The ratings intellectual

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Abstract

There are key figures in the design and the maintenance of audience ratings that are often unknown to the public, but whose careers have been in assessing, evaluating and innovating ratings systems. They also tend to be the major figures in the auditing of ratings, of mapping changes in the audience with respect to the ratings, and indeed inventing new ratings systems. Gale Metzger in the United States, Tony Twyman in the UK, and Ian Muir in Australia are each key figures in this regard, but there are many more. In this paper the authors provide an historical overview of what we call the ratings intellectual. These intellectuals deal with ratings measurement as a form of knowledge and when crises in the operation of the ratings emerge they have had the highest profile in their solution. At the same time an important role has been played by more public figures who we can call “general ratings intellectuals”. Historically, some independent ratings intellectuals, like Leo Bogart, have had a public profile as public commentators on ratings as a form of social research alongside ratings entrepreneurs such as AC Nielsen and Hooper in the USA and Bill McNair in Australia who published extensively on audience measurement and ratings often as a means of educating their clients and selling their services. Leo Bogart provided a generation of market researchers with a sense of the utility and scope of ratings as a specific and limited form of market research; while entrepreneurs such as Arthur Neilsen and Bill McNair introduced and promoted the concept of the ratings to potential clients and the broader public in the ratings.

After the formalisation of auditing functions from the mid-1960s ratings intellectuals increasingly became involved in both the ongoing investigation of the carriage of the ratings and in seeking improvements to its operations. To do this they often, like Bogart, operated outside the ratings companies themselves. Today, though, the ratings intellectual keeps a much lower profile as intellectuals exercising specific expertise within a particular technical domain even though their importance remains. Our principal figure here is Gale Metzger. The authors consider the operation of both personae as constitutive of the operation of modern ratings as a system of thought. It is our contention that the ratings intellectual represented a particular office although this office certainly changes over time. In this paper we are interested in two kinds of ratings intellectuals as distinct personae.
Studying the persona

To describe and do some justice to the knowledge work of these people we are calling them *ratings intellectuals*. That designation helps us recognise the standing of these people as thinkers and methodologists dealing with—and thinking with—data and its limitations and then communicating these limitations and possibilities to users and clients of the research. Bogart and people like him brought their professional expertise to bear as advisors. They commonly produced information and data that is not always understood by those who use it and act on its behalf. Bogart was a methodologist responsible for innovations in syndicated research. He wanted to have discussions about methodology. Bogart was also a sceptic. And this sceptical persona was important to the role he played as enlightened critic and commentator on marketing, audience, and broader trends in social research. Individuals such as Bogart need to be distinguished from those who use ratings and other forms of applied social research to construct a broadcast schedule, to analyse the reach and trajectory of a program over a season and seasons, to identify appropriate “slots” for broadcast messages and to report on the respective shares of broadcast networks.

The authors are drawn to the idea of a persona as a means of thinking about this larger constellation of contextual issues around people like Bogart who were more than survey technicians but were also ratings intellectuals. While there are a variety of ways of thinking about persona as a kind of role-playing derived from the work of Erving Goffman and Marcel Mauss which centre the triadic relation among inner self, role and society—our interest is in the uptake of persona “as a manifestation and representative of an office” (Condren 2006, p. 66). Condren, Hunter and Gaukroger writing about the history of early modern philosophy argue that in order “to understand the answers philosophers have given, it is necessary to reveal the contingent and variable nature of their problems, even if history here is really the medium in which such problems are resolved” (Condren et al., 2006, p. 3). For these writers this implied a shift of focus from “philosophical problems to the institutional contexts in which they are delimited, and from the subject of consciousness to the persona of the philosopher that is cultivated in such contexts” (Condren et al., 2006, p.7) The idea of an “office” as in a “public office” provides a way of exploring what in a former time we might have called a “speaking position” which in being institutionally sanctioned was important to the carriage of the role. For Condren to be representative of an office means to be “an embodiment of a moral economy” in the sense that a office entails “a whole sphere of responsibilities, rights of action for their fulfilment, necessary attributes, skills and specific virtues, highlighted by concomitant vices and failures” (Condren, 2006, p. 66).

These remarks suggest that we might usefully regard the writing and activism of ratings intellectuals on their own behalf and as a profession as being informed by a sense of a sphere of responsibility both to the profession, the industry and to a larger public and social good. We can look to the kinds of actions that they took and deemed appropriate to take. We can look to the specific skills that were important to this exercise and ethical ways of acting and thinking that he advocated and practiced. And we can open up an investigation of “the vices and failures” of the professions they spoke to—how were these elaborated and
denounced. Bogart provides a rich field for such inquiry. On the last matter alone there is Bogart’s high profile denouncing of both the concept of spiral of silence and its proponent Noelle Neumann for her Nazi propagandist past as providing one way of thinking about this. But such a larger inquiry must wait another time. What we are interested in here is Bogart’s specific criticism of the ratings and the institutional contexts in which these criticisms came alive.

Those with a “speaking position” within the industry and in the public arena have been and are limited. Archibald Crossley, the founder of audience ratings, like Bogart, wrote in the popular press, academic journals, industry journals and professional committees. C.E. Hooper and A.C. Nielsen, likewise, both created the techniques of ratings, critiqued them, and participated in policy and public debates. Crossley’s prodigy, Gale Metzger, did so on an even larger scale. Gale Metzger is the retired cofounder and President of Statistical Research, Inc. (SRI). SRI created and provided a number of major media and consumer research services, including:

- the audience ratings for national network radio (RADAR®: Radio ’s All Dimension Audience Research 1972-2001);
- studies and audits of television measurement systems, including the development - in collaboration with major networks and advertisers - of a complete ratings service for the digital era (SMART);
- ongoing services to understand how consumers use media - including TV, radio and the internet - in everyday life (MultiMedia Mentor);
- many sponsored studies related to media usage and advertising, including reactions to programming and products and ad campaigns.

The Market Research Council has inducted Gale into its Hall of Fame and the National Association of Broadcasters gave him the Hugh Malcolm Beville award in recognition of his distinguished professional career in broadcast audience research.

In the United Kingdom Tony Twyman had a major role setting up RAJAR (Radio Joint Audience Research) as well as being Technical Director of BARB (Broadcasters’ Audience Research Board). He has been a Director of TAM, the holder of the first UK television audience research contract. In Australia Bill McNair and George Anderson created their own ratings techniques, published in their defence, and took a proactive role in educating the market and the public about the utility of ratings for advertising and broadcast strategy alike. Ian Muir continued that work making the transition as Twyman and Metzger had done in the UK and the USA from working for ratings companies to auditing ratings and advising on the development of ratings contracts. Similar trajectories can be seen in the career of Ian Garland who was previously Managing Director of AC Nielsen Media Australia from 1997 until 2001. He is now the founding employee and managing director of Multiview Analytics in Australia. The company was established in 2009 to develop research and analytical
services for the benefit of the subscription TV industry (STV) and to serve the broader media and marketing community. Garland, like Metzger, is seen at one moment as a competitor in the world of the audience ratings business, but at the same time an impartial critic of how methodologies are constructed and applied. But not all trajectories towards auditing are via this route. Some important ratings intellectuals such as Peter Danaher and Peter Miller have career trajectories from working in market research (Danaher) and in ratings companies (Peter Miller) but then move into academia and from there act as consultants to the ratings. For Miller this has involved running, for AC Nielsen, their major survey of non-respondents. In Danaher’s case this has involved acting as survey auditor for the television ratings services in New Zealand, Australia and Ireland, and the print readership service in New Zealand.

Table 1 at the end of this paper provides a summary of some of the key people in the ratings intellectual role. It is taken for granted, of course, that key early methodologists, like Hans Zeisel and Paul Lazarsfeld very much set the broader methodological context for debate. Zeisel, particularly, is an important early figure in ratings auditing as he was responsible for the earliest “objective” comparison between competing ratings systems in the 1930s when he was commissioned by his advertising agency employer to report on the discrepancies between Hooper and CAB results in the 1930s for their clients. What marks this as important is the combination of his independence from the companies providing ratings – both Arthur Nielsen and Hooper certainly wrote and argued forcefully for their respective systems – and the development of methodologies for assessing the mechanisms, procedures and processes involved in the ratings.

**The general ratings intellectual**

For more than thirty years Leo Bogart’s persona was what we call here a “general ratings intellectual”. He was also a trenchant and very public critic of the ratings as a technique of audience measurement and how they are used by advertisers, advertising agencies, media planners and buyers and the radio and television industries. While many of his criticisms also feature in many media studies critiques of the ratings, his standpoint and speaking position were very different from the cultural and media studies critique. First and foremost he was an industry insider concerned with the proper conduct of social and market research. Perhaps because his criticisms were always part of larger industry discussions his sustained engagement with the ratings and the telling criticisms he made of its practice and uptake have not had the close attention they deserve. Bogart had a wide ranging agenda. He wrote about advertising strategy, the uses to be made of and possibilities for social and marketing research, the trajectories of the television industry and of commercial culture more generally, and developments in social and marketing research to which he contributed in no small measure. He was concerned to place the ratings in an ensemble of audience research.

Bogart’s criticisms mix practical experience and the theoretical knowledge of a methodologist and are closely linked to who and what he was as an industry player and a
virtuoso public commentator. Bogart’s insider reproach to the broadcast ratings is one of the field’s most sustained and informed criticisms of its shape and trajectory—and is worthy of attention as such. Bogart devoted significant sections of a number of his books to a discussion of the ratings starting in the 1950s and extending right through to the mid-2000s. These criticisms document and criticise the transformation of the ratings and market research over the period to become the pre-eminent media research instrument in the US and beyond. They cover the period in the US when ratings provision was a contestable market and there were a number of different, rival ratings providers. They chart the beginning and maturing of auditing regimes for ratings provision out of the Congressional hearings beginning in the late 1950s and moving into the 1960s given pre-eminence through the quiz scandal. They cover the contemporary moment where ratings sit alongside an ensemble of other proprietary syndicated information sources increasingly constituting the horizon line of action for media planners and buyers, advertisers and media outlets.

While his criticisms provide one reason for scholarly attention to Bogart, another is provided by the very thing that makes his contributions difficult to assimilate to contemporary communication and media studies perspectives—the very public place from which he spoke. He was both a public intellectual and critic and an industry insider. As a social and marketing research methodologist he was responsible for major innovations in syndicated research. He was an important figure in a wide variety of research industry forums including the World Association of Public Opinion Research and the American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). He was an AAPOR president, honoured with the association’s highest award, and was closely linked with the association over his professional life. He may have been a trenchant critic but he contributed in no small measure to the very shape of the institutions and research enterprises that he criticised.

His criticisms therefore form an integral part of the internal intellectual and institutional history of the ratings and applied social research. He explicitly used his corporate and institutional location to prosecute a case for particular kinds of applied social research and particular approaches to this research. He did this in AAPOR meetings, in his publishing of books and articles of appeal to both specialist and non-specialist readers alike, and in his journal articles in specialist publications. He explicitly used his reputation as one of the foremost social and applied commercial research practitioners of his day to prosecute his case for the appropriate use, disposition towards and flexible relation to social research. This combination of critical and practical attention made for a potent combination of ideas and public presentation. His criticisms were made with a combination of great intellect and rhetorical power. This speaking position is an important part of his story and provides his criticism of the ratings and ratings provision with its peculiar contextual force. This combination of elements suggests that a close attention to the historical persona of Bogart as a ratings intellectual, critic, and advocate for applied social research may provide a prism through which we can grasp aspects of a broader institutional history, including its transformation as an intellectual and professional field over Bogart’s active professional life.

In this work he made very public criticism of the growing importance of media planning and buying, he was critical of the consolidation of applied social research into a handful of companies, he was appalled by the downsizing of television network’s research divisions and their increasing reliance upon syndicated data such as ratings in decision making, he abhorred their increasing reliance upon “mechanical” research tools such as people meters and retail information derived from scanning technology and associated computing programs, and he argued for the baleful influence computers were having on the understanding of individual motivation and behaviour. These trenchant criticisms, when combined with his important earlier work on the social impact of television (1958, 1972), newspaper readership in the wake of television, opinion polling (1972) and advertising strategy (1967, 1986), not only provide us with a useful compendium of critical discussion of larger developments over the period but also, and more importantly for our purposes, point to larger institutional changes and changes in the kinds of practical knowledge, techniques and self-understandings of those practicing, buying and using ratings research. These changes and re-alignments—changes which increasingly placed Bogart on the outside of an industry in which he had been an insider for so much of his professional life—can be usefully put into relief by a dual attention to both his ideas and thinking and to the changing industry, institutional and intellectual formations within which this thought was exercised, valued and criticised.

Bogart’s persona of an applied social researcher committed to innovations in social research method and practice across a wide variety of research areas is still alive today. But he himself recognised that the changes he was observing—larger corporate, institutional and research practice changes—were marking different configurations of research information and its application, and privileging the exercise of certain kinds of research knowledge over others. These new configurations were making the kind of thing he did, the positions he spoke from, and the mix of institutional positions from which he spoke less in the mainstream than they once had been. It had become increasingly unlikely that his successors would have such a command of the territory or ability to exercise such a very public persona at the intersection of public debate, mediating the spaces among social research, marketing, advertisers, agencies and the like. As he recognised, research and researchers had become more specialised and with this specialisation and the growing routinisation of the uses to be made of research outputs there was less space for mediating these knowledges. Bogart’s successors could and would not command the field in quite the same way as he once had.

By attending to what it means to be a ratings and social research methods intellectual, the form and character of the comportments attendant to this role, we are able to investigate not simply an evidently extraordinary individual’s career but also the kinds of mix of thought and action and self-presentation available to ratings intellectuals as they act and promulgate to inform and refine ratings instruments and industry uptake alike. The attention we are paying here to Bogart’s persona is part of a larger attention we are paying to the history of the ratings including the ratings as a form of intellectual, industry and governmental thought.
The loss of the persona?

One of Bogart’s major criticisms of the ratings was that it implied a loss of standing on the part of the applied social research methodologist – the person who could not only create audience ratings, understand the limitations of data but also revise other methodologies. In this he usefully points to the transformations in the industry. He was critical of consolidation and concentration in the research business. The problem with this concentration was the effect he saw it having in the conduct of research and its practice. The first consequence—and it is a familiar criticism of market consolidation into companies with multifaceted portfolios in a variety of industries—was that firms were now being run by people who had not come up through the ranks in the business concerned and instead came to the business with different and sometimes incompatible knowledge and practice about how things were done and why they were done that way. At worst they were uninterested.

A relatively small number of firms that practice audience research continuously and on a large scale are the principal arbiters of what the American public reads, sees and hears. It is no slur on the personal merit of integrity of the people who manage these firms to say that in many cases they are almost totally uninterested in the content of the data their corporations generate, in the methods used to generate them, and in the standards that govern the process, except insofar as these may be related to their targeted profit goals. (Bogart, 2000a, p. 130)

This did not mean that these managers did not “staff their businesses with professionals who do have some concerns for content, methods, and standards, and that these researchers must be given some latitude to do what they want” (Bogart, 2000a, p. 131). Rather it was a different and subtler point: these managers judge the work of the research professionals “by the financial results, rather than by the excellence of what they do or the knowledge they generate”. This has the consequence of turning an “essentially a humanistic social science” into “an assembly line of repetitive and largely meaningless statistics” (Bogart, 2000a, p. 131). The problem lay with how these new corporate arrangements focused attention towards the “the wrong kinds of measurements” and “the wrong interpretations drawn from them”. They were making it more difficult to “search for meaning, for knowledge” but this search and capacity to search was what “distinguishes the research analyst from the collector and processor of data”.

Let’s follow his reasoning:

That business [research] is increasingly dominated by giant companies. The fifty largest account for about half the world’s total expenditures on commercial research, and only a handful of these big firms are headed by individuals whose careers were spent in professional research practice. (Bogart, 2003, p. 282)

The first casualty of this move was that “research has become the property of non-researchers” (Bogart, 2003, p. 283). In particular he worried about the trend to which “the
analysis of information, both in business and in politics, continues to be taken out of the hands of the researchers.” Researchers were no longer managing research businesses. Managers were no longer knowledgeable about and imbued with the sense of purpose and identity of their researchers. This is a familiar refrain marking as it does the increasing corporatisation and growth of large multinational conglomerates whose managers were increasingly “context independent”. A new repertoire of competences and skills using, often to different ends, the same vocabulary but in different assemblages of knowledge had become important. Bogart had a symbol for this new educational training repertoire—the MBA:

Masters of Business Administration who have taken a course in sales and market analysis now consider themselves research experts and ‘crunch’ numbers with scant regard for their origins or meaning. Large advertising agencies have abolished their research departments in favour of units that do “market planning and analysis”. (Bogart, 2003, p. 282)

For Bogart this trend was systemic. It was evident in both the conduct of the research companies as much as in the conduct of the companies using ratings data in media companies and media planning and buying criticism. His criticism was that the trend towards the MBA and forms of market research had spread a superficial general competence in market and survey research but accompanying this there had been a parallel trend away from a deeper level of understanding and competence. What was now important was that the user knew enough to make sense of pre-prepared datasets increasingly available through a variety of different channels. What was lost also was the interest of the principals of the companies themselves in applied social research. With this loss came a loss of agency on their part.

He saw the increasing centrality of the ratings as connected to these wider trends and the downsizing of research and research functions in organisations. Bogart was critical of increasing centrality of the ratings data to media company and advertising agency research budgets with a consequent diminishing of their capacity to maintain a comprehensive research facility. In Finding Out (2003) he put the situation graphically. In 1979 audience ratings made up a little more than a quarter of a TV network’s research budget by 1999 it was over half. At the same time this same network reduced the size of their research staff and therefore research capability from 118 to 38. As Bogart observed this decline was a decline in “original studies that require diligent and expert analysis rather than a mere recording of performance” (2003, p. 281-2). This same pattern he found evident in advertising agencies:

Young and Rubicam, a leading advertising agency, had 250 researchers in a total staff of about 1,200 in its head office in 1976. In 2002, Y&R was part of the WPP conglomerate, and had 24 “planners” in its New York headquarters. (Bogart, 2003, p. 281)
Both quantitative and qualitative research alike in the service of the (commercially oriented) media industry had diminished “the human contact of the researcher with unique individuals” (Bogart, 2003, p. 284). If the ratings risked diminishing a sense of the fundamental diversity upon which regularities or whatever kind were constructed (that is it lost sight of individuals and respect for them); qualitative research risked being diminished by the reliance upon and misuse of focus groups. Both problems were tied up in what was seen as the loss of a certain kind of professionalism and (relative) autonomy of research and research enterprise under the contemporary corporation. Another related concern of Bogart’s was a contraction in the institutional fields within which research was able to be conducted. Alongside this narrowing of commercial research to fewer instruments used more intensively and conducted more regularly, Bogart was concerned about trends within the academy that had made it more specialised and insular. Both were disrupting the conditions under which the profession of applied social research was conducted, social research methods were able to be developed, and the training and induction of researchers was accomplished. The previously close connection with research training and research concept development in academia was being transformed. He claimed that research becoming “the property of non-researchers” widened “the gap between academic and applied research” (Bogart, 2003, p. 283). It meant that “commercial researchers and their interests are no longer well represented in professional journals and conferences that once engaged them in fruitful dialogue with university scholars”. While never working in a University himself he valued these connections and saw them as intrinsic to his identity and performance as a researcher. He looked forward to the ferment of ideas in both social research and applied social research.

For Bogart this meant that media research was becoming more and not less bounded. More particular, more routinised, more insular with baleful effects for researchers in both the media industries and academia. This was not just the fault of corporate orientations towards research as research in academia had in its turn become more “specialised” and so less in contact than before. Bogart’s ratings criticisms were part of a large and generous apprehending of the research and application of research fields. He was clear minded about the limitations of much research including commercial research which turns out to be mostly inconsequential. Writing about opinion polls in 1972 he could opine that “most survey research is devoted to the study of trivia; it is the study or minor preferences in the marketplace and in the media” (Bogart, 1972, p. 197). He went on to say that “to a very large extent it is not a study of opinion at all but of purchasing and product usage”. This clear minded view of a field with which he was so closely connected bears some comparison with the larger orientation towards and attitude to research embodied in the career and trajectory of Paul Lazarsfeld and his collaborators. For Lazarsfeld the social research methodology was what was important and developing concepts for such research and getting someone to pay for it—it was not the actual research being undertaken that was as important as the prototype testing, the proof of concept being undertaken. Bogart shared this outlook. He certainly saw applied social research as a means of developing social research instruments which could become a means of solving and illuminating problems on a wider scale and canvas than mapping consumer decisions and preferences. He clearly believed that much of what was done in the space of marketing research was both narrow
and limited and on a broader scale and in the broader social context might not amount to much.

As a commercial researcher he was aware of the differences between himself and his academic counterparts. In the 1972 edition of *The Age of Television: A study of Viewing Habits and Impact of Television on American Life*, he put the difference as follows:

The commercial researcher commonly deals with generous quantities of data but rarely has the time to explore them in depth. By contrast, the academic or university researcher usually has only limited resources and handles them more intensively. (Bogart, 1972, p. 332)

For Bogart what set ratings services apart from the run-of-the-mill commercial research was that this commercial research was:

oriented to immediate and specific problems. Ordinarily the researcher cannot permit himself the luxury of theorizing or looking for generalizations. He must stick to the task in hand and come up with a fast and workable solution to the problem his client puts before him. Each research project tends to be undertaken from scratch, and there is therefore a certain amount of duplication with similar research undertaken at other places and times for other clients. Wariness of competitors means that research findings are usually kept confidential. (Bogart, 1972, p. 332)

His writings also represent a particular ethics of and projection of the business of research and evidence a care to provide and illuminate what he regarded as the proper place of research and a proper and considered perspective on this research. This in its turn would generate an appropriate set of expectations to have towards it. These considerations informed his understanding and criticism of the ratings. Bogart was concerned for how applied social research such as the ratings were to be taken up. He prosecuted these concerns internally as much as externally. His books—often published by business presses—were public communication to be sure but it could be said that he went public in order to reach the bits of the ensemble of users and practitioners he could not otherwise reach. His work was shaped in the cut and thrust of the debate over research at AAPOR annual conferences and more local events, and it was forged and refined in that institution’s “contest of ideas”. Bogart criticised the ratings with a broad sweep of social research in mind—whether applied in the pursuit of commercial ends or applied in the sense of social and governmental ends. Bogart, of course, did both. There was his work on the desegregation of the American Army and his development in the 1960s of a replacement newspaper circulation instrument. As Bogart recalls in his testimonial interview for AAPOR in the 1950s through to the 1970s at least AAPOR meetings being smaller would have everyone listening to and discussing each other’s methodology. Later it became bigger and there became less room for participants to consider alternative and new developments.

Bogart’s reproach to the ratings was, in a significant sense, a concern at the loss of office, of the standing and integrity of the applied social research intellectual. It was fundamentally a
concern about the loss of a persona that went with it. This loss of room to move was tied into the narrowing of larger attentions to the research enterprise, its conduct, and its proper integrity. It is not therefore surprising that his criticism of the ratings was accompanied by a parallel attention to what he perceived to be similar kinds of systematic misuses of qualitative research. Over Bogart’s career the ratings solidified into a narrow form as a pre-eminent data source used by media planners and buyers, ad agencies and their clients, and media companies. While it had enjoyed relative stability for almost half a century as an important data source—right at the end of Bogart’s active and long career it had started to solidify into its contemporary form as an even more important data source. With the changes in the buying and selling of advertising time and with the concomitant rise of media planners and buyers as crucial intermediaries when coupled with the increasingly internalised debates about shape and trajectory of ratings, there were different priorities vying for recognition. Its rise to increasing pre-eminence was due, as we have seen, to a combination of computing power and a move towards the certification of processes of audit from the 1960s. And the contest to regard ratings as simply one among a number of instruments was resolved in favour of the ratings so opening the way for the “survey” methodologist intellectual to be superseded by a recognisably modern ratings intellectual. This figure was still a methodologist but not a methodologist relating to a range of social research instruments. The ratings intellectual had become more a specific methodologist of ratings.

What kind of appeal to “insiders” was this trenchant criticism? Unlike some of the academic media researchers who followed Bogart, Bogart’s criticisms were not the 1980s criticism of “positivism” that characterised some British sociology debates leading notably to Catherine Marsh’s (1982) defence of the survey as a social research tool. Neither was it a criticism of the general deployment of numbers. Anyone who has read Bogart’s study of the press and its public (1989) could not see Bogart in this light. His scepticism was not of a general kind related to the survey form and general deployment of numbers. It was a scepticism borne within numbers. Bogart’s criticism of the ratings was part of a broader critique. As we have observed this was not a critique of research in the service of advertising decisions but rather a critique that given that research “provides the basic rationale for advertising decisions” this research and the forms it took including but not limited to the ratings was “commonly used in disregard of its limitations, which deserve close scrutiny” (Bogart, 2000a, p. 122).

The disputes Bogart entered into become disputes over what is to count as applied social research and what it is to be an applied social researcher. We could see these as “protracted border conflict” over the scope of the field and the duties of researchers (Condren et al., 2006, p. 8) which Bogart ultimately lost. These disputes and arguments are best understood as “formed by the moral habitus of overlapping institutional environments” (Condren et al., 2006, p. 8). Bogart saw himself fundamentally as a social researcher working in the commercial field. He was not, as increasingly became the case, a specific researcher working in a component of marketing and survey research. In a way that is increasingly difficult for later research and researchers Bogart was eclectic—with this eclecticism being fundamental to and in the mainstream of a particular way of being in and of the world. Even at the time it might not have been the dominant mode. Arthur C. Nielsen and his Australian
counterpart Bill McNair were also public figures who wrote important books. But their public commentary was always related closely to their particular corporate ends of informing their clients, vanquishing their rivals, and pursuing their own particular methodological interests. While there is some breadth to their work indicating the extent to which they also operated in this sphere they were entrepreneurial businessmen with particular products to sell and using the knowledge-based attributes, techniques and the like to sell these. Bogart’s persona was not the dominant mode of the ratings intellectual even in his time. But he does usefully join the dots to complete a circle of a project which we might call modernising social research through the survey form and other instruments.

Bogart’s was a persona where it was the responsibility of those writing as well as reading to explore and incorporate all the evidence. Sometimes this came at the expense of rigorous and close argumentation. This suggested Bogart was a kind of complementary persona defined by his eclecticism and a necessary doctrinal diversity to his contemporaries. He joined up the dots whereas his colleagues—specific ratings intellectuals like Hugh M. Beville and Gale Metzger—were more ratings centric in their focus. Beville’s history of the ratings extends no further than the ratings instruments themselves with no larger story of connections to social research, there are no intimations of a Lazarsfeld or the ratings as part of the emergence of applied social research. It is against the background of Bogart we can understand the image of the singular and systematic ratings persona of a Metzger or Twyman.

The specific ratings intellectual

With the ratings becoming so central to the market research effort, and single ratings providers becoming the norm, a different type of ratings intellectual emerges and was required. No longer were there competing ratings instruments to stimulate reflection on different approaches. Rather there was increasingly a single figure that had to be assured was working correctly. For this system to work, however, intellectuals with particular methodological skills would be critical. These were not, however, the skills of the general methodologist rather they were the specific methodological skills applied to the ratings as a form of knowledge. These specific ratings intellectuals accepted the ratings as a pre-eminent research instrument and were intent on continuing this pre-eminence. Indeed the circumstances Bogart was criticising are capable of a different construction. The ratings intellectual is less of a public than a specific intellectual providing specialised expertise.

What we find in Bogart is something different and more than what comes later. His books on advertising strategy, for instance, look very different from the “blockbuster” textbook of today with their class exercises, further reading lists, story and text panels, colour charts, educational design and injunctions to be careful about conducting your own research in lieu of using proprietorial datasets. Such books present the reader with a “reading competence” in the available syndicated proprietorial datasets, including the ratings that an agency or media planner and buyer subscribes to. They treat the field as settled rather than
permanently unfinished business and they typically provide delimited and evident rules and procedures for going along, acting within and working through ratings and other syndicated data. By contrast Bogart’s work encapsulates an orientation towards the material and business of advertising strategy as part of the unfinished project of applied social research. Bogart’s explorations by contrast are a primer for a different time. It was about orienting the reader. It was about the exercise of techniques of criticism and judgement. It emphasised the need for judgement and scepticism—not so much a recipe book for utilitarian and agreed upon actions on available and routinised datasets as his contemporary college text book counterparts but a thoroughgoing appraisal of a field of inquiry and a call for more not less customised research and less not more syndicated research and which restores the close connection between the researcher and the researched and the users of research. Unlike its contemporary counterparts it was not telling people not to do their own customised research as the textbooks were wont to do. It did not leave the reader with the view as does much of the literature that it was better for all their faults to deal with what you know rather than embark upon the unknown and do your own research.

The general ratings intellectual provided an essential bridge between the black box of audience ratings and the public, between the methodology underpinning the ratings and the disciplines that use them. The loss of this persona is not only the loss of a “voice” but of a whole approach where audience ratings are continually contested. Napoli’s (2011, p. 171) answer is that audience ratings is going through a period of reinvention and evolution. At the same time Napoli concludes that “one cannot help wonder whether it might be possible to bridge the substantial disconnect between’ different academic audience researchers and their industry counterparts” (2011, p. 172).

The authors’ position is clear. The general ratings intellectual is essential to a critical understanding of audience ratings and to their development. They are not a mere “add on” to the history of audience ratings but a part of its methodological and structural development.
Table 1: Ratings intellectuals in the early audience ratings history

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>Archibald Crossley Cooperative Analysis of Broadcasting (CAB) owned by advertisers and ratings available to broadcasters in 1936</td>
<td></td>
<td>Robert Silvey head of BBC audience research 1936-1960. No audience ratings research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same day telephone recall measured national network programs, changing to telephone coincidental in 1940s</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>C.E. Hooper and Montgomery Clark, started with magazine publisher support and then independent radio ratings. Hooper bought out CAB after the war.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Telephone coincidental</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>Bill McNair Independent radio ratings Personal interview</td>
<td></td>
<td>1946 Reopening of BBC TV, TV questions added to 24 hour aided recall to measure radio audiences, ABC-TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George Anderson Independent radio ratings Diary</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Sydney Roslow The Pulse of New York Interviews—roster recall measured local radio stations, out of business 1978</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>BBC begins continuous TV measurement, 1955 Nielsen operating NTI using audimeters and audilog diaries, TAM report on panel of 100 homes using Tammeters and Tamlogs, Pulse, using aided recall</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1957 TV Audience Advisory Committee (TARAC) created</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1957 National Readership survey began reporting ITV viewing data</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1958-59 experiments with Instantaneous</td>
<td></td>
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14
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>London Viewing Surveys 1 and 2 (Pulse)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Nielsen Television Index ceased, TAM jointly owned by Nielsen-Attwood companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Investigation into TAM technique, Professor M.G. Kendal for TARAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Joint Industry Committee for Television Advertising Research (JICTAR) formed, owned by Independent Television Companies Association (ITCA), the Incorporated Society of British Advertisers (ISBA) and Institute of Practitioners in Advertising (IPA). 1964 TAM awarded JICTAR contract for further 3 years. 1968 JICTAR transfers contract to Audits of Great Britain (AGB). JICTAR replaced TARAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>JICTAR seven day aided recall studies used 1/4 hour records to produce data on more demographic groups than meter diary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Television in a Family Setting study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>A Study of Housewives who are Light ITV viewers by TAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>An investigation in Audience Measurement Techniques, ASKE Research for JICTAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>October 1966 Tony Twyman appointed technical adviser to JICTAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Gale Metzger and Gerald Glasser, Statistical Research Inc (SRI) create RADAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Telephone recall for network radio listening and meter for SMART for wireless recording of program viewing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Balnaves, O’Regan and Goldsmith (2011)
References


Acknowledgement: Research for this paper was made possible by funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC) project The Emergence, Development and Transformation of Media Ratings Conventions and Methodologies, 1930–2008.