

# **The Dynamics of Conversion: the Islamisation of the Dayak peoples of Central Kalimantan<sup>1</sup>**

Ian Chalmers

Humanities

Curtin University of Technology<sup>2</sup>

[I.Chalmers@curtin.edu.au](mailto:I.Chalmers@curtin.edu.au)

As is the case throughout Borneo, and indeed much of Indonesia, Central Kalimantan is in the midst of a process of Islamisation. As described below, there are two factors responsible for the growing popularity of the religion in the province. One is the pattern of migration, for significant numbers of Muslim settlers, both spontaneous migrants and transmigrants, have relocated to Kalimantan in recent decades. A second and more significant reason is that Islam is gaining local converts, particularly among the indigenous Dayak peoples who have traditionally dominated the province. This finding is surprising, for the Dayaks have long been closely associated with Christianity and, to a lesser extent, nativist belief systems. It also challenges the contrast often drawn between the Muslim Malays of the coastal regions and the

---

<sup>1</sup> This paper was delivered to the 16<sup>th</sup> Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA) in Wollongong, 26-29 June 2006. It has been peer-reviewed and appears on the Conference proceedings website by permission of the author, who retains copyright. The paper may be downloaded for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and other relevant legislation.

<sup>2</sup> Some acknowledgements for assistance in preparation of this study are due. This paper is largely based on research conducted in Kalteng in 2003 and 2004, funded by the Division of Humanities, Curtin University, and the 'Research Unit for the Study of Societies in Change' (RUSSIC), also based at Curtin University. Greg Acciaioli provided insightful comments on an early draft of this paper, and kindly allowed me to reproduce his photographs.

indigenes of the hinterland. It raises the question: How relevant is religion as a marker of ethnicity in this region today?

This paper explores the social implications of the increase in the number of Dayak Muslims. Observers have long noted the phenomenon in Indonesia of ‘statistical Muslims’, namely people who have entered the faith by declaring their belief in God but who pay little heed to the other four pillars of Islam. As McVey suggested some decades ago, most Muslims in Indonesia were decidedly secular in orientation. “For all the overwhelming number of Islam’s formal adherents in Indonesia, which makes it on paper the world’s largest Muslim nation, unambiguous Islam is a minority religion” (McVey 1983, p. 200). Beginning in the 1980s, however, a Muslim revival resulted in both an increase in the numbers of Muslims and closer adherence to doctrine. It is therefore also relevant to ask of Dayaks in Central Kalimantan, has this growing identification with the broader universal religion also changed their social and political behaviour?

The first section below provides an overview of the socio-cultural background of each of three universal religions that have significant numbers of adherents in the province. The second section describes the gradual spread of Islam from the coastal regions into the hinterland, noting the regions that remain largely Christian and/or Hindu. I then explore the ethnic complexities that account for these variations in faith. Central Kalimantan (*Kalimantan Tengah*, hereafter ‘Kalteng’) was carved out of South Kalimantan in the late 1950s following political demands to create a ‘Dayak homeland’, a place where the indigenous peoples of Kalimantan could maintain a distinct ethnic identity (Miles 1976). Initially, opposition to the intrusion of Islam was an important factor sustaining the social movement that led to the creation of the province. However, the identification with Islam of an increasing number of Dayaks in the following decades means that the province cannot be so easily associated with the non-Muslim community.

The final and more speculative section asks: What are the socio-political implications of the adoption of Islam by a large section of the indigenous population? It may well be that many Dayaks originally changed their faith in what may be termed ‘strategic conversions’, namely the adoption of Islam in response to political or economic incentives. However, many observers have noted an increase in both the public display and personal observance of the faith throughout Kalteng, as many nominal Muslims have begun to practise a more devout form of Islam. To what extent then, has this Muslim revival also touched the Dayak community?

The Three Faiths of Kalteng

As in the rest of Kalimantan, Kalteng has a Muslim majority. However, Table 1 illustrates that there is also considerable diversity of faith, with significant Hindu and Christian minorities. Different religions influence their followers in different ways, so we would expect the social behaviour of these communities to differ. But the reverse is also true, for the social context also shapes doctrine. Each of the three major religions of Kalteng has evolved from a different social environment, warranting a brief description of their local socio-cultural histories.

**Table 1 – Religious affiliation in Kalimantan, 1971 and 2000 (%)**

	Muslim		Christian*		Hindu		Buddhist		Others**	
	1971	2000	1971	2000	1971	2000	1971	2000	1971	2000
<b>West Kal</b>	43	58	18	34	neg	neg	neg	6	39	2
<b>Centr Kal</b>	55	74	16	17	1	8	neg	neg	28	1
<b>South Kal</b>	96	97	1	2	neg	1	0.5	neg	2	1
<b>East Kal</b>	68	85	17	14	neg	neg	neg	1	14	neg

Note: Percentages rounded.

\* ‘Christian’ includes both protestants and catholics, who are recorded separately in Indonesia.

\*\* ‘Others’ here includes Confucianism, a separate category in the 1971 census (7% West Kal, 2% East Kal).

Source: calculated from Suryadinata, Ananta & Arifin (2003, Tables 4.2.2, 4.3.2, 4.4.2, 4.5.2, 4.6.4)

The province of Kalteng has long been associated with Christianity. Visitors to the capital city of Palangka Raya cannot help noting the number of prominent Protestant and Catholic churches, and may also witness large congregations attending services in any of the large towns. In addition, numerous schools, seminaries, colleges and other social institutions are managed by church authorities, while ministers and lay officials are prominent community leaders. In short, in urban and many rural areas a great deal of social life revolves around the churches.

This leading role of the church dates from the colonial period, and its orientation today owes much to the nature of colonial rule. Kalimantan was incorporated into the Netherlands East Indies in the early 1800s, and for almost a century the colonial authorities had little direct contact with its people. Colonial rule was generally indirect, and indigenous leaders, both secular and religious, were generally permitted to organise their own affairs. The Sultan of Banjarmasin was thus given considerable political autonomy over southern Kalimantan. Nevertheless, the colonial authorities created a social context conducive to the spread of Christianity. The churches were free to propagate the faith amongst non-Muslims, and actively sought to win converts amongst the Dayak community. The German Rheinische Mission was established in 1835, and initially had little impact beyond its base in the Kuala Kapuas region in the far southwest of present-day Kalteng. However, its Swiss successor, the Baesler Mission, intensified the missionary activities of its predecessor, especially after

World War One; it deliberately stimulated anti-Muslim sentiment among the Dayaks. Although unable to match the nationalist appeal of their main rival organisation Muhammadiyah, the educational programs and various social activities of the missions produced a small and highly motivated Ngaju elite, especially in the Kuala Kapuas region (Miles 1976, pp. 105-106). They had also engendered an antipathy towards Banjarese Muslims that would profoundly effect the history of the province.



**The main Palangka Raya church of *Gereja Evangelis Kalimantan*, ‘Evangelical Church of Kalimantan’, the province’s largest and most influential church.  
(Photo, Greg Acciaioli)**

The role of the churches went beyond pastoral care, for from the outset the colonial authorities relied on the missions for administration of inland areas. As the churches expanded into the countryside, they came into contact with myriad local belief systems. Their overriding mission was to ‘civilise’ the Dayak peoples, and bring them into the world of modern Europe.<sup>3</sup> The important consequence of these activities was that by the 19th century

---

<sup>3</sup> The policies of church and colonial authorities were formulated within an ideological worldview of their role in Borneo to be either administrators or “intrepid adventures, bringing civilisation to the savages of the tropical jungles” (King 1993, p.9). Taken as a measure of success in this effort, in 1894 agreement was reached to outlaw headhunting, which gradually disappeared in the following decades. The joint statement made after this meeting at the upland village of Tumbang Anoi was the first political decision that included all the indigenous people of Kalimantan. Although this agreement and its successful implementation came about due to colonial pressure, politicians now consider it the first sign of an emergent Dayak political consciousness. The months of negotiations between hundreds of people from across the island has been called “the greatest traditional council (*persidangan adat*) in the history of Kalimantan and Indonesia” (Usop 1994, p. vi).

the Christian churches had become the most important medium for the introduction of modern education and European values.

These activities left an important political legacy. The Protestant missions maintained their presence, and by the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century had provided European forms of education to tens of thousands of predominately Dayak youth. The *Pakat Dayak* ('Dayak Agreement') was formally established in 1926, growing from an organisation formed by Ngaju businessmen in 1919. It petitioned the governor for improved conditions for the indigenous people, and in the following decades both the Christian missions and the Pakat sent delegations to Batavia, demanding that not only the Banjarese Malays but also the Dayak people be given political representation (Miles 1976, pp. 108-110). By the time of independence, Christianity had thus become the religion of the Dayak political elite. The lasting significance of the long association between the Dayak people and these Christian missions is that the churches continue to have a significant spiritual, physical and political presence in Kalteng, especially in the capital city and in the lower Kapuas and Barito regions.

If Christianity has long been prominent in certain regions and within elite social circles, in recent decades we have witnessed a revival of nativist religions, usually known by the collective term 'Kaharingan'. There is now a considerable literature on these belief systems, especially those of the Ngaju, Ma'anyan and Ot Danum ethnic groups.<sup>4</sup> Although they differ in important aspects, there are a number of elements that they share. Firstly, all involve elaborate religious practices centred on the life cycle, particularly death. Second, the cosmology of these communities consists of an upper and a lower world, places that are far removed from everyday existence. Finally, priests and priestesses have an important religious function, for it is these shamans who are able to communicate in the esoteric languages needed to communicate when they are possessed by spirits; they are thus the mediums for communication with these other worlds. Perhaps the most important ceremonies conducted by these shamans are elaborate two-stage funerals, the secondary stage of which comprises a complex ceremony that may last weeks, when the spirit of the dead person is taken to its final resting place in the upper spirit world (the *Tiwah* ceremony for Ngaju, *Ijambe* for Ma'anyan) (Schiller 2002).

These religious beliefs contain certain Hindu-Buddhist elements, indicating long-standing cultural interaction with Java. As we will see, a recurring characteristic of social and political leaders in southern Kalimantan is that they have sought legitimation from culturally powerful centres. From the 14<sup>th</sup> to the 16<sup>th</sup> centuries local leaders sought to ally themselves with

---

<sup>4</sup> The following description draws on Scharer's classic text on the Ngaju (Scharer 1963), Hudson's description of the Ma'anyan (Hudson 1972), and a more general description of various Dayak communities (Ave 1972, pp. 185-196).

Majapahit, the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom that then held cultural sway over much of the archipelago.<sup>5</sup> The cultural authority of Java is also evident in the spiritual realm: in Kaharingan the upper world is called '*Mahatara*', a word that is cognate with *Batara Guru*, the term for Siva used in Java. This usage exemplifies how symbols of cultural power were borrowed from Java and blended with indigenous beliefs and practices, laying the basis for the eventual classification of Kaharingan as a form of Hinduism.

The religion was politicised after independence, when it enjoyed something of a populist revival. As discussed at greater length below, a characteristic of Kaharingan is its openness to other religions. Historically, such tolerance has not, however, extended to Islam. Indeed, the desire to maintain a religious identity separate from Islam was at least partly responsible for the creation of the province itself. Before independence socio-political movements such as the *Pakat Dayak* had been motivated by the desire to avoid being swamped by Muslim Banjarese. Although most Dayak politicians sided with Republican forces during the national revolution of 1945-1949, local ethno-religious demands soon re-emerged. In the early 1950s organisations such as the 'Union of Kaharingan Dayak of Indonesia' (SKDI) held a People's Congress of Central Kalimantan (KRKT), and demanded the creation of a separate Dayak homeland distinct from South Kalimantan. Some of these groups took up arms, after which the central government acceded to their demands.<sup>6</sup> The new province was formally proclaimed on 23 May 1957 (Miles 1976 pp. 114-124; Weinstock 1987 pp. 71-73).

A turning point in the recent history of Kaharingan came in 1980. After several decades of lobbying by prominent Ngaju politicians and religious leaders, in that year Kaharingan was finally recognised as a form of Hinduism (Weinstock 1981). This recognition explains an apparent anomaly in Table 1. Although care needs to be taken when comparing statistics derived from different sources, it seems that until then there had been little change in religious affiliation. In 1957 fifty-seven percent of the population was Muslim, seven percent Christian, while those who did not adhere to a world religion (then classified as 'pagan') made up over one-third of the province's population (Miles 1976, p. 117). By 1971 the Christian population had increased, but the proportions of Muslims and 'others' were changed little. Yet by 2000 there had been a precipitous drop in the share of the population classified as 'other', and greater affiliation with all the universal religions. The reason for this sharp reduction was that

---

<sup>5</sup> It is unlikely that Majapahit actually ruled most of the areas over which it claimed sovereignty, but was what has been called an 'exemplary centre' setting the standard for social and cultural authority (Cribb 1999, pp. 5-7; Geertz 1973 [1967], pp. 131-4).

<sup>6</sup> Reflecting the warrior tradition of the Ngaju, this movement was called GMTPS, *Gerakan Mandau Talawang Pancasila*, 'Pro-Pancasila Movement of the Cutlass (*Mandau*) and Shield (*Talawang*). The movement was revived in the mid-1990s, when a number of Dayak politicians formed the 'Generation of Warriors to Continue the GMTPS' (APP- GMTPS) (Interview, Yansen Lambung, Palangka Raya, 4 July 2003).

in 1980, tens of thousands of ‘pagans’ had almost overnight become ‘Hindus’; others had become adherents of other religions.

Official recognition in turn increased the appeal of Kaharingan. Previously, it had been classified as an *aliran kepercayaan*, a ‘belief stream’, and did not enjoy the material and social benefits that derived from classification as one of Indonesia’s recognised religions, an *agama*. Certain Kaharingan priests objected to the new classification, and some are still campaigning for its recognition as a distinct religion; Kaharingan and Hinduism are sometimes classified separately. But most Kaharingan leaders have concurred, content with the advantages that flow from more active participation in national religious and political life. What is clear is that the institutionalisation of the religion enabled it to attract more followers, and the number of Hindus increased further (Schiller 1996).



**A catholic church at Bangkal near Lake Sembuluh in western Kalteng. Note the mortuary figures associated with nativist death rituals in the foreground, symbolising the mutual tolerance that has traditionally existed between the churches and Kaharingan. (Photo, Greg Acciaioli)**

The third and final universal religion of Kalteng discussed here is Islam. In what seems to have been an almost inexorable expansion throughout the archipelago, it had established firm bases in northern Sumatra by the 13<sup>th</sup> century, after which it spread to regions further to the east,, reaching northeast Malaya, Brunei, southern Philippines and parts of East Java by the 14<sup>th</sup> century, and Malacca and all of the Malay peninsula in the 15<sup>th</sup> century (Ricklefs 2001,

p.7). However, in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century all of Borneo apart from Brunei remained non-Muslim (ibid, p. 10). Its most important foothold on the south coast of Borneo came with the conversion of the ruler of Banjarmasin in the mid-16<sup>th</sup> century, to be followed in later centuries by the establishment of sultanates in West Kalimantan (Tanjung Pura in Pontianak) and East Kalimantan (Kutai). As Banjarese settlements expanded from Banjarmasin into the hinterland in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the advance of Islam was accompanied by the retreat of Dayak culture. There were gradual conversions in the following centuries, and today the population of South Kalimantan is almost all Muslim.

As shown in Table 1, the proportion of the population adhering to Islam has increased in all four provinces in Kalimantan in recent decades. But it is in Kalteng that it has increased most rapidly, rising from about one-third of a million adherents in 1970 to over 1.3 million in 2000, or from 55 to 74 percent of the population. This process of Islamisation raises some intriguing questions. As we have seen, from the outset the province was defined in contradistinction to South Kalimantan, dominated as it is by the Muslim Banjarese. Does the growing popularity of Islam therefore indicate that Dayak politicians have lost their hostility to Islam? In the past it was often noted that the people of Kalteng shifted easily between Christianity and Kaharingan, but that such openness generally did not extend to Islam (Hudson 1972, pp. 39-43).<sup>7</sup> Does this ‘fluidity’ of faith thus now also embrace Islam?

These questions will be taken up in a later section. Prior to this, it is instructive to describe the various processes by which Islam penetrated the region.

#### The Geography of Conversion: Historical and Contemporary Patterns

Perhaps the most oft-remarked feature of early conversions to Islam in the archipelago is that the key bearers of the new religious knowledge came from well beyond the region. Contact with Arabian, Gujerati and Persian traders and the clerics who accompanied them was crucial, for it was the evident social and cultural authority of these outsiders that encouraged local religious and political leaders to adopt the religion. However, the form that the religion took varied greatly from region to region. In other words, the dynamic of early Islamisation entailed the indigenisation of foreign ideas and practices.<sup>8</sup> We therefore need to examine the local dynamics behind these processes, as rulers or political aspirants initially sought new forms of knowledge that would enhance their social and political authority, and then the religion was adopted by local communities.

---

<sup>7</sup> In a forthcoming study of village life in a Western region of Kalteng, Greg Acciaioli notes that in some respects the local Kaharingan belief system has modelled itself on Christianity, particularly in regard to places of worship and formal services (Personal communication, July 2006)

<sup>8</sup> Jones finds that the conversion to Islam of a number of regions in the archipelago from the 14<sup>th</sup> to 16<sup>th</sup> centuries came about after the rulers of existing kingdoms were converted (Jones 1979).



Historians record a number of factors that favoured the conversion of whole populations. One was the prominent role played by Sufi mystics after the 17<sup>th</sup> century, for their practices offered new interpretations that accorded with existing mystical belief systems. A second factor was the missionary fervour of many Islamic clerics who believed it was their mission to convert unbelievers and thus save them from perdition. Their efforts took on a more political tone with the arrival of Christian Europeans, and Islam became a symbol of resistance to Western cultural domination. Finally, perhaps the most important factor behind Islam's appeal was that the egalitarianism of Muslim commercial law made it especially attractive to traders. It offered both a set of ideas and religious practices that united merchants across the archipelago.<sup>9</sup>

Islam was thus adopted by various social groups because of the appeal of these four factors – its mystical appeal, the devotion of its most devout proponents, its resistance to European colonialism, and that most pragmatic of reasons, its usefulness to commerce. These factors suggest that Islam was most readily adopted by communities with an external orientation, for it appealed to social groups that were seeking to build links to outside centres of cultural authority.

Islam entered southern Kalimantan from Java in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, its entry initially aided by a family dispute (Sjamsuddin 1991). With the help of the Sultan of Demak, the Banjarese prince of the kingdom of Martapura, Pangeran Samudera, defeated his uncle Pangeran Temenggung. He moved the capital to the new city of Banjarmasin, and adopted the title of Sultan Suriansyah. Initially taken up by palace retainers and other state officials, in the following decades the new religion was gradually adopted by widening sectors of the population; scholars, merchants, and other 'upwardly mobile' groups sought to improve their social standing. Not much is known about the specific processes of Islamisation that followed, but it is clear that in the following two centuries various social groups within the Banjarese community converted (Sjamsuddin 1991). The mechanism for this long and gradual process seems to have been primarily social, as trade and intermarriage increased contact between Muslims and non-Muslims. By the early 20<sup>th</sup> century the region had become almost exclusively Muslim, and since then Islam has remained a key element of Banjarese ethnic identity (Hawkins 2000).

In this context, the early Islamisation of a particular Dayak community is of special interest (Sjamsuddin 1991). The Bakumpai were a subgroup of the Ngaju ethnic group who lived at

---

<sup>9</sup> James Siegel has shown that by the 19<sup>th</sup> century such links had afforded the traders of Aceh considerable authority from both the traditional local ruling class (*uleebalang*) and the religious scholars (Siegel 1969)

Marabahan, a village on the Barito river close to Banjarmasin. The Bakumpai had the advantage of speaking both Banjarese and Ngaju, and contact with the neighbouring community led some to convert to Islam. Marabahan linked Banjarmasin with up-stream Dayak communities, and its importance as a trade centre grew. As skilled Bakumpai traders moved up the river and established new settlements, increased social contact and intermarriage led to more conversions. Even though the Bakumpai were originally indistinguishable from the Ngaju, by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century they considered themselves a distinct ethnic group. Islam had become the key ethnic marker of the community. This example illustrates how it was the social interaction that followed trade along the river system that lay the basis for the initial penetration of Islam into Dayak communities in southern Kalimantan.

A remarkably similar process of gradual Islamisation is also evident in Kalteng today. As Table 2 indicates, there are a number of variations in religious affiliation between these six districts.<sup>10</sup> Almost one-third of the population in Barito Selatan ('Barsel') is Christian, as is that of the capital city, Palangka Raya (P. Raya). The presence of these communities reflects the continued influence of the missions established along the Barito river during colonial times, and the prominent social role of Christians in the provincial capital. There is also a significant following for Hindu-Kaharingan in the upland district of Barito Utara ('Barut'), with smaller minorities elsewhere. However, the most notable characteristic of these figures is the consistency in religious following, with Muslims in a majority everywhere.

**Table 2 - Religious Affiliation by District, Central Kalimantan, 2000 (%)**

	Islam	Christian	Hindu	Buddhist	Other	Total (000)
<b>Kobar</b>	82	13	4	neg	1	100 (246.0)
<b>Kotim</b>	81	9	9	neg	1	100 (521.8)
<b>Kapuas</b>	72	20	8	-	neg	100 (511.6)
<b>Barsel</b>	61	32	7	-	neg	100 (179.5)
<b>Barut</b>	67	16	17	-	1	100 (183.3)
<b>P. Raya</b>	69	30	1	-	neg	100 (158.8)
<b>TOTAL</b>	74	17	8	0.1	1	100 (1,800.7)


Note: percentages rounded

Source: unpublished data, BPS-Kalteng, 'Penduduk per kabupaten/kota, suku bangsa dan agama, 2000'

This relative consistency of these data is misleading, however, for they obscure some important differences. A distinctive feature of social and cultural life in Kalteng is that it revolves around the rivers, which have until recently been the principal means for communication, travel and trade. As a result, people strongly identify with the community

<sup>10</sup> The figures in the following tables are calculated from data supplied by of the local branch of the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS-Kalteng). I am grateful to these officials for sharing these data.

that extends from north to south along each of seven river systems: from east to west, the Barito, Kapuas, Kahayan (on which lies Palangka Raya), Katingan, Mentaya, Seruyan and Lamandau rivers (see Map 1). As is immediately clear from a glance at Map 2, the administrative boundaries follow the rivers, with each district (*kabupaten*) defined around one or two rivers. The important consequence of this administrative structure is that each district includes both communities near the mouth of the rivers and communities far inland.<sup>11</sup>



Map 1, the river systems that dominate Kalteng


Geographical differences in religious adherence become clearer if we look at a lower level of administration, and examine figures for sub-districts (*kecamatan*) within one of the major districts. The following analysis is of the largest district in the province, namely Kotawaringin Timur (commonly called 'Kotim'). It should be noted that in 2002 the six districts within the province were increased to fourteen, a policy associated with national decentralisation

<sup>11</sup> The Barito river is an exception to this pattern, for part of the river's community is in North Barito (Barut) district, part in South Barito (Barsel). The lower reaches of the river are actually within Kapuas district.

measures that came to be known as ‘splitting’ (*pemekaran*). The 26 sub-districts (24 before 2002) that fall within the boundaries of the former Kotim are now shared between three districts: Seruyan on the Seruyan River in the west, Kotim on the Mentaya River in the centre, and Katingan on the Katingan River in the east. However, the data on religious affiliation at the sub-district level date from 2001. For purposes of comparison, the boundaries of the former district are used; the three districts that came into existence in 2002 are treated as one.

Still the most populous district within the province, Kotim is also one of the most Islamic, with 81 percent of the population Muslim, 11 percent Hindu, and 8 percent Christian. However, religious affiliation at the sub-district level is more complex, with significant pockets of Christianity and a greater following of Hindu-Kaharingan as one moves inland and away from the coast.

**MAP 2, THE SIX DISTRICTS OF KALTENG (pre-2002)**



**Source:** Provincial government website, <http://www.kalteng.go.id/INDO/images/PETA>

A number of observations can be gleaned from closer examination of Table 3, which details the number of followers of three religions in each of Kotim’s sub-districts. The first

conclusion is that the most Muslim sub-districts are near the coast, either in estuaries (*kuala*) or at the downstream (*hilir*) section of the major rivers. Many of the sub-districts that are on the ‘downstream’ end of the three main river systems are over 95 per cent Muslim (Seruyan Hilir, Katingan Kuala, Mentaya Hilir Utara, Mendawai). The sub-districts in which transmigrants from Java and elsewhere have generally settled are also overwhelmingly Muslim (Baamang, Ketapang in ‘Mentaya Baru’, Samuda in ‘Mentaya Hilir Selatan’, Bapinang in ‘Pulau Hanaut’). Together, these subdistricts account for the vast majority of Kotim’s Muslim population.

The second conclusion is that religious affiliation is much more varied elsewhere. The population in the four most ‘upstream’ (*hulu*) sub-districts is majority Hindu (Seruyan Hulu, Katingan Hulu, Marikit, Sanaman Mantikei). There also remains a substantial Christian minority in the eastern part of Kotim, especially in the subdistricts of Tewang Sungai Garing, Antang Kalang and the Katingan regions – the traditional Ngaju ‘heartland’. (Mentaya Hulu is a large subdistrict in the centre of Kotim that includes the major city of Kuala Kuayan; it is largely Muslim, but also contains significant Hindu and Christian minorities.)

**Table 3 – Religious affiliation in Kotim by sub-district, 2001**

	Muslim	Christian*	Hindu	Total (000)
Hanau	100	neg	neg	16
Mentaya Hilir Selatan	100	neg	neg	34
Pulau Hanaut	100	neg	0	14
Seruyan Hilir	99	1	0	35
Mendawai	99	1	neg	9
Katingan Kuala	98	2	neg	24
Baamang	96	4	neg	40
Kamiping	94	2	4	8
Mentaya Hilir Utara	93	4	3	16
Mentaya Baru (Ketapang)	92	6	2	68
Seruyan Tengah	90	4	6	21
Danau Sembuluh	88	5	7	10
Parenggean	83	12	2	21
Kota Besi	83	7	10	22
Cempaga	74	15	11	28
Mentaya Hulu	68	11	22	51
Katingan Hilir	64	24	13	17
Katingan Tengah	56	20	24	18
Tasik Payawan	54	12	34	7
Antang Kalang	49	21	30	6
Seruyan Hulu	39	8	53	10
Katingan Hulu	31	12	56	10
Pulau Malan	28	19	53	8
Sanaman Mantikei	27	16	57	13
Tewang Sungai Garing	20	34	46	9
Marikit	20	16	64	6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>100 (522)</b>

Note: percentages rounded

\*‘Christian’ includes both Protestant (average 6%) and Catholic (average 2%)

Source: BPS-Kalteng, 2003, *Kotawaringan Timur dalam Angka 2001*, Tabel 4.4.1

Taken together, these two findings support the proposition that Islamisation has proceeded most rapidly in regions which have come into contact with outside influences. Two geographical aspects are relevant here. Firstly, the differences in religious affiliation between upstream and downstream sub-districts indicates that the process of conversion continues to follow historical patterns, namely conversion following increased social interaction along river courses. Second, improvements in modern transportation (air, roads) and the greater penetration of national administrative and commercial infrastructure have brought more communities into the orbit of nation-wide influences. The impact on religious following of the greater penetration of the nation-state is most clearly evinced by the increase in the number of Muslim transmigrants. The dynamic of Islamisation may still be gradual and via social interaction, but modernisation of the nation-state has altered the means for such interaction.

As mentioned at the outset, one plausible explanation for the steady Islamisation of the province relates to increased migration, itself a consequence of Kalteng's deepening integration into the nation-state. In the late 1970s an official government study estimated that only half of the province's 800,000 inhabitants were of indigenous descent (Mihing 1977/78, p. 40). The subsequent in-migration of individuals, families and sometimes whole villages from Java, Madura, Bali, Sumatra, Sulawesi and elsewhere in Kalimantan has certainly changed the province's ethnic composition. It could be that this movement of non-indigenes to Kalimantan changed the pattern of religious adherence.

Geographical factors alone do not, however, entirely explain the social dynamics that lie behind Islamisation, for in Kalteng the process is complicated by considerations of ethnic loyalties. As the case of the Bakumpai indicates, certain Dayak groups have openly embraced Islam. However, others remain resistant – or perhaps indifferent. We therefore also need to ask: To what extent can ethnic differences account for geographical variations in faith?

#### The Ethnicity of Conversion: Islamisation and Dayak Revivalism

One of the most important modifications of the 2000 census was that it contained questions about ethnic self-identification, and for the first time since 1930 we are now able to measure the ethnic balance within Indonesia with some degree of accuracy.<sup>12</sup> Importantly, for the first time ever we are now able to correlate these data with religious affiliation. Given the relatively untested status of these data, much of the following analysis is necessarily tentative. But it is clear that a large proportion of the Dayak community has converted to Islam since independence.


---

<sup>12</sup> Terry Hull (2001) discusses the improvements evident in the 2000 census, while noting some of the surprising results. Mackie warns, however, about the dangers faced when comparing these data with those of the 1930 census – particularly in matters relating to ethnicity (Mackie 2005).

By the end of the colonial period the regions of Borneo that would become part of Indonesia were already very ethnically diverse. Based on data drawn from the 1930 census, Map 3 indicates that most of the coastal regions of South and East Kalimantan were dominated by ethnic Malays. Banjarese Malays were concentrated around Banjarmasin, with significant numbers extending into present-day East Kalimantan; there was also a substantial concentration of Buginese on the east and southeast coasts. However, most of the island was inhabited by the various by those indigenous communities categorised by the Dutch as Dayak, with a concentration of Ot Danum in upland Borneo. Of particular relevance to this article, most of the region that would become Kalteng was dominated by Ngaju Dayaks.<sup>13</sup>

Even in the 1930s, however, the region was ethnically diverse. The areas where contiguous Dayak and Malay ethnic 'zones' meet are cross-hatched, presumably indicating that the population was mixed. There were also significant intrusions of Banjarese and other Malays along the courses of the major rivers, as the areas coloured grey indicate.

### MAP 3 – DOMINANT ETHNIC GROUPS IN KALTENG, ca 1930



**Source:** *Adatrecht bundles map 019*

Note: Malays = grey, Banjarese = grey/brown, Buginese = red, Javanese = pink/grey, Ngaju Dayaks = light green, Ot Danum = light/dark green

<sup>13</sup> Because of their use of a common language, the Dutch authorities probably categorised as 'Ngaju' many groups that consider themselves ethnically distinct, such as Katingan Dayaks, Sampit Dayaks and Ma'anyan.

Population movements after independence accelerated this trend, for migration from elsewhere in Indonesia significantly diluted Dayak dominance of the province. Starting from a low base, the population grew rapidly, rising from 200,000 in 1930 to 500,000 in 1961, 700,000 in 1971, just under 1 million in 1980, and reaching 1.9 million in 2004.<sup>14</sup> Much of this increase was due to an influx of people from other islands, chiefly attracted by expanding business and employment opportunities; in the 1980s the province of Kalteng had the second fastest-growing economy in Indonesia after that of Aceh. Perhaps the clearest example of the changing ethnic composition of the province is the growing number of Javanese. In 1930 there were significant numbers of Javanese concentrated on the southern coastline. In later decades many more Javanese migrated, often joining members of their family who had already settled. This process of 'spontaneous migration' was reinforced by state-promoted transmigration policies that began in the 1940s but accelerated in the three decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Most transmigrants were Javanese, who settled in regions near the coast. As shown in Table 4, by 2000 the Javanese had become the second-largest ethnic group in Kalteng. Overall, the four largest ethnic groups not indigenous to the island make up almost 50 per cent of the population. These communities are predominately Muslim, and the logical inference being that distribution of ethnic groups explains the distribution of faith in Kalteng today.

A second factor leading to the diminution of the Dayak presence in the province is a form of conversion particular to Kalimantan. Whereas there was considerable fluidity between Christians and Kaharingans, this was not always the case for Muslim converts. In his study of village life in the 1970s, Miles describes two social systems with different patterns of religious affiliation. In the Ngaju heartland and amongst the hill communities that he surveyed, individuals had a very fluid understanding of faith. These Dayaks saw no inconsistency in individuals of diverse religious orientations participating in each others' religious ceremonies. More importantly, religious identification was considered a matter of personal choice, and people would often switch between religions on the basis of pragmatic or material considerations. But there was a second social system operating in places like the town of Kuala Kayan (called 'Kuala Karis' by Miles). In such areas, those Dayaks who converted to Islam were considered to have *masuk Melayu*, 'entered Malaydom' or 'become Malay'; as elsewhere in southern Kalimantan, becoming Malay meant 'becoming Banjarese'. In other words, in these communities Islamisation was a one-way process whereby the convert lost his or her prior ethnic affiliation (Miles 1976, pp. 92-101).

---

<sup>14</sup> The early figures are taken from Mihing (1977/78, p. 27 ). The post-1980 figures from the official provincial government website.



To sum up the argument thus far, two long-term processes of social change partly account for the increase in the numbers of Muslims in Kalteng. Migration from other provinces has changed the ethnic and therefore the religious composition of the province; a significant number of Dayaks have converted. We might speculate that these two processes were mutually reinforcing, and that the interaction of Dayaks with a growing number of migrants encouraged conversion. Whether through migration or the process of Dayak ‘becoming Malay’, by 2000 the Banjarese community was the largest of the 54 ethnic groups recorded in Kalteng.

There is a third factor, however, responsible for the Islamisation of the province. As Table 4 indicates, a bare majority of people in the province is indigenous. The 11 largest Dayak groups listed below (ie those over 10,000 people) account for 47 percent of the population. Significantly, a majority identify as Muslims.

**Table 4 – Religious affiliation of major ethnic groups in Kalteng, 2000**

	Islam	Christian	Hindu	Other	Total %
Banjarese Malay	99	neg	neg	neg	24.6
Javanese*	96	3.5	neg	neg	18.8
Ngaju Dayaks	43	44	13	0.3	18.0
Sampit Dayaks	82	9	9	neg	9.6
Bakumpai	99	neg	neg	neg	7.5
Madurese	100	neg	neg	neg	3.5
Katingan Dayaks	37	22	32	9	3.3
Maanyan	4	86	9	1	2.8
Tomun Dayaks	18	56	17	2	2.2
Sundanese	99	1	neg	neg	1.4
Dusun Dayaks	9	29	63	neg	1.1
Siang Dayaks	6	40	48	4	0.9
Manyan Dayaks	20	70	10	neg	0.7
Ot Danum	10	51	38	neg	0.6
(other non-Dayak)**					1.3
(other Dayaks)***					5
					<b>100</b> (1,801,006)

Note: Figures rounded.

\* Includes Cirebon Javanese, Betawi, and Bantenese

\*\* Includes Batak, Bima, Bugis, Flores, Sumatran Malay, Sasak

\*\*\* Includes 32 indigenous groups

Source: unpublished data, BPS-Kalteng, ‘Penduduk per kabupaten/kota, suku bangsa dan agama, 2000’

A more focused examination of the relationship between ethnicity and religion at the district level shows the large numbers of Muslim Dayaks more clearly. Table 5 indicates the religious affiliation of the 10 largest ethnic groups in Kotim. Not surprisingly, it shows that the overwhelming majority of non-indigenous ethnic groups are Muslim (ie. Banjarese, Javanese, Bugis, Madurese, Sundanese); together they account for over 40 per cent of Muslims in the district. But there are also a significant number of Muslim Dayaks. The single largest ethnic group are ‘Sampit Dayaks’, who are 82 per cent Muslim. And although not as numerous as

elsewhere, in this district Ngaju Dayaks are over 50 per cent Muslim.<sup>15</sup> Even the Katingan Dayaks are about equally split between Muslims, Hindus and Christians. In short, a majority of Dayaks in Kotim identify as Muslim.

**Table 5 – Religious affiliation of major ethnic groups in Kotim, 2000**

	Islam	Christian	Hindu	Other	Total %
Sampit Dayaks	82	8.5	9	neg	32.4
Javanese*	97	3	neg	neg	18.3
Banjar Malay	99	neg	neg	neg	17.0
Katingan Dayaks	36.5	22	32	9	11.4
Ngaju Dayaks	56	19	25	neg	8.0
Madurese	100	neg	neg	neg	6.9
Sundanese	99	neg	neg	neg	1.3
Tomun Dayaks	15	19	4	34**	0.5
Buginese	95	5	neg	neg	0.3
Others***				neg	3.9
					<b>100</b>

Note: Percentages rounded.

\* Includes Cirebon Javanese, Betawi, and Bantenese

\*\* Includes 766 (=32%) Buddhists

\*\*\* Includes Batak, Bima, Bugis, Flores, Sumatran Malay and Sasak, and 32 Dayak groups

Source: unpublished data, BPS-Kalteng, 'Penduduk per kabupaten/kota, suku bangsa dan agama, 2000'

This third factor behind the Islamisation of Kalteng is of most political consequence, for it is closely related to a resurgence of Dayak ethnic identity. As the case of the Bakumpai illustrates, in the past conversion meant a change in ethnic affiliation. The Bakumpai were – and are still – considered Dayak, but their change in religion separated them ethnically from neighbouring Dayak communities. Similarly, more recent conversions to Islam resulted in at least some Dayaks becoming Banjarese – and may partly account for the increase in the number of Banjarese in the province. However, the new legitimacy that now derives from Dayak identity is reversing this process: it is likely that many Muslims who previously identified as Banjarese are now resuming their Dayak identity, but as 'Muslim Dayaks', *Dayak-Islam*.

At this point a brief discussion of the etymology of the term 'Dayak' is appropriate. Originally, 'Dayak' was a derogatory category used by the colonial authorities to refer to what they considered the uncivilised peoples of the interior; it carried connotations of primitiveness, and was related to popular European images of the 'Wild Men of Borneo' (King 1993, pp. 7-17). But as the example of the *Pakat Dayak* illustrates, in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century the term was appropriated by various indigenous groups to put forward political

<sup>15</sup> The Ngaju are still the largest single ethnic group in the province, about one-third of a million individuals. About 65 per cent of this population are in Kapuas Barat district, where they are 43 per cent Muslim, 43 per cent Christian and 14 per cent Hindu. Only in Palangka Raya are a majority of Ngaju Christians (64 per cent).

demands. Ethnic-based mobilisation reappeared in the first decade after independence, culminating in the events that led to the creation of the province itself. And since the mid-1990s there have been indications that Dayak politicians are once again emphasising a common ethnic identity, laying the basis for assertions of Dayak cultural and social rights.

During the decades of the New Order the prevailing discourse amongst Dayak politicians and activists focused on how they had been marginalised by the forces set in train by the regime's development policies. A sense of despondency took hold, one that persists in some quarters. Members of the 'Institute for Dayakologi' based in West Kalimantan, for example, consider that the demise of the Suharto regime has not greatly improved conditions for most Dayaks; they remain marginalised culturally, socially, politically, and economically. One of the most important means of such marginalisation, they suggest, has been the proselytising efforts of both Muslims and Christians who characterise indigenous belief systems as backward and unsophisticated (Bamba 2004; Djuweng 2001).

From the early 1990s, however, this sense of deprivation has begun to be replaced by growing self-confidence, certainly amongst Dayak political elites, but also amongst political activists. More Dayak intellectuals and political activists asserted their cultural primacy, and from the 1990s a 'Pan-Dayak' consciousness has spread throughout West, Central and East Kalimantan (Thung, Maunati & Kedit 2004). Particularly in Central Kalimantan, Dayak ethnic identity has been emphasised with more vigour (Kusni 2001; Widen 2002). K.M.A Usop, a prominent politician and one of the chief spokespeople for the local Dayak community, has reinterpreted the history of Kalteng as a series of five Pakat Dayak ('Dayak Agreements'), the first in the 1850s, the second at Tumbang Anoi in 1894, the third the historical Pakat Dayak of 1926, the fourth the formation of Kalteng in 1957, and the last the revived Dayak mobilisation in the early 1990s.

In other words, these Pakat Dayaks have functioned as a framework for the integration of [Dayak] identity, developing from period to period in the process of [developing] a civilisation (Usop 1994, p. v, my translation).

The most explosive expression of this form of indigenism were the anti-Madurese riots and killings that broke out in Central Kalimantan in 2001, starting in Sampit and spreading to other urban and rural areas.<sup>16</sup> Although there have been many different explanations for their causes, these events have been widely interpreted by Dayak political leaders as showing that

---

<sup>16</sup> The 2001 events followed similar conflicts in West Kalimantan in the 1990s. Some interpretations of the Kalteng events emphasise political manipulation (Klinken 2002), whereas others see in the conflict mostly evidence of cultural marginalisation (Widen 2002). My own observations suggest that there were a range of political, economic and cultural causes. The International Crisis Group provides a good description of the events, emphasising the variety of causal factors (ICG 2001).

non-indigenous inhabitants and more recent settlers must recognise the cultural authority of Dayak community leaders. As the expression now common amongst Dayak politicians and activists goes, ‘wherever you walk on this earth, it is the (local) sky that you must venerate’ (*dimana bumi dipijak, disitu langit dijujung*). In other words, in Kalteng Dayak politicians and intellectuals are asserting their cultural ascendancy, building on historical precedence to reinforce a tradition of Dayak political pre-eminence.

The significant implication for religious identification of this growing Dayak self-confidence is that it has become less necessary for Dayaks to alter their ethnic identity when they convert to Islam. Numerous Dayak government officials and political activists interviewed in 2003 and 2004 were Christian, but an equal number were proudly Muslim, and saw no tension with their Dayakness. As emphasised by K.M.A Usop, a prominent politician and one of the chief spokespeople for the local Dayak community, Islam has spread gradually amongst many ethnic groups within the province, and all communities are able to maintain their different ethnic identities. “So Dayaks no longer have to *masuk Melayu* when they adopt Islam”.<sup>17</sup> For our purposes, a corollary is that Dayak Muslims can continue to carry out traditional religious ceremonies associated with Kaharingan, and thereby assert the primacy of their Dayak identity.<sup>18</sup>

#### Concluding comments: political and cultural implications

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this account. Perhaps the most obvious is that more non-Muslim groups within the province have come into contact with Islam, and some have converted. These conversions repeat a world-wide historical pattern. As found by a study of conversion in the Holy Land during and after the medieval period, the religion spread primarily via social mechanisms. “Conversion to Islam was typically the consequence not of official pressure, or of an alleged collapse of indigenous Christian or other institutions, but of increasing social interaction between Muslim and non-Muslims” (Winter 2000, p. 97). And because the process of the Islamisation of southern Kalimantan since the 16<sup>th</sup> century has also proceeded via social mechanisms, the gradualism that has characterised the process is therefore likely to persist.

A second conclusion is that the fluidity that once characterised the relationship between Kaharingan and Christianity in the Dayak community now extends to Islam. There are obvious limits to such fluidity, for it is generally not possible to switch with ease from Islam;

---

<sup>17</sup> Interview, 2 July 2003. Professor Usop is himself a Ngaju-Dayak Muslim, reportedly married to a Banjarese.

<sup>18</sup> For example, a number of Muslim politicians interviewed in 2003, one a prominent Ngaju bureaucrat in the Kotim administration in Sampit, invited me to a *tivah*, which they proudly considered a feature of local Dayak identity.

renouncing the faith is generally understood as apostasy, not conversion. But there has been a blurring of the hard divide between the Muslim-Banjar community on the one hand, and the Christian-Dayak or Kaharingan/Hindu-Dayak communities on the other. Dayaks can now choose between at least three universal (and many local) religions. And unlike the 1970s, when Miles did his field work, there is in today's Kalteng no contradiction between being both Muslim and Dayak.

Thirdly, not only is there no such contradiction, but being Muslim has become an important source of legitimacy for Dayak politicians. It is certainly the case that the original motivation for creating a new province – to have a Dayak homeland, one that is implicitly non-Muslim in contraposition to the Muslim-dominated South Kalimantan – is no longer a factor in local politics. More than that, in a context in which the national political discourse is becoming more overtly Islamic, there are many examples of local politicians seeking to establish their Islamic credentials. Just as Dayak political and religious leaders in the past sought to build links with Hindu-Buddhist centres of power in Java, so are they today promoting Islam as a means to build local political power. In July 2003 the then governor of Kalteng Asmawi Agani, a Bakumpai, hosted a national Koranic reading competition. This MTQ competition (*'Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur'an'*) drew thousands of competitors from around the nation, and was widely reported in national media. Almost immediately, Asmawi announced that Palangka Raya would be the site for an international version of such a competition (NU on-line 2003). In the scramble for seats in the new parliaments that resulted from the creation of new districts after 2002, he also reportedly sought to promote Muslims into positions of local authority while still governor.<sup>19</sup> More recently, PDIP politicians, many of whom are Christian, admit that they have lost to Golkar in recent elections because of its success in projecting an increasingly Islamic image (Pelita 2004). The shift in religious sentiment in Kalteng is becoming increasingly evident in political life, from senior figures in the provincial capital down to local social leaders in the villages.

The new legitimacy allowed to Muslim Dayaks has encouraged the consolidation of a local Muslim tradition. On the one hand, the short history of Kalteng and its association with past Dayak political traditions means that it is difficult to construct such a tradition on a provincial level; before it was named the capital of the province in the 1950s, Palangka Raya had been a village ruled by a traditional leader.<sup>20</sup> In Kotim, however, there are signs that Dayak political figures are building on its Muslim tradition. Historians have traced the origins of Kotim back

---

<sup>19</sup> According to unconfirmed but widely-repeated reports, he issued instructions that all the new chiefs (*bupati*) of the 8 districts created in 2002 must be Muslim.

<sup>20</sup> Simal Penyang had then been the chief (*damang*) of the village of Pahandut. As part of the recent Dayak cultural revival, the *damangs* have since the late 1990s played a more prominent political and legal role, adjudicating in local disputes and representing the interests of their communities to the local government (Interview, June 2003).

to the kingdom of Kotawaringin Lama ('Old Kota Waringin'), which was founded in the 17<sup>th</sup> century by a prince of Majapahit who later converted to Islam (PPPKB 1978).<sup>21</sup> Although the kingdom came under the sway of Banjarmasin in the following centuries, its natural resources and links to Java gave it a degree of economic and political autonomy. The formation of Kalteng in 1957 created greater distance from Banjarmasin, and allowed the district to pursue more active economic policies. During the boom decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s Kotim's capital, the port of Sampit, became increasingly important, enabling it to build its own transport, communication and economic links to Jakarta, Surabaya and elsewhere. In other words, we can see in parts of Kalteng an active process of tradition-creation, one that looks back at past glories and projects forward building on emerging strengths.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, we need to explore the political implications of the creeping Islamisation of Kalteng. The question was posed at the beginning of this article, to what extent has the greater number of Muslims and the raised public profile of Islam in Kalteng changed political and social behaviour? Has the conversion of increasing numbers of Dayaks also laid the foundations for Islamist forms of politics? As McVey (1981 p. 266) notes in an early analysis of Islamism in Indonesia, faith is not only a screen for real interests, "a vehicle for the ambitious and a fig leaf for other aims". Religious doctrines have the own inspirational force, and can determine action; in some circumstances people are willing to die for their religion. The increasing numbers of young Muslims attending Koranic reading classes, graduating from Islamic high schools, and participating in social activities centred on the mosque also brings the community into closer contact with the universal Islamic community, the *umat*. It also brings contact with political activists from Java and Malaysia, some of whom undoubtedly seek to radicalise the community in the name of a global *umat*. In mid-2006 there were press reports of an Indonesian-based jihadist movement centred on Kalimantan pledging to take up arms in struggles in the Middle East (The Australian 2006).

Such forms of militant Islam generally will not, however, find fertile soil in Kalteng. The strength of the Dayak tradition described here means that Islam is likely to be of a tolerant and inclusive form. It is therefore likely that the Islamisation of the Dayak community will produce a moderate form of the faith.

---

<sup>21</sup> The capital of Kotawaringin Lama was actually near Pangkalan Bun in present-day Kotawaringin Barat (Kobar), but it is Kotim that has claimed 'ownership' of this Islamic past. It is likely that the ethnic composition of Kobar weakens any claim to indigeneity. The mining and logging boom of recent decades attracted many outsiders, and today almost 80 percent of the population is non-indigenous (mostly Banjar and Javanese).

<sup>22</sup> Building on the work of Raymond Williams, in a recent publication I suggest that processes of tradition-creation, tradition-maintenance and tradition-renewal can usefully be applied to many recent social and political phenomena in Indonesia (Chalmers 2006).

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ave, JB 1972, 'Kalimantan Dayaks', in FM LeBar (ed.), *Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia, Vol 1: Indonesia, Andaman Islands, Madagascar*, Human Relations Area Files Press, New Haven, pp. 185-96.
- Bamba, J 2004, 'Saving a house in fire: challenges, options and strategies in revitalization of Dayak cultural heritage', in J Bamba (ed.), *Kumpulan Papers/Makalah John Bamba*, Institut Dayakologi, Pontianak, pp. 8-19.
- Chalmers, I 2006, *Indonesia: An Introduction to Contemporary Traditions*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne.
- Cribb, RB 1999, 'Nation: making Indonesia', in DK Emmerson (ed.), *Indonesia beyond Soeharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, pp. 3-38.
- Djuweng, S 2001, 'Kolonisasi agama resmi terhadap agama lokal: pengalaman suku bangsa Dayak', in *Kebijakan Kebudayaan di Masa Orde Baru*, PMB-LIPI, Jakarta, pp. 443-95.
- Geertz, C 1973 [1967], 'Politics past, politics present: some notes on the uses of anthropology in understanding new states', in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, Basic Books, New York, pp. 327-41.
- Hawkins, M 2000, 'Becoming Banjar : identity and ethnicity in South Kalimantan, Indonesia', *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 24-36.
- Hudson, AB 1972, *Padju Epat : the Ma'anyan of Indonesian Borneo*, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, New York.
- Hull, TH 2001, 'First results from the 2000 population census', *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 103-11.
- ICG, ICG 2001, *Communal violence in Indonesia: lessons from Kalimantan*, Jakarta; Brussels, ICG Asia Report no. 19.
- Jones, R 1979, 'Ten conversion myths from Indonesia', in N Levtzion (ed.), *Conversion to Islam*, Holmes & Meier, New York, pp. 129-58.
- King, VT 1993, *The Peoples of Borneo*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, England.
- Klinken, Gv 2002, 'Indonesia's new ethnic elites - Central and East Kalimantan', in HG Schulte Nordholt & I Abdullah (eds), *Indonesia: In Search of Transition*, Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta, pp. 67-105.
- Kusni, JJ 2001, *Negara Etnik: Beberapa Gagasan Pemberdayaan Suku Dayak*, Fuspend (Forum Studi Perubahan dan Peradaban), Yogyakarta.
- Mackie, JAC 2005, 'How many Chinese Indonesians?' *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 97-101
- McVey, RT 1981, 'Islam explained', *Pacific Affairs*, no. 54, pp. 260-87.
- McVey, RT 1983, 'Faith as the outsider: Islam in Indonesia', in JP Piscatori (ed.), *Islam in the Political Process*, Cambridge Univ. Press, for The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Cambridge, England; Sydney, pp. 199-225.
- Mihing, T (ed.) 1977/78, *Geografi Budaya Daerah Kalimantan Tengah*, Balai Pustaka, Jakarta.
- Miles, D 1976, *Cutlass and Crescent Moon: a Case Study of Social and Political Change in Outer Indonesia*, Centre for Asian Studies, University of Sydney, Sydney.
- NU on-line 2003, 'LPTQ Pusat Tinjau Kelayakan MTQ Internasional di Palangka Raya', *NU on-line*, 17 June 2003. Retrieved 3 Aug 2006
- Pelita 2004, 'Di Kalteng PDI-P Salah Strategi, Kalah Dari Golkar ', *Pelita on line*.
- PPPKB 1978, *Sejarah Daerah Kalimantan Tengah*, Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Jakarta.
- Ricklefs, MC 2001, *A History of Modern Indonesia since 1200*, 3rd edn, Previous ed. published as: *A history of modern Indonesia since c.1300*. Basingstoke : Macmillan, 1993., Palgrave, Basingstoke.
- Scharer, H 1963, *Ngaju Religion: the Conception of God among a South Borneo People*, 1946, by E.J. Brill in Leiden., Nijhoff, The Hague.

- Schiller, AL 1996, 'An old religion in New Order Indonesia - notes on ethnicity and religious affiliation', *Sociology of Religion*, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 409-17.
- Siegel, JT 1969, *The Rope of God*, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Sjamsuddin, H 1991, 'Islam and resistance in South and Central Kalimantan in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries', in MC Ricklefs (ed.), *Islam in the Indonesian Social Context*, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne, pp. 7-17.
- Suryadinata, L, Ananta, A & Arifin, EN 2003, *Indonesia's Population : Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
- The Australian 2006, 'Indonesian jihadis set deadline', 7 August.
- Thung, J-L, Maunati, Y & Kedit, PM 2004, *The (Re)construction of the 'Pan-Dayak' Identity in Kalimantan and Sarawak*, PMB-LIPI, Jakarta.
- Usop, KMA 1994, *Pakat Dayak: Sejarah Integrasi dan Jatidiri Masyarakat Dayak dan Daerah Kalimantan Tengah*, Yayasan Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Batang Garing, Kuala Kapuas, Central Kalimantan.
- Weinstock, JA 1981, 'Kaharingan: Borneo's 'oldest religion' becomes Indonesia's newest religion', *Borneo Research Bulletin*, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 47-8.
- Weinstock, JA 1987, 'Kaharingan: life and death in southern Borneo', in RS Kipp & S Rodgers (eds), *Indonesian Religions in Transition*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, pp. 71-97.
- Widen, K 2002, 'The resurgence of Dayak identities: the symbols of their struggle for regional autonomy are self-evident', in M Sakai (ed.), *Beyond Jakarta: Regional Autonomy and Local Society in Indonesia*, Crawford House, Adelaide, pp. 102-20.
- Winter, T 2000, 'Conversion as nostalgia: Some experiences of Islam', in M Percy (ed.), pp. 93-111.