To Believe in the World Again:
Thought Becoming Imperceptible

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To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any other university.

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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i

ABSTRACT ii

ABBREVIATIONS iii

INTRODUCTION 1

PART 1: THOUGHT CONSTRAINED

Problem 1: Disciplined thought—the problem of the dogmatic image 35
Problem 2: Control—thought, information, the digital 73

PART 2: ENTERING A THOUGHT THAT MOVES—

SOME LINES OF FLIGHT 111

Line of flight 1: Affects, concepts, micropolitics 114
Line of flight 2: Thinking through art 145
Line of flight 3: Thought in an aesthetic paradigm 181

LATE THOUGHTS: In lieu of a conclusion 219

ENDNOTES 226

WORKS CITED 232
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Above all I thank my family, to whom my gratitude is beyond words: Eve and Coen, who are my inspiration, and Matt, who makes everything possible.
This thesis draws upon the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to, firstly, diagnose some of the restrictions contemporary life places upon a Deleuzian “thought without an image,” and secondly, to offer some means through which we might enter this more creative, life enhancing thought. As such, the thesis comprises a project of Nietzschean ethics, to the extent that it mounts a critique of today’s dominant thought forms, but exercises this critique as a preparatory move before turning to thought as a more active and affirmative force of/for life. The thesis argues that the dominant images of thought operating in our current milieu are of two primary modes: representation and information. Limitative representational thought structures, such as identity, resemblance and opposition, have, according to Deleuze and Guattari, defined what it means to think since classical times, prevailing through philosophy’s Platonic, Cartesian and Kantian phases, and into the present day. Proceeding by way of a series of actual examples, the thesis examines the contemporary functioning of this image of thought, focusing on such representational axes as individualism, science, gender/sexuality and race. In addition to this classical mode, though, the thesis also problematises our current informational milieu, proposing that it is, in fact, engendering a supplementary image of thought, one that also regulates what thought can do. This image includes the mediatisation of thought, its channelling through networks of control, and its confinement by the requirements of the digital. Cutting across both the representational and informational images, however, is the potent axiomatic of capital, which further and perhaps most powerfully delimits how thought today can function.

In resistance to these restrictions, the thesis proposes a thought without an image, whereby thought is nothing less than creation: the bringing into the world of the radically new, of difference-in-itself. This thought is materially embedded, traverses such spheres as philosophy, nonphilosophy, politics, micropolitics and aesthetics, and is interlinked with Bergsonian duration, Spinozian affects, and, above all, with the Deleuze-Guattarian virtual—the full reality of all that can be. Again by way of a range of actual examples relevant during the writing of this thesis, its second part maps this more potentialising thought along three lines of flight: though “ordinary” affects and the concepts and events to which they relate, through the strange sensations that art makes perceptible, and through the creation of change that Guattari’s aesthetic approach to the “post-media” era enables. Through each of these realms the thesis conceives of life in machinic, ethological terms, expressing an ontology of becoming that bespeaks the interrelatedness of all aspects of the cosmos. In this approach, no one element is privileged (including the human), and thought is conceptualised as an intensive, connective force that produces and affirms unconstrained, unregulated difference.
### ABBREVIATIONS

Works by Gilles Deleuze

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<td>D</td>
<td>Dialogues II (co-authored with Claire Parnet)</td>
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Works by Félix Guattari

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Works by Deleuze and Guattari (D+G)

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INTRODUCTION

[There is an] immense crisis sweeping the planet—chronic unemployment, ecological devastation, deregularisation of modes of valorisation, uniquely based on profit ... .
Guattari, Chaosmosis 132

It is not a question of worrying or of hoping for the best, but of finding new weapons.
Deleuze, "Postscript on Control Societies" 178

Project of/for Deleuze-Guattarian thought

This is a project of and for a Deleuze-Guattarian image of thought, or thought without an image, in response to what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari see as the serious limitations placed upon contemporary life by dominant ways of thinking under advanced capitalism. Working at the end of the 20th century, these philosophers/activists take a utopian approach to philosophy, in the sense that, for them, the word utopia denotes the "conjunction of philosophy ... with the present milieu" (WP 100). Thought and life, therefore, are indivisible, which means that anywhere that thought is restrained, so too is life. The keystone of Deleuze's philosophy (which Guattari also endorses) is that "[l]ife is difference, the power to think differently, to become different and to create differences" (Colebrook, Gilles 13). Hence, when the power to think is confined by a particular image of thought, as well as by a capital-oriented, market-constituted world, the diversity that is life's ethical potential is severely curtailed. At the same time, however, because "thought is creation" itself (D+G, WP 54), a real commitment to thinking otherwise—thinking in ways that resist dominant paradigms—can lead to new, more life-enhancing ways of living. This project comprises an attempt to, firstly, apprehend some of the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari (hereafter D+G') see that thought is constituted and restricted in this current milieu, and, secondly, to propose some pathways by which conceiving of and engaging in thought differently can move us beyond these restrictions. As such, this is a broad-based, ethically oriented project, where ethics is understood from the post-structuralist viewpoint—as a sensitivity to openness and difference (Popke 298). To conceive of thought in this more ethically productive way is to subscribe to what Deleuze calls "thought without an image" (DR 132, 167). Deleuze, whose "noology" studies the historicity of images of thought, claims that each period of philosophy has produced a particular model for thought—which is to say a "system of coordinates, dynamics, orientations: what it means to think and to 'orient oneself in thought'" (ATP 376; N 148). The representational image of thought, for example—for a long time our most dominant image—is a "dogmatic, orthodox or moral" one, predicated upon the supposition that "thought has an affinity with the true; it formally possesses the true and materially wants the true" (Deleuze,
Thought without an image, on the other hand, beginning with “a radical critique” of dogmatism, effectively frees thought from all traditional “presuppositions” about how it must proceed (Deleuze, DR 132). For Deleuze (and Guattari), it is only when thought is released from any delimiting image that it can actually “begin to think” (DR 132). Since this project strives towards constructing some Deleuze-Guattarian ways in which we might “begin to think,” in response to contemporary constraints upon thought, the first part of this introduction concerns some initial aspects of what such “beginning to think” might mean. In other words, here we offer a broad theoretical introduction to the Deleuze-Guattarian concept of thought. From there, we make a general survey of some of the salient facets of life in the current milieu—as a forerunner to Part 1 of the thesis, wherein our dominant thought systems are examined and critiqued. The next part of the introduction continues with the theoretical outline of Deleuze-Guattarian thought, but now characterised as a mode of resistance. Then, the introduction deals with the matter of how the thesis is structured, as well as some issues pertaining to methodology. At that point it becomes appropriate to address three of the most well known critiques of Deleuze (and Guattari), and explain why, for our purposes, we are able to countermand them. Finally, we suggest some ways in which this project makes a significant contribution to research.

To think, for D+G, is a multifarious enterprise. In large part, what they mean by thought is philosophy, since that is the thought-discipline they practise in. In defining philosophy, D+G declare it as "the discipline that involves creating concepts" (WP 2). Strictly speaking, then, for D+G, philosophical thought always functions to create new concepts: not concepts that refer to pre-given essences or true forms (in this sense a concept would be merely "a container for cognitive content" [Penner 45]), but concepts that are singularly, processually created in response to "problems without which they would have no meaning" (D+G, WP 16). Briefly, the concept is the "act of thought" that "speaks the event" (WP 21), and by "event" D+G do not mean a specific happening, but rather the incorporeal intensivities that underlie (or overlay) every actual occurrence or thing. As Gregg Lambert explains, "concepts attempt to grasp the diversity that makes up the conditions of experience" (Non 3), with this diversity overflowing spatio-temporal manifestations. If we are doing philosophy, if we are striving towards new concepts, it is important to remember—as Deleuze points out when discussing Foucault’s "theorising"—this thinking is “never just a theoretical matter”; rather, it is "to do with vital problems ... To do with life itself" (N 105). It is also important to acknowledge that concepts do not make up some closed philosophical set, but are always open-ended entities—as Paul Patton makes clear: “[b]ecause concepts are always created in relation to particular problems, and because different problems themselves may be interrelated, any given concept will be located in a series of virtual relations to other concepts" (Deleuze 14). Therefore, thought as philosophy, as concept creation, is an open kind of thinking, wherein the problematics of life
constantly introduce new, self-seeding nodes, making concepts ever transforming. In accounting for the newnesses that are always available to feed thought (and life), Deleuze makes use of Henri Bergson’s concept of the virtual, which, simply put, refers to “the open creativity totality” or the “full reality” of all that can be (Deleuze, B iii; DR 211). Concepts are created from a virtual whole of thought, a potentiality that is “real without being actual, ideal without being abstract” (Deleuze, B 96). Particular concepts are “actualisations” of the virtual, differentiations that have to be created (not copied) from a multiplicity of lines of potential. In this sense, D+G’s notion of thought as philosophy is, as Dorothea Olkowski suggests, “not a model, not a program[me] or ideology, but unceasing creation,” wrought from the virtual multiplicity that is thought’s whole (“Beside” 291). As a project of for Deleuze-Guattarian thought, then, this thesis is concerned with taking on philosophy, which does not mean we have to be professional “Philosophers.” “Philosophers must come from anywhere,” Deleuze tells us; “not in the sense that philosophy would depend on the popular wisdom you can find pretty much anywhere,” but in the sense that our work strives to produce creative encounters, across a range of disciplines, which might move us towards new concepts (TRM 146).

As important as concept creation is, however, D+G take pains to point out that there is another wing or side to philosophy that is just as crucial: ”nonphilosophy.” Before the creation of concepts there is a prephilosophical “absolute ground”—a “plane of immanence”—from which concepts can arise: a ”moving desert that concepts come to populate” (D+G, WP 41). This ground comprises the nonphilosophical, which is, according to D+G, ”perhaps closer to the heart of philosophy than philosophy itself” (WP 41). Thus, “philosophy needs not only a philosophical understanding, through concepts, but a nonphilosophical understanding” as well, which is “why philosophy has an essential relation to nonphilosophers, and addresses them too” (Deleuze, N 139, 164). Therefore, as well as covering a more properly philosophical concept-creation, this project also operates on a nonphilosophical plane. What comprises this nonphilosophical plane are not concepts, but concepts’ ”two other dimensions”: percepts and affects (Deleuze, N 137). To state this differently, Deleuze-Guattarian thought ”strains toward three different poles: concepts, or new ways of thinking; percepts, or new ways of seeing and hearing; and affects, or new ways of feeling. They’re the philosophical trinity” (Deleuze, N 165). What these ”three inseparable forces” achieve, ultimately, is the running together of philosophy and art (Deleuze, N 137). Thinkers who do this, according to D+G, are ”half philosophers but also much more than philosophers,” since they ”decisively modify what thinking means” (WP 66-67). If our modified understanding of thought involves affects and percepts, it is important to remember that, for D+G, affects are not feelings in the usual sense; rather, they are ”becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives through them (thereby becoming someone else),” just as ”[p]ercepts aren’t perceptions, they’re packets of sensations and relations that live on independently of whoever experiences them” (N 137). We will
develop these notions of “affects” and “becoming” as we proceed, but, in this general overview, we first acknowledge a related keynote: the prepersonal character of Deleuze-Guattarian thought. In both its concept-based (philosophical) and percept/affect-inflected (nonphilosophical) nature, this thought is a non-humanistic one, or, as Deleuze puts it, a thought “oblivious to the wisdom and limits of the organism” (C1 51). A worthwhile starting point in considering its non-human nature is to understand Deleuze-Guattarian thought as contingency.

If thought is contingent and relational, “[i]t cannot be regarded as a fact that thinking is the natural exercise of a faculty,” or that, as “everybody knows,” we are always already thinking beings, even before any philosophical or conceptual arguments take place (Deleuze, DR 130, 132). For Deleuze, “thinking is not innate, but must be engendered in thought (DR 147). In other words, “the possibility of thinking can no longer be understood as something ... predestined for the cogito—... the mere possibility of thinking in no way guarantees the presence of a subject who is yet ‘capable’ of it” (Lambert, Non 6). Thought is not reflection or recognition, as representation would have it, but occurs as a radical contingency—as an involuntary, necessary response to gripping problems as they arise. To this extent, thought is always “in an immediate relation with the outside, with the forces of the outside,” rather than any practise of interiority (D+G, ATP 376-77). Deleuze further explains:

Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition. (DR 139)

Philosopher Maurizio Lazzarato makes a similar argument: “[t]hought is an activity that expresses itself in an assemblage of evental relations between the body, the incorporeal, the brain and the other (qua envelope of possibles)” (“Dialogism”). Deleuze-Guattarian thought, thus conceived, has nothing to do with truth, knowledge, common sense or logical process. Instead, it is what happens (the “event” of what happens) when we are confronted with “the unexpected, the indecipherable, a disruption or a dislocation” of our habitual thinking patterns (Clements 54), and are thrust into the “differentials of thought” (Deleuze DR 194, 199). And because this thought is “primarily trespass and violence, the enemy” (Deleuze, DR 139), it is always difficult—an event of disturbance, perplexity, intensity. While in representation’s dogmatic image “[w]e are led to believe that problems are given ready-made, and that they disappear in the responses or the solution” (DR 158), Deleuze-Guattarian thought, or thought without image, does not reach neat conclusions. Rather, as soon as it reaches some sort of solution “a new curve of the plane, which at first we do not see, starts it all off again, posing new problems, a new batch of problems, advancing by successive surges”
A thought that is radically contingent, involuntary and connected to the sensible is far removed from a cognition-based model of thinking. In other words, a Deleuze-Guattarian (non-)image of thought is derived from an “unabashedly ‘inhuman’ philosophical naturalism” since, for Deleuze, thought occurs in concert with forces moving through us. This means that thinking is “something that we undergo rather than simply something that we do” (Due 50). As Deleuze puts it, "far from being the properties or attributes of a thinking substance, the Ideas which derive from imperatives enter and leave only by that fracture in the I, which means that another always thinks in me, another who must also be thought" (DR 199-200).

The other that thinks in me is the problematical, the forces of the outside. Ideas, then—the "'differentials' of thought"—are not produced by "a Cogito which functions as ground or as a proposition for consciousness," but are related to "the fractured I of a dissolved Cogito" (DR 194). In Deleuze’s ontology the Cogito must be dissolved, since individuality occurs at a "sub-representative realm beneath the form of the 'I' and the matter of the 'Self'" (Metcalf). Here, there is no pre-formed, distinct, thinking self, but only a "pre-individual field of singularity" (Metcalf). Such a view connects with D+G’s logic of multiplicity, whereby the world is composed not of substantial entities, but of multiplicitous, pre-individual, intensive differences that affect one another, constantly actualising and de-actualising as changing assemblages. For D+G, this process also bespeaks Benedict Spinoza’s theory of affects, which describes how, as forces encounter one another, they affect the capacity of each to act and to become (ATP xvi). In a world of encounters, forces, prepersonal intensities and on-going affectivity, all life is a fluid and mobile process. We are not distinct thinking beings who "have" thought/s; rather, "the fractured I and the dissolved self are actualised as fragile, fluid, and temporary surface effects," arising from a deeper realm of pure differentiation (Metcalf), that includes thought.

Faces of contemporary capitalism

We propose to position Deleuze-Guattarian thought as a creative response to some of the central problems of our times, and as an escape route from the restrictive images of thought entangled therein. While the subject of Part i is these limiting thought forms, we offer here a generalised outline of our current milieu. From the many theoretical attempts to define the particular social, economic and political landscape we inhabit in this first part of the third millennium, several overlapping themes emerge. One possible starting point is the unavoidably “globalised” nature of the contemporary world. For David Harvey, the concept of globalisation encompasses “a process, ... a condition, ... [and] a specific kind of political
project” (Spaces 54). In a more telling comment, he describes globalisation as signalling “a profound geographical reorganisation of capitalism” (Spaces 57). The key word here, of course, is capitalism, since, as Lawrence Grossberg emphasises, “the very meaning of globali[s]ation” derives from the geographical expansion of economic markets (148). Indeed, because the cultural condition of capitalism is what emerges as the crucial background (and common ground) in many theorists’ critical appraisals of how the world works today, it is perhaps a more pertinent starting point for any broad sketch of contemporary life. There is any number of descriptors for contemporary capitalism—post-industrial finance capitalism (Spivak 179), technocapitalism (Kellner 289), informational capitalism (Castells, Information 18), hyperindustrial capitalism (Stiegler, "Disaffected"), to name but a few. In any event, as Manuel Castells points out, present-day capitalism “has undergone a process of profound restructuring” (Information 1). For Fredric Jameson, this restructuring is explainable in largely economic terms, as the giving way of capitalism’s “productive moment,” in favour of “the moment of finance capital” (251). Capital is, for the first time, “free floating”—“no longer [living its life] in the factories and the spaces of extraction and production, but on the floor of the stock market,” frenetically pursuing speculative capital—“the new kinds of profits available in financial transactions themselves” (Jameson 251). Other notable theorists move beyond the realm of pure economics: Douglas Kellner, for instance, argues that the change is underpinned by the conjoining of capital with “the increasingly important role of technology” (289). Kellner’s term for this development is “technocapitalism” (289), a phase “in which technical and scientific knowledge, computeri[s]ation and automation of labo[u]r, and information technology and multimedia” perform analogously “to the function of human labo[u]r power, mechani[s]ation of the labo[u]r process, and machines in an earlier period of capitalism” (289-90). Castells, for his part, also focuses on “the technological revolution” of our present time, but his emphasis is firmly upon “information technologies,” with his well-known contention being that the informational era has facilitated the development of a new kind of organisational logic: that of "the network enterprise" (Information 1, 17, 187). This logic is extrapolated both to the operating structures of corporations, which, in recent decades, have needed to become more flexible and efficient in order to remain competitive, and to the organisation of electronic information delivery systems themselves. Castells’ summation of the processual arrangement of the network enterprise is that “[i]nformation circulates through networks: networks between companies, networks within companies, personal networks, and computer networks. New information technologies are decisive in allowing such a flexible adaptive model to actually work” (Information 177). Because information networks effectively disqualify the restrictiveness of time and space, and make possible real time interactions, their contribution to information productivity and exchange is enormous.
Overall, the strengths of the information technology network are often regarded to be its ever-increasing expansiveness, its flexibility, and its utter pervasiveness. However, as many commentators observe, some of the very "strengths" of network-based culture are also its afflictions. Pervasiveness, for example, can be regarded as a power-driven invasiveness. To begin to explore this claim, it is useful to consider Nicholas Thoburn's suggestion that in contemporary capitalism, the late-Marxist concept of hegemony is no longer an appropriate model for understanding power arrangements. Capitalism has entered Marx's "real subsumption" phase, which prompts Thoburn to argue that "an expanded understanding of production" is more apposite to the way power works today (80). By "production," Thoburn means "production considered as the patterning—or mobili[s]ation, arrangement and distribution—of rich social, technical, economic and affective relations" (80). Thoburn draws this perspective from the recent Italian socialist tradition of thought—of which Mario Tronti was a forerunner—that extends Marx's real subsumption of life under capital by defining contemporary capitalism as a "proliferation of productive relations across the social" (Thoburn 80).

For Tronti, this is the moment of the "sociali[s]ation of capitalist production," when "capital itself ... becomes uncovered, at a certain level of its development, as social power." Michael Hardt describes this Italian theoretical insight as the recognition that "creative practices across the range of terrains ... are the labo[u]r that produces and reproduces society" ("Introduction" 6). When the whole of society is subject to the principle of "unleashed production" (Massumi, "Requiem" 56), the concept of hegemony—which is predicated upon an autonomous political base—is superseded. If capitalist production now means the production of the totality of life, politics can no longer be circumscribed within the sphere of the politico-economic; instead, the political, as well, is "subordinated to capitalist regimes of production" (Thoburn 82, 80).

In a social landscape that is, for the first time, defined by widely dispersed production, new forms of power will emerge. Several theorists have taken up this question of power under the conditions of unlimited social production—Lazzarato, Franco Berardi, Antonio Negri (and Michael Hardt) and Paolo Virno being some who have contributed from the Italian context. Many theorists in this vein have, in fact, built upon the work of Michel Foucault, especially as interpreted and extended by Deleuze. In order to grasp the workings of power in this productive/informational/technological/network-based society, then, we also turn to Foucault and Deleuze. For Foucault, in the historical epoch immediately prior to our current one, Western society was configured in "discipline"-based terms: in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, social order and command were serially effected by way of the "major sites of confinement" through which an individual must pass—the family, the school, the factory, the prison, and so on (Deleuze, N 177). The development of network culture, though, has brought a new paradigm of power: "control societies are taking over from
disciplinarian societies,” Deleuze tells us (N 178), which means that "power is no longer exerted primarily through disciplinary deployments, but through networks of control" (Hardt, "Withering" 23). To understand control, Brian Massumi suggests reading the concept cybernetically, but with 'systems' control of input, output, and the transformative operations effected in the autonomic machine ... applied to bodies (defined as broadly as possible, to include images) rather than to information" ("Requiem" 57). Instead of a methodical, institutional mechanism, then, as power is in a disciplinary society, power-as-control is of a free-floating kind. This is a power befitting a society comprised of "diffuse social production" (Thoburn 82). Paul Virilio adds another perspective through his claim that such technologically and informationally distributed control is fundamentally penetrative of individuals (Information 39). Hardt and Negri concur, describing control as "immanent to the social field [and] distributed throughout the brains and bodies of ... citizens" (Empire 23).

Through the myriads of overlapping networks to and within which we are connected, then, "the normalising apparatuses of disciplinarity that internally animate our common and daily practices" have become intensified and generalised (Hardt and Negri, Empire 23). Put another way, generalised control can be regarded as the "self-transmuting overlay of disciplinary techniques across social space"—procedures also known as "modulation" (Thorburn 83). So significant is the power dimension of network society that many thinkers, of whom Hardt and Negri were perhaps the first, have conceptualised the emergence of new forms of "empires."

For Hardt and Negri, contemporary "Empire" signifies a "new global form of sovereignty" (Empire xii). They describe Empire as a decentred ruling mechanism, incorporating "the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command" (Empire xii-xiii). Other theorists of empire point more to the economic dimensions of the electronic network: Rita Raley, for example, argues that the "Electronic Empire" or "eEmpire" is "the apparatus of our time," since it represents the "convergence of electronics and commerce"; and with "information as its chief commodity," it is the primary site of corporate capitalism today (120, 122).

Perhaps underlying these theories of empire, however, is a more critically significant approach to control society—Foucault's concept of "bio-power." This concept bespeaks the epochal transformation in sovereign power's focus: from the classical notion of the power to simply take life away or let it live, to the modern notion of the power to administer life—or the power "to invest life through and through" (Foucault, Will 138-39). In Foucault's theory, bio-power directly targets the body: "its disciplining, the optimisation of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, [and] its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls" (Will 139). The idea that a system of "regulatory controls" effectuates bio-political power (Foucault, Will 139) is all the more relevant today, in
the modulatory regime that is network/control culture: as John Marks observes, "[b]iopolitical processes as defined by Foucault have become part of the fabric of everyday reality in advanced capitalist economies" ("Biopolitics" 333). Indeed, Foucault’s remark that bio-power amounts to "the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery" of capitalism is highly relevant (Will 141), since capitalism today, as a social power, is concerned with the very production of life. Virno explains: "while money is the universal representation of the value of exchange—or rather the exchangeability itself of products—life, instead, takes the place of the productive potential, of the invisible dynamis" (84). In contemporary capitalist society, then, "[t]he living body becomes an object to be governed" because it harbours such diverse productive powers: "the potential for speaking, for thinking, for remembering, for acting, etc" (Virno 84). For contemporary philosopher Bernard Stiegler, bio-political control today is especially concerning, due to the pervasiveness of the disseminating structures of technological/informational capitalism. According to Stiegler, the world is now "hyperindustrial," controlled totally by the mediatised "hypermarket," which means that life is "completely reduced to consumption" ("Disaffected"). For Stiegler, this yields a "horizon of despair," since marketised information and media technologies effectively bring about cognitive and affective saturation of the individual; in turn, this leads to an alarming "generalised disaffection" of the population ("Disaffected"). On this view, contemporary biopolitical control may be even more penetrative than Foucault could estimate, due to the increasing conflation of life with media, technicity and capital.

Stiegler’s concern with the disaffection of the population brings us to a further important shift in the workings of power today—a shift that, for some theorists, supplements and extends the control methods of biopower. As Thoburn explains, "[t]his orientation toward production and control" also marks a movement in the nature of power to incorporate the processes of "communication and affect" (83). Massumi agrees: "[t]here seems to be a growing feeling within media, literary, and art theory that affect is central to an understanding of our information- and image-based late capitalist culture" (Parables 27). Accordingly, then, Stiegler’s disaffectedness is not brought about by a lack of affect in contemporary culture, but by what Massumi calls "a surfeit of it" (Parables 27). It must be again be acknowledged, though, that affect in this sense does not correspond directly to emotion or a personal feeling. Rather, this affect is a pre-personal, autonomous intensity (Massumi, Parables 27, 35), which is sensed/registered before any conscious/emotional processing of the experience. It operates solely at the bodily level.⁴ As Massumi explains, this meaning of affect is related to Spinoza’s notion (also taken up by D+G) that bodies affect one another: affect-in-itself is the transition in—that is, either enhancement or diminishment of—a body’s state, brought about by the impact of another body (and, again, body here is broadly meant) ("Navigating" 212). When affect is registered, there is "the passing awareness of being at a threshold," of passing from
one bodily state to another (Massumi, "Navigating" 217). In information society, bodies-as-images carry/communicate significant affective charges, compressing manifold intensities into small bytes of information, so that one need not “so much read the encoded information, as sense and embody the pattern or the pulsion” (Thoburn 84). Communication (the core process of information society) is, therefore, productive, to the extent that these images convey preconscious intensities that directly affect bodies. For Patricia Ticineto Clough, the workings of affect are intrinsically linked to control since control actually operates by way of “investment in and regulation of a market-driven circulation of affect and attention” (19). She further explains that “control aims at a never-ending modulation of moods, capacities, affects, and potentialities, assembled in … bodies of data and information (including the human body as data and information)” (19). The aim of control, then, is always to maintain productivity, and, increasingly, the means of disseminating control is by way of affective channels. Like Thoburn’s notion of post-hegemony, Massumi calls this a post-ideological form of power, since in a control society “[d]irect affect modulation takes the place of old-style ideology” ("Navigating" 233).

More recently, Massumi has extended this idea of affect manipulation through his theory of “pre-emptive” power—a concept that is linked to what he sees as a post-September 11 transformation in governance. Prior to 9/11, Massumi tells us, the dominant mode of government in the West was “neoliberalism,” a mode that promotes the freedom of “individuals to act according to their personal interest, as rationally indexed to the needs and opportunities of the market economy that sustains them” ("Future“ 1). Neoliberalism is connected to biopower in the sense that each is economically driven—operating through the premise that every aspect and action in an individual’s life has potential for capital. Accordingly, “whatever amplifies an individual’s productive powers eventually settles into a reinforcing systemic adjustment” of the market (Massumi, "Future“ 2). A significant correlate of such a neoliberal milieu is a climate of risk and fear: what if something happens to affect productivity? What if the market drops? When all of life is capital, these are life-threatening questions. (Virno makes the related argument that due to the breakdown of “substantial communities” in “post-Fordist” capitalist society, we are subject to both an experience of direct fear—of losing one’s job, for example—and to generalised anguish—or an “absolute insecurity” [34-35].) The approach of neoliberal governance, however, for Massumi, is to maintain this affect-based mood of fear through a strategy of minimal interference; because the market is “autonomously self-organising” and “self-regenerating,” individuals are encouraged to become more speculative, more productive, so as to enable the system to re-adjust (Massumi, "Future“ 3). This strategy aims also to maintain the population’s hope in the (always unpredictable) future (Cooper 128). The events of 9/11, however, forced a tipping point, upgrading the generalised, fluctuating mood of fear/hope into a crisis of panic—the object of
which was/is terrorism. The greatest threat to productivity now has the face of a terrorist, and thus generating a sense of security has become politically, which is to say economically, paramount. For Massumi and Melinda Cooper, then, neoliberal governance has become augmented by a kind of "neoliberalism": a political style that is more future-orientated and interventional. It works like this: if the government fosters a constant state of alarm over something that will happen (a "state of permanent warfare," as Cooper calls it [128]), it preemptively manipulates the future. And when the threat of terror is always present (maintained by codes of "alertness"), governance can manage our fear of a (now certain) future event, and can operate by providing security. As Massumi explains, security comes from the "governmental logic" of the "foregone conclusion," as well as from sudden, confident, preemptive, George Bush-style strikes of active "command power" ("Future" 6–7). The key point here is that such governance functions almost exclusively along affective channels, doing away with "logico-discursive" reasoning and empirical facts (Massumi, "Future" 6). A "sense" of security in an "atmosphere" of on-going fear is now what enables the market to continue to function. Massumi describes this issuance of power as the deployment of the "affective fact" ("Future" 7,10), which surely signifies the deepening of capital’s control over not only what/how we produce ourselves—for the market that is us—but over our very sensibility.

Thought as a weapon

In terms of ethics, this current technological/informational milieu brings forth serious concerns regarding the limitations placed upon life, as a purely creative force, by advanced capitalism. In a cultural climate permeated by biopolitical control, affect modulation and neoconservative governance, questions must be raised as to what potential there might be to access any of the creative, differentiating force of life outside the mechanisms of capital. As we have indicated, D+G nominate thought as a particular, privileged pathway for creativity: "thought is creation," they tell us (WP 54), and "[t]o think is to create—there is no other creation—but to create is first of all to engender ‘thinking’ in thought" (Deleuze, DR 147). The impact of our capitalist milieu upon the processes of thought is, therefore, a critical matter, and Part 1 seeks to sketch out some details of this detrimental effect. But there is more we can do than understand the impact on thought. In his seminal essay, "Postscript on Control Society," Deleuze calls for an active response to "the harshest confinement" instituted by contemporary “mechanisms of control”: "[i]t’s not a question of worrying or of hoping for the best," he tells us, “but of finding new weapons" (N 178). Accordingly, this project strives to find a "new weapon" of resistance in re-imagining how thought might work as a truly creative force today, outside its enclosure by representation, and as a function of information for/of the market. To do this would be to help remove creativity’s internal obstacles, so as to liberate the “truth” that is “the creation of the New” (Deleuze, C2 147). To turn to thought as a weapon of
resistance is also to invoke what D+G call "counterthought—a way to “take thought seriously”—so as to escape conformity with the State (ATP 376-77). Such an act of resistance also recognises Foucault’s suggestion that "there are always possibilities of changing the situation” since, in power relations, "resistance comes first, and resistance remains superior to the [other] forces of the process" of biopower (Foucault 386). If resistance did not come first power relations would not exist, since "it would simply be a matter of [blind] obedience" (Foucault, Foucault 386). Moreover, for Foucault, resistance is eminently creative, as this interview fragment reveals:

Q: [A]s you see it, resistance is not solely a negation but a creative process. To create and recreate, to transform the situation, to participate actively in the process, that is to resist.

MF: Yes, that is the way I would put it. To say no is the minimum form of resistance. But naturally, at times that is very important. You have to say no as a decisive form of resistance. (Foucault, Foucault 386)

In Lazzarato’s estimation, Foucault’s concept of resistance constitutes "the reversal of biopower into biopolitics," which amounts to transforming “the 'art of governance' into the [creative] production ... of new forms of life" ("From").

In Deleuze’s view, “whenever one creates, one resists” (ABC), and if thought is creativity itself, thinking is resistance par excellence. As John Rajchman interprets Deleuze, “thinking is always directed against powers that resist or block its ramifications and complications” (73). Rajchmann’s comment is helpful since it indicates the primacy of thought over the more normative notion of resistance. When we talk about thought as resistance we do not mean that it is secondary to constraining forces: rather, thought’s creativity is foremost, and, when forces of power seek to capture it, it resists as a function of its ongoing productivity (D+G, ATP 531n39). The very joy of thought lies in "lead[ing] life to the limit of what it can do" (Deleuze, NP 101), which also means "the creation of dissonance and divergence” (Colebrook, "Joy" 224) in relation to established norms. As Peter Hallward rightly notes, in contemporary life we are often “held down, in the first place, by what [we] take to be unalterable constraints of [our] actual organic form,” and then “we restrict thought to the mere supervision of those forms of mental behaviour (recognition, classification, consumption ...) which preserve our bio-cultural distinction” (58, 59). A resistant thought, on the other hand, proceeds by way of (pre-cognitive) encounter, thereby unearthing unforeseeable singularities and an uncapitalisable, self-differing difference. Such thought will be bio-political in Lazzarato's sense, inasmuch as it will reverse the relationship between power and resistance, since thought as this resistant force will always precede control. And in overcoming the self who thinks, we will become "everybody/everything": in other words, "become-imperceptible" (D+G, ATP 279)—which is to say no longer one "who masters the world[,] but one who feels the very joy of life in an
intuition that is no longer directed towards the realisation of some external end” (Colebrook, "Joy" 219)—such as capital.

To take a slightly different approach in establishing our weapon of resistance, we might address the question: why thought? In other words, as Claire Colebrook asks, "[w]hy think? What is the function, purpose or point of philosophy [with its counterpart nonphilosophy] in a world directed more and more towards efficiency, outcomes and effort?" ("Joy" 214). The simple answer, again, invokes D+G’s non-humanism, which, importantly, also incorporates their philosophy of desire. In short, this desire—unlike the psychoanalytic desire-as-lack attributed to a subject—is the positive, productive force of life: the force that "form[s] connections and enhance[s] the powers of bodies in their connection" (Ross 63). Put another way, this desire is "the creative energeia of life" (Spangenberg 97). If all of life is desire, which is to say multiplicity, difference and creative production, the kind of thought that moves beyond the self and the organism is related, then, to the enhancement of life. In Colebrook’s explanation, we think “not to arrive at who we are, not to realise our inmost powers, but because life is desire. Life is the potentiality for force and synthesis that pays no attention to the already formed” ("Joy" 216). Thought, in the non-representational, Deleuze-Guattarian sense, is a process of creation that can take us out of the illusion of transcendence—the illusion that to think is to practise an essential, human cognitive logic whose aim is to establish and conform to the laws and truths of life. Deleuze-Guattarian thought is, rather, a process that realises (all of) life’s pure potentiality. If thought can flow as a creative force without reference to restrictions external to itself, it can help life express more of its fullest potential. This kind of thought, therefore, bespeaks a capacity to go further than a humanistic perception of the world, in order to “intuit[...] the world as such, not from this point here and now for me, but as it would be for all time, for any subject whatever" (Colebrook, "Joy" 217).

Life is multiplicity, pure difference-in-becoming, and the thought that moves outside of all creatural constraints (such as, for example, the ubiquitous "Money, Gold or the Dollar" [Deleuze, F 76]), intuits (in Bergson’s sense) the potential of the virtual. Again, this thought is not merely an act of self-maximisation, but is, more significantly, an unleashing of all creativity—even to “create lives and worlds that are incommensurable” (Colebrook, "Joy" 224). And to think in this way is eminently joyful, since, as Deleuze states, "[i]ntuition is the joy of difference" (DI 33). The joy referred to here again invokes Spinoza, for whom joy is an affect or passion marked by the "passage to a greater perfection, or the increase of the power of acting" (Deleuze, SPP 50). Therefore, if thought multiplies the potentialities for life by intuiting difference, it will also enhance the powers to be, thus calling forth joy. Thinking, then, in D+G’s sense of a creative force, is an ethical act, to the extent that it increases the potentiality of life. We think “because we can, and if we can ... then we ought to. Why? For Deleuze [and Guattari], life in general proceeds by maximising its potential; philosophy [and
non-philosophy are directions by which a certain line of life (thinking) increases its power” (Colebrook, Gilles 14). Thought increases life’s potential by thinking/intuiting/affirming the power of difference. If thinking means “discovering, inventing new possibilities of life” (Deleuze, NP 101), it is an apt weapon of resistance to the constraining forces that face us today.

**Structure, methodology, will to power**

The body of this thesis consists of two parts. Part 1 comprises an exploration of some of the ways in which thought, as conceived by D+G, is restricted by the predominant power mechanisms of contemporary life. These mechanisms, inextricable from late capitalism, are deployed through informationalism, biopower and other techniques of control. At the same time as these control mechanisms are present, however, a particular “image” of thought—what D+G call the dogmatic or classical (representation)—continues to prevail. This image, as with any one image, also constrains thought’s creative power. Part 1 addresses each of these limiting aspects, through dividing them into two kinds of problems: firstly, the problem of the dogmatic image; and secondly, the problem of control. The strategy of problematising these issues is intentional: as we have said, Deleuze-Guattarian thought is never pregiven, but is always a response to the vital problems we encounter. More, though, as Deleuze says, “[t]he ‘problematic’ is a state of the world,” by which he means we will find no definitive solutions: because of “the reality of the virtual” (DR 281), the world is always-already a problematising, differentiating structure. We can think, or create Deleuzian “Ideas,” in response to problems, but these ideas/solutions will only be provisional, as life remains dynamic and, therefore, ever problematising. Such provisionality does not devalue thought’s efficacy, though, since it always retains its power to create and think the new. Returning to Part 1’s content, we begin in the first section (Problem 1) by outlining the tenets of representational thought, which include notions of the thinking subject and his/her ideas, the categories according to which thought is structured (identity, resemblance, opposition), and the practices of binary logic and hierarchisation. We see how, at the time of the Enlightenment, such ways of conceiving life are linked to the State, so that reason and rationality become officially authorised as thought’s supreme modes of functioning. Such modes of thinking are highlighted in the modernist project of science, which seeks to know and, therefore, master the material world, and Enlightenment reasoning also sets up dominant identities—white, male, heterosexual, for instance—relegating their “opposites” to states of negative otherness. In this section of the thesis, we consider the status of such thought today, beginning with the notion of individualism. We contend that even in postmodernity, and with the decentrings and distributions of networked, late capitalist culture, individualism (albeit in revised format) persists. Having established a contemporary version of the classical human subject, we follow
what Rosi Braidotti proposes are the three main dialectical axes of otherness—nature, gender and race (“Posthuman” 76)—in order to investigate how elements of representational thought continue to endure, firstly in the practice of science, and also in dominant conceptualisations of sexuality and national identity. In this process, we explore such present situations as stem cell research, gay marriage and immigration/asylum seeking. As a segue to Problem 2, we consider, from D+G’s perspective, the force of capital—in terms of representational thought becoming thought-for-the-market. In Problem 2, we further examine the workings of capital, but now as it underpins what may be called our milieu’s new, informational image of thought. In investigating this informational image, we focus on the networks of control through which information flows, highlighting the checkpoint systems that capitalise on our every movement. We also consider the impact of contemporary media upon thought, with television and advertising proving most deleterious from D+G’s viewpoint. New media, defined as those relating to digital computer technologies, have a more complex relationship to thought, but in this section we focus on the ways in which these media foreclose thinking through the limitations of their binary systems. The internet presents further problems, with search engines like Google and social media such as Facebook being undeniably tied to profit generation and/or identity promotion/management—practices that are entirely unrelated to any ethical engagement in thought. We finish this section with the capture of affect by capital, the media and contemporary governance, a serious concern when, for D+G, affect is the intensity and drive at the very heart of thought.

After Part 1 outlines the two kinds of problems creative thought is hindered by today, Part 2 maps some responses to these problems. For D+G, such responses have the potential to be “cutting edges of creation,” which they also call “lines of flight” (ATP 531n39). The concept of lines of flight refers to abstract lines “according to which multiplicities change in nature and connect with other multiplicities” (D+G, ATP, 9). Ronald Bogue offers further elucidation:

A line of flight is a line of escape from any fixed and stable order. It is a line between things, between clearly demarcated entities and identities, a zigzag, unpredictable course that disrupts the coordinates of an organised space. … [W]hat is essential is that the line of flight is a line of becoming-other, of metamorphosis and constant transformation. (Deleuze’s 130)

And so we designate our responses to the problems set out in Part 1 as “lines of flight,” or a “thought that moves,” both from problems to responses, and also between different kinds of responses. Specifically, we map three lines of flight: the first travelling between affects, concepts and micropolitics; the second, exploring the notion of thinking through art; and finally, investigating how thought can be conceived in Guattari’s aesthetic paradigm. Generally speaking, the first line of flight charts a thought that is a kind of philosophy/nonphilosophy, moving through such pathways as the “ordinary” affects of...
everyday life and how they can lead to concept creation; the micropolitical moment of the “half-second delay” between the registering of affect and consciousness; and Bergsonian duration and intuition as a mode of what Lauren Berlant calls “stopping to think” (“Thinking” 6). Here, we also examine the potential of a particular contemporary event (the global financial crisis) to give rise to new concepts of “revolution” and “democracy” (which, for D+G, are provisional concepts, as indexed by their preference for the terms “becoming-revolutionary” and “becoming-democracy”). The second line of flight moves in a different direction, taking a course through art as a form of thought (or another kind of nonphilosophy). For D+G, thought, being nonhuman, can also be carried through the nonhuman affects and percepts—sensations—that are proper to art: indeed, Deleuze writes that art’s sensations “mobili[s]e pure thought” (PS 98). Art also has a political vocation, “in the sense that it elaborates the possibilities of new, more, different sensations than those we know” (Grosz, Chaos 70), which D+G phrase as “confid[ing] to the ear of the future” (WP 79). Of course, by “thought as art” we do not mean art as representation, but art as a force that effects difference in the world. We investigate some of the ways in which thought works as art through examples from three genres: Australian aboriginal painting, contemporary dance, and digital/interactive art. The project’s final line of flight explores Guattari’s “aesthetic paradigm”—his extrapolation of the aesthetic techniques of artistic creation to the ethical reinvention of subjectivity. For Guattari, it is possible to reappropriate subjectivity (individual and/or group) from capitalist forces of capture, enabling a more creative self-production, and for this task the technologies of the “post-media” era can be particularly useful. In our exploration of what Guattari’s aesthetics of existence mean for thought, then, we pay particular attention to the functioning of electronic and communication technologies, such as the internet. We explore a range of real situations to gauge how such technologies can be utilised to implement aesthetic techniques of experimentation, in order to enact a more ethico-political, transversalising thought for the creation of life.

In each of these lines of flight, and also in Part 1’s study of our limiting images and practices of thought, we take a situated approach. This means that our thought process is guided by a series of actual, present-day occurrences: examples from life in the current world. True thought always occurs in relation to life’s events, D+G tell us—it is never a disconnected, theoretical practice. Therefore, in proceeding by way of real life examples, we ensure that our thought remains vital and connected. As Braidotti suggests, “[w]e need schemes of thought and figurations that enable us to account accurately for the complexities of our historicity” (“Of Poststructuralist” 26). The events of our time are neither simple, nor linear, but are, rather, “multi-layered and internally contradictory phenomena that combine elements of ultra-modernity with splinters of neo-archaism: high tech advances and neo-primitivism at the same time” (Braidotti, “Of Poststructuralist” 27). If we are to generate different, more life-
affirming ways of thinking, we must start with actual accounts of our own embodied and embedded subjectivities (Braidotti, “Of Poststructuralist” 27). The actual accounts or examples we explore derive from real happenings; they are not “selected,” therefore, but are encountered during the time of thesis construction, and are taken up for the opportunities they present to engage with the kind of thought we are striving for. But there is another valuable inflection to such a process of exemplification, as Massumi points out in his discussion of Giorgio Agamben’s notion of the “example” (Parables 17). For Agamben, the “example” is a logical category that is neither particular nor universal (Agamben, Coming 9-11), meaning that, in a thought-project such as this, the traps of transcendentalism can be avoided. Rather than being an essence or a form, the example is a “singularity,” which means it is a real and distinct case that, significantly, also holds, stands in for, or serves, all cases of a similar type (Agamben, Coming 10). Thus, the example can be regarded as both a self and a relation, which is to say it is "a belonging to itself that is simultaneously an extendibility to everything else with which it might be connected" (Massumi, Parables 18). A technique of exemplification, then, is necessarily one that works through connection and relation, and this, as Massumi notes, will also give rise to "terrible powers of deviation and digression" (Parables 18). One never knows where an example will lead, or what other cases it will connect with and extend to. The result, overall, “is a systematic openness: an open system” (Massumi, Parables 18), making this technique of exemplification well suited to a project of/for Deleuze-Guattarian thought.

And with this idea of systematic openness we arrive at the question of methodology. As a project of Deleuze-Guattarian thought, this thesis is also a praxis of their “thought without an image,” which already sets up a challenge to the traditional academic notion of method. The kind of thought D+G affirm is experimental and indeterminate, which is to say: creative. Necessarily broad ranging and open-ended, thought without an image follows a “rhizomatic” logic, with “rhizome” denoting a system of diversity connecting “states of things of different status” (D+G, ATP 7). Therefore, the links between ideas tend not to follow a conventional narrative arc, or a propositional order of hierarchical concepts. Rather, there is a logic of immanence, unfolding as a process of its own movement and encounters—making it impossible to map comprehensively in advance. As Deleuze says, “one cannot prejudge the outcome of research”—there is always uncertainty in this process (DR 143-44). It is normally the case, however, that research is regulated and controlled by institutions of discipline, so that creativity is delimited beforehand; Andrew Murphie explains: “[t]his is the attempt to standardise and recuperate research into a certain order before it occurs, even if in terms of a standard deviation or pre-fixed range of variations or possible modulations” (“Clone” 3). Overall, though, this attempt at order is doomed (Murphie, “Clone” 3), since, according to D+G, all life is process (AO 3-5): variation—even in acts of repetition—is the condition of the
world (Deleuze, DR xvi). Rather than follow a strict model for how this thesis should be written and structured, therefore, we are engaging in what can be called “research-creation.” In this process, we strive to “engage in the creation, exploration and use of techniques for the generation of newness, not the radically new as a break[,] but newness as emerging from modes of participation, contact, transduction and relation” (Thain 3). In other words, situatedness and relationality are key, since they demand “an attentive posture, an openness to what is already happening, an expanded perception of what we are already participating in” (Thain 2). From here, thought is set in motion, thought that can only produce the new since it is generated by singular circumstances—again, not knowable in advance. In this process of research-creation, as Alanna Thain points out, “[p]riority falls not onto one term or another … , but to the ‘creative inbetween’” (2). Hence, the project is constructed in a zone of indiscernibility—the “border between knowing and not-knowing”—which is, according to Deleuze, exactly where “one must settle in [in order] to have something to say” (ABC).

Working in such a way is to embrace unexpected digression and being prepared for failure or even “outbreaks of stupidity” (Massumi, Parables 18). Such risks are part of experimental activity; “[i]f you know where you will end up when you begin, nothing has happened in the meantime” (Massumi, Parables 18). And because of the ongoing processuality of life/thought, this work is not meant to be exhaustive, or a conclusive undertaking or statement. Rather, it is an assemblage, which Deleuze defines as “a multiplicity … made up of many heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them” (D 69). Furthermore, not only does an assemblage of writing set up internal connections, it connects with the outside (what is outside itself)—with other assemblages of all kinds—as D+G make clear: a written text “exists only through the outside and on the outside” (ATP 4). Such a work is, by nature, unfinished in itself. In evaluating a writing assemblage (such as a book, or a thesis), then, D+G take a pragmatic approach, not asking what it means, but asking “what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed … “ (ATP 4). The effectiveness of thought is determined by how well it connects to new contexts, so as to help see things other than as they currently are. In this way, we can “produce new means of acting on the present” (Patton, Deleuze 133), and contribute to bringing about the “new earth and people” that D+G call for in resistance to life’s repressions (WP 108).

Because we are following a thought that moves contingently in this work, the writing will not be partitioned into the conventional, discrete “chapters” of an academic thesis. Instead, the thinking is presented as segments with sub-headings, but even these boundaries are not absolute enclosures. Ideas are likely to spill beyond these confines through overlaps and in various moments of repetition (as may already be evident). For Deleuze, repetition is, in fact, productive, for by nature it does not repeat the same: because life is always in process it only
ever introduces the new. Repetition, for D+G, is determined by Friedrich Nietzsche’s “eternal return,” according to which what returns is only the be(com)ing of difference, and what repeats is always singular and utterly unique (Deleuze, DR 41, 1). Repetition is, thus, an affirmation of singularity and difference. Braidotti calls this “creative repetitions,” maintaining that “[r]evisiting the same idea or project of location from different angles is ... not merely a quantitative multiplication of options, but rather a qualitative leap of perspective” (“Elemental” 218). At the same time, there may be gaps between ideas presented in the project’s segments, but again, these are not necessarily unfruitful: thinking along the rhizome involves leaping across breaks and ruptures (Deleuze, D 26), and, as Deleuze, says, sometimes “it’s in these holes that movement takes place” (N 138). While we do not follow the convention of chapter divisions, we do, however, break the work into two parts. As we have said, Part 1 presents an interpretation of how thought is constrained in our contemporary milieu, and Part 2 follows several creative lines of light. Although both parts follow a logic of immanence, Part 1 is somewhat more exegetical in style, which, we submit, is in keeping with its representation-based subject matter. It would be a mistake, however, to construe this two-part arrangement as an Hegelian movement of contradiction, whereby thought evolves according to a process of negation; indeed, Deleuzian philosophy is highly critical of German idealist Georg Hegel’s negating dialectic, which only allows difference as a negative (and derivative) reaction to an originary term. Rather, this work is conceived according to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s “critique,” which means it is a project of “active ethics” (Olkowski, “Nietzsche’s” 122)—aiming, firstly, to examine the forces taking hold of thought today, and, secondly, to create new possibilities for thought and life. For Deleuze, Nietzsche’s great contribution to philosophy is his affirmative approach, as Bogue explains: “Nietzsche’s ultimate goal is to enunciate an affirmative and active thought, one that will counteract the negative and reactive thought that has dominated Western philosophy from its inception” (Deleuze and Guattari 18). Nietzsche’s affirmative thought is, for Deleuze, a completion of Immanuel Kant’s project of critique, which Deleuze sees as merely a “politics of compromise”:

In Kant, critique was not able to discover the truly active instance which would have been capable of carrying it through.

...

Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit, a conception which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves. (NP 89)

Nietzsche, on the other hand, through his notion of “will to power,” brought about “a reinvention of the critique which Kant betrayed at the same time as he conceived it” (Deleuze, NP 52). As a project of Nietzschean critique, therefore, we invoke this will to power, which, according to Nietzsche himself, is the “unexhausted procreative life-will” (Thus 98). In Nietzsche’s view—which informs D+G—“ours is a world of becoming, of constant flux and
change in which no entities preserve a stable identity," and, concomitantly, nature "is an interrelated multiplicity of forces," which are either active or reactive (Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari 20). The will to power is "a general orientation of becoming" (Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari 22), which can go in the direction of either affirmation (the "becoming active" of force) or negation (the "becoming reactive" of force) (Deleuze, NP 54). It is important to realise that the will to power is not an anthropocentric concept—it does not want power; rather, it determines and evaluates the forces at play in a phenomenon as either active or reactive, and the quality of power as either affirming or denying (Deleuze, NP 85). Thus, as a "source of meaning and value" (Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari 24), "the will to power is essentially creative and giving: it does not aspire, it does not seek, it does not desire, above all it does not desire power. It gives" (Deleuze, NP 85). It is through the will to power, therefore, that Part 1 of this project does not comprise a negativising kind of critique. Instead, it is creative in the sense that it is an active examination and evaluation of the forces at play in our milieu, even though it does diagnose the forces themselves as negativising and limiting for thought. The manner in which Part 2 is creative is in its working to "express new forces capable of giving thought another sense ... a thought that would affirm life ... thought [as] the affirmative power of life" (D+G, NP 101). Overall, then, we are undertaking a project of ethical critique in Deleuze-Nietzsche's terms: critique as the will to power that evaluates the negative, as part of a process of seeking to make thought active—which is also to discover and invent new possibilities of life (Deleuze, NP 101).

One final aspect of the project’s methodology requires explication. The reader will already have noted the use of the plural pronoun "we"; this strategy acknowledges D+G’s rejection of the individual "author-function" in favour of the concept of the writer as multiple (Deleuze, TRM 139; D 17). In the first words of A Thousand Plateaus, D+G tell us: "The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd" (3). Each writer is populated by others—other books, people, encounters—all of which expand the writer beyond her/him-self." "We are no longer ourselves," D+G write, "we have been aided inspired, multiplied," and, therefore, "[t]o attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the exteriority of relations" (ATP 3). Writing under the pronoun "we" recognises that the writer is not working alone, but is thinking with others—D+G certainly, but also the plethora of other thinkers and lines of thought that affect this project. It is to appreciate that, according to D+G, "[t]here isn’t a subject; there are only collective assemblages of enunciation" (K 18). Deleuze further explains:

Utterances do not have as their cause a subject which would act as a subject of enunciation ... . The utterance is a product of an assemblage—which is always collective, which brings into play within us and outside us populations, multiplicities, territories, becomings, affects, events. ... The author is a subject of enunciation but the
writer—who is not an author—is not. The writer invents assemblages starting from assemblages which have invented [her], [she] makes one multiplicity pass into another. (D 51-52)

In Deleuze’s view, working multiply in such a way is also to enact a micropolitics, since it relies upon negotiating relationality and submitting to variation (D 17). This stance of favouring difference is an act of resistance inasmuch as it destabilises the sovereignty of the author over the text, and that of the stable, individual subject over life as connectivity and change.

Critical others

In recognising that we are thinking with others it is important to also acknowledge that there are prominent theorists who have produced negativising critiques of D+G’s approach. In recent years, three such critiques have emerged—by Alain Badiou, Peter Hallward and Slavoj Žižek—and, as a means of validating our taking up of D+G’s work, the arguments of these notable theorists require some consideration here. Whilst the procedure of this thesis as a whole is not, by design, polemical (that would be antithetical to a Deleuze-Guattarian style), it is hoped that this (necessarily limited) account and rejection of these critiques will support our preference—and reinforce the case—for D+G’s project. We make these appraisals in the knowledge that some of concepts addressed here will pre-empt what follows in the thesis; we anticipate that any cursory treatments will be more thoroughly attended to as we proceed.

We begin with Badiou, whose work Deleuze: The Clamo[u]r of Being (hereafter Deleuze) has been comparatively well received and is now widely known. As a philosopher himself, Badiou addresses this work to Deleuze’s sole and more patently philosophical writings; indeed, he regards the collaboration with Guattari as something of a contamination of Deleuze’s philosophical integrity (Buchanan, Deleuze 136). As Éric Alliez puts it, Badiou’s image of Deleuze “can and indeed must lead us to dismiss the works co-authored with Félix Guattari, beginning with Anti-Oedipus” (“Anti”), the implication being that these works contribute to a “naïve” and erroneous image of Deleuze: that he is liberator of the multiple (Badiou 11). That Badiou does not focus on Deleuze’s work with Guattari at all—works that are crucial for this thesis—is perhaps one reason we could sidestep Badiou’s claims, especially when Ian Buchanan has shown how their first work together, Anti-Oedipus, has a “theoretical backbone” constructed by the earlier Deleuze, primarily in Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 136). Indeed, Deleuze himself acknowledges this very point in the preface to Difference and Repetition’s American edition: “Everything I have done since [Difference and Repetition] seems an extension of this book, even the books Guattari and I wrote together” (TRM 300). There is, therefore, a strong linkage—dismissed by Badiou—between the work with Guattari and Deleuze’s earlier solo writings. To the Badiouian charge that Guattari corrupted Deleuze as a philosopher, we could also refer to Deleuze’s statement that Guattari “was nearly more
philosophical than if he had been formally trained in philosophy, ... he incarnated philosophy in its creative state” (qtd. in Stivale, Gilles 6). However, as has been demonstrated by several astute scholars, Badiou’s claims against Deleuze can also be justifiably circumvented due to their being based on serious conceptual misreadings of Deleuze. Badiou attacks several aspects of Deleuze’s thought, but, above all, rejects the notion that he is a philosopher of difference, claiming instead that the “very core” of Deleuze’s philosophy is devoted to “a metaphysics of the One” (24, 17). In other words, for Badiou, Deleuze’s overall project “is most certainly not to liberate the multiple but to submit thinking to a renewed concept of the One” (11). Badiou’s general argument, succinctly stated, is that the “power proper to the One,” for Deleuze, is the virtual, and this, in Badiou’s view, amounts to a reliance on transcendence—a kind of Platonic “univocal sovereignty” (52, 46). This transcendental univocity subsumes all actual beings, in the sense that every “actual being univocally possesses its being as a function of its virtuality” (Badiou 43). On this reading, multiplicities, or actual differences, occur not so much as images of the One but as simulacra, as “multiple forms of being”—which further implies that “[t]he multiple acceptations of being must be understood as a multiple that is formal, while the One alone is real” (Badiou 24-5).

As noted, there have been numerous rebuttals to Badiou’s claims. Nathan Widder, for example, takes exception to the last Badiouian point outlined above, calling it “a joke to suggest that for Deleuze actual multiplicities are unreal”; he also makes known that “Deleuze’s words are never used to substantiate this claim” (“Rights” 438). Widder, moreover, points out that “it is certainly questionable whether the virtual can adequately be characterised as a realm of Oneness and not of disjoined multiplicity” (“Rights” 438). Widder argues that Badiou is “hard pressed” to uphold this claim “in the face of Deleuze’s explicit analyses of multiplicities that are constitutive (and not so much merely simulacral)” (“Rights” 438).

Significantly, we can also recall that Deleuze himself takes pains to state that “[t]here is neither one nor multiple,” and that “[m]ultiplicity remains completely indifferent to the traditional problems of the multiple and the one” (F 14), suggesting a dubiousness to Badiou’s easy “mapping of Deleuzian vocabulary onto the terrain of the One and the Many” (Widder, “Rights” 438). Michael Goddard also questions Badiou’s reading of Deleuzian univocity, proclaiming it “far from clear” that Badiou’s reading proves Deleuze “a thinker of the one rather than the multiple” (“Misrecognising”). Deleuze’s univocity is more aptly read as a “flat non-hierarchical conception of being” (Goddard, “Misrecognising”), or as an ontological immanence that comprises only multiplicity as such. Even Badouian scholar Sam Gillespie concedes that Badiou “overstates the point” regarding Deleuzian unity without considering its advantages: “[i]sn’t the case that this unity is present only because it presupposes the best possible multiplicities, the greatest lines of flight?” he asks. Goddard is more forthright in seeing Badiou’s reading as “a series of rhetorical flourishes designed to disconnect the thought
of the multiple and the event” and link it with the “Platonic One” (“Misrecognising”). Overall, Goddard rebukes Badiou’s “procedure” throughout the Deleuze book as comprising “a deliberate misrecognition of immanence and materiality, a warping of Deleuze’s dynamic and material concepts of immanence, the virtual and temporality into mere masks of the One and the ideal” (“Misrecognising”). Prominent Badiou translator and philosopher Alberto Toscano, while commending Badiou’s book for confronting “the most daunting aspects of Deleuze’s thought,” also points out that Badiou employs certain “tactics of reading and exposition” (“To” 229). Referring to Badiou’s condemnation of Deleuze-Guattarian concepts, Toscano feels Badiou is so “eager to undo the reign of the joyous schizo” that he “engages in a rather excessive swing in the opposite direction” (“To” 230). Toscano identifies such tactics as “quietly import[ing] Heideggerian [and other foreign] terms to characterise key moments in Deleuze’s work,” the “interjection of terms which cannot achieve the level of concepts,” and “the practice of forcing a concept out of its particular constellation”: such tactics amount to a “conjuring trick,” achieving a “Brechtian alienation-effect” and rendering Deleuze unrecognisable to those who thought they understood his work (“To” 230). Toscano’s protestation is that in aiming to present a “Neoplatonist Deleuze,” Badiou assumes, through his particular deployment of vocabulary and concepts, “what should be the result of his enquiry”: thus, instead of taking the more credible path of unravelling the Deleuzian system “from the inside,” Badiou “succumbs to the polemical temptation and ends up painting a poor and deflated portrait of Deleuzian ontology” (Toscano, “To” 231, 230). Many other theorists take particular conceptual pathways or make further notable points in defending Deleuze against Badiou; there is not, however, the scope here to fully detail all this evidence. Finally, though, we do call attention to one important, very recent book-length work, the first such text to attempt a thoroughgoing and close analysis of Badiou’s claims against Deleuze. In his Badiou’s Deleuze, Jon Roffe makes a step-by-step “assessment of Badiou’s assertions about Deleuze in light of specific moments in Deleuze’s work”; in other words, he carries out “a procedure of testing, in which Badiou’s claims about Deleuze are put into contact with the Deleuzean text” (Badiou’s 160, 6). Roffe is not concerned with the “correctness” of either Deleuze’s or Badiou’s philosophy, but, rather, to establish whether there is sufficient evidence in Deleuze’s writings to support Badiou’s each of Badiou’s claims—including those relating to “being, method, the virtual, time, truth, the event, subjectivity and thought” (Badiou’s 160). Roffe’s hard-won conclusion is that “[s]imply put, Badiou is wrong about many aspects of Deleuze’s work,” and that his reading is “marked throughout by error” (Badiou’s 160). With regard to Badiou’s key thesis that there is an “ultimate ontological unity” to Deleuze’s philosophy, Roffe’s numerous investigations produce a finding that concurs with Toscano’s: Rather than being the key element in Deleuze’s thought, it is rather the a priori assertion on Badiou’s part that he imposes on Deleuze’s work. The thesis of the One
is thus used by Badiou as a lens through which he examines Deleuze; it is not a claim of Deleuzean thought that he has uncovered. (Badiou's 160-61)

At this time Roffe's finding constitutes the most definitive statement on this matter, giving us cogent grounds upon which to disregard, for our purposes, Badiou’s opposition to Deleuze.

As to the question of why Badiou would launch his polemic, much has also been said. Peter Osborne calls it a work of "strategic brilliance," pointing to Badiou's judiciousness in releasing this work when he did (19, 20). In the landscape of Continental philosophy between 1968 and 1997, Badiou, in contrast to Deleuze, was very much a fringe figure. Throughout this time he did, however—as he tells us in Deleuze—enjoy a professional relationship of sorts with Deleuze (albeit a distant one), which culminated in an exchange of letters between the pair not long before Deleuze's death (2-6). As Badiou notes, the two shared a commitment to philosophy as such, at a time when “the end of philosophy” was a popular theoretical dictum (5). Indeed, as John Mullankey states, Deleuze and Badiou approach philosophy by way of a similar set of “core concepts and attitudes”—it is their methodologies in relation to these that “fundamentally differ” (1). (For instance, while Deleuze pursues a logic of sense and sensation, Badiou is committed to the rigour of Cartesian mathematics [Mullankey 3].) But to understand the strategic goals of his Badiou's Deleuze book, consider this timeline: from his position as a marginal philosopher, Badiou publishes his magnum opus, L'être et l'événement, in 1988, which proclaims the “return of philosophy” (Osborne 20); D+G publish their bestselling What Is Philosophy (in French) in 1991, also upholding the importance of philosophy, and including a small reference to Badiou's “interesting” though ultimately “transcendental” philosophy (151-52; this, nevertheless, can be read as some sanctioning of Badiou by a major philosophical figure); their private, professional correspondence in the early 1990s during which they “clarify” their discordant positions (Badiou 6); Deleuze's death in 1995; the publication of Badiou's broadside against Deleuze (in French) in 1997. Examining this timeline from the point of view of Badiou's professional development, we can observe: a little known philosopher gaining professional proximity to a preeminent one, drawing alongside him, and, upon the latter's death, “making-over his rival’s house” to use Osborne's words (20), or setting himself up as “the future of philosophy,” to use Goddard's (“Misrecognising”). Badiou’s strategy of building an image of the “paradoxical tandem” between himself and Deleuze in the Introduction to his book (4) positions him at the same level as his rival, an image that the rest of the book sustains and builds upon. Eleanor Kaufman also notes how Badiou “implicitly equat[es] his status as a master thinker to that of Deleuze” in the body of the book (Deleuze 87), especially in the passage when he avows that “none of us escape ... the equivocal role of disciples” (Badiou 96). In other words, master philosophers like “us”—Deleuze, Badiou himself—deal with similar problems. But when master philosopher Deleuze is shown—by Badiou's book—to be philosophically misguided, only master philosopher Badiou is still
standing. In effect, his critique works to make a space for himself as Deleuze’s successor. Such strategising, added to the serious conceptual distortions in Badiou’s portrayal, is surely ample substantiation for our rejection of Badiou’s Deleuze. What we have provided here is, of course, not a comprehensive appraisal of Badiou’s argument or of his own philosophy, nor is it to say that his critique is altogether without merit for Deleuzian scholars; these, however, are matters for a different thesis, one more explicitly focused on this philosophical standoff.

As the leading English language interpreter of Badiou (Protevi), it is perhaps not surprising that Peter Hallward, in Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, has been said to be “indebted to Badiou’s reading” of Deleuze (A. Smith 151). Like Badiou, Hallward also reduces Deleuze’s “multiple interests and vocabularies” to one “singular logic of Being” (Protevi), but for Hallward, the “main idea” underlying Deleuze’s entire oeuvre is that “being is creativity” (Hallward 1). While creativity is undoubtedly a central tenet for Deleuze (and for this thesis), Hallward portrays Deleuze’s creativity as, overall, a project of univocity, thereby making Deleuze—à la Badiou—into “an essentialist, neo-Platonist thinker of the One-All rather than a thinker of multiplicity” (Grimstad 46). Hallward’s reading of Deleuze’s creativity is, to this extent, carried out in terms of a critique, even a polemic. Other respondents to Hallward agree that once he establishes his argument, he proceeds by way of a very particular “transformation of Deleuze,” working “by means of selection and omission” (Shaviro, “Hallward”), and ignoring all the “minor threads that lend Deleuze’s work depth and nuance” (Gilson, “Peter” 429). From Hallward’s insistence that the logic of creation is “the primary if not exclusive focus of Deleuze’s work” (7), several related, objectionable conclusions ensue. Before considering these, though, we observe that Hallward translates the complexity of Deleuze’s ontology into a tripartite conceptual schema: being as creation / equals active creatings (or creative processes) / which beget passive creatures (or created objects)—whereby “creatings” correspond to the realm of the virtual, while “creatures” are actual forms of being (27). Much more will be said throughout this thesis about the relationship between D+G’s virtual and actual, but here we note Hallward’s interpretation: “[c]reation is precisely the immanent combination of both creature and creating, [but] only one of these terms is active” (28). The critical point in Hallward’s reading is that “all of the productive, differential or creative force in this dual configuration stems from the virtual creating alone, and not from the actual creature” (28). In other words, only the creating virtual “differs or produces”: any actual, “constituted or creatural identity is in reality only the simulation or semblance” of the virtual creating (Hallward 28). As Steven Shaviro notes, there is no denying that Deleuze does endeavour to grasp “the real conditions of emergence—the virtual that generates the actual,” but Hallward makes the actual altogether passive, and then adds an extra dimension to the virtual (“Hallward”). Hallward presents Deleuze’s virtual as “a spiritual quest to escape the actual altogether, to dissolve the phenomenal and ascend into an entirely immaterial, spiritual
realm of pure creativity” (Shaviro, “Hallward”). In Shaviro’s view, this depiction of the actual as inert and the virtual as a spiritual realm is “a fatal and crippling misunderstanding” (“Hallward”). Hallward attaches this spiritual element to Deleuze’s ontology by establishing a link between it and the beliefs of theophanic thinkers (including Meister Eckhart and Sufi philosopher Ibn al-‘Arabi), in whose account the virtual aligns with God: “every individual or thing is conceived as a manifestation or expression of God or a conceptual equivalent of God (pure creative potential)” (Hallward 4-5). According to this “theologi[pling] rhetoric” (Protevi), the aim of humans, as created things, is to use thought as a virtual creating to reject the material concerns of the world and to return to God as the “absolutely creative being” (Hallward 2). In a sense, Hallward’s mystical reading sees Deleuze’s actual as “fallen’ in relation to the virtual,” and characterises Deleuze as “a thinker of actual beings oriented towards their own dissolution in the virtual or One of creativity”(A. Smith 153). This understanding of Deleuze leads Hallward to the following conclusion:

Rather than a philosopher of nature, history or the world, rather than any sort of “fleshy materialist,” Deleuze is most appropriately read as a spiritual, redemptive or subtractive thinker, a thinker preoccupied with the mechanics of dis-embodiment and de-materialisation. Deleuze’s philosophy is oriented by lines of flight that lead out of the world; though not other-worldly, it is extra-worldly. (3)

The implications of this statement are significant and extremely tendentious. In Hallward’s view, because Deleuze’s being-as-creativity is oriented towards “a contemplative and immaterial abstraction,” there is no hope for Deleuze’s (and D+G’s) philosophy to contribute to any project of political change (7). Hallward’s final statement on Deleuze is that because he promotes contemplation in the virtual plane over what is happening in the actual world, “those of us who ... seek to change our world and to empower its inhabitants will need to look for our inspiration elsewhere” (164).

If Hallward’s assessment of Deleuze were to be taken as accurate, the aims of the present thesis would become null and void. If there were no viable weapons of resistance and no political relevance to be found in D+G’s work, we would have to turn our attention to other thinkers. This is not the case, as the thesis will make evident, and, to this extent, much of our project can be read as a refutation of Hallward’s stance. That Hallward’s position is mistaken is a point well made by many scholars, with his error resting fundamentally on one key issue. As Anthony Paul Smith summarises, we can disqualify Hallward’s critique of Deleuze on the basis of “his exegetical mistake concerning the virtual and the actual” (155). Hallward’s rendering of Deleuze’s virtual/actual is as an “essential dualism,” which he also hierarchises in terms of “the unqualified dependence of the actual upon the virtual” (82, 47). In separating the virtual from the actual and aligning Deleuzean thought with the “superior” realm of the virtual, the actual is made passive and impotent, and transcendentalism is invoked. But
Deleuze’s virtual and actual is not a hierarchised dualism; rather, it is structured by way of the interactivity of “reciprocal determination” (Deleuze, DR 209). James Williams provides a lucid discussion of this process in Deleuze’s thought, and, specifically, in relation to the virtual and the actual:

Deleuze insists on the interdependence of the two fields. The virtual is only fully reali[s]ed as proper through a process of actuali[s]ation. Or, in another formulation, the virtual is incomplete without this actuali[s]ation. In return, though, the actual is incomplete without its differentiation in the virtual. So both realms require a completion that depends on a process within the other. (“Deleuze” 92)

As Deleuze puts it, there is a “perpetual exchange between the virtual and the actual” (D 150). Sam McLean concludes that Deleuze’s virtual-actual is “irreducible to the restrictive apparatus Hallward imposes,” since there is a large amount of textual evidence to show that Deleuze articulates “a distinctive ontological fold amounting to an ‘intensive multiplicity’ of diagrammatic connections between the virtual and actual.” Indeed, Deleuze makes clear by way of the concept of immanence that his understanding does not divide the two into distinct, ordered parts: “[t]he plane of immanence includes both the virtual and its actuali[s]ation simultaneously, without there being any assignable limit between the two” (D 149). Moreover, there is a “tight circuit” between the two, which “we are continually tracing from one to the other” (Deleuze, D 150), in both directions (D+G, WP 155-56). The question of how Hallward came to misread Deleuze’s notion of immanence and arrive at this “ultimately unsustainable Deleuze rend[er]ing” has been addressed by Gregory Seigworth (“Little”). Seigworth explains that “immanence inheres in the persistent resonances and refrains of the affectual,” whereas Hallward pays little attention to the role of affect (“Little”). For Seigworth, this is not very surprising, “given Hallward’s intellectual alignment with … Badiou (for whom Spinoza is decidedly more geometrical, whereas Deleuze’s Spinoza is intensely passiona[152]l)” (Seigworth, “Little”). Passage between the virtual and actual occurs by way of affect, as Seigworth clarifies, and as this thesis will elaborate. In refusing to “account for affect in any thoroughgoing way … Hallward cannot hold together—but rather chooses to split in half—the way that the virtual and the actual … reciprocally determine one another” (Siegworth, “Little”). There are other untenable elements to Hallward’s analysis, such as his dismissal of any conjunction between Deleuze’s aesthetics and political thought/action—which, again, this thesis will inveigh against. Further, as Shaviro argues, in polemically denying that Deleuze has any interest in “complex processes of material emergence” or political forms (Hallward 176n10), Hallward “utterly ignores the ways that Deleuze [both without and without Guattari] expressly uses his concepts of transformation to understand the inner functioning of ‘late’ (or post-Fordist) capitalism” (Shaviro, “Hallward”), and Paul Patton provides clear elaboration of how Deleuze’s work with Guattari has “an inherently political vocation” (“Deleuze’s” 216). Goddard adjudges Hallward’s book on Deleuze as, overall, rhetoric, “and rhetoric designed specifically to
reinforce the ascendancy of Badiou and by association Hallward himself in the field of contemporary political thought” (“Misrecognising”). On the basis of this evidence, as well as that which will unfold during the course of this thesis, we reject Hallward’s critique of Deleuze.

Slavoj Žižek, the third of Deleuze’s critics to be dealt with here, is also aligned with Badiou: he admits to relying “extensively” on Badiou’s reading of Deleuze for his own Deleuze book, *Organs Without Bodies* (2011), and the two (along with Hallward) are at the forefront of the New Communism movement, which we will return to shortly. Žižek’s Deleuze book has been characterised as an odd text: Robert Sinnerbrink regards it as a “strange Hegelio-Lacanian encounter with Deleuze” (62), while Widder sees it as “a very strange book that is purportedly concerned with Deleuze’s thought yet devotes at best 20 per cent of its pages to it” (“From” 207). Kaufman notes that “what counts as Deleuze” in Žižek’s book is “all over the map, at times hardly resembling Deleuze at all” (Deleuze 88), and Hanjo Berressem points to the plethora of digression and irrelevancies. At the outset Žižek announces that the “starting premise” of his book is that “beneath … the popular image of Deleuze based on the reading of the books he co-authored with Félix Guattari, there is another Deleuze, much closer to psychoanalysis and Hegel” (xi); in other words, “Deleuze equals Hegel” and, relatedly, Deleuze is “deeply Lacanian” (Žižek 48, 49). That Deleuze would equate to Hegel is totally antithetical to Deleuze’s own stated position: “[w]hat I most detested was Hegelianism and dialectics” (N 6). Nevertheless, Žižek proceeds to read Deleuze through a Hegelio-Lacanian lens, which leads him to renounce the joint Deleuze-Guattari books (Guattari was a “bad influence,” *Anti-Oedipus* was “arguably Deleuze’s worst book” [Žižek 20-21]). Before turning to and ultimately rejecting Žižek’s argument, it is worth considering why he might be so invested in drawing Deleuze and Hegel into the same philosophical camp; Berressem has the following suggestion:

Anybody who has ever read one of Žižek’s books knows that the two basic attractors around which his thought revolves are Lacan and Hegel. As the philosophical supplement to Lacanian psychoanalysis, Hegel is probably even more important to Žižek than he is to Lacan. ... For somebody so invested in Hegel, Deleuze, in his acknowledged and often repeated dislike of Hegel, must present a formidable irritation. He is the philosophical itch Žižek would love to scratch. In Berressem’s view, however, the true test of Žižek’s success in this book lies in the extent to which he can “see/imagine the true measure of the Deleuzian project.” In fact, he does not: as mentioned, Žižek dismisses entirely the works with Guattari, and considers only a small portion of Deleuze’s writings as “Deleuze proper (Žižek 20). But it is almost exclusively *The Logic of Sense* that Žižek refers to in this text—not surprising, since he considers this Deleuze’s specifically Lacanian book (27, 82). Accordingly, as Berressem points out, Žižek fails to engage “directly and in detail with Deleuze’s texts, their contexts, their internal logics or with the
complex resonances between his various texts” (Berressem), and, indeed, often relies on other authors’ readings of Deleuze. Such lack of confrontation with the full gamut of Deleuze’s work makes Žižek’s study narrowly referenced, and already throws into doubt his sweeping conclusions.

These conclusions relate to Žižek’s issues with (again) Deleuze’s virtual/actual, which, as they emerge in The Logic of Sense, Žižek regards as being “fundamentally incompatible” (21). To summarise, Žižek sees Deleuze’s entire “conceptual edifice” as relying on two oppositional logics: “[e]ither the infinite field of virtuality is an immaterial effect of the interacting bodies[,] or the bodies themselves emerge, actualise themselves, from this field of virtuality” (Žižek 22).

For Žižek, this opposition amounts to “dialectical materialism” versus “mechanical materialism” (88-89), or the “good” Deleuze of The Logic of Sense versus the “Guattarized” Deleuze of Anti-Oedipus (21), and, because of its Hegelio-Lacanian resonances, Žižek advocates the former. Žižek explains how he sees the relevance of Lacan: “the basic premise of Deleuze’s ontology [in The Logic of Sense] is precisely that corporeal causality is not complete. In the emergence of the New something occurs that cannot be properly described at the level of corporeal causes and effects” (27). Thus there is a gap in the emergence of the new, and this gap suggests a “positive notion of lack, a ‘generative’ absence” (Žižek 35). Leaving no question that this is a Lacanian lack, Žižek equates Lacan’s objet petit a with Deleuze’s “quasi-cause” (27): for Deleuze the quasi-cause is the incorporeal instigator of that which exceeds the material (LS 94), which is to say the gap, and for Lacan the objet petit a is the “lack of the real” that drives desire (Grosz, Jacques 75). (Later, Žižek also nominates Deleuze’s quasi-cause as the “Lacanian phallic signifier” [83].) But for Žižek, Deleuze abandons this logic after The Logic of Sense, turning toward Guattari “because Guattari represented ... an easy escape from the deadlock” (21). As Daniel Smith explains, “[t]he easy escape was the abandoning of a good Lacanian ontology (event as effect), for a bad Guattarian ontology (event as production and becoming), with the implication being that “[i]f Deleuze had stuck with the insights of The Logic of Sense, he would have been able to enter into a becoming-Žižek, and not wandered off into the desert of Guattari” (“Inverse” 638, 639). In doing this, Žižek believes, Deleuze “bypasses engagement with the central paradoxes that lead post-Hegelianism and psychoanalytic theories towards a true materialism ... in which meaning and sense emerge from a foundational lack (Widder, “From” 208).

As Nathan Widder points out, however, there is a much more “subtle and complex relationship between Deleuze and Lacan” than Žižek accounts for (“From” 209). In Widder’s view, Žižek’s ascribing to Deleuze a series of “sharp divisions,” such as The Logic of Sense versus Anti-Oedipus, and emphatic positions such as Anti-Oedipus being a “wholesale rejection of psychoanalysis,” are both “self-serving and simply erroneous” (“On” 209-10). In fact, as
Daniel Smith elucidates, Anti-Oedipus comprises “a reading of Lacan” (“Inverse” 639). Putting it another way, Anti-Oedipus is actually “an attempt to take Lacan’s profound thought to its differential and immanent conclusion,” and to this extent, “Deleuze can be seen as one of Lacan’s most profound, but also most independent, disciples, inventing a whole new set of concepts to describe the inverse side of the symbolic structure” (D. Smith, “Inverse” 647). Indeed, in discussing Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze acknowledges his and Guattari’s indebtedness to Lacan (N 13-14), and Lacan himself appreciated their efforts—telling Deleuze, after its publication, “What I need is someone like you” (qtd. in D. Smith, “Inverse” 635-36). Žižek, therefore, in dismissing Anti-Oedipus, completely fails to represent the relationship between these two thinkers. Moreover, in praising the psychoanalytic elements of The Logic of Sense, and equating various Deleuzian concepts with supposedly Lacanian equivalents, Žižek again carries out a misreading: “the psychoanalytical account of the genesis of sense in The Logic of Sense, worked out over some 50 pages and eight series of the book, is carried out through a reading of Melanie Klein, not Lacan”—a matter Žižek seems not to notice (Widder, “From” 210), since he does not mention Melanie Klein at all. It is, perhaps, not difficult to understand why Žižek would commit this oversight: “acknowledgement of Deleuze’s use of Klein, who treats both the castration and the Oedipus complex as secondary, would completely undermine Žižek’s thesis” (Widder, “Conference”).

Žižek’s misunderstanding of the psychoanalytic in both The Logic of Sense and Anti-Oedipus is but one shortcoming of his book on Deleuze. As has already been noted, Žižek’s notion that Guattari corrupted Deleuze with a whole new line of thought in the latter book is also misguided; there is, in fact, “a real continuity between the so-called good and bad Deleuze and not the split that … Žižek [and Badiou] contend” (Buchanan, Deleuze 136). Widder concurs, stating, “Deleuze’s early psychoanalytical writings … show him already to be on a decidedly anti-Oedipal path” (“From” 211). Buchanan also takes issue with Žižek’s representation of D+G’s concept of the unconscious as “primitive,” or pre-social: Buchanan shows this claim to be “patently false”—it can be rejected “simply by remembering that Deleuze and Guattari’s most fundamental point in Anti-Oedipus is that unconscious desire is part of the very infrastructure of society and vice versa” (Deleuze 150n9). Other Žižekian claims have been repudiated; for example, Widder provides textual evidence to demonstrate that it is “simply a joke … to equate the virtual with pure becoming and the actual with stable and reified being, as Žižek consistently does … or to proclaim that virtualisation and actualisation are two sides of the same coin” (“From” 227n4). Berressem also points out that to structurally separate these two realms “is hardly tenable,” since there is a relationship of “topological inclusion” between the two. Lambert sees Žižek’s entire reading of Deleuze as reductive, to the extent that it “telescopes the virtual,” reducing it to the position of psychoanalytic fantasy; at the same time, though, Žižek’s reading of fantasy is structured by contradiction (Who’s 89).
Shaviro claims a further weakness in this book to be the fact that Žižek overestimates “cognition, understanding, and comprehension as mental activities,” and (like Badiou and Hallward) ignores the role of affect; in this he “follows Lacan and Hegel in considering such questions to be epiphenomenal at best” (“Žižek”). In fact, this overestimation of human consciousness is a salient point upon which Žižek’s reading of Deleuze comes undone. In a key passage, Žižek links Deleuze to Hegel by way of the concept of immanence. “If there ever was a philosopher of unconditional immanence, it is Hegel” he writes, implying an overlap between the two philosophers due to each upholding the same concept (53). However, Žižek betrays his misunderstanding of Deleuze’s immanence when he outlines Hegel’s: Hegel’s is “the immanence of our thought,” or “the immanent movement of our thought-experience” (53)—a wholly conscious process. As we have seen already, Deleuze’s immanence is certainly not confined to consciousness: for Deleuze, Hegel’s immanence would amount to “a plane of transcendence within a much more inclusive ‘plane of immanence,’” since consciousness cannot be separated from the much broader whole of life of which it is but one part (Berressem). In Berressem’s estimation, Žižek’s keenness to subsume Deleuze into Hegel, leading to such crucial misreadings, means that his book is ultimately a failure.

As Goddard sees it, Žižek’s whole misreading of Deleuze’s virtual is not so much a mistake, but a “deliberate refusal” for strategic reasons (“Misrecognising”). And it is for these same reasons that Žižek identifies the post-Logic of Sense Deleuze as “an ideologist of today’s ‘digital capitalism,’” whose politics are necessarily impotent (Žižek xii). (Žižek’s point here is that the decentred, impersonal logic of digital capitalism is ideologically supported by Deleuze’s theory of life as “erratic affective productivity” [185].) These strategic reasons, as Goddard explains, concern reinforcing the power of his own leftist agenda “as the key voice in contemporary political theory” (“Misrecognising”). Goddard points to the fact that the thought of D+G has become a “key resource” for emergent forms of politics and subjectivity in new left movements, and, in discrediting Deleuze’s potential to facilitate political change, Žižek is working to clear a space for his own political imperatives (“Misrecognising”). However, as Sinnerbrink notes, Žižek’s critique of D+G’s politics (that is, Deleuze’s political stance post-The Logic of Sense) overstates the “ideological complicity” between our present “neo-liberalist geopolitical context” and Deleuzian ontology (81). While there may be elements of D+G’s philosophy that could be strategically mapped onto this context, many of their concepts are fully enabling of “contesting, undermining and transforming” this context (Sinnerbrink 81).

Overall, Sinnerbrink makes a powerful point:

[T]he theoretical anxiety behind Žižek’s critique ... is that Deleuze and Guattari may well be doing what Žižek identifies as the crucial task at hand: attempting to think the New in order to create possibilities of creative resistance and social transformation that shift the coordinates of the prevailing frameworks of theory and practice. Rather
than construing Deleuze as a dialectically superseded precursor, or as an unwitting apologist for postmodern capitalism, Žižek’s own critical project could benefit from recognising that Deleuzo-Guattarian micropolitics is a response to precisely those deadlocks concerning ontology and politics that Žižek himself identifies. (85)

Unfortunately, Žižek’s project has not taken this road, and in recent times, has become more conjoined with Badiou (and Hallward) in a movement termed “new communism.” This movement, officially beginning with the Badiou/Žižek organised 2009 “Idea of Communism” conference, aims to champion the “communist hypothesis,” which is to say (as is stated on the back cover of Badiou’s book *The Communist Hypothesis*) the “eternal’ Idea of communism”—so as to effect a “radical rupture with capitalo-parliamentariansim.” For Badiou/Žižek, communism throughout history has been an “ongoing struggle for human emancipation” (A. Johnson), and it is now time to usher in the Idea’s “third era” (Badiou, *Communist 260*). As Žižek puts it, “You’ve had your anti-communist fun, and you are pardoned for it—time to get serious once again!” Getting serious means working “to bring the communist hypothesis into existence in a different modality” (Badiou, *Meaning* 115). What this modality will look like is yet vague, but the rhetoric suggests “fantasies of revolutionary agency” (Shaviro, “Communism” 154). Political theorist Alan Johnson regards it as a “new form of left wing totalitarianism,” which may, disturbingly, appear particularly attractive in the current global politico-economic context, given its extreme oppositional stance to liberal democracy. Johnson defines it as leftist totalitarianism due, in part, to its belief in imposing the revolutionary will against the majority, and its “refusal to face up to the criminal record of actually existing communism as a social system.” Goddard also notes its proponents’ tendency to purify communism from “its unfortunate association with Stalinist purges, Gulags and repressive regimes” (“Misrecognising”). Even more disturbingly, there is a commitment to “the transformational power of revolutionary violence” (A. Johnson), which, Johnson contends, borders on left-wing fascism. Indeed, Žižek sees no problem with the history of communist violence “per se,” proclaiming that “[f]rom a radical emancipatory perspective … violence is always legitimate” (although, he concedes, it may not be necessary) (“Jacobin”). One of the movement’s aims, then, is to “resignify[ ] terror, the ruthless exercise of power, the spirit of sacrifice” (Žižek, “Holding” 326), and, Žižek states, “if this radical choice is decried by some bleeding-heart liberals as Linksfaschismus [left-wing fascism], so be it!” (“Holding” 326). For Goddard, this return to “an authoritarian Maoism, Leninism, Stalinism or Jacobinism” is “highly regressive,” and expresses a “blatant [anthropocentric] will-to-power on the part of its proponents” (“Misrecognising”). Confronting the present world’s political, social and economic instabilities indeed presents opportunities for new approaches to thought, as this thesis contends. But rather than following the rallying cries of the new communists, we agree with Goddard that “a real critical engagement with the materialism and immanence of Deleuze and Guattari’s ... project, despite the distortions it has suffered at the hands of both its
detractors and its defenders, might, in contrast, provide a more useful starting point for radical political practice” (“Misrecognising”).

Significance

Having dealt with the three foremost negativising critiques of D+G, and with the political orientation of their authors, we return to our thesis proper, to offer our understanding of where its significance, in terms of research, might lie. One of its springboards is Robert C. Thomas’ 1998 essay, “Whatever Intellectuals,” in which he poses several questions pertaining to the “relationship between ... thought and being in ‘post-disciplinary societies.’” These questions concern such issues as the nature of representational thought in a society of control, the curtailment of thought by contemporary state forms, how the affective potential of subjectivity is expropriated in the historical present, as well as the significance of D+G’s nonphilosophy for thought as a mode of resistance. Although Thomas’ essay is, by now, a decade and a half old, many of the issues raised therein are still highly relevant in this historical present, and, to our knowledge, have not yet been taken up by research in any sustained manner. Thomas’ own aim is more to problematise these issues than to offer any committed responses, although he does sketch out the figure of a “becoming-intellectual” (or “whatever-intellectual” in Agamben’s parlance)—a figure not prescribed by any particular mode of thought but characterised by “its capacity for thought as such.” For our purposes, this figure remains somewhat humanistic: it tends to ascribe thought to a human thinker, in the form of an intellectual way of being that exists outside of contemporary forms of regulation. Nevertheless, many of Thomas’ questions remain entirely apposite, and are productive of some of the lines of thought this project follows: these include the notion that thought is a potential Deleuze-Guattarian weapon of resistance in the face of control capitalism’s attempts to contain it, and also the idea that nonphilosophy—the plane of immanence that we explore, in Part 2, as both “ordinary affect” and art—is fertile ground for thought as creativity and invention. Further, Thomas’ question regarding the status of knowledge/thought as representation today, in an informational era, is a useful one, and we take up this question in Part 1, when we examine contemporary thought in its dimensions of representation and information. The side by side evaluation of these two aspects of thought as they operate today is distinctive: while (following Castells) there has been a plethora of research exploring the multifarious effects of network culture, and there has been some focus on the contemporary detriments of representational thought (for example, Alexandre Lefebvre’s critique of the dogmatic image’s hold over the domain of law), this project strives to be unique in its consideration of both alongside one another. It is hoped to draw attention to the fact that—while the implications for thought as informationalism are currently more widely discussed—dogmatic thought continues to present serious problems.
Another way in which this thesis aims to make a novel contribution to how thought might be remade in the present world is by bringing to bear some of the work Guattari produced without Deleuze. To be sure, there are numerous overlaps between their ideas, but Guattari’s singular contribution to social and political philosophy is often overshadowed by Deleuze’s ouvre and by their joint work. We foreground Deleuze’s work in many of the following segments, but, because Guattari was more attuned to the potential contribution of “post-mediatic” (or informational) developments to thought, and to the reclamation of subjectivity from capital, we engage his more exclusive ideas in Part 2’s final line of light. Specifically, we draw on his conception of an ethico-aesthetic paradigm to develop a possible Guattarian image of thought, one that might offer new ways of articulating such current events and undertakings as Wikileaks and open source practices. Guattari’s term “transversality” can also help illustrate what we submit is another unique aspect of this thesis: its cutting across a diverse range of disciplines, scales and dimensions. From philosophy to nonphilosophy to art, from scales of everyday life to dimensions of the political, from affects and sensations to concepts, we aim to mobilise a creative and self-engendering way of thinking, one that performs a Deleuze-Guattarian (non-)image of rhizomatic thought as it explores it. Through this transdisciplinarity, and through consulting a broad range of theorists, we mean to make diversity a core issue of the project. And because the project utilises actual examples from the life/time through which this thesis is written, it can only offer a singular contribution to thought, to the extent that this composite is utterly unique. By “singular contribution,” we mean to invoke Deleuze’s notion of singularity, which he uses “to specify that events [and objects] are not strictly subsumable under general categories”— general categories subsume “particular” objects (Murphy 221). A singular object or text is both a “unique point” and “a point of perpetual recommencement and of variation” (Conley, “Singularity” 253). In other words, it is a unique power of difference. Indeed, the value of this work, ultimately, will be determined by its power of difference, in terms of how well it sets anything new in motion. As Patton points out, Deleuze’s conception of thought is fundamentally pragmatic: “in the end, [its] value is determined by the uses to which [it] can be put, outside as well as within philosophy” (Deleuze 6). If it can engender new thoughts and sensations, new lines of flight, it will be, in D+G’s, phrasing, “Interesting, Remarkable, or Important” (WP 82)—which is to say, a valuable contribution to research-creation. After all, “[t]here are only immanent criteria. ... [T]here are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life” (D+G, WP 74).
PART 1: THOUGHT CONSTRAINED

PROBLEM 1: DISCIPLINED THOUGHT—THE PROBLEM OF THE DOGMATIC IMAGE

Orthodox thought, or, thought as representation

Both before and alongside the “distinctive practice of philosophy” D+G developed together, Deleuze’s own writings maintained a steady focus on “the question of the nature of thought” (Patton, Deleuze 18). It is in Difference and Repetition that Deleuze first addresses the notion of an “image of thought,” by which he means the “implicit presuppositions” that background the way we think, or the set of presumptions that “everybody knows” in terms of “what it means to think and to be” (129-30). For Deleuze, the history of thought has been dominated by one particular set of presumptions or “Image”: that thinking merely requires “an individual endowed with good will and a natural capacity for thought,” that “[n]atural good sense or common sense are [the] determinations of pure thought,” and that such “thought has an affinity” with truth (DR 130, 132, 131). These presuppositions make up what Deleuze calls the dogmatic or orthodox image of thought, which, regardless of its variances, is generally based on “the form of representation or recognition,” where “[r]ecognition may be defined as the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object” (DR 131, 133). Hence, this model relies upon “the unity of the thinking subject” and a form of identity in the object/s perceived (Deleuze, DR 133). As Patton points out, this model therefore entails “the conflation of thought with knowledge,” which is to say the presumption that “knowledge is ultimately a form of recognition” (Deleuze 19). Thus, from Plato to Descartes to Kant, the model of recognition reigns supreme: “whether one considers Plato’s Theaetetus, Descartes’s Meditations or Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, this model remains sovereign and defines the orientation of the philosophical analysis of what it means to think” (Deleuze, DR 134). So while, conventionally, Aristotelian logic is viewed as quite separate to the structures of the Cartesian and Kantian models of thought, inasmuch as Aristotle places the object in transcendence rather than foregrounding the subject, Deleuze finds a common principle that unites the three: for him, any philosophy’s “implicit presupposition [of] a pre-philosophical and natural Image of thought” amounts to the “most general form of representation,” and “[t]hereafter it matters little whether philosophy begins with the object or the subject, with Being or with beings (DR 131). Massumi describes representational thinking as resting on a “double identity,” which involves “the thinking subject, and ... the concepts it creates and to
which it lends its own presumed attributes of sameness and constancy” (“Translator’s” xi). He further explains:

The subject, its concepts, and also the objects in the world to which the concepts are applied have a shared, internal essence: the self-resemblance at the basis of identity. Representational thought is analogical; its concern is to establish a correspondence between these symmetrically structured domains. The faculty of judgement is the policeman of analogy, assuring that each of the three terms is honestly itself, and that the proper correspondences obtain. (“Translator’s” xi)

In Colebrook’s terms, “[m]an, mind or subject becomes that ‘mirror of nature’ or spectral doubling of a world grasped representationally,” and further, “the mind of man [acts] as a meeting point or court of judgement between the world and its representation” (“Questioning” 50). Representation and judgement come together in Deleuze’s term “doxa,” which refers both to what everybody knows (common sense) and what everybody is supposed to or should know (through good sense) (DR 134). Representation, then, as the mode in which we think, operates through fixed standards, thereby subordinating difference to “the complementary dimensions of the Same and the Similar, the Analogous and the Opposed” (Deleuze, DR 167). As Gregory Flaxman expresses it, thought, in this image, is “conceived in advance of empirical vicissitudes and thereby projects itself into the future as an anticipative matrix that turns any encounter into one of recognition” (11). This image currently permeates life’s many domains, as Olkowski confirms: “in most political, social, artistic, ethnic, economic, scientific, linguistic, and philosophical practices, ... representation—organi[s]ed around identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance—dominates” (Ruin 20).

The logic of representation is accentuated somewhat differently when Deleuze writes A Thousand Plateaus with Guattari. In this book, D+G emphasise the classificatory and negating thrusts of thought as representation, when they characterise this thought in terms of arborescence or a tree system. “The tree is already the image of the world, or the root the image of the world-tree,” they state, using the branching of a tree and its roots to explain “the law of reflection,” or “the law of the One that becomes two, then of the two that becomes four” and so on (ATP 5). Representation, then, with its “mirroring” of objective and subjective reality, adheres in general to a “Binary Logic,” while also assuming “a strong principle unity” (D+G, ATP 5). Melissa McMahon describes the pervasiveness of this system of thought:

[T]his … concept has a long pedigree in the history of philosophy, whether explicitly in Aristotle’s model of conceptual division (represented in “Porphyry’s Tree”), or implicitly in any philosophy that assigns a central principle (even “being” itself) in order to organi[s]e around it a series of secondary orders, tertiary orders and so on.

(50)

D+G also give an account of the various manifestations of the root system:
Whenever we encounter this formula, even stated strategically by Mao or understood in the most “dialectical” way possible, what we have before us is the most classical and well reflected, oldest, and weariest kind of thought. Binary logic and biunivocal relationships still dominate psychoanalysis, linguistics, structuralism, and even information science. (Thousand 5)

D+G’s mention of the “dialectical” here refers to the image of thought/truth first proposed by the Hegel, who uses the model of human historicity to demonstrate what he sees as the law of “negative unity”: “everything is inherently contradictory[…] [contradiction] is the root of all movement and vitality (164, 439). For Deleuze, not only is Hegelian negation another movement of thought that adheres to the arborescent model, but it is also an essential feature of the concept of difference under representation: the primacy of identity is always accompanied by its negative, difference from the One is defined by its contradiction (DR 263).

Therefore, while Hegelian contradiction might appear “to push difference to the limit,” it too submits to the categories of representation (Deleuze, DR 263). In Massumi’s summation, the actual “modus operandi” of the tree-like or dogmatic image of thought as representation is negation, and overall, the deeply embedded structures of “[i]dentity, resemblance, truth, justice, and negation” provide the “rational foundation for [social] order” (“Translator’s” xii). Massumi’s reference to social order serves to remind us, too, that representational thought is not merely the domain of philosophers and public intellectuals; as Todd May points out, the dogmatic image of thought is “our heritage”—“it is our template for conceiving the world” (Gilles 76-77, 74). For Massumi, since modernity at least, the corollary of the somewhat overt collusion between dominant philosophical projects and the State has been the “more insidious … propagation of the form of representational thinking itself, that ‘properly spiritual absolute State’ endlessly reproduced and disseminated at every level of the social fabric” (“Translator’s” xii).

Here, Massumi recalls that what Jean-François Lyotard calls the “fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society” (33) was born two centuries ago:

The collusion between philosophy and the State was most explicitly enacted in the first decade of the nineteenth century with the foundation of the University of Berlin, which was to become the model for higher learning throughout Europe and the U.S. The goal laid out for it by Wilhelm von Humboldt (based on proposals by Fichte and Schleiermacher) was the "spiritual and moral training of the nation," to be achieved by "deriving everything from an original principle" (truth), by "relating everything to an ideal" (justice), and by "unifying this principle and this ideal in a single Idea" (the State). (User’s 4)

The end result was that "each mind [becomes] an analogously organi[shed] mini-State morally unified in the supermind of the State" (Massumi, User’s 4).
What D+G call call State thought, then, follows an arborescent or representational logic, and has its origins in the beginnings of modernity. For D+G, the “State” is an abstract type of power not fully equivalent to its concrete manifestations (S. Newman 6). Rather, it is an “abstract machine which organises the dominant utterances and the established order of a society, the dominant languages and knowledge, conformist actions and feelings, the segments which prevail over the others” (Deleuze, D 129). As Saul Newman puts it, the State “essentially ‘rules’ through more minute institutions and practices of domination”—it “overcodes and regulates these minor dominations, stamping them with its imprint” (7). The thought that conforms to the model given by the State apparatus—reason and rationality—“defines for it goals and paths, conduits [and] channels” (D+G, ATP 374). And because this thought also serves to maintain the State, an important “exchange” occurs between the two: “[o]nly thought is capable of inventing the fiction of a State that is universal by right, of elevating the State to the level of de jure universality” (D+G, ATP 375). Additionally, in keeping with the representational principle of rationality, “the State gives thought a form of interiority, and thought gives that interiority a form of universality” (D+G, ATP 375). Because the representational model is universal, the State defines itself as “the rational and reasonable organisation of a people” (D+G, ATP 375). State thought or power, under this rubric, is merely common sense raised to its absolute, which means to obey the State is to obey “pure reason” (D+G, ATP 376). Again, the path this thought takes is tree-like: “there is a central unity, truth of essence—like Rationality—which is the root, and which determines the growth of its ‘branches’” (S. Newman 10). Let us revisit the tenets of arborescent logic:

[T]rees are not a metaphor at all, but an image of thought, a functioning, a whole apparatus that is planted in thought in order to make it go in a straight line and produce the famous correct ideas. There are all kinds of characteristics in the tree: there is a point of origin, seed or centre; it is a binary machine or principle of dichotomy, with its perpetually divided and reproduced branchings, its points of aborescence; ... it is a structure, a system of points and positions which fix all of the possible within a grid, a hierarchical system or transmission of orders ...

(Deleuze, D 25)

The binary machines of State thought that Deleuze refers to effectively disallow the virtual of difference, instead trapping identities into particular categories. For Deleuze, there are “[b]inary machines of social classes; of sexes, man—woman; of ages, child—adult; of races, black—white; of sectors, public—private; of subjectivations, ours—not ours” (D 128). To these, we could add: sane—insane, disabled—non-disabled, human—animal, human—machine, and so on. Of course, further branchings may occur: “if you are neither black nor white, you are a half-breed; if you are neither man nor woman, you are a transvestite” (Deleuze, D 128), each of which are still identities designated by the arborescent machine. Overall, this is a hierarchical process, as Chrysanthi Nigianni and Merl Storr affirm: “[w]ithin
this framework, difference can only be conceived of as a deviation from one single model: a hierarchical differentiation starting and descending from the dominant signifier (the white (hu)man Face, the majoritarian, white, hetero, able bodied male)” (4). Furthermore, this dominant signifier provides the ideal standard by which we are judged: “what defines the majority is a model you have to conform to” (Deleuze, N 173).

The matter of conformity alludes to another important aspect of State thought—its emphasis on judgement, applied according to “eternal values,” the “rights of man” (Deleuze, N 122), and the “law, institutions, and contracts” (Deleuze, “NT” 148). Taken together, values, rights and laws form the crux of sovereignty, and, as Deleuze notes, these “have been part of the history of sedentary peoples from the earliest despotic states to modern democracies” (Deleuze, “NT” 148-49). The concept of “sedentary peoples” refers to the process by which the State apparatus, through a deployment of reason, “parcel[s] out a closed space to people, assigning each person a share and regulating the communication between shares” (D+G, ATP 380). In other words, through the same kind of thinking that traps identities into categories, the State “captures” its subjects and fixes them to particular ways of being through notions of rights and laws. To escape the sedentariness of State thinking, D+G advocate a kind of “nomad thought,” one that can move outside such absolutist structures as “truth” and “law,” and allow for more dynamism and singularity. And to resist the aborescent logic of representation, they propose a rhizomatic thinking, based upon the image of a spreading “subterranean stem” rather than roots and branches; assuming “very diverse forms,” the rhizome—with its principles of connection, heterogeneity, multiplicity and rupture—“includes the best and the worst: potato and couchgrass, or the weed” (ATP 6-9). We will explore some of the potentialities of this latter thought in Part 2, but, for now, we repeat some of the characteristics of its State thought captor: “logos, the philosopher-king, the transcendence of the Idea, the interiority of the concept, the republic of minds, the court of reason, the functionaries of thought, man as legislator and subject” (D+G, ATP 24). Summing up a little differently, we could say that State thought “is the discourse of sovereign judgement, of stable subjectivity legislated by ‘good’ sense, of rocklike identity, ‘universal’ truth, and (white male) justice” (Massumi, User’s 1).

**Enlightenment continued: individualism**

We have already mentioned the significance of modernity’s beginnings for the development of the dogmatic image’s State thought. In order to begin investigating the persistence of this thinking in current times, we return to modernity, or, more accurately, to what is often seen as its fountainhead, the Enlightenment. One of the predominant strands of representational thought, following from the Kantian model, features the existence of the all-important thinker, the human agent who creates and controls thoughts, ideas, and, by extension, life
itself. According to many theorists, the notion of this particular thinker developed during the Enlightenment— that “explosion of intellectual energy in eighteenth-century Western Europe,” when French *philosophes* such as Diderot, Voltaire, and Scottish “luminaries” such as David Hume and Adam Smith, mounted a critique against the long-standing absolutism of the aristocracy and the church (Hall 2). Kant, too, from the German context, was a key figure, as Foucault notes: “Kant in fact describes Enlightenment as the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority” (“What” 37-38). For the first time, it was proposed that “human agency, if properly informed by enlightened self-knowledge, was perfectly capable of controlling society—for what was the latter but the aggregated wills of individual men and women?” (Hamilton 55). And, as Peter Hamilton further explains, such ideas did not remain merely in the discourses of the *philosophes*; rather, they were taken up “by a wide range of populi[ers] and political activists,” quickly becoming the predominant way in which people thought about the world and their relationships (55). In terms of the everyday, this led to a thinking “directed towards constancy, recognition and efficiency” (Colebrook, “How Queer” 23). In a wider sense, Stuart Hall lists some of the leading ideas of the Enlightenment as “progress, science, reason and nature,” and describes their effects thus:

> These [ideas] gave shape to the promise of the Enlightenment—the prospect which it opened up of an unending era of material progress and prosperity, the abolition of prejudice and superstition and the mastery of the forces of nature based on the expansion of human knowledge and understanding. (2)

As might be expected, the Enlightenment’s intellectual questioning also involved an intense focus on—with a view to developing—that aspect of the social we now call “economic” (V. Brown 128-29). Vivienne Brown notes, for example, how Enlightenment thinker Adam Smith is often considered the “father’ of economics,” due to his “scientific study” of the emerging “modern, industrial, profit-seeking economy” (129). With its vast dimension of rational, economic “progress,” therefore, modernity is usually identified with the rapid development of modern industrial capitalism (Giddons 55). Indeed, in Jim McGuigan’s terms, modernity is capitalist civilisation (96).

The Enlightenment, modernity, capitalism: across each overlapping movement the same representational image of thought endures. And what have also endured—even under the contemporary condition of late-capitalism or that cultural phase called post-modernity—are many of the key principles created and upheld by the paradigm of Enlightenment/modernist thought: reason, science, progress, universalism and individualism (Hamilton 21-22). Of course, capitalism’s own defining principle rewrites the purpose of any Enlightenment, modernist and even postmodernist tenets; we will return to this. But first, we investigate some of the key elements of Enlightenment and modernist thought that continue to subsist
within contemporary capitalism, beginning with the core concept of individualism. This concept is, of course, that which endorses the individual as “the starting point for all knowledge and action” (Hamilton 22), and that places “the beliefs and desires of individuals” above any “holistic” or collective goals (“Individualism” 416). It is not surprising that such an egocentric view of the world melds with earlier forms of capitalism—those emphasising private ownership of economic enterprises (Clarke 22); as sociologists Anthony Elliot and Charles Lemert note, individualism “came to be one with the older ideals of the European bourgeoisie” (xiii). However, individualism has continued to endure through to capitalism’s present neoliberalism phase, as we will now see. Neoliberalism, as promoted strongly by the governments of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s, has become the world’s “central guiding principle of economic thought and management,” as well as the hegemonic way of understanding capitalism today (D. Harvey, Brief 2, 3). It is a hugely diffuse system, as David Harvey observes: “almost all states, from those newly minted after the collapse of the Soviet union to old-style social democracies and welfare states such as New Zealand and Sweden, have embraced ... some version of neoliberal theory” (Brief 3). What, then, are the central precepts of neoliberal theory? Ultimately, neoliberalism continues to turn upon the rights of the individual; indeed, it puts in place extra measures to reinforce individualism’s stronghold:

>[T]he theory takes the view that individual liberty and freedom are the high point of civilisation and then goes on to argue that individual liberty and freedom can best be protected and achieved by an institutional structure, made up of strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade: a world in which individual initiative can flourish. The implication of that is that the state should not be involved in the economy too much, but it should use its power to preserve private property rights and the institutions of the market... . (D. Harvey, “On Neoliberalism”)

Put differently, neoliberalism is “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills”—in a institutional framework whereby “[s]tate interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum” (D. Harvey, Brief 2). Elliot and Lemert tie together neoliberalism and individualism on the basis of their origins in Enlightenment thought:

>“[t]here can be no argument with the claim that historically liberal (hence, neo-liberal) principals of the free market owe to the same nineteenth-century versions of the Enlightenment culture of reason as the liberating resources of the modern individual” (xvii).

But while it may seem clear that individualism remains intact under neoliberalism, how does it stand against the backdrop of late or (post) modernity, when, according to Marshall Berman, people’s lives are shattered “into a multitude of fragments” (17), or in the fuller landscape of a late capitalist world? In this broader context, one might well question whether individualism
is still a valid concept. Let us start with the postmodern argument—that the contemporary individual is in a “maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal” (Berman 15). According to many theorists, regardless of these postmodern circumstances, the concept of individualism persists. Ziauddin Sardar, for instance, argues that because postmodernity is an extension of, rather than a break from, modernity, the key Western values of the contemporary world continue to be predicated upon a deep-seated individualism (13, 61). Jim McGuigan, too, agrees that postmodernity is but a continuation of modernity, and claims that even today’s transformed notion of a supposedly decentered, hybrid and fluid identity can be read as simply “the latest manifestation of Western individualism” (103). As Sardar asserts, this is individualism redoubled, or taken to “a new level”: “[p]ostmodern individuals ... are forever acquiring new identities, creating new universes of realities, consuming whatever they think would satisfy their insatiable quest for meaning, identity and belonging” (39). This notion of consumption brings us to the issue of late capitalism, which is, D+G would argue, more salient than matters postmodern. Here, we can begin with Anthony Elliott’s proposal that today we are in the throes of a “new individualism,” by which he means that individualism has become “suitably modified and adjusted” to fit a world of “technology-induced globali[s]ation and [transformed] capitalism” (33-34). Elliott’s new individualism is made up of four dimensions: “a relentless emphasis on self-reinvention; an endless hunger for instant change; a fascination with speed, dynamism and acceleration; and a preoccupation with short-termism” (32). Overall, this individualism, predicated as it upon “the instant making, reinvention and transformation of selves,” makes a changeable identity its core, which means “it is not the particular individuality of an individual that’s most important,” but, rather, “how individuals create identities [and] the speed with which identities can be reinvented and instantly transformed” (Elliott 34). For Elliott, this new individualism is evident “in the pressure consumerism puts on us to ‘transform’ and ‘improve’ every aspect of ourselves: not just our homes and gardens but our careers, our food, our clothes, our sex lives, our faces, minds and bodies” (34). With a wide range of “market-directed solutions available—from self-help to therapy culture, from instant identity makeovers to plastic surgery”—we are left in no doubt that “there’s nothing to stop you reinventing yourself however you choose” (Elliott 35). Individualism in this new paradigm is “on a par with shopping: consumed fast and with immediate results” (Elliott 35).

From a different perspective, Massumi designates this current postmodern, late capitalist phase as neoconservatism: “[t]he neoconservative transnation-state corresponds to what is called ‘postmodernism’ on the cultural level, and in political economy ‘postindustrial society’ or ‘late capitalism’” (User’s 128). In the Introduction we discussed neoconservatism in terms of its future-oriented, interventional, affect-based governance style, but, in terms of capitalism, it has another inflection. Neoconservatism is capitalism one step beyond neoliberalism, to the
extent that it is “the coming out of capital” (Massumi, *User’s 131*). In other words, it is the clear perception by a liberal nation-state of the capitalist attractor in all its purity, ... a new golden age of greed that dares to say its name” (Massumi, *User’s 131*). Neoconservatism is personified by such men as Donald Trump, who embody capitalism as an abstract desire, expressed through “a mania for accumulating numerical quantities ...[,] for accumulating greater and greater sums, with no other interest or aim in life” (Massumi, *User’s 131*). This may be the infiltration of the individual by capital as never before, but the individual as figurehead remains. Certainly, we must acknowledge that D+G also argue that the individual in contemporary capitalism has been effectively privatised or “sold off”—to the extent that it is no longer the person herself who is important, but, rather, her capital or labour capacity (AO 272). Individuals have become “figures’ of capitalism; the capitalist as personified capital—i.e., as a function derived from the flow of capital” (D+G, AO 286). In this vein, Colebrook calls the individual of late capitalism a universal/global subject, who is the “capacity to signify, exchange and communicate” (Colebrook, “Sense”). Along similar lines, Deleuze also claims that in contemporary control capitalism individuals have become “dividuals”; this term means to describe how “control man” has become a decoded individual, a functional figure, that undulates, moving among a continuous range of different orbits” (N 180). Nevertheless, as Massumi observes, when “the moral and philosophical foundations of national and personal identity have crumbled, making a mockery of the Stateform[,] the world keeps right on going as if they hadn’t” (User’s 5). In other words, while it may be entirely overcoded by capital, the figure of the individual remains a strong mythical construct. We may function as dividuals, but individualistic standards continue to apply: how many possessions, how much money in the bank (or at least able to be liquidated), how expensive the cars/houses—all are still reliable indicators of each individual’s cultural value. Populist media outlets besiege us with “Rich Lists” and billionaire profiles with predictable frequency, upholding the heroic personage of the super-rich as the society’s ultimate success. Even in the face of the recent global financial crisis—which might have provoked a serious examination of individualistic mores—the model of the individual prevails; Elliott and Lemert explain: “as the world navigates [its] financial misadventures ... , what we see are the traces of the older liberal dogmas. ... [A] very good many politicians, policy-makers and economists cling to the tacit individualist assumptions that for so long guided the crypto-theologies of modern progress” (xvii). Such a retreat to dogmatic structures of thought in the event of social tumult is not new. Two decades earlier, Guattari describes how the shake-up of globalisation and the excesses of late capitalism provoke a return to “subjective conservatism”:

Faced with this situation, the most [post]’modernist’ capitalist formations seem, in their own way, to be banking on a return to the past, however artificial, and on a reconstitution of ways of being that were familiar to our ancestors. We can see, for example, how certain hierarchical structures (having lost a significant part of their
functional efficiency as a result, principally, of the computerisation of information and organisational management, have become the object of an imaginary hypercathectic, at both upper and lower executive level. Similarly we are witnessing a reinforcement of segregationist attitudes vis-à-vis immigrants, women, the young and the elderly. Such a rise in what we might call a subjective conservatism is not solely attributable to an intensification of social repression; it stems equally from a kind of existential contraction involving all of the actors in the socius. (TE 31-32)

Therefore, when faced with destabilisation, we cling to the saving lies of the Enlightenment, including that which delineates us as (albeit consumable) identities. In Braidotti’s appraisal, there is an “ontological insecurity” generated by the displacements of globalisation, resulting in “nostalgia for the lost sovereign position”: these two effects, she argues, amount to “two faces on the same coin” that is our experience of life today (Posthuman 74).

The consequences for thought of this persistence of individualism are grim. For D+G, true thought is a result of an encounter with something as yet unthought—it is not the act of a unified (or even a destabilised) capitalist subject falling into line with what is “known” to be “true” or “right.” Everyday acts of recognition and reinforcements of dominant identities do not engender thought: thought must be set off by the sometimes violent shock of real problems with no solutions—with only singular pathways of contingent response. While every thinking belongs to a subject, proceeds according to a categorising logic, and privileges some kind of an individual, thought as genuine creation is blocked. The fullness of being potentialised by the virtuality of thought’s involuntary encounters is curtailed by the preformed possibilities that make up the individualistic domain, even under late capitalism. As we shall explore in Part 2, true thought proceeds as part of a relational matrix, an ethological/ecological arrangement involving many overlapping participants—both human and non-human. D+G emphasise the idea of “a deep vitalist interrelation between ourselves and the world, in an ecophilosophical move that binds us to the living organism that is the cosmos as a whole” (Braidotti, “Elemental” 214). According to this notion, “[t]hinking is the conceptual counterpart of the ability to enter modes of relation, to affect and be affected, sustaining qualitative shifts and creative tensions accordingly” (Braidotti, “Elemental” 214). Since such thinking does not presuppose separate entities, it “interrogate[s] and unse[t] the instrumental rationality, abstract individualism, reductionism, and [the] exploitation of people and places that the epistemologies of mastery have helped to legitimate” (Code 21).

Truth, knowledge, science

Lorraine Code’s comment regarding “epistemologies of mastery” brings us to another Enlightenment vision that continues through to the present day: the discipline and practice of
science (surely one of the most dominant epistemologies of mastery). As an epistemology, classical science strives to produce knowledge as “the effect of a deployment of scientific reason upon the theat[re] of the world” (Braidotti, “Elemental” 211-12). In philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers’ account, when “we speak of science or society [in traditional terms], progress is the dominant image” (*Invention* 151), and progress in science is defined by “efforts on the part of scientists to understand the world[, resulting] in a virtual image or representation that develops over time, approximating the actual world with increasing detail and accuracy” (Gaffney, “Superimposing” 87). This production of knowledge about the natural world is founded upon “patterns that are conventionally believed to inhere to the object itself and that are broadly conceived as natural laws or universal constants” (Gaffney, “Superimposing” 87). Classical science relies upon procedures of “reproducibility” in order to establish the veracity (the “truth”) of data, and, as D+G state, “[r]eproducing implies the permanence of a fixed point of view that is external to what is reproduced” (*ATP* 372). The model of science that has become our standard, then, can be broadly described as “the work of rational subjects collecting data and building representations of the ‘outside world’” (Gaffney, “Superimposing” 89), coming closer and closer to a complete picture of the physical truths of the universe. That which cannot be reliably measured and corroborated according to fixed schema is outside the boundaries of these truths, and is to be discounted. Such an exclusionary stance takes a particular approach to difference, as Peter Gaffney explains:

[Classical science’s] ability to work directly with matter is exemplary, but its tools are only designed to identify quantifiable differences in time and space—which is to say that it does not concern itself with difference as such, only with questions or problems that arise during the individuation of a particular difference, from the more or less stable diagram of its outcome. (“Introduction”)

In privileging epistemology over ontology, science builds knowledge according to a particular (instrumental) plan, thus failing to account for difference in itself, or the virtuality of all that is—which, according to D+G, enfolds the observer and the observed into the same monistic life-world. From another standpoint, Braidotti argues that the dualistic model of science feeds the “dialectics of otherness” advanced by other projects of modernity (“Elemental” 216). As she puts it, “according to the unitary subject of classical humanism,” there are “three main dialectical axis that [are] used to constitute otherness ...—gender, race [and] nature” (“Posthuman” 76). Leaving aside for now gender and race, it is the othernesses of nature that science utilises, in the sense that they function “as the embodiment of difference that holds up the self [—sameness or identity—] in a dialectical relationship” (Braidotti, “Posthuman” 76). The essentialising dualism of science is an epistemology of mastery, therefore, to the extent that difference therein is a perjorative one, defined by it having an inferior essence. Accordingly, the natural world represents “indifferent and inert matter” available simply for “the operations performed on it by man” (Heilbroner 135). In Braidotti’s explanation,
“scientific inquiry and exploration has been historically an outward looking enterprise, framed by the dominant human masculine habit of taking for granted free access to and the consumption of the bodies of others,” including all the bodies of “nature” (“Elemental” 216). Science as this project of mastery can actually be traced to the pre-Enlightenment phase, when René Descartes proposed that mastery over the natural world would “increase man’s happiness because, as it progressively frees him from determination by ‘nature,’ it increases his autonomy and brings his human nature to greater perfection” (Schouls 110).

Turning to D+G’s philosophy, we see that science is conceptualised therein as being one of two kinds: either “royal” (also called “legal”), or “nomad” (“minor”) (ATP 361-74). Royal science, the science supported by the State, aligns with classical science: it is based on “the primacy of the fixed model of form, mathematical figures, and measurement,” and “only tolerates and appropriates perspective if it is static” (D+G, ATP 365). Royal science proceeds according to “the ideal of reproduction, deduction, or induction ... [; it] treats differences of time and place as so many variables, the constant form of which is extracted precisely by law”: the law that the same conditions should produce the same phenomena (D+G, ATP 372). Nomad science, on the other hand, does not seek to reproduce, or to “discover a form,” but, rather, follows the flow of matter in order to search for its “singularities”; it “engages in a continuous variation of variables, instead of extracting constants from them” (D+G, ATP 372). As Jeremy Hunsinger clarifies, nomad science is “the science that moves beyond mapping, measuring, discovering, and label[ing]ing the truths of the world” and is, instead, “the science of what is becoming, what will be, what is being created” (273). In D+G’s account, the two modes of science exist interactively: nomad science “cuts the contents of royal science loose,” while royal science continually works to “appropriate the contents” of the more experimental nomad science (ATP 367). This constant appropriation of the inventions of nomad science gives State or royal science a position of dominance: it “retains of nomad science only what it can appropriate; it turns the rest into a set of strictly limited formulas without any real scientific status, or else simply represses and bans it” (D+G, ATP 362). For Stengers, royal science advances through a process of “mobili[s]ation”: any rise in experimental practices occurring in science today is reclaimed by the “mobili[s]ation” of a stabilising, familiar model—one that reduces diversity to sameness; this works to maintain “order in the ranks of researchers” and to re-establish rationality and representation (Invention 113-15). Science is a “discipline,” Stengers tells us, because it aligns the interests of researchers toward a common goal: even “guerrilla” scientists have to imagine themselves “as belonging to a disciplined army” (Power 118). While State science mobilises its researchers to uncover the truth of forms, then, other potential modes of life are excluded. Even in the present day, Gaffney proposes, when contemporary scientists tend to “acknowledge the epistemological limits of the exercise as a whole,” a kind of naturalism endures: while scientists may be developing “an increasingly complex picture of
nature, characterised by far-from-equilibrium models of change” such as complexity theory, there is a “lingering tendency to approach the problem [as] a ‘dialogue’ between thought and nature” (“Introduction” 10, 17). In other words, the old models apply: chaos and complexity models continue to be scientific in approach. Although they are concerned with randomness and surprise, such theories still strive to account for it: they still attempt to confront chaos through providing an image of it. The aim of such theories is still to be useful in the advancement of humankind, and science continues to mobilise its thought according to “a single historically specific point of view” (Gaffney, “Introduction” 8).

Under advanced capitalism, the key to the State’s mobilisation and channelling of scientific endeavours lies in the “institutional support” it gives to research projects, through “policy and capital” (Hunsinger 272). As Hunsinger puts it, the State and science “have an alliance to suppress certain kinds of creativity, to limit certain kinds of innovation, and to structure the scientific process and the knowledge process as capitalist products” (277). Massumi concurs, noting that the issue of funding is at the top of the agenda in science laboratory discussions (Parables 235); in spite of calls for science to remain “pure,” corporate financing is “integral to science’s continuation” (Parables 234). This means that “[a]t profitability, science passes a threshold. Now it is science that becomes something new: capitalised technique; technologisation, with all its spin-offs” (Massumi, Parables 233). In relation to technologisation, Hunsinger addresses the role of “cyberinfrastructure” policy—which is the policy that accompanies infotechnics, or the computerisation of science. In Hunsinger’s view, “cyberinfrastructure policy is part of a new control system for science,” inasmuch as it brings together capitalism and science processes: “the values of science as process [and] knowledge as process are overwritten with the values of capitalism, science as production, knowledge as object” (272, 271). In other words, because it is geared toward profit-making, State-fostered cyberinfrastructure “blackboxes” or hides the processes of its research, focusing only upon certain (saleable) products. Therefore, the cyberinfrastructure underpinning computerised science has only “constructed yet another objectified science” (Hunsinger 274). One example of a burgeoning area of science research that has been sequestered by the State in this way, as Nikolas Rose demonstrates, is biotechnology (Politics 35). Rose describes how the coming together of State, science and capital in biotechnology was signalled in the UK in 2000 by then Prime Minister Tony Blair, who announced, “biotechnology is the next wave of the knowledge economy and I want Britain to become its European hub” (Blair). At the start of the twenty-first century, according to Rose, “the value of the biomedical biotechnology complex—biotech companies (working on everything from therapeutic stem cells to DNA paternity testing), pharmaceutical companies, manufacturers of machinery [and so on]—was immense” (36). By 2010, even with the global financial crisis, companies in established biotech centres of Australia, Canada, Europe and the US achieved “a record-breaking aggregate net profit of
US$4.7 billion, a 30% increase from the previous year (“Beyond”). The biotech industry faces its challenges, to be sure, such as the issue of regulatory protocols around drug safety; but overall, the push to bring products to the market is obdurate—in the Asian biotech sector as much as in the aforementioned centres of production (Rose 37). In order to apprehend the power of the capital/State alliance in science, it is useful to consider a specific biotech example, one that has played out in the public arena over recent years: stem cell therapy.

“The Truth about Stem Cells: The Hope, the Hype and What It Means for You,” the cover story of Time magazine’s August 7, 2006 edition, immediately evokes such ideological principles as science, reason, progress and universalism. Again, these principles are characteristic of the Enlightenment and of its extension, the Western modern, both of which connect with the structure of thought’s dogmatic image. Around the time of this Time story, stem cell research was hugely topical in Australia, as a new issue figured in the debate: the legalisation of therapeutic cloning for medical research purposes. Therapeutic cloning, defined, is “the splicing of DNA from skin cells into eggs to produce stem cells, also known as master cells, which are capable of forming all the tissues of the human body” (“Australia Lifts”). Such cells can then, theoretically, be used to grow new organs or repair disease processes. This type of stem cell therapy differs from reproductive cloning, in which the stem cells would be implanted into the uterus in order to produce a child. From 2002, both reproductive and therapeutic cloning were prohibited in Australia, but, after a parliamentary conscience vote in late 2006, the creation of embryonic stem cells for research (therapeutic cloning) was to be allowed under licence (Then). The practice has been legal in the UK since 2004 (Pilcher), while in the USA the situation is a little more complex: from 1996 until 2009 legislation effectively prevented any government funded research, although privately financed work could proceed (“Stem”). In 2009, President Obama issued an executive order permitting government-supported research, but this was blocked in 2010 by a federal judge, only to be reinstated again in 2011 (“Stem”). Stem cell research involving human embryos is a highly charged issue from political, moral and religious viewpoints, with much of the debate taking place through election campaigns and in media forums. Originally, a large part of the debate “focused on the moral status of the embryo and the acceptability of using embryos for research purposes,” but, increasingly, “the issue is no longer if [embryonic stem cell] research should proceed, but rather how it should proceed” (Lo et al 1454). There are two ways (at least) to account for this shift from “if” to “how,” from politico-moral uncertainty to the focus on the best way forward. In the first instance, the research is driven by the persistence today of the scientistic belief that investigative, empirical research—with its emphasis on rationality and intellectual rigour—advances our knowledge of life, with the overall goal being to follow humankind’s natural line of progress. The aforementioned Time magazine article exemplifies these classical notions: while it acknowledges the “politically loaded” aspects of the debate, it
speaks ultimately in terms of “real areas of progress,” and “breakthroughs [being] achieved”; moreover, the article concludes that while the debate is complicated, “the best role for legislators and Presidents may be neither to steer the science nor to stall it but to stand aside and let it breathe” (Gibbs 27, 32). Similarly, when federally funded embryonic stem cell research was allowed to continue in the US in April 2011, the Coalition for the Advancement of Medical Research (a lobby group for the use of regenerative medicine) made the following statement: “This is ... great news for the scientific community, so that they may continue to apply for grants and know their research will be able to move forward.”

But while ideals of rationality and progress continue to underpin current scientific practices, there is an even more formidable driver: the abstract machine of capital. In this context, politico-moral debates around stem-cell science will ultimately prove no match for capital’s power. Just as the 1970s controversy surrounding genetic engineering did not prevent that branch of research from proceeding (Wright), stem cell science will continue while there is promise of capital gain. As Massumi points out, government under contemporary capitalism is not about the will of the majority, but, rather, is defined by the “directly capitalist terms” of productivity and profit (“Requiem” 59). It was this motivation, primarily, that propelled Texas state Governor Rick Perry, in April 2012, to push for a relaxation of Texas’ stem cell treatment laws: since “the Texas Medical Board voted to accept rules intended to give doctors ‘a reasonable and responsible degree of latitude’ in using experimental [adult] stem cell therapies” (Aldhous), Texans can now potentially visit their own doctor for non-Food and Drug Administration approved treatments—at the cost of several thousand dollars. According to international expert in science policy and ethics, Douglas Sipp, this amounts to “Texas saying research can be done as treatment,” as long as patients are prepared to pay (Ackerman). Indeed, a large part of Governor Perry’s rationale in wanting to circumvent existing regulations with this new law is to provide “a potential boon to the Texan economy” (Cyranosky 377). Indeed, even before governments give their support to such medical practices, commercialism will exert its force: there is currently a worldwide industry in “stem cell tourism,” whereby patients travel to stem cell clinics in other countries to receive experimental therapies not approved at home; as of 2011, over 300 clinics in countries including Mexico, China and the Dominican Republic “offer what they claim to be stem-cell-based treatments for everything from autism to diabetes, from ALS to cancer” (Conger). Over the past decade, it is estimated that this industry has approached a market size of $US1 billion (Conger), evidencing the propensity of capital to spread even beyond State authorised science. In this case, when the State trails capital, the State is providing capital a service: as D+G say, “[n]ever before has a State lost so much of its power in order to enter with so much force into the service of the signs of economic power” (AO 273-74).
Altogether, the area of science that encompasses stem cell research—molecular biology—can be seen to still support representational thought’s discourses of truth, but, as Rose suggests, an epistemological shift has occurred. While the biology that had its origins in the nineteenth century “tried to discover the underlying laws that determined the functioning of closed living systems,” in contemporary molecular biology “the search is not for simplifying underlying laws but the reverse, for simulations of dynamic, complex, open systems, combining heterogeneous elements, to model future vital states” (Rose, “Molecular” 7). Like complexity theory, though, microbiology still strives to represent a true picture of life, and, because it is based on “the metaphysical presuppositions” of the methods of “abstraction and generalisation,” it is a terribly “narrow” way of doing science (Williams, Interview). The object of knowledge has shifted in another manner as well. Physical life, or “vitality” as Rose calls it, is no longer conceived “at the scale of limbs, organs, tissues, flows of blood, hormones and so forth,” but, rather, “life is understood and acted upon at the molecular level” (“Molecular” 5-6). Now, “tissues, cells, DNA fragments can be isolated, decomposed, stabilized, stored in ‘biobanks,’ commodified, transported around[, ... and] re-engineered by molecular manipulation” (Rose, “Molecular” 7). Along with this “mobilisation of vitality” (Rose, “Molecular” 6) comes “economies of vitality” (Rose, Politics 38), whereby science’s knowledge, as already discussed, is exploited by capital. At the same time, though, capital is instrumental in shaping these knowledges, as Rose makes clear:

[W]here funds are required to generate potential truth in biomedicine, and where the allocation of such funds inescapably depends upon a calculation of financial return, commercial investment shapes the very direction, organisation, problem space and solution effects of biomedicine, and the basic biology that supports it. This is less a matter of the manufacture and marketing of falsehoods than of the production and configuring of truths. (“Molecular” 17)

The capitalisation of human vitality becomes particularly evident in the way language is used in this realm of science: it is increasingly perfused with words such as “supply and demand, contracts, exchange, and compensation. Body parts are extracted like a mineral, harvested like a crop, or mined like a resource” (Andrews and Nelkin 5). But even though the human body is broken down and, in a sense, “post-humanised,” by the synergistic spheres of science and capital, vestiges of rational thought’s individualistic principles survive. For one thing, as Braidotti points out, regardless of any posthuman turn, the “century-old” form of “anthropocentric arrogance” remains “miraculously unscathed” (“Posthuman” 76). As well—and this resonates with Elliott’s “new individualism”—there persists a focus on “self-fashioning,” albeit at the level of molecular corporeality (Rose, Politics 39). With the opportunities available through biotechnology, the “maintenance of health and the prolongation of earthly existence” remain paramount (capital suffused) individualistic ideals.
And what of the rational laws of morality as they apply to this new sphere of science/medicine? Here, they are taken care of by the flourishing field of “bioethics,” comprising “national bioethical committees, local Institutional Review Boards and a whole apparatus of bioethical approved patient information and consent forms for any medical procedure or piece of biomedical research” (Rose, “Molecular” 15). Corporations, for their part, include bioethicists on their boards and use a variety of techniques to present themselves as responsible and ethical (Rose, “Molecular” 16). But is bioethics as it is practiced in these arenas truly ethical, to the extent that it is concerned with enhancing life-giving practices per se? While there is tremendous emphasis on settling the bioethical matters of “rights” in capitalised biomedicine and biotechnology, we might ask, with Rose, the broader question—“what determines the issues that ‘become’ bioethical?” (“Molecular” 16). This brings us to the matter of what Giovanni Berlinguer calls “everyday bioethics,” whereby issues that concern the difficult and often tragic conditions of “most of the world’s population” receive scant “bioethical” attention (1086). One such example relates to the practice of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)—a technique often used alongside in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) to test embryos for genetic disorders before implantation. This technique also enables sex testing, and, although UNESCO’S International Bioethics Committee only recommends sex selection for medical reasons, it does occur simply for reasons of choice in many developed countries (Berlinguer 1086). In the US, for instance, sex selection is legal in every state, and, in fact, “no binding rules deter a private clinic from offering a menus of traits” to IVF parents with the right money (Mitchison; “Need”). But because this practice is deemed “ethical,” it comes under heavy scrutiny by committees of bioethicists. At the same time, though, sex selection occurs in daily life in Asia and Africa, where there are deep-seated cultural biases in favour of males: infanticide, selective abortion against female foetuses, discrimination in nutrition and “other barbarous methods” mean that there is a very high male to female ratio (Berlinguer 1086), especially in China with its unsparing One Child Policy.” It seems that while “bioethics” is an integral aspect of high-tech, market-based medicine, with its issues of “individual autonomy, confidentiality, right and protections,” the mundane global matter of premature female deaths offers little (economic) value (Rose, “Molecular” 16). In fact, this cultural bias toward males evokes another persistent element of representational thinking, one to which we now turn.

**Heterosexual man**

As we have said, “the three main dialectical axes that ... constitute otherness according to the unitary subject of classical humanism,” or according to dogmatic thought, are nature, gender and race (Braidotti, “Posthuman” 76). We have considered some of the ways in which the Cartesian project of science treats nature as its object—through Royal science, and in
connection to its now-defining relationship with capitalism. Taking off from the matter of sex selection discussed above, it is apt to now take account of how dogmatic thought, in the present day, deals with the notion of gender. The ascendancy of the masculine subject has already been alluded to, but, in fact, as we shall see, this concept of the dominant subject can be extended to also include heterosexual predisposition. To begin with, though, according to the dogmatic image “man has been taken as the universal ground of reason and good thinking” (Colebrook, Introduction 2). The “right and power of man” is assumed as a universal pregiven (D+G, ATP 291), and, as feminist scholars have established, the Western “Woman” is the “cultural and ideological composite Other constructed through diverse representational discourse[s:] scientific, literary, juridical, linguistic, cinematic, etc” (Mohanty 19). For D+G, the “great dualism machine” opposes masculine to feminine, positioning “man” as “majoritarian par excellence”—with majoritarian implying a “state of domination” (ATP 272, 291). In feminist Catharine MacKinnon’s view, one of the main sites of domination is the family, which she sees as “a unit of male dominance, a locale of male violence and reproductive exploitation, [and] hence a primary locus of the repression of women” (61). MacKinnon links capitalism to this sphere, pointing out that “capitalism expresses the same authority structure as does the family, through its organi[s]ation, distribution of wealth, and resource control” (61). In Olkowski’s reading, the connective tissue between the family and capitalism as sources of oppression (as well as the oppressions of race, class and gender) is the “authority structure” of representation (Ruin 8). Early feminist Simone de Beauvoir, too, couples representation with masculinity, as this quotation indicates: “[t]he representation of the world as the world itself is the work of men; they describe it from a point of view that is their own and that they confound with the absolute truth” (162). Objectivity itself, then, the rational method of representational thought, which is assumed to be neutral, “is in fact the point of view of men, men with the authority and power to enforce it” (Olkowski, Ruin 9). Put another way, the so-called objective standards and principles that structure life’s hierarchies are male-centric, or, as Jacques Derrida would have it, phallogocentric. As MacKinnon notes, this thought takes over the female: “[t]he perspective from the male standpoint enforces woman’s definition, encircles her body, circumlocutes her speech, and describes her life” (114). With the gains made by feminism, however, it might well be asked whether it is indeed accurate to claim phallogocentrism as a defining aspect of thought’s dogmatic image today; one only need probe statistics, though, to discover that the subjugation and oppression of women is alive and well. For example, the International Violence Against Women Survey, covering some 30 countries from all continents (including over 6,000 women in Australia), reported in 2008 that “between 35-60% of women in the surveyed countries have experienced violence by a man during their lifetime,” and “[b]etween 22-40% have experienced intimate partner violence” (Johnson, Ollus and Nevala). In the workplace, gender inequality remains
the norm, as this recent statement from the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) indicates:

[W]omen earn less than men (16% less at the last count), they earn less over their working lives, end up with smaller pensions and are more likely to end up living in poverty. And the higher up the pay scale you go, the wider the gap. In Europe, women hold just 12% of board seats in quoted companies.

And it should also perhaps be noted that women in general are doing a great deal more of the world’s unpaid work than men. On average, women devote some two hours a day more than men to extra unpaid work such as housework, childcare, parent care. And this is an issue not just for OECD countries—in the developing world, rural women spend far more time than men obtaining water and fuel, caring for children and the sick, and processing food. The same is true for girls, making it more difficult for them to attend school and acquire the skills needed for jobs as adults. (“Gender”)

Moreover, as the OECD Secretary-General points out, “[w]omen are less likely than men to have access to credit, resources, and education,” and they are “more likely than men to be in vulnerable jobs in the informal sector, [or] to be underemployed or without a job” (Gurría).

Taking a different approach, economic researcher Anna Aizer reports a causal link between the gender wage gap and domestic violence: using a model of household bargaining and a measure of hospital admissions, Aizer found that in the US state of California between 1990 and 2003, “reductions in the gender wage gap explain nine percent of the decline in domestic violence” (1847-50). In other words, the authority structures of capitalism and gender participate in one another: as a woman becomes more economically successful, her degree of male perpetrated corporal punishment will decrease.

Does this mean that to redress gender inequality, we must simply strive to engage women more effectively in capitalism? Even if this were to happen, we would not escape a situation of subjugation, since the authority structure of capitalism would only be strengthened. The best possible response, according to Olkowski, is to effect “the ruin of representation”—break down the supreme authority structure that is associated with both male dominance and capitalism. It is bound to male dominance because representation itself is a phallogocentric system (or, as Elizabeth Grosz puts it, Western reason is characterised by misogyny [Volatile 3]), and to capitalism because this system “make[s] use of all the powers of representation for [its] own end” (Olkowski, Ruin 189). The ruin of representation would entail “[a] change from a logic of identity to a logic of difference,” with difference here meaning difference in itself, as singularity, not the “representation” of difference as that which distinguishes things in terms of one another (Olkowski, Ruin 14, 16). To do this, Olkowski suggests, “calls for a new ontology, an ontology of change as opposed to an ontology of static hierarchies and objectified
structures” (*Ruin* 14). An ontology of change, stated another way, is an ontology of becoming (in D+G’s terms), rather than one of Being. And because becoming can effect the ruin of representation, it presents a pathway to the beyond of gender inequality. For this reason we now highlight the concept of becoming, which, for D+G, relates to Deleuze’s notion of difference-in-itself. It also relates to a particular conception of time, as Todd May begins to explain:

>[Difference in itself] is not given to us in the form of identity. This means that an encounter with it must occur, not by means of the stable identities given to us in consciousness, but beneath or within those identities. Difference in itself is founding for identity but does not appear as such (as difference in itself) within those identities. It is not phenomenologically accessible. Thus, a search for difference in itself must abandon the project of investigating directly the givens of experience and turn toward a more hidden realm. Deleuze discovers that realm in the nature of time. (“When” 145)

In due course we will return to Deleuze’s “nature of time,” which he develops from Bergson’s theory; for now, suffice to say that time, for Deleuze, “is not a container occupied by living things, but is immanent to what lives. As such, for him, what lives is ceaselessly becoming or self-differentiating” (Cull). Becoming, therefore, is “the unfolding of difference in time and as time” (T. May, “When” 147). Time itself, as a virtuality (what Bergson calls “duration”), is “made” by the unfolding of being as difference—becoming. As Braidotti puts it, “Deleuzian becoming is the affirmation of the positivity of difference, meant as a multiple and constant process of transformation” (*Nomadic* 246). If the being of difference, becoming, is primary, the binarised identities established by representational thought are not fixed. The “molar” identities of “man” and “woman” are better conceived in “molecular” terms, which is to break forms down to the fluxing “particles” from which they are actually composed (D+G, *ATP* 272).12

From this position, there is no “dichotomous opposition” between “masculine and feminine subject positions, but rather a multiplicity of sexed subjectivities [whereby the] differences between them mark different lines of becoming, in a web of rhizomatic connections” (Braidotti, *Nomadic* 247). As Laura Cull puts it, “[b]ecomings are processes of genuine transformation or change in which we come to perceive things differently.” To become-other is not a process of imitation, but a “taking on” of the other, of the particles that the other emits, so as to enable the other to simultaneously become something else. Becoming is a matter of proximity and relative speed, as Braidotti acknowledges:

Starting from the form one has, the subject one is, the organs one has, or the functions one fulfills, becoming is to extract particles between which one establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are closest to what one is becoming, through which one becomes. The space of becoming is therefore a space of affinity and symbiosis between adjacent particles. (*Nomadic* 249)
Patricia MacCormack’s summary is also helpful: “[b]ecoming involves entering into a filiation with another term where the parameters of each become fuzzy, where zones of being shift toward non-molar alliances.” D+G specify an order for becoming, moving toward the total decomposition of identities, but, importantly, beginning with a passage through “becoming-woman”; they explain: an “apparent progression can be established for the segments of becoming in which we find ourselves; becoming-woman, becoming-child; becoming-animal, -vegetable, or -mineral; becomings-molecular of all kinds, becomings-particles” (ATP 272). In specifying that becoming starts with becoming-woman, D+G emphasise that man is the majoritarian standard in the universe, and there can be no becoming-man because “all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian” (ATP 291). Because women have a “special situation in relation to the man-standard,” which is to say they are its first figure of otherness, the first becoming is a becoming-woman (D+G, ATP 291). The process of “becoming-woman,” which is not in any way to imitate a woman’s form, approaches a “microfemininity,” or a “molecular woman” (D+G, ATP 275), which effectively “releases sexuality from molar identity, from its repression in an organised and sexed body” (Cull). As such, it also offers a way out of the epistemological authority structure of representation, with its oppressions of the female, towards an ontology of becoming.

But we have wandered away from representation’s dominant image of subjectivity and now return, for this image encompasses more than the quality that is “male”: it can be more closely defined as also incorporating the standard of heterosexuality (D+G, ATP 105). Present, on-going controversies around same-sex marriage attest to the fact that this standard persists in current times—that we live in a predominantly “heteronormative” world. This condition can be explicated thus:

Heteronormativity is the presumption that everyone is heterosexual, that only heterosexuality is normal or culturally intelligible, and it describes several intermeshing ideological state apparatuses which try to ensure that everyone is heterosexual in particular ways. Heteronormativity and heteropatriarchy are imbricated since only specific types of heterosexuality are considered normal, licit, or proper and the married, procreative, opposite-sex couple with children is valorised and reified as the normative sexual lifestyle. (O’Rourke 111)

In Deleuze-Guattarian terms, such a prescribed sexuality “is molar, sedentary, majoritarian, Oedipal, [and] despotic” (O’Rourke 111). Through Foucault’s work on sexuality, however, we can come to see that this “very everyday notion of sexuality” is a “historically singular form of experience” (Foucault 333). Foucault shows how sexuality is “the correlation of a domain of knowledge, a type of normativity and a mode of relation to the self,” incorporating a “collection of rules” that “differentiate the permissible from the forbidden, natural from monstrous, normal from pathological, what is decent from what is not, etc” (Foucault 333-34).
The seventeenth century, Foucault tells us, marks the beginning of this “age of repression,” prior to which sexual practices were openly discussed and regarded with a relatively *laissez-faire* attitude (Will 3-5). As Grosz makes clear, these emerging sexual norms centred on the heterosexual, monogamous couple, according to a twofold movement:

On the one hand, there is a proliferation and dispersion of sexuality and sexual “types,” which are defined in terms of their deviation or departure from the heterosexual, marital norm. In this movement there is an increasing specification and focus on the sexuality of children, the mad, the criminal, homosexuals, perverts, etc. On the other hand, there is an increasing discretion granted to the heterosexual couple, who, while remaining the pivot and frame of reference for the specification of these other sexualities, are less subject to scrutiny and intervention … . (Volatile 153)

For Foucault, this change in thinking about sexuality can be tied to “the objectification of sex” brought about through the rational discourses ushered in by the Enlightenment (Will 33; Politics 59). In other words, it is representational thought that turns sexuality into something that one could speak about “from the rarefied and neutral viewpoint of a science” (Will 53).

The birth of capitalism is implicated in this shift, to the extent that the new sexual mores became “an integral part of the bourgeois order”: as Foucault explains, sex “is incompatible with a general and intensive work imperative” (Will 6-7). In a more general sense, though, the discourses of modern knowledge, for Foucault, including those around sexuality, are crucial to the operations of biopower (Grosz, Volatile 152). As Foucault puts it, “sexuality is tied to recent devices of power,” which work by way of “proliferating, innovating, annexing, creating, and penetrating bodies in an increasingly detailed way, and in controlling populations in an increasingly comprehensive way” (Will 107). We can now take up the issue of same-sex marriage as an example through which to examine the continuing deployment of sexuality as a mode of control.

Over the past two decades, in many national contexts, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) politics has “increasingly incorporated demands for the recognition of same-sex relationships” (M. Smith 2). Even while many members of LGBT communities disagree on issues around rights, the entitlement to marry has come to be seen as something of the “holy grail” of LGBT politics (Josephson 269). Other sexuality rights issues in the United States have included “the right to serve in the military” and “to experience fair treatment in employment and housing” (Fingerhut, Riggle, and Rostosky 227), but nothing has galvanised LGBT’s more than the matter of marriage. As one theorist puts it, the fight for marriage equalities puts “lesbians and gays in the position of oppressed minorities seeking equal access to core institutions, solid citizens who want only to be included” (Phelan 2). In Jyl Josephson’s estimation, too, it is the issue of citizenship that underpins the importance of marriage rights to the LGBT movement: “marriage has a significant place in our understanding of responsible
citizenship in a democratic polity; marriage is seen as a prerequisite to the provision of certain rights and material benefits” (269-70). In the modern nation-state, Shane Phelan suggests that “citizenship is about recognition and participation” (3), making these the key goals at stake in the push towards same-sex marriage. Of course, there are fervent opponents of marriage equality, who “question the normality and/or morality of persons who are involved in same-sex relationships or who identify as LGB[T], sometimes using religious arguments” (Fingerhut, Riggle, and Rostosky 226). Such reasoning aligns perfectly with the tenets of representational thought, and with the domain of knowledge developed through modernity’s preference for heteronormativity. Nevertheless, highly publicised same-sex marriage debates are firmly on the worldwide, public agenda. As of 2011, Macarena Sáez summarises the rights under law of same-sex couples:

Forty years ago, same-sex couples were not legally accepted in any country. In the last thirty years, however, around 20% of countries have granted some rights to same-sex couples, making them visible to society. While there are still countries that criminalise sexual relations among two consenting adults of the same-sex, other countries are allowing same-sex couples to marry and form a family. Between those two poles, many countries have moved or are moving from total rejection of same-sex relationships to acceptance of some sort. (2)

But while it may be “undeniable that there is a movement towards the recognition of same-sex couples as family units” (Sáez 47), LGBTs may not end up with the release from oppression they seek. In their drive for marriage equality, LGBTs will not escape the biopolitical regime of State control: even when they become “full citizens” through marriage, they will remain subject to the system of power that regulates this institution, especially to the extent that it is, according to the laws of arborescence, and the heterosexual model, a hierarchical arrangement. Moreover, “[a]lthough there may be a common understanding of what marriage entails, in some countries, same-sex marriage has become a subcategory of marriage” with “restricted access to certain rights” (Sáez 2). Not all marriages, it would seem, are created equal under representation.

And what of D+G’s thought in relation to same-sex marriage? We know that they promote minoritarian ways of being, but, as Verena Andermatt Conley observes, they would not endorse the direct integration of a gay population into present society’s status quo; as such, “[t]heir work escapes much of the present discussions in the Anglo-Saxon world that takes as its point of departure the division between a desire for rights to established values—such as marriage” (“Thirty-Six” 25). For D+G, to start with any kind of identity, even a LGBT identity, “is to try to stabilise what has to be radically destabilised” (Conley, “Thirty-Six” 25). Although D+G are “sensitive to suffering and subjugated lives,” for them, to “close off the future with categorical statements about orientation or identity is to lose sight of the evolving nature of
existence" (O'Donnell 219). An individual, for D+G, is an “intensive and dynamic entity”—not “the emanation of an inner essence, nor ... the effect of biology” (Braidotti, “Teratologies” 159). A “body” is composed of intensities and encounters with all manner of other bodies, and to give it a label, such as “homosexual,” or even “bisexual,” is to fix it according to branching, binary categories and deny what else it might become—which is never knowable in advance. Sexuality, for D+G, is more accurately thought of in terms of desire, as MacCormack explains: “[o]ne of [D+G’s] great contributions to the philosophy of post-metaphysical humanist subjectivity is premised on the shift from sexuality to desire,” a move that catalyses “subjectivity to connective intensifications, opposition to relation, individuation to becoming” (“Encounters” 200). MacCormack further points out how projects of becoming forge a sexuality “based not on knowledge, but as thought,” in the sense that “becomings create a sexuality of proximity [and produce] unthinkable relations with never quite apprehensible outside elements,” each enrolling the other “in a singular event of desire” (“Encounters” 201). Thought as difference, then, extends to the creation of the new through a kind of sexual or productive energy—the energy of desire. As Bogue attests, this approach to sexuality takes it well beyond “genital excitation and the physiology of procreation,” which defines the normative heterosexual model (“Alien” 40). Overall, D+G “argue for a pansexuality of universal desiring-production,” which they staunchly oppose to Oedipal notions of desire (Bogue, “Alien” 40). While for Freud, sexuality is concerned with an individual psyche and Oedipal investments (Bogue, “Alien” 32), in D+G’s philosophy, the machinic force of sexuality/desire/production permeates the whole of life, including social and political institutions. This statement from Anti-Oedipus makes the spread of libidinal energy quite clear: “[t]he truth is that sexuality is everywhere: the way a bureaucrat fondles his records; a judge administers justice; a businessman causes money to circulate; the way the bourgeoisie fucks the proletariat; and so on” (293). The “large aggregates” of “nations, armies, [and] banks get a lot of people aroused,” they tell us, and when sexuality is seen to function only in particular, discrete units it is actually in a state of arrest: “it is through a restriction, a blockage, and a reduction that the libido is made to repress its flows in order to contain them in the narrow cells of the type ‘couple,’ ‘family,’ ‘person,’ ‘objects’” (D+G, AO 293).

Sexuality/desire, then, extends beyond the human, not taking as its “object” particular things or persons, but, instead, “the entire surroundings that it traverses, the vibrations and flows of every sort to which it is joined” (D+G, ATP 292). “We maintain that the social field is immediately invested by desire,” they say, so that when desire appears in any particular social machine, such as the family machine or the gender machine or even the capitalist machine, this is “purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate conditions” (D+G, AO 29; italics removed). With this conception of sexuality D+G also seek to denounce the “anthropomorphic representation of sex,” which is “the idea that there are two sexes,” or, in
Freudian terms, “only one sex, the masculine, in relation to which the woman, the feminine, is defined as a lack, an absence” (AO 294). Instead, D+G propose an infinity of sexes:

[E]verywhere a microscopic transexuality, resulting in the woman containing as many men as the man, and the man as many women, all capable of entering—men with women, women with men—into relations of production of desire that overturn the statistical order of the sexes. Making love is not just becoming as one, or even two, but becoming as a hundred thousand. Desiring-machines or the nonhuman sex: not one or even two sexes, but n sexes. (AO 295-96)

Sexuality cannot be confined to the identities of representation, as it brings into play “too great a diversity of conjugated becomings” (D+G, ATP 278), too many surfaces rubbing against one another (Beckman 13). Becomings occur through nonhuman, desiring connections “with economic, socio-historical and political surfaces” (Beckman 10), but also with the molecularities of animals, minerals and plants—through the particles, movements, intensities and vibrations that these other bodies emit (D+G, K 13; D+G ATP 274-75).

Returning to human becomings, though, or the nonhuman sexuality that underlies human sex, we ought to acknowledge that when Deleuze does explicitly refer to homosexuality it is not in the terms of identity politics. Rather, he is invoking the “micropolitics of desire” that homosexuality enacts in “escaping the heterosexual model” (DI 286). Homosexuality is a particular means of “exploding the anthropomorphic, heterosexual, familial, and Oedipal organisation of sexuality,” and, for D+G, is “sometimes seen as a point of entrance to a larger breaking down of restricting structures of sexuality” (Beckman 16). But the homosexual, Deleuze encourages, does not have to stay with the same sex: s/he can discover innumerable sexes (DI 285). In other words, in living out the micropolitics of sexuality as desiring-production, the homosexual—or the heterosexual, or the bisexual, or the transgendered—can open to many sexes:

Far from closing in on “the same,” homosexuality is going to open itself up to all sorts of possible new relations, micrological or microphysic, essentially reversible, transversal relations, with as many sexes as there are assemblages, not even excluding new relations between men and women: the mobility of particular S&M relations, the potency of cross-dressing, Fourier’s thirty-six thousand forms of love, or the n-sexes (neither one nor two sexes). It is no longer about being a man or woman but inventing sexes ... . (DI 287)

When sexuality becomes thought and creation there might be a “new homosexual” to oppose heterosexual man: this new homosexual “can finally say: nobody is homosexual, it doesn’t exist” (Deleuze, DI 287). Just so, in the micropolitics of desire every sexual body can be un-gendered, and have “the opportunity of escaping the dominant order and of entering into becoming” (Conley, “Thirty-Six” 33).
The (trans)nation-state

As well as nature and gender, the dominant order of dogmatic, dialectical thought includes a third axis of otherness, race, which we will now investigate, along with its corollary, nation. The concept of race, as the “analysis and taxonomy of racial characteristics,” also arose in the nineteenth century, through the project of European imperialism and its associated Orientalism: the “scientific” confirmation of a hierarchy of physical characteristics supported Imperialism’s need to establish a distinction between superior and inferior peoples (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 199). To this extent, racism can be regarded as existing prior to the concept of race (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 199). As D+G indicate, “the constant or standard,” or dominant, world subject is the white, (heterosexual) European male (ATP 105), a notion that emerged through this Imperialist project:

European colonisation of the rest of the globe, which accelerated in the eighteenth century and reached its apogee in the nineteenth, actively promoted or facilitated Euro-centrism through exploration, conquest and trade. Imperial displays of power ... and assertions of intellectual authority ... established European systems and values as inherently superior to indigenous ones. (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 91)

Through Imperialism, therefore, “the idea of the colonial world became one of a people intrinsically inferior, and this inferiority was guaranteed by rationalist, scientistic ideologies as something ‘genetically pre-determined’” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 47). As Edward Said shows in his treatise on Orientalism, Imperialism established the “White Man” as the “form of authority before which nonwhites, and even whites themselves” were expected to capitulate (227). There arose an “irreducible distance separating white from colo[u]red, or Occidental from Oriental,” (that is, “West” from “East”), and the White Man’s “tradition of experience, learning and education ... kept the Oriental-colo[u]red to his position of object studied by the Occidental-white” (Said 228; italics removed). In Said’s view, hierarchisation according to race continues in the contemporary world, when the “white middle-class Westerner believes it his human prerogative not only to manage the nonwhite world but also to own it, just because by definition ‘it’ is not quite as human as ‘we’ are” (108). Of course, the concept of the West spreads beyond Europe today, with former colonies such as Australia and especially—since World War Two—the United States developing as centres of power in their own right. The notion of a Western identity opposed to an Eastern one has also deepened in recent decades, with West-East conflicts such as the Gulf and Iraq Wars; furthermore, the World Trade Centre attacks of September 11, 2001 served to reinforce the divide perhaps more than ever before. As Said points out, though, “identity, whether of Orient or Occident, ... while obviously a repository of distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction,” one that simultaneously “involves the construction of opposites and ‘others’ whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from ‘us’” (332). Race, and
national identity, “is a cultural rather than a biological phenomenon, the product of historical processes not of genetically determined physical differences” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 205), and is connected to “the disposition of power and powerlessness” in society (Said 332). This exercise of representational thought in the present day has powerful ramifications, as Said stipulates:

Debates today about [for example] Frenchness and Englishness in France and Britain respectively, or about Islam in countries like Egypt and Pakistan, are part of the same interpretative process, which involves the identities of different “others,” whether they be outsiders and refugees, or apostates and infidels. It should be obvious in all cases that these processes are not mental exercises but urgent social contests involving such concrete political issues as immigration laws, the legislation of personal conduct, the constitution of orthodoxy, the legitimation of violence and/or insurrection, the character and content of education, and the direction of foreign policy, which very often has to do with the designation of official enemies. (332)

When understandings of race are articulated to the concept of nation several other implications of thought’s dogmatic image are brought to bear. As Etienne Balibar makes known, the modern idea of race as a “racial community” became closely interlocked with the nation form in nineteenth century Europe, when the “frontiers of kinship” finally dissolved and became “imaginarily transferred to the threshold of nationality” (“Nation” 100). With the birth of the modern state, civil codes (beginning with the Napoleonic code) officially marked the demise of relations of “extended’ kinship,” and at this point family relations became subject to “the intervention of the nation-state”—such interventions running from “legislation in respect of inheritance” to “the organi[s]ation of birth control” (Balibar, “Nation” 101). The racial community of the nation-state came to be regarded as “one big family or the common envelope of family relations,” and, accordingly, the “family policy of the state” projected into the public sphere through new notions of population and the need to control it (Balibar, “Nation” 100, 101). For Balibar, the idea of race, therefore, is always latent “in the reciprocal relation between the ‘bourgeois’ family and a society which takes the nation form,” since a line can be drawn from kinship (or blood) relations, to the modern family, and to the “family” that is the nation—the latter two of which are constructed by the same (representational) codes (“Nation” 102). 15 Writing in Homi Bhabha’s collection Nation and Narration, Timothy Brennan also connects the idea of family to the nation-state: “[a]s for the ‘nation,’ it is both historically determined and general. As a term, it refers both to the modern nation-state and to something more ancient and nebulous—the ‘natio’—a local community, domicile, family, condition of belonging” (45). This triangulation of family-nation-state constructs a nexus of both self-legitimation and power, especially when the concept of “tradition” is invoked:
The myth of a “national tradition” is employed not only to legitimize a general idea of a social group (“a people”) but also to construct a modern idea of a nation-state, in which all the instrumentalities of state power e.g. military and police agencies, judiciaries, religious hierarchies, educational systems and political assemblies or organizations are subsumed and legitimized as the “natural” expressions of a unified national history and culture. (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 150)

In the context of the expansion of capitalism—which, according to Balibar, occurred contemporaneously with Imperialism—the unified culture of the nation also took on the character of a “stable individualized unit” in competition with other national contexts (“From” 175). To this extent, Balibar argues that in the “capitalist ‘world-economy’” that developed with Imperialism, the state, the capitalist bourgeoisie and nationalism were entwined in a mutually complementary faction set against other politico-economic sectors (“From” 175).

With the interrelated spread of colonisation and mercantilism, another important element came into play with regard to notions of nation and identity: that of a “territorial definition of power” (Herb 10), whereby the idea of territory became inextricably linked to national identity (Herb and Kaplan 2). Thus a world economic system based on independent states developed alongside the state’s ability to control and maintain its territory/ies, either through representing them by way of mapping and census-taking, or through the development of weaponry (Herb 11). International law came to be founded upon the territorial sovereignty of each nation-state. The nation, then, as Bhabha puts it, developed around the notion of “totalizing boundaries—both actual and conceptual,” beyond which were situated “the Other or Outside,” against whom aggressivity could be projected (300). Overall, in Bhabha’s account, it is through such “ideological manoeuvres” as “representing the nation’s modern territoriality in the patriotic, atavistic temporality of Traditionalism,” that the “imagined communities” of nations were given, and retain, the “essentialist identities” of dogmatic thinking (Bhabha 300). The predominance of these essentialist identities in the social consciousness lead to, or are fed by, the hierarchical practice of racism, which, more than mere prejudice, is, according to Balibar, a “mode of thought”; as such, it “combines intellectual, even sophisticated scientific or quasi-scientific hermeneutic models with affective complexes of sympathy and antipathy” (“Difference” 23-24). In considering these essentialist identities and their bounded, nationalist territories, Dimitris Papadopoulos and Vassilis Tsianos offer an additional perspective, describing how a main focus of the nation-state has been to organise its people through the promise of “unrestricted rights and and extensive representation”—what they call the “double R axiom” (232). This double R axiom, they contend, “simultaneously defines the matrix of positive rights and representation within the national territory and the non-existence of rights and symbolic presence beyond its borders” (232). But
importantly, according to Agamben’s articulation of the “state of exception,” national sovereignty also contains the means of its own negation; in other words, “[i]t can always deny its own foundations and withdraw from its function as the creditor of the double R axiom” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 232). As Papadopoulos and Tsianos explain, modern national sovereignty thus conceived is “simultaneously, both the organi[s]ing agency which grants rights and secures access to symbolic power, as well as its antithesis: a power which systematically nullifies rights and restricts representation” (232). It is through invoking the state of exception within its own territory that national sovereignty can ratify xenophobia, misogyny and homophobia, and ensure that the nation is not a society of equals (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 232). In the politics of representation, then, equal rights do not guarantee the possession of “equal symbolic capital” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 231).

In a world conceptualised according to national territories and dialectical notions of “us” and “them,” the movement of people across borders is set to become problematical, as is the treatment of migrants once they have settled. As Said’s earlier quotation indicates, immigration policy is, presently, an urgent socio-political issue, one that we will now take up as exemplifying some of the ways in which the representationally constructed concepts of race and nation function to diminish life and thought today. As a starting point, Papadopoulos and Tsianos illustrate two ways in which the internal ambivalence of national sovereignty affected migrants in many European countries from the 1960s to the 1980s: first, where migration has been assimilated by way of “Gasterbeit” or temporary employment, migrants have been afforded the right to work at the national level, but have not been granted full and equal political rights (231). Then, in countries actively promoting immigration, where migrants have been accepted “as an integral part of the national project” and granted political rights, they are still subject to racist practices (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 231). While these migrants had been granted passage across the borders that surround the nation, they now found themselves enclosed by the state of exception: that power by which the nation-state erects borders within its own society, and suspends fair and equitable treatment therein (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 232). But let us focus now on the pressures current practices of migration place on national borders, and on the nation-state itself. Stephen Castles outlines the situation concerning world migration at the beginning of the 1990s:

International migration suddenly became a key issue in international politics at the beginning of the 1990s, when the breakdown of the bi-polar power constellation of the Cold War seemed to have opened the floodgates for vast new population flows. Right-wing politicians and sensationalist media conjured up images of welfare states being “swamped” and national identities being undermined by mass movements of impoverished people from East to West and South to North. Governments responded with tight border restrictions and international control measures.... (1143)
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, accelerated globalisation and economic growth in Asia have also affected border-crossing mobility, with the numbers of countries involved in migration having grown to new levels (Garson and Salt 12). As Castles notes, "cross-border population mobility is inextricably linked to the other flows that constitute globalisation," these flows moving not only people, but also capital, goods, services, ideas and cultural products (1144, 1146). These flows are organised through a variety of transnational networks, including intergovernmental organisations, transnational corporations, Non-Governmental Organisations and global criminal syndicates (Castles 1146). Under the conditions of globalisation it becomes easier for populations to move, especially since informal networks as modes of communication and organisation have increased (Castles 1146-47). As migrants become more diverse, states “do their best to encourage certain types (skilled and entrepreneurial migration) and stop others (unskilled labour migration and asylum-seekers) but find it hard to make clear distinctions and to enforce rules” (Castles 1146). The complexities of contemporary migration have led to the sense that there is an “immigration control crisis” occurring today in many highly developed countries (Sassen 41). This “crisis” is often portrayed by the media as centring upon the issue of illegal immigration, particularly with regard to asylum seekers. Refugee/asylum issues have been the subject of public policy debates in many Western countries since the mid-1980s, and have remained a major preoccupation up to the present day (Garson and Salt 10, 13). This preoccupation has led to an even greater tightening of entry restrictions and closer policing of borders, which, as Papadopoulos and Tsianos note, work to suppress “the autonomy of migration” (234).

The issue of asylum seeking deserves particular attention here, as it serves to augment representational thought in some key ways. One of the more popular asylum countries is Australia (Hamlin 12), and we take this country as our focus, bearing in mind that its situation is comparable to the “logics of deterrence and border security” that prevail in many Western countries, including USA and Canada (Hamlin 12), as well as to the ways in which asylum seekers are figured in the United Kingdom (Tyler). Since the mid-1970s with the first arrivals of Vietnamese “boat people,” Australia has experienced several “waves” of asylum seekers: approximately 3,000 from China, Vietnam and Cambodia from 1989 to 1993, approximately 12,000 from predominately Afghanistan and Iraq between 1999 and 2001, and over 9,000 from Afghanistan and Sri Lanka between 2008 and 2010 (McKay, Thomas, and Kneebone 114-25).

Over this time, Australia has been “an extremely reluctant asylum destination,” with a strong ethic of control pervading its immigration policies (Hamlin 71). Among the policies targeting asylum seekers is mandatory detention legislation, introduced in 1992 and strengthened in 1994 to sanction prolonged detention, which includes the mandatory detention of children (Coghlan). Asylum seekers are detained in one offshore facility (on Christmas Island), and in several other detention centres around the country, many of which are in remote locations.
Australia’s strong stance against asylum seeking was perhaps most famously displayed by former Prime Minister John Howard in a situation known as the Tampa affair, when, in August 2001, his government refused entry to 438 Afghani nationals who had been rescued by the Norwegian freighter the MV *Tampa* (McKay, Thomas, and Kneebone 115). The incident caught international attention as neither Indonesia nor Norway would accept the refugees, and a standoff developed between the ship’s captain and the Australian government (G. Martin). Howard held firm, and, with polls showing he had extensive support, the vessel was eventually re-routed to an island off Papua New Guinea (G. Martin; Hamlin 75). Following soon after, the Howard government was re-elected, and subsequently introduced a cluster of even more restrictive immigration legislation known as the Pacific Solution (Hamlin 75-76). Nevertheless, asylum seekers have continued to head toward Australia, with many losing their lives at sea and as they approach their destination. Each time an event is reported concerning approaching asylum seekers, intense public, media and political debate arises relating to “border control,” and how best to manage the issue of asylum seeking (McKay, Thomas, and Kneebone 116). The “correct” means by which individuals can be granted refugee status in Australia is through applying by way of the Australian Humanitarian Programme; if successful, applicants are granted refugee status before they arrive in Australia (McKay, Thomas, and Kneebone 114). If individuals arrive without this status already granted, they are designated as asylum seekers, also commonly regarded as “queue jumpers,” “bogus, illegals, the unwelcome” (Tyler 190)—in other words, “other” to the dominant national identity. In general, the public rhetoric implies that asylum seekers’ claims for refugee status are not legitimate, that they pose a threat to national security and that they are engaging in illegal behaviour by not following the correct process (McKay, Thomas, and Kneebone 114). Asylum seekers are placed in a detention centre until their case is dealt with, a process that can take several months or even years (McKay, Thomas, and Kneebone 114). During this period the asylum seeker is refused the status of “subject-citizen” (Tyler 187), and, within the borders of the detention centre (which are often privately run), is excluded from the nation-state’s zone of rights. As the double R axiom of rights and representation is denied, Agamben’s state of exception is imposed, keeping the asylum seeker largely invisible to the nation. The experience of indefinite detention in prison-like facilities, removed from the rest of the nation’s population, leaves many internees in extreme distress; this despair is often dealt with through the infliction of self-harm (Pagliaro), or through attention raising strategies such as riots and the burning of detention buildings (see Ralston).

In terms of the underlying structures of representational thought involved in this issue, there are several points to be made. First, as Imogen Tyler argues, identifying an individual as an asylum seeker, that is, refusing to recognise her/him as the “same” as us, effectively “shores up
the normative fantasy” of what it is to belong to our country (189). In other words, asylum seekers, “by power of their very exceptionality[,] allow us] to perceive the social totality of Australia as an organic whole” (Buchanan, “August”). Moreover, it is in producing “the imaginary figure of the asylum seeker as an ‘illegal’ threat to ‘our’ sense of national belonging that ‘we’ learn to desire and demand ‘their’ exclusion” (Tyler 191). It is in this representational framework, then, that the redefining of asylum seekers as “outside of the sphere of rights, that is, as less than human, has come to make ‘sense’” (Tyler 191). Making sense in this way recalls Deleuze’s concept of “common sense,” what ‘everybody knows,” which is one of the linchpins of the dogmatic image of thought. What “everybody knows” in this case is that asylum seekers are dangerous—that they pose a threat to our sense of national security. On this point, Deleuzian scholar Ian Buchanan makes a notable argument: “What possible threat can a few hundred bedraggled refugees pose to the average Australian citizen? They are hardly going to form a posse and march on Canberra (however much we might want them to)... ” (“August”). The possible threat, Buchanan suggests, especially following September 11, “is that there might be terrorists mixed in amongst the genuine asylum seekers, no matter how tactically illogical the idea is” (“August”). Buchanan expands:

If terrorists wanted to get into the country unnoticed they would simply fly in posing as rich tourists, or students; once here they might do something unobtrusive like flying lessons, or perhaps a short course in inorganic chemistry. What they wouldn’t do is chance an extremely hazardous voyage on a leaky boat across the Indian Ocean, which not only risks sinking, but also faces interception either by pirates or the coast guard (Indonesian or Australian), and therefore offers what one would think to a military mind is an unacceptably low possibility of success. (“August”)

Nevertheless, according to the logic of representation, the detention of asylum seekers fixes them in place, so as to preclude their movement into “our” realm, a movement that might lead to the fearsome result of our own displacement.

In Agamben’s view, though, when individuals are “stripped of every political status,” and are, therefore, reduced to what he calls “bare life,” the appropriate reaction is not to remain in debates circumscribed by notions of rights; rather, “[i]t would be more honest and, above all, more useful to investigate carefully [the] deployments of power by which human beings could so completely be deprived of their rights” (Homo 171). Put another way, inasmuch as it is the dogmatic image of thought that underpins the sovereign power structures figuring the asylum seeker as undeserving of rights, it is the image of thought itself that needs addressing. This same image of thought also prefigures the character of ambivalence regarding asylum seeking that also occurs in public discourse today: as we have said, there is racism and xenophobia, but on the other hand, there are also plentiful humanitarian responses, which are much more sympathetic. But while they may sometimes achieve small gains in terms of enhancing the
lives of those involved, humanitarian efforts, overall, are imprinted by the same thought structures as xenophobia. Instead of characterising asylum seekers as “other” to us, humanitarian discourses identify them as “like” us, and thus invoke a structure of universalisation in speaking for them (Tyler 194-95). Further, to seek to intervene on behalf of asylum seekers is to categorise them as human beings in need of aid, which, it has been argued, is a paternalistic approach that utilises a logic of victimisation (Papadopoulis and Tsianos 234). As Tyler points out, “[t]he central paradox facing humanitarian appeals and interventions on behalf of asylum seekers is that they conform to the law by situating their appeals within the language of the law which they nevertheless contest” (196). For instance, “they depend on the same categories of inclusion/exclusion, authentic/inauthentic, us/them, as xenophobic discourses” (Tyler 196). Discussions or actions that are foreclosed by these dialectics fail altogether in disrupting the system that produces the asylum seeker, and leads Agamben to claim that “a secret solidarity” exists between humanitarian organisations and “the very powers they ought to fight” (Homo 133). While representational thought’s habits of analogy, opposition and identification dominate approaches to asylum seeking, we will not experience the individuals involved as nodes of difference in themselves, as asylum seeking episodes as singular events calling for singular concepts. Instead of principles based on rights and recognition, perhaps, as Papadopoulis and Tsianos suggest, we need principles of becoming in thinking about how migration might proceed (228), or in dismantling the categories of race. If, for D+G, identity is a bereft concept, becoming-other in the context of race or migration would perhaps enable “gradual and careful, sometimes painful, transformations” of existing bodily constitutions, the realisation of productive desire through changes in “bodies, voices, accents, patois, hair, colour, height, gender, age, biographies” (Papadopoulis and Tsianos 228). This kind of becoming-other offers a rich vein for thought, one worthy of some future return.

**Thought-for-the market**

As acknowledged at the beginning of this thesis, it is Deleuze’s view that each historical era, including our own, is characterised by a dominant “image of thought” (Deleuze, N 147-48). So far in Part 1 we have focused on demonstrating the continuing prevalence of what Deleuze calls the dogmatic image, which refers to the structures of representation that shape our understandings of, and habits in, many of life’s present domains. Under this dogmatic image, thought is “the natural exercise of a faculty,” and, for Deleuze, any implicit presupposition that there is a “natural” way to think at all amounts to the most general form of representation (DR 131). But it is the position of this thesis that, with the complexities of modern society, what it means to think today goes beyond the orthodox image. Certainly, as we have shown, this image persists; but it is augmented by another contemporary power process that works to
shape and restrict thought’s possibilities. The force of capital, as we have acknowledged, exerts intense pressure in the realm of science, and, with globalisation, is increasingly affecting the form of the nation-state. And, as we shall soon see, with information and digital technologies now pervading our procedures for living and thinking, capital becomes even more formidable. Because of capitalism’s import, it is apposite that we now take account of how D+G conceptualise this machine. And, in considering some ways in which capital has a direct impact on thought as engaged in by thinking subjects, we establish a segue into the second half of Part 1. We begin with some repetitions. For D+G, life is the creation of difference, or “the actualisation of tendencies to differ” (Colebrook, Understanding 101). Again, as we have said, D+G’s specific term for life’s production of difference is “desire,” or “desiring-production” (AO 1). Life as desire, or as flows and productions of difference, occurs in a multiplicitous range of expressions: “the movement of people and traffic in a city, the flow of words ... in a language, the flows of genetic code between generations of plants, and even the flow of matter itself (the movement of the ocean, electrons moving in metals, and so forth)” (Roffe, “Capitalism” 35). As D+G put it, desiring-production “is at work everywhere,” and when it appears in the field of the social, producing selves, economic systems, or whole societies, this is only a particular determination of its overall productive power (D+G, AO 1, 29; Colebrook, Understanding 121).

In Anti-Oedipus, D+G make a historical study of desire, and propose that social-production (as a determinate instance of desire) has resulted in three broad social formations: primitivism, despotism and capitalism. D+G’s argument is that prior to capitalism, the general function of each socius (“socius” meaning “the abstract machine of society” [Massumi, “Users” 75]) has been to “codify” or structure the flows of desire:

The prime function incumbent upon the socius, has always been to codify the flows of desire, to inscribe them, to record them, to see to it that no flow exists that is not properly damned up, channel[led], regulated. (AO 35)

Primitive societies operate as social machines at the simplest level since bodies come together and connect into “tribes” (Colebrook, Understanding 123). These tribes function by way of kinship codes, which are enforced through a codifying system of cruelty: the requirements of the socius are marked directly onto bodies. As D+G explain, the “essence” of the primitive socius, insofar as it codifies the productive forces of desire, “resides in these operations: tattooing, excising, incising, carving, scarifying, mutilating, encircling, and initiating” (AO 159). In the history of desiring-production, though, this primitive regime is supplanted by the social formation of despotism. Despotism marks the transition from an immanent to a transcendent form of law: “The full body as socius has ceased to be the earth, it has become the body of the despot, the despot himself or his God” (D+G, AO 212). Rather than operating by way of a territorial chain of organisation, despotism involves “a power that organises that
territory from some position outside or above that territory" (Colebrook, *Understanding* 124). Colebrook explains that the despot rises to this position of higher power due to the production of a surplus value of enjoyment: “When the despot looks on and enjoys the marking of bodies, a position is generated from within force that seems to govern and order force. This is the beginning of the State …” (*Understanding* 124). It is not that primitive, coded flows disappear entirely in an externally powerful, despotic regime, but rather that they become “overcoded by the transcendent unity that appropriates surplus value” (D+G, *AO* 213). For D+G, what counts in the transition to despotism is “not the person of the sovereign,” but the change in the social machine:

[In place of the territorial machine, there is the “megamachine” of the State that has the despot at its apex … ... [This has] the effect of a deterritorialisation that divides the earth as an object and subjects men to the new imperial inscription, to the new full body, to the new socius. (*AO* 212)]

Capitalism, however, in D+G’s account, operates in another way entirely: it is the first social machine that does not impose codification as a means of governing flows. Indeed, capitalism rejects coding completely; instead, “it brings about the decoding of the flows that the other social formations coded and overcoded” (D+G, *AO* 267). In other words, capitalism “liberates the flows of desire” (*AO* 153), and it does this by emptying flows of their specific meanings in particular coded contexts (Roffe, “Capitalism” 36). For example, in a transcendental regime, sex is coded according to the laws of marriage, the church, the family, and so on; under (pure) capitalism, though, the flow of sexual relations is emptied of its institutional codings (Roffe, “Capitalism” 36). Does this mean that under capitalism anything goes? That capitalism amounts to an absolute decoding, so that flows are altogether free to connect, produce, proliferate? Not necessarily. For while capitalism “defines a field of immanence and never ceases to fully occupy this field[,]” it is also “determined by an axiomatic” (*AO* 271). Rather than providing an external code that applies to the whole of the social field, capitalism relies upon “an axiomatic of abstract quantities in the form of money” (*AO* 36, 153); indeed, capitalism “[substitutes] money for the very notion of a code” (D+G, *AO* 36). Thus, every aspect of life under capital is rendered equivalent to the general value of capital, or, as Roffe puts it, capitalism is the “law of general equivalence in the form of monetary value” (“Capitalism” 36). For D+G, then, capitalism “axiomatises with one hand what it decodes with the other” (*AO* 267). To return to the example cited above, capitalism is indifferent to the laws around sex that would be enforced by an external authority, but axiomatises sexual activity, so that the only thing that matters is its value for producing capital. The “law” of capitalism is the flow of money. Capitalism is, therefore, the limit of society in its restrictive forms, but it is not the absolute limit: “it is the relative limit of every society … because it
substitutes for the codes an extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state" (D+G, AO 267). Colebrook puts it this way:

Capitalism is a surplus value of flows; anything is allowable and permissible if it can be translated into capital flow. It is not a transcendent State or ideology that subjects human life to some overarching code or belief. It is the immanence of flow. Any practice, technology, knowledge or “belief” can be adopted if it allows the flow of capital. (Understanding 127)

D+G’s conceptualisation of capital, therefore, provides us with a way of understanding how it can function alongside, or underneath, those aspects of thought’s dogmatic image that persist in current times. Capitalism will not displace a system while it can profit from it, or at least while the system does not impede the flow of money. And where a system facilitates this flow, as is the case with the network organisation of electronic and information technology culture (as we will see), that system will only flourish.

The classical notion of thought as epistemology, as “man” producing knowledge, perseveres in contemporary culture—but, as we saw in our discussion of science, such coding tends to subsist to the extent that it serves the capitalist machine. Thought thus conceived has become regulated by capital, its worth gauged according to its contribution to the flow of money. Reconceptualised as a valuable product, this kind of thought is what D+G call “thought-for-the market” (WP 107). As Lyotard comments, in the late modern world, “[k]nowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to be valor[is]ed in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange” (4). As thought/knowledge has become a highly valuable kind of property, the circulation and protection thereof have become an essential component of capitalism—which brings us to another salient aspect of thought-for-the market. The control of thought/knowledge by the regime of intellectual property (IP) is one of the primary concerns of the capitalist world today. Although copyright laws were originally introduced in the late 18th century to protect the authors’ rights (Downing 58), current IP laws are designed to protect all manner of “intellectual products”—including music, inventions, a range of media material, and academic intellectual property. Steve Cisler notes that it is industry and government in the United States that are “the driving forces for the strengthening of laws protecting media content, physical products and other intellectual property,” and since “technology began flowing out of the US,” the country’s international IP laws have become “as much a part of U.S. foreign policy as the war on terrorism” (377, 378). Fundamentally, IP laws aim to prevent “the duplication and sale of many counterfeited and pirated materials and of the sharing of copyrighted materials without a profit motive” (Cisler 377), or with an expectation of lowered profit. Copying and selling cheaply or, worse, giving away intellectual property in any form, curtails the flow of capital, which is, of course, unacceptable under this power form. Where it concerns the channelling of (lowered) profits
away from larger corporations, intellectual piracy is of an extremely broad nature, as Cisler indicates:

Apart from books, CDs and movies, consider these items: watches, apparel, sparkling wine, computer chips, fire extinguishers, guns, golf clubs, cell phones, radios, prescriptions drugs, sunglasses, handbags, soaps, snowboards, water pumps, cigarettes, perfumes, art and antiques, indigenous art and crafts, identification cards, camping gear, automobile and aircraft parts and the Chinese product seized more by U.S. Customs than any other: batteries. Even shoe polish has been counterfeited, and in June 2004 the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau seized 12 tons of it in Kigale, Rwanda. (377)

Some of the time it is the rights of the “individual” creator whose ideas are protected, which upholds the tenets of representational thinking. More often, though, it is the structures of capitalism that are safeguarded: under the US “work made for hire” policy, for example, copyright of “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment” rests with the employer (United States). Other Western countries have similarly restrictive policies, and, according to Steven Tepper, such “tight copyright protection” is generally “at odds with creativity” (164). Indeed, creation with one precise goal—to produce profit—rules out the potential for thought to operate more positively as a power of difference.

This contemporary cultural anxiety in relation to IP reaches also into the arena of the academy, a sphere traditionally related to a more pure form of thinking. This shift is evidenced by former Stanford University president Donald Kennedy’s 1997 statement that “intellectual property management [is now] one of the principal duties of the academy” (McSherry 2). Until relatively recently, the university was regarded as “a special site of disinterested inquiry, … [located] outside the realm of commodity production and circulation” (McSherry 4, 103). As David Downing explains, “the pivotal function of higher education in modern society [was] the protection of a public domain where ideas could be openly expressed, shared, and circulated relatively free of capital interests and property laws” (57). Academic knowledge production, however, could not remain separate from the capitalist axiomatic. In a general sense, the axiomatisation of academic thought has meant a shrinking of the public thought domain due to the pressures of capital (Downing (57); in a more specific sense, as “university-industry partnerships proliferate” (McSherry 2), researchers and research departments are fostered (or, rather, funded) primarily according to the criteria of commercial applicability. There are at least two outcomes of this reconfiguration of academic work. First, there has been an increase in the economic rationalisation of university faculties, leading to merges across departments and cutbacks in courses—especially in areas that are traditionally “arts” focused. Tiziana Terranova and Marc Bousquet see such changes as due to today’s universities being subject to “the harsh realities of neoliberal economics: huge volumes of
students, extreme levels of performance-geared management, casualisation of employment, and the conversion of students into ‘consumers.” In such an environment, any truly creative thought will be hobbled by the “higher workloads, scarce resources and tighter managerial control” that must be maintained in order for the university to contribute to the dispersed “social factory” of culture (Terranova and Bosquet). As Lyotard puts it, “[r]esearch sectors that are unable to argue that they contribute even indirectly to the optimisation of the system’s performance are abandoned by the flow of capital and doomed to senescence” (143). In this age of the corporatisation of universities, “academics increasingly must perform on time and under budget” (Lash 77), and research will only be recognised if it “corroborates the interests of capital” (Rossiter 170). The other outcome of the changing definition of academic work relates to the notion of academic freedom. Historically, academic freedom has been linked to the idea of an open community of respectful scholars, all working to contribute to a “shared knowledge base” (Downing 57, 58). But as knowledge has become a valuable commodity, individual competition and battles over copyright have intensified throughout the academy. Indeed, intellectual property has become a question of power (Lash 75), even in the academy. This power can be related to academic freedom to the extent that such freedom is now elided with intellectual ownership: those “knowledge workers” who have the most academic freedom are those who have amassed the most intellectual property (Downing 58; McSherry 3). In other words, the circuits of academic thinking are less about the openness of thought and the value of creating the new than they are about the competition to increase one’s intellectual property; this building of intellectual property both ensures the flow of capital for the academy, and buys the knowledge worker a sense of (pseudo)power within the system.
PROBLEM 2: CONTROL—THOUGHT, INFORMATION, THE DIGITAL

Information and networks of control

We have considered representational thought’s epistemological project of building knowledge and its relationship to capital; however, it is increasingly the case today that the realm of knowledge is being supplemented (some say replaced) by the order of information. In producing intellectual property, the “knowledge workers” referred to above utilise a range of electronic technologies, and, as Lyotard notes, in order to fit into these electronic channels, knowledge must be “translated into quantities of information” (4). According to Shunya Yoshimi, the form of knowledge that is information has traditionally been regarded as more “superficial”: if knowledge is conceived as “stock,” information is more ephemeral “flow,” as in “something that circulates from one place to another, but is not necessarily stored anywhere” (Yoshimi 272). From classical times, information has had relevance to knowledge, but was not as culturally meaningful as knowledge in the storage bank. Since the development of capitalism, however, information has “assumed a central position in the world of human consciousness, rather than being left on the periphery of knowledge as before” (Yoshimi 272). Capitalism’s “systemic requirements of efficiency and exchange” require that knowledge is instrumental (Malik 30), and, as Lyotard has emphasised, instrumentalised knowledge is information (125). The state of information today has generalised from its 1930s-1940s military usages (information as “intelligence”) to more diverse social applications over the latter half of the 20th century (Yoshimi 271). Recently, the term has been understood in a variety of ways, depending on the specific context: “as an embodied and material cause (in some genetics), as a signal with a transmissible quotient without determinate location or material/embodied specificity (in cybertheory), as a statistical quantitative property of a system (in communication theory), [or] as an instruction” (Malik 30). But while information may appear to be a somewhat “inconsistent category,” Suhail Malik argues that it is “not incoherent”: “each of these determinations of information proposes a rationalisation of the system in question into ... channels of control and transmission,” which leads to it being characterised as “a type of instrumental rationality, both in its theory and practically” (30-31). Information, then, regardless of the system in which it is functioning or the theoretical field that embraces it, is something that is essentially operational.

In specifically cultural terms, the concept of information is connected to late capitalist “information societies”—those post-industrial societies that are “centred around services and knowledge work, trading and extracting value out of knowledge-as-information” (Terranova, “Concept” 287). As Malik puts it, these are “societies in which information takes a leading role
in (de)structuring their economies, knowledges and cultures” (31). Undoubtedly, “[c]ontemporary [Western] culture is manifestly more heavily information laden than any of its predecessors” (Webster, “Information Society” 448). In this contemporary culture, where “knowledge society” means “information society,” the concept of information relates to a very broad range of areas and practices:

One may think here of the growth of media technologies (video, cable, television, satellite), of advertising (campaigns, posters, placemats), of news and entertainment services (from CNN to Al-Jazeera, from DVD movies to computer games), of fashion, image, and style, of information-intensive occupations (teaching, accountancy, and design, for example), and of the development of education systems around the world. (Webster, “Information” 188)

In Neil Postman’s description, information is “a commodity that can be bought and sold, or used as a form of entertainment, or worn like a garment to enhance one’s status.” Moreover, information “comes indiscriminately, directed at no one in particular” (Postman). The ineluctability of information causes Scott Lash to argue that the information society is, overall, “an order in which the principle of ‘society’ becomes displaced by the principle of ‘information’” (75). As a consequence, for him, information displaces sociality, to the extent even that “[s]ocial relations themselves are becoming less a question of sociality than informationality” (Lash 75). In Lash’s view, information can be anything from “[f]ast-moving consumer goods and branded consumer products,” to “[30-second TV ads[,] quickly decomposing installation art[,] database files, J-Pegs and attached text files and software” (3, 75).

Regardless of what form a unit of information takes, however, several key attributes can be identified: “flow, disembeddedness, spatial compression, temporal compression, real-time relations,” as well as “quick obsolescence” and “regulation through intellectual property” (Lash 2, 3). As Lash observes, pre-informational societies may have revolved around such time-involved communication-types as narrative, lyric poetry or discourse: discourse, for example, encompasses “conceptual frameworks, … serious speech acts, … propositional logic, [and] legitimating arguments” (2–3). But one of information’s principal characteristics is its significant compression: information “must be produced pretty much in real time,” and it must be abbreviated and “byte-like” in format (Lash 3, 2). Pre-informational communication-types such as discourse were, of course, linked to the production of knowledge, but when knowledge is replaced by information the ramifications for conscious thought at least are significant:

When knowledge is reduced to information, then consciousness is stripped of its lived connection to history, judgement and experience. What results is the illusion of an expanded knowledge society, and the reality of a virtual [in its narrowed, “cybernetic” sense] knowledge. Knowledge, that is, as a tightly controlled medium of cybernetic
exchange, where thought has a disease, and that disease is called information.
(Kroeker and Weinstein 23-24)

The omnipresence of information in contemporary life, we are arguing, impacts upon and supplements our traditional, dogmatic image of thought. In addition to representation’s limiting of thought, thought is also impacted by the structures and characteristics of information, affecting the way it is both conceptualised and engaged in. Of course, this is not automatically a detrimental situation, but we will leave until Part 2 our consideration of some ways in which informational (or, better, digitised) thought may add to life’s potential. For now, though, we focus on how this informational turn may influence thought obstructively. As noted, Lash points to the compressional aspects of information. Virilio, too, critiques information as a medium of speed and immediacy, in specifying the generalised time of “instantaneity” (8). When geographical distance is eradicated in favour of the screen, Virilio points out, so are the delays associated with journeys and the successivities of concrete experiences: “in the age of the transmission revolution everything comes straight in, arrives immediately, [giving] a general absence of delay, instantaneity of information and the development of that interaction which surpasses any action, any concrete act” (127). When information from anywhere is immediately accessible, when all interactions can take place instantly, time is compressed absolutely. In Virilio’s words, “here no longer exists, everything is now” (116; italics removed), which also means we exist in a kind of “perpetual present” (125). This speeding up of reality has considerable consequences for time-as-duration, or our concrete experience of time as an open-ended becoming: “[t]he acceleration of real time … not only dispels geographical extension, … but, first and foremost, it dispels the importance of the longues durées of the local times of regions” (Virilio 118). For Virilio, this defying of “the very truth of all durée” provokes “the acceleration of all reality; of things, living beings, [and] socio-cultural phenomena” (117). We can also look at this compression of time from a more Deleuzian perspective: as we have indicated, Deleuze’s notion of time draws upon the work of Bergson, who conceives of time “as a whole, as a pure duration, in which each instant has its place” (T. May, “When” 145). For Bergson, the whole of the past exists in the present, and is connected to the future, in the totality he calls the virtual. In Leen De Bolle’s explanation, the virtual past accompanies the present “as a character accompanies the person” (140), and the present interpenetrates the future. If time is accelerated to the extent that it cannot be experienced as duration, there is no room for the impact of the virtual—no time for the vast potentiality of the whole of time-as-difference to reveal itself. This is to restrict thinking to the realm of sameness. In Virilio’s parlance, the speed of cybernetic interactivity “outstrips any time of thought” (124). In other words, the kinds of thought that are related to duration and the virtual are disallowed—their time is gone; the kind of thought that can take place is limited to the instantaneous production and exchange of information. Italian media theorist
Berardi puts forth a related view when he argues that because “we cannot replicate the insane speed of the hypercomplex digital machine,” we are now “tending to become the ruthless executors of decisions taken inattentively” (“Schizo-Economy” 83). Moreover, because our attention is so besieged, neither do we have the time for “love, tenderness, nature, pleasure and compassion,” a state of affairs that, Berardi argues, is leading to an increase in “pathologies in the affective and emotional spheres” (“Schizo-Economy” 83, 78). Berardi explains this problematic in the context of contemporary capitalism:

If you want to survive you have to be competitive; if you want to be competitive you have to be connected—you have to continually receive and process an immense and growing mass of data. This provokes constant attention stress and a reduction in the time available for affectivity. These two closely linked tendencies spell devastation for the human psyche. Depression, panic, anxiety, a sense of solitude, existential misery. (“Schizo-Economy” 84).

Although the human psyche does not correspond exactly to Deleuze-Guattarian thought, it is certainly implicated in what thought can do. Beradi’s concerns resonate, too, with Stiegler’s notion of a “disaffected” population, whereby he claims that “[o]ur epoch does not love itself. And a world which does not love itself is a world which does not believe in the world” (“Disaffected”). Indeed, D+G pronounce the problem of “believing in this world, in this life” as “our most difficult task”; this is not the task of believing “in the existence of the world[,] but in its possibilities of movements and intensities” (WP 74). True thought, as movements and intensities, is one way to approach this task, but there are many aspects of informationalism that will hold it back.

Another salient issue in relation to information and thought concerns the role of meaning. Whilst lay opinion may suppose information to carry specific meanings, in the strict “information theory” terms of Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, information “must not be confused with meaning” (Webster, “Information” 187). For Shannon and Weaver, information is “a [mathematically tractable] quantity which is measured in 'bits' and defined in terms of the probabilities of occurrence of symbols” (Webster, “Information” 187). Terranova explains, though, that while the Shannon-Weaver conception of information originally served the telecommunications industry and its military associations, information theory has broadened to refer generally to “communication as a material process that technological development latched onto and reinvented” (“Communication” 56). The starting point of information theory, according to Terranova, is “that information can only be defined as a ratio of signal to noise” (“Communication” 56). As Terranova notes, for information to flow (be communicated or transmitted), interference (noise) must be minimised: “[a] clear channel is the basic condition of the communication act inasmuch as the aim of communication is the creation of a contact that allows a message (regardless of its meaning) to get through” (“Communication”
In an informational milieu, then, meaning—in the representational sense—loses significance. Instead, “what counts is the preservation of the message/signal through all the different permutations that such a message/signal is liable to undergo” (Terranova, “Communication” 58). Put another way, “what matters is the endurance of the information to be communicated, its power to survive, as signal or pattern, all possible corruptions by noise” (Terranova, “Communication” 58). Significantly, Terranova further proposes that in the information age, “information managers” understand the dynamics of information, and utilise a “strategy of amplification,” in an “attempt to control the scene of communication by sheer power, by seizing control and monopolising the infosphere” (60). In this context, the public, as targets of information, are not expected to think through the information they receive, but, rather, to be affected/controlled by its abundance and force. As Webster points out, such a milieu fosters “uncertainty, insecurity, and anxiety,” since the sheer amount of (often conflicting) information leads to the abandonment of any hope of holding onto convictions (“Information” 187).

In his filmed lecture, “What is the Creative Act?”, Deleuze also considers the limits to the semantic dimension of information in contemporary culture (TRM 312-24). As Mark Bonta and John Protevi explain, while D+G may seem to regard information as the “content of messages,” information thus understood is not transported “from one consciousness to another,” and is of an extremely qualified nature (100). For Deleuze, information has a strategic function in “the system of control”:

> What is information? It is not very complicated, everyone knows what it is. Information is a set of imperatives, slogans, directions—order-words. When you are informed, you are told what you are supposed to believe. In other words, informing means circulating an order-word. Police declarations are appropriately called communiqués. Information is communicated to us, they tell us what we are supposed to be ready to, or have to, or be held to believe. ... Let’s say that is what information is, the controlled system of the order-words used in a given society. (Deleuze, TRM 320-21)

In D+G’s philosophy, the order-word is “the elementary unit of language” or, rather, “a function coextensive with language” (ATP 76). Information as order-words contains a “strict minimum” of meaning, since it functions only “to [give] life orders” (D+G, ATP 76). Therefore, as Mark Hansen puts it, paraphrasing Deleuze, in its purest theoretical form, information can only provide “a mechanical surrogate for thought” (“Cinema” 55). Information hereby provides an “existential imperative” which leads to an “incorporeal transformation” (Massumi, User’s 33). Massumi explains further this imperative function of information’s semantic content:
“Order” should be taken in both senses: the statement gives an order (commands) and establishes an order (positions bodies in a force field). The order-word culminates transformations that place the concerned body or bodies in a position to carry out implicit obligations or follow a preset direction. (User’s 31)

For Deleuze, “information [as order-words] is exactly the system of control” in contemporary society (TRM 321). And what, specifically, is the [limited] content of this information under capitalism? What are we compelled to think, and, and therefore, to do? If the “essence of capitalism functions or ‘speaks’ only in the language of signs imposed on it by merchant capital or by the axiomatic of the market” (D+G, AO 241), the answer is straightforward: buy, consume, compete, trade, produce, work, live: only to contribute to the flow of capital. Marks offers “the ubiquity of the ‘mission statement’ in contemporary business and institutional culture” as one particular instance of this kind of informational control, to the extent that it equates to being told what to think by the corporation (“Information” 210). The all-pervasiveness of advertising and the circulation of brands and consumer goods can also be regarded as instances of order-word-style information. In a specific comment upon Deleuze’s view of the practice of thought in the informational age, Rajchmann describes the current situation as “a retreat of thought back into transcendence, reformulated as ‘communication’ or ‘information’” (141). Further interpreting Deleuze, Rajchmann expresses this version of transcendence as “a new enemy of thought, more insolent and self-assured than those of the last century—a communicational stupidity” (11). Information, in the form of the minimalistic order-word, as a kind of transcendence, then, suggests a newly emerged image of thought: informationalism. As for the communication of this information, it is disseminated not from the top down, as in earlier, “sovereign,” or “disciplinary” social formations (Deleuze, N 177), but more by way of a sprawling, flexible network. Rajchmann warns, however, “we shouldn’t believe that the new ideas of ‘flexibility’ (in contrast to ‘top-down’ organisation) are there to save us; on the contrary, we must identify the new kinds of ‘control’ ... that they bring with them” (166n34).

In taking up Rajchmann’s recommendation that we identify the new kinds of control associated with the societal structure within which thought-as-information flows, a useful starting point is Terranova’s description of the overall cartography of network culture. She draws upon Hardt and Negri’s proposal that the new, open space of the communication network constitutes a new form of “Empire”:

The communication topology of Empire is complex as it is woven together by aeroplanes, freight ships, television, cinema, computers and telephony, but what all these different systems seem to have in common is their convergence on the figure not simply of the network, but of a kind of hypernetwork, a meshwork potentially connecting every point to every other point. As such, the network is becoming less a
description of a specific system, and more a catchword to describe the formation of a single and yet multidimensional information milieu—linked by the dynamics of information propagation and segmented by diverse modes and channels of circulation. (Terranova, Network 41)

In Hardt and Negri’s terms, this concept of Empire expresses the emergence of a “new form of sovereignty,” one that befits the global, informational age (xi). The defining features of Empire sovereignty are its boundlessness and its inclusivity: “[Empire] is a decentred and deterritorialising apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm with its open, expanding frontiers” (Hardt and Negri, Empire xii). Whereas previous forms of imperialist expansion may have operated by way of destruction, Hardt and Negri’s Empire is driven by the principle of incorporation: “when it expands, this new sovereignty does not annex or destroy the other powers it faces but on the contrary opens itself to them, including them in the network” (166). There seems nothing beyond Empire’s powers of expansion or control, since the network effectively regulates all kinds of divergences. Deleuze describes the control of the expansive network society as “snake-like, since it ‘undulates’ in a ‘continuous and unbounded’ manner (N 180-81). The particular mechanism of dispersive control, for Deleuze, is a constant, interactive system of checkpoints or “codes,” which indicate “whether access to some information should be allowed or denied” (N 180). As Massumi puts it, “[h]ere the figure of power is no longer the billy club of the policeman, it’s the barcode or the PIN number” (“Navigating” 228). Stating it another way, Massumi proposes that control society functions by way of a process of “gatekeeping”:

> It’s all about checkpoints. At the grocery store counter, the barcode on what you’re buying checks the object out of the store. At the automatic bank teller, the PIN number on your card checks you into your account. [These checks] … lie in wait for you at key points. … You’re free to move … [but to] continue on your way you have to pass the checkpoint. … [This is] a highly localised, partial exercise of power—a micro-power. (“Navigating” 228-29)

Continuous assessments in schools and never-ending performance reviews in workplaces (including the academy) are further examples of this execution of control through constant monitoring, as is the deployment of inescapable surveillance technologies. On this last point, Virilio sees the information age as having brought about “a new type of panoptical control”: web-cams, “tele-surveillance,” and the interactivity of multi-media networks create a highly visible and transparent set of living conditions, so that we are currently subject to a “revolution of generalised snooping” (58-62). In other terms, this cybernetic panopticon can be described as “the globalisation of the gaze of the single eye” (Virilio 65; italics removed). Similarly, Mark Poster coins the term “superpanopticon” to describe this cybernetic form of control, since it is “a system of surveillance without walls, windows, towers or guards” (Mode 93).
Coming back to Massumi’s reference to pin numbers and barcodes, though, we also return to the significance of capitalism in the functioning of informational, control societies. In his essay “Postscript on Control Societies,” Deleuze makes several key points in this regard, the strongest of which relates to the passage from nineteenth century factory-based capitalism to the age of business. In Hardt and Negri’s terms, “the information[s]ation of industry” has led to “the assembly line [being] replaced by the network as the organi[s]ational model of production” (Empire 294, 295). When structured in horizontal networks, production becomes effectively “deterioralised,” meaning that the “manipulation of knowledge and information” is not restricted by any territorial or physical constraints (Hardt and Negri, Empire 294-95). In this context, capitalism becomes even freer to flow: geographical proximity between workers is irrelevant, as is any distance between producer and consumer (Hardt and Negri, Empire 295-96). Moreover, for Hardt and Negri, when transactions become more immediate, the flow of information/capital is intensified, and when production nodes can be located anywhere, labouring populations become more insecure in their employment, and therefore more controllable (Empire 296-97). In Deleuze’s view, these “labouring populations” are no longer focusing on early stage production, which is often relegated to the Third World, but, instead, on “metaproduction” (N181). He explains:

[Capitalism] no longer buys raw materials and no longer sells finished products: it buys finished products or assembles them from parts. What it seeks to sell is services, and what it seeks to buy, activities. It’s a capitalism no longer directed toward production but toward products, that is, toward sales or markets. (N181)

Deleuze further notes that in capitalism today a business’ sales department has becomes its centre or “soul”—an occurrence he finds “terrifying” (N181). With marketing at the helm of present day business, the accurate targeting of consumers is crucial. Therefore, collecting “information on people’s patterns and tastes” becomes a primary goal, one that is taken care of by the system of checks we are subject to:

The checkpoint system allows information to be gathered at every step you take. You’re providing a continuous feed, which comes back to you in advertising pushing new products, new bundlings of potential. ... Your everyday movements and leisure activities have become a form of value-producing labour. ... Life movements, capital and power become one continuous operation—check, register, feed-in, processing, feedback, purchase, profit, around and around. (Massumi, “Navigating” 229-30)

As Berardi describes it, “[t]he human body and mind are caught in a permanent circuit of electrocution; they are now part of an integrated circuit of information” (“Technology” 63).

The implications for thought of this circuitous checkpoint system is that it does not go beyond the information that is the system’s motor: information about ourselves that we plug into the system, and information such as pin numbers that we have to remember in order to function
in the system. To think in such a network is to contribute and trade in information that will enhance the system, and to be aware that whenever we do not think in this way, we will block the flow of information/capital and be left out of the feedback loop. The order-word is clear: feed the system that feeds you by processing and contributing compressed bits of/to the flow of information; let capitalism do the thinking. In this system “the complexity of the socius” is simplified and made manageable “by compressing variations in tastes, timetables, and orientations” and making them move “to the rhythm of market expansions and contractions” (Terranova, Network 35). There is no room for the thought of pure difference—such events are becoming too singular to be of interest to the market. This phase of control, according to Berardi, is beyond formal and real capitalist subsumption: it is capitalism “imprinted on the collective intelligence, inside the techno-social interfaces, in the semiotic framework of social communications” (“Response”). With the permeation of every social space by the networks of control it is increasingly difficult to find the ways and means to enter a creative, differing thought. The typical family home, for instance, is now fully charged with informational technologies, making it a space heavily “populated by voices, by images, by sounds, by ideas, by games, by color[s], by news” (Castells, High 18). Massumi further explains how such technologies work in/through the home:

The around-the-clock access to the home by communication technologies (mail delivery, telephone and answering machine, fax, e-mail, radio, TV) opens wide its codings to high-volume and highly random passage, of signs if not of human bodies. In spite of the locks on the door, the event-space of the home must be seen as … a regime of openness to sign circulation—to the delivery, absorption, and relay of sounds, words, and visions … . (Parables 85).

All elements of society—individuals, families, workplaces, transport modes, leisure activities and spaces—are technologically enmeshed in the network, to the extent that we are rarely not taken up by the flows (of images, information, commodities, money) (Massumi, Parables 87). The network itself “can no longer be ignored as a global power formation in its own right,” and this power formation goes by the name of capitalism, since capital is the only flow-form that “traverses every event-space and piggy-backs every intervallic body without exception” (Massumi, Parables 88).

The media: capitalist thought in transmission

In dealing with networks of control and their impacts upon thought we simply cannot overlook the role of the media, a component of the information era that D+G view with great aversion. Because of the hegemony of media systems in contemporary life, Lash proclaims that “the information society is just as much and perhaps more accurately labelled ‘the media society’” (65). The concept of “media” has moved through several stages—from “a broad sense
of the middle” in the 16th century, to today’s commonplace notion that media encompasses “the process of dissemination, or circulation, of information by means of some particular channel of communication” (Morley 211, 212). In recent decades the idea of media has come to refer chiefly to the ‘communication media’ and the institutions and organisations in which people work (the press, cinema, broadcasting, publishing and so on) and the cultural and material products of those institutions” (Lister et al 10). As John Thompson puts it, “when we use the term ‘communication media’ we often think of a ... specific set of institutions and products: we think of books, newspapers, television and radio programmes, films, tapes, compact discs and so on” (24). Of these, newspapers, television, radio, and any form of widely published/broadcast journalism/opinion are typically categorised as “mass media,” a term which first gained usage in the 1930s (McQuail, “Origins” 13). An agreed definition of the mass media is difficult to come by, but Janowitz’s early description remains useful: mass media is the system “by which speciali[s]ed ... groups employ technological devices (press, radio, films, etc.) to disseminate symbolic content to large heterogeneous and widely dispersed audiences” (Janowitz 41). The beginnings of the mass media as we know it can be traced to the early 1800s, when, with technological developments in the printing industry and rising rates of urban population and literacy, the newspaper industry grew into a broad-scale commercial operation (J. Thompson 76-77). That other stalwart of mass media, broadcasting, developed a little later—radio in the 1920s and television in the late 1940s (J. Thompson 79). For John Thompson, the early stages of broadcasting occurred in a framework of power that involved, on the one hand, “the commercial interests of the media industries,” and, on the other, governmental attempts to “regulate, cultivate and control [this] new media” (79). Of course, by now society is deeply capitalistic and, accordingly, capitalist systems and ideologies ultimately determine the content and processes of mass media activities. James Curran suggests that it may be argued that media producers do this unconsciously (77); it is difficult to deny, though, that under neoliberalism the drive for capital is largely overt:

In sum, the dominant media firms are quite large businesses; they are controlled by very wealthy people or by managers who are subject to sharp constraints by owners and other market[profit-oriented forces; and they are closely interlocked, and have important common interests with other major corporations, banks, and government.

This is [a] powerful filter that will affect news choices.  (Herman and Chomsky 14)

In Ben Bagdikian’s view, the increased concentration of media ownership over the past few decades has led to a “[p]rivate [m]inistry of [i]nformation,” involving a corporate control of narrowed media content (1-9). A key figure in this concentration of ownership is Rupert Murdoch, whose media control is so extensive that Daya Kishan Thissu calls the general process by which media power has shifted from the public to private/multinational/multimedia corporations the “Murdochisation” of the media (7).
Undoubtedly, the media of mass communication is currently undergoing revision with the growth of electronic and digital media technologies—technologies we will address forthwith. But radio, printed newspapers and television continue to assail public consciousness, generating abundant profits for media corporations, and so we remain, for now, with these formats. In considering how these media affect thought today, we begin with the content presented by the mass media system, which is to say, the messages that are transmitted “from the few to the many” (Morley 212)—remembering, of course, that in an informational milieu this content will be of a limited nature. We have already noted Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s position that the commercial nature of the large media organisations will affect the content of information they present to viewers/readers/listeners—and this is in spite of the fact that, from a normative perspective at least, the media purport to offer “value-free, balanced and independent” reportage (Lowes 163). Put simply, “it is not in the interests of a profit-seeking corporation to give a platform to people and ideas that represent its antithesis” (Lowes 163). David Lowes offers the following examples of contemporary mass media bias towards the preferred meanings of capitalism:

The state and corporately owned media have neither questioned the thesis that the process of globalisation is pursued primarily on behalf of the poor, nor publicised the existence of viable alternatives and analyses. The effects of free-trade agreements on national sovereignty, corporate profits and the living and working standards of those who sell their labour-power in developing countries receive similarly scant attention. Media managers, editors and journalists present information about “celebrities,” stock markets and the activities of politicians as news, while protest and direct action are marginalised and distorted. (163)

In order to test Lowes’ claim in the final sentence above, we survey a 44 page, June 2007 issue of the Rupert Murdoch owned, national daily Australian broadsheet, The Australian. Whilst the broadsheet newspaper format generally connotes a more serious, “intellectual”—and, by extension, less biased—level of reportage than that of a tabloid, an informal count of the number of pages containing any items relating to Lowes’ categories above reveals the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Celebrities (including sporting celebrities)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock markets</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians’ activities</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct action</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1*
Survey of content in *The Australian*, 8 June, 2007
We carry out this exercise, not as a rigorous piece of quantitative research, but as an informal spot-check of Lowes' statement. This particular newspaper issue provides a good test of his claim, since the 2007 world G8 (Group of 8 largest economies) Summit—usually accompanied by well-organised protests and direct action events—was in its third day at the resort of Heiligendamm, Germany. In this issue of the *Australian*, the summit receives two favourable articles and one large, approbatory photograph—all placed top and centre on the page (11). The only item reporting G8 counter-activities is positioned to the side of the page and accompanied by a much smaller, decidedly neutral image. The paper's only other (small) article concerning any kind of protest relates to a new coalmine planned for Australia's Hunter Valley region; here, too, the protest is neutralised, or even negated: first, by the article's headline, “Coalmine Wins Approval Despite Protests,” and also by its final pro-economic position (6). This issue of the paper reports no direct action activities, but, as the table shows, considerable space is allocated to political events and stockmarket matters. Further, when pages that feature sporting stars are counted, the number of celebrity pages overall rivals what one might expect from a tabloid publication. In general, then, it seems that this mini-survey upholds Lowes' argument regarding the strict selection criteria.

According to eminent mass communication theorist Denis McQuail, the skewing of content discussed by Lowes is easily explained by the logic of capital:

> The main imperative on the media institution, stemming mainly from commercial motives, is for each channel to maximize the attention it receives under conditions of relentless competition (for audience and advertising income). The working assumption of media is that attention is best gained by appealing to sensation and human interest. The grooming of media “stars” and “personalities,” on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the intense focus on prominent human beings and dramatic or exciting events and spectacles are the agreed means to gain attention. (“Origins” 13)

As Arjen Mulder puts it, “[i]f an event is to appear in the media—to become infotainment—it must meet the criteria of topicality and entertainment” (“Media” 292-93). The result is that the “[d]istinctions between entertainment and news [become] artificial because they are all part of the same media spectacle, interspersed with the same advertisements in a seamless, everpresent montage” (Gamson et al 387). It is also important to note also that the media’s emphasis on “commercial messages,” along with “the focus on entertainment,” amounts to a powerful kind of censorship:

> [I]nformation is controlled or mediated in a manner that influences the expectations of people, setting limits on what they see as possible and providing trivial subject matter as the basis for social interaction. (Lowes 163)
In a commerce-based culture, media content tends toward entertainment, amusement and escapism, and, to a large extent, can be regarded as “superficial, undemanding and conformist, ... derivative and standardi[s]ed” (McQuail, *McQuail’s Mass 106*). This controlling of what matters is well illustrated through another 2007 example: the media coverage of celebrity hotel heiress Paris Hilton’s spell in and release from jail. In June 2007, Hilton served a three-week jail sentence (reduced from forty-five days) for driving on a suspended licence, thus violating a parole relating to an earlier traffic conviction. Hilton’s incarceration “ignited a worldwide media frenzy and debate about celebrity justice” (“Paris Hilton Leaves”), and when, a few days into her sentence, she was released into home detention—only to be sent straight back to jail by her sentencing judge—the item made the top five of all stories covered across five major sectors of the US media (including newspaper, internet, radio, network and cable TV outlets) for the entire week (Jerkowitz). Significantly, this occurred in what Journalism.org (a non-partisan research organisation providing on-going analysis of the US news agenda) described as “a very crowded news week,” with many “weighty events” (Jerkowitz). The Hilton story took precedence over such issues as the war in Iraq, the G8 Summit, and congressional corruption matters (“PEJ”). Hilton’s final release from prison also sparked high levels of reportage—although one US journalist did attempt to take an oppositional stance to the Hilton hysteria. Mika Brzezinski, co-presenter of cable news channel MSNBC’s early news programme, simply refused to lead the bulletin with the Paris Hilton story, and so “screwed up, shredded and attempted to set fire to the script on air” (“Presenter”). Her efforts to veto Hilton can be regarded as having been nullified, however, by the intervention of her two male co-hosts, who made good entertainment out of Brzezinski’s attempts by humorously goading her as she tried to make her point (“Mika”). While the news item was not read, Hilton certainly received plenty of exposure through the antics of Brzezinski’s co-hosts, and Hilton’s release still received optimal coverage across other new sources. Indeed, when Hilton gave her first post-jail interview on CNN’s “Larry King Live,” she drew 3.2 million viewers (three times the programme’s usual audience [“Paris Hilton Interview”]). Such ratings provide evidence of the power of trivial subject matter in the media. This example also points to the particular potency of television, a medium that “can count on the [wide] accessibility of the necessary technology (the TV set) and on the high impact of images and sounds broadcast in real time” (Terranova, *Network 41*). As Terranova points out, “from local and national broadcasting channels to satellite TV such as CNN and Al-Jazeera,” television has the reach and power “to capture the passions of the global masses” (Terranova, *Network 41*). But the spread of the televiusal message amongst diverse audiences does not equate to the spread of a thought enabling of difference: even Marshall McLuhan, who privileges television as a medium that, above all, “demands a creatively participant response,” acknowledges that television is fundamentally homogenising, in the sense that it addresses a “homogenised consumer” (368, 253).
For D+G, the entertainment and consumerist focus of media has grave ramifications for our ability to engage with real thought. To begin with, although such media may have a high impact in terms of (spectacular) images and sounds, Deleuze points out that the full force of an event can never be relayed:

I don’t think the media have much capacity or inclination to grasp an event. In the first place, they often show a beginning or end, whereas even a short or instantaneous event is something going on. And then, they want something spectacular, whereas events always involve periods when nothing happens. (N 159-60)

The media cannot capture D+G’s events since events always involve something incorporeal: “an event is not a particular … happening itself [, but rather] the potential immanent within a particular confluence of forces” (Stagoll, “Event” 87). Events involve the virtual, and as such, “carry no determinate outcomes” (Stagoll, “Event” 88). The media’s transmission of spectacles simply cannot access this positive dynamism. Guattari adds that “information filtered through the massmedia industry […] retains only a description of events and never problemati[ses] what is at stake, in its full amplitude” (GR 263). For D+G, there is a crucial relationship between thought, in terms of the creation of concepts, and events (as we will see in Part 2), which means that the media’s ignorance of the event is highly consequential. As Patton explains, real engagement with the event “orient[s] political thought and action”; this “enables us to become conscious of processes and forces at work in the present, those we might seek to advance as well as those we might oppose” (“World” par. 2). Rather than engaging with events, the media, for Deleuze, is simply full of “conversations”: it raises “no questions, no problems” (Gilles). Television is particularly deleterious for thought: in Deleuze’s view, it is “an all-purpose medium that’s an offence to all thinking” (N 154). He further explains: “If one sees the usual level [of] television, even in supposedly serious broadcasts,” it is replete with questions such as “‘what do you think of this?’ [which] does not constitute a problem, but a demand for one’s opinion” (Gilles). Sociologist Sherry Turkle concurs, stating that in media culture people base their thoughts on “what everyone else thinks. But we learn what everyone else thinks by reading [or viewing] highly polarised opinions that encourage choosing sides rather than thinking things through” (“I’ll Have” 49).

For D+G, opinion bears little relationship to real thought, since the “essence of opinion is will to majority,” and, in contemporary life, this coincides with the “perceptions and affections of the capitalist himself [sic]” (WP 146). Put another way, opinion is nothing more than reductive generalisation (Colebrook, Gilles 16). In the words of Italian sociologist Franco Ferrarotti, television “defrauds us of real human knowledge and participation, one which is unpredictable and dramatic” (32), which is to say, television deprives us of the experience of thinking difference. Of course, television’s (as well as other media’s) use of advertising is the most overtly restrictive media practice in this regard, inasmuch as it is specifically geared
towards producing capital. In the regime of advertising even the audience is the product, to
the extent that when advertisers' funds pay for programmes, they demand a “quality” audience
in terms of “buying power” (Herman and Chomsky 16). The influence of advertisers also has a
major impact on content: “[p]rojects unsuitable for corporate sponsorship tend to die on the
vine. … [S]tations have learned to be sympathetic to the most delicate sympathies of the
corporations” (“Arts” 110). For example, corporate advertisers will usually decline to sponsor
programmes that include any “serious criticisms of corporate activities, such as the problem of
environmental degradation, the workings of the military-industrial complex, or corporate
support of and benefits from Third World tyrannies” (Herman and Chomsky 17). So as to
serve their advertisers, programmers strive to create and maintain a “buying mood” by
offering, again, light and entertaining content (Herman and Chomsky 17). The directive to
think in particular ways is clear: buy, consume, do not problematise, do not engage in thought
outside of capital.26 And when advertisers promote their more earnest side in claiming it is
they (not philosophers) who foster creative thinking through their invention of advertising
“concepts,” Deleuze is aghast—disputing the contribution made to true thought by “the
concept of a brand of noodles” (Gilles). As we have already noted, in Stiegler’s estimation,
such a “thought-less” society is also a society without love, for “to love” has become
synonymous with “to buy” (“Disaffected”). The effects of consumption-channelled thought
upon familial love particularly disturb Stiegler, who sees that parents today are induced to buy
for, rather than love, their children:

[P]arents incited … to consume more and more by the combined power of television,
radio, newspapers, advertising campaigns, junk mail, editorials, and political speeches,
all speaking only of boosting levels of consumption … find themselves expelled from a
position where they could love their children truly, practically, and socially.
(“Disaffected”)

Stiegler thus sees “the poison of hyperconsumption”—fuelled in particular by the “hard drug”
of television—as responsible for much suffering today (“Disaffected” 2-3). When consumption
becomes an addiction it also becomes pathological, the prevalence of which is a sure
impediment to any positive movement of thought-as-creation.

Approaching the issue from a different angle, media theorists David Altheide and Robert Snow
claim that all media and formats are underpinned by a forceful kind of “media logic.”
Regardless of the specific format, all media utilise and promote a logic (way of
communicating, way of seeing) that, due to the pervasiveness of media, has become the logic
of “normalised’ social life” (Altheide and Snow 12). Because “media logic is so incorporated
into contemporary society … media professionals and the public take for granted that ’seeing’
social phenomena through media logic is ‘normal” (236). The result of adopting a media logic
is that ”people have effectively developed a [restrictiveness of] consciousness that affects how
they perceive, define and deal with their environment” (Altheide and Snow 16). This accounts for Herbert Schiller’s broad summation that the media are the key element in an “organic process by which the corporate ‘voice’ is generalised across the entire range of cultural expression” (44). From Ferrarotti’s perspective, the mass media preclude any deep experience of the everyday because such a consciousness “requires time, a taste for details, sharpness of sight, ... a nose for dark corners and byways, a sense of touch, openness and availability to what is new and unexpected” (2). The “technological imperatives” and “mental habits” of a mass mediated culture mean that we are constantly subject to a logic based on the sameness of media imagery, and are simply "unable to cope with meaningful discontinuities” (Ferrarotti 2). Ferrarotti’s summation of the impact of mass media forms—television in particular—is that it strips away singularity and difference (77-78). He writes:

In an age dominated by the mass media and their logic, [difference] slackens and clouds over. ... [The mass media] have simply emptied out the problem of the relation between history and the everyday, power and the masses, by flattening everything; they have made it harder to distinguish, in the undifferentiated quantity of information, what counts and what is important from what is less so, or not at all. In this sense they have built a wall of apparent plausibility, ... which scantifies and immortalises existing social and political conditions. (79)

In his account, Lash describes the logic of television as an informational logic, and information, as a type of “material culture,” is distinguishable "from other cultural contents through its duration, its temporality” (68-69). As with all information, Lash contends that television's primary characteristic is its real time, instantaneous modality (69). Since one corollary of information's immediacy is its short-lived-ness (information is only valid for a very short time [72-73]), the informational bits that are characteristic of television—“news, sporting events, soap operas, comedy—decline quickly in value after they are transmitted” (Lash 69). Newspapers, too, are informational to the extent that they present information, "bits’’/’’bytes” of culture, in real time, and because information-value does not endure, new information must be presented (never re-presented) in a rapidly turning cycle (Lash 69-73). The mode of attention appropriate to consuming these informational media is not depth of thought, but "distraction” (Lash 71). We flick through the paper, flick through the channels, often while simultaneously doing something else. Such inattentive connection to media leads to, as Ferrarotti indicates, a lack of real connection to the lives of others (5), and a lack of involvement in any of thought’s virtual potential. Ferrarotti’s overall contention is that mediatic deluges of imagery cancel out variation, circumstance and individual detail (2-3), and, from the informational viewpoint, Lash, points to the distrait manner of mind that is connected with such media (71). For Guattari, the overall consequences of the mediatisation of thought are quite dire: “the banality of the world represented to us by the media ... surround us with a reassuring atmosphere in which nothing is any longer of real consequence. We
cover our eyes; we forbid ourselves to think about the turbulent passage of our times” (GR 262). Deleuze expresses his view succinctly: the lack of creation taking place today in the context of television, the press and such like amounts to “the submission of thought to the media” (TRM 147).

New media: digitalisation and thought

To refer to "new media" is already to invite controversy, since, as Wendy Hui Kyong Chun points out, much critical dispute has centred on such questions as, "What is/are new media? Is new media new? What is new about new media?" (2). Lister and associates also indicate the unsettled nature of the concept: "[a]t the very least we face, on the one hand, a rapidly changing set of formal and technological experiments and, on the other, a complex set of interactions between new and established media forms" (9-10). Although new media is a "plural noun," it is treated as if it is a singular entity (Chun 1), a practice that belies the situation's complexity. Many commentators, however, would agree with digital media theorist and practitioner Noah Wardrip-Fruin that new media generally refers to "the use of the digital computer as an expressive medium." Lister and colleagues also note that new media is commonly understood as digital media, which "is a shorthand for 'media that use computers'" (14). If traditional, analogue media (such as a typewriter or single-lens reflex camera) use physical processes to capture and store information in a physical (or electronic) form that is analogously related to the original, digital media processes convert all input information to numbers (Lister et al 14). More specifically, "digital media are all media programmed using a basic code of zeros and ones" (Mulder, Understanding 169). Many digital media types, including "texts, still images, moving images, sound," use digital representation, but it is the computer that is the primary display and distribution device for these media objects (Manovich 19, 49). Thus, any process or cultural object that is produced and experienced by way of digital computer technologies can be regarded as new media, and this will include the internet, Virtual Reality, computer games, email, digital photography, CD-ROMs, MP3 music, and so on. It might be said that a primary consequence of new media, because of the conversion to digitalisation, is the "convergence between all existing media forms in terms of their organisation, distribution, reception and regulation" (McQuail, McQuail's Mass 118)—with the computer being the point of convergence. Indeed, the historical significance of the computer has prompted German media theorist Friedrich Kittler to call it "the universal medium" ("On"). Neil Postman remarks that this "quality of universality" is due not only to the "infinitely various uses" of the computer, but also to the fact that more and more, computers are "integrated into the structures of other machines." The concept of new media may be further defined by several more specific principles: for example, modularity, automation, variability, transcoding (Manovich 30-48), or, from another perspective,
interactivity, hypertextuality, dispersal and virtuality (Lister et al 13-37). Broadly speaking, though, it is useful to conceive of new media as comprising a wide "set of computer data," which include all "graphics, moving images, sounds, shapes, spaces, and texts that have become computable" (Manovich 20).

Of the various aspects of new media that will affect thought, perhaps the most important is digitality, since it is the digital that underpins all new media formats/technologies. Before considering the implications of digitality for thought, though, we should first understand the digital media process itself. Lister and partners explain it this way:

In [such a] process the physical properties of the input data, light and sound waves, are converted not into another object but into numbers; that is, into abstract symbols rather than analogous objects and physical surfaces. ... Once coded numerically, the input data in a digital media production can immediately be subject to the mathematical processes of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division through algorithms contained in software. (15)

The computer, then, as media theorist Aden Evens tells us, is a digital instrument “in that everything it accepts as input, everything it stores, and everything it generates as output are, in effect, numbers,” with all manipulations of these numbers being reducible to “0 and 1, on and off” (“Concerning” 51). Accordingly, anything that appears on a computer screen, or is stored within or processed by a computer, is reducible to the “possibilities of the binary” (Evens, “Concerning” 51-52). This process of digitalisation has several significant effects: for example, texts of all kinds become "dematerialised," vast quantities of information become compressed, and data can be accessed and manipulated far more swiftly and efficiently than analogue types could (Lister et al 16). Overall, Evens suggests that, due to its logic and numerical character, the digital brings a welcome order to technology:

Digits provide a universal standard that is easily transportable, exactly duplicable, and broadly applicable. Analysis of digital data allows the immediate detection and correction of variation across space and time. Accurate predictions are possible in extraordinarily complicated circumstances: just crunch the numbers. (“Concerning” 53)

According to this viewpoint, the great advantage of the digital derives from its formal nature: due to the exactness of the binary code interactions with the digital can be conducted with remarkable certainty, and yield the valuable results of measurability, verifiability, robustness and repeatability (Evens, “Concerning” 53, 56). Thus, in "representing the formal properties of an object independently of the object itself,” we establish a standard, which is easily replicable, and allows for analysis and comparison using standard statistical procedures—regardless of the origin or type of data (Evens, “Concerning” 59-60).
Already, though, we can begin to see problems for thought in this digital system. While its orderly functioning bears many practical advantages, in an ontological sense these processes have the effect of reducing difference to sameness, and of being controlled by procedures of reproducibility, in a manner reminiscent of D+G’s royal science. Such precision of data management is, in other words, also a highly restrictive mechanism. Because the binary code “determines what can be represented as digital data and what operations can alter those data,” and since “[f]orm and form alone” can be represented, duplicated and repeated, the digital will only capture that which is reducible to its formulae; what is left out, then, is “the singular, the unique, the immediate” (Evens, “Concerning” 52, 53). From an ethical perspective, this reduction of life to formal principles is problematical, since the creativity of the virtual, in Deleuze’s sense, far exceeds what can be extracted and manipulated according to a binary system. As well as these limitations of the binary code, the absolute distinction between 0 and 1 is exceptionable: “[b]etween 0 and 1 there is nothing, no milieu, no remainder, so that a given bit asserts its blunt edge as the limit of its subtlety (Evens, “Concerning” 57). As Evens points out, “between any two actual individuals, there is always something more, something fuzzy, something to be determined” (“Concerning” 57). While digital forms are sharply divided, one from the other, actual beings are not so clearly demarcated. Of course, this reference to the richness of the middle bespeaks Deleuze’s concept of becoming, which is based on the notion of the creative power of interstitial spaces: what matters “is always the middle, not the beginning or the end”; it is the “intermezzos, intermezzi” that are the “sources of creation,” says Deleuze (D 28). For the purposes of digital representation, though, the fuzziness of actuality must be divided “into ranges of quality determined by endpoints or thresholds” (Evens, “Concerning” 57). And while the range between two thresholds (the resolution) is actually a whole extent of quality, the digital imposes a fixed value on that range—thereby homogenising the actual heterogeneity (Evens, “Concerning” 58). In this process, the qualitative richness of whatever falls outside of the digital resolution value is simply discarded. Evens echoes Deleuze when he locates the differentiation between this actual and the digital in the actual being’s “haecceity, a ’here-ness’ or singularity”—which is the actual’s generative power (“Concerning” 58). As Evens explains, actuality essentially includes “a force of productivity that sets it in motion” (“Concerning” 58)—this force being Deleuze’s virtual. Again, we can invoke Deleuze’s distinction between potentiality/virtuality and the realm of the possible, as Massumi reminds us: “[t]he medium of the digital is possibility, not virtuality, and not even potential” (Parables 137). Indeed, for Massumi, “[n]othing is more destructive for the thinking and imaging of the virtual than equating it with the digital” (Parables 137). In fact, digital technologies have a particularly “weak connection to the virtual,” since they operate by systematising the possible (Massumi, Parables 137). While the virtual produces actuality, the possible only enables the real, through the process of realisation—a temporal process that, as Grosz reminds us, does not allow creativity and the
new (“Thinking” 26): it is duration and the virtual that yield creative emergence. Amongst the “reservoir of potentialities that have not yet been tapped,” which makes up the virtual (Shaviro, “Kant”), is thought that is different and new. Thought is located in the “intelligence of the virtual” (Rajchmann, qtd. in Marks, “Information” 209), which means it is only in the virtual that we find “the capacity to distinguish between real and false problems and to resist doxa” (Marks, “Information” 209). Thought thus conceived is not accessible in the static formality of the digital world’s binary possibilities.

While on the face of it, then, it may seem that as digital consciousness moves outside the rigidity of the analogue, its associated thought prospects will be greatly potentiated, this can only constitute a kind of “pseudocreativity” (Evens “Concerning” 69). As Turkle notes, “[d]espite the ever-increasing complexity of software, most computer environments put users in worlds based on constrained choices” (“How”). Interacting with the world through the digital would mean thinking according to the terms provided by the digital, which is to say along the lines of generic standards and reproducible reductions. Again, real thought taps into duration, whereas the digital only allows for time divided into bytes. Users of computers must “organise their thoughts and goals” into files and their operations, think within the boundaries of software choices, and, in the case of audiovisual technology, conform to “time slots, linearity, succession, inputs and outputs” (Evens, “Concerning” 68). To illustrate more broadly our experience in the digital world, it is worth quoting Evens again:

Human beings, apprehended as digital, are nothing more than a sum of formal characteristics: a digital résumé, a set of statistics, usage habits, sites visited, target marketing groups, a digital voice print, a digital signature, a digital image, homepage, isp, ip address, screen name. ... The digital world does not offer a new experience each time, does not unfold itself to reveal unique forces gathered from the depths of history, for a digital object is static and without history; it offers instead the promise of generic and repeatable experience, measured by bandwidth, buyable by the byte. (“Concerning” 65)

The “language of control,” Deleuze tells us, is digital (N 180). To think in such an environment will not be a matter of, as Postman puts it, addressing any of the “fundamental questions we need to address [such as] why we fight each other or why decency eludes us so often, especially when we need it the most.” Rather, the dominant message in the digital environment is that “through more and more information, more conveniently packaged, more swiftly delivered, we will find solutions to our problems” (Postman). Postman wonders what might be achieved if the talents and energies of computer scientists—those masters of digital technology who are so richly rewarded by capital—are turned to the real questions of our age: “[w]ho knows what we could learn from such people—perhaps why there are wars, and hunger, and homelessness and mental illness and anger.” Massumi, too, argues against any
notion that the digital is an essentially creative field: for him, the sets of "alternative routines" of digitisation amount to a process of "[s]tep after plodding step. Machinic habit" (*Parables* 137).

According to Massumi, however, it is important to remember that the "digital age" has not rendered the analogue defunct (143). Instead, Massumi argues that the analogue must be retained: it is superior to the digital since it is the very "process" of the virtual (*Parables* 135, 142). Moreover, it is only through the analogue that digital operations have any link at all to potential and the virtual (*Parables* 138). Massumi uses analogue in its more "technical" sense, which is to say that it is not an analogue "of anything in particular," but, instead, is "a continuously variable impulse or momentum that can cross from one qualitatively different medium into another. Like electricity into sound waves. Or heat into pain. Or light waves into vision" (*Parables* 135). This is to use a topological approach to the virtual: to see the virtual as enfolded in the "continuity of transformation" that all visual, verbal or aural images undergo (*Parables* 133-35). In this approach, the analogue is referenced only to itself, but it is a constantly, qualitatively transforming self, through which the virtual can be processually sensed. The digital is not related to the potentialities of the virtual through its own nature, but only through the process of the analogue (*Parables* 138). To explain how this works Massumi uses the examples of word processing and hypertext. The codes that contain the letters, words and images are digital, which is to say an "electronic nothingness, pure systemic possibility" (*Parables* 138). Even when the words and sentences appear on the screen they remain code, until they are read, which is an analogue process: "[t]he analog[ue] process of reading translates ASCII code into figures of speech enveloping figures of thought, taken in its restrictive sense of conscious reflection" (*Parables* 138). In an analogue act, reading qualitatively and topologically transforms the digital code into something else—something that comes closer to thought than any digital code alone could. For behind the conscious thought that occurs during the analogue process of reading is the felt thought—the sensation encompassing the thought—its virtual potential. Such thought is not available in the possibilities of digital algorithms themselves: it must be activated by opening to the virtual, through analogue processes. Presenting a similar argument in different terms, Evens states that in itself, the digital is sterile, unproductive and uncreative, but creative intervention is possible—at the interface where the human interacts with the digital: "It is the monitor, the digital-to-analog[ue] converter, the keyboard and mouse that determine the ways in which we accede to pure form when we interact with digital data. By challenging the interface to offer a more human experience," he argues, "we fend off, at least for a moment, the threat of digital reduction" ("Concerning" 68, 69). Hansen’s work on the digital image also draws attention to the interface, in the sense that he argues for a more processual understanding: for him, the digital image is a process in which "the body, in conjunction with the various apparatuses for
tendering information perceptible, gives form to or in-forms information” (10). In other words, “information is [only] made perceivable through embodied experience” (Hansen 10). And he agrees with Massumi that this embodied experience connects to the virtual through analogical processes (161). But again we have wandered, for the prospect of accessing the virtual in the digital world will be properly explored in Part 2. Since Deleuze claims that “control societies function ... with information technology and computers” (N 180), we remain for now in the analysis of how these technologies can be confining for thought.

Other theorists propose alternative means of approaching the ways that digitalisation, information and computer technologies affect the way we think. Mulder, for example, draws on McLuhan to suggest that the more digitised information we receive, the less we think; “information overload,” he argues, kills off both the imagination and the will to act (43). But it is Berardi’s perspective on the implications of the digital that we finish with here, since he raises several critical issues. One of Berardi’s focuses is the realm of sensibility, a thought-realm corresponding to D+G’s affect, which Berardi describes as “the ability to detect, interpret, and understand signs that cannot be translated into words” (“I Want”). According to Berardi, “[t]he digitalisation of the communicative environment and even of the perceptive environment acts on the sensibility of human organisms, without a doubt” (“Biopolitics”). To begin with, the “acceleration and information overload” of digital culture lead to an “impoverishment of experience,” in the sense that we cannot possibly absorb the flood of stimuli we are exposed to (“Biopolitics”). Berardi calls this the “subsumption of the mind,” whereby the “conscious and sensitive organism is submitted to competitive pressure, to an acceleration of stimuli, to constant attentive stress” (“Schizo-Economy” 76). As a result, our sensibility is corroded, and our reactions become automatic, or standardised, as prescribed by the “preformatted chain of actions and reactions of the homogenised infosphere” (“Biopolitics”). Elsewhere he calls this “a digital formatting of the mind” (“I Want”). For Berardi, this automatism, with its accompanying desensitivity to the unpredictable or the non-codified, has another disturbing effect. Due to “the insertion of the electronic in the organic,” there has been a marked shift in the way that relationality occurs between conscious organisms (Berardi, “Sensitivity”). One aspect of this shift is a diminution of empathy, or in the “affective and sensuous understanding of the other” (“I Want”). Underpinning this shift in relationality is a mutation in the “paradigm of exchange” between humans: interpersonal exchange has moved from the realm of “conjunction” to that of “connection” (Berardi, “Sensitivity”). In Berardi’s theory, conjunction and connection are two alternative modes of concatenation, or coming together. Simply put, conjunction is “a becoming other” (a concept that reflects Berardi’s association with Guattari), while “in connection each element remains distinct and interacts only functionally” (Berardi, “Sensitivity”). Connection, it seems clear, is the mode of exchange of digital culture. Berardi explains further:
Conjunction is the meeting and fusion of round and irregular shapes that are continuously weaselling their way about with no precision, repetition or perfection. Connection is the punctual and repeatable interaction of algorithmic functions, straight lines and points that overlap perfectly, and plug in or out according to discrete modes of interaction that render the different parts compatible to a pre-established standard. (“Sensitivity”)

The loss of conjunction as a mode of interaction involves other losses: newness, heterogeneity, ambiguity, empathy and becoming other. Conjunction touches the virtual in its admittance of the other’s potential. And since this becoming other is also largely material, there are also losses in flows of substance: “Conjunction is the endless readiness of bodies, signs and events to form rhizomes: the concrete, carnal and erotic concatenation of each pulsating fragment with each other pulsating fragment” (“Sensitivity”). For Berardi, the alternative world of connection is a posthuman one whose accelerated rhythms and nervous overloads have grave consequences, particularly for the younger generation. Indeed, Berardi suggests that the increased turning to psychopharmacological substances (cocaine, heroin, anti-depressants) may be a means of dealing with the coldness, lack of contact and social contraction inherent in digital culture (“Biopolitics”). And moreover, because capital today relies on the productive labour of our mental and psychic energies, it is all too ready to support the use of psychopharmaceuticals to alleviate our psychic suffering (“Schizo-Economy” 84).

One final point Berardi makes pertains to the effect of digitalisation on memory, a faculty strongly related to the virtual, and, therefore, to thought. As Berardi explains, the powers of memorisation “depend on the mind’s capacity to store information that has left a deep impression” (“Biopolitics”). But, for him, memorisation is reshaped by the digital, in the following way:

What happens to memory when the flow of information explodes, expands enormously, besieges perception, occupies the whole of available mental time, accelerates and reduces the mind’s time of exposure to the single informational impression? What happens here is that the memory of the past thins out and the mass of present information tends to occupy the whole space of attention. The greater the density of the infosphere, the scarcer is the time available for memorisation. The briefer the mind’s lapse of exposure to a single piece of information, the more tenuous will be the trace left by this information. In this way, mental activity tends to be compressed into the present, the depth of memory is reduced and thus the perception of the historical past and even of existential diachrony tends to disappear. (“Biopolitics”)

If the historical past disappears in the compressions of the digital, the outlook is troubling for the virtual past, where, for Bergson, the entirety of past experiences coheres with the present.
Lazzarato explains this memory as “the co-existence of all virtual remembrances,” and, accordingly, “[t]o remember something does not consist in looking for a remembrance in memory, as though one were rummaging through a drawer. To remember something ... is to actualise a virtual, and this actualisation is a creation” (“Concepts” 184, 185). Grosz, too, points out that memory is part of what life brings to the world: “the movement of actualisation of the virtual, expansiveness, opening up” (“Thinking” 25). Therefore, if the digital focuses upon the “perpetual present” (Virilio 125), and reduces our access to our deep and extended memory, to the virtual past, thought cannot access its fullest potential. If Berardi is correct, the consequences for thought of the impact of digital and computer technologies, are, at the least, extremely problematic. From an ethical viewpoint, this closing down of thought, memory and relation by information technologies needs urgent addressing, and calls for, in Berardi’s view (drawing upon Guattari), the development of a “postmedia sensibility” (Goddard, “Felix”). Again, we defer until Part 2 how this type of sensibility might take shape.

The internet, thought and capital

We cannot make a thorough investigation of the relationship between new media and thought without turning our attention more directly to what Terranova defines as “more than simply one medium among many” (Network 42). We have discussed computer technologies in terms of digitisation, and addressed the networked structure of contemporary society. However, in order to more fully understand the impact of new media forms, we must consider the role of the internet, that “network of networks” (Morris and Ogan 136). A multifaceted communication system that includes the World Wide Web, the internet is, at base, “a network of internationally connected computers operating according to agreed protocols” (McQuail, McQuail’s Mass 29). However, due to the exponential increase in its global usage over recent years (world internet usage increased by over 500% from 2000 to 2011, swelling from 360 million to almost 7 billion users over that period [“Internet Usage”]), this particular network requires serious scrutiny with regard to its impact upon thought. Such scrutiny is especially important since, as McQuail notes in 2000, “it is already apparent that the internet is being powerfully shaped more by the possibilities for economic exploitation than by the intrinsic capacities of the net or the dreams of its founders” (McQuail, “Origins” 10). Since its development in 1969, when it connected only four computers in California, the internet has undergone incredible transformation (Wellman and Hogan, “Internet”). Originally called the ARPANET, and established for military purposes, by the 1980s the Internet had expanded to serve a limited range of academic purposes (Golding 137). The 1990s, however, heralded what Barry Wellman and Bernie Hogan call “the first age of the Internet”: the time “when the Internet moved from the arcane scholarly world to homes and offices” (“Immanent”). With the development of the World Wide Web in 1989, and then “browsers” and user-friendly
software by 1993 (Golding 137), the Internet was proclaimed as “a technological marvel bringing a new Enlightenment to transform the world” (Haythornthwaite and Wellman 4). This was the Internet’s utopian era, offering such golden promises as unlimited connectivity, “free knowledge sharing and collaborative knowledge production, [and] more equality and liberty in a global social space” (Wenninger). According to Wellman and Hogan, though, the stock market’s dot.com bust of 2000 marked the end of this era, the bust reining in the euphoric rhetoric, and bringing expectations for the internet down to a more ordinary level (“Immanent”). And so the internet’s “second age” began, whereupon “the light that dazzled overheard [became] embedded in everyday things” (Haythornthwaite and Wellman 5). The internet’s sphere shifted from “a world of Internet wizards” to “a world of ordinary people routinely using the internet as an embedded part of their lives” (Haythornthwaite and Wellman 6). As Wellman and Hogan put it, “[t]he stand-alone capital-I ‘internet’ became the more widespread and complex small-i ‘internet’” (“Immanent”). And a decade on from 2000, the internet as an “ordinary” system has subsumed most of our other daily technologies, having become “our map and our clock, our printing press and our typewriter, our calculator and our telephone, ... our radio and TV” (Carr), and much more as we shall explore.30

The “ordinary” internet is, of course, massively extensive: statistics relating to usage in 2011 show that internet penetration has reached 78% of the North American population, 67% of Australia/Oceania and 61% of Europe (“Internet Usage”)—with these figures increasing by the day. And while an internet “digital divide” between the “haves” and “have nots” still exists, populations in developing nations are rapidly becoming connected: the largest growth in internet usage between 2000 and 2011 occurred in regions such as Africa and Latin America (3,000% and 1200% growth respectively) (“Internet Usage”). The United Nations (UN) regards spreading the internet throughout the whole world as such an urgent problem that they devoted their 2003 and 2005 World Summits to developing an ongoing action plan which would expedite a “global information society” (Drori 298, 297, 302).31 So if the majority of the developed world and fast increasing numbers in developing nations are on-line, what kinds of internet practices are they generally engaged in? According to the Pew Internet and American Life Project, a US-based research organisation, the most common online activities in America in 2011 were searching, emailing, shopping and social networking (Zickuhr and Smith 11-13). Other developed countries show similar trends: over 2010-2011 in Australia, email, searching, online banking and social networking were the most common actions (Australia, Australian), and in Britain, similar patterns are also evident (Dutton, Helsper, and Gerber 19-25). The list of other internet activities in which users participate is long, and includes: blogging (online diarising); posting ideas/information onto or as web pages; accessing/contributing to social network sites such as Facebook; accessing and uploading media streams (video, such as on YouTube, and radio); participating in chatrooms and discussion forums; instant messaging
and voice telephony; and online gaming (including MUDs or multiuser domain games). While many of these online activities may seem more related to the realms of, say, entertainment or social connectivity than commerce, many theorists are concerned about the “increasing corporate colonisation of cyberspace” (Marks, “Information” 195). In fact, since the mid-1990s the internet has been a commercial operation, underpinned by “a fully commercial set of backbone systems” (Golding 137). Internet service providers have always been (often large) public companies (Golding 137), and, in general, the principle of capital has driven the internet’s development and expansion (McChesney 39). In other words, in the world of new media the old adage still applies: “whoever can make the most money wins” (McChesney 39). Even the giants of “old media,” such as Rupert Murdoch, Time Warner and Disney have incorporated internet media into their empires, thereby increasing their net worth and enhancing their capacity to cross promote products (McChesney 38-41). Meanwhile, traditional media such as television and newspapers/magazines are being displaced onto the internet (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”), and, in their own media, are having to adapt to internet presentation styles—introducing “text crawls,” “pop-up ads,” and “easy-to-browse info-snippets” (Carr). Overall, it is fair to say that “the internet … has become fundamental to the global expansion of capitalist markets” (Coté 5).

The correspondence between corporate concerns and internet use is exemplified no better than in the case of the search engine, Google. As already noted, the internet’s search/research utility is its most used application (along with email). Google, being by far the most popular search engine worldwide (with an 80% average global market share across 2011 to early 2012 (“Google”)), is, then, the online function of choice for hundreds of millions of users around the world each day (Vise and Malseed 5). Indeed, building on the notion that the internet is now “much more about searching than connecting,” Ian Buchanan claims that “Google is effectively the commonsense understanding of what using the internet actually means, both practically and theoretically” (“Deleuze and the Internet”). As David Vise and Mark Malseed put it, Google and the internet can now be regarded “as one” (1). A public company since 2004, Google is a vast multinational operation, attracting revenue in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2011 of $US10.58 billion (a 25% increase from 2010’s Q4 revenue), and this includes a net profit of $US2.71 billion (Goodwin). Google does not charge its users directly, so how does it generate such immense profits? Vise and Malseed explain: “Google the search engine became Google the money machine” through advertising: advertisers pay to place “small, highly targeted text advertisements [AdWords] that searchers click on for information” (3). As well as gaining income from the ads themselves, Google also gets a percentage of every click onto these ads (Battelle 143). Google has been highly successful in generating income this way because, as Vise and Malseed note, they “figured out how to make advertising on the internet work effectively by targeting it to individuals at the moment they most need it: when searching for
information” (5). And with the increasing influx of advertising dollars traditionally spent on other media—such as television and print—Google is set to become even more profitable (Vise and Malseed 5).33 Not only does Google generate its own extraordinary profits, it is, by and large, one of the primary drivers of the commercial internet (Battelle 8)—which is to say, it is a key driver of capitalism under the digital. The linkage of all kinds of search results to purchasing opportunities means that Google traffics both information and commodities, many of which can be bought in just a few more clicks. As Ian Buchanan explains, “[t]he operating premise of Google searches may not be that whenever we are searching ... we are actually looking for something to buy, but its results certainly appear to obey this code” (“Deleuze and the Internet”). Indeed, as a way of drawing attention to the fact that Google’s aim is quite simply to make money, not to provide a useful and comprehensive public archive, media theorist Geert Lovink suggests that we start naming Google as the advertising business that it is (Networks 156). Further, if the internet now effectively equates to Google (or “Googling”), and Google is about “the facilitation of sales,” then the internet’s primary function can be seen in the same way (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”). And any claims that Google is more concerned with “serving the best interests of [its] users” and offering a “higher-quality search experience” over and above making money (Vise and Malseed 6) can be challenged when we consider its involvement in the lucrative Chinese market. While professing to be “a company that is trustworthy and interested in the public good,” Google’s founders collaborated with the Chinese government’s restrictive internet censorship laws in 2006, in setting up its subsidiary in China (C. Thompson). Thus, in order to capture potentially the world’s richest market, Google effectively renounced its freedom of information principles, by agreeing “to purge its search results of any Web sites disapproved of by the Chinese government” (C. Thompson). These sites included any referencing Tibet, Tiananmen, Taiwan, Amnesty International, religious group Falun Gong (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”), as well as sites advocating free speech in China (C. Thompson). Even when Google made a surprising about face in 2010, and (supposedly) ended its Chinese operations—a move that was lauded by human rights activists (Vaidhyanathan 119)—it failed to live up to its benevolent promises. As Siva Vaidhyanathan explains, Google merely redirected its Chinese users to its Hong Kong based service, which is still censored by the Chinese government; as well, it maintained office facilities and other business interests in China: all of which amounts to shifting from an active to a passive partnership with Chinese censorship (119, 10).

In a more general sense, the relationship between the internet and capitalism is quite clear: “where a free and open system of communicative networks (the internet) has developed within an economic system based on property and profits (capitalism) one has to come to an accommodation with the other” (Lister et al 186). In such a dynamic, capitalism will not compromise: it will come to determine the internet’s mechanisms and capacities. The
implications for thought, then, in the capitalistic sphere of the internet, are just as clear: it will be circumscribed within the logic of capital. The way we think on the internet is to search—click, click, from link to link—which both fosters the desire for more “by constantly rewarding us with the little satisfaction of the unexpected discovery,” and engenders a restlessness “to always see what’s just over the horizon, one click away” (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”). John Battelle calls this “search” mode of thought the “universally understood method of navigating our information universe” (4), and claims that the multitudinous enquiries that pour through the internet every day make up “the aggregate thoughtstream of humankind—online” (4,6).

(Of course, direct shopping sites such as eBay and Amazon use “search” as a business model, cementing the commerciality of this action.) Thus, a kind of “consumptive,” rather than creative, thought mode corresponds to the internet, which has at least two, self-feeding consequences. First, as Poster points out, our acts of browsing, window shopping and buying “are routinely recorded, stored, and made available for advertisers,” so that our profiles can be used to build an even stronger consumptive environment (Information 250). Even our email inboxes are continually filled with messages from would-be sellers who match to our personal profiles. Second, as Battelle argues, on the internet “all intent is commercial in one way or another, for your very attention is valuable to someone” (30). No matter which sites you are visiting there is an economic promise in your attention, and, throughout your online movements, there is a good chance that “you’ll see plenty of advertisements on the way, and those links are the gold from which search companies spin their fabled profits” (Battelle 30). It is not difficult to see, then, that the kind of thinking fostered by the internet is the kind that propagates money. Ian Buchanan, therefore, proclaims the internet to be “just another ‘model of realisation,’ [which is] Deleuze and Guattari’s term for the institutions capitalism relies on to extract surplus value from a given economy” (“Deleuze”). Moreover, the fact that the internet was not always so economically driven helps to disguise its current mercenary nature:

That business couldn’t immediately figure out how to make money out of the internet ... meant that in the early years of its existence the utopian image of it as an affirmative agent of cultural change was able to flourish, giving the internet a powerful rhetoric legacy it continues to draw on as it is moulded more and more firmly into a purely commercial enterprise. (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”)

For Lovink, the search logic that accompanies the commercial internet diminishes our ability to think in a critical way, since it encourages us to simply click away rather than engage deeply in any problem (Networks 157). “Stop searching, start questioning,” Lovink enjoins (Networks 157), but we leave the question of whether thought can find a way to use the internet as “an affirmative agent of change” (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”) to the thesis’ next part.

As well as from the viewpoint of the institutional forces of capitalism, there are a number of other (albeit related) angles from which to approach the internet’s bearing on thought.
Rossiter, for example, acknowledges that “software design, virtual environments, games, and search engines all generate and naturalise certain ways of knowing and apprehending the world” (112). Particular techniques that can be said to apply to the internet include “database retrieval over linear narrative,” and “editing, and selection rather than simple acquisition” (Rossiter 112). This shift in technique is corroborated by a recent study reported by University College London, which investigates how users behave in virtual library environments. Their longitudinal computer log trail analysis reveals that users “prefer visual information over text,” display “a strong tendency towards shallow, horizontal, ‘flicking’ behaviour in digital libraries,” and rely heavily upon cutting and pasting techniques (Centre). Moreover, the researchers report that users spend very short amounts of time on e-book and e-journal sites, which leads to the conclusion that “new forms of ‘reading’ are emerging as users ‘power browse’ horizontally through titles, contents pages and abstracts going for quick wins” (Centre). Other recent accounts make similar claims: internet commentator Nicholas Carr, for instance, sums up the personal impact of more than a decade of internet use in his statement “I’m not thinking the way I used to think.” Carr admits that the web has been a “godsend” to him as a writer in terms of cutting research time, but states that the internet has diminished his concentration span: “[m]y mind now expects to take in information the way the Net distributes it: in a swiftly moving stream of particles.” Carr also quotes University of Michigan medical writer Bruce Friedman, who says his thinking “has taken on a staccato quality, reflecting the way he quickly scans short passages of text from many sources online” (Carr). Friedman himself states that “I have now almost totally lost the ability to read and absorb a longish article on the web or in print” (“How”), which he attributes to the internet “altering our ability to concentrate and read long articles” (“Is”). In Lovink’s view, our overall “techno-cultural default is temporal intolerance” (Networks 157). The question Carr asks is whether a different kind of thinking lies behind this different kind of reading. His verdict is that it does: “deep reading” (as opposed to internet browsing) “is valuable not just for the knowledge we acquire from the author’s words, but for the intellectual vibrations those words set off within our own minds” (Carr). Deep reading fosters ideas and is thus “indistinguishable from deep thinking,” while the internet will only “scatter our attention and diffuse our concentration” (Carr). As for Google, Carr contends that it systematises thought: “[i]n Google’s world, the world we enter when we go online, there’s little place for fuzziness … . Ambiguity is not an opening for insight but a bug to be fixed.” Inattentiveness and systematization may be the conditions of internet connectivity, but are not conditions for the real connectiveness and encounters required for a Deleuze-Guattarian thought. “Skimming the surface of cyberspace,” Bryan Appleyard maintains, equates to “skimming the surface of life.”
There are two final interconnected practices through which we will examine the internet’s relationship to thought: blogging and social networking. Blogs, defined, are a genre of home pages, “but they are far more than that—they represent a new form of authoring on the Web, authoring that takes as its foundation the ability to quickly and easily link to anything else on the Web” (Battelle 266). Again, we see the appearance of Deleuze’s “author-function,” which he describes as nothing more than “an empty and vain subject” (TRM 139). If blogs are “personal statements about individuals, digital declarations of who they are and who they wish to be in the searchable world” (Battelle 267), they are indeed subjective. Moreover, according to Andrew Keen’s definition, blogs could certainly be interpreted as empty and vain: “[w]e are blogging with monkeylike shamelessness about our private lives, our sex lives, our dream lives, our lack of lives, our Second Lives” (3). Confirming the ubiquity of blogging, Lovink notes that as of 2010, 150 million blogs crowded the internet (Networks 95), and, regarding content, a 2006 Pew/internet US national survey reported that “76% of bloggers say a reason they blog is to document their personal experiences and share them with others” (“Blogging”). What is more, “[o]nly a small proportion focus their coverage on politics, media, government, or technology” (“Blogging”). And when blogs do address such extra-personal matters, they generally offer mere opinion, a form of thought that is, again as D+G tell us, “a will to majority [that] already speaks in the name of majority” (WP 146). In a sense, blogging constitutes a celebration of the representational staple of individualism, to the extent that it champions the personal and her/his self-focused ideas. In Lovink’s estimation, though, blogs evidence a shift in “the status of the personal wherein the personal is both mobili[s]ed, and erased or flattened (erased insofar as blogging priorit[i]ses display over introspection)” (Networks 101). In other words, blogging foregrounds an identity that is produced for display: “[w]hat matters is what appears” (Lovink, Networks 101)—scarcely a way into engagement with thought as creativity. In fact, we can extend this notion that blogging is predominantly self-reportage and display to much of the Web 2.0 phenomenon (the participatory internet). As well as blogging, Web 2.0 refers to media sharing sites such as YouTube—a site that, for Keen, is highly narcissistic: The tagline for YouTube is “Broadcast yourself.” And broadcast ourselves we do, with all the shameless self-admiration of the mythical Narcissus. As traditional mainstream media is replaced by a personali[s]ed one, the internet has become a mirror to ourselves. Rather than using it to seek news, information, or culture, we use it to actually be the news, the information, the culture. (7) Unfortunately, wanting to “be” the news or the culture bears little relationship to entering into a thought that might lead to a more affirmative cultural change. Furthermore, as Lovink points out, although blogs, YouTube and the like offer the opportunity for readers/viewers to post “comments,” comment software prescribes brevity, and comments are generally at the level of mundane public discourse rather than any real confrontation with ideas (Networks 19, 51). Again, this is thought at the level of majoritarian opinion.
Turning to social networking sites such as Facebook, they are also, Keen argues, essentially self-advertisements, in which are advertised “everything from our favourite books and movies, to photos from our summer vacations, to ‘testimonials’ praising our more winsome qualities or recapping our latest drunken exploits” (7). Lovink sees such a site as “a massive self-branding exercise” wherein “identity management” becomes an obsession (*Networks* 38). In her extensive review of the movie *The Social Network*, Zadie Smith adds to this argument, claiming that the nature of Facebook (“falsely jolly, fake-friendly, self-promoting, slickly disingenuous”) is highly reductive of life itself: in the data set that makes up our Facebook life, “[e]verything shrinks. Individual character. Friendships. Language. Sensibility. In a way it’s a transcendent experience: we lose our bodies, our messy feelings, our desires, our fears.” This “denuding” of our network selves, though, does not lead to any greater freedom, she argues, since with Facebook people “just look more owned.” On the one hand we are owned by the mind and preoccupations of Facebook’s founder Mark Zuckerberg, who was a Harvard sophomore when he designed the system (hence the “profile” emphases: What is your relationship status? Do you like the right things? Prove it: post pictures) (Z. Smith). Thus, the potential for being is fully circumscribed by the software, or, as Lovink puts it, this is “[V]irtual [R]eality” penetrating and mapping out our lives and relationships (*Networks* 13). On the other hand, we are also owned by capital. Here, Zadie Smith ties together the contractiveness of Facebook and its partnership with advertising:

> With Facebook, Zuckerberg seems to be trying to create something like a Noosphere, an Internet with one mind, a uniform environment in which it genuinely doesn’t matter who you are, as long as you make “choices” (which means, finally, purchases). If the aim is to be liked by more and more people, whatever is unusual about a person gets flattened out. One nation under a format. To ourselves, we are special people, documented in wonderful photos, and it also happens that we sometimes buy things. This latter fact is an incidental matter, to us. However, the advertising money that will rain down on Facebook—if and when Zuckerberg succeeds in encouraging 500 million people to take their Facebook identities onto the Internet at large—this money thinks of us the other way around. To the advertisers, we are our capacity to buy, attached to a few personal, irrelevant photos.

With the explosion of self-publication that is Web 2.0, perhaps the most disturbing element is the amount of “data” about ourselves that we are contributing to the digital machines of capital. Turning back for a moment to search engines, Battelle points out that from the array of self-information we post, “intelligent engines will be able to discern patterns among them that will provide second- and third-order relevance inputs that will help refine and return far better search results” (267), and, therefore, far better purchasing matches. Indeed, Lovink notes that “[i]n 2008, Google patented a technology that enhances its ability to ‘read the user’”
(Networks 152), which means it can direct his/her choices more precisely. In our constant connectivity to Facebook, too, we are doing little more than “submitting private and professional data to the world” (Loving, Networks 41), which means to the marketplace. Perhaps, then, Web 2.0’s self-interested communication, which we might call net-based speech, is dangerous. Perhaps Deleuze’s comment that “speech and communication have been corrupted” because they have been “thoroughly permeated by money” (N 175) applies more than ever in the age of Google and Facebook. Perhaps we would do well to rethink how we use Web 2.0, heeding Deleuze’s advice that “[w]e’ve got to hijack speech. Creating has always been something different from communication. The key thing may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control” (N 175).

**Capitalism, affect, thought**

How we might “hijack speech” and break the self-confessional, capitalised circuits of the internet is a question to which we will return. For now, we explore a final aspect of communication today, one relevant to both newer and “old” media forms. We refer to affect, that key element of post-ideological power, considered briefly earlier on. Recall, firstly, that affect as we use it here is neither a personal feeling nor an emotion but, rather, a “prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another” (Massumi, “Notes” xvi). Such an understanding draws from both William James’ contention that a “bodily disturbance” or “sensation” is our first response to the events we encounter with nameable emotions only following secondarily (“What”), and from Gilbert Simondon’s orienting of preconscious affect before conscious emotion (Shaviro, “Simondon”). As Eric Shouse puts it, “affect is a non-conscious experience of intensity,” which can be described thus:

> At any moment hundreds, perhaps thousands of stimuli impinge on the human body and the body responds by infolding them all at once and registering them as an intensity. Affect is this intensity. In the infant it is pure expression; in the adult, it is pure potential (a measure of the body’s readiness to act in a given circumstance).

To the extent that it is “unformed and unstructured,” affect is, therefore, an abstract force, and because this abstractivity is highly transmittable, affect has become tremendously powerful in terms of sociality (Shouse). Of course, the power of affect has not escaped the reach of contemporary capitalism, for which affect’s potential has been a key component in its subsumption of life. This usurpation of affect is actually part of a cluster of late capitalistic movements, all of which are connected to the control mechanisms of bio-power. Amy Villarejo explains:

> Capital has been invested at an affective level. This is not to isolate the terrain of economy from accompanying shifts: from discipline to control in politics, from representation and meaning to information in culture, from organic to nonorganic life
in biophilosophy, and so forth. The labor of the production, circulation, and
manipulation of affects, with its emphasis on the corporeal (not simply “the body” but
subindividual bodily capacities and also machinic assemblages of bodies), becomes
crucial in understanding contemporary networks of biopower; it compels a shift in
thinking from the bounded, identitarian body to an intensification of the perception
of the body, its capacities and assemblages. (136)

As we have seen, under bio-power every capacity of the body is captured by the capitalist
machine, with the subindividual capacity of affect being particularly valuable since its
abstractivity is directable toward any number of capital-enhancing endpoints. Since post-
industrial, global capitalism is a turbulent environment of flows—“flows of money, flows of
culture, flows of people”—control must adapt to a permanent state of turbulence (Parisi and
Terranova), and one of capital’s key entry points for extracting value from this turbulence is at
the micro-level of affect modulation.

If affect is now integral to capitalism’s control, it is important to understand both the means
by which it is managed/modulated, and, of most interest here, its relationship to thought. For
Clough, both of these issues involve “working out a line of thought about life, matter,
information, and bodies,” in what she sees as the present “technoscientific” context (“Future”
21-22). One of the principal focuses of technoscience, as we have noted, has been the
development of information technologies, and, on their relationship to affect, Clough writes:

[T]here has … been a development of information technologies, both entertainment
and surveillance technologies, which are increasingly less about representation and
the narrative construction of subject identities and more about affecting bodies,
human and nonhuman, directly. These technologies mean to control bodies of
information and to treat bodies as information. Even when appealing to the human
subject, these technologies aim to affect the subject’s subindividual bodily capacities,
that is, capacities to be moved, to shift focus, to attend, to take interest, to slow down,
to speed up, and to mutate. (“Future” 3)

For Massumi, the technologies most linked to manipulating affectivity are mechanisms of the
mass media: as he puts it, “the mass media are not mediating anymore—they become direct
mechanisms of control by their ability to modulate the affective dimension” (“Navigating”
232). As mobilised by the media, affect modulation is an apparatus of capitalist power that is
based on the channelling of attention and feeding into control systems on other levels
(Massumi, “Requiem” 61). And since affect “is an impersonal flow before it is a subjective
content” (Massumi, “Requiem” 61), the media does not transmit a series of preformed
meanings in its employment of affect. Rather, it attaches affect to images and their associated
content: “[technological media] have the capacity to intensify, alter or distort the affective
dimensions of an image, sound, voice, face or gesture” (“Research”). It is this intensive,
affective dimension to which the body responds. Affect’s importance, then, as Shouse points out, comes from the fact that often “the message consciously received may be of less import to the receiver of that message than his or her non-conscious affective resonance with the source of the message.” Furthermore, “[s]ince the meaning and intensity of an image are not necessarily congruent with each other, affect can be and is easily exploited for political or commercial use” (“Research”). While other media technologies are undoubtedly important in the transmission of affect for control purposes, for Massumi television is, again, the prime offender: it is the “privileged channel for collective affect modulation” (“Fear” 33). With its “real time” coverage of “socially critical turning points,” Massumi argues that television even surpasses the internet in its capacity to provide “a perceptual focal point for the spontaneous mass coordination of affect (“Fear” 33). Visual culture theorist Nicholas Mirzoeff also writes of the significance of television, focusing on its affective role during the Iraq War: the constant feed of war images were “carefully and precisely targeted tools,” which were recognised as “friendly” by the “large screen, theatre TVs of American suburbia” (73, 74). Similarly, Massumi speaks of the “Gulf War show,” and also contends that the broadcast of post-9/11’s “war on terror” indicates the yoking of “governmentality to television” in the following way: “Government gained signal access to the nervous systems and somatic expressions of the populace in a way that allowed it to bypass the discursive meditations on which it traditionally depended and to regularly produce effects with a directness never before seen” (Massumi, “Fear” 33-34). Hence, television broadcasts following 9/11—most notably those connecting to the terror alert system—testify to “the habituation of the viewing population to affect modulation as a governmental-media function” (“Fear” 34).

In Melissa Gregg’s view, the mediatisation of affect is especially useful for both control and capitalism since it is particularly difficult to marshal resistance against:

This is precisely the difficulty of forming any rational model of political opposition to apparently personable leaders like [former US President George] Bush, or concertedly “ordinary” leaders like [former Australian Prime Minister] John Howard: a diverse population will often interpret a manifest message through a quite different set of unconscious criteria.

In the general case of the US president, for example, Massumi argues that s/he “is not a statesman anymore, like Woodrow Wilson or Franklin Roosevelt were. He’s [sic] a visible personification of that affective media loop. He’s the face of mass affect” (“Navigating” 233). Thus George Bush’s September 2008 address to the nation, as the US subprime mortgage crisis unfolded, presents an affective image of confidence and strength while delivering a warning of financial disaster. The warning serves to pre-empt and, therefore, manage fear, but it is the affective charge of confidence that is most important here: it works to counterbalance the flow of anxiety-inducing images—financial indexes plummeting, stock exchanges in panic—which
had been circulating heavily through media outlets prior to the address. The affectively delivered command, then, is clear: keep investing, spending, and borrowing, in order to keep capital flowing. As Massumi notes, such affective manipulation “changes how people experience what potentials they have”: when we are impacted at an affective, intensive level by media images, we are barely even aware of the limits that are being set for our subsequent actions (“Navigating” 232). In Terranova’s view, we are dealing here with “a dispositif of power that grasps knowledge not as the result of abstract logical games affecting the sphere of truth, but as the secondary result of a certain hold on the body” (“Futurepublic” 134). For her part, Terranova considers the mediatisation of war, describing “a new relation between war and the media”: from the initial (negative) media treatment of Islam in the 1970s, through to the glorification of the Iraq War, Terranova illustrates how the media’s images of war do not lead to “an objective knowledge” that relates to “narratives and representations,” but, rather, function through “an active mobilisation of the body’s immaterial capacities to think, feel and understand” (“Futurepublic” 132, 133). And what we are affectively led to think and understand through the media’s new relation to war is that Islam is highly threatening (Terranova, “Futurepublic 133), and—because war “has become the new driving force behind US economic growth”—a state of “permanent war” is now “a fact of life” (Cooper 128, 129).

In assessing how capitalism’s arrogation and restriction of affect impacts upon thought we can begin by recalling that, in D+G’s project, affect and sense are closely linked: “[s]ense is the potential to imagine [unrestricted] perceptions of the infinite,” and, correspondingly, “different perceptions [are] opened from different affective encounters” (Colebrook, “On” par. 41). If affect is the “risings and fallings—the becomings” of a body (O’Sullivan, Art 41), sense is the virtual “non-place” where these affects are expressed. Put another way, sense is “the virtual milieu through which we live and become” (Colebrook, Gilles 11)—which means that sense, the affects it expresses, and the associated powers of thought are related to the full potentiality of life beyond any circumscribing instrument, including capital. Colebrook further explains this connection to thought:

Deleuze affirms the power of thought … to intuit life as the source of difference, folds, relations, and spaces. Sense, philosophy, intuition, thinking and concepts all name the power to unleash other territories by imagining the given as an expression of a life that exceeds any of its fixed terms, and imagining the potential that can be unfolded from that expressive power. (“On” par. 38)

Under contemporary capitalist strategies of mediatisation, affect is manipulated, channelled and controlled: there is only one direction for the movement of affect. But for Deleuze true thinking requires a background of (limitless) sense—the enablement of the fullest range of affects produced by all kinds of encounters. True thinking is a process of pure creation that “realises itself or becomes through perceiving” (Colebrook, Understanding 69-70); and the
whole potentiality of this perceiving emanates from a virtual field accessed through affective encounters. In Deleuze’s view, affect is a mode of thought, but one that is non-representational, pure potential (“S”), since it is always connected to the virtual. If thinking is a connection of life’s dynamic flows (Colebrook, Understanding 69-70), it will only be impeded if these flows are directed towards a specific end. Affect that is regulated by an external force cannot pertain to thought. To be clearer, for Deleuze thinking is created or generated when an encounter (experienced affectively) “forces thought to raise up”—in a form that is “imperceptible,” that “can only be sensed” (DR 139, 140). This thought that “can only sensed ( ... the being of the sensible), moves the soul, ‘perplexes’ it—in other words, forces it to pose a problem: as though the object of encounter, the sign, were the bearer of a problem—as though it were a problem” (Deleuze, DR 140). Thought, then, as a “generative movement,” as something that is “felt” (Massumi, “Introduction” xxxi), problematises life, to the extent that it designates “the state of the world” or “the reality of the virtual” as essentially “problematic” (Deleuze, DR 280). As Deleuze tells us, “[s]ense is located in the problem itself” (DR 157). Rajchman helps us to connect Deleuzian thought to problems by explaining that thought aims to “make new forces visible, formulating the problems they pose, and inciting a kind of experimental activity of thinking around them” (45). Thought, then is “trespass and violence” (Deleuze, DR 139) to what is commonly accepted as standard ways of living and being. When affect as a mode of thought is captured by capitalism and contemporary modes of governance, it sidesteps any problematisation of life, failing to challenge whether the status quo is actually life enhancing. Instead, this version of an affect-thought dynamic falls in with and promotes established patterns of living as they are decreed by capital+state. If the potentialities of life are only creatively maximised by submitting to Deleuze’s autonomous power of thought (Colebrook, Gilles 14), this taming of affect seriously forecloses what a life is capable of.

**Toward a movement of thought**

According to cultural/art critic and activist Brian Holmes the composite of “political-economic-cultural situations” in which we find ourselves today, is a “damnably complex reality” (“Articulating”). This complexity involves several dimensions, as we have explored in previous pages. In terms of thought, we live, to a large extent, within the conditions of the dogmatic image and its associated structures of representation. For D+G, the orderliness of the dogmatic image is most evident in doxa or opinion-based thought:

> We need ... order to protect us from chaos. ... That is why we want to hang on to fixed opinions so much. We ask only that our ideas are linked together according to a minimum of constant rules. All that the association of ideas has ever meant is providing us with these protective rules—resemblance, contiguity, causality—which enable us to put some order into ideas, preventing our “fantasy” (delirium, madness)
from crossing the universe in an instant, producing winged horses and dragons breathing fire. (WP 201-02)

Thought under this rubric amounts to a narrow, media-driven, mass-based kind of opinion, which provides a kind of “umbrella” to protect us from the chaos of undisciplined thought (D+G, WP 202). Such thought is shaped and perpetuated by a qualitative majority, yielding a limiting and anti-creative way of being in the world. This mode of thought persists widely—with just one example being the discipline of science, where “every proper thought [is] processed neatly and cleanly, within a defined and knowable technical system that [tidies] up the performance not only of communication, but of thought itself” (Murphie, “Clone” 15). As we have also seen, the potential messinesses of sexuality and national identity are other areas that are kept sanitary through dogmatism’s strategies of categorisation and confinement.

Of course, the overarching operative of such majoritarian thought is the current capitalist order, which rests upon a globalised economy that determines the world as an integrated marketplace. Under neoliberalism, we live in a politico-economic state whose language is “composed of a single word”: money (Westbrook 51). To be a subject in this context is to “understand[…] yourself, your accomplishments and your own creativity, indeed your own desire, as human capital, to be nourished and cherished in terms of its potential returns on the market, and to be used as a measurement of the value of any experience whatsoever” (Holmes, “Articulating”). Moreover, as Holmes (amongst others) notes, this stage of capitalism is “defined by permanent crisis,” a crisis linked to a globalised subjectivity that is always at the “ready to respond” (“Recapturing”). As we have seen, this permanent crisis translates also into a state of indefinite/permanent warfare (Cooper 129), and, at the present time, a state of financial crisis. The power arrangement of the present globalised environment includes the remnants of sovereignty and Foucauldian discipline, but, as Deleuze brings into focus, it is largely defined by the “rapidly-shifting” type of control that spreads as intricately as a “snake’s coils” through daily life (Deleuze, N 181, 182). Specific technologies and techniques disseminate this control, most predominantly those related to informationalised media. Control by way of media tends to operate at a subindividual, affective level—thereby channelling the subject’s readiness to respond into capital. At this historical moment, media technologies and the information that is their currency saturate daily life, conquering our attention (Stiegler, “Within”), and leading also to the proposition that we are in such a state of “continuous excitation” by informational stimuli, the collapse of the individual and collective mind is nigh (Berardi, “City”). Arguments for collapse aside, the informationalisation of culture has a profound impact on thought—perhaps even constructing for thought a new image. Speed, compression and inattentiveness are some of the hallmarks of this image, as well as the homogenisation and static reproducibility that relates to the digital nature of information. In general, though, information feeds capital, so, above all, this thought too is
connected to money. Overall, thought, already constricted by information or dogma, is further constrained by economics: “capitalism has lost its mind” is how Stiegler puts it (“Spirit”). The powerful drive to maintain and increase the flow of capital far surpasses any ethical inclination that thought might enhance the wider potentialities of life.

At a time, then, when we are faced with such multiple constraints, it behoves us to look for ways to “live more fully, with augmented powers of existence” (Massumi, “Of Microperception” 18). The central problem, for Deleuze, is to resist control, since this would equate to believing again in a world that “has been taken from us” (N 176). One vital means of resistance is to find ways to return thought to creativity, for as Deleuze tells us, “[w]henever one creates one resists,” (ABC), and to think is nothing but to create (DR 147). In Holmes’ phrasing, “the counter-urgency of our times” is to “seize the potential that is overcoded and channel[led] by the monetary sign, and to release it into freely ranging movement” (“Artistic”). With regard to thought, this would be “a movement of the mind” (Holmes, “Artistic”), or, in Deleuze’s words, “a movement capable of affecting the mind outside of all representation” (DR 8), and outside of all information. Such thought would move across “intellectual, social, affective, sexual and psychic levels,” thereby helping us to “find [a] way to break through the soft consensus of normality and discover something worth living for” (Holmes “Financial”). If we were to call this thought that moves “a moving mind,” what might it involve? Gillian Fuller suggests the following:

[The moving mind is] a complex thing—a series of connections and feedback loops differentially distributed across technical, biological, socialized, mediatised (and more) modes of perception and cognition. Let’s therefore also take it as given that this moving mind is embodied, that its stability is formed through complex sensing across, and making sense of, the multiple worlds through which it lives—the industrial worlds of trains and past empires, the informational worlds of impending ones, through different people, histories, agendas, mother tongues.

Erin Manning, perhaps more vividly, describes this moving thought as “experience’s complex instigator,” which is to say that thought pulls sensation from a world that is unfolding, that is also in motion (“Creative” 3-4). Thought is, therefore, incipience, or becoming, or creativity, or, putting it yet another way, “[t]hinking is of potential” (Massumi, Shock xxxii). It is the task of this work, now, to follow this potential, to explore more specifically some ways in which we might engage in thought as a means of resisting the crises and closed circuits of our time.
Thinking on the move is a nebulous undertaking. The well-worn pathway crumbles, multiplicities arrive. So many potentials to follow it is unnerving. We can understand what Massumi is getting at when he says that “[t]he wrackings of the thinking body mimic the excess of potential it hosts” (Shock xxxii): this thinking body is wracked by the potential of thought’s virtuality. In attempting to shift into a thought that moves, though, perhaps we can start by remembering something that Massumi’s statement alludes to. The “thinking body” is host to thought; thought is an independent movement that sweeps us along. We will not, cannot, master it, since it always maintains its own momentum. If it seems that we have control, it is always incomplete. Massumi explains: “[t]he thinking is not contained in the designations, manifestations, and significations of language, as owned by the subject. These are only partial expressions of it, pale reflections of its flash” (“Shock” xxxi). Thought is more than this, beyond these words. Although it is difficult for a rational thinking subject to face this uncertainty, doing so is to open to much more of life. To which othernesses can it lead? What futures can it open? Uneasiness, unsettledness, the shock of thought: not states to be conquered, but flows toward emergences. The lines of thought we are following are those that might take us to an experience of life beyond power constraints and thought control. These lines are more concerned with affect than representation, with connectivity and relationality than identification or opposition. And since it was an encounter with D+G that led us to this thought, we return to Deleuze, Guattari and D+G-friendly others in order to map a series of flight lines—lines that might take us off the beaten thought-tracks of our times.  

What we are engaged in here, is a kind of cartography, which is to say, making the beginnings of a map that might help us in orientating ourselves in thought. We use “map” in the Deleuze-Guattarian sense: “[w]at we call a ‘map’ or sometimes a diagram is a set of various interacting lines ... . We think lines are the basic components of things and events. So everything has its geography, its cartography, its diagram” (D, N 33). As Bonta and Protevi point out, “making maps ... establish[es] the contours of intensive processes” (67), and thought is indeed an intensive process. Cartography, for D+G, is different to “tracing,” which is more a device of reproduction and representation. “Make a map, not a tracing,” they declare, for only the map “is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real” (ATP 12). A map is a rhizome, and as such it “fosters connections between fields” and is, therefore, always unpredictable: “[t]he map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed,
adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group or social formation” (D+G, ATP 12). We are attempting to map a thought that is on the move, which cannot be planned in advance, which is subject to what may not be expected, as well as to repetitions (the eternal return of difference), gaps, fissures and divergences. This is thought on a plane of immanence, an endlessly varying topological field that can only ever be mapped provisionally (Frichot 68). Such lines of thought are always in the process of composing themselves, always being affected by encounters with the teeming nature of everything there is. It must be remembered, then, that the “map is not a contained model ... of something larger, but is at all points inflecting that larger thing, so that the map is indistinguishable from the thing mapped” (Kaufman, “Introduction” 5). The map and the thought that moves are interwoven. Moreover, “[n]ot only is the map constantly redrawn and reconnected, but its functions are multiple, intersecting at once the realms of politics, art, and philosophy” (Kaufman, “Introduction” 5). For D+G, thought is heterogeneous: affect and concept, sense and difference, movement and creativity, ethics and aesthetics, politics and philosophy. What follows are multiple lines that are not conclusive or certain, but that constitute an attempt to diagram some of the elements and practices of a more productive image of thought, or thought without an image. Overall, these “mobile and non-hierarchical” (Kaufman, “Introduction” 5) lines aim to connect to ways of thinking that might move us outside the constrictive, life-diminishing forces of our dogmatic and informational milieu.

In resisting the dogmatic image, this attempt to “find [our] bearings in thought” (D+G, WP 37) will clearly not follow the kind of “method” that has the aim of thinking “truthfully” and “ward[ing] off error” (Deleuze, NP 103). Rather, this work is an expression of thought’s encounters, a “witch’s flight” (D+G, WP 41), unfolding and enfolding multifarious elements in its immanent field. It may include elements that, at first glance, you would regard as error; to do so, however, would be to conceive of thought in terms of the “truth” model, for “error” is nothing but “false recognition” (Deleuze, DR 148). For Deleuze, thought will always include “misadventures” (DR 149). Such mishaps are not “external to thought,” but comprise “a necessary and constitutive background to thought itself” (Williams, Gilles 125). Thought is a risky practice, as Patton points out: “it is not the reassuring familiarity of the known which should provide us with the paradigm of thinking, but those hesitant gestures which accompany our encounters with the unknown” (Deleuze 19). Hesitant gestures, “a stumbling and stuttering thought,” a thought of “piecemeal fibres” (J. Martin 25, 27): in its contingency, a work of thought has the potential to take off in many directions, which means that Part 2 will not be a series of neat ties with points made in Part 1. This is not to say that D+G promote an unsystematic kind of thought: indeed, Deleuze tells us that “[s]ystems have lost absolutely none of their power” (N 31). The kind of system they advocate, though, is an open system, a rhizome, wherein “concepts relate to circumstances rather than essences” (D, N 32). In such a
system, thought “functions along a model of dissemination, bifurcation and proliferation; it engenders polyvalence, asymmetry, heterogeneity and dynamism” (Zayani 96). An open, nomadic system will traverse many realms and dimensions—the social, the pre-individual, biology, art, micropolitics—each offering something different for thought, each giving thought a fresh entryway.

Of course, attempting to diagram the profusion of thought lines arising through a project such as this would be quite overwhelming, and would likely take us “close to chaos” (D+G, WP 127). As D+G tell us, though, at the same time as having the fortitude to approach this chaos, we also “require just a little order to protect us” (D+G, WP 201). Therefore, in order to navigate thought’s multiplicities, it will be useful to invoke what Steigler calls "technicity": that system of memory by which individuals have come to select techniques through which to cultivate or enhance life ("Take"). While the term “technique” has a variety of theoretical inflections, we refer to Stiegler’s notion that techniques of life constitute "arts of living" ("Take"). Techniques of/for thought are, therefore, arts of living, and this is also to call upon the Greek techne that is both “an extension of life's potential” and a “transformation of life” (Colebrook, Gilles 10). In our mapping, we seek out particular techniques, since, as William Connolly tells us, to enter thought through techniques is to alter thought’s "direction, speed, intensity, or sensibility" (Neuropolitics 100). In other words, it is to position oneself within the “inventive and compositional dimensions of thinking” (Connolly, Neuropolitics 104). We will return to Connolly’s specific conception of techniques shortly, but, in the meantime, let us be mindful that to invoke or develop techniques for thought is not to take ownership of thought or of thought’s becomings. Rather, it is to participate in thinking the new through “the partial, always incomplete attempt at what used to be thought of as agency (now agency as participation and becoming) within worlding” (Murphie, “Clone” 2). In this sense, technicity in relation to thought amounts to an ethic of negotiating the primary interactivity of life (Murphie, "Differential"). In what follows, then, techniques for/of thought are practices that, while enhancing the processes of thought and life, are always relational, contingent and immanent to the whole moving context.
Ordinary affects

Let us begin where we are, in ordinary life; after all, it is always something in our experiential world that “forces us to think” (Deleuze, DR 139). This something—the object of an encounter—may be anything: “Socrates, a temple or a demon” (Deleuze, DR 139). In searching for our initial break-out-line, the object of our first encounter is Kathleen Stewart’s book *Ordinary Affects*, and her notion of “the ordinary” (*Ordinary 1*). What is the ordinary? For Stewart, it is the “reeling present” (*Ordinary 4*), which she depicts as “a shifting assemblage of practices and practical knowledges, a scene of both liveness and exhaustion” (*Ordinary 1*). Elsewhere, Stewart depicts the ordinary as the “ongoing present” (Stewart, “Cultural” 1028)—a “time and place” of here/now that is “an emergent assemblage made up of a wild mix of things—technologies, sensibilities, flows of power and money, daydreams, institutions, ways of experiencing time and space, battles, dramas, bodily states, and innumerable practices of everyday life” (Stewart, “Cultural” 1028). Similarly, for cultural theorist Lauren Berlant, the ordinary is “the rise and fall of quotidian intensities” (“Thinking” 5). Corresponding to this field of the ordinary, Stewart designates “ordinary affects” as the moving sensations, the sensory field, that underpin this plane. Stewart further explains:

> Ordinary affects are the varied, surging capacities to affect and to be affected that give everyday life the quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes, contingencies, and emergences. They’re things that happen ... in impulses, sensations, expectations, daydreams, encounters, and habits of relating, in strategies and their failures, in forms of persuasion, contagion and compulsion, in modes of attention, attachment, and agency, and in publics and social worlds of all kinds that catch people up in something that feels like something. (Stewart, *Ordinary 2*)

As Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth note, “affect emerges out of muddy, unmediated relatedness” (4), which is very much the processes of ordinary life. Ordinary affects, as the intensities and vitalities that fill the quotidian, are experienced as “the promise, or threat, that something is happening—something capable of impact” (Stewart, “Cultural” 1041). Something happening is what James calls “something doing”—the “experience of activity,” or the sense of event and change that amounts to life itself (*Essays* 73-74). Something capable of impact: this is the intensity of affect, the multiple tendencies for action and expression that crowd and press and make themselves felt. As D+G put it, affect is neither personal feeling nor characteristic, but, rather, an impact with difference—a prepersonal energy or force “that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel” (*ATP* 240). The differential presence of affect is explained by Bergson, when he states that affections (affects) “always interpose themselves...
between the excitations that I receive from without and the movements I am about to execute” (Matter 17). In other words, as Olkowski explains, “[e]ach and every affection is situated at the ‘interval’ between a multiplicity of excitations received from ‘without’ and the movements about to be executed”—which is to say that affects are “conditioned by a dual movement that itself contains a multiplicity” (93). This “multiplicity” of affect refers to a “zone of indetermination” at the heart of the individual or organism, as she/he/it is affected, disturbed, disrupted by what happens (Olkowski, Gilles 97, 150). We have seen how contemporary governance and the media capture and utilise affect; the question now is, how can we, in a sense, reclaim affect, and, more significantly, how do ordinary affects open to a difference in thought?

As a technique for thought, attending to ordinary affects is not to attend to “‘meanings’ per se, but rather [to] the way they pick up density and texture as they move through bodies, dreams, dramas, and social worldings of all kinds” (Stewart, Ordinary 3). Put another way, affect is “the place where meaning per se collapses and we are left with acts and gestures and immanent possibilities” (Stewart “Cultural” 1041). The immanent potentialities of ordinary affect include, as Gregg and Seigworth state, movement, extension and, that which is of most interest here, the operation of thought (1). In discussing Spinoza’s notion of ideas and affects, Deleuze describes affect as thought itself—“a non-representational mode of thought” (“S”). Elsewhere, he tells us “it is always by means of an intensity that thought comes to us” (DR 144). In Stewart’s explanation, ordinary affects are enabling of thought to the extent that they are connected to thought’s broader potentialities:

Their significance lies in the intensities they build and in what thoughts and feelings they make possible. The question they beg is not what they might mean in an order of representations, or whether they are good or bad in an overarching scheme of things, but where they might go and what potential modes of knowing, relating, and attending to things are already somehow present in them in a state of potentiality and resonance. (Stewart, Ordinary 3)

For Berlant, what we are talking about here is “stopping to think”: “[p]eople are always thinking in the sense of making sense of things, when they apprehend what fluctuates without challenging very much the procedures of living” (“Thinking” 6). But stopping to think is thinking that “interrupts the flow of consciousness with a new demand for scanning and focus, not for any particular kind of cognitive processing” (Berlant, “Thinking” 5). In other words, this kind of thought can be described as “the power of the brain to delay an active relation to images, where we select and move according to the needs of life,” so as to allow “the images in all their complexity, difference and potential to be thought” (Colebrook, Deleuze 7). Such thinking defies the instantaneity of informationalism. Such affect-related thought attends to “pressure points” (Stewart, Ordinary 5), to “the complex and uncertain objects that fascinate
because they literally hit us or exert a pull on us” (Stewart, *Ordinary* 4). Such thought requires a certain attentiveness: it is “[t]he work of being sentient to the world [we’re] in” (Stewart, “Worlding” 353). In Deleuzian terms, however, stopping to think and attending to affects are not acts of a conscious, unified subject who is at the centre of things. We are not referring to “a subjective unity in the nature of an ‘I think’” (Deleuze, *DR* 145). Rather, thinking infused by affect and intensity takes place across the “fragments of a dissolved self” and “the borders of a fractured I” (Deleuze, *DR* 145). This is already to think differently. For Deleuze, before the self or the I there is a domain of individuation, which is the “chaotic and dissemblanced” field of indetermination or intensity that forms the “ground” of personhood or subjecthood (Lumsden 150).

To follow this line further, and to explain one way of “stopping to think,” it is useful to turn to the Deleuze-Bergson concept of duration, and its counterpart, intuition. In general, Bergson conceives of the entire universe, all of materiality, in terms of “images that transmit [and influence one another through] movement” (Olkowski, *Gilles* 96). As Olkowski explains, “the image of one’s own body occupies a central position, but only because everything else changes as the body moves” (*Gilles* 96). Bergson’s images are not the idealist images of representation, nor are they what realists call “things”; instead, they are somewhere between the two (Bergson, *Matter* xi-xii). Images are quite simply all the phenomena that we perceive through our senses, but that also “exist independently” of our perceptions (Bergson, *Matter* xii). Affects, to repeat differently, are those images that arise between the movement-images we receive from outside, and those movement-images we are going to effectuate. For Bergson, this zone of indetermination of affectivity occurs within a larger zone of difference: duration. In Anna Powell’s explanation, all the phenomena we receive through our senses amount to “intense sensory stimuli” that can “briefly dissolve our subjective personality” (142); this dissolution of personality, or—as Bergson puts it—“the melting of states of consciousness into one another” (*Time* 107), produces an experience of inner fluidity or flux, which is duration. In order to reflect on and communicate this fluid process of inner consciousness, or duration, we usually “freeze its intensive flux into discrete thoughts” and structured words; but this is to introduce a spatialisation into time as pure intensity (Powell 142). Before this, the experience of duration is “confused, ever changing, and inexpressible” (Bergson, *Time* 129)—a “perpetual motion of images” (Powell 143). Duration, then, as we have already indicated, is related to time: not the time of the clock that is divisible into separate units, but the time of experiential change—which also encompasses the whole of what has already happened. Colebrook clarifies:

Each creative change or difference in life opens a different time or “duration.” ... [E]ach perceiving person’s life [is] a constantly differing flow[.] I am not the same as I was a few minutes ago, and the changes I will undergo depend on the specific and singular changes I have already undergone; my memory is a constantly altering and
opening whole, with each new experience also altering what counts as my past, but my past also altering the ways in which I change. (Deleuze 17)

Duration, therefore, expresses a non-linear continuity between the past that survives as the whole of memory and the absolutely new moment (Lawlor 81). As Powell puts it, “duration is seamless, the continuum of past, present and future” (143): it is time as it is lived, an indivisible act of movement. In Deleuze’s words, duration is “a way of being in time”; it is the “totality and multiplicity” of “differences in kind” as opposed to differences in degree (B 32). Because change (lived time) is indivisible, any potential change (or becoming) that is to be undergone by a form of existence is always virtually present in duration. In other words, “duration must coincide with the virtual as that which redefines substance in terms of self-alteration” (Moulard-Leonard 102).

Life, then, for Deleuze-Bergson, consists of images, existing in different durations, affecting one another. So how does this relate to Berlant’s idea of “stopping to think”? Stopping to think has to do with Bergson’s notion of intuition, which is not the normative understanding of intuition as a sort of gut feeling or instinct. For Bergson, “to think intuitively is to think in duration” (Creative Mind 34), which is to say to think from the viewpoint of movement. Bergson explains: “immediate intuition shows us motion within duration, and duration outside space” (Time 114). The normative way of thinking (which Bergson call “intelligence”) takes a more static approach:

Intelligence starts ordinarily from the immobile, and reconstructs movement as best it can with immobilities in juxtaposition. Intuition starts from the movement, posits it, or rather perceives it as reality itself, and sees immobility only an abstract moment, a snapshot taken by our mind ... . For intuition the essential is change ... . (Bergson, Creative Mind 34-35)

Intuition is the means by which duration can be perceived: it “perceives in [duration] an uninterrupted continuity of foreseeable novelty” (Bergson, Creative Mind 35). Put another way, if duration is the entire virtual multiplicity of an entity’s different ways of becoming, intuition is the mode of perception that can tune into this multiplicity. Human beings may have habitually relied on an intellect that separates the fluidity of duration into discrete, static elements, so as to better organise experience into a common stock of ideas and feelings (Olkowski, Gilles 129), but the mode of thought that is intuition seeks to locate the fuller potential contained in duration—not only one’s own duration, but in the profusion of other different durations that abound. As Deleuze puts it, “[i]ntuition is ... the movement by which we emerge from our own duration, by which we make use of our own duration to affirm and immediately to recogni[s]e the existence of other durations, above or below us” (B 33).

Thinking in this way is not easy, according to Bergson: the attention required of intuition is “arduous,” because thinking the “radically new” is to think our way down “obscure” and
seemingly “incomprehensible” pathways (Creative Mind 35-36). It takes great effort to “put my senses in continuity with one another” and turn away from the normative way of perceiving experience (Lawlor 70). However, to think beyond one’s own usual perspective is to enact an “ethics” of thought, as Keith Ansell Pearson suggests (Germinal 33). It is to establish a “sympathetic communication” between ourselves and other forms of life; it expands our consciousness to take us into “life’s own domain,” which is “endlessly continued creation” (Bergson, Creative Evolution 177-78). Stopping to think, on this account, is to attend to the gap between perception and action—where affect resides. Thinking intuitively is to employ a technique that expands perception and “puts it into immediate contact with sensation” (Thain 3). It is to more carefully attune to affect, so as to intuit durations beyond those of immediate self-interest (Colebrook, Deleuze 19); it is to turn away from pre-made ideas and the “traps of language” (A. E. Pilkington 17), and concentrate one’s focus on the pre-conceptual, pure qualities of what is actually happening or being experienced. Valentine Moulard-Leonard calls it a “problematizing, differentiating and temporalizing method,” which effects a “folding over of the psychological and the ontological, of the actual and the virtual” (103). The experience of intuition is always singular, to the extent that its particular duration will always be brand new, and other to what has been thought before.

To think in this way is not, Berlant reminds us, the duty of particular people, but is “a general opening for cultivating attentiveness and an ethics of mindfulness” (“Thinking” 5). To enact an ethics and politics of affect-based, intuitive thought is to cultivate the technique of an acute attention to what’s going on and an intuitive sensing of where else this might carry us. In other words, this is “a style of being present to the struggles of our time” (Gregg and Seigworth 12). Indeed, as Colebrook points out, D+G have dedicated much work to uncovering “the tendencies of forces from which [contemporary] ‘man’ arose,” and to attempting to intuit new ways of being/living—especially outside of capitalism (Deleuze 19). She extrapolates:

In their work on capitalism and schizophrenia Deleuze and Guattari argue that their geology of life—their study of the forces and connections from which the social world has emerged—will allow for a reactivation of those forces beyond the restrictive image of humanity as a labouring, consuming and upright “man” of reason. (Deleuze 19)

In the realm of ordinary affects, then, thought is movement, to the extent that it is always encounter, or the sharp (or vague) questions that spin out of disparate things bumping into one another. It is also movement in the sense of duration—the internal differentiation that every such question reaches into. These questions can lead to new ways of being, created in resistance to an unjust situation. But, in our attentiveness, we must be keenly aware that affect will not necessarily move us toward a more ethical state of affairs: affect can lead to one thing—or another. In other words, because of the multiplicity of duration, affect does not automatically lead to more life-enhancing thought. The promise of
affect can also deliver something threatening, or painful, or simply more of the same. “As much as we sometimes might want to believe that affect is highly invested in us and with somehow magically providing for a better tomorrow …—affect instead bears an intense and thoroughly immanent neutrality” (Gregg and Seigworth 10). It is vital, therefore, to not only practise an ethics of affective attentiveness to the generativity embedded in things, but also, to actively seek affective encounters that will yield to thought’s highest potential. One way to do this, according to Deleuze, is to follow Spinoza’s principle of endeavouring to avoid “bad” encounters, and of aiming for the “active joy” that will increase our powers of being/acting in the world (EPS 287-88). This is to practise a Spinozan ethology of studying “the compositions of relations or capacities between different things” (Deleuze, SPP 126). Will this affective encounter lead to an augmentation or diminishment of life? To ask such a question is also to be open to experimentation, for, as Deleuze, interpreting Spinoza, tells us, we do not know in advance what a body or mind can do (Deleuze, SPP 125). Therefore, in being prepared to “[lodge [ourselves] on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it” (D+G, ATP 161), we are practising another technique: “an art of organising ‘good encounters,’ or of constructing assemblages (social, political, artistic) in which powers of acting and the active affects that follow from them are increased” (Baugh 92). Such an ethos would also provide a means of countering what Berlant calls “cruel optimism”: that “affective attachment to what we call ‘the good life, which is for so many a bad life that wears out [its] subjects” (“Cruel” 97). In Berlant’s view, one mode of ordinary life in relatively wealthy Western countries is the painful contexts of poverty and having— not they also encompass; “cruel optimism” defines “a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility” (“Cruel” 94). In other words, cruel optimism describes what binds peoples to problematic or deferred objects or scenes of desire. The promise of the American Dream, for example, an optimistic attachment to a fantasy, facilitates a tolerance of and even support for the conditions of attrition of the present. As Berlant puts it, “the ordinariness of suffering, … and the ‘technologies of patience’ … enable a concept of the later to suspend questions of the cruelty of the now” (“Cruel” 97). But, through acknowledging the contingency of the present, and “being open to an encounter that is potentially transformative”—for the better—of the habituated normal (Berlant, “Cruel” 113), it is possible to escape the grip of cruel optimism. Such an escape involves close attention to—intuiting—affectively imbued lines of flight, and a willingness to strive for new ways of thinking the conditions of the present, as well as thinking a more equitable future.

Scene 1: The “Political” event of the global financial crisis

As we have seen, oftentimes powerful social forces (such as capitalism and what may be called Politics with a capital P [Himada and Manning 5]) harness ordinary affects so that the creative,
potentialising thought is not possible. Sometimes affects lead to a kind of thought that is merely representative of what has gone before, or to a thought that invokes optimism—but only as a (cruel) means of surviving a damaging ongoing ordinariness. Before we deal with the promise of how affects can feed a more ethically imbued thought, we first explore an example of how thought in concert with affects can be channelled so that it proceeds in a more limited fashion. Borrowing from Stewart, whose work often tries to map connective singularities across a series of ordinary “scenes” (Ordinary 4-5), we will focus on a particular scene of the here and now, attending closely to its affects. The scene is a current global event, still unfolding. While the here and now traverses a number of levels—the “economic blocs” of continents, the scale of global networks, the level of the nation with its mass representations and continuous red alerts, the “territorial” level of “daily mobilities,” and the more personal “scale of intimacy” (Holmes, “Affectivist”)—we will concentrate initially on the levels of economies and the nation. We will attempt to see how the kind of public thought that is emerging on these scales is tightly controlled in comparison with the multiplicitous potentials that could be available.

This scene takes place in a present that has become disoriented in terms of its economic moorings. Some pages ago we described our long-running neoliberal milieu, but in late 2008 the first flutterings of a global financial crisis signalled a possible turn of the politico-economic tide. This crisis followed the sub-prime mortgage crisis that gripped the United States from late 2007, causing “widespread economic downturn, massive lay-offs, major exchange-rate volatility and a collapse in world gross product” (Elliott 45). As noted, in September 2008, US President George Bush broadcast an “urgent address to the nation,” making a command-style bid to “rescue” the American people, and, by extension, the world, from impending economic doom. By January 2009, however, the US had a new president and neo-liberalism was “officially” declared at the point of general disaster. The crisis had become a global phenomenon, with some of the consequences being a “big freeze on credit; the disintegration of various national financial budgets, such as the Icelandic economy; and, the worldwide shrinking of consumer confidence and employment” (Elliott 46). This excerpt from 2009 Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s lengthy, public essay expresses some of the Politically-charged affects of this scene:

From time to time in human history there occur events of a truly seismic significance, events that mark a turning point between one epoch and the next, when one orthodoxy is overthrown and another takes its place.

... There is a sense that we are now living through just such a time: barely a decade into the new millennium, ... and barely 30 years since the triumph of neo-liberalism—that
particular brand of free-market fundamentalism, extreme capitalism and excessive greed which became the economic orthodoxy of our time.

The agent for this change is what we now call the global financial crisis. In the space of just 18 months, this crisis has become one of the greatest assaults on global economic stability to have occurred in three-quarters of a century.

Rudd continues his interpretation of the impacts and urgencies of this “crisis,” rendering an affective field that reverberates with fear, threat and tumult:

The global financial crisis has demonstrated already that it is no respecter of persons, nor of particular industries, nor of national boundaries. It is a crisis which is simultaneously individual, national and global. It is a crisis of both the developed and the developing world. It is a crisis which is at once institutional, intellectual and ideological. It has called into question the prevailing neo-liberal economic orthodoxy of the past 30 years—the orthodoxy that has underpinned the national and global regulatory frameworks … .

Rudd proceeds to lay the blame for the crisis at the foot of the “unregulated system of extreme capitalism” that is rampant neo-liberalism. From his social democrat perspective, Rudd then pushes for a state-driven interventionist recovery programme, and, in his view, it is the newly elected US President Obama who should lead this recovery:

[T]he international challenge for social democrats is to save capitalism from itself: to recognise the great strengths of open, competitive markets while rejecting the extreme capitalism and unrestrained greed that have perverted so much of the global financial system in recent times. … And so it now falls to President Obama’s administration—and to those who will provide international support for his leadership—to support a global financial system that properly balances private incentive with public responsibility … .

Rudd’s reference to President Obama bespeaks what Elliott and Lemert see as “the idealisation of a solitary political figure”—the expression of “the West’s long held belief that … an exceptional individual will restore the terms and conditions of a proper individualism” (xvii-xviii). In other words, dogmatic thought’s structures should prevail. Overall, reactions to Rudd’s polemic, published as response pieces, are varied. Prominent Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, for example, argues that “market fundamentalism” is now beyond restoration, while economist Dean Baker claims that “the villains in the story” are not necessarily “free-market ideologues,” since such agents were always happy to receive big-business directed government protection. In terms of proposing a way out of the crisis, theorists also differ. Although Hobsbawm believes that Rudd does not go far enough in his estimation of “the scope and need for future state or other public action,” Rudd himself puts ultimate faith in the social democrat notion of the state’s “proper regulation of markets,” and Baker thinks that
recovery will come through massive spending programmes and more transparent financial regulation.

Many commentators, including those just mentioned, joined political leaders in pointing to the “opportunities” engendered by the economic crisis. Indeed, Baker sees these opportunities as hugely impressive—“if we have the courage to be creative and push the limits of the possible.” Such proffering of hope, still within the confines of capitalism, exemplifies the way cruel optimism works as a technique of control in managing public affect. From a Deleuzian perspective, though, we have to ask: what are the opportunities offered by the current crisis for pushing the boundaries—not of the possible—but into the virtual? Opportunities of the possible may reach outside neo-liberalism, but they fail to stretch beyond the dominance of capitalism as a social order or capital as a framework for thought. Western governments may not know “where we are in this depression,” nor “how long or deep it will turn out to be” (Hobsbawm), but they tend to agree that finance, economics and (more regulated) markets should prevail (Hobsbawn's Marxist response notwithstanding). Rudd’s aim, after all, is to “save capitalism” (italics added), so while he may strive toward a revision of capitalism, it remains … capitalism. Perhaps even more disturbingly, the move toward stronger financial governance may be accompanied by a firmer partnership between governance and the markets of war, as Holmes warns (“Financial”). Indeed, this warning rings in our ears when reading, in 2009—while economies are crumbling—of US Army’s Chief of Staff General George Casey’s announcement that “the reality of permanent war” means that the US is ever ready to go to war against North Korea should that country attack South Korea (“US Ready”).

In thinking about whatever opportunities are made possible within this scene of economic crisis, we could also remember that we will be restricted by what Tom Lundborg calls “a politics of the event.” Such politics does not refer to the Deleuze-Guatttarian event, but “seeks to inscribe meaning on what has happened by making it into a seemingly coherent whole and by placing it in accordance with a particular narrative” (Lundborg). The meaning of this particular crisis, produced according to a still dominant capitalist-political framework, is that capitalism “went too far,” by failing to restrain markets and by rewarding corporate greed, and now it needs to be reined in. As the event's narrative carries on unfolding, it continues to turn upon capitalism, with its steady cornerstones of finance, (more regulated) markets, and (permanent) war. To meet this politics with thought would be to take up D+G’s call to “struggle against capitalism,” for the reason that it “prevents the becomings of subjected peoples” (WP 100, 108). To struggle would be to “take the criticism of [our] own time to its highest point” (D+G, WP 99), by looking beyond the Political or historical actualisation of this event, and seeking to intuit the event’s virtuality and duration. For D+G, the historically placed or actualised event—in this case as circumscribed by a capitalist framework—is
doubled by a more pure event: “[w]hat History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self-positing as concept, escapes History” (WP 110). In other words, every event has both “the present moment of its actuali[s]ation, the moment when the event is embodied in a state of affairs, an individual, or a person,” as well as a side that is “purely expressed,” which is to say impersonal, incorporeal, infinitive—“free of the limitations of a state of affairs” (D, LS 151, 149). Because of the virtuality of the pure event, any event can never be “fully determined”; rather, its potential “hides in the background as an unanswered question” (Lundborg). There is always the potential, then, to reach a new understanding of this “crisis,” one that “breaks with the dominant way of framing the ‘event’ as this particular ‘thing’” (Lundborg). Putting it differently, it is always possible to “counter-effectuate” an event such as the economic crisis, or think it anew. Patton explains:

> To counter-effectuate events is to consider everyday events from the perspective of the “aternal,” as processes whose outcome is not yet determined. It is to relate them back to the pure event or problem of which they appear only as one particular determination or solution. It provides new means of description of the forces which shape our future and therefore new possibilities for action. (“World” Par. 21)

If we were to approach the event of the economic crisis in a way that strives to access what lies beyond the dominant capitalist narrative, we might stand a chance of entering a new milieu.

What this future might be involve is something not specified by D+G: their philosophy is not utopian “in the sense that it posits an ideal ... end state to be achieved as a result of this struggle” against capitalism (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 180). Rather, we are urged to counter-actualise or counter-effectuate the event as it is predominantly conceived in order to follow an open-ended, creative train of thought that would allow us to “perceive the world differently” (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 181). This would enable us to think in the vicinity of “the contour, the configuration, the constellation of an event to come” (D+G, WP 32-33).

Finance, markets, war, capitalism. Perhaps we can open to a way of thinking in which “life is not finance” (Holmes, “Financial”), or, rather, where there is more to life than finance. At present, we certainly live in a society that celebrates money, and we may have a “(however contradictory) interest in the daily functioning and reproduction of financial capitalism” because of our “current dependence on it” (Panitch and Gindin 27). But perhaps there are better ways of living. Perhaps there are ways that break from the dominance of capital, that avoid war, and that “allow people to take care of each other” (Holmes, “Financial.”) Perhaps such ways of thinking might more successfully arise out of other levels of life, such as the richly affective “scale of intimacy”:

> And so finally we reach the scale of intimacy, of skin, of shared heartbeats and feelings, the scale that goes from families and lovers to people together on a street
corner, in a sauna, a living room or a café. It would seem that intimacy is irremediably weighted down in our time, burdened with data and surveillance and seduction, crushed with the determining influence of all the other scales. But intimacy is still an unpredictable force, a space of gestation and therefore a wellspring of gesture, the biological spring from which affect drinks. (Holmes, “Affectivist”) “Scales of intimacy” are where we experience the resonances and intensities that are Stewart’s ordinary affects. At the global and national scales of the Politics of events, ordinary affects are subject to manipulation (cruel optimism) and regulation. But affects are replete with sense: they harbour thought’s potential, to the extent that they register “not only points of breakdown in the system, but also lines of possible breakthrough” (Stewart, “Cultural” 1035). Let us return to the lived event of the financial crisis, then, but now as an event that resonates through and impacts upon actual and virtual bodies. Let us see whether it can set off an event to come, one that Rudd, Obama and associates would not have us dream of.

Alternative scene: The ordinary event of the global financial crisis

It’s an event of watching and waiting. Of attached and also detached attention. Because it’s an event ungraspable no-one knows quite how bad or big it is, or not, or when it will, or won’t, end. There is a sense of something going on but we can’t tell whether it’s moving up or down or whether it’s slowing to the point of nothing much happening at all. Some of us are afraid, some wary, some of us only read about it in the paper. The papers, all media, have a lot to say, to the point where we become buffeted by the opinions and then have no clue what else to think. The media puts us in the middle of it, makes it real. The media feeds us “[p]artial scenes saturated with expectations, impressions [that are] too easily gathered into a narrative of social decline” (Stewart, Ordinary 26-27). You might still have the same job and the same life so the paper incites you to get excited about spending your government’s cash handout on a new TV or a new wardrobe. Or perhaps you’re watching the property market, hawk-like. You watch interest rates fall but still you delay selling and upscaling your home, even though you’ve outgrown this one and the kids have no space to do their homework or play outside and everyone’s at each other’s throats most of the time. Or you get evicted because you can’t keep up with the rent and you sleep in the car while you wait for the call from public housing, and now you are afraid. You might feel disconnected and wait for the news to change. You might get tired of it all, done in. Or you watch, poised, ready for action, focused on the next, unknown scene. All this waiting for the economy to lift, all this intensity, suddenly you start getting an irregular heartbeat for the first time, and a burning reflux that antacids won’t fix. The doctor says its stress. The paper says the economic turndown is causing employers to worry that productivity will go down because their employees are so stressed about the economic turndown. You might find yourself no longer an employee, which means that you
have to renege on your monthly payments to World Vision, which means that the poor will get poorer, which causes you more stress.

“The drama melds to the ordinary” (Stewart, "Watching"). Life goes on, as they say, which means that “[t]he ordinary throws itself together out of forms, flows, powers, pleasures, encounters, distractions, drudgery, denials, practical solutions, shape-shifting forms of violence, daydreams, and opportunities lost and found” (Stewart, Ordinary 29). The ordinary pulls us along, through impacts and scenes and flat spots and ways of being that constantly develop, regardless of where we may have meant to go. Things happen. Like the financial crisis, which, at the scale of a Politically charged, global economic event is perceived quite homogenously, but which, at the level of daily mobilities and intimacies, is wildly heterogeneous. The pure event of the economic crisis involves flashes of its own virtuality, as yet unactualised. We sense these flashes. We feel the potential shadowing the ordinary, there is more than this, more than we can read about or are experiencing now. This is not being optimistic but, rather, sensing the surfeit of what is actually happening, attending to emergences that are barely present, but could be. “A scene might appear of something that looks like ‘getting a life’” (Stewart, "Watching"). Or finding another way. You might start to notice pockets of life that reduce the power of finance. A purity of tenderness, for example, in the way your aunt laughs (and cries) with the residents at the nursing home where she volunteers, and in the careful way your neighbour looks after his chickens and his vegetable garden. You see generosity in his sharing with you the few eggs he gathers. You experience the force of real connection at a local swap meet, where neighbours swap excess vegetables they have grown for something different—another friend’s excess fruit, a book on gardening, some seedlings, a promise of child-minding. You find yourself thinking more about the negativising power of this massive free marketplace, whose crash is creating so many intimate hardships and heartaches. Every day you are confronted by the market, that “extraordinary generator of both wealth and misery” (Deleuze, N 172), whose demand that the axiom of property security take precedence over—effectively suspend—any axiom relating to human rights (D+G, WP 107). So, even as you are being urged by the state to spend up big so as to buoy the economy, you wonder if there is any potential for life outside the voracious world market. You opt out of Facebook and stop watching YouTube for entertainment. You read Judith Levine’s book Not Buying It: My Year Without Shopping, which describes her attempt to “withdraw from the marketplace” for one year (8). Pondering whether “a person [can] have a social, community, or family life, a business, a connection to the culture, an identity, even a self outside the realm of purchased things and experiences,” Levine and her partner decide to live for twelve months buying “only necessities for sustenance, health, and [their home] business” (8, 7). The insights and rewards of their year of non-consumption are numerous, but perhaps the most pertinent are, firstly, their “discovery that people like to help you,” and,
more crucially, their enjoyment of an overall exposure to a “wider range of small experiences”—an outcome that they regard as “embracing the ordinary” (251, 263). There are other ways of resisting consumer culture, such as participating in one of the events promoted by Adbusters—an anti-consumerism activist group. In trying to create a “world in which the economy and ecology resonate in balance,” Adbusters call for participation in their annual anti-consumption campaigns: the Buy Nothing Day, and TV Turnoff Week (“About Adbusters”). Instead of watching television, you might finally start to learn the guitar, learn something you can play for others, or take the kids camping for the first time, or make that move to the countryside where the supply of information is not so excessive. New actions and ways of thinking can open up when we pay attention—make the effort to follow affects into thoughts beyond finance and the market. Apply a technique of intuition, an ethics of mindfulness. New questions arise, such as what other durations are hiding in the scenes of the crisis? The capitalist axiomatic may fully inhabit the social space, but capitalism “is also in motion, providing a space of becoming, of undecidability … of background that might become foreground” (Gibson-Graham 89-90). The everyday life of the crisis “is a life lived on the level of surging affects, impacts suffered or barely avoided. It takes everything we have. But it also spawns a little series of something dreamed up in the course of things” (Stewart, _Ordinary 9_).

**Thinking concepts, or, doing philosophy**

Stewart’s reference to a “little series of something dreamed up in the course of things” may appear, at first glance, somewhat inconsequential in terms of the overall quest here to escape thought’s dominant images. In fact, it is highly germane. For if “the course of things” is the event, the “little series of something” might become the significant concepts that arise out of this event. The notion that radically new, life-enhancing concepts can be generated by an event is crucial to D+G’s formulation of a more creative thought: indeed, for them, concept creation is the essence of philosophical thought—philosophy itself “is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts” (WP 2). So here we move from nonphilosophical modes of thought to philosophy proper, as D+G conceive it. This is not to denigrate nonphilosophical thought, which is necessary, experimental, productive—the “moving desert that concepts come to populate” (D+G, _WP_ 41). Indeed, as Massumi explains, the nonphilosophical is an essential component of thought: the “becomings of thought cours[e] in from the outside of non-philosophy, through philosophy, then back out again in potentialised overspill” (“What” 8). For Deleuze, however, the concepts created in philosophical thought—concepts that are “along the lines of the Singular, the Important, the New”—are “full of a critical, political force of freedom” (TRM 238; N 32). Such concepts are not those that refer to pre-given essences or true forms (in this sense a concept would be merely “a container for cognitive content” [Penner 45]), but concepts that are singularly, processually created in
response to "problems without which they would have no meaning" (D+G, WP 16). As Patton puts it, "[t]hey do not provide a truth which is independent of the plane of immanence upon which they are constructed" (Introduction 1). While such thinking is of a philosophical nature, then, it is "never just a theoretical matter"; rather, it is "to do with vital problems ... To do with life itself" (Deleuze, N 105). To create concepts is to engage in the political or utopian practice of thought, addressing thought to "our problems, to our history," and "connect[ing] up with what is real here and now in the struggle against capitalism" (WP 27, 100). According to Deleuze, "philosophical thinking has never been more important than it is today" (N 32), given the problems of our times. The invention of concepts is crucial inasmuch as it takes the critique of the present "to its highest point" (D+G, WP 99). In order to see how concept creation may be useful in responding to the financial crisis, then, let us delve a little more into this way of thought.

As noted earlier, for D+G, the concept is the "act of thought" that "speaks the event" (WP 21). By "event" they do not mean a particular happening, but, rather, they are referring to the Stoic notion that incorporeal intensivities (virtually) underlie (or overlay) every actual occurrence or thing: "the event of the Other or of the face [or of] the bird" (D+G, WP 21)—or of the global financial crisis. The event of each of these things is not the "visible state of affairs" but the excess or reserve beyond what is seeable/sayable: "the event is pure immanence of what is not actualised or what remains indifferent to actualisation" (D+G, WP 36, 156). Thinking philosophy—constructing concepts—is to express the event of a situation, it is to reach into the virtual and "counter-actualise" the way something has already been effectuated or conceived. To this extent, "[e]very concept shapes and reshapes the event in its own [new] way" (D+G, WP 34). To explain it another way, Patton invokes D+G's geophilosophical notions of absolute as opposed to relative deterritorialisation:

[R]elative deterritorialisation concerns the historical relationship of things to the territories into which they are organised, including the manner in which these territories break down and are transformed or reconstituted into new forms. Absolute deterritorialisation concerns the a-historical relationship of things and states of affairs to the virtual realm of becoming or pure events that is imperfectly or partially expressed in what happens. ("Political" 8)

Concepts are formed in the zone of absolute deterritorialisation, which means that through concept formation we can “[disassociate] the pure event from the particular form in which it has been actualised” (Patton, “Future” 26). It is a new way of being, a new event, which concepts point toward: a new way of seeing the present so as to open a different future. D+G elaborate: “the task of philosophy when it creates concepts, entities, is always to extract an event from things and beings, to set up the new event from things and beings, always to give them a new event: space time, matter, thought, the possible as events” (WP 33). Their
commitment to concept creation leads D+G to promote a “pedagogy of the concept,” which involves analysing “the conditions of creation of factors of always singular moments” (WP 12). As Stengers points out, “pedagogy means the creation of a habit,” the habit here being “learning the ‘taste’ of concepts and the way one can be modified by the encounter with concepts” (“Experimenting” 52). In practising this pedagogy, we can aim to construct more ethical concepts of the events that befall us, and, therefore, strive to redirect the future from the strictures and injustices of the present.

Having worked through some of the hallmarks of what a concept is, we now turn to the important matter of where concepts come from. To be sure, they don’t “turn up ready-made, they don’t pre-exist”: they have to be invented, created (D, N 32). One key aspect in the process of concept invention is the role of affect. Concepts are made in response to specific, situated problems with all the flows of affects they involve, which means that, as D+G put it, there is a “rich tissue of correspondences” between the plane of affects and the plane of concepts (WP 199). Stating it differently, thinking—as concept building—connects with an event through the intensity of its affects. James Williams tells us that in Deleuze’s view, “we have intimations of significance prior to well-defined concepts and to knowledge, not the opposite. What is more, these intimations are irreducible and critical elements of the concept” (Gilles 32). These intimations are affects, the “felt force” of a situation, and, as Manning puts it: “felt force is a concept-in-waiting” (“Creative” 10). The felt force of affect is a “pulsion to think,” a pulsion to create concepts (Manning, “Creative” 8). To move the pulsion from feeling to thought Manning suggests attending carefully to all the relational elements of a situation (the evental aspects) so as to invite “thought’s virtual potential into the articulation of a concept” (“Creative” 22). For Manning, other practices that move felt-thought towards concept-formation include the techniques of speculation, and of making propositions (“Creative” 15, 18). Here, Manning is referring to ideas from process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, who promotes speculative thought, since it “always has the status of an hypothesis subject to revision” (Neville 93), and propositions, which indicate not only the way things are, but the felt potentialities of future actualisations (the way things might be), which can be expressed as proposals and suggestions (Durand 210). To put these Whiteheadean techniques simply, in striving to create new concepts out of affects, it is useful to adopt the stance of always being willing to make an attempt at new ideas, to experiment, without concern for judgement or truth/falsity. To invoke Guattari, “it is sometimes necessary to ... run the risk of being wrong, to give it a go, ... [t]o respond to the event as the potential bearer of new constellations of Universes of references” (C 18). After all, as Whitehead says, “[t]he vitality of thought is in adventure” (Dialogues 250). Further, from D+G’s perspective, it is helpful to remember that, while concepts must be created, it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel: concepts “are never created from nothing” (D+G, WP 19). All concepts have a history,
which is to say, “there are usually bits or components that come from other concepts, which corresponded to other problems and presupposed other planes” (D+G, WP 18). As Patton explains, “[t]he history of concepts therefore includes the variations they undergo in their migration from one problem to another” (Deleuze 13). At the same time, though, concepts are also connected to other concepts in their own milieu, at the convergence of related problems. D+G call this connection a concept’s “becoming” and describe it thus: “[h]ere concepts link up with each other, support one another, coordinate their contours, articulate their respective problems, and belong to the same philosophy, even if they have different histories” (WP 18). Concepts, overall then, are complex and living, “like invisible creatures” (D, TRM 238); in Massumi’s phrasing, their composition is always in process (“Deleuze” 565). Since it is a mobile assemblage it is, therefore, not appropriate to judge a concept according to its semantic contents. Rather, a concept “submits itself to judgement only to the extent to which it awakens concern, taking on ‘importance’ in the world” (Massumi, “What” 10). As Alliez puts it, “the concept is valid only insofar as it enables” (“Questionnaire” 81), and it does this to the extent that “it is collectively felt to make a difference” (Massumi “What” 10). The value of a concept, then, lies in what it does, what new affects it gives rise to, what new ways of feeling, thinking, living it inspires. Hence, not only do affects feed into concepts, affects are also engendered by them. Altogether, “[c]oncepts are inseparable from affects, i.e. from the powerful effects they have on our life,” but they are also indivisible from “percepts, i.e. the new ways of seeing or perceiving they provoke in us” (Deleuze, TRM 238). Because affects are becomings (D+G, ATP 256), the ordinary affects of an event such as the financial crisis are open to becoming something else: new ways of thinking in the form of new concepts. In turn, these new concepts have the capacity to beget new affects and percepts, new becomings, new forces for a people-to-come.

**Crises and concept creation 1: becoming-revolutionary**

The ordinary affects of an event, then, have immense potential. They have the potential to become creatively political when they contribute to the development of concepts and ways of living that step outside the dominant language of capitalist crises and recovery programmes. The ordinary affects of this financial crisis are surely turning up new concepts right now, for, as D+G point out, thought advances by way of shocks and crises (WP 203). The “strong sensory lives” of our ordinary experiences (Stewart, “Watching”) are encountering shocks and “micro-shocks” (Massumi, “Of Micropereception”), which are opening to flashes of alternatives, new proposals, speculations about another future. If we were to turn to D+G to direct us toward particular solutions, we would find, as noted earlier, no suggestion that any ideal state is the perfect alternative to capitalism and its problems. However, D+G do proffer two concepts that may prove helpful if recast in response to the current circumstances. These two
concepts, as Patton notes, appear later in D+G’s work, and signal an “awareness of normative political issues that were less prominent in earlier writings” (Patton, “Utopian” 42). The two concepts—“becoming-revolutionary” and “becoming-democratic”—are normatively inflected, since, like all concepts, they carry references to their earlier histories. However, in D+G’s usage, they work to “express an open-ended and immanent utopianism” rather than any specific, determinate future (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 180). The concept of becoming-revolutionary, for example, alluded to in ATP and developed in Deleuze’s Dialogues and D+G’s What Is Philosophy?, does not refer to the history or future of bloody revolutions and their militants. Rather, this is “a becoming-revolutionary that, according to Kant himself, is not the same as the past, present, or future of revolutions” (D+G, WP 112-13). The latter kind of revolution is an “eternal impossibility” (Deleuze, D 147). Indeed, in Deleuze’s view, “[t]he question of the future of the revolution is a bad question because … there are so many people who do not become revolutionaries, and this is exactly why it is done, to impede the question of the revolutionary-becoming of people, at every level, in every place” (D 147). So what does the Deleuze-Guattarian concept of becoming-revolutionary refer to? To a “new kind of revolution [that is] in the course of becoming possible” (Deleuze, D 147). This new kind of revolution is both “plane of immanence [and] infinite movement,” as the following elucidates:

That the two great modern revolutions, American and Soviet, have turned out so badly does not prevent the concept from pursuing its immanent path. As Kant showed, the concept of revolution exists not in the way in which revolution is undertaken in a necessarily relative social field but in the “enthusiasm” with which it is thought on an absolute plane of immanence … . . . As concept and as event, revolution is self-referential or enjoys a self-positing that enables it to be apprehended in an immanent enthusiasm without anything in states of affairs or lived experience being able to tone it down, not even the disappointments of reason. Revolution is absolute deterritorialisation even to the point where this calls for a new earth, a new people. (D+G, WP 101)

Becoming-revolutionary, then, is a manifestation of absolute deterritorialisation—it is “like a reserve of freedom or movement in reality” that ensures the “permanent possibility of movement beyond present limits to our individual and collective capacities” (Patton, “Future” 25, 27). Indeed, it could be seen as a way out of cruel optimism, that which tethers subjects to their present conditions: it is a concept that confirms the permanent potential for social change. In practice, become-revolutionary may be said to “encompasses the myriad forms of minoritarian-becoming open to individuals and groups” (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 182). While minority groups may seek to be accepted by the majority, the minoritarian-becoming of D+G’s revolution is the becoming-minor (becoming-impoverished, becoming-indigenous, becoming-woman) of everyone: it is an impetus that seeks to displace majority thinking by introducing uncontrollable difference or “continuous variation” into majoritarian notions of
social order (see D+G, ATP 105-06). Open to all, becoming-revolutionary allows for “the possibility of transformation in [various] forms of social organisation” (Patton, Deleuze 83), inasmuch as it continuously displaces social boundaries. Indeed, its success or “victory” is that it installs new bonds between people (D+G, WP 177). It is even possible to conceive of becoming-revolutionary in terms of freedom, as Patton does: “Freedom is manifest in [the] moments of becoming-revolutionary, whether in a personal or social sense, but this is a different concept of freedom to that which underpins liberal or liberation theories alike” (Deleuze 83). Becoming-revolutionary is the freedom to become the altogether new earth and people.

The openings to take up and recreate the concept of becoming-revolutionary and in order to invent the new in the face of the global financial crisis environment are manifold. One possible method of becoming-revolutionary, for example, relates to both the Levine and Adbuster projects as described above, which support the ecologically derived concept of “sustainability.” The notion of sustainability, driven by the logic of “sufficiency” rather than by capitalism’s pivotal principle “efficiency” (Princen), is, of course, not a novel concept. Introduced to the political mainstream over twenty years ago by the UN’s Brundtland Commission (Bass 10), sustainability or “sustainable development” was defined as “a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional change are made consistent with future as well as present needs” (United Nations). In other words, meeting the present needs of all groups of people (not just the wealthy), while also being responsible for future generations. But while the “idea” of sustainability “has been pretty well absorbed” by now, most governments, businesses and individuals have not yet felt “the burn to act,” and practices of unsustainability have continued to prevail (Bass 11, 12). To recreate the concept of becoming revolutionary in our time, then, might involve recognising that “[t]he root of our economic crisis and the root of our ecological and sustainability crises [is] the same”: that root being the “guiding principle” of expansion—of wealth, technology and power (J. Buchanan). As Guattari points out, “[p]roduction for the sake of production—the obsession with the rate of growth, whether in the capitalist market or in planned economies—leads to monstrous absurdities” (C 21). Responding to this crisis in becoming-revolutionary, therefore, may involve “redefining our ‘needs,’” changing our “patterns of hyper-consumption,” and “embark[ing] upon a more sustainable path forward—economically, communally and environmentally” (J. Buchanan). It would involve promoting the understanding that “[t]he only acceptable finality of human activity is the production of a subjectivity that is auto-enriching its relation to the world in a continuous fashion” (Guattari, C 21). A becoming-revolutionary response might mean radically challenging existing notions of progress; for example, the New Economic Foundation (NEF; a sustainable-economics “think-and-do tank”) has established “National Accounts of
Well-Being”: new measures of assessing “societal progress” that operate “[i]n contrast to the conventional narrow focus on economic indicators, [and] allow governments to directly and regularly measure people’s subjective well-being: their experiences, feelings and perceptions of how their lives are going” (National). NEF executive director Stewart Wallis may well have been operating as a becoming-revolutionary when he took this message to the 2009 Davos World Economic Forum, speaking to “the assembled money-makers” about “the importance of ‘gross domestic happiness,’ as opposed to gross domestic product” (Lewis). Becoming-revolutionary in the here-and-now provides no particular programme for us to follow. Instead, it simply calls for close attention to the minoritarian forms of resistance that are cropping up around us, attunement to and trying out of resistances that suggest lines of flight to the outside of present day capitalism’s inequalities, short-sightednesses and intolerabilities. As Patton notes, D+G “do not envisage global revolutionary change but rather a process of ‘active experimentation’ which is played out in between economic and political institutions and the sub-institutional movements of desire and affect” (Deleuze 7). This, then, is one of the conceptual pathways available to us, individually and collectively, out of the current crisis.

Crises and concept creation 2: becoming-democratic

The second Deleuze-Guattarian concept that might be called upon and redeveloped as a response to the current global crisis is “becoming-democratic.” There is a relationship between this concept and the one just visited—a becoming between the two—as pointed out by Philippe Mengue: becoming-revolutionary is inseparable from becoming-democratic, since “[b]ecoming-revolutionary is immanent to the plane of thought that underlies the public space of democracies” (183). Patton also sees a relationship, but for him “becoming-revolutionary as the path towards a new earth and a ‘people to come’ is modulated by the call for resistance to existing forms of democracy” (“Utopian” 44). Existing forms of democracy have nothing to do with what D+G call becoming-democratic; indeed, D+G are quite scathing of prevailing democracies, telling us that the new earth and new people “will not be found in our democracies” (WP 108). A becoming-democracy, they emphasise, “is not the same as what [democratic] States of law are,” since present day democracy is the Greek “society of friends” appropriated by capitalism (WP 113, 98). As Jérémie Valentin notes, we may be “prone to think that the model of liberal democracy has prevailed, and that there is no point in critic[i]ing it,” but D+G refuse to accept this view (199). Although D+G reject present manifestations of democracy, they imply that other actualisations of the concept are still possible, since becoming-democratic calls upon the “pure event of democracy” (Patton, “Utopian” 44). As a more pure event, becoming-democratic may be said to “begin again at every moment” (Mengue 183), which is to say it expresses a virtual dimension that always offers its actualisations something creative and new. Indeed, for Derrida, democracy is always-already
virtual: “we do not yet know what democracy will have meant nor what democracy is. For democracy does not present itself; it has not yet presented itself, but that will come” (9). But while Derrida’s democracy-to-come refers to a perpetually deferred, never actualisable future, D+G’s becoming-democracy offers the potential for new actualisation: it does not remain entirely in the realm of the virtual since new forms of the democratic are always available to be actualised and brought to life.

While the economic crisis prompts us to think about what changes could be necessary to move beyond the present issues, we have the opportunity to engage in real thought by way of a concept such as becoming-democratic. The prevailing concept of liberal democracy, as reterritorialised by capitalism, involves considerable contradiction and points of conflict, many of which may have contributed to the developing crisis. The Deleuze-Guattarian concept of becoming-democratic offers “ways of criticising the workings of actual existing democracies,” and—because it calls upon the fullness of the concept (the event of democracy)—it does this “in the name of the egalitarian principles that are supposed to inform [current democracies’] institutions and political practices” (Patton, “Utopian” 50). In bringing to bear this concept it is important to identify some of the contradictory elements of modern democratic states. According to Patton, Deleuze (and Guattari) refer to several points of conflict, of which we will consider three. First, there is the problem of the “coexistence of formally equal rights alongside enormous disparities of material condition” (“Utopian” 50). Although one of the charters of modern democracies may be “to ensure that the basic rights of citizens have at least approximately equal value for all” (Patton, “Utopian” 50), such states ultimately submit to the “universal market” (D, N 172)—the axiomatic of global capitalism. As Deleuze states, the market has no interest in equal rights, and every existing democratic state is “compromised to the very core by its part in generating human misery” (N 173). Not only are the rewards of market economies inequitably distributed, but any human rights laws are effectively suspended when substantial property ownership is involved (D+G, WP 107). This has become especially evident during “foreclosure crisis” element of the financial crisis in the USA—whereby millions of people have lost their homes due to the often-illegal foreclosures of their mortgages. That poor, black and other minority communities have been the worst affected by the housing crisis was confirmed by a 2010 Princeton University study, which found that “the greater the degree of Hispanic and especially black segregation a metropolitan area exhibits, the higher the number and rate of foreclosures it experiences” (Rugh and Massey 644). Because predatory lending and subsequent foreclosures were concentrated in segregated poor, black communities, the authors conclude that America’s foreclosure crisis was racialised, and “occurred because of a systematic failure to enforce basic civil rights laws in the United States” (Rugh and Massey 646).
Further, as Patton suggests, when a financial benefit is on offer, democratic states will often overlook the oppressive actions of dictatorial states ("Becoming-Democratic" 188). We can think here of Vietnam, which, since the early 2000s, has become a significant trading partner for Australia: in 2009, Australia-Vietnam trade amounted to $AU6 billion, a substantial portion of Australia’s total trade with South East Asia (“Vietnam”). At the same time, Vietnam maintains what amounts to a communist dictatorship: its one party government controls all media and its constitution disallows “any challenge to the party’s primacy, no matter how non-violent” (F. Brown 329). The human rights advocacy organisation Human Rights Watch regularly highlights cases of oppression and unjust imprisonment in Vietnam, condemning the government for its “lack of tolerance for dissent and denial of fundamental human rights to freedom of expression, assembly, association, and religious belief” (Colm). During a recent visit to Vietnam, our tourist guide spoke of poverty, corruption, and his belief that ninety percent of South Vietnamese would leave the country if they were allowed. Far from being free to speak this way, this guide’s anti-government pronouncements bordered on treason according to Vietnamese law. Some do attempt to escape the regime, but only to encounter more problems in their country of arrival. In March 2011, for example, a group of Vietnamese asylum seekers were found off the coast of Broome, Western Australia; this discovery caused an “immigration headache” for the Australian government: “The arrival foreshadows a diplomatic problem for Australia, which regards Vietnam as a friendly nation and an important trading partner. Determining that Vietnamese nationals had been persecuted in their home country would open a rift with Hanoi” (B. Harvey). Opening a rift with Hanoi is not desirable if trade profit will suffer, which means that these new arrivals are unlikely to be granted refugee status (their “jumping the queue” offers a likely justification for this refusal). A capitalist democracy will always put money before a democratic principal such as equality, especially in the shadow of a financial crisis.

The second problematical aspect of existing democracies also relates to capitalism’s dominance, and concerns the kinds of opinions that circulate in society. If “[d]emocratic politics is inseparable from the play of conflicting opinions in order to determine a collective will as the basis for laws and public policy” (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 186), then such opinions need to be entirely immanent, without being subject to any overlying criteria. Yet, as D+G proclaim, the play of opinion in contemporary democracies all too often strives toward the consensus of the “universal liberal opinion,” which simply expresses “the cynical perceptions and affections of the capitalist him[her]self” (WP 146). Putting it another way, D+G argue that the “values, ideals, and opinions of our time” are founded upon the “vulgarity of existence that haunt democracies” (WP 107). The role of the media in disseminating the capitalist line rather than an authentic problematisation of states of affairs is, as we have seen, particularly disturbing. In addition to the flow of this kind of everyday opinion, D+G discuss
the role of a society's more “philosophical” opinions. These kinds of public opinions are “nationalitariations,” because they are “marked by the national characteristics” of a people (D+G, WP 104). This is dogmatic thought at work. As Patton explains, such opinions are embedded in a people's national “conceptions of right and their practical philosophy as this is expressed in political and legal institutions” (“Utopian” 55). Particular forms of democracy, then, will not only be qualified by capitalistic constraints, but also by nationalistic, transcendental notions of rights; for example, “[o]pinions about the natural hierarchies of race, sex and class have long influenced ... basic political and civil rights in otherwise democratic societies” (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 187). When former Prime Minister Rudd spoke of and for “the Australian people,” for example, in his responses to the financial crisis, it is unlikely he was recognising the countless indigenous Australians who do not share in capitalism's rewards.

The third incongruity of present democracies is linked to this operation of opinion, to the extent that opinion is a particularly narrow form of thought (D+G, WP 146). The opinion that matters in a democracy is that of the majority, and this does not only apply to a quantitative majority. There is also a qualitative majority at work in democracies, a majority that relates to the prior question—always settled in advance—“majority of whom?” (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 191). As we discovered in Part 1, the majority refers to those who are fit to be counted (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 191), or who match the “model you have to conform to: the average adult male city-dweller, for example” (D, N 173). In light of the financial crisis, we should add “white” and “wealthy” to that description. The strength of majority opinion is evidenced by the resilience of capitalism during this crisis: one year into the height of the crisis the Carnegie Endowment, a “Global Think Tank” based in Washington, declared capitalist democracy intact:

[C]oncerns that the discrediting of U.S.-style capitalism would lead to a guilt-by-association discrediting of democracy have proven unfounded. Indeed, despite early bluster, alternatives to capitalism have not gained much traction. Many countries are trying to strengthen their regulatory systems, but are not throwing out capitalism [read: democracy] altogether. (Davis and Carothers)

As a concept of resistance, becoming-democratic strives “to broaden the base of those who count as citizens,” again through the vector of minoritarian-becoming (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 191). As such, the majority subject is challenged by efforts to secure the legal and political equivalence of a whole range of minorities—those outside the majority according to “sexual preference, physical and mental abilities, and cultural and religious backgrounds” (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 191), as well as according to race and financial status. Of course, as we have seen, the concept of becoming(-imperceptible) can undo these categories altogether, but as a first step towards this, the concept of becoming-democratic is one surely
worth developing. If “[d]emocracies are majorities,” and “a becoming is by nature that which eludes the majority” (D+G, WP 108), becoming-democratic is a concept of resistance.

How, then, might we move to recreate the concept of becoming-democratic in the here and now? In Patton’s submission, this will involve working through several related issues. For example, in response to the problem of existing democracies’ material inequality, the normative question might be asked: “what principles of distribution should apply in a just democratic society?” (Patton, “Utopian” 50). In terms of current democracies’ opinions—both everyday and more “philosophical”—regarding what is fair and justifiable, becoming-democratic brings us to the idea “that more genuinely democratic forms of public political reason are both possible and desirable” (Patton, “Becoming-Democratic” 189), and should be negotiated. And concerning the notion of the majority subject, becoming-democratic demands attention to minoritarian-becomings, which will have at least two effects: altering “the affects, beliefs and political sensibilities of a population in ways that amount to the advent of a new people” (Patton, “Utopian” 52), and permanently destabilising the fact of a majority subject with the force of difference. Overall, in Patton’s estimation, the concept of becoming-democratic can be seen as “a means to counter-actualise what passes for democratic society in the present,” to the extent that “it challenges existing opinions about what is acceptable, right or just” (“Becoming-Democratic” 190). Taking the concept of becoming-democratic through a different vector, though, we might turn to Manning’s consideration of the meeting between democracy, politics and touch. Through her concept of the “politics of touch,” Manning strives toward an alternative to the kind of democracy sanctioned by state Politics—with its reliance of representation, signification and the foreclosure of meaning (Politics 111).

Underpinned by D+G’s espousal of “expression”—as opposed to communication or representation—Manning’s suggestions toward a concept of democracy start with “the sensing body in movement” (Politics 111). For D+G, expression is the self-moving, impersonal agency (Massumi, “Introduction” xxi) that expresses all the coming-into-beings of the world, or, to state it another way, the process of autopoietic, “self-organising emergence” that is the world’s becoming (Massumi, “Deleuze” 756, 777). (As Deleuze tells us, the world “does not exist outside of its expressions” [FL, 132].) In Manning’s account, “expression leads us to the body, to touch, to skin,” and the “expressivity of touch is political” to the extent that—in its “reaching toward”—it “provides an opening for an event” (Politics 111, 110). A concept of democracy that invokes a politics of touch assumes that “there is a body to reach toward” (Manning, Politics 112). Not the body as signified and foreclosed by existing systems of governance (racialised, genderised, accountable bodies), but a moving, sensing, open body that can “know differently” and that can even be created again into something not foreseeable (Manning, Politics 113-14, 131). As Manning puts it, “[d]emocracy as a sensing politics is a movement toward making sense(s), towards new orientations of experience” (Politics 131).
This is politics not as something to be solved (which is policy or policing) but as an event: the event-ness of democracy as opening the way for “disagreement, for choice, for accidents” (Manning, Politics 131). To conceptualise democracy from a perspective of sense is to foreground relationality and to resist dominant teleological versions of “identity, territory [and] history” (Manning, Politics 132). Once again, the kind of democracy/ies this might lead to is an open question, but, certainly, there is potential for new becomings of people, people not discountable or punishable by reason of identity or economics.

Counter-actualising the concept of democracy as a response to the current economic crisis is surely an ethical act of thought, as is developing the concept of becoming-revolutionary. If the crisis is an outcome of capitalism, and if “[c]apitalism prevents the becoming of subjected peoples” (D+G, WP 108), any concept that works to undo capitalism’s stranglehold is potentially life-enhancing. Overall, the entire process of concept creation is an expansive enterprise. It introduces something new, something previously unseen, which will increase the potential for living. The flow of ordinary affects, in and through both the small events of daily life and large events like a financial crisis, strikes us, offering us the opportunity to draw connections, develop ideas, create/recreate concepts. To think. As Berlant puts it, “[u]nder duress from changes in the conditions of life, thinking jams the machinery that makes the ordinary appear as a flow that we shape mildly, often absentmindedly” (“Thinking” 6).

Thought as concept creation is quite rare, according to Deleuze; there are people, he tells us, “who go through life without ever having an idea” (ABC). Indeed, this kind of thought can be something of a shock: “[t]he concept ... creates a crack in the skull ..., it’s a habit of thought that is completely new, and people aren’t used to thinking like that, not used to having their skulls cracked, since a concept twists our nerves” (ABC). One must be prepared to be moved by the impacts of everyday affects, to stop to think other durations, and to make the effort of extending to the concepts they engender. Again, this kind of thought is movement, in the sense that it is difference and change, and in the sense that it activates “the openness of concepts and their a-systematic relations with other concepts” (Patton, “Utopian” 41). To open to the concepts of becoming-revolutionary or becoming-democratic is to admit difference into capitalism, to find an excess beyond this force that only ever deterritorialises toward one strict end. There are undoubtedly countless other concepts enfolded in the current situation, concepts that will bring forth events and have the potential to lead to real moments of social change. The crisis has the capacity to reveal a people who “no longer fit the managers’ models,” and a future that “doesn’t turn out the way it’s expected” (Holmes, “Financial”). If we are willing to remember that we are not simply subjects of capitalism but affective intensities capable of accessing creative thought, if we apply ourselves to developing the techniques of affective attention and intuition, if we adopt a pedagogy of the concept, we may find more life-affirming ways of being in the world other than those wholly prescribed by capital.
Micropolitics of bare life

What we have started to map, then, is the image of a thought that is sensory, affective, and that, when practised as philosophy, is concerned with the creation of concepts. Through such techniques as affective attention, Bergsonian intuition, and Whiteheadean speculation we can move toward the realm of concept creation, “not through any external determinism but through a becoming that carries the problems themselves along with it” (Deleuze, *N* 149). We have explored the potential of two concepts for our time, becoming-revolutionary and becoming-democratic, and, no doubt, we will return to these and other fruitful concepts as we proceed. But let us make a return to the space of everyday affect, the “scale of intimacy,” in Holmes words: that “space of gestation” where sense resides (“Affectivist”). Let us spend a moment mapping it from a different perspective, to see if any other techniques for thought can become available. We begin by utilising Nigel Thrift’s taking up of Agamben’s concept of “bare life” (“Bare” 147), which Agamben, in his turn, actually takes from Aristotle’s notion of *zoe*: this “bare life” refers to the “natural sweetness” of the “simple fact of living” that lies outside both the common laws of *bios* and the practices of the *polis* (Agamben, *Homo* 1-2). In Thrift’s reworking of Agamben’s bare life, it becomes a realm of “pure, ‘real’ experience” and “potentiality,” as well as being “concerned with ‘everydayness’ as a common ‘place’ and an excess” (“Bare” 147). In other words, bare life is the constant flow of variation that backgrounds life, as well as the “seemingly ephemeral, transient, incorporeal, and inorganic aspects” of the everyday (Seigworth, “Banality” 257). Bare life, as the full pulse of what is going on, is certainly not bare: “[i]t is most of what there is” (Thrift, “Still” 35). Bare life, then, resonates with Stewart’s concept of ordinary affects. For Agamben, though, as Thrift notes, the potentialities of bare life—in terms of any kind of positive politics for life—are yet to be realised, so powerful are the imperatives of state rule (“Still” 48). Thrift takes a more optimistic, and argues that “an emancipatory politics of bare life” is already underway (“Still” 48). In probing this notion of bare life, and asking how it might implicate a positive politics, we seek to further uncover features of our map for thought.

Bare life, Thrift tells us, is focused “by the contours of the simple living body” (“Bare” 148). This “simple living body” is identified quite specifically, as a being located in the “small space and time—what is often called the half-second delay—between action and consciousness” (“Bare” 148). Thrift acknowledges the rich affectivity of this small space of time, when he nominates it as the space “upon which affect thrives and out of which it is often constituted” (Thrift, *Non-Representational* 185). Setting aside momentarily the notion of the “half-second delay,” we turn to Thrift’s contention that in recent times a “new structure of attention” has emerged, one that “involves the inhabitation of much smaller spaces and times than before”;
in these spaces actions take place that “involve qualities like “anticipation, improvisation, and intuition” (“Bare” 150). Through this structure of attention, “[p]erception is both stretched and intensified, widened and condensed” (Thrift, “Bare” 150). In terms of what has contributed to the development of this structure of attention, Thrift proposes the “advent of a whole series of technologies,” which include the following:

First, there is the ability to sense the small spaces of the body through a whole array of new scientific instruments which have, in turn, made it possible to think of the body as a set of micro-geographies. Then, there is the related ability to sense small bodily movements. Beginning with the photographic work of Marey, Muybridge and others and moving into our current age in which the camera can impose its own politics of time and space, we can now think of time as minutely segmented frames, able to be speeded up, slowed down, even frozen for a while. Next, numerous body practices have come into existence which rely on and manage such knowledge of small times and spaces, most especially those connected with the performing arts, including ... much modern dance ... . Then, finally, a series of discourses concerning the slightest gesture and utterance of the body have been developed, ... from the analysis of gesture to the mapping of ‘body language’. (Non-
Representational 185-86)

Perhaps Thrift’s point regarding this sharpening of attention can be further illuminated through a particular, recent example, one also concerning modern dance: the use of video technology in Veridiana Zurita’s video dance piece, Das Partes. In this work, the videography captures and intensifies the dancer’s movements at a micro-level, effectively making the movements “stutter”: this stutter “allows both the imagery and the music to open up to an oblique four-dimensionality in which hesitation, fear, desire, chance and power are produced through a returning pleat creating non-chronological steams” (Dolphijn 169). These micro-movements, folding forwards and backwards, constitute, and allow us to perceive, the space of affect. What is normally imperceptible becomes visible, as Rick Dolphijn explains: “the smallest gestures that the camera reveals to us present us with the fractal nature of space that, in magnifying even the infinitesimal, creates new forms of expression, new blocks of sensation ad infinitum” (172). For Manning, there is tremendous potential when digital technology begins to operate in this way: “[i]f technology can recompose a body beyond the level of sensuous perception,” as has occurred, it would seem, in Zurita’s work, then “technology becomes technogenesis”—by which she means technology “bring[s] to the fore movement’s incipiency” (Relationscapes 74, 71). The experience for the viewer is an affective one “that does not end with the [viewing]: the affective tone’s residue lingers, provoking adjacent forms of experience, many of which remain virtual” (Manning, Relationscapes 74). Because technogenesis foregrounds the durations of the moving, sensing body, Manning calls for a greater development of this practice: “[t]echniques for technogenetic emergence must become part of [digital] technology’s interface: we must develop techniques that create new
associated milieus never distinct from the ontogenetic body” (*Relationscapes* 75). Here, we begin to get a sense of how—instead of compressing time and movement—digital technologies can also be used to access duration and affect. Practices of technogenesis provide an example of the digital becoming techniques of/for thought, to the extent that they enable access to the simultaneously present potentialities of other ways of moving, of being in the world.

But we have digressed, and will leave any further foray into the potentialities of digital technology until Line of Flight 2. We return now to the small time and space at the cusp between the virtual and the actual, the “bare life” of affect, which Zurita’s video works to bring into perception. While Bergson-Deleuze might call this duration, for Thrift, it is “the undiscovered country” of the “the half-second delay” (*Non-Representational* 186). The half-second delay has long history in terms of research:

This is the period of bodily *anticipation* originally discovered by Wilhelm Wundt in the mid-nineteenth century. Wundt was able to show that consciousness takes time to construct ... . That insight was subsequently formalised in the 1960s by Libet using new body recording technologies. He was able to show decisively that an action is set in motion before we decide to perform it: the “average readiness potential” is about 0.8 seconds, although cases as long as 1.5 seconds have been recorded.

... To summarise, what we are able to see is that the space of embodiment is expanded by a fleeting but crucial moment, a constantly moving preconscious frontier. (Thrift, *Non-Representational* 186)

Massumi calls this delay “the missing half second,” and explains it as the body “absorbing impulses quicker than they can be perceived,” with the “entire vibratory event [being] unconscious, out of mind” (*Parables* 29). Although the half-second is “missed” it is not empty, but “is overfull, in excess of the actually-performed action and of its ascribed meaning” (Massumi, *Parables* 29). What this means is that “[w]ill and consciousness are subtractive. They are limitative, derived functions that reduce a complexity too rich to be functionally expressed” (Massumi, *Parables* 29; italics removed). Again, there are parallels here with Bergson’s notion that the intellect is ineffective in taking in the fullness of duration. The complexity of unconscious thought taking place in the half-second delay is situated at the level of the body, to such an extent that cognitive scientists have estimated that 95 per cent of all thought is of this kind—“and that may be a serious underestimate” (Lakoff and Johnson 13). In other words, there is a world of thought taking place in the missing half second, one that is present to the body as stirrings, anticipations, affect, and one that is virtually present as the whole of duration. And because new structures of attention are making more and more visible this fleeting moment of potential, it has become a time that is “highly political” (Thrift, *Non-Representational* 186). As discussed earlier, the control mechanisms of bio-power work...
powerfully at the affective level—in the time/spaces of the half-second delay. The mass media and especially television are potent mechanisms by which affect is transmitted and modulated for political and commercial purposes. As Thrift states, the half-second delay “becomes explicitly political through practices [that] are aimed at it specifically,” and, for him, the practice that is the strongest and “most astute” in this respect is capitalist business (“Bare” 153). Thrift proposes several ways in which capitalist business attempts to reach into and exploit the half-second delay. For example, through the employment of brands, which work at a preconscious level through “signs understood as immediate response” (Thrift, “Bare” 156). Another such application is the “experience economy,” which uses object-experiences to propagate capital, for instance in the “explicit sensoriali[s]ing of goods,” and in “the use of nonconscious cues to add ambience to retail environments so as to produce impulse purchases” (Thrift, “Bare” 156-58). Thus, in the bio-politicisation of the half-second interval, “[o]ur anticipation is being anticipated” and “[o]ur perceptions are increasingly becoming instrumentali[s]ed” (Thrift, “Bare” 161). All is not lost, however, in Thrift’s view: “[t]here are still a number of ways in which the essential multiplicity and virtuality of bare life can be restated; what has been transposed can be recomposed” (Thrift, “Bare” 161). What Thrift calls for is a “microbiopolitics of the subliminal,” one that “understands the kind of biological-cum-cultural gymnastics that takes place in this realm” (Thrift, Non-Representational 192). In order to reclaim the half-second delay for life, then, we need to develop such a microbiopolitics, and, in doing so, discover and apply techniques that may release a new, life-enhancing kind of thought. For Massumi, micro[bio]politics involves “returning to the generative moment of experience,” or, to “the conditions of emergence of the situations [in which] you live” (“Of Microperception”). The question before us is how this might be done.

Although Thrift proposes a number of ways of engaging in such a micro[bio]politics, we will consider the two that are perhaps most apropos here. The first suggestion we take up is his use of Deleuze’s notion of “mediator” (N 121-34), which Massumi translates as “intercessor” (Parables 255). The idea of mediator/intercessor assumes that life—the expanded empirical field—is filled with “mutually modulating, battling, negotiating, process lines” that are “affectively engaged” (Massumi, Parables 255). In other words, the affectively charged half-second delay is always already a zone of in-betweenness, of “processually unique and divergent forms of life” (Massumi, Parables 255). One way of approaching bare life micropolitically is through taking an approach of “tending” this zone (Thrift, Non-Representational 191). This tending cultivates the “interplay” between the various lines (D, N 125) that make up the affective field, so as not to limit the potential for the living out of difference. When Deleuze writes that mediators are concerned with the “capacities of falsity to produce truth” (N 126), he is describing the process of intercession/mediation as “a form of positive dissonance, made possible through an openness to interferences that disturb one’s
regular harmonic vibrations” (Bogue, Deleuze’s 14). In other words, it is helpful to invite difference and disturbances to one’s usual way of thought. Tending to this process means ensuring one is always exposed to the interference that mediators offer, for “[c]reation’s all about mediators. Without them nothing happens. They can be people ...—but things too, even plants or animals ... . Whether they’re real or imaginary, animate or inanimate, you have to form your mediators” (D, N 125). As Thrift puts it, “the simple political imperative is to widen the potential number of interactions a living thing can enter into, to widen the margin of ‘play’” (Non-Representational 191). Widening this margin means opening oneself to the discomfort of the half-second delay—to submitting oneself to, and being able to withstand, the violence of uncommon encounters, encounters with mediators that “falsify” what you think you know. It means “always working in a group, even when you seem to be on your own” (D, N 125). It means being open to encountering and absorbing divergent lines of affect, and to actively tending their symbiosis (Massumi, Parables 255). This tending also enacts a kind of “political ecology,” as Massumi points out: supporting the “coming-together or belonging-together” of disparate affective forces requires a non-self-interested commitment to a process of “reciprocal readjustment” (Massumi, Parables 255). Such a process recognises the value of every self-creating form of life, and accepts the responsibility of constantly adjusting to one another. From a micropolitical perspective, therefore, the generative moment of experience could be approached by way of a technique of mediation: negotiating and expanding—tending—dissonant interactions, so as to sustain an ethos that maximises the potential for difference.

The second mode of engaging in this micropolitics utilises the work of William Connolly, who draws upon a range of fields—including neuroscience and philosophy—to explore the affective richness of the “inscrutable domain” of the half-second delay (Neuropolitics 86). One of Connolly’s chief aims is to argue for “the critical significance of technique in thinking, ethics, and politics” (Neuropolitics xiii). In general terms, Connolly develops a theory around an “ethic of cultivation,” making use of several related philosophical concepts: “‘self-artistry’ (Nietzsche), ‘tactics of the self’ (Foucault), ‘techniques’ (Hampshire), and ‘micropolitics’ (Deleuze)” (Neuropolitics 107). It is English philosopher Stuart Hampshire, though, who provides Connolly with the grounds for “technique,” by way of the following:

First, Hampshire contends that while substance is one, we humans have two irreducible perspectives on it, what he sometimes calls the first-person and the third-person perspectives. Second, he says that a change in either body or thought is always correlated with some change in the other ... . Third, he emphasises how new findings in neuroscience can, once reviewed by the human objects of inquiry, be folded into their own thinking, informing future capacities of thought and action. Fourth, he asserts that coming to terms with such external knowledge can also prompt the invention of techniques and
technologies to act upon the body/brain network, so as to alter, in turn, future patterns of thought, feeling, and action. (Connolly, “Experience” 69)

Thus, while the “immanent field” of the half-second delay is “unsusceptible to full explanation and unsusceptible in principle to precise representation,” it retains amenability to both “cultural inscription” (as we have seen in the influence of Politics and capital), and also, more positively, to “experimental tactics of intervention” (Connolly, Neuropolitics 86). It is possible, then, to “apply techniques to yourself experimentally to ascertain what new possibilities become discernible in your thinking” (Connolly, Neuropolitics 89). A technique of thought, thus conceived, is “an exercise or other intervention that alters the direction of thinking or the mood in which it is set” (Connolly, Neuropolitics 88). Accordingly, “[a]n electrical probe becomes a technique of thought when applied purposively to a patch of the brain; clearing your mind of everyday concerns while going on a long, slow run in the woods is another” (Connolly, Neuropolitics 88). Other examples include going dancing “to music that inspires you … after hearing very disappointing news,” or listening to classical music “while reading a philosophical text in order to relax your mind and sharpen its acuity of reception” (Connolly, Neuropolitics 102, 101). Such techniques of the self “aim at unconscious processes below the reliable reach of conscious regulation” (Connolly, Neuropolitics 90). Connolly’s reason for advocating the relationship between thinking and technique thus conceived is that thinking is more than “knowing, explaining, representing …”; at its highest it is “expressive, creative and compositional”; or, to put it another way, “[t]o think is to move something” (Neuropolitics 103-04) (as we have seen, it is often to move toward new concepts in response to problematical states of affairs). Technique as a micropolitical self-intervention is connected to ethics: it is “the hinge that links thought (as corporeally stored thinking) to ethical sensibility” (Connolly, Neuropolitics 107). Connolly explains this connection:

In a world in which institutional discipline has become extensive and intensive, such tactics can function as counter-measures to build more independence and thoughtful responsiveness into ethico-political sensibilities. You might, thus, act tactically and experimentally upon yourself to fold more presumptive receptivity and forbearance into your responses to pluralizing movements … . (Neuropolitics 107)

In other words, these micropolitical techniques of the self dip into the half-second delay and stretch the potential for thinking and tending difference in the world. Just so, such techniques might amount to a kind of practice that also aids the technique of tending mediation as described above.

Finally, here, let us draw a line between Berlant’s “stopping to think,” Bergson’s intuition, and the micropolitics of the half-second delay that corresponds to bare life. Leonard Lawlor’s discussion of Bergson’s intuition would seem, actually, to also encapsulate elements of each of these concepts: in stopping to think, intuitoring, and attending to the half-second delay, we
“listen carefully” to life, and enlarge our consciousnesses “to include unconscious memory” (70). Lawler further explains how to obtain intuition:

I must turn away from the fragmented and discontinuous experience of social life and inhabit a, so to speak, ‘world without others.’ [Here] I am in the grey zone between the day of practical action and the night of dreaming. Here, in the middle, I try to see the infinitely small differences in which experience consists and I try to reconstitute the whole curve of experience. In this attempted reconstitution, I return to social life, or action, or language.

(70)

Stopping to think is tuning into the grey zone of affect, as well as to the whole curve of experience that is duration. The half-second delay of bare life is also the zone of the middle, the experience of infinitely small differences. From attending to this zone, from enlarging, tending and even intervening in it, we can produce a “germ for thought,” which is to say “invit[e] thought’s virtual potential into the articulation of a concept” (Manning, “Creative” 22). We can return to the world of language and action, armed with the raw materials for creating concepts that open out to a new, “possible world” (D+G, WP 17). And as we have indicated, such tuning in to affect, duration and bare life is a matter of urgency under the saturated conditions of our informational milieu.
In diagramming a Deleuzian thought without an image that might help us chip away at some of the problems of our time, we have so far mapped lines through affect, intuition, concept creation and micro(bio)political techniques. We have engaged a kind of philosophical/nonphilosophical/political thought, to the extent that, by way of affect, we have reached towards concepts through which we might move closer to a people to come. According to D+G, though, thought is heterogeneous (WP 199): there are still other ways to participate in thought. The notion of thinking in terms of “having an idea” extrapolates to creative planes other than philosophy, with one of the most critical of these being the sphere of art. In Deleuze’s view, philosophy and art are “separate melodic lines in constant interplay with one another” (N 125). As Bogue points out, while “Deleuze often describes philosophy as the invention of concepts,” he parallels this enterprise with “the creative activity of the artist” (Deleuze on Music 2). Art is a neighbouring thought form to philosophy (Patton, Deleuze 24). Indeed, as Massumi puts it, “[a]rt, as ‘composition,’ is enacted philosophical thought” (Parables 176). “Art, like philosophy, looks past ‘what’ things are, to how they become. … This is a speculative act, a conceptual gesture, in much the same way that philosophical thinking is” (Massumi, “What” 13). For Deleuze, the power of art is immense, emanating as it does from art’s inherent “secret pressures”—the “signs” that a work of art emits and generates (PS 98, 97). Such signs are not concerned with the material world in the sense of evoking recognition—this means that, or even, this could mean that. Rather, the signs of art are entirely dematerialised, meaning that they open out to the virtual, or to what Deleuze, in Proust and Signs, also calls “ideal essence” or an essential “Idea” (PS 13, 39). Therefore, while on the plane of philosophy ideas occur in the form of concepts, on the plane of art, thought proceeds differently: in its emission of signs, art thinks by way of intensities and sensations (Grosz, Chaos 1). The heterogeneous and moving nature of thought means that its different planes not only parallel but also interpenetrate one another, without any one plane being any “better than another, or more fully, completely, or synthetically ‘thought’” (D+G, WP 198). Daniel Smith explains art’s specificity for Deleuze, and further clarifies the interpenetration of art and concept creation:

Great artists are also great thinkers, but they think in terms of percepts and affects rather than concepts: painters think in terms of lines and colo[u]rs, just as musicians think in sounds, filmmakers think in images, writers think in words, and so on. None of these activities has any priority over the others. Creating a concept is neither more difficult nor more abstract than creating new visual, sonorous, or verbal combinations in art; conversely, it is no easier to read an image, painting or novel than it is to comprehend a concept. Philosophy, for Deleuze, can never be undertaken
independently of art (or science); it always enters into relations of mutual resonance
and exchange with these other domains . . . . ("Deleuze" viii)

In other words, art and philosophy run side-by-side and through one another to “slow down,
decompose, harness, and develop” the forces of chaos that life rolls out (Grosz, Chaos 5). Of
course, we should acknowledge, as Grosz does, that by “art,” we mean “all forms of creativity
or production that generate intensity, sensation, or affect: music, painting, sculpture,
literature, architecture, design, landscape, dance, performance, and so on” (Chaos 4), as well as
new digital art forms. Before we follow any one of these modes, though, let us repeat that
“[a]rt is thinking, a specific style of thinking” that produces difference through sensation
(Colebrook, Deleuze 114).

As we have seen, thought in the modes of everyday affects, concept-creation and micropolitics
has tremendous potential for mounting resistance to the present. Holmes also argues that,
while it might not have always been the case, there is presently a similar role for art. While art
in the twentieth century was primarily concerned with broadening and rupturing its own
aesthetic, Holmes contends that its function has now changed:

The backdrop against which art now stands out is a particular state of society. What
an installation, a performance, a concept or a mediated image can do is to mark a
possible or real shift with respect to the laws, the customs, the measures, the mores,
the technical and organi[s]ational devices that define how we must behave and how
we may relate to each other at a given time and in a given place. What we look for in
art is a different way to live, a fresh chance at coexistence. (“Affectivist”)

A wellhead for thought, art offers a real opportunity to break with dogma and disrupt the lines
of control that run through contemporary life. Our concern now, in this project, is to map
some resisting lines of art-as-thought, with the aim of ascertaining how they might expand our
capacities for living. In Guattari's terms, we are striving to discover how this aesthetic
dimension of thought might bring us to a “new art of living in society” (Guattari, C 20). And
simultaneously, we are interested in how art might comprise a technicity, in the sense of
offering up particular art/thought techniques by which our potential to live more fully is
enhanced.

Thought as art's sensations

Across his oeuvre, Deleuze's theory of art develops through a range of concepts, with the
overall premise remaining consistent: that art is “a force that transforms inner and outer
experience” (Bogue, Deleuze on Music 2). In his early book on Proust, Deleuze focuses on the
notion of the essences of art—the qualitative, singular expressions of the essential difference-
in-itself of things. Again, this is not an empirical difference but “the absolute and ultimate
Difference” that “constitutes being” (PS 41). In other words, these essences are the irreducible differentness of each of art’s substances: this colour, this musical line, this combination of words. And, as Colebrook explains, when signs lead to these essences there are implications beyond art:

[O]nce we have experienced art in this essential way we see the truth of experience in all its difference. This is not a truth tied to an object, opinion or state of affairs; it is the truth of the whole or possibility of experience: experience as an impersonal and differential flow beyond any of our actual or finite perceptions. ... Essences for Deleuze are not general categories or meanings that lie behind experience; they are unique possibilities which are actualised in any experience. (Understanding 91).

These unique possibilities are connected to a kind of purity of thought, as Jay Conway affirms: the “essence or absolute difference in things is the object of pure thought” (175). From Deleuze’s perspective, as we encounter the signs of art—an encounter that does violence to our habitual, conscious, “intelligent” modes of thinking—we are forced to apprehend essences, which is to say “pure thought” is entered into (Marks, Gilles 133). When Deleuze says we are forced to think beyond conventional truths by what is outside of (conscious) thought, he also means we are forced to think by the signs of art: “they release within thought ... the act of thinking itself” (PS 98). The signs emitted by a work of art provide an invitation to—an entry into—pure thought, to the extent that they force us into a realm of singularities that are nothing but pure difference. This realm provides the raw materials for creation—for thought, which is “the only true creation” (Deleuze, PS 97). Therefore, to think through art is to taken up by the raw force of thought.

By his penultimate book, What is Philosophy, Deleuze, with Guattari, has come to characterise art not so much as signs, but as a composite of sensations, complete in itself, not tied to any artist who might retain control over it. Here, D+G present a work of art as “a bloc of sensations,” or “a compound of percepts and affects,” that exists independently of both artist and art-experiencer (WP 164). Sensations, in the form of percepts (perceptions freed from the perceiver) and affects are not of the subject, but of the art itself: the work of art is “independent of the creator” since it is self-posed and “preserved in itself” (D+G, WP 164). D+G further explain:

Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the absence of man [sic]... . The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself. (WP 164)
Grosz’s explanation is also useful to explain art’s independence: “[t]he work of art, whether pictorial, tactile, or sonorous, is a block of intensities, a compound of sensations and affects, of intensities that have gone beyond a subject to become entities themselves” (Chaos 59). The artist, therefore, may create “blocs of percepts and affects,” but inherent in the process of creation is the principle that “the compound must stand up on its own” (D+G, WP 164). In fact, to create something that stands up on its own is an artist’s greatest challenge (D+G, WP 164). The true artist does not depict his/her own perceptions, affections and memories, but instead glimpses something beyond what is representable. In making compounds of sounds, colours, textures and so on, the artist releases or sets free sensations that are independent of the materials made. For D+G, in launching these qualitative sensations, “[t]he artist is a seer, a becomer,” who “has seen something in life that is too great, too unbearable also” (WP 171).

The role of the artist, then, is to “accede to a vision” that “shatters lived perceptions” into an autonomous composition: a composition that frees life from its forms of imprisonment (D+G, WP 171). Putting it yet another way, the artist is someone who has “seen the force of life—the world of inorganic forces—underlying the world as it is typically experienced and then] through artistic method, is able to give this experience to us through a bloc of percepts and affects” (O’Sullivan 55). It is through the artist’s style—syntax, modes and rhythms, lines and colours—that these blocs of percepts and affects are constructed (D+G, WP 170). In creating these blocs, which are becomings rather than representations, the artist takes that which is material into a zone of indetermination—a zone that can only be specified as the experience of “something passing from one to the other” (D+G, WP 172)—sensation. Again, these are not the bodily sensations of a subject (Grosz, Chaos 60), but, rather, the sensation that refers only to the material itself: “the smile of oil, the gesture of fired clay, the thrust of metal” (D+G, WP 166). Art, therefore, as “a lightning rod to sensations” (M. Fuller 48), carries great power. In D+G’s estimation, it has “the power of a ground that can dissolve forms,” and, because “the beings of sensation are varieties,” the artist continually increases the varieties that are in the world (WP 173, 175).

In order to grasp the greater importance of art, however, we must look beyond sensation per se to the way sensation couples with composition (M. Fuller 49). After all, as Grosz remarks, art gives life to sensation through throwing “the plane of composition” over chaos—the plane of composition being “the collective condition of art-making” (Chaos 8, 70). Art creates many compounds and syntheses of sensations, including such “spatial and sensual forces of arrangement” (M. Fuller 49) as movement and rhythm, which also draw us into the compound (D+G, WP 175). According to D+G, the various of compounds of sensations include the “simple sensation” of vibration, the “coupling sensation” of “the embrace or the clinch” of “energies,” and the “opening or splitting, hollowing out” that releases sensation (WP 168). Here, then, art is understood as a bloc of shifting “movements” created by the artist—rhythms
and melodies of sensations—that comprise a kind of monument to the future. D+G express it thus:

[T]he task of all art [is to] extract new harmonies, new plastic or melodic landscapes, and new rhythmic characters that raise them to the height of the earth’s song and the cry of humanity: that which constitutes tone, health, becoming, a visual and sonorous bloc. A monument does not commemorate or celebrate something that happened but confides to the ear of the future the persistent sensations that embody the event … . (WP 176)

In Grosz’s account, “artistic production” is different to “other forms of cultural production” because it “merges with, intensifies and eternali[ses] or monumentali[ses] sensation” (Chaos 4). Because art’s expressivity does not come from the artist’s own interiority but from the expressions of the matter itself (D+G, WP 196), art as monument has the power to take us beyond what is actual and already experienced, into the virtual. Art, therefore, unleashes us from life as it is lived at the level of efficiency and productivity, and opens life to other potentials (Colebrook, Deleuze 99). Indeed, because it generates intense, compound and autonomous sensations that “directly impact living bodies, organs, [and] nervous systems” (Grosz, Chaos 4), art affords us the capacity to “become universes” (D+G, WP 169). This notion of art’s becoming also, as Colebrook explains, connects with D+G’s idea of the externality of relations:

Life is not properly reali[ses]ed in human perception, for our “world” is only one of the ways in which life might be actuali[ses]ed or lived. The power of the artist is to take an actuali[ses]ed set of relations—the lived—and open the potential of other relations. … Art presents life as a power to vary, as the potential for colour, light or line to produce sensations other than those already lived … . (Deleuze 99)

Because art’s sensations stand alone from a subject, and sensations do not require consciousness’s slowing down to decide how to act, Colebrook contends further that “art is one of the ways in which thought approaches infinite speed” (Deleuze 100). Sensation sidesteps consciousness and strikes the body directly, at infinite speed, though impacting “on the body’s own internal forces, on cells, organs, the nervous system” (Grosz, Chaos 73). This is to enact a politics of art by way of sensation. In Rajchmann’s words, artworks “complicate things,” creating “more complex nervous systems no longer subservient to the debilitating effects of clichés, [so as] to show and release the possibilities of a life” (138).

Indeed, there is a correlation between art thus understood and the concept of becoming revolutionary. When D+G declare that “the success of a revolution resides … precisely in the vibrations, clinches, and openings it [gives] to men and women at the moment of its making and that composes itself in a monument that is always in the process of becoming” (WP 177), they could be describing monument-making art-thought as a form of becoming revolutionary.
This kind of becoming is particularly joyful: there is a “necessary joy” in art as creation, Deleuze tells us, in the sense that “art is necessarily a liberation that explodes everything” (DI 134; see also GF 77). This is to say that art’s shocks and resonances displays a “catalytic power” (Colman, “Affective” 68) that disrupts, disturbs and displaces, meaning that art follows an “outward trajectory” that transposes into other forms of life (M. Fuller 49). Therefore, we are not concerned with artist, work and ownership, but with art’s power to vibrate sensations across and through life forms, opening up minor ways of being. Herein lies art’s political potential: if “[s]ensation is that which is transmitted from the force of an event to the nervous system of a living being and from the actions of this being back onto the world itself” (Grosz, Chaos 71), art has the power to ameliorate the constrictions of our milieu. Artworks carry force: their power is not in what they signify or represent, but in the fact that “they assemble, they make, they do, they produce” (Grosz, Chaos 75, 79). In Grosz’ interpretation, art is acutely political since it is where matter most proliferates, which is to say “where becoming is most directly in force” (Chaos 76). In other words, because sensation is “an incorporeal threshold of emergence,” it gives us a sense of the inhuman power to become (Grosz, Chaos 77). In subverting the privilege of the intelligible over the sensible, art enriches our capacity to experience ever-new sensations—the world’s othernesses (Grosz, Chaos 79). And the mechanism through which art brings other possible futures into the present moment, as Grosz explains, is sensation’s vibratory nature: sensation thus touches the living body with a vibratory wave that resonates as well into/out to the world as yet unknown—the being otherwise of the virtual (Chaos 80-81).

Our challenge with art, therefore, is to embrace and mobilise sensation’s potential to invent new ways of being in the world, as a way of responding to the problems we face today. We have considered Deleuze’s art in a broad sense, but we now focus on some examples that might aid us in this challenge. In doing so, however, we should remember that each of the arts carry portions of the others, since the aim of each is to capture “a kind of foundation or unity, the unity in difference of the universe itself, ... of universal forces that impinge on all forms of life” (Grosz, Chaos 81). In other words, although we might address specific art forms, we are still operating within a “post-medium notion of art practice,” to the extent that we are more interested in what the art object can do than the particularities of any medium (O’Sullivan 52). As Deleuze makes clear, art is not so much concerned with the creation or autonomy of forms, as with “capturing forces” or making forces visible (FB 48). With this in mind, we begin with an example from the art that Deleuze regards as most related to material forces, as connecting to “the material reality of bodies” (FB 47): painting. As Bogue explains, for Deleuze painting “is the most carnal of the arts, the art that most directly engages percepts and affects as they arise in human bodies (Deleuze on Music 189). In Deleuze’s estimation, painting can be considered “the paradigmatic art of sensation,” since it is concerned wholly
with expressing the logic of sensation (Bogue, Deleuze on Music 2). As he explains, “[w]hat is painted on the canvas is the body [any kind of body], not insofar as it is represented as an object, but insofar as it is experienced as sustaining this sensation” (Deleuze, FB 32).

**Painting Dreaming**

While Deleuze’s ideas about painting are developed primarily in relation to the works of Paul Cézanne and Francis Bacon, the painting practice we will bring together with Deleuze’s thought arises out of a specifically Australian context. First, though, we consider some general components of Deleuze’s notion of painting, components that will prove useful to our example. Essentially, for Deleuze, through “its line-colour systems and its polyvalent organ, the eye,” painting’s task is to “render visible forces that are not themselves visible” (FB 47, 48). In taking on the problem of making invisible forces visible, painting connects to sensation, since painting also “make[s] us sense … insensible forces” (Deleuze, FB 41, 40). Cézanne, for instance, displays the genius of “rendering visible the folding force of mountains, the germinative force of a seed, the thermic force of a landscape, and so on” (Deleuze, FB 49).

Cézanne, for Deleuze, tackles “the problem of [W]estern painting, the problem of the figure and its relation to figuration” (Colebrook, Rev. 737). As Daniel Smith explicates, “figuration” refers to a form that is related to an object it is supposed to represent (recognition), [whereas] the figure is the form that is connected to sensation, and that conveys the violence of this sensation directly to the nervous system” (“Deleuze’s” 44). Figurative painting is representational, illustrative and narrational, while the figural is a violent kind of break from figuration—a mode that works to get behind all the clichés and “givens” that already crowd the canvas before the painter begins (Deleuze, FB xxxii, 10, 71-72). For Deleuze, who draws this notion of the figural from Lyotard, “[t]he Figure is the sensible form related to sensation; it acts immediately upon the nervous system, which is of the flesh,” and has no need to pass through the intermediary of conscious thought (FB 31). Cézanne’s general approach to rendering the figure is “to connect sensations with some act of framing that will allow the sensation to endure in itself,” while his particular focus is on varying colour internally, so as to “give form to modulation and difference” (Colebrook, Rev. 738).

As Daniel Smith notes, the sensation of the figure is not to be found in the air but in the body, and, while for Cézanne the body may be the body of an apple, it is, for Bacon, the human body (“Deleuze’s” 45). In Deleuze’s appraisal, Bacon’s contribution to developing a figural style was hugely significant. In his attempt to paint sensation directly, Bacon paints the human body “deformed by a plurality of forces: the violent force of a hiccup, a scream, the need to vomit or defecate” (D. Smith, “Deleuze’s” 44). This is not a relationship of form and matter, then, but of forces and materials (Deleuze, FB xxix). So when Bacon wishes to “paint the scream,” he
means not to paint the “visible spectacle before which one screams,” or to represent pain or horror; rather, he means to capture the imperceptible, “invisible and insensible forces” that cause the scream, that “scramble” the body of the figure (Deleuze, FB 51). As rendered by Bacon, the figural elevates the lines and colours of painting to the state of an analogical language, “which consists of expressive movements, paralinguistic signs, breaths and screams, and so on” (Deleuze, FB 92-93). These expressive movements come from the “vital power” of painting: its rhythm (Deleuze, FB 37). Sensation is vibration and resonance, and each painting encompasses a rhythm that is, in fact, its essence (Deleuze, FB xxxii). In Bacon’s work Deleuze identifies “three basic rhythms”: “one steady or ‘witness’ rhythm,” one of crescendo (expanding, diastolic), and one of diminuendo (contracting, systolic) (Deleuze, FB xxxiii). From a figurative viewpoint Bacon’s figures may appear to be “monsters,” but from the viewpoint of the figures themselves they are simply a distribution of rhythms, or figures separating and uniting, resonating, in a field that makes them “of a piece” (Deleuze, FB xxxiii). This is the same rhythm of the world, “the world that seizes me by closing in around me, the self that opens to the world and opens the world itself” (Deleuze, FB 37). Overall, through Bacon and Cézanne, Deleuze sees that painting releases another world: sensation, which is irrational, nonrepresentative, and free (Deleuze, FB 82).

The art to which we now turn had barely begun at the time Deleuze published his treatise on Bacon and Cézanne (Grosz, Chaos 89). Our focus here is the contemporary Aboriginal art of dot painting using canvas and acrylics, a movement that emerged in the early 1970s in the Western and Central desert regions of Australia (Grosz, Chaos 89). By now, of course, this movement has become a substantial one, having gained strong worldwide acceptance. In terms of figural painting, there are definite indications that art from Western/Central desert regions demonstrate this concept. However, these paintings are perhaps more complex, as Grosz acknowledges; she posits that this art straddles abstractionism, expressionism, as well as the figural:

These arts share an obsession with a mystical code (or many) and a fascination with the geometrical forms and with abstraction. They are also concerned with the direct expression of rhythm and force, movement and embodiment that characterises expressionism. But no less concerned with the figure than in the works of Cézanne or Bacon, the figure, alone, coupled, boxed in, deformed, subject to invisible forces, is as explicitly the object of sensation in these various works; in addition, while figural, they must also be understood as landscapes, ... spatialisations of lived space that nevertheless can also be mapped and coordinated, can function also geographically. (Chaos 90)

For our purposes, the key point here is that this is an art of the sensible, an art that evokes sensations which “must be felt as well as thought” (Biddle 11). Most significantly, as
anthropologist Jennifer Biddle notes, this art “produces radical political possibilities” insofar as it “enables a ‘thinking’ not otherwise available in official historical accounts” (11). In other words, this is a minoritarian movement, one that carries the potential to disrupt and dislodge majority thinking about indigenous peoples, culture, land, the body, and more. We will return soon to the political and thought prospects of this Aboriginal art, but first it is fitting that we consider, through two paintings, some elements that make this art one of sensation.

Evaluations of contemporary Aboriginal art from a classical perspective will typically tell us the subject matter of these paintings—that this art is “about Ancestors, Dreamings, sites” (Biddle 14). Furthermore, as Biddle tells us, the exhibition and marketing of these works in worlds outside of the desert communities “not only provide us with information about these paintings—site locations, botanic terms, kinship—but they tell us that these works are this kind of information” (14). In Biddle’s view, though, the more appropriate way to approach these works is by way of “affective reading,” which, she posits, is the only way “[t]o do justice to the force and effect of these paintings in the material terms they themselves enact” (22). These paintings are, essentially, haptic, affective, sensate: situated at the level of the body (Biddle 79). As Biddle explains, “[t]his bodily imperative is not a result of the icon’s capacity to represent but is rather the force and effect of an imprint” (79). These works are material and sensible, “experienced by us corporeally because they are expressions of a profoundly corporeal, incarnate relationship between bodies Ancestral and Aboriginal” (79). This relationship between Aboriginal and Ancestor forms part of the Aboriginal cosmology that is the Dreaming or Dreamtime. Fundamentally, Dreamtime expresses the Aboriginal experience of space and time, which is far removed from the homogenous, Euclidian space-time knowledge of the Westerner. As Manning puts it, Dreamings are “many overlapping space-times of experience” (Relationscapes 168). Moreover, this is a cosmology heavily imbued with spirituality:

> The Aboriginal sensitivity to cosmological forces is well known. They seemingly inhabit the substance of the cosmos, as if inside its elemental currents of space and time or, more accurately, its spacetime continuum … . These elemental currents are the lifeblood of Aboriginal spirituality and spoken of in a literal sense. Everyday life and its duration are never experienced autonomously, as we Western moderns seem to, but in conjunction with spirits who move back and forth through time and space as if networked into the structure of the cosmos. (McLean “Dreamtime” 16)

The “spirit world” of each person’s Dreaming is made up of a complex relationship that encompasses that person’s birthplace, the animals, foods and trails that link to that birthplace, the original “Dreaming Beings” (or mythical ancestors) of that site, as well as the human ancestors associated with the place (Manning, Relationscapes 163; McLean, “Dreaming”). As Grosz notes, Dreaming incorporates the dreaming country, as well as “the animal beings that
link to the artist’s own bodily and clan history” (Chaos 92). Dreamings, therefore, are “mythological and cosmogenic tales” that are both stories of creation and stories of the “creation of the future-present” (Manning, Relationscapes 159). They tell and retell, through art that “animates time in space (Manning, Relationscapes 159, 160). It is also important to acknowledge that Dreaming is highly relational, in the sense that all living things that connect to a particular place are forever mutually related (McLean, “Dreaming”). This is how Manning describes the relationality and dynamism of Dreaming:

To think of Dreamings as representing discrete spaces or particular laws is both to underestimate the ways in which Dreamings challenge linear space-time and to forget the relational aspect of ownership within Aboriginal culture. The Dreamings no more belong to the land than they do to the people. The people and the Dreamings are coextensive: they are ontogenetic networks of reciprocal exchange. A Dreaming ... is a movement, a song and a dance, a practice of mark-making that does not represent a space-time but creates it, again and again. (Relationscapes 163)

As Ian McLean sums up, “[t]o know Dreaming, then, is to open one’s being to the life force of its sites and from this knowledge, form a culture or expression that communicates with it” (“Dreaming” np). Making paintings is one form of this expression.

Until relatively recently, Central/Western desert painting as an expression of relationship to Dreaming was packaged in a very particular way for Western audiences. It was commonplace, for example, that each painting entering the Western art market be accompanied by its “Dreaming story,” which had the purpose of “completing” the painting for the Western viewer (Stratton 112). For Biddle, though, such supplementary stories tend to point the viewer toward “a strictly narrative reading,” and also to promote a “‘decoding’ interpretation” that focuses on the relationship between the painting’s “icons” and their real “referents” (38, 34). Additionally, this story text has the function of exoticising the work, “[signalling] the Otherness of the object from ‘our,’ apparently homogenously known, culture” (Stratton 112). However, Biddle notes that in recent times aboriginal artists often resist providing extra documentation, with the aim that any viewing will attend entirely to the painting itself (39). Indeed, Biddle acknowledges that desert artists themselves do not discuss the meaning or content of one another’s paintings, since “authority to speak about another’s painting or Dreaming is highly restricted and regulated” (35). Instead, their discussions will tend to focus on style or form. Due to their sensate nature, and their proclivity for bodily engagement, it seems that these paintings call for an awareness not of what they mean, but more of what they do (Biddle 39). These paintings, for example, speak to the relations they incorporate through “the pulsations of the dots, in the rhythms of the layered surfaces at play, of intensities interweaving” (Manning, Relationscapes 161). As we now turn to two examples of Aboriginal art, then, we make no attempt to “read” their meanings or decode their Dreamtime stories. Rather, we try
to follow the paintings’ forces, attend to their affects and sensations, in order to map some elements of what these paintings are capable of.

Nancy Kunoth Petyarre’s *Mountain Devil Lizard Dreaming* is a painting one metre forty squared, which manifests the movements of the mountain or thorny devil lizard. She shares this Dreaming with a number of her well-known artist siblings, the most renowned of whom is perhaps her sister Kathleen Petyarre. This family’s “country” is in and near Utopia in Australia’s Northern Territory (Biddle 80), a community that was one of the first to practise the contemporary Desert art style in the mid-1980s (Stratton 95). This painting did come with an accompanying statement from the gallery. The text explains that the painting is “Nancy’s depiction” of the mountain devil lizard, that the “coloured arc shapes ... represent the markings that are on the back of the lizard which change colour throughout the day as the sun moves across the sky,” and that “[t]he pale line in the centre of the painting shows the ancestral trail of the mountain devil lizard” (United Galleries). Of course, such a representational, narrativistic interpretation reveals little of what the painting does, actually or virtually. Grosz, in commenting upon one of Kathleen Petyarre’s works, comes closer to a more enlivening affective response:

Nancy Petyarre’s painting is not so much a likeness of the lizard, but more a figural rendering, the sensation of the lizard contracting and expanding on the canvas. Just as Grosz remarks of one of Kathleen’s works, there is something of “a becoming-devil of the paint itself, the coming alive of the corrugations and patterns of its skin, of its tracks, the arcs of its movements as well as the projection of the skin onto the terrain” (Grosz, *Chaos* 94). The immediate energy of the piece comes from its sense of movement, across several space-times. First, there is the shimmering in place effected by the tiny dot work, achieving a vibrant pulsation of movements that creates an immanent materiality, holding the painting both here and not-here, in “real” time and in Dreamtime. As well, there are the arc-like movements, the swirling semi-circles of the becoming-lizard, rhythms repeating here-there, back-forth, drawing us into the s(w)inging resonances of relational spaces. This is a ritual of appearance and disappearance, of the actual meeting the virtual in a “cycle of continuous regeneration” (Manning, *Relationscapes* 164). Then, there is the diagonal movement across the canvas, from corner to corner, building a force that resists the boundaries of the square and liberates sensation to the painting’s outside. Overall, the work has the feel of a spatial transformation, a
becoming of movement in the lines and dots that is not achieved figuratively. Again, the work calls forth Manning’s “politics of touch” (*Relationscapes* 157), which is generated through the haptic pull of the animated textures, the intensities of the dotted whites and arcs of darkness. The painting demands more than viewing—it calls for a “reaching-toward” that shifts the field of energy from the optic to the depths of the haptic. For Manning, a painting such as Petyarre’s is aprehension of Dreaming (prehension is the Whiteheadean operation through which an actual entity relates itself positively to some other entity [Christian 33]); as Manning explains, toprehend the Dreaming is not to simply narrate one of its instances (*Relationscapes* 160). Instead, it is to bring forth, through painting, the “land’s eventfulness,” which is also to bring forth “a new actual occasion—a becoming-world” (Manning, *Relationscapes* 160). In prehending Dreaming, such a painting feels the Dreaming’s resonance and paints this into the canvas (Manning, *Relationscapes* 160). This has a distinct political impact, as Manning explains: such artworks “call forth a new way of feeling-seeing, a seeing-with that moves the body. This elicited movement-with is affective: its tonality (its modalities, its resonances, its textures) alters both what a body can do and how the world can be experienced” (*Relationscapes* 160).

Figure 1
Nancy Kunoth Petyarre, *Mountain Devil Lizard Dreaming*, owned by the author, © the artist, licensed by Aboriginal Artists Agency 2009
Shane Pickett’s Aboriginal heritage is quite different to Nancy Petyerre’s. Born in the wheatbelt town of Quairading in 1957, Pickett belonged to the Noongar (or Noongyar) people of the southwest corner of Western Australia (McLean, “Dreaming”; Tapper 6). Pickett, then, was not strictly a desert artist; but, as Judith Ryan tells us, “[t]he success of the movement is not confined to a small group of artists throughout the Central and Western deserts, but has had a big bang effect on other forms of Aboriginal art made in widely different contexts.”

Pickett was, by his own account, “a painter of the Noongyar lands,” having “learnt to read the songlines that journey through all living things across the entire landscape.” Just as the desert artists attempt to “map out ... the geography of their Dreaming country” (Grosz, Chaos 92), so too does Pickett, with close attention also to the relationality of Dreaming components: “Every river, every tree, every rock is important, as the Dreaming runs through them connecting all things, including mankind. These are the energy paths of the Dreaming” (Pickett, Artist).

Pickett’s painting, Hunting Grounds and the Men’s Stories (153cm x 123cm), was not accompanied by any explanatory text; the viewer is simply left with a dynamic work, whose subject seems to be the energy and vitality of the paint’s movement around and in the surface of the canvas. Pickett’s works have been called “gestural abstractions” (“Current”), and may well be to the extent that they “display the sweeping gestural brush strokes and energetic application of pigment” typical of that style (Gardner and Kleiner 973). However, such a classification fails to convey fully the affective force and materiality of this work. The deep black background, strong swathes of creams, and bold trails of ochre do not map the land in a simply “gestural” sense. Nor do they “present a bird’s eye view of the landscape operating according to preestablished [Cartesian] coordinates of space-time” (Manning, Relationscapes 166). Instead, this is landscape by felt force, a topological mapping of “Dreaming’s intensive movement” (Manning, Relationscapes 166). The vigorous strokes of colour, as they fold and swirl and layer, create an embodied experience of landscape as the overlapping space-times of the Dreaming. Manning’s comments about Clifford Possum’s map painting could equally apply to Pickett’s work here:

Space here is performed, folding into durations that become part of the materiality of the painterly event. Be it the land “itself” or acrylic, the point of the Dreaming is that it is not a location or a representation. It cannot “exist” in a Euclidian space-time, but must always move, resituating itself in relays that are changeable, depending on seasons and tribal conjunctions. (Relationscapes 169)

If Pickett’s painting is a map of hunting grounds, it is an experiential map: one that “performs a kind of active reading of the land” using Dreamings as position-makers (Manning, Relationscapes 168). As McLean points out, Pickett’s rendering of the landscape “is no picturesque reverie but a persistent searching for the energies though which Dreaming reveals itself (“Dreaming”). In this work Dreaming reveals itself through the vibrancy, texture and
depth of the colours, and through the intense ebbing and flowing of the textured rhythms of the brush strokes. In “mapping” these hunting grounds, Pickett is the “skilled hunter” who “carefully scans the whole scene, looking beyond the appearance of individual things to what is between them”—elements such as “scents and sounds, ... patterns and rhythms of shapes and colour tones, variations in light” (McLean, “Dreaming”). His gently curving lines of fine white dots add a further affective dimension, providing pathways into the rhythms, pulling us securely along the trails, immersing us into the very immanence of the work. Whether these “dancing skeins” of dots represent “the paths travelled by generations of ancestors, or “the paths of stars” (Tapper 7) is moot, in terms of the immediate force they impart. To the extent that they are always-already steadily moving, they admit another, different layer of experience—of space-time—to the various felt pulsations of the paint through which they travel. Overall, as Biddle might put it, this canvas breathes “with a life-force not reducible to the cold flat geometry of map, compass or grid” (82). Rather than offering a “perspective” of the land, it produces “an immersion in a movement that touches and transforms as it crosses surface (country [and] canvas)” (Biddle 82). Altogether, it might be said to comprise a figural rendering of the land as movement, as a plurality of sub-conscious rhythms.
Through these two examples, we can begin to see how contemporary Aboriginal art operates primarily through the bodily levels of sensation and affect, rather than via strategies of representation. To respond appropriately to these paintings is not to search for codes or narratives or direct translations, but to approach them affectively. To do so is to “open to a way of seeing which engages our bodies and our senses in order to make something—else, more, different—happen” (Biddle 22). The importance of an affective reading is made more clear in Biddle’s statement that it “allows for the possibilities of not just seeing but inhabiting ways of being that are not easily assimilated, that fundamentally destabilise and defamiliarise our taken-for-granted ways of being and doing in the world” (22). And so we come to the political efficacy of this kind of Aboriginal art. To begin with, this efficacy involves the same potential as all art forms: to “produce a break with habitual formations and dominant signifying regimes”—a break that also carries with it “the concomitant affirmation of something new” (O’Sullivan 69). On a more specific note, the pertinent questions regarding the political potency of desert-style paintings might be: what, in particular, do they work to resist, and how do they constitute a thinking that opens up “other possible worlds” (O’Sullivan 96)? In terms of resistance, we should remember that these paintings have emerged in an Australian context in which indigenous people continue to experience the “ongoing assailing effects of colonialism—dispossession, displacement, land rights, native title” (Biddle 39). Indeed, this style first arose around the same time as the first Aboriginal land rights legislation, and the accompanying development of “Aboriginal self-determination and self-management politics” (Biddle 31). As Biddle suggests, these paintings were (are) part of an attempt to “rewrite the eurocentric version of Australia’s occupation” (31). As Aboriginal activist Galarrwuy Yunupingu writes:

> When we paint—whether it is on our bodies for ceremony or on bark or canvas for the market—we are not just painting for fun or profit. We are painting, as we have always done, to demonstrate our continuing link with our country and the rights and responsibilities we have to it. We paint to show the rest of the world that we own this country and that the land owns us. Our painting is a political act. (65-66)41

Yunupingu also argues for Aboriginal painting as a form of writing: “[o]ur form of writing, writing for land, is in the form of a painting” (65), a point with which Biddle concurs. In her view desert-style paintings “are an intercultural form of writing: a recently developed and in-process form of materiality designed to communicate directly between Desert artists and the European reader” (37-38). Similarly, Stephanie Radok notes that “all Aboriginal art is … about communication across and between cultures, that possibility, and that achievement” (19). In more political terms, we might say that this art is a method of “writing back to an institutionalised incapacity of Europeans to ‘recognise’ Aboriginal ways of being” (Biddle 39). What they are working to resist, therefore, is their positioning by a dominant culture—formed according to the dogmatic image of thought—whose oppressions they have been subject to
for over three hundred years. To the extent that it works to deterritorialise majoritarian rule, this is a minor art practice, which is also, as O'Sullivan points out, a revolution “yet-to-come” (80). This is again to mobilise the Deleuze-Guattarian concept of becoming-revolutionary—revolution “as that moment which allows all of us to form new alliances, new relations and produce new joyful subjectivities” (O'Sullivan 80). This is a minor practice that “joins forth with philosophy, calling forth new earth, new peoples”—which is also to say this (politically charged) art movement involves “a collective enunciation, the production of collaborations and indeed the calling forth of new kinds of collectivities” (O'Sullivan 74). These new kinds of collectivities could involve rethinking democracy, as Deleuze’s concept of becoming-democratic asks us to do. But because this art movement engages with capitalism—creates works for the market—some might argue that it is actually in the process of becoming-major. O’Sullivan contends, however, that a practice can still become-minor “even if it is located within a major institution”: indeed, a minor art is best positioned “at an oblique angle” to the major—both inside and outside of it (73). In terms of this art’s relationship to post-colonial capitalism, Jon Stratton even asserts that we must “recognise not only the modes of appropriation which Western society imposes on [Aboriginal artists] but also the ways in which the peoples who produce the paintings mobilise those modes of appropriation for their own purposes” (125). What this suggests is that while resisting the dominant power structure, these artists can be “using elements of that system to their own advantage” (Stratton 125). Capitalism aside, it is still the case that the desert art style disturbs the major, not only politically, but simply at the level of art itself. As Radock notes, “[i]t challenges conventional approaches to contemporary art by standing simultaneously both outside and inside it; and it charges that category with its narrowness, forcing confronting political perspectives into Eurocentric visions” (19).

According to thinkers such as Biddle and Manning, the foremost purpose of this art is not to engage with capitalism anyway, but to enact (rather than represent) the Dreaming: to “bring the country into being again” (Biddle 54). As Biddle writes, “Aboriginal painting is not art in the strictly Western sense of an object designed solely for aesthetic purposes, contemplation, display or sale” (13-14). Its purpose is more to “make [Aboriginal] culture into an experience: a culturally distinct way of doing and being in the world” (Biddle 14). As we have noted, a large component of Aboriginality is relationship to land, which this art directly enacts: this art “expresses the possibility of human intimacy with landscapes. This is the key to its power: it makes available a rich tradition of human ethics and relationships with place and other species to a worldwide audience” (Langton 16). This indigenous art, therefore, opens up, amongst other things, a new way of thinking (a new concept of) landscape, one that is outside the dominant Western view:

This is not a geographically bound, naturally given forensic landscape of flora, fauna,
species, but a country which is animated and made by the fleshly, bodily remains of Ancestral animal parts, excrement and traces. To put that in concrete terms, canvas becomes ... the same stuff as country, and thus productive of the same effects. (Biddle 56)

These artworks bring to life a world heretofore hidden, that of the corporeal relationship between Ancestors, species, land and people. And they do so through the affective means of sensation: through the force of a painting directly impacting the nervous system. In Biddle’s words, these works are “a writing of sensation, of texture as feeling, operating at an irreducibly bodily level” (84). Derritorialising the major will, after all, involve “the foregrounding of art’s intensive, affective quality” (O’Sullivan 73), and the language of affect has become especially important at a global moment replete with “genocide, disparity, abuse” (Biddle 22). As a mode of thought, this art “has transformative potential—intellectual, emotional, political—because it incites immediacy and intensities; somatic sensibilities evoke response” (Biddle 84). As an enactment of Aboriginal ways of being, this art creates “a movement of thought ... that is ... at once painting, song, dance, sacred object, and power word” (Manning, Relationscapes 183).

This thought movement evokes change at both artistic and political levels, “asking us to rethink the map, the landmark we presumed we could locate, the direction we thought we knew how to follow” (Manning, Relationscapes 183). In our mapping of thought, then, we would do well to open to this kind of art-thought, since it has the capacity to unearth much otherness. Through its topological approach to art, this thought moves “beyond preexistent coordinates, be they for a body, a territory, a landscape, a law” (Manning, Relationscapes 166). To invoke Bergson, this art/thought also opens to other durations, ones “that eventfully alter how experience can unfold” (Relationscapes 183). While we may not be able to participate in this art/thought as the artist, we can enter it by relation, through a “technique of relation”—a “thinking-with” as Manning puts it (Relationscapes 226). We are “relationally activated” by the artwork’s virtual movement, especially since art itself is the technique of “experiencing the virtuality of [life] more intensely” (Massumi, Semblance 43, 45). To this extent, Massumi calls art a “technique of existence,” in that it composes “potentials of existence” (Semblance 45, 73). Aboriginal desert art, as a form of powerful sensate thought, is, therefore, an immensely productive technique in terms of resisting the dominant subjectivities and ways of seeing of our time.

Art, thought, movement

In many lines of this thought-map so far—including in the last paragraph—we have made reference to thought as movement. As we have implied, thought, for D+G, is fundamentally related to movement. Thought as intuition, for example, is that mode of thinking connected to the movement of internal difference: not movement in space or degree, but the continuous,
qualitative change of continuous self-variation (Bryant 55). The thought of painting, too, is one involving movement—the “immobile movement” of sensation (Dankjær 107), as well as the rhythms, resonances and vibrations of a work’s material forces. Movement is also the character of thought itself—there is movement in thought as it gropes around for concepts: “one does not think without becoming something else, something that does not think—an animal, a molecule, a particle—and that comes back to thought and revives it,” D+G tell us (WP 42). Moreover, thought, in Deleuze’s view, “must produce movements,” in terms of “bursts of extraordinary speeds and slowness” (NP xiii). Thought as movement occurs in the qualitative dimension of affect, which links to the virtual, where any/all potential connections can be thought, where thought can move anywhere. But as well as thought as movement in these senses, Deleuze also refers to the inverse relation, which is to say movement itself as capable of affecting thought. In discussing the “new means of expression” brought to philosophy by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, for instance, Deleuze tells how their works are enlivened by “a movement capable of affecting the mind,” and claims that “it is a question of making movement itself a work, without interposition; of substituting direct signs for intermediate representations; of inventing vibrations, rotations, whirlings, gravitations, dances or leaps which directly touch the mind” (Deleuze, DR 8). Although Deleuze is alluding to movement in a work of thought that can effect more thought, it is possible to interpret this statement differently. Making movement itself a work, creating dances that “directly touch the mind”: couldn’t these be invitations to return to the body, to Manning’s sensing body in movement, one of the lodestones of Deleuze’s theory of expression? After all, in terms of thought, Deleuze’s work on Spinoza tells us that the powers of the body are parallel to the powers of the mind (PP 18). Therefore, thought moves also at the level of the body, and if we are striving for techniques through which to enter a more creative thought, the zone of bodily, physical movement may turn up new ideas. Perhaps there is a movement-thinking that offers a way out of thought as representation or functionalism, an art/thought that can enhance ordinary or political life. The first question, though, concerns the kind of bodily movement we might turn to for this exploration, since, of course, there are countless from which to choose. Deleuze speaks of “dances … which directly touch the mind” (DR 8), so, taking this cue, we now turn to the art of dance, prompted also by Thrift’s concern that dance has been “all but ignored in the social sciences and humanities,” even while it harbours potential as a means of resistance to power and control (“Still Point” 145, 150). Although Deleuze may not deal with the art of dance “with any real importance” (Ellis 2), preferring to focus on music, painting and literature, his work offers many fecund ways through which to explore this art form. We will settle for one particular dance-related route to Deleuze, by way of two examples. Our question, overall, is two-fold: first of all, what might it mean to “think dancerly”? And further, if thought is connected to physical movement, what could it mean to have an idea in dance?
In approaching these concerns, it is useful to first consider how we might broadly conceptualise dance from a Deleuzian perspective.

In general terms, Western theatrical (and social) dance has regarded the body as fundamentally a “means of expression and representation” (H. Thomas 1). This is dance as understood to express human emotions and meanings, as well as representing events and situations in the actual world. Dance, here, can be considered “a choreographic version of a simple correspondence theory of truth ...—in dance the gestural mirroring of a prior meaning” (Wyschogrod 146). Further, from an Aristotelian standpoint, dance can be deemed an “image of self-creation through realisation,” to the extent that in dancing, the dancer properly realises her/his potential to dance (Colebrook, “How Can” 7). Since Deleuze’s project is to liberate thought from representation, such an image will not suffice to explain what is happening in dance. For him, dance will not be concerned with signification or with self-creation, but will be connected to life as “a power to become, a potential for multiple creations in any number of styles” (Colebrook, Gilles 86). Dance, then, is a power to create: it is not just about this body dancing here and now but is an expression of the power to dance (Colebrook, Gilles 86). In other words, dance is not an act carried out by a body toward some particular end, but is, rather, an act in and of itself—an act that expresses life’s creativity or differentiation in the style of dance. To dance is to express the world’s becoming, the essential power to always become something new. What is true for dance “is true of all the arts”: it unleashes “strange becomings” across “melodic landscapes” and “rhythmic characters” (D+G, WP 169). Deleuze does explicitly refer to the figure of a dancer in a discussion of actualisation and counter-actualisation; he gives the art of dance (as well as acting) the role of opening the “crack” or pain that occurs when the body opens to the pure virtuality of what it has the potential to do:

[T]o be the mime of what effectively occurs, to double the actuali[s]ation with a counter-actuali[s]ation, the identification with a distance, like the true actor and dancer, is to give to the truth of the event the only chance of not being confused with its inevitable actuali[s]ation. It is to give the crack the chance of flying over its own incorporeal surface area, without stopping at the bursting within each body; it is, finally, to give us the chance to go farther than we would have believed possible. (LS 161)

Thus, dance involves both the corporeal at the level of the body, and the incorporeal, inasmuch as it expresses the “sense of the body as potentiality” (Colebrook, “How Can” 11).

After all, “[t]he work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else” (DG, WP 165). This notion that dance can stand alone—be stripped of representational conventions and express only itself—is not without application in the world of dance; the well-known American dancer/choreographer Merce Cunningham has perhaps advocated it most famously. Although Cunningham does not specifically reference Deleuze, or even philosophy in general (Damkjaer
Cunningham was not interested in the “layers of meaning” with which dance is normally encumbered, instead seeking to bring into focus “movement’s particularity and specificity” so as to reveal it “as an event on its own” (Foster 8). Cunningham’s goal was to unveil an autonomy of movement, to disallow dance its conventional expressivity and mimetic function (Gil 117), in order to reveal a new kind of expressivity—that of movement itself unfolding. As Gil states, “[t]o dance is to create immanence through movement,” and, accordingly, “Cunningham wills immanence: for him, meaning does not transcend movement and life” (125). Cunningham himself proclaims, “[w]hen I dance, it means: this is what I am doing” (qtd. in Vaughan 86). Such an approach, for Massumi, brings dance “most intensely into its own,” since it breaks open movement so that it becomes “a pure expression of bodily power” (Semblance 145). Our intention here is not to provide a thoroughgoing investigation of any particular dance professional, but, in our quest to uncover what it might mean, in Deleuzian terms, to have an idea in dance, we use as a starting point some aspects of a work by Cunningham. In fact, Cunningham’s work, Beach Birds for Camera, links—by way of Deleuze—to another performance, Wish, staged in 2011 at the Blue Room Theatre in Perth, Western Australia. Therefore, on the way to exploring the Deleuzian connection, we outline the salient elements of each of these works.

Beach Birds for Camera is a 1992 film version of Cunningham’s 1991 stage work Beach Birds. The filmed work involves eleven dancers, dressed in “identical white and black leotards and tights making a direct reference to bird figures” (Ivarez 11). The dancers, facing and moving in various directions, are spread across a large floor space. While there is a score accompanying the piece (the spare sounds of John Cage’s “Four 3”), the music operates autonomously: neither music nor any kind of narrative structure organise the dance’s movements (Brandstetter 8). The dancers do not acknowledge the camera and make no attempt to convey emotion: rather, as is typical of Cunningham, expressivity is carried only through the dancers’ movements. These movements include arm waves, jumps and shakes, balances on one leg, as well as more classic dance moves:

Out of slightly vibrating movements of the outstretched arms accompanied by demi-pliés, various more complex spatial relations crystallise into new steps and arm combinations, ... becoming turns and small leaps. At the same time the hands, which are covered in black gloves, are never relaxed; they maintain the conduct of the arm as associated with the image of the tips of wings. (Brandstetter 8)

The group’s movements are somewhat uncoordinated, although there are repetitions. As Gabriele Brandstetter puts it, “the impression is created of a self-regulating system of movements on the flocking model” (8). Cunningham’s own explanation is that “[i]t is all based on physical phrasing. The dancers don’t have to be exactly together. They can dance...
like a flock of birds, when they suddenly take off. They are not really together; they just do it at the same time” (qtd. in Vaughan 258). The second work, Wish, is a stage adaptation of the eponymous novel by Peter Goldsworthy. Adapted, directed and performed by Humphrey Bower, the work is essentially a play that includes a key movement component. That component is performed by dancer/choreographer Daniele Micich, who won the West Australian 2011 Most Outstanding Female Dancer Award for her role. The narrative centres on the relationship between “JJ” (Bower) and his sign language student, Eliza, a young female gorilla (Micich). In playing the gorilla, Micich wears a costume that is not an animal suit but simply a singlet, long dance pants and half-gloves—all black. While she communicates meaning to JJ (and the audience) in sign language, Micich expresses “gorilla-ness” through her movements. Perhaps most striking of these is her knuckle-walking, the quadripedal movement pattern of gorillas, “in which the hands are formed into fists and the weight is borne on the middle bones of all the fingers” (Noble and Davidson 29). With her legs shortened and folded under, her body tilted forward and her arms rounded and in-turned, Micich pulls herself along in light, large, jerky steps—expressing both speed and slowness. Her sometimes quick, instinctive reactions to JJ’s actions are offset by periods of heavy rest, during which she hangs her head forward, or faces the audience and moves only her eyes. Micich also makes numerous hand/arm gestures, such as extending her hand toward JJ, hugging him, or patting the floor. The narrative develops a romantic love relationship between JJ and Eliza, and, in a climactic mating scene, Micich and Bower roll and tumble, their bodies by turn entwining and unravelling in a fast tempoed pas de deux that leaves Eliza verging on upside-down.44

What these two performances have in common is a rendering of D+G’s concept of becoming-animal through the art of dance. Not through the costumes, which are minimalistically animal-like and therefore representational, but purely through movement, Cunningham’s dancers and Micich each enter a zone of proximity to birds, and to the gorilla, respectively. In discussing whether or not Beach Birds for Camera functions through resemblance, dance theorist Gabriele Brandstetter finds that “[t]he movement and the relationships between the movements of the dancers evade explicitness, ... relegate ... interpretation to the realm of aesthetic experience”; further, the work is “[n]ot expression (in the sense of mimesis) but a ‘showing’ ... in the physical-gesticulatory-material sense” (9). The bird movements in Cunningham’s work, then, are not easily classifiable, carrying an intensity of experience that does not fit conventional models of dance as mimesis, representation or expression (as does, for example, classical ballet’s figure of the graceful swan). Micich as the gorilla also took her “performance” to a level beyond mere mimicry—one critic reporting her to be “mesmerising as ... the gorilla, [having] hands that ‘were a different instrument, a different voice’; another writing that Micich “embodied the gorilla so well I was shocked by the climax of the piece” (G.
Clark; Knight). Rather than performing like a gorilla, then, Micich approaches a kind of bodily proximity to the qualities of a gorilla—a qualitative state of different-ness beyond resemblance. Such is the essence of becoming—"one does not imitate; one constitutes a block of becoming. Imitation enters in only as an adjustment of the block, like a finishing touch, a wink, a signature. But everything of importance happens elsewhere: in the becoming-[animal] of the dance" (D+G, ATP 305). D+G's block of becoming is of a different order to imitation: it is a milieu of alliance between two terms—a human and a gorilla, a group of dancers and a flock of birds—whereby something unique is created, something "between' the terms in play and beneath assignable relations" (D+G, ATP 239). This uniqueness is not a particular entity, stable and identifiable, but "the very dynamism of the change situated between two heterogeneous terms" (Stagoll, “Becoming” 21). Put another way, becoming is “involution,” which is the opposite of the evolution of molar identities such as the self: in D+G's words, "the self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities. ... A fib[re] stretches from a human to an animal, from a human or an animal to molecules, from molecules to particles, and so on to the imperceptible" (ATP 238). In terms of the body of the dancer, "[f]lesh is only the developer which disappears in what it develops: the compound of sensation" (D+G, WP 183). There is, too, an ethical element to becoming, as Patty Sotirin suggests in her statement that "becomings are about passages, propagations and expansions" (99), but before we treat this element let us come back to the two dance pieces and consider how they bring about their becomings-animal. When the Cunningham company dances bird rhythms and movements they are not emulating birds: their arbitrary twitches, leg shakes, head tilts, arm flaps and singular, balanced stillnesses, as well as their balletic steps, take them into a zone that fuses the bird with the human, moving between the two, destabilising each. Movements are not regulated by music, audience or stage space, instead affecting and being affected by the intensities of the bird motions themselves—to the extent that even the slightest shift in bearing or demeanor registers across the whole flock-assemblage. Here, as movement becomes art, “the material passes into sensation,” and a ground is reached “that can dissolve forms and impose the existence of a zone in which we no longer know which is animal and which is human” (D+G, WP 173). Just so, the Micich-gorilla assemblage is not brought about by way of costuming, set or narrative, but, rather, through the singularity of the movements. The slowness of a gorilla pose that is moving at infinite speed, the economy of eye movement and intensity of gaze, the heaviness of the body pulled by the foreknuckles, and the muscular lightness of instinctual darts towards or away from a stimulus, all bring about a block of becoming between human and animal—an emission of particles “that enter the relation of movement and rest, or the zone of proximity” (D+G, ATP 275) of becoming-gorilla. Micich's gorilla is "not representative but affective" (D+G, ATP 257), since both becoming and art are a "rejection of the metaphysics of identity and representation in favour of 'affects' and 'intensities'” (Urpath 107). Even though the dancers do not in reality become birds or a gorilla,
D+G insist that “there is a reality of becoming-animal” (ATP 103), by which they mean “becoming is more real than being” (Urpeth 103). This is to invoke an ontology that, as James Urpeth points out, is centred upon “the theme of ‘immanence’—a reality that contains no negations or boundaries, but only differences and ‘thresholds,’ in which everything is implicated in everything else” (103). Thus, the “category” of the human is immanent to that of the bird or the gorilla, and the movements of the dance open to this reality. D+G put it eloquently:

To become animal is to participate in movement, to stake out the path of escape in all its positivity, to cross a threshold, to reach a continuum of intensities where all form comes undone, as do all the significations, signifiers and signifieds, to the benefit of an unformed matter of deterritorialized flux, of non-signifying signs. (K 13)

In terms of what this means for thought, we might now see that becoming-bird and becoming-gorilla in these dance works are effected by engaging in certain movement-ideas: the subtensive, micro-movements that express particles and intensities in the zone of a “bird” or a “gorilla”—each of which is already becoming something else. To think dancerly is to enter into an affect-based form of movement that undoes discrete step-by-stepness and reaches even into the excess of choreography, so that new processes and becomings may emerge.

Becoming-animal in movement is, first of all, to make a map of intensities—a “constellation of affects” (Deleuze, ECC 64)—relating to the image of the animal in question (this is image in Bergson’s terms—where everything in the material world is an image that transmits movement [Massumi, User’s 185]). To be more specific, this map of animal intensities attains a zone of proximity with the dancer’s image of her/his own body, altering this image by way of affects, making it a becoming. Deleuze explains: “it is the map of intensity that distributes the affects, and it is their links and valences that constitute the image of the body in each case—an image that can always be modified or transformed depending on the affective constellations that determine it” (ECC 64). D+G make this more clear through this example:

The actor Robert De Niro walks “like” a crab in a certain film sequence; but, he says, it is not a question of his imitating a crab; it is a matter of making something that has to do with the crab enter into composition with the image, with the speed of the image. That is the essential point for us: you become-animal only if, by whatever means or elements, you emit corpuscles that enter the relation of movement and rest of the animal particles, or what amounts to the same thing, that enter the zone of proximity of the animal molecule. You become animal only molecularly. You do not become a barking molar dog, but by barking, if it is done with enough feeling, with enough necessity and composition, you emit a molecular dog. (ATP 274-75)

To emit a molecular bird or gorilla in dance, then, is to commit to taking on, becoming, the affects and intensities of bird and gorilla images. Movement, in dance or otherwise, is a
mixture of a “certain degree of improvisation” and a “certain degree of habit” (Manning, *Relationscapes* 19). As Manning explains, “habits hold our [movements] to a practiced repetition: a choreography of sorts” (*Relationscapes* 19). But before the actual movements of these habits, Manning proposes that there is an interval of “preacceleration”—the virtuality of movement at its stage of incipiency, the interval where “different durations coexist” (*Relationscapes* 18). In a movement of becoming-animal, these durations are populated by the forces and intensities of the animal qualities, which, through the improvising of them, are further released. This is not to think about becoming an animal, but to become animal through directly taking on the animal’s affects. Interrupting habitual movements through expressing the intense movements and poses of the birds and of the gorilla is to express the durations of these animals directly through the body. Stamatia Portanova would put it this way:

The “becoming” (aiming at, tendency, a sensation of movement or a movement-idea) of the dancing body is generated by the [affective constellation of the animal image] and is actualised in a step. In other words, movement is generated in the body through an affective passage of ideas between different ... orders of expression: [the image of the animal and that of the] dancer.

This is to think in movement, which, in turn, affects a movement of thought. Most significantly, the movement ideas expressed in becoming provoke a movement away from thinking the world in terms of identity and representation. As Sotorin points out, “becoming offers a radical conception of what a life does” (99). This shift is an ethical one, to the extent that it “explodes the ideas about what we are and what we can be beyond the categories that seem to contain us: beyond the boundaries separating human being from animal, man from woman, child from adult, micro from macro, and even perceptible and understandable from imperceptible and incomprehensible” (Sotorin 99). If art is “always a question of freeing life wherever it is imprisoned” (D+G, WP 171), danced becomings such as these “animate the possibilities of life, constantly moving through what we know to be real or true and running beyond the limits, boundaries and constraints that make those realities and truths what they seem to be” (Sotorin 99). In the specific terms of becoming-animal, to release this concept through dance/movement is also to call forth a new way of thinking the animal, one that rejects anthropocentrism and that can open to a more ethical way of relating to animals. Jennifer Parker-Starbuck suggests that a performance of becoming-animal leaves a trace or imprint upon the audience (through the technique of relation), which might lead to a more balanced, reciprocal alliance between the animal and the human (662-63). Perhaps such a trace may result in a granting of greater respect to those animals held in slaughterhouses and laboratories (Parker-Starbuck 668) at the service of capitalism. This result would, finally, speak to becoming as a political practice, in which social actors overturn normalised
representations “and reconstitute themselves in the course of participating, and changing, the conditions of their material existence” (Papadopoulis and Tsianos 223).

The movement ideas in the becoming-animal comprise just one example of how dance constitutes a mode of bodily thinking that is also a movement of thought; there are countless others. We could, for instance, consider dance, as D+G do, to be a kind of territorialisation: “the [way] in which space is produced by relations amongst bodies, bodies marking a distance from each other [in order] to negotiate the chaos that always threatens to introduce too much difference” (Colebrook, “How Can” 12). A space becomes a territory when the dancing body/ies produce a rhythm that is not merely functional, but is expressive of qualities (D+G, ATP 315)—whether animal qualities or the qualities of a storm or a love affair. The rhythm and qualities mark the dancing space, making it into a quasi-stable territory. Territorialisation, though, also involves deterritorialisation, which is when a danced refrain of movements begins to become autonomous, so that the expressive forces open to the outside of this particular dance—“budding, producing” its rhythms to affect other assemblages (D+G, ATP 325). As such, through deterritorialisation, dance becomes a power that can transform the more seemingly stable, functional movements of life into “rhythmic expressions that divert from striving and function” (Colebrook, “How Can” 13), and open to new, more affirmative ways of being. Dance, then, is an “inhuman” art, in the sense that it is “movement as such” (Colebrook, “How Can” 13), having the power to move beyond the territory of the dancing space. But let us return to the movement ideas at play in becoming-animal, and consider them as techniques for thought. To take up these techniques would be to think dancerly: to keenly attend—relate—to the qualities and affects of other becomings and move, bodily, into them; to intuit the gap of preacceleration and micro-move into another duration: with the overall aim of destabilising the range of practices that follow from ontologies of identity and representation, and from capital-suffused thought.

Art and the digital

In our mapping of thought as movement and movement affecting thought the following phrase would not be ill-fitting: “[o]pen spaces, smooth spaces, absence of boundaries, speed, the firing of electrons, blurrings of sexual or species boundaries, rhizomatic connectivities and the creation of hybrids” (Conley, “Space” 259). As Conley notes, “all of these descriptives abound in Deleuze’s writings” (“Space” 259), and, in fact, this serves to connect him (and Guattari) to another, highly contemporary mode of art. It is because of Deleuze’s predilection for rhizomatic thinking, Conley suggests, that he is “a favourite of digital artists” (“Space” 259). If this is the case, and given the ubiquity of electronic media technologies today, it is fitting that we now consider the potentialities of art in this realm. This is especially of interest in
light of our earlier questioning of the prospects of the digital for thought. As a starting point in considering art in the age of digitalisation, let us further consider Conley’s link between rhizomatics and “digital art”:

Rhizomatic thinking makes its way into the virtual spaces of computers and digital art. It sets out to undo limits and to collapse boundaries—nature versus culture, human versus machine, human versus animal, or human versus cyborg—and creates new spaces. On their computers, network digital artists experiment with connections between different species to create hybrids and becomings. Like philosophers, many digital artists question limits in order to destabilise the self that is defined by the position it occupies or owns in the world. Working with Spinozist questions—“What can a body do?” and “Where do the senses end?”—digital artists undo the barriers used to fix and define the “Self.” (“Space” 259)

Conley’s nomination of “digital art” rather than “new media” art points to the difficulty of categorising art made using electronic media technologies. Indeed, art curators have grappled with this issue, claiming that such art is, by nature, a field of “gnarly diversity” (Graham and Cook 1). Just a few of the terms used to describe this art are computer art, digital art, interactive art, immersive art, digital media, multimedia (Graham and Cook 4), as well as software art (Parikka, “Ethologies” 116). According to US art scholar and curator Christiane Paul, digital/new media art “resists ‘objectification,’” and has “introduced a shift from the object to process: [it is] an inherently time-based, dynamic, interactive, collaborative, customisable and variable art form” that makes use of digital technologies “as a medium” (1).

Before exploring the potential of digital art for thought, however, we revisit our earlier investigation of the digital, wherein we presented a somewhat pessimistic view of new media technologies with regard to thought. In returning to that particular ontology of the digital, we seek to turn that negation into a Nietzschean creativity.

To recapitulate, in Part 1 we put forward several objections to the realm of the digital and new media technologies. We raised such issues as the corporate colonisation of cyberspace, information overload, the “pseudocreativity” of the digital due to the restrictiveness of binary code, and the concomitant superiority of the analogue. In our attempt to see whether there is anything to be salvaged for thought from this realm, let us return to the positions of Deleuze, and Guattari, both of whom, we should remember, “were writing at the threshold of the digital age” (Conley, “Space” 260). We have already seen how Deleuze links information to control; he further addresses the impact of new media on cinema and on traditional power structures in Cinema 2, concluding that, at that stage, the full effect of the new “electronic image” was “yet to be determined” (265). In terms of art specifically, Deleuze’s stance is that the actual media of new technologies is secondary to aesthetic force, and that the technologies can make art go either way—that is, be potentialising or be severely limiting (C2 267). “The new
“automatism” he writes, “is worthless in itself if it is not put to the service of a powerful, obscure, condensed will to art, aspiring to deploy itself through involuntary movements which none the less do not restrict it” (C2 266). As we shall see in Line of Flight 3, Guattari, too, sees potential in the new media, but is also cautionary regarding its deployment. Conley gives an apt summary of both theorists’ attitude to this new development:

If [D+G] see possibilities of becoming through connections between humans and machines or the creation of new spaces, they also flatly condemn the political abuses through the world of the digital media and the internet. Technology, they argue, can be liberating. It can help create and recreate a world that no longer exists to be represented. ... [But] information science ... is also constructed around order-words. It extracts constants and discourages true becomings. Computers and the internet are presently under the spell of finance capitalism, the latter deploys its order-words to build barriers and arrest movements that it would otherwise be unable to channel for its own ends. It extracts constants and helps consolidate a society of control. (“Space” 260)

In D+G’s estimation, then, there is promise that the new information technologies might open to “infinite becomings” (Conley, “Space” 260), but there is also the real possibility that they might remain captive to the flows of capital. Deleuze, however, indicates a way to oppose the information and control aspects of digital technologies: for him, there is a “fundamental affinity between a work of art and an act of resistance,” and there is also a related potential that technologies of “information and communication” can work to become “an act of resistance” (TRM 322-23). To bring the two together would be to make art-as-resistance with these new media—technologies of the digital. As D.N. Rodowick explains, “[t]he special task of the simulacral arts and a philosophy of resistance is to ... invent alternative ways of thinking and modes of existence immanent in, yet alternative to, late capitalism and liberal democracies” (205). The prospect of digital art as resistance, though, would require a different ontology to that hermetic digital outlined in Part 1, one that is directly in touch with creativity and that is capable of accessing the true realm of the virtual (the virtual that is beyond that hype word often associated with network culture) (Parikka, “Ethologies” 119). It remains for us to now explore what this more potentialising ontology of the digital might entail.

In fact, in recent times several researchers have taken up this very question. Evens, for example, as noted earlier, begins by laying out a thorough contrast between Deleuze’s virtual—a realm of pure creativity—and the unproductiveness of the digital. To summarise:

In Deleuze, the virtual is fecund or genital, an autochthonous source of novelty; it has no being but the becoming of the new. Every event in the virtual generates not just a new object (one more) but a whole new dimension, a new kind. Virtual production ...
produces what was inconceivable hitherto, a new thought in every moment. By contrast, the digital, working from only the neutered difference of 0 and 1, produces nothing outside if itself. Indifferent and pliable, lacking a will of its own, the digital is effectively sterile. (Evens, “Digital” 154)

However, Evens also acknowledges that this particular ontology of the digital “fails to explain (and indeed outright denies) the manifest creativity of digital technologies” (“Digital” 158). The digital is evidently a site of tremendous “creative production” (Evens, “Programming”), but is this solely pseudo-creativity, or does the digital “overlap at some point with the virtual”? (Evens, “Digital” 158). In the end, Evens concludes that it does, and searches for a means by which this occurs:

It is not enough to point to the materiality of the digital, even though this materiality is essential; for digital materiality is overcoded, dominated by the abstraction that squeezes out creativity. It is also inadequate to note that the digital is employed by human beings who are themselves seized by the virtual; the question of creativity stands ... . (“Digital” 158)

For Evens, it is by way of a specific “ontological structure” that “the digital reaches beyond itself” and comes into contact with the actual/virtual: “[i]f the digital in isolation is ... laminated onto a plane that renders everything level, then the structure that describes its contact with the actual would be a fold or pleat in that plane (“Digital” 158). Elsewhere, Evens labels this structure an “edge” (“Programming”). Evens explains his fold/edge though detailing it at work in two examples: object-oriented programming (“Programming”) and the “interrupt” (or “force quit”) command on computers (“Digital” 159-68)—both of which are examples of largely human-directed actions directing/overriding code. Such actions activate particular effects within the digital itself, effects by which Evens sees that the digital makes an ontological escape from its own “flatness” (“Digital” 162). These effects include increasing the number of dimensions of the computing plane, instating hierarchical distinctions between these dimensions, introducing a topological inside/outside distinction between layers of the computing environment, and the enfolding and intermixing of temporally, logically and spatially distinct spheres (“Programming”; “Digital” 163-65). There is not the room here to detail Even’s two examples, but suffice to say that the fold or edge, integral to the processes of both object-oriented programming and the interrupt command, is, for Evens, “the mechanism” that connects “the pure form of the digital to the material, actual, and human worlds” (“Digital” 167). In order to overturn “the aesthetic and political homogeneity” that links to a delimiting ontology of the digital, Evens calls for our cultivation of another ontology, one that unleashes creativity through promoting the location of a fold/edge in digital processes (“Digital” 168).
In bringing together the digital and the virtual/actual, Evens relies upon a specific mechanism, brought to life at the computer interface. Other theorists, however, have taken a more process-based, perhaps more overtly Deleuze-Guattarian approach. It is this latter approach we will foreground, since, as will become evident, it allows a more fruitful foray into the potentialities of the digital to access both the aesthetic and the political effects of art. This approach is informed by reworkings of ethology and ecology (fields that are conceptually related: indeed, in the late nineteenth century, they were often considered to overlap [Ansell Pearson, Germinal 237n19]). We will begin here with a consideration of D+G’s particular notion of ethology, in order to conceive of the digital as a complexity of “intensive relations and dimensions” (Parikka, “Ethologies” 117). In their reappraisal of evolution in the terms of ethology (Ansell Pearson, Germinal 170), D+G are especially influenced by the writings of biosemiotican Jakob von Uexküll, who proposed that “objects are not autonomous or independent sets of qualities and quantities, but opportunities for engagement” (Grosz, Chaos 41). Such a conception shifts the definition of individuals away from being understood as separate entities, towards being construed as coextensive with other entities and life worlds. This reforms evolution into a more open, creative process, as Ansell Pearson makes clear:

[In this] major reconfiguration of ethology … behaviour can no longer be located in individuals conceived as preformed homunculi, but has to be treated epigenetically as a function of complex material systems which cut across individuals (assemblages) and which traverse phyletic lineages and organismic boundaries (rhizomes). This requires the articulation of a distributed conception of agency. The challenge is to show that “nature” consists of a field of multiplicities, assemblages of heterogeneous components (human, animal, viral, molecular, etc.), in which “creative evolution” can be shown to involve blocks of becoming. (Germinal 171)

Transposing such an ethology to the functioning of digital technology means letting go of dualistic notions of independent, mechanistic marchings of code, or of unaffected human controllers. Instead, it means focusing on the whole assemblage, understanding that its organic and inorganic components are cutting across and affecting one other in complex, topological ways. This ethology can be seen to also relate to Rossiter’s processual media theory, which “describes situations as they are constituted within and across spatio-temporal networks of relations, of which the communications medium is but one part, or actor.” For Rossiter, these systems of relations make up an “aesthetic regime,” which involves reflexivity and change, “transformative iterations” and “sensory affect.” Such an ethological approach can be linked to the idea of ecology, to the extent that “it is based on connectionism, self-reproduction, and couplings of heterogeneous elements” (Parikka, “Universal”). As Jussi Parikka points out, this also resonates with the “Spinozian understanding of life as affectivity: relations of varying velocities, decelerations and accelerations between connected particles” (“Universal”). Luciana Parisi, too, conceives of the digital environment in terms of ecology:
putting it eloquently in her essay “Technoecologies of Sensation,” she writes that “media have ceased to be instruments of communication and have become part of an atmospheric grid of connections where distinct milieus adapt together as microclimates in complex weather systems” (182). Both Parikka and Parisi invoke D+G’s machinism to define this ecology; again, for D+G, the machine (as distinct from the technology itself) is “an ontology of flow” that refers to the “production of consistencies between heterogeneous elements” (Parikka, “Universal”). There is no sense of humans either using or being determined by technology in machinism (Parikka, “Universal”); rather, as Parisi notes, “[t]o think machinically is to engage with technical machines in terms of semi-concatenations of partial objects running through strata” (“Technoecologies” 183).

From this ethological/ecological approach to the digital we can return to the question of Deleuze’s virtual through the notion of machinism. As with all machines, the machinic ecologies of digital culture are by no means “homeostatic grids or rigid structures” (Parikka, “Universal”). Parisi explains: “[f]ar from being a matrix of combinatorial codes, a machine is always already traversed by internal, external and associated milieus, regions of supra-action ready to give way to new protomachines: machines in potential, futurity machines” (“Technoecologies” 183). In this sense, each of the partial objects involved in the assemblage is a vector of becoming, meaning that the digital ecology is overflowing with potential connections and interactions; this is to say, of course, that it is fully engaged with the plane of the virtual (Parikka, “Universal”). As Parikka notes, “[digital] ecologies are not mere systems of empty repetition, but affecting and living entities looking for and testing their borders and thresholds” (“Universal”). This moving beyond borders and thresholds implicates an open system, and, as Ansell Pearson reminds us, the virtual is “the open system par excellence (Germinal 28). Therefore, while an ontology of the digital based on the binary code of os and 1s may not offer much in the way of creativity, D+G’s notions of machinism and ethology/ecology offer a means of connecting the digital to the openness of the virtual. This virtual of machinic ethology/ecologies is accessed by way of sensation and affect, as Parisi explains: we are “rethink[ing] new media technologies neither in terms of form (technical medium) nor content (the code, the signifier), but as technoeconomies of sensation intersecting energetic, cognitive, affective capacities of feeling” (“Technoecologies” 184). Furthermore, as Parikka points out, when D+G address codes they do so from the position that codes always have surplus values (“Ethologies” 122). In their own words:

Every code is affected by a margin of decoding due to these supplements and surplus values—supplements in the order of a multiplicity, surplus values in the order of a rhizome. Forms ... far from [being] immobile ... are part of a machinic interlock: they relate to populations, populations imply codes, and codes fundamentally include
phenomena of relative decoding that are all the more usable, composable, and addable by virtue of being relative, always “beside.” (D+G, ATP 53)

This prompts Parikka to call for us to “bypass the cliché of reducing new media to a binary mode of coding” and focus on the potential set off by the processuality and relationality of the whole assemblage (“Ethologies” 121). In her analysis of bioinformatics (“the application of cybernetics to biology”), Parisi also shifts the discussion away from binary coding: rather than reducing genetic data to 0s and 1s, in bioinformatics the biological data itself is preserved in combination with digital material substrates (“Technoecologies” 186-87). Bioinformatics, then, involves “an amodal activity inciting the biological and digital into a new machinic arrangement” (Parisi, “Technoecologies” 187). For Parisi, the field of bioinformatics defuses Massumi’s argument, referred to earlier, that the analogue is superior to the digital, since in this process “there is no dialectical quarrel between these modes of transmission, only a viral transduction able to spin out microvariations during the transfer” (Parisi, “Technoecologies” 187). Breaking down this analogue-digital opposition, Parisi reveals how the virtual, a realm not of binaries but of continuous variation, animates the digital machine. “If there is a superiority of the analog[ue],” she suggests, “it will privilege neither phenomena of subjective perception nor those of objective transportation of the bio-logic to a digital level” (Parisi, “Technoecologies” 187). Instead, “it will affirm the tendency of binary systems to code drift, of numbered numbers to enter the fuzziness of numbering numbers, of atoms and molecules to unleash their own micropercepts, where information transmission coincides with rarified areas of vague sensations, with the velocities of felt-thought” (“Technoecologies” 187).

Having now found ways in which the digital does open to the virtual, we can turn to the matter of the potentialities of digital art. The “felt-thought” just referred to in Parisi’s statement provides a good starting point. Let us try to define what felt-thought is: “a virtual affective event” (Massumi, Semblance 65), the intensivity of duration (Frichot 71-72), or, as Massumi elaborates, “[n]ot feeling something. Feeling thought—as such, in its movement, as process, on arrival, as yet unthought-out and un-enacted … … The mutual envelopment of thought and sensation” (Parables 134). Similarly, Sher Doruff sees felt thought in terms of sensation: as the “non-representational, a-syntactic, non-linear movements of thought. This kind of felt thought [is] charged by the chaotic force(s) of the unthought” (157). Felt thought, then, equates to sensation, which, as we have seen, has a central role in art: “the work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else” (D+G, WP 164). Grosz explains further: “[s]ensation draws us, living beings of all kinds, into the artwork in a strange becoming in which the living being empties itself of its interior to be filled with the sensation of that work alone” (Chaos 73). There is, therefore, sensation and the virtual available in the workings of the digital, and also, fundamentally, in art. How, then, can we bring the two together in order to find the aesthetic in the digital, one that is productive of the “radical sensations” that can “contest the
territorialisations of late capitalist life”? (Zepke, “Concept” 163, 162). Putting it another way, how can we “recast the digital as an aesthetic force capable of producing new kinds of sensations and affective responses”? (Munster 94). Again, we map a path through by way of a specific example. This example is not selected according to any criteria of form or medium; for a start, the media are hugely diverse, and, as already noted, for Deleuze the medium is secondary to the issue of aesthetic force. Instead, we use ethico-aesthetic criteria that focus on the affective force of the art work/event, and that give “shape to digitality as a virtual ecology of bodies, technologies and socialities” (Munster 155).

Much has been written about Mexican-Canadian artist Rafael Lozano-Hemmer’s large scale, public art works, Relational Architectures, a series of digital, interactive projects that use “custom-made technologies to transform urban space” (Bullivant 37). In demonumentalising the identity of public buildings/spaces (Bullivant 37), Lozano-Hemmer’s projects set up “an active field of relations that require[s] negotiation between body, building and imaging technologies” (Munster 147). To take a less worn path, though, we now turn to a more intimate Lozano-Hemmer project: a gallery-based exhibition made up of twelve artworks, each of which also functions as an active set of relations. Recorders, presented in 2011 at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Sydney, consists of interactive art pieces that “hear, see or feel the public; they exhibit awareness and record and replay memories entirely obtained during the show” ("Rafael Lozano-Hemmer: Recorders"). Overall, the show is dependent upon the participation of its visitors, with all content being collected by way of such digital technologies as “heart rate sensors, motion detectors, fingerprint scanners, microphones and face recognition software” (“Exhibition”). As the Sydney Morning Herald puts it, in Recorders, “people’s intimate biometric details—their heartbeat, fingerprints, voices—are sampled via live surveillance cameras, recorders and digital technology and transformed to poetic effect” (Lobley). It is not feasible here to consider each of the twelve pieces, but, in highlighting three of them, we aim to build some understanding of how this “poetic effect” translates to what Massumi calls the “thinking-feeling” of the art: its “sense of relational aliveness,” its “vitality affect” (Semblance 44-45). To begin with, “Pulse Room” consists of a large darkened room with one hundred twinkling incandescent light bulbs suspended from the ceiling in a uniform grid. Upon gripping a sensor, a globe in front of the participant begins flashing in time with and to the strength of his/her heartbeat; the room darkens and the participant’s heartbeat transfers to a bulb in the overall array; when the room re-lights the participant’s heartbeat has joined the grid, knocking off the heartbeat that has been flashing the longest. There is then a room filled with both shadows and flickering lights, each lighting at different intervals, so that “at any given time, as you walk around that room, you are surrounded by the vital signs, by the electrical activity of the hearts of ... one hundred people” (“Rafael Lozano-Hemmer—Recorders”). From an aesthetic viewpoint, the work offers a “poetics of mortality” (Herbert),
the ineffable sense of the flickering fragility of life. The experience of seeing one’s heartbeat as pulses of light in relationship with the heartbeats of ninety-nine others creates an affective impact that exceeds the technological materiality of the situation, moving the participant into a qualitative dimension where the “relational aliveness” of the event is intuited. Moreover, a becoming-other is sensed, as the flickerings interweave with one another, and move along the grid to take one another’s place. The second work we will consider, “Tape Recorders,” relies on motion detectors to pick up the movements of visitors. The installation comprises of a room lined with two rows of measuring tapes, each row fixed to two opposite walls. As a visitor moves through the room, measuring tapes project upwards, each one recording the amount of time the person stays in front of that tape. When a tape has reached a height of three metres it collapses, crashes to the ground and recoils. This installation evokes a strong sense of the uncanny, with the measuring tapes moving in strong connection with the visitor, almost as if in a strange dance. This creates “an uncanny experience that questions who is the observer and who is the observed” (“Eye”). Moreover, there is a powerful experience of relationality, which has the effect of blurring “distinctions between human and nonhuman actions and interactions,” and bypassing the “false dichotom[y]” between “technology and the human” (Ravetto-Biagioli 123). The third piece, “People on People,” can be described as a large shadow play, created by “high resolution surveillance cameras with face recognition and 3D tracking” (“Works”). When people enter the room they “see their shadow cast onto the wall, and inside of their shadows they trigger and animate … portraits of people who look back at them” (Sheerin). The portraits inside the shadows are “the live and recorded image of other visitors, while their own image is recorded for live or delayed playback inside the shadow of someone else” (“People”). Lozano-Hemmer sees the installation as being a “phantasmagorical project,” that also questions the status of observer and observed (Sheerin). As Kriss Ravetto-Biagioli notes, such shadow play creates “the illusion of confrontation, contact, and engagement” that often seems to “disturb audiences”: “[b]eing coupled with an ephemeral double implies a form of intimacy” that, again, produces an “uncanny experience” (127-28).

This feeling of uncanniness is exactly what Massumi means by “vitality affect” (Semblance 44). Putting it differently, Massumi draws on Susanne Langer’s concept of semblance when he writes “[t]he perception of an object involves the thinking-feeling of a semblance” (Semblance 44). Langer’s semblance refers to the virtuality involved in any artwork (see Langer 47-50), and, indeed, these Lozano-Hemmer works—though digitally-constructed—are both real and virtual. The ephemeral doubling of the shadow play opens the participant’s own (digital) image to a virtual otherness, destabilising the identity of the Self. As well, there is an opening of the present to the virtual by filling real-time images (shadows) with images from the past, just as the virtual past remains in Bergson’s duration. Just so, the past co-exists with the present in “Pulse Room” (the heartbeats of past visitors continue to flicker in the present), and
in “Tape Recorders” (earlier movements remain suspended in tapes that are not currently activated). These works constitute, to quote Rossiter again, an “aesthetic regime” made up of “spatio-temporal networks of relations.” In a machinic or ethological flow, the human-digital-technological assemblage autopoetically creates itself: the artist sets up the conditions of relations but thereafter each element of the assemblage is a vector of becoming, making unprogrammable outcomes. As Lozano-Hemmer explains, “[w]ith ‘relational’ work I [am referring to] this emergence of ad hoc connections that [are] not intended by the artist him[her]self” (Ponzini). As digital ecologies these artworks distribute agency, and, through affect, become open systems—in touch with the virtual. As such, they connect participants to others and to otherness, to the sense of difference, to an uncanny, disconcerting thinking-feeling that senses another reality (virtuality). In Massumi’s words, this kind of art “pries open existing practices … in a way that makes their potential reappear at a self-abstacturing and self-differing distance from routine functioning, in a potentialisation of semblance of themselves” (Semblance 53). The sense of aliveness produced through the relationality central to these works serve to remind us that nothing in life is of fixed form and therefore unchangeable, that the form of all life is dynamic. As one critic puts it, Lozano-Hemmer’s work makes us aware that we are always “networked, subject to other realities and memories” (Clayton). And when Massumi states that this is “what makes art political, in its own way,” he points to another level of Lozano-Hemmer’s work (Semblance 53). In Massumi’s view, the political in art makes it “push further to the indeterminate but relationally potentialisation fringes of existing situations, beyond the limits of current framings or regulatory principles” (Semblance 53).

Clearly, Lozano-Hemmer’s work pushes beyond the dominant, transcendentalist conceptualisation of Being towards the concept and ontology of becoming. The “existing situation” that Lozano-Hemmer specifically means to draw attention to, though, is the issue of control by surveillance, which is, as we know, a practice ubiquitous in contemporary culture. As Richard Clayton puts it, “[h]is primary concern is with ‘materialising’ or ‘making tangible’ the various surveillance systems that surround us in daily life.” In Lozano-Hemmer’s words, “we live in a society that is now completely functioning through those mechanisms of control … Globalisation ..., politics, everything, is based on the idea of metrics, of tracking. ... These kinds of cameras or surveillance mechanisms are at work at all levels” (Lozano-Hemmer, “Artwriter”). Lozano-Hemmer is acutely aware that “[t]he same surveillance technologies that read us as an index of potential criminal intent see us as potential consumers” (Ravetto-Biagioli 127). And although he says he is not happy having to make works that explore cultures of predatoriness and paranoia, Lozano-Hemmer believes it extremely important to do so, in order to “confront these technologies of the panoptic and post-optic gaze” (Lozano-Hemmer, Interview). In the first instance, he wishes to make the technologies “more visually tangible, so you [can] get a sense of the observation” (Ponzini). Further, though, he seeks to push beyond current framings of advanced surveillance technologies, and introduce new ways of
experiencing them: “[w]e are extending them and making them work for our purposes, custom modifying them, and then creating what we consider is a project that is connective [and] that is quite playful” (Sheerin). In “misusing these technologies,” Lozano-Hemmer aims to open them to the “whole range of different experiences” they can effect—beyond their control function: an aim, he points out, consistent with “what art has always done” (Lozano-Hemmer, “Artwriter”). As Ravetto-Biagioli notes, the (political) point of Lozano-Hemmer’s work is not to “declare victims and victims or to return to the bounded individual of disciplinary societies”; instead, it is “to visualize and animate how positions, bodies, and identities are themselves in flux, activated, deformed, and transmuted by the flows of capital, media, surveillance, and information technologies” (136). Through providing opportunities for participation in a digital-human machinic assemblage that opens to virtual becomings, Lozano-Hemmer offers ways to resist and deterritorialise the control mechanisms of digital society. Ravetto-Biagioli expresses Lozano-Hemmer’s achievements in terms of Deleuze’s call for “new weapons” against control: “[p]ossible new weapons may be found in the proliferation of responses, relations, interactions, indeterminate or plainly dubious activities, and the doubling and redoubling of bodily images and gestures that produce new groupings, new constructive forces” (140).

There are numerous other examples that show how digital art can produce “new constructive forces” in the face of contemporary capitalism. Parikka, for instance, demonstrates some of the ways in which software and net art work “to find cracks in the majoritarian language operating as the cultural relay of power and control” (Ethologies 124). Leaving aside for now the potentialities of software and the internet, we conclude here by applying some of Parikka’s comments to digital art in general. As stated earlier, against the argument that the digital is merely pseudo-creative, we have taken the Deleuze-Guattarian, ethological approach to an ontology of the digital. This is to conceive of digital art as a realm of relationality, a dynamic of all kinds of bodies-in-relation (Parikka, “Ethologies” 125)—bodies of code, human bodies, material environments and so on. As Parikka points out, such “[e]thological cartographies look for experiments and mutations” and, therefore, are open to the virtuality inherent in becoming. In thinking the potentiality of digital art, it is useful, finally, to invoke (as Deleuze often does) Simondon’s work on individuation. For Simondon, each “individual” is an “open-ended construct,” a process of “ongoing individuation” that is always determined in relation to its “material and immaterial environment” (Brunner and Fritsch 122). Parikka explains:

For Simondon, potentiality, or metastability, is practically a definition of a living system. Life here does not have to be thought according to the biological paradigm where “living” is a characteristic stratified according to the mode of organisation of animals, plants, etc. Instead, we can talk of the non-organic life of various systems—or life as individuation and intensity inherent in matter. Practices in [digital] art and
related fields are exemplary social and critical interventions that tap into this logic of the non-organic and function as (re)modulations of what is real. ("Ethologies" 125)

As such, relational or connective projects such as Lozano-Hemmer's “tap into the very logics of power that are increasingly asignifying: algorithms, computational processes, protocols and diagrams of how bodies, social practices and codes are connected” (Parikka, “Ethologies” 125). In doing so, such art effects a disruption of majoritarian (transcendental and capitalistic) modes of seeing/being in the world. Digital art as a technique for thought traverses the layers of digital materials and processes, non-human sense and preconscious affect, to engender a movement in thought—a difference in conceptualising the way things are/can be. Such re-conceptualising affirms art as ethics, as bio-politics, as “a mechanism to increase our power” (Zepke, Art 9). Indeed, this power of art leads Guattari to see it as “the paradigm for every possible liberation” (C 91).
LINE OF FLIGHT 3: THOUGHT IN AN AESTHETIC PARADIGM

In the previous section, we mapped the lines of thought through art, attending to the affective and transformative power of several specific works. We saw that art as composition is, in fact, thought in action, to the extent that the affectivity of these works enact and realise "conceptual newness" (Massumi, Parables 176). In their writings, both Deleuze and Guattari also refer to certain artists and art objects—Deleuze in particular, in his extensive treatment of Bacon, Proust, Jean-Luc Godard, and many others. Guattari, however, in his later work, takes the power of art to a different level, when he extends this power to artistry or aesthetics in a more general sense. In Chaosmosis, Guattari develops what he calls an "aesthetic paradigm," one that "creates new modalities of subjectivity in the same way that an artist creates new forms from the palette" (7). As O'Sullivan suggests, this extended paradigm of art could be regarded as “an expanded field of creative life practices” (“Guattari’s” 259), since it carries art’s creative force into broader realms of life. This paradigm turns around “creation in a nascent state” (Guattari, C 102): it takes art’s ethic of experimentation and moves it across the spectrum of spheres impacting subjectivity—philosophy, science, economics, ecology, and so on. Guattari explains:

The incessant clash of the movement of art against established boundaries … , its propensity to renew its materials of expression and the ontological texture of the percepts and affects it promotes brings about if not a direct contamination of other domains then at least a highlighting and re-evaluation of the creative dimensions that traverse all of them. Patently, art does not have a monopoly on creation, but it takes its capacity to invent mutant coordinates to extremes: it engenders unprecedented, unforeseen and unthinkable qualities of being. (C 106)

In other words, for Guattari, the aesthetic modes of art bear “an autonomous, catalytic” function that bleeds into all realms of life, thus having the exceptional capacity to “change the very social group from which it may have sprung” (Colman, “Affective” 68). Indeed, Guattari proposes that artistry, or aesthetics, is “on the verge of occupying a privileged position” in our milieu, to the degree that it holds the potential to guide us through the “immense crisis sweeping the planet” (C 101, 132). As Stephen Zagala notes, the aesthetic paradigm’s power lies in art’s ethic of the “creative production of the new” (20), and is concerned generally with new constructions of subjectivity and new futures. The potentialities of Guattari’s aesthetic paradigm for our mapping of thought as resistance can, therefore, take us along another, highly productive line. For this reason we follow Deleuze’s friend’s particular ethological-ecological thinking to chart this project’s final Line of Flight.

As indicated above, at the base of the aesthetic paradigm is Guattari’s concept of subjectivity.
In this concept, subjectivity is not “given as in-itself,” but is “the product of individuals, groups and institutions” (C 7, 1). There is no one dominant factor that produces subjectivity, but a blend of elements, making it a “polyphonic and heterogenetic” assemblage (Guattari, C 6), or, in O'Sullivan's interpretation, “a complex aggregate of heterogeneous elements” (Art 90). It is important to note that when Guattari speaks of “subjectivities” he means both “personal territories—the body, the self—but also, at the same time, ... collective territories—the family, the community, the ethnic group” (GR 267). Either way, Guattari is concerned with departing from scientific paradigms of subjectivity, a move that he sees as ethical: “[w]e are faced with an important ethical choice,” he tells us; “either we objectify, reify, ‘scientifise’ subjectivity, or, on the contrary, we try to grasp it in the dimension of its processual creativity” (C 13). To grasp the processuality of subjectivity is to admit the potential of difference into the concept, to undo the traditional notion of the subject as “the ultimate essence of individuation” or “the unifier of states of consciousness” (Guattari, C 22), and to redress “a social field devastated by capitalist subjectivity” (Guattari, C 15). It is also to imply “a kind of self-construction or self organisation, a certain auto-cohesiveness, ... an autopoiesis” of subjectivity, which invites us “to move from passive spectators to become active participants” in creating the conditions of our lives (O'Sullivan, Art 91). To the extent that art is a “pragmatics of assemblage and composition” (Stengers, “Experimenting” 52), so the aesthetic paradigm is concerned with (re)assembling and (re)composing subjectivities, utilising “the aptitude of [aesthetic] processes of creation to auto-affirm themselves as existential nuclei, autopoietic machines” (C 106). It is our aim, now, to map more specifically how contemporary subjectivities can be remade in this ethical way, and, importantly for this project, how we can conceptualise here the role for thought.

Thought and the art of living

If art helps societies and individuals access thought (Colman, “Affective” 78), this thought arises through art’s connection to sensation or the sensible. As we have indicated, by aesthetics, Guattari, and Deleuze, mean “the dynamics of sensible assemblages” (Zagala 36). Within the aesthetic paradigm, thought always begins with “blocks of sensations”—the sensations that precede “significations, ... trivial perceptions, ... opinions, and common sentiments” (Guattari, C 89). Thought is, first of all, the power of accessing these blocks of the sensible—percepts and affects—and recreating subjectivities. Guattari explains:

This extraction of deterritorialised percepts and affects from banal perceptions and states of mind takes us from the voice of interior discourse and from self-presence—and from what is most standardised about them—on paths leading to radically mutant forms of subjectivity. A subjectivity of the outside and of wide-open spaces ... .

(C 89)
The kind of thought that enables us to “get to know” these blocks of mutant percepts and affects is not representation, but “affective contamination”: “[t]hey start to exist in you, in spite of you. And not only as crude, undifferentiated affects, but as “hyper-complex compositions” (Guattari, C 92-93). In turn, these compositions engender multiplicitous potentials for thought, primarily because they are an encounter with something as yet unthought (Zagala 22), in any kind of domain—economic, social, religious, political, ontological. In an aesthetic paradigm, then, thought, drawn by affect (or the aesthetic power of feeling), moves out from the “nuclei of differentiation” that is both “at the heart of” and “between” the different spheres (Guattari, C 101, 92). At this point the assemblage of percepts and affects can, as Zagala suggests, “link up to all manner of things” (36).

We have established that thought, in this paradigm, begins at the level of affect. But thought here, too, can be characterised in relation to the driving concept of movement, and its corollary, difference. The movement mode of aesthetics, as outlined by Guattari, is, once again, machinic, a concept Guattari takes up and extends through biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s definition of “living systems”: “their notion of autopoiesis—as the auto-reproductive capacity of a structure or ecosystem—could be usefully enlarged to include social machines, economic machines and ... the incorporeal machines of language, theory and aesthetic creation” (C 93). As we have already noted, the movement of the machinic is none other that “the flow of matter,” the “material vitalism” of life (D+G, ATP 410, 411): the entirely immanent “vital mechanism of a world always emerging anew” (Zepke, Art 2). Putting it another way, there is a “machinic essence” that incarnates itself in the various assemblages of life—social groups, bodies, works of art, political entities and so on; overall, the “abstract” machine “passes through all these heterogeneous components [and, in turn,] it heterogenises them, beyond any unifying trait” (Guattari, C 39). Through machinic autopoiesis, then, living be(com)ings as collective entities “maintain diverse types of relations of alterity, rather than being implacably closed in on themselves” (Guattari, C 39). Difference and creation is at the core of machinic movement, therefore, since only variation can arise from such heterogeneous dynamism. Variation, the shock of the new, is machinically induced by affective thought, and also serves to induce new ideas, new thinking. And when Guattari points to the crucial “double process” of machinism, we gain an added sense of how thought is involved. This double process refers to both the “autopoietic-creative” element of machinism, as we have just discussed, as well as the “ethical-ontological” aspect, an aspect that implies “the existence of a material of choice” (Guattari, C 108). The ethical aspect is further unravelled:

The new aesthetic paradigm has ethico-political implications because to speak of creation is to speak of the responsibility of the creative instance with regard to the thing created, inflection of the state of things, bifurcation beyond pre-established
schemas, once again taking into account the fate of alterity in its extreme modalities.

But this ethical choice no longer emanates from a transcendent enunciation, a code of law or a unique and all-powerful god. (Guattari, C 107)

Instead, this ethical choice belongs to thought, to a thought that is, like a work of art, “an activity of unframing, of rupturing sense, of baroque proliferation or extreme impoverishment, which leads to a recreation and reinvention of the subject itself” (Guattari, C 131). The wider implication of this ethical thought comes from the notion that “the immense machinic interconnectedness” that is the world today “finds itself in an autofoundational position of its own bringing into being” (Guattari, C 108). As O’Sullivan phrases it, “[i]n this aesthetic paradigm we become the authors of our own subjectivities” (“Guattari’s” 263). Therefore, as all the traditional economic, political and social bearings break down, it behooves us to shift “the axes of values, the fundamental finalities of human relations and productive activity” (Guattari, C 91). Rather than valorising capital ad infinitum, which only “smashes all other modes of valorisation,” we can make a more ethical choice, in favour of “an ethics and politics of the virtual” (Guattari, C 29). Thought, to this end—as an ethico-aesthetic enterprise—brings about “a new art of living in society” (Guattari, C 20). In being guided by the mode of the sensible that constitutes aesthetic thought, we can work to bring about “changes in production, ways of living and axes of value,” and may thus experience the joys of “a new taste for life” (Guattari, C 134, 92). Under this paradigm, those who engage in thought might be conceptualised as “cartographers of subjectivity,” who understand that “perpetual reinvention” at each and every opportunity evades entrapment in sameness (Guattari, “TE” 133). As Guattari urges, “with each concrete performance [we should seek] to develop and innovate, to create new perspectives, without prior recourse to assured theoretical foundations or the authority of a group, school, conservatory, or academy” (Guattari, “TE” 133). But since capitalism is the authority that straddles all others, our greatest efforts should be directed against its gross inequities. In Guattari’s estimation, “[i]f social and political practices are to be set back on their feet, we need to work for humanity, rather than simply for a permanent re-equilibration of the capitalist semiotic universe” (Guattari, “TE” 139).

Dissensual thought in a post-media era

To repeat, the movement of life under Guattari’s aesthetic paradigm is machinic, which, in turn, is a heterogenising process. In his appeal that we work for humanity by putting social and political processes back on their feet, Guattari again stresses the importance of heterogeneity: he claims that that an aesthetic approach to social and political practices makes it essential “not to homogeni[s]e the various levels of practice— not to join them under the aegis of some transcendent instance” (Guattari, “TE” 139). Instead, we should engage these practices in “processes of heterogenesis” (Guattari, “TE” 139). To actively seek heterogenesis
would be one way of resisting capitalist control, since, as Guattari points out, capitalism strives for power “by controlling and neutralising the maximum possible number of subjectivity’s existential refrains” (Guattari, “TE” 139). In other words, capitalism evades and appropriates the myriads of potential singularities available to subjectivity, by forming “massive subjective aggregates” which connect to such ideas as “race, nation, profession, sporting competition, dominating virility, [and] mass media stardom” (Guattari, “TE” 139). Therefore, if we are to withstand such appropriation, we must nurture atypical, rare and singular subjectivities. Guattari puts it this way: “[t]he task facing us in the future is not that of seeking a mind-numbing and infantilising consensus, but of cultivating dissensus and the singular production of existence” (Guattari, “TE” 138). Guattari’s concept of dissensus finds resonance both with Deleuze’s notion of the mediator, discussed in Line of Flight 1, whereby we are called to cultivate lines of dissonance at the level of the affective individual, and with the concepts of becoming-minor and becoming revolutionary. The point is not to think alike, but to actively cultivate differences in thought, and the accompanying differences in modes of becoming. As Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton explain, “Guattari’s finely nuanced, radically dissensual approach to social ecology requires the collective production of unpredictable and untamed ‘dissident subjectivities’ rather than a mass movement of like-minded people” (9). Guattari’s “dissensual approach” derives from his belief in the “fundamentally pluralist, multi-centred, and heterogeneous character of contemporary subjectivity” (GR 266), which is, of course, at the heart of the possibility of new, creative and positive forms of subjectivity. In a general sense, Guattari rejects “consensual agreement” in favour of an overall “dissensual metamodelisation” (GR 272), since he regards consensus as threatening to the extent that it becomes fixed orthodoxy (Genosko 37). Dissensual metamodelisation, on the other hand, “escapes every attempt to reduce it to established modelisations (historical materialism and liberal economics alike)” (Genosko 37). For Guattari, the most sinister driver of consensus is the mass media, which is, in turn, the primary carrier of capitalistic subjectivity (“the subjectivity of generalised equivalence” [C 22]). His assessment of the mass media is that it is deadening, stupefying, homogenising (C 5, 97; GR 266), and that it creates mass consensus “in terms of responses to commercial media messages” (Genosko 38). As Guattari puts it, “there is a weakening of true debate, and an avoidance of authentically dissensual problematics” (qtd. in Genosko 39). In this mass mediated, capitalist milieu genuine dissensus is only ever “simulated,” due to the following reasons:

short-sighted use of new information technologies for the gain of multi-nationals; production and distribution is controlled either by private or public interests; a situation in which relations between producers are of concern only after a product has been brought to market; absence of effective bodies, nationally and internationally, to investigate mediatic manipulation. (Genosko 39)
Since the mass media industry “never problematizes what is at stake,” and induces alienated spectators “stripped of any awareness of responsibility,” Guattari calls for us to move into a “post-media” world (GR 263, 262). In other words, his predilection for dissensus runs hand-in-hand with his desire for “a revolutionary shift from a consensual mass media to a dissensual post-media era” (37). This new era would involve intertwined changes in mentalities and in social and material environments, amounting to a complex aesthetic reshaping that Guattari calls “ecosophy,” since it links “environmental ecology to social ecology to mental ecology” (GR 264). Such reshaping comprises a “plan for the planet that challenges rather than ‘capitali[ses]’ on the globali[ation] of capitalism” (Genosko 40). One of Guattari’s specific objectives in this plan is for a “refoundation of politics,” a rebirth he believes should move through the aesthetic dimensions involved in what he calls “the three ecologies” referred to above: “the environment, the socius and the psyche” (Guattari, C 20). Once again, as Guattari explains, it is the honouring of difference (dissonance) that underpins this rebirth of political thought: “[w]e cannot conceive of a collective recomposition of the socius, correlative to a resingularisation of subjectivity, without a new way of conceiving political and economic democracies that respect cultural difference—without multiple molecular revolutions” (C 20-21). Again, we find links to the concepts of becoming-democracy and becoming-revolutionary, both of which figure in Guattari’s dissensual metamodelling. Guattari further develops the concept of becoming-democracy, in insisting that “[e]cosophic democracy would not give itself up to the facility for consensual agreement” (GR 272); instead, it would seek new forms of collective accord. This is how Guattari sees that collective consistencies can allow for singularity:

The goal is no longer to reach a working consensus on several general statements covering the range of current political problems but, on the contrary, to further what we call a culture of dissensus, working to deepen particular positions toward a resingularisation of individuals and groups. What must be envisaged is not a programmatic accord that erases differences but a collective diagram permitting the articulation of individual practices to the benefit of each, without one imposing itself on the other. (Guattari and Cohn-Bendit, qtd. in Genosko 40)

It is not that collectivity should not occur, then, but that blind consensus would be replaced by a collective commitment to “an authentic hearing of the other” (GR 271). As Guattari elaborates, “[a] hearing of disparity, singularity, marginality, even of madness, … could overturn or restore direction to [any collective] structures, by recharging them with potentiality, by deploying, through them, new lines of creative flow” (GR 271). Moreover, in Guattari’s account, a post-mediatic reinvention of democracy ought to take a pluralist approach to managing its machinic components, and should seek to rebalance current systems of valorisation (Guattari, GR 268). Machinic elements such as legislature and the judiciary could construct new ties with technology and research, and commissions could be created to
deal with ethical issues relating to the media, education, urbanism and so on (Guattari, GR 268). With regard to a readjustment of valorisation, it should be recognised that developing “clean, livable, lively” cities, humane medicine, and “enriching education” is as (if not more) valuable as developing “a production-line of automobiles, or high-performance electronic equipment” (Guattari, GR 268). In more ethical phrasing, the capitalist valorisation of economic profit must be replaced by an endorsement of “[t]he joy of living, solidarity, and compassion with regard to others,” as well as a taking of responsibility for future generations (Guattari, GR 266, 271). Such a politics would constitute, according to Guattari, “a politics and ethics of singularity, breaking with consensus [and] the infantile ‘reassurance’ distilled by dominant subjectivity” (C 117).

Post-media, technology, thought

In light of Guattari’s vision of a post-media era, we might now wonder: what kind of social and technical mechanism could facilitate the living out of this ethico-aesthetic paradigm? Should we reject contemporary media of all kinds? As noted earlier, D+G were writing at the very early stage of the digital era, and Deleuze, especially, is ambivalent about its potential for enhancing life in an ethical sense. Guattari, on the other hand, is rather more hopeful: while he acknowledges that new technologies “produce an ever increasing alienation and atomisation,” he also sees them as having “the potentiality to produce new forms of life—and subjectivity—that go beyond the latter” (O’Sullivan, “Guattari’s” 258). In particular, Guattari sees promise in early forms of networked media, and, therefore, in our quest to map new ways for thought, it is to this kind of new media that we here return. While it is clear that Guattari renounces the mass media for the way its “bombardment of social attention produces brutal effects on sensibility” (Berardi, Félix 32), he also advances the view that “[t]echnological evolution will introduce new possibilities for interaction between the medium and its user, and between users themselves” (GR 263). So while Guattari’s post-mediatic civilisation involves a destructuring of the mass media system, it allows for, even advocates, “the diffusion of electronic communication technologies” (Berardi, Félix 31). This new era, as Berardi suggests, would be one in which “communication flows are no longer directed from above toward a passive public [but] instead function as the densest framework for rhizomatic exchange through emitters situated on the same plane” (Félix 31). Perhaps Guattari’s earliest involvement in such a framework was his 1970s-80s work in the free radio movement(s) in Italy and France, a movement he called “an experimentation, a new mode of expression” (qtd. in Stivale, Two-Fold 200). These free radio stations were clandestine, outside government control, and played music, poetry and “information about police manoeuvres” (Plant 1107). Open to anyone, they aimed to resist the centralised mass media, or, as Sadie Plant puts it, “interrupt the conventions of communication and the monopolisation of the airwaves and
broadcast technology” (1107). Overall, these early pirate radio networks worked to produce “new forms of sensibility and sociability,” and comprised a significant “auto-referential feedback loop between rhizomatic thought and media subversion” (Goddard, “Felix”).

For many theorists, including Guattari’s colleague Berardi, the early free radio networks were an anticipation of today’s internet model (Berardi, Félix 31). In Berardi’s view, Guattari foresaw the potential of the “Net” simply through the somewhat primitive French Minitel experience of the early 1980s—a time “before the World Wide Web existed and the internet started making newspaper headlines” (Félix 31, 30). Furthermore, for Berardi, Guattari already thought in terms of a net, a system that Berardi terms Guattari’s “lookout post” (Félix 30). As Goddard notes, “Guattari had no fear of new technologies but rather embraced their potentials even when these had barely been developed” (“Felix”). In the development of electronic technologies, Guattari saw the prospect of a kind of collective thought:

The junction of the audiovisual screen, the telematic screen and the computer screen could lead to a real activation of a collective sensibility and intelligence. The current equation (media=passivity) will perhaps disappear more quickly than one would think. Obviously, we cannot expect a miracle from these technologies: it will depend, ultimately, on the capacity of groups of people to take hold of them, and apply them to appropriate ends. (GR 263)

The “appropriate ends” Guattari refers to has nothing to do with a capitalist agenda, which, as we explored in Part 1, the internet continues to be seized by. Nor does it have to do with the superficial skimming of websites that constitutes much internet use. Rather, “[t]he key element in any media or post-media assemblage is that of the production of subjectivity, which for Guattari is a directly political or micropolitical phenomenon” (Goddard, “Felix”). While the mass media homogenises, Guattari emphasises the “fundamentally pluralist, multi-centred, and heterogeneous character of contemporary subjectivity” (GR 266). In a 1985 essay that rejects the disengagements of postmodernism, Guattari sets out his vision for how processes of subjectivation might work through technological means; this statement is worth quoting in its entirety:

The emergence of these new practices of subjectivation of a post-media era will be greatly facilitated by a concerted reappropriation of communicational and information technology, assuming that they increasingly allow for:

1) The formation of innovative forms of dialogue and collective interactivity, and eventually, a reinvention of democracy;

2) By means of the miniaturisation and personalisation of equipments, a resingularisation of the machinic mediated means of expression; we can presume, on this subject, that it is the connection, through networking, of banks of data which will offer us the most surprising view;
3) The multiplication to infinity of “existential operators,” permitting access to mutant creative universes. (SS 299-300)

Guattari’s hope for a “libertarian cyberculture” (Berardi, Félix 31), then, is more specified than any broad-based notion of “the coming culture of digital networks” (Goddard, “Felix”). As Goddard explains, “if the postmediatic era means the era of mass networks this is not in itself a positive development but one that holds as many catastrophic potentials as liberating ones,” since “the spheres of both neoliberal economics and infinite warfare have also become rhizomatic and post-mediatic in their own way” (“Felix”). To counter such developments, Guattari spells out his hope that technological interactivity and networking become a means for mobilising a becoming-democracy and a people to come. To begin with, using these technologies in an ethical, life-enhancing manner requires the reappropriation of capitalism’s channelling and gatekeeping of internet usage for profit and control. If these networks are to be an open mode of creativity and self-organisation, we must also resist “neo-liberal economic and military networks and their associated deadening of relationality, affect and desire in the direction of pure functionality and aggressivity” (Goddard, “Felix”). Rather than the limited subjectivities of capitalism, Guattari is interested in machinic networks that promote subjectivities “engaged in developing material and moral well-being, in social and mental ecology” (GR 268). Moreover, these networks should encourage new kinds of collective thought, reached through dissensual rather than consensual means. Guattari is especially keen that collective engagement occur with minority groups, since, for him, they are the only ones who understand “the mortal risk, for humanity, of problems such as: the race to stockpile nuclear weapons[,] world hunger[,] irreversible ecological damage[,] and] mass-mediatic pollution of collective subjectivity” (SS 300). Finally, electronic interactive media offer “a multitude of vectors of resingularisation, attractors of social creativity” (Guattari, C 117), since they have the potential to connect us to innumerable lines of flight from current circumstances. For Guattari, these media can be more than mere “technical machines”: they have the potential to be “machines of thought, sensation, and consultation,” which “can become a crucial instrument for subjective resingularisation [or liberation] and can generate other ways of perceiving the world, a new face on things, and even a different turn of events” (C 97). Although Guattari did not survive to witness it, it is fair to say that the post-mediatic internet, as well as other information and communication technologies (ICTs), has developed to the point that today they are certainly “the privileged plane of social self-organisation” (Berardi, Félix 31). Therefore, we now turn to ICT’s potentialities in terms of Guattari’s post-mediatic, ethico-aesthetic vision, following three particular lines of thought. A foreword: although the sub-headings below set apart “becoming-revolutionary” and “becoming-democratic,” these concepts are, of course, overlapping; becoming-revolutionary is equally a
call for a more democratic way of life—which is also to say a call for the reinvention of existing forms of democracy.

Libertarian cyberculture 1: becoming-revolutionary

Over the past decade or so the world has seen numerous revolutionary uprisings across a range of locations—Eastern Europe, Asia, the Arab sphere, for instance. A phase of "colour" revolutions took place in many Soviet-style Eastern European countries following the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse (in Serbia and Georgia for example—2000 and 2003 respectively), with this same wave perhaps extending to Lebanon in 2005 and Burma in 2007 (Cheterian). Each country’s uprising became identified with a particular colour or flower worn by the protesters, with non-violent techniques being the key mode of resistance (Hirst). The colour emblem and model was again taken up during the Iranian uprising in 2009, and by a more recent series of Arab revolutions triggered by Tunisia in late 2010. According to various commentators, the internet and several other ICTs have played a critical role in many of these revolts, especially as its functions have expanded year by year. In Holmes view, for example, “[e]xperimentation with the internet [over the last decade] has been inseparable from an upsurge of radical democracy, this time on a transnational scale” (“Games”). Overall, however, the exact part played by the internet and other networked digital devices (such as mobile phones) in these revolutionary moments is still a much-debated issue. In order to pursue Guattari’s notion of ethico-aesthetic, post-mediatic thought, let us now explore the extent to which ICTs are implicated in some of these revolutions, especially in the sense of their becoming-revolutionary nature.

First, we turn to Iran, where, in response to the events of its tenth presidential election, the country experienced its so-named “Green Revolution” in mid-2009. In the lead-up to the election voters were confronted with the decision of “whether to keep hard-line president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in power for four more years, or to replace him with [Mir Hossein Mousavi,] a reformist more open to loosening the country’s Islamic restrictions” (Taylor, “Iran’s Presidential”). The election drew a record 85 per cent voter turnout (Worthy and Fathi). The result was hugely controversial, with both candidates claiming immediate victory, until Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared a "divine victory" for his preferred candidate Ahmadinejad (“Iran”). This declaration was made despite only two-thirds of the vote being counted (Afshari and Underwood 7). Large-scale protests ensued throughout Iran: supporting Mousavi’s claim that the election had been fraudulent, hundreds of thousands of protestors took to the streets marching under Mousavi’s green campaign colour and “where is my vote?” banners (Kamrava 409). To begin with, demonstrations were largely noisy but peaceful (“Ahmadinejad”); however, protests became violent when security forces and militia
attempted to stifle the uprising (Taylor, “Iran’s Disputed”). Indeed, as Mehran Kamrava notes, “just as the magnitude of the street protests took everyone by surprise, so did the brutality of the violent crackdown that followed” (409). One particular young unarmed protestor, Neda Agha Soltan, became the public face and symbol of the intense repression, when the last moments of her violent death were captured on a witness’s mobile phone camera, and uploaded onto YouTube (Kraidy and Mourad 7). The video soon spread rapidly (became “viral”), being picked up by other social media, as well as by mainstream media such as the BBC and CNN (Kraidy and Mourad 7). Within about twelve hours of Neda’s death, she was “the fifth most commented topic on Twitter” (Putz).

Following the Iranian uprisings, one of the most discussed aspects of the election aftermath in mainstream media circles was the use of new technologies. Australia’s ABC TV programme Foreign Correspondent, for instance, focused on the power of “digital dissent” versus “bullets and batons”:

In 2009, post-election Iran has seen the unveiling of a bold and angry, highly mobile rebellion that’s challenging Iran’s old guard with new-media—filming protests and government aggression with mobile phones, uploading the sometimes bloody and confronting images to global net transmitters like YouTube, messaging instant observations to Twitter and keeping a concerned outside world up to the minute on the state of a secretive nation. (“Rebellion”)

Such accounts propagated the notion of a “Twitter revolution,” the idea that social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook were being used to organise the protests (Mishra). Other commentators—more informed according to Lovink (“True”)—see the role of the internet in the Iranian protests slightly differently: “[p]rotests are organi[s]ed centrally by the campaigns of reformist candidates and then that information is disseminated both online and off. The role of citizens with regard to social media is as citizen journalists” (Tehrani). Social media researcher Gaurav Mishra agrees that Twitter did not play an organising role, but, nevertheless, was extremely important in “fixing the world’s attention on the crisis, both in terms of getting individuals like you and me to focus on the crisis, and also in getting the attention of the international media and making sure this crisis gets the amount of coverage it deserves to get.” Indeed, Twitter became a primary source of information about the turmoil when Iranian authorities restricted mobile phone networks, blocked foreign TV and radio broadcasts (“Iran”), and clamped down on foreign journalists by severely curtailing their reporting of events (Plunkett) and expelling them from the country (Guthrie). But as Marisa Guthrie notes, “[d]espite the violent crackdown by state-sponsored militias, Iranians continued to document the unrest in their country,” demonstrating the difficulty of imposing a media blackout when internet-linked media are involved. As far as the result of the protests, George Lawson’s comment that “successful revolutions are ... rare” is apposite, especially in
circumstances where armed forces are willing to fire upon their own people. Ultimately, Iran’s 2009 Green Revolution failed to oust the corrupt regime due to the authority’s willingness to use bloodshed, and, since 2009, the regime has continued to maintain dominance by way of “force, torture, executions, and house-arrests of key opposition figures” (Jahanbegloo). Nevertheless, the revolutionaries’ success at bringing the injustices of the Iranian situation to international attention provides one strong example of how web-linked technologies can be well utilised by dissident or, rather, dissensual, groups, in working towards creating a singular democracy. Using ICTs as an effective “channel of dissent” (Alavi, “Iran’s”) effectively counters the censorship of an authoritarian state (Solow-Niederman 30), and can also “diminish a dictator’s monopoly of ‘truth’” (Alavi, Interview). At the same time, such a post-media permeated challenge to an oppressive state is a machinic mobilisation of dissensual subjectivity in general, as well as of the kind of heterogeneous thought relating to a paradigm of ethico-aesthetic emergence. The aesthetic remaking of the Iranian political landscape—from a becoming-revolutionary point of view—remains an autopoietic becoming.

In response to another phase of revolts—December 2010-January 2011’s regime-changing uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt—14 February 2011 saw “tens of thousands of [Iranian] protestors gathered in the streets of Tehran and other cities … to rally in solidarity with the ‘freedom fighters of [Cairo’s] Tahrir Square’” (Alavi, “Iran’s”). Oppressed Iranians, the becoming-revolutionaries, remain creative and resilient, “capable of using technology as a channel of defiance, and of mobilising large numbers of people” (Alavi, “Iran’s”). These revolutionaries are, in Guattari’s terms, cartographers of subjectivity. Post-media technologies such as the internet are part of an ethological assemblage that includes the event of the uprisings, giving rise to mutant sensations that destabilise dominant subject-forms. Through affective contagion, collective thought and engagement, effects of the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions (the Jasmine wave), have seeped into other Arab nations—Libya and Bahrain as well as Iran—galvanising them to “become firmer and more outspoken in [their] demands for democratisation” (Jahanbegloo). With new political and social ecologies in emergence, these network media spread images and effect ideas of other ways of being in the Arab world, ways that remain open to a democracy-becoming, a democracy perhaps not modeled on Western varieties. In doing so, these post-media machines answer Guattari’s call for innovative forms of “collective interactivity,” and move towards his hope for “a reinvention of democracy” (SS 299).

There are other examples wherein the potentialities of the internet and cyberactivism become apparent as aesthetically-derived means of becoming-revolutionary. The second we consider here is a situation in Burma (Myanmar), a country under rigid military dictatorship (junta) for five decades—from 1962, until a measure of democratic reform began to be introduced in 2012. The situation we are concerned with occurred in September 2007, when protests arose
challenging a steep rise in fuel prices; these protests spawned a campaign subsequently called the Saffron Revolution. This 100,000 strong protest movement “caught global attention as bloggers and digital activists flooded cyberspace with grainy images and videos of saffron-robed monks leading large, peaceful demonstrations against the government” (Chowdhury 4).

As the government moved quickly to crush the demonstrations, bloggers subsequently spread graphic images of and information about the “violent repression” of the protests (Alfaro 2), whereby up to 200 monks, civilians and journalists were killed (Wang and Nagaraja 2; Chowdhury 4). In response to the widespread internet dissemination of such images, the junta acted again, taking the extreme step of shutting down the country’s access to the internet altogether, as well as disabling the majority of its international mobile phone connectivity (Chowdhury 4). The blockade lasted a fortnight, during which time the government was “monitoring (even raiding) internet cafes and their users, confiscating equipment, limiting media licensing and controlling ICT companies” (Alfaro 23). Prior to the shutdown, Burma already had extremely heavy internet censorship, especially in relation to political reform, independent media and locally-focused human rights sites (Wang and Nagaraja 3). This complete shutdown of access, however, was unprecedented, causing the New York Times to wonder “whether the vaunted role of the internet in undermining repression can stand up to [such] a determined and ruthless government” (Mydans). Prior to the shutdown much was accomplished, however: despite less than one per cent of the population having internet access, a “relatively small group of Burmese citizens achieved a disproportionate impact on the global awareness and understanding of [the] crisis, despite operating in a very limited online space where information [was] severely controlled” (Wang and Nagaraja 3). The images and words surreptitiously sent through cell phone messages, and (anonymously, from internet cafes) through emails, blogs, Facebook posts and e-cards alerted the outside world to the brutal crushing of the protests, and led to “international condemnation of the Burmese military rulers’ violations of human rights” (Alfaro 23). Responses ranged from an online-organised Global Day of Action for Burma on 6 October 2007, comprising peaceful protest rallies in almost one hundred cities (Chowdhury 11), to 5,000 bloggers joining a blog blackout called International Bloggers’ Day for Burma (Stirland). Several governments also condemned the junta’s actions: the French President advised French oil giant Total Oil “to restrain itself from making any new investments in Burma,” and then Australian Prime Minister John Howard announced “financial sanctions against the military rulers of Burma” (Chowdhury 11). In this situation, then, the internet added a powerful dimension to political activism, or to becoming-revolutionary. It can be regarded here as a significant component in an abstract machine of production, a concatenating becoming-other (-revolutionary, -world, -democracy) through a mode of aesthetic autopoeisis. The fact that the Burmese government reacted as strongly as to close down the internet indicates its recognition of the real potential of online activism to threaten its status quo. Internet-driven
international attention may even have affected the government’s actions during the Saffron Revolution: as Mridul Chowdhury suggests, “[i]t is plausible that the military felt it was under greater scrutiny because of the internet, and that it was therefore more restrained in its use of force.” Although there are countless occasions when such surveillance techniques work for the military (or capital), this example demonstrates the reappropriation of such technologies for ethical purposes.

In terms of Burmese developments subsequent to the 2007 internet shutdown—when the junta worked even harder to restrict online connectivity—we might ask if the internet continued to be an important instrument in the Burmese people’s striving for becoming-democracy. As the New York Times points out, “[t]echnology is making it harder for dictators and juntas to draw a curtain of secrecy” (Mydans), and internet users in Burma are steadily increasing year by year (Aung). These users have made good use of censorship circumvention technologies, with internet cafes and private homes downloading free anti-censorship software, as well as installing state-evading foreign-hosted proxy sites and hyper-encrypted email services (Chowdhury 13). Breakthrough internet usage both during and since the crackdown have, it has been suggested, led to “some irreversible gains”: “[m]ultiple generations of Burmese living locally and abroad have found linkages to each other as blogging became increasingly recognized as a valuable source of information” (Wang and Nagaraja 13). Indeed, the role of the internet again became evident in direct response to the Arab world’s 2010-11 Jasmine Revolution uprisings: in February 2011 “Burmese activists operating both inside and outside of the country … began a social media campaign against military rule in Burma[, launching] a Facebook page called ‘Just Do It’” (Moe). The junta’s nervous reaction—to expand intelligence services by reviving its National Intelligence Bureau—is indicative of the “fear of revolutionary contagion” apparent among a number of autocratic regimes across Asia, the Middle East and Africa: moves to tighten control have occurred in several countries, most markedly in China (Gershman). Of course, “revolutionary contagion” is an affective phenomenon, an errant block of sensations that serves to unsettle majoritarian subjectivity. Overall, the Burmese situation provides another example of “how the development of cyberactivism can be related to an expansion of the democratic capabilities of social movements” (Alfaro 3). Moreover, as Alfaro notes, the practices of citizen journalism via internet technology take place at the level of everyday life, which is to say “at a distance from the sphere of official politics” (Alfaro 26). This distance is enabling of Deleuze-Guattarian difference in the form of minoritarian-becomings, and in the sense of allowing “[t]he formation of innovative forms of dialogue … and eventually, a reinvention of democracy” (Guattari, SS 299). And the “collective sensibility and intelligence” (Guattari, GR 263) that such new communicational technologies activate are ethico-aesthetically constituted modes of thought that may be increasingly difficult to put down, as Gershman affirms:
Autocratic regimes will employ all means at their disposal to prevent the use of the internet by their opponents. But they cannot change the underlying reality, which is that there is a sharpening contradiction between closed and repressive states and increasingly networked, informed and awakened populations, which is in itself creating a revolutionary crisis of the political order. Indeed, though not considered here, it would be worthwhile to investigate the part played by ICTs in the 2010 release of high profile, long term, pro-democracy political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi, and in her subsequent election to the Burmese parliament.

The “revolutionary crisis” referred to in the above quotation from Gershman is one way of conceptualising the Jasmine uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, referred to briefly earlier. To finish this section we address these countries’ uprisings more specifically, especially since these uprisings actually resulted in the ejection of longstanding autocratic regimes. The role of digital activism in these revolutions has, again, been broadly debated, but it is safe to say that most commentators think it irrefutable that the internet and mobile devices have played a highly consequential part (Coll). The Tunisian insurgence commenced in December 2010 when a fruit and vegetable seller, after being harassed by police for not having an appropriate merchant’s permit, set himself alight, and subsequently died, in front of his local government headquarters (“Tunisian”). This event sparked protests in the town, and videos of the protests and violence towards protestors were quickly posted on the internet—onto Facebook by private citizens such as the man’s cousin (Oram), and onto the Tunisian blog Nawaat.org (Charlton) by activists. The images soon spread extensively, and demonstrations against widespread unemployment and corruption broke out across Tunisia; protests were so potent that by 14th January 2011 long-term dictatorial President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali had surrendered power and fled the country (Levinson). The Tunisian events, then, led to “the first successful popular uprising in the Arab world” (Walt), a result which would not be without repercussions in the region. As journalist Alexis Levinson observes, the Tunisian uprising “seemed to spread to Egypt like contagion,” with large-scale protests commencing in that country on 25th January 2011. Again, ICTs were pivotal: one of the key instruments in the Egyptian protests was a Facebook page honouring an Egyptian businessman, Khaled Said, who had been beaten to death by police in June 2010 (Quinn). The web page “became a rallying point for a campaign against police brutality” (“Profile”), and the activist-organiser of the Facebook page, Egyptian Google executive Wael Ghonim, “emerged as a leader of the Egyptian revolution as it metastasised and forced President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation of February 11” (Coll). The internet’s function is described by Ghonim: “[w]e would post a video on Facebook and it would be shared by 50,000 people on their walls in hours” (Sifry). In Micah L. Sifry’s explanation, “without the relatively free arena of online social networking sites and tools like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, young Egyptians like Ghonim could not have built
the resilient and creative force that finally toppled Hosni Mubarak” (Sifry). Even when the Egyptian government took the rare and extreme step (as in Burma) of shutting down the internet, connectivity was not lost and the revolution proceeded: hackers came up with several ways to sidestep the censorship (“How”), and protest numbers actually grew—“many of the [Egyptian] people who wanted to follow events remotely decided to go to [the main protest site] Tahrir Square, just to keep their connection with the historic events of the day” (Oram). While Wael Ghonim may have been something of a figurehead, his status as a leader, from a Deleuze-Guattarian perspective, is improbable. As Hardt and Negri affirm, the organisation of the revolts was in the mode of “a horizontal network that has no single, central leader” (“Arabs”). This network structure is, for them, the very strength of the becoming-revolutionary process, with social network tools such as Facebook and Twitter being simply “modes of expression of an intelligent population capable of using the instruments at hand to organise autonomously” (“Arabs”). For Hardt and Negri, the Arab revolts are an experiment in freedom and democracy—an aesthetically invented experiment, in Guattari’s terms—aimed toward a new form of democracy that is adequate to the “forms of expression” and “experiences of network relations” that make up contemporary life (“Arabs”). Moreover, to the extent that this is an ethical experiment calling for the management of natural resources, social production, and economic governance, it involves “a threshold through which neoliberalism cannot pass and capitalism is put into question” (Hardt and Negri, “Arabs”). In Guattari’s parlance, this is a “refoundation of politics” passing through “the aesthetic and analytical dimensions implied in the three ecologies—the environment, the socius and the psyche” (C 20). Such a politics of experimentation is governed by a logic different to that of discursivity or signification: Guattari’s aesthetically composing “eco-logic, ... concerned only with the movement and intensity of evolutive processes” (TE 30). As an “ecological praxis,” such revolts express “subsets that have broken out of their totalising frame and have begun to work on their own account, overcoming their referential sets and manifesting themselves as their own existential indices, processual lines of flight” (Guattari, TE 30). Again, these lines of flight commence as intensities, as the blocks of affects that course through revolutionary moments, aesthetically composing new forms of subjectivity. Such revolutionary moments do not relate to the history or future of Revolutions, but to the notion of revolution as immanent and libertarian, as connecting up with “what is real here and now,” and “relaunching new struggles whenever the earlier one is betrayed” (D+G, WP 100).

There are, certainly, those who challenge the role of the internet in regard to its contribution to such becoming-revolutionary impulses. Popular writer Malcolm Gladwell, for instance, maintains that the internet fosters weak social ties, when only strong ties will lead to revolutions, while Evgeny Morozov argues that “cyber-utopians” see the internet as inherently democratic when authoritarian regimes are also adept at using the it for their own repressive
purposes. The internet (and its related technologies), however, is but one element in a processual assemblage, a revolution-making assemblage in this instance. It is a powerful component in this machinic becoming, and the fact that it may also present opportunities for surveillance and censorship does not preclude it from being a highly potent mechanism in processes undoing “normal” political landscapes. Indeed, as Tom Glaisyer points out, “to date, digital activism has not been completely eliminated in any state where it has been able to gain a foothold” (97). As part of an overall network structuration, or autopoeitic machinic assemblage, that also includes such “old” revolutionary methods as demonstrations, rallies and in-person meetings, it may help provide unprecedented becoming-revolutionary potential. And although capital R “Revolutions” may fail in the face of violent authoritarianism and savage repression, the micropolitical, minoritarian potentials of becoming-revolutionary will not, especially with the self-constructing movements of such networked assemblages. As Hardt and Negri note, “what will not die are the political demands and desires that have been unleashed, the expressions of an intelligent young generation for a different life in which they can put their capacities to use” (“Arabs”). These expressions open the way for D+G’s called-for “new earth and people that do not yet exist” (WP 108).

**Libertarian cyberculture 2: becoming-democratic**

In considering the becoming-revolutionary potential of digital activism as a pathway toward D+G’s new earth and people, let us remember Patton’s statement regarding the relationship between becoming-revolutionary and becoming-democratic: becoming-revolutionary, he explains, “is modulated by the call for resistance to existing forms of democracy” (*Deleuzian* 154). It is now worth revisiting this related concept of becoming-democratic, to the extent that there is also promise that ICTS might play a role, by enabling new and creative implementations of democratic processes and forms. There are several perspectives from which to view the potential of digital networks in relation to the activation of a “more democratic” or more pure form of democracy. To begin with, although D+G tell us that this new “people and earth will not be found in our [existing] democracies” (*WP* 108), there may be some hope that the internet can aid the development and improvement of democracy within the current system. To this end, as Glaisyer indicates, digital activism can play a strong role in electoral politics, in terms of the election of governments, as well as in “policy formation, execution, and monitoring” (90). With respect to the election of governments, the 2008 Barack Obama US presidential campaign is perhaps the most notable instance to date of the ways in which the internet can influence democratic politics; as Ariana Huffington puts it, “[w]ere it not for the internet, Barack Obama would not be president[, nor even] the nominee” (qtd. in Miller). Obama used the internet in unprecedented ways to reach and mobilise countless grassroots supporters, leading some to conclude that “[b]y using interactive Web 2.0
tools, Mr Obama’s campaign changed the way politicians organise supporters, advertise to voters, defend against attacks and communicate with constituents” (Miller). This is not at all to argue that Obama has, by using the internet, brought about a more pure democracy; however, his example demonstrates that there is great potential for any new vision of democracy to reach innumerable voters by way of internet technology. In terms of change within the current system, however, perhaps of more interest is “the opening of government to the digital activist” (Glaisyer 92). Glaisyer outlines several recent initiatives in the United States, United Kingdom, South America and Africa whereby governments have become more transparent and accountable due to their utilisation of digital technology to open their data and processes to the public. Indeed, the Obama administration, in one of its first initiatives, introduced an extensive scheme to compel its governmental agencies and departments to become “more transparent, publicly accessible, and collaborative than they [had] historically been” (Ginsberg 1). One of the primary edicts of this Open Government Initiative was to direct key agencies “to post ‘high-value’ data-sets to Data.gov, a national Web portal, in formats that allow the public to download, search and reuse the information without restriction” (Vogel). While this initiative may well have been politically motivated—a move to reverse his predecessor George W. Bush’s predilection for secrecy (Coglianese 529-30)—some commentators regard this Obama directive as a step towards greater democratisation of government. Government analyst Wendy Ginsberg, for instance, concludes that the initiative “attempts to create new spaces for the public to communicate and affect federal government” (1). And because the directive instructs officials to reply to all citizens’ comments, there is the prospect that public ideas may be incorporated into policy (Ginsberg 1). As Glaisyer notes, not everyone may have the time or inclination to analyse government data, but the important fact is that it is available for such analysis (93). In terms of the British experience, Andy Williamson observes that democracy research organisation the Hansard Society’s Digital Dialogues project (a three year evaluation in the mid-2000s of numerous online government programmes designed to engage with citizens) reaches the significant finding that there are important benefits “when citizens and governments do talk online[, and that] there is a need for a more sustained public deliberation with government” (307). Initiatives in other parts of the world include Vota Intelligente in Chile, which “aims to use technology to provide Chilean citizens with more information about their elected officials” (Sasaki), and Mzalendo in Kenya, a parliament watch project that strives to demand accountability from the Kenyan parliament (Glaisyer 95).

Accountability, transparency and negotiatory initiatives such as those outlined above may, through digital means, go some way toward bringing about more democratic representation by elected governments. However, as we have noted, D+G are more interested in aspects of becoming-democratic that have not yet been seen, which is to say that are outside the
capitalistic, representative system Western citizens are bound by. Indeed, Ismael Peña-López argues that there is still a “democracy gap” between citizens and capitalist-framed governance, since while citizens may be more empowered by ICTs, it is only within this same system (5-7). The question, then, is do ICTs admit any forms of becoming-democratic that might present pathways to the outside of current capital-defined Western democracy? As a starting point, we can consider the tension between an open government’s purported transparency and the business of secrecy/security. Returning to the US context, let us revisit Glaisyer’s comment that whether or not government data is analysed by the public, it is important that this data be openly available. But, in a “neo-liberal soci[ty] of security” (Lazzarato, “Aesthetic” 173), which data is the crucial question. While Obama’s open government policy may have offered the prospect of a more democratic turn in governance, it seems that, overall, this has not eventuated. In March 2010, long-time Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigator and open government advocate David Sobel testified to the US Government Reform Committee that “[w]hile the President and other top officials have said the right things and attempted to convey the right message, implementation of their stated objectives [regarding openness] remains unfulfilled,” and, furthermore, that “bureaucratic resistance to transparency in general” persists (“Administration” 2). Sobel points to a number of instances in which the Obama government has been even “less transparent than many of its predecessors” (“Administration” 8). While it may have opened some of its data and processes to the public (such as disclosing the names of official White House visitors), the administration refuses to reverse a key George W. Bush ruling that exempts the White House Office of Administration from FOIA—even though administrations prior to Bush had complied with FOIA requests (Sobel, “Urge” 32). Such withholding of information leads Sobel to conclude that Obama’s “rhetoric of transparency” has not become reality, and that a culture of secrecy remains ingrained in many government agencies (“Administration” 10, 6). In Sobel’s view, the stifling of significant official information is, in fact, “counter-productive,” to the extent that it “invites and encourages unauthorised leaks” (“Urge” 30, 31). Indeed, in May 2011, the US National Public Radio network reported an aggressive and broad crackdown on leaks of government secrets: evidently, “[n]ational security experts say they can’t remember a time when the Justice Department has pursued so many cases” against leakers (C. Johnson). Foremost amongst these cases, of course, is the one against Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks. Because Wikileaks holds particular interest for any exploration of the potentialities of becoming-democratic enabled by the internet, we explore the case in some detail.

Wikileaks is a not-for-profit media website whose stated purpose is to uphold Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”
In other words, Wikileaks is based on “the rights of human beings to communicate freely with each other without the intervention of governments,” and it is particularly focused on exposing the secret workings of authoritarian governments—which also include “the increasingly authoritarian tendencies seen in the recent trajectory of Western democracies, and the authoritarian nature of contemporary business corporations” (Manne). The Wikileaks website operates as an outlet for anonymous whistleblowers (protected by several layers of internet security) who wish to leak sensitive material, and it publishes this material without censorship or editing, but with an accompanying “news” story. As such, Wikileaks seeks to offer a “new model of journalism” based on the notion that publishing original documents improves the transparency and scrutiny of leading institutions, with this scrutiny leading to “reduced corruption and stronger democracies in all society’s institutions, including government, corporations and other organisations” (WikiLeaks). From its first year, 2007, to mid-2011, Wikileaks had published 20,000 files of information, including “documents alleging corruption by the family of Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, secret Church of Scientology manuals[,] and an operations manual from the US detention centre at Guantánamo Bay revealing a determination to hide prisoners from the International Committee for the Red Cross” (Calabresi). It also exposed numerous other secrecy issues from around the world, such as evidence of “tax avoidance by the largest Swiss bank, Julius Baer; an oil spill in Peru; a nuclear accident in Iran and toxic chemical dumping by the trafigura corporation off the Ivory Coast” (Manne). Many of these Wikileaks stories achieved minimal attention in a worldwide context, but, in 2010, Wikileaks’ profile soared: Wikileaks and its Australian founder, Julian Assange, attained international fame/infamy for, first, releasing Collateral Murder, “a US video shot in 2007 from an Apache helicopter, showing the unprovoked killing of a dozen Iraqi civilians, including two Reuters news staff,” then publishing the War Diaries—“hundreds of thousands of secret reports from 2004 through 2009 from US soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq” (Hanley). Then, in late 2010, Wikileaks gained the full attention of the US government with Cablegate, its staggered release of over 250,000 US State Department cables—“the largest unauthor[is]ed release of contemporary classified information in history” (Calabresi). Its aim was to “give people around the world an unprecedented insight into the US Government’s foreign activities” (“What”), a goal it certainly achieved. Several of the leaked memos were a cause of embarrassment to US and foreign leaders, with US officials’ comments about other leaders proving revealing: “Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is compared to Adolf Hitler, while Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev fare slightly better as ‘Batman and Robin’ respectively[,] Italy’s scandal-plagued Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi [is] called ‘reckless, vain and ineffective as a modern European leader,’ while French President Nicolas Sarkozy is ‘an emperor with no clothes’” (Wong). While such personality attacks were largely “shrugged off” by the targeted leaders (“Wikileaks Documents”), it is perhaps still too soon to understand the
full effects of the more substantial disclosures of Cablegate. Here is a small sample of the revelations: several Middle Eastern nations, most notably Saudi Arabia, have urged the US to bring force against Iran to disarm its nuclear capacities; Iran may have been supplied with missiles by North Korea; for several years the US has been trying, unsuccessfully, to remove uranium from a Pakistani reactor in order to circumvent nuclear arms development; China has launched cyberattacks against Google, US interests and the Dalai Lama; the US Secretary of State directed diplomats to secretly gather identifying information, such as credit card numbers, from United Nations leaders; and the US offered cash and inducements to other nations to take Guantanamo Bay prisoners in order to bring about an accelerated emptying of the detention centre (“Wikileaks’ ‘Cablegate’”). The US government’s immediate reactions to this enormous breach of secrecy were fierce: the White House condemned it as “a life-threatening ‘criminal’ act”; Hillary Clinton declared it an “attack on the international community”; congressman Peter King proclaimed it “an act of terrorism”; Sarah Palin demanded that Julian Assange “be hunted down as an ‘an anti-American operative with blood on his hands’”; and “former presidential candidate Mike Huckabee ... demanded that whoever leaked the files should be executed for treason” (Milne). However, in an effects analysis of Wikileaks in March 2011, Mark Fenster notes that while initial government reaction was extreme in predicting dire consequences for US diplomacy and national security, “open sources [now] provide no clear evidence that Wikileaks caused significant damage to the Departments of Defense and State” (51). Nevertheless, in May 2011, the US grand jury commenced a hearing to determine what charges could be brought against Assange (espionage being the preferred indictment), and in February 2012 it was reported that US prosecutors had, in fact, drawn up a “secret indictment” against Assange twelve months earlier (Dorling). At the time of writing this thesis, Assange also faces possible extradition from the UK to Sweden on controversial sexual assault charges (see McVeigh and Townsend), a move that could smooth the way for his Wikileaks-based extradition to the US to face whatever retribution is in store for him. Meanwhile Bradley Manning, the US soldier who actually leaked the state secrets, is undergoing court martial and possibly faces the death penalty (E. Pilkington, “Wikileaks”; E. Pilkington, “Bradley”).

Calls for prosecution and punishment are not, however, the only reactions to Wikileaks: many others have had a quite different response. In December 2010 and January 2011, for instance, support rallies for Assange and Wikileaks took place across Australia, as well as in cities in the US, UK, Canada and Europe (“Upcoming”). A Sydney rally was addressed by prominent Australian broadcaster Phillip Adams, who pledged “unswerving support” for the project: “Democracy is being democratised, tyrannies exposed and millions who’ve been fed bullshit for generations are now able to confirm their suspicions,” he told the crowd. The Australian Walkley Foundation, comprising key figures in the Australian media, wrote to Australian
Prime Minister Julia Gillard in support of Wikileaks and Assange (Walkleys), and an open letter addressed to Gillard urging her to support Assange was signed by linguist/activist Noam Chomsky as well as by dozens of prominent Australians, including Senator Bob Brown, author Helen Garner and philosopher Peter Singer (Sparrow and O’Shea). In February 2010, Sydney University’s Sydney Peace Foundation awarded Assange its rarely bestowed Gold Medal, for the “seismic effect” Wikileaks has had on “freedom of expression” and the “world order” (Aikman). Moreover, Assange and Manning were nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in 2011, and Manning again in 2012. While Assange’s model of “massive, vigilante disclosure” (Fenster 50) may be largely a function of his own “cyberpunk,” anarchist, revolutionary politics (see Manne for a full discussion of Assange’s political influences), there’s no question that Wikileaks has generated enormous debate about the nature of democracy. A democratising of democracy, as Phillip Adams sees it. A becoming-democracy, D+G would call it. The pure event of democracy is reached into by the event of Wikileaks, calling forth other actualisations of the concept. Wikileaks effects a convergence with the virtual and a debating here and now, at this time, of how democracy might otherwise be manifested. As the New Statesman reports, “[t]he presumption that governments can conduct their business with one another in secret, away from the prying eyes of the public, died when the leaks started to emerge on 28 November” (C. Ross). The gap between citizens and state narrows, and the potentialities of a fuller notion of democracy appear before us. As Guardian journalist Seumas Milne puts it, “[b]y making available Washington’s own account of its international dealings Wikileaks has opened some of the institutions of global power to scrutiny and performed a democratic service in the process.” And, it would seem, there is some spillover from Wikileaks’ democratic resonances into the field of becoming-revolutionary, specifically in relation to the Tunisian situation. As Fenster explains, WikiLeaks cables concerning Tunisia drew attention to President Ben Ali’s “system without checks” in a government whose kleptomania apparently began with the first family. The Tunisia-related cables were in turn made available to Tunisians via a locally produced website, TuniLeaks” (48). Although protestors in Tunisia were well aware of the regime’s corruption before Wikileaks/Tunileaks, the leaked cables had profound effects for both revolution and democracy:

[T]he cables’ influence may have come from informing Tunisians of others’ perceptions of and knowledge about their corrupt government—information that enlightened and further energised protestors about the righteousness and likely success of their cause. If, as has been widely reported, the Tunisian revolt in turn inspired other popular uprisings in the region, and WikiLeaks in fact played some role in inspiring the Tunisian protestors, then the disclosures had quite significant direct and indirect effects, to whatever small degree, in setting potentially democratic change in motion. (Fenster 47-49)
Through Wikileaks, then, becoming-democratic interweaves with becoming-revolutionary, bringing together two concepts that, as they develop in the historical present, make D+G’s new earth and people more accessible. Beyond Tunisia, journalist John Pilger claims that Wikileaks activates another mobilisation of becoming-revolutionary and becoming-democracy, in the domain of journalism and the media. In an interview dealing with his documentary “The War You Don’t See,” which covers the Wikileaks phenomenon, Pilger lambasts the embedded mindset “that only authority can really determine the ‘truth’ of the news” (Collett-White). The achievement of the Wikileaks reports, Pilger states elsewhere, is to “shame the dominant section of journalism, devoted to merely taking down what cynical and malign power tells it. This is state stenography, not journalism” (“Why”). Wikileaks, he maintains, is a kind of journalism “that is telling people how the world works. … It’s not framing it in how governments or other vested interests want us to think about something” (Collett-White). Rather, it gives us the raw story, an approach that, for Pilger, is a “revolution in journalism” (Collett-White). From another perspective, Lovink sees that the “transparency, democracy and openness” promoted by Wikileaks goes some way toward remedying the “glut of dislocatable information” that is a feature of information culture (Networks 185).

Overall, Wikileaks’ dissensual orientation moves well in the direction of Guattari’s postmediatic culture, in several important senses. In the first instance, we can understand Wikileaks as a machinic assemblage, a dynamic “functional ensemble” of various components, that is auto-constructive (Guattari, C 35). Each component is also an articulated, interfacing machine, with these articulations traversing the technological, human, media, code, government, socius and so on. Wikileaks, in Guattari’s terms, might be called a “heterogenetic machinic imbrication” (“Vertigo” 37). From an aesthetic standpoint, such an assemblage is in the process of assembling itself, of experimentally constructing a new machinic object in the world. The human-hacker/leaker function of this assemblage is, firstly, to disrupt a technological system that is based on security, but also to effect a line of dissonance with the authority of that system. Assange’s particular aim, in setting up Wikileaks, was to address the injustices of “modern communications states” through exposing those “conspiratorial interactions among the political elite” that maintain and strengthen “authoritarian power” (Assange 1, 2). As such, he connects to an abstract machine of resistance. From a purely technological perspective, the authoritarian security of computer networks can be disrupted simply because the possibility of hacking is built into the system; as Alexander Galloway notes, computer protocols contain plentiful “exploits,” those “preexisting bugs that are leveraged by the hacker to gain access to a computer” (167). This, he argues, makes protocol “synonymous with possibility,” and hackers “machines for the identification of this possibility” (167, 169). Therefore, at the level of the technological machine, with its inherent susceptibility to disruption, experimentation is enabled and is, therefore, an aesthetic line of flight that can be
followed by any cartographer of resistance. Of course, we know that malicious hackers abound, intent on destruction for its own sake; these are examples of computers being used for inappropriate ends, or when computer use “subtract[s] from thinking” (Guattari, C 36), which also occurs in the self-focused employment of blogs and social media. Wikileaks, however, with its programme of challenging the tenets of contemporary power, exemplifies Guattari’s more productive computer-linked form of thought: “[t]he forms of thought assisted by computer are mutant, relating to other … Universes of reference” (C 36). The techniques of the computer-thought in Wikileaks are “the strictly aesthetic techniques of rupture and suture. Something is detached and starts to work for itself” (Guattari, C 132). In this case, information is detached from the information-controlling machine of the capitalist state, and placed into a broader domain of flow “in order to produce a situation, in order to organise as resistance” (Lazzarato, “Aesthetic” 182). This “situation” is experienced, fundamentally, by way of affects that “go beyond the limits maintained by individual persons and identities” (Lazzarato, “Aesthetic” 177). The reactions of the US government, media, and Wikileaks supporters are not conveyed through perfectly formulated linguistic phrasing, but, rather, affectively; Lazzarato explains: “[t]he ‘message’ is not passed on by means of a linguistic series, but rather through the body, postures, noises and images, gestures [and] intensities” (“Aesthetic” 177). These intensities carry the force of the situation, before it can be reformulated as language or knowledge (Lazzarato, “Aesthetic” 179). Thus, the aesthetic paradigm that underpins Wikileaks “invites us to shift our point of view, moving it to the widening interval between the pathic and the discursive, between a molar and a molecular system of signs” (Lazzarato, “Aesthetic” 179). Aesthetic practices such as these are always risky, according to Guattari. The risks include “the risk of madness, the risk of nonsense, the risk of a break with the dominant subjectifications, with others, such as they are organised” (“V” 34). The risk of incarceration, too, in the case of Wikileaks’ Assange and Bradley. But the process of auto-constructing subjectivity is a complex one, involving “praxial crossroads” and “ethical choice,” as Guattari tells us:

This ethical choice of the always possible reimmersion in questions like “what am I doing here?” “what am I doing right here?” “do I have a responsibility for what I am at the moment?”, but also, for what will come afterwards, not just for me but for the other, for the entirety of universes of sense that are concerned? (“V” 32)

To take on such questions, as we are arguing Wikileaks does, is to enter thought aesthetically, from the vector of constructing other ways of being in the world, other ways of be(com)-ing democratic, of finding more life-enhancing ways to live.

Wikileaks is but one example of how internet technology can, in an aesthetic paradigm, further the development of becoming-democracy. We also acknowledge that the related, wider movement of citizen journalism in general is a more egalitarian means for us to learn
what is happening in the world—to be affected by it so that it might draw us into thought. As internet researcher Axel Bruns points out, the phenomenon of citizen journalism has generated considerable research over the past few years, with the relatively recent emergence of news blogs and citizen journalism websites prompting him to coin the term “produsage”; produsage describes the “hybrid producer/user” character of the internet’s media possibilities—a situation Bruns describes as more equitable than the conventional top-down news dissemination model (“Citizen”; “News). There are many instances of citizen journalism, in the form of blogs and collaborative news networks (wikis), which strategically bypass corporate mass media avenues to create oppositional news mechanisms. Mark Glaser explains the phenomenon:

The idea behind citizen journalism is that people without professional journalism training can use the tools of modern technology and the global distribution of the internet to create, augment or fact-check media on their own or in collaboration with others. For example, you might write about a city council meeting on your blog or in an online forum. Or you could fact-check a newspaper article from the mainstream media and point out factual errors or bias on your blog. Or you might snap a digital photo of a newsworthy event happening in your town and post it online. Or you might videotape a similar event and post it on a site such as YouTube. ... As Glaser notes, one early example of citizen journalism was Iraqi blogger “Salam Pax,” who gave “stunningly detailed early accounts of the [Iraq] war.” Another key example is the group blog http://tsunamihelp.blogspot.com, developed in response to the major tsunami that affected several countries in Southeast Asia in 2004. Originally created by a small group of bloggers in India, this site comprised “entries from people on the ground who could report what they saw happening, of information on who needed help, [and] how best to [provide that] help” (Wu 17). When traditional media had not yet reached the area, and governments and aid agencies were still getting organised, those who wanted information about loved ones or who wanted to help in some way had access to pivotal information, in real time, straight from the source (Wu). So successful was the blog that, within a week, it became one of the top ten humanitarian websites in the world (Wu 17). A third example of a seminal citizen journalism site is the Indymedia (“Independent Media”) network, whose genesis occurred during the 1999 anti-World Trade Organisation protests in Seattle (the “Battle of Seattle.” These protests, planned and organised largely via the internet, railed against “the excesses of corporate capitalism,” while also advocating “democrati[s]ation” and “social justice” (Kahn and Kellner 305, 306). Indymedia emerged as a site where activists and citizen journalists could upload their on-the-spot “text, audio, and video files” as the protests occurred (Juris 270). Before long, as Jeffrey Juris notes, “the network quickly expanded on a global scale” to numerous world cities (270). These cities received “web portals in which [they could] document, organise and proliferate information that would not otherwise be readily available
through the major media” (Kahn and Kellner 306). Today, the network continues to operate as a broad series of locally-operated sites, whose overall *modus operandi* is as follows: “Indymedia is a collective of grassroots media-makers providing a platform for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate coverage of struggles and movements working for social, environmental and economic justice” (“About Indymedia”). As Richard Kahn and Douglas Kellner point out, since the development of *Indymedia*, “[c]ountless other organi[s]ations and sites have developed similar Web sites and networks ..., turning the internet from a valuable tool in the anti-globali[s]ation struggle into the driving engine for a new global cultural vision” (306).

While mainstream media organisations are hierarchically structured and based on such values as productivity, profitability and editorial stringency, citizen journalist sites are egalitarian, informal and subjective (Lasica). Their decentralised, consensus-based, horizontal operation correlate such ventures with a kind of “direct democracy” (Juris 270-71) not possible in mainstream media. Moreover, such alternative agencies can be said to forge real political power at grassroots level, due to “the connections [they make] between local, amateur news gatherers,” connections that would not occur under “normal, centralised, broadcast news coverage” (Sutton and Martin-Jones 34). These connections demonstrate the “pragmatics of assemblage and composition” at the heart of an aesthetic construction of life (Stengers, “Experimenting” 52). The political power unleashed is the force of becoming-democracy, a new way of being democratic, a sociopolitical machine produced by a resistant, collective subjectivity. And while this citizen journalism offers alternative views to the corporate and political mainstream on “high-stakes, global-impact politics,” it also provides penetrative coverage of content disregarded by mainstream media (Bruns, “News”). For example, Bruns cites the rise of “a variety of hyperlocal citizen journalism projects, covering neighbourhood news[,] which may be of interest only to strictly limited local communities” (“News”). For traditional media there is little economic sense in focusing journalistic resources on the hyperlocal, which may only occasionally produce stories of broad interest (Bruns, “News). However, the availability of hyperlocal as well as global stories means that there is a greater depth and breadth of information accessible, giving citizens a kind of independence from the gatekeeping of mainstream media and other related social forces (Tewksbury and Rittenberg 197). Such elements of internet journalism suggest there is an evolving “*democrati*[s]ation of the creation, dissemination, and consumption of news and information” (Tewksbury and Rittenberg 197). But more than that, sharing the journalistic load amongst on-the-ground contributors allows non-profit-driven attention to be paid to a huge array of community-based, alternative and marginalised issues, which in turn allows for a Guattarian development of “subjective resingularisation,” or the configuration of rare and atypical subjectivities (C 97). Not only does this admit everyday affect into the aesthetics of subject-creation, but also it is
also a playing out of Guattari’s hope for capitalist societies to advance to a post-media age, “in which the media will be reappropriated by a multitude of subject-groups capable of directing its resingularisation” (TE 40). This becoming-democracy, with its new, accompanying subjectivities, advanced by an aesthetically constructed, alternative journalism, ethologically develops through open, inclusive and minoritarian practices. Such practices apprehend “a force that expresses a change in the manner of feeling, in the affects, in existence,” before this becomes captured by the majoritarian languages of mainstream media (Lazzarato, “Aesthetic” 180).

Libertarian-cyberculture 3: collective thought

As Simon O’Sullivan affirms, “the emergence of the Web is not without its problems, not least in its utilisation for profit and control” (Art 13). In spite of these “moments of capture,” though, “the Web remains a space of creativity, invention and expression. It allows for a certain amount of individual freedom, or simply self-organisation” (O’Sullivan, Art 13). In O’Sullivan’s view, another worthwhile example with regard to the self-organisation (or autopoeitic subjectivity) that the internet enables is the practice of open source software production (Art 13). Bruns agrees, citing the development of open source software as similar in some ways to the community-based model of “open news,” as discussed above (“News”). Open source software development involves the creation and sharing of “quality software for applications ... deemed to be financially unviable by the mainstream industry” (“News”). While the term “open source” does refer to a range of often complex and powerful software systems (such as operating system Linux and web server Apache), it more points to a development methodology. The key methodology is that “the core code of such software can be easily studied by other programmers and improved upon—the only proviso being that such improvements must also be revealed publicly and distributed freely in a process that encourages continual innovation” (N. Newman). There are several overlaps between open source and the open news model as outlined above—for instance, the removal of hierarchical editorial control, the acceptance of content as essentially unfinished, and the overall commitment to collaborative principles (Bruns, “From Reader” 123). In terms of genealogy, however, open news/publishing is, in fact, underpinned by the open source movement, since this is where both its technical and philosophical foundations are located (Meikle 105, 108). Therefore, to further explore Guattari’s idea that “technical” or digital machines are potentially also “machines of thought, sensation and consultation” (C 97), we now investigate the case of open source, seeing whether we can map some aesthetic lines through a kind of “collective thought.” First, though, we survey this movement somewhat, so as to outline the nuances of “Free” and “Open Source” software.
Prior to the 1970s, when computers were used primarily for research purposes, a collaborative and non-proprietary model constituted software development, meaning that source code was available to be freely used by any interested parties (C. May, 369; Schütz 85). With the taking up of computers by commercial enterprises, software development became more proprietary-based, with companies seeking to “own” code as a means of profiting from it (C. May 369). It was in resistance to the closed nature of this ownership model that the open source programme first arose, beginning in the early 1980s with Richard Stallman’s “Free Software Foundation” (Lawton). Graham Lawton explains Stallman’s motivation: “Stallman’s beef was with commercial companies that smothered their software with patents and copyrights and kept the source code ... a closely guarded secret. Stallman saw this as damaging. It generated poor-quality, bug-ridden software. And worse, it choked off the free flow of ideas.” Indeed, rather than focusing on the practical issues of how to improve software, Stallman’s movement specifically stands for “users’ essential freedoms: the freedom to run [open source software], to study and change it, and to redistribute copies with or without changes” (Stallman 31). Stallman sees Free Software as equating to “freedom in general”: software freedoms are crucial, “not just for the individual user’s sake, but because they promote social solidarity—that is, sharing and cooperation” (31). As an alternative to the individualistic and market-based concept of copyright, Stallman developed the GNU General Public License, also known as “copyleft,” which guarantees the freedom of a program to be changed, as well as the ongoing freedom of any subsequent versions (C. May 369-70). As Lovink points out, this “locks software into a form of communal ownership” (My First 195). Stallman’s GNU Project worked on developing, from scratch, a free software operating system (Schütz 85), but when another programmer, Linus Torvalds, completed this project in the early 1990s and named it Linux, a division emerged in the movement (Lovink, My First 195-96). This division was, in a sense, formalised in 1998 when free software developer Eric Raymond initiated the term (and notion) of Open Source—a model that allowed free software to also be open to the possibility of commercial profiteering (Lovink, My First 195). Christopher Kelty makes clear the agenda of Raymond’s Open Source:

Prior to 1998, Free Software referred either to the Free Software Foundation (and the watchful, micromanaging eye of Stallman) or to one of thousands of different commercial, avocational, or university-research projects, processes, licenses, and ideologies that had a variety of names: sourceware, freeware, shareware, open software, public domain software, and so on. The term Open Source, by contrast, sought to encompass them all in one movement. (99)

Stallman’s Free Software remains devoted to an ethic of overall freedom, which means that any business-driven restrictions are not tolerated, while Raymond’s Open Source model allows that while the original source code might remain free, Open Source companies are able to make a profit from such services/products as regular upgrades, installation software, technical
support and so on (Terranova, *Network* 92). Further, with Open Source, commercial users of original free code may impose copyright restrictions on their own redeveloped versions. Thus, a company such as Microsoft, which is non-Open Source, utilises innovations drawn from Open Source browsers such as Firefox, and IBM mixes Open Source and proprietary information (Samuelson). As Steven Weber notes, though, while Open Source is “a productive movement ultimately linked to the mainstream economy,” it is, overall, still working out exactly “how it relates to commerce and the capitalist economy that embeds it” (Weber 7, 15).

Setting aside for a moment the question of capitalism’s reach, some theorists prefer to focus more on the principle of “open source” (rather than “Open Source”). As Weber explains, “[t]he essence of open source is not the software. It is the process by which the software is created” (56). Christopher May puts it this way: “[w]hile there are philosophical differences between the ‘free software’ and ‘open source’ software’ movements, both are based on what I term a ‘logic of openness’” (370). The newer terms FOSS (free/open source software) or FLOSS (free/libre/open source software) perhaps better express this commitment to a logic or principle of openness (C. May 370; Schütz 89)—one that attempts to see beyond issues of moralisation or commercialisation. The stance of this thesis is that “open source” offers a model or methodology that can access a way of thinking and a politics outside of capital; as Lovink puts it, we can the term “primarily as a metaphor” (*My First* 196). In endorsement of this model/principle of openness, we adopt the lower case term “open source.”

Returning to the question of capitalism’s involvement in this movement, though, we first acknowledge cultural theorist Olga Goriunova’s refutation that open source is still working out how it relates to capitalism; instead, she claims that the economic success of the “FLOSS development model” has led to it being regarded as a supreme business model (“Towards”). For Goriunova, open source alone will not provide the “ultimate revolutionary technique ... to defeat capitalism” since FLOSS is very much a capitalist target (“Towards”). To this end, it is “unable to provide a model of a better constitution of ... society” (Goriunova, “Towards”).

Terranova, in her book *Network Culture*, goes even further, when she addresses the question of open source from an Italian Marxist autonomist viewpoint. From this perspective, Terranova dismisses the possibility that any kind of work can take place outside of capitalism—the “free labour” of open source processes included. She writes: “the open-source question demonstrates the overreliance of the digital economy as such on free labour, free both in the sense of ‘not financially rewarded’ and of ‘willingly given’” (*Network* 93-94). This reliance “is part of larger mechanisms of capitalist extraction of value which are fundamental to late capitalism as a whole” (Terranova, *Network* 94). By this she means that “such processes are not created outside capital and then reappropriated by capital, but are the results of a complex history where the relation between labour and capital are mutually constitutive” (*Network* 94). In other words, for Terranova, it is “technically impossible” to disconnect the free labour that
underlies open source from late capitalism, since this free labour is immanent to the advanced capitalist economy (Terranova, *Network* 94). The “collective intelligence” at work in networked processes, she maintains, is, in fact, a manifestation of the autonomists’ notion of the “general intellect” or “mass intellectuality”—the ensemble of living labour and machines articulating productive knowledge (*Network* 86-88). Although Goriunova also believes that open source is tied to capital, she actually takes issue with Terranova’s analysis, regarding it as too pessimistic: for her, Terranova’s argument does not allow for any creative practice to be emancipatory—that is, “truly creative”—under late capitalism (“Towards”). Goriunova asks:

If the development of capitalism is a monolithic process, and experiments in digital production were always born within capitalist systems with no potential for liberation, even unrealised, if no contradictions and no ruptures, no potentials and struggles, no excess, no gaps, no “liberating” in “free[,]” then what kind of action and practice is possible today? (“Towards”)

Indeed, Goriunova contends that the very process of creativity is “undervalued” in autonomist theory, since, for her, it is this very process that enables an escape from the logic of capital (“Towards”). Creativity in the digital world, according to Goriunova, is an unpredictable, dynamic, explosive process that occurs at an intersection between humans, technology and network systems. Goriunova draws on Braidotti, who in turn draws on Jacques Lacan, to theorise that the explosive process of creativity is “essentially excessive,” to the extent that it creates something that is driven neither by need nor possession; it is neither functional, nor utilitarian (“Towards). The “self-unfolding explosion of creativity ... spreads out an extra space, a dimension where construction of value is enabled within a different logic” (Goriunova, (“Towards”). Rather than being pre-subsumed, Goriunova holds that “[c]apital needs to keep creativity free in order to survive,” and creativity remains free due to its essential excessivity—its “existence in ruptures, in events, in intensification, in uncontrolled catastrophes” (“Towards). Of course, Goriunova’s assessment of the intensive excesses of creativity pertains to the Deleuze-Guattarian ontology of difference, with its foregrounding of affect.

What we have above, then, are two separate arguments—from Goriunova and Terranova respectively—claiming that the open source model will not offer any escape for thought from capital. However, it is the position of this thesis that each of these writers, in fact, offers a means to think the effectivity of the principle of open source, in terms of its potential for thought. From Goriunova, it is her notion of creativity. If the concept of open source, extrapolated beyond its software programming roots, describes a collaborative, networked, autonomous, free-flowing, experimental process, then surely we may understand Goriunova’s force of creativity to also be one of its fundamental mechanisms. Elsewhere, Goriunova designates creativity as “autocreativity,” in order to characterise it as self-organising, as well as
to conceptualise it “outside of the dominant, capturing, redundancies currently at work” ("Autocreativity" 24). This self-organising/self-generating quality of creativity is also a key feature of the open source development process (Juris 16-17), with “autopoietic [and] autonomous” creativity (Goriunova, “Autocreativity” 25) underlying its generation. In other words, the creativity of open source is not simply reliant on human creativity; rather, it is propelled by “a force of aesthetic desiring production” that plays out dynamically at the juncture between the human and the technical (Goriunova, “Autocreativity” 25). As a “machinic creativity,” autocreativity is “something to be joined in with, discovered, followed and worked with in order to become” (Goriunova, “Autocreativity” 25). Just so, the creativity of a self-generating open source project is a machinic ethology to become conjoined with, which proceeds through its creative flow. To follow Goriunova’s logic, the self-organising process of something coming into being—of an open source project autopoietically and ethologically becoming—will necessarily escape the imperativeness of notions of labour. This concept of autocreativity, therefore, offers a way of conceptualising open source as beyond capital. Returning to Terranova’s argument against a liberating role for open source, it seems that she, too, perhaps unwittingly, offers a contradictory view. In a chapter further on from her “free labour” argument, Terranova pronounces open-source software to be recent example of the intrinsically vital “bottom-up, piecemeal, parallel approach to organisation” of network culture (120). This kind of “spontaneous productivity” involves the decentralised organisation of large numbers of peers interacting with one another with/in technical systems, with the significant result of “an excessive production of cooperation and interaction” (120). This excess may well relate to Goriunova’s notion of the excess of creativity, but Terranova approaches it from a different standpoint. Drawing on the results of “cellular automata” experiments from the field of biological computing, Terranova argues that the self-organising, innovative systems of network culture call forth new techniques of control—a kind of self-modulating “soft control,” which applies a “minimum amount of force”: only managing a system’s initial conditions, and thereafter allowing unpredictability, open-endedness, and incomplete knowledge of the whole (Network 115; 119). This “abstract machine of soft control” takes as its focal point “the productivity of an ascended and leaderless multitude” (123). Here Terranova invokes the idea of the “networked multitude” (Network 135), building on Hardt and Negri’s sense of a multitude as “a multiplicity, a plane of singularities, an open set of relations, which is not homogenous or identical with itself and bears an indistinct, inclusive relation to those outside of it” (Empire 103). Therefore, while the interconnected internet culture is “an industry—and hence a mode of labour” (Terranova, Network 129) that can/will be valorised by capital, it is also potentially a self-organising “networked multitude,” which offers a means of escape. Escape from economic and political capture is possible due to the multitude’s “active power of differentiation,” which brings with it “a potential for transformation and even catastrophe” (Terranova, Network 153-54, 128). Such transformation, differentiation, even
catastrophe amounts to an “excessive value” of life over and above the “logic of exchange and equivalence” (Terranova, Network 129)—the very logic that the principle of open source seeks to escape. Indeed, as Terranova notes, the concept of the multitude defines a kind of “political mode of engagement that is located outside the majoritarian and representative model of modern democracies” (Network 129–30). Just so, open source movements that seek to resist majoritarian mores such as ownership, hierarchical structuration and profit building can be characterised as multitudes on the basis of, amongst other things, their self-modulation, patterns of emergence, and their drive toward a new logic of the political. As we shall see, significant activist movements, movements whom Terranova has characterised in terms of the multitude, have adopted the principle of open source. It seems, then, that her summary statement about the networked multitude can be just as aptly applied to the open source principle: “What this ultimately boils down to is a … common passion giving rise to a distributed movement able to displace the limits and terms within which the political constitution of the future is played out” (Network 156).

Having found a way past some possible objections to the creative and political potentialities of open source, we can now look at some examples of how this principle may apply within an aesthetic paradigm of cultural thought/action. If we are to take open source as a kind of metaphor, as an open and collaborative and intrinsically creative approach to production, we can look beyond computer code to see how open source transfers to other fields. In Lovink’s view, it is not appropriate to partition open source from the “non-technical” side of culture since technology is now inseparable from life overall; therefore, the general principles of open source spread readily to other realms (My First 213). Again, the underlying principle of open source might be summed up as: “a self-determining, collective, politically independent mode of creating very complex … objects that are made public and freely available to everyone” (Kelty x). As Goriunova points out, licences other than the GPL have been developed, from Lawrence Lessig’s Creative Commons (a “legal toolbox” guaranteeing a range of actions), to a variety of Open Content licenses dealing with “music, art, text or any publication, sampling,” and so on (“Towards”). With and without new forms of licences, the fields that have taken up open source methodologies and principles are diverse:

There are free encyclopedias, such as Wikipedia, and “free music”—not that copied from commercial CDs but that offered for free from the start and distributed in line with the GPL principle. There are visual artists who experiment with “copyleft” and open content, using the Creative Commons license and experimenting with the exchange of artworks on sites such as www.opuscommons.net … … Open-source principles are also applied in the hard sciences—think of the fascinating open-source battle with the human genome project. … There are also projects like OpenMedicine,
OpenBiology and OpenScience, all of which fight the scientific publishing houses and their rigid intellectual-property-rights regimes. (Lovink, My First 213)

Therefore, we have open source principles applied to open networks of collaborative knowledge, as well as to the sharing of artworks and scientific research. OpenMedicine and OpenBiology, to expand, are free, open access, peer-reviewed journals committed to disseminating high quality research expediently, with the aims of producing networks of collaboration and resisting expensive monopolist journals; OpenScience is a free, open source scientific software development project seeking to “encourage a collaborative environment in which science can be pursued by anyone who is inspired to discover something new about the natural world” (“About OpenScience”). The sequencing of the human genome also drew upon open source principles when it ultimately “placed all the resulting data into the public domain rather than allow any participant to patent any of the results” (“Open-Source”). Such initiatives promote access to thought for the benefit of a collective subjectivity, while proprietary models serve only a privileged few. In terms of implementing open source methodologies for medical research itself, there are perhaps fewer examples. Recently, however, Australian chemistry researcher Michael Woelfle and colleagues used an open online collaborative approach in order to improve the drug treatment for the “neglected tropical disease,” schistosomiasis (Woelfle et al). Since the pharmaceutical industry has little interest in developing drugs for the poorer countries that are afflicted by tropical diseases, Woelfle and his associates chose an open source methodology—calling for international assistance through a website, networking forum, blogs and news articles. No rewards were offered for contributing research, “other than peer recognition for having solved a problem and contributed to something philanthropically valuable” (Woelfle, Olliaro, and Todd 747). The project was successful, the drug problem resolved, and the researchers concluded that the crucial message from the undertaking was that “the research was accelerated by being open” (Woelfle, Olliaro, and Todd 748). Other advantages of such a project are that the process is entirely transparent, has the potential to be on-going, and is subject to the “most rigorous” peer scrutiny (Woelfle, Olliaro, and Todd 748). The next significant question, for Woelfle and colleagues, is whether or not open source will be utilised for the discovery of completely new drugs (Woelfle, Olliaro, and Todd 748). This would be of benefit in the area of neglected diseases, but also for diseases that affect relatively few people, such as Parkinson’s (“An Open-Source”). It seems that while there has been some discussion about open source drug discovery, to date there has been little concerted effort (Woelfle, Olliaro, and Todd 748). Nevertheless, the collective thought available through open source methods—through mobilising a research-oriented networked multitude—presents tremendous potential for both the creative development of new therapies, and for destabilising the drug monopoly operated by “big pharmaceutical.” To use such a relational, processual methodology would be to engage in D+G’s “minor” or “nomad” science, as mentioned earlier, which is opposed to “royal”
science: an open source means of doing science would be “minor” to the extent that it is “very different from the royal or imperial sciences” (ATP 362). While royal science plots out “a closed space for linear and solid things,” nomad science “operates in an open space throughout which things-flows are distributed” (D+G, ATP 361). To this extent, the minor science of open source is inseparable from the flux, becoming and heterogeneity that is “reality itself” (D+G, ATP 361). It does not proceed by way of “reproduction, deduction, or induction,” but, rather, aesthetically, by way of “the sensible conditions of intuition and construction” (D+G, ATP 372, 373). In this way, it can move toward creating new, perhaps more life-giving perspectives, without falling back on secure but limiting “theoretical foundations,” or the rulings of an established “authority” (Guattari, “TE” 133), such as capital.

Finally, we return to a more sociopolitical domain, in order to explore how open source principles might function in relation to “experimentation with political tactics and forms of organi[s]ation” (Terranova, Network 154). As Terranova points out, the networked multitude empowers “a political and cultural milieu that can no longer be subsumed … under a majority”; at the same time, it works to develop “informational tactics able to counteract the overbearing power of [corporations/governments]” (Network 154). As such a tactic, the open source model works as a resistant sociopolitical collective, in a self-organising but heterogeneous communication matrix. From the starting point of a common passion, a shifting assemblage of activists effects a power of sociopolitical differentiation—that is, breaks away from dominant forms. Open source, thus conceived, is the aesthetic becoming of a collective subjectivity. There are numerous contemporary illustrations of such assemblages, two notable examples being the large scale movement against the Iraqi war (an ongoing and “unprecedented expression of collective consciousness and action bound together through the internet” [Cortwright]), and the 2011 Occupy Wall Street campaign (an “open, participatory and horizontally organi[s]ed process … [protesting] the blatant injustices of our times perpetuated by the economic and political elites” (“About.” New York)). The latter, of course, is also another example of a becoming-revolutionary event materialising in response to the global financial crisis. Such assemblages have, as Terranova states, “given temporary but powerful visibility to a process of horizontal and diffuse communication that draws both upon the latest technologies (from video cellular telephony to wireless internet access) and also upon more established strategies, such as conferences, talks, camps, workshops [and] meetings” (Networked 154-55). In Guattari’s terms, such an assemblage comprises an interfacing series of machines, proceeding experimentally (aesthetically). A third example of such an open source-like assemblage is the World Social Forum (WSF), an entity worthy of some elaboration. Commencing in 2001, the WSF can be described as “a meeting place for all of the organisations and individuals involved in the struggle against neo-liberalism, without the control of any one governmental institution and without the participation of sectarian
organisations” (Gilbert, Anticapitalism 91). The initial WSF was set up in direct opposition to
the World Economic Forum (WEF), the annual Davos-based summit for finance ministers,
banks, corporate CEOs and the like, a summit financed by multinational corporations that
“has been instrumental in advancing neoliberal economic policies since 1971” (Milberry 44).
Taking place in varying cities, the WSF, like the WEF, runs over five days, and since 12,000
people attended the first event in 2001, it has regularly attracted between 60,000 and 150,000
participants (Bond 327). One of the WSF’s key achievements has been to conceive and initially
plan the massive February 2003 protest against US/UK intentions to invade Iraq: an
unparalleled 15 million people worldwide were mobilised to participate in a day of action
which, although ultimately unsuccessful, impacted strongly upon world leaders (J. Smith 413-
14; Bond 328). Overall, though, perhaps the WSF’s fundamental achievement has been to
establish “an alternative pole of world opinion to the dominant neoliberal (market-oriented)
ideology associated with Davos” (Bond 328). This is not to say that the WSF is a unified body;
indeed, its charter clearly states that the forum is not a body at all and that no participants
may “express positions claiming to be those of all its participants” (“Charter”). Instead, the
forum constitutes a space of convergence for a diverse range of groups, movements, networks,
activists, NGOs, academics and interested individuals, whose starting point or point of
commonality (or “initial condition,” if we are to look at it from the perspective of soft control)
is an explicit commitment to oppose neoliberalism and the sovereignty of capital, or, for that
matter, any mode of imperialism (WSF). The machinic essence of the collective, however,
ensures that heterogeneity prevails, since a machine never produces homogeneity. To this
extent, Jeremy Gilbert sees the WSF as composing “a democratic space and a space for
democracy” (“Forum” 222). The democracy that Gilbert refers to here corresponds to
becoming-democracy rather than representative democracy, since he means to invoke the
“fuller and more participatory democracy” that Hardt and Negri’s networked multitude
enables (“Forum” 232). In terms of framework, this more participatory democracy involves,
according to Juris, not one singular open space involving “diverse actors,” but, rather, a range
of “self-organi[sl]ing counter-publics” (Gilbert, “Forum” 235). In other words, the WSF
operates as a network of horizontally coordinated, autonomous, self-organising spaces (Juris
25), with an initial and overarching anti-market agenda. Concepts and actions are created
according to such open source principles as “the free and open circulation of information,”
“decentralized coordination” (Smith et al 29), as well as spontaneous productivity and self-
determination. Of course, capitalist notions of proprietary ownership are eschewed, and, in
fact, since 2004 the WSF has run on open source software (Smith and Smythe 803); in 2005 the
forum also urged its widespread use beyond the forum (Clendinning). Giuseppe Caruso
accounts for the WSF’s software preference:

The WSF chose [open source] software ... as one more way to support people’s struggle
against marginali[s]ation and uneven and unfair distribution of resources (in this case
information)—struggles that all the groups involved in the WSF process are conducting in their aspiration of building another, more just, world. (174)

Open source software, therefore, underpins the communicative technology of this forum, which amounts to an open source style of networked politics, striving to find ways of thinking and living other than those stipulated by capital. Inevitably, there have been criticisms leveled against the WSF, such as it being too top down and not diverse enough (Smith and Smythe 811). However, the forum continues to make efforts to build heterogeneity and horizontality, and the fact that forums have been held in places such as Mumbai, Nairobi and Senegal also reveals a commitment to marginalized regions (Juris 261; Smith and Smythe 812). Overall, the WSF provides an example of an open space architecture that has enabled the struggles of a vast array of anti-corporate movements/groups/individuals to become visible. As a networked multitude, it strives to think through the problem of escaping the inequities of the market, to create strategies of resistance, and to enact a new model of a becoming democracy.

To conclude here, we face the question of how the concept and process of open source relates to thought. How exactly does it connect to an image of a collective kind of thought, or as Guattari phrases it, a “collective sensibility”? We are not referring to Pierre Lévy’s “collective intelligence,” or to any notion relating to Jürgen Habermas’ “public sphere”: Lévy’s concept is a largely humanist one (Terranova, Network 85), striving as it does for “the mutual recognition and enrichment of individuals” (Lévy 13), while the Habermasian public is consensual and exclusive of difference (Blackman 139). On the evidence presented above, open source may be construed as “a space that is common, without being homogenous or even equal” (Terranova, Network 154). Correspondingly, we may conceptualise it as “a collective diagram permitting the articulation of individual practices to the benefit of each, without one imposing itself on the other (Guattari and Cohn-Bendit, qtd. in Genosko 40). For Guattari, this kind of collective thought is dissensual, to the extent that it does not seek to reach any kind of group consensus in solving (political) problems. Instead, collective thought always allows for dissensus, which is the only true way to arrive at “disparity, singularity, marginality”—with all their potentialities for rethinking subjectivity (GR 271). Open source approaches collective thought, then, in the sense that it comprises a multiply connected network (or networks) of autonomous, creative experiments, whose very aim is to admit and advocate differentiation—from one another, as well as from any majoritarian framework. Open source thrives on dissensus, just as a collective diagram of creative thought does: dissensus is the very driver. For this reason neither open source nor collective thought will ever be a smooth, conflict-free process. However, through both these processes the “excessive value” of life over and above the “logic of exchange and equivalence” (Terranova, Network 129), and the essentially excessive nature of creativity (Goriunova, “Towards”), are accessed. The result is an entry into the virtuality of thought—the as-yet unthought—and the initiation of something new and
potentially free from axiomatic constraint. Again, this initiation is aesthetically constituted, to the extent that it is affectively imbued, and an experimental and auto-constructive process. The notion of collective thought, then, of which open source is an example, is a production of “collaborations and alliances” that work against the restrictive subjectivity/ies prescribed by majoritarian forces; or, to put it another way, it is “the mapping out of productive, joyful encounters that increase our capacity to act in the world” (O’Sullivan, “Pragmatics” 321).

To finish this Line of Flight (knowing, of course, that it cannot end in its virtuality), we map somewhat more purposively the ways in which Guattari’s aesthetic paradigm, as explored through all the preceding examples, enacts a more ethical image of thought. We start by recalling that, for Guattari, today’s predominant paradigm of subjectivity involves, as O’Sullivan indicates, “an homogenisation of life and its capture by transcendent points, especially around the exchange principle. This is the organisation of subjectivity around money and material production solely for its own sake” (“Guattari’s” 275). Putting it in different terms, Lazzarato observes that “the production of subjectivity [today] takes place in a ‘common world’ modelled by signs, opinions, languages, slogans and the dispositives of power in societies of security” (Aesthetic 175-76). For Guattari, this situation can lead to “monstrous absurdities,” and, therefore, a particular, politico-ethical response is called for, as he explains: “in the contemporary context where the primacy of information fluxes that are machinically engendered” can lead to “mass mediatic infantalism [and] ignorance of difference and alterity”—which is to say, the “homogenetic ‘entrapment’” of subjectivity—it is of the utmost importance to “reappropriat[e] the production of subjectivity” (GR 202; C 19, 133). Overall, “[t]he only acceptable end result of human activity is the production of subjectivity such that its relation to the world is sustained and enriched” (GR 202). Again, how can such subjectivities be engendered? As Colman suggests, such “creative change can only occur when dominant authorial coding systems (...) capitalism, communicative language) are ruptured, shifted or mutated” (“Affective” 60). These functions—of rupturing and mutating—are, as we have said, of an aesthetic nature, which brings us to the kind of thought Guattari advocates: thought as ethico-aesthetic social practice. If, for him, the questions are: “how do we change mentalities, how do we reinvent social practices that would give back to humanity ... a sense of responsibility ...?” (C 119), the answer is to think aesthetically, to think like an artist. This would involve, first of all, grasping the “processual creativity” of subjectivity (Guattari, C 13), which means to understand that it is always amenable to change. This change will be brought about through an ecologically-oriented thought, involving a range of aesthetic techniques. Guattari explains:

A singularity, a rupture of sense, a cut, a fragmentation, the detachment of a semiotic content—in a dadaist or surrealist manner—can originate mutant nuclei of subjectivation. Just as chemistry has to purify complex mixtures to extract atomic and
homogeneous molecular matter, thus creating an infinite scale of chemical entities that have no prior existence, the same is true in the “extraction” and “separation” of aesthetic subjectivities or partial objects, in the psychoanalytic sense, that make an immense complexification of subjectivity possible—harmonies, polyphonies, counterpoints, rhythms and existential orchestrations, until now unheard of and unknown. (C18-19)

The artistic practices of cutting into (or apart) and putting back together differently, then, are at the bottom of an aesthetic thinking of life in the socius. As Colman affirms, aesthetic thinkers “recognise that the machinic universes they choose, or are chosen to engage with[,] are a paradigm of which they are only a part, but which they may modify through their aesthetic techniques” (“Affective” 75). Hence, subjects of unjust regimes may utilise social media and ICTs for the unanticipated purposes of disseminating details of repression and resistance, hackers may lift strictly authorised information and place it into the public domain to expose authoritarian policies, and practitioners of open source may cleave asunder systemic hierarchies and enclosures of thinking so as to fashion transparent, continually developing and heterogenetic processes of thought. Each of these is an experimental, aesthetic practice—an aesthetic technique of/for thought—detaching and deterritorialising a segment of the real, triggering “a function of sense and alterity” (affect), and generating a shift in subjectivity (Guattari, C131). Guattari often uses the term “transversality” to express the interrelatedness of and, therefore, potential for cutting across machinic assemblages: indeed, “experimentation with this kind of aesthetic and ethico-political transversality” (C132) is another apt way to characterise a Guattarian image of thought.51 Taking up the methods of this transversality would be, therefore, to think in ways that bring about “changes in production, ways of living and axes of value” (Guattari, C134). Because of its potential for thought, it is worth ending here with what Guattarian scholar Gary Genosko describes as the “key concepts” of transversality; they are: “mobility (traversing domains, levels, dimensions, the ability to carry and be carried beyond); creativity (productivity, adventurousness, aspiration, laying down lines of flight),” and, finally, “self-engendering (autoproduction, self-positing subjectivity), territories from which one can really take off into new universes of reference” (55).
Repetition: thought becoming imperceptible

As a project of Nietzschean active ethics, the goals of this thesis have been two-fold. First, we sought to establish and investigate some of the restrictions that contemporary life places upon a Deleuze-Guattarian thought without an image, which is to say thought as the uninhibited power to create and expand difference in the world. To this end, Part 1’s Problem 1 examined some of the key ways in which dogmatic thought continues to determine the kind of thinking that we habitually enter into. This thinking is constrained by representational structures and processes such as the recognition of identity, resemblance and opposition; the refusal of otherness, which manifests as racism, sexism and an extensive array of fascistic practices; the privileging of the universal human subject, even—perhaps especially—in times of social and global insecurity; the endless expression of opinion, which is both self-centred and mass-driven; and thought as no more than a mirroring of subject and object. In Part 1’s Problem 2, we explored how information impacts upon thought, beginning with the way informational networks maintain control through the circulation of “order-words” that reduce thought and life to pre-formed possibilities. We considered arguments that the compressive nature of information denies duration and any other time than now, and that the banality and instantaneity of media content cancel out the potentialities of difference and real attentiveness. As well, we saw how computers and the internet may lead to the diminishing of thought in the sense of promoting a skimming kind of engagement with images, ideas and life itself. Overall, though, permeating both the dogmatic and the informational problems for thought, is the problem of the capitalist axiomatic, which further and most powerfully delimits what thinking can do in our current context. In the representational realm of science, for instance, which includes medicine, it promotes certain research areas and refuses others, and in the world of the internet, it mines our interests for profit and, indeed, shapes those interests. Representation, as Guattari sees it, is bound to capitalism in the sense that capitalism requires a “normal” individual who functions “in terms of a communication based on dualist systems” ([MR 85, 72]), and, as Deleuze emphasises, in this late capitalist milieu, information is the system of control ([TRM 321]).

Our second goal in this work, pursued in Part 2, was to seek ways to counteract, or resist, the kinds of oppressions against thought and life outlined in Part 1; we sought a thought that might comprise a Deleuze-Guattarian weapon of resistance. We began with suggestions for recovering the potential of affect, which, in the present day, is largely captured by the
mediatised strategies of capital and governance. Affect, for D+G, is a critical mode of thought: it is felt thought, the forerunner of concepts. Techniques such as mindful attention, “stopping to think” and practising Bergson’s intuition were proposed as some means through which affect can be tuned into, so as to experience the different lines of thought—thought’s virtuality—that it may open. From the affective components of events, new concepts can assemble—new ways of conceptualising current circumstances so that the future can be different to, more life-affirming than, the past; this is D+G’s, and this project’s, utopian objective. We used the event of the global financial crisis as a fillip to wonder how such concepts as becoming-revolutionary and becoming-democratic might be made anew, so as to access ways of seeing our socio-political circumstances outside of majoritarian, capitalistic blueprints. We also approached affect from the angle of Thrift’s recasting of Agamben’s bare life into a concept that includes the “half-second delay,” a micro-space/time of creative potential wherein thought might be impacted by a range of microbiopolitical techniques. In proposing thought as the creation of new forms, D+G also affirm the power of art as a specific way of thinking the new, to the extent that art brings new affects and percepts, blocks of sensations, into the world—sensations that are not of the body but that stand alone. These sensations are the world’s imperceptible forces, which the work of art makes palpable; in doing so, the art “draws us into [its] compound,” making us become-other, and gives us “vibrations, clinches, and openings” that can lead to new ways of being (D+G, WP 175, 177).

We explored art-as-thought through two examples of contemporary Australian Aboriginal painting, in terms of their laying open new ways of perceiving such life elements as landscape, animals, movement, space-time and Aboriginality—each one of which is normally conceived in limitative and/or negativising representational terms. Our study of two works of dance also showed that this art form has the potential to draw us into a movement-made thought, with the sensations in these particular examples shifting beyond anthropocentric prescriptives and bringing about the potentialities of becoming-animal. Through our digital art example, we saw how, from the Deleuze-Guattarian standpoints of machinism and ethology, ICTs do have the potential to access the Deleuze-Bergsonian virtual of thought, to the extent that they operate by way of a relationality of multiple human, technological, social and environmental components. As the Lozano-Hemmer work demonstrates, they even have the ability to subvert control capitalism’s own digital surveillance mechanisms, satisfying Deleuze’s criteria that it is only when they are taken up as modes of resistance that computer technologies can truly prove life enhancing. Finally, with Guattari, we sought to extend the practices of art into the practices of living, by approaching life from the perspective of an ethico-aesthetic paradigm. This paradigm, which is especially enabled by what Guattari names post-mediatic technologies, regards subjectivities (individual and group) as autopoietic, processual machines, capable of remaking themselves using aesthetic techniques of experimentation. We revisited the concepts of becoming-revolutionary and becoming-democratic through such
examples as the recent wave of colour uprisings and Wikileaks, and offered a concept of
collective thought through the example of open source, in order to explore how “mutant
nuclei of subjectivation” (Guattari, C 18) can actively create and self-engender subjectivities
not sanctioned by the dominant, capitalist world order. Such aesthetic praxes bring together
“feelings, action, theory and machinism” in a “collective arrangement” (Guattari, MR 87,93).

Thought, in Deleuze-Guattarian terms, takes multiple pathways. Fundamentally, “thought is
creation, not will to truth” (WP 54), and this creation can proceed through a range of
expressions. In the sphere of philosophy, thought works to create active concepts. Concepts
as they are commonly understood in day-to-day, representational terms are, as Colebrook
acknowledges, a kind of shortcut ensuring that we do not have to think (Gilles 15). Properly
philosophical concepts are the power and difference of thought; through concept creation
thought reaches into the sub-representative virtual of an event and extracts new ways of
seeing and, therefore, living its potential. The philosophical concept of democracy, for
example, or of sexuality, would undo already actualised forms of these concepts and construct
them anew (though always provisionally), so as to allow new ways of living them out. What
concept creation amounts to is a kind of breaking down of thought’s structures, a dismantling
of the forms that are determined by the dogmatic image so as to enable us to genuinely think
difference. Just so, the thought of nonphilosophy, which we have explored in the mode of art,
moves away from the object of thought to the forces that make us think: “the condition of
sensibility and no longer the representation of its sense” (Lambert, Non 9). In art’s realm of
sensibility, thought perceives what is imperceptible in the actual world—that which emanates
from the intensities of the virtual. Thought enters the region of affects and percepts, inhuman
becomings that can only be felt and sensed, becomings of real difference that cannot be
identified or even bounded by channels of information. Again, art takes regularised thought
apart, inasmuch as it decomposes into (Deleuze-Proustian) signs that, when perceived, point
toward “ways of living, possibilities of existence” (Deleuze, N 143). As Deleuze puts it, “[a]ny
work of art points a way through for life, finds a way through the cracks” (N 143). But affect as
a power of thought is available not only in art; it abounds also in everyday life, as we
discovered with Stewart’s ordinary affects. Affect is the “something doing” of life, the “bare
activity” we sense as “change taking place” (James 73-74). We are always in the middle of
change and the unfolding of difference, as D+G imply: “[a] becoming is always in the middle;
one can only get it by the middle” (ATP 293). This middle comprises a zone of in-betweenness
and indiscernibility (D+G, ATP 293), where thought is, again, of the order of the
imperceptible: unformed, unstructured, affective. This is thought as encounter, as the jolt of a
brush with radical discongruity. From here, thought can keep moving—to create concepts, or
to become arrested by the dogmatic image or by informational capitalism. Or perhaps this
imperceptible thought might become political—which is to say micropolitical, from Guattari’s
viewpoint. In this sense, thought is connected to the productive force of desire, which, as micropolitics, Guattari articulates as “a collective direction of libido to parts of the body, groups of individuals, constellations of objects and intensities, machines of every kind,” which, as we have seen, can unleash “a whole host of expressions and experimentations” (MR 72, 84). Thought in an aesthetic paradigm constitutes “a politics of experimentation that takes hold of the existing intensities of desire and forms itself into a desiring mechanism in touch with historical social reality” (Guattari, MR 87). This reality, of representational thought structures, information networks and control capitalism, can be eaten into by imperceptible lines of micropolitical thinking, which begin to grow right in the middle of things, feeling out escape routes and producing new ways of living (Guattari, MR 84).

To believe in the world again

We said at the outset that this was a project concerned with ethics, and it is now appropriate to address more deliberately how thought, as we have advocated it herein, relates to the ways in which D+G conceptualise—or, better, espouse—ethics. Firstly, we affirm again that D+G’s approach is an immanent (rather than transcendent) one, since for them there are no overriding laws to apply in reaching so-called ethical decisions, but only the material forces of life to negotiate in always singular circumstances. For D+G, life attains its fullest potential in its unfolding of difference, and this, in broad terms, implies that ethics involves the tending of this process. There are, however, some specific ways we might see how this tending of difference connects to thought in D+G’s works, and, since the ontological structure of difference is the virtual, we return now to that domain. The virtual, to repeat it anew, is “a dimension of self-differentiating differences, ... of individuating metamorphic processes, of a disorientating ‘spatiali[s]ing’ space, and a floating time of a simultaneous before-after” (Bogue, Deleuze’s 8). When it passes into an actual state of affairs, the virtual is never depleted; rather, it continues to subsist in what actually happens (Bogue, Deleuze’s 8). While common sense-based, representational thought cannot perceive the virtual, this domain can be sensed “in moments of disequilibrium and disorientation” (Bogue, Deleuze’s 9), or “in the strange indifference of an intellectual intuition,” as D+G put it (WP 158). When this occurs, the pure event of an occurrence is sensed, and what is actual becomes counter-effectuated: its zones of indiscernibility, or shades of difference, become exposed (D+G, WP 159-62). “We need reasons to believe in this world,” Deleuze implores—we need “a belief capable of perpetuating life” (C2 172). When there are so many reasons not to believe in the world (D+G, WP 75), the ethical act of a thought that seeks the event—that intuits how else the world might be—provides us with a pathway to believe in this world, “as it is” (Deleuze, C2 172), with all its limitations and problems; for such thought apprehends the potential for change. This thought is also ethically oriented toward the future, inasmuch as it affirms the possibility of the future being different
to the oppressions of the present, so that from chaos can emerge “the shadow of the ‘people to come’” (D+G, WP 218). This concept of a “people to come” brings with it another inflection of what may be understood as D+G’s ethics: its concern for the constitution of community. In What Is Philosophy? D+G write how the language (or thought) of sensation “summons forth a people to come,” who are “a mass-people, [a] world-people” (176, 218); this people, according to Bogue, is “a future, yet-to-be collectivity that has a genuine cohesiveness and functionality” (Deleuze’s 14). This function is nothing grandiose, as Deleuze tells us: “[t]his is not exactly a people called upon to dominate the world. It is a minor people, eternally minor, taken up in a becoming-revolutionary” (ECC 4). Becoming-revolutionary people, as we saw in our colour revolution examples, and through such groups as the WSF, or even in neighbourhood swap-meets, are not stable entities, but are always in the process of becoming; Bogue conceives this as “a mutual becoming-other of multiple bodies engaged in unpredictable unshapings and reshapings of one another” (Deleuze’s 14). In terms of thought, such a process takes a willingness to submit to the impersonal thinking of an ethological approach, whereby thought is carried relationally along multiple shifting vectors and partial concatenations. The ethological question, according to Deleuze, is “no longer a matter of utilizations or captures, but of sociabilities and communities” (SPP 126). In other words, “[h]ow do individuals enter into composition with one another in order to form a higher individual, ad infinitum? … Now we are concerned … with a symphony of Nature, the composition of a world that is increasingly wide and intense” (Deleuze, SPP 126). Guattari’s version of this broader ethology is his “ecosophy,” an eco-logic that includes subjectivities, social relations and the environment. For him, to resist the monstrosities of “Integrated World Capitalism,” we need to “learn to think transversally” so as to “apprehend the world” across all three viewpoints (TE 19-20, 29). The logic of this transversal thinking is based not on communication, but on intensities—processual lines of flight that move partial objects out of their totalising frames and bring about “the reinvention of the environment and the enrichment of modes of life and sensibility” (Guattari, TE 20, 30).

Returning to What Is Philosophy?, though, we find what may be D+G’s most direct statement regarding how they approach thought as an ontology of ethics. “There is no other ethic than the amor fati of philosophy,” they write, with amor fati translating to “love of fate” (Bogue, Deleuze’s 8). In Deleuze’s earlier book Nietzsche and Philosophy, he first signals the importance of this concept, which he takes from Nietzsche; in The Gay Science, Nietzsche declares: “I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them—thus I will be one of those who makes things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love from now on! I do not want to wage war against ugliness. I do not want to accuse” (157). Nietzsche wishes to affirm exactly what happens, what “is necessary in things,” and does not want to lament or resent what does not go his way. Deleuze discusses Nietzsche’s amor
Amor fati equates to loving the “fatally obtained number,” and to welcoming its “eternal return” (Deleuze, NP 27). Deleuze develops amor fati further in The Logic of Sense, when he brings it together with his (Stoic-derived) notion of the event. The event, we recall, refers not to what actually occurs, but to the “neutral splendor” of what is “inside what occurs,”—its “eternal truth” (Deleuze, LS 149). In other words, what happens is underpinned by an impersonal, incorporeal force (Nietzsche’s fate), so to interpret occurrences as “unjust” or “unwarranted” is to cling to “the limits of individuals and persons” (Deleuze, LS 149-50). Ethics, as Deleuze expresses it here, simply means “to become worthy of what happens to us, and thus to will and release the event” (LS 149). To will the event is to accept and affirm the impersonal virtual reality that constitutes “a” life, not to be fixated on “my” life. Explaining it elsewhere, Deleuze discusses willing the event in terms of a wound: “The wound is something that I receive in my body, in a particular place at a particular moment, but there is also an eternal truth of the wound as impassive, incorporeal event. ‘My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it!’” (D 65). The dissolution of the self that thinking the event requires is called for most strongly in relation to death—that “mortal wound” (Deleuze, LS 151): “Yes, dying is engendered in our bodies, comes about in our bodies, but it comes from the Outside, singularly incorporeal, falling upon us like the battle which skims over the combatants, like the bird which hovers above the battle” (Deleuze, D 65). To grasp death as the absolute event, then, as that which is most impersonal and most beyond what the all-controlling “I” can think or do, is to turn death against itself, which to affirm life as unqualifiable difference. To think the ethic of amor fati is, finally, to live the most singular life, a life made up of events and virtualities on a transcendental field of pure immanence (Deleuze, PI 31). A life of immanence involves constructivism, desire, relation, difference, creation: surely forces of thought enabling us to believe in the world again.

There are other lines of flight this project could have taken. For instance, we are aware that, while we have discussed science several times, we have not addressed it in the terms D+G do in What Is Philosophy? In this book, D+G specify that thought, as a power to transform life, occurs in three primary modes: philosophy, art and science. Each of these modes casts a plane over the chaos that is the virtual, and brings back different qualities of thought: we have seen how philosophy brings back concepts and constructs a plane of immanence, and art brings sensations and lays out a plane of composition; but we have not explored science’s potential to bring back functions that make a plane of reference (D+G, WP 202-03). Explaining the distinction between philosophy and science, D+G write that each approaches the “infinite
“speed” that is the virtual in different ways: philosophy “selects infinite movements of thought and is filled with concepts formed like consistent particles going as fast as thought,” while science’s approach is to slow down matter, so that scientific thought, expressed in propositions, can “gain a reference able to actualise the virtual” (WP 118; italics removed). While the focus of philosophy is thought and the event, then, the focus of science is actual states of affairs and bodies (D+G, WP 22). This does not mean that science as a power of thought in D+G’s terms seeks to represent a static world, but more that it is a movement of thought that engages with a material world in process (Gaffney, “Introduction” 2-3), and that enables the constitution or modification of bodies and states of affairs (D+G, WP 138). So while we have concentrated on philosophy, art, and other facets of non-philosophy, we acknowledge the value of science—as outlined in What Is Philosophy?—for thought, but leave this for a different investigation (one that might recognise and take up the notable contribution of Manuel Delanda). Similarly, we leave the question of the “thought-brain,” a concept D+G introduce in What Is Philosophy?’s concluding chapter. Here, they present the brain as the “junction—not the unity—of the three planes” of philosophy, science and art (WP 208; italics removed). As Arkady Plotnitsky notes, “[t]his is an extraordinary conjecture, most especially because it relates art, science, and philosophy to certain specific (although, as yet, not biologically specified) forms of neural functioning of the brain itself” (259). In this proposal, philosophy, art and science are the “three aspects under which the brain becomes subject,” which is to say it becomes “a state of survey without distance, at ground level, a self-survey” that is coterminous with the concepts it conceives and the sensations it feels (D+G, WP 210, 211). Returning to the concerns of this project, though, it is also the case that there are countless pertinent examples that could have been explored but were passed over, and there have been many lines opened but not followed far. It has been a matter of speeds, slownesses and degrees; of following the trajectories that were the most intensive in the haecceity that is this assemblage, inseparable from the hour, season, atmosphere, life that made it. This assemblage is necessarily unfinished. In the spirit of D+G’s pragmatics, we leave it here for later becomings, for the machinic connections it might make with other contexts, and for any difference, however minor, it might institute in life.
ENDNOTES

1 “D+G” denotes the works written by Deleuze and Guattari together; the thesis also cites many works by Deleuze individually, and several by Guattari. As a philosopher first and foremost, Deleuze published more texts than Guattari, and his work is better known. Correspondingly, there has been something of an “absence of Guattari from the canons of university study” (Alliez and Goffey 2). Nevertheless, from his social science practitioner background, Guattari was, in Deleuze’s view, an “inventor of unusually creative and versatile ideas” (Dosse n). Therefore, although Deleuze’s work is foregrounded for much of this project, Guattari’s alone is given prominence in the latter section of Part 2.

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all italics within quotes replicate italics within the original source.

3 For a discussion of the development of the Italian socialist movement “Operaismo,” through the 1960s and 1970s, see Foreword to Virno’s Multitude 7–10.

4 While emotion is not in itself affect, there is a relationship between the two, inasmuch as emotion is what comes after or out of affect: “[e]motion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions. … It is intensity owned and recognized” (Parables 28; emphasis added). As Gilbert Simondon puts it, “affectivity is the ground of emotion” (qtd. in Adkins).

5 We take this term from the Sense Lab group at Concordia University, Montreal, founded in 2004 by Erin Manning, whose activities aim to “explore the active passage from research to creation” (“About.” Sense Lab).

6 For example, Keith Ansell Pearson presents a detailed analysis of Deleuze’s virtual, contra Badiou (Philosophy 97–114); Jeffrey Bell (“Charting”) invokes Hume and Peirce in correcting Badiou’s misreading of Deleuze’s virtual-actual distinction; Bell (“Badiou’s”) and Mogens Laerke each show how Badiou misreads Deleuze’s Spinoza; Daniel Smith demonstrates that, contrary to Badiou’s claim, Deleuze’s multiplicity does have a connection to mathematics by way of problematics, and exposes Badiou’s mathematical ontology as transcendentalism (“Mathematics”); Bell addresses, by way of Whitehead, Badiou’s miscalculation of Deleuze’s approach to politics (“Fear”); Éric Alliez shows how Badiou’s disavowal of D+G’s desiring-production and his misreading of becoming-minoritarian lead him, erroneously, to deny Deleuze’s political philosophy (Anti 7–10); Paul Patton also rejects Badiou’s claim that Deleuze’s philosophy is essentially not political (“Deleuze’s); and Joshua Ramey refutes Badiou’s overdetermination of Deleuze’s ethics “as simply a stoic preparation for dying” (Hermetic 208).

7 Berressem states that at times, “one suspects that the Deleuzian argument is merely a rhetorical glue that holds together a number of textual (auto)samplings that round up once more Žižek’s usual suspects: Bush, Slovenia, Cognitive Science, Hitchcock, the Palestine, the Left, the Right, the Middle, bad jokes, dumb movies.” As an example of textual irrelevancies, Berressem offers the following: “Between passages of serious engagement with Deleuze, Žižek writes sentences like: ‘And to go a step further, is the practice of fist-fucking not the exemplary case of what Deleuze called the “expansion of a concept?” … No wonder Foucault, Deleuze’s Other, was practising fisting’ (Organs 188). Such a sentence is objectionable not because it is irreverent, politically incorrect or because it touches upon a taboo (all of that, in fact, would make it at least slightly interesting), but simply because it is irrelevant.”

8 Robert Thomas’ explanation that his essay was written out of his own experience as a “homeless intellectual,” alienated from established intellectual forms of belonging, and separated from his own thought and ability to express it, perhaps accounts for his human-centred conception of thought.

9 Deleuze and/or Guattari’s use of “machine” is not metaphoric and has nothing to do with the mechanical; rather, it refers to a process that holds together a series of disparate parts: “What we term machinic is precisely this synthesis of heterogeneities” (ATP 330). By “abstract machine” they mean the “consolidated aggregate of matters [and] functions,” which are “real yet nonconcrete, and that open any assemblage into its outside (ATP 510–11). Put another way, D+G’s machinic “operates by the connection of parts. Unlike an organism or a mechanism, it has no final or bounded form; it is pure production in and for itself without governing intention” (Colebrook, Understanding 122).
has not lost its sovereignty, it has been transformed somewhat by “the growth of a global asserting the death of the state” (ix). On balance, Saskia Sassen state has suffered a reduction in informa have yet devised” (156 because it “is the most effective means for establishing sovereignty over territory that human beings Malcolm Waters, though, claims that the organised nation the economy and the borderless flow of goods and communication” (Rembold and Carrier 361). The state is no longer a suspension of its own law, the state can effectively turn against its own constituents. Representation’s hierarchical codes pervade each domain. Medianation of the state” (102). Again, representation’s hierarchical codes pervade each domain. This feminist objection raises the question, then, of whether “the goals for actual change held by contemporary feminist groups” can be reconciled with D+G’s micropolitics of becoming (Cull). In response to this problematic, Colebrook contends that, in fact, “[t]he molar politics of identities and the molecular politics of becoming are not opposed; but the latter must be thought and confronted as the possibility and mobilisation of the former” (Introduction, 13-14). Similarly, Jerry Aline Flieger argues that their relationship is more in the order of a paradox, which means that “Deleuzian thought and feminist thought may be ‘mapped’ or interwoven in a kind of productive disjunction” (62). Ultimately, “the task that confronts feminism in its confrontation with Deleuze is whether a philosophy of becoming, or becoming-woman, can be made to work” (Colebrook, Introduction 12), and for many Deleuzian feminists, including Flieger, Olkowski and Colebrook, this task is achievable.

Balibar asserts, also, that nationalism maintains an affinity with sexism because of this connection between family and nation-state: “the inequality of sexual roles in conjugal love and child-rearing constitutes the anchoring point for the juridical, economic, educational and medical mediation of the state” (102). Again, representation’s hierarchical codes pervade each domain. Bhabha borrows the concept “imagined communities” from Benedict Anderson’s seminal work of the same name.

For Agamben, the state of exception is “the original structure in which law encompasses living beings by means of its own suspension” (State 3). Put another way, through the (seemingly lawful) suspension of its own law, the state can effectively turn against its own constituents.

Several writers (such as Timothy Luke, and Kenichi Ohmae) have argued that that the nation-state is no longer a viable concept in the context of globalisation’s “transnational organisation of the economy and the borderless flow of goods and communication” (Rembold and Carrier 361). Malcolm Waters, though, claims that the organised nation-state remains highly resistant, possibly because it “is the most effective means for establishing sovereignty over territory that human beings have yet devised” (156-57). Similarly, Silvio Waisbord and Nancy Morris claim that, although the state has suffered a reduction in information sovereignty, as yet “there is insufficient evidence for asserting the death of the state” (ix). On balance, Saskia Sassen offers the view that while the state has not lost its sovereignty, it has been transformed somewhat by “the growth of a global economic
system and by other transnational processes” (35). Some of the state’s functions, for example, have been transferred to the private sector and to supranational organisations (Sassen 39–40).

19 While in October 2010 the Gillard Government announced that it would be release children from detention, the Refugee Council of Australia notes that the policy was not immediate and continue to remain concerned that protection of children during the refugee determination process has not been sufficiently addressed” (Coghlan).

20 Alberto Toscano explains that D+G utilise an axiomatic system for capitalism since it “differs from systems of decoding and overcoding by its capacity to operate directly on decoded flows. In this respect, while it implies a form of capture, its degree of immanence and ubiquity is far greater than that of coding systems, all of which require an instance of externality or transcendence” (“Axiomatic” 17).

21 In the wake of the 2011–2012 “News of the World” phone hacking scandal—which implicated Rupert Murdoch and his son James in illegal phone tapping activities—it remains to be seen how the overall power of the Murdoch corporation is impacted.

22 While we acknowledge John B. Thompson’s argument that the recipients of media content are not “a vast sea of passive, undifferentiated individuals” (24), and that there are “complex ways in which media products are taken up by individuals” (25), our angle of approach concerns the fact that the process of mass media transmission is not, substantially, a reciprocal activity. It is, rather, “fundamentally asymmetrical” (Thompson 25). Under these circumstances, and given our immersion in a mass media culture—even though media consumption is not an inactive process—much absorption of dominant media meanings would seem inevitable.

23 The image is a close-up, headshot of four women simply wearing protest hats; each has a relatively unemotional facial expression.

24 In fact, Guy Debord’s renowned Situationist manifesto, The Society of the Spectacle (originally published in 1967), arose out of his concern that, due to Western society’s saturation by the images transmitted in “news or propaganda,” advertising, and entertainment, the direct experience of life had become replaced by the indirect or mediated experiences of “the spectacle” (12–13). The spectacle results in a detached kind of living, which allows only a visual experience of life. Debord’s theory led to the Situationists inventing “methods of generating authentic, complete experiences” that simply could not be reproduced by any set of images, such as May 1968, Woodstock, and the like (Mulder, “Media” 293).

25 To some extent, events in D+G’s sense are beyond the media in a similar way to the Situations created by the Debord’s followers. However, D+G’s events are not deliberate political strategies, since they occur all the time in everyday life.

26 Occasionally, as Herman and Chomsky point out, corporations are willing to sponsor content of a more serious nature; but this is often “a result of recent embarrassments that call for a public-relations offset,” and the “serious” content will still shy away from any particularly divisive or controversial issues (18).

27 The “virtuality” of new media that is often referred to in terms of “virtual reality” is quite different to Deleuze’s virtual. In an effort to establish distance from Platonic forms of thought, Deleuze, following Bergson, takes pains to distinguish the dynamic of the actual-virtual from the more dominant philosophical categories of the possible-real, which connect to new media’s virtuality. In Deleuze’s explanation, Platonic thought is based around the notion of an original, necessary and universal “Idea,” whose qualities are possessed by any number of secondary copies (ECC 136). This original/copy relation is reflected in the relationship between the possible and the real, where the real is a mirror or image of the possible. Put another way, this means that the real is that which is “realised” from the possible; as such, the real resembles the possible (Deleuze, B 97, 98). Such resemblance is a determination of representation. For Deleuze, “the possible is a false notion, the source of false problems,” for if the real resembles the possible, “we [can only] give ourselves a real that is ready-made, preformed, pre-existent to itself, and that will pass into existence according to an order of successive limitations” (B 98).

28 For D+G, a “haecceity” is an individuation utterly different to a “well-formed subject”; it is the intensity of an “individuated aggregate,” made up of a time, the weather, an atmosphere as well as the life (also an aggregate) that occurs there (ATP 253, 262).
29 Strictly speaking, topology is a branch of mathematics. As Massumi explains, “[t]opology is the science of self-varying transformation. A topological figure is defined as the continuous transformation of one geometrical figure into another” (Parables 134).

30 We acknowledge here the argument that the internet’s open architecture structure—that is, its intrinsic openness to new additions (Terranova, Network 55)—is the realisation of D+G’s rhizomatic model of thought. Robin Hamman, for example, sees the internet as “a real world example [of] Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome.” Rajchman, however, warns that although “Deleuze’s language of connection, rhizome, network may well sound like talk of [the internet] one must proceed with caution” (11). For Ian Buchanan, D+G’s rhizome has been “misread,” and too much used “in an essentially conservative way, looking more to reify and endorse the status quo rather than to challenge it” (Deleuze”). In contrast to D+G’s rhizomatic principle that any point can connect to any other, Ian Buchanan notes that the practical reality of internet use means that high traffic volumes and low bandwidths often prevent connectivity (“Deleuze”). Further, the expansion and proliferation of websites does not necessarily constitute a multiplicity in D+G’s sense: websites are not “dimensions” but, rather, “units” of the internet, since the addition or subtraction of any one site does not impact the internet as a whole—as would be the case with dimensions in a multiplicity (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”). What is more, the internet may appear to be “ascentred, nonsignifying, and acephalous,” but movement is still from point to point, and, as we have already seen, Google searches are not at all disinterested (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”). Rather, a search engine such as Google can be regarded as “a centring system,” since its omnipresent advertisements direct users to commodities, and its page ranking system (whereby it algorithmically ranks the importance of sites) is strongly hierarchical (I. Buchanan, “Deleuze”). From a different perspective, Marks’ rejection of D+G as “cyber-enthusiasts” (“Information” 210) is based on the claim that “cyberspace” and “cybertheory” foregrounds the notion that “information allows us to transcend the body,” whereas D+G’s concept of the rhizome is firmly located in a theoretical framework that “views body, brain and world as a complex whole which has a material density” (“Information” 202, 196). In other words, the rhizome, as it is sequestered by cybertheory, loses its “material complexity” (Marks, “Information” 196).

31 The “digital divide” is most visible in Africa, where, in 2011, there was only 13.5% internet penetration. But uptake is occurring with increasing speed: this 2011 figure grew from only 5% in 2008 (“Internet Usage”). With regard to the UN’s “information society agenda,” sociologist Gili Drori sees it as simply a reframing of “the development vision” according to the (capitalist) goals of globalisation (298).

32 In fact, Google is a rapidly expanding corporation, now offering numerous applications and services in addition to its search archives; these include Gmail’s free email service, YouTube, Orkut social networking site, GoogleMaps, Google Earth, office applications, scanned books, and cell phone related applications such as Android (Lovink, Networks 151). This “Googli[s]ation of everything,” as Siva Vaidhyanathan calls it, means that, according to Lovink, “there is virtually no critic, or academic or business journalist, who can keep up with the scope and speed of its development in recent years” (Networks 151).

33 For Lovink, Carr’s internet technology background as a prior editor of Harvard Business Review makes him “the perfect insider critic” (Networks 155).

34 Writing before 9/11 and the war in Iraq, Richard Dienst takes a different approach in theorising television in a post-representational, post-ideological sense. While Dienst also examines how television modulates subindvidual capacities or affect, his argument concerns television’s relationship to time: “[t]elevision, in its fundamental commercial function, socialises time” (Dienst 61). Put differently, in contemporary capitalism, television collectivises and valorises not only our labour time (as Berardi points out “[Meaning”), but also our “free” time. This collectivisation of free time “allows us to offer up our social lives as free contributions to capitalist power” (Dienst 62). In this way, our very attention to television’s stream of images is capitalised upon. For Dienst, the “work” of television takes place at a deeply affective level: “television images do not represent things so much as they take up time, and to work through this time is the most pervasive way that subjects can suffer through [and] participate in ... the global unification of contemporary capitalism” (64). If the time of affect is “one’s sense of aliveness, of changeability” (Massumi, Parables 36), watching television relinquishes this bodily force to capital.
On 24th September 2008, George Bush made a nationally televised address to the nation in which he detailed the “distressing scenario” of the “long and painful recession” that would surely unfold for the American people should his “economic rescue package” not be supported (Bush). By way of this address—which pre-emptively “makes present the future consequences of an eventuality that may or may not occur” (Massumi, “Future”)—Bush attempts to manage the state of fear evoked by the 2008 Wall Street meltdown.

At the time of writing, the world is still experiencing major financial repercussions on the back of the 2008 US subprime mortgage crisis. As Holmes points out, we are yet to know “what the geopolitical consequences of this meltdown will be” (“Interscale”). However, Holmes suggests that the panic will lead to “a sudden retreat to private self-interest, when world-spanning networks of confidence collapse to the scale of frightened individuals” (“Interscale”). On this point he is of the same mind as Elliott and Lemert, who, as cited earlier, note the return to individualist dogma as a key response to the crisis (xvii). More troubling, though, is Holmes’ suggestion that, along with this retreat to traditional individualism, there will emerge in the US “a new kind of fascism”: “[w]hen America’s financial crimes are over,” Holmes writes, “the only thing the politicians can sell to the people are police, guns, armies and outright war” (“Financial”). Relatedly, while Žižek and the New Communists (as referred to in the Introduction) may not envisage this particular manifestation of Linksfaschismus (left wing fascism), we might also be concerned that such an outcome could be compounded by their espousal of violence as a legitimate revolutionary strategy.

In saying “D+G-friendy others,” we invoke Deleuze’s notion of friendship as “an internal condition of thought”: this does not refer to “speaking with your friend or remembering him or her, etc., but on the contrary going through trials with that person ... that are necessary for any thinking” (TR 329). In other words, the “distresses” of friendship add the necessary difference to thought. Therefore, the thought introduced by D+G-friendy others does not necessarily closely reproduce D+G, but will lead to productive lines of flight.

In March 2009, the Australian government began paying one-off “Household Stimulus” bonuses to vast numbers of means-tested, Australian families. For example, the “Single Income Family Bonus” granted $900 to low and middle-income families with only one main income earner (Australia, Centrelink).

Whitehead’s propositions, then, are not part of a discursive system, whereby they would be “entirely extensional,” referring to a particular, external state of affairs (D+G, WP 22). To this extent, they are related to D+G’s concepts, which also have nothing to do with a plane of reference but are concerned with potentialities. For a full treatment of Whitehead’s speculative philosophy and the nature of propositions, see his Process and Reality.

For a detailed report on the foreclosure (or subprime mortgage) crisis, especially from the perspective of “people of color[r] and poor people,” see Amaad Rivera et al, “State of the Dream 2008: Foreclosed.” In regard to the extent and nature of lender abuse in US foreclosures, see Reid, “Foreclosure Abuse Rampant.”

Other theorists interpret Agamben’s bare life differently, which, as Catherine Mills suggests, may be a consequence of Agamben’s own somewhat inconsistent use of the concept. In this case, though, we are making use of Thrift’s particular interpretation.

In relation to Aboriginal land rights and Aboriginal “ownership” of land, though, Manning makes the important point that Aboriginal understanding of land implies a “singular relation” rather than a Western notion of ownership: “[i]t is not the space itself that the Aborigines are calling for through their art but the topologies of space-time the land incites in relation to Dreamings of which they remain an active part” (668).

Thought as a movement of “infinite speed” is a thought that grasps instantaneously and simultaneously “a potential in all its possible relations” (Colebrook, Deleuze 7). In other words, this is a movement of thought that immediately “takes in everything” (D+G, WP 37)—all potentialities for becoming. Just so, extreme slowness is intensive change slowed to the rate of immobility (which does not mean non-movement) or suspense—as in “the infinite slowness of the wait” for Japanese sumo wrestlers (D+G, ATP 281). Thought as slowness, just like speed, is thought-movement that is beyond ordinary perception—thought that is “traversed and energised by gradients, powers and other worlds” (Buchanan and Thorburn 6).
As discussed in Part 1, D+G’s concept of sexuality is based on the notion of productive desire, which is to say sexuality is a productive energy that charges diverse fields and bodies. Certainly, sexuality, thus conceived, has the potential to produce couplings across species. However, D+G take pains to point out that there are no guarantees that becomings will result in a better future (Bogue, “Alien” 31), and, therefore, they advise that “caution” is the “rule immanent to experimentation” (D+G, ATP 130).

As we indicated in the Introduction, and as Karl Jaspers acknowledges, for Nietzsche, “[a]ll negation is justified only by the creative positing to which it is preparatory” (156).

For Deleuze, the simulacral has a special power: “the simulacrum is the instance which includes a difference within itself…. It is here that we find the lived reality of a sub-representative domain” (DR 69). Joshua Ramey explains the purpose of the simulacral in art: “for Deleuze, we do not depend on art to reveal to us what is already there, but to extract a singularity, a difference, a simulacrum from the intersecting series of what appears to be there” (Gilles 23).

Guattari’s use of the term “libertarian” refers to the European rather than U.S. employment of the concept: “Libertarianism in Barcelona, and in much of Europe and Latin America, involve a radical critique of both the market and the state, while the U.S. variety is oriented toward limiting the role of the state to unleash the potential of the free market” (Juris 317n35).

“The 40-second video shows the young woman collapse on the pavement, a pool of blood spreading beneath her body, and blood coming out of her nose and mouth, her eyes open and staring at the camera. Two men kneel next to her, pressing on her chest. One of them is screaming out her name, Neda” (Kraidy and Mourad 7).

Chowdhury comes to this suggestion through a comparison of “the crackdown of the Burmese military government in [the] 1988 uprising with that of 2007”: both were similar with regard to scale and participation, but there were significantly lower deaths in 2007 (14).

While Wikileaks expresses its purpose in the individualist, humanist terms of “rights,” it works, at the same time, to undermine normative understandings of representational democracy.

Deleuze, too, is concerned with the function of “transversals” to interconnect assemblages, especially in Proust and Signs. For a discussion of the relationship between Deleuze’s “transversals” and Guattari’s “transversality,” see Bogue, Deleuze’s 1-3.

Deleuze’s reference to the transcendental field is not related to the transcendent plane of representation, which sits in some metaphysical realm beyond the world; rather, he refers here to a more radical transcendentalism, describing thought’s absolute connection to the worldly problems that bring it into being (see DR 143).
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