Transforming Tunisia: Transitional Justice and Internet Governance in a Post-Revolutionary Society

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ABSTRACT

In this article we argue that examining efforts at Internet reform in Tunisia holds important lessons for transitional justice (TJ) theory and practice, as well as for the way the field defines itself in a space where technology plays an important role in facilitating both repression and transitions. Given the impact of the Tunisian revolution in inspiring the Arab uprisings, as well as those elsewhere, an examination of the Tunisian revolution offers many lessons in understanding the transition away from authoritarian government. We focus specifically on what the Tunisian process of Internet reform can tell us about the increasingly institutionalized implementation of the TJ framework. This process is particularly notable because it has been informed by TJ goals and discourse while remaining outside the formal mechanisms implemented in the wake of the revolution. We examine the more flexible and responsive ways in which local institutions and activists might approach transition, including through attempts to memorialize the impacts of a regime or conflict, build trust, incorporate diverse voices in new partnerships and manage the international dimensions of postconflict reconstruction. Finally, given the Internet’s central role as both a tool for repression and a site of resistance and democratic engagement, our findings indicate the importance of future work in considering how TJ can begin

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3 The authors thank Habib Nassar, Anne Massagee, Kelli Muddell, Salwa El Gantri Omran, Reem El Gantri, Steve McCauley and interviewees for sharing their time and knowledge with us. We especially appreciate the comments on the final draft from Phoewass and from the reviewers, including Stefan Wolff and Nick Wheeler, all of which have made this a much stronger piece of work. We remain grateful.
addressing Internet governance as a vital aspect of conflict resolution and rebuilding.

**Keywords:** Internet governance, Tunisia, dictatorship, censorship, surveillance
INTRODUCTION

As institutional practice around transitional justice (TJ) develops, there is a growing distance between the roots of TJ as a process grounded in local conditions, and increasingly uniform applications of a ‘toolkit’ based on comparative experiences. This has become an important theme both in the academic literature and for practitioners. In light of this, a key gap in the literature is work focusing on balancing the need for transferable lessons with encouraging organic TJ efforts grounded in local experience. As TJ is primarily concerned with healing and transforming societies that have experienced conflict/repression, it is vital that such processes are grounded and localized.

We argue that Internet reform in Tunisia, and specifically the experience of the *Agence Tunisienne d’Internet* (Tunisian Internet Agency, or ATI), provides us with one such opportunity to examine the TJ framework. The ousting of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s dictatorship in Tunisia in January 2011 after a long campaign of civil resistance was the forerunner of the Arab uprisings. The Internet received particular attention in journalistic and academic coverage, with numerous sources crediting online organizing as key to overthrowing the dictatorship. As Tunisia rebuilds, a significant part of the process involves unpacking the legacy of Ben Ali’s repressive apparatus. The ATI was the Ben Ali regime’s sole Internet service provider and the technical arm of the regime’s surveillance and censorship machine. While it is only one part of a complex system of Internet governance composed of overlapping legal, institutional and architectural structures, it has been a key driver of reform and is

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therefore the focus of this article.

Although the processes surrounding Internet governance are taking place at a remove from TJ reforms, the ATI has had to think about the same issues that characterize TJ debates, including the extent to which past structures of abuse are revealed and discussed; the locus of responsibility for the abuse and the possibilities of punishment; debates around transparency and reform; the protection mechanisms against return to rights-violating systems; vetting; new uses for contested sites that facilitated abuse by the former regime; and whether space should be left for memorialization. The ATI’s approach to these issues has been informed by, but not officially a part of, the TJ process, and therefore provides an opportunity to explore innovative local approaches to TJ. In examining work by the ATI and others in the area, we contribute to rethinking the TJ framework within academia and in practice.

An examination of the Tunisian revolution and transition has the potential to offer many lessons in understanding transitions away from authoritarian government. We focus specifically on what the Tunisian process of revising Internet governance can tell us about the increasingly institutionalized implementation of the TJ framework. This allows us to gain a better understanding of how processes of reform and rebuilding can work when informed by the TJ discourse, but not contained within the theory’s formal mechanisms. This case study is particularly important in light of the growing critiques of TJ, especially those arguing that the field as it stands has a limited capacity to innovatively incorporate new challenges, that it largely perpetuates structural inequalities, dehumanizes victims, lacks internal cohesion around its core goals and pursues global legal principles that may suffocate

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local efforts at societal transformation.\textsuperscript{10}

We therefore examine Internet governance in Tunisia as an aspect of broader conflict transformation efforts, positioning the Internet not just as a communicative tool but also as a symbolic site of struggle that serves as a focus for new discussions around justice, reform and political inclusion. Internet reform overlaps significantly with core TJ principles. The ATI’s efforts impact society’s ability to communicate openly and to organize and create networks as active citizens outside of formal political frameworks. This perspective brings something new to the literature, emphasizing how Internet governance in Tunisia is engaging with previously underdeveloped aspects of transition.

This case study serves as a bellwether for the new generation of transitions. In Tunisia, the discussion about how change should look is taking place not just in the constitutional committees and between political parties, which are highly polarized, but also on the streets, online, in the expanding civil society sector and within institutions that were formerly vehicles of the Ben Ali regime. Not all of this, however, is being filtered into the collection of official initiatives looking at the legacy of violence of previous regimes that are gathering momentum under the rubric of TJ, but whose grassroots legitimacy is also being challenged.\textsuperscript{11}

While we do not argue that Internet governance should be central to TJ efforts, there are grounds for considering the ways Internet reform and TJ processes overlap and might mutually inform each other. We argue that examining one organization’s efforts at Internet reform in Tunisia holds important lessons for TJ theory and practice, as well as for the way the field defines itself in a space


where technology plays an important role in facilitating both repression and transitions.

**Methodology**

We sought to understand what the Tunisian process of revising Internet governance could tell us about the increasingly institutionalized implementation of the TJ framework. While we used the case of Tunisia to rethink TJ as a theoretical and empirical framework, we were not testing a hypothesis but rather exploring a question. We therefore situated the study within the pragmatic social sciences approach, using mixed methods to arrive at a conclusion. The primary framework was inductive and the purpose of the research exploratory, that is, we used the case study to reflect back on the existing theory and practice of TJ. A strong feature of this approach is a grounded methodology led by the concerns of practitioners working in the field, rather than by theoretical imperatives. The article draws together a deep engagement with the field of TJ, including both the academic literature and the practice associated with organizations such as the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), qualitative critical discourse analysis and qualitative, semi-structured interviews carried out in Tunisia.

By grounding this reflection on TJ as an academic theory and as a body of practice in the experience of Tunisians negotiating the transformation of Internet governance, the article allows a better understanding of how TJ can meet the challenges it faces. This case study was chosen because Tunisia has frequently been cited as current best practice for current TJ work. It is a process that has had five years to mature, giving some opportunity for TJ mechanisms to take shape. At the time of research, Tunisia was the only case in the early enough stages for us to understand

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12 Christalla Yakinthou was the country manager of ICTJ’s Cyprus office, and has also managed components of ICTJ’s Lebanon programming as well as consulting on other transitional justice programming both for ICTJ and other initiatives.

how perceptions of TJ and its importance to reform are developing in civil society and government structures during an active transition, and how an administrative body which has reformed understands itself in relation to TJ processes.

Over two weeks in March and April 2013, a crucial period in which the TJ process was still very much under way, 15 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were carried out with activists and policy makers in Tunisia. These interviews were targeted at building a complex picture of different perspectives on the TJ process, and on Internet governance in the post-revolution period. Interviewees included people who took part in implementing censorship and surveillance under the Ben Ali regime, Internet freedoms activists, members of TJ-specific Tunisian and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and policy makers within the current Tunisian government. This range of participants allowed us to understand the TJ process both from within and from the perspective of outsiders who were more involved in reconstructing Internet governance and who did not see their work as part of the TJ process. A purposive sampling strategy was used for those involved in the TJ process, and Christalla Yakinthou’s access to the TJ community was used to draw up initial interviewee lists. Some informants, however, were part of hidden populations and so we also made use of snowball sampling methods. Two sets of interview guides were developed, one for TJ-related actors and another for Internet governance and social media activists. In each case, some questions were adapted to the expertise of the informant. Key questions about the TJ process, how interviewees came to know about TJ and its relation to Internet governance remained through every interview, as a means of seeking consistent themes.

All interviewees were offered the option of anonymous participation and in cases where this was preferred, further attempts were made to ensure that participants are not identifiable through details of their employment or lives. However, some participants, particularly activists, had compelling reasons to prefer being identified by name or by a well-known pseudonym. If we are to take seriously
the injunctions to treat activists as experts in their own right, and co-producers of knowledge, we also must acknowledge that at times activists will value the visibility and acknowledgement of their work that comes with real-name or pseudonymous participation. Activists’ decisions to seek visibility for their work is also, at times, informed by the potential protection afforded by international attention, as seen in the efforts to free Egyptian blogger Alaa Abd El-Fatah. A commitment to ethical research processes and respect for participants’ knowledge and autonomy must include leaving room for participants’ informed decisions to balance potential harms and benefits of anonymity.

This research has obvious limitations. First, it is a single case study with an individual organization as the primary unit of analysis. Ideally, the findings of this research should be tested against other case studies in a larger comparative study across longer time periods. Second, we acknowledge that as an exploratory work that expands the discussion of TJ to a new area, we have limited space for deep theoretical reflection. We focus, rather, on drawing together empirical material to highlight innovations to the TJ framework that would benefit from more comprehensive elaboration in future publications.

Outline

The next section sets out our case study, outlining the TJ framework in Tunisia and information controls (including Internet censorship and surveillance) in the country under Ben Ali. The ways in which the legacy of information controls (and therefore also Internet reform processes) overlaps with broader TJ concerns, in Tunisia and elsewhere, is then highlighted. The final section holds a deeper

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16 Research was carried out in line with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975 (2000), and was approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee, ID 4427, 19 March 2013.
analysis of our findings, including the ways activists and institutional actors in Tunisia have addressed national and international legacies of information controls and attempted to build new structures for Internet reform. The conclusion focuses on how these findings might translate into broader contributions to the discussion of three key criticisms of the TJ framework: that it is inflexible and does not respond effectively to new experiences and needs; that more attention must be paid to structural inequalities between TJ practitioners/experts and local communities; and that it fails to address international complicity in human rights abuses.

<THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TJ FRAMEWORK>

Transitional justice is a field that has emerged over the last roughly three decades of human rights practice. Over the first decade of its development, there was no uniform approach to addressing legacies of state-sanctioned violence. However, the last period has seen a move towards the standardization of approaches across contexts, particularly as it becomes part of the international community’s postconflict agenda. The establishment of TJ institutions like the ICTJ in 2001 (and others subsequently), the publication of the UN Secretary General’s key 2004 report on TJ, and the 2012 establishment of a UN special rapporteurship on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of nonrecurrence have played a significant role in its entrenchment as an area of practice and study. The latter two have formally brought the field into the UN system.

Transitional justice can be defined as a series of judicial and nonjudicial efforts to overcome legacies of significant human rights abuses. Though it is rooted in principles including the rights to truth, justice and nonrepetition, at its most conservative it is articulated, especially by the ICTJ and the UN, as a collection of ‘mechanisms’ to address these legacies. These centre on criminal prosecutions,

17 Arthur, supra n 2.
truth commissions, reparations programmes and institutional reforms. While there are a number of interpretations of TJ that challenge this framing, they will be discussed later. We use this particular understanding here because it is these actors that are setting agendas and guiding TJ programming in Tunisia.

Internet governance is not considered part of the TJ framework. Academic and policy analysis of TJ barely mentions the Internet, and certainly does not provide in-depth examination of the place of Internet governance within the TJ framework. This is not surprising given that the framework’s development preceded widespread use of the Internet.

However, the literature and practice of TJ does touch on key issues related to Internet governance. For example, the TJ literature addresses the need to allow avenues for citizens to make their concerns heard and to question authority, to balance lustration law with the right to political expression and more generally to build a robust democracy and an engaged citizenry, which is assumed to include a healthy media environment as a ‘fourth pillar’ of democracy. While some authors and practitioners are addressing the role of the Internet in democratic reconstruction, this is not happening within the TJ framework.

The Tunisian TJ Landscape and Emerging Critiques

Although the Tunisian transition has been the face of the new generation of TJ and of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) revolutions, it has also been challenged by a variety of push and pull factors

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20 For a summary, see, van der Merwe, supra n 8.
24 Breuer and Groshek, supra n 3. Internet
for and against reform. While the country is moving towards implementing a new constitution it also, in November 2014, elected a president with strong links to the old regime. This may change the landscape of the transition and has implications for TJ efforts. At the same time, two 2015 terrorist attacks purportedly by Daesh affiliates have negatively impacted laws around a number of civil rights for citizens. There is a perception that the government is quietly undermining freedom of expression laws, and that there is a return of censorship and surveillance through agencies that have no independent oversight. There are also concerns about the lack of real reform in the security sector and judiciary, and ongoing police violence.

While all this happens, a wide variety of actors previously excluded from political processes are starting to be involved in them, as well as in reform efforts. In this tense climate, the revolution’s vanguard and watchdog has been and continues to be civil society and Internet activists, including critical voices linked to independent media online. This makes the nexus between Internet reform, via the work of the ATI, and TJ mechanisms important to watch. Where mainstream media is largely silent and owned by a shrinking group of key political actors, bloggers have continuously forced issues into public consciousness. It is fitting, then, that the one area that underwent constant and

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26 In the October 2014 parliamentary elections, the secularist party Nidaa Tounes won the majority of seats. The party’s head, veteran politician Beji Caid Essebsi, won the subsequent presidential elections. There are considerable implications for the TJ landscape in Tunisia, as Caid Essebsi was prime minister under Habib Bourguiba, Ben Ali’s predecessor. This has clear implications for the Truth and Dignity Commission (discussed in this article), as its mandate includes human rights violations committed under the Bourguiba period, and Caid Essebsi has already made comments about repealing aspects of the TJ law. For political analysis, see, Rim El Gantri, ‘Transitional Justice in Tunisia: The Implications of Political Change,’ Insight on Conflict, 5 May 2015.
steady reform to general widespread satisfaction in the early days after the fall of Ben Ali was Internet governance.

The ATI’s approach to reform has been inclusive, creative and almost entirely off the radar of the TJ process. Its experiences hold relevant lessons, particularly in the broader context of a visible tension in both the literature and practice between the need for transition processes to learn from within – that is, from local experiences – and the need for best practice learning from other contexts.

On the other hand, TJ in Tunisia seems to have followed a more conventional path. Amine Ghali\(^{30}\) argues that there have been two primary phases of TJ in Tunisia that correspond to the periods between the revolution and the election (January–October 2011) and between the post-revolution election until the adoption of the constitution in January 2014.\(^{31}\) We would add that a third phase began with the adoption of the Transitional Justice Law\(^{32}\) and the launch of the Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) in June 2014.\(^{33}\) The first phase focused on establishing investigative commissions looking at corruption, embezzlement and human rights violations,\(^{34}\) as well as early conferences introducing TJ, held by Tunisian centres for democracy. This shaped early conceptions of TJ in Tunisia. Included in the second phase are events such as the establishment of the landmark Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice and the expansion between 2011 and 2012 of civil society organisations with a TJ focus and a base in capacity building, and a broad spectrum of rights.


\(^{34}\) These commissions were announced by Ben Ali in the last days of his presidency in an effort to quell public anger, but were formalized and implemented by the transitional government.
agendas. With the involvement of key international TJ actors (particularly the ICTJ and the UN Development Program), a technical commission was also formed to manage the national debate on TJ, producing the draft TJ law.

While this second phase demonstrated local institutions’ remarkable capacity and willingness to begin working on TJ processes, it also highlighted some of the issues surrounding the framework, including the overwhelming pressure to develop TJ institutions quickly at the expense of building deep and broad public platforms for discussion, which takes time; the exclusion of certain voices; and the need to provide space for people to shape their own visions of TJ, instead of boxing public voices into preexisting strategies. On the other hand, this process was useful in building a common language and framework around which visions of the future can be modelled. This also affects the context within which sideline reform efforts like the ATI’s have been shaped. From our primary data, it appears that interplay exists between the articulation of reform in Tunisia as laid out so comprehensively by the TJ landscape, and efforts with aligned goals that are outside the official TJ framework.

Our interviewees’ critiques of the Ministry and dominant approaches to TJ in Tunisia speak to broader concerns around the balance between creating an organic process which is at least in part responsive to specific citizens’ needs, and implementing core TJ mechanisms that address global principles of reform and the attainment of justice. An interviewee articulated this tension:

If you see any debate on transitional justice it’s … very much focused on procedure. How do you proceed, rather than what kind of place you want to live in, which is the essential question. What is our vision for the future of this country? How do we see ourselves 20 years from now? *This* is transitional justice. It’s not about, you know, what sort of procedures should be placed, what sort of laws should be placed. It’s part of the process of course to have laws about this, but it’s not the main process.\(^{35}\)

\(^{35}\) Personal interview, TJ practitioner, Tunis, Tunisia, March 2013.
Speaking to broader criticisms concerning consequences of transporting the ‘TJ industry’ to Tunisia, another interviewee commented that,

The community that is involved in this [Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice] is a very closed community. It’s really not open to many people, and it’s also a technical community. So they come with all these really established ideas for what counts as TJ, what counts as reparation. And what they do is they go and talk to people in the regions, then they translate or try to translate what these people say into their own legalistic language of reparation, of nonrepetition, etc. But I would much rather have the opposite happen, which is basically that people talk [and we get to what people want from there].

This model of TJ feeds into broader concerns with the increasing inflexibility of both the theory and the field, captured by Habib Nassar’s recent critique that the TJ priority (particularly in MENA) has been flipped towards consolidating the normative framework of TJ at the expense of the actual needs of the society in question: that ‘standardizing policies and mechanisms generates a rigidity that precludes TJ from fully addressing the regional and national complexities.’

Five years in, warning signs are clear. An interviewee noted the specific impact of this standardized framework on the development of TJ in Tunisia:

What I see happening is you have this top-down framework that is taking much space, public space, but there are small processes on the side, which are not recognized as transitional justice processes, because they don’t fit into this global framework. So you have, I hear it in the regions I visit, very nice debates on, for example on ending discrimination against certain groups. I mean these debates would fit under transitional justice but they’re not part of this national discussion because they’re happening locally,

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36 Personal interview, employee of international organization, Tunis, Tunisia, Februrary 2013.
37 Nassar, supra n 2 at 73.
because these people don’t have access to this machinery of transitional justice that the government has set up.\textsuperscript{38}

We argue that the introspection, reform and reframing of the ATI as a defender of civil liberties may well be one of those ‘small processes on the side’ that carry significant local innovation. Examination of this particular sideline process illuminates the importance of an area that is of increasing relevance to the issues around reconciliation and rebuilding trust, which are central TJ concerns. It also offers broader lessons about how the increasingly formalized TJ process might be rethought to better meet local needs.

\textbf{Internet Governance in Tunisia}

In contrast with the recognized TJ processes, we use the informal process surrounding Internet reform in Tunisia – focusing on the ATI’s role – to underline some of the criticisms and weaknesses outlined in the literature. While Internet governance may not be considered part of the TJ framework, in this case it both echoes and grapples with many of the field’s concerns. To understand this, it is useful to briefly review the country’s history of Internet censorship and surveillance, which we refer to collectively as ‘information controls’ to capture their complexity and reach. There were a number of important characteristics of this regime, including the central role of the ATI within Internet governance, the purchase of European censorship and surveillance technology, and the ways censorship and surveillance overlapped with other mechanisms of state control and, subsequently, with the lived experience of Tunisians under the dictatorship.

The history of Internet regulation in Tunisia mirrors the increasing importance of controlling online spaces for many governments, authoritarian or otherwise. Ben Wagner\textsuperscript{39} argues that there have been

\textsuperscript{38} Personal interview, employee of international organization, Tunis, Tunisia, March 2013.

four stages in the Tunisian government’s approach to the Internet, shifting from a complete lack of regulation in its early days through to censorship, surveillance and then active attacks on targeted sites and accounts. While the extent of controls implemented by the Tunisian government is more extreme than in many other states, they are part of a continuum that includes democratic states. This is particularly evidenced by the provision of censorship and surveillance technology to Tunisia from European and US companies. Information controls were not only an issue during Tunisia’s dictatorship, but are an ongoing area of contestation during transition and peacebuilding around the world.

Under Ben Ali, the ATI was not entirely responsible for information controls; some of this responsibility seems to have lain directly in Ben Ali’s hands. While Kamel Saadaoui, director of the ATI for three years, emphasized that the ultimate power lay with the government, he acknowledged the ATI’s role in hosting and maintaining censorship and surveillance technology, and the widespread public perception of the ATI as a vital part of the Tunisian government’s Internet control framework. Similarly, Moez Chakchouk, head of the ATI after Saadaoui, leading much of the reform process within the institution, said in an interview that the ATI maintained the equipment, but that the Ministry of the Interior accessed and controlled it. At the same time, he recognized that the ATI’s previous administration was implicated in these processes and that there was a need to rebuild trust. Wagner’s work makes it clear that although the Ministry developed blacklists, manually filtered emails and engaged in other decisions around censorship and surveillance, the ATI was integral to this process, including through its development of in-house products for email filtering. Crucially, while many decisions about censorship and surveillance were carried out by ‘a special unit within the interior ministry … the ATI was still branded as Ammar404 [the nickname given to the censorship

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40 Elkin, supra n 3.Internet
41 Wagner, supra n 37.Internet
mechanisms by Tunisian Internet users] in public.\footnote{Ibid., 489.} This means that separate to the extent of its responsibilities, which remain unclear, the ATI came to be seen as an important institution (albeit not the only one) responsible for implementing the dictatorship and, thus, implicated in the process of postconflict change.

The ATI has also engaged with questions around international complicity in human rights abuses. Although some aspects of the information control regime after 1997 were developed and administered within Tunisia, imported technology played a vital role in online censorship. In the wake of the Tunisian revolution, Saadaoui spoke in detail about how Internet control technologies were acquired, listing companies from the US, UK, Germany and other European countries as providing support.\footnote{Vernon Silver, ‘Post-Revolt Tunisia Can Alter E-Mail with “Big Brother” Software,’ \textit{Bloomberg}, 12 December 2011.} Chakchouk said in 2013 that as the ATI was still in the process of sorting through and finalizing contracts for this equipment, including completing final payments to international companies, he followed Saadaoui in respecting nondisclosure agreements where they were in place. However, he publicly named the companies with which there were no nondisclosure agreements at the 2011 Arab Bloggers’ Meeting. The role of international companies in facilitating Tunisian information controls, and the costs and difficulty of dismantling its legacy, should make it clear that Internet governance is an ongoing issue which – like so many aspects of TJ – extends beyond Tunisia’s borders, has complicated questions around international responsibility and complicity and has a longer temporal framework than may immediately be recognized. In this respect, while the ATI’s efforts to grapple with international complicity in the regime’s information controls do not offer a complete solution, they do point to some areas that need to be addressed.

It is important to connect this to the lived experiences of activists and others targeted by censorship and surveillance. Attacks on email were one of the most notable examples of this, and after 2003 ‘interior ministry operators went through emails, sometimes dropped or modified the contents and then
forwarded emails, often hours later to their intended recipients. This aspect of the regime also impacted people who weren’t involved in politics but whose email included content critical of the government, as Vernon Silver’s investigative work in 2011 showed. The ability of the surveillance apparatus to modify, as well as read and censor, emails had particularly chilling effects. While on occasion email content would be replaced by garbled symbols or advertising, at times it also included messages such as ‘you can run but you can’t hide,’ pornographic material or inappropriate sexual or threatening content.

The moment of jubilation that accompanied the end of Ben Ali’s information control regime has been followed by recognition that significant work is still required to deal with its after effects, and to build an alternative system of Internet governance (not to mention restricting surveillance of mobile and other communications). As well as dealing with the distrust created by years of information controls, the ATI remains in possession of many of the machines used by the regime, and has borne the financial costs of the final periods of contracts with providers of censorship and surveillance technology, as Chakchouk noted. A series of highly visible cases relating to freedom of expression online have arisen, with some worrying outcomes, although in other cases Internet freedom activists have been more pleased with results. Even committed activists with whom we spoke often saw the need for some form of regulation of online content, and Chakchouk talked about the need for a clearer delineation of the ATI’s role as the provider of a technical service. Recent research demonstrates that while blanket censorship has ended in Tunisia, technical mechanisms that would allow mass surveillance remain in place. These concerns, as well as others, require ongoing negotiation and dialogue about what the Internet will look like in post-revolutionary Tunisia. The ATI has been at the

44 Wagner, supra n 37 at Internet487.
45 Silver, supra n 41.
46 Human Rights Watch, ‘Tunisian Rapper Sentenced to Two Years in Prison for a Song,’ IFEX, 17 June 2013; Smadhi, supra n 27.
47 Afef Abrougui, ‘Tunisia: Court Quashes Verdict Ordering the Filtering of Pornography,’ Global Voices, 22 February 2012.
48 De la Ferrière and Vallina-Rodriguez, supra n 4.Internet
These issues play a significant role beyond the limited sphere of Internet governance. Internet regulation in post-revolution Tunisia will undeniably shape a wide range of personal freedoms and the democratic potential of the political system. The Internet has become a key platform for citizen engagement.

Separate Universes or Concentric Circles? Transitional Justice and Internet Governance as They Currently Stand

In Tunisia, both the gap between TJ and Internet reform/governance and recognition of areas of overlap were reflected in interviews. One Internet activist, Phoewass, when asked whether changes to the ATI's functioning after the revolution were part of the TJ process, replied emphatically not, in part because of the success of Internet reform in contrast to the perceived failure of the TJ process.

Similarly, NGOs did not often see these issues as connected. Hisham Sharif from the Tunisian Centre for Transitional Justice replied to the same question that, ‘no, it is not transitional justice, it is Internet reform.’ At the government level, Internet reform is also not being addressed. In an interview with Mohsen Sahbani, advisor to the Tunisian minister of transitional justice and human rights, he noted that there was little if any coordination with or awareness of the work of the ATI. However, key staff involved in the ATI's work, both during and post dictatorship, firmly placed Internet governance within the remit of TJ:

Internet reform is part of transitional justice … it is the life of a person. Everywhere. It is in your phone, your home, your job. I have to work … to get the real solution without touching the freedom of the other person.

This recognition of the ATI's reform work as related to the broader TJ process

49 Personal interview, Hisham Sharif, Tunis, Tunisia, April 2013.
50 Personal interview, ATI staff member, Tunis, Tunisia, April 2013.
demonstrates the reach of the TJ narrative and its potential impact beyond formal mechanisms, but the ATI has few links with either government or international institutions implementing the framework. It is unclear whether incorporating Internet reform within formal TJ mechanisms in Tunisia would have helped or hindered the process. While this may have provided additional resources and political attention to the urgency of Internet reform, it may also have diminished the ability of the ATI and other actors to develop flexible and responsive processes. Additionally, it makes it clear that activists’ and other practitioners’ understandings of the relationship of different issues to TJ (in this case, Internet governance) are shaped in part by how effective and participatory TJ processes are seen to be. It would therefore be useful to build on this research by exploring the contestation through which different areas are included or excluded from local understandings of TJ. In the following section, we explore some of the arguments for considering Internet governance within the aegis of TJ reforms.

TRANSFORMING TJ: LEARNING LESSONS FROM TUNISIA

‘If It Looks Like a Duck …’: The ATI’s Reform Processes

While the harms caused by Internet surveillance and censorship were, as many interviewees noted, far less serious than the systematic imprisonment, torture, exile and other forms of oppression faced by many under the Ben Ali government, they nevertheless played an important role in sustaining the dictatorship and in the day-to-day repression experienced under the regime. Some bloggers and online journalists were jailed and tortured. This leaves the ATI (and Internet governance mechanisms more generally) with a legacy closer to TJ concerns than has to date been acknowledged. Tunisian blogger Zouhair Yahyaoui was arrested in 2000 for ‘inviting readers to vote on whether Tunisia was “a republic, a kingdom, a zoo or a prison”.’ He died in 2005 of a heart attack after being extensively tortured in prison. In 2009, bloggers’ advocacy site Global Voices placed Tunisia after Iran as ‘one

51 ‘Tunisian Blogger Detained,’ Al Jazeera, 7 November 2009.
52 Amanda Watson-Boles, ‘Without a Net,’ Committee to Protect Journalists, 2004. See also, Threatened
of the most repressive countries towards bloggers and online activists. Blogger Fatma Riahi and journalists Zuhair Makhlouf and Taoufik Ben Brik were arrested after criticizing the government. The introduction of a new framework for Internet governance is therefore vital to the reform process.

Just as the opening up of the Internet underpins many of the TJ processes being put in place, particularly around freedom of expression, there is also a sense of Internet governance as one of the few areas where transition is happening effectively. One Internet activist said of the shift, ‘it [the ATI] was the enemy, the censor guys, and they made a point in fighting against censorship. I mean, they fought against the decision in court for censoring pornography.’

Another said, ‘Actually, the only thing that’s gone into transition is the ATI. Moez Chakchouk and his team represent the only institution that is really committed to making a democratic transition.’ An activist who has experience with international institutions working in Tunisia said,

The only transitional justice case that succeeded is the case of the ATI. When you see Fatma Riahi (Arabicca) who was in jail … going to the ATI, discussing and laughing with all the team, making interviews, and saying thank you on Twitter to the ATI, to Moez, to all the team, it’s the only thing that … it’s the only case that succeeded.

The ATI has been a key actor driving broader processes of Internet reform and has grappled with issues around vetting and employment of regime staff, internal reform and transparency and restitution. Since its reform, the ATI has created opportunities for dialogue both within its walls and with activist and Internet governance communities about its role during the dictatorship, including the establishment of the 404 Lab (discussed later). The nature of the violations committed by the ATI

54 Personal interview, Slim Amamou, Tunis, Tunisia, April 2013.
55 Personal interview, Phoe Wass, Tunis, Tunisia, April 2013.
56 Personal interview, Douha Ben Youssef, Tunis, Tunisia, April 2013.
57 ‘Tunisian Hackers Decrypt Dictator’s Old Internet Censorship Machines,’ Observers, 24 June 2013,
means that vetting and prosecution procedures have been easier for the agency to sidestep. Very few people were imprisoned, tortured or killed as a result of the ATI’s machinery, and the ATI is able to say that, as a technical body, it did none of this directly itself. At the same time, it was the surveillance arm of a deeply repressive state and has chosen to confront this legacy directly.

In addition, the ATI has consciously made what can be framed in TJ terms as a global restitution initiative, becoming the first country in Africa to install TOR servers. These servers will allow people in countries that use Internet censorship to use Tunisian servers to ‘freely access the Internet’; the initiative was firmly positioned as a legacy project.\(^{58}\) The ATI has been involved in leading conferences on Internet freedom and developing relationships with the US-based Electronic Frontier Foundation and other international Net freedoms groups.\(^{59}\) Tunisia has also joined the Freedom Online Coalition, a network of 23 governments committed to protecting freedom of expression, association, assembly and privacy online. Often these discussions have included frank declarations of how the ATI worked under the regime, the companies that provided surveillance equipment to the agency and the challenges it faces today, including around pressure to continue censorship and surveillance.

The management’s perspective on vetting and institutional reform processes, and its pre- and post-revolution role, has also been interesting. When asked about vetting, reform and accountability, Chakchouk replied that his board’s approach was to balance the need to retain skilled staff (some have left) with ensuring deep intra-institution understanding and buy-in about the importance of civil liberties, especially open Internet:

> We don’t need to go to a court and put them in jails. After all, okay, they made it for a

\(^{58}\) Ibid.; personal interviews, ATI staff, Tunis, Tunisia, April 2013.

reason, Ben Ali’s pressures. We really tried with the board to regularize, or to make things clear, without putting people in a position to face a court, or lawyers, and so on.\textsuperscript{60}

This has included initial internal discussions around the future of the ATI, accountability for its staff, and media accessibility and interviews for ATI staff.

Individual accountability has also been given an interesting shape. As well as talking to journalists himself about the surveillance state and how it worked, Chakchouk began involving his staff, asking those who had worked under the Ben Ali regime to speak, ‘to explain what happened before. So for me it’s really important to involve people now.’\textsuperscript{61} This was positioned as both signalling to staff that their help (and their own transition) is valued and recognized, and as a kind of accountability exercise by talking to journalists about the role they played in the regime. This approach was discussed with the ATI’s 70 staff members and supported by them. However, the ATI staff’s trust in their leadership was also important in the public accountability process. One staff member highlighted this:

The first time I went to the media I was scared, I didn’t know if someone would get up and accuse me of doing something. But I had Moez’ support … that was important.\textsuperscript{62}

This issue of trust is one that many TJ bodies struggle with, and is worthy of note. Chakchouk has argued that there should be more public discussion regarding the role of the ATI in the dictatorship’s machinery, to encourage accountability. However, at the time of our interview, what this might look like was still a question:

[What we need to say now is], ‘this is what ATI has done. This is the equipment.’ … And also I think what is important is just to have a process, to open those things, to get out those archives in ATI to try to show to people a lot of details … it’s not [only] our process, I think the government and the state have to be involved in it, and the state has to show the

\textsuperscript{60} Personal interview, Chakchouk, Tunis, Tunisia, April 2013.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Personal interview, ATI staff member, Tunis, Tunisia, April 2013.
way to the people, they have to open all those archives, and they’re really huge.\textsuperscript{63}

The opening of archives was positioned by Chakchouk as part of the ATI’s debt to Tunisian society, but one that needed active assistance from civil society to happen. At the same time, Slim Amamou argued that the key issue that needs attention is the decision-making process, rather than decrypting the technology or opening archives. Amamou’s comment is particularly important given that questions still remain about information control chains of command and the relationships between the Interior Ministry, the police and judiciary and the ATI. A clear aim of truth seeking and institutional reform is to bring to light exactly these kinds of relationships and to implement change that blocks reversion to such structures of control.

One outcome of the ATI’s ‘public legacy’ thinking is the creation of the 404 Lab – the transformation of the former surveillance headquarters’ basement, where the regime kept its surveillance hardware, into a dual memorial/educative site. The 404 Lab was launched in June 2013 as an open innovation space, designed in collaboration with civil society and hacktivists.\textsuperscript{64}

In engaging with aspects of its legacy by championing a free Internet, creating an open public space on the site of former surveillance headquarters, encouraging discussions by regime staff with media about how the system worked, working with civil society to push for the opening of ATI archives, setting up global legacy projects for other less-open societies, and thinking through the balance of individual and collective accountability, the ATI can be said to be leading its own form of truth-seeking discussion about violations committed through its agency, attempting to provide accountability for its role in the dictatorship’s machinery and engaging in efforts at restitution. Essentially, these efforts can be seen within the framework of a commitment to address its role in the legacy of state-led violence and repression against Tunisian citizens.

This is not to say, however, that the ATI’s role has been entirely unproblematic. One interviewee, 63 Personal interview, Chakchouk, Tunis, Tunisia, April 2013.
64 ‘Tunisian Hackers,’ supra n 55.
Phoewass, cited the ATI’s support for deep packet inspection,\textsuperscript{65} which allows packets of data to be filtered by their content, as very concerning. There are also questions around how much the ATI’s reforms have taken root. Much of the trust that has been built, post-Ben Ali, in the ATI, has also been attributed to the work done by Chakchouk. Internet activists note that this is a precarious situation and Chakchouk’s recent departure from the ATI raises questions about the future of the institution. More broadly, there are concerns about whether attempts to resist Internet censorship and surveillance can be sustained without institutional support within the ATI (or other key organizations). This is particularly the case as deep packet inspection and other technical structures discussed by Alexis Artaud de la Ferrière and Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez leave the door to mass surveillance open.\textsuperscript{66}

\textbf{<B>Reflecting on the TJ Framework}

The Tunisian experiment with internet reform alongside ongoing TJ reforms holds lessons for TJ theory and processes. Despite the constructive intentions underlying TJ, a number of important criticisms have been raised about its framework. The first of these is related to structural inequalities between TJ practitioners and local communities. In this regard, Tshepo Madlingozi is among the more radical voices criticizing orthodox TJ efforts, particularly their way of treating

\begin{quote}
 victims and victims’ stories, as a form of cultural imperialism, of ‘stealing the pain of others’, dehumanising victims further and reinstalling First Worlders as morally and racially superior in relation to them.\textsuperscript{67}
\end{quote}

Reflecting on the field’s interaction with the contexts in which it operates, Madlingozi argues that ‘transitional justice scholars and practitioners have not genuinely interrogated how their programmes

\textsuperscript{65} This is the International Telecommunication Regulation. For information on signatory states, see, http://www.itu.int/osg/wcit-12/highlights/signatories.html (accessed 7 February 2016).

\textsuperscript{66} De la Ferrière and Vallina-Rodriguez, supra n 4.

\textsuperscript{67} Madlingozi, supra n 6 at 211. See also, Pigou, supra n 5; Razack, supra n 6.
and interventions have led to the disempowerment or empowerment of victims or of the society more broadly. Some of these criticisms were echoed in our interviews with Tunisians involved in TJ processes. The ATI’s experience allows us to examine processes related to reform and peacebuilding as carried out by local practitioners outside the formal TJ institutions, but nevertheless informed by many of the ideas underpinning the TJ framework. What is remarkable in this regard is the ATI’s horizontality, focus on collective ownership of change, and close and reciprocal relationship with civil society activists located beyond the small networks of peace activists usually engaged in peacebuilding work.

A second important area of learning relates to inconsistencies within the TJ framework, including the lack of internal cohesion of its goals, the extent to which its agendas are set by international rather than local actors, and the pursuit of core mechanisms which represent certain global legal principles that may impede or suffocate locally defined efforts to come to terms with legacies of conflict. This last area is particularly contested because TJ as a field has been built upon the pursuit of these legal principles, which themselves come out of human rights frameworks. Critic-practitioners like Nassar argue that the growing focus on implementing specific mechanisms in place of thinking innovatively about addressing the underpinning norm (e.g., on truth commissions representing the right to truth rather than on innovative approaches to upholding the right to truth), as well as on the prioritizing of certain comparative experiences over others, may be undermining creative domestic approaches to dealing with the past. Such criticisms also point out underlying system bias: the choice

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68 Madlingozi, supra n 6 at 225.
71 Nassar, supra n 2.
of which experiences to include and exclude depends on whose definition is taken as legitimate by those actors implementing and funding TJ efforts. This point was raised by both ATI practitioners and interviewees.

A final relevant criticism of TJ’s deep institutionalization relates to its consequent hesitation around comprehensively addressing issues of international complicity, including the complicity of governments and private companies in human rights abuses. As we have highlighted, the Tunisian experience of TJ, cast against the silence around the role of private companies supplying the regime with surveillance technology, speaks directly to this ‘elephant in the room.’

Simon Robins and Paul Gready argue that the cooption of TJ approaches into prescribed and legalistic processes has significant limitations, and prefer to refocus on a newer, broader concept termed ‘transformative justice.’ This resonates with the Tunisian context, where much of the rebuilding process is taking place with reference to existing TJ narratives and practices. The current TJ framework and institutions’ rigidness are highlighted by TJ’s failure to even glancingly address Internet reform. While we do not argue that Internet governance should be central to TJ efforts, the Internet has become a key platform for political communication and engagement and as such requires attention, particularly in local contexts where online censorship and surveillance were prevalent.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Tunisia is the face of TJ in the MENA region. However, the growing critical literature, our summary of

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the current TJ process and discussion of the ATI's work show that the course of TJ is not linear – especially not in a context like Tunisia, where the dictatorship’s end has exposed deep economic, political and religious tensions. This article used the example of Internet governance reform in Tunisia to challenge the idea that a TJ path should consist of a set of well-formulated mechanisms representing the primary pillars of a TJ programme. Instead, it showed that there are other ways of addressing legacies of widespread human rights violations that are doing equally well, and that combine an outlook informed by TJ discourse with local processes in order to grapple with the larger questions of accountability, memory, truth and reform.

The ATI’s work to deal with its legacy, and indeed to shift the broader Internet reform process in Tunisia, holds lessons for TJ. It certainly speaks to three significant criticisms of the field: the first, and broadest, is that the TJ framework is inflexible and is not incorporating new experiences and needs. Our interviews and the literature have shown that the ATI’s reforms are not on the radar of TJ practitioners either in-country or internationally, but its work began early and has tackled all the key elements that underpin TJ concerns. It has engaged with its legacy of repression by championing a free Internet; establishing a kind of global restitution by setting up legacy projects for other less-open societies and sharing its knowledge and transition with some of its neighbour states grappling with similar issues; creating its own version of a ‘memorial space,’ a public site of learning on the grounds of the former surveillance headquarters; encouraging public and media discussions by regime staff about how the system worked; and showing evidence of attempts to balance individual and collective accountability while also trying to push debates on international complicity and the protection of freedom of speech and information.

It can be argued that this work is particularly important for us to learn from because, as our interviews have shown, there are already important voices within Tunisia signalling that some perspectives are being closed out or ignored by a TJ machine that seeks to ‘translate or try to translate what these people say into their own [the international community’s/practitioners’] legalistic
It is telling that the ATI has managed its transformation while operating in a context that is clearly informed by, but not linked deeply into, the country’s TJ landscape; perhaps being left to its own devices was a key to its apparent success.

This case study contributes in three main ways to the broader work around accusations of inflexibility and marginalization of particular voices. First, it is an example of innovative thinking that addresses the underlying norms but that does not fit within the prescription or the areas of attention given to TJ reforms. In addition, internet reform and governance is likely to become an area of increasing importance for TJ over the coming decade, both because of the Internet’s growing role in citizen engagement and because it grapples with how to deal with structures of the legacy of surveillance and censorship.

The second criticism addressed relates to the ways in which the ATI’s work speaks to the structural inequalities between TJ practitioners and experts and local communities, and questions around the extent to which TJ programming truly empowers or disempowers local communities and victims. The ATI’s attempts at Internet governance and reform undertaken post-revolution could be considered an unorthodox case study, undertaken by local actors outside the formal TJ context but unavoidably infused by the broader context of seeking to engage with legacies of repression. This is perhaps an ideal relationship between awareness of a broader culture, goals and lexicon of dealing with the past, but teamed with the autonomy to create change in a way that is internally meaningful and relevant.

The third criticism addressed relates to TJ’s failure to more honestly consider international complicity in human rights abuses. While the principle of universal jurisdiction has taken us some way towards global accountability, less has been done on international accountability for governments and the private sector. In this respect, naming companies and countries which offered technology and support to Ben Ali’s surveillance architecture has opened a space for discussion around an issue continuously ignored, perhaps primarily because donor governments to TJ programming are often

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74 Personal interview, employee of international organization, Tunis, Tunisia, April 2013.
also the same states from which the technology comes. This issue will become increasingly relevant, as both democratic and authoritarian governments employ information controls with varying degrees of corporate cooperation.