraced Islam” (Daud, 1997, p. 542). The Banjarese culture is considered a basically Muslim Malay culture, albeit with local accretions.

This perspective has echoes in the contemporary use of religion to define ethnicity, especially on the geographical boundaries of the Banjarese region. Anna Tsing has described how from the seventeenth century the Banjarese expansion pushed local Dayaks into the Meratus mountains, which became a Dayak island surrounded by Banjarese Muslims. Some Dayaks did convert, but in the process thereby became Banjarese (Tsing, 1993). In those upland parts of South Kalimantan that are ethnically mixed today, it is religion that distinguishes the Banjarese from Meratus Dayaks, who adhere to a local belief system containing many Hindu elements (Radam, 2001). In a local version of the masuk Melayu
phenomenon, Dayaks today still become Banjar if they convert to Islam. In other words, to become a Muslim is, by definition, to become an ethnic Banjarese.\(^6\)

A perspective that looks for the wellspring of local religious belief in such terms has the effect, however, of decentring those people who should be the focus of our analysis, namely the Banjarese. Rather than conceiving of Islam as an exogenous factor, as a cultural import brought to the region by foreign settlers, it may be more useful to consider the religion as an identity marker adopted by certain local social groups. Islamic teachings obviously originated outside Indonesia, but their popularisation was not necessarily associated with the arrival and expansion of a particular ethnic group. A more fruitful perspective is one that explores the factors that led certain local Dayak communities to adopt Islam, and to then examine the nature of their relationship with the Muslim Malays.

Marko Mahin has offered a thought-provoking re-interpretation of the Hikayat Banjar, one which goes some way towards explaining how Islam was adopted by the Banjarese court (Mahin, 2004).\(^7\) He finds that there was no Banjarese ethnic group prior to the sixteenth century: in the Hikayat itself there is no mention of Dayaks or Banjarese, indicating that these categories emerged subsequently. A turning point came with a brutal struggle for power within the palace, when the rightful heir to the throne, the young Samudra, fled before being killed by a rival. While in hiding, he sought support first from local Dayak allies throughout southern and central Kalimantan, and later the sultanates of Sambas, Sukadana, and Lawai on the west coast. Importantly, Samudra also formed an alliance with the coastal Javanese kingdom of Demak, which was at the time deeply involved in a struggle with the Catholic Portuguese. Samudra won this support on the condition that he converted to Islam. After his victory in 1526 the royal Hindu family thus adopted Islam; *Pangeran* (Prince or King) Samudra became Sultan Suriansyah, the first ruler of the Banjar Sultanate. In this perspective, the original identification of the Banjarese with Islam was thus not ethno-cultural but political: rather than an ethnic trait brought by migrating Malays, it derived from a strategic alliance formed with the local Dayak king to oppose non-Muslims.

The spread of Islam within the general population over the following three centuries can be explained by a combination of two factors: the long period of economic expansion, and the socio-political conditions under which it took place (Chalmers, 2008). As noted earlier, pepper plantations and other cash crops expanded from the seventeenth century, as did trade and later manufacturing. These growing economic interests were largely controlled by the Banjarese political elite, who identified more strongly with Islam. The eighteen sultans who followed Suriansyah continued to provide important material support for the religion,
including sponsorship of Kalimantans most famous Islamic scholar, Arshad al-Banjari (1710-1812). In 1835 Sultan Adam issued a famous law that obliged all the population to adhere to the Syafii school of Sunni Islam. And as the palaces link with Islam developed a stronger socio-economic base, so did the incentive for local communities to adopt Islam become greater.

Crucial to the Islamisation of the evolving Banjarese community was the construction of the Dayaks as a non-Islamic ethnic other. They were outside Islam, and therefore considered beyond political sponsorship; various peoples who maintained their traditional practices moved away. Those Dayaks who remained adapted to the emerging cultural norms; the adoption of Islam marked entry into this ethnic group. With Islam now the key component in identity formation, the growth in the number of Banjarese occurred through religious conversion rather than migration.

In time, Banjarese became an ethnic category in the full sense. Hawkins (2000) notes that in the nineteenth century Banjar still referred only to the royal court, but that by the 1930s urang Banjar was being used as an ethnic designation. A similar conclusion was reached by Riwut, a famous nationalist hero and the principal founding father of Central Kalimantan, who carried out a number of detailed socio-historical studies of Borneo. He finds that the influence of the Banjar royal elite extended increasingly beyond the palace as they took up positions as religious officials, government bureaucrats and businesspeople. By the 1940s and 1950s Banjar referred to the people of the upriver Hulu Sungai region, and eventually became an ethnic category for all those peoples who lived inland from the major port for the province, Banjarmasin. Illustrating the strong identification of the Banjarese with Indonesian nationalism, the popularisation of this ethnic label occurred at about the same time that Kalimantan began to replace Borneo as the common local name for the island amongst nationalists (Riwut & Riwut, 2007).

The history of Islam in South Kalimantan is thus one of its incremental advances. There may have been Muslim traders in coastal districts from as early as the tenth century, but the key event in the first stage of Islamisation was the conversion of the king in the early sixteenth century; the religion then gained adherents amongst the palace elite. The second stage of Islamisation began when this political elite transformed itself into an economic elite during a period of sustained economic expansion. And the mechanism by which Islam spread throughout society was through an ethnic construction, with the Banjarese defined as distinct from the Dayak.
One might therefore conclude that these ethnic and religious constructions are mutually reinforcing, creating a totalising ethno-religious tradition. However, there is also a degree of fluidity in the use of ethnic categories to describe Islam in South Kalimantan. It is true that there are virtually no Banjarese who are not Muslim, but it has been shown that the Banjarese community is internally diverse. In addition, neither of the two ethnic markers often cited as distinctive of the Banjarese—language and religion—are exclusive. In southern Kalimantan there are many Ngaju-speaking Muslims, Banjar-speaking Christian Dayaks, and Malay-speaking non-Muslims. As Mahin (2004) argues, we should not see the Banjarese as created from a melting pot of other ethnic groups. Rather, a more appropriate metaphor for the ethnic order in South Kalimantan is of a *gado-gado*, a salad of different and intersecting identities.

At this point it should be noted that an important historical precedent was set by one ethnic group that was never absorbed into the Banjarese, namely the Bakumpai. A subgroup of the Ngaju Dayaks, the Bakumpai originally lived at the village of Marabaahan on the Barito River about fifty kilometres west of Banjarmasin. The Bakumpai had the advantage of speaking both Ngaju and Banjarese, and became intermediaries with up-river Dayak communities. Although contact with the Banjarese led most to convert to Islam, they maintained a separate Dayak identity, and by the end of the nineteenth century considered themselves a distinct ethnic group (Sjamsuddin, 1991). These pious Muslims thus considerably blur the close association between Islam and Banjar identity.

The Muslim identity of this Dayak community becomes relevant in the context of a Borneo-wide revival of ethnic consciousness. As we have seen, until recently, indigenous groups would become Banjar upon conversion to Islam. But nowadays there is not the same pressure to change ethnicity. In fact, we may even be witnessing early signs of a gradual re-Dayakisation of society: many Banjarese families recall that they too have Dayak ancestry, and lay claim to Dayak cultural traditions (personal communication Marko Mahin, March 30, 2007). Although such observations are largely anecdotal, the frequency with which they were mentioned lends them credibility. This Dayak cultural revival has been most pronounced in Central Kalimantan, which has witnessed a resurgence of Muslim Dayak traditions.

**Dayak revivalism and the diversity of faith in Central Kalimantan**

Of the three provinces examined here, the relationship between ethnicity and religious faith is most fluid in Central Kalimantan. The province is remarkably diverse ethnically, and has probably become more so as a result of the in-migration that has occurred in recent decades.
This diversity may be responsible for a rather loose association between particular ethnic groups and religions. The ethnic Javanese, Banjarese and Madurese are overwhelmingly Muslim, and Islam is continuing to win converts from within the numerous Dayak ethnic groups. But the growth in the Muslim population has not diminished the tolerance shown towards non-Islamic religious practices, nor the diversity of local forms of Islam.

From the outset, the socio-cultural context for religious affiliation was set by the activism of Dayak politicians. In the early twentieth century the derogatory term Dayak was appropriated by local activists of the dominant ethnic group of southern and central Kalimantan, the Ngaju. A number of Ngaju politicians drafted a Pakat Dayak, a Dayak Agreement, petitioning the authorities for improved social conditions and political representation for the indigenous people. This pro-Dayak sentiment persisted during the late colonial and early post-colonial periods, and re-emerged in a movement demanding greater local autonomy, eventually leading to the creation of Central Kalimantan as a separate Dayak homeland in 1957 (Chalmers, 2006). Today, similar political activism has created a political context encouraging Dayaks to identify as Muslim.

Such a linkage between pro-Dayak activism and Islam may seem to be counter-intuitive, for the demand for Dayak cultural autonomy has, historically, been associated with non-Islamic religions. The church took a leading role during the colonial period, and after Kalimantan was incorporated into the Netherlands East Indies in the early 1800s they were encouraged to propagate the faith amongst non-Muslims; the German Rheinische Mission and the Swiss Baesler Mission actively sought to win converts from within the Dayak community. Their educational programs produced a small and highly motivated Ngaju elite, especially in the Kuala Kapuas region in the south of the province (Miles, 1976). It was these groups that were behind the Pakat Dayak, and by the time independence was achieved in 1945 Christianity had become the religion of the Dayak political elite.

These activities left an important political legacy, and have given Christianity a strong socio-cultural presence. Today, visitors cannot help noting the large Protestant cathedral in the capital of Palangka Raya and the numerous smaller Catholic churches scattered throughout rural areas. In addition, numerous schools, seminaries, colleges and other social institutions are managed by church authorities, while ministers and lay officials are prominent community leaders. In short, a great deal of social life revolves around the church in both urban and rural areas.

If Christianity has long been evident within elite social circles, in recent decades we have witnessed a revival of local religions with a far longer genealogy, religions known
collectively as Kaharingan. There is now a considerable literature on these belief systems, especially those of the larger Dayak ethnic groups, the Ngaju, Maanyan and Ot Danum (Ave 1972; Hudson 1972; Scharer 1963). Although they differ in important aspects, all involve elaborate religious practices centred on the life cycle, particularly death rituals. These religious beliefs also contain certain Hindu-Buddhist elements, indicating long-standing cultural interaction with Java and laying the basis for the eventual classification of Kaharingan as a form of Hinduism.

The religion was politicised after independence, and enjoyed something of a populist revival. Although most Dayak politicians sided with Republican forces during the national revolution of 1945-1949, local ethnic demands soon re-emerged. In the early 1950s organisations such as the Union of Kaharingan Dayak of Indonesia (SKDI) held a Peoples Congress of Central Kalimantan (KRKT), and demanded the creation of a separate Dayak homeland that would not be dominated by the Muslim Banjarese. Some of these groups took up arms; reflecting the warrior tradition of the Ngaju Dayaks, this movement was called GMTPS, Gerakan Mandau Talawang Pancasila, Pro-Pancasila Movement of the Cutlass (Mandau) and Shield (Talawang). The central government acceded to their demands and a new province was carved out of South Kalimantan; Central Kalimantan was formally proclaimed in May 1957 (Miles, 1976; Weinstock, 1987).

A turning point in the recent history of Kaharingan came in 1980 when, after decades of lobbying by prominent Ngaju politicians and religious leaders, it was recognised as a form of Hinduism (Weinstock, 1981). Official recognition increased its appeal. Previously, Kaharingan had been classified as an aliran kepercayaan, a belief stream, and did not enjoy the material and social benefits that derived from classification as one of Indonesia’s recognised religions, an agama. The institutionalisation of the religion now enabled it to attract more followers, and the number of those classified as Hindus in Central Kalimantan increased notably in the following decades (Schiller, 1996).

It remains then to describe the place of Islam, which has a somewhat uncertain position in the political culture of the province. The Christian faith of much of the Dayak elite gives the religion a firm social base, while the recent revival of Kaharingan gained it a level of official backing. Given the lack of formal support that has been extended to Islam historically compared to West or South Kalimantan, there has been a somewhat surprising increase in the number of Dayak Muslims in the province.

The proportion of the population of the province as a whole who identify as Muslim has increased in recent decades, rising from 55 to 74 percent between 1971 and 2000.
This growth can be attributed partly to migration, both past and recent. According to official provincial statistics, the predominately Muslim Javanese and Banjarese communities constitute 19 and 24 percent of the population respectively. Yet official data show that the majority Dayak community is also about half Muslim: fifty-three percent of those in the eleven largest Dayak ethnic groups identify as Muslim, with the remainder split evenly between Hindu, Protestant and Catholic faiths.\(^9\)

The recent Dayak revival also builds on a number of Islamic socio-cultural traditions, giving Islam in the province a particular character. This diversity partly reflects the manner in which it was introduced (Anwar, 2006). Unlike West and South Kalimantan, in Central Kalimantan Islamisation was not a process initiated and subsequently dominated by a political or economic elite. Rather, it began with what was referred to in the first section above as the second process of Islamisation: rather than being introduced by a powerful political leader, from the beginning Islam was spread bottom-up, and involved processes strongly based on societal forces: trade, Sufi activism, intermarriage, education. And because the process was more localised, different historical contexts played a greater role. Inevitably, Islam took a variety of forms as it adapted to the social contexts created by different Dayak communities.

The forms of Islam that evolved in Central Kalimantan have been described elsewhere: the Javanised aristocratic Islam of the Dayak Kotawaringin sultanate on the south coast; the Barito tradition of politicised Islam following the failure of the Dayak-led Banjar rebellion in 1859-1863; the more austere Islam brought by ulama returning from the Holy Land in the early twentieth century (Chalmers, 2008). But what is most relevant here is the Islam that became established within Central Kalimantans riverine communities. Traders travelled up and down the numerous rivers in the province from at least the seventeenth century, and many settled and married into local Dayak communities. As Muslim communities grew, prayer houses and later mosques were built for the performance of religious obligations, and a distinct riverine Muslim culture emerged. A good example of this process is provided by the Bakumpai Dayaks mentioned in the previous section, who by the mid-nineteenth century had spread along the provinces longest river, the Barito, leading to thousands of conversions, either by marriage or by example. Bakumpai traders can now be found along all the major rivers throughout Kalimantan, and there is a major concentration at Puruk Cahu, 800 kilometres from the mouth of the Barito in the mountains of Central Kalimantan (Sjamsuddin, 2001). Inevitably, these Muslim traders confronted non-Muslim religious traditions.
There were different responses to the activities of Muslim preachers (*mubaligh* or *dai*). Some Dayak groups steadfastly rejected Islamisation, such as the Maanyan of the eastern Barito districts, who have generally maintained religious practices that blend indigenous with Hindu elements; many later converted to Christianity. On the other hand, some Dayak communities merged into the expanding Banjarese ethnic group in the southernmost regions, as we have seen. Although many other Dayak communities did convert, their conversion did not usually lead to changes in ethnic affiliation, however. As Dayak Muslim activists are fond of pointing out, the *masuk Melayu* tradition has never been strong in Central Kalimantan.

An earlier study of the Ngaju of northern Central Kalimantan provides some clues to the factors underpinning changing religious identities. Based on fieldwork carried out in the early 1960s, Miles (1976) describes how Ngaju converts to Islam in a large urban community on the upper Barito became Banjarese, and thereby lost their prior ethnic affiliation. As Miles notes, however, there was a high degree of fluidity associated with faith at this time, and people would often switch between religions on the basis of pragmatic considerations. It is likely that their willingness to change ethnic affiliation was also based on the same pragmatic consideration: it was the Muslim Banjarese who had better links to outside economic interests. It seems logical to conclude that these Ngaju became Banjar to complete their conversion to a way of life that promised improved material circumstances.

Today there is not the same incentive to change ethnic identity, for Dayak community leaders have stronger links with external sources of influence. In this context, a more recent study suggests that ethnic affiliations are becoming more important markers of identity. In his account of the Banjarese penetration of a community in the East Barito district, Kumpiady Widen (2002) describes how a minority of Maanyan did convert, seeking to emulate the lifestyles of their Muslim Banjarese neighbours. A partial acculturation towards Banjarese norms took place: to distinguish themselves from non-Muslims they felt obliged to speak Banjarese and adopted other Banjar identity markers. However, these converts did not change their ethnic self-identification: they called themselves Muslim Maanyans.

This example is only one of a more general revival of Dayak cultural and political activism across Central Kalimantan. Some have suggested that such cultural assertiveness expresses a growing Pan-Dayak consciousness throughout Borneo, one that took root in West Kalimantan and then spread northwards and eastward (Thung, Maunati & Kedit, 2004). This is only part of the story, however. Although it is undoubtedly the case that political activists have been influenced by the pro-Dayak sentiments expressed in neighbouring provinces, the logic of indigenism is necessarily local, an expression of a sentiment demanding greater
cultural autonomy for local communities. Although some suggest that this revival is based on
the material and strategic interests of an emergent socio-political elite based in the provincial
capital (Klinken, 2001, 2002), the renewed celebration of Dayak identity has been generally
local in focus, emphasising the importance of the local community and family traditions
(Schiller 2002, 2007). Prominent spokespeople for Dayak interests in the province certainly
emphasise the cultural focus of their political activism (Kusni, 2001; Usop, 1994; Widen,
2002).

In the context of a strong revival of various Dayak identities, religious affiliation is
only one of various significant attributes. Islam is an important marker of identity for some
Dayak groups, such as the Bakumpai and Sampit Dayaks, as is Christianity for most Maanyan
and Hindu-Kaharingan for the Ot Danum and Dusun Dayaks. Religion is of less importance
for others, such as the Ngaju and Katingan Dayaks, who contain roughly equivalent numbers
of Christians and Muslims. Yet all Dayak ethnic groups seem to have become more assertive
of their Dayakness. As a consequence, the Dayak revival has injected a greater degree of
fluidity into the relationship between ethnicity and religious affiliation.

**Concluding comments**

Based on these descriptions of the socio-historical processes behind Islamisation in three
provinces in Kalimantan, it is possible to draw a number of more general conclusions. Firstly,
the ethnic identity maintained by different local populations has greatly influenced the nature
and extent of Islamic practices. In West Kalimantan, the primacy of ethnic constructions of
identity has generally limited Islam to the Malay community, making religion a key signifier
of ethnicity. By contrast, in South Kalimantan it is religion that defines ethnicity rather than
the reverse, so the religion has incorporated a wide range of local ethnic practices; the
category of Muslim Banjarese extends to a number of sub-ethnic groups. Finally, in Central
Kalimantan there have been many different Islamic traditions, making it difficult to generalise
about local forms of Islam. But the relative fluidity of ethnic and religious identity does
suggest that in Central Kalimantan religion is somewhat less definitive of identity.

A second conclusion is that there has been a long-term trend toward greater fluidity in
ethno-religious identity in Kalimantan as a whole. It is beyond the scope of this study to
ascertain whether Islamic teachings in the region have become more tolerant towards
alternative formulations, as has been found for Indonesia as a whole (Azra, 2004). But in each
of these three cases there has been a trend whereby ethnic and religious identities have
become less fixed. Even in West Kalimantan there is evidence of movement across ethnic and religious boundaries that were formerly quite rigid.

Finally, a third and related conclusion concerns the focus of this study, the tradition of *masuk Melayu*. We have seen that in many parts of Borneo the Malay ethnic community had a virtual monopoly on the Islamic identity. Although this was never really the case in Central Kalimantan, there are regions in southern parts where conversion to Islam has involved individuals becoming Banjar, the variant of Malay ethnicity as constructed by local communities. However, throughout Kalimantan the *masuk Melayu* phenomenon has become less common as various non-Malay communities have become Muslim without losing their local ethnic identity.

**Notes**

1 Fredrik Barth (1969) marks the discursive shift from objective to subjective definitions of social identity within the social sciences. Judith Nagata (1974) made a significant contribution to the debate on the construction of ethnicity, showing how a ‘situationist’ perspective can explain variations in subjective definitions of Malay ethnicity. Cynthia Enloe (1996) suggests that both ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ approaches should be used, noting that adherence to a set of religious principles can unite an ethnic group but may, in certain circumstances, divide an otherwise identical social grouping.

2 Hildred Geertz (1967) provides a classic description of Indonesia’s ethnic and religious diversity. A comprehensive account of the various religions of contemporary Indonesia is the volume edited by Kipp and Rodgers (1987), to which they contribute a useful theoretical introduction.

3 This figure is controversial, for many of those classified as Malay actually belong to one of the dozens of Dayak ethnic groups of western Borneo; some ‘Malays’ are now beginning to reclaim their Dayak identity. According to one estimate, Malays constitute about 20% of the population (Somers Heidhues, 2004).

4 Muslim Dayak politicians complain that they had previously been excluded from office by a convention that when a Muslim Malay is appointed to a senior position, the ethnic and religious balance would be maintained by the appointing a Christian Dayak as deputy (personal communication, H.A.M. Idrus, Dayak politician from Upper Kapuas, March 7, 2007).
Banjar is Malay for ‘village’, while masih or oloh masih is Ngaju for ‘a Malay’. Banjarmasih later evolved into Banjarmasin (tim editor [editorial team], 2003, p. 72).

According to one authority on the cultures of South Kalimantan, the Banjar term for conversion is babarasi, a ‘cleansing’ of pre-existing religious beliefs (equivalent of the Indonesian ‘bersih-bersihkan’) (personal communication, Setiabudi, February 16, 2007). This implicitly characterises the Dayak worldview as unclean.

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The movement was revived in the mid-1990s, when a number of Dayak politicians formed the ‘Generation of Warriors to Continue the GMTPS’ (APP-GMTPS) (personal communication, Yansen Lambung, Palangka Raya, July 30, 2003).

Unpublished data from the provincial office of statistics provide a breakdown of faith by fifty-four ethnic groups. Whereas Madurese, Banjarese and Javanese are 100, 99 and 96 percent Muslim respectively, these eleven Dayak ethnic groups (almost half the province’s total population) are more varied, ranging from 99% Muslim for Bakumpai and 82% for Sampit Dayaks to 43% for Ngaju, 37% for Katingan, 18% for Tomun, 4% for Maanyan, and 1.1% for Dusun Dayaks. The other numerous smaller Dayak communities tend to be either Christian or Hindu (BPS-Kalteng, ‘Penduduk per kabupaten/kota, suku bangsa dan agama’, 2000).

References


India: In search of a nation and its other histories

Sekhar Bandyopadhyay

Abstract

“The world is divided into territorial states”, writes Smith (2000, p. 1). It is “similarly divided into nations; that is, named populations possessing an historic similarity, shared myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members, which are legitimised by the principles of nationalism” (p. 1). Smith (2000) also observes that “states, nations and nationalisms do not often coincide … it is the aim of all nationalists to create the conditions for a greater congruence between state, nation and nationalism. In this quest they have been only partly successful; but this serves merely to spur nationalists to greater efforts” (p. 1). This essay, by looking critically at the recent historiography of nationalism in India, seeks to demonstrate that in Asian post-colonial nations like India, where community structures and historical trajectories have been significantly different from those of Europe, such efforts to invent “congruence” can be even more futile and counter-productive. On the other hand, as this historiography also shows, there can be alternative ways of conceptualizing nation, disentangled from the history of the nation-state. In such models of nationhood, homogeneity is not imposed from above, pluralism is celebrated, and a nation is allowed to speak in many voices, as those voices do not necessarily challenge the sovereignty of the state. Nation can thus be seen as a ground for debate and discussion of competing visions, rather than just a breeding ground for consensus and homogeneity, providing legitimacy to the nation-state.

Introduction: Conceptualising nation

In this current age of globalisation, as consumer goods and labour travel more freely across the national boundaries and threaten to homogenise our consumption cultures and complicate the ethnic structures of national communities, there is a renewed focus on reinventing the “congruence” between the nation, nation-state and national identity. In the countries of the global south this debate has been caused more by the flooding of goods and cultural artefacts from the north, whereas in the north it is more the influx of labour from the south that has unsettled the established cultural textures of nations. Cultural and political anxieties created by such globalising trends have been recently discussed in a provocative book called Fear of
Small Numbers, by Appadurai (2006). It is to be noted that nationalism itself was homogenised as a global phenomenon during a previous era of globalisation, that is, the era of imperialism. And not just that, the way the histories of the post-colonial nation in India have been written bears the continuing evidence of Western intellectual hegemony that puts the modern nation-state at the centre of any historical discourse on nationalism. Instead of that, this essay will argue that the history of the Indian nation—and similarly of the other post-colonial nations in Asia—can be better understood if we give up the futile search for artificial “congruence between state, nation, and nationalism” (Smith, 2000, p. 1) and discursively disengage the history of nation from the history of the nation-state. Different readings of the history of India can suggest a number of alternative ways of conceptualising nation. However, it is also true that these alternative possibilities were overlooked by the modernist elite of colonial India who were more attracted to the model of territorial nationalism of the West.

In terms of general theory of nationalism, there is a greater consensus among historians that nation is a collective mental construct, it is not something naturally given. Anderson (2006) has provided a powerful definition of nation by calling it an “imagined political community” (p. 6), which is constructed through the influence of print capitalism, that is newspapers and novels, and by such other politico-cultural artefacts of modernity as census, maps and museums. Hobsbawm (1983) has called nationalism an “invented tradition” (p. 1). What Anderson, Hobsbawm and others (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994) have done is to unmistakably entangle the history of nationalism with that of modernity.

Nationalism is now widely recognised as a modern phenomenon, inspired by Enlightenment and Romanticism, incubated in an economic environment enriched by industrial capitalism and was the product of particular historical processes in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which led to the transformation of the absolutist dynastic empires into democratic nation-states. Nations and nationalism in Europe thus came to be integrally associated with the notions of self-determination, states and sovereignty. This post-Enlightenment European modernity travelled to Asia through the pathways of empires. But the boundary lines of these new geo-political constructs had very little congruence with the pre-existing lines of ethnic, racial or religious communities in this continent. It was in this state of historical confusion that the process of nation building started in Asia. Schama (2002 tells us in his television history of the British Empire that the liberal expectation of the empire was to educate the indigenous people in self-government and when they would be ready to claim their own nation-states, the empire would “pack up and go”! The empires did not leave
of their own volition, and Asian nationalisms were born through anti-colonial resistance movements.  

Challenges for Asian nationalisms

There were however, problems in imagining nations in these regions, as their own histories differed from those of the empires. First of all, these empires contained myriad groups of people. Take for example the British Indian Empire, which had eighteen major languages and about 844 local dialects, about 3000 castes and two major religious groups, the Hindus and the Muslims, besides a host of other minor religions. Other colonies like British Burma or Malaya, Dutch East Indies or French Indochina had equally diverse populations (Tarling, 2001). If we look at the pre-colonial history of state formation in these regions, what we find is that unlike Europe sovereignty was not conceptualised as centralised absolute power; it was always shared with the periphery. In Mughal Empire in India, as the recent historiography shows, the Emperor shared his power with the regional polities and the concept of sovereignty was shared and layered (Alam & Subramanyam, 1998).

In the Southeast Asian states, like Cambodia, Thailand or Burma for example, as Osborne (2000) has argued, sovereignty was conceptualised as a system of concentric circles, where the power of the monarch gradually faded as one travelled away from the capital. In such a political system, it was difficult to imagine firm territorial boundaries of states drawn across the maps. There were maps in pre-colonial Asia, but the political boundaries were fuzzy and porous (Harley & Woodsward, 1992), and therefore it was hard for peoples to think of themselves as territorially anchored populations which could become core groups for imagining modern nations.

As for India, many imperial observers like Chirol (1910) believed that India was a “mere geographical expression” and one might add, that too was the creation of the British Empire. It was, as he wrote in 1910, inhabited by a great variety of nations… there are far more absolutely distinct languages spoken in India than in Europe; that there are far more profound racial differences between the Maharatta and the Bengalee than between the German and the Portuguese … and that caste has driven into Indian society lines of far deeper cleavage than any class distinctions that have survived in Europe. (in Ray, 1980, p. 37)
Some of the early Indian nationalists like Surendranath Banerjea (1963) accepted that and described India as a “nation in making”.

This “making” process, as Anderson (2006) would suggest, was facilitated by the colonial regimes, which brought to the colonies Western education and print capitalism and created an intelligentsia who had been crucial to the process of imagining a nation. They were helped by several institutions of the colonial state: colonial cartographers drew their territorial boundaries; the census operations counted them, transforming the “fuzzy communities” into “enumerated communities” (Kaviraj, 1993, p. 20); and the colonial museums reinvented their antiquities. The colonial intelligentsia chose their models, Anderson (2006) argues, from the “official nationalisms” of European or American histories, which “were copied, adopted and improved upon” (p.140). Even before Anderson formulated his theory of modular influences in his 1983 book, many historians of Indian nationalism had been writing in the same vein. A British Broadcasting Corporation documentary, (1985) claims in a triumphalist tone that modern India remains exactly as she was fashioned by her colonial masters. It is this claim that has been contested in the more recent historiography.

**Indian nationalism and its hybridity**

Chatterjee in his 1993 book observed with sarcasm that if the West crafted our colonial subjecthood, imagined our anti-colonial resistance and designed our post-colonial misery, then what was left for us to do? “Even our imaginations must remain forever colonized” (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 5). So in what ways could Indian nationalism claim its difference from the western model? We can address that question by raising several related questions regarding how this nation was imagined. First of all, where the vast majority of the population were illiterate, did education and print capitalism play the same role in nation building as envisaged by Anderson or before him by Gellner (1964)? If not, then what was this process and how did it differ from Anderson’s modernist mental process of imagination? Second, how did this Indian concept of nation relate to territory and the inherent pluralism of the population contained therein?

Chatterjee (1993) sought to address these questions by dividing the nation’s space into an inner spiritual space where the colonised nation seeks its sovereignty in spite of subjection in the outer public space where it surrenders to Western modular influences. As another postcolonial historian Chakrabarty (2000) argues, nation is thus spiritually experienced in this inner sphere, rather than mentally or rationally imagined. This can be illustrated by the
nationalist iconography of Bharat Mata or Mother India. It was in 1882 that Chattopadhyay in his Bengali novel Anandamath, introduced the powerful imagery of mother goddess into the discourse of nationalism. For her disciples he drew with his emotive words three pictures of Mother in three different forms: the Mother as she was, the Mother as she is and the Mother as she will be, and wrote a song “Bande Mataram” (Hail Mother) that eventually became the anthem of Indian nationalism.

In the Hindu mythology the Mother goddess is imagined in two forms: Kali and Durga, both representing primal power. Mother is responsible for procreation as well as protection of the world from all evils. During the extremist movement in the first decade of the twentieth century this imagery of mother goddess in both these two forms were extensively used for appealing to the masses. Then in 1905 Abanindranath Tagore, the illustrious nephew of Rabindranath Tagore, drew the famous water colour image entitled “Bharat Mata” (Mother India), thus introducing a new form of mother goddess now expressly representing the motherland. In the subsequent years this image of Bharat Mata was represented in multiple ways and reproduced in millions in various art forms, and almost in every regional language songs were written in her praise.

Such imageries are not absolutely rare in the history of nationalism; Marianne of France is an obvious example (Agulhon, 1980). In India too a significant amount of literature has been produced on this nationalist icon; here we may go into only a selected few. Modernist and feminist historians like Sarkar (1987) have called Bharat Mata a “cultural artefact” (p. 2011) of nationalism, which also reflected the patriarchal anxieties of a male dominated colonial society. In Tagore’s painting, mother appears to be more vulnerable: she is no longer the protector but requires protection by her patriotic sons. Other historians have argued that Bharat Mata was not an artefact or a rational construct, rather it naturally emanated from a centuries-old Hindu tradition of regarding earth or Prithvi as mother. This religio-mythological concept of mother-nature equation was naturally extended to cover motherland (Bose, 1997). For Chakrabarty (2000), this spiritual aesthetic of visualising nation as a nurturing mother, or this “seeing beyond the real”, is different from the “mentalist” process of imagination that Anderson speaks of (pp. 174-175). This iconic representation of nation bridged the gulf between the literate elite and the illiterate masses in a way that no print capitalism could ever achieve.

Yet, other historians like Sumathi Ramaswamy (2003) considers Bharat Mata and similar other nationalist imageries as “products of a modern imagination”, which had nothing in common with the Puranic Hindu mythological concepts of Kali, Durga or Prithvi. The way
the subsequent representations of Bharat Mata were dressed up and placed on the map of India, with a national flag in her hand, it amounted to what she called “territorialisation of the goddess”, or “somaticisation of the motherland”. In it she sees the “cunning of modernity”, as this transforms the nation into a kin group by making all its citizens sons of the same mother. It is a fact that the way Bharat Mata was represented in the later nationalist iconography of the 1940s it is difficult to miss the obvious modernist elements like the flag and the map. But then it will be simplistic to describe this symbolic representation of a spiritual nation as modernist; more appropriately we should recognise its hybrid nature, because the evidence of cultural alterity in this nationalist imagination is too obvious to miss.

This hybrid nature of nationalist imagination will become clearer if we keep in mind that it provided space for heterogeneity. In 1948, shortly after independence, a history textbook for school children (Sonar Bharat) published in Calcutta contained a picture of Bharat Mata imposed on a map of India, with a couplet at the bottom from a well-known patriotic song by Dwijendralal Roy. In English translation, those lines would mean: “The day Mother India you emerged from the depths of the blue ocean” (in Bandyopadhyay, in press). The poet’s nationalist imagination thus seemingly pushed the history of the motherland back to the earliest day of creation. But the map shows no territorial boundaries – apart from the natural boundaries provided by the oceans. Pictures like these leave us not with the representation of a territorial nation-state that the British left for us, but with an image of a cultural space that had been the cradle where an Indian civilisation was nurtured.

**Alternative nationalisms**

It is in this civilisational concept of nation that Indian nationalism could claim its difference from the Western territorial concept of nation. This broad Universalist concept was spelled out more clearly in the early twentieth century writings of Rabindranath Tagore. In a famous poem in *Gitanjali* (1910) he described India as a civilisation, a meeting ground for various kinds of humanity, rather than simply a country or territorial unit. Tagore (1902) had further argued in another seminal essay with the title *Bharatbarsher Itihas* (History of India), that India had been subjected to a series of foreign invasions by Greeks, Scythians, Parthians, Shakas, Hunas, Arabs, Persians, Afghans and Mongols. But many of the foreign invaders eventually embraced this land and in course of time were themselves “Indianised” and left their mark on Indian art and culture, further enriching its immense diversity.
It was in this assimilative power that India could claim her difference from Europe. Because, here the idea of India developed more as an inclusive civilisational community, rather than as a political territorial state. Indeed, the whole of India was never politically unified until the first half of the eighteenth century, as the various regional groups continued to maintain their political autonomy and local patriotism, and continuously fought with each other. Tagore (1902) dismisses this “political” or statist history of territorial warfare as a dark history of nightmares. He privileges instead the other more inclusive history of social assimilation, which internalised even the invading outsiders. It was in this assimilative spirit, Tagore argued, that the true essence of Indianness, her national identity was to be found. This essence could not be rationally defined, but like life in a body, it needed to be felt or experienced.

Mahatma Gandhi was also developing the idea of a civilisational nation when he was working for the rights of the Indians in South Africa. Then in *Hind Swaraj* (Indian Home Rule), (1909) in response to the question: “Who is the nation?” Gandhi wrote: “It is only those Indians … who conscientiously believe that Indian civilisation is the best…” (Gandhi, 1997, p. 52,) And this civilisation is not exclusive, as he goes further: the “introduction of foreigners does not necessarily destroy the nation, they merge in it. A country is one nation only when such a condition obtains in it” (p.115).

One of the stalwart theorists of nationalism, Elie Kedourie argued that nationalism is a combination of patriotism or love for the country and xenophobia or dislike for outsiders (in Kedourie, 1994). In other words, it is a process, which is inclusive and exclusive at the same time. In this sense Tagore and Gandhi’s concept of nation was certainly different, because here the core of the nation was a civilisation, not any “sacred national ethnos”, to borrow an expression from Appadurai (2006, p. 4), or any politically unified territory. A postmodern historian Nandy (1994) has therefore described them as counter-modernist critics of the imperial West, who offered an alternative model of nationalism and nationhood, which could unite India at a social rather than political level by creatively using this difference.

Neither Tagore nor Gandhi rejected modernity as a package, but made a case for an alternative modernity, which would be modern but not Western (Hardiman, 2003). Nor did they reject the idea of nation, but suggested ways to conceptualise it outside the political exclusivity of territorial states. Nandy is, however, right when he asserts that the educated Indian middle classes and their party the Indian National Congress did not accept Tagore and Gandhi’s Universalist concept of nationhood, and adopted instead the narrower Western political model of nation-state. However, this civilisational concept of nation also raises two
difficult questions, one about the antiquity of the putative nation, and the other about the limits of the assimilative nature of this civilisation itself.

It seems as if Tagore and Gandhi, and after them Nehru in his book *Discovery of India* (1945), were pushing back the history of the Indian nation to 3000 BCE when the Indus valley civilisation flourished in the north-western parts of what constituted British India or at least to 1500 BCE when the Rig Veda the earliest text of the Aryan civilisation was believed to have been composed. Historians have questioned such retrospective biographies of nation. One of the well-known postcolonial historians Prasenjit Duara, who in 1995 published a book with a provocative title, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, critiqued such formulations as “teleological model of Enlightenment History” that has tended to give the “contested and contingent nation” a false sense of history (Duara, 1995, p. 4). But one could argue that Tagore and Gandhi were not looking for a modern territorial nation, but the civilisational core that had the potential to develop into nationhood in a social rather than political sense.

In European historiography this debate over the antiquity of nation was renewed in 1990 when Connor wrote a seminal essay called “When is a nation?”, reiterating the modernity of the idea (Connor, 1990). Then in 1999 Smith published a new book *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, to explore what he called “the pre-modern bases of nationhood in the earlier manifestations of ethnic community” (Smith, 2004, p. 196). He was critiqued by a number of modernist historians and the debate between Smith and his detractors led to a special issue of the journal *Nations and Nationalism* in 2004. What is interesting however is that almost at the same time, and without any reference to the European history debate, a new set of books came out in India trying to trace the pre-colonial roots of Indian nationality.

Two books in particular, Ray’s *The Felt Community: Commonalty and Mentality before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism* (2003) and Habib’s edited book *India – Studies in the History of an Idea* (2004), tried to trace the etymology of “India” and its indigenous equivalent *Bharat* and *Hindustan* and their history of development as a geo-cultural space, rather than a geo-political construct, since at least 1500 BCE, that is the period of the Rig Veda. “A longer view of history”, Ray (2003, p. 537) argues, “reveals the process by which this civilisation effected its transition to nationhood”. This transition process matured in the revolt of 1857 when the rebels constantly referred to the people of India as the “Hindus and Mussulmans of Hindustan” (Ray, 2003, p. 543). This was not modern nationalism, Ray agrees, but in it he sees the inchoate ideas of a confederate nation. In his own words, “It signified a confederation of two separate peoples bound together as one political unit by the shared perception of Hindustan as one land” (Ray, 2003, p. 545).
In this idea of confederate nation Indian nationalism could also claim its difference. Indeed this was not an idea that died with the suppression of the revolt of 1857. In the 1890s, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan visualised India as a confederate nation of *qaums* or communities based on common descent, where entitlements and rights would be determined by community identity rather than by individual citizenship (Lelyveld, 1978). Sir Muhammad Iqbal, who is usually known as the originator of the idea of Pakistan, said in 1930: “The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries … The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified…” (in Pirzada, 1963, pp. 123-24). Iqbal in 1930 was not demanding a separate sovereign nation-state for the Muslims or partition of India, but recognition of a confederate nation.

Gandhi, too, believed in this idea when he gave leadership to the Non-Co-operation-Khilafat Movement in 1920. But he changed soon to declare that “we are Indians first and Hindus, Mussulmans, Parsis and Christians after” (in Pandey, 1990, p. 233). Indianness thus does not any more co-exist with, but takes precedence over all other identities. It was 1922 and since then the Indian National Congress wholeheartedly embraced the Western concept of nationhood based on individual citizenship. The ultimate goal of this nationalism was to achieve sovereignty for the Indian nation-state. It was also expected that this nation would speak in one voice, which would provide legitimacy to the nation-state. All other heterogeneous voices that could be allowed by the civilisational or confederate models of nation were now delegitimised. However, as history of Indian nationalism suggests, it was difficult to muffle all those discordant voices, which questioned not only the official statist nationalism of the Congress, like the Muslim breakaway politics after 1937, but also the alternative nationalisms as well. Among those voices were those of the untouchables or the *Dalit* (oppressed) and the regional cultural separatism of south India.

**Challenges to homogeneity**

The Dalit leader Dr B.R. Ambedkar in a hard-hitting treatise in 1936, called *Annihilation of Caste*, questioned the very inclusive nature of Indian civilisation. In his perception of history the foundational principle of this civilisation was caste exclusion or the *varnashram dharma*, which condemned several million untouchables into the status of social outsiders in their own land. Tagore and Gandhi accepted that untouchability was a blot on Indian civilisation and needed reform; but they considered it as a distortion or aberration rather than the foundational
principle of the civilisation (Parekh, 1989; Bandyopadhyay, 1990). Ambedkar rejected their reformist solution, branding it as a deliberate attempt to obfuscate the real issue of Dalit empowerment, and wrote in 1945 another hard-hitting book, *What Congress and Gandhi have Done to the Untouchables*. He was not opposed to swaraj or self-rule, but he asked: “Tell me what share I am to have in the Swaraj” (in Omvedt, 1994, p. 216). In other words, he was not against Indian nationalism and did not claim a separate sovereign state for the Dalit; he was concerned more about the rights of citizenship within the Indian nationhood.

Similarly concerned were the non-Brahmans of western and southern India, the latter in a more articulate way than the former. They believed that the Indian civilisation was essentially the Brahmanical culture of north India, which spread to the south to subjugate and hegemonise the autochthonous southern Dravidian culture and the Tamil language. In other words, the so-called inclusivism of Indian civilisation was actually hegemonic. Yet, this so-called Tamil separatism did not actually claim sovereignty for a separate Tamilland, although there had been some rhetorical claims (Irschick, 1969; Ramaswamy, 1997). What they really demanded was recognition of their distinctive voice within the nation-space, to use Homi Bhaba’s (1990) terminology.

Apart from the distinct voices mentioned above, there were multiple other voices in the history of nationalist movement in India and that makes the application of the standard modern definition of nation problematic. One of the modernist expectations is that, as Walker Connor (2004) put it, “national consciousness is a mass, not an elite phenomenon”, and it was not a nation if the “elite’s conception of the nation did not … extend to the masses” (p. 41). It takes us back to the question where we had started. In a country where people spoke so many languages, where the majority of the population were illiterate peasants, where print capitalism did not work effectively to communicate ideas, how could the “elite’s conception of nation” (Connor, 2004, p.41) be homogenised? Those who came to see Gandhi in his numerous mass meetings were inspired more by rumours about his supernatural powers, than by his message of non-violence or civilisational nation. They interpreted nationalism in their own ways, deriving meanings from their day-to-day experiences. Their notion of nation most often differed from those of the elite (Amin, 1995).

The masses in their millions participated in Congress-led movements for national liberation, but the forms of these movements varied so widely from region to region, that apart from their simultaneity, it is difficult to describe them as one movement. If the Congress wanted to achieve a nation-state, the peasants often dreamed of a utopian Gandhi Raj, where there would be no taxes, no landlords, no rents or no moneylenders. Bharat Mata became a
hybrid symbol of this nationalism. As Jawaharlal Nehru discovered, although he desired to see a secular modern nation, his rural followers would still be defining nation in religious terms and would be in immense difficulty when asked what their Bharat Mata actually stood for (Nehru, 2002). This nation and its nationalism therefore defy the modernist definitions based on the experiences of European history.

**Conclusion: Conceptualising a pluralist nation**

So how can this situation be resolved? One way is to agree with Aloysius that it was *Nationalism without a Nation* (1997). Or we may say like an influential group of Indian sociologists like Sharma and Oommen (2000) that India is a multi-national state. Both these positions assume that a nation has to be homogeneous and it has to speak in one voice. Khilnani, (1997) on the other hand, recognises that Indian nationalism was plural: “a dhoti with endless folds” (p. 6). But all those folds arise from the same piece of cloth, which is its underlying unity, *The idea of India*. But we may also conceptualise a nation with many voices. If we disengage the history of the nation from the history of the state, then we need not expect that a nation should speak in only one voice and should have a homogenised identity, which is required to provide legitimacy to the state. This disengagement will allow us to recognise the multiple voices of a nation. Not all of these voices claim sovereignty, but seek recognition within the broader nation-space (Bandyopadhyay, 2004). In other words, instead of searching for a homogeneous nation, we should consider nation as—to use Ania Loomba’s (1998) expression—“a ground of dispute and debate, a site for the competing imaginings of different ideological and political interests” (p. 207).

It is only this search for a pluralist nation that can take us away from the known trajectories of European history trying to discover homogeneous nations within the constrictive perimeters of nation-states. This is not an agenda against state, but to argue that the history of nation needs to be conceptualised separately from the history of the state. In that way we will be able to avoid the risk of homogenising any majoritarian discourse of national identity. As Sanjay Seth (1999) has argued, it is time that we “embrace the possibility of many histories [of nation], and thus also of many ways of being Indian” (p. 116).
Notes

1 An early version of this paper was presented at a seminar at the Division of Humanities, Curtin University of Technology in 2008.

2 For this critique of historiography see Chatterjee, 1986, 1993; also see Hutchinson & Smith, 1994 for an overview of European historiography of nationalism.

3 For an overview of Asian nationalism, see Leifer 2000.

4 For discussion of this earlier historiography, see Ray, 1980; Bandyopadhyay, 2004.

5 For this book Tagore received the Nobel Prize in 1913; but interestingly, this poem does not appear in the English version of Gitanjali, for which W. B. Yeats wrote an introduction. See Tagore, 1957.

References


Shantiniketan: Viswabharati.


Community resilience and sustainable development in Okinawa:

Yomitan village’s traumatic trajectory of war and military occupation

Miyume Tanji

Abstract

The experience of Yomitan village merits attention as a successful case of economic and community development alongside a large US military presence. What is special about it, and what can be learned from it? This paper argues that to represent Yomitan as a model of sustainable development focusing primarily on its economic growth, balanced with efforts to preserve environmental and cultural resources, is to omit a crucial ingredient: resistance to forms of economic development rooted in militarism inherent in the traumatic trajectory of war and US occupation.

US military bases in Okinawa and community resilience

The presence of some 737 global US military outposts in different parts of the world often jeopardises the environment, and undermines the wellbeing as well as quality of life for the local population. Politicians and media commentators often talk of friction between overseas US forces and locals as primarily being a matter of managing crime, accidents, noise and other hazards adversely affecting local communities; essentially ameliorating the overt impacts of US military deployment. Yet these occasional crimes, risks and hazards barely scratch the surface of the problem. From the perspectives of local populations living with the US bases, the status of locals’ social, economic and cultural wellbeing is constantly insecure, and is continually subjected to the priorities of the powerful US military and its allies. More specifically, in post-World War Two Okinawa, the US military presence has fundamentally changed and upset locally specific life-sustaining systems. In many cases, base-hosting communities have lost their traditional forms of livelihood—notably fishing, agriculture and manufacturing—to become largely dependent on service industries, base-related rent,
governmental aid and compensation from the Japanese government. Nevertheless, many local communities accept living near the bases, most commonly for economic returns.

However, some communities have converted suffering, victimisation and discontent into effective political action. What makes a community resilient to the negative impacts, and ultimately, presence of military bases? On the small, crowded Okinawa Main Island, thirty-eight bases and facilities of the US military bases that amount to almost 75% of the US forces stationed in Japan reside in nearly one-fifth of the land surface. They are also spread across 21 out of 41 cities, towns and villages. Density, size and functions of the bases in these municipalities vary within Okinawa, as do local geographical and socio-economic conditions. These local municipalities have dealt with the US military bases and their impacts differently. Research is needed on how local communities have dealt with such changes using the resources and knowledge available to them. Some municipalities, communities or neighbourhoods, as they seek to protect their livelihoods, appear more resilient and capable of exerting influence and control over the presence of US military bases than do others. This chapter investigates whether and how the experience of one such community living with US military bases, Yomitan Village, may be relevant to other communities in similar situations in the Asia-Pacific. Since the end of World War Two, Yomitan Village has shrunk its land surface occupied by the US military from 95% to approximately 36% today.

Firstly, this chapter critically examines how Yomitan’s community development is described as sustainable or endogenous development, a model for other Okinawan communities, for overcoming dependence on “base economy”: making a living out of incomes created by base-related incomes, especially, governmental subsidies paid as rewards and compensations. Secondly, in order to obtain a deeper understanding of Yomitan’s experience, the chapter discusses how it draws on the concept of resilience in community, adapted from the literature of ecological science. Community resilience is “the ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental change” (Adger, 2000, p. 347). This definition captures the most basic and general meaning of the concept of resilience used in this chapter. Then, it examines the historiography of collective suffering and trauma related to war and US occupation, specific to Yomitan. This element is the most crucial factor for Yomitan’s resilience; yet it is locally specific, and not transferable to other communities.

In the first of a series of case studies and comparative analyses, this chapter critically evaluates what is commonly depicted as a successful case of economic and community development alongside a large US military presence: the experience of Yomitan village. What
is special about it, and what can be learned about a community’s resilience? This chapter argues that representing Yomitan as a model of sustainable development by focusing primarily on its economic growth, balanced with its intact environmental and cultural resources, does not provide a complete picture. Such representation would leave out a crucial ingredient, namely, the political dimension of resilience unique to the community to economic development supported by militarism. Yomitan’s resilience is inspired by the traumatic trajectory of war and US occupation.

**Yomitan’s community development**

A visitor usually cannot avoid passing through Naha, the capital city of Okinawa, where the airport is located. The city is busy, noisy and very commercialised: full of cars, trucks, shops and concrete houses right next to winding narrow paved roads with not much space in between. After a one-hour drive north along the main road, sandwiched between the long fences and barbed wire of US military bases on both sides, the visitor reaches Yomitan Village located on the west coast of central Okinawa (Figure 1). In the village, roads are winding and narrow with concrete houses built right next to each other, as in Naha. The US military presence is prominent, evidenced by a tall, white shrine and US and Japanese flagpoles juxtaposed at the military gate of Torii Station. Yet something here is different to other parts of Okinawa; there is a calmer, old-fashioned and dignified feel. You can see many more earth colours and the greenery of farmland and sugar cane fields, and more natural-looking (less concrete-filled) beaches. More buildings have antique-looking features such as traditional Okinawan-style red tile roofs, and walls and pavements made of stone. Obviously, in Okinawa Main Island, Yomitan is a particularly attractive place for visitors.

![Figure 1: Yomitan Village in Okinawa Main Island (area shaded in black)](source: Yomitan Son, 2008a.)
Yomitan villagers seem to have a strong sense of community, not just belonging to a municipal unit. Importantly, this sense of community is a product of a series of policies implemented by the village council following Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in 1972. This process is commonly known as ‘village reconstruction’ (mura okoshi), and has been led by Yamauchi Tokushin, who became mayor in 1974 and was re-elected to serve multiple terms until 1998. It is an example of community development, that is, of a series of programs and policies aimed at building a community. The concept of community is explained in terms of five defining elements by Ife and Tesoriero (2006, pp. 96-98): a scale of population small enough to know each other and manage autonomous social structures; a sense of belonging and identity; holistic interactions among the villagers in the realm of personal development beyond functional ties (gemeinschaft rather than gesellschaft); the obligation of members’ active engagement to hold the place together; and the existence of a unique local-specific culture that the members contribute to creating, as opposed to consumption of globalised, mass versions.

The population of Yomitan is over 35,000. It is divided into twenty-three districts called aza. Each aza has no more than a few thousand resident members: these are close-knit self-governing units overseeing villagers’ day-to-day affairs, such as education, health, production, recreation and cultural events. Most aza have existed since before World War Two, surviving the Battle of Okinawa, and some of them date back to the administrative structures set up when the area was ruled by the Ryukyu Kingdom (1429-1879). On any random visit to an aza, one is likely to encounter festivals that promote something local: pottery, music, dance, food etc., which keep the residents busy preparing, catering, coordinating and practicing.

On the other hand, a communal life has conservative aspects that can be constricting for individuals: attendance at community events such as funerals and other annual rituals take up considerable amounts of time, inevitably interfering with personal life. Communal support comes with responsibilities. To become a member of an aza self-governing organisation, one has to be from a family resident locally in the pre-war era. The social hierarchy is strictly adhered to, according to the traditional order of male seniority rule.

Thus, the Yomitan Village community is composed of geographically close members whose families have known each other well, since at least their grandparents’ generation. Beyond the aza, an overarching Yomitan identity has developed under the village reconstruction program since 1972. In that sense, it has become a community. Mayor Yamauchi’s comprehensive community development program had four distinctive
dimensions: 1) locally controlled economic development and environmental resources; 2) an emphasis on agriculture as a core industry; 3) promotion of local crafts and arts; and 4) recovering land from US military occupation.

In particular, the first element, namely, economic development, has been represented as a successful community-based initiative, one that counters the vulnerability of Okinawan communities’ dependence on a base-oriented economy. Sasaki (1999) stresses the importance of control and ownership over planning and building of resort-related facilities such as hotels being retained by the village. The villagers manage private capital effectively through a semi-non-profit corporation, the Yuntanza Village Development Company, owned by village’s public employees and the members of the Yomitan Chamber of Commerce. Unlike in other resort towns, the village prohibited mainland Japanese capital from buying land to build hotels and purchase private beaches, thus maintaining local ownership of land.

This has given the village government the means to protect its environment effectively, by, for example, obligating large hotel chains to use multiple-staged processes of water purification so that it can then be used for irrigation. Similarly, golf courses are banned from using agricultural chemicals. This partnership system has prevented environmental damage being caused by the profit-oriented tourist industry, as has happened in other parts of Okinawa. Likewise, the Company and the village have ensured that the resort industry contributed to creating jobs for locals, by introducing preferential employment of villagers, including the hiring of local people with disabilities as cleaners. The resort industry also entered into an agreement with the Company to use local agricultural products at restaurants, and to sell local produce such as fresh fruit and vegetables at hotels, highly unusual practices for resorts in Okinawa, which typically do not benefit local workers, manufacturers and farmers (Sasaki, 1999).

Additionally, the remarkable growth of the red sweet potato industry has contributed to the reputation of Yomitan as an example of successful community-based economic development. Yomitan has specialised in the production of highly distinctive sweet potatoes with strong, purplish red flesh (Figure 2). Again, the Yuntanza Village Development Company ensured that the local red sweet potato farmers benefit, by purchasing their products at appropriate prices. The Company and the Chamber of Commerce further promoted mass processing of red sweet potato products that required peeling and pasting, which created further employment among the villagers (Sasaki, 2000). The red sweet potato became a Yomitan brand, used in pies, ice cream, biscuits, bread etc. The Company has marketed these red sweet potato products widely in Okinawa: they are sold everywhere in the shops along
main tourist streets of Naha, at airports, and in specialty shops in mainland Japan. The villagers themselves have turned the red sweet potato into a unique local industry and an economic stimulus (Takara, 2006).

Figure 2: A replica of the red sweet potato (photograph by author)

This highlights the second dimension of community development: the importance of agriculture as a core industry in Yomitan. Farming, especially sugar cane and sweet potato production, has traditionally been the main means of livelihood in Yomitan since the pre-modern era.¹ In the post-reversion village reconstruction, the mayor placed a priority on benefiting farmers, and protecting the agricultural economy (Yamauchi, 2007). The village has also resurrected traditional weaving skills, characterised by distinctive flower-patterns specific to Yomitan. Yomitan weaving has existed for 600 years, but dwindled with modernisation, and was discontinued during the war. Since the 1960s, local elderly women, who vaguely remembered witnessing the weaving process, have contributed to the recovery of this traditional skill. The village promoted the industry by training weavers and sponsoring expositions in major Japanese cities. Both red sweet potatoes and the recovery of weaving have contributed to Yomitan’s image as a cultural village and thus to the development of pride and identity for the villagers.

**Yomitan as a model of sustainable and endogenous development**

Yomitan has been featured in the *International Journal of Environmental Cultural Social and Economic Sustainability* for its sustainable development strategy, and for pursuing a
distinctive “bottom-up approach that builds on its identity as a cultural centre” (Banasick 2005, p. 143). Japanese economist Sasaki Masayuki (1999) also describes Yomitan’s development as a model of “endogenous local development” in an essay entitled “Sustainable Development in Okinawa for the twenty-first century”. Miyamoto Ken’ichi (2000) views Yomitan as having demonstrated the type of economic development that many Okinawan communities living with a heavy military presence continue to aspire to, yet mostly struggle to attain. These scholars see Yomitan’s economic development as the antithesis of a reliance on the economic stimulus policies of central government in Tokyo, which is much more common elsewhere in Okinawa.

The nature of this income transfer is clearly political: the money that the island receives is in return for Okinawa’s role as a “safety valve” of the US-Japan security alliance (Banasick 2005, p. 145). The US Military bases stationed in Okinawa were constructed following the 1945 Battle of Okinawa, when the island came under direct US occupation. Contrary to the Okinawans’ expectation, reversion to Japan in 1972 did not remove the US military presence, which was largely maintained according to a bilateral agreement that prioritised the stability of the US-Japan security alliance. Meanwhile, the government of Japan significantly raised its subsidies for developmental projects in Okinawa, as well as the rents paid to the private landowners and municipal governments whose land was occupied by US bases. The Okinawan economy has thus become dependent on economic aid and special subsidies from the central government. This Okinawa-specific economic policy has been justified as a necessary economic stimulus in Okinawa, which was excluded from mainland Japan’s economic growth between 1945 and 1972, when it was under US military administration. The subsidy oriented economy following 1972 invited short-term projects, especially the construction of public buildings and infrastructure facilities funded, planned and executed according to mainland Japanese standards, and favouring Japanese companies. As a consequence, Okinawa Main Island has become mostly a “concrete island”, losing most of its natural resources and obliterating landscapes that had existed before its reversion to Japan (McCormack, 1998). Nevertheless, Okinawa has remained the poorest prefecture in Japan, in terms of income levels, unemployment rates, and various other socio-economic measures.

The Japanese government’s heavily interventionist economic policies, which had been described as a developmental state, have ostensibly retreated, and there has been a shift to a more neo-liberal, market-oriented policy in recent decades (Kohno, 2003). Government intervention, however, remains in the form of base-related economic policies in Okinawa. The
degree of dependence, importantly, varies across the Island. Tokyo’s economic stimulus policy has recently targeted local governments in the northern region. These include, among others, Nago City, where the planned construction of a major US Marine’s Air Station will replace the current base in Futenma, which is now more than 60 years old. Communities in this region, rural and aging, have suffered from chronic economic setbacks. In the hope of regenerating the local economy, most of the local population support the government’s economic stimulus policy (Banasick, 2005; Inoue, 2007; Miyagi & Tanji, 2007; Tanji, 2008).

Banasick (2005) and Sasaki (2000) contrast Yomitan’s entrepreneurship and self-reliance with the policies of Nago City. The latter has accepted Okinawa-specific economic stimulus policies from the Japanese state in exchange for their acceptance of a US military presence. For example, Nago City’s acceptance of the planned Futenma Air Station’s replacement facility has resulted in the Northern Districts Development Fund, specially set aside for the municipalities located nearby, for which ¥100 million was budgeted (McCormack, 2007). This base-oriented economic development is typically stimulated by state-sponsored expensive construction projects, and one state, two systems-type favouritist policies such as financial and free trade zones. For example, taking advantage of governmental subsidies, Nago City built a Multimedia Centre in July 2002, which cost ¥2.1 billion and now houses twenty-five international and Japanese companies with 800 local employees (Nago shi chiiki koyou souzou kyougi kai, 2008). These special zones attempt to attract external financial and high-tech industry investment, by providing tax, rent, and employment benefits (in Banasick 2005, p 146):

The special financial zone designation, the only one of its kind in Japan, includes a 35% reduction of corporate taxes, low-rent office space, an 80% subsidy for communication expenses, and a 30% subsidy for hiring young workers. Given that wages in Okinawa tend to be about 40% lower than the mainland, the 30% subsidy means that firms relocating to the Nago City financial center can achieve a 70% reduction in labour costs.

A special non-profit organisation, the Nago Development Authority, was set up in 2006 by local private companies and municipal government entities, to manage businesses related to the special financial and information technology zone (Nago Development Authority, 2008). Nago City Office also has a special section with similar responsibilities. Thus, the local government and the non-profit company strategically coordinate employment creation and investment stimulation. Arguably, therefore, Nago City also promotes a kind of community-based regional development.
What is, then, the crucial difference between the regional development strategies of Nago, the base-oriented economy, and of Yomitan, which is often associated with sustainability? Sustainable development usually means economic performance combined with restrictive measures placed on ecological damage that will effect future generations. However, when scholars represent Yomitan as a model for overcoming the base-dependent economy, they mean much more than that.

Social science scholars in Japan often use the term endogenous along with sustainable development, in reference to Yomitan. The notion of endogenous development refers to internally generated social change driven primarily by local or indigenous people, and encompassing tradition, culture, corporations and natural resources. It contrasts with the idea of development based on a modernisation theory imported from outside, from the West, or from a colonial power. Nishikawa (2004) explains the increasing significance of endogenous development in the context of growing regionalism as a counter force to globalisation. Governance at the community level has recently become more significant, relative to the dwindling significance of nation-states as the provider of economic goods and services, or the co-ordinator of economic development, as it is replaced by market mechanisms. The recent greater importance attached to the idea of endogenous development is derived from the increased significance and popularity of community-based policies and initiatives globally, especially in the context of a weakened welfare state in late capitalism (Ife & Tesoriero, 2006).

Indeed, in Yomitan, economic and social change seems more locally interconnected; growth generated in just one area (agriculture, for example) transfers to other local industries such as tourism and manufacturing. This can be contrasted with the situation in Nago, where base-related government economic stimulation policies have resulted in short-term projects that benefit mainly construction and external corporations, typically in isolation from other local sectors.

As Sasaki (1999) explains, endogenous development in Yomitan was also fuelled by the locals’ “energy” which drove the removal of US military bases. This relates to the fourth feature of Yamauchi’s village reconstruction; the political campaign to recover land occupied by the US military to benefit residents’ productive capacities and livelihoods. At the time of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in 1972, more than 70% of the Village was still occupied by US bases. This ratio shrunk gradually to approximately 36% today (Table 1). This contrasts with other municipalities that mostly retained the areas occupied by the US military since its post-war occupation: 82.8% in Kadena Town, 59.3% in Kin Town, 52.9% in Chatan Town.4
Table 1: Ratio of US military bases to the total area of Yomitan Village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total village area (ha)</th>
<th>Area occupied by US military bases (ha)</th>
<th>Ratio of US military bases (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3,448</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3,448</td>
<td>1,893</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3,517</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3,517</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3,517</td>
<td>1,261</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Yomitan Son, 2008b.

Miyamoto (2000) defines base removal as a necessary condition for realising sustainable development in Okinawa, as demonstrated by Yomitan’s experience. Others, such as Naha City and Chatan Town, also experienced base removal due to the US forces’ decision to close some major training sites and facilities. The development that ensued there mainly involved that of commercial districts with shopping malls, resort facilities, cinemas and fast food chains mainly owned by external capital, which brought in rent and employment to the local economy. Commercial districts that enriched former US military sites, however, ended up impoverishing other existing commercial areas within Okinawa. They are not considered to have led to sustainable or endogenous development. Yomitan’s development is distinguished from such examples, for successfully creating lasting local production and local market that benefit local business and farmers (Makiya, 2008).

However, there is a problem with connecting endogenous development in Okinawa to base removal; the notion of endogenous development does not in itself presage a form of resistance that most Okinawan local communities cannot commit to, namely, resistance to the dependent economic structure that that accepts the need for more US military bases. Arguably, it is possible to strategically utilise base-generated subsidies, and still promote local production and, employment, and maintain ownership and control of the external capital supplied through public non-profit companies. What is missing here is a discussion of what makes communities politically subservient to the political economy of the bases and to compensation payments in the first place. Endogenous development and sustainable development can only partially explain this highly successful and political aspect of Yomitan’s community development.
War, US military occupation and the making of a ‘resilient’ community

The concept of ‘resilience’

In Yomitan, a political consensus was formed to commit to a position of non-reliance on military bases as a means of economic development. Among base-hosting municipalities in Okinawa Main Island, such consensus is rare: acceptance of military bases for economic survival is politically powerful in most local governments with a heavy military presence. The concept of resilience in community, adapted from the literature of ecological science helps explain the process of this resistance. The historiography of collective suffering and trauma related to war and US occupation, specific to Yomitan, is the most crucial factor. This element is locally specific, and not transferable to other societies.

The idea of resilience was originally developed in the study of ecology, to be adapted to the study of societies. It refers to the ability of an ecological system to cope and adjust to disturbances (such as environmental hazards), and to spring back to a state of equilibrium (Holling, 1986). Adger (2000) defines social resilience as “the ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental change” (p. 347). This definition captures the most basic and general meaning of the concept of resilience used here.

Nevertheless, Adger’s definition alone does not provide a sufficient conceptual tool. This is because the concept of resilience in a social context lacks precision and clarity in many ways. Among others, it is particularly unclear if, and to what extent, a resilient community should maintain, or spring back to, a basic unchanging social structure, in the face of environmental change. Is it more important to be able to fundamentally transform its social structure and infrastructure in order to adjust to external changes? In defining resilience, therefore, consideration of at least three aspects is necessary:

1. The amount of disturbance a system can absorb and still remain within the same state or domain of attraction;
2. The degree to which the system is capable of self-organisation;
3. The degree to which the system can build and increase the capacity for learning and adaptation. (Klein, Nicholls, & Thomalla, 2003, p. 40)

The concept of resilience thus allows explanations of a range of collective responses a community or a group may make, to certain stresses and shocks.
For the purpose of this section, it is important to focus on the role that internal politics plays in the formation of a community’s resilience. Different views and interests are represented unevenly in the process of collective decision-making. In other words, the process of a community becoming resilient is necessarily a political process. A researcher therefore needs to ask (Lebel et al., 2006, p. 19): “resilience of what, to what, and for whom?” Whose wellbeing and rights are given priority? What kind of worldviews, interests and identities are represented? Thus, a community’s resilience is heavily dependent on aspects of its governance: that is, how power is shared in the community in question. Examining a community’s governance requires looking into “laws, regulations, discursive debates, negotiation, mediation, conflict resolution, elections, public consultations, protests and other decision-making processes” (Lebel et al., 2006, p. 20). Therefore, the most important questions asked here is: what are the values, principles and social structures that the Yomitan village community have chosen to preserve? Also, who defined them, how, and in what context? How did the community self-organise to retain its original social structures against disruptions, risks and uncertainties, or to learn, adapt and transform? In what historical contexts have these principles, values and social structures predominated?

**Aza, feng shui and opposition to US military bases**

As explained earlier, Yomitan’s basic social unit is aza. As many as 22 out of 23 aza survived the radical disruption to their communal lives caused by the Battle of Okinawa. This is remarkable, considering that the war destroyed most of central and southern regions of Okinawa Main Island, and also that the US forces occupied most of the land immediately after the war.

In April 1945, 180,000 US soldiers landed on the coast of Yomitan, and turned the island into the only battlefield in Japan. In Yomitan, 3,840 residents died, reducing the population of the village to 14,611 in September 1946 (Yomitan Sonshi Henshu Iinkai, 2002b). During the war, the US military uprooted residents from where they lived to designated internment areas (camps). In November 1946, when the people of two aza, Namihira and Takashiho, were allowed to re-settle, 95% of the Village’s total area was under US military enclosure and was secured for base construction (Yomitan Sonshi Henshu Iinkai, 2002a).

When the villagers eventually returned, most aza residents had to re-settle in different places from their old homes, which had been taken over by the US military. Many had to live
away from their old aza. However, they maintained interpersonal ties based on kinship and traditional neighbourhoods. The residents desired the preservation of the aza community structure, for which the mayors persistently appealed to the US military government (Hara, 2003). This demonstrated the value placed by the community on the preservation and revival of aza, the most basic and important element of the pre war social structure of Yomitan.

The survival of the aza system indicates social resilience, in particular, the first type of resilience outlined above: the capacity to spring back from disturbance to an original social structure. The Battle of Okinawa and the ensuing US military occupation in Yomitan are primarily remembered for displacement, deprivation, fear and humiliation: in short, for disruption to communal life. Importantly, the history of aza restoration points to a local understanding of the US military presence primarily as a temporary disturbance that should be, and could be, eventually removed. It also explains the general consensus among the villagers about the importance of resurrecting old and traditional features, inherited from the past beyond the disruption of war.

In the post-reversion period, US forces in Yomitan prepared for the Vietnam War and subsequent conflicts. Among others, the parachute drop training of the Army First Special Group (also known as the Green Berets) released soldiers and military equipment from aircraft flying 4,000 metres above ground. They occasionally landed on residential areas and farms. Yamauchi recalls that all kinds of things fell on their living spaces:

A piece of timber penetrated a roof of a resident’s home; a few oil drums fell from the sky into the village; soldiers shocked farmers by landing on their fields. In particular, the death of a 10-year-old girl, squashed underneath a trailer dropped during the training, was tragic…. These incidents continued until last year.

(Yamauchi & Mizushima, 1997, pp. 8-10)

The villagers and mayor stopped the construction of an anti-P3C antenna base within the Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield. After three years of villagers’ demonstrations and sit-ins, as well as the mayor’s persistent negotiations with the US Marine commander and an open letter to then US president Jimmy Carter, the antenna construction was cancelled in 1979. Following a similar struggle, the village also regained a site used for the disposing of unexploded bombs, which often threatened nearby residents’ safety. In 1978, a new Yomitan-specific cultural centre was built on this recovered site, with an old-style pottery kiln and fifty workshops. This land, formerly occupied by the US military, became a cultural focal point, the Yomitan Home of Pottery. These workshops have trained and employed young artists, and have further
contributed to tourism, providing an example of ‘endogenous’ development, on a former US military site.

Yomitan Village’s struggle to reclaim land from US military bases and to preserve the pre-war aza structure, are, as Tomoaki (2003) explains, both closely reflected in the way that contemporary village governance is manifested in feng shui. In the 1980s, aza and the Village government cooperated to create ethnic maps in order to reproduce the pre-war topography of aza, instead of introducing modern urban planning. In this process, both aza and the village officials re-discovered and re-evaluated the idea of feng shui as an alternative system for understanding how the Yomitan residents should relate to their natural environment.

Feng shui and the pre-war aza structure represent the importance of kinship and neighbourhood connection embraced in particular natural surroundings; an antithesis to the logistical and strategic priorities of military bases, which tended to neglect, and destroy the personal and local particularities that the Yomitan people actually experienced (Hara, 2003, p. 23). Figure 3 is a map of Yomitan Village drawn by a feng shui specialist for the City Planning Master Plan issued in 1997. The map shows the energy (chi) of the place flowing into the central area. This central area corresponds to the location of the US Air Forces Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield. Under mayor Yamauchi, Yomitan Village demanded from the US forces and the US-Japan Joint Committee the right to build a multi-purpose sports stadium and a Villagers’ District, within the confines of the Airfield. The former request was presented as urgent, in order to provide a venue for the National Athletic Meet to be held in Okinawa in 1987. The latter eventuated in 1997, with the completion of Yomitan Village Office inside the US Airfield. An officer at the Yomitan Village Office explained that this feng shui drawing provided a philosophical justification for the construction of these public facilities in this location; an intellectual basis from which to make demands on the US forces (Anonymous staff at Yomitan Village Office, Interview, November 2007). Other public facilities for the villagers were built surrounding the Village Office and inside the US Airfield, collectively constituting a Villagers’ District. These facilities were all located right next to the parachute and other US military training sites and thus were potentially dangerous for the residents. Yet the choice of this site within the Airfield sent a clear message, that the Villagers’ needs and preferences came first, and that the foreign bases should adjust to them.
The entire village, both conservative and progressive political party supporters, followed the mayor’s lead and joined the protests against the US military bases and training exercises. The whole village—the mayor and village executives, public servants’ unions, farmers’ and fishers’ co-ops, teachers’ unions, women’s organisations, youth groups, and senior citizens’ groups—in solidarity staged protests against US military training exercises and the expansion of military facilities. The proximity between their living spaces and the military training sites, which immediately threatened the villagers’ lives, partially explains why solidarity has been possible. Yomitan’s political consensus contrasts with the political divisions seen in Nago City, for instance, where a majority of the population lives away from the planned Futenma Replacement Facility site.

**Trauma of war in Yomitan**

In order to fully grasp the nature of Yomitan Village’s resilience in the face of Tokyo’s economic policy as it is exerted on Okinawa, however, a discursive debate among the villagers on wartime trauma must be taken into account. During the Battle of Okinawa, the mainland Japanese army soldiers deployed in the Island threatened the villagers’ lives more immediately than did the US soldiers. The Japanese soldiers at the time were without sufficient resources to fight. They deprived civilians of their food and often killed them, accusing them of being spies. In *Chibichirigama*, a natural limestone cave in Yomitan, where residents escaped following the US landing in April 1945, eighty-two villagers (including 47 children younger than twelve) died of a “compulsory group suicide”. Many were obliged to
kill their family members under pressure from the Japanese military, who forced self-sacrifice upon civilians as an imperial virtue. The survivors’ experiences were neither told, nor discussed in the village for nearly forty years. In the mid-1980s, however, supermarket owner Chibana Shōichi and others interviewed the survivors and recorded their experiences. Many villagers condemned this breaking of silence, for hurting the survivors again, and revisiting their traumatic experiences.

Field (1993) effectively narrates how a flag-burning incident at the National Athletic Meet in Yomitan, perpetrated by none other than Chibana, revealed this wartime trauma, stirring an internal debate on their war experience and what it meant to the Yomitan residents. The survivor’s story in chibichirigama reveals the inseparability of “the civilian atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese army and the collective suicide committed by the Okinawan civilians” (p. 66). Field (1993) notes “the paradoxical phrase ‘compulsory suicide’ is meant to suggest the dark in-mixing of coercion and consent, of aggression and victimisation at work in the story of the caves” (p. 66). That is, the villagers’ engagement in an act glorified by mainland Japanese needs to be understood in light of their obsession with “proving themselves more loyal subjects than other Japanese” (p. 80). The trauma of war experience, collectively shared by the Yomitan residents, especially, “what happened in the cave”, is remembered as “in part retribution for the Okinawan role in Japanese aggression in Asia” (p. 87). Prior to the National Athletic Meet, many in Yomitan opposed the state’s imposition of raising the flag sporting the Rising Sun, the symbol of Japanese imperialism. However, mayor Yamauchi had to yield to the pressure to avoid spoiling an important event that, significantly, was held at a baseball stadium, which had been built within the US Airfield, after a long struggle. Field points out that Chibana was compelled to burn the Rising Sun flag at the stadium, out of “his sensitivity to the ways in which inattention to the present overlaps with oblivion of the past” (p. 66).

The present that overlaps with the past refers to the conformity to economic “models of success throughout Japan, the mainland as well as Okinawa, and increasingly, throughout the world in relentlessly familiar though deceptively various forms” (Field, 1993, p. 67). Twenty years later, Chibana is a well respected, elected member of the Village Assembly, and now assumes responsibility for Yomitan’s community development: his message has been accepted or at least recognised by most community members. The collective reflection on the emotional scar of compulsory group suicide explains the Yomitan residents’ resilience and their opposition to their dependence on the base-oriented economy. In the post-reversion years, achieving parity with mainland Japan has been a predominant goal in most
communities in Okinawa. Priority given to this goal has also imposed on them the mainland economic models and standards as well as the base-oriented subsidies; but not in Yomitan.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has critically examined the concept of community development of Yomitan Village that has often been framed in terms of a sustainable or endogenous model of economic development. These terms describe Yomitan as an exceptionally successful community that overcame its economic dependence on the US military presence. Their success is explained in terms of programs and policies that have worked: local control over external resort capital to regulate pollution, successful marketing of local agricultural products, effective co-ordination among the various sectors in the local community to enhance employment prospects and to further other economic activities. Their success is often also ascribed to ideological and philosophical aspects: Yomitan Village’s self-promotion as a cultural village is a case in point. Furthermore, successful recovery of land from the US military bases is also counted as crucial. These explanations are valid, but not sufficient.

What is missing is an explanation of the political processes that led to the successful community building which fuelled the protests against the US military bases and exercises. The political consensus over the protests against military bases is partly explained by the immediate threat of the military exercises and operations that the villagers have been daily exposed to. But most importantly, the trauma of wartime conformity to state policy that forms an important part of Yomitan’s resilience to the current state-imposed economic policy of base acceptance. This consensus came to fruition during the controversy and debate over the meaning of the war experience, at the village level. In this sense, Yomitan’s resilience is demonstrated not only by its ability to spring back but also to learn and adapt to new events and stimuli.

The *aza* structure has provided stability, continuity and distinctive identity to village life in Yomitan. Uncritical conformity to the pressure to achieve development according to mainland Japanese standards, accompanied by the state’s pressure on Okinawans to accommodate to the US military needs through the provision of special economic benefits – did not occur in Yomitan. At the same time, conceptually framing Yomitan’s case as one of sustainable development or endogenous development betrays the political dynamics of its community development.

Okinawa is a diverse community of protest. It is made up of many different local
identities: each local group has its own history and legacies. Yet each one of them identifies with, and represents Okinawan-ness. In this sense, each local struggle contributes to the fabric of an “Okinawan struggle” against the continuing US military occupation, and other kinds of marginalisation that Okinawans have been historically subjected to (Tanji, 2006). Yomitan is one of them, and offers an important story for all Okinawans, and also to other vulnerable small island economies hosting US military bases, such as Guam and Puerto Rico; the economic dependence on bases and base-related subsidies and aid from the government can be overcome, at least at the community level.

Acknowledgement

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Notes

1 In 1962, 94.5% of Yomitan’s households were engaged in farming (Yomitan Sonshi Henshu Iinkai, 1995, p. 341).

2 The decision to close Futenma Air Station followed the temporary rise of anti-base protest in Okinawa caused by the 1995 kidnapping and gang-rape of a twelve-year-old school girl by US soldiers.

3 Japanese social scientist Tsurumi Kazuko originally publicised this notion, which was inspired by Japanese intellectuals in the Meiji period (1868-1912), such as Yanagita Kunio and Minakata Kumagusu. See Tsurumi, 1996.

4 In ten municipalities in Okinawa Main Island (including Kadena, Kin and Chatan Town, Ginoza, Higashi and Yomitan Village, Okinawa and Ginowan City, and Onna Village) US military facilities take up more than approximately 30% of land surface.

5 For example, in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, Diamond studies the resilience and adaptive capacity of ancient communities across the globe, including those that perished and survived eco-meltdowns. The latter includes a successful case in Tokugawa Japan and its deforestation program.

6 Among the estimated 6,390 villagers who evacuated or escaped to the forests in the mountainous northern region of Okinawa, many starved to death or were killed by malaria (Yomitan Sonshi Henshu Iinkai, 2002b).

7 Kinjo Jiro, the most prominent pottery artist in this style, migrated from Naha in 1972 and contributed to the establishment of a distinctively Yomitan pottery industry.

8 The US-Japan Joint Committee is a key decision-making actor under the US-Japan Mutual Security Pact.

9 The facilities include, among others, a concert hall where cultural events are held, the Yomitan Weaving Centre, the Yomitan Welfare Centre, a Democracy Forum, an Agricultural Forum and large parking areas.

10 Apart from the examples cited here, there were similar struggles: including demonstrations and picketing against the expansion of Sobe Beach (exclusively used by the US military), the deployment of the Army First Special Group, and the runway reconstruction training in the Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Yamauchi & Mizushima, 1997, p. 15).
References


Local resilience: Living with risk in vulnerable internally displaced communities in Timor-Leste

Jaya Earnest and Patricia Faulkner

Abstract

The eruption of violence in April 2006 in Timor-Leste was accompanied by widespread looting and burning with destruction of the environment, infrastructure, property and the means of livelihood for a significant section of the population, with over 15% fleeing their homes. In May 2008, two years after the conflict, there were still an estimated 100,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) within the capital Dili and scattered throughout the country. As a result there were severe stressors on both the displaced and host populations and their local environments with attendant environmental health problems. This qualitative case study explores the influences on the capacity of internally displaced communities in Timor-Leste to recover from and adapt to living with risk in the aftermath of the civil and political conflict in 2006-07. Drawing on a framework of vulnerability and resilience from a humanitarian and social change perspective, semi-structured and key informant interviews, focus group discussions and transect walks were undertaken in Dili and Baucau within both IDPs and host communities. Additional key informant interviews and documentary data were obtained from Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and humanitarian agency personnel. Analysis of the data revealed that communities have key concerns regarding governance and future stability in the country, lack of demonstrable progress in health, education & infrastructure, and future employment opportunities for the youth. The study documented that sustained peace was vital for development and progress in the country.

Introduction

This chapter reports results of a study undertaken in Timor-Leste in mid-2008. Drawing on a framework of vulnerability and resilience, the adaptive capacity in vulnerable communities in Timor-Leste living with recurring political instability and displacement was explored. It is increasingly recognised that there is a growing need for a multidisciplinary approach to study vulnerability and resilience that involves all stakeholders including the communities
themselves (Bogardi, 2004; Thomalla, Downing, Spanger-Siegfried, Han & Rockström, 2006; Vogel, Moser, Kasperson & Dabelko, 2007). Traditionally different disciplines have conducted research into vulnerability, resilience and severe events from global change, disaster-risk management or humanitarian perspectives. All approaches, however, recognise that vulnerability, resilience and adaptation are inextricably entwined and affect a community’s ability to withstand, and live with the risk of a severe event. The concept of vulnerability and resilience from humanitarian and social change perspectives has been used in this study. The chapter commences with an overview of the political and historical background and the health indicators in Timor-Leste. The concepts of vulnerability and resilience and the definitions and frameworks underpinning the study are then introduced, followed by the research design and methodology and the themes generated from the analysis. The chapter concludes with recommendations and implications from the analysis.

Background

A political and historical background to Timor-Leste

The years of Timorese resistance to Indonesian occupation culminated in a referendum and subsequent vote for independence in 1999. The celebrations that accompanied the declaration of the referendum ballot on September 4, 1999 in Timor-Leste were short lived as pro-Indonesian militias, aided by the Indonesian army, went on the rampage, employing a scorched earth policy, destroying infrastructure and carrying out systematic human rights abuses including assault, murder, torture, rape, sexual abuse and mass forced deportations (Human Rights Watch, 2006). It is estimated that nearly 2,000 people were killed, 200,000 fled to the mountains and a further 250,000 were forcibly deported to camps in West Timor (Devereux, 2000; Human Rights Watch, 2006; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2004). Dili, the capital city and other towns had been razed; there was no water, electricity or phone system and over 90% of health and educational infrastructure in East Timor had been destroyed (UNHCR, 2004).

By December 2002, there were again riots in Dili with buildings being burned including the home of then Prime Minister Alkatiri. The crisis in 2006 arose from earlier rumblings of unrest in the army which escalated into armed conflict between the East Timorese army and police forces and sparked underlying tensions in government, precipitating a political crisis. However, much of the accompanying violence, arson and looting was perpetrated by gangs of disaffected youths (International Crisis Group [ICG],
2006). This unrest resulted in 38 deaths and the displacement of 150,000-178,000 people (International Displacement Monitoring Centre [IDMC], 2008; International Organisation for Migration [IOM], 2008). Fifty-three camps housing around 70,000 people were established by UNHCR and IOM around Dili, with further camps in Baucau, but at least 100,000 people were scattered throughout East Timor staying with friends and relatives (IDMC, 2008; UNHCHR, 2006). In early 2008, on February 11, rebels carried out two simultaneous attacks on the President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmão. In the attacks the President Ramos-Horta was seriously wounded and subsequently airlifted by the Australia Defence Forces (ADF) to Darwin. Nearly two years after the initial crisis in 2006, the IDMC reported in April 2008 that there were still some 100,000 IDPs in East Timor; 30,000 living camps in Dili and 70,000 scattered with host families throughout the districts (IDMC, 2008).

**Health indicators in Timor-Leste**

The legacy inherited by this new nation ensured that it is also one of the world’s most impoverished. Ranked 150 out of 177 in the 2007 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index, it is the poorest country in the Asia Pacific region; 41% of Timorese live below the poverty line of less than US$0.55 per day (UNDP, 2008). Unemployment is high, particularly amongst the youth, with even higher rates amongst rural youth (World Bank, 2007). Health indicators in the country are extremely poor with life expectancy estimates ranging from 59.7 years in 2005 (UNDP, 2008) to 66 years in 2006 (World Health Organisation [WHO], 2008). In 2005 the infant mortality rate was estimated at 47 per 1000 live births, the under five mortality rate was 44 per 1000 live births and the maternal mortality ratio 380 per 100,000 births (WHO, 2008). It is estimated that only 61% of women had access to antenatal care, 90% of women had their babies in the home and only 18% of births were attended by skilled birth attendants. Immunisation rates are low; only 5% of children are fully immunised and over half of children under two years have never been immunised (WHO, 2006). The main causes of death in children under five are malaria, dengue fever, acute respiratory infections and diarrhoeal diseases. Overall, only 50% of the population have access to safe drinking water, 40% to adequate sanitation and 25% to electricity, with the proportions lower in rural compared to urban areas (UNDP, 2008).
The framework underpinning the study

The concept of vulnerability

The term “vulnerability” is now used pervasively in research literature and the media. Adger (2006) argues that the concept of vulnerability is a powerful analytical tool that illustrates the states of susceptibility to harm, powerlessness and marginality of both physical and social systems. He describes vulnerability as, "The state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to stresses associated with environmental and social change and from the absence of capacity to adapt” (p. 268).

The vulnerability of an individual or community is therefore determined by their pre-existing circumstances and not by any future stresses that they may be exposed to. It is this approach that we adopt, where the emphasis is on the social construction of vulnerability. Here individuals or community are placed at the centre of the definition and vulnerability is defined in terms of their ability to respond to a stressor or crisis (Adger, 2006; Cannon, 2006; Cutter et al., 2008).

Kelly and Adger (2000) contend that vulnerability is also related to wellbeing, livelihoods and access to resources and proposed the following definition: “The state of individuals, groups or communities in terms of their ability to cope with and adapt to any external stress placed on their livelihoods and wellbeing and is determined by the availability of resources and by the entitlement of individuals and groups to call on these resources” (p. 325). Thus, in these definitions, vulnerability is related to underlying social, economic, political, and security factors which may be local, national or global and which are often beyond the control of the individual or community.

The concept of resilience

As with vulnerability, resilience has been studied in many differing disciplines, resulting in widespread use and many different definitions. The Oxford Dictionary Online (2009) defines the term resilience as the ability to “recoil or spring back into shape after bending, stretching, or being compressed” (n. p.). Or, of a person, resilience is defined as the ability to “withstand or recover from difficult conditions” (n. p.).

Many early studies were in the fields of psychology, where there was a growing interest in the concept of resilience. The concept in this context was described by Rutter in 1985 (in Earvolino-Ramirez, 2007) as the “ability to bounce back or cope successfully despite
substantial adversity”, (p. 93). A later definition by Luthar and Cicchetti (2000) describes resilience as a “dynamic process wherein individuals display positive adaptation despite experiences of significant adversity or trauma” (p. 858).

On an individual level resilience, therefore, implies positive adaptation in face of significant adversity. According to Waller (2001), research in this field has centred on individuals and families, and the identification of risk and protective factors and possible interventions that may foster resilience. Risk or protective factors may be biological, psychological, social, spiritual or environmental and occur within the individual, family, community, or within larger social and environmental systems. She also argues that resilience should incorporate social factors and a perspective that recognises the interrelatedness and interdependency of individuals and social systems. All these elements interact on the ability of vulnerable communities to cope with a severe event and attendant risks and, as each community, and sections within those communities, will have different experiences, it is necessary to research many different scenarios in order to compare and contrast those experiences.

Cutter et al. (2008) have recently proposed a quantifiable model, which they have named the Disaster Resilience of Place Model’ (DROP), shown at Figure 1.

![Schematic representation of the disaster resilience of place (DROP) model](Cutter et al., 2008)
The model describes the influences on community resilience and purports to depict the overlapping relationship between resilience and vulnerability. The proposed model could be adapted to both man-made and natural disasters. The model demonstrates the dynamic nature of resilience, which is dependent on inherent pre-event characteristics as well as exogenous factors, on the severity of the disaster, and on the time between hazard and disaster events. This framework has been used to underpin the study, inform the analysis and draw conclusions.

**Method**

**Aims and objectives of the study**

The main aim of this study was to identify the influences on the capacity of vulnerable and displaced communities in Timor-Leste, to recover from and adapt to the risk of recurrence of a severe event; in this case the political and civil conflict of April, 2006. This study thus explored the factors affecting the ability of communities in Timor-Leste, to recover from and adapt to a series of severe events caused by political conflict. The aim was achieved through the following objectives:

- To examine the broad socio-political contexts influencing the distribution of social capacity and resilience factors within East Timorese communities, especially the displaced;
- To document the East Timorese community members’ views of their own and their community vulnerabilities and capacity to withstand or recover from possible adverse events;

**The research process**

The study was conducted over a two-week period in May and June 2008. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions were undertaken in the capital Dili and in Baucau, the second largest centre in Timor-Leste, located in the Eastern districts. In order to obtain as broad a picture as possible of the setting, interviews and discussions were held with, and documentary data obtained from, key informants connected to NGOs and humanitarian agencies and with expatriates working for the government or the various United Nations (UN) agencies active in Timor-Leste. Transect walks and photographs were taken of the IDP and transitional camps.
and of the environment in rural areas and the urban settings of Dili and Baucau. Two trips outside of Dili were undertaken; one east to Baucau, one west through rural areas near the border with West Timor and into the coffee growing highlands.

A case study approach

A case study is an empirical qualitative approach that allows the researcher to investigate the phenomena of interest within the real-life context using multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2003). They are particularly useful in studies that involve broad complex questions in complex settings as they have the capacity to be richly descriptive in their exploration of complex behaviours, attitudes and interactions (Keen & Packwood, 1995; Pope & Mays, 1995). In the context of Timor-Leste, this study was an enquiry into a post-conflict transitional society that is struggling with multiple social, political, economic and educational constraints. The case study approach has the capacity to generate exploratory, descriptive and explanatory data (Hess-Biber & Leavy, 2006) and was therefore considered the most appropriate methodology to employ in this context. This study was an exploratory, descriptive cross-sectional case study of IDP and host communities in Timor-Leste. The case study approach was used to explore the complexities and challenges facing these communities in their capacity to respond and adapt to the devastation caused in the aftermath of the conflict in 2006.

Participant data collection

Opportunistic, snowballing and purposive sampling was employed using established contacts within the communities. Participants were recruited via the various contacts that the first author had established on previous research visits to East Timor. They included IDPs who had been or were still living in the camps, those who had hosted and were continuing to host IDPs and various key informants from the community, international humanitarian and UN agencies and NGOs working in the field. IOM, the international organisation that provides services to many of the camps, assisted in gaining access to the IDP communities. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted to explore the complexities of the adaptive processes and capacities within the communities at both sites.

The data collection methods placed the focus on the participants’ own perceptions and interpretations and facilitated exploration of the complexities and meanings of the
participants’ experiences and views in more natural and informal settings (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2005; Pope & Mays, 1995). In addition, the methods used do not discriminate against illiterate and vulnerable participants, an important consideration in the context of East Timor and the high adult illiteracy (Kitzinger, 1995).

In all nineteen key informant interviews and three FGDs were conducted. The three focus groups were conducted with IDPs who were all still displaced and from three disparate settings; one in an IDP camp, another with hospital workers and a third with youth. Thus participants had varying ages and backgrounds, giving a broad picture of the phenomena of interest in the study and assisting in establishing the credibility of the data (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). A trained local research assistant who had worked in similar scenarios with the first author in previous research projects undertaken in East Timor assisted with the translation of the youth FGD. The other two FGDs were conducted with the assistance of multilingual expatriates, who had been in East Timor for a considerable period, and were fluent in English, Tetum and Bahasa. In each case the person was someone known to the participants and with whom they felt comfortable.

**Data analysis**

The data analysis explored the social, cultural and human contexts of the participants’ lives, the sense of community cohesion and vulnerabilities experienced in the aftermath of the conflict, adaptive and resilience capacities and their anxieties about the future. Preliminary data analysis took place concomitant with data collection allowing for questions to be refined and new avenues of inquiry to develop. The data was compiled from the transcription of the interviews and focus groups, field observations and the researcher’s reflective journal and memos written in the field and was analysed using the framework approach described by Pope, Ziebland and Mays (2000).

The transcript was then annotated with codes and, as the themes emerged, a table was developed that contained the main themes and contextualised and categorised within the DROP framework of Cutter et al., (2006). To facilitate interpretation of the findings, the chart was then used to define the concepts appearing in the analysis and to clarify any associations between them (Pope, Ziebland & Mays 2000). This allowed for within-methods triangulation and cross-validation of the data, thereby reducing the possibility of bias and increasing the richness and rigor of the data obtained (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Hesse-Biber & Leavy,
Discussion of emerging themes

The analysis revealed eight major themes, and these are detailed with appropriate respondent quotes in the ensuing sections. The themes have been contextualised within the disaster resilience of place (DROP) categories, shown together at Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Categories from DROP framework</th>
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<td>2 Personal vulnerability</td>
<td>Post event coping response</td>
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<td>3 Problems associated with displacement</td>
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<td>4 Support mechanisms</td>
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<td>5 Personal and family effects, professional life and colleagues</td>
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<td>6 Problems associated with returning home</td>
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<td>8 Concerns about the future</td>
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Theme one: Governance

Several authors have stressed the role of governance and violent conflict in determining both vulnerability and resilience to severe events (Adger, 2000; Barnett, 2006). One of the overriding themes that emerged from the research was the sense that participants held the government and politicians responsible for the crises. Timorese participants revealed that the political situation was outside their personal control and arose from a government whose politicians were more intent on political manoeuvring than on strengthening fragile civic institutions and addressing the country’s many problems, and in doing so they had precipitated the crises. They also believed that the government failed to act decisively once the crises had developed.
It was a big destruction in 2006; very sad. First it was a political decision with big consequences to all communities. Male lecturer, IDP host

There was also a consensus amongst all informants that though the government had good programmes in place, it lacked the expertise with which to execute them and that this issue needed to be urgently addressed.

This government is good but it is a failure; must resolve problems of IDPs, petitioners and improve the development of the population. We still have a problem; the government has good programmes but do not have enough qualified people to implement them ... Must concentrate on development NOT political manoeuvring. Male youth

Theme two: Personal vulnerability

It was evident that all the Timorese participants had felt personally vulnerable during the crisis. They indicated that they had left their homes in the crisis of 2006 because they felt frightened and threatened by the growing tensions between the army and police, the flare up of hostility between “Easterners” and “Westerners” (a largely artificial division between those from the Eastern and Western parts of Timor-Leste) and by gangs of youths stoning and burning property. The underlying inherent tension between Easterners and Westerners is sometimes the cause of ethnic tension in the country.

Non-Timorese key informants working for NGOs and who had lived in Timor-Leste for an extended period considered the reaction of the populace to flee and to remain in the camps an overreaction to what, in global terms, was a relatively low level of violence. They believed that this was probably due to the recent past history in East Timor and possible unresolved trauma associated with these events.

The actual violence in 06/07 was very minor. Only 38 people were killed but the people are very skittish... this is probably the result of the previous 24 years.” Female expatriate humanitarian agency worker

Both Cannon (2006) and Cutter et al., (2008) identify wellbeing, including physical and mental health and security, as being a component of vulnerability and resilience.
Theme three: Problems associated with displacement and living within camps

Participants reported that they had fled their homes with just the clothes they wore and/or only the barest of essentials. None of the participants had returned to their original residences and most had lost everything. At the beginning of the crisis many of the participants were going between Dili and the districts and in all did several trips as and when the violence flared up. Participants reported that there was an initial period of about one month when the ongoing violence prevented any services reaching the IDPs, which caused great hardship for refugees and for host families. In addition the violence in 2006 in Dili and 2007 in Baucau curtailed other outlets for food in that there were no markets so that people were unable to buy provisions.

There was no water, no sleeping mats; we slept on ground. To begin with there was no food; only got food after one month. Male youth FGD participant

Those participants living in the camps found the conditions very stressful and disrupting to normal activities of daily living. The camps were very crowded, and either very dusty in the dry season or prone to flooding in the wet. Many camps had no access to electricity. There were communal ablution and sanitation facilities with the limited privacy while washing and bathing especially affecting women. Participants reported that during the initial phase of the crisis there was both violence and barricades outside the camps, making it difficult and frightening to leave the camp confines. Gangs would come daily and throw stones at the camps and the fighting outside the camps continued up to December 2006.

It was very frightening with gangs of youths with Samurai swords and catapults with stones ... it was very bad during the rains with flooding in the camps ... there was no food at first; eventually the government gave rice, oil, beans after 1 month. Male youth FGD participant

Conditions for host families and IDPs in the districts were particularly stressful in the initial phase of the crisis. There is no running water available in Baucau, and the food supply that comes from Dili had been cut off. Participants therefore had to spend considerable time daily collecting water from the spring in the Old Town in addition to going to the villages and mountains to forage for food and firewood to cook on.
Food and water were very difficult. We had to hire or find a car and take 10-20 jerry cans into town to get water ... the same for wood for fuel. Male lecturer, IDP host

Host families had extra family members staying with them for a considerable period of time and all still had extra people in their households some two years after the initial crisis. Participants, and in particular expatriate informants, stressed that as the camps became established not all those in the camps were or are true refugees. There is an element of rural/urban migration or those registering, particularly students and single women with children, so that they can receive services.

Many people came into the camps not because of the crisis of 06 but for the food distribution. They put up a tent and live elsewhere ... the camp manager will register them... no capacity for verification. Female expatriate humanitarian agency worker

Theme four: Support mechanisms, coping and resilience

Several authors have suggested that the strength of social support networks is an indicator of community resilience (Cutter et al., 2008; Paton & Johnston, 2001). This was evidenced in the discussions when participants reported that that their principal support systems were those related to family, community and their interconnected social networks. Family obligations are compelling and override all other considerations.

It’s part of our culture; must help each other in the family. Male lecturer, IDP host

Participants also gained strength from a sense of community in that they were all in the same circumstances and they supported each other in managing their environment.

We worked as a group to collect firewood from the mountains and to collect water, going back to the villages to get food from the plots ... bananas, potatoes cassava etc.

There was no rice or oil in Baucau; it all comes from Dili. Male lecturer, IDP host

Participants reported several sources of emotional support. Those participants who had been able to continue working stated that going into work had given them the strength to continue, especially seeing people who were worse off than themselves. One participant reported that she found the strength and courage to go on from her children and the fact that they had all survived. Several others also commented that it was enough that they had all survived.
My motivation is my children. It gives me the courage to go on ... a lot of people who lose family members ... it is enough that all have survived. I am working hard to replace bad memories with good ones. Female hospital health worker

Theme five: Effects on themselves, family, professional life and colleagues

Participants reported that it was very stressful living in the camps or playing host to displaced family members. Participants also noted that this caused financial as well as emotional strain as they were unable to attend work during the height of the crises in 2006/7 due to closure of their workplace or as a result of being prevented from reaching it due to the violence and barricades. They reported that their families had been split up during the height of the crisis with children sent to relatives to escape the violence, or husbands and wives going to different locations. Several participants were still separated from their family. Participants commented that the lack of privacy had resulted in tensions between husband and wife and marital problems.

I was very torn; part of family is here, some are in Metinaro. The split in the family is very difficult and I am very preoccupied at times. Male hospital health worker

Participants reported that the ongoing situation still engenders fear and that they do not feel safe to return to their former residences. The violence has severely restricted the ability of people to move after dark. It is still insecure at night and the lack of any form of public transport after dark curtails the activities of East Timorese, very few of whom have vehicles; this affects both their working and social lives as they are not able to undertake jobs or activities that entail them having to walk home after dark. The youth in particular commented that they are not able to lead a normal life.

I feel unhappy that I can’t go out, live a normal life. Male youth

Most participants, other than the hospital workers, had been unable to work for a considerable period following the initial crisis in 2006, fearing further outbreaks of violence due to the uncertainty surrounding the ongoing situation with the petitioners. Not only did this cause financial hardship, but also made it difficult to focus when they did return. Some reported East/West tensions were evident in the workplace, though others such as the hospital staff commented that this was not the case in their setting. One respondent reported that she had
found it difficult to work with colleagues and students who had been involved in the stone throwing and burning.

*I want to teach but the psychological impact of teaching kids who burnt the houses. ... I am not comfortable.* Female university lecturer

**Theme six: Problems associated with returning home**

Most respondents had not returned home because their house had been damaged, either burnt or looted. They did not think that the security situation was stable enough to start rebuilding their houses and were also awaiting government compensation. Key informants reported that the Indonesians destroyed all records of land sales and property transactions making it difficult to establish ownership of property. Many people now displaced had previously occupied houses vacated by departing Indonesians post 1999. These were therefore recognised by the community as not being legally theirs and once the IDPs left those properties they were subsequently occupied by others.

*The government has not resolved the issue with land ... no rights to own land in the city, can use the land only. ... In Baucau most of land is already owned and have to buy; villages own their land.* East Timorese male Masters student

Some communities do not want the refugees back and returning IDPs are very fearful of returning to areas where they, or their property, have been attacked. This has complicated the resettlement process. In addition there was general consensus that the government is rushing the resettlement process. The IDP community complained of lack of consultation prior to the process. Key informants from the humanitarian agencies involved felt that the government should construct permanent housing for those who have nowhere to go, rather than place them in transitional camps, which is merely prolonging the problem.

**Theme seven: Gender roles and norms**

Several authors have argued that gender and attendant inequality of access to entitlements and resources are important variables of vulnerability (Adger, 2006; Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon & Davis, 2004). Traditional East Timorese society in most parts of the country is patriarchal, with women regarded as subordinate to men. Some women in the camps are rural women with children who no longer have a partner, are struggling to survive in the districts and have
come into the camps to access services; others have lost their partners subsequent to moving into the camp and now have nowhere to go. This is creating problems in the resettlement process.

*Some women came down from the districts; single women with 6 kids, no food, no job ... they come into the camps and the camp managers register them; they can’t go back to their husband’s family; they are very vulnerable.* Female expatriate humanitarian agency worker

Participants noted that it was very difficult for women in the community, particularly single women with children, during both periods of violence as there was no work and no markets and therefore a reduction in avenues to earn any income. Women participants in Metinaro, the most isolated of the IDP camps, complained that their isolation continued to make it very hard for them to access services, alternative sources of food over and above the rations, or to be able to earn an income.

*There are big problems for women regarding food; not enough oil, rice, soap; no money to buy: to live is a big pressure ... no money to buy essentials.* Female IDP camp FGD participant

**Theme eight: Concerns about the future**

Participants feared for the future for themselves and their children and felt that the community must reject violence, unite and create a peaceful stable environment so that development can proceed. Participants felt that education, both for youth and parents, was the stepping stone for future development. Youth participants noted that since the crisis the scholarships and technical courses for youth training had folded and therefore very few youth are being trained at present. Participants felt that much of the violence was perpetrated by youth who are frustrated by the lack of employment opportunities. All participants commented that there was reluctance particularly amongst the youth to work in the traditional farm sector or manual employment.

Participants felt that in addition to other training programmes, the government needs to establish programmes in agriculture and provide incentives for the youth to return to the villages. Several participants emphasised that the solution to East Timor’s problems must come from the East Timorese themselves. They perceived that there is a lack of community spirit to work together to solve problems and a dependency mentality is developing with an
attitude that it is the responsibility of the government to resolve any problems that arise in the community. They considered that the community should start thinking of solutions for themselves rather than waiting for the government or outside agencies to sort it out. They observed that whilst East Timor still needs the support and guidance of the international community, it must start to solve its own problems within the community: “Priority number one, need thinking carefully to develop from ourselves, not just wait for the government … development is government plus community” (Male lecturer, IDP Host).

Several participants noted that the government must start acting in the short-term rather than constantly planning for the long-term. The community needs to see results happening on the ground rather than always the promise of future action.

**Impacts on the environment**

**The IDP camps**

During the 2006 crisis people fled to places that they perceived offered a measure of protection, regardless of their suitability. Thus camps were established spontaneously at such disparate places as churches, school and hospital grounds, the central municipal gardens (Jardim), or near army, police or ADF bases. The camps were very diverse in nature and size, with some, particularly Airport and Jardim (shown in photograph one) being highly politicised and difficult to police, with outbreaks of violence occurring within the camp.

![Photograph 1: Jardim camp near the Parliament in Dili after a heavy downpour (Photograph used with permission of an ADF Nurse)](image)
The location of many of the camps restricted access to community facilities and amenities and created strains on existing infrastructure and degradation of the local environment. One camp, Metinaro, at twenty-three kilometres from Dili was the most isolated of the camps and in an inhospitable location, adding to the hardships of its (reputed) 9,000 occupants. This isolation had direct impact on the local environment with all the surrounding hills being denuded of trees as a consequence of the collection of firewood both for use as fuel and sale as a source of income.

The IDP camps were the highly visible manifestation of the displacement crisis. However, throughout the crisis and the continuing displacement over the following two years, the majority of the IDPs were in fact staying with relatives and host families, either in Dili or scattered throughout the districts. At the height of the crisis there was a mass exodus of Easterners to Baucau and the eastern districts where a significant proportion were staying with family members or friends. These extra household members have continued to place a significant burden on their host environment, stressing not only their human hosts, but the already scarce household resources. The households hosting family members have had negligible support other than the initial assistance offered in the immediate aftermath of the crisis (Morgan, 2007). In addition, the establishment of transitional camps places strains on adjacent community facilities and infrastructure and in some cases has also restricted access to community amenities.

Photograph 2: Becora Markets transitional camp. As a result of this camp the general public has lost access to these markets and a community amenity
A legacy of destruction

Photographs three and four document evidence of the damage to the built environment in East Timor and reveal some of the considerable damage to both the burnt buildings. The legacy of the damage to the built environment was evident throughout the areas visited by the researchers, not only in Dili and Baucau, but also in the districts.

Photograph 3: The charred remains of the Customs building central Dili

The burnt-out buildings and power poles stripped of their electric cables are a stark reminder, of the overwhelming destruction of infrastructure that accompanied the post-referendum violence in 1999. As illustrated, there was also considerable evidence of the more recent damage associated with the arson attacks that have occurred since independence.

Photograph 4: The burnt UNICEF sponsored community child care centre in Baucau
These burnt-out buildings, many in the centre of Dili and in the New Town in Baucau, in conjunction with the lack of any visible maintenance of basic infrastructure such as roads or footpaths, create a depressing atmosphere of neglect. The failure to restore some of the buildings is in part related to the lack of certainty over land tenure and property law and in part to the possibility of further attacks due to the uncertain security situation. To see facilities being destroyed with impunity only engenders discouragement and despair in the wider community and significantly erodes hard won gains in improving well-being and resilience.

**Impacts on the natural environment**

Photographs five and six also document some of the environmental degradation that is evident in East Timor. In part this degradation was directly related to the location of the IDP camps such as in the totally denuded hillsides behind the Mettinaro camp, and in part to agricultural and other practices and the management of the difficult climatic conditions. Some of the environmental issues that were witnessed included denuded hillsides, soil erosion and landslides; burning of grasslands to encourage new growth, dry river courses and extensive areas of already desiccated land at the beginning of the dry season.

![Photograph 5: A dry riverbed, fallow land and denuded hills on the road to Baucau](image-url)
Discussion

Governance, the community and youth

At the time that this research was undertaken, the government was implementing its closure of the IDP camps and initiating its resettlement project. The government, NGOs and United Nations and humanitarian agencies involved needed to address community concerns whilst involving community stakeholders in the process of resettlement. The government should continue to widely publicise its national recovery strategy and increase the support for reintegration of IDPs into the receiving communities. The needs and role of the districts and rural communities in these crises should not be overlooked.

Much of the violence during the crises and in East Timorese society in general is related to the youth gangs and other disaffected youth. There is a pressing need for a combination of immediate short-term measures coupled with long-term programmes such as targeted education and training programmes that realistically address youth aspirations and future long-term employment requirements for East Timor. Whilst it is recognised that the government and international agencies are beginning to address this issue, the researchers would affirm that this is an issue that requires urgent action if outbreaks of violence are not to continue to be an ongoing feature of East Timorese society.

There is a perception in the community that those who have committed serious crimes, and particularly those involving violence against women, have not been pursued. This belittles the experiences of those who suffered these crimes and festers resentment and
unresolved trauma in the community. Similarly a failure to prosecute those believed to be responsible for arson attacks and acts of violence engenders a belief in the community that they can commit such actions with impunity and promotes a culture that sees violent confrontation as an acceptable means of resolving disputes.

**Land tenure and housing**

The process of addressing the issue of a functioning land tenure and property law system needs to be expedited. The uncertainties over ownership of property need to be resolved so that people can return to their homes where appropriate and the renovation and rebuilding of damaged buildings and infrastructure commenced. Similarly the issue of compensation for those whose property was occupied by IDPs for this extended period needs some attention. The issue of land tenure is also tied in with the necessity of addressing the issue of housing requirements for present and future growth projections in Dili and other regional centres with long-term, sustainable solutions. Rather than building more transitional camps, low cost affordable permanent solutions that address some of current housing shortfall should be considered, such as in the housing constructed in the wake of the 2006 Boxing Day Tsunami in Aceh.

**The environment**

The pervasive use of firewood as an alternative cheap fuel source has resulted in widespread clearing of trees in rural areas and threatens the already depleted forest cover. There needs to be a focus on an urgent development of a feasible low cost alternative to the use of firewood as a fuel source. There are clearly many environmental issues in East Timor that need addressing urgently to avoid further soil degradation and erosion and to help prepare the community for the potential predicted effects of climate change and associated displacement. This should be done in conjunction with the implementation of large scale reforestation and sustainable agricultural practice education programmes to address the issues of water quality, land degradation, forest depletion and soil erosion.

**Conclusion**

The main aim of this study was to identify the influences on the capacity of vulnerable and displaced communities in Timor-Leste to recover from and adapt to the risk of recurrence of a severe event; in this case the political and civil conflict of 2006. The study thus documented
the factors affecting the ability of communities in Timor-Leste to recover from and adapt to a series of severe events caused by political conflict. The broader socio-political contexts influencing the distribution of social capacity and resilience factors within East Timorese communities, especially the displaced, were explored and East Timorese views of their own vulnerabilities and capacity to recover from adverse events were documented.

The resilience and diversity of livelihoods within a community are major determinants of the vulnerability of that community. Socio-economic factors determine the level of vulnerability and its ability to withstand recurrent stresses. Community resilience to further stresses on livelihoods was therefore already diminished, resulting in a population very vulnerable to the effects of the crises. Using the DROP framework (Cutter et al., 2008), eight major themes emerged from the analysis and provided insights into IDP and community perspectives on the background to the crises of 2006 and 2007, their sources of vulnerability and resilience and their solutions to some of the perceived problems in East Timor and their fears for the future.

The research also revealed that the prolonged nature of the displacement has placed many stresses on the community including financial and emotional. These issues have rendered them vulnerable and reduced their resilience to any further severe events, natural or manmade. Participants voiced their concerns over questions of governance, particularly related to security, land tenure and the compensation and resettlement process. In addition, education and training and the problem of unemployed youth and a loss of social cohesion in this cohort were areas of major concern that needed immediate addressing. Family ties, social networks and a sense of community were seen as providing personal and community strength, as did the support proffered by NGOs and humanitarian and international agencies, including international defence forces.

The East Timorese have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of a recent violent and volatile history. However issues of governance, unresolved trauma and lack of sustainable livelihoods have rendered the community vulnerable to outbreaks of further violence and to destruction of the natural and built environment. Participants identified four key areas of need, which are echoed in the words of one of the respondents, who was a female hospital health worker:

... need four factors for the violence of 2006 not to be repeated:

peace, education, economy and health ...

four very important factors and need all to be there otherwise we will have more of the same
These words poignantly capture the essence of what the people of East Timor so urgently need for a brighter future for themselves and their children.

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References


THEME THREE:

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The empire strikes back: Refugees, race and the reinvention of empire
Lucy Fiske and Linda Briskman

Abstract

In this chapter, the authors explore the ongoing cultural, economic and ideological impact of the British Empire in Australia. Using Australia’s history of immigration and its more recent response to asylum seekers under the former government of Prime Minister John Howard as a case study, the authors contend that the “end of empire” has not yet come; rather “empire thinking” is thriving and continuing to shape global refugee movements and international politics. Empire has been divorced from the overt evidence of its existence, enabling the “common sense” of racism and capitalism to be redeployed in a postmodern guise to continue the economic, cultural and political domination of peoples from the global south, wherever they may live.

Introduction


The British Empire was founded on the central idea of white supremacy; that Europeans were superior to other races, and that this superiority (of intelligence, culture, religion and science) meant that it was both the white man’s right and the white man’s burden to “civilise” the world. This belief justified the occupation of lands, the (often brutal) subjugation of peoples around the globe, and the exploitation of the new lands and people for commerce and trade. Such beliefs justified the colonial domination of nations considered less civilised and enabled the imposition of western ways on the non-western world (Ife, 2001).

The second half of the twentieth century saw the collapse of the British Empire with most colonised countries winning independence. While the physical occupation of lands and people may have been largely dismantled during this period, the ideas and beliefs that justified and underpinned the colonial system are very much alive. Advances in technology have made the physical control of territory and people through military and other colonial
power, less necessary. Such power and, importantly, economic exploitation, can be achieved at a distance and through less immediately obvious methods and controls.

Empire has not died; it has simply been reinvented. It is no longer a modernist construction with a central focus on physical occupation of lands, pseudo-scientific categorisation of race, Christian moral justification and early capitalist exploitation of resources. The world today is characterised by a postmodern construction of empire in which the controls are more nebulous but equally powerful. The more amorphous and therefore more flexibly deployed notion of culture has replaced the now discredited, more rigid and ultimately less useful category of race. Remaining central, however, are the key elements of capitalism with the corresponding primacy of the individual, exploitation of non-European peoples and lands and an accompanying Christian moral framework. In this schema, one need not actually be white-skinned to be accepted, but one needs to accept and not challenge the core organising framework. This reinvention of empire is evidence of the conservative principle that “If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change” (di Lampedusa, 1988, p. 40).² As Kundnani (2007) argues, the end of the British Empire did not bring the end of racism, but offered the pretext for its transformation, even exploiting moments of crisis as opportunities for renovation.

This chapter gives a broad overview of Australia’s historical response to non-British immigration and to Indigenous Australians, as a backdrop to its focus on Australia’s response to asylum seekers and refugees during the last ten years. We contend that the vilification of asylum seekers is symptomatic of powerful hegemonic forces seeking to maintain a colonial world of half a century or more ago. We further contend that the re-emergence of empire-logic as a central organising principle in the political, social, cultural and economic life of the nation is not unique to Australia, but rather is a global phenomenon maintaining the monopoly of European peoples over economic, political, scientific and moral power.

**Empire: The beginning**

At the time of colonisation in 1788, Australia had a robust Aboriginal population with distinct cultures and a special relationship with the land. The colonisers believed Aboriginal Australians to be a “backward race” who would soon “die out”, but that those Aborigines of “mixed race” would assimilate to the point of being invisible (Jupp, 1995). One of the main means of achieving this goal of cultural destruction was through the removal of so-called half-caste children from their families and communities (Briskman, 2003).
These beliefs and the introduction of practices that went alongside them, combined with Australia’s lack of land borders, presented an opportunity for the colonisers to create a uniquely British outpost of empire, as long as they could control immigration. The idea of immigration control was new at the turn of the century, with seafaring conventions supporting unrestricted and unannounced arrivals and departures the international norm (Cronin, 1993). The first act of Australia’s new parliament following federation in 1901 was unprecedented at the time. The parliament passed the Immigration Restriction Act (1901), which was designed to exclude almost all non-white prospective immigrants as well as left-wing political agitators (Soldatic & Fiske, 2009). The application of the Immigration Restriction Act became known as the White Australia Policy, a policy that continued unchanged until 1958 and that was not fully abandoned until 1973.

The White Australia Policy used a dual system of testing prospective immigrants in English or any other European language, and fining carriers who brought “undesirable” people to Australia. The dictation test was administered at the point of arrival to select people: “All aboriginal inhabitants of Africa, Asia and Polynesia should be subjected to the test. … In the case of White Races, the test will be applied only under special circumstances” (Department of Immigration directive cited in Norris, 1975, p. 92).

Immigration was to be restricted primarily to Anglo-Celts, and expanded later to include Southern and Eastern Europeans as a fear of “invasion” from Asia grew, pejoratively known as the “yellow peril”, particularly immediately after the Second World War. The ruling elite in Australia was determined to build and maintain a homogeneous Anglo-Celtic nation on the geographical periphery of the British Empire.

Long after the Empire crumbled, Australia still maintains an imperial British hegemonic nation in which the consensual support of the population is manipulated through the dissemination and promulgation of an exclusionary construction of Australian national identity (Bocock, 1986; Johnson, 2007). While Australia’s demography has changed, due largely to a brief period of non-discriminatory immigration policies from the mid-1970s, it has, in the last decade, maintained and even strengthened the hegemonic power of White Australia. Altho

3 Although the target has moved from “the Asian” to “the Muslim”, the ideological underpinnings remain firmly in place.
Retreat from empire: A temporary reprieve

Under successive Liberal and Labor governments from 1972 to 1996 Australia began to reposition itself in the world, acknowledging its geographical location and, importantly, changing its sense of identity from an Anglo-Celtic nation to a multicultural nation drawing strength from its diversity. Australia looked increasingly towards Asian neighbours for important trade, immigration and other ties (Johnson, 2007; Jupp, 1995). Under multiculturalism, not only were immigration policies made non-discriminatory, but immigrants were able and encouraged to maintain their cultural heritage in language, dress, food and cultural practices. Australia’s national identity began to broaden to enable a more heterogeneous notion of what it means to be “Australian”. Accompanying this diversification of Australia’s national identity was a rise in republican support, with then Prime Minister Keating declaring in 1995 his plan for Australia to become a republic by 2001. This would, he argued, resolve the issue of Australia’s national identity as a modern multicultural nation drawing strength through diversity (Allegritti, 2004).

Empire under reinvention

Many of the new relationships with Asia were primarily at the government and institutional level while changing attitudes among the general population lagged behind (Jupp, 1995). There was a popular backlash against the changing identity of Australia. The Liberal Party at this time was deeply divided on issues of multiculturalism and immigration (Jupp, 1995). After much wrangling within the party, conservative politician John Howard, who was known to be highly critical of multiculturalism, was elected leader of the Liberal Party in 1995.

As the newly appointed party leader, Howard made a series of speeches in which he set out his agenda for Australia. He accused the Keating government of engaging in “a heist of Australian identity” (in Johnson, 2007, p. 195), and portrayed the government as elitist and left wing, beholden to a broad range of “special interest groups” (p. 195). He attacked the government for running the country to suit the powerful claims of those groups at the expense of “mainstream Australia”. He censured the Labor government for trying to re-write Australian history to undermine White Australian achievements and the strong ties with Britain, even going so far as accusing Keating of trying to “intimidate all those Australians who still feel strong ties with Britain” (in Johnson, 2007, p. 197). In particular he was concerned about the re-writing of Aboriginal history, terming this revisionist and a “black arm-band view of history” (p. 197), and with what he saw as postmodern cultural relativism.
which overemphasised the contributions of non-Anglo immigrants without due recognition of the centrality of ongoing nation building efforts of British Australians (Jones, 1997; Brett, 2003).

Howard promised to make Australia “relaxed and comfortable” with its identity, history and future. He promised to halt the elitist social engineering of the Keating government and return Australia to Australians. In doing so he drew upon a mythical legend of Australia – the Anglo-Celtic, rural or suburban, white, working-class male, of simple needs and with strong pragmatic values of mateship and egalitarianism. Howard aligned himself strongly with the image of the “Aussie battler”, and cast the university educated critics of his politics as the “chardonnay set” or “chattering classes”: cosmopolitan, inner-urban self-interested minority groups who had lost touch with mainstream Australia (Brett, 2003).

Howard insisted that Australian values were open and tolerant, and that Australia had a proud history of welcoming newcomers. He denied that racism existed and argued instead for a culturally diverse community unified in a commitment to “common values underlying Australian identity” (Johnson, 2007, p. 196). This Australian identity is strongly rooted in its British colonial origins, a theme which Howard has repeated in many speeches, such as this delivered in 2003 during a visit to Britain: “there is no nation in the world with which we share as much history, language, culture, patterns of humour and even sporting rivalry as Great Britain, to Australians, the British heritage is immense” (Johnson, 2007, p. 198).

In the 1996 election campaign, Howard clearly outlined Australia’s national identity as a major campaign platform. He read, fanned and rode a vein of popular discomfort with Australia’s national identity becoming more diverse. By painting the Labor government as “social engineers” and the government of “special interest groups”, Howard was able to position himself and the Liberal Party as the party of the people, a government for “mainstream” Australia. In his first term in office it was his distortion of Indigenous history, land rights and reconciliation that formed the primary focus of his reclamation of a proud White Australia (Johnson, 2007).

The Liberal Party won the 1996 election, an election which also saw Pauline Hanson, an independent right-wing Queenslander and a formerly endorsed Liberal Party candidate, elected to the Senate on outwardly racist politics. In her maiden speech to parliament, Hanson blamed “Aboriginals, multiculturalists and a host of other minority groups” (Hanson, 1996) for most of Australia’s social problems. Hanson’s speech struck a chord amongst many disaffected Australians and, in 1997, she formed the One Nation Party. One Nation performed well in the 1998 election, drawing around one million votes from the traditional Liberal Party
base (Jupp, 2002). This electoral success for One Nation’s anti-multicultural stance emboldened Howard to pursue his own agenda of social cohesion and cultural homogeneity, and ultimately led to the end of bipartisan support for multiculturalism in Australia.

Refuge in the empire (no room at the inn)

During Howard’s second term in office there was a relatively significant increase in arrivals of unauthorised asylum seekers mostly from Afghanistan and Iraq. The arrival of 10,515 asylum seekers between 1998 and 2001 became a defining issue in Australian politics and the government’s response to asylum seekers shaped the agenda for the 2001 federal election along lines of immigration, border control and national security (Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 2005). Long before the attacks on Washington and New York in September 2001, the Howard government had been presenting the arrival of asylum seekers as a quasi-invasion of Australia. Using terms such as “border protection”, “national security”, “illegals” and “sovereign rights”, government ministers implied that refugees might be terrorists and emphasised the unknown and potentially dangerous aspect of unauthorised arrivals (Fiske, 2006; Osuri & Banerjee, 2004).

In August 2001, two months prior to the federal election and with the government lagging in the polls, the government refused permission for the MV *Tampa* to enter Australian waters. The *Tampa*, a Norwegian cargo vessel, had rescued some 400 asylum seekers from a sinking boat in international waters (Jupp, 2002). After several days of deadlocked negotiations, the captain of the *Tampa* began moving into Australian waters, citing his obligations under the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention as people on board the *Tampa* needed food, water and medical treatment. Australia responded by deploying Special Air Service troops in full combat gear to board and take control of the vessel. Images of Australian troops boarding the *Tampa* made front page news across the nation, emphasising the fears of an invasion which were already present in the mainstream Australian psyche, and which the Howard government had reawakened and linked to refugees (Fiske, 2006).

Two weeks later, the attacks of 11 September 2001 occurred and the Australian government was quick to link refugees, asylum seekers and the terrorist threat. On September 13, Australia’s defence minister, Peter Reith, said in a radio interview, “…look you’ve got to be able to manage people coming into your country, you’ve got to be able to control that otherwise it can be a pipeline for terrorists to come in and use your country as a staging post for terrorist activities” (Reith, 2001).
The following month, in October 2001, the government released photographs to support its claim that asylum seekers had thrown their children overboard. This action was used to further discredit and dehumanise asylum seekers and to justify the government’s tough asylum regime with the prime minister declaring that “those people” had no place in Australia (Howard, 2001). It has been clearly shown that the government manipulated the images and silenced the naval officers involved in what was actually a rescue of asylum seekers from a sinking boat (Parliament of Australia, 2002).

Tensions amongst the Australian community were running high. Opinion was polarised, with neutral stances almost impossible. Polls consistently showed over 80% support for the government’s actions against asylum seekers, while community-based refugee support groups and refugee rights groups grew exponentially. Refugees had become the battleground for Australian identity. Howard wanted a reclaimed British colonial Australia, while refugee supporters were fighting for a more diverse, open and compassionate Australian identity.

Through a raft of policy constructs, Australia continued to engage in what Barthes describes as inoculation, practices that immunise society against difference (cited in Sandoval, 1997). Escalating Labor’s introduction of immigration detention from 1989, the conservative Howard government introduced stringent requirements that saw unauthorised arrivals detained in immigration detention facilities, typically located in remote locations out of sight of the populace. Despite increasing exposure of the brutal practices within detention, the politics of fear which has pervaded the immigration and refugee landscape, resulted in, at best, benign acceptance and, at worst, passionate support from mainstream Australia. Even the detention of children until 2005 resulted in little public outcry, reminiscent of the human rights violations inflicted on institutionalised Aboriginal children in past times. The conflation of asylum seeking with the so-called war on terror and the representations of Muslims as inherently violent and fanatical (Perera, 2002) resulted in a continuation of a policy trajectory where border control remained sacrosanct and ideologically driven.

Upon release from detention the denial of permanent protection, through the introduction in 1999 of the Temporary Protection Visa (TPV), further exemplified the embodiment in policy of those deemed unworthy to achieve the “ideal” of the integrated migrant. The TPV created a new class of refugee, a signifier of inferiority and lack of acceptance of those outside the realm of empire. To emphasise the discourse of the “uninvited outsider”, harsh restrictions were in place. Non-eligibility for both English language support and interpreting services presented one potential hurdle to acceptance and opportunity.
Perhaps the harshest of provisions was the denial of family reunion, a policy that reinforced refusal of entry to those seen as a threat to the existing value system (Fiske, 2006; Mansouri, 2002).

There were further endeavours to push people back from entering Australia. A policy of surveillance, known as Operation Relex, operated in the waters between Australia and Indonesia (Parliament of Australia, 2002). This naval operation resulted in asylum seeker boats being pushed back into dangerous waters and some of the occupants languishing in Indonesian camps for many years (Briskman, Latham & Goddard, 2008).

In 2001, legislation was introduced which excised most of Australia’s northern islands from the migration zone. This meant in effect that unauthorised boat arrivals on those islands were ineligible to be processed under Australian law. Instead, asylum seekers were taken to Australian-built and funded detention centres in the Pacific nations of Papua New Guinea and Nauru under a policy called the “Pacific Solution” (Parliament of Australia, 2002). This tightening of territoriality was unopposed by the majority community who were convinced Australia was being swamped by bogus claimants who would undermine the Australian way of life. According to Perera (2002) the passing of the legislation brings Australia to a new moral threshold, whereby it can forcibly push away un-armed people seeking refuge in its waters. We argue that it also repositions Australia into an overt neo-colonial relationship that serves to exercise power over Pacific nations deemed to be available for exploitation within the global order. It is a reminder of the history of “modern” aid, which began with colonialism with a sense of responsibility (self-interested or altruistic) arising from it (Barratt, 2008).

The empire strikes back! (At home)

John Howard and the Liberal Party won the 2001 election. They went on to win a fourth term in office in 2004 with race politics and national identity remaining a cornerstone, if less prominent, part of the election campaign. Boat arrivals are now fewer and the discourse of fear shifted its gaze to focus on Muslims already living in Australia. Instead of attacking multiculturalism through immigration, multiculturalism itself came under direct attack from the Howard government. The rhetoric of Howard’s government was very much about integration and social cohesion, with Howard proclaiming in a speech on Australia Day (January 26) 2006 that “we’ve drawn back from being too obsessed with diversity to a point where Australians are now better able to appreciate the enduring values of the national culture that we proudly celebrate and preserve” (in Grattan, 2006). Howard explicitly referred to the
significance of “Judeo-Christian ethics, the progressive spirit of the Enlightenment and values of British political culture” (Howard, 2006, n. p.). Unsurprisingly, the imperial master, Britain, also demanded “a recharging of the batteries of national belonging, for the state to once again connect with the nation, for a return to a clear sense of “them” and “us” in the face of a world in which sovereignty has been increasingly globalised” (Kundnani, 2007, p. 7).

Howard steadfastly believed that non-British and non-Christian immigrants retaining their culture led to divided loyalties, and posed a threat to the material and social life of “mainstream Australia” (Johnson, 2007, p. 198). As such, immigrants were subjected to significant pressure to assimilate to avoid being treated as objects of suspicion. Meanwhile, mainstream Australians were encouraged to report any suspicious looking activities to a terrorism hotline.

Early in 2007, the government officially dropped multiculturalism as a policy, echoing the Conservative Party call in Britain to promote greater emphasis and pride in British history, identity and values and to move away from multiculturalism (Kundnani, 2007). Howard stated that this move was to reflect the desire of the Australian people that “immigrants become Australians” (AAP, 2007). Alongside this change was the introduction of a new citizenship test emphasising Australia’s British heritage. An old but transformed policy of restriction re-emerged in a discourse on citizenship whereby immigrants were not only required to demonstrate English language ability, with reverberations of the early dictation test, but also were expected to adhere to a set of values and accept an account of history that is seen to be quintessentially Australian.

Further echoing the White Australia Policy, the government retained the practice of fining carriers who bring “unauthorised arrivals” to Australia. As in Britain, the measures of cohesion to assure the public that its national identity was secure were introduced alongside measures to harness public confidence in the effective management of the nation’s borders (Kundnani, 2007). Although the Labor government of Kevin Rudd replaced John Howard in November 2007, it still remains to be seen how policies towards immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers will unfold and whether policies of multiculturalism will be reinstated. At the time of writing some changes had taken place including the closure of the Nauru camp, the abolition of TPVs and minor changes to the citizenship test. Language requirements have been retained and citizenship continues to be promoted on the government’s citizenship website using a language of “Australian values” and “privileges and responsibilities” rather than within a discourse of legal rights and responsibilities (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2009).
The empire strikes out (in the Pacific)

The colonial project in its many and varying guises represented a variety of means of exploitation of less powerful and more vulnerable nations: including economics, governance and imposition of western worldviews. The location of detention facilities (under the Pacific Solution) in economically disadvantaged countries further evidences the colonial entrenchment in dictating development. In this instance it was the offering of economic rewards in exchange for the location of detention facilities in Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and Nauru.

These countries that joined Australia in implementing its harsh policies, both have a colonial legacy and remain members of the British Commonwealth. Papua New Guinea obtained independence from Australia in 1975 (SBS, 2006). Nauru became a British mandate in 1920 but was administered by Australia. It became an independent country in 1968 (SBS, 2006). Its economic plight was arguably the motivation for succumbing to pressure to house asylum seekers in that country. It was under the guise of the Pacific Solution that the Australian Navy intercepted and forcibly moved asylum seekers to detention centres offshore in exchange for an “assistance package” to provide detention services as well as to improve the living conditions of the local population (Rogalla, 2003).

The country of Nauru is a particularly telling case study. It is a small Pacific Island of only twenty-one square kilometres with a population of 13,500 people and retains close connections with Australia (Dastyari, 2008). Nauru’s serious economic problems resulted in it agreeing to host a processing centre on its shores in exchange for a pledge for a vast increase in aid and development programs from Australia (Dastyari, 2008). It continues the methodology of meeting the needs of empire, which started with economic exploitation, and continues with co-option steered by the interests of Australia’s immigration policy.

What is significant is that, since 2001, Australia increased five-fold the amount of development assistance provided to Nauru, compared with the 1990s. Between 1992 and 2001 Australia gave a total of $24.6 million in aid to Nauru. From the establishment of the detention centres in late 2001 until mid-2006, Australia gave over $123 million in aid (Oxfam, 2007). As well as the strings attached to the aid through the detention facility, there have been other inequities with Australia providing assistance where it deems fit, rather than responding to the needs of the recipient country. In Nauru the amount of money Australia allocates for police development, for example, exceeds that provided for health (Oxfam,
Furthermore, the detention of asylum seekers on Nauru placed extra burdens on a small population that was facing economic and political problems (Oxfam, 2007).

The Pacific Conference of Churches and the Pacific Islands Association of Non-Government Organisations made a joint statement in October 2001:

We also appeal to Pacific Island Governments to carefully consider the long-term impact and consequences of accepting Australian aid deals in connection to the refugees. To welcome and accommodate Australian refugees for the sake of money will add more problems and will have adverse impacts on our communal life as Pacific communities, as well as our sovereignty. Pacific Island Governments need to focus on finding solutions to overcome political, social and economic problems at home. … (in Oxfam, 2007, p. 43)

Interestingly, when trying to find a country to take asylum seekers post-Tampa a number of countries rejected the requests. It was finally to the Pacific that the Australian government turned, knowing it could rely upon its former colony of Papua New Guinea, still dependent on Australian support, and the nation of Nauru, which was virtually bankrupt and desperate for Australian aid (Corlett, 2007; Parliament of Australia, 2002). According to Oxfam (2007) there is a legal fiction that Nauru and Australia, as sovereign states, were equal partners in the Pacific Solution. This ignores the fundamental power imbalance in the relationship, with Nauru reliant on Australia for aid funding and the whole process of offshore processing financed, managed and controlled under Australian authority. Rather than being focused on the future development of countries like Nauru, aid was directed towards Australia’s immigration outcomes (Corlett, 2007).

**Empire comes home**

Australia selectively calls on the colonial past to continue to dominate those still part of the British dominion and to exclude those who have removed themselves from the colonial project. As Perera (2002, p. 25) asks, “[w]hat histories sustain our new defensive geography?” There is a question here of the perpetuation of a neo-colonial relationship predicated on exploitation, domination and territorialism. Osuri and Banerjee (2004) point out that colonial nationalisms, despite histories of multicultural co-existence, remain entrenched in discursive terms. In Australia, a settler nationalism born of conquest continues to produce a racialised Australia that proclaims a monocultural way of life, asserted through white nationalism (Osuri & Banerjee, 2004). The events of September 11, 2001 further entrench the new race narratives that proclaim the enlightenment, the west and white suffering and conveniently
forgets the colonial legacy and the genocide, murder and institutionalised violence inflicted on those geographically within but culturally outside the construction of empire. We are told we are part of a monolithic coalition that values freedom while denying alternative constructions of freedom from those outside the white nationalist construct. Those who refute dominant stories are cast as “un-Australian”.

From modern to postmodern racism

A century ago, the White Australia Policy was argued on pseudo-scientific notions of race, specifically that there was a hierarchy of races with Europeans at the top and all others in staggered positions below. This notion of race was essential to the colonial project and it was seen as the “white man’s burden” to “civilise” the world. Imperial occupation and control of far-flung lands was justified ostensibly by this superiority. The colonial inheritance of the belief of white superiority is sown deeply within Australia’s dominant social, political and economic institutions and attitudes. The White Australia Policy was one such manifestation of this belief, which aimed to create a racially homogeneous nation. Such pseudo-scientific notions of race today have been discredited and replaced instead with a postmodern construction of culture. In this schema, cultures are not catalogued along a hierarchy. Instead, the difference between cultures is emphasised with the conclusion that some cultures are so different that dialogue and co-existence is impossible (Flecha, 1999).

Australia’s demography has changed during three decades of multiculturalism and non-discriminatory immigration such that any hope of a racially homogeneous nation is unrealistic. The aim of the Howard government instead was for a limited multiracial society with a monoculture (Stratton, 1998). This cultural homogeneity essentially means a unilingual, capitalist, Judeo-Christian society which values and recognises the individual above any membership of a “special interest” or cultural group, and a society that recognises and honours the British heritage of Australia as a core component of society.

Conclusion

A brief retreat from the British Empire in Australia in the 1970s and 1980s did not resolve, as Keating hoped, the issue of Australia’s national identity as a modern multicultural nation drawing strength through diversity (Allegritti, 2004), but triggered a popular backlash against multiculturalism and a revaluing of White Australia. Politicians have used the arrival of some
10,000 asylum seekers in leaky boats, linked with the spectre of terrorism, to argue for the reintroduction of harsh and discriminatory immigration policies coupled with assimilationist policies towards Indigenous Australians and non-British groups already living here. At a definitional level the language of empire and race has largely fallen from popular lexicon. However, the world continues to be organised significantly around the core values and beliefs that drove imperial expansion and exploitation for several centuries. The function of empire and race has been divorced from the language, thereby freeing the power of this ideology to reinvent and replicate itself whilst authoring its own disappearance. Today, we are the inheritors of the received logic of empire, unable (or unwilling) to see the continuing existence of empire. Thereby global power relations (here explored through refugee movements into Australia) continue to be impelled by the hidden drivers of an inherited certainty of superiority and right. A necessary but by itself insufficient step towards deeper change and global justice is to recognise the functioning of empire in its multiple guises. Refugee flows, at their roots as well as receiving countries, provide a useful case study for the recognition that is an essential precursor to change.

Notes
1 We use the term “European” as Franz Fanon did – that is, it includes those lands not physically located in Europe, but dominated by European people and systems: USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
2 di Lampedusa’s The Leopard is set in Sicily during the time of Risorgimento when Italy as a collection of individual kingdoms was unified under Victor Emmanuel II following the successful campaign of Garibaldi in 1860. Tancredi, nephew of Sicilian nobleman Don Fabrizio Corbera, Prince of Salina, urges his uncle to switch allegiances to the invading army by saying: “Unless we ourselves take a hand now, they’ll foist a republic on us. If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change”.
3 The term “Asian” here refers primarily to people coming from Asia major and South East Asia such as China, Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia and Thailand.
4 The Liberal Party is the conservative party in Australian politics.
5 This aspiration remains unachieved.
6 One of the islands excised from Australia’s migration zone, and one of the more common points of arrival for asylum seekers is named Christmas Island, prompting many remarks about the Christian values Howard promotes.
References


Academic activism for political change:
Opposing mandatory detention of asylum seekers

Linda Briskman

Abstract

The mandatory detention of asylum seekers in Australia has been extensively critiqued in Australia and abroad for callousness driven by an overreaction to the arrival of asylum seekers on Australian shores. Less explored is the role of academic and professional groups in harnessing their expertise to speak out against the injustices and human rights violations that flow from the mandatory detention policy. This chapter presents an overview of the treatment of asylum seekers in their rights-seeking pursuits and then discusses the convergence of ethical responsibility and moral courage in endeavours to restore transparent processes at a time when civil liberties and human rights are increasingly eroded. Two interrelated projects are discussed: The People’s Inquiry into Detention, and Caring for Asylum Seekers in Australia: Bioethics and Human Rights.

Introduction

The asylum seeker regime in Australia has been increasingly subject to critique and contest. Under a policy harsher than in many comparable nation states, people arriving without authorisation are mandatorily detained in immigration detention camps, contracted by the Immigration Department to private prison operators, for the duration of their asylum seeking process. They are then either granted a refugee visa or returned to the country from which they fled. The arrival of asylum seekers by boat in Australian territory has generated considerable debate in Australia and the media has played a powerful role in mediating the public discourse concerning asylum seekers (Saxton, 2003). Concerned activists, professionals and academics have endeavoured to research the terrain to turn around the dominant discourse and influence policy developments. The chapter examines the role of academics who exercised what they saw as a moral imperative to expose and interrogate asylum seeker policies.

Immigration detention was introduced by the Labor Government in 1989 but continually extended in scope, particularly by the conservative government of Prime Minister
Howard that was in power from 1996 to 2007, with a succession of Ministers responsible for its implementation. Defying criticism from human rights groups in Australia and abroad, the Howard Government argued that mandatory detention was necessary to contain people while their claims were processed and to prevent absconding; for health and security checks; and to deter other would-be asylum seekers from arriving in this manner. Although each of the reasons can be readily disputed, deterrence is the foundation stone of the policy (Briskman, 2008) and this tilts Australia into what prominent Queen’s Counsel and refugee advocate, Julian Burnside (2005b) describes as a moral shadow-land. Burnside states that the punishment of innocent people to shape the behaviour of others is impossible to justify.

A question arising for many refugee advocates and researchers is how a government could convince itself and others that the denial of human rights, including those enshrined in international conventions, could maintain a stable society including one free from the manufactured terrorist threat that was incongruously associated with asylum seeking since the events in the United States on September 11, 2001. It is also necessary to ask how Australia reached a state of existence whereby people could be locked away indefinitely, where indifference to the suffering of others held sway and where human rights could be breached in a nation that ostensibly prides itself on meeting international obligations.

Pondering on such questions, emerging awareness of the harsh and cruel policies resulted in the formation of advocacy groups that called upon the Australian government to account for its actions and to comply with its obligations and with principles of humanity. These groups operated individually and in unity to condemn policies of mandatory detention, Temporary Protection Visas (which existed up until 2008), the Pacific ‘solution’ which until 2008 saw detention facilities established in Papua New Guinea and Nauru and the excision of islands from Australia’s migration zone (Briskman & Goddard, 2007). Both the People’s Inquiry into Detention and the Caring for Asylum Seekers in Australia: Bioethics and Human Rights project are among the tenacious endeavours that emerged to reveal the determination of asylum seeker commentators, advocates and researchers to restore a fair and just system of refugee determination and to reinstate humanity to those whose rights are obliterated. Both have at their core the goal of contributing to the end of malevolent policies and practices.

The projects

The People’s Inquiry into Detention was auspiced by the Australian Council of Heads of Schools of Social Work (ACHSSW), representing social work schools throughout Australia.
This national citizens’ inquiry garnered the knowledge of concerned community members, including those who had directly experienced immigration detention, by conducting public hearings and receiving written submissions throughout Australia, producing compelling and disturbing testimony.

The second case study concerns the health of asylum seekers derived from an Australian Research Council discovery project on *Caring for asylum seekers in Australia: Bioethics and human rights*, which analyses and reflects on the principled stance of members of the health professions who exposed and challenged the policies and practices of the privatised immigration detention system. This interdisciplinary project gives voice to the concerns emerging from practitioners with medical, psychiatry, psychology and nursing qualifications and experience.

The broad aims of the People’s Inquiry were to expose iniquitous policies and influence policy development, as well as placing the stories of this era on the public record for the future of the nation. With a more focused approach, the Bioethics and Human Rights project has similar aims: to expose the practices through an ethical lens and to foster humane policies of care and treatment of asylum seekers that can only be achieved outside a detention environment. Such research is essential to overturn a state of affairs where the quality and quantity of health care of asylum seekers may be dependent on the goodwill of individual practitioners rather than on good policy or may be thwarted by immigration officials and the detention service providers. Mounting evidence of the severe compromising of health delivery in a contained environment as well as credible evidence of harms to health and mental health prompted this research.

The collection of testimony in both projects is significant as the findings will form part of a living history of the conditions facing those seeking asylum from their own voices and from those directly involved with them, including those charged with providing advice, care and treatment. Both projects represent a witnessing of experiences that might otherwise be lost from public scrutiny. Furthermore, both illustrate the balance between professional obligation, risk, ethics, political engagement and academic freedom. Although acknowledging recent and some positive changes within immigration detention centres, including the closure of some of the harshest facilities and the decrease in the number of long-term detainees, the studies are underpinned by the premise that the mandatory detention policy that remains in place is harmful to both asylum seekers and the reputation of the nation. The processing of asylum seekers on remote Christmas Island with its formidable high security facility remains of deep concern (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2008)
This chapter outlines the role of academics in using their expertise, academic freedom and professional networks to enact projects that scrutinise the injustices and the flouting of human rights obligations. In these explorations, questions are raised of the convergence of academic, professional, ethical and political responsibilities. These responsibilities stand in sharp contrast with the way men, women and children, who traversed perilous seas to seek asylum in this country, are treated with indifference by the mainstream community or with contempt by those who adhere to the tenets of mandatory detention policies.

To the forefront of the academic endeavours was the imperative to never forget that the government and some sections of the media convinced people that onshore asylum seekers were less than human. They have been people pejoratively referred to as queue jumpers, bogus claimants and would-be terrorists (Babacan & Briskman, 2008; McCulloch, 2008), ideologically driven terminology to distort the undeniable right of people to seek asylum. It is troubling that the suffering of those depicted as “the dangerous other” (McCulloch, 2008) does not shake the conscience of what is publicly presented as a compassionate nation. Even if the mainstream community is not attuned to the minutiae of the daily mistreatment within immigration detention, there are questions underlying the projects such as what brought about community agreement with the government’s rejection of the Tampa refugees in 2001 and the factors which created some immunity to the drowning in the same year of the 353 people - children, women and men - on the vessel bound for Australia known by government as Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel X (SIEVX) and to those affected by the tragedy as the Iraqi Titanic or the Ship of the Damned.2

Apart from the espoused reasons for mandatory detention, asylum seekers are irrationally seen as a threat to Australian values, vague and undefined, and as a threat to national security, with a prevailing monocultural doctrine uncritically depicted as cohesive (Briskman, 2007, p. 163). In the pervading punitive politics of fear (McCulloch, 2008) and a reinvented xenophobia, the “friendly stranger” is now the “hostile stranger” spurred on by a condition where the majority feels it is under attack and its way of life threatened by social groups that it does not understand, with whom it cannot identify and hence does not recognise (Turner, 2006, p. 133). The construct of a “war on terror” links terrorism with Islam with a shift in the representation of asylum seekers from cultural threat to potential terrorist threat (Babacan, 2008). More broadly, depictions and actions associated with the “war on terror” have turned many western states against migration and hardened attitudes towards political refugees and stateless peoples, with governments emphasising their responsibilities to citizens in terms of providing security, and not defending rights (Turner, 2006, p. 133).
Case study one: The People’s Inquiry into immigration detention

The People’s Inquiry represents an attempt to overturn and expose the symbol of lost hope for a life free of persecution. Immigration detention centres are a signifier of the denial of rights and the ill-treatment of those ideologically deemed to be less than human. Alongside this was the insidious adoption of “values” as a menacing rhetorical device for depicting those from non-western cultures as inferior. Although a variety of nationalities (and stateless people) have been detained, many of those who have told their stories were from Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran; men, women and children, who languished under a system that permits indeterminate detention. By shielding the centres from public view in remote locations or offshore, the “out of sight, out of mind” adage culminates in a tyranny of ignorance through geographic dispersal.

It is only in relatively recent times and following dissent by Howard’s Liberal Party backbencher, Petro Georgiou, and some of his parliamentary supporters in May 2005, that practices changed to ensure that children were no longer detained and that many long-term detainees were released. These parliamentary champions had threatened to introduce a Private Member’s Bill to soften the government’s detention policy. Despite these gains and some cosmetic changes, the policy of mandatory detention remains in place. The Rudd Labor Government, which took office in late 2007, has abolished the Temporary Protection Visa (TPV), although it is too late for those who have experienced the hardship and uncertainty of what has been described as detention in the community (Marston, 2003), particularly the restriction on family reunion, which was a core provision of this temporary visa category.

The People’s Inquiry was born of deep concern at the way the Australian public were duped by government propaganda machinery and the way that people who had turned to us for help were denied compassion. The turning point arose from an unexpected development occurring at a time when many detained asylum seekers had lost hope and media attention had diminished. Revived attention to immigration detention emerged in early 2005 when an Australian resident, Cornelia Rau, was found to be incarcerated at the Baxter Immigration Detention Facility near Port Augusta. She was severely mentally ill and believed herself to be a German woman called Anna. It was other suffering detainees who exercised a duty of care when the authorities failed to do so, and reported her distress to advocates on the outside. The relentless media eruptions that followed, as well as concerns by advocacy and human rights groups, forced the government to convene an inquiry, led by former Federal Police
Commissioner, Mick Palmer, into the circumstances of her detention. His damning report was presented to the Immigration Department in June 2005.

At the time the decision to hold the Palmer inquiry was announced, other immigration detainees and refugee advocates and activists pushed hard for a more comprehensive inquiry but the government would not budge. After all, in the public’s mind the others entrapped in immigration detention were not like us, or, as Julian Burnside states (2005a):

The only novel feature of the Rau case is that she is uncomfortably like us. She looks like a typical Aussie girl. We are shocked at her treatment, but she received the same careless, cruel indifference that most asylum seekers receive. Why is it acceptable to treat asylum seekers this way, but shocking when it is done to one of us? (p. 17)

The ACHSSW, in frustration at the government response, appointed itself in February 2005 to conduct an independent, transparent and open citizens’ inquiry, believing it had the skills, knowledge and moral obligation to do so. In so doing members and their supporters became enmeshed in an unrelenting personal, professional and emotional journey. Once the intention to hold this independent citizens’ inquiry was announced processes were set in place through academic social work departments and with other advocates to conduct the inquiry. The inquiry operated flexibly and transparently, attracting many volunteers to assist. Accomplishing the three-year inquiry involved holding public hearings in rural and urban settings throughout Australia hearing the testimonies of almost two hundred former detainees, professionals, former detention staff and refugee advocates and receiving almost two hundred written submissions.

The first report, *We’ve Boundless Plains to Share*, was released in November 2006 by the ACHSSW and the expansive *Human Rights Overboard: Seeking asylum in Australia*, was published in 2008 (Briskman, Latham & Goddard). With small amounts of donated funds and with massive volunteer support the inquiry was supported from people from all walks of life and from across the nation. Julian Burnside (2008) describes it as “a remarkable exercise in democracy” (p. 16). Some of these advocates had been part of other social and political movements, but many had not engaged in political action previously, but were shamed into doing so by what they heard from the media, church leaders and others. Some visited detention centres, sometimes from sheer curiosity, and subsequently found themselves caught up in an unstoppable commitment to support and activism after witnessing the brutalities inflicted on innocent people. Arguably the most powerful of voices were those of former
immigration detainees themselves, who entrusted their experiences to the public record through the inquiry.

The inquiry amassed rich, disturbing and plentiful information and the reporting focuses on journeys to detention, life inside detention, processing of refugee claims and life after detention. From the testimonies there were accounts of the actions of the Australian Navy in repelling people from Australian waters despite pleas for mercy. The inquiry learned of the unliveable conditions in the Nauru camp where the sun was scorching and the water supply inadequate. The inquiry was told about the excessive high security measures and militarised approaches adopted in the South Australian Baxter facility near Port Augusta. Information was provided on the abuse and neglect of children in immigration detention and the failure of outside authorities to respond to notifications. Obstructions to refugee claims were to the forefront, including lack of access to legal advice and inconsistencies in decision-making. There were disturbing stories of ongoing difficulties after detention including the limits placed by temporary protection, uncertain futures, mental health problems, detention debts for some and the barriers to family reunion. The narratives painted an undisputable picture of systemic human rights violations, and the stories presented were verifiable from a range of documentary sources (Briskman, Latham & Goddard, 2008).

**Case study two: Caring for asylum seekers in Australia: Bioethics and human rights.**

The three-year project on asylum seekers (2007-2009) was inspired by the words of Eleanor Roosevelt:

> Where, after all, do human rights begin? In small places, close to home – so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any map of the world…Such are the places where every man, woman, and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity, without discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without concerted citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the larger world. (1958, n. p.)

Although the impact on the mental and physical health of immigration detainees is increasingly documented, including in testimony to the People’s Inquiry and in research and public statements from practitioners, research into the ethical problems confronting health care professions remains largely unexplored terrain. The predicament that many from the
healing professions encountered within a confusing, inept and destructive system included incapacity to provide effective and patient-centred health care within immigration detention facilities. This added considerably to the suffering and ill-health caused by the detention itself. The signing of confidentiality clauses had the potential to suppress the adoption of a public advocacy role, although some took risks to speak out through a belief in the right to know. The harshest pressure on practitioners concerns the question of complicity with the immigration detention regime, in which the array of practices that were antithetical to human rights have been described as torture (Curr, 2008; Rogalla, 2003) and, in regard to children, as organised and ritualised abuse by the government (Goddard & Briskman, 2004, p. 17).

Goddard and Briskman use the term “organised abuse” to mean that those children are being abused by many perpetrators who are acting together in ways that they know can be extremely harmful. And we use the term “ritualised abuse” to mean that the children are subject to formal and repeated acts of abuse carried out under a belief system that the government uses to justify such cruelty. (2004, p. 17)

Ways of providing ethically acceptable health care for those whose rights are trampled remains elusive for, as they are probed and treated, the refugee bodies become objectified through a medical gaze that symbolises the loss of cultural, social and physical wholeness (Coker, 2004). Although some practitioners appeared to work dispassionately within detention facilities others were unable to endure what they saw and to cope with the limits of their efficacy and resigned. Participants in this research were imbued with the importance of speaking out rather than colluding with the orchestrated deceit. Interviewing practitioners who have worked with asylum seekers is the cornerstone of this project for without this insider information the creation of adequate policies for the care and treatment of asylum seekers is not fully achievable. Furthermore, the information gleaned from such research recasts that contained within official documents from a personal and professional standpoint, which uncovers the ethical problems that clinicians face when attempting to provide care for asylum seekers in accordance with the seemingly contradictory dictates of professional ethics, institutional obligations and human rights (Zion, Loff & Briskman, in press).

The ethical foundations of professional practice which bind health professionals are perceived by members to be inalienable and cannot be discarded at the whim of others. Evidence provided by health workers tells of the stresses of trying to do good within a pernicious and damaging regime. One nurse interviewed for the research, spoke of the difficulty of dealing with large numbers of profoundly disturbed or distressed people who
were forced to attend a medical centre to obtain their prescribed medicine, rather than being able to distribute the medications in a more dignified and caring manner in the compounds. A psychologist who worked in detention spoke of how suicidal detainees were contained in small isolation cells with minimal facilities and no forms of distraction. A midwife talked of how, against the odds, she extended her defined practice role to gain a deep understanding from the detainees about what had happened and what was happening in the lives in order to validate the grimness of their situation.

The research inquires into the ethical issues arising from dual loyalties whereby health providers are required to subordinate patient interests to those of the state (Zion & Loff, 2008). The question of dual loyalty—to the client and to the employing body—has vexed health professionals, academics and advocates in a range of punitive or controlled settings. Dual loyalty issues frequently arise in closed settings or total institutions characterised by secrecy and ambiguity about the health professional’s role (London, Rubenstein, Baldwin-Ragaven & Van Es, 2006, p. 383). The International Dual Loyalty Working Group (2002) refers to the dimensions of the dual loyalty problem as follows:

- Using medical skills or expertise on behalf of the state
- Subordinating independent medical judgment, in therapeutic or evaluative settings
- Limiting or denying medical treatment or information related to treatment to an individual
- Disclosing confidential patient information to state authorities or powerful non-state actors
- Performing evaluations for legal or administrative purposes
- Remaining silent in the face of human rights abuses committed against individuals and groups in the care of health professionals.

The experience of dual loyalty conflict was apparent in immigration detention where the demands of the authorities were in conflict with those of detainee needs, a situation exacerbated by private detention arrangements that were in place from 1998, first with Australasian Correctional Management and subsequently with Global Solutions Limited, where the profit motive prevails. Dual loyalty questions highlight the vulnerability of asylum seekers in relation to the apparent lack of accountability for the delivery of health care provision.
We shall overcome

Refugee advocate Pamela Curr (2008) asks how it is that the detention of asylum seekers spills over into a system of brutality with more in common with torture than respect for human rights? This raises the question of the means by which this question can be addressed.

There are a variety of ways in which exposure of policies and practices can have an impact. The first is an overt political stance, and both the People’s Inquiry and the Bioethics project are unashamedly political in expressing their views on mandatory detention and its impact. Additionally both projects have aims consistent with the noble words of historian Henry Reynolds (in McGrath, 1995) in relation to his research on Indigenous issues where he says that in his endeavours he was not a dispassionate scholar, but was motivated by a desire to change an ignorant, racist society. However, it needs to be acknowledged that such views are contested and a dichotomy is evident between those advocating external political action and insider policy advocacy (O’Neill, 2008).

Secondly, both projects were underpinned by a belief that it is in the public interest to expose the policies and the systemic brutality of indefinite, mandatory detention from a range of perspectives and knowledge bases. The immigration authorities acted in great secrecy, particularly in relation to commercial-in-confidence dictates of this privatised regime.

Professional responsibility is a third guiding principle. The People’s Inquiry was led by social work academics. Social work ethics—Australian and International (Australian Association of Social workers, 1999; International Federation of Social Workers & International Association of Schools of Social Work, 2004)—adhere to principles of social justice and human rights. Taking action when these principles are threatened can transform a profession, from a “helping profession” to a “politically engaged profession”. Regrettably there is sometimes a disjuncture between the values of social work and the practice, and there is pressure on social workers to discard their ideals and operate in the realm of what is seen as practice reality (Lymberry & Butler, 2004). For social workers who have entered the academic realm those restrictions are largely absent and there is generally freedom to act on one’s conscience, expertise and beliefs without interference. However, in exercising this right, academics may wish to contemplate the question raised by Sharon Andrews (2008, p. 28) as to whether academics are encouraged, supported and rewarded for engaging with the community and immersing themselves in public debates.

Beyond these questions, the bioethics and human rights project explores the landscape of professional responsibility, complicity and advocacy. How is it that people who have
entered “ethical” health professions with espoused values that focus on the primacy of the patient, healing and duty of care, collude with punishing and even torturing regimes? What prompts only some to speak out and expose the practices inside from their own professional standpoint?

At the political level, both the inquiry and the bioethics research raise questions about democracy, a contested concept in an era where civil liberties and human rights can be eroded by an overzealous state. A citizens’ inquiry can restore democratic processes as our rights to participation in decision-making are minimal. As political philosopher Jonathan Wolff (2006) asks, “[c]ould it be that every one of us has knowingly, and voluntarily, given our consent to the state?” (p. 41) What about the question of participatory democracy, one where “all citizens take an active role in government, far more extensive”, he posits, “than anything we have encountered in modern democracies?” (Wolff, 2006, p. 41). Hamilton and Maddison (2007) ask what are the costs when a government tries to ensure that its values are the only ones heard in public debate? They argue further that the Howard government was pervaded by an intolerant and anti-democratic sentiment that is at times given an ideological justification that reflects the belief that it has the right to act in whatever way it deems appropriate (2007, p. 3). These commentators raise the question of whether we are a nation that values public participation and debate or whether we see legitimate democratic participation only through a three-yearly visit to the ballot box.

In this respect, a citizens’ inquiry and advocacy research can both be viewed as ways of restoring democracy when most community members acquiesce to the power of government by merely exercising their democratic rights on the day of an election. What drives the activity is resolving the question as to what gives the government the legitimacy to enact immoral policies in our name? With a human rights mantle of the worth and dignity of all framing both investigations, we are mindful that unpopular causes require the greatest attention. This is not to say that achieving this quest is an easy one when popular opinion is not sympathetic.

There remains the question of moral responsibility and collective action, a question that is raised in relation to the silence occurring in settings where concerns arise about the practices. If it is in our power to contribute to stopping harmful policies, what is our moral responsibility, especially when those being oppressed are effectively silenced through the political system or when their attempts to exercise resistance, for example through self-harm or demonstrations are quelled?
Refugee voices

Delving into the heart of political problems is one means of elevating silenced voices into the public domain. It appears that Australia, through the largely hidden treatment of asylum seekers, lost its way as an open society, and endeavours to obtain information from authorities of detention practices have been resisted. This creates quandaries for academics who subscribe to tenets of participation, equality and partnership as the equations that should drive explorations. As Harrell-Bond & Voutira (2007, p. 281) have noted, there has been a global move from refugees as being prime movers in research to reduced to invisibility. Whether they are held in refugee camps or in detention facilities there are a range of obstructions and restrictions to access. Further, they say, refugees are subsumed under elaborate bureaucratic structures that control them. A key feature of the structures of control is the power wielded by individual actors who represent authority structures and often perceive their role as saying ‘no’. Theoretically, they note, refugees have rights they seldom enjoy but government agencies and others with responsibility, such as private detention providers, are unlikely to welcome exposure of their failings in protecting those rights. Moreover, those in detention experience the most silencing and once failed asylum seekers they have been deported they may disappear from sight, and opportunities to hear their experiences are diminished (Harrell-Bond & Voutira, 2007), although determined researchers have followed some home (for example Corlett, 2005; Edmund Rice Centre, 2004).

An ethical value base in conducting such investigations must be to the forefront and both projects provide leads. Underpinning all investigations must be the question of in whose interests is research being conducted and who benefits. Formal research ethics needs reconsideration. With some justification, rigorous research ethics have been put in place to regulate how researchers should act. However, in recent years a rift has occurred between traditionalists who support mainstream codes and those who contest these codes through a counter-discourse (Ferdinand, Pearson, Rowe & Worthington, 2007). According to Ferdinand et al., (2007), the more radical opinion rejects the normative authority of ethics codes on the basis that being ethical cannot be measured against a checklist of what is right and what is wrong. Ethics research in this conceptualisation is process driven, self-regulatory and mediated through self-reflexivity. They argue against the position that researchers should be passive, objective and dispassionate, which they see as unrealistic in certain situations in adhering to the question of where our moral duty as researchers belongs. It is important to note that beyond the gathering of information from health professionals there are a variety of
means of documenting the delivery and impact of health services within these exclusionary environments. Outside formal research paradigms, advocates are increasingly documenting case studies of ill-treatment, dehumanisation and illness, to act as a conduit between the silenced voices and the community’s right to know (Zion, Loff & Briskman, in press). A further beneficial consequence of interviewing asylum seekers directly is a contribution to a healing process through providing a site for unheard or previously ignored and discredited stories to be validated.

There is also the question of professional and bureaucratic dictates of confidentiality that can be misused by government agencies to mask transparency. The secrecy that veils detention has been described as an “information lock-up”. This statement was coined by the Business Review Weekly, which revealed that the contents of a damning report on detention centres were kept secret (Washington, 2003, p. 18). A reconfiguration of ethical responsibilities is evident from the actions of former staff of detention centres who publicised the plight of immigration detainees through the media and in published articles, and speaking to such entities as the People’s Inquiry. Confidentiality protocols between government authorities and private detention centre operators exacerbate the problem, but can be overcome when the imperative to expose exceeds the imperative to comply and collude as accomplices. To stand alongside other dissenters for the common good is an ethical and courageous action that is nearly always taken with deep consideration and professional and personal reflexivity.

Lessons for the future

At the peril of reifying the achievements of academic and professional advocacy, the risks associated with investigations that speak out politically must be taken into account. In an article in The Australian, academic Brian Martin (2006) called on more scholars to speak out. He warned against fear of imagined risks saying, “You think that if you offend someone powerful, this may jeopardize your tenure or promotion application. Your grants might be blocked. You might be sued for defamation. You could even be hauled in by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and interrogated” (p. 34). This threat is not without some foundation when one contemplates the case of the publication by mental health professionals of studies reporting on widespread psychiatric disorders in detention centres, which was followed by the federal government commissioning a report that discredited their work (Wroe, 2005).
But for those believing in human rights, the risks are worth taking. In exposing some of the worst practices in Guantanamo Bay, derived from his role as a lawyer representing some of those detained inside, Stafford Smith (2007) makes the following pertinent comment from which those charting difficult territory can take heart: “I am under no illusion that I have the skill to do justice to the stories of these prisoners, but the greatest sin would be not to try” (p. x).

In concluding, it is necessary to reiterate that the policy of mandatory detention of asylum seekers is senseless, futile and immoral. It is primarily designed to deter others from arriving uninvited in Australia and thereby punishes one group of people to keep out another. The policies and practices are cruel, heartless and incredibly expensive. Given that most people are eventually deemed to be refugees and released, why do the authorities wait until they are so damaged, physically and emotionally? Mauro De Lorenzo (2007) from the American Enterprise Institute points out that in the long run, the benefits of asylum redound more to the host than the refugee.

In bringing asylum seeker issues to the public domain, we should be mindful of the words of anthropologist Stanner in referring to the Great Australian Silence in relation to Indigenous peoples (in McGrath, 1995). The People’s Inquiry and the health advocacy research are ways of ensuring that what has happened to asylum seekers is not silenced and that their voices and those of their advocates can be heard. Furthermore, the work undertaken by academics, practitioners and researchers plays a role in restoring democratic processes, adhering to human rights tenets and creating accountability, when all were eroded by government. The role of universities is essential, for, as Hamilton and Maddison (2007) tell us, they

are essential for producing educated, informed and questioning citizens with some capacity to scrutinise government decisions. The academics who staff these institutions require a high level of academic freedom to pursue research that may, at times, challenge a government’s values and agenda. (p. 13)

A final question that remains is who will be held accountable for the policies and practices that have destroyed lives, health, hope and the national reputation. Hopefully, this a matter to which academics, professional groups and advocates will turn their attention in the future.
Notes

1 This Monash University ARC-funded discovery project has as its chief investigators Dr Deborah Zion, Professor Linda Briskman and Associate Professor Bebe Loff.

2 Thank you to refugee advocate and researcher Sue Hoffman for providing this information, which was translated from Arabic.

References


Working through trauma in post-dictatorial Chilean documentary: Lorena Giachino’s *Reinalda del Carmen*

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**Abstract**

According to Dominick LaCapra’s critique, the Holocaust documentary *Shoah* (1985) would operate in terms of a *re-traumatising* strategy, appearing obsessed with prompting survivors and other witnesses to act out traumatic symptoms in front of the camera. Alternatively, LaCapra argues for a favouring of texts that work through trauma and seek to release survivors and audiences from the cycles of trauma transmission. A recent documentary that explores the theme of the military dictatorship that shook Chile between 1973 and 1990, *Reinalda del Carmen, mi mama y yo* (2006) is proposed in this essay as an example of the kind of text favoured by LaCapra. In order to illuminate its analysis of this Chilean documentary of enmeshed personal and public memory this essay draws on the distinction between acting out and working through textual approaches to historical trauma derived from LaCapra’s theorisation of this topic. The essay argues that, despite inheriting much of the approach established by *Shoah*, through its simultaneous articulation of acting-out and working-through strategies *Reinalda del Carmen, mi mama y yo* moves beyond the limitations identified by LaCapra in *Shoah*, thus actively contributing to the process of cultural release of the cycle of historical trauma in Chile.

**Introduction**

More than a century since its inception cinema has established itself worldwide as a prime form of mass entertainment. Paradoxically, cinema has at the same time had an intrinsic role in the historical witnessing of catastrophic events and the unspeakable human suffering they have caused. This affinity between film technology and modern history finds one of its most refined expressions in the genre of documentary cinema. It is, in fact, plausible to posit “the documentary as the cinematic *par excellence*” because “at the moment of its inception cinema would have actually been delivered as the visual documentation rather than fictionalisation of the filmmaker’s surrounding reality” (Traverso & Mhando, 2005, p. 109). However, the
distinction between documentary and fiction is not an unproblematic one and, indeed, it has been an element of the history of the genre that documentary film is also determined by “an inherent ambiguity between the inclination to record and the tendency to imagine reality” (Traverso & Mhando, 2005, p. 109). Thus, the history of the documentary film genre shows that a recurrent concern amongst practitioners around the world is, beyond the detached documenting of social disasters, an involved witnessing of the range of human experiences unleashed by mass tragedy.

In this sense, one of the most common manifestations of the interconnection between historical reality and the subjective force of the imagination is in the representation that we create of our remembering of past events and our experience of them. Since the first decades of the twentieth century political documentary filmmakers have explored the affinity between the technologies and techniques of the documentary film and the qualities of traumatic memory as experienced by the subjects in their films. Countless documentary films have focused on the traumas of survivors and witnesses of war, genocides and other atrocities. Two highly appraised Holocaust films, for example, which are emblematic of key styles and approaches in documentary cinema that deals with historical trauma, are Alan Resnais’s film-essay Nuit et brouillard (Night and Fog [1956]) and Israeli director Claude Lanzmann’s testimony documentary Shoah (1985).¹

Cultural historian Dominick LaCapra has produced a critique of such kind of films, according to which they would largely tend to operate in terms of a re-traumatising strategy; whereby modernist, avant-garde film would seem fixated with repeating in cinematic form the subjective features of traumatic memory, testimonial documentaries would appear obsessed with prompting survivors and other witnesses to act out traumatic symptoms in front of the camera. Alternatively, LaCapra argues for a favouring of texts that work through trauma and seek to release survivors and audiences from the cycles of trauma transmission. A recent documentary that explores the theme of the military dictatorship that shook Chile between 1973 and 1990, Reinalda del Carmen, mi mamá y yo (Reinalda del Carmen, My Mom and I [2006]), by the young director Lorena Giachino², is proposed as an example of the kind of text favoured by LaCapra. In order to illuminate its analysis of Giachino’s documentary of enmeshed personal and public memory this essay draws on the distinction between acting out and working through film approaches to historical trauma implied in LaCapra’s critique of Shoah. The essay argues that, despite inheriting much of the approach established by Lanzmann in his classic film, through its simultaneous articulation of acting out and working through strategies Giachino’s documentary moves beyond the limitations observed by
LaCapra in *Shoah*, thus actively contributing to the process of cultural release of the cycle of historical trauma in Chile.

The essay begins with a section that addresses basic concepts in ongoing discussions of cinematic texts in the field of studies of trauma culture, as well as considering more in detail the above-mentioned critical argument by LaCapra. This is followed by a brief section that contextualises *Reinalda del Carmen* within the recent history of political documentary in Chile vis-à-vis the extraordinary political events that stirred the social life of this country since the early 1970s and until 1990. The final and lengthiest section of the essay is dedicated to a detailed analysis of Giachino’s documentary.³

**Trauma theory and trauma cinema**

Like memory, trauma is a notion increasingly invoked in contemporary debates concerned with the links among history, experience and representation. This growing interest within the humanities has resulted, firstly, in the interrogation of models of scientific knowledge describing memory and trauma, and, secondly, in the critical application of these knowledges to the realm of culture. This process has reached such vast proportions in the past two decades or so that the outcome has developed into intersecting, multidisciplinary fields of critical enquiry often referred to as memory studies and trauma studies. The application and adaptation of the notion of trauma from the contexts of medicine and therapeutic psychoanalysis to debates in the humanities occurred throughout the twentieth century. It emerged, firstly, as a philosophical reflection about the impact of modernity on human life, for example in the writings of Walter Benjamin, and, secondly, as a direct extension from the post-war field of Holocaust studies. From the 1990s to the present this intellectual project has progressively gained momentum, constituting itself into a vast, fully inter-disciplinary field of study, in which scholars from anthropology and politics to cultural studies and philosophy engage in the problematics of trauma for individuals, communities and cultures alike.⁴

Central to the debate concerning cultural trauma is the problem of the failure of the representation of trauma both in personal testimony and cultural texts. In a recent intervention, Hirsch (2004a) has proposed the category “discourse of trauma” as a way of facilitating not only a theory of trauma representation but also of bridging methodological gaps in analyses of individual and collective historical experiences (p. 9). According to Hirsch, “the discourse of trauma - as one encounters it in conversation, in reading, in film - gives one a language with which to … represent the failure of representation” (2004a, p. 18).⁵
In fact, despite the difficulties that trauma implies for cultural representation, histories and experiences of collective suffering have been depicted through a broad range of cultural forms. Among these, film is the form that most often and vividly has sought to visualise traumatic experience and traumatic memory. Such is the magnitude of cinema’s interest in historical trauma and traumatic memory that it may be possible to suggest the emergence of a genre of “trauma cinema,” to use the phrase relatively recently coined by Walker (2005). Countless films that deal with historical trauma were made throughout the twentieth century and have continued to be produced in the first decade of the twenty-first. They are from numerous countries around the globe and explore the memories of myriad genocides and atrocities. As a result, a vast critical literature has accumulated, initially mostly focusing on films about the Holocaust and other conflicts in Europe and the United States but more recently also addressing many less known tragedies, especially in the regions of the so-called third world. 

A film that established many of the conventions used by contemporary political memory documentaries is the abovementioned Shoah, a nine-and-a-half hour long documentary that addresses the historical memory of the Holocaust by relying uniquely on the living memories of survivors, witnesses, bystanders and perpetrators. As advanced in the introduction, LaCapra (1997) has offered the area studies of trauma cinema a detailed critical analysis of Shoah, a critique that can in principle be extended to the entirety of the dominant stylistic model used by documentaries that explore historical trauma. LaCapra argues that in Shoah Lanzmann’s key strategy is to prompt, even pressure, survivors and other witnesses to act out traumatic symptoms in front of the camera. The outcome of this approach, according to LaCapra, is that the film would act as a relay point in a broader unconscious cultural process of trauma transmission. As an alternative to what may be described as Shoah’s re-traumatising approach to the treatment of traumatic memory, LaCapra (2001) proposes a favouring of texts, cinematic or otherwise, that work through trauma and, in doing so, contribute to release audiences from the cycles of trauma transmission.

Thus, LaCapra’s critique of Shoah, especially his distinction between acting out and working through approaches to representing trauma will inform my analysis of Giachino’s political memory documentary. In order to support this discussion, Hirsch’s assessment of LaCapra’s critique of Shoah is also considered, where, while embracing LaCapra’s distinction between acting out and working through films, Hirsch tones down LaCapra’s critique by reappraising the value of acting out because acting out would be a necessary stage of any cultural process of mourning or working through (Hirsch 2004a). In consequence, below I
offer a close analysis of *Reinalda del Carmen* in order to demonstrate the contention that Giachino’s film would be an example of a film that like *Shoah* relies uniquely on the testimony of witnesses but unlike *Shoah* does not fix the representation in the repetition of the traumas. On the contrary, *Reinalda del Carmen* elaborates the witnesses’ traumatic memories by connecting these to the broader political culture. However, before this analysis, the next section will briefly contextualise *Reinalda del Carmen* within Chile’s relatively recent political history and the place of documentary cinema within the latter.

**Politics and documentary in Chile**

Chilean cinema’s persistent interest in the representation of traumas of national significance is particularly visible in contemporary documentaries, such as *Reinalda del Carmen*, which strive to come to terms with the most traumatic period of Chile’s republican history: the 1973 military coup and the ensuing 16-year dictatorship. As evidenced by the work of the two main historians of Chilean cinema, Alicia Vega (2006) and Jacqueline Mouesca (2005), there is a strong, if little known, tradition of documentary cinema in Chile. This tradition acquired a unique political force in the early 1970s, for example, in Patricio Guzmán’s three-part epic *La batalla de Chile* (*The Battle of Chile*) [1977], in response to the extraordinary events that took place in this South American country when socialist president Dr Salvador Allende carried out his radical program of social and economic reform. In fact, two documentaries made between the years leading to Allende’s historical electoral victory and the first year of his government—*Militarismo y tortura* (*Militarisation and Torture* [Ruiz, 1969]) and *No es hora de llorar* (*This Isn’t the Time to Cry* [Chaskel & Sanz, 1971])—uncannily anticipated the practice of torture that was soon to spread in Chile and dominate the country’s social life for almost two decades. The practice of political torture has been a reality of lasting effects for a section of Chilean society as the country struggles to come to terms with its painful past; naturally, the attention devoted to this topic in these early works is echoed in countless more recent documentaries, such as *Reinalda del Carmen*.

In consequence, the filmic treatment of harsh realities such as politically motivated torture, murder and disappearance did not arise in post-dictatorship Chilean documentary in a vacuum but in the context of this country’s continuing production of political documentaries. Naturally, the production of political documentaries came to a sudden halt in Chile in the years following the 1973 coup with the exception of, firstly, foreign film productions that using a façade secretly documented aspects of the country’s political life and, secondly,
activist films made by Chileans clandestinely in the country and then screened (and sometimes even edited) abroad. Additionally, exiled Chileans made documentaries during period that addressed the political situation in Chile either from the perspective of an activist cinema or by treating the dictatorship theme obliquely and focusing self-reflexively on the exilic experience itself. However, with the resurfacing of massive public demonstrations against the dictatorship in the 1980s hundreds of video documentaries were made in Chile that provided evidence not only of the violence of the military and the suffering of the population but also of the people’s active challenge of military rule.

The return of parliamentary democracy to Chile in March 1990 marked the commencement of a new period in the history of Chilean cinema, one often referred to as post-dictatorial cinema. Since 1990 until today, numerous political Chilean documentaries have explored both the socialist and dictatorship periods from the perspective of a project of recovery of historical memory, often depicting knowledge previously repressed or investigating the circumstances of unresolved and/or unspoken about events and experiences. The majority of these films often turn memory itself, in both its individual and collective senses, into a central theme, while addressing more or less directly the traumas of the torture, the disappearances, and the generalised violence used by the Chilean military against civilians. These films, which may be described as post-dictatorial, political memory documentaries take the perspective of the subjective recollections of survivors and witnesses in order to recover a historical or collective memory still perceived by most in Chile as distorted, denied or lost. Amongst the latter is Giachino’s Reinalda del Carmen.

Reinalda del Carmen

Structuring this documentary as a first person narration, director Lorena Giachino, whose voice-over and occasional on-screen presence embody the I (yo) of the film’s title, turns her camera on her mother, Jaqueline Torréns. The mother, who suffers from chronic diabetes, recently survived a crisis in her condition that left her with partial amnesia and speech dysfunction. The third subject alluded to in the film’s title, Reinalda del Carmen, is an absence in the diegesis. Reinalda was Jaqueline’s closest friend in the period spanning from their childhood and adolescence to their university years, throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. By the time of the 1973 coup, Reinalda was an active member of the Chilean Socialist Party, and, like many others, was arrested, interrogated, and then released by the military. Approximately a year later, Reinalda, who was pregnant at the time, was abducted from the street in plain daylight by the regime’s
security police. On that day Reinalda became one of the numerous cases of disappeared political prisoners, presumed dead, whose remains, their assailants’ identity, and the truth about their fate are yet to be found.

Giachino explains in voice over that her purpose in making this film is to find out what happened to her mother’s young friend. The obvious place to begin the search is her mother’s own memories of Reinalda. Significantly, while Jaqueline’s amnesia affects her ability to recall recent events she is nevertheless capable of remembering her childhood and adolescence, as well as the period when she and Reinalda were students of medicine at Universidad de Chile. However, during the production of the film Jaqueline suffers another crisis, apparently provoked by the emotional intensity unleashed by the documentary’s investigation into the past. Upon her doctor’s request she discontinues her participation in the film.

Thus, in the second half of the film Giachino’s mother’s absence replicates the primary absence of Reinalda. Soon after her mother’s withdrawal from the film, Giachino, rather than closing the production, acknowledges on screen that she has become obsessed with the desire to solve the mystery of Reinalda’s fate and, subsequently, begins a meticulous investigative work that will take her to a series of locations and individuals connected to the case. While in the end Giachino is unable to establish what happened to her mother’s friend after her abduction in 1974, the events, places, and interviews depicted in the course of her attempt are all deeply charged with significance and affect. Moreover, they illustrate the links between her mother’s particular circumstances and the broader national context of the traumatic events of the early 1970s. Specifically, the film uncovers the continuing, hidden suffering that has shaped the lives of the dictatorship’s survivors until today and that has been passed on vicariously to their families.

Giachino’s film also highlights the conspiracy of silence that still protects many of those responsible for crimes against humanity in Chile. In an interview with direct witnesses of Reinalda’s kidnapping, Giachino explains to them that others who had witnessed the event from a much closer position had declined to speak to her. They answer: “It’s fear. We learned to remain silent if we saw anything.” The theme of a conspiracy of silence is also present in many other films about atrocities committed by governments against unarmed civilians, including Shoah, in which Lanzmann establishes it not only as an inherent feature of the Nazi strategy of extermination of the European Jews but also as a traumatic legacy continued by survivors and witnesses.

In another scene that also brings the attention to this conspiracy of silence in Chile, Giachino rings ex-military personnel formerly tried in relation to Reinalda’s case, all of whom were dismissed without charges due to the application of the General Amnesty Law passed
during the dictatorship. As expected, they refuse to give interviews and for legal reasons could not be named in the film. We briefly hear their voices over the telephone line, refusing to talk and hanging up. Later, Giachino drives to Concepción, a major city south of Santiago, to interview a key witness in Reinalda’s case. When she finds him behind a counter in a marketplace the man refuses to be interviewed and becomes hostile. The scene is strongly reminiscent of a similar moment in *Shoah*, where Lanzmann attempts to interview an ex-Nazi over a restaurant’s counter. In *Reinalda del Carmen*, upon Giachino’s insistence on camera, the man calls a security guard, who pushes the crew away. Frustrated, Giachino reflects in voice-over: “The culture of fear continues on.”

Therefore, as a result of its simultaneous engaging in both acting out and working through strategies, for example in its ongoing linking of individual traumatic memories to the broader experiences of the community, Giachino’s film actively contributes to the process of cultural release from the cycles of historical trauma. As demonstrated in the following section, whereas acting out seeks to bring forth the reality of the trauma, for example, by asking a witness to remember what they prefer to leave as forgotten or to speak out what cannot be conveyed in words, working through consists of on-screen strategies of memory work that elaborate the witness’ traumatic memory through imaginative play that reworks not only the witness’ identification with their trauma but also their position in relation to a community of others who similarly suffer and seek release.

**The route of memory: From the subjective to the historical**

From the onset *Reinalda del Carmen* is overtly presented as a film focused on subjective experiences; yet as the film unfolds it becomes clear that this subjective focus is also a means to address the historical and political dimensions of its subjects’ relation to the dictatorship period. This two-fold articulation is evident, for example, in the film’s declared interest in the figure of memory. In fact, memory is used as the link between the director’s mother’s suffering, which she mostly lives intimately, and the trauma of the society in which she and her filmmaker-daughter are inserted. It is telling, for example, that in its official synopsis, as it appeared in the programme of the tenth International Documentary Festival of Santiago, where it premiered in 2006-2005, the film was described as a documentary that attempts but fails to recover a lost memory. The notion of a failed memory refers as much to the director’s mother’s deteriorating capacity and desire to recollect a painful episode of her past as to the inability and unwillingness of most in Chile to establish the truth about the military regime’s *desaparecidos* (disappeared).
Analogically speaking, the amnesia of one individual and the significance their remembering (or recovery of lost memory) may have for that individual’s and their family’s healing from a traumatic experience has often been taken as a model to understand a community’s necessity not only to find out the truth of a traumatic past but also to bring this knowledge out to the realm of public discourse.

Foregrounding the subjective dimensions of the suffering caused by political conflict and atrocity in Chile as a strategy to engage with the historico-political scope of this country’s relatively recent past constitutes the film’s core structure. This structure is established through film style: the film’s first image, shot at close range with a shaky, hand-held camera, shows Jacqueline in bed while Giachino jokes with her off screen. As a result, we are given the (false) impression that it is the director herself who is holding the camera. A sudden cut takes us to the next shot, still in shaky, hand-held camera. Jacqueline is sitting in her kitchen, looking sleepy while smoking and sipping coffee. Giachino asks her about Reinalda. Her mother replies: “She was my best friend at university. She got married, was arrested and went missing.” Therefore, these opening shots establish the film as the personal exploration of a mother’s traumatic memory by her filmmaker-daughter. Their signifying power is such that this structure will be sustained until the end in spite of the fact that throughout the rest of the film, the camera, operated by Pablo Valdés, will often depict Giachino as one of the film’s characters.

Yet, notwithstanding the director’s consistent onscreen presence her authorial perspective is maintained and further emphasised by the regular return of her voice-over, either narrating the story or reflecting upon the depicted events and emotions. Irrupting onto the screen in the style of a home movie being shot in the most intimate of locations and instants—waking up in one’s bed, having breakfast in one’s kitchen—these opening scenes immediately establish the privileging of the personal and the subjective in this film’s incursion into the political dimension of memory. The film’s opening scenes make palpable at the onset the intimacy of the relationship among its main characters: the director, her mother, and the absent Reinalda, who will bring the other two both together and apart in the course of the production. Moreover, it is the memory of an absent one that will also connect the personal lives of these two women to the lives of many others in Chile, similarly shattered by devastating, unresolved political crimes.

**Doing memory work**

Giachino often initiates memory work with her mother in front of the camera. The purpose of this is to trigger memories of details of the everyday in her mother’s past. Like a historian at work she
wants to understand who Reinalda was and what she was like by reviving her as a familiar, living presence in her mother’s memory. In voice-over Giachino explains that she wants to “find out what these two girls did every day, what they thought and felt, what they spoke about.” In the film, memory work is attained through a range of strategies, a common one being to look at photographs on screen while discussing both what they depict about the past and what emotions and sensations they elicit in the present.

The film’s best example of this method that links photography and memory is a scene at the public memorial known as Muro de los detenidos desaparecidos (Wall of the Missing), where the deep meanings unleashed by the mother and daughter’s silence is triggered by the simple encounter with a photograph. The Muro is a public memorial for missing political detainees, located in Santiago. The desaparecidos are political detainees whose trace was lost after their arrest or abduction, or even voluntary submission to the military authorities. In some cases there is anecdotal or witness evidence of their passage through a specific location, such as a detention centre or torture house, but their remains have never been found and no official record was kept of their whereabouts and circumstances.

The Muro is a simple wall standing near a busy street on whose surface relatives and friends of the missing persons have attached names and photographs. It remains a symbol of the open wound still aching at the core of Chilean society and a reminder to passers-by that the knowledge of what happened to these people, and of their remains’ whereabouts, still freely circulates behind the walls or on the streets of this city in the bodies of perpetrators who have not yet become accountable for their crimes. At the Muro Giachino and Jacqueline slowly look at each photograph of missing persons. Eventually, Jacqueline identifies Reinalda’s portrait. She tenderly touches it with her finger. After placing some flowers near the picture, Jacqueline remains silent. Visibly aware of the camera’s presence, she closes her eyes as if keeping the sudden emotional storm hidden. Giachino, who is in the frame standing next to her mother, silently looks at Reinalda’s picture and then at Jacqueline. They remain together in the frame staring at each other in silence. This is a simple yet most powerful moment of the film.

The scene foregrounds the two women who embody a restrained suffering: an unresolved pain and longing for a missing loved one that has been past down a generation. At the same time, in their immediate background, the Muro represents the historical and social ramifications of these women’s pain into the pain of many others. Behind the Muro, in the far background, is the street; we have glimpses of cars and buses as they pass by, with the women’s silence being enhanced by the noise of traffic. The personal suffering of the two characters depicted on the screen, as much as the pain of many more relatives and friends of the missing persons
represented by the photographs behind the pair, is turned into a historical tragedy as the patterned movement and noise of traffic signals to an amnesiac society that has become oblivious to its own history and the plight of a segment of its own constituency.

Another technique of memory work practised in the film consists in registering Jacqueline’s onscreen responses while physically revisiting places of the past and speaking to people who knew Reinalda. An example of this is an onscreen conversation among the director, her mother and her grandmother as they walk on the street to see the house where Jacqueline and her mother used to live and where the girls used to see each other regularly. The three women go on slowly, with the camera following them closely, through one of the streets where the girls used to walk together. Black and white photographs are inserted into the scene: in them two happy girls, Jacqueline and Reinalda, are seen walking down that very street. We are encouraged to view these images as a substitute of the memories that Jacqueline may be privately experiencing as she walks with eyes cast down, subjective reminiscences that the camera cannot reveal.

With the camera still rolling, the women ring the bell at the house’s front door and ask to be allowed inside. They enter and inspect the rooms of the house one by one, with Jacqueline and her mother making comments as they recognise spaces and remember furniture and objects in the places where they used to stand. Then, they sit in the backyard and Giachino asks her grandmother what Reinalda was like. When the grandmother replies that Reinalda had a difficult character and unfriendly manner, there ensues a discussion between the older woman and Jacqueline, who does not only disagree with her mother’s perception but is visibly offended by it. This argument between Jacqueline and her mother illustrates the political nature of memory, that is, the fact that the recovery of the past, whether as a familial, social or national project, is always subject to a process of contestation. As they argue, in the background and behind the glass of a large window with clear curtains, we see the ghostly figure of a small child looking at the scene.

Although the context in which we view this film as documentary immediately explains this child as a member of the family who currently dwells in the house, the child’s blurred image in the mise-en-scene also evokes Jacqueline’s own childhood in this house’s past. In fact, at this point, black and white photographs of the young Jacqueline and Reinalda are inserted. The silent and faded quality of the figures in the photographs points to the impossibility of clarifying the mystery of Reinalda, despite all their painstaking efforts. This failure ultimately amounts to the broader impossibility of recovering the past, regardless of the physical presence of remembered locations, persons and objects. In addition, the blurred figure of the child behind the glass in the scene’s background also suggests the force of desire as invested in the work of memory, not only
in the nostalgic sense of a clinging to the desire to recover a loss but in the productive sense of imagining alternative futures, and in the process effectively changing the present.

**Acting out trauma**

As Giachino continues to search for the truth by revisiting in chronological order the last locations where Reinalda was either seen or presumed to have been before her trail disappeared, she begins to confront her mother with what the latter had sought so far to avoid: the embodied reality of the terror and suffering experienced by Reinalda. Thus, Giachino takes her mother to the street corner where Reinalda was kidnapped, where they speak with two neighbours who were visual witnesses to the kidnapping. The neighbours describe the events: a car followed her, she looked scared, men grabbed her on that corner and pushed her into the car, while she screamed and fought back. We see a series of black and white photographs of Reinalda, with the last one out of focus: her blurred image suggesting the violence and fear implied in her tragic fate. The witnesses add that the uniformed police, who passively observed the kidnapping, told them later that the girl was pregnant.

After visiting the corner of Reinalda’s kidnapping, Giachino takes Jacqueline to see a human rights lawyer who has been involved in Reinalda’s case. As the lawyer speaks to them, Jacqueline does not engage in the conversation. Rather, she smokes and, with eyes cast down, remains introspective. The lawyer describes vividly how Reinalda may have been killed and how her corpse is likely to have been disposed of to erase evidence. Suddenly Jacqueline exclaims: “Enough!” On the street, outside the lawyer’s building, mother and daughter discuss whether they will go on with the film. Increasingly distressed, Jacqueline will soon repeat her abrupt reaction in the middle of filming a scene. However, despite her mother’s increasing reluctance, Giachino talks to Jacqueline about coming with her to Cuesta Barriga, an old road that clings to the side of a mountain range in the outskirts of the city. Jaqueline tells Giachino that she doesn’t want to go because this is the place where they most likely disposed of Reinalda’s body. Nevertheless, in the next shot we see Giachino and Jaqueline driving to Cuesta Barriga. With them in the car is Patricia Hernández, a forensics expert who spent two months meticulously extracting human remains from an abandoned mine at Cuesta Barriga, while trying to identify (inconclusively) Reinalda and other missing political detainees.

At the site, Giachino invites Jaqueline to come up to the edge of the mine to place a bunch of flowers to Reinalda’s memory but she declines, saying: “It’s too sad; that’s where they threw her.” Giachino and Hernández, however, climb the few metres to the edge of the mine entrance,
where they kneel down and place a bunch of flowers on the ground, while the distant noise of the
highway’s traffic is heard in the valley below. Soon after this visit to Cuesta Barriga Jaqueline
suffers a new crisis and her doctor instructs that she discontinue her participation in the film.

Giachino’s continuing requests on her mother become the more disturbing as we realise
Jacqueline’s growing reluctance to continue to relive the trauma of her violent loss of Reinalda
through the film’s investigation. This opposition of forces in *Reinalda del Carmen* between the
willing filmmaker, whose legitimising discourse has it that knowledge of the traumatic truth is an
indispensable ingredient for healing, and the reluctant witness, for whom the pain associated with
the recovery of this knowledge threatens survival, is further reminiscent of *Shoah*. Indeed,
Lanzmann has insisted that *Shoah* be not seen as a documentary, that is, that rather than a
representation or documentation of the Holocaust the film should be understood as the acting out
of the Holocaust experience. On this point, LaCapra suggests that *Shoah* may be seen “as neither
representational nor autonomous art but as a disturbingly mixed generic performance that traces
and tracks the traumatic effects of limit-experiences, particularly in the lives (or afterlives) of
victims” (1997, p. 234). As pointed out earlier, LaCapra is critical of the film’s emphasis on the
performative insofar as “acting out or reliving the past tends to outweigh attempts to work
through it” (1997, p. 234). *Acting out* and *working through* are often presented in the literature
on the representation of trauma as opposite approaches to traumatic memory, whether in
individual healing or in socio-cultural engagements with the mourning of a traumatic loss. Acting out derives from the psychoanalytic therapeutic technique that consists in inducing in the
patient a re-experiencing of the traumatic event by unleashing repressed memories (in fact, in
certain extreme cases the trauma sufferer may not even be aware that the event actually took
place). Acting out is prompted by the analyst under the assumption that experiential awareness of
a traumatic past is the first step on the way to recovery. LaCapra’s view of this approach to
trauma is critical, as he evidences it in Lanzmann’s own strategy of inducing the testimony of
concentration camp survivors in *Shoah*. Indeed, in one of the film’s interviews with a Holocaust
survivor who lives in Israel, Lanzmann does not stop at the man’s initial reluctance to answer his
questions about the concentration camp experience. Not unlike Jacqueline in *Reinalda del Carmen*, the survivor explains that “there are certain things of which it’s better not to speak.”
Lanzmann, however, is relentless: he speaks with the survivor’s adult daughter who confides to
the camera that she had to force the story out of her father over the years. Soon the survivor is
seen answering Lanzmann’s questions with difficulty. According to LaCapra,

there is an important sense in which Lanzmann relies on an antimemory or on the silences and
indirections of memory in arriving at what I take to be the object of his quest: the incarnation,
actual reliving, or compulsive acting out of the past—which remarkably its traumatic suffering—in the present. (1997, p. 235)

Lanzmann’s stress on inducing in his subjects the acting out of their Holocaust experience in front of the camera is partly explained by the fact that his approach is based on a complete rejection of the project of understanding the Holocaust, what LaCapra (1997) refers to as *Warumverbot*, that is, a prohibition of the *why* question (p. 236), as expressed in the title of a one-page manifesto written by Lanzmann: “Hier ist kein Warum” or “Here there is no why” (in LaCapra 1997, p. 237). For LaCapra, Lanzmann’s *Warumverbot* is intimately connected to *Bilderverbot* (prohibition of images), which is expressed in *Shoah* through Lanzmann’s total ban on archival footage. Both indictments are, for LaCapra, manifestation of a broader ideology of “sacralisation” of the Holocaust (1997, p. 236). Moreover the void left by the impossibility of understanding or seeing the trauma of the Holocaust is filled by Lanzmann with the notion of “transmission” of trauma. This transmission would occur during the activity of testimony or witnessing, which involves both the primary witness (victim, survivor) and the secondary witness (empathic listener, reader, or viewer). In the absence of understanding, the secondary witness would participate in a process of contagion of trauma via that LaCapra describes as the “incarnation, actual reliving, or […] acting out” of the survivor’s past terror and trauma (1997, p. 237).

In a similar vein in Reinalda del Carmen Giachino actively attempts to induce her mother to recover and act out painful memories in front of the camera but Jacqueline’s constant reluctance and ultimate withdrawal from the film provokes the director-daughter’s reincarnation of her mother’s trauma. Giachino confides in voice-over: “I understood that the recovery of memory was being transferred from my mother to me. For me, it was becoming an obsession.” Giachino’s narration speaks heavily of trauma’s transferential power. The occurrence of transference can be observed in the relationship between the director and her subject, which may well be interpreted in terms of the relationship between the analyst and their patient. In this case, the mother’s traumatic memory is transferred to her daughter and, as a result, the epistemophilic and scopophilic drives that should in principle help mobilise the mother’s healing process manifest vicariously in the film’s director, while her mother legitimately and understandably closes down refusing to know, see or remember any further. The scene illustrates the way in which trauma radiates its effects beyond those directly implicated, a phenomenon referred to as vicarious trauma, which Hirsch describes as the
traumatic relay or transmission of “a shock from a specific scene of victimization to … scenes of remote and mediated witnessing” (2004b, p. 96).

In the next scene, one of the film’s gloomiest instances of transference: traumatic acting out, Giachino, now without her mother, visits a human rights research centre, formerly a clandestine torture house run by the military regime’s secret police. Giachino interviews Pinilla, one of the centre’s researchers, whom is described in voice-over as “a woman who clings on to memory in order to survive pain.” They walk upstairs to see the rooms where they used to keep the prisoners. Unlocking doors, they enter very dirty, darkened rooms, bathrooms, and small spaces, some of them with barred windows. They walk around in total silence, while the camera follows and observes them closely. In the course of this scene, Pinilla produces a file containing documents that prove that Reinalda spent time at this place. Paradoxically, it is in the silence, emptiness, and darkness of the derelict corners of this house that the film takes us as close as we can possibly can get to what was Reinalda’s unimaginable fear and pain.

**Working through trauma**

*Reinalda del Carmen* attempts to depict a personal journey from traumatic memory through a belated mourning and towards the promise of healing and renewal. If not successful, at least the film depicts the desire or hope for the completion of such a journey in the relationship between the director and her mother. However, this is not a private document for the family’s perusal alone but a political documentary screened at a major film event and distributed internationally, that is, it is a powerful public document that due to its theme - the traumatic memory of the military regime in Chile - vehemently addresses the national community. In this sense, Giachino’s insistence and (self-confessed) obsession with unveiling the truth about Reinalda through persistent induction of traumatic acting out that leaves her mother out of action is justified by the fact that in its second half the film increasingly focuses on working through the trauma.

Indeed, working through these traumatic memories and experiences would not be possible if these had not been allowed to resurface by the director’s methods in spite of the generalised reluctance among those directly implicated. And where Giachino’s mother has the personal right to refuse to go ahead with this disturbing experience, what the film appears to suggests is that the rest of the Chilean community has the ethical obligation to bear witness to these events, statements, recollections, locations and official information. In addition, the film reminds us that
the perpetrators and their accomplices, most of whom are still at large, are also legally and ethically bound.

\textit{Reinalda del Carmen} avoids the shortcomings that LaCapra identified in \textit{Shoah}’s fixation with repeating the experience of trauma through relentless acting out methods. However, as indicated, neither does Giachino’s film pose an opposition between acting out and working through nor does LaCapra suggest that these can really exist as separate terms. In fact, according to LaCapra:

\begin{quote}
[T]he relation between acting-out and working-through should not be seen in terms of a from/to relationship in which the latter is presented as the dialectical transcendence of the former [but], particularly in cases of trauma, acting-out may be necessary and perhaps never fully overcome. Indeed, it may be intimately bound up with working-through problems. But it should not be isolated, theoretically fixated on, or one-sidedly valorized as the horizon of thought or life. (1994, p. 205)
\end{quote}

Thus, accepting the inevitability of the failure of the film’s investigation, in the absence of her mother Giachino admittedly takes Jacqueline’s place and begins an active process that illustrates LaCapra’s arguing for a movement that dislodges the concept of working through from “a narrowly therapeutic framework and [instead relates] it to ethical and political considerations” (1994, p. 210). Moving away from the specific concerns about her mother’s personal journey through loss, trauma and healing, Giachino relates the political meanings unleashed by the figure of Reinalda to the experiences of others, who have also lost loved ones to the clash of historical and ideological forces in Chile. For example, she returns to Cuesta Barriga, where she interviews Antonia Cepeda, whose missing father and brother were very close to being conclusively identified among the remains found there, ardently believes that they were killed at this place. Antonia explains that she often brings flowers to the mine, adding that every time she walks on the path on which she and Giachino are now standing, she imagines that she is walking over her father’s and brother’s final steps. Giachino expresses in voice-over: “I wanted to speak with Antonia in order to figure out what a missing person’s relative does in order to go through mourning.” Antonia also believes that Reinalda’s baby may have protected her and that because of this she may have also been a moral support for all the others.

The film at this point replicates Antonia’s method of narrativising historical events for which records and evidence have been erased: a photograph of a happy Reinalda is inserted and this image is accompanied with a musical tune that evokes childhood. This method of creative memory helps Antonia, in her own words, to continue “to journey through this life with renewed
optimism.” Antonia’s use of the verb “to journey” metonymically links the missing person’s relatives’ going on with life to the actual physical path that leads to the mine and to the narrative trail in whose shape this film has been structured. The function of metonymy is highly significant for debates regarding the role of the imagination (for example in art, narrative, and film) in the context of collective processes of working through historical trauma.

The transition between traumatic acting out and working through that Reinalda del Carmen portrays is reminiscent of the shift of emphasis between the unmediated recollection of the traumatic event or experience and the mediations that the work of the imagination imposes on traumatic memory, a variation of emphasis recently found in the literature about cultural trauma. As Walker points out, where many theorists of trauma emphasise the place of the event “in the etiology of traumatic memory,” many others “assert the significance of mental processes of fantasy” (2005, p. 9) Among the latter, Walker cites Hodgkin and Radstone, who argue that the “emphasis on the traumatic event as origin is misleading; what is absent from this teleological narrative, in effect, is precisely the way the mind makes its own meanings” (in Walker, 2005, p. 10). Furthermore, Walker argues against a potential dichotomy between reality and fantasy in the formation of traumatic memory, stressing that “fantasy and reality are inextricably—if mysteriously—bonded” (2005, p. 10).

Whereas Lanzmann’s Shoah may place an obsessive attention on the re-enactment of the experiences and recollection of the real events, Reinalda del Carmen clearly moves away from this emphasis on the acting out of the painful past implied in attempting to unveil the objective truth of the event to an emphasis on working through the traumatic memories and histories thus unveiled by positing imaginative work as a methodology. Working through, in this sense, does not imply a drastic erasure of the memory of the traumatic past in which the latter may be exchanged for an idealised trauma-free future. Working through implies, instead, a freeing of the subject not from the past but, according to Laplanche and Pontalis, from “the grip of mechanisms of repetition” and as a method it consists in a work of interpretation directed to “showing how the meanings in question may be recognised in different contexts” (in LaCapra, 1994, p. 209).

In consequence, even though Jacqueline does not return to the production after her departure, Giachino, stresses the film’s investment in working through by choosing to end her documentary with scenes in which she and her mother engage in symbolic work that resemble the open narratives created by Antonia Cepeda in the absence of closure regarding the fate of her missing father and brother. In one of the film’s most significant scenes, Giachino and Jacqueline are shown placing flowers next to Reinaldá’s picture back at the Muro de los detenidos desaparecidos. Giachino asks her mother if she can imagine how Reinalda would be like if she
were alive today. What would they do together? What would her baby have come to be like? Would it have been a girl? Jacqueline answers all these questions without hesitation, willingly following and clearly enjoying the healing exercise initiated by her daughter. In another similar scene, Giachino resorts to the use of music as a variation of the memory work with which she has sought to trigger Jacqueline’s memories. While sitting on the bed in her mother’s bedroom, Giachino asks her about Reinalda’s favourite song. Jacqueline answers that it was La cigarra (the cicada). The director asks her mother to sing it but Jacqueline claims to have forgotten it. But when Giachino begins softly to sing the song, Jacqueline, with the camera focusing solely on her, hesitantly tries fragments of the lyrics, as if slowly recovering her lost memory:

\[\text{Cantando al sol; Como la cigarra; Después de un siglo bajo la tierra; Igual que sobreviviente Que vuelve de la Guerra}\]

[Singing to the sun; Like the cicada; After a century under the ground; Like a war survivor; Who finally returns home]. \textit{Como la cigarra} by Maria Elena Walsh

Finally, mother and daughter sing together, and then they tenderly embrace and kiss each other, signalling with this act of embodied togetherness, and through the symbolism of the song’s lyrics, an opening to the promise of a grounded renewal after un siglo (“a century”) of silent suffering.

**Conclusion**

Like the classic Holocaust documentary \textit{Shoah} (1985), the Chilean political memory documentary \textit{Reinalda del Carmen, mi mamá y yo} (2006) avoids the kind of direct depiction of traumatic past events normally adopted by straightforward historicist filmic approaches. In other words, it rejects constructing an objective historical narrative via the combination of a detached narrator voice, witness interviews, and visual and other archival documents. Rather, the Chilean film focuses on the traumatic memory of the military dictatorship period as latent in one woman: the director’s own mother. By unveiling her recollections and forgettings about the brutal loss of her best friend, Reinalda del Carmen, to the dictatorship, it signals towards the traumas of many and, thus, of the nation’s continuing struggle to recover and acknowledge its painful historical memory.

This essay has drawn on Dominick LaCapra’s distinction between acting out and working through textual approaches to cultural trauma in order to illuminate its close analysis of \textit{Reinalda del Carmen}. The essay has argued that because this Chilean film simultaneously
engages in both acting out and working through strategies, it actively contributes to a cultural release from the cycle of historical trauma. Furthermore, the essay has shown that the techniques of memory work and working through trauma used by the film’s director allow her and her central subject to begin to come to terms with the trauma caused by the lack of closure in the narrative of Reinalda’s violent loss, a trauma that has muddled their own relationship as mother and daughter over the years. Similarly, it may be argued that the film invites its audience, especially its Chilean audience, to a similar process of working through insofar as Reinalda’s case is exemplary of many other cases in Chile.

In conclusion, inasmuch as trauma can be transmitted from witness to witness in never ending acting out cycles, the delivery from trauma suggested in Reinalda del Carmen, the essay has contended, promises to work through the silences and forgettings constraining Giachino and Jacqueline’s mother-daughter relationship. This promise, as depicted on screen for the national community’s eyes to behold, echoes in the lives of all those other Chileans who continue quietly to suffer in the dark the traumatic memories of unacknowledged and unresolved crimes committed against them and/or their loved ones by the Chilean armed forces and police. Ultimately, this promise may also resound in the conscience of an empathic Chilean audience who chooses to bear witness to, rather than ignore and avoid, their country’s recent painful past.
Notes

1 Whenever a film is mentioned in this essay the original title is used italicised with the full title being provided the first time and, if a long title, an abbreviation in all subsequent references. The first time a film is cited the following information is provided in brackets: i) the year of production; and ii) if a foreign language film has distribution in English, the official English title italicised, and if it does not, the author’s translation of the foreign language title, not italicised. Additionally, a list of films cited is included after the references list.

2 Hereafter referred to as Reinalda del Carmen.

3 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Spanish texts are provided by the Author.

4 Some of the ideas and information in this section are adapted from an earlier paper which attempted a similar discussion but in reference to two contemporary Chilean fiction films that depict in very different ways the memory of the military coup (Traverso, 2008).

5 Author’s emphasis.


8 Festival Internacional de Documentales de Santiago de Chile (founding director: Patricio Guzmán; website: www.fidocs.cl).


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Russia-Indonesia defence cooperation: The old-new affair
Alexey Muraviev and Colin Brown

Abstract
The past decade has seen a significant increase in defence cooperation between Russia and Indonesia, to the point where Russia has become a major supplier of sophisticated weapons systems to Indonesia. To date, though, this cooperation has received little scholarly attention. This chapter examines the evolution of this most recent stage in the Russia-Indonesia relationship, setting it against the background of the history of defence (and broader political) relations since 1945. It notes that this history has been one characterised by a period of very close relations in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which was both preceded and succeeded by periods in which there was virtually no defence cooperation at all. It examines the differing objectives Russia and Indonesia have in the contemporary relationship, and concludes that, although each country sees significant benefits flowing from it, their objectives are different. The chapter concludes that in its current state this is a relationship of mutual convenience, rather than of strategic alliance. It is, nonetheless, one that could have a significant impact on the strategic environment of Southeast Asia and nearby regions.

Introduction
In late November, 2008, Russian information agencies released several reports about Moscow’s participation in the third Indonesia’s major defence show, Indo Defense Expo Forum–2008, held between November 19 and 22. Twelve arms manufacturing companies from Russia took part in the forum, which they regarded to be quite successful (ITAR-TASS, 2008, 24 November). In particular, Moscow announced the approval of a US$1 billion credit facility to the Indonesian Government to assist in acquiring Russian armaments (Chemyak, 2008), a reflection of the growing cooperative relationship between Russia and Indonesia in the field of security and defence.

This development, which has been building slowly and unobtrusively for some time, is set against a backdrop of an Indonesia-Russia relationship (and before that an Indonesia-Soviet Union relationship), which has gone through a variety of phases since Indonesian
independence in August 1945. In the early 1960s, the relationship was very close; after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the relationship was in tatters. Today, we seem to be seeing a new stage in the evolution of Indonesia-Russia defence cooperation, one characterised by substantial Indonesian purchases of Russian arms and training packages, and yet one that is still largely overlooked in contemporary analyses of Russia-Indonesia relations.

This chapter aims to chart this substantial re-engagement between Russia and Indonesia, to explain why it has happened, and to analyse what each party is seeking to derive from it. It will start with a review of the major phases of Indonesia-Soviet relations up to the break up of the USSR, but focuses primarily on the way the Indonesia-Russia relationship has evolved in the past decade. In conclusion, the authors make some assessment of the impact the new relationship could have on international affairs in and the security landscape of Southeast Asia.

The initial phase, 1945–64

In 1945, bilateral relations between Indonesia and the Soviet Union were non-existent. The Soviets were far more concerned with recovering from World War II and securing geopolitical gains in Europe and Northeast Asia, and the Indonesians were focussed on the independence struggle against the Dutch (Bogaturov, 1997; Kahin, 1952; Reid 1974). Indonesia’s foreign policy was based on the principle of being active and independent, which basically meant not being aligned with either of the global power blocs as they were emerging.

The Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, [PKI]) had had contacts with the Soviets and the Comintern before the War, but it had been eliminated as a significant domestic political force following its failed risings against the Dutch in 1926-27. By 1948, though, it had recovered sufficiently to attempt an armed revolt against the Republican government, centred on the East Java city of Madiun, but this too was readily defeated (Bogaturov, 1997; Reid, 1974). The Soviets were almost certainly not involved in the planning and execution of this revolt, but it had the effect of drawing the United States into Indonesian politics, with Washington coming off the diplomatic fence and supporting the Republican government. In turn this led Moscow to denounce the eventual 1949 Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence as “not bestowing even a vestige of sovereignty upon Indonesia” (Taylor, 1960, p. 389).
Relations between Moscow and Jakarta did not improve much in the early 1950s; diplomatic missions, for instance, were not exchanged until 1954. The initial political and commercial links Indonesia developed were with countries in the Soviet bloc, rather than with the USSR itself (Fifield, 1958; Hindley, 1963). Indonesia’s bloc partners included Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and Romania.

Soviet-Indonesian relations began to warm however from 1956. The two countries signed a bilateral trade agreement in August; Moscow opened a trade mission in Jakarta; and perhaps most importantly Sukarno made his first visit to the USSR, during which he was widely feted by the Soviet leadership. In the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the visit, the two countries announced that agreement had been reached

on the establishment of cooperation in trade, technical and economic spheres, based on equality and mutual benefit. … The Soviet Union will be granting a long-term credit (sic) to the Republic of Indonesia, while the Republic of Indonesia will supply raw materials and other commodities to the Soviet Union. (Harsono, 1977, pp. 151–152)

The credit package amounted to US$100 million, though the Indonesian Parliament refused to ratify the agreement until February 1958 (Pauker, 1962). What was not mentioned in the communiqué, but seems to have been set in train by Sukarno during his Moscow visit, was the supply of Soviet military technology to Indonesia (Leifer, 1983).

At this time, Indonesia was facing two significant political-military challenges: the campaign to recover West Irian, the western half of the island of New Guinea, from the Dutch, and the revolts against its authority emerging in both Sumatera and Sulawesi. In 1955, Jakarta had approached the United States to request weapons and military equipment to use against the rebels, but had been rejected, apparently because of the US fear—undoubtedly well founded—that they would be used in the West Irian struggle (Jones, 1971; Lowry, 1996).

The Soviet Union had no such qualms, engaged as it was in building its regional security networks in Europe and the Pacific. Weapons transfers to Indonesia began quickly but cautiously, proceeding via a network of transit states including Czechoslovakia and Poland, following the pattern which had been established earlier on the trade front (Lowry, 1996).

In February 1960, then Soviet head of state Nikita Khrushchev visited Indonesia, during which an Agreement on Cultural Cooperation was signed in Bogor (Gromyko, Kovalyev, Sevostyanov & Tikhivinskiy, 1984b). The Agreement specified that the two
nations would develop multi-lateral ties based on mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, a point that was particularly important for the Indonesians.

As part of the Agreement the Soviet Union agreed to assist Indonesia in the defence sphere, including through the transfer of advanced military hardware, which now proceeded directly to Indonesian from the USSR (Pavlov, 1998). The following year, Defence Minister General A. H. Nasution undertook two arms purchasing missions to the USSR, facilitated by a Soviet line of credit worth US$450m. By the end of 1961, as Leifer (1983) says, Indonesia “had become the largest non-communist recipient of military aid from the Soviet bloc and the largest recipient of economic credits after India and Egypt” (p. 63).

From the Soviet viewpoint, its investment in Indonesia was justified in terms of the political leverage it hoped to gain in the region and the geopolitical advantages which would follow. In particular, the Soviet commitment to arm Indonesia needs to be seen in the context of the Sino-Soviet strategic rivalry, by this time the dominant issue in Soviet Pacific foreign and defence policy. Moscow expected that by developing a strategic relationship with Indonesia it would outflank China to the south, both militarily and politically.

Moscow also hoped that an alliance with Indonesia would strengthen its strategic positions at the junction of the Pacific and Indian Ocean military theatres and limit US shipping and naval operations in the area, particularly deployments of US Navy ships from their Pacific bases to their Indian Ocean patrol areas. ¹

Indonesia evaluated the situation rather differently. Jakarta certainly valued the military support it was receiving from Moscow. Building up its military potential was an important part of the game of bluff it was playing with the Dutch over West Irian. Indonesia probably never seriously thought it could force the Dutch out by military means but it did want to make the cost of defending the territory so high that the Dutch would see political negotiations as a realistic—if undesirable—option. Further, that the Soviet Union was the primary supplier of weapons to Indonesia put additional pressure on the United States to support Jakarta. And indeed the crucial event which tipped the balance against the Dutch was the decision taken by the newly-elected Kennedy administration to reverse previous US policy, and support the Indonesian position, prompted by the fear that the Soviets were winning support from Jakarta (Jones, 1971).

While a few were politically close to Moscow, though, for the most part Indonesia’s civilian and military leadership maintained an ideological distance from the Soviets. In particular, Nasution remained outside the Communist orbit, despite American concerns that his loyalties might be wavering (Poulgrain, 1998; Khrushchev & Khrushchev, 2004).
For Indonesia, then, the relationship with the USSR as it developed from the mid 1950s to the early 1960s was pragmatic rather than political or ideological. Jakarta sought access to military technology and training, and other forms of assistance, but avoided making political concessions to achieve this end.

**Decline and stagnation: 1964–97**

This was the high point of the Indonesia-USSR strategic relationship to date, but also the point at which the relationship began to turn downwards.

The first clear signs of the difficulties were to be seen almost as soon as the West Irian issue had been settled in Indonesia’s favour. Indonesia’s attention then turned to the proposal for the formation of a Federation of Malaysia, which would unite the Federation of Malaya with the British territories of Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah (Mackie, 1974). Sukarno opposed this plan, thereby presenting Soviet policy-makers with a difficult dilemma. The West Irian conflict they could readily identify as an anti-colonial struggle against a western, capitalist state, but this was much harder to do with respect to Malaysia, the reason for the formation of which, after all, was to bring the remaining British colonial territories in the region to independence (Derkach, 1965). As a result, the Soviet approach to Indonesia cooled. Khrushchev & Khrushchev noted of Sukarno: “we supported him in the press, but didn’t go beyond that” (Khrushchev & Khrushchev, 2004).

In Indonesia, there was also a pulling back from the relationships with the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet split was beginning to weigh heavily in Indonesian political calculations by the early 1960s. Sukarno himself was moving in the direction of Beijing, as was the PKI, resurgent since the early 1950s. By 1965, the chance of Indonesia allying itself politically with the USSR, much less taking its side in the Sino-Soviet split, was close to zero. Then in that year Indonesia saw an attempted coup (or counter-coup: the interpretation of the events of September 30 - October 1, are still subject to major debate) that overthrew Sukarno, saw the decimation of the PKI and brought in a military-dominated regime led by General Suharto. These events drew caused a very cool response from Moscow (Suryadinata, 2006).

Suharto was keen to retain good relations with the Soviet Union, particularly in the economic sphere. Thus Indonesia and the USSR signed and ratified several bilateral economic agreements, including in 1974 and 1984 (Gromyko, Kovalyev, Sevostyanov & Tikhivinskiy, 1984b). Nonetheless, the early years of his rule saw the effective end of intensive Indonesian-Soviet bilateral defence cooperation. By the late 1960s, all Soviet advisors had been recalled,
and stricter regulations imposed by Moscow on logistical and financial support for Indonesia. It was only towards the end of 1980s, after Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempts to modernise the ageing Soviet state, that Suharto considered re-establishing closer ties, a move highlighted by his 1989 visit to Moscow (“Putin Pre-APEC Visit”, 2007; Suryadinata, 2006). But substantial improvement in the relationship had to wait until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The United States replaced the Soviet Union as the primary supplier of equipment to the Indonesian military, Washington seeking to reinforce Indonesia’s anti-communist credentials and to bolster the American position in Southeast Asia. So long as the Cold War prevailed, the logic of this position was strong. However the end of the Cold War removed this imperative from US policy. Concern for human rights now took on a much more prominent role in American policy-making, which left the relationship with Indonesia vulnerable to degradation, given Jakarta’s record on these matters. In 1991, in response to the killings at the Santa Cruz cemetery in East Timor, the US Congress effectively banned Indonesia from receiving American military equipment, and prevented Indonesian military personnel from attending training programs in the United States. The result of these sanctions was that by the middle of the 1990s, the Indonesia military’s operational capacity had been eroded substantially.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 saw not just the demise of the second most powerful actor of the Cold War international politics. In the first five years of its existence, the new Russian state and its ruling elites made unprecedented efforts to break with its communist past and to integrate itself into the community of western liberal democracies (Petro & Rubinstein, 1997). At the same time, Russia’s new political leadership and the emerging powerful business elite set course to expand the nation’s influence and interests into areas previously denied to the USSR, primarily on ideological basis. This also resulted in reanimation of old ties in key geopolitical areas, including Southeast Asia.

**Revitalisation of the relationship: 1997 to 2004**

In early 1997, two senior Russian bureaucrats had a series of high-level closed-door meetings in Jakarta, including with Suharto (Gornostayev & Korotchenko, 1997). These discussions continued in July when Indonesian Minister for Research and Technology B. J. Habibie visited Moscow for talks with Russian Vice-Premier Jacob Urinson (“Indonesia not Reluctant,” 1997). The results of these talks were announced on August 5, when Indonesia indicated its intention to acquire 12 Su-30K multirole aircraft and eight Mi-17-1B transport

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data suggest that by the time of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, when Indonesia was forced to reconsider its defence budget and acquisitions of foreign military technology, the nation was considering spending about US$1 billion on Russian armaments (SIPRI Yearbook 1998, 1998). If correct, this figure would have made Russia once again Indonesia’s principal suppliers of military technology and expertise.

Russia’s rationale for reanimating defence cooperation ties with Indonesia seems fairly clear. After the Soviet collapse Moscow had inherited the major portion of the once mighty Soviet military-industrial complex, amongst other things a major generator of much-needed hard currency. After 1991, Russia began losing position in the international defence market; its share dropped to 11% in 1992, a sharp contrast to 37% mark held by the USSR in 1989 (Chufrin, 1996). Seeking to diversify its clientele base to secure a stable and sizeable niche of Southeast Asia’s lucrative defence market, Russia responded with enthusiasm to approaches by regional states, particularly Indonesia.

Indonesia’s position is perhaps a little more complicated. Certainly it needed to upgrade its military capacity. Not only had this eroded for reasons already mentioned; in addition, given its (self-) perception as the regional leader, it is likely that the Indonesian government was not happy to see the Malaysians surpassing them in the military field. This fact alone would probably have inclined Jakarta to seek to upgrade their military hardware. But there was another factor at work here as well.

It is significant that it was Habibie, a civilian, who negotiated the purchase of the Russian aircraft rather than the Defence Minister General Edy Sudrajat, the Coordinating Minister for Defence and Security General Soesilo Soedarman or even the Commander of the Armed Forces General Faisal Tanjung. Habibie had previously been the long-term Minister for Research and Technology; by professional training he was an aeronautical engineer who had spent many years working in the German aeronautical industry (Schwartz, 1999).

A long-standing protégé and ally of Suharto, Habibie’s political influence by the mid-1990s was high. Most importantly for the discussion here, he was Chair of the Board for the Development of Strategic Industries (BPIS), which grouped together 10 state-owned enterprises operating in a range of strategically important and/or high technology areas.
These enterprises had a crucial role to play in Habibie’s plans for Indonesia’s future economic development.

Habibie argued that in order to raise its level of economic prosperity in the future Indonesia had to cease its reliance on low wage industries to attract foreign capital and encourage local capital. Rather, Habibie argued for targeting high value added industries for future development. A major barrier to the successful application of this strategy was the generally low quality of the Indonesian workforce, compared with neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and Thailand – let alone Singapore. Improving workforce quality was thus a key goal.

Through the purchase of Russian military aircraft, Habibie expected Indonesia would to be gaining access not just to sophisticated military equipment, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to training in their maintenance and use, acquiring skills which could be used in other contexts, civilian and well as military. The fact that the number of aircraft to be purchased was too small to be viable in defence terms, a criticism often levelled against the project, in this context was both true and irrelevant.

This approach is in line with a broader tendency in East Asia at this time: the acquisition of dual-use technologies that Willett (1997) argues were “undermining traditional defence-industrial strategies and blurring the boundary between civilian and military production” (p. 108). At the time, Willett (1997) put Indonesia’s defence capabilities on a par with Singapore, and above Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.

The Indonesian military, though, was by no means supportive of Habibie’s moves into an area they saw as their own: arms purchases. Whether or not the Air Force actually wanted the aircraft Habibie was negotiating to purchase—the leadership probably did, at least in the sense that it gave them access once again to modern military weapons—they certainly did not want him to be playing the key role in their acquisition. Moreover, the gap in technology between Indonesia’s existing demonstrated capabilities through IPTN (Industri Pesawat Terbang Nurtanio, Nurtanio Aircraft Industry) and the Sukhoi fighters was huge. Only a politician of Habibie’s supreme confidence could have seen the Russian equipment as a logical next step on Indonesia’s path to high technology industrialisation.

However, the whole issue was put firmly on hold when the Asian financial crisis broke over Indonesia in late 1997. The purchase was to all intents and purposes cancelled early in 1998. Much smaller acquisitions, including Mi-17 helicopters, BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers, 9,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles and ammunition, were announced in 2000 (TS VPK Information Agency, 2004; Isenberg, 2004). Habibie’s influence in this purchase is unclear;
he had become President following Suharto’s resignation in May 1998 but had been forced to resign before the package was announced, although he did retain some residual influence. It does seem, though, that this package fitted more readily into Indonesia’s immediate military needs.

Shortly after the turn of the century, Indonesia undertook a re-thinking of its foreign and defence policies. In March 2003 the Department of Defence published a major White Paper entitled *Mempertahankan Tanah Air Memasuki Abad 21* [Defending the Homeland Entering the 21st Century], which outlined the changing nature of the security challenges facing Indonesia (Department of Defence, 2003). Because the era of the bipolar world and global competition for military hegemony had passed, the Paper contended:

> Security issues over the past decade have become more complex with the rise of terrorism, looting and piracy, smuggling, people trafficking, illegal fishing, and other transnational crimes. These types of illegal activity are increasingly complex because they are undertaken by transnational actors who are very well organised and who have high levels of technological capacity and financial backing. (Department of Defence, 2003)

The threats to Indonesia’s security did not come from foreign powers seeking to invade its territory. Rather:

> Possible threats and disturbances which Indonesia will face in the future include terrorism, separatist movements, transnational crime (smuggling, illegal fishing), polluting and destroying of the ecosystem, illegal immigration, piracy/theft, radical action, communal conflict and the effects of natural disasters. (Department of Defence, 2003)

These potential threats are all primarily internal in nature and location. Indonesia’s primary immediate defence needs were thus for equipment and training, which could be directed to these internal threats: counter-insurgency, maritime surveillance, and environmental protection. The 2003 White Paper was followed in 2004 by a Strategic Defence Review (*Kaji Ulang Strategis Sistem Pertahanan Tahun 2004*) which identified 10 threats to Indonesian security, of which one was invasion or military aggression by a foreign power; the remaining nine were internal, mirroring those noted in the White Paper (Meliat, Prasetyono & Widjajanto, 2007).

Nonetheless, the fact that at the same time other Southeast Asia states were continuing building up their conventional military capacity could not be ignored by Jakarta. Indonesian leaders had always assumed their country was the natural leader of the ASEAN group, even if
other members did not always share this assumption. Its position had taken a battering late in the twentieth century, as its economy collapsed, separatist movements re-emerged, terrorists struck and it was forced into a humiliating and internationally damaging retreat from East Timor. The challenge in the early years of the new century was to re-build Indonesia’s position regionally, and ultimately internationally. To do so required that Indonesia match the military capacity of its neighbours or, at the very least, not be left behind in any regional arms race. For reasons already noted, the Indonesian military early in the century was in a weakened state, with outdated equipment and low levels of maintenance and repair (Meliat, Prasetyono & Widjajanto, 2007). Rectifying this situation was a high priority to military planners. But the continuing financial constraints within which decision-making was located meant there would be major limitations on Indonesia’s capacity to satisfy its requirements.

In September 2002, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr Hassan Wirajuda visited Moscow—the first visit by an Indonesian Foreign Minister since the collapse of the Soviet Union—for talks with his Russian counter-part, Igor Ivanov. One senior Indonesian diplomat described this visit as marking a “turning-point which gave birth to new commitments from both countries to raise their levels of relationships and cooperation to new and higher levels” (Pohan, 2006, p. 4).

The talks produced an agreement on bilateral consultations between the two Foreign Ministries and laid the ground work for an official state visit to Russia the following year by President Megawati Sukarnoputri. On April 21, 2003, Megawati and Putin signed a Declaration on the Foundations of Friendship and Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Indonesia in the twenty-first century. The Declaration covered a wide range of policy areas, including investment, tourism, science and technology. However closer cooperation in the security sphere was identified as one of its key foundations (“Na Novy,” 2003). This closer cooperation was exemplified by another agreement signed at the time, under the terms of which Indonesia would purchase six Russian combat aircraft: two Su-27SK, two Su-30MK and two Mi-35P. This purchase, worth US$193 million, was to be 87.5% financed through counter-trade in palm oil and other commodities (“Southeast Asian Fighter Purchases,” 2003). To oversee the further development of the strategic partnership, the establishment of a joint commission on Military-Technical Cooperation was foreshadowed.

But the Indonesian side was keen to ensure that the military cooperation was not limited simply to the purchase of Russian equipment. The major lesson that Jakarta had drawn from the US arms embargo was the need to diversify its sources of armaments. The purchase
of weapons systems from Russia was one reflection of this. But so was developing the nation’s own production capacity. An important aspect of the collaboration with Russia was the development of the productive capacity of five of Indonesia’s strategic industries: *Dirgantara* (aircraft), PINDAD (firearms), PAL (shipbuilding and repair), *Dahana* (ammunition and explosives) and LEN (electronics) (Pohan, 2006). In part this was to make Indonesia more self-sufficient in strategic goods. But in terms reminiscent of Habibie, a senior Indonesian diplomat also argued that there would be “spill-over effects” into other civilian industries from the development of capacity and skills in these industries (Pohan, 2006, p. 11).

However the weapons purchases negotiated during the Megawati visit did not go unquestioned in Jakarta. Indeed, the purchases drew quite substantial criticism, on the grounds that Indonesia could not afford the equipment being purchased; that the equipment was of the wrong sort or not suited to Indonesia’s security needs; or that the whole deal, involving a complicated counter-trade package, was unauthorised and possibly even illegal.

Thus Rizal Ramli, former Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, while supporting the principle of purchasing weapons systems from the Russians, nonetheless argued:

> These worthwhile objectives have been used as cover for short-term interests, illegal activities, contravention of the division of authority between ministries and of fiscal procedures, misuse of food stabilization funds, waste of government money, and potential corruption, collusion and nepotism resulting in losses to the state. (Ramli, 2003, p. 4)

On June 19, 2003, the parliament was sufficiently concerned about the issue—or perhaps sufficiently conscious of the political points which could be levelled against the government by pursuing it—to set up a Working Party (*Panitia Kerja: Panja*) to investigate the deal. The Working Party finally recommended to the President that sanctions be put in place against the officials who negotiated the deal, including the Commander of the TNI, the Minister for Industry and Trade, the Minister for Defence and the Head of the National Logistics Bureau (“Rekomendasi Panja,” 2003). However, and presumably to the surprise of none of the members of the Working Party, nothing resulted from the recommendation and the purchase went ahead.

The Russia-Indonesia defence relationship was further enhanced the following year when the Russian defence industry had the largest national presence at the Indodefence 2004 Expo & Forum, Indonesia’s tri-service defence exposition held in Jakarta between 24 and 27
November 24-27, with sixteen companies exhibiting (Isenberg, 2004; Kramar, 2005). The Russian pavilion attracted significant attention of senior Indonesian officials and military, including the President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

**The tsunami and second peak, 2004–08**

On 26 December 2004, a massive tsunami engulfed many regions around the Indian Ocean, hitting the Indonesian province of Aceh particularly hard. Ironically, though, the disaster relief operation in the aftermath of the tsunami contributed to the further development of ties between Russia and Indonesia, particularly between their defence ministries.

On January 5, 2005, Yudhoyono called Putin and asked for emergency assistance, including direct military logistical support (Mukhin, 2005). By January 15, the Russian Ministry of Defence had deployed a military field hospital to Aceh. Between January 19 and February 19 the hospital treated 2066 patients, including 1656 locals, and Russian epidemiologists were actively engaged in monitoring and prevention of possible epidemics (Bykov, 2005). At the end of its tour of duty, all the hospital’s equipment was transferred to the Indonesian military.

If in financial terms Russia’s disaster relief assistance was moderate compared to other nation’s contributions, it was significant nonetheless, in political as well as humanitarian terms. The deployment of a regular army medical unit was particularly significant. In Russia, the civilian Ministry of Emergencies is normally responsible for disaster relief assistance during both domestic and international crises. In this case, though, a front-line military medical unit was deployed instead, an action which required special approval of the President and the Federation Council (the Senate) (Mukhin, 2005).

Russia’s willingness to send such a unit to work with the Indonesian military in Aceh, where the latter was regularly accused of human rights violations in an attempt to suppress local separatists, aimed to demonstrate to Jakarta Moscow’s consistent stand on the principle of non-interference in the country’s internal affairs. This was in stark contrast to the positions of the United States, Australia and other western nations that were also involved in the post-tsunami recovery. While also providing substantial aid to the tsunami victims, these countries remained acutely aware of the possibility that their actions would be interpreted as support for the Indonesian government and military in the province, and did what they could to try to counter that impression.
Furthermore, from the military-strategic viewpoint, through engaging in a paramilitary disaster relief operation in Banda Aceh Russia was also able to demonstrate to the world its limited but yet effective military strategic air lift capability, one of the first such demonstrations of its restored ability to project military power globally in recent years (Babakin, 2005). Russia used its response to the tsunami, then, to revitalise its strategic relationship with Indonesia, following the blow it sustained following the 1997–98 financial crisis.

The year following the tsunami, 2005, saw a clear strengthening of bilateral defence contacts, building on the goodwill Russia had gained through its response to the tsunami disaster. In September, the first meeting of the bilateral Military-Technical Cooperation Commission was held in Moscow (“Indonesia, Russia,” 2005). Once again, at these discussions the Indonesian side stressed the importance of securing soft loans from Russia to pay for the military equipment to be purchased, and their desire to arrange substantial technology transfers to Indonesian state-owned companies such as Pindad, PAL, Dirgantara and Dahana. One Indonesian commentator noted:

Indonesia is optimistic that Russia will fulfil the expectations which have been put to them, given that military relations between Indonesia and Russia go back such a long way. (Bambang, 2005, p.10)

At the end of October, a Russian Pacific Fleet task force arrived in the Indonesian port of Tanjung Priok. Russian warships spent several days in Indonesia before departing for Singapore. Vice Admiral Sergey Avramenko, in command of the task force and Deputy Commander of the Fleet, called on the commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (“Russia Diharapkan,” 2005).

Russian defence sources described the port call as aimed at achieving high-level political outcomes (Gainutdinov, 2006). Indeed, it is likely that the visit aimed to send a dual message to Jakarta. First, it had to show that Russia was returning to Southeast East Asia and the Indian Ocean and was capable of offering assistance, including military support, to its clients and allies. Second, the visit of warships was a “live” display of military technology and hardware, aimed at impressing potential buyers.

The persistence with which Russia approached Indonesia as an arms sales customer seemed now to be paying off. The Indonesian military began lobbying for major defence purchases of Russian armaments and equipment. In 2005, the navy submitted a proposal to the Government to allocate US$1.9 billion for the purchase of six Kilo class submarines (“Do
The Air Force was reported to be hopeful of receiving some 20 Sukhoi aircraft and 15 helicopters (“Indoneziya Zakupit,” 2007).

In November 2006, Yudhoyono made his first official visit to Russia. He and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, signed a five-year agreement, running to 2010, covering cooperation in seven areas, including military and military-technical cooperation (“Indoneziya i Rossiya,” 2006; “SBY Putin,” 2006). Russia also flagged the extension to Indonesia of soft loans for military purposes amounting to US$1 billion, over a five-year period until 2010.

Yudhoyono’s visit to Moscow was reciprocated less than a year later, when Putin flew into Jakarta for a one-day visit on his way to the APEC summit in Sydney. This was the first ever visit to Jakarta by a Russian head of state, and in Moscow’s terms matched in standing only by Khrushchev’s visit in 1960. Putin’s stopover proved to be the culmination in the long and complex process of reanimating bilateral strategic ties between the two countries after 1991. By the end of the visit it had become clear that both nations intend to intensify cooperation in many spheres, including energy and mining, communications and space, and certainly defence (“Oruzheie v Kredit,” 2007). As part of a comprehensive cooperation package, Putin and Yudhoyono agreed to develop two major bilateral strategic initiatives.

The first project was the development of a joint space facility on the Indonesian island of Biak to the north of the New Guinea mainland (Litovkin, 2007). Codenamed Vozdushny Start (Air Launch), the joint space project aimed to provide efficient and cost-effective launch services to a growing clientele in Southeast Asia and beyond. Russia and Indonesia had began preliminary discussions and work on the Air Launch project in 1999. The seriousness of Indonesia’s intentions is highlighted by the fact that between 1999 and 2007, it reportedly invested over US$25 million in this initiative (Litovkin, 2007). The total cost is anticipated to reach US$120 - $130 million (Kislyakov, 2008), with the first launch from Biak anticipated in 2010 (Hidayat, 2003; “Pervy Start Sputnika,” 2007).

The second project involved Russian assistance to Indonesia’s national nuclear power program. Following Putin’s visit, the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) announced plans to submit a tender to build the Ujung Abang 1,000 megawatt nuclear facility in Central Java. With the estimated cost of US$1.66 billion the construction is expected to commence around 2010 with a preliminary completion date in 2017. Talks were also held about a possible purchase of a Russian-built floating nuclear-powered station.

There is little doubt, though, that the main outcome of Putin’s visit to Jakarta was the signing of a bilateral agreement under which Russia would provide Indonesia with a US$1 billion loan to purchase specified defence equipment between 2008 and 2010 (Table 1).
Table 1: The 2010 defence package

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platform</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diesel-electric attack submarines</td>
<td>Kilo class 636</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-role assault helicopters</td>
<td>Mi-35P</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-role transport helicopters</td>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious armoured vehicles</td>
<td>BMP-3F</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Marines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oruzhie v Kredit, 2007, p. 2

However, bilateral defence cooperation went even further than this package. In October 2007, Russia media claimed that Indonesia intended to spend as much as US$3 billion on Russian armaments and equipment. Apart from what was listed under the 2010 defence package, other plans were said to include acquisitions of 20 Su-27/30 aircraft, four submarines, several corvettes and patrol craft, and air defence systems (“Indoneziya Zakupit,” 2007). However, it is likely that these contracts—if indeed they proceed—will be introduced slower than the ones arranged under the 2010 defence package.

Despite these developments, though, the 2007 deals were by no means unchallenged. In December 2007, Prayitno said that, through to the end of 2009, the Air Force’s focus would be on increasing the weaponry available to its existing aircraft rather than buying any new types (“KSAU: Sampai 2009,” 2007). The only exception would be the purchase of an additional six Sukhois, the purchase of which had been announced on August 21, 2007 (“Dephan Minta,” 2008). In February 2008, the Indonesian Government announced plans to cut its defence budget by as much as 15%, a move that would clearly hurt defence procurement programs (Grevatt, 2008a; “Pemerintah Bahas,” 2008). In March, referring to the change of leadership in the Kremlin after March 2, 2008 Presidential elections which brought Dmitry Medvedev to power, Minister for Defence Juwono Sudarsono stated to local media that “a change in the Russian government will likely affect the decision and agreement on the state credit offered to Indonesia.” (Grevatt, 2008b, p. 20). So far, these pessimistic prognoses have not eventuated.

**Major considerations**

After about fifty years of stagnation, Russia-Indonesia relations are becoming closer again, with growing defence ties playing a significant, and perhaps even a central role in the foreign
defence policies of the two countries. So, what are the contributing factors that have brought the two nations together once again?

As a potential partner in meeting Indonesia’s perceived defence equipment needs, Russia offered a number of advantages compared with other potential suppliers, such as the United States, China and even India.

First, there was a history of Russia’s being an arms provider to Indonesia, in its previous form as the Soviet Union. This history might have become rather romanticised over time, but nevertheless, when Indonesia’s conventional military strength was at its height, it was based on Russian weapons supplies. Many senior Indonesian military officers had personal experience of working with Russian counter-parts, equipment and training programs.

Second, Russia was a much more accommodating supplier of military equipment than its primary competitor, the United States. It was willing to engage in counter-trade deals and state defence loan schemes which obviated the need for Indonesia to spend large amounts of hard currency to acquire the equipment ordered. There were of course limits to this flexibility, and on Indonesia’s capacity to pay even a proportion of the cost of equipment in hard currency. But these arrangements were still more favourable than the terms offered by the United States.

This was an issue of ongoing significance for Indonesia. By regional standards the Indonesia military had historically been under-funded from the state budget. Historically Indonesia has allocated around one per cent of GDP to defence; other Southeast Asian nations typically allocate 4-5% (Department of Defence, 2003). Under Suharto, only about one third of the defence budget was paid directly by the state (Solikin, 2008). The rest came primarily from military-owned businesses. All governments after the fall of Suharto have pledged eliminate these latter businesses: but this will put additional pressure on the state budget to fund arms purchases, and thus additional significance to the efforts to negotiate favourable terms.

Third, Russia was distant from Indonesia: not just in the obvious geographical sense, but distant also politically in that Russia made it clear that it had no intention to link any trade deals, including those involving military equipment, to Indonesian domestic political issues. There would, in other words, be no likelihood of Russia cutting off the supply of weapons, parts or training because of human rights abuses perpetrated by the government in Jakarta, or prohibiting use of the equipment in certain theatres, such as Aceh. In the view of senior Indonesian officials, Russia’s assurances that human rights considerations will not affect defence cooperation allows Jakarta to initiate a long-term modernisation of all fighting
services. The United States lifted its arms embargo on Indonesia in November 2005 (Morрисsey, 2006). However, as one unnamed Indonesian defence official reportedly remarked at the time of US Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates’ visit to Jakarta in February 2008: “How can we be sure they [Americans] won’t impose another embargo? The Russians seem to be more reliable, especially during difficult times for our country” (Govindasamy, 2008 p. 9).

Fourth, for Indonesia Russia was a useful counter-balance to the established regional power, the United States and the emerging superpower, China. Indonesia wanted—and indeed needed—good relations with these latter two powers. On November 7, 2007, for instance, Indonesia signed an agreement on defence cooperation with China. But it certainly did not want to be dependent on either of them, not least because both were physically present in the local region, with the capacity should they choose to do so to exert considerable overt or covert military and political pressure. As noted earlier, Indonesian foreign policy had been founded on the principle of being active and independent; this principle is still the moral cornerstone of foreign policy. To some external observers to suggest that Russia could balance the United States and China in the Indonesian region might seem farfetched, and a carry-over of Cold War thinking. In Jakarta, though, the need to be seen to be maintaining a degree of distance from the US—and from China, too—requires a different perspective on foreign policy. More positively, projects such as Air Launch potentially provides Indonesia with a strategic option of securing access to near space, thus furthering its geo-political weight in Southeast Asia.

Fifth, the defence relationship with Russia, clearly seen by Jakarta as something which Moscow was interested in and thus potentially a lever for it to use, was an adjunct to closer financial relations, and in particular to accessing Russian investment capital. According to Indonesia’s Ambassador to Russia, Hamid Awaluddin, in recent years Russian investment in Indonesian economy reached US$4 billion (“Indoneziya Khochet,” 2008). Adding to that, in the past seven years bilateral trade increased considerably, from US$210 million in 2001 to US$904 million in 2007 (“Indoneziya Khochet”, 2008; Suryadinata, 2006). Tourism is another sector where Indonesia hopes to get major benefits from being close with Russia (“Indoneziya Nadeetsya,” 2008). Clearly the relationship, while perhaps leveraging off defence cooperation extends a good deal further than that.

Finally, there were considerable political similarities between Indonesia and Russia. Both were states undergoing the same kind of transition, from an authoritarian regime to a more democratic one via an uncertain and often difficult evolutionary path rather than a
revolutionary one. In both countries the new political elites were in many ways hardly different from the old ones. Putin had been a KGB officer during the Soviet time; Yudhoyono had been a general under the military-backed regime led by Suharto. Both countries faced similar internal threats, from separatist regimes and Islamist terrorism; both were ethnically and religiously diverse. And both seemed to believe their countries had pasts, which promised, and perhaps even mandated, a future greater than the present.

Russia’s consistency in pursuing close defence cooperation with Indonesia is driven by equally important considerations. By once again building partner relations with Jakarta, including close bilateral defence cooperation, Moscow aims to strengthen its position as an active player in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region, an area of growing importance to the nation. Contrary to Soviet strategies of the early 1960s, Russia applies a multi-vectored approach, with many ends being longer-term rather than immediate.

First and most obviously, Russia wants to firm up its position in the Southeast Asian arms market, which currently generates 15 - 20% of all defence-related Russian (Soloviev, 2007). Defence cooperation with Indonesia complements existing links with Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Philippines and Singapore, thus positioning the nation as one of the principal providers of military and dual-use technologies to regional clientele. The existing legal framework and special preferences given to the Indonesian Government creates strong possibility that Russia may become the principal provider of defence-related technologies to the TNI.

Second, Russia’s strategic investment in Indonesia is driven by longer-term geopolitical considerations. Close relations with Jakarta, the world’s largest Muslim nation, as with Malaysia and Middle Eastern states, is aimed at improving Russia’s image in the global Islamic community, and strengthening socio-economic and political links with the Muslim world.

Russia’s comeback as a Pacific power is warranted by economic imperatives as well as geopolitical concerns. For Russia, Indonesia is an important economic partner, an arena of long-term capital investment, and an additional source of energy resources. The latter correlates with Russia’s current strategy of establishing control over energy rich zones and supply chains. Moreover, Indonesia’s strategic geography (the country sits at the junction of the two strategic theatres, Pacific and the Indian Ocean) makes it pivotal in Russia’s regional great power game in the near to medium-term future against the United States and, in the longer run, possibly against PRC. By being strategically close to Indonesia, Russia hopes to ensure favourable security regime around the Archipelago, a matter of growing importance
for the nation’s economy and the accelerating export potential, particularly in the energy sector.

Conclusion

Are we seeing a significant military realignment in Southeast Asia, in which Russian-Indonesian relations will play a much more prominent role than at any time since the early 1960s? Or will the grand plans of at least some officials in Moscow and Jakarta ultimately come to nothing, as have so many other grand plans involving Indonesia in the recent past?

Moscow certainly seems committed to making the relationship work, putting political and economic weight behind them. Such a relationship fits well into Russia’s world view, and its understanding of its own place in the new emerging political constellation regionally and more widely. Moreover, there seems to be a clear decision-making process in Moscow, which means that once decisions are made, they are adhered to; the change from Putin to Medvedev has in fact brought little discernable change, at least in terms of the Russia-Indonesia relationship.

But in Indonesia, the situation is rather different. Decision-making is diffused throughout the political (and military) systems. Plans for weapons purchases, made by various civil or military officials, are highly contingent: no such plans should be considered final until the equipment is actually delivered to Indonesian hands. And it would be a brave observer who would predict that the plans for a Russian-supplied nuclear-powered electricity generating station being set up in Indonesia would be realised any time soon; and the same goes for the Biak Air Launch facility.

Moreover, the onset of the global financial crisis in the second half of 2008 will inevitably impact on Indonesia’s capacity to purchase military equipment from abroad, no matter how flexible and generous the terms. Few political or military leaders in Indonesia want to be dependent again on the United States as their principal technology supplier, in either the military or civilian contexts, and in this context the relationship with Russia is very useful, and will be supported. But by the same token, few of those same political or military leaders want to replace dependence on the United States with dependence on Russia.

It would be a mistake to suggest that the developing cooperation in the sphere of defence and security makes Russia the principal strategic partner for Indonesia. Over the past thirty years Jakarta has shown considerable skill in maintaining relationships with many great
powers, which were often geopolitical rivals. There are no indications today that this policy will change in any significant way, on defence or any other matter.

However, the strategic relationship with Russia, including in the defence sphere, has a strong potential for growth. On the practical level Russia has offered Indonesia a complete suite of weapons systems ranging from light firearms to sophisticated combat systems such as attack submarines, long-range aircraft, and air defence complexes on highly competitive terms. On a strategic level, Russia’s growing geopolitical and economic weight may appeal to Indonesia in its power game against regional and global giants, among them the United States and China. Moscow has offered Jakarta its hand with a smile. Sooner or later, though, Indonesia will have to decide whether it wants to relive the honeymoon of the early 1960s by realigning strategically with Russia, or simply choose a pragmatic, materialist approach, unencumbered by political or strategic considerations.

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Notes

1 For further analysis of Soviet perceptions of the significance of sea-based threats posed by US strategic submarines and strike aircraft carriers, see Muraviev, 2007.

2 BPIS was formed in 1990, and consists of ten companies: four which were previously under the Department of Industry (IPTN, Barata Indonesia, Boma Bisma Indra and Krakatau Steel), three formerly controlled by the Department of Defence and Security (PAL, Pindad, Dahana), and one each from the Departments of Tourism, Posts and Telegraph (Inti), and Communications (Inka), and the State Secretariat (LEN).

3 This is not the place to discuss the political implications of the paper, which was criticised by many as representing a retreat from the process of reforming the military, and in particular efforts to extract the military from internal security issues. For a brief review of the issues see Perwita, 2004, pp. 1–9; Sebastian, 2006, pp. 150-52.

4 Dirgantara was the new name for IPTN, the aircraft manufacturer.

5 Figure not confirmed from Indonesian sources.

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