

**Department of Media and Information
Faculty of Media, Society and Culture**

**Indonesian Cultural Policy, 1950-2003:
Culture, Institutions, Government**

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Declaration

I, Tod Jones, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Media and Information, Faculty of Media, Society and Culture, Curtin University of Technology, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. It contains no material which has been accepted for the award of degree or diploma by any university.

Tod Jones

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Abstract

This thesis examines official cultural policy in Indonesia, focussing on the cultural policy of the national governments from 1950 until 2003. Drawing on Michel Foucault's writings about government and debates about cultural policy in Cultural Studies, the study proposes that the features of cultural policy in Indonesia are primarily determined by the changing ways that the state has put culture to work in its versions of modern governance.

Part I of the thesis provides a history of official cultural policy, including a background chapter on the late colonial era and the Japanese occupation. Although contemporary cultural policy was first articulated within Western liberal democracies to shape self-governing national citizens, the Dutch colonial cultural policy differed in that it assumed indigenous subjects had reduced capacities and focussed on managing ethnic populations. The cultural policies of subsequent governments maintained the twin imperatives of 'improving' individuals and managing populations, but with different understandings of both imperatives. While a more autonomous subject was assumed during Constitutional Democracy, Guided Democracy exercised greater state guidance as part of Sukarno's mobilisation of the population behind his political program. Cultural policy during the New Order era rejected Sukarno's 'politicisation' of culture, replaced 'improvement' with 'development' and further strengthened the role of the state in providing cultural guidance, a move justified by designating Indonesians backward by modern standards. The Japanese administration was the first government to address a national population. Relations among indigenous ethnic populations and between ethnicity and the nation were addressed in cultural policy from 1956 and were central to cultural policy throughout the New Order era. Part II of the thesis consists of two case studies of cultural programs in the New Order and Reform eras: (1) the arts councils and cultural parks and (2) a cultural research project. It explores New Order centralism, demonstrating the heterogeneity between different levels of the state and how governmental goals imbued particular practices and objects with special significance and meaning by constructing them as culture.

Cultural policy in the post-Suharto period is addressed in both Parts I and II. While the practices of the New Order era are generally continuing, decentralisation created the possibility of a plurality of cultural policies across Indonesia, as lower levels of government are responsible for administering cultural policy. Decentralisation could result in a more participatory cultural policy as more cultural practices are addressed or a narrowing of cultural policy if conservative ethnic identity politics drives changes.

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Preface

Two sets of experiences helped me clarify the direction of my research. When I was on fieldwork in Sumatra, two people in different provinces who were actively involved in the arts said independently to me that they did not know what Indonesian culture (*kebudayaan Indonsia*) was. They felt it was something alien, talked about by, and used to justify the actions of a far-away central government. While most other Indonesians with whom I talked did not hold this view, there was a widespread confusion over the purpose of cultural policy and dismay at the effects of centrally generated policy on local practices. While at a seminar in Australia, after discovering that I was researching Indonesian cultural policy a senior academic asked, with a roguish smile, whether Indonesia had a cultural policy. While this was a dig from a political economist, it also indicated that while it had been established that other countries had cultural policies, this was not the case for Indonesia. These experiences identified cultural policy as a puzzling, blurry space within two disparate communities.

My understanding of what I was doing grew from the question of how best to explore and map this space. I do not view my research as charting the linear stages of development of cultural policy. Instead, I have endeavoured to write about the contingency of the present condition of cultural policy – a history of what Michael Shapiro calls ‘what we are now’:

This ‘what we are now’ is not meant as a simple description of the current state of things. Rather, it is an attempt to show that the ‘now’ is an unstable victory won at the expense of other possible nows. (Shapiro, 1992, p. 12)

I have tried to write about cultural policy in a way that allows for different possibilities and choices, both in Indonesia and abroad. My goal has been to contribute to the debate, in particular in Indonesia, about the state’s role and relationship to culture in its myriad forms. This thesis in many ways arises from the long discussions with numerous friends and colleagues in Indonesia who have an interest in cultural policy. I hope that my research can clarify issues and assist reflection about future directions.

Modern Indonesian spelling is used in the body of the text. Where names and titles use earlier conventions, I have followed the original spelling with two exceptions. I have used

the modern Indonesian spelling for *Pujangga Baru* and *Balai Pustaka*,¹ as this has become the convention after considerable contemporary research. I adopt the English-language convention of citing an author's last name in this thesis because many Indonesian authors publish in English as well as Indonesian, and I have applied this convention to Indonesian publications for consistency. In the case of articles from the Indonesian daily newspaper *Kompas*, I have used the journalists' abbreviated names, as the difficulty of associating abbreviated names with full names makes the abbreviated names the easiest way of tracking down the original articles. All of the translations in the text are mine except when otherwise indicated. The reference system I have used is the American Psychological Association (APA) citation system.

¹ Originally *Poedjangga Baroe* and *Balai Poestaka*.

Introduction:

Culture, Politics and Power in Indonesian Studies

The goal of a state is to provide a reasonable, humane existence for all its populace, and a state only can prosper if the culture there is virtuous and of a high standard.

Tujuan negara ialah untuk memberi penghidupan yang layak bagi manusia segenap penduduknya, dan negara hanya bisa hidup apabila kebudayaan disitu baik dan mempunyai tingkat yang tinggi.

Vice President Hatta in his opening address to the *Cultural Congress I*, 20 August 1948.¹

I hope that the congress this time results in agreements that society can use as a guide and can be implemented within culture in everyday life. So, no abstract concepts, but policies and strategies that are able to be internalised as values in an effort to clarify the self-respect of the nation, including values connected to character, morals and ethics.

Saya berharap kongres kali ini menghasilkan kesepakatan-kesepakatan yang bisa dipedomani oleh masyarakat untuk bisa diimplementasikan pada kebudayaan dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Jadi, bukan konsepsi yang abstrak, tetapi sebagai kebijakan dan strategi yang dapat diinternalisasikan sebagai nilai-nilai dalam upaya mempertegas jati diri bangsa, termasuk yang berkaitan dengan akhlak, moral, dan etika.

State Minister for Culture and Tourism I Gede Ardika in his opening address to the *Cultural Congress V*, 20 October 2003.²

This thesis is the first extended historical study concerned with the cultural policy of successive Indonesian governments. I analyse what practices the state deemed ‘cultural’ and how they were used to shape a ‘national culture’. The bulk of the thesis explores the cultural policies of the national governments that have administered Indonesia in the second half of the twentieth century. Analysis of these governments’ cultural policies requires some consideration of the policies of their forerunners. I argue that culture’s contemporary use within methods of governance was established during the late Dutch colonial and Japanese occupying administrations and has not been challenged within the

¹ (Hatta, 1950, p. 16). The proceedings of the Conference were published in 1950.

² (LAM, 2003).

different articulations of modern governance in Indonesia since 1950. Understanding the form that these articulations took between 1950 and 2003 is the main task of this thesis.

In one of the few articles to be focussed exclusively on cultural policy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia expert Jennifer Lindsay argues that the continued presence of traditional cultural practices is the primary determinant of the features of cultural policy in the region (1995). There are two key points in Lindsay's article. Firstly, she argues that in Southeast Asia, 'state cultural agencies act as patrons bestowing project funds and rewards rather than as service organisations' (1995, p. 661). Artists are 'clients' within this 'system of patronage' that began in pre-nationalist Southeast Asia and continues to be 'perpetuated in a modern setting' (1995, p. 663). Lindsay writes:

From the performers' point of view, then, the context of employment ... is not essentially different from a pre-national context. ... The government acts in the way a patron is traditionally expected to act – nominating the kind of performance, choosing the performers, vetting undesirable elements, favouring those whose performance pleases, and rejecting from favour those whose performance offends. (1995, pp. 664-5)

According to Lindsay, the continued centrality of the patron-client relationship to the role of government in cultural life differentiates cultural policy in Southeast Asia from cultural policy in the West, where the state commissions artists and audiences pay to view performances in a commercial context where demand influences content.

The second point is that Southeast Asian governments, as 'the most significant sources of ... patronage' (1995, p. 664), have introduced new concerns 'with ideas of national identity, acceptability and image' (1995, p. 663). They use their status as patrons to enforce a particular set of standards appropriate for the nation. Lindsay lists the governments' requirements as 'brevity and formality', 'accessibility' and 'dignified and entertaining' display (1995, p. 666). She writes: 'It is important that the performance is not offensive to other ethnic and religious sensibilities, or to a sense of official decorum and respectability' (1995, p. 666). The patron-client relationship places these government concerns in the forefront of the artists' considerations in contrast to the West, where, Lindsay contends, artists both comply less with government considerations and are more responsive to public opinion (1995, pp. 668-70).

Lindsay's article provides two important signposts for this thesis. Firstly, it can be used to assess the desirability of focusing on the patron-client relationship, which Lindsay uses to explain how Southeast Asian governments exercise control over artists. However, placing the patron-client relationship at the centre of cultural policy analysis also skews the argument in a way that both leaves important areas unaddressed and leads to misleading characterisations of cultural policy in Southeast Asia. First, Lindsay attributes the characteristics of Southeast Asian cultural policy to the desires of governments without interrogating what shapes those desires. Although government desire is a plausible cause, her reasoning does not provide great insight into why and how Southeast Asian governments chose particular cultural policy content. Second, emphasising the continuity of the patron-client relationship both across space and time neglects important breaks both between nations³ and, more importantly for this thesis, within nations. Lindsay does not explore the cultural policy differences among different political regimes in Indonesia nor the extent to which institutions and policies were inherited from or influenced by the Dutch colonial and the Japanese occupying administrations. A third issue is her reliance on a divide between cultural policy in Western nations and Southeast Asia. Governments in all locations attempt to bring about particular outcomes when they formulate and implement cultural policies (see, for instance, Bennett, 1998, pp. 87-164). The reasons Lindsay herself gives for subsidies in Australia, Europe and the United States (culture's 'educative, moral, heritage, aesthetic or ... spiritual value to society') are not all that different to her reasons for subsidy in Southeast Asia ('national identity, protection of moral and religious values, or protection of indigenous cultural heritage', 1995, p. 668).

The second signpost in Lindsay's article points towards an alternative focus for Indonesian cultural policy analysis. While noting that culture is commonly linked to education in many Southeast Asian nations, Lindsay writes that in Indonesia, 'the educative value of culture itself as a civilising agent of human behaviour' was never questioned in nationalist debates about culture. The links between culture and education (and the project of civilisation) suggest that alternative histories exist that predate the Indonesian nationalists. Culture has long been used in Europe as a method of civilising unruly elements of society (Bennett, 1998, pp. 87-106) and putting to use its civilising function was a central concern in the creation and regulation of public libraries, art

³ For instance, the cultural policy of a right-wing, USA-aligned dictatorship like the New Order regime is represented as having more continuities than breaks with Communist Vietnam.

galleries and museums in Britain in the eighteenth century (Bennett, 1998, pp. 107-134). Additionally, the Dutch colonial administration implemented its own programs that at times encapsulated a civilising mission aimed at the colony's indigenous inhabitants.⁴

The quotations at the beginning of this chapter, from prominent Indonesian politicians separated by over fifty years, indicate a similar concern with shaping the behaviours of Indonesians. Both of the quotations construct culture in a similar way: 'culture' refers to national culture, shared by all Indonesians, and encompasses behaviours and values ('virtuous and of a high standard' and 'values connected to character, morals and ethics'). The two politicians share the assumption that if a nation has the right culture, it will prosper and that the cultivation of culture was a concern of the state.

While this thesis shares Lindsay's focus on official cultural policies, I argue that investigating cultural policy's connections to modern forms of governance in Indonesia provides a more productive and insightful analysis than an emphasis on how the state functioned as a traditional patron. The recurring emphasis on the task of civilising subjects suggests the relationship between Indonesian, colonial and Western cultural policy is close, complex and cannot be ignored in analysis of cultural policy in Indonesia. Highlighting governance shifts attention towards the content of cultural policy programs and policies, highlighting changes in how culture was conceived and used in different locations and times.

Differentiating my perspective from Lindsay's also distances this thesis from an influential interpretation of Indonesian politics and society that emphasises ongoing patron-client relationships that are sustained by reference to an unchanging culture. I argue that Lindsay's approach conflates different historical eras that have different social, political and cultural relations. The alternative perspective pursued here, following the methods of Michel Foucault, attempts to identify and account for changes in cultural policy content and practice. It asks about Indonesian cultural policy: what has been retained, what has been lost and why has this happened? Taking this perspective requires an engagement with unresolved debates about culture and power in Indonesian Studies.

⁴ See Legge's summary (1977, pp. 94-105). I develop this connection further in Chapter One.

As such, this thesis focuses on the policies and institutions of the key official state apparatus concerned with regulating culture in Indonesia, in particular the institution responsible during the post-independence period, the Cultural Office, which in 1964 was renamed the Directorate of Culture. However, this is not the only way of defining cultural policy. If the definition of culture as ‘a way of life’ were used, as it now is in many academic fields, cultural policy would be any policy that affects everyday life (what I call the broad definition of cultural policy). Another issue, dealt with in detail in the methodology section that follows, is defining the limits of the thesis as official cultural policy. I begin with the premise that the state is the most important, but not the only cultural institution nor is it isolated from other Indonesian or international institutions. The state has been present in research about Indonesian culture, and it is rare now to find research that identifies its subject matter as ‘cultural’ that does not include a consideration of state policy and actions.⁵ Additionally, cultural policy in the narrow sense is often used, as researchers have identified (Bennett, 1989b, p. 6), to attempt to alter the ‘way of life’ of particular groups. All of these relationships and fields are considered where they impact on, or are implicated in, official Indonesian cultural policy.

1. Culture and the State in Indonesian Studies

There is no single concept of culture in Indonesian Studies. A multiplicity of concepts and categories has resulted from the diverse academic background of researchers on Indonesia and the tendency to include a cultural component in many different kinds of analysis. In this section, I briefly review the four most common research approaches to culture in Indonesian Studies with a focus on their characterisation of the state’s relationship to culture.

The first approach is located in political analysis. Analysts of Indonesian politics have attempted to use culture to explain political occurrences. There are two concerns regarding this formulation. Firstly, certain texts (in particular, texts which have used the notion of political culture) have separated political and economic causes from cultural

⁵ For instance, Anna Tsing’s research into a marginal ethnic group living in a remote mountain range in South Kalimantan demonstrates that cultural issues are not dictated by an internal community logic but are always under negotiation both within the community and externally with other communities and institutions (1993, pp. 8-9). According to Tsing, the most powerful institution that received the most attention from within the community was the state (1993, p. 13).

factors in seeking to explain Indonesian politics. Once separated as a variable, culture is often then defined as a set of values or attributes.⁶ Such an approach results in multiple problems: culture is represented as static and unchanging both across time and in different social contexts; rather than being mediated by culture, political and economic categories are considered generalisable across space and time rather than specific to a time and place; cultural traits are often generalised across communities, ignoring other divisions such as class, ethnicity and gender; activities defined as cultural are excluded from political analysis (Philpott, 2000, pp. 72-3);⁷ and the possibility of change is circumvented by static cultural attributes, which are viewed as the foundations of the political system.⁸

However, the more pressing concern is the way that culture has been used as an explanatory tool without interrogation of its construction in both Indonesia and Indonesian Studies. Simon Philpott, in *Rethinking Indonesia: Postcolonial Theory, Authoritarianism and Identity*, is critical of the conceptualisation of culture in the study of Indonesian politics. He critiques both how cultural metaphors are used to frame political studies (2000, pp. ix-xii) and cultural explanations of behaviour (2000, pp. 76-87). In the same vein, Ken Young comments:

[Political science research about Southeast Asia] stresses culture as an explanatory variable above all others, yet it contributes so little to the study of culture itself, preferring to use it as a catch-all which tidies up all the otherwise inexplicable connections between the State and civil society. (1991, p. 99)

Culture often acquires explanatory force without attention to the relations of power that shape its usage, the multiple ways it is deployed and the ways it changes in different contexts. I return to this issue in the discussion in the following section regarding the construction of Javanese culture in the patrimonial approach to Indonesian politics.

While political research can threaten to impoverish culture, cultural research has political hazards. In his study of the construction of the Javanese subject and the functions of cultural tradition in New Order Indonesia, John Pemberton notes the convergence ‘between anthropological disciplinary interests in culture and repressive interests like

⁶ See, for instance, the work of Lucian Pye (1965, p. 8) and Sidney Verba (1965, p. 551).

⁷ See also the articles in Stivens (1991) for analysis regarding gender in Southeast Asian Studies including Indonesia.

⁸ For instance Karl Jackson, one of the key proponents of political culture in the study of Indonesian politics, wrote in 1978, ‘A political earthquake ... can briefly level the distribution of power in the country, but the tendencies toward bureaucratic polity soon re-emerge’ (1978c, p. 396).

those manifested under New Order conditions' (1994a, p. 9). Pemberton argues that any research that posits a general cultural order independent of political interests can reinforce the political order in the name of culture. He writes: 'What appears to remain is a purely *tradisional* culture free of political and historical implication, a culture dedicated to, as if by nature, its own celebration'⁹ (1994a, p. 15). Pemberton attempts to avoid affirming the political order of the New Order regime through writing histories of the development and changes of practices that have been labelled cultural. He demonstrates the importance of the New Order regime's use of its version of Javanese culture to confirm and strengthen the regime's political authority and critiques the regime's argument that its form of rule was culturally appropriate for Indonesia.

Most contemporary practitioners of anthropological research have recognised the relationship between political power and cultural praxis and address the state's relationship to their subject matter (Acciaioli, 2002; Tsing, 1993, pp. 22-26).¹⁰ By recognising that cultural and community practices are formed in negotiation with state discourses and that the community has the power to subvert and appropriate state policy and programs, many researchers avoid confirming the cultural/political divide critiqued by Pemberton. The state's attempts to influence cultural practices are now generally included in anthropological research. For instance, Carol Warren (1995) researches policies that exert impact on community practices, such as law reform, land tenure and local governance and how these policies are negotiated within community structures and understandings. Lyn Parker (2003, p. 265) takes a similar position that 'the New Order ... has reached into all aspects of village life – agriculture, education, health, transport, housing, food, clothing, cultural and religious life, health and reproduction, employment – and transformed them all.'

A third approach to culture in Indonesian Studies has focussed more explicitly still on the state's conceptualisation of culture and its impact in Indonesia. Research into cultural expression has been forced into a more direct engagement due to the state's numerous interventions and the political commentary of many cultural forms. Virginia Matheson Hooker and Howard Dick's broad introduction to the edited collection of articles *Culture*

⁹ Pemberton uses the Indonesian spelling for traditional.

¹⁰ Tom Boellstorff comments that anthropological study in Indonesia has been 'responsive to the methodological challenges of the contemporary period' (2002, p. 25).

and Society in New Order Indonesia, assesses the state's impact on culture from a number of different vantage points (1993). This is one of a number of works that reflect on the New Order regime's impact on cultural expression and cultural developments in Indonesia, through both its economic and cultural policies (Hatley, 1994; Zurbuchen, 1990). Hooker and Dick and Mary Zurbuchen move between a very broad definition of culture¹¹ to a focus on culture as the performing and creative arts, indicating the links between how Indonesians' live and behave and what they consider to be their culture. More focussed research on topics, such as Indonesian literature (Foley & Sumandhi, 1994; Foulcher, 1980; 1986; 1993b; Maier, 1987; 1993; Tickell, 1982), fine arts (Suaedy, 2002; Supangkat, 1990; 1994) and the popular performing arts (Effendi, 1998; Hefner, 1987; Suanda, 1995; Widodo, 1995; Yampolsky, 1995), also explore the role of politics and the state in shaping cultural forms. The field of research about cultural expression helps reveal the complex and diverse ways that culture was used and impacted by official and non-official institutions and forms an important body of secondary sources for this thesis.

The final approach encompasses research into cultural institutions and industries. This research also indicates the importance of the state's conceptualisations of culture to how these industries were regulated and the resulting cultural products. For instance, Phillip Kitley argues that the regime's 'national cultural project' was central to the creation and regulation of Indonesian television (2000, pp. 3-4). Krishna Sen's account of New Order cinema also demonstrates the importance of the regime's regulation of Indonesians to its regulation of cinema, in particular the representation of the nation in film (1994, pp. 79-104). Similarly, the state's conceptualisation of national culture has played a vital role in arts educational institutions (Hellman, 1999; Hough, 2000), regulating cultural tourism (Picard, 1997; 1999; Vickers, 1989; Volkman, 1990) and in museums and theme parks (Acciaioli, 2001; Taylor, 1994; Wrath, 1997). In contrast to the focus on cultural texts and symbolism in research into cultural expression, research into cultural institutions and industries concerns itself with the pressures on institutions and their effects on cultural products and everyday experience. The concerns of this thesis with cultural regulation by

¹¹ Hooker and Dick (1993, p. 2) define culture broadly as embracing 'spiritual life, values, morality, education, and political processes' before focussing on a more narrow definition based around 'cultural expression'. Mary Zurbuchen makes a similar distinction (1990, p. 137), whereas Barbara Hatley limits her discussion to 'symbolic forms' (1994, p. 216) including discussions about the impact of broader changes on those forms.

state cultural institutions link it most closely to the cultural institutions and industries perspective.

2. Constructing the Relationship between the Indonesian State and Culture

Analysis of Indonesian cultural policy is fragmented because it has developed through the publication of a number of short articles emphasising a small number of themes, hindering the emergence of a more coherent understanding.¹² Below I outline the four most common perspectives on official Indonesian cultural policy.¹³

a. Impacts On Local Community Practices and Performing Arts

The area of research that has most often addressed official cultural policy is analysis of the state's influence on community practices and the popular performing arts. Much of the historical research about cultural policy has been written in response to the impact of official cultural policy on local community practices that have commonly been understood as rituals connected to ways of life.¹⁴ In this research, the state's interventions have been interpreted as bringing a different understanding of cultural practices into a community or, in the words of Greg Acciaioli in one of the first articles to address this issue, 'culture has become art' due to the policies of the state (1985, p. 162). After giving a general overview of the effects of state intervention and a few accounts of specific interventions, Acciaioli accuses the state of seeking to 'emasculate' regional community practices¹⁵ through bringing its 'true Culture based in the political philosophy of the *Pancasila*¹⁶ and the civic religion that undergirds it' to bear on the communities it

¹² An exception is the mammoth edited book *Kebijakan Kebudayaan di Masa Orde Baru (Cultural Policy in the New Order Era*, Tirtosudarmo, 2001) that covers six subject areas in 1404 pages.

Although a fantastic resource for information about cultural administrative structures and policy documents, *Kebijakan Kebudayaan* suffers from a lack of coherence and clear themes and a characterisation of all cultural policy as repressive that is mirrored by the larger field of Indonesian cultural policy analysis. Another expansive piece of research that avoids these problems is Michel Picard's excellent analysis of the impact of changing forms of governance on Balinese life, religion and culture across the twentieth century (1997). My study is more limited in that it only examines cultural policy and more encompassing in that it tackles the national policies in much more detail.

¹³ It should be noted that these characterisations are often combined (see, for instance, Foulcher, 1990, pp. 302-6). They are separated here due to the need to clearly engage with each of the four ideas.

¹⁴ Such assessments have generally been heavily influenced by anthropological understandings of culture. Greg Acciaioli (1985, p. 152) uses Pierre Bourdieu's idea of *doxa* (1977, p. 164) where the natural and the social world correspond.

¹⁵ Acciaioli uses the Indonesian word *adat* to refer to regional community practices that are based on local traditions.

¹⁶ The *Pancasila* is a group of five principles elaborated by Sukarno in 1945 as the basis of the Indonesian state – Nationalism, Internationalism, Democracy, Welfare and Belief in God (Legge, 1977, p. 180).

governs (1985, p. 161). The result is an increasing divide between communities and their rituals as the state seeks to transform these into markers of state-administered national and regional identity.

Philip Yampolsky's assessment of the state's impact on regional performing arts provides a more detailed analysis of official cultural policy (1995). Yampolsky writes a general history of the official cultural policy before focussing on the New Order era. He also gives a description of the state's interventions, but frames the issue as interventions into the regional performing arts.¹⁷ Although he rejects the notion that there was a Machiavellian strategy behind the New Order regime's cultural policies,¹⁸ Yampolsky agrees with Acciaoli's assessment that state intervention breaks the links between regional communities and their community arts due to the 'redesigning' of art forms for 'external consumption' (1995, p. 714). However, he also provides examples of different forms of resistance to government policy.¹⁹ The existence of resistance leaves open the possibility of individuals, working either inside or outside of the bureaucracy, using government policies in ways that reinforce the links between communities and their arts (1995, p. 721).

While the negative effects of official cultural policy were immense, a few researchers have noted there were some positive effects. For instance, Kathy Foley writes about the introduction of state-sponsored arts festivals:

The change of context, however, is the most striking modification. Arts festivals expand the horizons of the arts. In traditional Southeast Asian society the arts were often used to enhance life-cycle ceremonies, aristocratic endeavours, or religious festivals. The tables are turned when the arts themselves become the festival ... [Removing arts] from a religious festival setting emphasizes their secular proclivity. Clearly the majority of the presentations are in the 'secular entertainment' category, and all are juxtaposed against performances from abroad. The time, place, and context of the Bali Arts Festival have allowed it, by virtue of

¹⁷ Yampolsky also pays more attention to the rationale behind the state's interventions into the arts with particular attention to the bureaucrats that implemented arts policy (1995, pp. 707-714). Widodo's article on *Tayuban* similarly interrogates the interventions of arts bureaucrats into regional performing arts, but in a specific case study and with more local detail (1995).

¹⁸ This is possibly a reference to Anderson's assessment of minority groups in Indonesia where he states that 'what was publicly presented as a prominority policy in fact represented a Machiavellian policy of divide and rule' (1987b, p. 77).

¹⁹ Yampolsky notes that some communities were resisting such changes, that there were possibilities for subversion even if the state 'co-opted' regional arts, that there has been a significant deal of criticism within Indonesia, and that the government's approach to the arts includes a great deal of confusion and imprecision (1995, pp. 718-21).

its emphasis on secular arts, to become a significant forum for modern experimentation and development. (1994, p. 276)²⁰

Foley's comments can be linked to a broader observation about the application of power, including centrally driven policy: it very rarely has completely negative effects. Parker has also noted the productive effects of the state's moves to spread and strengthen a sense of national community. In her book about Balinese village life, Parker argues 'against the assumed opposition of society and state and shows that we can only understand the longevity of the Suharto regime by understanding that villagers wanted to participate in the version of modernity offered by the Indonesian nation-state' (2003, p. 1).

This field of research, in particular the work of Acciaioli and Yampolsky, is one of the points of departure for this thesis. Yampolsky's brief history of official cultural policy, with its focus on the constitutional debates and the New Order regime's Five Year Development Plans (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun – Repelita*), touches on important aspects of New Order era cultural policy. This thesis seeks to supplement his history through including the political and social circumstances that informed the bureaucratic developments at particular times. This thesis also offers an alternative perspective through adopting a different framework to the regional performing arts. Assessments of cultural policy focussed on the regional performing arts with only a few exceptions give an extremely negative appraisal of official Indonesian cultural policy. An analysis framed by the state's use of culture to shape a national community with a broader definition of what constitutes cultural policy would view the impact of state policy on regional performing arts as a negative aspect of a larger set of policies which had a much wider array of impacts across a number of different areas.

b. Indonesian culture as a version of Javanese culture

There are two related arguments regarding the representation of Indonesian culture as a version of Javanese culture. The first is a controversial but common notion regarding the structural causes of the political system and political behaviour in Indonesia. An example of this position is Karl Jackson, who, drawing from Benedict Anderson's analysis of the

²⁰ Lindsay's assessment of the performing arts in Southeast Asia also rejects the portrayal of cultural policy as completely 'top-down, with the imposition from above of undesirable requirements forcing undesirable changes' (1995: 657), but comes from a different perspective to Foley. The connection Lindsay makes with pre-existing cultural practices allows her to claim that there are continuities with pre-existing systems. However, this overlooks the many connections between cultural policy and governance which I discuss later in the introduction and draw throughout the thesis.

idea of power in Javanese culture (1990b), posits that the Indonesian political system is based on Javanese concepts of power and social organization (Jackson, 1978b, p. 34). According to this view (which provides a model for Lindsay's analysis of cultural policy), culturally determined patrimonial relationships between patrons and clients persist in Indonesia from pre-colonial Java and continue to shape the Indonesian political and social structure. Richard Robison has critiqued the patrimonial model from a Marxist perspective as ignoring the 'specific development of forms and relations of production' that provide a more concrete explanation regarding the shape of the Indonesian polity (1982a, p. 139). Philpott also rejects the patrimonial model and critiques its prominence as an explanation for Indonesian politics and society.²¹ Philpott notes that although such explanations demonstrate the 'pervasiveness of Javanese culture in New Order discourses' (2000, p. 94), they also rely on academy-approved cultural discourses rarely interrogated by analysts.

The second argument is located amongst cultural researchers rather than in political studies. While acknowledging that Javanese culture is a construction that has been shaped by a number of influences including political power, many researchers hold that the New Order's understanding of culture was still Java-centric.²² Pemberton's book, *The Subject of Java* (1994a), is the most prominent text about the construction of Javanese culture and its use by the New Order regime. The focus of *The Subject of Java* is an exploration and critique of 'the remarkable extent to which a rhetoric of culture enframes political will, delineates horizons of power' in New Order Indonesia (1994a, p. 9). Pemberton firstly argues that the particular relations of power, connected to indirect methods of rule, between the Dutch colonisers and the Javanese courts constructed both Java and the Javanese subject. One of the effects of Dutch interventions and political power was the construction of Javanese customs and traditions in the courtly texts as a way of excluding and domesticating the Dutch. The New Order regime drew on the constructed tradition of

²¹ Philpott argues that Javanese cultural performances have been used to frame Indonesian politics (2000, pp. xii-xiii) and notions of a 'Javanese sultan' and 'Javanese values' have been used to explain Suharto's style of rule (2000, pp. 78-82). See also Philpott (2000, pp. 184, fn 43&44). It is also relevant to note that other cultural clichés have been employed as explanatory devices in the analysis of Indonesian politics. For instance, the killings of 1965-6 were portrayed in books and newspapers as Malays running *amok* (See excerpts in Sulistyono, 2000, p. 133). Sulistyono argues against this generalised, cultural explanation for the killings.

²² For instance, Tsing, drawing on the work of Pemberton and patrimonial conceptions of political culture, argues that a constructed notion of Javanese culture dominated the cultural politics of the New Order regime (1993, pp. 22-5).

the Javanese courts in order to legitimise itself by presenting its authority as cultural and its use of ritual to represent Javanese society as inherently stable and ordered (1994a, pp. 148-196). Thus, Pemberton's account of the changing use of practices deemed culturally Javanese demonstrates how state power has transformed Javanese tradition, ritual and culture, firstly during the colonial period, and then during the New Order period.

In *The Subject of Java*, Pemberton skips the 1942-65 period because it constitutes a period of 'discontinuity' between eras where Java was constructed as based in tradition and ritual.²³ He states that those years 'trouble the virtual identity one might now read into 'Java'' (1994a, p. 26). The 1942-65 period was highly politicised and involved a number of struggles and debates between competing institutions over the constitution and use of Indonesian culture. Although certain perspectives on culture were systematically excluded after 1965, there were other constructions of Indonesia and Indonesian culture that also informed the New Order regime. For instance, the New Order regime borrowed and reconfigured ideas from both Sukarno (Bourchier, 1996, pp. 157-8) and artists influenced by Western liberalism (Supartono, Rasih, Agung, Roosa, & Razif, 2000, pp. 5-6). Most research that has touched in some way on cultural policy has been focussed on the New Order era, raising the issue of continuities and breaks with the cultural policies of previous eras.²⁴

Pemberton's careful historical research before 1945 and attention to the state's constructions of Javanese culture after 1965 demonstrates historically specific, changing and contested notions of culture and tradition that are intimately tied to political power and social change. The thrust of his argument about the New Order regime's construction of culture is well supported by Keith Foulcher in a much quoted article, where he writes that there is 'an increasing tendency to align 'Indonesia' with a redefined *priyayi* Java' (1990, p. 303). However this does not equate to either the essentialist assertion that Javanese concepts of power shape and hold together the political power structure or to the assertion that official cultural policy is based on a version of Javanese culture. Despite the

²³ This is not to say he argues that tradition and ritual were the same in both periods – he argues that there were significant differences. Vickers makes a similar criticism of the absence of the 1942-1965 period in *The Subject of Java* (1997, p. 178). Although Pemberton's emphasis on rural resistance to a degree ignores urban resistance, he is overt in his reasons for skipping the 1942-1965 period.

²⁴ Bali is an exception due to the number of assessments regarding its cultural history, which is quite different to the other provinces (Picard, 1997; Vickers, 1989). Another exception is the work into cultural industries and cultural expression mentioned previously.

New Order regime's use of the ceremonies and traditions from its version of Javanese culture, Indonesian culture is not simply a redefined version of Javanese culture. Foulcher, for instance, also acknowledges continuities with the nationalism of the Sukarno period within the construction of culture during the New Order era (1990, p. 303), while Ruth McVey highlights a continuity in the drive to modernise the most symbolically Javanese of art forms, *wayang*, among early nationalists, the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI*) and the army-dominated New Order regime and a shared desire to improve the indigenous population (1986).

c. The Growth of Consumption and Indigenous Values

The third group of theories about the Indonesian state's relationship to culture situates Indonesia in the context of global and regional economic and social change and how these changes have impacted Indonesians' 'ways of life'. There are two elements of New Order era policy within this argument. First is the adoption of capitalist economic policy, which relates to the growth of consumer culture in Indonesia through an increasingly deregulated marketplace. Second is the Indonesian government's response to the growth of consumption of goods and lifestyles generally perceived to be Western within Indonesia. Since these are global and regional trends, I review both the broader trends and their specific operation within Indonesia to generate a complete picture of the forces at work.

The social phenomenon of modern consumption was first noted around the turn of the century in America (Veblen, 1953)²⁵ and Western Europe (Simmel, 1971)²⁶ as a result of changing economic and social patterns. The important difference between the twentieth century and the preceding years was not the existence of symbolic consumption, but its spread to a much larger proportion of the population, particularly after World War II (Bocock, 1992, p. 132). Symbolic consumption began to grow in Asia following the expansion of globalised capitalism in the 1970s and the search for new markets by international capital (Chua, 2000a, p. 3). Sociologists, such as Pierre Bourdieu (1984; 1989), have observed that consumption has become an important method of establishing and maintaining differences between groups, as well as an important tool of social

²⁵ First published 1899.

²⁶ First published 1903.

mobility. Although not as widespread in many parts of Asia compared to Western countries (Chua, 2000a, p. 8), amongst a growing proportion of Asians, it has become an important method of identity formation.

The spread of culture through consumption in the marketplace in liberal democracies such as America has regularly been depicted by agents of the state as operating independently of the state (Miller & Yudice, 2002, pp. 35-6). At a UNESCO roundtable in 1969, the United States, for instance, famously claimed to 'have no cultural policy' (Kammen, 1996, pp. 795,798), reflecting the idea that culture should be as free as possible from state intervention. However, as Miller and Yudice demonstrate in their discussion of the United States, the state has always exercised considerable influence on the production and distribution of cultural goods (2002, pp. 35-71). If, for instance, going to see a film is a cultural experience, then policies related to funding, free trade, classification, and the regulation of the film industry become part of the regulatory framework of culture.

Discussion of the growth of capitalism and related consumption habits in Indonesian Studies has centred on the issue of the Indonesian new rich.²⁷ The first publication to recognise the significance of the growth of the new rich in Indonesia was the February 1984 issue of the Indonesian journal *Prisma*. English language research soon followed (Dick, 1985; Lev, 1990; Robison, 1986) and, from 1996, *The New Rich in Asia* series of books has continued to pursue analysis of these groups (Chua, 2000b; Pinches, 1999; Robison & Goodman, 1996; Sen & Stivens, 1998). A major problem with research into the new rich has been the variety of groups which fall into the category (see, for instance, Heryanto, 1999b, pp. 164, fn. 6; and, in the context of the Asia region, Robison & Goodman, 1996). If the category is divided by religion, ethnicity and political affiliations, it begins to lose its theoretical usefulness. However, a few traits run across all of the groups: their lives have been transformed by the economic growth of the New Order period (see Heryanto, 1999b, pp. 176-8; Robison, 1996, pp. 80-81) and they all partake in the consumption of middle class lifestyles (Dick, 1985, p. 74).

²⁷ New rich is another way of referring to what others, such as Dick (1985), have termed the middle class, while avoiding confusion over the more specific meaning given to the term by other researchers such as Robison (1996, pp. 84-95) to differentiate them from the bourgeoisie.

Ariel Heryanto's analysis of the 'new rich' in Indonesia demonstrates the centrality of consumption to the cultural construction and contestation of the identity of the groups identified as 'middle class' (1999b, p. 159). Heryanto identifies an increase in conspicuous consumption in the 1990s (1999b, pp. 163,167-8) and interactions between consumerism and constructions of both 'West' and 'East' (1999b, pp. 168-71), attitudes towards Chinese (1999b, pp. 171-3) and Islam (1999b, pp. 173-6). He argues that consumption and consumerism increasingly played an important role in contemporary Indonesian cultural politics. Other research into both consumption (Gerke, 2000, pp. 146-7) and the urban poor (Murray, 1991, p. 138) indicate that the consumerism of the new rich has begun to influence the habits of the urban poor and lower middle class. In the case of the growth of consumption, the state's economic policies were the cause of significant changes in Indonesian culture broadly defined. These changes were important to official cultural policy because they evoked a response from the New Order regime.

In the Southeast Asia region, the spread of consumer culture and the increasingly rapid movement of information associated with capitalist goods and services created some consternation amongst the regional governments. The governments of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, China and Burma (Birch, 1998a; Bourchier, 1998, p. 203) opposed the cultural changes and the related political and social messages brought by international capitalism with a discourse of 'Asian values' which emphasised hard work, family values, respect for authority, social responsibility, discipline and support of leaders.²⁸ David Birch argues that the government discourses about Asian values were a way of asserting government control over a nation (1998a, p. 183). In the name of preserving Asian values, governments consolidated their political power through populist opposition to the bogeyman of negative Western values and maintained their political control through the rejection of press freedom and human rights by labelling them 'Western' and therefore incompatible with an Asian way of life (Birch, 1998a; 1998b).²⁹ However, the Asianisation of Asia should not be viewed as only repressing the lives of those packaged as Asian. For instance, Chua Beng Huat demonstrates the productive effects of 're-indigenisation' on fashion in Singapore (2003, pp. 76-92). Similarly, the Indonesian state was a patron of some indigenous Indonesian cultural forms and even repressive measures

²⁸ See, for instance, the list provided by Singapore's Senior Minister of State for Community Development, Ching Jit Koon (quoted in Birch, 1998a, p. 184).

²⁹ Chua Beng Huat identifies the primary motivation of anti-Westernism in Asia as 'political' and based around a rejection of a liberal democratic political model (2000a, p. 12).

had some productive effects. For instance, the existence of a repressive state encouraged the emergence of on-line papers and magazines that operated outside of the Indonesian state's constraining regulatory framework and the growth of an on-line readership (Birch, 1998b, p. 338; Sen & Hill, 2000, pp. 200-2).

The New Order regime similarly employed a version of Asian values in its attempts to influence the habits of its populace (Birch, 1998a; Bourchier, 1998; Vickers & Fisher, 1999). Adrian Vickers and Lyn Fisher, for instance, write:

All the elements of 'Asian values' can be found in the way the New Order attempted to clarify and institutionalise 'Indonesian values'. The ideals of family and authority were there, as was a construction of a Western 'Other'. (1999, p. 398)

An important feature of the Indonesian values discourse³⁰ has been the political justification of a more authoritarian political system against criticisms from advocates of liberal-democratic models and associated individual rights (Bourchier, 1998, p. 207; Vickers & Fisher, 1999, p. 398).³¹ However, there was also a more widespread and pervasive use. Indonesian values also functioned as a form of control over cultural practices associated with the nation. The regime used the official state ideology of the *Pancasila* and associated programs to instil a model of conduct into the population through education in schools and the workplace (Bourchier, 1998, pp. 207-8). In this regard, David Birch's comment about Asian values could also apply to Indonesia:

What we need to understand is that new realities, new definitions and new structures are being determined by powerful forces within the Asian region, driven by powerful economic capital and, aligned to that, the developing cultural capital of what constitutes the public cultures of 'Asianness'. (1998a, p. 198)

Indonesian values discourses, as noted by Bourchier, also had a 'proactive aspect' in its creation of Indonesian citizens (1998, p. 207). While the regime's cultural policy response to greater integration with the outside world and growing consumption is examined in chapters three and four, other research has also noted the proactive elements and results of the regime's use of Indonesian values discourse. Researchers have assessed how it has been used in the construction of Indonesian citizens through education (Leigh, 1991; Parker, 1992), through alternative readings of government discourses such as the

³⁰ Vickers and Fisher use the term 'Indonesian values' (1999, p. 382) whereas Bourchier uses 'indigenous values' (1998, p. 204).

³¹ It should be noted that the 'Indonesian values' discourse strengthened pre-existing discourses about Indonesian identity. Thus was not a new phenomenon as much as a strengthening of a conservative understanding of Indonesian culture (Bourchier, 1998).

Pancasila to argue in favour of democratic reforms (Ramage, 1995, pp. 45-74,156-83) and also through opposition to official discourse, such as opposition to the regime's assertion that individual rights are not important to being Indonesian (Bourchier, 1998, pp. 209-11; Vickers & Fisher, 1999, pp. 396-8). Carol Warren's account of the different readings of terms and concepts common in New Order Indonesia and the contests over meanings that they involve also indicates how New Order concepts and language shaped political action (1990).

d. New Order National Culture as Military Culture

A fourth concept of the New Order regime's cultural policy which has not yet received much critical attention from English-language researchers has begun to be articulated by emerging Indonesian left-wing critics. One of the forums for left-wing criticism of the cultural policy of Indonesian governments from the late 1990s has been the magazine *Media Kerja Budaya*, published by cultural workers in Jakarta.³² The position of *Media Kerja Budaya* on national culture is that it should be diverse, inclusive (particularly of Indonesian urban and rural working class cultural practices), and promote involvement of diverse groups and people in cultural work (Supartono et al., 2000, pp. 5-6,15). According to this analysis, the New Order regime nurtured 'a military culture' that was homogenising and limited. A group of writers calling themselves the '*Media Kerja Budaya* Team' are critical of the impact of the New Order regime on culture:

What triumphantly surfaced was a military culture! Ceremonies and drills, *P4*³³ indoctrination, the standardisation of curriculum, the sole foundation [*Pancasila*] in politics, the banning of art activities are only several examples from the strength of the spirit of militarism in our culture for the last three decades. (Supartono et al., 2000, p. 15)

Yang muncul berjaya adalah kebudayaan militer! Upacara dan baris-berbaris, indoktrinasi P4, penyeragaman kurikulum, asas tunggal dalam politik, pelarangan kegiatan kesenian hanyalah beberapa contoh dari kuatnya semangat militerisme dalam kebudayaan kita selama tiga dekade terakhir.

The background of the New Order leadership, particularly in its early years, to some degree supports the above statement. When the New Order regime came to power, its leaders had generally received a military education and many had been influenced by

³² Although most of my information here comes from this magazine, it has been supplemented with interviews and discussions in Indonesia.

³³ *P4* is the acronym for *Pedoman, Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Orientation in Life and the Implementation of the Principles of the Pancasila)*, the New Order regime's civic education program that was implemented in schools, universities and workplaces in Indonesia.

their training under the Japanese, experiences during the revolution and their political conflict with the PKI, including its bloody resolution (Crouch, 1978, pp. 24-42).³⁴

The emphasis on the authoritarianism of the New Order serves here as a reminder of the political outlook of groups within the New Order elite and the kinds of pressures they put on cultural policy. However, the discussion of culture and the state in the preceding sections demonstrates that a single perspective never determined how policy related to culture and neither was the resulting cultural policy purely oppressive in either intention or results. Instead, the work of the emerging Indonesian left should be viewed as a reminder of the negative elements of the New Order government³⁵ and should also be read alongside accounts of the more productive elements of state policy.

A second issue is the characterisation of the New Order state as having a single rationale. There is a tendency in much research about the New Order regime and culture to present the state as a homogenous entity. For instance, Pemberton's research does not acknowledge differences within the state itself, particularly between the national government and the provincial and local governments, leading Vickers to write that Pemberton's homogenisation of the New Order state is 'an essentialised explanatory key to different kinds of changes in ceremonial action and representation' within his research (1997, p. 178). Similarly, Acciaioli's focus on state interventions from the perspective of marginal communities presents the state as a singular external force that seeks to impose its understanding of cultural practices on the community (1985). This representation has been compounded by a tendency within Indonesian Studies to represent the state as a single entity and operating independently of the international context and non-state institutions (see van Klinken, 2001b). In this thesis, the Indonesian state is considered far from unified and including diverse opinions and perspectives that differ significantly between different levels of the state³⁶ and, as I argue in the chapters that follow, multiple discourses about national culture.

³⁴ Adam makes a similar criticism of officially-sanctioned New Order era historiography when he summarised its impact as 'the militarization of history and nationalism' (2005, p. 272).

³⁵ Particularly impressive is the *Jaringan Kerja Budaya's* research into book bans during the New Order era (1999).

³⁶ See Schiller's research into state formation in Jepara, Java, where he notes the changing relationship between different levels of the state and the uniqueness of the state in Jepara itself (1996, pp. 28-98).

A final question that applies to the vast majority of cultural policy research, conducted as it was before the fall of Suharto, is the extent to which it remains applicable in post-New Order Indonesia. The economic crisis that began in late 1997 and the subsequent resignation of Suharto on 21 May 1998 preceded a period of rapid political and social change. Now the post-Suharto state's cultural policies need to be analysed with reference to both broad global and regional trends and internal changes within Indonesia. The need for new assessments is made more pressing by the length of the New Order regime and the existence of certain continuities within its cultural policies since the early 1970s. Even if there is a high degree of continuity across the periods, the impact of the political and social changes on pre-existing cultural policies needs to be assessed.

3. Thesis Objectives

Arising from the previous discussion, my first objective is:

To analyse the cultural policies of Indonesian governments in a way that identifies continuities and breaks within and between different governments and interrogates their interaction. In particular, the thesis will address changes that have occurred between the Suharto and post-Suharto governments.

My second objective is:

To examine the application of the cultural policies of Indonesian governments in state sponsored cultural institutions and how those institutions understood and targeted the attributes and behaviours of Indonesians during the New Order and the Reform eras.³⁷

The singular pursuit of the first objective would come close to representing the Indonesian state as monolithic. As Gerry van Klinken has argued, there is a pressing need to include analysis of the lower levels of government as they have their own political conflicts, dynamics and histories which have become increasingly important in post-New Order Indonesia (2001c, pp. 2-4,23-4). It is not enough to analyse the broad changes in policy and discourse. Through the second objective, I give attention to the actual application of cultural policy through programs and activities. I argue that the homogenous representations of Indonesia produced by the bureaucrats in Jakarta were far from the diverse and negotiated situation that existed at the lower levels of government.

³⁷ The first four years of the Reform era, finishing at the end of 2003 are investigated here.

4. Methodology

Designing an appropriate methodology for analysis of cultural policy in Indonesia hinges on two areas of debate within two different academic communities: debates over Indonesian political analysis conducted within Indonesian Studies and debates over cultural policy analysis within Cultural Studies. Recent debates about Indonesian political analysis have highlighted the need for a rethink of the conceptualisation of the state in Indonesia and its relationship to society and social groups beyond the political elite. Developing a method of analysis that clarifies the operations of the Indonesian state connects with debates over the state's relationship with cultural practices, which have been conducted in Cultural Studies, as both revolve around analysis of the state/society relationship. Despite differences in subject matters, similar methodological moves are required now in political studies about Indonesia as were made in Cultural Studies perspectives on cultural policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Below I critically review different perspectives about the state in Indonesian political studies before exploring the options for a perspective that better recognises the links between the Indonesian state and society. Then I turn to different methods of cultural policy analysis and debates within Cultural Studies over the most appropriate method for tackling policy issues before reflecting on these issues in the context of research into Indonesian culture. My analysis suggests that the writings of Foucault and his concept of governmentality, which have already been canvassed in both fields, is possibly the best available method for linking culture and government policy in Indonesia.

State, Society and Culture in the Study of Indonesian Politics

a. Understanding the Indonesian State

The study of Indonesian politics has been shaped by the conditions of its emergence following World War II and the subsequent events. Particularly relevant is the institutionalisation of certain liberal assumptions as a result of the spread of American influence and decline of European influence throughout Southeast Asia (Anderson, 1982, p. 70; Philpott, 2000, pp. 46-55). In an article reflecting on the dominant methodologies of the early years of Indonesian Studies, Anderson identifies the two dominant perspectives in Indonesian Studies of the 1950 to 1965 period, despite significant differences in method and attitudes to nationalism, share a focus on the political elite and

political institutions and generally share a commitment to the spread of liberal democracy.³⁸

Analysis of the New Order years generated greater debate about methodological approaches to Indonesian politics and in particular the New Order state. Andrew MacIntyre identifies six perspectives about the Indonesian state (1990, pp. 6-21): state-qua-state,³⁹ bureaucratic polity and patrimonial cluster,⁴⁰ bureaucratic pluralism,⁴¹ bureaucratic authoritarianism,⁴² structuralist approach,⁴³ and restricted pluralism.⁴⁴ Mark Berger's account of trends in the study of Indonesian politics consolidates MacIntyre's six perspectives into three approaches: liberal state-society approaches that developed out of revisions of modernisation theory (which groups together bureaucratic polity and patrimonial cluster, bureaucratic pluralism, bureaucratic authoritarianism and restricted pluralism); Marxist analysis (labelled structuralist by MacIntyre); and state-qua-state. Of the 'liberal state-society' approaches, the most used has been patrimonialism (drawn in particular from the work of Harold Crouch⁴⁵), which emphasises patron-client relationships between rulers and political and business elite, with different patron-client cartels competing for rewards dispersed by the ruler.⁴⁶ In this model, politics is characterised by conflicts over resources rather than being driven by ideological differences or policy issues.

The Marxist approach to Indonesian politics grew out of a critical review of dependency theory which was in vogue in the 1970s and a critique of the 'liberal state-society

³⁸ See Anderson (1982, pp. 71-83). Anderson labels the approaches (1) anticolonial liberalism and the historical method, which centred around George Kahin and dominated the beginning and middle of the 1950s, and (2) imperial liberalism and the comparative method which came to the fore at the end of the 1950s and was reliant on the doctrine of modernisation and related universalist assumptions about political systems and societies (1982, p. 75). As such, modernisation theory assisted the spread of American capital and institutions across Asia. Some scholars, including Pauker and Pye, accepted the demise of the liberal constitutional order as the agent of modernisation and argued that military regimes would be adequate substitutes. See their chapters in Johnson (1962).

³⁹ MacIntyre cites Anderson (1990c). I discuss the state-qua-state approach later in this section.

⁴⁰ He cites Jackson (1978a) on the bureaucratic polity and Crouch (1979; 1980; 1984) on patrimonialism.

⁴¹ This is a reference to Emmerson's argument that there is more plurality within the bureaucracy than recognised by Anderson and that policy debate is more widespread than recognised by researchers in the bureaucratic polity and patrimonialism perspective (1983).

⁴² MacIntyre cites King (1982) and refers to his use of corporatism to understand how the New Order regime prevented dissent by structuring interest representation through regime-controlled groups.

⁴³ MacIntyre cites Robison (1978; 1982b; 1985; 1986; 1988), whose approach I discuss below.

⁴⁴ MacIntyre cites Liddle (1985; 1987).

⁴⁵ See the citations in footnote 40.

⁴⁶ Both MacIntyre (1990, p. 8) and Berger (1997, p. 325) identify patrimonialism as the most used or 'conventional' approach to Indonesian politics.

approach'. The most well-known proponent of a Marxist approach is Richard Robison, whose analysis hinges on identifying class tensions within Indonesian society created by the changing capitalist system and analysis of how these were managed through the corporatist strategies of the New Order regime (1986). The state-qua-state perspective has its basis in a single article by Anderson (1990c). Anderson argues that the state and the nation are separate entities and characterises different periods in Indonesian history by the strength of one relative to the other. MacIntyre writes that 'Anderson's argument is perhaps most usefully interpreted as a response to instrumentalist Marxist views of the state as a tool of the capitalist class' (1990, p. 7). Anderson emphasises the complicated dynamics of historical change in accounting for the rise of the New Order state.

My purpose in reviewing the different perspectives is to identify the possibilities they raise for analysis of cultural policy. Two issues are of concern. The first has been touched on earlier, in particular in regards to the idea of patrimonialism: the use of culture as an explanatory tool in Indonesian Studies without any interrogation of the relations of power which shape its features and limit how it is able to be used. Researchers following the 'liberal state-society' methodology in particular have resorted to culture as an explanatory device.⁴⁷ Philpott also notes that Robison, after claiming that Anderson's state-qua-state perspective relied on culturalist assumptions,⁴⁸ 'falls back on categories such as ethnicity, culture, and 'history', none of which enter into his critical calculations' (2000, pp. 74-6,84-7). Of the perspectives, Anderson's state-qua-state offers the most promise as its emphasis on historical specificity in the constitution of the Indonesian state and nation does not allow culture to become an ahistorical, universal category.

The second issue relates not to culture but to policy. Research into Indonesian politics has separated the state and civil society and focussed its attentions almost exclusively on the state. MacIntyre, for instance, asserts that while there is disagreement about explanations for the system of governance in Indonesia, 'it remains inescapable that there is an underlying consensus centring on the idea that the state is largely unfettered by societal interests in the determination of policy' (1990, p. 17). Young argues that the narrow focus on the state is a problem not just for studies of Indonesian politics (echoed in van

⁴⁷ On the use of culture in the work of Crouch and an influential article by Macintyre and Jamie Mackie see Philpott (2000, pp. 78-84).

⁴⁸ Robison writes that 'the New Order state cannot be understood as some ahistorical, universal Javanese state transcending its specific history and social environment' (1986, p. 84).

Klinken's work a decade later, 2001b) but Southeast Asian political studies and that certain issues are excluded from political analysis as a result. He writes:

Research into political trends in Southeast Asia takes place in a theoretical and institutional context which cleaves firmly to the discipline's origins which were concerned with institutional analyses focused above all else on the government, the state and the ruling elite. (1991, p. 100)

The problem the state-society division causes for the study of policy in Indonesia is that it ignores how the New Order's sustained authoritarian rule relied on particular constructions of the Indonesian subject in policy as well as the use of coercive force and how these constructions had effects on behaviours and subjectivities. Philpott writes:

A striking feature of the discourse of Indonesian politics is that it ignores the full range of practices lumped together under the rubric of the state's other, civil society. ... Practitioners of the discourse of Indonesian politics have commonly asserted, explicitly or otherwise, that the Indonesian state had distinct interests and, in that sense, is autonomous of civil society. However, the specific ways in which the New Order's will to govern was realized in civil society have been neglected. (2000, pp. 144-5)

The study of the relationship between the state and culture needs a methodology that brings into focus the more complex and indirect forms of power that exist in addition to the direct application of state power for the protection and furtherment of state and ruling elites' interests.

b. Power, the State and Foucault

Although not overly concerned with legitimacy and consent, the limits of Indonesian politics drawn by post-World War II social science cause it to adhere to the focus of the kind of 'political theory' criticised by Foucault because of its narrow scope. Foucault stated in an interview in 1977:

What we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the King's head: in political theory that has still to be done. (1980, p. 121)

Foucault's move to broaden political theory hinges on a revision of the concept of power. Analysis of Indonesian politics has generally viewed power negatively. Philpott writes: 'Power is almost exclusively understood as militarised, violent, repressive, and censorious' (2000, p. 147). Foucault, on the other hand, labels this kind of power relations 'domination' and considers it to be one of many structures of power. Foucault's definition of power does not privilege a single set or type of power relations. Power, at its

most basic level, 'designates relationships between partners' which refers to 'an ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from one another' (1982, p. 217). As such, power is inherently unstable, ambiguous, reversible and is dispersed throughout the network of human relations rather than just the possession of the powerful.

Between domination (where there is little room for resistance) and the flowing, easily reversible type of power described above,⁴⁹ Foucault identifies the category of power relations which is the chief concern of this thesis: *government*. Foucault outlined his ideas about government in a lecture titled 'Governmentality' given in 1978 (1991b). Government is defined as 'the conduct of conduct' or the regulation of the ways people regulate their own behaviour. In the lecture, Foucault traces the emergence of increasingly complicated forms of government since the sixteenth century around the changing answers to questions concerned with the best possible forms of governance not just of states and nations but also of the individual and of families. However, the dissemination of new forms of government throughout a population is linked to a particular form of government: the type of government concerned with managing the nation-state as a whole, the 'art of the state' (1991b, p. 90). The state became increasingly concerned with the correct management of individuals, people and goods, rendering the state's use of domination far less important than the use of government. It is in this sense that Foucault referred to the 'governmentalisation of the state' (1991b, pp. 102-3). Within this formulation, the task of regulating conduct is not just that of the state. Instead, the agencies of the state are one set of instruments of government amongst others, leading Foucault to write that 'maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a mythicised abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. Maybe what is really important for our modernity [is the] governmentalisation of the state' (1991b, p. 103).

Central to Foucault's research into governance is a recognition of the importance of the particular rationalities of government (which he termed governmentality) – the discourses that construct the logic of governmental powers – at work in any given situation. Discourses, in Foucault's work, are the building blocks of knowledge and power. Discourses are not just ways of speaking, but also ways of thinking and acting that

⁴⁹ Foucault describes this form of power as 'strategic games between liberties' (1988, p. 19).

are held together by a particular set of relations (1972, pp. 44-5). Hence Foucault talks of discourses not ‘as groups of signs ... but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (1972, p. 49).⁵⁰ Discourses then do not describe pre-existing objects, but imbue objects with meaning and purpose. Through the concept of discourse, Foucault attempts to disrupt the groupings that ‘purport to be natural, immediate, universal unities’ (1972, p. 29) by describing the specific operations of a statement or practice in a particular historical moment in order to engage with the set of relations that regulates its operation.

Foucault writes that ‘a discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy’ (1990, p. 101). Meaning, in other words, is socially constructed across a number of sites through discourses. Rationalities of government are discursive formations – combinations of discourses held together by sets of relations that produce a certain network of material relations. However, as Foucault notes, discourses within discursive formations can contradict and oppose as well as reinforce, and can form the basis for opposition. The use of ‘strategy’ in the previous quote from Foucault deserves some attention. Discourses and rationalities of government do not presuppose a consciousness of a contest over meaning. A strategy, however, includes an element of choice in the designation of means, actions or procedures in order to come up with winning solutions (1982, pp. 224-5). Discourses can be strategically deployed in power-games in a calculated effort to overcome resistance.

Despite the array of governmental rationalities that operate in modern society independently of the state, Foucault still views the state as important and as having become more important recently. Foucault writes: ‘power relations have been progressively governmentalised, that is to say, elaborated, rationalised, and centralised in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions’ (1982, p. 224). The different areas which have come under state surveillance have become increasingly diversified and, even though the state is not seeking to dominate many fields of possible intervention, it has greatly increased its regulatory role and become increasingly reliant on non-state

⁵⁰ Foucault, as Vehne notes, studied ‘practice by way of discourse’ (1997, p. fn.1). While I choose to retain discourse as a tool of analysis, other policy analysts that have drawn from Foucault, like Dean (1999), have done away with discourse in favour of ‘practice’.

rationalities of government. The state is therefore still worthy of attention as an important and large set of institutions in the web of governmental power relations that underwrite social institutions and subjectivities. However, for Foucault societal institutions are also superstructural to the state and form an element of the tactics through which the continued existence of the state is made possible. Thus, Foucault writes that ‘the state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality’ (1991b, p. 103).

The state as a whole would be an unwieldy unit of analysis within a Foucaultian framework. It is too large, too fragmented and caught in so many relations of power that detailed analysis would be rendered near impossible. Instead, Foucault suggests that analysing power relations is best done by ‘focussing on carefully defined institutions’ (1982, p. 222). Institutions are the sites at which governmental rationalities meet, intertwine, disagree, are translated into technologies and applied to subjects. Translated back into policy terms, focusing on a particular institution provides an insight into how the development and application of policy is contingent on the operations of a particular combination of power relations in that institution and links those relations together with broader historical movements.

Foucault’s research methods and ideas about power, government and the state have been developed by a number of scholars and have become known as the governmentality perspective. This perspective became more widely known through an edited book that included Foucault’s ‘Governmentality’ lecture along with a number of other pieces analysing and applying his ideas (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991). It has since spread amongst researchers due to the insights it gives into the ways we are governed and related operations of power. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osbourne and Nikolas Rose’s comment on the governmental studies in *Foucault and Political Reason* can be generalised more broadly to understand the appeal of governmental analysis:

These perspectives on governmentalities deliver, we think, real and immediate gains, conferring a new kind of intelligibility upon the strategies that seek to govern us, and the ways in which we have come to understand, embrace or contest such strategies. (1996, p. 16)

Governmental analysis has been particularly used in research about liberal democracies (Barry et al., 1996; Burchell, 1993; Hindess, 2000; Rose & Miller, 1992), but has also

been applied in many other areas including psychology (Rose, 1996b) and cultural policy (Barnett, 2001; Miller & Yudice, 2002).

c. Governmentality and the New Order Regime

Foucault's theories on power and the state provide possible solutions for some of the limitations within studies about Indonesian politics referred to earlier. Foucault provides a broadened definition of power that recognises its productive and restrictive effects. Indonesian political studies concerns with elite politics and the state can be supplemented with research into the techniques through which governmental rationalities are inscribed into the everyday practices of a populace, the resistances they meet and their responses and changes. Political power, in such a formulation, exists beyond the state.

Another important contribution would be Foucault's challenge to the structural soundness of the state-civil society divide in studies of Indonesian politics. The state/civil society divide is itself a construction of particular governmental rationalities, as are the limits of state action which were adopted by the New Order regime. To borrow from Foucault again:

It is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on. (1991b, p. 108)

Within Foucault's research, the state-civil society divide itself is contingent on the particular rationality of government being employed and can hide the full extent of the operations of power in civil society. In this framework, institutions and policy become recognised as central to the functioning of the state and their results become contingent in that their strategic deployment of discourses can be resisted or coopted.

Foucault's own work was focussed on Western Europe and most of the Governmentality literature is focussed on Western liberal democracies. However, Foucault's concepts have been used in Asian and Latin American contexts.⁵¹ In *Rethinking Indonesia*, Philpott begins the methodological work of considering how Governmentality would operate in the Indonesian context. Philpott argues that Indonesians were not just subject to domination while being under the New Order regime, although this form of power was

⁵¹ See Stoler (1995b), Said (1993) and Escobar (1984-5).

more widely used than in Western liberal democracies, but were also subject to governmental relations of power. He writes:

[The] New Order regime also attempted to regulate, both directly and indirectly, the behaviour of citizens. This regulation sought the realisation of certain aims, desires and goals, suggesting that the New Order's practices manifested more than a simple desire for domination ... The bodies of Indonesians are targets of particular technologies and strategies that seek to construct productive, regulated, controlled, adapted and ultimately, 'governed' subjects. (2000, p. 150)

Philpott suggests that an 'authoritarian governmentality' (2000, pp. 167-177) existed in Indonesia with its own specific rationality and effects. The New Order 'authoritarian governmentality' was defined partly in opposition to liberalism and explicitly rejected the separation of state and society (2000, pp. 150-1) and is indebted to a 'development' discourse (2000, p. 173).⁵²

Recent writings on governmentality have explored the connection between liberal and authoritarian governmentalities through examining their shared understandings regarding what constitutes government. Mitchell Dean (1999, pp. 98-102) argues that central to liberalism is the understanding that government is the task of regulating naturally occurring processes in society through the measurement of populations. Although liberalism is generally associated with freedom, the operation of government in liberal societies has incorporated elements of what Barry Hindess has termed 'unfreedom' or 'authoritarian rule' (2001, p. 94). Liberal rationalities of government are based on the assumption that freedom is the ideal condition for individuals to make rational decisions (Hindess, 2001, pp. 98-100). However, this raises the problem of ensuring that individuals have the appropriate capacity for 'autonomous' action, or in other words, make their choices rationally where their 'rationality' concurs with the logic of the state. The result has been that large populations (by far the majority of subjects of liberal rule before 1945) have been excluded from full liberal citizenship. Hindess identifies three categories of response within liberal thought to these populations: extermination, such as John Locke's suggestions about the native inhabitants of America, (Hindess, 2001, p. 101); compulsion of these populations to acquire the required capacities through the imposition of discipline; and, in the case of 'relatively civilised populations', government

⁵² Philpott also makes an observation which further recommends a governmental approach as the most appropriate choice for the topic of this thesis: 'Importantly, governmentality disturbs the explanatory force of culture in the discourse of Indonesian politics by treating it as a site at which Indonesians are governed' (2000, p. 176). Culture, within a governmental formulation, is constituted within a discursive formation aimed at shaping the attributes of populations. I return to this topic in the next section.

facilitation of their development through providing a ‘benign and supportive environment’, such as welfare distribution (Hindess, 2001, p. 99). Colonised peoples, such as the indigenous populations of India and also Indonesia, fit into the second category. According to John Stuart Mill, these populations benefit from continued enslavement since they are not sufficiently advanced ‘to be fitted for representative government’ (Mill, 1977, p. 567 in Hindess, 2001, p. 105).⁵³

While the measurement of processes and populations, best exemplified in the sciences of economics and demography, was essential to the birth of liberalism, they have also become essential to other forms of government. From early in the nineteenth century, identifying and managing populations and processes has become the principal concern of most contemporary methods of governance. Dean argues:

the governmentalisation of the state occurs according to a line of modification along which [previous conceptions of government are] supplemented, and to some degree displaced and reinscribed, by a government through particular and specifiable processes, at once opaque to rulers but rendered knowable by definite forms of knowledge. In this regard, liberal, social democratic, and even authoritarian and statist forms of rule can be understood as variations on the consequences of such a line of modification. (1999, p. 102)

While liberal rationalities of government limited the extent that state control could be exercised over at least a portion of a nation’s citizens due to a concern with the freedom of citizens (Dean, 1999, pp. 98-112), non-liberal rationalities of government have shown less restraint. In Indonesia, the Family Planning program (*Keluarga Berencana*) undertaken by the New Order regime conflated ‘the interests of the family and the health of the nation-state’s economy’ (Newland, 2001, p. 22). Lynda Newlands’ assessment of Family Planning, which included ‘military’ style strategies (2001, pp. 35,27), indicates a more paternalistic style with an emphasis on reaching quotas rather than women’s health (2001, p. 42) and greater intrusion and intervention than generally the case in Western health programs (2001, p. 44).

Rather than developing an account of the rationalities of government present in New Order Indonesia, Philpott’s analysis is more focussed on demonstrating how a governmental perspective might address some of the shortcomings of the mainstream forms of analysis in Indonesian political studies. Other research into specific institutions

⁵³ I explore this issue further in my discussion of colonial government in the next chapter.

and industries in Indonesia has demonstrated that the subject of New Order Indonesia is constituted by relations of power that emanate from the official apparatus such as educational institutions (Leigh, 1991; Parker, 1992) and family planning (Newland, 2001; Sullivan, 1991), as well as non-state institutions including the media (Kitley, 2001; Sen & Hill, 2000) and labour migration companies (Rudnyckyj, 2004) and Islam (Hefner, 1998a). In this research, the subject is not just constituted through these discourses but through resistance to and the interaction of these discourses, demonstrating that there is much existing Indonesian Studies research that can be drawn on in a governmental analysis.

A governmental perspective addresses some of the methodological concerns raised previously. It recognises that power is productive and moves beyond the conception that power is limited to political power. A governmental perspective also provides the analytical tools to differentiate between different discourses within the state and recognises that the state is heterogeneous. Most importantly, it recognises that government exists beyond the state and begins to move beyond the state-society divide in seeking to understand how people are governed. It focuses attention towards the discourses, strategies, rationalities and institutions that are implicated in forming Indonesians and the continued existence of the nation-state. Culture, within this framework, is of strategic importance as an element of social life that is closely related to group and individual identity. It offers a means for the state and other institutions to target populations and as such is a form of governmentality that can be analysed through the discursive structure that gives it meaning.

Researching Cultural Policy

The discussion of Foucault's conceptions of power provides a broad methodology for analysing cultural policy. However, a more detailed methodology is needed if the features and characteristics of Indonesian cultural policies are to be explained. My search for an appropriate methodology in cultural policy research led, once again, to Foucault. Before revisiting the debates in Cultural Studies around cultural policy research, there is a need to sketch the cultural policy field to locate the perspective I take amongst a diverse and growing body of work and assess its suitability when compared to other perspectives. My purpose in returning to the cultural policy debates is both to explore how the cultural

linkages between society and state were theorised in this debate and introduce the key positions of this methodology. These debates inform the next section where I analyse the resulting cultural policy practice to fashion an appropriate methodology for Indonesia.

a. Different Analytical Perspectives on Cultural Policy

The use of culture by the state has long been a concern of intellectuals and visionaries. Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* (1882)⁵⁴ deals extensively with the state's use of culture to create a model society. Arnold takes an aesthetic view of culture that limits it to a narrow selection of practices which he considers to be close to human perfection (1882, p. 39). Writings about culture and the state by Marxist theorists also privileged the role of a few experts in identifying cultural quality and perfection (for instance, Adorno, 1991) forming a general point of agreement across the political spectrum. In the 50s, 60s and 70s, more pluralistic conceptions of culture began to challenge the cultural elitism of older theories particularly in the research relating to popular and working class culture (for instance, Hoggart, 1972; Thompson, 1963; Williams, 1965) and writings about race and colonialism (Fanon, 1963; 1967).

Also in the 1970s, social scientists began to bring new forms of analysis to culture and the arts in particular. Some of the current trends in cultural policy research hark back to this time: 'Cultural Policy Studies' was named and undertaken through the creation of the Association of Cultural Economics and the Center for Urban Studies at the University of Akron; Herbert Gans published his work on 'taste cultures' (1974); and social science journals such as the *Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society* (est. 1969), and the *Journal of Cultural Economics* (est. 1973) began ongoing publication.⁵⁵ Although beginning at the same time as the changes in other disciplines, this body of research was oriented towards the needs of states, which were involved in their own processes of cultural policy reform. Previously, many Western countries had limited cultural policy to arts funding, which was generally directed to activities considered to be elements of high culture. From the 1970s until the present, the scope of cultural policy in Western countries has expanded to include a widening variety of practices and objects along with a broader set of objectives. Cultural policy research in the West has a reciprocal

⁵⁴ First published in 1882.

⁵⁵ See Miller and Yudice (2002, p. 29) for a more detailed account and critique of this movement.

relationship with the changing scope and priorities of states whose policies and institutions generally are the research topic.

Three broad directions in the analysis of cultural policy have developed in the last thirty years. The first perspective is cultural economics which brought economic theory to the field of cultural activities. This method began with the publication of William Baumol and William Bowen's book *Performing Arts: the Economic Dilemma* (1968) and the founding of *The Journal of Cultural Economics* five years later. Many in the field of cultural economics, like Bruno Frey, hold that the tenets of cultural economics are the methodological devices of individualism and rational choice. Rather than judging what constitutes good and bad art, cultural economists leave these decisions up to the market (Frey, 2000). Cultural economics holds that if institutions, including cultural institutions and the market, take into account the rational economic choices of individuals, culture will flourish.

The second perspective I term the regeneration-through-culture perspective. Rather than understanding policy as being directed at the field of cultural activities, 'cultural regeneration' recognises culture's utility as a tool of the state. The definition of culture is expanded to include the cultural industries (such as media, fashion, leisure and tourism), the activities of community groups, lifestyles and heritage along with the arts.⁵⁶ Culture became a means for generating jobs and income as well as a tool for building community and increasing the quality of life of the populace. Franco Biancini's research into urban regeneration through cultural policy provides an example of this research genre and how it has developed in tandem with changes in how governments use and administer culture (1987; 1993). Biancini notes the changes in the strategic objectives of cultural policies in Western European cities between the 1970s concerns with social and political issues to the 1980s focus on economic and urban development (1993, p. 2). A key difference between the cultural regeneration perspective and the cultural economics perspective is the inclusion of a political dimension in critiquing and understanding the development of cultural policy, allowing the inclusion of issues connected to citizenship and democracy.

⁵⁶ The inclusion of cultural industries was a particularly important development as it moved away from the elitist division between art and administration and recognised that most cultural goods in Western capitalist societies are provided through the market. For an early document that moved cultural policy in this direction in the context of the Greater London Council, an important institution for the development of this cultural policy field, see Garnham (1987).

Cultural regeneration can be applied at various levels from cities to nations as well as specific cultural industries and institutions.⁵⁷ It is beginning to be applied in Asia (Kong, 2000) as Asian states have begun to realise the economic and social advantages of vibrant cultural industries.

The third perspective on cultural policy takes a wider and more critical view of what cultural policy is and what it does. It focuses on issues of identity formation and power that inhabit the cultural connections between institutions and people. This perspective broadens the scope of cultural policy beyond the current cultural policy developments and regeneration strategies to focus, in the words of Toby Miller and George Yudice in their book *Cultural Policy*, on ‘those cultural knowledges and practices that determine the formation and governance of subjects’ (2002, p. 2). The critical perspective includes a broader range of policies and asks more detailed questions about how culture is used by institutions to exert impact on groups and individuals. Finally, the critical perspective brings a rich understanding to the history of cultural policy and historicises its current developments. It recognises that the language and race policies of colonial powers are as much cultural policies as urban regeneration strategies in Europe. Similarly, the present cultural policy moment is understood as the product of a particular historical junction and holds within it the mechanisms, inequalities and assumptions of present and past times and projected futures.

A brief survey of some of the key proponents that fall into this category will help clarify the forms of analysis that it includes. The researcher whose work has been central to the critical position is Tony Bennett, whose arguments I look at in detail in the next section. It is sufficient here to note his extensive research on both cultural policy and museums and his focus on the changing use of cultural institutions in attempts to govern people and groups (1992; 1995; 1998). Alison Beale’s feminist research into cultural policy also falls into this category of research due to her questioning of the gender bias that inhabits the market mechanisms of employment and consumption which have become key elements of the cultural sector (1999). The critical perspective has been used to analyse a range of different topics from institutions such as museums (Bennett, 1989c; 1995) to the cultural

⁵⁷ Journals (such as the British journal *Cultural Trends*) and books (like Schuster, 2002) that are committed to providing statistical information or descriptive data for cultural policy institutions are an element of this approach.

policies of nation-states⁵⁸ to international institutions (Barnett, 2001; Miller & Yudice, 2002, pp. 165-84).

A problem when applying contemporary cultural policy analysis to a postcolonial setting like Indonesia is the underlying assumption of a Western setting. Clive Barnett's criticism of the critical cultural policy perspective is perhaps even more apt for the other two perspectives:

cultural policy studies ... assumes the existence of the characteristic institutional arrangements of liberal, representative democracy, and the existence of an elaborate public sphere of cultural institutions mediating the relationship between nation-state and citizenry. (1999, p. 374)

All three perspectives outlined above have grown out of debates in the Western academy and have largely focussed on cultural policy developments in the West. Virginia Dominguez and Sasha Welland, in their introduction to an edited book about national cultural policies in East and Southeast Asia, make the point that 'contemporary culturalism is not regionally restricted, not primarily European, and not simply a case of mimicry by Europe's former colonies' (1998, p. 5). Additionally, as Anne Stoler demonstrates in her research into race and culture, the work of culture for the colonial administrations used the same logic as Western nation-states but with different purposes and results (1995a; 1996). Cultural policy was put to work in different ways in Indonesia than the West, and thus requires a methodology that is capable of reflecting on its own assumptions and histories.

Governmentality presents itself as a methodological solution to this problem for two reasons. Firstly, as was demonstrated previously, governmentality provides a method for assessing the complex relationship between Western, colonial and authoritarian regimes that is necessary for an analysis of cultural policy history in a postcolonial setting. Secondly, previous cultural policy research in Asia has successfully employed Foucaultian tools to analyse how culture has been constructed as a discursive formation due to its location within different governmental discourses. Chua Beng Huat and Eddie Kuo's analysis of cultural policy in Singapore identifies Singaporean national identity and Singaporeans as the results of discursive practices with 'temporally changing

⁵⁸ See, for instance, *Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society* 31, (1) (2001) which collects together research on Scandinavian cultural policy and the articles in Dominguez and Wu's edited book on cultural policy in East and Southeast Asia (1998).

characters' that are "called into existence' by statements that circulate in different discourses, in different spheres of social practices' (1998, p. 37). By recognising Singaporean culture as discursively constructed rather than an object with determined features, Chua and Kuo are able to map changes to official Singaporean culture due to changes in government policies and strategies.⁵⁹ The critical cultural policy perspective, with its links to governmental analysis, is best equipped for analysis of Indonesia.

b. The Cultural Policy Debate in Cultural Studies

Having identified critical cultural policy perspectives as the field of study most able to construct an appropriate framework for the analysis of Indonesian cultural policy, the next step is to explore the key debates and positions within this perspective. A way of moving towards a deeper understanding of the critical cultural policy field is to return to the early debates that surrounded its emergence in Cultural Studies. As has been mentioned previously, a key proponent of the cultural policy perspective in Cultural Studies is Tony Bennett. He was one of the founding members of the Institute of Cultural Policy Research in Queensland,⁶⁰ his writings provided a basis for much contemporary cultural policy research (Barnett, 2001; Whitcomb, 2003), and his research has been consistently cited as a key example of cultural policy analysis (See During, 1993, pp. 16-7; O'Regan, 1992b, p. 518). Bennett's framework for 'putting policy into cultural studies' (1992, p. 23) is outlined below, followed by a brief summary of critiques of his ideas by other Cultural Studies researchers and finally Bennett's reply.⁶¹

Bennett's early texts about cultural policy served as both an outline for a future research direction and a challenge to certain shared understandings amongst Cultural Studies practitioners. The key text that outlined his project is 'Putting Policy into Cultural Studies,' which was presented at the Cultural Studies Conference in Illinois in 1990 and printed as part of the proceedings (1992). Other texts produced before this time give a shorter outline of the same project (see, for instance, Bennett, 1989a) and are analysed

⁵⁹ Governmentality is also used to analyse Singaporean cultural policy by Kwok and Low (2002, p. 159).

⁶⁰ See the definitions used by the institute as reported in Bennett (1989a, p. 5) and those used by Bennett himself (1992).

⁶¹ Another key proponent of cultural policy in Cultural Studies has been Stuart Cunningham. See Cunningham (1992a; 1992b) for his approach which seeks to position cultural critique as the 'handmaiden' to Cultural Studies and an account of what Cunningham views as the future of Cultural Studies, which is similar to Bennett's vision.

alongside 'Putting Policy into Cultural Studies' to review how Bennett envisaged cultural policy in the early 1990s.

Bennett began his paper with a criticism of the kinds of cultural politics that were prevalent in Cultural Studies and their preoccupation with 'a view of culture which sees it as, chiefly, the domain of signifying practices' (1992, p. 25). This was the first move of an important element of Bennett's argument that took Cultural Studies to task for its tendency to forego engagement with cultural institutions, including the state, in favour of criticism that 'transforms cultural artefacts ... into vehicles for the elaboration and transmission of a generalised form of social criticism' (1989a, p. 7). Bennett argued that Cultural Studies needed to pay more attention to the institutional conditions that regulated different fields of culture. Bennett turned to this task through reviewing Raymond Williams's definitions of culture which are the most important single influence on how culture has been understood in Cultural Studies. Bennett argued that Williams and most Cultural Studies research privileged two of his definitions – culture as 'a way of life' and as 'works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity' – over William's other definition – 'the independent and abstract noun which describes a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development' (Williams, 1983, p. 90).

The effect of overlooking the latter aspect of culture's usage was that Williams and much of Cultural Studies miss 'one of the most distinctive aspects of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century transformations in which the changing and conflicting semantic destinies of 'culture' are implicated' (1992, p. 26). This moment was when culture was put to work within emerging fields of social management. Culture was figured as both object – or target as it refers to the morals, manners and ways of life of a populace – and instrument – in that in its more restricted sense culture refers to the domain of artistic and intellectual activities which can be put to work in governmental programs intervening in and regulating behaviours and attributes of target populations. Initially, artistic and intellectual practices were focussed on the symbolic exclusion of the vast mass of the population from inter-elite communication or, as in the case of Elizabethan theatre, used to disseminate lessons about monarchical power. Through and after the Enlightenment, artistic and intellectual practices came to be understood as capable of improving the mental and behavioural attributes of the general population and were put to work in programs. Through these programs, cultural practices were harnessed to particular types

or regions of subject formation in different ways depending on the prevailing notions of a particular historical period. Within Bennett's formulation, the semiotic properties of cultural practices take a back seat to the 'programmatically, institutionally, and governmental conditions in which cultural practice are inscribed – in short, the network of relations that fall under a properly theoretical understanding of policy' (1992, p. 28) because it is the latter that determine how practices are connected with different parts of life and function to achieve specific effects.

Bennett's focus on the governmental, programmatic and instrumental conditions that give rise to cultural practices clearly informed his definition of culture:

Culture is more cogently conceived, I want to suggest, when thought of as a historically specific set of institutionally embedded relations of government in which the forms of thought and conduct of extended populations are targeted for transformation – in part via the extension through the social body of the forms, techniques, and regimens of aesthetic and intellectual culture. (1992, p. 26)

Bennett further elaborated on this definition when he stated that culture should be thought of as:

a historically produced surface of social regulation whose distinctiveness is to be identified and accounted for in terms of (i) the specific types of attributes and forms of conduct that are established as its targets, (ii) the techniques that are proposed for the maintenance or transformation of such attributes or forms of conduct, (iii) the assembly of such techniques into particular programs of government, and (iv) the inscription of such programs into the operative procedures of specific cultural technologies. (1992, p. 27)

Culture, in this formulation, was clearly bound up with the relations of power that permeate society and the state and determine the conditions of its operation within governmental programs.

Bennett adopted a Foucaultian perspective. His reasons for choosing Foucault over the theorist who had the most influence over Cultural Studies in the 1970s and 1980s, Antonio Gramsci, were twofold.⁶² First, Gramsci commits analysis to an 'automatic' politics which assumes that cultural activities conducted through cultural institutions are bound into the struggle to achieve hegemony, generally for the ruling classes while opposing flows of counter hegemonic ideologies rise out of the subordinate classes (1992, p. 29). Foucault, on the other hand, views power relations as inherently unstable,

⁶² Bennett also argues in favour of Foucault over Habermas (2001). In another paper, Bennett gives a more complete comparison of Foucault and Gramsci with more detailed reasons why he prefers Foucault (1998, pp. 60-84), which I draw from here to supplement 'Putting Policy into Cultural Studies'.

pursuing multiple ends and dispersed. For Foucault, the development of modern forms of government 'goes beyond the problematic of political obedience to replace it with a concern with knowing, regulating and changing the conditions of the population in potentially limitless ways' (Bennett, 1998, p. 70). The focus of Foucault's analysis therefore is on the exercise of power in programs, technologies and practices of cultural institutions, making it a more useful framework for revealing what is actually happening.

Second, Bennett argued that the Gramscian search for a unified class, people or race that will act as a social agent is misguided and has hindered the development of 'more specific and immediate forms of political calculation and action' that would attempt to influence the agendas and procedures of those groups that regularly input into decisions within cultural fields (1992, p. 29). Bennett argued that Cultural Studies needs to move away from such a perspective and instead connect to the requirements and concerns of people working within cultural institutions and government, as those agents influence the institutional conditions that produce culture. Foucault's insights provided a way of reorienting Cultural Studies because they encourage attention to be paid to the detailed routines and operating procedures of cultural institutions and enable intellectuals 'to connect with the debates and practices through which reformist adjustments to the administration of culture are actually brought about' (1998, p. 61).

Bennett's ideas about the future direction of Cultural Studies were strongly refuted by some of its practitioners. The main thrust of Bennett's critics was that moving towards a position at ease with engagement with institutions (state institutions in particular) was at odds with the critical vocation of Cultural Studies and compromised its independence (Curthoys, 1991; During, 1993, p. 17; Grace, 1991; Jameson, 1993, p. 29; McGuigan, 1996, pp. 12-29). In reply, cultural policy researchers connected Bennett's advocacy of a greater engagement with policy to a particular political moment in Australia while the centre-left Labour government was in power (S. Cunningham, 1992b; Miller, 1998, p. 46). Other critics, such as Meaghan Morris and Tom O'Regan, took issue with the structure of the debate itself which constructed a hierarchy between cultural criticism and cultural policy (Morris, 1992; O'Regan, 1992a). O'Regan, for instance, argued that cultural criticism is in fact a necessary element of the policy process and indeed exists in a symbiotic relationship with cultural policy (1992a, p. 418). Bennett responded by examining the structures that maintain the hierarchy between culture and policy.

Bennett argued that dividing cultural criticism from cultural policy (or, in O'Regan's terminology, bottom-up from top-down approaches) hid the extent to which the cultural politics and practices that are the subject of cultural criticism are dependent on cultural policies (Bennett, 1998, pp. 200-3). Bennett used James Clifford's advocacy of a community perspective in contemporary museum practice to demonstrate that transforming museums into 'contact zones' for 'communities' is in fact a reconfiguration of relations of government and culture and not a radical departure from past museum practice (1998, pp. 200-13).

Clive Barnett makes a separate criticism of Bennett's formulation of cultural policy in regards to his use of Foucault. Barnett suggests that Bennett's cultural policy research has 'conflated' discipline and government (1999, p. 381) due to its focus on institutions with well-defined spatial boundaries. He writes that 'authoritative accounts' such as Bennett's research into museums, 'tend to construct the deployment of culture in terms of a monitorial disciplinary regime which inculcates new ethical practices of self-formation in distinctive spatio-temporal locales' (1999, p. 378). Such research, according to Barnett, suffers from two related deficiencies. Firstly, it overstates the efficacy of the disciplinary regimes in cultural institutions (a) because it ignores both how those institutions are generally more 'open' than the 'enclosed spaces of containment' examined by Foucault (1991a) and (b) because of the way that subjects move between locales with different disciplinary regimes. Secondly, the focus on discipline ignores the broader operation of Foucault's concept of biopower with its mode of operation at the level of populations. Barnett suggests that more attention needs to be paid to other forms of regulation such as 'discourses of the subject' and 'practices of individual self-regulation' in addition to 'disciplining the conduct of bodies' (1999, p. 383-4).

However, Barnett may be selling Bennett's version of cultural policy analysis short through reading analysis of the functioning of museums as analysis of all cultural institutions. In a slight revision of his method in 1997, Bennett writes that it is not sufficient to 'define the concerns of Cultural Policy Studies' as being with the ways that government shapes the characteristics of populations (which is already broader than the focus on individual bodies that Barnett attributes to him). Instead, Bennett writes:

what analysis most needs to concern itself with in any policy context is precisely how the activities of government aim to influence the widely diverse ways in

which cultural and intellectual resources are produced and circulated (ranging from associational forms of community production through to the cultural industries), in view of the role that these play in shaping both particular ways of life and the relationships between ways of life. (1997, p. 171)

Within this formulation, culture is implicated in a much broader set of governmental relations than the disciplining of bodies. It encompasses the twin domains of disciplining the body (in cultural institutions) and managing populations as it is concerned with ‘ways of life and the relations between ways of life’.⁶³

Positions and Issues for Analysis of Indonesian Cultural Policy

This thesis is located at the intersection between the expansion of governmental and Foucaultian analysis of Indonesia and debates about governmental analysis of cultural policy. The key contention, borrowed from the critical cultural policy perspective, is that culture is constructed by governmental discourses and the power relations that shape the conditions of its use in any given situation determine its content. Bringing together the two fields to research Indonesian cultural policy raises four issues.

The first issue involves a criticism of governmentality is that it overestimates the effectiveness of policy. James Donald writes that practitioners of governmentality tend to present the ‘souls’ of citizens as being regulated and controlled by governmental practices by positing ‘a preformed self as the necessary target on which the machinery [of government] works’ (1992, p. 93). Barnett writes that there has been a similar tendency in the case of cultural policy analysis that has taken a governmental perspective. He writes that the ‘cultural-policy studies literature tends to assume a high degree of fit between the political rationalities of institutions and actual processes of subject-formation’ (1999, p. 377).⁶⁴ The assumption of effectiveness could, in the case of analysis about official cultural policy like this thesis, represent the state as determining the features of either culture or cultural subjectivity.

In order to combat such representations, two positions need to be established from the outset. Firstly, my analysis needs to recognise the heterogeneity of discourse and

⁶³ Kian-Woon Kwok and Kee-Hong Low also acknowledge these two dimensions: ‘Cultural policy ... is also primarily concerned with not just collective representations (for example, of the nation-state) but also with constructions of the individual, with what Foucault called the ‘technologies of the self’ (2002, p. 165).

⁶⁴ Whitcomb makes a similar point in her analysis of debates and issues surrounding museums. Whitcomb demonstrates that understanding museological practices as solely the product of governmental uses of culture overlooks the multiple meanings, histories and contexts present in the museum (2003).

Foucault's concept of 'power-games'. Discourse are constantly negotiated, misunderstood and used in unexpected ways.⁶⁵ Grounding cultural policy analysis in concrete historical research involves understanding the wider political and historical processes that contribute to generating policy and how those policies have operated in specific institutions and instances. Secondly, the state needs to be understood as the largest and most influential set of institutions that seek to utilise culture, but not as either the only institution or as a single, unified entity. Although the responsibility for regulating culture is often in the hands of non-state institutions, the uses of culture are increasingly under the purview of the state, whether directly or indirectly.⁶⁶ The state is addressed here as a dispersed and at times conflicting range of institutions and the limits of its control are understood as constantly contested and shifting.

The second issue is the relationship between broad and narrow definitions of cultural policy. Bennett notes culture's importance 'as a set of artistic and intellectual forms' because of its ability to act on and influence the attributes and behaviours (ways of life) of particular populations and the relations between them (1989b, p. 6). The deployment of 'culture' in a narrow sense was therefore the instrument for transformation of culture in a broad sense as 'ways of life'. Bennett traces the process of this now widespread splitting back to the emergence of 'liberal forms of government' in the nineteenth century where the deployment of culture would 'help cultivate a capacity for voluntary self-regulation in the general population' (1998, p. 110). The deployment of artistic and intellectual forms through institutions and programs is, as suggested by the literature on Indonesian cultural policy and in the chapters that follow, an important cultural strategy of government and part of the governmental conditions that produce culture. Although this thesis focuses on cultural policy in its narrow sense, interactions with both broad definitions of culture and cultural policy are important elements of how cultural policy is devised and deployed.

The third issue is the question of how to engage with the state in post-Suharto Indonesia. Criticism of Bennett's critical cultural perspective has, as I explored in the previous

⁶⁵ The position taken in this thesis is similar to the position taken by Stuart Cunningham: that critical cultural policy research requires a wider rather than a narrower critical understanding of what constitutes policy, which encompasses understanding the conditions that generate policy outcomes in their entirety (1992a, p. 535).

⁶⁶ This is a subset of what Foucault addresses in his comment that 'power relations have been progressively governmentalised' (1982, p. 224).

section, centred on his call for greater engagement with institutions and in particular the state. Bennett and other advocates of greater engagement have been taken ‘to task for overstating the case for a ‘useful knowledge’ of an involvement in governmental practices over the cultivation and deployment of a critical knowledge’ (Yudice, 1999, p. 2). In contrast to Bennett’s model of engagement, much Foucaultian research has been aimed at upsetting rather than working with the structures of intelligibility that organise practices, identities and institutions. Michael Shapiro writes that Foucault’s genealogical method is one of disrupting and defamiliarising the familiar (1992, p. 2). He writes:

the genealogical imagination construes all systems of intelligibility as ... false arrests, as the arbitrary fixings of the momentary results of struggles among contending forces, struggles that could have produced other possible systems of intelligibility and the orders they support. (1992, p. 2)

The end of the Suharto era has been a time of review and change, which is where a critical Foucaultian perspective can contribute. I hope to present a historical analysis of contemporary practices, indicating and exploring the struggles and choices and opening up new narratives and histories for exploration in the area of cultural policy. The timing is right for critical disruptions of the present given the current political climate and the openings that have emerged in Indonesia since 1999.

Finally, an important issue for cultural policy analysis that recurs throughout this thesis is the issue of aesthetics or taste. Contemporary academic understandings about aesthetics have revolved around the writings of Bourdieu. Bourdieu rejected the Kantian notion of disinterested judgement (Kant, 1987, p. 228), instead preferring to understand aesthetics as a product of education, family and the social trajectories of economic class and status (Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 3-6). Bourdieu’s analysis has been used in two ways in writings about aesthetics: to relativise the value distinctions made between high and low cultural forms, arguing for equivalence (Fiske, 1992; Rowse, 1985); or arguing that sociological research should not obliterate but reshape divisions of value (McGuigan, 1996; Street, 2000).⁶⁷ Aesthetics as a category for this thesis is not dependent on the outcome of this debate, but around the question of how taste relates to politics. John Street writes:

judgement is not simply a product of ... discourses; it is also the legitimation of these discourses and the processes which include or exclude particular forms of discourse. Aesthetic judgement is the product of a process in which authority is assigned and legitimated. (2000, p. 48)

⁶⁷ For a critical analysis of Bourdieu’s position on the desirability of distinctions between high and low cultural forms, see Bennett (2005).

Aesthetics therefore can function in a normative system designed to reinforce existing power structures or can be used to resist such normative systems.

An important aspect of cultural policy is how it seeks to educate the citizenry into a set of tastes or aesthetics. The citizen who internalises the correct set of tastes and morals is more likely to monitor their own behaviour according to state-defined norms. Taste provides an alternative value register to ethnicity and religion, both of which the state views as problematic in Indonesia due to their diversity and their potential for evoking deep divisions. Miller and Yudice write:

An aesthetic of truth and beauty is, as per Kant, the internal monitor within each person that provides a collective, national, categorical imperative. Its very *ethos* of singular appreciation becomes, ironically, a connecting chord of national harmony, binding individual goals to an implied national unity. (2002, p. 10)

Aesthetics has the potential to both transcend class and ethnicity (and manage them) through the internalisation of knowledge of what is desirable and ‘normal’.

5. Thesis Outline

In this thesis, I make use of the periodisation of Indonesian history by political regimes that has become standard in most Indonesian history texts that encompass the twentieth century (see, for instance, Cribb & Brown, 1995; Ricklefs, 2001). The use of political regimes to mark eras is fitting here because the governmental changes brought by new political regimes are considered the key generators of cultural policy change. However, my use of political eras does not assume that policy change naturally occurs with regime change. Considerable attention is given to the reasons for cultural policy changes and continuities, both between and within political eras.

This thesis is divided into two parts that correspond to the two thesis objectives (see p. 20) which were derived from the current state of cultural policy analysis in Indonesian Studies. It makes use of a variety of primary and secondary sources, including interviews, previously unexamined archival material from the 1950s and 1960s and New Order cultural policy documents. Part I provides a historical account of how cultural policy has been constituted in Indonesia from the late colonial period to the post-New Order ‘Reformasi’ era. The first five chapters demonstrate how technologies of government developed in Europe were translated to and put to work in Indonesia and altered across

time due to both internal and external circumstances. This requires analysis of the changing governmental rationalities in Indonesia across the twentieth century and their implications for cultural policy and the conditions that constitute culture. Chapter one provides important historical information about the foundations of post-independence cultural policy that can be found in the cultural policies of the late colonial and occupying Japanese administrations while the following chapters, with the partial exception of chapter three, make use of more substantive data to analyse the cultural policy of the post-independence era.

The five chapters are chronological and follow a similar pattern. They begin with a discussion of how culture was formulated in governmental discourse before moving to the details of official cultural policy in order to identify the distinctive features of the cultural policy of particular eras. The exceptions to this method are chapters three and four that analyse the New Order era. Chapter three provides important background information through presenting an account of the causes of the changing articulation of culture in governmental discourses while chapter four analyses the impact of these changes on official cultural policy, thus replicating the pattern across two chapters.

My emphasis in Part I is on official policies and the discourses that informed them, rather than the activities and criticisms of non-state individuals and groups. I seek to explore the changing ways the state used culture and include the activities and writings of non-state actors only where they intersected with cultural policy programs or changes in cultural policy. Focussing on official cultural policies that were applied across Indonesia excludes two noteworthy categories. These are Chinese Indonesians, who have been subject to state policies that at different times have aimed to differentiate them from and assimilate them into the indigenous population (Suryadinata, 1993) and were rarely addressed in cultural policy, and Bali, which has been granted a special status as a culturally-rich 'living museum' since the Dutch conquest of Bali in 1908 (Picard, 1997, p. 185). The treatment of Chinese Indonesians and Bali require more extensive analysis than is possible here and have both been the subject of considerable scholarly attention.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ On the forces that shaped Balinese cultural identity including governance during the colonial and independence periods, see Picard (1997; 1999), Schulte Nordholt (1986) and Vickers (1989). On Chinese Indonesians, see, Coppell (1983; 2002), Godley and Lloyd (2001), Heryanto (1998), Mackie (1976) and Suryadinata (1993).

Part II consists of two case studies of cultural programs run by the Directorate of Culture. The chapters explore the links between cultural programs and governmental rationalities as well as demonstrating how different discourses combined in different ways in different institutional locations to alter the operation of cultural policies. They focus on the technologies and techniques of cultural institutions that were inscribed into cultural programs, how these were spread across Indonesia and how the broader political and social changes since 1998 have influenced the actual operations of cultural policy. Instead of assuming uniform outcomes generated by a centralised, singular state, the case studies explore the possibility of a plural and diverse array of outcomes and occurrences. Additionally, these chapters recognise the resistances both within institutions and by the subjects of cultural policy to the strategies and designs of Indonesian governments. The two case studies tackle quite different cultural institutions. The first case study chapter investigates the creation and operation of two kinds of arts institutions across Indonesia: the *taman budaya* (cultural parks) and the *dewan kesenian* (arts councils). The cultural parks and the arts councils were located within the provincial capital cities and were therefore situated within a diverse range of locations. The second case study chapter examines a series of national cultural research projects coordinated by the Directorate of Culture.

Finally, it should be noted that the methodological framing of Part II does not preclude discussion of themes that are specific to those institutions. On the contrary, it opens up new areas of discussion through its appreciation of the productive power of governmental discourses. For instance, chapter six identifies how the cultural parks were the site of various governmental programs that positioned the arts in a variety of ways and chapter seven examines how the field of local culture was fashioned through state-sponsored research projects.

Part I.

A Short History of Indonesian Cultural Policy

Chapter 1

The Genesis of Modern Cultural Policy in Indonesia: Culture and Government in the Late Colonial and Japanese Occupation Periods, 1900-1945

Benedict Anderson, in his introduction to *Southeast Asian Tribal Groups and Ethnic Minorities*, writes:

It is easy to forget that minorities came into existence in tandem with majorities ... They were born of the political and cultural revolution brought about by the maturing of the colonial state and by the rise against it of popular nationalism. The former fundamentally changed the structures and aims of governance, the latter its legitimacy. (1987a, p. 1)

This chapter explores how Indonesian cultural policy was born within the complex relationship between Indonesian populations and the policies of foreign administrations. Anderson's observation highlights that when the Indonesian nationalists declared independence, they declared popular dominion over a territory that was already profoundly shaped by modern methods of government. Indeed, the resistance of anticolonial nationalists, as noted by David Scott, was articulated into a 'political game' that was itself linked to the 'political rationality' of the colonial state (1995, p. 198) and also, in the case of much of Southeast Asia, then impacted by Japanese occupation. Dutch colonial cultural policy, which bloomed at the beginning of the twentieth century, and Japanese occupying cultural policy should not be understood as fundamentally different to post-independence cultural policy, but as its precursors.

1. Culture and Government in Indonesia from 1900 to 1945

Scott writes that 'in order to understand the project of colonial power *at any given historical moment* one has to understand the character of the political rationality that constituted it' (1995, p. 204). Although forms of the state in Europe were not simply replicated in the colonies, Scott argues that colonial rule was linked to the 'structures, projects, and desires' (1995, p. 198) of Europe and, in particular, changes in the way that

imperial powers understood and undertook government. In his article 'Colonial Governmentality', Scott uses the example of the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms of 1832 in Sri Lanka to explore how changes in political rationalities in Europe had corollaries in the colonies. He demonstrates how power was redirected from producing 'extractive-effects on colonial bodies' to 'governing-effects on colonial conduct' (1995, p. 214). An effect of this transformation of power was the 'reconstruction of colonial space' (1995, p. 204). However, the construct of colonial space should not be considered a one-sided project with the results completely determined by European colonisers. We need to acknowledge that the 'conditions' of the colonised country, including local practices and differences, also affected colonial practice (Gouda, 1995, pp. 9,21; Stoler, 1989, p. 135).

The emergence of cultural policy in Indonesia is tied to how Dutch colonial government constructed colonial space and the opposition of Indonesian nationalists. In order to understand the emergence of cultural policy, a series of steps similar to those outlined by Scott need to be undertaken, beginning with the broad liberal rationalities of government in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century and narrowing down to the specific elements of Dutch colonial government within which culture was articulated. The governmentality group of scholars identify two features of the liberal rationality of government that are particularly important to the birth of cultural policy: the liberal approach to security and the conceptualisation of government as managing 'natural' processes. Once these elements have been discussed in the context of the liberalism, it is then possible to explore their different treatments by the Dutch colonial administration, Indonesian nationalists and the occupying Japanese.

Liberalism is commonly defined as a political doctrine concerned with ensuring the liberty of individuals, in particular from the encroachment of the state (Hindess, 1996, p. 123). Following Foucault, a number of scholars¹ have taken a view of liberalism that emphasises its use of governmental methods to secure a specific 'form of life' (Dean, 1991, p. 13) concerned with creating a society of free individuals. Essential to liberalism is the notion of 'naturally occurring' processes that cannot be known by the state, but are essential to government, the exemplar of these processes being the economy (Dean, 1999,

¹ See Dean (1999, pp. 48-55,113-31), Gordon (1991), Hindess (1996, pp. 123-31), and Rose (1996a; 1996b).

p. 50). In a liberal rationality of government, securing individual liberty is essential to securing these 'natural' processes. Foucault argues:

The setting in place of ... mechanisms of modes of state intervention whose function is to assure the security of those natural phenomena, economic processes and the intrinsic processes of population: this is what becomes the basic objective of governmental rationality. Hence liberty is registered not only as the right of individuals legitimately to oppose the power, the abuses and usurpations of the sovereign, but also now as an indispensable element of governmental rationality itself (Foucault on 5 April 1978, quoted in C. Gordon, 1991, pp. 19-20).

The state's concern with security extends then to ensuring that people have developed the thoughts and behaviours the state deems appropriate for free and independent people in order for the 'natural' processes to properly function (Hindess, 1996, p. 130). Forms of indirect regulation, such as education, are therefore central to governance. In the case of groups considered to deviate from the norm of 'free and independent' people, the state is obliged to guarantee the security of the processes considered beyond the state. Thus Mitchell Dean writes in his discussion of liberal notions of security, 'regulation made in the service of security has to be structured in such a way as to lead indigent and other troublesome groups to exercise a responsible and disciplined freedom in the market and in the family' (1999, p. 116).

The colonised at the beginning of the twentieth century, as was briefly mentioned in the introduction, are defined as lacking the capacity for self-government in liberal rationalities of government. Barry Hindess, in his article 'The Liberal Government of Unfreedom', analyses how liberal forms of government defined their populations through the concept of 'authoritarian rule'. Hindess argues that 'authoritarian rule' was justified in the case of the colonised (and is still justified in the case of the unemployed and minors) as 'the capacities required for autonomous conduct and the social conditions that foster and sustain them can be developed in [these populations] only through compulsion, through the imposition of more or less extended periods of discipline' (2001, p. 101). In the Dutch Indies, a racial hierarchy defined the populations that were subjected to colonial 'authoritarian rule', as shall be explored below, including colonial cultural policies. The policies of the Japanese also divided the inhabitants of Indonesia into racialised populations in a hierarchy that contrasted markedly to the colonial construct. Following Foucault's observation that governing populations made war genocidal in the

twentieth century through posing killing at the level of entire populations (1990, pp. 136-7), it also entrenched racism within modern methods of government.²

The cultural policy link between the colonial administration, the occupying Japanese and the nationalists is the common ‘improving’ or ‘civilising’ function attributed to culture. Culture was understood as being able to change the attributes of populations through addressing the behaviours of their members as individuals, making it an ideal field for governmental programs. The use of culture by both of the administrations and the nationalists was governmental in their purported desire to ‘improve’ the indigenous populations/Indonesians, although towards very different ends and using different models of improvement. However, there are also shared techniques and methods. An important shared component that enabled culture to do its civilising work is what Tony Bennett has termed ‘strategic normativity’. ‘Strategic normativity’ refers to the way in which culture has ‘functioned to lay open the ways of life of different sections of the populace to reformist programs of government’ (1998, p. 91). Drawing from Robert Young (1995, p. 29), Bennett notes how culture is usually thought of as opposed to something or as itself internally divided. The resulting sectors are rarely on equal terms. Instead, there is typically a hierarchical ordering of relations between sectors. He states:

It is this hierarchical ordering of the relations between the different spheres of culture that results in a strategic normativity in which one component of the cultural field is strategically mobilised in relation to another as offering the means of overcoming whatever shortcomings (moral, political or aesthetic) are attributed to the latter. This results in the establishment of a normative gradient down which the flow of culture is directed in reformist programs through which cultural resources are brought to bear on whatever might be the task to hand. (1998, p. 92)

This chapter explores the relationship between the use of culture by the colonial state and by Indonesian nationalists before turning to the cultural policy of the Japanese. Firstly, I explore the changes in methods of governance that made cultural policy possible. Cultural policy is linked here to the emergence of modern methods of governance that were introduced by the colonial state and adopted by the nationalists and, as is explored in later chapters, the independent Indonesian state. Secondly, I examine the operation of strategic normativity in both the colonial administration’s publishing house for Malay language literature, *Balai Pustaka*, and in the first exchange of the cultural polemics, the

² Similar arguments are made by Goldberg (1993) and Mehta (1990).

high-profile debates amongst Indonesian nationalists about Indonesian culture that took place in the mid to late 1930s. This chapter does not provide an exhaustive account of Dutch and nationalist cultural policy perspectives and institutions during this period but instead employs analysis of policies relating to literature to explore the features of colonial and early nationalist cultural policy. Literature was a prominent issue for both the colonial administration due to the spread of education amongst its indigenous colonial subjects and nationalists, as they struggled to define and develop Indonesian literature and culture.³ Thirdly, I examine the cultural policy of the Japanese and its relationship to and effects on nationalist cultural discourses and institutions. Nationalists moved into an uneasy alliance with the Japanese occupying administration following their opposition to the colonial administration.

An important element of cultural policy in Indonesia since its inception that is introduced in this chapter is the emergence and embedding of the command culture model of cultural policy. Toby Miller and George Yudice use the term ‘command culture’ to differentiate state-based models of cultural provision from models which privilege the market. They write: ‘The notion of a non-market form of cultural provision always already centres the state in planning, creating, policing and revising cultural practice’ (2002, p. 107). They use the idea of the command-culture to challenge the assumption that the market-based model is ‘natural’ and state intervention is somehow ‘a distortion’ (2002, p.107) and to identify cultural provision as it occurred under fascist and socialist governments. Of course within the command culture model there is a wide variety of methods of cultural provision. Miller and Yudice are careful to distinguish between state-socialist and fascist models (the former characterised as proclaiming an ‘egalitarian, worker-oriented world’, the latter as ‘dedicated to chauvinistic nationalism and the heroisation of conquest and domination’, 2002, p.108) which are primarily linked through the increased role of the state and opposition to the market-based provision of culture. Additionally, and importantly for discussion of Indonesia, they address the idea of a postcolonial model, ‘which intersects with command-cultural models and profit-based ones’ (2002, p.108). I argue in the chapters that follow that Indonesian cultural policy has demonstrated elements of command-culture and market-based models as it has struggled to come to

³ Other possible fields of analysis that I hope to develop in the future are the fine arts and museums (which are briefly touched on below). Literature received greater attention from the state than the fine arts due to its more direct relationship to developing the capacity of Indonesians.

terms with issues of national identity, ethnic difference and cohesion, internal political conflict, the need for economic development and the pressures of an increasingly strong international capitalist system. The command culture model is relevant to this chapter in two respects. Firstly, the 'authoritarian' elements of colonial cultural policy indicate the presence of the command culture model. Secondly, the cultural policy of the Japanese occupying administration can be expected to also exhibit the characteristics of the command culture model.

2. Late Colonial Rule in the East Indies (1900-1942)

A feature of liberalism is its constant critique of its own methods, including its operation in the colonies, and its constant review of the extent of its interventions.⁴ One such critique of colonial government in the Dutch East Indies coincided with the turn of the twentieth century, which is where I begin my analysis of Dutch colonial administration. While it cannot be said that the ethical period of Dutch colonial rule (1900-1930) was the start of the colonial government's concern with education or welfare or that it was successful at achieving far-reaching gains in either of these areas, it can be said that increased attention and energy was given to these areas during the period and that these changes had a formative influence on a small but important group which became the future nationalist leaders. The state's concern with education, for instance, precedes even the liberal period (1870-1900) of colonial rule. It began in 1848, the same year that the Fundamental Law was passed in Netherlands to guarantee everyone in the Netherlands a free education, with a grant of money to educate Javanese to become officials and slowly increased throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century (Saunders, 1984, p. 26). The rationale of the liberal period was also aimed at improving the welfare of the indigenous population through the removal of barriers to free enterprise which it was hoped would stimulate economic development. However, by the turn into the next century there was a realisation amongst administrators and observers in the Indies and Netherlands that indigenous farmers had not responded to the bounties offered by economic freedom and that economic welfare had, if anything, declined during the period (Wertheim & The, 1962, p. 223).

⁴ Gordon has characterised liberalism as 'a critique of state reason' (1991, p. 15). See also Dean (1999, pp. 49-50) and Rose (1996a, pp. 43-4).

The most noted expression of the changing attitude in the Netherlands towards the Indies is an article by C. Th. van Deventer entitled 'A debt of honour' and published in 1899 in the Dutch journal *de Gids*.⁵ Van Deventer argued that the Netherlands owed a debt of honour to the Indies to repay the f187 million that was taken from the Indies between 1867 and 1878 when the Netherlands' finances were sound and to ensure the good government of the Indies' inhabitants. His sentiments gained broad support from a number of political parties and individuals, including Queen Wilhelmina (Furnivall, 1967, pp. 228-9). The Indies debt of f40 million was taken by the Netherlands in order to encourage spending on social services, and the colonial administration began to take a greater interest in the living standards, work practices and education of the indigenous populace (Wertheim & The, 1962, p. 224).

Frances Gouda has linked the ethical policy to the advent of social liberalism and the social policies it advocated in the Netherlands (2000, pp. 14-20). Social liberalism advocated an increased role for the state in the Netherlands, making the state responsible for securing the basic necessities that were distributed by entrenched interest groups within Dutch society (what Gouda calls 'pillars', 2000, p. 14). Gouda writes:

social liberals envisioned the primary purpose of state policy to be educating and civilising both the disorganised, unruly poor and the more politically mobilised working class in order to elevate them to virtuous citizenship within their semicloistered circles. (2000, p. 18)

The architects of the ethical policy envisioned a related change of policy in Indonesia that would nurture the material, educational and cultural well-being of indigenous subjects (2000, p. 19). The views about indigenous Indonesians that circulated between 1900 and 1942 generally shared an evolutionary rhetoric about the relative stages of development of 'native' and 'European' populations (1995, p. 155).⁶ Overseeing this process of evolution was a historical task of the Dutch that bordered on the religious. Hence Johan Christiaan van Eerde, a Professor in the Colonial Institute in Amsterdam, could say in 1914 that the Dutch provided the best guarantees that they would 'implement the appropriate policies' in order to administer 'the gradual adjustment process and

⁵ Van Deventer was an ex-lawyer who had worked in the Indies before joining the Liberal Party. For more details about van Deventer and his article, see Ricklefs (2001, pp. 193-4) and Legge (1977, pp. 96-7).

⁶ In concluding her review of the wide variety of opinions expressed in regard to the 'native 'other'', Gouda writes with more than a hint of irony: 'The evolutionary trajectory that primitive Indonesian people in the colonies needed to follow in the future in their valiant attempts to achieve full-fledged maturity and independence, was exactly the route that Dutch men and women had followed before, both individually and collectively' (1995, p. 155).

evolutionary development that indigenous people must go through in order to achieve a higher level of civilisation' (van Eerde, 1928, p. 54 in Gouda, 1995, p. 39). Similarly, Dutch Prime Minister Hendrik Colijn, when replying to the Soetardjo petition for self-government in 1937, could claim that it was for the sake of Indonesian people themselves that Dutch colonial authority should persist in its efforts to guide the native population on their journey towards intellectual adulthood (Gouda, 1995, p. 63).

After 1901, the state greatly expanded its programs aimed at improving the welfare of the indigenous population.⁷ The programs that absorbed the bulk of the resources and energy of the colonial administration were education, irrigation and emigration⁸ and, although not receiving the same level of financial support, there was a tenfold spending increase on health (Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 194,198). Despite these reforms, most assessments of the outcomes of the period are scathing. W.F. Wertheim and The Siauw Giap highlight the failure of the ethical policy to achieve its lofty ideals due to its limited scope, the reformers' inability to assess the needs of the indigenous population, and the stultifying social stratification of colonial society by race (1962, pp. 224-30). Others have been more acerbic in their assessment, seeing it as a token gesture aimed more at alleviating the consciences of the colonisers than achieving real change amongst the indigenous population (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 205).

Although the ethical period did not bring meaningful reforms, a new appreciation of culture emerged within colonial administration, as is evident in Gouda's research. Her book, *Dutch Culture Overseas* (1995), provides a broad appraisal of life and governance in the Dutch East Indies in the twentieth century. The primary relevance of her work for this chapter is her examination of how the Dutch colonial state conceived and managed culture. Gouda's work assists in locating Dutch colonial administration as a version of liberal colonial governance and to explain why culture becomes more prominent as an area of policy during this period.

The method through which the Netherlands pursued colonial administration was a point of Dutch national pride. As a minor player in Europe, the Dutch felt that they could not

⁷ Harry Benda writes: 'The last four decades of Dutch rule in Indonesia are seemingly dominated by the constant theme of reform' (1966, p. 591).

⁸ The goals of emigration were to alleviate the overcrowding on Java and simultaneously provide labour for plantations on the outer islands.

and should not rule with brute force. Instead, many Dutch colonial administrators ‘saw their primary role as one of governing their districts with more anthropological learning, greater cultural sensitivity, and better political skills than any other imperial power in Asia’ (Gouda, 1995, p. 41). Cultural knowledge was an element of Dutch colonial governance as it provided a resource for ‘skilled’ government. Gouda writes:

Since the late nineteenth century, Dutch colonial governance revealed a remarkable symmetry between the desire for knowledge and the desire for power. ... In other words, *adat* scholarship in colonial Indonesia, which had become deeply entrenched by the 1920s, was unequivocally beholden to the logic of colonial rule. (1995, p. 43)

The Indies state, which had shown relatively little interest in cultural research before the ethical period, ‘embraced its role as a faithful sponsor’ of cultural research, in the process reconstructing what was previously considered ‘esoteric wisdom’ or the ‘whimsical hobby’ of oddballs into ‘a tool that was essential to the pursuit of a truly ‘enlightened’ colonial administration’ (1995, p. 225).

Adat was defined in the Encyclopaedia of the Dutch East Indies as ‘customs and practices that guide every aspect of indigenous life: social relations, agriculture, treatment of the sick, judicial arrangements, ancestor worship, burial of the dead, games and popular entertainment, etc’ (*Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1917, pp. 6, in Gouda, 1995). *Adat* research furnished the colonial state with discrete categories and knowledge that it put to use within its administration. Nineteen or twenty different *adat* regions were charted based on ethnographic research (Gouda, 1995, p. 52). Gouda writes in relation to the legal field that:

the task of Dutch *adat* law experts was to enumerate and index the data on each separate realm of customary law. This would lead to the construction of an overall taxonomy that might enable European civil servants and their native retainers to employ the kind of judicial reasoning that fostered, as much as possible, due process of law across the enormous expanse of the archipelago. (1995, p. 57)

Good colonial government was to lean on knowledge of the practices and processes of the native populations.

Adat scholarship’s entry into colonial administration allowed the colonial state to reformulate its task in line with its new ‘ethical’ commitment. The Dutch saw their task as nurturing ‘the organic development of indigenous people in order to enable them to flourish’ (Gouda, 1995, p. 39). In contrast to the reforms discussed by Scott in Sri Lanka

where local customs and traditions were to be overwritten by a British model of civil society, the ‘unofficial spokesperson’ for Dutch colonialism (1995, p. 40), Arnold De Kat Angelino, writes that the Dutch had to respect the ‘organic diversity’ of Indonesians’ lives and ‘orchestrate the proper role of all the individual organisms that compose the whole’ in order to oversee the ‘right functions, the right organs, the right ligaments’ (de Kat Angelino, 1931, p. 464). A central concept of the Dutch form of colonial management was cultural synthesis that Gouda writes ‘entailed a happy marriage between the systematic, and above all, sensitive insights of European civil servants and pristine Indonesian customs and institutions that had organically grown over time and would continue to do so under Dutch tutelage’ (1995, p. 51).⁹

Dutch colonial governance during the ethical period did not aim to reshape Indonesian society but to guide natural ‘organic’ cultural processes towards their evolution and in doing so oversee the improvement of the indigenous populations. From this perspective, the emergence of culture in policy at this time was a product of the governmentalisation of the state in a colonial location. Culture was being brought within the broad custodianship of the state and became, as noted by Tom Boellstorff, an ongoing spatial organising principle of the state in Indonesia (Boellstorff, 2002, pp. 26-30). Indigenous Indonesians fared poorly within the cultural taxonomy that supported the continuation of Dutch rule. They were categorised as lacking the capacities for full participation in colonial society and the rights of full citizenship¹⁰ and the ‘organic process’ that was to result in a stage of maturation suitable for Indies autonomy was going to take, according to Governor-General de Jonge in 1936, another 300 years.¹¹ In addition to legitimising colonial rule, the pluralism of the cultural categories also supported the ‘divide and rule’

⁹ Benda too comments on the ‘modernising’ Dutch model that underlay the basis of reforms until the late 1920s (1966, p. 601). He also observes that the reforms of the 1930s aimed to reverse this trend through two moves. Firstly, a form of indirect rule that was based on ethnic groupings was to replace territorial groupings and, secondly, the position of the regional Dutch administration was strengthened without providing any education or opportunities to indigenous rulers or civil servants (1966, pp. 601-3). Despite these changes, both sets of reforms were evolutionary and utilised cultural taxonomies. The difference was that the former aimed to modernise more quickly along a Western model while the latter took a much more conservative approach that emphasised continued Dutch control and a slower pace of change.

¹⁰ On the position of the indigenous Indonesian in colonial discourse, see Gouda (1995, pp. 118-193; 1998) and Stoler (1996).

¹¹ De Jonge, a conservative who was opposed to Indies autonomy, said this in an interview with the North Sumatran daily *Deli Courant*. The quote has been reproduced in Benda (1966, pp. 590-1, fn8). See Gouda (1995, p. 25) for a longer discussion of de Jonge’s attitude to colonial governance. The Royal Decree of 16 November 1938 in reply to the Soetardjo petition for self-government held that ‘maturation’ to the stage of independence would take many decades if not centuries (Gouda, 1995, p. 63).

tactics of the Dutch state in the face of the threat of unified opposition from either nationalist or Islamic groups (Boellstorff, 2002, pp. 27-30; Gouda, 1995, pp. 53-6,62-3).

The use of cultural knowledges within colonial governance should not be understood as an isolated event, but as an element of a broader change in governmental techniques. Ann Stoler's research explores how technologies of race and class developed in Europe and its colonial empires informed the taxonomies that underlay the emergence of new techniques of government in Europe (1995b). Stoler argues that a racial taxonomy was used to differentiate populations in order to define the internal and external boundaries of the nation and to link individual morals and behaviours with national strength within liberal rationalities of government (1995, pp. 95-136).¹² For instance, although 1848 marks the beginning of the Dutch liberal-parliamentary state 'identified with philanthropic bourgeois interventions to uplift the home environments of the domestic working class,' it also was the year where racial dualism was enshrined in legislation in the East-Indies (1995b, p. 120). Thus, while race tended to unify populations in Europe and led to greater inclusion in social programs, it further stratified the East Indies.¹³ Although the ethical policy introduced programs that targeted indigenous Indonesians, racial stratification still both divided European from indigenous Indonesian cultural programs and underlay the 'civilising' function of the programs themselves.

Cultural Policy for Europeans

It was no coincidence that cultural policy began at a time when bourgeois states were increasingly attempting to alter the attitudes and behaviours of its citizens. Tony Bennett, in a study of museums in England, observes:

In the nineteenth century... the most ardent advocates of public museums, free libraries and the like typically spoke of them in connection with courts, prisons, poorhouses and, more mundanely, the provision of public sanitation and fresh water. Public cultural institutions equated with educational and sanitary programs. For [early museum advocate William Stanley] Jevons, free libraries were merely one among many engines 'for operating upon the poorer portions of the population.' (1998, p. 109)

¹² Many authors have noted how the colonies were used as social laboratories for developing technologies of government and scientific knowledges before being imported back to the metropole. See Gouda (2000, pp. 37-46) and Rabinow (1989).

¹³ See also C. Fasseur's study of racial classification in the Netherlands Indies in the twentieth century that demonstrates the intractability of the racial taxonomy within the legal systems (1994).

The English state sponsored a capillary system of cultural diffusion because of the belief that exposure to bourgeois culture would alter the behaviour of the working class, creating more refined social conduct (1998, p. 124). Cultural institutions were viewed as necessary concomitants to sanitation and education initially because of the cultural object's assumed near-mystical power to transform through its aesthetic properties (1998, pp. 107-34), but later because of its educative value if framed correctly within the context of a well-run cultural institution (1998, pp. 135-64).¹⁴

Hierarchies of race became more important to cultural institutions with the growth of the natural sciences in the last twenty to thirty years of the nineteenth century. The natural science collections, including emerging disciplines such as ethnology, anthropology, geology and archaeology, provided the state with a pedagogical tool structured around Darwinian notions of evolution (Bennett, 1998, pp. 135-64), with broad similarities to the cultural taxonomies in the Dutch East Indies. The importance of Darwin for museum practice was that it placed the visitor on an evolutionary scale that advocated a slow process of change regulated by the visitor themselves. In the same manner that evolutionary succession ordered displays, liberal governmentality asked its citizens for an ordered development (Bennett, 1998, pp. 155-64). The museum, Bennett argues, was more than a tool for justifying the dominance of white Europeans in the colonies and policing racial, gender and class hierarchies within the nation. It also was an important pedagogical apparatus that made use of race, class and gender discourses to shape European citizenries (Bennett, 1998, pp. 153-4).

In the East Indies, institutions were either established for Europeans or for indigenous Indonesians, often with very different purposes. A notable example of the trajectory of European cultural policy was one of Asia's earliest museum, established in Batavia in 1778 (Taylor, 1995, p. 106).¹⁵ Paul Michael Taylor says of the museum:

Still, the collecting institution and its spectatorship were European, as was the scientific method which upheld the collecting tradition and was celebrated by the

¹⁴ For a more extended discussion of the linkages between the birth of the museum and the growth of governmentality, see Bennett (1995, pp. 17-58).

¹⁵ The birth of the Indonesian National Museum is tied to the history of Dutch scholarship on Indonesia. Debates within the Dutch Society of the Sciences (*Hollandsche Maatschappij der Wetenschappen*, est. 1752) over the establishment of a colonial branch in Batavia led to the founding of an independent scientific organisation called the Batavia Society for Arts and Sciences (*Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen*), whose beginning marks the start of the museum and whose collection later became the national collection.

museum. Thus museums summarized and reinforced Europeans' sense of having a hierarchically more advanced culture, even in the guise of celebrating the cultures of other peoples whose objects were assembled. (1995, p. 106)

A museum thus existed for Europeans in Indonesia since the end of the eighteenth century. However, European cultural activities and institutions experienced their biggest expansion only after 1900 (Furnivall, 1967, pp. 415-8). The colonial state began to invest much more heavily in archaeology at the same time and established a Commission of Antiquities (*Oudheidkundige Commissie*) in 1901 and paid for Borobudur to be restored between 1907 and 1911 (Anderson, 1991, pp. 179-80). An example of the simultaneous growth of non-government activities was the Culture Circles (*Kunstkringen*). The first was established in 1901 in Batavia and soon other Culture Circles were established in cities and towns where there was a Dutch presence. By 1930, the Culture Circles had a combined membership of ten thousand and promoted concerts by famous European musicians and exhibitions of European pictures, patronised indigenous arts and promoted theatre and cinema (Furnivall, 1967, pp. 416-7). Access to cultural activities and institutions was both a felt need of Europeans and a goal of the state. Not only did culture reinforce the Europeans' superiority and right to rule Indonesia as indicated by Taylor, but it also was used to inculcate and reinforce the lessons and boundaries of European citizenship, which may have been its most important function.

Cultural Policy for Indonesians

A prime example of the different trajectory followed by cultural institutions for indigenous Indonesians is the government printing house *Balai Pustaka*. *Balai Pustaka* has its origins in a committee that was established in 1908 to study the problems of popular reading (*Commissie voor de Volkslectuur*) which became the Office for Popular Literature (*Kantor voor de Volkslectuur*) in 1917. In 1920, it acquired its own printing house specialising in book printing and binding. *Balai Pustaka* was the product of two trends within Dutch colonial administration. Firstly, it was part of a long-term goal of the standardisation of the local languages and, in particular, Malay in order to assist in the efficient and effective administration of the Indies colonies (Maier, 1993, p. 49). Secondly, its creation was an expression of the ethical policy's attention to social welfare in that it was trying to alter the behaviours and attributes of the indigenous population through engagement with literature (Furnivall, 1967, p. 422; Ricklefs, 2001, p. 233).¹⁶

¹⁶ Furnivall summarises the basis for the decision as 'it was realised that little would be gained by teaching lads to read unless they had books to read on leaving school' (1967, p. 422).

This goal is confirmed by an entry about literature in the Netherlands Indies Encyclopaedia of 1917, which stated that the government was aware ‘that the ability to read could bring about all kinds of unwelcome results except in the case that there would be taken care of providing good and inexpensive materials’ (‘Volkslectuur,’ 1917, in Kimmen, 1981, pp. 88-9). *Balai Pustaka* was, in other words, an instrument through which the state attempted to assert a measure of control over the cultural development of its indigenous subjects where it considered the market inadequate (Kimmen, 1981, p. 89). It is the policies surrounding the latter goal that I am interested in here.

Balai Pustaka published three kinds of books: children’s books, practical books (about, for instance, cooking, planting and animal breeding), and adult literature (Kimmen, 1981, pp. 34-5). Within its literary publications for adult readers, Merle Ricklefs asserts that *Balai Pustaka* had three tasks: the publication of older classical works in regional languages; translations and adaptations of Western literature into Malay; and publication of new Malay language literature (2001, p. 232). However, *Balai Pustaka*’s first Director, Douwe Adolf Rinkes, planned to publish periodicals ‘in a number of Indonesian languages’ and *Balai Pustaka*’s popular almanac, which sold 100 000 copies, was published in four languages: Javanese, Malay, Sundanese and Madurese (Drewes, 1961, pp. 423,433). Newspapers and magazines were also published in Malay, Javanese and Sundanese on a weekly, bi-weekly or monthly basis (Drewes, 1961, p. 433).

The Office for Popular Literature greatly assisted the circulation of *Balai Pustaka* books. The primary form of circulation was the creation of libraries in Second Class schools.¹⁷ By 1914, there were 680 libraries, 1618 in 1920 and 2528 in 1930 (Furnivall, 1967, p. 422).¹⁸ Local agents were appointed for book sales where demand indicated buyers may be found. However, the agents did not last long, owing to the small size of the market. Instead, the state sent out book motor vans to aid sales and distribution. *Balai Pustaka* had a remarkable circulation given the low literacy rates. In 1920, for instance, 100 000 books were sold and one million borrowings recorded (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 233).

¹⁷ Second Class schools were for indigenous children and used Malay instead of Dutch or local languages. They were generally attended by the children of middle and lower level bureaucrats and other wealthier families.

¹⁸ These numbers exclude Dutch language libraries.

Balai Pustaka was established because of a perceived shortcoming in the literature being produced in the Indies for its indigenous inhabitants in the eyes of the Dutch administrators. According to Rinkes, *Balai Pustaka* was to provide reading materials that would ‘satisfy the people’s desire to read and advance their knowledge, as much as and according to contemporary standards of order. In doing so, all things which could damage Government power and state security must be purged.’ Rinkes lists another of *Balai Pustaka*’s functions as preventing ‘undesirable consequences that may destroy law and order’ due to ‘dangerous reading matter from booksellers whose intentions were less than pure and by persons who wished to stir up feelings’ (Rinkes, 1923, p. 13, in Tickell, 1982). *Balai Pustaka*’s editorial policies corroborate Rinkes’s comments. *Balai Pustaka* would not publish books with clearly religious overtones since it took a neutral stance on religion; it would not publish works that contained political views contrary to the government; and it would not publish any ‘immoral’ literature (Teeuw, 1967, p. 14). The pre-*Balai Pustaka* literature criticised by Rinkes above is now known as *bacaan liar* (literally, ‘uncontrolled readings’). *Bacaan liar* is characterised by a degree of independence from state control in both its form and content. In many cases, the material was ‘unashamedly political’, linked directly to nationalist movements and written by politically active figures (Tickell, 1982, p. 11).

The operation of strategic normativity mentioned earlier in this chapter can be identified in the strategic splitting between *bacaan liar* and *Balai Pustaka* literature inherent in Rinkes’s comments and *Balai Pustaka*’s editorial policies. Political writing was labelled ‘subversive’ and not considered good literature. Paul Tickell writes: ‘In the eyes of *Balai Pustaka*, literary meant apolitical. Political meant *bacaan liar* and was to be eliminated as ‘sub-standard’’ (1982, p. 195). Of course, the hierarchical relations between the two forms of reading materials constructed by *Balai Pustaka* (listed in table 2.1) were closely related to the colonial state’s cultural management of its indigenous population. The state

Table 2.1: The Strategic Splitting of *Balai Pustaka* and *Bacaan Liar* Publications.

<i>Balai Pustaka</i>	<i>Bacaan Liar</i>
Apolitical	Political
Moral	Immoral
Good Literature	Substandard Literature

was marking out for reform those attitudes and behaviours that it considered obstructed its goals for the improvement of its indigenous subjects.

Paul Tickell's research about *Balai Pustaka* provides a number of insights into the institution's practices, in particular its editorial policies. While Tickell's argument is centred around the formation of the Indonesian literary canon, his account of the changes made to *Balai Pustaka* novels, such as *Salah Asuhan* (Muis, 1928), provides an illustration of *Balai Pustaka*'s reforming function. The original draft of *Salah Asuhan*, submitted by author and active nationalist Abdul Muis, was judged to offend 'the moral and political sensibilities' of the *Balai Pustaka* editors (1982, p. 196). The major cause of offence was the depiction of a major female character, a Dutch woman, who was in the original novel 'morally suspect, the cause of a marriage breakdown, greedy, rapacious and ultimately [depicted] as a prostitute' (1982, p. 197).¹⁹ In the rewritten version, the Dutch woman becomes half-French, half-Indonesian and the cause of the marriage breakdown is shifted to a male Indonesian character and his betrayal of tradition (1982, pp.197-8). Other novels were rejected for moral reasons, such as Armijn Pane's *Belenggu* due to its depiction of adultery. Suwarsih Djojopuspito's original Sundanese language manuscript for *Buiten het Gareel*, identified by some commentators as the pre-eminent novel of the period (Teeuw, 1967, p. 64), was originally rejected because of it contained too little instruction and was not written in a simple enough style (Foulcher, 1993b, p. 225). Since *Balai Pustaka* had a near monopoly over defining what was serious literature, subjects and attitudes labelled immoral and politically subversive by the colonial state were labelled inappropriate for serious literature and manuscripts including such subjects and attitudes were more difficult to get published and suffered from a lower circulation.

As a form of cultural management, *Balai Pustaka* had a substantial impact on Malay-language literature. The higher quality, subsidised price and extensive circulation of *Balai Pustaka* materials effectively wiped out *bacaan liar* publications by the end of the 1920s (Tickell, 1982, pp. 16,17). A second effect of the cultural strategies used in *Balai Pustaka* was the establishment of new aesthetic standards that identified literature with apolitical writing. Tickell writes:

¹⁹ The position of white women and children was of great concern during the colonial period due to the linking of race and national strength. See Stoler (1996) and Gouda (1995, pp. 75-117; 1998).

Balai Pustaka never expressed its role in direct political terms, viz, the elimination of politically partisan oppositional literature, although it did see itself as ‘improving’ the standards of publishing and literature. The standards that it used were however loaded – excluding the politically motivated, anything that may have been construed as anti-Dutch, labelling all but officially published material as *bacaan liar* and its publishers as those ‘with impure intentions.’ (1982, p. 196)

New forms of literature which did not conform to the standards, such as the commercial popular fiction, *roman picisan*, were dismissed as ‘popular’ (Tickell, 1982, pp. 17-18) and therefore substandard. The aesthetic standards established by *Balai Pustaka* have had long and ongoing effects on literary criticism (Tickell, 1982, pp. 28-53) that fed into later Indonesian literary debates (Foulcher, 1993b).²⁰

In the 1920s and 1930s the Dutch began to move away from the ethical policy and turned towards cultural relativism and racial determinism (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 231). Changes in the administration’s policies were reflected in *Balai Pustaka* which became more conservative and less tolerant (Tickell, 1982, pp. 195-201). The social changes that had been kicked off by the ethical policy had assumed by the 1930s a degree of independence from the Dutch state. Harry Benda writes:

The progressive abandonment of the Ethical Policy was primarily caused by the fact that political and administrative reforms, Western education and welfare legislation, however well intended they had been, had combined in unloosing a whirlwind of unexpected and highly perturbing repercussions which seemed to threaten the very foundations of colonial society. The tides of change, in other words, were running faster than ever before, but they were to all intents and purposes spilling over the banks chartered by the proponents of the Ethical Policy. (1958, p. 36)

It is to nationalism, that ‘unexpected and highly perturbing repercussion’, that I now turn.

3. The Rise of Nationalism

Nationalists had a complex relationship to the emerging European ideas about government, traditional power structures and the colonial state. They accepted and rejected elements of colonial governance and local practices and many different nationalisms developed across the first half of the twentieth century. A key factor in the growth of the nationalist movement was the Westernised education provided by the

²⁰ It should also be noted that *Balai Pustaka* was not without its critics. Armijn Pane, an author and Sanusi’s brother, had criticised *Balai Pustaka* for assuming that the Indonesian reading public were devoid of both intelligence and taste (Foulcher, 1980, p. 58).

ethical policies of the colonial government. Almost all of the nationalists had received such an education (see van Niel, 1960, pp. 47-100). Nationalist organisations began to grow after the formation of *Budi Utomo* in 1908 and proliferated in the first half of the twentieth century, often in the face of repression by the colonial state.²¹ In the second half of the 1920s young nationalists from different regions and ethnicities formed a number of study clubs in educational institutions in Java. At a conference in 1928 they took the 'Youth Pledge' to three ideals: 'one Fatherland, Indonesia; one nation, Indonesia; and one language, *Bahasa Indonesia*, the language of unity' (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 233). However, Dutch repression soon followed, and the nationalist movement was effectively out-manoeuvred by the Dutch throughout the thirties despite growing nationalist sentiment.

Two key groups of young nationalists exerted a large influence over Indonesian politics and policy after 1927. Sukarno emerged as a broad-based nationalist leader, advocating a position that enveloped aspects of Islam, Marxism and nationalism. The alternative was the more Westernised socialist-nationalist leaders (Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, Ali Sastroamidjojo, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo) with international (mainly Dutch) educations who favoured a strategy of cadre formation. Both groups favoured political resistance against Dutch colonial rule to cooperative methods (Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 206-226). However, in the face of the arrest or exile of the more radical leaders and growing Dutch repression of political activities and politically active organisations, the nationalist movement increasingly came under the leadership of moderates who favoured dialogue with the Dutch in order to achieve independence through the existing political institutions (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 240).

Cultural Debates amongst the Nationalists in the 1930s

In the early 1930s, a group of Western-educated Indonesian intellectuals began an attempt to articulate a cultural counterpart to the nationalist political movement (Foulcher, 1980, p. 1). The primary forum for nationalist Indonesian discussion of culture was the literature journal *Pujangga Baru*, which began through a collaboration between the editor of a literary column in the *Balai Pustaka* Malay language publication, *Panji*

²¹ On the nationalist movements, see Legge (1977, pp. 120-45), Ricklefs (2001, pp. 206-44) and van Niel (1960).

Pustaka, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, and the author and poet, Armijn Pane.²² The emergence of the journal elicited some criticism from amongst the political nationalists who were at the time committed to a non-cooperative, politically radical nationalist vision. They questioned the journal's links with *Balai Pustaka* and the importance of a literary journal's contribution to Indonesian awareness (Foulcher, 1980, pp. 13-5). The linkages between the group defined by Heather Sutherland as the 'cultural nationalists' (1968, p. 116) and the political movement became much closer over the course of the 1930s due to changes in both the nationalist movement and *Pujangga Baru*. The colonial state, while increasing its repression of political activities, left cultural avenues of nationalist expression open and *Pujangga Baru* was redefined by its editors to be located within this space (Foulcher, 1980, pp. 15,21-2).

Pujangga Baru was central to the debates about defining Indonesian culture, referred to by Claire Holt as 'The Great Debate', (1967, pp. 211-54) conducted by Indonesian intellectuals from the mid 1930s until 1942. *Pujangga Baru*'s initial volume was orientated towards literary criticism. Keith Foulcher, in his monograph on *Pujangga Baru*, identifies a change in its editorial policy at the beginning of its second volume in May 1934 to include 'widely based social and cultural issues' (1980, p. 19). This change was confirmed in 1935 at the start of its third volume, when the editorial described *Pujangga Baru*'s aims as the 'formation, organisation and promotion of a new culture, the culture of unity' ('Tahun yang Ketiga,' 1935, in Foulcher, 1980, p. 20). The political and cultural nationalist movements thus coalesced in their focus on Indonesian culture and led to a situation where *Pujangga Baru* 'dominated the intellectual world' (Sutherland, 1968, p. 127) of Indonesia from 1935 until the Japanese invasion in 1942.²³

The background of the cultural nationalists has a large degree of similarity as can be demonstrated by an examination of the main contributors to *Pujangga Baru*. Virtually all of the main contributors were Dutch-educated, had undergone the consciousness-

²² For a detailed account of the beginnings of *Pujangga Baru* (and by extension the cultural nationalists) and biographies of its founders, see Foulcher (1980, pp. 1-15) and Sutherland (1968).

²³ While *Pujangga Baru* and the cultural debates that took place in its pages were the most high-profile and prominent of the time, it should be noted that artists in other fields such as painting (in particular the Persagi artists, see Sudarmaji, 1990) and theatre (Brown, 2001, pp. 79-98) were also involved with the nationalist movement and developed their own perspectives regarding Indonesian culture. The *Pujangga Baru* writers were also particularly prominent in the cultural institutions of the Japanese occupying administration, as I explore in the latter half of this chapter.

transforming ‘bureaucratic pilgrimage’ of that system, which Anderson identifies as central to the nationalist movements of the late colonial period (1991, pp. 114,121-4), and used Dutch as their main means of communicating with Indonesians from other ethnic groups.²⁴ The ethnic spread of the *Pujangga Baru* writers reflects the Sumatrans’ greater familiarity with Malay and therefore the Indonesian language they were trying to develop. Of the twenty-five major contributors, sixteen were Sumatran, three Javanese and six from other ethnicities. However, the ethnic differences were minimised by a central similarity, summarised by Sutherland as ‘the modernising impact of Dutch colonialism in the twentieth century and resultant rise of a Western educated urban intelligentsia, to which they belonged’ (1968, p. 110).

Cultural Policy and a Cultural Polemic

The ‘Great Debate’, despite its singular connotation, was actually a series of exchanges between different authors over a range of issues related to the formation of a national culture. It gained full momentum in 1935, which saw the first of a series of cultural polemics, some of which are collected together in Achdiat Mihadja’s *Polemik Kebudayaan* (1998).²⁵ These debates, much like the literature produced by the cultural nationalists, suffered from the limitations of their authors’ background and confidence. Foulcher, for instance, characterises the debates as ‘a series of assertions and counter-assertions of nationalist pride and self-confidence’ (1980, p. 25) rather than an attempt to build concrete solutions for cultural problems. Despite their limitations, the debates are still an important historical moment for discussions of Indonesian identity and culture. Most analysis of the cultural debates, despite their broad scope, has focussed on their relationship to the development of Indonesian literature (Foulcher, 1980; Teeuw, 1967, pp. 28-46).²⁶ Below I analyse the initial cultural polemic, republished in *Polemik Kebudayaan* (1998, pp. 1-28), from a cultural policy perspective.

The initial cultural polemic began as an exchange between Alisjahbana and Sanusi Pane, two of the most prominent cultural nationalists and most active participants in the cultural debates. This first exchange has been the most reviewed (Foulcher, 1980, pp. 20-1,24;

²⁴ The biographical information on the *Pujangga Baru* writers is taken from Sutherland (1968, pp. 109-10).

²⁵ First published in either 1948 or 1949.

²⁶ An exception is the article by Sutherland (1968) titled ‘Pudjangga Baru: Aspects of Indonesian Intellectual Life in the 1930s’.

Teeuw, 1967, pp. 35-7), and the positions taken by both authors do not greatly alter throughout the period. As such, this exchange has become representative of the debates and is an excellent place to analyse how culture was being used by cultural nationalists. Alisjahbana was the dominant personality within *Pujangga Baru*. Born in North Sumatra, Alisjahbana was educated at a Dutch language elementary school at Bengkulu, primary teacher's school in Bukittinggi, and teacher's training college at Bandung. He then moved to Batavia to work for a headmaster's certificate and began working for *Balai Pustaka*, first as the editor of the magazine *Pandji Pustaka*, later as a literary editor and author. Sanusi Pane was also a Batak from North Sumatra. After graduating from a Dutch language elementary school at Bengkulu, Sanusi studied between 1922 and 1927 at the *Gunung Sari* Teacher's Training College which was run by the Theosophical Society. In 1929 he travelled to India on a trip that greatly influenced his opinions and writings (Foulcher, 1980, p. 89, fn. 79).

Alisjahbana began the first cultural polemic with an article entitled 'Towards a New Society and Culture' ('Menuju Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Baru') published in *Pujangga Baru* in August 1935 (1998). In the article, Alisjahbana identified his purpose as 'cleaning-up' understandings about 'Indonesianness'.²⁷ He argued that Indonesianness was a product of the twentieth century that should be differentiated from the cultures that preceded it, which he labelled 'pre-Indonesian'.²⁸ The dynamic and unifying spirit of Indonesianness was a result of interaction with the West and represented a new stage in the development of the region, much like the coming of Indian and Arabic cultures to the archipelago in the previous centuries. However, Alisjahbana argued that Indonesia should look to the 'dynamic' (1998, p. 7) culture of the West as a model and opposed attempts to link Indonesia to 'pre-Indonesian' cultures which he viewed as impeding cultural development (1998, p. 10).²⁹

Sanusi was one of the first to respond to Alisjahbana's theory. In an article entitled 'Indonesian unity' (*Persatuan Indonesia*) published in the newspaper *Suara Umum* on 4 September 1935,³⁰ Sanusi voiced his opposition to Alisjahbana's division between

²⁷ 'Keindonesiaan' (1998, p. 4).

²⁸ 'Prae-Indonesia' (1998, p. 5).

²⁹ Alisjahbana's model does allow some elements of local cultures to become 'assimilated' into Indonesian culture, but only after careful consideration that those elements are not linked to impediments to cultural development (1998, p. 10).

³⁰ Reprinted in *Polemik Kebudayaan* (1998, pp. 13-24).

Indonesian and pre-Indonesian cultures, instead positing that the future was dependent on the past. Moreover, Sanusi held that common Indonesian cultural characteristics had existed in art and *adat* before Indonesians had developed a consciousness of their shared identity and, in fact, there was a shared basis for all of the different local cultures (1998, p. 17). Sanusi also opposed Takdir's promotion of Western culture over all other cultures. Sanusi rejected the materialism, individualism and intellectualism of the West which, in his opinion, privileged the material over the spiritual and subjugated nature (1998, p. 15-17). In contrast to the West, Eastern culture was at one with nature and nurtured the spirit. Sanusi argued that ideally the material and the spiritual should be combined, placing the East and West on equal terms in the development of an Indonesian culture. The two positions were followed by another article by Alisjahbana and a reply by Sanusi, where both confirm their initial positions (Alisjahbana & Pane, 1998).

In contrast to *Balai Pustaka* which involved the concrete use of a cultural resource, the cultural polemics were more idealistic and conducted at an intellectual level. As a consequence of the authors' idealism, I focus my analysis on how Alisjahbana and Sanusi made use of an abstract idea of culture, within which can be identified a similar strategic normativity to that used by *Balai Pustaka*. Both Alisjahbana and Sanusi were articulating a similar agenda for the reform of Indonesians and both used a strategic splitting of desirable and undesirable cultural attributes. Alisjahbana's division is the more straightforward of the two. He divided pre-Indonesian culture from a Westernised Indonesian culture. Indonesian culture, as set out in Table 2.2, is dynamic, free to change, modern and is the result of a people united. Pre-Indonesian culture, on the other hand, is represented as static, chained by tradition, traditional and was the result of a people divided. In the emotional closing sections of the article, Alisjahbana urged his readers to take up his vision of Indonesia and leave behind the traits he associates with pre-Indonesian culture.

Table 2.2: Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana's Division between Indonesia and Pre-Indonesia

Indonesia	Pre-Indonesia
Westernised	Traditional
Dynamic	Static
Free to change	Chained (<i>terikat</i>) by tradition
United	Divided

Sanusi's split was more complicated because his model was articulated against the Alisjahbana model with its simple splitting of past and future. Instead, he identified the past with healthy Eastern spirituality and divided Western influence into desirable material attributes and undesirable spiritual attributes. He then began to articulate his preferred model, which was a mixture of the desirable attributes of his characterisations of Eastern and Western culture, while rejecting the attributes he labelled undesirable. Sanusi characterised his model as a mixture of Faust representing the West and Arjuna representing the East:

The perfect direction would be to unify Faust with Arjuna, fusing materialism, intellectualism and individualism with spiritualism, feeling and collectivism. (1998, p. 17)

Haluan yang sempurna ialah menyatukan Faust dengan Arjuna memesrakan materialisme, intelektualisme, dan individualisme dengan spiritualisme, perasaan dan collectivisme.

Sanusi held that Indonesian culture should be drawn from as broad a basis as possible including Western cultures. His division was thus between a balanced mixing of Eastern and Western culture which he contrasted to one-sided cultural models that privilege either East or West. Sanusi argued that Indonesia had always possessed an underlying cultural unity and that pursuing 'provincialism' that would only draw from earlier regional cultures would be to limit the development of Indonesian culture.

Table 2.3: Sanusi Pane's Divisions between a Balanced East-West Culture and Either Eastern or Western Culture

Balanced East-West	East	West
Harmony	Harmony	Competition
One with Nature	One with Nature	Subjugates Nature
Technology	Undeveloped	Technology
Science	Undeveloped	Science
Economy	Undeveloped	Economy
Spiritual and Material	Spiritual	Material

Both Alisjahbana and Sanusi's cultural models can be read as reformist programs. Due to their political persuasion, they shared the desire to spread the nationalist spirit amongst Indonesians. Both the cultural models they promoted encouraged Indonesians to put aside regional divisions and unite behind a progressive vision of an emerging Indonesia. Both also articulated attitudes and attributes that should be, in Alisjahbana's model, rejected as

elements of an outmoded past, or, in Sanusi's model, as part of an undesirable future. They were not describing the cultural attributes that were there as much as they were outlining which cultural attributes Indonesians should strive to produce and which they should avoid. In other words, they were grappling over the shape of a normative definition of Indonesian culture that Indonesians would journey towards.

The abstract civilising function attributed to culture in the exchange between Alisjahbana and Sanusi Pane was only supported by a few concrete courses of action. For instance, Alisjahbana attempted in his writings to 'put into practice his theory of the role of the artist as a leader and guide in the process of social change' (Foulcher, 1980, p. 26). When criticised for the obviously didactic themes that ran through his novel *Layar Terkembang*, Alisjahbana argued that, in a time of national construction, didacticism is an essential element of art (Foulcher, 1980, p. 27). Similarly, in a *Pujangga Baru* article in 1934, Alisjahbana encouraged Indonesian youths to follow the example of a Spanish youth movement which sent groups of wandering players out to tour villages to put on theatre performances for the education and entertainment of villagers (Alisjahbana, 1934). Given *Balai Pustaka's* dominance as a publisher of serious fiction during the time of the cultural debates and the employment history of many of the *Pujangga Baru* contributors, including Alisjahbana, who had worked for the government publishing house, it is not surprising that the cultural nationalists should seek to use literature as a cultural resource to reform Indonesian society. The problem, from a cultural policy perspective, was that they lacked the means and know-how to turn their abstract ideas into concrete programs that reached beyond the small circle of urban Indonesian intellectuals who subscribed to the magazine and participated in the debates. Nevertheless, their debates demonstrate a similar reformist impulse to the programs of the Dutch and a similar adherence to culture's civilising function, albeit at a much more abstract and idealist level.

4. Colonial Cultural Policy and Nationalist Cultural Discourses Compared

In the chapter 'Census, Map, Museum' in the revised edition of his book *Imagined Communities*, Anderson asserts that 'the immediate genealogy [of the official nationalism in the colonised worlds of Asia and Africa] should be traced to the imaginings of the colonial state' (1991, p. 163). Anderson then demonstrates how the 'grammar' (1991, p. 163) of the colonial state informed the nationalism of the new state through an

examination of the three institutions mentioned in the chapter's title. In Indonesia, the civilising function of culture was also taken from the grammar of the colonial state through the articulation of cultural nationalism. Culture is used by both the colonial state and the nationalist movement in a way, to borrow a term from Bennett, which is 'inescapably normative' (1998, p. 91) and is tied to historical changes in governance in Indonesia.

The linkages between reformist programs in Europe and the ethical reforms in the East Indies indicate that culture was used governmentally in the Dutch colony. *Balai Pustaka* was a product of the reformist tendencies of the ethical period and was aimed, from the perspective of the colonial state, at improving Indonesian publishing and literature. Significantly, this included the omission of political and immoral themes and attitudes. Literature's civilising function was central to *Balai Pustaka's* operation, as literature was used to improve indigenous Indonesians. *Balai Pustaka* illustrates how cultural policy operates as a form of government here through how it targets the understandings and behaviours of individuals in order to shape the attributes of populations, in this case defined as different ethnic groups or indigenous readers of Malay-language literature. *Balai Pustaka* also is an example of how the cultural policy of a liberal state can incorporate elements of the command culture in regards to the populations it deems backwards or in need of special guidance. Dutch interventions into indigenous Indonesian literature were far more intrusive than would have been considered appropriate for the literature of the European populations.

It is not surprising that the cultural nationalists articulated versions of culture that incorporated a civilising function given their Westernised education, linkages with *Balai Pustaka* and their desire to reform Indonesian society.³¹ Like *Balai Pustaka*, the cultural nationalists targeted certain behaviours and attitudes as undesirable and sought to eliminate them through articulating models of cultural development. *Balai Pustaka* and the cultural nationalists also both targeted populations, with the essential difference not being their operation, but the way they defined their target population. In contrast to the colonial regime, the cultural nationalists viewed their audience as a modernising, national population slowly but surely headed towards independence. Unlike *Balai Pustaka*, the

³¹ Sutherland writes, '*Pujangga Baru* explored one possible type of intellectual development within the colonial situation, working to carve an Indonesian cultural identity using Dutch tools' (1968, p. 127).

cultural nationalists did not have the financial or logistical support of a state, and their arguments remained highly abstract and theoretical, although they did acquire a much broader influence during the Japanese occupation. In spite of the differences in methods and goals, the governmental function of culture – its role as a tool to shape the attributes and behaviours of individuals and groups – was central to both colonial era cultural institutions and nationalist cultural politics. A state did not harness the mass-appeal of national culture until the Japanese armies arrived on Java.

5. Cultural Policy during the Japanese Occupation

Japan and the Invasion of Indonesia

The key to understanding the policy directions of the Japanese occupying administration is analysis of the conditions in Japan that preceded World War II and the wartime imperatives felt after the Japanese had seized control. Cultural policy during the occupation was linked to propaganda connected with wartime goals but was also influenced by Japanese ideas about government which had emerged in the 1930s and were imported with the Japanese military bureaucrats who ran Indonesia from 1942 until 1945.

During the 1930s, the military increasingly agitated to assert more control over economic relations and social life (A. Gordon, 2003, pp. 182-6). The military became increasingly independent, and certain military factions were willing to resort to violence to achieve their political goals (Beasley, 1990, pp. 177-84). Although ultimately not able to gain complete political control in Japan, a series of violent assassinations by the Imperial Way faction had the effect of strengthening military and bureaucratic representation in cabinet at the expense of the political parties (Beasley, 1990, pp. 181-2; A. Gordon, 2003, pp. 196-7). Greater state intervention followed, and the authorities sought to control groups, arrest intellectuals and activists and ban books which they deemed to propagate ‘dangerous thoughts’ that were in conflict with its goals (Beasley, 1990, pp. 184-8). Following the assassination of influential minister of finance, Takahashi Korekiyo, in February 1936, the military successfully agitated for large increases in its budget that required increased taxation and direct economic controls (Nakamura, 1997, pp. 141-3). The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 caused the assertion of state control over

more areas of social and economic life to address wartime needs – a trend that continued until the end of World War II.³² The picture that emerges is of a state increasingly under the influence of the military seeking to orchestrate a smooth modernisation to meet an escalating war. As preparations for war intensified, theories that championed the harmony of state and society were increasingly adopted by the state, culminating in 1940 with the abolition of the labour unions and political parties and the establishment of a new non-party body, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Bourchier, 1996, pp. 45-52). Confronted with pressure to withdraw from war due to commodity shortages and increasing economic pressure from the United States of America, as well as witnessing German successes in Europe, Japan signed a treaty with Germany and Italy in 1940 and began its invasion of Southeast Asia (Nakamura, 1997, pp. 149-50).

The Japanese army invaded Indonesia on 10 January 1942, and the Netherlands Indies administration surrendered on 8 March 1942. Japanese occupying administrations were quickly put into place. The first priority of the Japanese occupiers was to meet the needs of the Japanese war effort. The *Principles Governing the Administration of Occupied Southern Areas*,³³ adopted on 20 November 1941, had as their first objective:

For the present, military government shall be established in occupied areas to restore public order, expedite acquisition of resources vital to national defence, and ensure the economic self-sufficiency of military personnel. (Benda, Irikura, & Kishi, 1965, p. 1)

However, their methods for meeting wartime military demands differed across Indonesia and altered as the tide of war turned against the Japanese. Indonesia was divided into three administrative areas run by three distinct military entities with different policies towards their region's indigenous populations. Java was administered by the Sixteenth Army, while the Twenty-fifth Army administered Sumatra (initially from Singapore) and the Navy governed the rest of the Indonesian archipelago (Reid, 1980, pp. 19,23). The Japanese strategy in Java was centred around mobilisation based on the nationalist movement, whereas the two other occupying administrations relied more on traditional leaders to muster support. Both the Twentieth Army and the Navy initially had little time for nationalist movements and placed much less emphasis on generating mass movements (Reid, 1980, pp. 19,23), until Japanese Premier Koiso's declaration in 1944 that

³² Economic historian Takafusa Nakamura asserts that national controls would have been necessary soon after 1937 even if war had not broken out due to the direction of the Japanese economy (1997, p. 142).

³³ *Nanpo Senryochi Gyosei Jisshi Yoryo*.

Indonesia would be granted independence (Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 256-7). Michael Van Langenberg's study of Northern Sumatra highlights the mobilisation (particularly of youth) and anti-feudal sentiment that accompanied the Japanese occupation (1980). Although the strength of the nationalists was greater on Java, Van Langenberg's research demonstrates that nationalists did mobilise in other parts of the archipelago, such as North Sumatra, without the same level of Japanese support.

The Japanese policy for meeting wartime needs planned to utilise the existing structures of the societies they occupied. The *Principles Governing the Administration of Occupied Southern Areas* make this clear in its first principle:

In the implementation of military administration, existing governmental organisations shall be utilised as much as possible, with due respect for past organisational structure and native practices. (Lebra, 1975, p. 114)

Despite this policy, the Japanese embarked on extensive social and economic reforms in the pursuit of wartime goals, including taking control of the mass media and banning all organisations at the beginning of the occupation (Kurasawa, 1988, pp. 332-4,362; Ricklefs, 2001, p. 251). Shigeru Sato, in his assessment of the impact of Japanese policy in Indonesia, writes that in Indonesia, as in Japan, the aim of the social and economic intervention was 'to construct an economic and social structure that would withstand the stress of war, at the same time enabling the maximum mobilisation of human and natural resources for the war effort' (2003, p. 289). Sato argues that Japan undertook primarily 'defensive' policies that were employed as countermeasures against wartime shortages (2003, p. 289). However, Aiko Kurasawa notes that the attention to rediscovering and reviving indigenous values, in addition to reviving indigenous pride, was also linked to revealing basic similarities between Indonesia and Japanese culture, indicating that the imperatives behind Japanese policy were a mixture of ideological reform and the demands of wartime (1990, p. 487).

One of the features that clearly distinguished Japanese from Dutch rule was the use of mass mobilisation. John Legge notes that the Japanese occupiers, in the circumstances of the Pacific war, sought to 'mobilise Indonesian support positively behind their regime' (1977, p. 138). To do so they employed methods already employed in the mobilisation of Japanese society in the 1930s – constructing mass organisations with close ties to the bureaucracy and new consultative bodies. Kurasawa, in her study of social change in

rural Java, characterises Japanese rule as a combination of ‘mobilisation and control’ (1988, p. 16). Mobilisation refers to the exploitation of economic resources, labour and the cooperation of the Indonesian population, while control refers to the use of tight controls, including censorship and suppression of ideas deemed opposed to the war effort, to direct and contain mobilisation. Similarly, Japanese historian Furuya Tetsuo characterises the government of 1930s Japan as mobilisation and repression (1976, p. 30 in McCormack, 1982, pp. 30-1). The period of Japanese rule in Indonesia involved a highly interventionist, controlling state, which contrasts with the Dutch model of ordered development and stability.³⁴

One consequence of mobilisation that was to have a considerable influence over future political events in Indonesia was its effect on Indonesian youths. A large number of youths underwent training in the Japanese organised youth militias, such as *PETA* in Java and the smaller *Giyugun* in Sumatra (Reid, 1980, pp. 27-8). The young officers of the youth movements, who were soon to come to prominence during the War of Independence, were influenced by the Japanese ideology of the period (Bourchier, 1996, pp. 41-71). They became an important political block in the post-independence period and assumed national leadership in 1966 (Crouch, 1978, pp. 21-42).

Nationalism and the Pan-Asian Cultural Model

For the occupying administration, ‘culture’ was a means through which to manage the population and mobilise groups and individuals to sustain Japan’s imperialist vision. The notion of pan-Asian identity and the formation of a bloc of Asian nations under Japanese leadership were central to Japanese cultural policy. The original idea for a bloc of nations was developed in the 1920s and 1930s and encompassed Japan, parts of China, Korea and Taiwan.³⁵ By 1940, the bloc had come to encompass Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, and was labelled the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Yosuke, 1975). Premier

³⁴ Scholars of the Japanese occupation have generally contrasted Japanese romanticism and emphasis on self-sacrifice and discipline to Dutch emphasis on expertise and scientific superiority, characterised in the title to Reid’s well-known essay, ‘Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword’ (1980). Another example is Ken’ichi (1997, p. 27). However, this has the effect of downplaying the Japanese emphasis on bureaucratic control and rational decision making that emerged in 1930s Japan and was transported to Indonesia along with the Japanese occupying administration.

³⁵ See Lebra (1975) for a collection of documents and analysis that indicate the development of the idea of an East Asian body in Japan leading up to and encompassing World War II.

Tōjō Hideki, in an address to the House of Peers in 1942, outlined some of the features of the body. He stated that the aim of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was:

... to enable each country and people in Greater East Asia to have its proper place and demonstrate its real character, thereby securing an order of co-existence and co-prosperity based on ethical principles with Japan serving as its nucleus. ... The regions which will newly participate in this work of construction are those which, though they abound in various resources, have had the progress of their civilisation and culture greatly impeded due to the ruthless exploitation by the United States and Britain for the past hundred years. (1975b, p. 79)

Tōjō's statement demonstrates the key features of Japan's model. It was pitched as a cooperative body for the mutual benefit of the nations involved, but with Japan, as the most progressed and mature nation, as leader and builder.³⁶ However, Japan still justified its privileged position and control of other countries through presenting itself as an Asian 'model for modernity' (Narangoa & Cribb, 2003, p. 8) and an already revitalised Asian civilisation. The underlying argument, and contradiction, of Tōjō's speech is that American or British imperialism should be replaced by a form of Japanese imperialism that was represented as more appropriate due to a shared Asian identity.³⁷

Culture was a major justification for the existence of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In a conference of nations in Greater East-Asia, Tōjō addressed the underlying cultural similarities:

A superior order of culture has existed in Greater East Asia from its very beginning. Especially the spiritual essence of the culture of Greater East Asia is the most sublime in the world [sic.]. It is my belief that in the wide diffusion throughout the world of this culture of Greater East Asia by its further cultivation and refinement lies the salvation of mankind from the curse of materialistic civilisation. (1975a, p. 91)

The pan-Asian cultural model was spread through Japanese propaganda and was supported by an institutional structure throughout the occupied territories. However, the war often created coordination problems resulting in policy differences between administrative areas. These differences make it difficult to discern a unified purpose beyond winning the war despite the pronouncements from Tokyo (Lebra, 1975, p. x). However, the pan-Asian model underlay cultural policy in each of the territories and in the pronouncements from the centre, although there were significant regional differences

³⁶ Following changes in international political discourse after 1918 that recognised the right of self-determination of nationalities, the language of cooperation had replaced the imperialist rhetoric that had justified previous Japanese annexations in Asia (Stegewerns, 2003, pp. 107-10).

³⁷ Dick Stegewerns notes the Japanese made use of the 'civilised man's burden' (2003, pp. 107-10). Narangoa and Cribb also note the similarities (2003, p. 8).

in its implementation. The following discussion will examine the pan-Asian cultural model's application in Indonesia, in particular how it defined relations between populations and the attributes of individuals.

Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb, in their analysis of Japanese discourses about Asian identity during the age of Japanese expansionism, write that 'Japan ... sought ... to recruit their subjects' sense of identity to the imperial cause ... by creating a variety of discourses about the nature of their empire' (2003, p. 1). In the case of Indonesia, the Japanese replaced the Western-centred cultural-racial policy of the Dutch era with a 'pan-Asianist principle of homogeneity under the slogan of Asian superiority over Europe' (Goto, 1997, p. 16). The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere linked Indonesia to Japan through the promotion of Asia as an economic and cultural group that had suffered from a Western imperial presence. The sphere was represented as cooperative and economically mutually beneficial and leading to world peace (Tojo, 1975a). Japan was positioned as a beneficent sponsor and leader that would assist in modernising the countries that had suffered from Western imperialism, such as Indonesia. Premier Tōjō's 1942 address to the House of Peers included the statement:

As regards the Netherlands East Indies ... if they continue as at present their attitude of resisting Japan, we will show no mercy in crushing them. But if their peoples come to understand Japan's real intentions and express willingness to cooperate with us, we will not hesitate to extend them our help with full understanding for their welfare and progress. (1975b, p. 80)

Japan was particularly keen to recruit nationalists through its support of local nationalisms against the Western colonial powers and to make use of nationalism's popular appeal. Nationalists were made the spokespeople for Japanese programs, most prominently in Java, but also in Sumatra (Reid, 1980, pp. 21-2). However, there was a tension between the nationalist desire for complete independence and Japanese control (as well as exploitation of Indonesian resources and Japanese police cruelty) for the length of the occupation. Nationalists were closely monitored and their activities curtailed.

The relationship between Japan, Indonesia and the West reflected the treatment of the three different populations within Indonesia for the duration of the war. Indonesians were made to bow to Japanese whenever they passed them on the street, and the Japanese calendar was introduced (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 250). The Dutch and English languages were

banned, and Japanese was promoted in educational institutions and newspapers (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 250). A primary goal of the Japanese cultural programs was to spread Japanese culture as an example of a mature Asian culture that had succeeded in overcoming Western influences. A number of Japanese cultural workers (*bunkajin*) were sent to the occupied territories for the purposes of developing Asian arts (Goodman, 1991, pp. 2-5; Kurasawa, 1991, pp. 39-43). The Japanese intended to intern all Europeans (except Germans), but were initially forced to leave out Europeans whose skills were needed to run vital industries (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 248). Within a year, those Europeans were also interned in camps with terrible conditions and high death rates.³⁸

Japanese cultural policy went beyond promoting Indonesia's place in Greater East Asia. It also sought to alter the behaviours and attributes of individual Indonesians. Narangoa and Cribb recognise the reformist element of Japan's policies towards other Asian cultures when they write, 'the Japanese prized some aspects of other Asian cultures while marking other aspects for improvement or elimination' (2003, p. 2). Kurasawa's research into Japanese propaganda in Indonesia provides extensive information about its goals and methods. She identifies the 'long term' goal of Japanese propaganda as 'mental indoctrination'. Japanese propaganda was aimed at 'encouraging particular Japanese virtues and morals, such as piety, modesty, motherly love and diligence' (1991, p. 61). Kurasawa links the goal of transforming 'the mentality of the Indonesian people into that of the Japanese' (1991, p. 61) with the goal of total mobilisation for the war effort. However, it could also be linked into Japan's modernising rationale that lay behind its justification of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere. Kurasawa also observes that Japanese propaganda included a number of short-term goals that are more directly linked with mobilisation. The short term goals were more practical with more concrete aims focussed on immediate social-economic needs, such as recruiting Indonesian volunteers, promoting increased food production and entertainment (1991, pp. 61-2). The first year of the occupation was more oriented towards the long-term goal but this changed as wartime hardships multiplied and became more severe and Indonesian aversion to Japanese indoctrination grew (1991, pp. 62-3).

³⁸ In the male civilian internment camp, forty percent of internees died (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 248).

Within Indonesia, there was a number of forces working against the achievement of the occupying administration's cultural policy goals. In addition to the intervention of pressing wartime demands that required propaganda resources, Indonesians themselves did not passively participate in Japanese programs or simply accept Japanese propaganda. Instead, they took advantage of the opportunities provided by Japanese cultural policies in order to achieve their own goals.

The Cultural Policy Infrastructure

Japanese cultural policy was centred on the production of wartime propaganda. Propaganda was an important part of the war effort and was present in all of Japan's occupied territories. The propaganda models show some similarities and were broadly based on programs from Nazi Germany (Goodman, 1991, p. 2). However, there were significant differences between the different territories. The use of the nationalist movement in propaganda by the Sixteenth Army in Java significantly differs from the policies of the Twenty-fifth Army that controlled Sumatra and the Navy in Eastern Indonesia. Outside of Java there were few concessions to the nationalists (1991, p. 118).

The key department for Japanese cultural policy in Java was *Sendenbu*, the Propaganda Department (Kurasawa, 1991, pp. 36-44). *Sendenbu* was established in Jakarta in August 1942. It was composed of three sections: Administration, News and Press, and Propaganda. As the military structure became more complex, a number of specialised centres were established as extra-departmental bodies in the areas of print media, reporting, radio broadcasting, theatre, movie production and movie distribution. In addition to the *Sendenbu*, five district operation units were established and each residency office had its own propaganda section. Within this administrative framework, two organisations in particular were focussed on the development of nationalist arts: the Cultural Centre and the cultural section of the nationalist-run mass organisation, *Putera*.

In April 1943, the Cultural Centre (*Keimin Bunka Shidosho*) was established as an auxiliary organisation of *Sendenbu*. Its tasks were to promote traditional Indonesian arts, to introduce and disseminate Japanese culture, and to educate and train Indonesian artists (Kurasawa, 1991, pp. 17-8). The Cultural Centre consisted of five sections—administration, literature, music, fine arts and performance arts (theatre, dance and film).

Indonesians headed each of the sections and worked as full-time staff. Japanese instructors were sent to the Cultural Centre to train Indonesian artists. The Centre also produced a yearly magazine, *Keboedajaan Timoer*, edited by Sanusi Pane of *Pujangga Baru* fame. Although promoting the Japanese version of Indonesian culture, the magazine also contained some discussion of various art forms (film, fine arts, literature) and promoted Indonesian poets and writers.

Putera (*Pusat Tenaga Rakyat* – People’s Power Movement) was established on 9 March 1943. *Putera*, although better known as a political organisation, also ran cultural programs and had a cultural section. It was a Japanese-funded organisation headed by leading nationalist figures who viewed it as a potential vehicle for mobilising and organising the populace behind the nationalist cause. Sukarno was the head of *Putera* and promoted it vigorously. *Putera* formed committees across Java under the supervision of a large central office. The central office was divided into sections dealing with education, propaganda, culture, health, social welfare and ‘enlightenment’³⁹ (Kanahele, 1967, p. 78). The Japanese were heavily involved in the financing, organisation and appointments process of *Putera*, and hoped it would assist them in achieving their wartime goals. As a price for Japanese support, *Putera*’s leaders were forced to participate in Japanese propaganda. *Putera* provided a platform for the nationalists with a larger degree of autonomy from the Japanese than the Cultural Centre, greatly encouraged Indonesian nationalism and also initiated some of its own cultural programs.⁴⁰ Differences between the Japanese administrators and the nationalists hamstrung *Putera* from its inception and resistance from the *Pamong Praja*⁴¹ restricted their activities outside of the large cities in Java (Kanahele, 1967, pp. 133-6). *Putera* became a part of the even more tightly controlled *Jawa Hokokai* mass movement on 8 January 1944 (Kanahele, 1967, pp. 137-8), modelled on Japan’s Imperial Rule Assistance Association (*Taisei Yokysankai*) (Kurasawa, 1991, p. 40).

The Cultural Centre and *Putera* became important centres for the development of Indonesian art and cultural expression. They provided resources, published works and ran training workshops. Nationalist artists, writers and performers quickly gathered around

³⁹ ‘Enlightenment’ referred to teaching nationalist philosophy.

⁴⁰ Some of *Putera*’s cultural programs are explored in the fine arts section below.

⁴¹ The petty nobility who had been employed in the colonial bureaucracy.

the Cultural Centre and *Putera* and were given key positions in the cultural apparatus. After the defeat of the Dutch colonial government, nationalist artists and writers were given the opportunity for the first time to develop their arts with the resources of the state. Nationalism began to assume a central position in the development of the arts in Indonesia within Japanese-sponsored cultural institutions.

The Impact of Japanese Cultural Policy

The occupying administration intervened with a wide variety of cultural forms for the purposes of propaganda. The production and distribution of propaganda impacted film production, radio, the print media, fine arts, theatre, music, *wayang* and introduced a new art form for the duration of the occupation, *Kamishibai*.⁴² The following discussion deals mainly with the fine arts.

In the fine arts, Japanese cultural policy further stimulated a movement that began four years before Japanese soldiers arrived in Indonesia. In October 1938, a small group of Indonesian artists formed the Union of Indonesian Fine Artists (*Persatuan Ahli Gambar Indonesia*, or *Persagi*) began in Jakarta. They were politically aligned with the nationalist movement and incorporated Indonesian themes into their work. *Persagi*'s basis was a shared critique of the state of the fine arts in Indonesia based on the nationalist vision of an autonomous and free nation. Its goal was to develop fine art among the Indonesian people through seeking the 'style of New Indonesia' (Sudarmaji, 1990, p. 75), predominantly through adopting early twentieth century European techniques with Indonesian subject matter. Although *Persagi* was disbanded when the Japanese invaded along with all other social organisations, and replaced with government-run bodies, *Persagi* artists increased their profile during the occupation. After limited recognition during the Dutch period, the nationalist artists who were active in *Persagi* were given state sponsorship, and their ideas and techniques were institutionalised in the key cultural organisations of the period. Claire Holt writes:

It was during the Japanese occupation that the impetus first given by *Persagi* began to accelerate. By the time the revolution broke out in August, 1945, the number of Indonesian painters was perhaps double, possibly triple that of pre-war

⁴² A Japanese-style picture-story show involving a series of pictures accompanying a story. *Kamishibai* is not examined here, as it virtually disappeared with the Japanese administration in 1945. For more information on *Kamishibai*, see Kurasawa (1988, pp. 353-8).

days. And they were ready to throw themselves headlong into the stream of revolutionary activities. (1967, p. 200)

Persagi artists held important posts in both the Japanese Cultural Centre and *Putera*. The fine arts section of the Japanese Cultural Centre was headed by Agus Djajasoeminta (often shortened to Djaja), the ex-Chairman of *Persagi*, while *Putera*'s fine arts section was headed by Sudjojono, who was the most well-known *Persagi* artist (Holt, 1967, p. 198; Kusnadi, 1990, p. 85).

A great number of influential Indonesian artists from the 1940s and 1950s were affiliated with either *Putera* or the Japanese Cultural Centre. Sudjojono and Agus Djaja are well-regarded artists. Affandi, one of the outstanding Indonesian artists of the second half of the twentieth century, launched his career from *Putera* in a solo exhibition in 1943. Kartono Yudhokusumo, a pioneer of the 'decorative' art style in the 1950s, also was associated with *Putera*, as were Hendra Gunawan, Henk Ngantung, Mochtar Apin and Zaini. Another outstanding artist, Barli, was associated with the Japanese Cultural Centre's branch in Bandung and, as part of the Japanese program, taught a number of young artists, including Popo Iskandar and Suparto (Supangkat, 1996, p. 45). These are the outstanding artists of the revolutionary and early independence periods.

Training and exhibiting were core activities of the fine arts sections. For the first time the state sponsored artists to be trained in the contemporary fine arts. Takashi Kohno, a Japanese instructor of the fine arts section of the Cultural Centre, viewed training as central to developing the future of Indonesian fine art. He emphasised the encouragement of new artists and that art 'should not be above but right in the middle of society' (1942, p. 22).⁴³ Many new artists were trained in the Japanese-sponsored institutions and numerous exhibitions were organised by both the Japanese Cultural Centre and *Putera*. In December 1942, the first all-Indonesian exhibition of paintings was held in Jakarta in the Cultural Centre and toured around Java. Two more such exhibitions occurred in 1943, along with five single-artist exhibitions organised by *Putera*. In April 1944 a fourth general exhibition was held.

⁴³ Kohno's name is changed to 'Kono' in the original article, probably because it made spelling and pronunciation easier for the Indonesians with whom he was working.

Both the Cultural Centre and *Putera* actively promoted Indonesian artists who were using Western techniques. To all appearances, such work contradicted a central principle of Japanese cultural policy, which aimed to rid Indonesia of European influence. At the opening of the Cultural Centre, Seizaburo Okasaki, a representative of the Japanese Central Administration in Java, stated:

In particular the greater part of the Asian continent, including Indonesia, which had been oppressed by the Western nations up until then, was subjected to a culture which destroyed Indigenous Eastern Culture. The Greater East Asia War is like an eternal flame which has rebuilt Eastern Culture. (1943, p. 1)

Teristimewa pula sebagian besar benua Asia dimana Indonesia termasuk pula dalam lingkungan itu, yang selama ini dibawah tindasan bangsa Barat, terpaksa menerima kebudayaan yang merusak binasakan Kebudayaan Timur Asli... Peperangan Asia Timur Raya seolah-olah telah menjadi api unggun yang membangunkan kembali Kebudayaan Timur.

However, Indonesian artists did not view their style as ‘Western’, but as contemporary. Jim Supangkat writes of Indonesian ‘modern art’ that its aesthetic basis is ‘quite different from that of traditional Indonesian art’ and that the ‘various popular styles in the development of modern art in Western Europe and the United States also appear in Indonesian modern art development’ (1990, p. 158). The works of Sudjojono and Affandi in the years before 1943 indicate the influence of impressionism.⁴⁴ Indonesian artists also viewed their art as uniquely Indonesian because of their focus on Indonesian themes and their nationalist commitment. The nationalist artists explored modernity from an Indonesian perspective that involved combinations of themes and conventions from traditional and new sources. Their achievements and artworks demonstrate a style that reflects the politics, emotions and understandings of the needs of the time. Supangkat labels the style of painting that emerged ‘romanticism’, as it was influenced by the romantic style of ‘early nineteenth century Europe’ that initiated international modern art. Paintings were dominated by themes of ‘rebellion, struggle, oppression and poverty’ as well as political themes, and were strongly symbolic (1990, p. 159). The romantic imagery of revolutionary struggle continued into the 1970s (1990, pp. 149-62).

Putera and the Cultural Centre generated artists who broadly shared a perspective about painting and an orientation to Indonesian culture. The overlap between Indonesian modernism and Japanese occupying doctrine created a space where Indonesian modern

⁴⁴ See Affandi’s *Ibunda* and Sudjojono’s *Before the Open Kelambu* (Holt, 1967, pp. 197,228). Affandi in the early 1960s described his work as ‘expressionist’, but this better applies to his paintings after the Japanese occupation (Holt, 1967, p. 227).

art could flourish. The artists of this time had a sense of taking Indonesian art from its current state (characterised by Kohno as a ‘blank sheet’)⁴⁵ towards a new destination and place. Kohno wrote in 1943:

The effort we must make is now very evident in front of our eyes. Therefore Indonesian painters must shape a basis of painting and sculpture that is healthy in spirit, that is based on the new consciousness of artists and understands the new world, because it is a consciousness that is based on the new climate. (1943, p. 10)

Sangat nyata sekarang usaha yang harus kita kerjakan dalam waktu ini bertimbun-timbun di depan mata kita. Maka ahli kesenian Indonesia harus membentuk dasar kesenian lukisan dan ukiran yang sehat dalam arti rohani yang didasarkan pada kesadaran ahli kesenian yang baru, faham dunia baru, ialah yang didasarkan susunan baru.

The ‘new consciousness’ desired by the emerging Indonesian artists had some commonalities with the ‘new consciousness’ promoted by the Japanese occupying government. The overlap is also obvious in an article by Agus Djaja. Djaja describes Javanese culture and art as having undergone three centuries of ‘hypnotism’ because of Western colonialism and capitalism. He then highlights the opportunity to develop painting in the ‘new climate’ of free East Asia and the need to develop ‘Eastern’ painting. Mirroring the famous poet Chairil Anwar, Djaja states: ‘We the artists truly must feel lucky to live in these times. Though they are tough, we may want to live and die a thousand times.’⁴⁶ The *Persagi* critique of colonialism is very similar to the Japanese critique and the sense that a new form of art is emerging for a new time also parallels *Persagi*’s direction.

The overlap allowed *Persagi* artists to use the Japanese fine arts institutions to promote their own agenda. For instance, the themes of *Persagi*, particularly the everyday lives of Indonesians, became prominent in the works of new artists. According to Kusnadi, the Japanese did not interfere with the themes of the Indonesian artists except that they were asked to paint Indonesians undertaking manual labour for the Japanese war effort, which were to be used in recruitment propaganda aimed at Indonesian workers (1990, p. 85). After Japan’s surrender in 1945, Indonesian artists took up themes depicting the suffering of the people, soldiers and battles, and the events of the war of independence.

⁴⁵ ‘Kertas putih’ (1942, p. 21).

⁴⁶ ‘Kami para seniman dan seniwati sungguh harus merasa beruntung hidup didalam suasana ini. Meskipun berat, tetapi jika mungkin hendaknya kami ingin mati hidup seribu kali’ (Djajasoeminta, 1943, p. 8).

The affiliation between nationalism and modern art strengthened further in the years after 1945. As the newly formed Republic declared independence and then fought the Dutch, fine artists withdrew with the republic, eventually ending up in Yogyakarta as the Republic's troops retreated to that city. A number of artists recorded the war, but unfortunately their pictures, along with many of the pictures from the Japanese interregnum, were lost when the Dutch sacked the city of Yogyakarta and in the turmoil of the period. After the end of the war in 1949, a number of artists elected to stay in Yogyakarta. Holt states that in the 1950s two-thirds to three-quarters of Java's painters lived in Yogyakarta (1967, p. 215). The romantic themes established by *Persagi* and developed during the Japanese years continued to be pursued in Yogyakarta and were particularly prominent in the arts college established there in 1950. A smaller group of artists in Bandung (including Barli, Iskandar and Suparto) pursued a style of art that moved away from realism and towards a more abstract style that became affiliated with the arts college at the Bandung Institute of Technology. These two art movements have exerted a prolonged influence over Indonesian contemporary art.

While Japanese policy exercised some influence on the development and course of Indonesian art, Japanese art itself had little impact. Despite the rhetoric of finding an 'Eastern style,' artists moved towards European impressionism. Western techniques seemed to grow more influential even while the Japanese were denigrating Western traditions and forms. Holt writes:

it was during the Japanese occupation that Western music and painting acquired an enthusiastic following ... In contrast there is little clearly identifiable Japanese influence discernible in modern Indonesian art. (1967, pp. 198-9)⁴⁷

Indonesian artists were able to make use of the opportunities presented to them while pursuing their own interests, including exploration of Western methods.

State control over production and distribution of film followed the model that was already in place in Japan.⁴⁸ In Indonesia, the Japanese used confiscated movie production houses to make their films and also took control of all existing cinemas and ran open-air movie screenings (Kurasawa, 1991, pp. 46,56). Viewing options changed immediately.⁴⁹ A large

⁴⁷ See also Wertheim (1956, p. 299).

⁴⁸ The data on Japanese film policy in Japan and Java is taken from Kurasawa (1991, pp. 44-58).

⁴⁹ For instance, American films constituted 65 percent of all movies shown before the occupation and Japanese movies only 2.9 percent (Kurasawa, 1991, pp. 46-7).

number of Japanese films were imported, and the occupying administration stimulated local film production of both news and movies for the purposes of propaganda (Kurasawa, 1991, pp. 51-2). The various types of film were all oriented towards government-approved themes, technical instruction and moral teachings. News films also reported speeches by prominent Indonesian leaders, most frequently Sukarno (Kurasawa, 1991, pp. 51-3). Ticket prices were reduced substantially from pre-war prices to facilitate attendance (1991, pp. 56-7). The Japanese administration also expanded the use of mobile cinemas. Fifteen projection teams travelled the countryside giving free screenings of propaganda films for the rural population, many of whom had never seen a film before (1991, pp.58-9). The Japanese use of film for political purposes also survived the war, with Indonesian film-makers documenting historic occurrences of the war of independence (Sen, 1994, p. 17).

The Japanese administration also stimulated the production of radio programs and the spread of radios. Around 1500 radio 'singing trees' (*pohon nyanyi*) were spread around Java to disseminate propaganda (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 81). The Declaration of Independence was first broadcast through the nationalist capture of a Japanese radio station on the evening of 17 August 1945. The Republic of Indonesia Radio (RRI) began as a consortium of eight stations from within the Japanese network (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 82). The Japanese administration's take over of the press offered Indonesians increased opportunities to take positions of responsibility formerly held by Dutch journalists and training, although the occupying administration also increased censorship (D. T. Hill, 1994, pp. 26-7).

The Japanese also needed new historical narratives, myths and heroes to replace the Dutch histories that had dominated textbooks and street names before 1942. Anthony Reid notes that the nationalist histories written for use during this period consolidated 'a new nationalist orthodoxy which has proved remarkably durable' (1980, p. 25). Key nationalist figures who held senior posts in the occupying administrations, such as Muhammad Yamin, the poet and highest ranked Indonesian in *Sendenbu*, and Sanusi Pane promoted and developed nationalist histories with two elements that would become standard fare in nationalist history texts. Firstly, the texts represented Indonesia's pre-colonial past as a time of political unity and prosperity brought by the great Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms. Secondly, the 350 years of Dutch rule were represented as a time of

oppression with resistance at some time or another of each Indonesian region and people. In these histories, the Indonesian ‘villains’ of Dutch histories were made into resistance heroes in their narrative about the struggle for independence (1979, pp. 297-8). The new historical orthodoxy had its roots in nationalist intellectual attacks on the Dutch VOC and Netherlands Indies state-centred version of history used to educate Indonesians from the 1920s (1979, pp. 292-3). Sanusi Pane’s *Sejarah Indonesia* (1965)⁵⁰ became the standard national history and its structure, according to Reid, has been replicated in many local histories (1980, p. 25). Reid states of the impact of the period on understandings of the past: ‘While the shape of this national past owed very little to the Japanese, its projection into an official orthodoxy for the new nation was greatly speeded by wartime propaganda needs’ (1980, p. 25).

The explosion of nationalist poetry and literature began during the Japanese Occupation although much of it was not published until after the Japanese surrender due to censorship. Literary critic A. Teeuw states: ‘There can be no doubt that the spiritual revolution in Indonesia, and closely interwoven with it the new literary movement, started in 1942’ (1967, p. 107). An important development for literature was the Japanese discouragement of the Dutch language, which has been widely used amongst the Western-educated elite from which many Indonesian writers were drawn, and the encouragement of Indonesian (1967, p. 106). Some books were published within the Cultural Centre and included Japanese themes and slogans (Teeuw, 1967, pp. 107-9). Other books were written during this time, but were not published until after independence. *Keboedajaan Timoer*, a Japanese-sponsored weekly magazine focussed on culture, was an important forum for the discussion of literature and poetry and included excerpts of new works. Chairil Anwar also had a small number of poems published in *Keboedajaan Timoer* (for example 1944), although he was generally critical of the Japanese and much of his poetry was published only after the end of the occupation.⁵¹

Effects of Japanese Cultural Policy

Within the material produced for propaganda purposes, the driving force of change in the content of cultural forms was the pressure to conform to the principles of pan-Asian culture. Nationalist cultural workers, through their participation in Japanese cultural

⁵⁰ First published in 1943.

⁵¹ On the importance of Chairil Anwar in the development of Indonesian literature, see Foulcher (1993a).

institutions, were able to continue to promote overlapping nationalist themes, in particular liberation from the Dutch. The wartime content and the idea of pan-Asian culture ended with the Japanese occupation, as did the promotion of Japanese culture. The brutality of elements of the Japanese occupying forces, Japan's ambiguous relationship with nationalist leaders and the Japanese defeat in WWII made for an easy departure from Japanese influences. Narangoa and Cribb also note that the disruptions of war prevented the development of institutions that may have opened up opportunities for local elites within the Japanese empire, preventing greater commitment to the idea of pan-Asian culture and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere (2003, p. 18). Certainly, nationalist artists, writers and cultural workers involved in the mass media of the time were more interested in the relationship with Western ideas and techniques than with ideas and techniques from Japan and quickly moved away from the 'propaganda' of the period after 1945.

The more important and long-lasting effects of Japanese cultural policy were not listed in its goals and principles. Japanese cultural policy facilitated two important trends that were central to cultural provision within Indonesia in the following years. The first trend, which was the most important for the historical development of cultural policy, was how Japanese cultural policy laid the foundations for the official orthodoxies of the independence years. The promotion of Indonesian art and culture encouraged an explosion of arts that entrenched some art forms and styles in the public imaginary as representative of Indonesia. Japanese cultural policy in particular catalysed the modernist arts which were aligned with nationalism, such as modernist fine arts and Indonesian language literature. The nationalist artists of this era and the traditions associated with them proceeded to become established in state-sponsored teaching and cultural institutions as elements of national culture.

The second trend was the development of the mass culture industries, in particular film and radio and their relationship to national culture. It was through film and radio that many Indonesians gained access to the wider world and first heard and saw their national leaders. The spread of the new culture industries was in many ways linked to the spread of a new consciousness of being Indonesian and the emergence of the Indonesian nation. Kurasawa states that despite its failure to achieve its stated goals, the propaganda was

significant ‘in the sense that it provided most rural people with accessibility to modern entertainment media such as movies’ (1991, p. 65). Kurasawa continues:

Those media enlarged their mental environment and surroundings and brought the people into contact with the larger society. Through the screen, they first saw the faces of their national leaders and the great capital city of their ‘nation’, and thus came to be more familiar with the events going on outside their immediate society. (1991, p. 65)

Although the new culture industries would not be national in scope for many years, from the time of the Japanese occupation they were national in perspective.

6. Conclusion

While Dutch colonial policy displayed features of the command culture model in its treatment of indigenous Indonesians, the model was most in evidence during the period of Japanese occupation than any other in Indonesia’s history. Previously existing cultural institutions were disbanded and state-approved or state-run institutions provided the cultural infrastructure as part of the occupying administration’s propaganda apparatus. Within this model of cultural provision, the administration’s cultural policies were applied within administration-run or approved programs. Cultural policy during the occupation had two sets of objectives. First was the material objective of addressing problems and needs caused by the war. Second was the ideological objective of serving the needs of the Japanese imperial state articulated through the idea of pan-Asian culture. The latter set of objectives have a continuity with colonial cultural policy: occupation-era cultural policies included both a ‘civilising’ function and lessons about relations between populations that could be seen within Dutch colonial cultural policy and nationalist ideas about culture. The modernising imperative of the Japanese imperial state sought to ‘improve’ indigenous Indonesians based on a Japanese, rather than Western, set of normative cultural values. The racial hierarchies of culture were thus restructured in Japanese cultural policy but not thrown away. For the duration of the Japanese occupation, culture was implicated in a much more ambitious attempt at transforming Indonesian society than it was under the Dutch due to the interventionist streak in Japanese governance, which was amplified by the pressures of fighting a war.

Japanese cultural policies in Indonesia, although successfully implemented and administered, failed to achieve their stated goals. Indonesians did not accept the idea of a

pan-Asian culture or ape Japanese culture as a 'mature' Asian culture. Putting aside its failures, Japanese cultural policy did have some long term governmental effects. The Japanese ideological opposition to and erasure of Dutch and Western cultures and narratives created a situation that nationalists exploited to spread their own ideas about Indonesian culture and history through their involvement with Japanese propaganda. Japanese cultural policy, which reinforced and encouraged aspects of Indonesian national culture in order to unite rather than divide Indonesians and put them on par with their European ex-colonial masters, greatly strengthened the nationalist elements of cultural policy. The notion of a national culture was further developed within the cultural policy of the fledgling nation-state after 1945.

Chapter 2

From Cultural Regulation to Cultural Leadership: the Changing Uses of Culture in the Periods of Constitutional Democracy (1950-1957) and Guided Democracy (1957-1965)

This chapter explores the changes to cultural policy during the periods of Constitutional Democracy and Guided Democracy, in particular focussing on two trajectories: the roles defined for the state and for non-state organisations in cultural policy. These two periods offer interesting glimpses of the possible alternatives to the system that eventuated during the New Order regime.¹ This chapter aims to situate the cultural policy of the period within the changing rationalities of governance. To understand the changes to cultural policy, it is necessary to trace the broader changes in how understandings about the function of the state changed. For this reason, discussion of cultural policy in both periods is preceded by an exploration of the methods of governance and the social and political forces that were acting on them. The broad change in the tasks and objects of government established the conditions that led to a series of changes in cultural policy content and implementation, including the decline then the return of the command culture model of cultural provision.

While the war of independence (1945-49) was a formative period for the fledgling nation-state, the near complete disruption of state authority prevented the development of both national institutions and the implementation of national policies.² The conflict between the new Indonesian state and the Netherlands made the coordination of state activities near impossible given the small area under the control of the new republic. According to

¹ No extended research has focussed specifically on official cultural policy during this period, although Yampolsky provides a very brief overview in his article about New Order cultural policy (1995). Foulcher's research into LEKRA (1986) provides the most detailed insight into cultural politics and policies while focussing on an arts organisation, while Maier's research into literary history provides insights into the cultural politics of the period (1987; 1996). McVey's detailed analysis of Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* – PKI) policy and internal debates regarding *wayang* and education provides similar insights into the PKI (1986; 1990).

² This period is probably better characterised as an interregnum between the control of the Japanese occupiers and the Indonesian state than the Japanese occupation where authoritative control was present.

Benedict Anderson, ‘in many areas of Java and Sumatra the state almost disappeared in the face of popular insurgence’ (1990c, p. 99).³ The Indonesian state, through the military, only consolidated its position in the 1950s and established its authority across Indonesia, in the process overcoming regional uprisings in Ambon, Sumatra, Sulawesi and West Java. My account begins in 1950 with the advent of a new Constitution following the end of warfare, when thoughts turned to developing new institutions and governing the new nation.

1. Politics and Governance After the War of Independence

Within a governmental analytical framework, the key to understanding changes in cultural policy between 1950 and 1965 rests on how culture is configured in the rationality that shapes governance. In his ‘Governmentality’ lecture (1991b), discussed in the thesis introduction, Michel Foucault traces the historical change in governmental rationalities that have shaped the exercise of power over conduct by rulers. While governmental rationality is important for the broad parameters it sets for the exercise of government, its examination here would not reveal great differences. The two periods are both relatively short and sequential and did not involve great methodological or technical innovation. Instead, what is needed is an examination of the political rationality of two distinct political periods. Mitchell Dean defines political rationality as:

the relatively systematic, explicit, discursive, problematisation and codification of the art or practice of government, as a way of rendering the objects of government in a language that makes them governable. (1994, p. 187)

The same governmental practices may be quite differently configured within different political rationalities. Political rationalities can therefore explain the differences between governance in, for instance, a country that has experienced a change of administration but little or no technical innovation or, like Indonesia between 1950 and 1965, a country with a relatively unchanged political elite and social structure, but with a changing language and method of government.

The seminal text on the Constitutional Democracy period is Herbert Feith’s *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (1962).⁴ The key division in Feith’s analysis is

³ See also Anderson (1972) and Cribb (1991) for discussions of control by popular insurgent groups rather than the state during the revolution.

⁴ *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* is the first book referred to as reference material in the history texts by both Ricklefs (2001, p. 435) and Cribb and Brown (1995, p. 169). Additionally, Philpott

between ‘administrators’ and ‘solidarity makers’. He defines ‘administrators’ as ‘men with administrative, legal, technical and foreign language skills, such as are required for the running of a modern state’ (1962, p. 24). They had received a Western education, normally up to university level, or were needed for ‘central organisation and strategy’ (1962, p. 24) and negotiations with the Dutch during the war of independence. Solidarity makers, on the other hand, possessed ‘what may be called integrative skills, skills in cultural mediation, symbol manipulation, and mass organisation’ (1962, p. 24). Solidarity makers generally had received a primary or senior secondary Western education or a Muslim education and the basis of their authority was ‘traditional or charismatic authority or (most usually) a combination’ (1962, p. 25). Feith characterises the period as changing from an ‘administrator’ oriented understanding of government to a ‘solidarity-maker’ understanding (1962, pp. 113-22). Other Indonesian researchers have used similar characterisations to explain the changes during the period. For instance, Daniel Lev views the change from Constitutional Democracy to Guided Democracy as the abandonment of ‘copies’ of Western European institutions for institutions that represented a return to Indonesian traditions (1966, pp. 1-2).

From a governmental perspective, Feith’s notions of ‘administrators’ and ‘solidarity-makers’ can be understood as two competing political rationalities pushed by different elements of the political elite. The two groups were promoting differing policy priorities linked to differing understandings of how Indonesia should be governed. In Feith’s words:

The conflict between ‘administrators’ and ‘solidarity makers’ was sometimes one between different groups of government leaders stressing different and conflicting aspects of government activity. At other times it was a conflict within government parties, usually involving antagonism between ‘administrator’-controlled factions advancing pragmatic arguments in support of government policies and ‘solidarity maker’-led factions opposing these policies in the name of the nationalist ideology ... And at other times again it was a direct conflict between an ‘administrator’-led government and a ‘solidarity maker’ led opposition (or in later years between a ‘solidarity maker’-led government and an ‘administrator’-led opposition). (1967, p. 115)

Feith states that the two groups were not mutually exclusive and that certain leaders could exercise both type of ‘skills’ (1962, p. 25). Another way of understanding the ability of certain leaders to move between the groups is to understand the groups as discursively

identifies *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy* as a ‘hegemonic text’ due to its importance in defining the period (2000, p. 52).

constructed. Certain leaders were adept in making appeals using the discourses of either administrators or solidarity makers to achieve outcomes.⁵

This thesis adopts Feith's administrators/solidarity-maker distinction in order to explore the changing political rationalities of the two periods while acknowledging that analytical innovations within Indonesian studies research have questioned elements of Feith's analytical framework.⁶ For the purposes of this chapter, one criticism in particular needs to be addressed: Feith's (and Lev's) focus on elite politics, meaning the national institutions and the political parties in Jakarta. This narrow focus on the upper stratum of the state and political parties provides detailed insights into national politics that greatly assists understanding of national policy making during the 1950s. However, it also raises problems. First, analysis of the centre, when combined with a liberal philosophical framework, depicts regional opposition to the Indonesian state as manifestations of instability or disorder rather than as the expression of alternatives to the Indonesian national state (Philpott, 2000, p. 64). Second, the 1950s saw a proliferation of cultural institutions that were not included in analysis of the political elite. The analysis that follows includes these non-state organisations in policy analysis and argues that they became increasingly important to cultural policy during the Guided Democracy period.

2. Policy and Culture during Constitutional Democracy

The cultural clause of the 1950 Constitution, which used the same wording as the 1949 Constitution of the Indonesian Federal Republic (*Republik Indonesia Serikat – RIS*),⁷ states:

The government will protect the freedom to partake in culture, the arts and science. Respecting this principle, the government will, to the greatest extent possible, promote the development of nationalism in culture, the arts and science.⁸

Penguasa melindungi kebebasan mengusahakan kebudayaan serta kesenian dan ilmu pengetahuan. Dengan menjunjung asas ini maka penguasa memajukan

⁵ Lev also notes changes in how government was understood and executed when he argues: 'the dominant elite simply gave up trying to maintain itself according to one set of rules and turned to another set ... Thus if the leadership appears to be the same, the political institutions of the [Guided Democracy] period have become very different from those of [Constitutional Democracy]' (1966, pp. 1-2).

⁶ The criticisms of Feith's research paradigm were reviewed in the 'Introduction' to this thesis. The criticism can be extended to include Lev's research into Guided Democracy (1966).

⁷ The clause is section 40 of the 1950 Constitution and section 38 of the RIS Constitution.

⁸ My translation from the Indonesian original.

sekuat tenaganya perkembangan kebangsaan dalam kebudayaan serta kesenian dan ilmu pengetahuan.

The emphasis on freedom and what can be assumed to be individual rights reflects a liberal current that runs through the 1950 Constitution and can be expected to run through the cultural policy of the period of Constitutional Democracy. To understand why this liberal current was introduced, it is necessary to first explore the administrator rationality that was most dominant at the beginning of the period of Constitutional Democracy.

The administrator political rationality of the Constitutional Democracy period can be uncontroversially characterised as a Western-style liberal form of government. While political analysts and historians have disagreed about the causes for its demise,⁹ there is a widespread agreement that the four cabinets that cover the 1949-1953 period were oriented towards the use of Western-style expertise in their policies and committed to parliamentary democracy along Western lines.¹⁰ These cabinets were committed to institutional development and made gains in the areas of education, health and macro-economic policy (Feith, 1994, p. 21) although it should also be noted that there were widespread problems with policy development and implementation.¹¹ The commitment to a liberal democratic system of rule is also reflected in the regulation of other institutions. The press enjoyed a large degree of freedom, the courts were independent even when dealing with ministers or army officers, and there was a commitment to the rules of parliament and parliamentary debate (Feith, 1994, p. 21). Feith states that these cabinets ‘concentrated their attention on normalisation, the restoration of secure conditions, and

⁹ The early and persisting division over the causes of the decline is between Feith’s ‘quasi-structuralist’ (Mackie, 1994, pp. 27-8) account in *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, which stresses the difficult barriers to Guided Democracy and the growing strength of the opposition, and Benda’s cultural critique of Feith’s argument, which argues that the ‘Western’ system of Constitutional Democracy was unsuited to Indonesia’s past history and cultural traditions (Benda, 1982). For reviews of this debate see, Feith (1994), Lev (1994), Mackie (1994), and McVey (1994). Given my critique of the use of culture in Indonesian Politics Studies in the Introduction, I disagree with the cultural explanation while acknowledging Feith’s preference for the ‘problem solver’ perspective.

¹⁰ See, in addition to the Feith and Lev books discussed earlier, Mackie (1994, pp. 27-8), Lev (1994, p. 42), and Legge (1977, pp. 149-50) for accounts that adopt the characterisation of the early years of Parliamentary Democracy as a version of liberal democratic government. Benda too characterises the ‘problem solvers’ as ‘the truly Westernised members of the Indonesian elite’ (1982, p. 17). McVey makes a similar division into two groups which are based on (1) a commitment to the ‘things which would make Indonesia the social, economic, and political equal of other nations’ and (2) excluding things that were ‘foreign to ‘Indonesian-ness’’ (1994, pp. 4-5).

¹¹ Three problems stand out. Firstly, the number of parties needed to form a cabinet meant that the large parties had an effective veto over government policy (Cribb & Brown, 1995, p. 61). Secondly, the bureaucracy increasingly tended to respond to pressure from groups outside of government when implementing policy and frequently vetoed policies that would adversely impact its own membership (Feith, 1962, p. 311). Thirdly, political appointments politicised the bureaucracy and impeded smooth administration (Cribb & Brown, 1995, pp. 61-2).

the establishment of strong, unified and efficient government' (1962, p. 303) although their brief terms in office and the economic and social issues they faced concurrent with the political hurdles of the times reduced their effectiveness (Feith, 1994, pp. 22-4; Lev, 1994, pp. 39-42; Mackie, 1994). The administrator oriented political rationality began to wane from 1953 with the Sastroamidjojo cabinet (1953-1955), as it excluded the parties with the strongest commitment to that rationality (Cribb & Brown, 1995, p. 59) and continued to weaken until the end of Constitutional Democracy in 1957,¹² when Sukarno began to reassert his power.¹³

*Cultural Policy Debates in Four Cultural Conventions*¹⁴

The Ministry of Education, Training and Culture (*Kementerian Pendidikan, Pengamatan dan Kebudayaan – Kementerian PPK*) began on 19 August 1945 as one of twelve ministries created to administer the two day old state of Indonesia and the nationalist educator Ki Hadjar Dewantara was named the first Minister of Education, Training and Culture (*Menteri PPK*).¹⁵ The Cultural Office (*Jawatan Kebudayaan*) within the Ministry of Education, Training and Culture (*Kementerian PPK*) was the primary locus of cultural policy formation and programs. The Department of Education, Training and Culture (*DPPK*) organised a series of three cultural congresses between the years of 1948 and 1954. In addition to the three cultural congresses, a 'Cultural Conference' was held in 1950 to address the relationship between Indonesian and foreign cultures, a thinly veiled reference to the 1949 Cultural Accord between Indonesia and the Netherlands made as part of the Round Table Agreement with the Dutch. The four meetings constitute an important window into the cultural policy formulations of the political and cultural elite, including Ministers and high-ranking bureaucrats along with prominent cultural commentators. The opinions voiced in these forums provide insights into the basis of the early cultural policies of the Republic that are discussed in the following section and the field of cultural policy options that were considered.

¹² The 1955 elections (Cribb & Brown, 1995, pp. 68-73) and the PRRI and *Permesta* regional rebellions (Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 308-11) further weakened and marginalised the administrator-oriented parties (*Masyumi* and the PSI).

¹³ See Feith (1967) for a detailed analysis of the end of Constitutional Democracy and the advent of Guided Democracy. The solidarity-makers' critiques of Constitutional Democracy are returned to later in the discussion of the political rationality of Guided Democracy.

¹⁴ Two more cultural congresses have been held in 1991 and 2003, demonstrating the historical importance that is placed on the early conferences.

¹⁵ See *Voice of Free Indonesia*, I(1), 24.

a. The 1948 Cultural Congress

The first cultural congress was initiated and organised by the Yogyakarta Cultural Office with the support of the Governor of Yogyakarta and the DPPK. The conference followed two other meetings (Sukabumi in November, 1946, Solo in April, 1947). However, this was the first large congress and was attended by the President and Vice-President, who both gave speeches to mark the occasion. The congress was held at a time when Indonesia was trying to represent itself to the United Nations and the Western powers as a united country with a national culture.¹⁶

The first congress, more than any other, regenerated the themes of the nationalist cultural debates that preceded World War II. The binaries around East/West structured most of the participants' arguments about culture. The regeneration of the cultural debates quickly was apparent in the presentations of two of the most prominent statesmen of the period. Vice President Hatta, after defining culture as the opposite of nature and the product of 'humankind's struggle ... to reach a higher plane of existence',¹⁷ divided culture into two types: material and spiritual (1950, p. 15). According to Hatta the West excelled in the production of material culture but had fallen behind in the pursuit of spiritual culture, whereas cultural prosperity was the result of a balance between the two kinds. Similarly, the then Minister of *PPK* and future two-time Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, called for a 'harmony' between the material and the spiritual (1950a, p. 22). Both men emphasised the use of Indonesia's existing methods and cultures alongside new measures to enliven and renew national life.

Although some participants postulated an unassailable gap between Western and Eastern culture,¹⁸ the majority of participants resolved the dichotomy between East and West through a synthesis in a 'new Indonesian culture'. However, problems were already starting to make themselves felt with the 'synthesis' formulation. Two incidents in particular were problematic because they raise the issue of internal divisions. The first occurred in the discussion after the first session when a participant, Mohamad Zain,

¹⁶ Ajip Rosidi, in his opening address at the International Conference of Sundanese Culture, claimed that the government only held the first three congresses in order to advertise that it had a 'high culture' that was appropriate for a nation-state (2001).

¹⁷ '*Perjuangan manusia ... untuk mencapai penghidupan yang tinggi*' (Hatta, 1950, p. 15).

¹⁸For instance, bureaucrat Kuntjoro Purbopranoto quotes Kipling in English that 'East is East and West is West, and never the twain will meet' (1950, p. 38).

raised the issue of the ‘antithesis’ between different cultures within Indonesia (in particular the antithesis between Java with the other Islands, ‘Bertukar Pikiran,’ 1950, p. 46). He was immediately addressed by the Chair who told him that the topic of discussion was Indonesian culture and that he should not differentiate the cultures of the various islands.

The second disagreement followed Dewantara’s paper on national education. Dewantara’s ideas were important to the conceptualisation of Indonesian culture during the period and he is the most likely source for the definition of Indonesian culture that accompanied the 1945 Constitution (Yampolsky, 1995, fn. 11). Dewantara was an innovative educator and the founder of the *Taman Siswa* school movement that educated and employed a large number of nationalists. His educational policies reflected a syncretic perspective on Indonesian culture. Dewantara thought that Indonesian culture should be comprised not just of Western elements but also various indigenous traditions and practices. He still viewed Indonesian culture of the future as unitary and singular and that it would arise from the mixing of different regional and foreign cultures.¹⁹

Dewantara defined Indonesian culture as the ‘peaks of all of the regional cultures in all Indonesia’.²⁰ The writer Armijn Pane contested the definition:

The new generation does not want a federative culture, but a single culture. The definition is not able to fulfil our desires now, and means that we are tied to old constructions. (1950, p. 91)

Angkatan baru tidak menghendaki kebudayaan yang federatief, tetapi kebudayaan yang bulat. Definisi tidak dapat memenuhi kemauan kita sekarang, dan berarti bahwa kita terikat kepada bentuk-bentuk yang lama.

According to Armijn, discussions of difference and plurality were not important because old forms of cultural practices would make way for the forms of ‘New Indonesia’. In fact, as the examples above demonstrate, they were discouraged in favour of a theoretical social change that would simultaneously resolve the pressures within Indonesian society. Sastroamidjojo drew attention to a related issue in both of his speeches: the gap between the ‘young generation’ who want to ‘improve culture they feel is not in accordance with

¹⁹ For a longer discussion of his life and ideas, see Pranata (1959) and Foulcher (1986, pp. 14-7).

²⁰ ‘*Puncak-puncak segala kebudayaan Daerah diseluruh kepulauan Indonesia*’ (Dewantara, 1950a, p. 88).

the times' and an 'old generation' who want to preserve older cultural forms (1950a, pp. 21-2; 1950b).²¹

The first Cultural Congress was one of the first forums to discuss the relationship of the state to Indonesian culture. The state was given an important place from the beginning of the congress and the importance of culture to administration was acknowledged. Even so, there was no clear consensus on how the state relates to culture. In his address, Vice-President Hatta recognised the governmental importance of 'culture' for state administration:

A state's administration is able to prosper if culture is at a high level, because culture influences also the characteristics of a state's administration. (1950, pp. 14-15)

Pemerintahan sesuatu negara dapat hidup subur apabila kebudayaan tinggi tingkatnya, karena kebudayaan berpengaruh pula pada sifat pemerintahan negara.

Later in his address, he combined the importance of culture for a state together with the goals of the state:

The goal of a state is to provide a reasonable lifestyle for all of its populace, and a state can only survive if culture there is good and of a high standard. (1950, p. 15)

Tujuan negara ialah untuk memberi penghidupan yang layak bagi manusia segenap penduduknya, dan negara hanya bisa hidup apabila kebudayaan disitu baik dan mempunyai tingkat yang tinggi.

These statements raise the question of responsibility for the development of a 'healthy' culture. Hatta did not address or clearly answer this question although, at the end of his address, he encouraged all of the participants to work towards a 'higher culture'²² which suggests that he viewed cultural development as the task of both society and the state. Two later papers by Ki Mangunsarkoro and Kuntjoro Purbopranoto asserted a more central role for the state in shaping Indonesian national culture, with little discussion of society (Mangunsarkoro, 1950; Purbopranoto, 1950).

²¹ It is also worth noting that the editors of *Indonesia* included a note at the end of the proceedings that clarified their own position on the relationship between regional culture and the 'culture of unity' (*kebudayaan kesatuan*). The editors state that regional cultures should be able to develop in their own regions (but not 'imperialistically' in other regions) and that national culture should develop across Indonesia as the culture of unity. The editors note that while this view would previously have been considered 'provincialist', it was no longer viewed that developing regional cultures would impede the development of a national culture (Editor, 1950b, pp. 1-2).

²² '*Kebudayaan yang lebih tinggi*' (Hatta, 1950, p. 16).

In marked contrast to the determining elements in the formulations above, Sastroamidjojo was careful to distinguish the style of the new government from its Japanese predecessor. He argued:

I take the position ... that we from the Ministry of *PPK* should not interfere so that it appears as if there is pressure or a decree from above to organise something that is wanted by one group only. That is our express undertaking because we remember past periods, mainly the Japanese period, where culture was directed, led by the centre with a particular purpose. (1950b, p. 12)

Saya berpendirian ... tidak seharusnya kita dari Kementerian P.P. dan K. campur tangan sehingga seolah-olah merupakan tekanan atau merupakan perintah dari atas untuk menyelenggarakan sesuatu yang dikehendaki oleh satu golongan saja. Pendirian yang demikian itu kami sengaja oleh karena kami ingat kepada zaman-zaman yang lampau terutama di Zaman Jepang dimana kebudayaan didirigir, dipimpin oleh Pusat dengan maksud yang tertentu.

Sastroamidjojo viewed the role of the state as facilitating the activities of non-state groups rather than determining cultural attributes. In his speech he emphasised that the conference was the initiative of the Kedu Cultural Centre and called the involvement of the Ministry of PPK ‘passive’ (1950b, p. 12). The role of the state Sastroamidjojo defines is a departure from Japanese practice and has some parallels with the Dutch liberal model of supervising ‘natural’ cultural developments.

The conference also settled on a broad definition of culture. The ‘Conclusions’ of the conference state that ‘culture includes all aspects of humankind’s life in society (both physical and spiritual). Not just art.’²³ Finally, an important institutional development was the creation of the Institute of National Culture (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional – LKN*) whose name later changed to Institute of Indonesian Culture (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Indonesia – LKI*). The debates about the creation of the Institute at the first Congress were dominated by the need to include both the ‘young’ and the ‘old’ generation in its committees and operation, ensuring that it was inclusive (‘Pembentukan Organisasi Kebudayaan,’ 1950). The legislation for the beginnings of LKI was put in place at the congress, but the opening had to be postponed due to the Dutch invasion of Yogyakarta. The body was formed in Jakarta in March 1950.

²³ The ‘Conclusions’ of the conference state: ‘Ditegaskan, bahwa kebudayaan meliputi segenap kehidupan manusia dalam masyarakat (baik lahir, maupun batin). Tidak hanya kesenian saja’ (‘Kesimpulan-Kesimpulan,’ 1950).

b. The Cultural Conference

One of the first acts of LKI was to organise the Indonesian Cultural Conference in August 1950. The theme of the conference was ‘National Culture and Its Relationship with the Cultures of Other Nations’ (*Kebudayaan Nasional dan Hubungannya dengan Kebudayaan Bangsa-bangsa Lain*). The topic and papers were focussed on the 1949 Cultural Accord between Indonesia and the Netherlands that listed specific measures that both parties had to undertake in the other’s territory and guaranteed the free movement of people and materials related to culture and the arts. It also safeguarded the Dutch cultural presence in Indonesia²⁴ creating a backlash from the many Indonesian artists and intellectuals who had been inspired by the ‘revolution’ and were relying on it to create ‘new Indonesia’ (Foulcher, 1986, pp. 15-6). The three plenary sessions were given by Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, Ki Hadjar Dewantara and Trisno Sumadjo.

The speeches themselves were restatements of earlier positions, so I will not dwell on the papers at length. Ki Hadjar Dewantara restated his more syncretic perspective on national culture (1950b). Dewantara was critical of the Dutch control of cultural exchange during their tenure in Indonesia. According to Dewantara, during the colonial period all cultural exchange occurred via the Netherlands causing Indonesia to neglect relations with her immediate neighbours in Asia and only have access to other European countries through the Dutch. Dewantara thought that the Cultural Accord was a mistake and that Indonesia should itself experience the cultures of many different countries in order to equip itself to develop a national culture. Trisno Sumadjo, a painter and writer from the younger generation of artists, took a similar position in his attack on the Cultural Accord.

Alisjahbana repeated the position he held during the *Pujangga Baru* debates. Alisjahbana, who was a participant in the Round Table Agreement, stated that Indonesians should utilise links to the Netherlands to access both international culture and the largest body of knowledge about Indonesian culture. Alisjahbana viewed Indonesian culture, which he understood broadly as all aspects of life, as ‘very far from being native to our state’²⁵ and also far from the prosperity of the modern era. He stated that ‘it is already proper that we

²⁴ At the time there were some assertions that the cultural provisions would be used to gain a trade advantage (Editor, 1950a).

²⁵ ‘*Jauh sekali daripada asli di negeri kita*’ (Alisjahbana, 1950, p. 30).

open our nation as wide as possible to the riches of all the culture of the new era'.²⁶ The consensus that emerged from the conference followed the thought of Dewantara. It emphasised the requirement that Indonesian culture be free to follow its own path and demonstrated a commitment amongst artists and cultural bureaucrats to a liberal understanding of artists as requiring freedom to be at their most creative. However, the conference also was the catalyst for the creation of an artists' group with an alternative understanding about culture and the role of artists. The People's Cultural Institute (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat* – LEKRA) was formed just ten days after the conference as a response to disillusionment at the direction that the participants were taking with regard to Indonesian culture (Foulcher, 1986, p. 17).²⁷

c. The Second Cultural Congress

The second congress was organised by the LKI and held in Bandung in 1951. Whereas the first congress had been focussed on general concerns about Indonesian culture framed by a general and theoretical perspective,²⁸ the second congress was much more focussed on institutional development and the practicalities of encouraging cultural activity.²⁹ The binaries that dominated discussion in the first congress were pushed aside as attention turned to the issues of institutional development. The five topics chosen for discussion are an example of the altered focus: cultural policy, copyright, art criticism, film censorship and literature.

The two papers that dealt most thoroughly with cultural policy and received the most attention in the subsequent discussions were by Kuntjoro Purbopranoto and Muhammad Yamin. Purbopranoto began with the definition of culture that was agreed on at the first congress before limiting himself to art as a 'concrete' focus for cultural policy. He

²⁶ 'Telah selayaknya kita membuka negeri kita seluas-luasnya untuk kekayaan segala kebudayaan zaman baru' (Alisjahbana, 1950, p. 30).

²⁷ I discuss LEKRA in detail in the section of this chapter about non-state cultural organisations during Guided Democracy.

²⁸ At the beginning of the second congress, the Chair of LKI, Bahder Djohan stated in the opening speech that the central point of the first congress was the discussion of the bases of culture ('*dasar-dasar kebudayaan*') and that 'the cultural problem mainly was viewed from the perspective of its relationship with State Development and Societal Development' (1952, p. 12). ('... soal kebudayaan itu terutama dipandang dari sudut perhubungannya dengan Pembangunan Negara dan Pembangunan Masyarakat.')

²⁹ The Minister of Education and Culture, Mr. Wongsonegoro, encouraged participants to 'discuss as completely as possible how organisations can best implement this culture' (1952, p. 17). ('... membicarakan semasak-masaknya bagaimanakah sebaik-baiknya organisasi penyelenggaraan kebudayaan ini.')

continually emphasised the need for ‘concrete’ and ‘practical’ discussion (1952, p. 392).

He argued:

The goal of arts and cultural organisations ... is to care for and foster the expertise of its members (artists) and strengthen national identity. (1952, p. 388)

Tujuan organisasi kesenian dan kebudayaan ... ialah memelihara dan memupuk keahlian para anggota (seniman) dan memperkuat kepribadian bangsa.

He then developed his ideas for a network of arts organisations reaching from the village to the national level which were enthusiastically received.

Yamin, who was a prominent nationalist leader during the war of independence and Japanese periods and held important positions during both the Constitutional Democracy and Guided Democracy periods, presented a comparative study of different countries’ cultural organisations. He assessed cultural policy in China, Russia, France, the United States of America, Egypt and India-Pakistan. Yamin’s long paper called for a ‘decentralised’ system with a ‘place for representatives of regional cultures in the central leadership,’ acknowledging the growing need for recognition of regional cultures (1952, p. 425). Yamin attempted to formulate cultural institutions that can further stimulate cultural activity in an enlivened and diverse cultural milieu. He argued for the creation of a new cultural organisation to coordinate the fields of education, science and culture including conservatories of art, libraries and a University ‘of international quality’ (1952, p. 428).³⁰ Like Purbopranoto, Yamin viewed cultural policy centred on the development of a national culture³¹ despite the ‘geographic’ and ‘racial’ differences in Indonesia (1952, p. 432).

The difference between the first and second congresses reflects the changing political climate. The first congress, held during the war of independence at a time when the fate of the Republic of Indonesia was uncertain, reflects the feeling that a new society and a new type of human – the Indonesian – was emerging. The second congress was held

³⁰ The conference did birth a new organisation with greater scope than a focus on the arts and culture. The idea for the National Society for Sciences (*Masyarakat Ilmu Pengetahuan Nasional*), which later became the Indonesian Society for Sciences (*Masyarakat Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia – MIPI*), was formulated in the months following the conference (Prawirohardjo, 1952). MIPI’s scope reflects the breadth of the definition given to culture which includes almost all aspects of life of the populace. MIPI was established with Law No. 6, 1956 (Prawirohardjo, 1959). Initially under the Department of Education and Culture, MIPI was transferred to a newly created Ministry for National Research in 1962 before becoming LIPI (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*) in 1967 and being made directly responsible to the President. (LIPI, 1971).

³¹ For instance, as the name of his new cultural organisation, he suggests ‘Proclamation Institute’ (*Lembaga Proklamasi*), based on the proclamation of independence (1952, p. 426).

when administrators held political power. They had turned their attention to the problems facing Indonesia with a perspective informed by their Western education. Their attention was primarily focussed towards institutional development. However, Yamin in particular looked beyond the West in his search for a suitable model. A concern remained that Indonesia not copy the West, but develop a unique culture.

The debates in the second congress also demonstrate a raised awareness of the need to accommodate a number of different cultures within Indonesia. Bujung Saleh, a prominent writer and LEKRA activist, raised the issue of cultural autonomy and minority cultures (1952). An attendee from Bali, Utusan, discussed the position of art in Bali (1952). He stated that the Balinese have an investment in their art, unlike Indonesian culture which was the province of educated nationalists, and that the relationship between culture and religion in Bali was different to Islam. He then discussed the issue of tourism and the need for tourists to understand Balinese art rather than simply viewing it as a spectacle. However, a concern with the development of a singular national culture still dominated the debates. The ideas of LEKRA also were represented at the conference, but were not central to discussion. A.S. Dharta, one of LEKRA's most eloquent spokesmen of the early 1950s, expressed the need for artists to side with progressive political forces and their obligation contribute to societal transformation (1952).

d. The Third Cultural Congress

The third cultural congress was held in Solo in September 1954. Rather than focussing on cultural policy generally, the congress focussed on the issue of culture in education. The third congress was organised by the Consultative Committee on National Culture (*Badan Musyawarah Kebudayaan Nasional – BMKN*). The three topics covered were: cultural education for the school community, for the city community and for the workers and farming community. The narrower scope of the third congress was accompanied by a narrowing of participants and ideas. The congress focussed almost exclusively on education and the concerns of the *DPPK*. The conclusions made recommendations to expand the *DPPK*'s role and power in the social sphere without calling for any reforms to the actions of *DPPK* itself ('Beberapa Kesimpulan Kongres Kebudayaan Indonesia,')

1954). In contrast to the excitement and possibilities of the second cultural congress, the third congress promoted increasing state intervention, control and leadership.³²

The proceedings of the four conventions provide a resource for identifying the positions of the politicians, bureaucrats and cultural commentators that had the attention of the makers of cultural policy. Three key features from the cultural conventions provide an interesting and important picture of the terrain on which cultural policy was being made and the key issues of the period. The first feature is the use of *synthesis* to create a single national culture from elements considered antagonistic. Synthesis was regularly used to solve the Eastern culture and Western culture dichotomy and was also used to overcome the differences between the 'old' and 'young' generations, and between their desires to protect 'old' cultural forms and foster new forms. The national culture that was *supposed* to eventuate from this vague, theoretical and unproven process was to overcome the divisions between different groups within Indonesia. Synthesis also involved a level of state intervention in order to control the synthesis to avoid the normalisation of particular cultural attributes (for instance, the negative elements of Western culture). In other words, there were elements of a command culture model alongside liberal notions of artistic freedom. It should also be emphasised that in most cases the resulting culture was *singular*. At the time of the first Cultural Congress, it was a commonly assumption amongst the Western-educated cultural elite that Indonesia would develop one culture and all other cultures would fade away. This assumption was highly problematic in the case of ethnic cultures and, even during the early years of the republic, there was a quiet acknowledgement by some participants of the issues raised in indigenous ethnic cultures.

Secondly, the Cultural Conference in particular and, to a lesser degree, the second Cultural Congress took the position that artists required artistic freedom in order to produce the highest quality of work possible.³³ The commitment to artistic freedom correlates with the liberal notion that freedom is a requirement for optimum performance, be it the production of a commodity or work of art. The third feature is the changing position of attendees in regards to the role of the state in cultural policy. The first Cultural

³² Sapardi Djoko Damono's analysis of the three Cultural Congresses reflects the marginal interest of the third congress. In a twenty-one page article, he spends under three pages discussing the third congress (1987).

³³ In an unanswered question at the first Cultural Congress, Asmara Hadi asked if 'freedom to create' (*kemerdekaan untuk mencipta*) was to be included in LKN ('Pembentukan Organisasi Kebudayaan,' 1950, p. 116), indicating that the freedom of artists was an issue for some participants at this congress.

Congress was awash with theories about the state's relationship to culture, while the state was generally designated responsibility for national culture. In the second Cultural Congress, attendees were concerned with institutional development where the state was to provide the infrastructure for cultural activities that would secure the conditions for the development of national culture. The emphasis was on practical plans for a cultural policy infrastructure.

The dominant faction in the cultural conventions, all of which were organised by the state or, in the case of the Cultural Conference, a state-sponsored institution, was the Western-educated, liberal-leaning elite. Islamic or Left-wing positions about the arts were marginalised at this time by a 'liberal' pro-West, modernising position. The communists were still ostracised and in the process of regrouping after the events in Madiun in 1948 (Thomas, 1981, p. 371), and Islamic groups were split on questions of culture and the form that Islamic cultural and artistic expression should take (Maier, 1987, pp. 10-11). These other perspectives only rarely arose in the debates and only in the question times of the sessions.

Cultural Policy during Constitutional Democracy

A good starting point for an analysis of cultural policy is a 1951 article about culture by the Head of the Cultural Office, Soedarsono (1951). After emphasising the importance of the moment for the development of culture in Indonesia, Soedarsono turned his attention to the controversial Cultural Accord with the Netherlands. Much like the majority opinion at the Cultural Conference the preceding year, Soedarsono stated that the ideal and only acceptable condition for the development of Indonesian culture was absolute freedom:

Where old ties are retained, of course these forced ties are not free, so the 'free development' of independent peoples is just a myth. (1951, p. 73)

Dimana ikatan2 lama diteruskan, ikatan paksaan tentu tidak bebas, maka 'perkembangan bebas' dari manusia merdeka adalah kosong belaka

Soedarsono discussed at length the repercussions of 'forced' cultural relationships (the periods of Dutch colonialism and Japanese occupation) and emphasised the positive results of 'natural' relationships with neighbouring countries (such as India and China) that produced Borobudur, Prambanan and great mosques (1951, p. 74).

Soedarsono then turned his attention to national culture, which he defined as the basis of the nation and therefore an important resource to be developed. He lists the four ‘basic’ goals of the Cultural Office which can be summarised as follows:

- 1) Democratisation of every cultural field until they penetrate to all of wider society and become popular (but also ‘protected so they do not become vulgar’);³⁴
- 2) Verticalisation of *DPPK* (the spread of cultural offices to lower levels);
- 3) Leading culture towards ‘national universal culture’³⁵ and away from provincialism; and
- 4) A harmonious prosperity where all cultural fields’ (language, the arts and archaeology) receive attention (1951, pp. 74-5).

Soedarsono also emphasised an ‘international orientation’³⁶ in cultural policy where culture is to be used to foster relations with other countries and the inclusion of a cultural attaché in international trips. Soedarsono finished by emphasising that the ‘path of synthesis is more constructive than analysis that enlarges differences’ in the case of indigenous cultures (1951, p. 75).³⁷

Soedarsono’s emphasis on freedom should be viewed in the context of the broad definition of culture that underlay the operation of the Cultural Office and sanctioned greater intervention than was the case in most Western countries. The 1953 outline of policy for *DPPK* provides an insight into the definition of culture:

The function of Culture in a free nation-state is not only limited to investigating objects, but those objects in all fields must live in the natural culture of all of Indonesian society and become the basis of life for all of the nation. (‘Garis-Garis Besar Politik Pendidikan, Pengajaran dan Kebudayaan,’ 1953, p. 4)

Fungsi Kebudayaan dalam negara yang merdeka tidak hanya terbatas hingga penyelidikan objek2, akan tetapi objek2 itu dalam segala lapangan harus hidup dalam alam budaya segenap masyarakat Indonesia dan menjadi dasar kehidupan bagi seluruh Bangsa.

This definition is reminiscent of the Dutch emphasis on the daily lives of indigenous Indonesians in *adat* research, but also reflects the struggle in newly independent countries to develop national cultures that united different ethnic, religious and social groups. A consequence for the Cultural Office of using a broad definition was that it took on an extremely wide range of the tasks. The scope of the Cultural Office’s self-apportioned brief burdened policy makers with almost impossible tasks that were well beyond their

³⁴ ‘Dijaga jangan sampai vulgar’ (1951, p. 74).

³⁵ ‘Kebudayaan universal nasional’ (1951, p. 74).

³⁶ ‘Orientasi internasional’ (1951, p. 75).

³⁷ ‘Jalan sintese lebih konstruktif daripada analisa yang dapat membesar-besarkan perbedaan’ (1951, p. 75).

capacity.³⁸ They were not equipped either financially or technically to fulfil their role as the creators of a new culture which becomes apparent when the policies of the various areas are examined more closely.

The four divisions within the Cultural Office can be divided into two types: newly formed divisions and institutions appropriated from the colonial regime. The appropriated institutes were the National Museum and the Institute of Archaeology (*Dinas Purbakala*).³⁹ In an article that discussed museum display in 1945, Soedibio Soewardipetro, a writer for English language magazine, *The Voice of Free Indonesia*, observes the change that independence had brought to museum management:

The museum is justly renown for its ethnographical collections. Formerly exhibited in dark and unattractive rooms, they are now in brilliantly lighted halls. The visitor is strongly impressed by a sense of space, good taste and novelty. The exhibits are not shown as curious or strange quaint people and many a prejudiced foreigner finds himself revising his opinion regarding these ‘savages’. (1945, p. 17)

From the racial hierarchy of the colonial period, colonial era institutions were reoriented to represent the heritage of a civilised and unified people, while using contemporary methods of museum display.

Moh. Amir Sutaarga, the most important figure in museum management in the 1950s and 1960s (McGregor, 2003, pp. 93-4), made a similar argument in a long article (1968).⁴⁰ Sutaarga begins by reviewing a speech by the Dutch Head of *Oudheidkundige Dienst* (Bureau of Archaeology), Dr. F.D.K. Bosch, noting that both the role that Bosch assigned museums in Indonesia and many of his criticisms are still valid. However, Sutaarga incorporates another goal within museum management:

... museums are not only a tool to combat the cultural poverty of a nation - as has already been proven by Dr Bosch in his speech analysed earlier – but museums are also an institution that advances the civilisation of a nation. (1968, p. 8)

... *museum itu bukanlah semata-mata suatu alat untuk mencegah bahaya kemiskinan kebudayaan suatu bangsa saja –seperti yang sudah dinyatakan oleh Dr. Bosch dalam pidatonya yang diuraikan tadi itu – tetapi museum pun suatu lembaga untuk memajukan peradaban bangsa itu*

³⁸ For instance the Cultural Office was expected to implement supervision and maintenance for all natural structures and ancient structures as national monuments (Djohan, 1951, p. 5), a huge undertaking in a country as large and diverse as Indonesia.

³⁹ The two were initially joined before a Division of Museum Management was established in 1956 (Soebadio, 1985, p. 16).

⁴⁰ The article was first published in *Siasat*, 2(May, June, July, August) in 1958.

In Sutaarga's article, two functions of museums emerge as central to their contribution to the achievement of an advanced civilisation: firstly, museums are to protect the nation from cultural poverty by keeping and collecting cultural objects and knowledges; and secondly, a didactic function that spreads knowledge about the past and the future, including through technological museums that focus on the sciences (1968, pp. 12-17). Sutaarga's article demonstrates how the functions (and the critique) of museums in independent Indonesia shared a number of continuities with colonial practice, with the important difference that Indonesians were now also addressed as national subjects.⁴¹

The new divisions in the Cultural Office were Arts, Historical Documentation and Language. Arts policy encompassed both modern forms and traditional forms that were still relevant to Indonesian society. Early arts policy was focussed on developing the Arts Section (*Bagian Kesenian*) as the developer of national artistic forms. The three central tenets of the Division's early plans can be summarised as:

- 1) A 'scientific' approach to developing the arts ('using psychology, ethnology, aesthetics, etc')⁴² where all the various types of art are collected together, studied, then suitable foundations identified as an embryonic 'basis' for Indonesian national arts;
- 2) Educating Indonesians about arts through the mass media, in schools and organising artistic events 'with high values'⁴³; and
- 3) Increasing the technical proficiency of Indonesian artists and providing artists with scholarships and tools (*Bagian Kesenian*, 1951, p. 5).

The first tenet reflects the synthetic perspective about Indonesian culture where a single culture was going to eventuate with elements of the different cultures present within Indonesia. The state's role here was not just to oversee, but to study (using the natural sciences) and identify the basis of the national arts. However, there is no suggestion in the policy that artists' activities were to be directed by the Arts Section, even though this Section was attempting to define the national arts and shape popular tastes. Artists were to be taught technical skills and to be provided with tools and grants. The Arts Section had a supervisory role in relation to artists where creative expression was not directed to particular ends. The contradiction with the Arts Section's attempts to define the national arts highlights the presence of two discourses about the regulation of the arts and the role of the state. The arts were also to be taught in schools, but only those arts 'with high

⁴¹ Balai Pustaka also came under the control of the new government (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 23). However, it lost its place as the primary publisher of Indonesian fiction in the face of increasing competition.

⁴² '*Psychologis, etnologis, estetis, dsb.nya*' (1951, p. 5).

⁴³ '*Yang bernilai tinggi*' (1951, p. 5).

values', indicating the presence of hierarchies of different kinds of arts within policy. Arts policies were very broad in scope⁴⁴ and well beyond the capabilities of a small government department with limited resources. It was not until increased government spending in the 1970s that the Cultural Office would develop the capacity to implement large-scale projects in accordance with its own formulation of its role.

An important legacy of the 1945-65 period for Indonesian artists was the creation of arts colleges. By 1953 there were four state-sponsored art schools operating within Java of which three were under the control of the Fine Arts Section. The Indonesian Academy of Fine Arts (*Akademi Seni Rupa Indonesia* – ASRI) in Yogyakarta was the first arts college in Indonesia. ASRI was established in 1949 in a city which had a large number of nationalist artists (Editor, 1951). The Indonesian Karawitan Conservatory (*Konservatori Karawitan Indonesia* – KKI) was established in 1950 in Solo, Central Java. R. Anderson Sutton suggests that one of the aims of establishing the KKI was to provide a place where all the regional arts could blend together, which is in accordance with the goals of the Fine Arts Section during this period (Sutton, 1991, p. 175). The third institution controlled by the Cultural Office was the Western Music School (*Sekolah Musik Barat*) in Jakarta. All three of these institutions were established on the understanding that they would contribute to the development of nationalism and the Indonesian arts. An art teacher training program was established in Bandung in 1947 as part of the University of Indonesia's Bandung campus. It later became part of the Bandung Institute of Technology in 1959.

From the early 1950s there were links between cultural policy and foreign policy. A 1951 report indicates that the Cultural Office had a UNESCO Bureau and an International Division⁴⁵ and Soedarsono's report of the same year also emphasised an 'international orientation'⁴⁶ in cultural policy. The 1953 policy outline places a high importance on introducing and promoting Indonesian culture to the international community in order to influence opinions about Indonesia, assist the development of Indonesian art and demonstrate that the Indonesian nation is interested in supporting the development of

⁴⁴ For instance, the Division of Arts was responsible for all ancient arts which had disappeared, organising all art that was currently being performed in Indonesia, demonstrating Indonesian art to the international community, supporting artists and running three art schools ('Garis-Garis Besar ...,' 1953).

⁴⁵ 'Urusan Luar Negri' (Djohan, 1951, p. 6).

⁴⁶ 'Orientasi internasional' (Soedarsono, 1951, p. 75).

culture ('Garis-Garis Besar ...,' 1953, p. 4). The bulk of activities in this area were cultural exchanges for students, artists and Cultural Office officials. A 1955 report lists exchanges in 1954 to East Pakistan, China, 'several states in Asia, Europe and America'⁴⁷ and future trips to China, Czechoslovakia, and plans for cultural representatives in a number of major foreign cities ('Garis-Garis Besar ...,' 1955, p. 198). In 1955, Indonesia became a member of UNESCO's Executive Board, underlining its commitment to international cooperation in the cultural field ('Garis-Garis Besar ...,' 1955, p. 199).

The emphasis on international cooperation peaked in 1955, largely because of the Asia-Africa conference held in Bandung, West Java. Instigated by Ali Sastroamidjojo when he was Prime Minister in 1954, the Asia-Africa conference was a large conference of Afro-Asian states that brought domestic prestige to Sastroamidjojo and Sukarno (Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 301-2). One of the four goals of the conference was 'to consider social, economic, and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented' (Yamin, 1955, p. 9), which resulted in the formation of the Committee on Cultural Cooperation during the conference (1955, p. 95). The Conference's 'Final Communiqué' strongly endorsed cultural cooperation as a means of 'promoting understanding among nations' (1955, p. 34). The communiqué expressed a desire to renew 'old cultural contacts' between Asian and African cultures that had been 'interrupted' by colonialism and develop new ones through the means of bilateral arrangements (1955, pp. 34-6). The Conference took care to state that 'true to the age old tradition of tolerance and universality', that cultural contacts with non-Afro-Asian countries should be pursued simultaneously to promote worldwide cooperation (1955, p. 35). The Conference was scathing of colonialism, which at this stage referred to ongoing colonial administration of some territories in Afro-Asia that 'suppresses the national culture of the people' (1955, p. 35).⁴⁸ The Asia-Africa conference marks the beginnings of an important movement in international relations of which Indonesia was an early leader. One of the goals for the conference outlined by the Indonesian parliament was to organise a 'special group'⁴⁹ of nations in the United Nations based on shared positions. The Final Communiqué recommended collective action in the United Nations and other arenas on particular

⁴⁷ 'Pelbagai negeri di Asia, Eropa dan Amerika' ('Garis-Garis Besar ...,' 1955, p. 198).

⁴⁸ Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are singled out due to the suppression of the study of the indigenous cultures and languages of those countries (Yamin, 1955, p. 35).

⁴⁹ 'Golongan yang khusus' (Yamin, 1955, p. 7).

issues (1955, pp. 7,37). The Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77 grew out of this impetus (Kang, 1988, p. 160).

Throughout this period the Cultural Office was developing sub-branches at the lower levels of government. Regional offices responsible to the national office in Jakarta were built in all provincial capital cities in the 1950s. However, development was not uniform as provinces and regencies could also sponsor their own cultural offices which were responsible to a lower level of government. An extreme case is Yogyakarta, which had four cultural offices with overlapping activities in the mid 1950s: the national Cultural Office, the Cultural Office of the Province of Central Java, the Cultural Office of the Special Territory of Yogyakarta, and the Yogyakarta municipality's Cultural Office. By the end of the 1950s there were individual cultural technicians (*teknisi budaya*) who worked in particular sub-regencies (*Kecamatan*), although it was not until the 1990s that every sub-regency had its own cultural technician.⁵⁰

A final point about the early years of cultural policy in Indonesia is the activities of state sponsored institutions. LKI was active in the early years with the publication of the cultural magazine *Indonesia*. In 1952 it was replaced by BMKN, which took control of *Indonesia*. BMKN was a nongovernmental arts organisation funded by the state. It was an apolitical body with individuals, including artists, intellectuals and bureaucrats, and groups represented. BMKN adopted a broad engagement with culture that was symptomatic of much of the cultural policy of the period. Holt notes that its goals and programs were 'all encompassing' and that its 'wide-ranging aims were rarely implemented with concrete, detailed and systematic programs of action' (1967, p. 246). BMKN's liberal perspective about culture was soon contested by LEKRA from within as a member association. LEKRA's position (which I discuss in the final section below), combined with sporadic government funding, increasingly weakened the BMKN as the 1950s progressed. Holt states that in the early 1960s, BMKN 'became a somewhat impotent residue of the 'liberal' orientation toward the arts' (1967, p. 248).

Arts organisations were active during the period. For instance, Claire Holt notes that fine arts collectives proliferated and multiplied in Yogyakarta during and after the struggle for

⁵⁰ The position title was changed to *Penilik Budaya* around the time when Suharto took power.

independence (1967, p. 201). During the early 1950s the Cultural Office was attempting to provide an institutional framework that arts organisations could use. BMKN provides an example of this cultural policy model. It was a government-organised body that involved artists and arts organisations in order to facilitate their activities. An article by a representative of the Cultural Office in East Java, Karyono Js., both notes the multiple activities of cultural groups in the area and provides an example of the place of cultural groups in cultural policy (1953). He stated that the potential is high, although ‘the features in several things and several places are still very elementary.’⁵¹ He then turned to the application of cultural policy. Karyono emphasised the need to take forward-looking steps towards these cultural groups that were ‘more active and concrete’,⁵² such as giving subsidies.

Cultural policy during Constitutional Democracy was characterised by two contradictory models regarding the role of cultural policy. The first model was a commitment to institutional development that can be characterised as a broadly liberal model of cultural regulation. This commitment can be seen in the development of a cultural infrastructure, including groups like LKN and BMKN, whose members were also drawn from outside the bureaucracy, arts schools, as well as a network of cultural bureaucrats throughout Indonesia. The state was understood a facilitator of national culture rather than a leader, as reflected in its organisation of BMKN and the notion that if the state established the right conditions national culture would develop. An important condition that was repeatedly emphasised was freedom from outside interference, a common element of liberal cultural policies.

The second model was centred on the process of synthesis that it was assumed would create a national culture. The Cultural Office took responsibility at times for supervising, at times for instigating the process of synthesis itself and included encouraging desired elements and discouraging bad. Although the notion of ‘supervision’ accorded with certain elements of liberal models (for instance, encouragement of high culture rather than popular culture), the Indonesian state’s role often extended beyond that of most Western countries. The commitment to synthesis and a single culture was peculiar to the early 1950s and was an inheritance from the war of independence and earlier nationalist

⁵¹ ‘Sifatnya dalam beberapa hal dan beberapa tempat masih sangat elementair’ (Karyono Js., 1953).

⁵² ‘Lebih aktif dan konkrit’ (1953, p. 33).

movements when there was a commitment to the development of a unified, new national culture for the new nation.

The cultural policy of Constitutional Democracy demonstrated some continuity with late colonial and Japanese occupying cultural policy in its use of culture to alter the behaviours of individuals and manage populations. However, the underlying rationale differed markedly from the perspectives of the occupying administrations. Cultural policy was structured around building an independent nation that was an equal with other nations in the international system. The aim of the different fields of cultural policy was to facilitate the continued development of a national population understood as a group of free individuals with a national commitment through their understanding of Indonesia's cultural and historical development. The central goal was, in the words of Sutaarga, to make 'the civilisation of a nation prosper' (1968, p. 8). In comparison to the more directive cultural policies of the preceding periods, Constitutional Democracy's cultural policies were more focussed on facilitating cultural development although there were elements of a command culture in some of its plans and programs surrounding the use of synthesis. However, this was minor relative to what it preceded and what was to follow in Guided Democracy.

The administrator governmentality is most obvious in the state's reduced role when compared to the Japanese Occupation and Guided Democracy, particularly the understanding of the state's role as a facilitator. However, the commitment to institution building was often thwarted by the highly idealistic and vague definitions of culture. Cultural policy was plagued by the political imperative of an inclusive, popular nationalism. Its inclusiveness pushed its goals and brief well beyond the capacity of the Cultural Office and often resulted in vague and impracticable policies.

3. Policy and Culture During Guided Democracy

The cultural policy changes brought by Guided Democracy occurred during, and to a large degree because of, the advent of the solidarity-maker political rationality. The problems of the Constitutional Democracy period reviewed earlier, combined with the opposition of Sukarno and the army (Lev, 1994; Mackie, 1994), made it susceptible to the intense critique of the solidarity-makers between 1957 and 1959, led by Sukarno, who

soon was to reshape the methods and institutions of governance. Below I provide a brief synopsis of Sukarno's critique of Constitutional Democracy, followed by a summary of the solidarity-maker political rationality that shaped governance from 1959.

Sukarno was particularly scathing of the 'liberal' system which he regarded as 'alien' to Indonesia (Lev, 1966, p. 50) and 'imported' (Sukarno, 1970c, p. 84). Daniel Lev identifies two themes in Sukarno's attack (1966, pp. 50-1). Firstly, Sukarno attacked the adversarial aspects of parliamentary democracy, relating them to the worsening economic and social problems in Indonesia. Secondly, Sukarno emphasised the return to Indonesia's own identity. According to Sukarno, the problems Indonesia faced were a result of the adoption of a foreign system that was inappropriate for Indonesia. In contrast, Sukarno presented his own 'concept' as true to the spirit of Indonesianness:

I want to propose something that is in harmony with the Indonesian spirit, the real spirit of the Indonesian Nation, that is: the spirit of family life. (1970c, pp. 88-9)

The 'fifty-percent-plus-one' method of parliamentary democracy was to be replaced with a system that emphasised consensus through concepts that Sukarno represented as uniquely Indonesian: mutual-help (*gotong-royong*) and consultation-consensus (*musyawarah-mufakat*) (Lev, 1966, p. 56).⁵³ Sukarno also stated his preference for single-party states like China and Russia where development 'runs smoothly' (Lev, 1966, p. 57).⁵⁴ Culture was a significant justification used by Sukarno for political change.

Sukarno's critique of government, supported by the army leadership under Nasution, was successful in overcoming the opposition of the supporters of Constitutional Democracy. Sukarno reintroduced the 1945 Constitution on 5 July 1959, strengthening his position as President and taking up the position of Prime Minister.⁵⁵ Sukarno's ideas and slogans dominated Guided Democracy (Legge, 1972, p. 357). The new power of the President moved authority from discussions in parliament to Sukarno's speeches (Maier, 1987, p.

⁵³ Researcher Selo Soemardjan, in an article that reflects the sentiment and politics of the times, characterises the change as a move to a culturally appropriate system: 'President Sukarno dramatically implemented his desire to move away from the system of liberal Western democracy and to return to a system of Guided Democracy, conceived as more consistent with the institutionalised patriarchal or identity-centred structure of Indonesian social organisations in general' (1963, p. 71).

⁵⁴ He was attracted to the organic connection between ruler and ruled: 'What the ministers determine is in fact distilled from the people, and what is ordered by the ministers penetrates to the common people' (Lev, 1966, p. 57). See also Lev (1966, p. 52) and Sukarno (1970a, p. 82).

⁵⁵ For a detailed summary of the events of the period, see Feith (1967) and Lev (1966). Cribb and Brown write: 'In his series of reforms from 1957 to 1959, however, Sukarno did away with the checks and balances which had enabled the politics of stalemate to flourish and put into place institutions which would enable him to shape Indonesia according to his own visions' (1995: 82).

12). Perhaps the most important example was his Independence Day speech of 1959 that the Supreme Advisory Council a few months later called the Political Manifesto (*Manipol*) and declared it provided the general program of government.⁵⁶ One political observer noted that the ‘President, formally detached from political parties, is the sole agency to issue fundamental decisions’ (Soemardjan, 1963, p. 77), although other groups, in particular the army, were able to exert substantial political pressure (Feith, 1967, pp. 379-83).

The central element of the solidarity-maker political rationality was the integration of different groups. Revolution, the most frequent theme in Sukarno’s speeches in the Guided Democracy period (Feith, 1967, p. 385; Legge, 1972, p. 349), was the most used of Sukarno’s integrative ideas with which he attempted to unite Indonesians. He urged people on to the task of nation-building and attempted to turn attention away from the deteriorating economy and the divisions between different groups (Feith, 1967, pp. 400-9). John Legge, much like Feith, recognises that ‘a good deal of Sukarno’s radicalism ... was designed to serve the goal of preserving a social *status quo*’ (1972, p. 353). He notes that Sukarno desired to mobilise Indonesians through the idea of revolution, but he gave no specific direction, provided no detailed plans and supported a regime that was ‘essentially representative of an existing elite’ (1972, pp. 352-4).

It is not surprising then to repeatedly come across the observation that despite his attention to ideological direction, Sukarno ignored policy direction and left concrete policy details to others (Cribb & Brown, 1995, p. 89; Legge, 1972, p. 315). Despite Sukarno’s aversion to detail, policy during the Guided Democracy period was increasingly influenced by Sukarno’s ideas and rhetoric. Particularly important to policy making was *Manipol* and the *USDEK* doctrine⁵⁷ that Sukarno claimed was a clarification of the five main points of *Manipol*. Feith identifies the most appealing aspect of *Manipol-USDEK* (as they came to be known) as the sense of purpose it gave people after a long

⁵⁶ See Supreme Advisory Council (1970) and Sukarno (1970b) for extracts of both documents.

⁵⁷ Sukarno’s *USDEK* doctrine pronounced in his speech on 28 May 1960 (Sukarno, 1961, p. 54).

U	<i>UUD Proklamasi 1945</i>	Constitution Proclaimed in 1945
S	<i>Sosialisme Indonesia</i>	Indonesian Socialism
D	<i>Demokrasi Terpimpin</i>	Guided Democracy
E	<i>Ekonomi Terpimpin</i>	Guided Economy
K	<i>Kepribadian Bangsa</i>	National Identity

absence of shared direction (Feith, 1967, p. 368). The remaining political parties and most voluntary organisations were forced to make a statement declaring their support for *Manipol-USDEK* and the *Pancasila* (Feith, 1967, p. 373). The notion of ‘national identity’ in *USDEK* was particularly important to cultural policy and is examined in the next section. Feith also demonstrates widespread opposition to the doctrine and multiple interpretations to modify it according to the desires of particular individuals and groups (1967, pp. 366-72). Despite the veneer of adherence as the government extended its influence across state and non-state institutions, there are indications that the doctrine was not uniformly interpreted or applied.⁵⁸

Sukarno continued the trend toward a solidarity maker political rationality. The central thrust of Guided Democracy was to provide unity after the divisions of the 1950s and in a climate of ongoing opposition between different groups. The use of ritual and symbolism in the pursuit of integration overtook an expertise-based perspective on policy (Feith, 1967, p. 385). However, Guided Democracy also struggled to secure the conditions for effective government. Legge writes: ‘Indonesia’s problem was ... that the new regime, like the old one, was unable to mobilise the power that was needed if government was to be effective and if the gigantic problems of the economy were to be tackled seriously’ (1972, p. 318).

The Cultural Office during Guided Democracy

The move from the administrator to the solidarity maker political rationality began to make itself felt in cultural policy from 1956. As Sukarno’s political power increased and was strengthened with the return to the 1945 Constitution, his ideas and concepts increasingly dominated cultural policy. However, given the ambiguity of Sukarno’s statements, attention needs to be paid to the programs and policies of the cultural institutions to find anything more than the general direction of cultural policy.

A useful starting point for cultural policy analysis is the cultural clause that came into effect with the 1945 Constitution. Clause 32 of the 1945 Constitution states:

The government shall advance Indonesian Culture.

Pemerintah memajukan kebudayaan Indonesia.

⁵⁸ Feith also notes that some army commanders resisted pressure ‘to create a Manipol-USDEK ideological climate in their regions’ (1967: 381).

Gone was the ‘freedom to partake in culture’ and emphasis moved towards the government’s responsibility for the advancement of national culture. The 1945 Constitution itself was linked to a romantic nationalism associated with the struggle for independence, that emphasised the importance of society (often represented by the will of political power-holders) over the individual. The clause was accompanied by a ‘Clarification’⁵⁹ that states:

The culture of the nation is culture that arises as the product of the character of the entire people of Indonesia. Old and authentic culture is found in high cultural achievements [Lit. peaks of culture] in regions throughout Indonesia [and is] considered the culture of the nation. Cultural effort must be directed to the advancement of civilisation, culture and unification, and should not reject new materials from foreign culture that can develop and enrich the culture of the nation and raise the level of humanity of the Indonesian nation.⁶⁰

Kebudayaan bangsa ialah kebudayaan yang timbul sebagai buah usaha budinya rakyat Indonesia seluruhnya. Kebudayaan lama dan asli terdapat sebagai puncak-puncak kebudayaan di daerah-daerah di seluruh Indonesia, terhitung sebagai kebudayaan bangsa. Usaha kebudayaan harus menuju ke arah kemajuan adab, budaya dan persatuan, dengan tidak menolak bahan-bahan baru dari kebudayaan asing yang dapat memperkembangkan dan memperkaya kebudayaan bangsa sendiri, serta mempertinggi derajat kemanusiaan bangsa Indonesia.

Phillip Yampolsky identifies three points of confusion within the explanation. Firstly, the first sentence provides little explanation about anything and avoids addressing whether Indonesian culture was created along with the concept of Indonesia or encompasses all of the cultures of the various ethnic groups (1995, pp. 703-4). Secondly, the second sentence contradicts the first in that it limits national culture to ‘old and authentic’ forms (1995, p. 704). Thirdly, the clarification provides no guide about how to determine what qualifies as a ‘high cultural achievement’ (1995, p. 704). This clause did not have much impact on early cultural policy due to the upheavals of the revolution.⁶¹ However, its return placed its ideas and rhetoric at the centre of cultural policy where its ambiguity caused much debate.

The change in the Cultural Office was assisted by a new *Menteri PPK* who held office from 1957 until the army gained political power and forced him from office in 1966.

⁵⁹ ‘Penjelasan’.

⁶⁰ This is based on Yampolsky’s translation (1995, p. 702). Yampolsky also notes that Clause 32 evoked some consternation within the Exploratory Committee on Efforts to Prepare for the Independence of Indonesia (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*) due to the absence of any mention of regional cultures (1995: 702).

⁶¹ Yampolsky writes: ‘Aside from a brief period in 1945, the [1945 Constitution] was not implemented until 1959’ (1995, p. fn 6).

Professor Prijono⁶² had earned a Doctorate from Leiden University and had long been the Dean of the Arts Faculty at the University of Indonesia when Sukarno appointed him Minister. Prijono has been linked to the left-leaning, Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) affiliated *Murba* party (Thomas, 1981, p. 373) and was considered a strong supporter of the President's ideas (Lee, 1995, p. 182). He received the Stalin peace prize in 1955 and was Chairman of the Indonesia-China Friendship Association from 1955-1957. Prijono interpreted Sukarno's proclamations for application in cultural policy and education. In 1959, for instance, he issued a statement called 'Nation Building and Education' (1970) which Feith and Castles state 'was sometimes regarded as a kind of educational supplement to the Political Manifesto of August 1959' (1970, p. 327).⁶³

A trend that began in 1956 was an increasing recognition of regional cultures.⁶⁴ This trend first became apparent in the 'Independence Day Review' of 1956 where the cultural office began to position local cultures as elements of national culture. The review states:

To give an opportunity for the growth of the national culture, the Government also gives good opportunities to local cultures to develop. Local cultures of a high quality will enrich national culture. (Setjonegoro, 1956, p. 568)

Untuk memberikan kesempatan kepada pertumbuhan kebudayaan nasional itu, Pemerintah memberi pula kesempatan sebaik-baiknya kepada kebudayaan daerah-daerah untuk berkembang. Kebudayaan daerah yang tinggi mutunya akan memperkaya kebudayaan nasional.

Prijono continued to acknowledge the place of regional cultures.⁶⁵ In 1958 he repeated a formulation, 'our art must be national art in spirit but can be regional in its form,' in a series of speeches (1958a, p. 11).⁶⁶ Prijono's formulation marks the beginnings of a policy that positions regional arts to accord with national goals and the behaviours of

⁶² Prijono's biographical information comes from Feith (1970, pp. 477-8).

⁶³ Lee, in his study of education in Indonesia between 1945 and 1965 states that Priyono 'tried faithfully to incorporate the symbols and themes of Guided Democracy' (1995, p. 99).

⁶⁴ Feith identifies 1954 as the year that more attention turned to regionalism due to the increasing demands for autonomy in Sumatra and Sulawesi (1962, p. 317). However, I did not find any evidence of such a change being mirrored in cultural policy until 1956.

⁶⁵ A speech of the *Menteri PPK* who preceded Dr. Prijono, the conservative nationalist Sarino Mangunpranoto, also emphasised the importance of regional cultures from 1956. Mangunpranoto highlighted that national culture is derived from regional cultures: 'National culture should have its roots in regional cultures. Regional cultures must give the life essences to national culture' (1956, pp. 611-2). (*'Seharusnya kebudayaan nasional berakar pada kebudayaan daerah. Kebudayaan daerah harus memberi zat-zat hidup kepada kebudayaan nasional.'*)

⁶⁶ 'Kesenian kita haruslah kesenian yang nasional isinya tapi boleh daerah bentuknya.' This was also the title of a speech he gave on 20 July 1958. Interestingly, LEKRA's interest in regional cultures also began in approximately 1955 (Foulcher, 1986, p. 30), which perhaps dates a sea change in how regional cultures were understood in Indonesia that also coincides with the increased regional discontent that followed the 1955 elections.

Indonesians. He argued for a mixture of Western and Indonesian arts that builds high moral quality (1958a, p. 12), although his emphasis was on the indigenous forms, and was scathing of art that is ‘full of sex’⁶⁷ and of low moral character. Within this formulation, Prijono emphasised that commitment be to the nation and not a particular ethnicity. He stated in ‘Nation Building and Education’ that ‘we must, if possible, abolish ethnic-consciousness and raise men’s consciousness to the level of the nation’ (1970, p. 328).⁶⁸

Cultural policy after 1959 became increasingly dominated by Sukarno’s notion of ‘national identity’ outlined in the USDEK doctrine. Sukarno related ‘national identity’ to a number of different areas including science, politics, the arts and the economy. However, the only definitive statement he made was that ‘Indonesia has a socialist identity’ (1961, p. 64). In August 1960, a large *Consultation Concerning the Meaning of National Identity*⁶⁹ was held in Salatiga. According to the Chair of the organising committee, the goal of the conference was to develop the ‘practical guidelines for the implementation of cultural tasks and activities in the framework of the President’s Political Manifesto.’⁷⁰ Six fields were covered: religion and philosophy, education, ethics, the arts, law and society. I limit my discussion below to the field of arts policy.

Prijono’s message to the conference provides an insight into how ‘national identity’ was used within the bureaucracy. Prijono recognised that Indonesian culture is a synthesis of different elements including Hindu, Muslim and Western, and made reference to the existence of regional cultures by calling culture in the Republic of Indonesia ‘multiform’ (1960, p. 19). He then argued that nation building requires a synthesis of cultures into one, if not in shape (*bentuk*), then in essence (*isi*). The division of essence and shape was an important element of the main thrust of his argument, as is demonstrated by his statement:

We can and we must shape modern Indonesian identity, which I feel has not yet been formed as deeply and as broadly as it could be, using what we have inherited from our ancestors, in a way consistent with the Political Manifesto and USDEK. In this way, modern Indonesian identity will be a national Indonesian identity whose characteristics are widely shared and whose spirit is socialist. (1960, p. 20)

⁶⁷ ‘Kesenian yang penuh dengan ‘sex’’ (1958a, p. 12).

⁶⁸ This text is an English translation. The translators are Feith and Castles.

⁶⁹ *Musjawarah I Sekitar Arti Kepribadian Nasional*.

⁷⁰ ‘Pedoman praktis untuk melaksanakan tugas2 dan kegiatan2 kebudayaan dalam rangka Manifesto Politik Presiden’ (Sindoesawarno, 1960, p. 3).

Kepribadian Indonesia modern yang menurut perasaan saya belum terbentuk dalam arti yang sedalam-dalamnya dan seluas-luasnya, dapat dan harus kita bentuk dengan bahan-bahan yang diwariskan kepada kita oleh nenek-moyang dan yang kita sesuaikan dengan Manifesto Politik beserta USDEK-nya. Dengan demikian maka kepribadian modern Indonesia itu adalah kepribadian nasional Indonesia yang umum ciri-cirinya dan sosialis jiwanya.

Prijono rated whether a culture was national by its accordance with the ideas and positions put forth in the state's political doctrine. For instance, he turned to *Manipol-USDEK* to determine which elements were desirable and undesirable within his ancestors' cultures (1960, p. 19). He continued to identify the 'best tools' for growing modern Indonesian identity as 'culture broadly defined' which included 'art, literature, traditions and 'way of life' which, he added, 'must be empowered by our modern ideals'.⁷¹

The three papers about arts policy are all focussed on elaborating how the arts contributed to 'national identity'. All of the papers also included a division similar to essence and shape which reflects the problems of trying to link diverse cultural forms and traditions to a single 'national identity'. The first speaker, Soebagio Sosrowardojo, spent most of his paper critiquing the overlapping dichotomies of Western/Eastern culture and modern/traditional arts. He defined art that comes from 'a world view that is positive, tends towards realism and has a people-minded attitude' as reflecting Indonesian identity.⁷² Although he critiqued Sanusi Pane's resolution of the dichotomy in a 'synthesis' as 'impossible' (1960, p. 8), the themes of his talk remained similar including the inclusion of elements of Western culture (1960, pp. 12-14). The second speaker Hoemardani followed Prijono's formulation more closely than either of the other two speakers. He used the same terminology (*isi* and *bentuk*) although, rather than centring the 'essence' on *Manipol-USDEK*, Hoemardani used the more vague term 'spiritual heritage'.⁷³

The third speaker, Achdiat Karta Mihardja, held that the 'national identity' was based on the *Pancasila* (1960b, p. 31). He defined the work of the arts as enriching knowledge and seeking truth which he viewed as vital to the life of the nation. He defined 'good art' as

⁷¹ 'Alat yang menurut perasaan saya paling baik untuk menumbuhkan kepribadian Indonesia modern adalah kebudayaan dalam arti luas jadi dalam arti kesenian, kesusasteraan, adat-istiadat dan 'way of life' pada umumnya, yang tentunya harus dijiwai dengan cita2 modern kita' (1960, p. 20).

⁷² 'Pandangan dunia yang positif, kecenderungan kepada realisme dan sikap kerakyatan' (1960, p. 12).

⁷³ 'Harta jiwa' (1960, p. 25).

art that ‘contains elements of truth, goodness, beauty’⁷⁴ and ‘is related to ethics and characteristics that are considered vital to a particular time and place.’⁷⁵ From this position, he made two suggestions about developing ‘dynamic and effective cultural politics’⁷⁶ that would fit within his framework. His first suggestion was to increase opposition, including state opposition, to ‘cheap and sensational entertainments’ that had ‘damaging effects’⁷⁷ (1960a, pp. 49-50). Mihardja’s second suggestion was educating people about how to appreciate good art as a way of combating the imported commercial forms (1960a, p. 51). He called for greater integration of the activities of the state cultural apparatus and artistic groups to achieve his vision for cultural politics (1960a, p. 52).

All three speakers combined elements of the previous orthodoxy with the more radical agenda of the state. Both Hoemardani (1960, p. 49) and Mihardja (1960, p. 18) discussed the need for freedom alongside calls for greater state intervention. Hoemardani argued that excessive rules impoverishes art (1960, p. 22) and that there was a ‘responsible freedom’ within society that extends to artists. The ‘responsibility’ of artists was to be oriented towards the national interest (1960, p. 25), indicating a lesser degree of freedom when compared to the calls of the early 1950s. Mihardja took a position closer to the earlier orthodoxy. He held that a dynamic cultural politics required freedom from rules and taboos (1960, p. 49). Prijono himself had, in an earlier speech in 1958, criticised the formulation of ‘art for art’s sake’ that had become associated with the Western-oriented liberal artists of the period. Instead, Prijono supported ‘engaged art’ or art that promoted ‘peace and happiness ... through state development.’⁷⁸

Interestingly, the aesthetics of the state can be seen to have similarities with the preceding period. Art that was in accordance with the ‘national identity’ was considered to hold high values and morals, including certain forms of Western art. Through educating artists and the people about such arts, the ‘national identity’ could become complete as people acquired the values associated with those arts. Ruth McVey, in her study of attitudes to *wayang* in the PKI, notes how ‘technical’ reform was broadly understood as inevitable

⁷⁴ ‘Mengandung unsur2 kebenaran, kebaikan, keindahan’ (1960a, p. 48).

⁷⁵ ‘Dihubungkan dengan etik dan cita2 yang dianggap urgen pada sesuatu-waktu’ (1960a, p. 48).

⁷⁶ ‘Suatu politik kebudayaan yang dinamis dan efektif’ (1960a, p. 49).

⁷⁷ Mihardja writes: ‘Hiburan murah dan sensasionil itu sangat buruk efeknya terutama jiwa massa’ (1960a, p. 49).

⁷⁸ ‘Kesenian yang mengabdikan diri, ‘l’art qui s’engage’ ... Untuk kesentosaan dan kebahagiaan kita bersama ... melalui pembangunan Negara’ (1958a, p. 10).

within the party and how many of the ‘technical’ reforms had been suggested by other groups not linked to the PKI (1986, pp. 28-40). McVey suggests that these ‘technical’ reforms were in fact ‘ideological, reflecting new ideas as to proper cultural models’ (1986, p. 38) and were linked to the PKI leaders’ place in the metropolitan superculture of the Indonesian middle class (1986, pp. 40-2). Aesthetic reforms in cultural policy, like the PKI standpoint on *wayang*, reflected the views of the Indonesian middle class and, as McVey notes and as is demonstrated in the next two chapters, has a continuity of understanding with cultural policy during the New Order regime (1986, p. 40).

During Guided Democracy, the formulation of national arts had widened to include regional arts within the definition of ‘national arts’. Certain arts of high quality and moral character that build the nation were to be encouraged and developed in the community. More importantly, the classification of which arts were ‘of a high quality and moral character’ and the moral leverage provided by identifying a ‘national culture/identity’ that was emerging but required development provided a discursive framework for the Cultural Office and elites. Much like the formulations before it, the state and elites were well positioned to pressure Indonesians about their decisions and behaviours. They could pronounce what arts and behaviours were ‘high quality’ and ‘national’ and which were not. Tying regional cultural forms to the discursive framework extended the discursive power structure into the most popular forms in all of the regions across Indonesia at the same time as the Cultural Office was extending its reach down to the sub-national levels of government.

The cultural bureaucracy began to assert a state view about acceptable and unacceptable cultural forms, which followed Sukarno’s opinions, including his attitude to the West.⁷⁹

In a statement issued on 30 October 1959, representatives of *DPPK* asserted:

Crazy-looking Western dances like rock ‘n’ roll, cha-cha, samba and the like are not acceptable to the *DPPK*, if performed by Indonesian boys and girls either in their own homes or in public places. (*Departemen Pendidikan Pengajaran dan Kebudayaan*, 1960)

Dansa Barat jang kegila-gilaan sebangsa rock’n roll, cha-cha-cha, samba dan sebagainya tidak mendapat persetujuan dari Departemen P.P. dan K., apabila dilakukan oleh putra dan putri Indonesia, baik dalam lingkungan rumah tangga sendiri, maupun ditempat umum.

⁷⁹ Feith notes that Sukarno ‘repeatedly denounced’ rock-and-roll, jitterbugging and various other imports from American popular culture as ‘against the Indonesian national identity’ (1967, p. 370).

In the statement, a series of guidelines are put forward setting forth the official position about what constitutes Indonesian dances and music, acceptable Western dance and music and unacceptable Western dance and music. Ballet and artistic dance are acceptable, as are their accompanying music, opera and chamber music. As a ‘balance’, DPPK promoted national dances, in particular *lenso*, *saputangan* and *serampang duabelas* (*Departemen Pendidikan Pengajaran dan Kebudayaan*, 1960). *Serampang duabelas* was invented around 1954 by a bureaucrat from Medan’s Arts Office in conjunction with a member of a local royal family (Sedyawati, 1987, p. 248). After quickly developing a local following, the state started supporting it as an alternative to Western dances, and it became a state-supported dance craze across Indonesia.⁸⁰ Another state-led endeavour to create a national cultural form was a genre of music called *Hiburan Daerah*. Yampolsky describes the genre as ‘songs sung in regional languages and derived from regional cultures ... adapted to standard Western tunings and idioms and [that] were accompanied by cocktail-lounge combos’ (1995, p. 706). Multiple recordings of *Hiburan Daerah* were made and broadcast through Republic of Indonesia Radio (*Radio Republik Indonesia* – RRI).

The international elements of cultural policy varied in line with Sukarno’s diplomatic manoeuvres. Although not as prominent in cultural policy as was the case during the early 1950s, cultural exchanges continued, but were limited to Sukarno’s international allies (‘Politik Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Dep. PPK,’ 1964). Cultural programs and speeches also incorporated support for Sukarno’s foreign policy goals and views, such as the campaign to gain control of Irian Jaya⁸¹ from the Netherlands and opposition to the ‘colonialist and imperialist bloc’.⁸² A broader and perhaps more fundamental parallel can also be drawn between the changing international climate, Sukarno’s foreign policy and the features of cultural policy. While there was increasing disillusionment amongst the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries with the state of international relations, Sukarno tended to take more radical positions than his fellow leaders in this movement,

⁸⁰ Interestingly, Edi Sedyawati, herself a well known dancer and Director-General of Culture from 1993 until 1998, critiques the spread of *Serampang Duabelas* as ‘aesthetically poor’ and the dancers as lacking knowledge of Malay dance traditions (1987, p. 248). As a result, a number of state-sponsored institutions organised a Malay Dance Class in Jakarta in 1972 that demonstrated to Sedyawati and other participants that Malay dance did indeed have ‘sophisticated’ (*canggih*) technique and a ‘sufficiently wide range’ (*cukup luas*) of sources (1987, p. 249) – an example of the assertion of elite control over a popular form through the application of aesthetics.

⁸¹ Now divided into two provinces: West Irian Jaya and Papua.

⁸² ‘*Kaum imperialis dan kolonialis*’ (Priyono, 1958b, p. 6).

particularly as his domestic position became more tenuous (Legge, 1972, pp. 358-84). In 1961, Sukarno divided the world into two groups: the New Emerging Forces (NEFO) and the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO) (Legge, 1972, p. 344).⁸³ He became increasingly scathing of what he called continued 'colonialism and imperialism' through the continued domination of international political and economic relations by the great powers (Legge, 1972, p. 344). Sukarno's increasingly radical positions took its toll on Indonesia's international prestige. From its position of leadership in 1955, Legge argues that Indonesia's moves away from the West and towards the Soviet Union 'had lost the sympathy of many of those who had supported her initiatives at the Afro-Asian Conference' (1977, p. 160). The confrontation with Malaysia in 1964 further undermined Indonesia's leadership and led to Sukarno withdrawing from the United Nations in January 1965 and from the International Monetary Fund, Interpol and the World Bank in August 1965 (Legge, 1972, pp. 369-70; Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 335,338).

Sukarno's criticisms of the international system shared similarities with the criticisms of many postcolonial states. These shared criticisms resulted in a change in UNESCO policy in the 1970s and 1980s when the NAM began asserting its numerical weight, resulting in the debates about creating a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO).⁸⁴ The NAM countries argued for a reshaping of existing economic and communication structures to protect the cultures of developing nations from the economic and cultural imbalance of the existing system (Dutt, 1995, pp. 185-234; McBride & Roach, 1994). Two features of the UNESCO debates were already apparent in the cultural policy of Guided Democracy. Firstly, UNESCO's criticism of Western cultural imperialism⁸⁵ and disparities between North and South in the circulation of cultural goods and information (Miller & Yudice, 2002, pp. 169-71) was similar to Indonesia's critique of Western influence on Indonesian culture and desire to address the influx of Western popular culture. Secondly, UNESCO assumed the structural imperative of the nation state. Its discussions about culture often elided cultural identity with national identity, which was problematic given its commitment to cultural plurality (Tomlinson, 1991, pp. 70-1). Similarly, national culture

⁸³ Although the division was defined largely in terms of former colonies and former masters, other elements occasionally were attached including wealth-poverty, socialist-capitalist, and, underlying all of these divisions, Sukarno's friends and foes (Legge, 1972, pp. 344-5).

⁸⁴ Indonesia's support of America in the cold war may have prevented it and other South East Asian nations from taking a leadership role in the movement.

⁸⁵ Outlined in Tomlinson (1991, pp. 70-3).

was the structural imperative of cultural policy, within which ethnic cultures were forced to fit and cultural plurality was contained. Indonesia's position in international relations reinforced these features of cultural policy.

One museum that was designed during Guided Democracy, but never completed, was the National Monument History Museum (*Museum Sejarah Monumen Nasional*, hereafter the Monas Museum). Katharine McGregor's recent research into the Monas Museum provides both detailed description of the displays and analysis of the planning process and underlying concepts (2003). Sukarno was personally involved with the project and signed off on all of the plans for the displays (2003, pp. 95-7), while the museum committee itself was chaired by Prijono (2003, p. 99). Two themes dominated the portrayal of Indonesian history: first, the progression towards socialism and away from imperialism (2003, pp. 104-5); secondly, nationalism and a united people (2003, p. 104). The two themes were not always easy to represent given the record of Indonesian history (2003, pp. 93, 104-9) and clashed in some instances, such as the absence of scenes depicting class struggle (2003, p. 117).

The years between 1956 and 1965 brought changes to cultural policy which can only be understood against the broader political climate under Guided Democracy. Defining and spreading 'national identity' and the development of socialism became the central focus of cultural policy. Institutional development, such as the building of arts educational institutions, ended with the period of Constitutional Democracy. Instead, the Cultural Office was engaging with the politics of the Guided Democracy period through its attempts to mobilise artists and Indonesians behind Sukarno's political agenda. An example of its leadership is the summarized message that Prijono sent out to artists at a conference in 1960 about cultural in general and literature and art in particular (Prijono, 1963):

... permit things that accord with all the characteristics of our Revolution and especially those that accord with Indonesian socialism, and reject everything that opposes or is contrary to those features. (1963, p. 95)

... membenarkan apa yang sesuai dengan semua cita-cita Revolusi kita khususnya sesuai dengan sosialisme Indonesia, dan menolak semuanya yang bertentangan atau melawan cita-cita itu.

Compared to the preceding period, the government's guidelines were more prescriptive, such as the case of dance and music, as cultural activities were linked to political positions.

Examining the concepts of 'artistic freedom' and 'synthesis' provides a method of gauging the changes of Guided Democracy. The concept of artistic freedom was increasingly sidelined as a 'liberal' position regarding culture, while politically oriented cultural expression was embraced as long, as it was aligned with Sukarno's concepts and terminology. In their rhetoric, supporters of Sukarno like Prijono demanded a commitment to their goals and increasingly attempted to narrow the field of possibilities for what constituted 'national identity' and national culture. The civilising function of culture was harnessed to Sukarno's political agenda and attempts to mobilise the national population. From facilitating the development of a national culture, the goal of cultural policy became to encourage participation in the political programs of Sukarno through the rhetoric of creating a socialist society. These moves were controversial and contested, as will be examined in the next section about non-government arts organisations. In these circumstances, the notion that freedom was the optimal condition of artistic creativity was a minority position.

The notion that a singular national culture was to develop through 'synthesis' was absent from cultural policy from 1956. The central reason for this absence was the introduction of indigenous ethnic cultures into cultural policy and the framing of ethnicity as an element of the national population. Two occurrences assisted this change. Firstly, Sukarno's emphasis on indigenous traditions turned attention towards indigenous cultures. Secondly, acknowledgment of the culture of the 'regions' as national culture in the constitutional definition of national culture also excluded perspectives that viewed regional culture as obsolete due to the advent of a new national culture. While there was still to be acculturation and the inclusion of some Western elements, the Cultural Office promoted a cultural plurality rather than assisting the development of a single national culture. Ethnic cultures became a focus of management as elements of the national culture.

Non-Government Arts Organisations

An important change between Constitutional Democracy and Guided Democracy was the relationship between non-state cultural organisations and cultural policy. From the mid-1950s but increasing markedly in the 1960s, artists' associations became involved in Sukarno's 'remobilisation' (Anderson, 1990c, p. 106) of Indonesia and began to actively support his ideas and concepts. Anderson writes:

The punctuational rhythms and legislative focus of parliamentary constitutionalism were replaced by an accelerando of mass politics penetrating ever more widely down and across Indonesian society. The major political parties of the period ... threw themselves into expanding not merely their own memberships but those of affiliated associations. (1990c, p. 107)

Artists' associations played a prominent role in the application of Sukarno's concepts when it came to culture. The vagueness of Sukarno's concepts allowed them to be broadly interpreted to fit with a range of political programs and ideologies. The greater involvement of artists' associations with cultural policy interpretation and implementation during this period is the primary concern of this section. Additionally, the interaction of the artists' associations during Guided Democracy has implications for the direction of cultural policy during the New Order period.

The *DPPK* encouraged cultural workers to engage with the politics of Guided Democracy, in particular including political positions and messages into their work. In his 1963 speech, Prijono enunciated a definition of the role of the nationalist artist. First, he established the 'point of departure' for artistic activity which is the revolution and socialism as defined within Sukarno's *Manipol*. From this position, Prijono linked culture together with the political position of the government:

the best works are those works that give energy, support, spiritual strength, happiness to work, self-belief, especially to the working class, the farmers and our armed forces. (Prijono, 1963, p. 94)

karya-karya yang terbaik adalah karya-karya yang memberi semangat, dorongan, kekuatan batin, kegembiraan berkerja, kepercayaan akan diri sendiri khususnya kepada kaum pekerja, kaum tani dan angkatan bersenjata kita.

Prijono then called on the administrators of the Cultural Office and the *DPPK* to 'get or invite our artists and writers to create works that are like that'.⁸⁶ Prijono's direction of cultural workers extended to condemning abstract works and directing artists and writers

⁸⁶ 'Petugas-petugas pada Jawatan Kebudayaan ... harus mengusahakan atau mengajak seniman-seniman dan sastrawan-sastrawan kita untuk menciptakan karya-karya yang demikian itu' (Prijono, p. 94).

towards realism (as Prijono thought that style was more easily understood by the three groups he, and the PKI, viewed as needing to be incorporated in the nation building effort – farmers, the working class and soldiers), the adoption of particular themes (such as paintings and stories about national heroes) and the active opposition to imperialists (1963, pp. 96-99). The prescription of the cultural workers' role and interventions into cultural expression within cultural policy contributed to the growing divisions between Indonesian artists.

The largest and most important artist organisation of the 1945-65 period was the People's Arts Institute (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat – LEKRA*). LEKRA was formed by a group of fifteen cultural workers on 17 August 1950 in response to the Cultural Accord (which LEKRA termed 'imperialist') and Alisjahbana's advocacy of Western style modernisation in the Cultural Conference earlier that month (Foulcher, 1986, p. 17). The group included two leaders of the newly reformed PKI, D.N. Aidit and Njoto along with A.S Dharta, Joebaar Ajob and Henk Ngantung, who all were prominent LEKRA leaders of the future. LEKRA used a Marxist framework to resolve the issue of the development of Indonesian culture. They promoted the development of a 'People's culture'⁸⁷ to oppose the 'anti-People, feudal and imperialist culture' of the Indonesian ruling class (Foulcher, 1986, p. 18). The cultural workers were to be responsible for building of a socially just and democratic Indonesia through cultural activities.

LEKRA was, as Foulcher notes, a product of its times and environment:

In its formulation of an approach to the Indonesian culture question, it indicated its descent from the *Pujangga Baru* debate, with all the optimism and idealism of the 1930s in the face of the Indonesian future. (1986, p. 19)⁸⁸

LEKRA was committed to modernisation and nationalism much like the groups that participated in the cultural meetings previously discussed and that dominated cultural life in Jakarta in the 1950s.⁸⁹ However, it differed in its commitment to a particular vision of national culture and how it envisioned the role of the artist and their links to society. LEKRA expected national culture to emerge from the Indonesian people. LEKRA was not interested in a particular aesthetic style, but instead relied on a definition of socialist realism that promoted a commitment to social justice. According to the LEKRA

⁸⁷ '*Kebudayaan Rakyat*'.

⁸⁸ Maier also notes the overlap between LEKRA and its opponents (1987: 18).

⁸⁹ See Maier (1987, pp. 2-4) for a discussion of the ideas holding sway in Jakarta in the early 1950s.

perspective, art should both demonstrate the inequalities present in social reality and promote a process of revolutionary change (what has been labelled *kerakyatan* or people mindedness, Foulcher, 1986, p. 29).

LEKRA thus involved itself in what it termed a ‘cultural struggle’ against the more liberal visions of other cultural commentators, such as the people who had dominated discussion in the early 1950s, and began to promote its version of socialist realism. LEKRA began a period of increased mobilisation following its 1959 National Congress in Solo, Central Java (Foulcher, 1986, pp. 105-7). Its members identified the political climate as becoming increasingly conducive to its vision and responded through a closer alignment with Sukarno’s guidelines and increased mobilisation of its members. LEKRA had always maintained a commitment to the ‘August 1945 Revolution’, which was apparent in its initial 1950 statement of belief, the ‘Mukadimah’ and its revised Mukadimah adopted at the 1959 Congress (Foulcher, 1986, pp. 213-4, 219-20). The revised Mukadimah in particular positioned LEKRA as continuing the struggle against colonialism started with the ‘revolution’ (Foulcher, 1986, p. 220). At the congress, Njoto introduced a new slogan that came to summarise LEKRA artists’ commitment to political involvement: ‘politics is the commander’.⁹⁰ The directions of Sukarno and his supporters during Guided Democracy confirmed for the movement that ‘a cultural revolution was now underway’ (Foulcher, 1986, p. 107). LEKRA also became more aggressive in putting forth its position, as did its opponents in the early 1960s.⁹¹ The polarisation into two sides within debates over cultural issues was aligned with the broader political polarisation. Tensions escalated.

In 1963 a group of writers affiliated with the literary magazine *Sastra*, many of whom had already engaged LEKRA members in cultural debates, published a challenge to *Manipol* as the basis of national cultural life. Known as the *Manifes Kebudayaan* (*Manikebu*), the document opposed LEKRA’s social commitment in the arts with liberal universal-humanism and a commitment to ‘artistic freedom’. Henk Maier summarises *Manikebu* as a ‘challenge in the struggle for authority over the literary world’ (1987, p. 24). In particular, it was a challenge to the LEKRA concept that ‘politics is in command’

⁹⁰ ‘*Politik sebagai Panglima*’ (Foulcher, 1986, p. 107).

⁹¹ See Maier (1987, p. 23) and Foulcher’s discussion of LEKRA and anti-LEKRA activity in the early 1960s (1986: 117-8).

(1987, p. 24). After a four month hiatus, LEKRA responded with ferocious attacks on the *Manikebu* signatories and the literary magazine *Sastra*. Foulcher says of LEKRA's reaction to *Manikebu*:

It was seen as an act in open defiance of the direction of state ideology, and a particularly audacious challenge to LEKRA's role as the only legitimate voice of Indonesian artists and cultural workers. (1986, p. 126)

LEKRA managed to do more than attack its opponents in its publications and speeches. The radical nationalists, led by LEKRA, gave the document the acronym *Manikebu* (which sounds like the Indonesian term for buffalo sperm). Under pressure from his advisors, Sukarno banned *Manikebu* in May 1964, after accusing it of weakening the spirit of the revolution (Maier, 1987, p. 25). Signatories were attacked in the press, their works were banned (Foulcher, 1986, p. 133), and some were demoted from their positions or sacked (Maier, 1987, pp. 24-7; Mohamad, 1988, p. 2). The ferocity of LEKRA's response should be viewed in the context of the intensification of conflict between powerful political groups for who much was at stake.

LEKRA was affiliated with the PKI, although in practice it generally operated autonomously with little guidance from party leadership.⁹² In the 1960s other parties and artists associated with different parties began to establish their own cultural organisations. The Indonesian National Party (PNI) established the National Cultural Institute (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional* – LKN) under the leadership of Sitor Situmorang.⁹³ Created in 1959, the LKN supported Sukarno's *Manipol-USDEK* doctrine and was aligned with LEKRA against the supporters of *Manikebu*. In the early 1960s, LKN became the proponent of the 'official' nationalist line instead of the weakened BMKN. Like LEKRA members, LKN members were also jailed, censored and banished after 1965. *Nahdlatul Ulama* established the Institute of Muslim Artists and Cultural Workers of Indonesia (*Lembaga Seniman Budayawan Muslim Indonesia* – LESBUMI) and began to explore the meaning of Indonesian culture from the perspective of Islamic artists.⁹⁴ Other artists'

⁹² Foulcher emphasises this point (1986, p. 206), although LEKRA did come under pressure from the PKI in 1964 (1986, pp. 128-131).

⁹³ For a longer analysis of LKN, see Maier (1996).

⁹⁴ LESBUMI was started in 1962 (Sjamsulridwan, 1963) by a number of Muslim intellectuals associated with NU. The important players were also significant figures in the film industry (Djamiluddin Malik, who was chairman, Usmar Ismail, Asrul Sani) who drew many workers from that industry into LESBUMI. LESBUMI was opposed to the PKI affiliated Film and Arts Workers Union (*Serikat Buruh Film dan Seniman*) (Sen, 1994, p. 30). A case could be made that LESBUMI was created in Jakarta with this purpose in mind, although its focus and attitude differed in branches outside the capital. The LESBUMI branch in Riau focussed on teaching Q'uranic arts and banned Western dancing and more traditional dancing styles with sexual connotations (*Program Kerdja Lembaga Seniman Budayawan Muslimin Indonesia Pemimpin*

organisations with political party affiliations were the Cultural Institute of Indonesian Christians (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Kristen Indonesia – Lekrindo*) and the Cultural Institute of Catholic Christians (*Lembaga Kebudayaan Indonesia Katolik – LKIK*).

The activities of non-government arts organisations were an important element of cultural policy during Guided Democracy. Guided Democracy differed from Constitutional Democracy in that artists' associations were being urged to adopt political themes and particular styles that demonstrated political support for Sukarno. Cultural policy was an element of the increased mobilisation of the period. The vagueness of Sukarno's agenda and terminology led many groups with diverging views to support his ideas, but also caused much dissent between groups with different interpretations linked to different agendas. State rhetoric encouraged further intensification of recruiting and educating LEKRA members and the active pursuit of the 'people's culture'. However, Maier notes that LEKRA's slogans, like Sukarno's, may have increased political awareness, but they did not 'offer clear directions as to how socio-political changes could be realised' (1987, p. 21). Instead, cultural mobilisation became part of maintaining the delicate political balance. The government also became increasingly implicated in the left-versus-right cultural politics of the period. The ideas of Sukarno were increasingly aligned with the more radical groups, in particular LEKRA, which alienated the Western-educated artists whose positions had previously been much closer to the positions of the state. It culminated in the murder and repression of LEKRA members and the suppression of their legacy.

4. Conclusion

The key cultural policy change of the periods is how the state defined its role. From a regulatory role where the state provided an institutional structure for activities that focussed on fields that were defined as national culture, the state assumed a leadership role where it attempted to mobilise the populace behind its political programs. The model of cultural provision during this period can be understood as postcolonial in that it

Daerah Riau di Pekanbaru, 1963). LESBUMI disbanded in 1966 because of the decreasing importance of (and increasing state and societal antipathy towards) political association and the opposition of more conservative Muslims (a letter from Situbondo in 1965 gives notice of NU's decision to disband LESBUMI due to its endangering of the authority of the party through its more open attitude to the arts and racy artistic displays by NU standards. He specifically cites a dancing display at a Performance Night). I would like to thank Greg Fealy for generously allowing me access to his LESBUMI documents.

included elements of a liberal model and a command model. However, the role of the state demonstrates that the features of the command culture model declined in the early 1950s before returning with increasing strength from 1957, due in no small part to Sukarno's understanding of governance and preference for a one-party state.

Another important change was the role of non-state cultural organisations in cultural policy. Sukarno's mobilisation of non-state organisations and the requirement that those organisations sign pledges to support state doctrine combined with the escalating activities of artists' associations to redefine the relationship between artists' associations and the state. The role of non-state cultural organisations in cultural policy changed from being supported by infrastructure provided by the state in their efforts to build a national culture to an engagement with the state to promote a political program within their activities. Expressing alignment included the adoption of particular themes and styles that were understood to be aligned to Sukarno's goal of creating a socialist society. However, cultural expression was equally about proclaiming support for a variety of groups aligned to Sukarno in the tumultuous politics of Guided Democracy, since the ambiguity of Sukarno's concepts allowed them to be interpreted in multiple ways and linked to a variety of political agendas.

The force that drove the changes in cultural policy was the exchange of the 'administrator' political rationality for a 'solidarity-maker' political rationality, marked by Sukarno's ascent to political power between 1957 and 1959. The regimes of practices that shaped cultural policy's form and purpose changed substantially with the change of political rationality. Understandings of the acceptable limit of state intervention changed dramatically, as did the definition of the role that cultural workers should play in achieving the state's political goals. Both periods used culture as a tool to 'civilise' and unite the diverse Indonesian populace. However, the two periods were attempting to shape very different societies and adopted different methods. From attempting to facilitate the development of a population of free individuals with a nationalist commitment and outlook, cultural policy became a tool for mobilising the national population behind Sukarno's political agenda. In as much as they were attempting to 'improve' individuals and shape the attributes and behaviours of populations, the cultural policies of 1950-1965 demonstrate a broad similarity with late colonial and occupying Japanese cultural policies.

An important change in cultural policy across both periods that had wide ranging effects was the move away from the understanding that cultural ‘synthesis’ would result in the creation of a single national culture to an understanding that a diversity of cultures could signify national culture. This change brought ethnic cultures within the realm of cultural policy, expanding cultural policy into a wide range of cultural forms, including both ceremonial and community arts and practices. Cultural policy’s aesthetics, however, were brought from the ‘metropolitan superculture’ (H. Geertz, 1963, p. 35) of the Indonesian middle-class and differed greatly from the variety of aesthetic understandings within the indigenous ethnic groups. However, it was not until the New Order era that the state had the resources to undertake broad and sustained interventions into indigenous ethnic practices through its cultural policies.

Chapter 3

The New Order as a ‘Cultural Process’

The formidable New Order strategist and architect of the New Order regime’s early political and social policies, Ali Moertopo, acknowledged the importance of cultural change to the New Order regime when he wrote: ‘The New Order is a cultural process.’¹ The New Order regime viewed cultural change as both a desirable and inevitable aspect of its policies and, as a close reading of Moertopo’s quote indicates, intended to direct cultural development. However, the regime could not exercise complete control over the cultural processes present within Indonesia during the New Order era. This chapter explores the ‘cultural processes’, both generated from New Order governance and from other groups and dynamics, from which cultural policy arose. While the official cultural policy programs and institutions are analysed in the following chapter, this is only possible after an exploration of how broader political and social changes impacted notions of national culture, particularly amongst political power-holders.

Indonesian national culture, far from being a pre-existing set of attributes, has a temporally changing character. Philip Kitley, in his discussion of Television in New Order Indonesia, argues that the changing ‘national cultural project’ from Guided Democracy to the New Order era should be understood as ‘three entwined processes of cultural denial, affirmation and invention, which together have attempted to map a unitary and unifying cultural identity across [Indonesia]’ (2000, pp. 5-7). Chua Beng Huat and Eddie Kuo similarly draw attention to the processes of deployment and suppression or erasure of different ‘elements’ in their discussion of the invention of ‘Singapore’ and ‘Singaporeans’ (1998, p. 38). They write: ‘In each deployment, some

¹ ‘Orde Baru adalah proses kebudayaan’ (1978, p. 36).

elements of the past will be discursively suppressed or erased, others accented and given added semiological significance' (1998, p. 38). Kitley (2001, pp. 12-3) and Chua and Kuo highlight the importance of discourse in the construction of national cultural identities (1998, pp. 37-9). They argue that national identity is 'necessarily the results of discursive practices that formulate them as objects ... which are 'called into existence' by statements that circulate in different discourses, in different spheres of social practices' (1998, p. 37). While I am tracing a discursive formation through analysis of its constituent parts (in the words of Chua and Kuo, its 'ontological elements', 1998, p. 37) and am interested in questions of discursive deployment and erasure, unlike Chua and Kuo, I am not directly analysing the construction of a national identity. I trace here the discursive formation that gave rise to a particular cultural policy.

After a brief historical introduction, I examine four 'ontological elements' that informed cultural policy. The first three cultural policy informing factors were central to the articulation of national culture from the 1970s. These are: the governmental discourses of the New Order regime; the supporters of the concept of universal humanism that dominated the national arts and national cultural debate in the New Order era; and the governmental uses of ethnic cultural practices. The final section addresses the impact of social changes in the 1980s and 1990s brought about by sustained economic growth.

Two themes run across the chapter. Firstly, the notions of deployment and erasure are used to assess the chronology of the period and provide a sense of the changing environment within which cultural policy was produced. Secondly, the argument that cultural policy in Indonesia is a variation of a widespread form of contemporary governance is continued here, but with a focus on the broader governmental discourses in which culture was employed, rather than the specific cultural programs within the Directorate of Culture (*Direktorat Kebudayaan*, the new name for the Cultural Office)² which are the subjects of the next chapter. This chapter is focussed on changing discourses and only provides brief examples of their effects on cultural practices. The impact of these changes on cultural policy is explored in chapter four.

² The name of the Office of Culture changed to Directorate of Culture in 1964. Although the name change occurred before Suharto took control of the government, the different names are a convenient way of separating the two periods.

1. Historical Background: The Political Climate of the Early New Order Period

The core of the New Order political elite was a military faction that had built alliances with anti-communist civilian groups in the last years of the Sukarno regime. In the months following the attempted coup of 1 October 1965, a broad coalition of groups that had suffered in the political polarisation of Sukarno's Guided Democracy supported the army's tough handling of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Two groups were particularly important sources of support: the urban middle class and Islamic mass organisations (Aspinall, 2000, p. 26). Many university students, academics and professionals rallied to the army. Students' and scholars' action fronts (such as KAMI, KAPPI and KASI)³ agitated initially against the PKI and later against Sukarno, providing crucial support for Suharto's political manoeuvrings. The Islamic parties *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama* openly supported the army, and *Nahdlatul Ulama*, in particular, was involved in the killings and suppression of rural communists (Cribb, 1990; Sulisty, 2000). The New Order regime was reliant on the support of these groups to maintain power and this reliance was reflected in how the regime responded to the problems of governance it faced when it first came to power.

Suharto's faction consisted of officers of similar age and, most importantly, similar experiences from the War of Independence and the pre-1965 period. The military had been increasingly caught up in politics in the fifteen years preceding 1965 and developed substantial links with various political groups and business concerns. By 1965 the military was part of the political elite, and was deeply involved in politics, civil administration and economic management (Crouch, 1978, p. 22). On taking power, Suharto and his supporters were not primarily concerned with instigating social change. They wanted to consolidate their position of power.

The stabilisation of power in the hands of the New Order elite corresponded with the breakdown of the coalition that was so effective in 1965. Opposition began to surface as early as 1967 with student protests in Jakarta (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 354) as the urban middle

³ KAMI – *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* (Indonesian University Students' Action Front), KAPPI – *Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda dan Pelajar Indonesia* (Indonesian Youth and High School Students' Action Front), KASI – *Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia* (Indonesian Graduates' Action Front). These groups were formed around (ex-)members of the anti-communist political parties (the PSI and *Masyumi*) and Catholic groups.

class became disillusioned with the economic policies and the level of corruption (Aspinall, 2000, p. 28).⁴ The *Malari* riots and the subsequent political crackdown galvanised civilian critics of the government. Edward Aspinall identifies the end of the civilian coalition as 1977-78 with large student demonstrations and public dissent surrounding the elections and parliamentary session (*Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat – MPR*) followed by state occupation of campuses and a wave of arrests (2000, p. 29).

An important tool the New Order state used to assert control was violent anti-communist repression. The usefulness of the violent actions of the army was not limited to the elimination of the politically powerful PKI. Repression provided a deterrent for potential political opposition, and the techniques used on the communists were later used on other political opponents.⁵ Ken Ward describes the killing of thousands of communists and sympathisers as the ‘fundamental fact of the New Order’ (1973, p. 67). Ward writes:

By continuing to inflict extreme penalties, whether execution or imprisonment for indefinite periods, against those who had participated in communist politics, the new government had at its disposal an example with which to threaten critics from all parties and to discourage any from engaging in active politics. (1973, p. 71)

Anti-communism also made important new alliances possible in the international arena. Suharto quickly abandoned Sukarno’s foreign policy stance (particularly the confrontation with Malaysia and alignment with China) and pursued economic aid from Western countries. Indonesia’s non-communist creditors formed themselves into the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia and from July 1966 began making arrangements to reschedule Indonesia’s debt repayments. Anti-communism strengthened both the domestic and international position of the new regime.

Substantial amounts of Western aid were given in conjunction with economic policy reforms.⁶ The Suharto government’s early economic policy focused on stabilisation and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and encouraging foreign investment. A significant economic policy change in 1967 stimulated foreign investor interest in Indonesia. The New Order regime reversed the highly restrictive foreign tariff and investment policies of its predecessor between the years of 1967 and 1972. In 1973 the regime began to again

⁴ Feith identifies the beginning of the end of the coalition in the full parliamentary special session of March 1968 (1968, p. 103).

⁵ See Thomas (1981, p. 384) on the repression of student opposition.

⁶ Anderson notes that the lowest IGGI commitment per year between 1967 and 1974 was higher than total net government expenditures and receipts in 1957 and 1960. In some years aid covered 50 percent of the cost of all imports (1990c, pp. 112-3). See also Ricklefs (2001, p. 352).

restrict foreign investment, a decision that was made possible through revenue increases caused by the boom in oil prices. Following *Malari* in 1974, which counted amongst its causes the worsening situation of indigenous businessmen and the growing influence of foreign capital, investment restrictions intensified and all foreign investments required a local partner (until 1992). The commitment to a liberal economic order since 1972 has thus been ‘half-hearted and ambivalent’ (H. Hill, 1994, p. 66), and economic policy has fluctuated between liberal policies, economic nationalism and pay-offs to Suharto’s supporters.⁷ The liberal economic policy reforms of 1967-72 constitute an element of broad cultural policy change in the early New Order period. Miller and Yudice state: ‘The embrace of market reforms oriented towards foreign investment has distinct cultural corollaries’ (2002, p. 145). However, the impact of economic reform on practices of consumption and identification were more regularly and severely criticised in the 1980s and 1990s, as is discussed in the final section of this chapter. In the regime’s early years, the problems of providing the ideal conditions for fast modernisation and securing its political position had a much greater influence over how culture was articulated within governmental discourse.

2. Culture in the New Order Regime’s Rationality of Government

Although a variety of governmental discourses, strategies and techniques were part of New Order governance, many of which are considered in the discussion below, the discourse of development (*pembangunan*)⁸ had the most influence on the articulation of culture. Ariel Heryanto identifies *pembangunan* as one of the two most consequential ‘key-words’ in New Order era language, meaning terms that are ‘significant’, ‘binding’, and ‘indicative ... in certain forms of thought’ (1988, p. 8).⁹ Heryanto’s exploration of *pembangunan* followed Raymond William’s keywords approach (1983), where a term’s semantic history and relationship to social and historical formations is explored. The analysis of development/*pembangunan* below follows a slightly different, but related, understanding of development suggested by Simon Philpott: that the ‘government of

⁷ Liddle discusses how the balance between rent-seeking and liberal policies contributed to the collapse of the Suharto regime (1999). For a discussion of the changing economic and financial situation of the New Order regime until the mid-1990s, see H. Hill (1994).

⁸ In this chapter, I use the term *pembangunan* to refer to the use of development in Indonesia during the New Order era.

⁹ The other term is *Pancasila* (Heryanto, 1988, p. 8) on which I touch below.

development/growth' was an element of a 'particular form of governmentalisation of the state' (2000, pp. 166-7) that arose in Indonesia following the fall of the Sukarno regime.

Development and Governmentality

The usage of the term 'development' that is relevant to government in Indonesia began after 1945 around the term 'underdeveloped' (Williams, 1983, p. 103). According to Raymond Williams, two ideas became connected at this point in time: firstly, the 'development' of natural resources; and secondly, that economies and societies pass through 'stages of development' (1983, p. 103). From 1945, the concept of development became increasingly focussed on a group of societies, which included Indonesia, identified at the time as the 'Third World' (Arndt, 1981). The peak of development's popularity coincided with the years when the New Order regime was at its most confident in the 1970s and 1980s.

Marc DuBois, in his Foucaultian critique of development, focuses on the 'new relations of power' that development introduces into the 'Third World'.¹⁰ According to DuBois, development aims to restructure 'the behaviour and practices of individuals and populations' with the goal of increasing 'economic productivity, the wealth of the nation, the level of health or education of the people – in short, to increase public welfare' (1991, p. 10). DuBois writes:

Particularly in the Third World, [the masses] are not only presented as human resources, but as resources in need of modification, adaptation, and change – in other words, development. (1991, p. 10)

Barry Hindess (2001, p. 108) connects development's 'improving' function to the features of liberal imperial administration discussed in chapter one. Much like the colonial subject, the subject of development requires capacity building in order to achieve the goal of autonomous action. He writes:

The aims of the [liberal] project have barely changed, but the end of empire has transformed the conditions in which it can be pursued ... The liberal project of improvement ... can no longer work through what it once saw as the civilising effects of a benign imperial rule ... Instead, the liberal project is now pursued by significant minorities in non-Western states, many of whom have adopted some version of the earlier liberal view of the people among whom they live, and also,

¹⁰ For other critical assessments of development, see Illich (1969), Arndt (1981), and Escobar (1984-5).

more remotely, by western states themselves working through a different range of indirect means. (2001, p. 108)¹¹

While the central thrust of Hindess's argument about the continuities of imperial rule and development is accepted here,¹² I would be more cautious about characterising development as a 'liberal project' given its many forms and implication in different state-systems, many of which have been decidedly non-liberal and have loudly rejected liberalism.

An alternative characterisation lies within DuBois's understanding of development as a form of biopower exercised over and within non-Western nations (1991, pp. 9-10). Like cultural policy, biopower is concerned with both monitoring and regulating the norms of populations and changing the conduct of individuals (Foucault, 1990, pp. 137-8), and both culture and biopower became a focus of state activities around the same moment. However, biopower refers to a different range of governmental fields that are concerned with the processes and evolution of life (Dean, 1999, p. 100).¹³ Dubois illustrates the concern with populations through the policies of population control (1991, pp. 10-18) and the introduction of 'scientific' norms regarding family size, methods of birth control and child rearing (1991, pp. 17-8). DuBois also identifies the other side of biopower in the disciplinary power that development exercises over the practices of individuals in non-Western nations. Development introduces methods that firstly make individuals' actions calculable and, secondly, inserts individuals into training regimes (1991, pp. 18-24). However, DuBois tends to downplay the agency of the non-Western states in the operation of development. Both Heryanto (Heryanto, 1988) and Jonathan Rigg *et. al.* (1999) stress the particularities of *pembangunan* in Indonesia and emphasise that its usage is the assemblage of both national and international semantic and political histories and had a special salience for the New Order regime. An indication of the importance of

¹¹ Hindess continues: 'They operate, in effect, through national and international aid programs that assist, advise and constrain the conduct of postcolonial states, through international financial institutions and also, of course, through that fundamental liberal instrument of civilisation, the market' (2001: 108). Similarly, H.W. Arndt links the prevailing meaning of development to colonial authority (1981, p. 462).

¹² The existence of a form of continuity is also suggested by the emergence of the contemporary meaning of development in 1945 when many colonies became nation-states. My purpose is to note the existence of a continuity rather than chart its complex history, which would involve more analysis than required here. Alatas, in his book *The Myth of the Lazy Native*, provides an interesting and relevant exploration of the historical links between colonial and developmental discourses. He writes regarding the representation of indigenous Southeast Asians: 'The image of the indolent, dull, backward and treacherous native has changed into that of a dependent native requiring assistance to climb the ladder of progress' (1977, p. 8).

¹³ Biopower encompasses phenomenon that focus on living beings, such as health, sanitation, birth rate, longevity and race (Foucault, 1997, p. 73).

pembangunan was a declaration by the 1983 parliament that gave Suharto the title ‘Father of *Pembangunan*’.¹⁴ That this occurred, as Heryanto notes, at precisely the time that development became a target of criticism in other parts of the world indicates that *pembangunan* had a degree of importance in Indonesia independent of how development fared internationally (1988, p. 19). *Pembangunan* also extended to areas outside of the limits commonly sets for biopower, such as culture and economics.

Development was a rationality of government that was readily adopted within authoritarian states. It provided a rationale for intervention at the level of populations and individuals that had a large degree of independence from liberal concerns regarding individual freedoms, but still received the approval of the international community and, in particular, the more powerful Western states.¹⁵ *Pembangunan*’s centrality to the New Order regime can thus be understood through the way it both provided a *rationale* for and *legitimised* the application of modern forms of state-power, providing the basis of an Indonesian, authoritarian ‘normalising society’ (Foucault, 1990, p. 144) with a focus on fostering exploitation of both natural and human resources.

Culture in Pembangunan

The origins of *pembangunan* were in the alliances that the New Order faction formed with two Indonesian groups and the international community when it first came to power and was connected to the economic problems that faced the regime in its early years. One of the groups, labelled the ‘modernising intellectuals’ by Ward (1973, p. 180) and R. William Liddle (1973, p. 79), was the intellectuals and students from the action fronts. These groups were most responsible for a trend that dominated public debate in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Liddle, 1973, p. 178). Adopting the language of Daniel Bell, Seymour Martin Lipset and Samuel Huntington,¹⁶ these groups, which had been alienated during Guided Democracy, advocated a turn to a political system that focused exclusively on modernisation and de-emphasised divisions within society (Ward, 1973, pp. 75-80). Ward associates the ‘cult of non-ideological pragmatism’ that developed within these

¹⁴ ‘*Bapak Pembangunan*’ (Philpott, 2000, p. 164).

¹⁵ Philpott identifies this element of the New Order regime when he writes, ‘the New Order sought to create a state premised on a form of economic freedom aimed at securing its legitimacy, even if it did not entail liberal norms of self-limitation’ (2000, p. 166).

¹⁶ See Ward (1973, p. 75) and Bourchier (1996, pp. 156,197). Ward also mentions their attention to Karl Deutsch, S.N. Eisenstadt, Herbert Feith, Wilbert Moore, Lucian Pye and Gabriel Almond.

groups with the ‘anti-ideology mainstream of American social science’ (1973, p. 75). Many of the modernising intellectuals became organizers of and spokesmen for GOLKAR¹⁷ in 1970 and 1971 (Liddle, 1973, p. 197).

The other group has come to be known as the ‘technocrats’ (Mackie & MacIntyre, 1994, p. 35; Ricklefs, 2002, p. 352; Robison, 1986, pp. 108-11). The technocrats were a group of US-trained economists at the University of Indonesia that Suharto summoned to advise him on how to tackle the economic problems of the late 1960s. The technocrats utilised a ‘market-oriented, outward-looking approach’ (Mackie & MacIntyre, 1994, p. 35) that included many elements of the orthodox liberal perspective on economic management. Their policies received the approval of the international community, demonstrated by debt rescheduling and increased aid donations. The techniques and technologies of *pembangunan* were applied through the macroeconomic reforms of the technocrats, the programs of the aid packages and the New Order regime’s development projects. In 1969, *pembangunan* was confirmed as a central concept and goal of the regime through the advent of the first of the Five Year Development Plans (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun – Repelita*).

Lieutenant-General Ali Moertopo was one of the most prominent ideologues and political operators of the New Order regime. He also played a major role in laying the foundations of the understanding of *pembangunan* that became central to governance (Krissantono, 1991, pp. 141-3). Born in 1924, Moertopo began his Military career in the informal military forces (*laskar*) that fought for independence during the revolution. He was involved in crushing the PKI *Tiga Daerah* and *Madiun* revolts during the War of Independence and the PRRI/*Permesta* rebellion after it. Moertopo’s career was predominantly in military intelligence. As a member of the newly formed regular forces (TNI), he became close to Suharto in the 1950s. After 1965, Moertopo was involved in many covert operations including the rigged ‘Act of Free Choice’ in Irian Jaya in 1969. Moertopo was a private adviser to Suharto from 1966-74 and held a number of intelligence roles (including responsibility for the emasculation of opposing political parties, the construction of GOLKAR, and its overwhelming election victory in 1971). His positions became increasingly high-profile. In 1974 he became Deputy Head of the

¹⁷ The Government party established by Moertopo on behalf of the New Order regime before the 1971 elections.

State Board for Intelligence Coordination (*Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara – BAKIN*) and was Information Minister from 1978 until 1983. As an important political player in the New Order era between 1965 and 1983, Moertopo was influential in the Department of Education and Culture, particularly during the 1978-1983 period when Daoed Yoesoef was the Minister of that Department (Pangaribuan, 1995, p. 40).

Moertopo's ideas on development took shape through his leadership firstly of the Special Operations Unit (*Operasi Khusus – Opsus*) and later with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that he helped establish in 1971.¹⁸ Key members of *Opsus* later were prominent in CSIS, and both organisations were important hubs of policy formation.¹⁹ Through the role of the technocrats, Moertopo and *Opsus*, the New Order regime picked up on the corporatist logic of much modernisation theory which identified a depoliticised society and technocratic reasoning as ideal for fast modernisation (Hadiz & Dhakidae, 2005, p. 7; Heryanto, 2005, pp. 65-6) and adopted certain of its discourses that justified the existence of a strong state. Moertopo published several books elaborating his ideas about *pembangunan* in the 1970s and 1980s. The first was *Accelerated Modernisation of 25 Years' Development (Akselerasi Modernisasi Pembangunan 25 Tahun, 1973)*. A few years later Moertopo turned his attention more specifically to the role of culture in development in his book *Cultural Strategies (Strategi Kebudayaan, 1978)*.

Greg Acciaioli summarises *Cultural Strategies* as articulating 'a full-blown theory of cultural evolution, which situates the developmentalism of the New Order Indonesian state ... as the teleological realisation of a process of cultural evolution that has characterised Indonesian society from its archaic beginnings' (2001, p. 8). The central thrust of *Cultural Strategies* was to plan the future changes in Indonesian culture in order to build human capacity and national strength. Moertopo's definition of culture was linked to the evolutionary development of humanity. He defined culture firstly as a form of 'strength'²⁰ which he later clarified as 'human resources potentials' (1978, p. 9).²¹

¹⁸ Robison and Hadiz write that a 'sophisticated and pervasive apparatus of social control and mobilisation was designed in the early 1970s within Moertopo's Special Operations Command (OPSUS), the New Order's most important security and intelligence office' (2004, p. 48).

¹⁹ Krissantono calls CSIS the 'kitchen of the New Order government' (*dapurnya pemerintah Orde Baru*, 1991, p. 140).

²⁰ *'Kekuatan'* (1978, p. 9).

²¹ Moertopo uses English in the original.

Moertopo then defined culture as ‘all the processes of development of human life’²² and finally as the process of ‘humanisation’ (1978, p. 10). For Moertopo, culture was shaped by human agency in conjunction with outside influences, causing him to reject the East/West typology of earlier theories (1978, pp. 38-9). *Cultural Strategies* was an exercise in outlining what elements Indonesian culture needed to ‘culturalise’ and as such operated as a normative plan for Indonesia’s future.

A key feature of *Cultural Strategies* was the identification of cultural deficiencies in Indonesia’s cultural evolution. Moertopo argued:

The New Order must be capable of finishing the huge task that faces it, that is to make Indonesia into a stable subject, a strong subject, by the standards of world development. The New Order must be able to execute cultural tasks that are very important, executing cultural borrowing (acculturation) in the passage of world history both now and in the future. This is the cultural nucleus that we must formulate now. This includes thoughts and planning connected to scientific and technological progress, economic development, the development of social systems ... progress in language and the arts and development connected with religion. (1978, p. 36)

Orde Baru harus mampu menyelesaikan tugas besar yang menghadapinya, yaitu membuat Indonesia menjadi subyek yang mantap, subyek yang kuat, di dalam ukuran perkembangan dunia. Orde Baru harus mampu melaksanakan tugas kulturil yang sangat berat, melaksanakan akulturasi di dalam perkembangan sejara dunia dewasa ini dan di masa mendatang. Inilah inti sebagai budaya yang harus kita rumuskan dewasa ini. Ini meliputi pemikiran dan penataan yang berkenaan dengan pengembangan pengetahuan dan teknologi, pembangunan ekonomi, pembangunan sistem kemasyarakatan ... pengembangan bahasa, kesenian dan pembangunan yang berkaitan dengan agama.

Moertopo held that Indonesians were not sufficiently developed in the areas of economy, technology and information and that these should be the focus of ‘acculturation’ that would bring Indonesians to the level of ‘humanity’ required by the international and domestic climate (1978, pp. 44-5). Moertopo made the development of the capacities of Indonesians, in other words the creation of idealised modern Indonesian subjects who could contribute economically, the primary goal of cultural development. The state’s economic priorities overrode all other possible considerations, such as cultural identity, traditional knowledge and lifestyles and considerations of equity.

Moertopo’s writings provide an example of how *pembangunan* and development theories more widely mirrored colonial understandings of governance including culture’s role in

²² ‘Seluruh proses perkembangan hidup manusia di dunia’ (1978, p. 10).

governance.²³ Like colonial administrators, Moertopo described Indonesians as backward and unable to respond to the demands of the times, qualities which he attributed to a culture shaped by an easy environment and climate (1978, pp. 39-42). He held:

... a relaxed cultural style has clearly become the main source of various mental barriers that we are experiencing now, even though the current situation requires that the Indonesian society lives with a culture of work, whatsmore a culture of hard work. (1978, p. 42)

... gaya kebudayaan santai yang nampaknya menjadi sumber utama dari bermacam-macam hambatan mental yang kita alami sekarang, padahal situasi sekarang meminta agar masyarakat nusantara hidup dengan pola kebudayaan kerja, bahkan pola kebudayaan kerja keras.

According to Moertopo, this situation required the New Order regime to ‘save the historical process’ of national evolution by directing national culture towards the priorities of *pembangunan*.²⁴ Much modernisation theory, linked as it was to the end of colonialism, also shared the hierarchy between modern and traditional ways of life. Liddle writes that ‘development ideology of Western social science’ which was adopted in Indonesia by the modernising intellectuals, had at its heart ‘a sharp distinction between traditional and modern societies’ and constructed a hierarchy between the two that privileged the modern and condemned the traditional (1973, p. 181).

Moertopo’s writing has been linked to the functionalist school in American sociology through the way it drew on the writings of Indonesian anthropologist Koentjaraningrat (Acciaioli, 2001, pp. 8, fn. 6). Koentjaraningrat was the most influential Indonesian anthropologist of the New Order era (Hadiz & Dhakidae, 2005, p. 12). He made great use of the concept of ‘cultural value orientation’²⁵ which he borrowed from the works of Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn (Koentjaraningrat, 2000, pp. 27-8). The Kluckhohns were part of the functionalist movement in North American social science and worked in one of its key engine rooms at Harvard between 1940 and 1960 (Marzali, 1998).²⁶ Utilising his background, Koentjaraningrat expressed a popular version of the relationship between culture and *pembangunan* in a series of newspaper articles that were reprinted as a book, *Culture, Mentality and Development (Kebudayaan, Mentalitet dan Pembangunan, 2000)*.²⁷ Koentjaraningrat preceded Moertopo, and followed Dutch colonial thought, in

²³ See also Philpott (2003).

²⁴ ‘... menyelamatkan proses sejarah’ (1978, p. 36).

²⁵ ‘Orientasi nilai-budaya’.

²⁶ I discuss Koentjaraningrat’s methodology in greater detail in chapter seven.

²⁷ First printed in 1974.

designating Indonesians' 'mental attitude' as 'generally not prepared for development'.²⁸ His articles in *Culture, Mentality and Development* then mapped out a course for development, identifying 'cultural values' that needed to be repressed and traits that needed cultivation.²⁹ Koentjaraningrat's ideas should be understood in the context of the 1970s where Indonesian social sciences were being reshaped by international academic training regimes that emphasised value-neutral research and an authoritarian regime that was using technocratic governance to contain criticism of its legitimacy and decisions. Vedi Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae write regarding the growth of the social sciences during the New Order era:

[The] main inclination was still toward social science development that basically became part and parcel of the New Order's broader development agenda from the 1970s until its demise in the 1990s. (2005, p. 9)

Moertopo's writings about culture built on Koentjaraningrat's ideas, drawing on the authority of the social sciences to legitimise the New Order regime's policies.

Moertopo also warned that economic, technological and scientific *pembangunan* may bring with it negative effects, such as disappearance of identity and social conflict (1978, pp. 45-8). Moertopo advocated that a process of 'enculturation' be undertaken by national leaders that involved the selective protection of elements of Indonesian culture in order to ameliorate undesirable consequences. Culture therefore played a double role in *pembangunan*. It encouraged Indonesians to expand their capacity for economic production through adapting to modern technologies and sciences, and it protected against the negative effects of *pembangunan*.

Cultural Strategies articulated culture's place within the 'normalising society' governed by the technologies and techniques of *pembangunan*. It viewed individual Indonesians in terms of their capacity for production and urged them to build their capacities through cultural change based on a normalising ideal model. *Cultural Strategies* thus used culture to link the capacities of individual Indonesians to national strength. Furthermore *pembangunan* becomes the latest stage in the long cultural evolution of Indonesian society. Acciaioli writes:

²⁸ 'Sikap mental orang Indonesia umumnya belum siap untuk pembangunan' (2000, p. 32).

²⁹ Although this is ultimately the project of the entire book, see in particular Koentjaraningrat (2000, pp. 32-36, 68-78).

[In] Ali Moertopo's framework the developmental process of cultural evolution finds its fruition in the explicit process of 'Development' (*pembangunan*), as enacted by the New Order, an apotheosis of self-conscious human agency, in its Development policies and programs. (2001, p. 9)

Moertopo was eventually excluded from power at the beginning of the Fourth Development Cabinet in 1983 as part of a Suharto clean-out that was suspected to be motivated by his desire to end continuing rivalries between political elites (Pangaribuan, 1995, p. 58). While Moertopo was absent from later political and policy decisions, his articulation of culture's role in *pembangunan* resonated with cultural policy from the early 1970s until the present. He passed away in 1984.

Other New Order Era Governmental Discourses and Strategies

While *pembangunan* can be thought of as being a cultural process and including a specific set of ideas about culture, the New Order regime's methods of governance also included cultural *corollaries*, or effects that were not intended by the regime. This section analyses four different discourses and strategies of government that included cultural components or cultural corollaries.³⁰ While discourses are the languages, thoughts and practices through which subjects and objects are given meaning, strategies include an element of choice in the designation of means, actions or procedures in order to come up with winning solutions. Put another way, while discourses constitute meaning, strategies can alter how discourses are deployed.

a. Political Emasculation

The New Order regime employed a political strategy that analysts, such as David Bourchier (1998, p. 207), have labelled 'depoliticisation'.³¹ Depoliticisation began in the early 1970s through three methods that the New Order power-holders employed to consolidate their political position. Firstly the new government undermined the autonomy of groups that could provide substantial opposition because of their mass support in society. The political parties, large Islamic groups, professional groups and unions were weakened and brought under the control of Suharto cronies, generally through the

³⁰ Since definitions of 'discourse' and 'strategy' are provided in the introduction, only a quick review of the difference between them is included here.

³¹ Ward states: 'Far from educating Indonesia's masses within the framework of a world-view based on ideology, as is attempted by Muslims and communists, the leaders of the New Order are convinced that 'de-education' is required to rid the people of the ideological thinking that has 'poisoned' Indonesian politics since independence' (1973, p. 75).

network of functional groups (Crouch, 1978, pp. 245-72; McIntyre, 1972; Ward, 1973, pp. 70-71). Secondly the New Order elite used their position as military-bureaucratic office holders to enrich themselves and their cronies, ensuring continued support through what has been labelled a system of patrimony (Crouch, 1979; Robison, 1986). Thirdly, Suharto purged both the military and the bureaucracy of possible opposition, removing any internal opposition to his rule and appointed loyal individuals, often military officers who were reliant on his support, to important government and military positions (Bourchier, 1996, p. 151; Crouch, 1978, pp. 221-244; Ricklefs, 2001, p. 349).

The strategy of political emasculation was further pursued around the 1971 and 1977 elections in ways that reached further into Indonesian society and strengthened the political hegemony of the New Order regime and, in particular, the position of its election vehicle, GOLKAR. In 1970 the government announced that government employees must observe 'monoloyalty' to the government, preventing bureaucrats from joining political parties except GOLKAR. The doctrine of the 'floating mass', a term coined in 1971, emphasised that Indonesia's rural and working classes were not to be distracted from the task of state-led development with political involvement in parties (Anderson, 1990c, p. 115). Another barrier to political participation was the 1975 banning of all political party branches below the regency level except for a few weeks before elections, effectively preventing them forming into mass organisations capable of challenging the government (Crouch, 1978, p. 272).³² The political emasculation of Indonesian society attempted to bar political discussion from everyday life in New Order Indonesia, including in cultural and artistic expression. Themes and expressions considered 'political' were frowned on, banned and sometimes resulted in detention and even death.

Restraint of political expression was not applied uniformly to all Indonesians nor was it uniformly implemented across the period. Artists affiliated with groups considered political enemies, such as the left and Sukarno, were killed and gaoled in the 1960s and, after the release of political prisoners including many artists and writers beginning in 1979, experienced continued hostility and were excluded from their previous occupations (Hatley, 1994, pp. 247-8). Regional arts (which I explore in the fourth section)

³² The New Order regime also attempted to depoliticise students following protests before and after the 1977 elections and undertook a number of repressive measures against student groups, including the 'normalisation of campus life' policy in 1978-79 (Aspinall, 2000, p. 29).

experienced an immediate change in themes that Hatley characterises as ‘depoliticisation’ (1994, pp. 229-38). In contrast to these two groups, the urban groups that had alliances with the regime when it came to power remember the years between late 1960s and the late-1970s as a time of freedom of expression. Following the *Malari* riots in 1974 the regime became less tolerant of dissent and launched another offensive again in 1978 – the crackdown on dissent mirrored the end of the coalitions that brought the New Order regime to power. From 1989, the prospect of increased ‘openness’ for discussion was raised by New Order figures and there were some encouraging signs that there was room for freedom of expression (Bourchier, 1996, pp. 258-63; Hatley, 1994, pp. 244-5).³³ However, the 1990 banning of *Teater Koma*’s play *Sukses* (Hatley, 1994, pp. 244-5) and the 1992 crackdown against the performance genre *Kethoprak Plesenden*³⁴ indicate that the expression of political dissent was still barred. Another crackdown on political activities began in 1994 with the closure of three political magazines (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 399) and the 1996 attack on Megawati Sukarnoputri and the political offices of the opposition Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrat Indonesia – PDI*).

b. Language and New Order Governmentality

One way that the New Order regime made its policies acceptable to its supporters, the political elite, the army and the broader populace was by articulating them through familiar idioms and authoritative discourses. The process of expression³⁵ made particular use of Sukarno’s concepts and expressions and Western social science through the discourse of *pembangunan* as previously explored.

The New Order regime made good use of a type of speech that Roland Barthes calls ‘myth’ (1972, pp. 109-58), which allowed the regime to represent their policies as non-political. Barthes identifies myth as the mechanism that produces ‘naturalised’ (or depoliticised) speech. Certain symbols evoke shared memory of, for instance, nationalism

³³ For a detailed account of the period of ‘openness’ including its basis in social changes and elite conflict, see Aspinall (2000, pp. 63-79).

³⁴ *Kethoprak* is a form of popular theatre in Java that developed early in the twentieth century. *Kethoprak plesedan* subverted the conventions of the genre for humorous effect and to engage in social comment and critique (Hatley, 1994, p. 256).

³⁵ By ‘process of expression’, I refer to the way that the discourses of the New Order regime were expressed through certain idioms while simultaneously altered by economic and socio-political needs. The process of expression was thus continuous and changing. The discourses are not hidden in symbols or idioms. They are transformed by them and are present for all to see. I am following the logic of Foucault, (1991b) where the introduction of a new idiom opens up possibilities of action while foreclosing others.

or a well-known story or an ethnic group. Myth is the mechanism that evokes such a memory and therefore hides the specific history of the symbol. Barthes gives the example of a picture of young African in a French uniform saluting with ‘his eyes uplifted.’ To Barthes, the picture signifies that ‘France is a great Empire, that all her sons, without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her flag’ obscuring the history of French colonialism in Africa. In his words: ‘What French imperialism obscures is also a primary language, a factual discourse which was telling me about the salute of [an African] in uniform’ (1972, p. 122). New Order discourse was replete with a ‘mythology’ of Indonesian nationalism, tradition and *pembangunan*.

Sukarno’s genius, as mentioned in the previous chapter, lay in his ability to unite diverse groups through his use of language and symbols. Strong support for Sukarno in the early years of the New Order regime concerned Suharto and his followers. They undermined popular support through repositioning Sukarno’s popular symbols of Indonesian identity. The most prominent was the *Pancasila*, which had its meaning reworked in the early years of the New Order regime such that it became one of the key ideological documents of the conservative, authoritarian state.³⁶ The 1945 Constitution was also reinterpreted through the *Pancasila* with similar emphasis (Bourchier, 1996, pp. 166-78; Ramage, 1995).³⁷ A third example is Sukarno’s concept of *gotong royong*. From a term again aimed at facilitating popular participation, under the New Order regime *gotong royong* became a way of legitimating top-down programs through its connection with an imagined indigenous lifestyle (Bowen, 1986).

c. Family Principles

The concept of *kekeluargaan* or family principles was an important element of the governmental rationality of the New Order state. Bourchier depicts the ‘spirit’ of *kekeluargaan* as one ‘of organic wholeness, harmony, stillness’ (1996, p. 164). Elsewhere, Bourchier gives a more critical description of *kekeluargaan* as ‘a word with overtones of stasis, patriarchy and a feudalistic ‘know thy place’ traditionalism’ (1998, p.

³⁶ The process has been well documented by Morfit (1981), Ramage (1995, pp. 10-44) and Bourchier (1996, pp. 162-166).

³⁷ Ramage also notes the way that oppositional groups have developed their own competing understandings of the *Pancasila* (1995, pp. 45-74, 156-83).

204).³⁸ The basis of *kekeluargaan* is an idealised model of traditional Indonesian society drawn from Dutch *adat* scholarship.³⁹

Kekeluargaan became a state model for Indonesian society in three different locations.⁴⁰ Firstly, *kekeluargaan* establishes relationships within the family. The standard text for indoctrinating schoolchildren, *Pancasila Moral Education* (PMP), states:

In the family there is a feeling of mutual consideration and empathy. The father works in the interests of the whole family. Your mother cares for your father and all the children. Often your father puts the needs of his family above his own needs. He postpones buying himself shoes because he has to buy your schoolbag. It is the same with your mother... Father and mother see you and the interests of the family as more important than their own. How happy is a household with such a mother and father. (*Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan*, 1984 in Bouchier, 1996, p. 234)

A second location is the community. *Kekeluargaan* reflects the notion that the traditional (and therefore authentic) Indonesian community operates without conflict and in a state of balance. Leaders are ‘spiritually united’ with their communities and ‘everyone cooperates in a spirit of community mindedness and family-ness’ (Bouchier, 1997, p. 162). The third location is the nation-state. *Kekeluargaan* became the guiding principle of the state’s relationship to society. The most obvious manifestation of ‘family principles’ at the national level is Suharto’s title as the ‘Father of Development’. According to Heryanto, this title emphasises ‘a ‘natural’ authority and over-all order’ (1988, p. 20).⁴¹

d. State/Society

A significant strategy of the New Order regime was its articulation of the relationship between state and society. The variety of ways the incorporation of society into the state has been achieved has been well documented.⁴² The point is succinctly put by David Bouchier:

³⁸ It is worth noting that Bouchier uses the term to characterise New Order era conservative indigenism (1998, p. 204).

³⁹ Parker writes: The state ideology of Indonesia ... drew upon a vision of integrated nation and state within the ideological framework of *kekeluargaan*’ (2003, p. 8). There are links between *kekeluargaan* and integralism, which was revived by the regime in the 1990s and is explored in the final section of this chapter.

⁴⁰ Bouchier identifies the terms use across a number of different sites. He states: ‘Family, society and state are represented as a continuum, each of them grounded in traditional values’ (1998, p. 207).

⁴¹ Kitley demonstrates that *kekeluargaan* also extended into the state-owned mass media in his analysis of the TVRI soap opera, *Keluarga Rahmat* (2000, pp. 146-77).

⁴² On corporatism in Indonesia, see MacIntyre (1994). On political parties, see Ward (1973), Ricklefs (2001, pp. 356-7,361) and Mackie and MacIntyre (1994, pp. 12-3). On legal structure (which began with

The dismantling of the party system; the corporatisation of youth, women, farmers, workers and professionals' organizations; the requirement that all social organizations submit to government supervision; and the proliferation of restrictions on the freedom to organize are all consistent with the idea of a progressive incorporation of civil society into the state. (1997, p. 176)

Michel Foucault identifies the articulation of the dividing line between state and society as an important governmental strategy (Foucault, 1991b). In the case of the New Order regime, the state's agenda was considered paramount, and civil society was considered important because it was a means to achieve that agenda. The dividing line between state and society was blurred through representing the interests of the state and civil society as organically linked. However, in practice the regime would not allow civil society to challenge its articulation of the national interest. Authorities sought to impose a high degree of regulation on the institutions of civil society (including intervening in appointments and banning organisations) and any actions that authorities considered a critique of state action or a barrier to the achievement of state goals were labelled antisocial and anti-Indonesian. The New Order's articulation of the state-society relationship, like *kekeluargaan*, was used to justify the repression discussed in the previous sections. These two discourses, while underlying the institutional configuration developed in the 1970s, were reasserted in the 1990s in the form of integralism which is discussed in the final section.

Exploring the discourses and strategies that have informed cultural policy provides a partial picture of how the New Order regime understood the task of government. Philpott writes:

The techniques, technologies and rationalities of the New Order were a particular form of governmentalisation of the state, with 'development' as its leitmotiv. This entails thinking about New Order authoritarianism as an activity that made government thinkable and practicable as an art dependent upon particular knowledges to give form to the domain it sought to govern, rather than treating it in institutional terms. (2000, p. 167)

Cultural policy was given shape within the New Order regime's governmental rationality. When the New Order regime came to power in 1965-66 it erased many of the discourses that had informed cultural policy since independence and in particular during Guided Democracy. Gone was the political mobilisation, the concept of 'national identity' and

MPRS Resolution No.XX/1966), see Bouchier (1996, pp. 165-78). On the parliament, see Feith's discussion of the March 1968 MPRS session (1968).

the goal of creating a socialist society that had been at the centre of cultural policy since 1959.

The new justification for cultural policy was culture's role in *pembangunan*, which became a key governmental discourse in 1969 and remained important across all portfolios for the regime's duration. Depoliticisation was an important tool of the regime that was enforced in conjunction with *pembangunan* and justified through *kekeluargaan* and the related conceptualisation of the relationship between state and society. Depoliticisation severely limited the cultural practices of all groups, although some periods within the New Order era offered particular groups more room for cultural expression than others. In particular, the early New Order period from 1966 until the late-1970s provided contemporary artists who had been amongst its supporters a space where they could practice their arts with a degree of freedom than had been absent since the early 1950s, as I explore in the next section. The freedom for this group was curtailed in 1978 and, despite promises of 'openness' in the late 1980s, was restricted until Suharto fell in 1998. Similarly, New Order language was asserted more vigorously at different times, in particular the late 1970s and 1980s. For instance, in 1982-84 Suharto successfully pushed for the *Pancasila* to be made the sole philosophical basis (*azas tunggal*) of all socio-political organisations in the face of complaints from Islamic and other groups (Mackie & MacIntyre, 1994, pp. 15,31).

Although the regime has often been represented as making decisions independently from non-state actors, official cultural policy was also influenced by non-state groups and cultural workers. During the early part of the New Order period when these groups were at their most popular and energetic, their ideas and agendas exerted some influence over cultural debate and discourses.

3. The Indonesian Arts Community and the New Order Regime

Universal Humanism and the New Order Regime

The term *universal humanism* was constructed during the debates about the life and works of Chairil Anwar, a young poet active in Jakarta during the Indonesian War of

Independence, and a group of poets and writers that surrounded him (Foulcher, 1993a).⁴³ A loose-knit group of cultural workers who were colleagues of Chairil issued a statement the year after Chairil's death in 1949 known as the *Gelanggang* Testimony of Beliefs (*Surat Kepercayaan Gelanggang*). They made their commitment to universalism clear in the statement's opening words: 'We are the true heirs of world culture and must perpetuate this culture in our own way.'⁴⁴ The concept of humanism, defined as 'a conviction that the problems of humanity start within universal human nature' (Foulcher, 1993b, p. 240) was also attributed to Chairil in articles written after his death. In 1951, H.B. Jassin, a literary critic later closely involved with *Manikebu*, defined the term universal humanism to summarise the rationale of Chairil and the other writers of what was becoming known as the Generation of '45 (Foulcher, 1993b, p. 241). As the radical challenge strengthened, universal humanism, understood slightly differently in the 1960s as the assertion that 'the autonomy of the individual artist, free from political involvement, was the precondition for genuine aesthetic achievement' (Foulcher, 1993a, p. 246),⁴⁵ became the rallying point of anti-Sukarno artists. Their position became increasingly marginalised by Sukarno, LEKRA and the PKI during the period of Guided Democracy.

As was discussed briefly in the last chapter, in September 1963 the magazine *Sastra* printed *Manikebu*, which outlined the opposition of a group of twenty-one 'universal humanist' artists and writers to the then dominant radical nationalist position. The signatories included Jassin, Wiratmo Soekito, Trisno Sumardjo, Goenawan Mohamad, Arief Budiman and Taufiq Ismail (Mohamad, 1993, p. 12). As discussed in the previous chapter, the artists who were affiliated with LEKRA or supported Sukarno attacked the document and the signatories suffered from the reprisals until the start of the New Order regime. From this marginalised position at the end of 1963, the *Manikebu* group and its creed of universal humanism would in three years come to dominate the arts community in Indonesia. The supporters of universal humanism (from now on referred to as universal humanists) were at their most united in opposition to radical nationalism after the publication of the *Manifes Kebudayaan (Manikebu)* in 1963 and during the early years of

⁴³ 'Universal humanism' has a complex and much-debated history. I provide only an outline here. See Foulcher (1993a) for a more detailed account.

⁴⁴ Translated in Foulcher (1993b, p. 241).

⁴⁵ The terms meaning has altered over time. See Foulcher (1993a, p. 247) for a discussion about the changing definition of 'universal humanism' in the 1980s and Hill (1984) on the universal humanists in the 1980s.

the New Order regime. They were a loose knit group, rather than an organised faction of modern artists, who tended to work in arts classified as ‘national’ (such as Indonesian language literature, contemporary theatre, contemporary fine arts and certain musical genres).

The first prominent alliance between the army and universal humanists occurred around the time *Manikebu* was signed. The significance and extent of the contacts is a widely contested point (Foulcher, 1986, pp. 124-6; D. T. Hill, 1984, pp. 33, fn. 66; Maier, 1987, p. 24; Mohamad, 1988, pp. 10-15).⁴⁶ However, all commentators agree that the army sponsored and facilitated a national conference for writers (*Konferensi Karyawan Pengarang Indonesia*) in the middle of the ongoing debates in March 1964. The universal humanists aligned themselves with the army against the groups that supported Sukarno. In the face of ferocious attacks, it is neither surprising nor unjustified for the universal humanists to seek protection from the only group powerful enough to resist the PKI, LEKRA, Sukarno and their allies. As such, the *Manikebu* had a ‘political function’. David Hill reports Arief Budiman’s statement to a conference about *Manikebu* in October 1982 that the ‘manifesto could not be seen as neutral for it was a rallying point for the anti-Communists who sought military support for their ideological position’ (D. T. Hill, 1984, p. 33). Universal humanism and the military had established an important point of contact.

The alignment became more concrete in the dramatic atmosphere of Jakarta in the days following the attempted coup. Universal humanist artists became closely aligned with young artists associated with the student movement and the modernising intellectuals discussed above. PKI had always struggled to gain the support of the university-educated who predominantly came from elite families and considered the PKI particularly responsible for the corruption and hypocrisies of Guided Democracy (McVey, 1990, p. 20). An example of the nexus between the three groups is the literary magazine *Horison*, which began publication in July 1966.⁴⁷ *Horison* has been described as ‘the literary vanguard of the then student movement’ (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 252). Positioning itself as

⁴⁶ Although not all of the signatories were connected with the military, some have since acknowledged their ties. Wiratmo Sukito, the primary author of *Manikebu*, later admitted to working ‘voluntarily’ for the secret service of the armed forces in the time leading up to and following *Manikebu* (Soekito, 1981; 1982) in (D. T. Hill, 1984, p. fn66).

⁴⁷ The information on *Horison* is taken from D. T. Hill (, 1993b, pp. 252-5).

humanist and the defender of creative freedom, *Horison* was stridently anti-Sukarno and anti-communist.⁴⁸ The editorial board consisted of signatories of *Manikebu* (Jassin, Zaini, Taufiq Ismail, and Arief Budiman) and was headed by the similarly inclined Mochtar Lubis (D. T. Hill, 1993a). The poetry of Taufiq Ismail, himself a student, became the catch-cry of the 1966 student movement, where he was prominent at rallies and in the press. Similar commitments to Western models of artistic and social development cemented links between the groups which were initially built on increasing unease with Sukarno's radical nationalist policies. After being marginalised within Sukarno's national front, both groups rose to prominence during the brutal dismantling of the communist organisations and were initially aligned with the New Order regime.

Points of Agreement, Points of Disagreement

The universal humanists and the New Order regime were not comfortable companions. Universal humanism's commitment to artistic integrity and the importance it placed on independence did not sit easily beside the New Order regime's ideal of a servile and politically inactive populace. After the initial alignment, some artists began to criticise the regime in the late 1960s for human rights abuses of their former adversaries, alongside the changing attitudes of the modernising intellectuals (Southwood & Flanagan, 1983, pp. 175-81). The New Order regime tolerated a degree of dissent from some of their former supporters. For instance, Rendra's popular, politically-critical poetry was tolerated in the 1970s. However, the changed political climate after the national elections in 1977 led to a clamping down on dissent; Rendra was jailed in 1978 then banned from public performance for seven years (Hatley, 1994, pp. 228-9). Arief Budiman was also consistently critical of the state in the national press from the late 1960s, as were other artists and intellectuals.

The actions of the politically active universal humanists at this time can be characterised as *dissidence* or tolerated political dissent from former allies within defined boundaries.⁴⁹ Much like the student movement, they saw themselves as a 'moral force' rather than a political force. They were allowed to operate within a 'dissident niche', albeit one that narrowed considerably until the period of 'openness' (*keterbukaan*) beginning in the late

⁴⁸ Some observers saw *Horison* as a continuation of *Sastra*, where *Manikebu* was published (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 252).

⁴⁹ I take the idea of dissidence from Aspinall (2000, pp. 36-42).

1980s. Their opposition was a ‘purely expressive politics’ (Linz, 1975, p. 213 in Aspinall, 2000, p. 37) that did not focus on transformation of the social order, mass mobilisation or the development of politically active groups.⁵⁰ Of course, it should be remembered that many supporters of universal humanism did not publicly demonstrate any political commitment at all, either in their work or otherwise. When a universal humanist made a political statement, she or he did so as an individual rather than as a representative of a particular group.

The rise of the universal humanists is historically associated with the rise of the New Order regime. Political links were established around *Manikebu* and the universal humanists’ support of the new regime was initially forthright and adamant in the hope of establishing a free environment for artistic expression. They gained support from the regime through the institutionalisation of their position and their acceptance as a valid (although at times a barely tolerated) element of Indonesian society. They also shared some commonalities with the regime’s methods of governance. Particularly notable are: (1) their disavowal of mass-politics; (2) the apolitical position of many of the universal humanists; (3) their artistic aesthetics that gave preference to spiritually uplifting art (a version of which was adopted within the cultural policy of the new regime discussed in the next chapter) and (4) their opposition to communism. While not linked to the political program of the regime to the extent of LEKRA and LKN under Sukarno, they were allowed to dominate the arts community for many years and received institutional support through positions in universities and arts colleges, government grants and access that was denied to ex-radical nationalists.⁵¹

The Ismail Marzuki Arts Centre: a ‘Cultural Oasis’

An important instance of the institutionalisation of universal humanism was the establishment of the Ismail Marzuki Arts Centre (*Taman Ismail Marzuki – TIM*). TIM immediately became the most prominent performance venue in Indonesia after its creation in 1968 and hosted more performances and audiences than any other venue in

⁵⁰ Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan would call them ‘loyal opposition’ (other examples are student movements and the Legal Aid Institute – *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum*) because they accept the ‘basic fact of the New Order system of power’, while arguing for particular institutional reforms (1983, pp. 205-6).

⁵¹ Hill writes: ‘By 1968 ... [artists] who shared the values of the political force which swept aside all leftist opposition gained government blessing and established their cultural hegemony from a base in the capital’ (1984, p. 1).

Indonesia in the 1970s.⁵² It was the location of numerous national festivals and conferences, the most popular theatre and dance performances and widely-reported discussions of the arts and culture.⁵³ TIM was the creation of Major-General Ali Sadikin, the Sukarno-appointed governor of Jakarta⁵⁴ and the artists associated with *Manikebu*.⁵⁵ The universal humanists dominated the *formateur* committee, the Jakarta Academy (*Akademi Jakarta – AJ*), the Jakarta Arts Council (*Dewan Kesenian Jakarta – DKJ*) and the DKJ Daily Worker’s Council which were formed to organise and run TIM. In accordance with universal humanist principles, the involved artists desired, as stated in the program for TIM’s official inauguration, a cosmopolitan centre of artistic creativity and freedom where ‘nevermore the arts will be subject to and tool of political bickering and suppression’⁵⁶ (‘Peresmian Pusat Kesenian Jakarta Taman Ismail Marzuki,’ 1968, p. 26), leading one prominent artist to label TIM a ‘cultural oasis’.⁵⁷ This metaphor gains a darker edge when considering the brutal events that surrounded TIM’s construction, the absence of the left and changes in community art forms discussed in the next section.

According to LIPI researcher Bisri Effendi, the three problems that dominated discussions of the establishment of TIM were (1) the threat of left-wing artists’ involvement in TIM; (2) concern about bureaucratic intervention; and (3) the problems of shaping and managing a cultural centre (2001, p. 677). The first concern is reflected in the enforced absence from TIM for many years of artists who supported Sukarno (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 250). Although many universal humanists appear to have easily reconciled the apparent contradiction of artistic freedom with limiting expression, the exclusion of these artists did not sit easily alongside other universal humanists’ commitment to freedom of expression. For instance, Arief Budiman’s article in *Kompas* criticises TIM

⁵² Goenawan Mohamad states that TIM had 500 000 visitors in 1970 (1993, p. 111).

⁵³ Hill (1993b, p. 245) and Hatley (1994, p. 221) both confirm TIM’s centrality to the arts in New Order Indonesia.

⁵⁴ Despite Sadikin’s connection with Sukarno, he remained governor of Jakarta until 1977. After his term, Sadikin became more openly critical of the New Order regime and was a prominent signatory of the critical ‘Petition of Fifty’ in May 1980.

⁵⁵ The process of TIM’s creation has been reviewed a number of times. See Effendi (2001), Hill (1993b), and Mohamad (1993, pp. 105-116). For the official view, see Murgiyanto (1994b).

⁵⁶ Other statements in the program confirm the centrality of universal humanism. For instance: ‘The aim of today is to free artistic life forever of depressing trends of the past and to promote instead the socio-artistic climate that knows no political occupation and recognises the artist’s real responsibilities’ (‘Peresmian Pusat Kesenian Jakarta Taman Ismail Marzuki,’ 1968, p. 25). Goenawan Mohamad’s discussion of TIM in 1977 is another example, based as it is around an (often unflattering) assessment of TIM’s achievement of its goal of ‘creative freedom’ (*kemerdekaan kreativitas*) (1993, pp. 105-116).

⁵⁷ Playwright, actor and author Umar Kayam used this term to refer to TIM in 1989 (Wahono, 1994a, p. 47).

for excluding the left from the new arts institutions (1969). Referring to the spectre of the left despite its recent decimation may also have been aimed at assuring the New Order regime of the new centre's political stance.

The second issue was not so easily resolved. While Sadikin was governor, artists enjoyed a large degree of creative freedom thanks to his financial and political patronage, although on occasions Sadikin himself intervened to request the banning of performances, (Mohamad, 1993). However, a change of governor brought new political and financial pressures to TIM, changing the ecology of the 'cultural oasis'.⁵⁸ The state, through the Jakarta provincial government, increasingly intervened in DKJ appointments, using its authority to influence inclusion and exclusion in the premier national performance space. Still greater interventions followed in the 1980s and 1990s. While Hazil Tanzil was General Manager of TIM (1982-1990), he brought TIM into line with the system of human resource management employed by the Province of Jakarta and made TIM workers civil servants (Murgiyanto, 1994a, p. 70). In 1991, management of TIM was taken away from the original management team of TIM, the Jakarta Arts Council (*Dewan Kesenian Jakarta – DKJ*), and given to the Jakarta Arts Foundation (*Yayasan Kesenian Jakarta*), which was formed in 1989 in an attempt to address funding shortfalls through collaboration with the private sector (Gondomono & Murgiyanto, 1994, p. 62; Wahono, 1994b, p. 53).⁵⁹

However, government intervention did not reduce, but instead reinforced the dominance of universal humanism. Hill writes:

Despite sporadic friction between the DKJ and the government, ostensibly of the 'independence' of TIM, the existence of the Arts Centre, none the less, is a sign of official government backing for a stream of Indonesian culture which has become dominant after the destruction of the left in 1966. Having gained government blessing and funding for their Arts Centre, these artists dominated 'New Order' Indonesian literary and artistic life from their base in the national centre of the performing arts. (1993b, p. 250)

Despite the ideas of universal humanists and their institutional strength relative to other groups, having an artistic space run by artists has not produced a popular version of national culture. Instead, after initial successes,⁶⁰ art in TIM has been increasingly

⁵⁸ On state intervention in TIM see Hill (1993b, pp. 248-51) and Mohamad (1993, pp. 105-116).

⁵⁹ These changes are examined in greater detail in chapter six while analysing the Jakarta Arts Council.

⁶⁰ See, in particular, Keith Foulcher's exploration of a revival of *Lenong* theatre in TIM that attracted an audience from the Jakartan working class and young middle class students (2004).

isolated from the populace and cultural provision has been increasingly dominated by commercial enterprise (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 256). TIM itself has not operated within a vacuum, separated from broader social change. Declining attendance figures in the 1980s and 1990s forced TIM to open itself to commercial ventures such as a cinema complex and craft shops; its management became increasingly oriented towards attracting private capital (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 251). Additionally, the views of the universal humanists (which were engrained in much of the arts establishment) were challenged by the development of alternative perspectives, such as the New Art Movement (Supangkat, 1990, pp. 161-2; 1994) and contextual literature (*sastra kontekstual*) (Foulcher, 1987).⁶¹

While universal humanism was not ‘deployed’ by the New Order regime, universal humanists did play a role in filling the cultural space created by the erasure of the elements of the arts community affiliated with the left and Sukarno. As a discourse that generated a set of ideas about culture, universal humanism generated its own understandings about the role of artists and cultural expression in society that can be differentiated from the New Order regime’s governmental discourses. However, the relationship between the supporters of universal humanism and the New Order regime created points of contact and mutual support that should not be ignored. The universal humanists had no qualms in representing the annihilation of the left as deserved and moved quickly to suppress their legacy by asserting their own version of history and ideas about culture. Also important is the overlap between features of universal humanism and the regime’s methods of governance that facilitated the adoption of elements of universal humanism, such as a commitment to spiritually uplifting art and freedom from politics (but not freedom of political or creative expression), into the New Order regime’s cultural policies that I discuss in the next chapter. The universal humanists were at their most influential between the late 1960s and late-1970s when the regime was formulating its cultural policy. Decline was brought by the crackdown on political dissent in the late 1970s, declining attendance figures and increasing provincial encroachment in TIM and challenges from alternative perspectives in the arts. However, proponents of universal humanism continued to dominate the arts establishment (including continued involvement in TIM), while politically critical art was further

⁶¹ For a discussion of cultural expression in Indonesia during the New Order period with a focus on the state of critical cultural practices, see Hatley (1994). Hatley demonstrates that political art was still being performed, albeit in a marginalised position.

marginalised. Throughout this time, New Order economic policy opened Indonesia to international companies and the economy began to boom. The marketplace increasingly became the provider of cultural goods for the majority of Indonesians in the 1980s and 1990s, which I explore in section five below.

4. Indigenous Ethnic Cultures

The third element of cultural policy I discuss differs from the previous two in that it is not a set of discourses or strategies like New Order governance or universal humanism. Instead, indigenous ethnic culture is considered here as an important issue where cultural identity is contested and shaped. Previous discussions of indigenous ethnic identity in this thesis have demonstrated that it has been an important element of governance since the colonial era. Indigenous ethnic culture became one of the central focal points of New Order era cultural policy, surpassing even its importance during Guided Democracy. This section explores the historical continuities and breaks between previous eras and the New Order era regarding how ethnic cultures were used in governmental programs. I explore two areas: regional art forms and official representations of cultural pluralism.

Regional Art Forms

Due to the traumatic events at the beginning of the New Order era, many regional art forms went into hiatus, particularly within Java, until the early 1970s. Before 1965, political parties made use of the links between communities and local arts in their attempts to build support and consensus for their programs. The scale and viciousness of the attacks following 1965 caused many artists to fear for their lives if they had affiliations, however tenuous,⁶² or even if their art form had been affiliated with leftist organisations.⁶³ When troupes began performing again in the early 1970s, they did so with bureaucratic or military backing (Effendi, 1998, p. 213; Hatley, 1994, pp. 220,230;

⁶² The experiences of a female shadow puppeteer (*dalang*), Bardijati, demonstrate the extent of the repression (Antariksa, 2001). Bardijati was popular in Central Java before 1965. She was a member of LEKRA, but, it should be noted, was not familiar with LEKRA ideology and was not a LEKRA leader. Bardijati and her husband were arrested four days after Gestapu, were jailed for eighteen months; and many of her possessions including her puppets and gamelan were permanently 'borrowed' by the military (Antariksa, 2001, p. 13). She was not allowed to perform again until receiving official authorisation in 1976. From this time until today she has not received the recognition and income that her talents previously brought her.

⁶³ See Hatley (1994, pp. 220,229-30), Effendi (1998, pp. 211-3), Widodo (1995, pp. 10-11) and Hefner (1987, p. 91) for reports on the influence of the political events of 1965 on regional arts.

van Groenendael, 1985, pp. 140-151). The state replaced the political parties as an important sponsor of the regional arts and began to increasingly intervene in performance techniques. Performance texts also became increasingly aligned with the regime's priorities. An insight into the regime's role for regional arts can be gained from the six ethical rules from the *dalang* association *Ganasidi*, formed on 12 July 1969.⁶⁴ *Ganasidi* itself was an initiative of Major General Surono, the commander for Central Java and the Special District of Yogyakarta (van Groenendael, 1985, p. 145), who had the desire to guard *dalangs* 'against future political errings [and] improve the level of the art and performance style ... so that these might make a positive contribution to the development of the Indonesian people' (van Groenendael, 1985, p. 146).

Regional art forms were altered by their use as a means of communication between the regime and ordinary citizens. The alteration of regional art forms occurred because of three interlinked processes. Firstly, as was demonstrated above, content was directly altered through the insertion of *pembangunan* slogans and lessons. The military (Hatley, 1994, pp. 229-31) and the Directorate of Culture ensured that 'actors and singers incorporate government messages into their speeches and song lyrics' (Yampolsky, 1995, p. 711). Secondly, the regime discouraged political topics and discussion. Political themes were erased⁶⁵ and replaced with generic, inoffensive stories and *pembangunan* messages. Thirdly, a broad process of improvement took place, including reduced performance time, use of Indonesian language and the alteration of elements that were considered 'immoral'. Philip Yampolsky characterises 'respectability' as the 'essence of the notion of upgrading artistic quality' (1995, p. 711). These changes have been

⁶⁴ *Dwi-Warsa Ganasidi's Six Ethical Rules* (Ganasidi, 1971) in (van Groenendael, 1985):

1. In the fulfilment of his duty as a counsellor and educator, the *dalang* is the servant of the people. As a provider of healthy entertainment, it is his duty firstly to support the people in its struggle to achieve social well-being and security, and secondly to boost the morale of the Indonesian people.
2. As the servant of his country, it is the *dalang's* duty to give precedence to the National Interest by honouring the *Pancasila* and the Constitution of 1945 and obeying and observing their injunctions in conformity with the government's policy.
3. As a servant to the Indonesian culture, that is to say, as someone devoted to the preservation of its originality and purity, the *dalang* is bound to do his utmost for and assist in the development of his arts, in harmony with the advancement of the Indonesian people.
4. In his private life, it is the *dalang's* duty to guard the dignity of his office and put his art into practice, as well as to devote his energies to the mastering of all the facets of his art.
5. As leader of the performance, it is the *dalang's* duty to watch over the morals of his company, in addition to honouring and defending his culture.
6. It is the *dalang's* duty to promote cooperation and harmony between artists and to avoid all that is likely to conduce to conflict.

⁶⁵ Hatley discusses the 'depoliticisation' of *Wayang* and *Kethoprak* (1994, pp. 234-7).

discussed at length elsewhere⁶⁶ and are returned to in the next chapter and in both of the case studies in Part II of the thesis.

While the New Order regime was working hard to erase the discourses of Guided Democracy, its model for managing indigenous ethnic cultures was quite similar. A process of improvement including a concern with morality remained central to the regime's treatment of regional cultural forms and slogans continued to be inserted into performances. McVey identifies this process as a continuation of a middle-class reform agenda linked to the urban culture of the politically powerful (1986, pp. 40-2). Art forms that expressed regional and national identity could not be seen in either era to include 'immoral' or 'backward' behaviour, invoking a range of cultural programs discussed in the next chapter. Where Guided Democracy and the New Order differed was not in their methods, but in two other important respects. Firstly, the normative model that lay at the heart of their treatment of regional cultural forms rejected Sukarno's overtly political priorities and privileged the political priorities of *pembangunan*. Instead of encouraging involvement with achieving political goals and the achievement of a socialist society, regional art forms were to encourage a focus on economic development and an acceptance of the social hierarchy. Secondly, the resources they invested in regional cultural programs far outstripped previous political regimes and were applied across a much longer time period.

New Order Pluralism and Taman Mini

Indonesia's diversity, with its multiple potentials for conflict and intractable differences, presented a particularly tricky problem for the new regime. How could they acknowledge Indonesia's obvious pluralism while preventing discord and the rise of regional powers based on cultural groupings? Keith Foulcher argues that 'region' is incorporated into national culture through appropriation of the visual and decorative traditions as evidence of the harmony of 'national' and 'regional' cultures (1990, pp. 302-3). The representation of pluralism through decorative traditions performs two important functions. Firstly, the process removes pluralism from the political field and places it in the cultural field, stripping it of political content and reducing the possibility of political mobilisation. Secondly, the process of representation was an important method of inculcating the New

⁶⁶ For a discussion of these kinds of changes, see also Widodo (1995), Effendi (1998), Acciaioli (1985) and Weintraub (2001).

Order model of pluralism into the population as part of the nationing process. Cultural institutions, through their representations of Indonesian cultural diversity, taught Indonesians what it meant to be Indonesian. Cultural institutions played an important role in disseminating lessons about being Indonesian in the New Order era. A particularly high-profile example of such an institution in Indonesia is the ‘Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature’ Theme Park (*Taman Mini Indonesia Indah – Taman Mini*).

Taman Mini was opened on 20 April 1975. Students had protested against the building of *Taman Mini* because of its extravagance in a time of economic hardship for many Indonesians (Pemberton, 1994b, pp. 241-6). Its stated purpose was to educate Indonesians about their nation and themselves. At *Taman Mini*’s opening, Suharto said:

By visiting this park we will know ourselves better, we will know our nation better and we will love our motherland more. Therefore the ‘Beautiful Indonesia’ Park is also a real effort to strengthen national development, now and in the future. (Writers-Group, 1978, p. 9, in Acciaioli, 1996, p. 39)

Similarly the Minister for Education and Culture, Daoed Yoesoef, in a speech at its sixth anniversary, defined *Taman Mini* as a ‘cultural park’ in that it contributes to cultural growth ‘towards civilisation’ and an ‘educational park’ in that it illustrates ‘the unity-in-diversity-ness of the values we revere’ (1981/82, pp. 6-7).⁶⁷

Taman Mini has been analysed repeatedly in order to demonstrate the New Order state’s construction of national culture with similar conclusions (Acciaioli, 1996; Errington, 1997; Hellman, 1999, pp. 48-60; Pemberton, 1994b). Acciaioli’s article ‘Pavilions and Posters’ provides a sustained analysis of the park’s representations of regional cultures in its geography, displays, and posters and finds similarities in their representations about Indonesia. From a relatively close representation to regional forms in Java, Sumatra and Bali, the representations become increasingly homogenous as the ethnic group is situated further from the ‘cultural centre’ (which coincides in the *Taman Mini* itself with its geographical location of the ethnic group further from the centre the park). Acciaioli argues:

[*Taman Mini*] constructs the generic Indonesian, and presents all the local variety of Indonesian cultures as regional variations, defined by administrative divisions in matters of detail, upon basic shared themes, the purported ‘local genius’ or basic cultural substratum of Indonesianness. What diversity is evident is generated centrally, permitted embroidery upon an homogenised broadcloth dictated by

⁶⁷ Joesoef uses the phrase ‘*nilai-nilai ke-bhinneka-tunggal-ika-an nilai-nilai yang kita hayati*’ (1981/82: 7).

government officials bent on constructing a generic type, whether of abode or costume, promulgating the message of sameness rather than difference. (1996, p. 39)

Pluralism is sanitised and produced for Indonesians to internalise and foreigners to absorb.⁶⁸

Benedict Anderson notes the similarities in New Order pluralism to the cultural management promoted by Dutch colonial policy. The reasons he gives for the regime's 'strong support for conservative ethnolinguistic community leaderships' centre around preventing strong, coherent oppositional movements from forming (1987b, p. 77). However, New Order cultural pluralism was more than a 'Machiavellian policy of divide and rule' (Anderson, 1987b, p. 77). By inscribing a hierarchy within ethnic cultural forms and practices, New Order cultural pluralism had the model of the regime's ideal cultural subject inscribed within it. Cultural institutions, such as *Taman Mini*, were governmental in that they taught lessons about both being Indonesian and the relationship between different indigenous ethnic populations and between indigenous ethnicity and the nation.

The construction of regional cultures became the vehicle for New Order cultural pluralism and an important focus for New Order governance. Regional cultures both managed populations through inculcating lessons about the proper relationship between ethnic groups and their place in the nation, as well as disseminating lessons to individuals about morality, and proper conduct. The New Order regime's model of indigenous ethnic identity was a reforming discourse. As indigenous cultural forms increasingly became the focus of cultural programs, they were subject to greater observation and alteration in an effort to make them accord with the discursive formation that surrounded them. However, the outcomes desired by the regime were not guaranteed. Indonesian society may have been increasingly targeted through programs, but it was not a programmed society.

⁶⁸ John Pemberton's discussion of *Taman Mini* notes that it also taught lessons about the nature of power in New Order Indonesia. Through its representations of tradition, *Taman Mini* normalised hierarchical power relationships, demonstrated the proper attitude for Indonesians to take towards authority and legitimising New Order regime's authority and right to rule (1994b). There are similarities here with the notions of power inherent within *kekeluargaan* and *pembangunan* discussed in the first section.

5. Responses to Changing Social Conditions and Political Imperatives in the 1980s and 1990s

The 1980s and 1990s were a time of economic growth that led to social change through the growth of the urban middle class (Antlov, 1999; Gerke, 2000; Ricklefs, 2001, p. 384; Robison, 1996; Robison, Beeson, Jayasuriya, & Kim, 2000). The success of the New Order regime's economic policies, while providing the resources for the regime's activities and a form of legitimacy, also had two other effects that concerned the regime that were canvassed in the Introduction to this thesis: first, success led to a huge growth in circulation of consumer goods and forms of conspicuous consumption which the regime worried would offend other elements of society; and second, economic growth fed groups in the middle classes that hoped for reforms for greater freedom of expression and that would possibly lead to democracy. The growth of these groups concerned the Suharto regime, which responded through the repression of opposition⁶⁹ and through a form of 'cultural politics', which forms the subject matter of this section.⁷⁰

Marl Ricklefs writes: 'Being anti-communist, suspicious of radical Islam and in favour of capitalist-style development, Indonesia in the late 1970s was well placed to maintain the support of the United States, and therefore of other Western powers' (2001, p. 370). Ricklefs' continues to note that this gave Indonesia a degree of freedom over other internal matters such as East Timor and Aceh. However, it was also a choice to incorporate particular forms of governance, in particular market mechanisms that were viewed as desirable by Western states.⁷¹ Indonesia's economic policy changes of the 1980s reflect the regime's engagement with the international order, although the outcomes were at times far from those desired by Western states and international

⁶⁹ For a brief summary of repression in the 1980s, including the *Tanjung Priok* massacre and subsequent arrests, see Ricklefs (2001, pp. 381-2). Repression was more frequent in the 1990s, including the mid-1994 banning of three major news magazines, *Tempo*, *Detik* and *Editor*, subsequent battle through the courts (D. T. Hill, 1994, pp. 41-4) and the 1996 attack on the *PDI* headquarters and subsequent arrests and disappearances (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 403).

⁷⁰ Another important change was the growth of Islam and its growing importance for politics, in particular Suharto's courtship of Islamic groups. However, I have chosen not to explore this issue here due to the small impact it had on cultural policy. See Hefner (1993; 1998a; 2000) and Ricklefs (2001, pp. 379,400) for detailed analysis.

⁷¹ Hindess suggests that liberal political thought views the market as a 'powerful instrument of civilisation' that has been constructed 'as a matter of deliberate policy, by a number of powerful states and supra-national agencies' (2002, p. 135). Hindess argues that by engaging in the international system of states and, in particular, the international market, newly independent states such as Indonesia are placed within a hierarchy of states that compares them to Western liberal-democratic norms and pushes them towards 'good governance' (2002, p. 139).

economic institutions (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, pp. 71-102). When oil prices fell after 1982, the regime responded through a process of deregulation (including the financial sector), catalysing increased investment from both domestic and international financiers (H. Hill, 2000, pp. 76-8). The most prominent and sustained manufacturing boom of the New Order era began with the economic policy change of the mid-1980s. This change was aimed at fostering export-oriented growth and encouraging private investment. The boom lasted until the economic crisis in 1997.⁷² Industrialisation had transformed Indonesia's economy which, by the mid-1980s, had become dependent on private investment and business. However, business remained dependent on the regime for opportunities and was precluded from exerting pressure for reforms that would damage the private interests of the power-holding elite (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, pp. 69-144).⁷³

Table 3.1: GDP at constant 1983/93 prices (\$US million).

Year	GDP	Percentage Growth
1985	85,082	2.5
1987	94,518	4.9
1990	263,162	9.0
1991	286,765	7.2
1992	307,474	7.2
1993	329,776	7.3
1994	354,641	7.5
1995	383,792	8.2
1996	413,798	7.8
1997	433,246	4.6
1998	376,374	-13.1
1999	379,352	0.8
2000	398,017	4.9
2001	411,691	3.4
2002	426,741	3.7

Source: Asian Development Bank

⁷² Manufacturing exports grew at an annual average rate of between 20 to 30 percent from 1980 until 1996 (Asian Development Bank, 2001, pp. 176-7).

⁷³ It should also be noted that the international environment of the 1990s saw the promotion of economic imperatives over the political imperatives of the Cold War years, which allowed for increased criticism about corruption and human rights abuses (Winters, 2000).

Years of economic growth brought significant social change. Indonesia's cities were crowded and jammed full of the rewards of industrialisation: office blocks, housing estates, cars, motorbikes, mobile phones, designer clothes, their cheap imitations, shopping malls, stores, traffic jams, pollution and advertising. Between 1990 and 2000 (which includes three years of economic recession), motorcycles grew from 2.3 per 100 households to 7.7 and telephones increased from 1.3 to 10. During the same period, consumer expenditure increased by a factor of 7.6 (from 117,120 billion rupiah to 888,631 billion rupiah). The mass media also expanded, facilitating the circulation of more images, information and advertising.⁷⁴ The number of colour televisions in use grew by 89.6 percent (to over 26 million) and the number of homes having access to satellite television increased by 97.3 percent between 1995 and 2000 (Euromonitor, 2003).⁷⁵ Newspaper circulation increased by 14.3 percent for daily newspapers and 63.7 percent for non-daily newspapers between 1995 and 2000.⁷⁶ Clearly, some major social changes were taking place across Indonesia.⁷⁷

The cultural effects of the changes to the Indonesian economy received the regime's attention from the late 1970s and were increasingly criticised in the 1980s and 1990s. The most noticeable and far reaching change has been the spread of consumer culture. Ariel Heryanto, in his account of the identity politics of the new rich,⁷⁸ states:

Lifestyle and consumer culture have not simply occupied a larger slice of the nation's quantitative spending and public discourse. They have participated, to say the least, in the changing dynamics of the nation's social hierarchy, providing new profiles to the new rich, and modifying or undermining the profiles of others. Lifestyle has become a crucial site for the construction, negotiation and contestation of identity in Indonesia. (1999b, p. 178)⁷⁹

⁷⁴ For a discussion of the expansion of the mass media during the New Order era and its complex relationship to politics, power and social change, see Sen and Hill (2000).

⁷⁵ As televisions are normally watched by larger groups of people in Indonesia than Western countries (including neighbours, extended families and friends) and satellites feed more than one household (in some accounts, even hundreds), the numbers of people who are actually accessing these forms of media are probably much higher than these figure indicate.

⁷⁶ The economic crisis no doubt hampered growth during this period, but the explosion of print media following the end of the censorship practices of the New Order regime also stimulated growth.

⁷⁷ The source for all of these statistics is Euromonitor (2003).

⁷⁸ A concept Heryanto critiques but still uses (1999b, p. fn6). Richard Robison provides a careful analysis of the different groups that have been grouped under the label 'middle class' from a Marxist perspective (1996). As was noted in the Introduction, conspicuous consumption has also been adopted by members of the working class (Gerke, 2000, pp. 146-7; Murray, 1991, p. 138).

⁷⁹ See also Gerke (2000), who also emphasises the importance of consumption in Indonesia despite the impact of the economic crisis, which was not assessed in the Heryanto article.

Although Heryanto is focussed on particular strata of the population (the bourgeois and middle class), the spread of mass consumer goods and mass culture have had a far-reaching impact on Indonesia, which became more apparent as Indonesians' purchasing power increased.⁸⁰ The decision to open some sections of the Indonesian markets to international business allowed a range of goods and lifestyles into Indonesia that had previously been banned or discouraged by the Sukarno government or simply were difficult to access. The state's cultural programs had to compete (or at least coexist) with a rapidly expanding array of market-driven cultural products and practices. Economic policy and economic growth, in particular in industries centred on consumption, opened up avenues to novel cultural commodities and new subjectivities to a broader section of the population.

The regime's response to the growth of consumption was ambiguous and changed over time. From the mid-1970s, the regime moved to combat what it regarded as excessive consumption and individualism amongst middle-class Indonesians. One program it employed was a 'Simple Life Style' campaign, which began in 1974 but was reinvigorated in 1983, 1986 and mid-1993 (Heryanto, 1999b, pp. 177-8). Although targeted at the lifestyles of the upper class, the campaigns claimed only a few scapegoats, who were state officials, never the privately employed. Another attempt to limit the influence of commerce was the ban on television advertising on the state station TVRI. When he announced the ban, Suharto said that his reasons were 'to focus television more on facilitating the development programs and to avoid the detrimental effects [of advertising] which do not promote the spirit of development' (Kitley, 2000, p. 64). Philip Kitley places the ban on advertising in the broader political context where there was a widespread dislike of foreign companies and investors who tended to dominate television advertising; allowing such advertising to continue could have left Suharto open for attack by Islamic groups during the 1982 election campaign (2000, pp. 63-72). Kitley writes:

The advertising ban was linked to a polemic that constructed foreign capitalism as materialistic and based on assumptions and a way of life inimical to idealised principles of Indonesian national culture. (2000, p. 69)

Advertising remained off the airwaves until August 1990, when two commercial stations opened in Jakarta.

⁸⁰ Consumption was increasing rapidly during this period. Between 1988 and 1996, private consumption increased at an average rate of 8.9 percent yearly (Asian Development Bank, 2001, pp. 170-1).

By the 1990s, the regime was taking credit for the Indonesians' increased capacity to consume brought by its liberal market policies (Heryanto, 1999b, pp. 164-6). However, the regime also felt that the pressures brought by these changes raised issues of concern. In addition to concerns about the compatibility of the new lifestyles with conservative cultural discourses and *pembangunan*, the regime was also concerned that the uneven division of the spoils of economic growth could cause unrest amongst the Indonesian poor and working class. The state responded through efforts (some sincere) to combat the economic imbalance between rich and poor (and also indigenous/Muslim and Chinese/Christian owned business, Hefner, 1998b) through financial assistance, loans, and corporate partnerships (Heryanto, 1999b, pp. 164-5; Yoon, 1991).

A third area of concern for the regime was the political commitments of the new rich. As David Bourchier notes 'rapid growth of the middle classes ... together with the accelerative integration of Indonesia with the global economy and the ending of the Cold war led to increased pressure on the government to loosen its grip and extend political rights to vocal sections of the population' (1998, p. 212). The regime responded through asserting 'Indonesian values'. Through Indonesian values, the regime critiqued liberalism, individualism and excessive consumption through the revival of conservative indigenous discourses. The relationship among Indonesia, conspicuous consumption and the Asian values debate was discussed in the Introduction. Here I explore a specific example of 'Indonesian values' that Bourchier identifies as the regime's response to the pressures caused by the growing middle class: the return of integralism.

Integralism's intellectual heritage dates back to Dutch *adat* scholarship in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and has similarities to the Japanese occupying administration (Bourchier, 1996; 1997).⁸¹ The 'central point of reference for all discussion about integralist ideology in Indonesia' is a speech by constitutional lawyer Raden Supomo in 1945 as Indonesia was preparing for independence (Bourchier, 1997, p. 159). Supomo differentiated integralism from individualism⁸² and class theory⁸³ before defining it as a theory where 'the state was committed not to individual rights or particular classes but to society conceived of as an organic whole' (Bourchier, 1997, pp.

⁸¹ It has also been argued that integralism has a basis in indigenous thought (Reeve, 1985).

⁸² By individualism, Supomo meant Hobbes, Locke, Spencer and Rousseau.

⁸³ Marx, Engels and Lenin.

160-1). Supomo, and prominent New Order figures that followed him, including Moertopo, military lawyer Sudharmono⁸⁴ and conservative historian and Minister of Education and culture (1983-5) Nugroho Notosusanto, argued that integralism was more in keeping with Indonesian identity due to its similarities with indigenous legal systems. Integralism had been largely absent from Indonesian public life from 1945 until 1965, but remained prominent in the writings of a few army ideologues.⁸⁵

Integralism allowed the regime to appeal to the conservative ideals of ‘family’, ‘community’ and ‘tradition’ in the face of calls for greater freedom and individual rights (Bourchier, 1998, p. 212). Integralism began to be pushed into the public sphere following a seminar and publication organised by Abdulkadir Besar on the eightieth anniversary of the birth of the long-time advocate of integralism, Djokosutono (Bourchier, 1996, pp. 253-4). Within three years integralism had been incorporated into the P4 courses and by the end of the decade was a common feature of the speeches and language of New Order figures (1996, pp. 254-5). Providing a political history that legitimated the absence of criticism and autocratic political strategies, it resurfaced when the regime identified that its greatest threats were no longer political Islam and communism but instead ‘liberalism and individualism’ (1998, pp. 208-9).⁸⁶ In particular, Bourchier identifies criticism of human rights abuses and calls for democratic and liberal reform based on the constitution – both of which were the products of a growing middle class (1996, p. 156). Although integralism was devastatingly critiqued by Marsillam Simanjuntak in the early-1990s (1994), references to conservative indigenous ideals continued until the regime fell in 1998.

6. Conclusion

Conservative indigenous discourses presented a version of Indonesian culture that represented hierarchical relationships as elements of an ingrained cultural heritage, justifying the patrimonial character of relationships within New Order government. Unlike Moertopo’s construction of ‘culture’ within *pembangunan*, indigenous discourses relied on the dichotomy of Western and Indonesian that divided liberal reforms from a

⁸⁴ On Sudharmono, see Bourchier (1996, pp. 179-221).

⁸⁵ Bourchier identifies Col Sutjipto SH and Lt.Col Abdulkadir Besar (1996, p. 138).

⁸⁶ However, communism did occasionally appear in the 1990s, but as a spectre rather than an organised political threat (Heryanto, 1999a).

pre-existing Indonesian culture. Although some assumptions are shared with Sukarno's notion of 'national identity', such as an association of individualism, liberalism and materialism with a Western other, culture under Suharto was used to justify a conservatism that justified and buttressed the political power of the New Order regime.

The regime's response to a changing society in the late 1980s and 1990s was to attempt to reinforce the political order and their governmental discourses. It attempted to strengthen the official 'cultural process' in the face of a broader and more pervasive cultural process unleashed by New Order economic policies. However, official discourses were increasingly out of step with the lifestyles of a large portion of the political elite, of which the most conspicuous were Suharto's children, and a growing portion of the expanding middle class. Nonetheless, the regime continued to assert the necessity of authoritarian control and utilise the discourse of *pembangunan* throughout its period of rule. Through the deployment of these discourses, the features of a normative 'authoritarian' subject were inscribed into New Order era cultural policy as I explore in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

New Order Cultural Policy: Cultural Institutions and Programs

As discussed in the last chapter, the state in the New Order era has been marked by a rapid expansion of its capabilities. Driven firstly by foreign aid and foreign investment and then the boom in oil prices, real government receipts between 1966 and 1978 grew at an average annual rate of 27 percent compared with a 21 percent average decline in receipts between 1961 and 1966 (Schiller, 1996, p. 21). In 1977-8, government expenditures were 22.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) compared with 9.3 percent of a vastly smaller GDP in 1966 (Schiller, 1996, p. 22). The growth of its resources fuelled an increasing level of state intervention into the lives of Indonesians through a rapid growth in personnel and programs.¹ Cultural policy programs received significant funding boosts as part of the rapid expansion of the Indonesian state. The state hired personnel and expanded programs to promote national culture and the arts. The Directorate of Culture was a primary beneficiary of the funding boosts.² An exploration of the trends, policies and tensions within the Directorate provides a fascinating picture of the pressures that shaped New Order era cultural policy.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section analyses trends and influences across the Directorate of Culture. In the second section, specific areas of cultural policy are assessed. The final section uses the previous discussions to assess how the characteristics of cultural policy changed across the New Order era.

¹ The interventionist state, fuelled by the boom in production in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, accompanied by an increasing commitment to shaping its subjects and society, has been labelled in Indonesian studies the *powerhouse state* (C. Geertz, 1972, p. 327; Schiller, 1996, p. 17).

² Of course the oil boom allowed for increased expenditure in other areas of cultural expression. One example is cinema. Sen writes that the early 1960s to 1980s was 'a time of increasing ... expenditure on cinema' (1994, p. 157). However expenditure increases were tied to its governmental uses. Sen writes that they accompanied by 'increasing government policy declarations, legislative initiatives [and] executive intervention' (1994, p. 157).

1. Cultural Policy Trends and Influences

Continuities and Breaks with Guided Democracy Cultural Policy

In his article ‘Old State, New Society’, Benedict Anderson (1990c) argues that an important break between policy behaviour at the end of Guided Democracy and the start of the New Order periods is the change from encouraging popular mobilisation behind nationalist policies to an overriding concern with state strength and stability. While I explore the accuracy of Anderson’s assessment for cultural policy below, there is also *prima facie* evidence of continuities in the techniques through which culture was used within governance. General evidence of culture’s continued use as a civilising tool were the continued association of culture with education and the absence of significant changes to the internal structure of the office beyond grouping the various policy-areas together within different branches.³ The major structural change of the Suharto period was the creation of the Directorate of Local Beliefs (*Direktorat Pembinaan Penghayat Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa – Ditbinyat*) which focussed on Javanese spirituality at the request of President Suharto and to the consternation of Islamic groups.⁴ The Cultural Office under Sukarno and the Directorate of Culture under Suharto both viewed culture as a necessary part of the development of Indonesia as a nation. However, the understanding of what it meant to be Indonesian and how Indonesians should behave differed considerably.

The Directorate of Culture justified its continued existence (and expenses) through a New Order version of what Toby Miller and George Yudice label ‘cultural citizenship’ (2002, pp. 24-8) or the governmental work that culture can do for the state.⁵ Cultural policy sought to teach Indonesians about Indonesia. Indonesians had to learn about the unity of Indonesian culture, about the different groups that lived together in Indonesia, how they

³ For instance, an Office of History and Anthropology existed alongside an Institute of Archaeology and National Relics from 1960 until 1975 when an Office of History and Archaeology was formed alongside a Research Institute of Archaeology and National Relics and a Research Institute of History and Culture.

⁴ The existence of *Ditbinyat*, proclaimed in a Suharto speech on 16 August 1978, was strongly criticised by the Muslim United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – PPP*) at the time and in 1997 the conservative Indonesian Committee for World Solidarity (*Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia – KISDI*) called once again for *Ditbinyat* to be abolished (AS, 1997).

⁵ Miller and Yudice use a pluralistic definition of cultural citizenship, defining it as a democratic ideal: ‘Cultural citizenship concerns the maintenance and development of cultural lineage via education, custom, language and religion, and the acknowledgement of difference in and by mainstream cultures’ (2002, p. 25). However, they also recognise that there are differences between states and the problems this throws up for advocates of cultural policy (2002, pp. 25-28).

lived together in harmony, the way that Indonesia was modernising and how modern Indonesians lived. Indonesians had to learn their history, about their own and other ethnic identities, the things the state had done and was doing for them and the proper relationship to foreign cultures and technologies. In short, Indonesians had to be taught after the Sukarno years how to be Indonesian in New Order Indonesia.

Development

The discourse of *development* was the most important organising principle of New Order era cultural policy. The prioritisation of development changed the focus of cultural policy from encouraging mobilisation behind Sukarno's political plans to build a socialist society to supporting state-led domestic growth. More importantly still, development provided an enduring cultural policy rationale that explained the purpose and goals of cultural policy to cultural bureaucrats and justified its existence as part of the broader purpose of state-led modernisation.⁶ Three elements in particular deserve our attention.

In a speech in 1978, the Minister for Education and Culture, Daoed Yoesoef, made the surprising observation that in a 'democratic' nation like Indonesia, the state should facilitate the actions of non-government organisations in undertaking cultural activities rather than organising activities itself (1978, p. 35).⁷ Yoesoef then included a significant proviso:

It must be acknowledged, in a state that is developing like Indonesia, where the non-government sector is still relatively weak in the areas of funds and facilities, the government is pushed to undertake actions in many areas, including culture. (1978, p. 35)

Harus diakui, di suatu negara yang sedang berkembang seperti Indonesia, di mana sektor non-pemerintah masih relatif lemah di bidang dana dan fasilitas, pemerintah terdorong untuk melakukan sesuatu aksi di bidang apapun, termasuk bidang kebudayaan.

⁶ Within the Directorate of Culture, the term *pengembangan*, which also means development but in the sense of cultivation, was preferred to *pembangunan*. However, *pengembangan* subjected culture to similar instrumental usage by the regime. In a booklet outlining cultural policy, *pengembangan* clearly retains the transitive character of *pembangunan* that foregrounds human action to shape culture. It states that *pengembangan* refers to activities that 'increase quality' (*mempertinggi mutu*), 'enrich values' (*memperkaya nilai-nilai*), and 'strengthen national cultural identity' (*memperkokoh identitas budaya bangsa*) (Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1994/95, p. 14).

⁷ Yoesoef writes: 'The government in a democratic state like Indonesia does not possess the pretension or desire to itself undertake cultural actions' (1978, p. 35). (*Pemerintah di satu negara demokrasi seperti Indonesia tidak mempunyai pretensi ataupun hasrat untuk melakukan sendiri sesuatu aksi kebudayaan.*)

Indonesia's status as a 'developing nation' provided a rationale for action within the country itself, as well as defining its place within the international order. Increased state intervention in cultural policy was necessary to due to apparent deficits (that it can be assumed are relative to 'developed' countries) within society. After sixteen years of sustained economic growth, a booklet outlining the policies of the Directorate of Culture produced in 1994/95 was still emphasising that Indonesian society is 'bound by tradition that does not always support readiness and maturation to think, behave and act openly and progressively, respecting time and prepared to engage in healthy competition'.⁸ The justification for greater state intervention and control remained society's backward state of development throughout the New Order era.

Secondly, a development rationale reconstructed cultural policy as a necessary supplement to economic modernisation. A 1970 report of the Department of Education and Culture outlined the problems facing the New Order regime's goal of accelerated development. Chief among them is 'traditional elements that impede ... economic development' (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. iv). The report continued:

The value system from traditional society usually tends towards an attitude that leans towards fatalism because of development's slow growth ... Although economic improvement continues smoothly, it is obviously harder to change attitudes and mentalities to accept the relevant renewal that accompany the needs of socio-economic development and rational, realistic politics. (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. iv)

Sistim nilai dari masyarakat yang tradisional biasanya berkisar pada sikap yang mengarah kepada fatalisme oleh karena lambatnya perkembangan pembangunan... Walaupun perbaikan ekonomi berjalan lancar, tampaknya lebih sulit untuk mengubah sikap dan mental untuk menerima pembaharuan yang relevan dengan kebutuhan pembangunan sosial ekonomi dan politik yang rasional dan realistis.

Cultural policy is charged with the task of 'directing the way of thinking of Indonesian society... towards a modern outlook'.⁹ Economic development was not enough. It needed to be supported by cultural change. The state, in addition to leading economic development, was to lead cultural development. The transition to modernity also facilitated the move away from previous political and social commitments and a greater commitment to the state and state projects. Science and technology, for instance, were to

⁸ '... masyarakat Indonesia masih terikat oleh nilai-nilai tradisional yang tidak selalu mendukung kesiapan dan kematangan berpikir, bersikap dan bertindak secara terbuka dan maju, menghargai waktu, dan berani bersaing secara sehat' (Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1994/95).

⁹ '...mengarahkan alam pikiran masyarakat Indonesia... kepada sikap yang modern.' (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. v)

be integrated into Indonesian culture by the state, which was very careful not to oppose culture and science.¹⁰

The third element related to the negative effects of modernisation. A summary of cultural policy written in 1976 dramatically cautioned that modern technology, along with ‘bringing prosperity and profits, can also cause loss and, what’s more, danger for humankind’.¹¹ Modernisation could weaken social harmony and the ‘spirit’ of the nation and cause conflict.¹² Additionally, modernisation could bring ‘negative foreign influences’ that could poison national culture. A prominent aspect of New Order era cultural policy was combating the negative social changes of modernisation, such as ethnic and social conflict (which is largely explained through reference to weakened social ties).¹³ Cultural Policy did so through strengthening those elements of national culture that the New Order regime viewed as desirable. Rather than leading to specific measures, combating the negative effects of modernisation tended to be a justification for the existence of cultural policy in general with its larger goals of promoting ‘spiritual development’ and nationalism.

The 1985 UNESCO publication *Cultural Policy in Indonesia*, written by then Director-General of Culture Haryati Soebadio, confirms the importance of Indonesia’s program of development for Cultural Policy and the double-bind it presented:

On one hand, development needs a culturally congruent environment to be successful, while on the other, it also tends to bring negative side-effects in its wake, which may only be solved through cultural measures. (Soebadio, 1985, p. 12)¹⁴

Soebadio’s statement provides a short summary of the two elements of regime-led development that defined the broad goals of cultural policy across the New Order era. Yoesoef’s 1978 speech similarly defined the role of ‘cultural development’ as providing

¹⁰ A related statement was made by the Director-General of Culture Ida Bagus Mantra in 1970: ‘Hopefully the potential of science and technology that brings respite will ease the burden of bodily life and make the spiritual creativity of national cultural life prosper’ (1970, p. 4). (*‘Hendaknya potensi ilmu-pengetahuan dan teknologi yang memberi keringanan, kemudahan beban hidup jasmaniah dapat lebih memberi kesuburan pada kreativitas jiwa pribadi budaya bangsa.’*)

¹¹ ‘Teknologi modern di samping membawa kemajuan dan keuntungan dapat pula mengakibatkan kerugian dan bahkan bahaya bagi umat manusia’ (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1976, p. 5).

¹² I realise that there are conflicting goals surrounding the role of modernisation, tradition and science and technology. Competing priorities exist within the Directorate and there is often confusion about the details of a modern yet indigenous Indonesia.

¹³ See, for instance, Soebadio (1985, pp. 33-4).

¹⁴ The emphasis on the dual roles of culture mirror the ideas of Ali Moertopo analysed in the previous chapter.

an environment conducive to economic development and ameliorating its negative effects (1978).

The changing structure of Indonesian society brought by years of economic growth exerted some pressures on cultural policy, which are connected to the regime's response to the increasing penetration of Indonesia by consumer goods and lifestyles discussed in the previous chapter. Cultural policy in the 1970s and 1980s tended to emphasise the positive feature of the development discourse about culture: directing national culture to assist economic development. In the 1990s, the balance shifted towards negative features: combating negative outside influences that were considered to be weakening national culture. In the booklet *The Guidance and Development of Culture (Pembinaan dan Pembangunan Kebudayaan, Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1994/95)*, the primary challenge for cultural policy was to redress the flow of Western popular culture into Indonesia. The booklet states:

The entry of values that are opposed to *Pancasila* and other lofty values through television programs from outside, films and reading materials are a threat for national cultural development. (*Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1994/95, p. 20*)

Masukya nilai-nilai yang bertentangan dengan Pancasila dan nilai-nilai luhur lainnya melalui paket acara televisi dari luar, film, dan bahan bacaan merupakan ancaman bagi pembangunan budaya nasional.

The changes in social structure that occurred during the New Order era did not evoke novel policy responses, but instead shifted the emphasis within existing policy directions, emphasising the protection of national culture against intruding influences. Nevertheless, the two features remained the same: creating a culturally-congruent environment for national development while ameliorating its negative effects.

International Connections

International cultural discourses also influenced Indonesian cultural policy. Soebadio listed six bilateral cultural agreements, a range of cooperative relationships and involvement in UNESCO programs in her 1985 UNESCO-sponsored report *Cultural Policy in Indonesia* (1985, pp. 50-8). Like the Guided Democracy period, cultural policy continued to critique of Western influence on Indonesian culture and to oppose the influx of Western popular culture. The New Order regime was willing to play the international

victim of the Western nations' strength in cultural products and information,¹⁵ while utilising developmentalist discourse within Indonesia. The New Order regime also moved quickly to reengage with the international community (Warmenhoven, 1973, p. 269), where its involvement with UNESCO and other international agreements gave legitimacy to the slippage between Indonesian national culture and the plurality of cultures that existed in Indonesia. Like Guided Democracy, national culture remained the structural imperative of cultural policy and was reinforced by Indonesia's engagement with global politics. However, there were some important differences from the preceding era.

After some goodwill was gained from the foreign policy changes of the first decade of the New Order period, Indonesia's invasion and military-style rule of East Timor was roundly condemned by the international community. From the mid-1980s, Indonesia began once again to reassert its claims for leadership amongst the non-aligned nations, particularly through negotiations with Vietnam over the occupation of Cambodia (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 383). Despite the peaceful resolution in Cambodia, Indonesia could not beat Yugoslavia for the 1988 Presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Merle Ricklefs observes that Indonesia's 'standing in this group was still being undermined by East Timor' (2001, p. 383). By 1991, concern over East Timor had faded to the extent that Indonesia was able to win the NAM Presidency (2001, p. 384). Indonesia's domestic position was developed in conjunction with its involvement in NAM and its calls for equitable development. The Third NAM Summit Conference in 1970 in Zambia brought a change from a political emphasis to a position that linked non-alignment with the struggle for development (Kang, 1988, pp. 77-8). Political researcher Henri Warmenhoven writes that at the Fourth Summit Conference in Algiers in 1973, Foreign Minister Adam Malik 'stressed the ways nonalignment could be utilised in the current climate of rapprochement in order to help the developing nations to accelerate their process of nation-building and economic development' (1973, p. 276).

Although Indonesia was located within NAM when it began asserting its numerical weight in the United Nations and UNESCO and began to argue for a New International Economic Order and a New World Information and Communication Order, its

¹⁵ Soebadio, for instance, distinguishes between 'developed' and 'developing' countries when discussing the lesser financial contribution of Indonesia to joint cultural activities (1985, p. 51). The use of the developing/developed distinction is not just a reference to finances, but invokes an international discourse about the proper set of relations between the two sets of countries.

commitment to reforming the economic and cultural order was not as clear cut as Sukarno's commitment during Guided Democracy. The New Order regime's cultural anti-Western rhetoric, which encompassed the two continuities with Guided Democracy mentioned previously, was at best ambiguously supported by its economic and foreign policies. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the New Order regime opened the door to international markets and cultural products and its rule of East Timor contradicted the notions of national sovereignty and non-intervention that were important elements of NAM. While the New Order regime's international engagement reinforced elements of its cultural policy, its cultural rhetoric was undermined by its actions in other fields.

The Director-Generals of Culture

Mantra, the Director-General of Culture from 1968 until 1978, established the policy framework that continued within the Directorate of Culture throughout the New Order era. Mantra had received a Dutch education as a child before completing postgraduate study in India in the area of cultural history. He had lectured in the University of Indonesia (*Universitas Indonesia*) in Jakarta and, after his time as Director-General, went on to be appointed as Governor of Bali (Leirissa & Katartadarmadja, 1984). His major achievement as Director-General was to establish a series of national cultural projects that absorbed much of the funding increase of the 1970s. He was followed by Soebadio, who was Director-General until 1988 and also taught in the same Faculty at the University of Indonesia in the area of ancient languages. G.P.H. Poeger, the brother of the Sultan of Yogyakarta, was Director-General from 1988 until 1993. The next Director General was Edi Sedyawati, a well-known dancer who had been involved in the establishment of Ismail Marzuki Arts Centre (*Taman Ismail Marzuki – TIM*) and who had once again taught and studied in the Literature Faculty in the area of ancient archaeology. She held the position until the fall of the New Order government in 1998.

There are some remarkable similarities among the Director-Generals. All were either from Central Java or Bali (the two 'cultural centres' of Indonesia). More significantly still, three of the four had taught in the Literature Faculty at the University of Indonesia in areas associated with ancient texts and archaeology.¹⁶ Mantra, Soebadio and Sedyawati all viewed national culture as a system that formed the basis of a way of life (*kehidupan*)

¹⁶ The Director-General in office was drawn from the same faculty in the same University for all but five of the thirty years between 1968 and 1998.

common to all Indonesians that was connected to the notion of civilisation (Mantra, 1978, pp. 10-11; Sedyawati, 1995/6, p. 77; Soebadio, 1986, p. 21). Through the work of these people, cultural policy for the entire New Order era shared the purpose of shaping an Indonesian civilisation as part of the goal of national development. However, Soebadio took a more instrumentalist view of culture that aligned it closely with the interests of the New Order regime.¹⁷ The Director-Generals also shared a focus on cultural heritage and expanded programs concerned with recording cultural history and archaeology that were begun by Mantra.

The New Order Regime's Policy Making System

One of the most significant techniques that the regime used to ensure a centralised system of policy development and implementation was funding. There were two kinds of funding within the New Order era bureaucracy. The first kind was the recurring budget that covered the costs of basic operations and maintenance. Although the routine budget expanded markedly over the course of the New Order era (see Table 4.1), it tended to barely cover the costs of employment and maintaining facilities. The second system of implementing policy, the development projects, was a much more lucrative distribution of state-resources for all parties involved.

Beginning with the first Five-Year Development Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun – Repelita*) in 1969, development projects quickly became the regime's primary means of meeting its policy objectives. The word 'project' (*proyek*) in Indonesia brings with it, in addition to links with state development programs, also the management techniques employed by officials who often made money from their involvement. In his analysis of the changing state in Jepara during the 1970s and early 1980s, Jim Schiller makes the point that for bureaucrats, 'the most important source of legal income was *uang proyek* or *uang pelaksana proyek*' (project money or project manager's money, 1996, pp. 154-5). Compared to other sections of the bureaucracy, there was not much money in the Directorate of Culture. However, projects promised prestige, a larger than

¹⁷ For instance, Soebadio placed the concerns of the New Order regime at the centre of her writings about culture, such as her statement that 'cultural identity is no other than what in Indonesia is called national defence' (1986, p. 21). ('... *cultural identity itu tidak lain daripada yang di Indonesia kita namakan ketahanan nasional.*') The same article uses the 1945 Constitution to interpret Indonesian culture itself whereas both Mantra and Sedyawati use the 1945 Constitution as the basis of Indonesian cultural policy.

usual pay cheque and possibly financial kickbacks for senior officials working for the national and provincial level bureaucracies.

Table 4.1: Directorate of Culture Budgets (Rp. Thousand).¹⁸

Year	Routine Budget	Development Projects	Year	Routine Budget	Development Projects
1969/70	295,579	163,000	1981/82	3,480,156	23,556,700
1970/71	308,579	205,325	1982/83	3,556,287	26,886,588
1971/72	223,023	205,685	1983/84	3,875,149	19,021,500
1972/73	360,585	300,000	1984/85	4,371,649	29,500,000
1973/74	509,564	576,053	1985/86	5,598,272	31,293,959
1974/75	695,849	2,181,246	1986/87	6,109,121	17,573,125
1975/76	1,191,004	4,499,400	1987/88	5,969,087	6,426,659
1976/77	775,737	6,683,291	1988/89	Not available	Not available
1977/78	1,047,331	8,907,646	1989/90	Not available	9,277,988
1978/79	1,174,952	10,289,365	1990/91	Not available	17,638,795
1979/80	1,386,397	11,315,269	1991/92	Not available	23,079,995
1980/81	2,367,817	18,319,587	1992/93	Not available	28,240,304
1981/82	3,480,156	23,556,700	1993/94	Not available	36,940,488
1982/83	3,556,287	26,886,588	1994/5-98/9	286,925,070	274,642,453

Cultural policy was formulated through a highly centralised system of policy making that worked in a five year cycle. Part of the Supreme Advisory Council's (*Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat – MPR*) tasks when it convened every five years was to decide on policy directions for the next five years. They envisioned this task as translating the New Order regime's key ideological documents, the *Pancasila* and the 1945 constitution, into policy programs that addressed current problems and positioned Indonesia for future prosperity. The resulting document, the Broad Outline of State Policy (*Garis Besar Haluan Negara – GBHN*) was passed across to the National Planning Board (*Bapenas*), which, in consultation with the bureaucracy, translated the GBHN into the *Repelita*. The *Repelita* were the basis of the policies developed and put into place by the various departments and directorates. Over the life of the *Repelita*, *Bapenas* and the Directorate of Budgeting

¹⁸ Compiled from data in Directorate of Culture reports: Mantra (1978, pp. 101-2) and *Direktorat Kebudayaan* (1987, pp. 77-83; 1993, Appendix 4; 1999a, pp. i-ii).

(*Direktorat Anggaran*) determined which programs were approved or rejected in accordance with the *Repelita*.

Thus programs and projects had to demonstrate a direct link with the *Repelita*, the 1945 Constitution and/or the *Pancasila*, explaining the constant references to these three documents in Directorate of Culture publications and reports. As the juridical basis for cultural policy, the explanation for culture in the 1945 Constitution remained significant throughout the New Order era. Since the elements of the *Repelita* that are relevant to culture have been analysed at length elsewhere (Hellman, 1999, pp. 40-7; Yampolsky, 1995, pp. 706-10), only a brief summary is provided here. Culture was mentioned in each of the five year plans although it was only briefly touched on in the first plan (1968/69-1973/74). From a two page section in *Repelita 1* that also covered sport, culture grew to forty pages in *Repelita 5* (1989/90-1993/94). Both Philip Yampolsky (1995, pp. 709-11) and Jörgen Hellman (1999, pp. 41-5) note the developmental emphasis. Hellman also identifies an expanded focus on local cultural sites and knowledges in *Repelita 2* (1974/75-1978/79), which increased further in the later *Repelita*. The concern with regional art forms, cultural objects, sites and knowledges was part of a broader concentration of focus on indigenous cultural practices within the Directorate. The increased number of references to the 1945 Constitution in successive *Repelita* sections about culture placed concern with indigenous culture at the centre of cultural policy, continuing a trend begun in 1956. Although tourism was only occasionally mentioned in the cultural sections of the *Repelita* (generally in the context of cross-sector cooperation, but also briefly in *Repelita 5* in connection with developing historical sites for tourism), culture was often mentioned in the tourism sections both as an important resource and as an object that needed careful management in the context of tourism. Cultural tourism, in large part due the experiences of Bali, was viewed as a potential source of revenue by the regime (Picard, 1997).

Both foreign and Indonesian observers challenged the patriarchal quality of the cultural development projects. Mary Zurbuchen writes in relation to state-sponsored cultural research:

Research (*penelitian*) itself is a kind of 'project,' one with a narrowly defined subject and a limited period for implementation, generally defined by calendar or fiscal year. To earn government support, cultural research usually must have some

relation to questions of government policy and the achievement of some aspect of development. (1990, p. 139)

Benny Yohanes, the Head of the Indonesian College of Performing Arts (*Sekolah Tinggi Seni Indonesia – STSI*) in Bandung, took aim at the way that people involved in New Order government projects prioritised profit over artistic quality in a newspaper article published two years after the fall of Suharto:

At the same time, the behaviour of the arts bureaucracy too often views art as a ‘project’, so that suggested ideas aimed at conceptual innovation are not accommodated. The ‘projectisation’ of art, which is a legacy of the decadent New Order bureaucracy, has infected the distorted behaviour of arts institutions that exist in a collegial environment. The tendency to exploit the potential of artistic authenticity and profitability always surfaces through camouflaged pretexts. (2000)

Sementara itu, perilaku birokrasi kesenian telah terlampau terbiasa memandang kesenian sebagai ‘proyek’, sehingga penawaran gagasan-gagasan yang bertujuan ke arah pembaruan konsep, tak siap untuk diakomodasi. Mem-‘proyek’-kan kesenian, yang merupakan warisan dekaden birokrasi Orba, telah turut menjangkiti perilaku distorsif institusi kesenian yang berada dalam lingkaran kolegialnya. Kecenderungan mengeksploitasi potensi otentisitas dan potensi finansial kesenian, selalu muncul lewat berbagai tameng kamuflase.

Although the system of policy making was successful in inscribing the New Order regime’s version of culture at the centre of cultural policy, it attracted criticism which was articulated before and after the fall of the regime.

2. Cultural Policy Areas Under the New Order

In the following discussion, Indonesian cultural policy is divided into three areas: archaeology, museums and history; language; and arts policy. The archaeology and museums sections have similar histories. Both were institutes under the colonial regime that were inherited and transformed by the Indonesian state. History can be traced to the Sub-Division of Customs and Traditions created in 1956 (Soebadio, 1985, p. 16), which later was combined with archaeology to become the Institute of History and Anthropology (*Lembaga Sejarah dan Antropologi*) in 1960. This Institute was split into the Directorate of History and Archaeology (*Direktorat Sejarah dan Purbakala*) and the Research Centre for History and Culture (*Pusat Penelitian Sejarah dan Budaya*) in 1975 before becoming the separate Directorate of History and Traditional Values (*Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai-Nilai Tradisional*), the Directorate for the Protection and Management of Historical and Archaeological Artefacts (*Direktorat Perlindungan dan Pembinaan Peninggalan Sejarah dan Purbakala*) and the National Research Centre for Archaeology

(*Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional*) in 1980. History, Archaeology and Museums also had a common emphasis on the historical construction of Indonesia. Language and Arts, on the other hand, have both been established since independence and had quite distinct roles and histories. However, all areas contributed to the management of national culture across a range of fields.¹⁹

Archaeology, Museums, History

The feature that links these three areas together was their role in constructing what Miller and Yudice call ‘historical citizenship’. They state, in the context of museums:

Historical citizenship emerges in the contemporary moment, but in reaction to the past. It knows that errors lie back there, before we knew. The past’s commemoration in museum form is rendered as a strictly delimited ethical zone, a space that divides worthy and unworthy conduct. (2002, p. 148)

In the case of Indonesia, a concern about the political affiliations of citizens limited the extent that the past could be constructed as negative. When the affective commitment of a citizen is doubted, the past tends to be glorified rather than critically assessed. However the Indonesian museum, archaeological site and history book were still ‘delimited ethical zones’. They combined lessons in conduct with attention to professionally-correct display, viewing and behaviour in an attempt to ensure that the lessons were correctly imparted and absorbed.

A 1972 report assigned archaeology the goal of ‘completing humankind with knowledge and consciousness about themselves’.²⁰ The report adopted the term ‘know yourself’²¹ to justify archaeology’s importance. It continued: ‘Therefore, if we want to participate and be active in shaping the future of our nation, like it or not we must first truly know ourselves now.’²² In order that Indonesians could know their ‘national past’, the state needed to support the continued work of archaeology, protection of important sites and objects, the introduction of new techniques and start to spread information about

¹⁹ Arts education was originally under the control of the Directorate of Culture before being transferred to Education in 1976. Although arts educational institutions were important points of mediation for New Order cultural discourses, they are not examined in detail here due to the split in 1976. For detailed analysis of two educational institutions, see Hough (2000), Hellman (1999) and the collected articles of musician and teacher Dieter Mack, who taught and performed for a number of years in Indonesia (2001a; 2001b).

²⁰ ‘*Tujuannya adalah melengkapi manusia dengan pengetahuan serta kesadaran akan dirinya*’ (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 120).

²¹ ‘*Kenalilah dirimu*’ (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 120).

²² ‘*Maka kalau kita hendak turut serta aktif membentuk masa depan bangsa kita, mau tidak mau kita harus terlebih dahulu mengenal betul2 diri kita sendiri pada masa kini*’ (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 120).

archaeological remains in schools. A later article noted that society needed to be taught to appreciate the importance of archaeological remains' 'cultural value' (Tjandrasasmita, 1976, p. 33).

Museums had a similar justification. A quote from a speech by Director-General Mantra in 1970 captures the rationale behind museums and the relationship between historical objects and society:

From the angle of cultural management, the important meaning of research and care for historical artefacts [and] works of high art which are kept in museums as valuable artistic objects is able to become a source of information from generation to generation in the effort to cultivate the national identity. The disappearance of valuable artistic objects from Indonesia means we lose our source of inspiration and self-belief. (1970, p. 4)

Dari sudut pembinaan kebudayaan penting artinya penelitian dan pemeliharaan peninggalan benda2 sejarah [dan] hasil karya seni yang tinggi yang disimpan di museum2 sebagai benda2 seni berharga yang dapat menjadi sumber pengetahuan dari generasi ke generasi dalam usaha memelihara kepribadian bangsa. Hilangnya benda2 seni yang bernilai tinggi dari Indonesia berarti kita kehilangan sumber inspirasi dan kepercayaan pada diri sendiri.

Thus, both archaeology and museums were viewed as caring for culturally valuable objects that could contribute to building national identity. However, Mantra neglected to mention in his quote that Indonesians needed to be trained in an aesthetics of viewing to appreciate culturally valuable objects. Through the process of acquiring the viewing aesthetics and learning to appreciate those objects' historical importance and value, the viewing public became Indonesian.

Museums expanded as part of the growth of government beginning in the early 1970s. By 1976 there was a plan and government support to build a museum in the capital city of every province (Herman, 1976, p. 36). By 1990, there were 140 mainly state-sponsored museums in Indonesia (Taylor, 1995, p. 113).²³ The centralised system of museum development was also reflected in design and exhibition practice. Exhibits followed a standard format that reinforced the New Order state's ideas about the essential sameness of cultures within Indonesia (See Taylor, 1994; 1995, pp. 115-6). The concern with representing national unity in museums remained throughout the New Order regime as can be seen in a statement by Sedyawati on 17 January 1994 in her opening address to the 'Indonesia-Dutch Seminar On Museum Development Problems':

²³ At the end of World War II, there were 24 museums in Indonesia (Zurbuchen, 1990, p. ff.19).

As an educational instrument, a museum in Indonesia should also have a presentation strategy that is in line with Indonesia's national development policy. The idea of nationality, of national unity, and of the supporting position of different ethnic groups within the Indonesian nation are basic ideas that should underlie any strategy of presentation. (1995/6, p. 26)

Acciaioli's research into a *Bajau* museum exhibition demonstrates how the state used elements of various ethnic cultures in order to tie them back into the nation while excluding other elements that are in conflict with the state's governmental discourses (2001, p. 7).²⁴

In addition to representing cultural unity and harmony, museums also instructed Indonesians in other ways. Museums themselves were regulated spaces that compelled certain behaviours and prohibited others. Take for instance a 1976 article on correct lighting by a bureaucrat working in the Directorate of Culture. The correct technical expertise needed to be used to both protect display objects and guarantee that visitors both enjoy their visit and absorb information correctly (Herman, 1976, p. 36).²⁵ Concerns with methods of museum management and display have remained present in Indonesia since the Dutch established the first museums. Similarly, museums have retained their didactic role, in particular their mediating role between different ethnic populations. The key difference was that they changed to serve the development priorities of the New Order regime.

Two related terms ran through the areas of archaeology, museums and history: 'cultural values' (*nilai-nilai budaya*) and 'cultural heritage' (*warisan budaya*). In his end of term report in 1978, Mantra placed 'values' at the centre of the activities of these three sections:

The importance of the glorious values that are contained inside archaeological artefacts, history and the other elements in cultural anthropology are a reminder that the efforts ... to develop and research them need to be increased. (1978, p. 20)

Mengingat pentingnya nilai-nilai luhur yang terkandung di dalam peninggalan purbakala, sejarah dan unsur-unsur lainnya dalam antropologi budaya, maka usaha-usaha ... pengembangan serta penelitiannya perlu ditingkatkan.

²⁴ The *Bajau* are a formerly nomadic people indigenous to Indonesia who used to live on ocean-going boats. Acciaioli also connects the normalisation of the state's version of Indonesian culture in museums with broader political strategies and rationales (2001, pp. 12-17).

²⁵ Herman states as one of the reasons for correct design: 'to give information with a visual display that is easily appreciated by the general public' (1976, p. 36) ('... *memberikan informasi dengan sarana visual yang mudah dihayati oleh masyarakat secara umum.*')

Cultural values were viewed as the cultural heritage of the nation that was threatened by negative outside influences. Mantra also outlined future steps that needed to be taken in regards to cultural heritage:

Protection of cultural heritage is implemented through the activities of research, excavation, safeguarding, restoring, protecting, appreciating, documenting and publication of the cultural heritage of the nation and the regions. The environment (for these activities) entails the areas of history, cultural anthropology, archaeology and historical/archaeological artefacts. (1978, pp. 58-9)

Penyelamatan warisan budaya ini diselenggarakan melalui usaha-usaha penelitian, penggalian, pemeliharaan, pemugaran, pengamanan, penghayatan, pendokumentasian dan penerbitan dari warisan budaya nasional maupun daerah. Ruang lingkungannya mencakup bidang sejarah, antropologi budaya, arkeologi dan peninggalan sejarah/purbakala.

The concept of cultural heritage was central to the Research Centre for History and Cultural Anthropology which became the Directorate of History and Cultural Values in 1980. The activities associated with this area of the Directorate of Culture expanded rapidly in 1973 with the announcement of an ambitious publication program in *Repelita* 2. Under the title, ‘Saving and Caring for the Historical and Cultural Heritage,’²⁶ the New Order regime made indigenous cultures a focus of research and data collection and announced its intention to publish the information to ‘spread knowledge’ of Indonesia’s cultural heritage (*Departemen Penerangan*, 1974, pp. 225-9).

The Directorate of History and Traditional Values was thus generated within, and then carved out of the Archaeology Section. Like Archaeology, it was oriented towards protecting and preserving ‘cultural values’, but the focus of its activities was the cultural practices and knowledges of indigenous ethnic groups, events and figures in Indonesia’s nationalist history. Its programs involving history and indigenous cultures cannot be viewed as only recording and spreading ‘cultural heritage’. Research in the Directorate of History and Traditional Values was greatly influenced by developments in the Indonesian social sciences in the 1970s. As was briefly explored in the last chapter, the social sciences in Indonesia were subject to both a North American research paradigm (Hadiz & Dhakidae, 2005, p. 13) that was apolitical in perspective and promoted American-style modernisation and the requirements of the New Order regime. Vedi Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae argue:

²⁶ *Penyelamatan dan Pemeliharaan Warisan Sejarah Kebudayaan.*

It was during the New Order ... that social sciences and academia were geared towards fulfilling the requirements of the exercise of state power. This clearly shaped the orientation of social science research, activity and training. (2005, p. 7)

State-run research projects played a major role in influencing research directions. In state-sponsored cultural research, most of which was managed by the Directorate of History and Traditional Values, the ideas and research methods of the Indonesian anthropologist Koentjaraningrat were influential, particularly the use of quantitative surveys and the focus on cultural values and their relationship to development.²⁷

An article by the inaugural head of the Directorate of History and Traditional Values, S. Budhisantoso,²⁸ provides an interesting insight into how the most influential figure in the Directorate of History and Traditional Values understood its role. He argued that in addition to protecting culture from negative outside influences, history also played an 'active role' in shaping society through assessing the evolution of society and culture to identify areas of 'cultural lag' (1983/4, pp. 16-17). Cultural lag was caused by the different rates at which stages of evolution were achieved by the technological system and the cultural system present in Indonesian society. According to Budhisantoso, the study of history could make society aware of the problems it faced in order to help it shape its future, but this is not the only role that history played in shaping society. In the final line of his article, Budhisantoso writes:

Historical instruction is not just about increasing the consciousness of national history, but it will also intensify the feelings of unity and unification, love of the nation, and national pride that is very much needed as the developmental allowance of a complete Indonesian humankind, along with planning for the future of the whole of Indonesian society. (1983/4, p. 17)

Pendidikan sejarah bukan saja meningkatkan kesadaran sejarah bangsa, melainkan ia akan mempertebal rasa kesatuan dan persatuan, semangat cinta akan tanah air, dan kebanggaan nasional yang sangat diperlukan sebagai bekal pembangunan manusia Indonesia seutuhnya serta perencanaan masa depan masyarakat Indonesia seluruhnya.

History's links to the priorities of the state are clearly evident here. Like the policies relating to museums and archaeology, concerns with national development and national unity undergirded the focus on cultural heritage.

²⁷ Chapter seven provides a detailed account and analysis of the research publications generated by the Directorate of History and Traditional Values where these themes are further explored.

²⁸ Budhisantoso's name has its own process of historical evolution. At this stage, he was S. Budhi Santoso.

Languages

Language has been a political tool of rulers and social elites for centuries and in many countries, generally because of its role in unifying or distinguishing different social groups.²⁹ The Indonesian language is historically linked closely with the nationalist movement and its goal of modernisation – an association that has been encouraged by the state since the Japanese occupation because of the overlap with a number of its own goals, including (symbolically) unifying diverse social and ethnic groups within the nation, simplifying administration and providing a ‘modernising’ language to construct Indonesian citizens. In an article titled ‘The Political Function of the National Language’ Amran Halim, a bureaucrat in the Directorate of Culture, argued:

... the existence of an agreement regarding the function and state of Indonesian as a national language is a symbol of the resoluteness of Indonesian national energy, a unifying tool of many societies with different backgrounds, languages, cultures and ethnicities inside a single Indonesian national society, and a communication tool between ethnic groups, between areas and cultures. Secondly, in its position as language of state, Indonesian is the formal state language, introductory language to the world of education, a tool of communication at the national level for planning and implementing national development, as well as a tool of cultural development, science and technology. (1976, p. 10)

... adanya kesepakatan mengenai fungsi dan kedudukan bahasa Indonesia sebagai bahasa nasional adalah lambang kebulatan semangat kebangsaan Indonesia, alat penyatuan berbagai-bagai masyarakat yang berbeda-beda latar belakang, kebahasaan, kebudayaan dan kesukuannya ke dalam satu masyarakat nasional Indonesia, dan alat perhubungan antarsuku, antar daerah serta budaya. Kedua, di dalam kedudukannya sebagai bahasa negara, bahasa Indonesia adalah bahasa resmi pemerintah, bahasa pengantar di dalam dunia pendidikan, alat perhubungan pada tingkat nasional untuk kepentingan perencanaan dan pelaksanaan pembangunan nasional, serta alat pengembangan kebudayaan, ilmu pengetahuan, dan teknologi.

Correct use of Indonesian was bound to the creation of productive citizens with a strong national commitment. Recommendations in the early cultural policy plans followed language programs with educational programs, including such topics as farming, fishing, handcrafts and other skills needed to meet local needs (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 94).

The Indonesian language did not only provide access to the state. It also provided access to a range of non-state institutions and information that contributed to economic, political and cultural citizenship. Indonesian provided access to national press, radio and film, as

²⁹ See Miller & Yudice (2002, pp. 5-7) for a short discussion and Anderson (1991) for a discussion of the importance of language and literature in the process of nationing.

well as access to books about science, literature and culture (Halim, 1976, p. 12). Indonesian created opportunities for citizens to undertake self-education and thus improve themselves and Indonesia. The national media also provided a valuable state service through the creation of a national viewing public. Citizens could be constantly reminded of their place in the national community, and the state could disseminate information directly into their homes and lives.

Indonesian cultural policy expressed great concern about the regulation of the national language. The unity of the Indonesian people was only symbolically complete when they were all speaking exactly the same national language and not misusing words or disobeying grammar. Bureaucrats also thought vocabulary growth presented a problem, as new words would continuously enter the lexicon and threaten to destroy its homogeneity and, most disturbing of all, cause misunderstanding. Misapprehension of the national language threatened to subvert state-led development and slow Indonesia's journey to prosperity. The answer to these problems was through the state-led creation and promotion of a formal language (*bahasa baku*). Language policy focussed on creating and promulgating 'standard Indonesian' across all islands and to all people within the borders of Indonesia with a single spelling and grammar to promote modernisation. A report from 1972 summed up the feelings at the time of cultural policy bureaucrats about Indonesian: 'Indonesian is still lacking in scientific terms and modern technique, as well as definite structures, to fulfil its function as a scientific language or a language of modern culture'.³⁰ However the report continued by forecasting that, with the right guidance (like Chinese and Japanese), Indonesian will overcome its difficulties (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 85).

The management of languages also included policies about local and foreign languages. The reasons given for the state management and protection of local languages are both cultural and connected to the development of formal Indonesian. Local languages, as part of local cultures, come under state protection which involved their formalisation (*pembakuan*). The formalisation of languages that are largely oral and informal renders the language calculable and amenable to programs, particularly in the field of education

³⁰ 'Bahasa Indonesia masih sangat kekurangan akan istilah-istilah ilmu pengetahuan dan teknik moderen serta kekurangan akan struktur-struktur tertentu untuk menjalankan fungsinya sebagai bahasa ilmu pengetahuan atau bahasa kebudayaan moderen' (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 84).

(Halim, 1976, p. 13). Foreign languages were viewed as desirable because of the access they give to science and technology. Although not concerned with the development of foreign languages themselves, there is a concern that foreign expressions could come to dominate Indonesian (Halim, 1976, p. 14). Within the state's framework, both local and foreign languages had the potential to help or hinder the development of Indonesian. Proper understanding and management, according to the state, would assist the state's goal of every citizen speaking and comprehending standard Indonesian.³¹

Arts Policy

Arts policy in the Directorate of Culture during the New Order period was predominantly focussed on indigenous art forms rather than the contemporary arts (Yampolsky, 1995, p. 710). While the emphasis on indigenous forms strengthened a policy direction begun during Guided Democracy, there were significant changes at the beginning of the New Order period. Meanwhile, contemporary artists' engagement with the state during Guided Democracy was heavily criticised. The changing relationships between artists and the state were driven by four reasons. Firstly, the regime's initial alignment with the supporters of universal humanism entrenched an artistic rationale in the contemporary arts that discouraged political engagement and made contemporary artists uneasy about incorporating the regime's development messages into their works. Secondly, indigenous art forms were reinvigorated through the patronage of the New Order elite at the beginning of the New Order period in order to overcome the stigma that had been attached to them due to engagement with LEKRA and other politically-affiliated arts organisations during Guided Democracy. Indigenous art forms were therefore more easily targeted by the regime's cultural programs. Thirdly, the interpretation of the 1945 Constitution emphasised indigenous ethnic cultures as the basis of national culture. Indigenous art forms were the most symbolic elements of the indigenous ethnic cultures. Finally, indigenous art forms were a good fit with the notion of cultural heritage, with its emphasis on historical connections. Indigenous art forms became the focus of a broad range of programs with the twin development goals of the development of Indonesians and the development of Indonesian art.

³¹ This model continued into the 1990s (*Direktorat Kebudayaan*, 1994/95, pp. 28-9).

Arts policy in particular drew on universal humanism in its understanding of art and the role of the arts. Universal humanism made its entry into cultural policy in the late 1960s and was at its strongest in the early 1970s³² before weakening in parallel with the influence of the groups that were its strongest supporters. For instance, a report in 1970 published by the Department of Education and Culture included a long criticism of the ‘paternalistic’ Sukarno era and called for a range of reforms including a constitutional bill of rights, independent judiciary, free elections, freedom of opinion and freedom of association demonstrating the connection with the urban modernisers (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 41). After the 1972 elections, the changing political climate reduced the scope of the Department to call for such reforms. However, the ‘spiritual value’ of culture remained, as can be seen in a summary of arts policy in the first issue of the Directorate of Culture’s magazine in 1976, *Warta Budaya*:

Especially in traditional art the creativity of artists and appreciators needs to be developed and spread [by the state] so that we are completely able to appreciate our present Indonesian culture. On the other hand, the development of modern Indonesian art must also be directed to appreciation of Indonesian cultural values, including universal values. (*Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan*, 1976, p. 9)

Khususnya dalam seni tradisi kreativitas pada seniman maupun penghayat perlu dikembangkan dan disebarluaskan sehingga sepenuhnya dapat memberikan penghayatan budaya kita Indonesia kini. Sebaliknya perkembangan seni modern Indonesia harus pula mengarah ke penghayatan nilai budaya Indonesia, termasuk nilai-nilai universal.

The connection to universal humanism (and the group of modernising intellectuals more generally) and the invocation of cultural heritage were clearly demonstrated in this policy.

The spiritually improving qualities of art were often emphasised in contrast to its political role, which is an important difference with arts policy during Guided Democracy. Art that included political commentary was not considered national because it reduced the spiritual value of art. However, Indonesians still needed to be taught how to appreciate the intrinsic qualities of national art works and Indonesian art works themselves needed to be made spiritually uplifting. For instance, a report published in 1972 stated:

The goal of arts management is not only safeguarding arts that are already there but also trying to increase the quality of that art so that it is able to truly constitute

³² The connections between the Directorate and the universal humanists in TIM were multiple. At the time, TIM was at its most popular and some TIM personnel, like Sedyawati, also worked for the Directorate. Additionally, there was collaboration between the Directorate and the Jakarta Arts Council under the leadership of Ajip Rosidi, most notably conferences and seminars on indigenous performing arts.

spiritual food for its admirers. Serving up quality art requires complete concentration, full dedication and an outpouring of pure spiritual character from its makers and doers. (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 114)

Tujuan pembinaan kesenian ialah bukan saja memelihara kesenian yang telah ada tetapi juga berusaha untuk meningkatkan mutu seninya sehingga benar dapat merupakan santapan rohani bagi yang menikmatinya. Penyajian kesenian yang bermutu memerlukan konsentrasi yang bulat, dedikasi yang penuh dan pencurahan sikap jiwa yang murni dari para penggarap dan penjadinya.

This aesthetic discourse regulated the inclusion and exclusion of arts and artists into the category of ‘national art’. If art was not sufficiently ‘spiritually uplifting’ or of sufficient quality, it could only gain inclusion through undergoing certain aesthetic transformations.

The use of a discourse of aesthetics hid issues of class and ethnicity. From associations between various socio-cultural groups, their cultural practices and political parties, Indonesians were to engage with their culture as an inspiring spiritual experience much like watching an opera or listening to a symphony (see policy documents such as Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 115). Miller and Yudice recognise the unifying function of aesthetics:

‘Standards of taste’... are part of hegemony, a key means of differentiating and stratifying society. The value projected by aesthetic hegemony is ultimately premised on a series of exclusions ... Social harmony is bought at the expense of those whose tastes are not only aesthetically unacceptable but, more importantly, potentially contestatory. (2002, p. 11)

The educated middle class tended to define the aesthetic standards and therefore could most easily access national arts.

While the emphasis on spiritual improvement differentiated New Order arts policy from the arts policy of Guided Democracy, there were a number of continuities in how it functioned to alter behaviours; its goals were ultimately not that dissimilar. Much like the regime’s use of regional art forms discussed in the previous chapter, there was a continuity in what was considered technical improvement across the two eras that is located in the shared middle class background of the political elite and extends back to the 1920s (McVey, 1986, pp. 31,39-40). The New Order era process of making art ‘spiritually improving’, like Guided Democracy’s emphasis on ‘quality’ (Setjonegoro, 1956, p. 568), aimed to ensure regional arts were of a high standard. Regional arts were subjected to a similar set of ‘national’ aesthetic criteria in both periods. This continuity was governmental in that it altered the behaviour of cultural workers and audiences to

accord with the behaviour desired by the state and centred on the state's preferred forms of regional and national identity. While there were significant differences between the messages of the two periods, their methods and broad aim to improve Indonesians and Indonesian art remained similar.

Within arts programs, two terms were particularly important due to both their frequency and how they tie together different discourses about the arts: guidance (*pembinaan*) and development (*pengembangan*). National development, in the context of arts programs, referred to both developing the arts and developing Indonesians. A 1976 article provides definitions for the terms in the context of the arts:

The implementation pattern in the Indonesian arts includes a particular understanding of management (*pembinaan*) and development (*pengembangan*). *Pembinaan* refers to activities of caring for, protecting, researching, excavating, recording, giving guidance and direction along with processing and increasing quality. *Pengembangan* refers to activities of dissemination, including activities to increase the quality of art appreciation, and, what is more, to spread expertise and art works as far as possible into society to complete cultural life. (*Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan*, 1976)

Pola pelaksanaan dalam kesenian Indonesia mencakup pengertian pembinaan dan pengembangan. Pembinaan dalam arti usaha-usaha memelihara, menyelamatkan, meneliti, menggali, mencatat, memberikan bimbingan dan pengarahan, serta pengolahan dan peningkatan mutu. Pengembangan dalam arti usaha-usaha penyegar luasan, baik usaha yang menuju peningkatan penghayatan seni, maupun perluasan tenaga dan karya seni dalam masyarakat seluas-luasnya untuk melengkapkan kehidupan budaya.

The terms continued to feature prominently in the 1994/95 publication *The Guidance and Development of Culture (Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Kebudayaan, Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1994/95)*. Arts policy, through activities like *pembinaan* and *pengembangan*, involved both the preservation of indigenous arts and its improvement, as a part of the project of national development, in accordance with the aesthetic criteria that dominated the Directorate of Culture.³³ The two terms also inscribed a relationship between the holders of knowledge (the bureaucrats) and the receivers of knowledge (artists, society), where knowledge flows from the former to the latter, in the process transforming artistic practices.

³³ A number of observers have critiqued the New Order regime's arts policy, in particular its aesthetic changes to indigenous art forms. See Yampolsky (1995), Acciaioli (1985), Hefner (1987) Widodo (1995), Effendi (1998) and Suanda (1995). The specifics of the arts programs are discussed in detail in chapter six in the context of examining the Cultural Centres administered by the Directorate of Culture.

The Licensing Regime for Arts Events

Although licensing was for the most part managed by the police, the Directorate of Culture was also involved in the licensing of arts events. Licenses for arts events were required by a 1963 piece of legislation³⁴ that was revised in 1995.³⁵ Under the legislation, various types of meetings required either a license, a police notification of the activity, or did not require police involvement. ‘Cultural meetings’, according to the police field directives, are gatherings that aim to discuss or perform music, dance, drama, poetry, opera, pantomime and other related art forms. According to the legislation, cultural meetings did not require either a license or notification unless they could possibly cause a public or traffic disturbance. In practice, ‘cultural meetings’ required a license in most places in Indonesia. Such licenses had to be applied for at least seven days before the event and would be deemed granted if either the police affirmed the request or there was no response prior to three days before the event. According to the law (which is still in place), police could charge for licenses at their discretion.

Although modern artists were affected,³⁶ traditional artists were generally more restricted by the licensing regime. Due to the distance they had to travel and the number of shows they performed during their times of high demand, they often did not apply for licenses and were forced to bribe police.³⁷ Dancer and researcher Endo Suanda notes that artists in Cirebon Regency had to pay fees to the Office of Tourism, pay for ‘Artist Cards’ every two to three years, and ask the Office of Education and Culture for permission before every performance, whereas artists in the provincial capital Bandung only required a

³⁴ *Undang-Undang No. 5 Pnps 1963 tentang Kegiatan Politik.*

³⁵ *Surat Keputusan Bersama Menteri Dalam Negeri dan Menteri Pertahanan Keamanan Republik Indonesia No. 153 thn.1995 tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Perijinan Sebagaimana Diatur dalam Pasal 510 KUHP dan Pemberitahuan Sebagaimana Diatur dalam UU No. 5 Pnps 1963.*

³⁶ See, for instance, the experiences of Theatre Comma (*Teater Koma*) (Budianta & Budiman, 2001, pp. 1267-8; Cohen, 1991; ‘List of Art Works that were Banned,’ 1995; Wahono, 1994b, pp. 1244-5), playwright Ratna Sarumpaet (‘Playwright Plans to Sue Police,’ 1997) and even *dangdut* singer Roma Irama (‘List of Art Works that were Banned,’ 1995) because of his affiliations with Islamic organisations.

³⁷ Suanda’s account of a trip by a group of Cirebon Mask Dancers (*Topeng Cirebon*) includes a negotiated bribe with police (1995). Askadi Sastrasuganda, a senior Dalang who has performed for over fifty years in Cirebon and also worked for the Directorate of Culture at the local level, stated to me in an interview: ‘If a traditional artist wants to travel, he needs a travel license for every trip outside the local area. He also requires a performance license from the police and Office of Education and Culture and the Office of Tourism. If an artist is performing every night across different regencies and cities, they do not have the time to fulfil all of the bureaucratic requirements. Therefore, if they encounter police, they pay a bribe. ... Therefore paying the police becomes the norm. This is a huge obstacle for artists. The focus is on the needs of the bureaucracy, not on the needs of artists’ (Interview, Desa Cankring, Kecamatan Waru, Kabupaten Cirebon, 29/11/2001).

permit from the police (1995, pp. 122-3). In Cirebon, the arts became a source of funds for the Office of Education and Culture and Tourism through their regulatory role.

3. New Order Cultural Policy as a Command Culture Model

From the features and characteristics outlined in this chapter, it is possible to identify the model of cultural provision in the New Order era, which I argue is a version of the command culture model. The key governmental rationality for cultural policy was national development. Development justified the regime's interventions into all aspects of culture through the assumption that culture in Indonesia was backward and inappropriate for economic development. Although development was an important part of liberal rationalities of government, development discourses had some important differences in Indonesia. Instead of being constructed as a temporary measure to quicken a 'natural' developmental process, it was conceived as a permanent state of affairs to achieve an outcome defined by the regime. Cultural policy was conceptualised as exercising state control over culture. A state version of culture was disseminated through development programs aimed at civilising the population.

The expansion of the Directorate facilitated the spread of the regime's version of national culture. At the end of *Repelita VI* in 1998, 74,722 people were employed full-time under the supervision of the Directorate of Culture across Indonesia, and many more were employed for specific tasks (*Direktorat Kebudayaan*, 1999a, pp. 10,12,13). There were sizable line-offices in every province and offices in every city and regency. Within each city and regency, a *Penilik Budaya* or Cultural Officer was designated to every sub-regency in Indonesia with a centrally determined set of tasks.³⁸ Outside of the Directorate and the line offices, there were numerous institutions located in various provinces that reported to the Directorate. These were the 24 Cultural Parks, 11 Historical and Traditional Values Research Bureaus, 9 Preservation of Historical Remains and Archaeology Reserves, 10 Archaeology Bureaus, 6 specialised museums, 25 provincial museums and the Borobudur Research and Conservation Bureau. Centrally defined programs were being run across Indonesia by a large organisation that coordinated a variety of different institutions.

³⁸See *Keputusan Kementerian Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan* 0304/0/1984.

There was a large degree of continuity within cultural policy throughout the New Order era. An event that confirmed the direction of New Order era cultural policy, while simultaneously linking it to the days of the independence struggle, was the 1991 Fourth Cultural Congress (*Kongres Kebudayaan IV*). The Cultural Congress had the theme ‘from art to development’ (*‘dari seni sampai pembangunan’*) and, unsurprisingly, confirmed the direction of the regime’s cultural policy in its recommendations despite the opposition of some participants (BHS, 1991).

In the 1990s, the regime’s cultural discourses still privileged a highly regulated model of cultural provision. However, the command culture model of the early New Order period had been impacted substantially by the fruits of its economic policies: booming manufacturing, media and tourism industries and related changes in the lifestyles of Indonesians. The unplanned competition for market share between official cultural provision and market provision was a significant change in how the majority of Indonesians accessed culture and the choices available for them. Regulation of media, for instance, was increasingly difficult in the 1990s because of the proliferation of different media types, providers and means of production and distribution (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 12). Artists and observers also became more critical of the Directorate’s policies and positions, such as the criticism of Director General Sedyawati’s support of the banning of Ratna Sarumpaet’s play *Marsinah* about a female labour activist who was killed by the military in 1993 (Mohamad, 1998).

The regime responded to the competition with its command culture in two ways. Firstly, as was discussed in the section on ‘development’, the regime shifted its emphasis in cultural policy from the positive elements of national development such as developing national culture to assist economic development, to its more negative features of combating negative outside influences that would weaken national culture and protecting cultural values and heritage. Secondly, some attempts were made at adopting cultural policy to the changing situation. Contemporary popular culture became a topic of cultural research in the 1990s,³⁹ although it was still dwarfed by the attention given to indigenous cultural forms. Additionally, the Directorate began to organise a triennial Indonesian Arts Festival (beginning in 1995).

³⁹ Discussed further in chapter seven.

4. Conclusion

New Order era cultural policy can be broadly identified as a continuation of a reformist use of culture that had been an element of every government in Indonesia since colonialism. The element of cultural policy where changes (like those identified by Anderson) occurred was not its techniques or its governmental function but in cultural policy's normative model. In other words, cultural policy was attempting to shape a new type of cultural subject suitable for the New Order era. Guided Democracy's emphasis on political messages and mass mobilisation was replaced by national development messages and the call for stable and ordered development. Development goals and messages were spread through cultural institutions and programs with the twin aims of developing individuals and strengthening the national population. New Order cultural policy also emphasised the spiritual value of culture and a conservative notion of cultural heritage and values in contrast to the emphasis on engagement during Guided Democracy. The changes in the Directorate of Culture were due to the inculcation of new norms connected to the new political, social and economic imperatives felt by a conservative authoritarian regime.

The changing role designated for artists was more complex. Contemporary artists generally did not incorporate regime themes or messages into their work. Indigenous arts were treated much more instrumentally. Artists who worked with indigenous art forms were subject to training regimes and made to incorporate development themes and messages. The normative models for the arts in the two periods also included some similarities. The most noticeable was the aesthetic standards within the cultural programs, with their emphasis on technical innovation, performance quality and morality. Additionally, both Guided Democracy and the New Order period employed a version of the command culture model where the state undertook the task of controlling cultural provision and exchange rather than relying on the market.

The New Order state was able to secure the conditions for the deployment of its governmental discourses to an extent unprecedented in Indonesian history since it had unparalleled resources and technologies with which to govern. Cultural governmental discourses were disseminated in programs and institutions across Indonesia as never before, although they also had more intense competition than ever before. They had to

contend with the challenge of growing cultural consumption through the expanding Indonesian market. Apart from responding to the threat of marginalisation from the cultural lives of Indonesians, New Order cultural policy remained remarkably unchanged from the mid-1970s. However, a raft of changes accompanied the fall of Suharto in 1998.

Chapter 5

Cultural Policy in the Reform Era:

Ethnic Identity, Decentralisation and Tourism

Reformasi

Yang jumlah korbannya

Konon sudah melebihi revolusi

Ternyata hanya sekedar basa-basi

Sebab tak mampu menghapus korupsi

Apalagi mengadili para mantan petinggi

Acep Zamzam Noor, *Dongeng Dari Negeri Sembako* (2001, p. 49)

The Era of Reformation

Whose numerous victims

Appear to already exceed the revolution

Turned out to be a mere formality

Because it could not eliminate corruption

To say nothing of prosecuting ex-authorities

Acep Zamzam Noor's poem summarises not just the feeling amongst many Indonesians about the *reformasi* movement in Indonesia, but also amongst many political analysts. Despite the hope and energy that it initially produced, the critics of *reformasi* held that it did not produce democratic reforms to the extent expected by its early advocates and did not break with many questionable past practices. This chapter argues that during the time period examined here¹ the most important cultural policy changes were generated in a situation where the national governments instigated extensive institutional change but did not articulate or follow a defined democratic agenda. However, I also argue that despite their limitations these changes created greater potential for future cultural policy

¹ This chapter covers the period from the resignation of Suharto on 21 May 1998 until 2003.

diversity, innovation and wider social participation in policy making than existed in the New Order era.

The complexity of the situation has given rise to two simultaneous sets of cultural policy changes that, although not contradictory, are not obvious partners. Firstly, ethnic and regional identity politics became increasingly important in the context of decentralisation. Secondly, culture's role was challenged in a contentious restructure that took the culture portfolio out of education and joined it with tourism. While the first of these reforms has links to *reformasi* calls for the end of centralised control and creates the potential for greater innovation, popular participation and diversity in the long term, the second represents a greater immediate change. However, the restructure was actually a New Order initiative that was implemented in the Reform era and has little connection to popular pressures for reform. The reasons for this configuration are grounded in the political events of *reformasi*.

1. Changes to Governance after Suharto

Suharto's successor, Habibie, was caught between popular demands for reform and his connections with New Order era elite. Habibie had little choice but to institute reforms, most notably decentralisation of political and financial control, given the demands from numerous groups, the mass popularity of *reformasi* and his need to prove his democratic credentials before the 1999 elections (Bourchier, 2000, p. 31; Emmerson, 1999, pp. 335-340). He was assisted by the power that Suharto had concentrated in the Presidency and its dominance over the DPR and the MPR. However, his reformist initiatives were often mitigated by his close relationship with a corrupt elite and his supporters' commitment to the status quo.²

Following the 1999 elections, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president despite his National Development Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* – PKB) having won only eleven percent of the seats in the DPR.³ The political dealings necessary for him in the October Presidential election to defeat Megawati, whose PDI-P had won thirty-five

² Emmerson writes: 'The New Order was over in the sense that a return to power by its founder seemed inconceivable. But if that regime had amounted to more than just one man, if it had been a set of institutions, a cohort of officials, and a way of doing business, these were still in place' (1999, p. 342).

³ The process of Wahid's election is closely traced by Mietzner (2000) and Bourchier (2000).

percent of the 462 contested seats, quickly hamstrung his political agenda. The military turned against Wahid because of his support of human rights trials and his interventions in military appointments (Gorjao, 2003, pp. 15-20,24-29). Additionally, the international good will that he attracted as the victor of fair elections also disappeared, as his cabinet fell out with the IMF (Djiwandono, 2003, p. 211). Wahid attempted more cultural initiatives than any other post-Suharto President, perhaps because of his background as a serious intellectual with long-standing connections to the artistic and literary community.⁴ Two such initiatives were his Presidential decree making the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) a legal institution (which was later rejected by the legislature) and an aborted shake-up of the Directorate of Culture, the second of which is discussed in the final section of this chapter. Wahid's moves to reconcile with the victims of 1965-66⁵ and his apology for the violence was a move away from the anti-communist rhetoric of the New Order regime. Responses from artists to Wahid's initiative were generally negative (Aritonang, 2000b; Imran, 2000b; Romli HM, 2000a), and emphasised a continuing rejection of the PKI and LEKRA's perceived 'politicisation' of the arts. The divisions within the Wahid cabinet and between Wahid and the parliament, including the end of the alliance of Islamic parties that brought him to power (Fealy, 2000, pp. 11-13), prevented pursuit of any extensive reforms and quickened the downfall of his government. All of Wahid's former allies, excluding PKB, aligned themselves against him and in support of Vice-President Megawati.

Megawati assumed power on 23 July 2001 and followed a conservative political agenda from her inception.⁶ Following widespread celebration after her inauguration, Megawati disappointed reform-minded supporters and observers through her lack of leadership, particularly in contentious policy areas (Crouch, 2003, p. 15; Malley, 2003a, pp. 135-6). Megawati was less active in her efforts to fight corruption than Wahid and more willing to accommodate the military leadership's opposition to reform (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, p. 248). Hadi Soesastro, a well-known political observer from the Centre of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, has written, 'great disappointment has been expressed by the public and the media with the performance of her Cabinet ... Megawati

⁴ Wahid has also worked in the arts as joint-head of *Taman Ismail Marzuki* (TIM) Operational Committee from 1982 until 1985.

⁵ Many members of the organisation that Wahid led, *Nahdlatul Ulama*, had been implicated in the 1965-66 killings.

⁶ Malley writes: 'Her instincts are socially and politically conservative' (2003a, p. 136). For an assessment of the conservative tendencies of Megawati before she became President, see Bourchier (2001, p. 121).

is now being dubbed the 'do nothing' President' (2003, p. 3). The three post-Suharto presidents were thus unable and/or unwilling to pursue reforms that would extensively alter the existing power structure, tied as they were to Suharto era institutions and power structures.

Initial assessments of the Reform era classified it a 'transitional period' when Indonesia was gaining the features of a liberal democratic polity (Budiman, 1999; van Klinken, 1999). Indeed Indonesia developed some of these attributes such as free and fair elections and a legislature that is now central to law making. However, more recent assessments have criticised the substance of the reforms. The political and electoral reforms also entrenched the power of the legislature and political parties without resulting in a clear and direct accountability to voters (Fealy, 2001). Ordinary Indonesians have been forced to continue to make use of the non-democratic methods and avenues when dealing with administration and government (Tornquist, 2002, p. 564) or the judiciary (Lindsey, 2000, pp. 289-91; 2002). Tim Lindsey's analysis of law reform during the Habibie era argues that little actual reform took place. He writes that 'very few of [the] new laws and amendments have actually delivered any substantial reform at all' (2000, p. 279). Instead, the laws were inclined to be broad statements of reformist principle, lacking in substance and detail and therefore doomed to failure.⁷

Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, pursuing a neo-Marxist analysis, argue that the political-business groupings (*oligarchies*) of the New Order regime, which profited from the corruption and the market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, survived the collapse of the Suharto regime. Furthermore, they argue the oligarchies have adjusted to take advantage of the new political climate and institutions, limiting the possibilities of political and economic reform (2004, p. 12). In contrast to the strength of the oligarchies, the groups that supported a liberal agenda have been unable to organise themselves into a 'force' able to capture state power (2004, pp. 29,259). Moderate observers, like Harold Crouch, have come to similar conclusions regarding the limited extent of reform. Crouch writes:

⁷ Economic reform was driven by donor countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which were attempting to fundamentally restructure Indonesia's economic institutions and policies in the face of significant resistance (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, pp. 156-161).

... the state is weak because it itself is made up of powerful competing vested interests. The state has been penetrated by interests that are opposed to reform. (2003, p. 33)

Crouch concludes that the 'Indonesian state has a considerable capacity for improvisation' that allows it to survive without tackling the fundamental causes of problems (2003, p. 33).⁸

The picture that emerges from political analysis is of a country where the groups most committed to democratic reform have been sidelined from the political process and far-reaching democratic change has been successfully resisted. Practices changed in response to popular pressure, pressures from outside groups like the IMF and any reform initiatives that were generated within the system, but these responses tended to limit the extent of reform. Institutional change did happen, but it was initiated within divided political institutions that were more responsive to groups and interests that favoured the status quo than they were to advocates of far-reaching democratic reform. Unlike previous regime changes in Indonesia where elements of the preceding rationalities of government were more unambiguously critiqued and rejected (and groups excluded) and new rationalities constructed in their stead, the Reform era produced a mishmash of watered down policy initiatives driven by a raft of often competing interests. The absence of a strong group or coalition has resulted in the absence of a coherent critique of governance that could have driven broad reform of state institutions and policy. Although the popular initiatives of the early days of *reformasi* had some impact on cultural policy, most notably a partial end to the state's licensing regime for cultural events, they did not penetrate far into official cultural institutions. Institutional change did occur in cultural policy, but it cannot be read as being driven by a push for democratisation – national politics ensured that was not the case.

2. Immediate Impact of *Reformasi*: Winding Back State Licensing of Arts Events

An immediate impact of *reformasi* was a demand for freedom of expression that was quickly manifest in the candid reporting of the crisis in the media and amongst contemporary urban artists. The early manifestations of *reformasi* need to be

⁸ Smith Kipp's summary of political and economic developments in Indonesia in 2003 asserts similar conclusions about the prospects of reform (2004, p. 69).

distinguished from later changes that emanated from the bureaucracy and the Reform era governments. The immediate changes were generated through popular pressure for reform combined with demands from media organisations and their audiences for a more critical media (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 71) and carried out without the involvement of the state. Contemporary urban artists were among the groups that were most involved in *reformasi*. They quickly began to incorporate *reformasi* themes in their works and became increasingly critical of social and political events (Supriyanto, 2002, p. 7).⁹ Another effect of the reformist tendencies amongst modern artists was the almost immediate rejection of the state's licensing regime for arts events in many urban areas.

In the cities, the licensing regime ended quickly after the fall of Suharto, but not because of democratic reform initiated by politicians or bureaucrats. The organisations and individuals who held arts events stopped asking for permits, and the police no longer enforced the regime. The end of the licensing regime has facilitated the emergence of small arts institutions and performance venues. One such venue is *Rumah Nusantara* in Bandung, West Java. A group of local artists headed by Aat Soeratin, a well known local actor from television and theatre, began *Rumah Nusantara* at the end of 1998. *Rumah Nusantara* is based in a house on the outskirts of Bandung that has been transformed into a performance space, shop and cafeteria. The house has been provided rent free and, instead of paying set amounts, donations are collected from audiences at the end of a performance. Performers usually donate their time and are friends of the organising committee. Although this arrangement makes programming difficult, there are regular performances that are reasonably well attended. An arts institution like *Rumah Nusantara* could not have survived the New Order era level of regulation with any public prominence. The increased level of flexibility has provided space for smaller arts organisations to grow.¹⁰

The end of the licensing regime has only been partial. At the end of 2003, artists outside of the large cities, such as in Cirebon, are still seeking permits from and paying police and their local cultural office. This difference between the contemporary urban artists and

⁹ Another example is the fine artist Sunaryo, who covered some of his paintings in black cloth in protest at the killings of students in 1999 (Maulana, 2000a). They were still covered when I visited his gallery in 2001. Soni Farid Maulana, a Sundanese poet and journalist, draws attention to the theme of human rights abuse in his end of year review of the arts in 1999 (Maulana, 2000a).

¹⁰ Interview with Aat Soeratin, Bandung, West Java, 19/11/2001.

the practitioners of indigenous arts (traditional artists) reflects the uneven impact of *reformasi* and the continuation of a division between how the two kinds of artists relate to the state. Modern artists have adopted *reformasi* themes and became increasingly vocal in their criticism of social and political events in addition to benefiting from the end of the licensing regime of arts events. There has not been an equivalent impact amongst traditional artists who have less contact with each other and were less involved in the largely urban *reformasi* movement.

3. Decentralisation, and the Growth of Ethnic and Local Identity Politics

In contrast to the immediate changes brought by *reformasi* that were generally limited to urban artists, the institutional changes of the reform era brought cultural policy change across Indonesia. The most influential reform has been the process of decentralisation.

Decentralisation

During the New Order era, the state emphasised the decorative aspects of ethnic and local identity in its promotion of a superficial plurality. After the fall of Suharto, ethnic and local identity politics began to be reasserted as an important form of mobilisation across a variety of locales as the highly centralised political structure began to weaken. Some observers of Indonesian politics noted a change in the level at which important political decisions are made. Gerry van Klinken has called for a ‘disaggregation’ of the Indonesian state in response to the increased incidence of local political conflicts involving societal and state actors all the way from Jakarta to the village level (2001c, p. 3). Similarly, Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy emphasise the need for a revision of political analysis about Indonesia. They state: ‘In our struggle to understand Indonesian politics today, we must attempt to comprehend what is happening at the local level’ (1998, p. 11).

Such far reaching changes have implications for cultural policy. The overlap between the splintering of political power, mobilisation of ethnic and local identity through cultural events and groups and institutional changes to the state’s cultural apparatus due to decentralisation is complex and requires an understanding of the social and political pressures at the national and sub-national levels. Following a discussion of decentralisation, I analyse the increasing importance of ethnic identity politics and the

kinds of pressures it is putting on cultural policy. These are necessary steps towards understanding why and how local politics is becoming more important to cultural policy.

The fall of Suharto was accompanied by increasing opposition from regional elites who had felt ignored and sidelined during the New Order era. Particularly prominent in the Indonesian and international media was the separatist and federalist aspirations of four provinces rich in natural resources: Aceh, Papua, Riau and East Kalimantan (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003, p. 2). However, tensions were not exclusively between the centre and the regions, as demonstrated by Michele Ford's analysis of Riau (2003) and the subsequent split of Riau to form a new province – Riau Islands. George Quinn's research confirms the complexity of the emerging local politics in Java, as various local elites and communities mobilise to secure their interests and define internal and external social boundaries (2003). Most of these movements are rooted in local histories that extend back years before the fall of Suharto, but began to assert themselves much more aggressively from 1998. The successful East Timorese fight for independence further strengthened the resolve of separatist groups and added to the impression that Indonesia was splintering. Habibie responded with a piece of legislation which has shaped Reform era politics.

The Regional Autonomy (*Otonomi Daerah*) legislation was passed in August 1999, two months after the June election and before the MPR session to determine the new president. It was touted as a response to federalist and separatist ambitions and as proof of the President's and parliament's democratic credentials (Jones, 2002, pp. 59-61). Since the legislation and the reasons for various provisions are analysed in detail elsewhere, only a brief summary is given here.¹¹ The central element was the decentralisation of various areas of government, including education, health, the environment, labour, public works, natural resource management, tourism and culture, to the regency/municipal level along with a much larger share of revenue and the power to raise revenue. Another important element is that appointments at all levels of government are to be made by the local legislatures, not the national executive as was previously the case.

¹¹ See Rasyid (2003) for a summary of the legislation from one of its key instigators and implementers. See also Sakai (2002), Jaya (2002), and Aspinall and Fealy (2003).

Assessments of political decentralisation can be divided into two groupings. The first group emphasises increased democratisation of Indonesian society due to the devolution of power and resources to the lower levels of government (for examples of this group, see Antlov, 2003; Colongan, 2003; Rasyid, 2003).¹² They argue that the fruits of decentralisation are greater responsiveness, better representation and increased participation of a variety of groups in decision making. The second group emphasises the extent that New Order era elites (old elites) have been able to capture the decentralisation process (this group includes Hadiz, 2003; Malley, 2003b; van Klinken, 2001c). Old elites formed new alliances to take advantages of the political and economic opportunities presented by *reformasi*. For instance Vedi Hadiz, in contrast to the first group described, argues that political decentralisation in fact strengthened the predatory interests of the old elites and that rent-seeking continues to drive Indonesian political life (2003, pp. 121-2).

The Growing Assertion of Ethnic and Local Identity

In the context of these changes it is not surprising that ethnic identity is becoming an increasingly important tool of local elites. The use of ethnic identity politics is a result of contemporary contests over resources and is often linked to political contests at the sub-national level of government. Although ethnic identity politics is spread across Indonesia, it does not have a uniform operation, but instead is dependent on local historical and political configurations. Van Klinken, in his exploration of the new and quite different political configurations emerging in Central and East Kalimantan, demonstrates the increasing importance of ethnic identity to local elites in local political configurations, particularly in contests over control of the state:

The complexity grows as new elites – not part of the westernised national elites who rode high on earlier waves of anti-colonial nationalism – enter the arena by mobilising hitherto unmobilised sections of the population. These other elites could for example (claim to) represent the traditional chiefs, princes and landlords upon whom the imperial powers relied in colonial-dominated Asia and Africa. In the context of a weakened central state, Indonesia is presently seeing a resurgence of such ‘new’ (or newly prominent) elites. (2001c, p. 3)

There is evidence of a growing politicisation of ethnic identity in Papua, Riau, throughout Java, in West Sumatra (Sakai, 2003) and in Jakarta itself (Shahab, 2001). Another measure is the widespread demand that important local positions in the bureaucracy be given to ‘native sons’ (*putra daerah*).¹³ Many of these movements have long been present

¹² These scholars assess developments favourably while noting repeated incidence of money politics.

¹³ See Aspinnall and Fealy (2003, pp. 6-7) and Widen (2002, p. 102).

in the local communities, but could not flourish in the climate of New Order centralism. The decentralisation of local politics has revived their usefulness.

The growth of ethnic and local identity politics has implications for cultural practices across Indonesia. Accompanying the political mobilisation of people along lines of ethnic and local identity is the growth of ethnic and local cultural practices. Some communities have flagged the reintroduction of traditional systems of government to replace the village system enforced on the whole of Indonesia under Suharto. Bali and West Sumatra have both debated the merits of officially reintroducing their traditional systems of local government in place of the *desa* system forced on them by the New Order regime (Cohen, 2001). Another example is Greg Acciaoli's account of a return to traditional legal systems amongst the To Lindu people in Central Sulawesi following the end of New Order centralism (2002, pp. 221-30). Local content, particularly local languages, customs and crafts, is finding its way into school curriculum.¹⁴ The turn to ethnic identity politics has also resulted in violence in certain areas between indigenous peoples and migrants.¹⁵ The ethnic internal boundaries of the nation are becoming increasingly important for politics and in people's lives.

A symptom of the increasing importance of sub-national politics has been a proliferation of conferences exploring and celebrating the cultures of various ethnic groups across Indonesia. These conferences have a much wider scope than the artistic events organised by the New Order which tended to showcase only the performing arts. An example is the *International Conference of Sundanese Culture (Konferensi Internasional Budaya Sunda – KIBS)* held in Bandung from 22 to 25 August 2001. Six concurrent panels ran, which addressed: Literature and Sundanese Culture; History, Archaeology and Philology; Religion, Spirituality and Outlook on Life; Economy, Society and Politics; Art; and Lifestyle, Architecture, Food and Clothes. *KIBS* followed similar conferences in Central Kalimantan in December 1998, Riau in January-February 2000, Papua in May-June 2000, Minahasa in August 2000 (van Klinken, 2001c, p. 6) and about Malay identity in Batam in September 2001 (SMN, 2001). *KIBS* was opened by a representative of the Governor

¹⁴ In 2001, Bandung had drafted legislation to include the viewing of local arts in the curriculum of all primary school aged children. Interview with Dana Setia, 20 November 2001.

¹⁵ Central Kalimantan is one such example (van Klinken, 2001c). Ambon's recent violence is the result of similar tensions between elites and communities, but the key divide amongst the inhabitants was religion, not ethnicity (van Klinken, 2000).

of West Java and was sponsored by the Province of West Java for approximately \$31 000 AUD (150 000 000 Rp.) and the Toyota Foundation, a Japanese non-profit organisation, for approximately \$72 500 AUD (350 000 000 Rp.) (Maulana, 2001). The role of regional governments in many of these conferences is substantial due to their willingness to fund such causes in return for an association with large ethnic constituencies, although they are generally cautious of claims that would alienate the national government and the military.¹⁶

The cultural agenda of regional ethnic organisations prioritises the place and prosperity of ethnic constituencies and their cultures and draws attention to communal concerns with their decline under the Indonesian nation-state. Ajip Rosidi, a well known poet, novelist and academic from West Java and head of the Sundanese cultural organisation *Rancage*, provides an interesting example of how ethnic cultural organisations frame their agendas in his opening speech at *KIBS* (2001). Rosidi begins by discussing the years after 1942 in West Java, where there was a twenty-year period of turmoil (due to the Japanese occupation, the revolution, and the Darul Islam rebellion) that interrupted local lifestyles and cultural practices. From the beginning of the New Order period, the state turned its attention to modernisation and industrialisation. According to Rosidi, Sundanese culture and society were further weakened during this period due to the ‘Westernisation’ which accompanied modernisation and in-migration of ‘other people’¹⁷ to take advantage of economic opportunities. Sundanese began to lose interest in local arts and practices as their society began to ‘disintegrate’ (2001, p. 3). Rosidi then turns his attention to the Indonesian state. He claims that the state has never seriously addressed the issue of culture. Rosidi states:

To defend culture against extinction, a *political will* is required from the state and national leaders. And until now, we have not yet seen a *political will*. How will a *political will* to restore cultural life surface if consciousness of and understanding about culture’s importance to shaping the nation has never existed? (2001, p. 4)

Untuk menjaga jangan sampai punah, diperlukan adanya political will dari pemerintah dan para pemimpin bangsa. Dan sampai sekarang political will itulah yang belum pernah kelihatan. Bagaimana akan timbul suatu political will untuk membenahi kehidupan budaya kalau pengertian dan kesadaran tentang pentingnya kebudayaan dalam berbangsa juga tidak pernah timbul?

¹⁶ See Colombijn (2003, pp. 344-63) for an account of the Riau Malay movement, including the relationship to the provincial government.

¹⁷ ‘Orang lain’ in the original text (Rosidi, 2001, p. 2).

Rosidi then outlines the failure of the state to address the decline of traditional ethnic cultural practices, particularly in the case of education, to which he devotes a third of his speech. He concludes by stating that the role of *KIBS* is to encourage the development of a political will. *KIBS*, he hopes, will increase interest about and appreciation of Sundanese culture in both the local, national and international communities and will increase pressure on the state to develop a meaningful and effective cultural policy.

Six characteristics can be identified within Rosidi's speech that often recur within the analysis of ethnic cultural organisations from the late 1990s.¹⁸ They constitute a new key pressure on cultural policy in the reform era. The first characteristic is the historical decline of an ethnic culture. A once thriving culture declined due to the tides of history, in particular modernisation and the entrance of Western popular and high culture.¹⁹ The second is the identification of culture as a neglected area of governance. Rosidi accuses the state of failing to protect or seriously address cultural issues throughout the independence period and in particular the developmentalist New Order period.²⁰ The third characteristic is the conservative agenda underlying the argument. Sundanese culture tends to refer to older cultural forms and lifestyles, rather than emerging local/global practices and tends to exclude non-indigenous ethnic groups living in the region from the cultural and political arena.²¹

The fourth is that the state is compelled to act to protect local indigenous practices. An underlying element of such demands is competition for resources within the local arts community, which is discussed in chapter seven on the Cultural Institutions.²² The fifth characteristic is the relationship to Indonesian culture. In politically aware organisations like Rosidi's *Yayasan Rancage*, the relationship between the ethnic culture in question and Indonesian culture is clearly spelt out. Rosidi, for instance, clearly states that Sundanese culture is also Indonesian culture (Rosidi, 2001, p. 8), whereas Al azhar, in his

¹⁸ Many similarities exist with a text of Al azhar, the head of the Free Riau (*Riau Merdeka*) movement, who was also heavily involved with the arts in Riau (Al azhar, 1997b). I include references to Al azhar's text to support my claim that these characteristics can be generalised.

¹⁹ See also Al azhar (1997a, pp. 767-9).

²⁰ See also Al azhar (1997a, pp. 764-5). Al azhar's claim is broader still: Riau Malays were marginalised culturally, economically and socially during the independence era in the lands they once owned.

²¹ Al azhar also emphasises ethnic revival through exploring the 'heritage of the past' (1997a, p. 768). The activities of Al azhar and his associates in Riau are more encompassing than Rosidi and *Yayasan Rancage*. When I was in Riau in 2001, I attended a rock concert for local youth organised and promoted by Al azhar's organisation.

²² See also Al azhar (1997a, pp. 771-2).

description of the growth of Riau Malay identity, rejects that Riau Malay culture is Indonesian (1997b, p. 764). The final characteristic is increased attempts to engage with international groups and individuals. Rosidi makes a plea for more international academics to study Sundanese culture and for more international interest. Ethnic cultural organisations are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of international recognition for the well-being of their organisation and culture. The original declaration of Riau sovereignty (*Daulat Riau*) included an interpretation of the demands in English (Colombijn, 2003, p. 348) and a Malay culture conference in Batam in 2001 fostered links between Riau and Malays in neighbouring countries. International recognition generates cultural prestige, breeding local interest and pride and improved funding opportunities from the state, international organisations and tourism.

4. Cultural Policy in the Reform Era

While decentralisation and the growth of ethnic identity politics exerted pressure for cultural policy change across Indonesia, their effects were felt much more at the sub-national level than the national level. The Directorate of Culture, located at the national level, also experienced pressure for change, but this was predominantly generated by pressures and political decisions that began in the New Order era rather than post-New Order reforms. Below I firstly discuss changes within the Directorate of Culture, in particular a controversial cabinet-level decision to join culture with tourism rather than education, as well as responses to decentralisation. Secondly, I explore the impact of decentralisation at the sub-national level through an examination of cultural policy formation in West Java.²³

²³ I have chosen West Java for three reasons. First, it is representative of neither the centre nor the periphery, due to its proximity to Jakarta and Central Java, the current commitment of the West Javanese to the Indonesian nation and the minority status of the ethnic Sundanese in Indonesia. West Java is predominantly ethnic Sundanese and issues regarding Sundanese culture predominate. The Sundanese are acutely aware of their minority status compared to the Javanese majority in both Indonesia and Java. Second, West Java itself contains many active cultural forms, and Bandung is a centre of cultural activity. This, along with concerns to protect Sundanese culture, has stimulated cultural policy in Bandung, making it an ideal case study. Third, there is a tension between the ethnic Sundanese and the smaller indigenous groups, particularly the Cirebonese, regarding the status of Sundanese culture relative to other local indigenous cultures. This tension is present in many other provinces due to Indonesia's cultural diversity and the cultural policy pursued during the New Order era.

The Directorate of Culture and Tourism

A sea change in cultural policy has been signalled through a restructuring of the Directorate of Culture that has seen culture linked to tourism rather than education. Suharto's last Development Cabinet (Seventh) instituted the restructure in 1997. Without any consultation within the bureaucracy, Suharto announced a change in the Minister's portfolios with the term culture appearing twice. The Ministries of Education and Culture and of Tourism, Post and Communications became the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture. The movement from education to tourism was followed through before decentralisation took effect and with significant internal resistance.

The move of culture into the tourism portfolio began a series of events that constitute the biggest structural shake up in the Directorate of Culture since its inception as the Cultural Office in 1945. The Minister of Tourism, Post and Communications in the Sixth Development Cabinet, Joop Ave, successfully lobbied Suharto to have culture and its 4300 bureaucrats moved across to the Department of Tourism.²⁴ The Seventh Development Cabinet was dissolved before any substantial changes could be made. Habibie left culture with tourism, and some planning was made for the move. The first Wahid cabinet did not include culture in any portfolio (although there was a State Ministry of Tourism and Arts), as Wahid was planning to implement a National Cultural Board to oversee the area.²⁵ The second Wahid cabinet saw culture again linked with tourism, which is where it remained under Megawati. Bureaucrats within the Directorate of Culture have generally not responded well to the move. Most have a commitment, through their own studies in arts and culture faculties and their work history in the Directorate, to culture as a tool of national development and conceive of culture's role as central to maintaining national cohesion and identity.

The *Broad Outline of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara – GBHN)* for 1999-2004²⁶ provides an insight into both the nexus of tourism and culture within the cultural

²⁴ Interview with Jasli Falal, 10 September 2001. Falal was the Head of the Cultural Section at the National Planning Board at the time of the move.

²⁵ Interview with Jasli Falal, 10 September 2001.

²⁶ This GBHN was developed during the Wahid presidency.

apparatus and the continuing presence of New Order era cultural discourses. The first subsection frames the goals for Culture, the Arts and Tourism:

To cultivate and manage the national culture of the Indonesian nation, which has its origins in the noble cultural heritage of the nation, national culture that contains universal values including belief in the one true God has the goal of supporting the care of harmony in social life and developing the national civilisation. (Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat, 1999, p. 30)

Mengembangkan dan membina kebudayaan nasional bangsa Indonesia yang bersumber dari warisan budaya leluhur bangsa, budaya nasional yang mengandung nilai-nilai universal termasuk kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa dalam rangka mendukung terpeliharanya kerukunan hidup bermasyarakat dan membangun peradaban bangsa.

This subsection indicates that New Order era cultural discourses still frame national cultural policy. It pays homage to cultural heritage, universal humanism's understanding of culture as universal, and culture's role in national development. The third subsection confirms the continued centrality of national development by its statement that a critical attitude to cultural values needs to be maintained to develop values that are conducive to 'facing opposition to national development in the future.'²⁷

However, there are also some changes. The fourth subsection states that the state should develop the freedom to create in the arts and protect the rights and royalties of artists. From a peripheral position during the New Order era GBHN, tourism became much more prominent in the cultural policy section. It is mentioned in two places. Firstly, the government is to make 'traditional' arts and culture a 'vehicle for the development of national tourism and promoting it overseas.'²⁸ The linkage between indigenous cultural forms and tourism is, as we shall see below, the most controversial of the developments of the Reform era. Secondly, in a move aimed at allaying opposition, the development of tourism is to be 'holistic',²⁹ 'participatory'³⁰ and respectful of culture and the environment (1999, p. 31).

Internally, the Directorate has undergone numerous restructures. The key elements of the restructure were the division of the Directorate of Culture into two Directorates: the Directorate of Cultural Values, Art and Film and the Directorate of History and

²⁷ 'Menghadapi tantangan pembangunan bangsa di masa depan' (1999, p. 30).

²⁸ 'Menjadikan kesenian dan kebudayaan tradisional Indonesia sebagai wahana bagi pengembangan pariwisata nasional dan mempromosikannya ke luar negeri' (1999, p. 31).

²⁹ 'Utuh' (1999, p. 31).

³⁰ 'Partisipatoris' (1999, p. 31).

Archaeology (*Directorat Nilai Budaya, Seni dan Film* and *Direktorat Sejarah dan Purbakala*). Secondly, mass cultural forms, specifically film and video, are included once again within the purview of official cultural policy. According to the GBHN, the Directorate of Cultural Values, Art and Film is to ensure ‘healthy’ cinematic developments in order to ‘improve religious morality and national astuteness, develop positive public opinion and increase economic value’.³¹

Two changes which have not been well received in the Directorate are the process of decentralisation and the downgrading of the culture portfolio within the Megawati cabinet (LOK, 2004). As part of the decentralisation process, a number of Technical Implementation Units (*Unit Pelaksanaan Teknis – UPT*) have been put under the control of the lower levels of government. UPT were units of national government departments that were present in the region but were directly responsible to the national bureaucracy in Jakarta and constantly communicated with their affiliated section. As control of the UPT moved to the sub-national levels of government, bureaucrats in the Directorate saw the institutions which they had built and run for a number of years move out of their grasp. Additionally, Megawati changed the status of Tourism and Culture from a department to a state ministry (*kementerian negara*). State ministries receive a much lower level of funding and have lower staffing levels. They also are focussed on policy development rather than operational activities such as those undertaken by the UPT. The worries of the cultural bureaucrats were allayed by the creation of a Development Board of Culture and Tourism (*Badan Pembangunan Kebudayaan dan Parawisata*) soon after the announcement of the Megawati cabinet. The cultural apparatus now sat within the Development Board and, under such an arrangement, would be separate from the tourism apparatus and could continue to control the UPT that remained.³² The cultural bureaucrats’ rearguard action had so far produced results. However, Presidential Decree 29/2003 soon brought many of these issues to the surface in a very public row.

³¹ ‘... untuk meningkatkan moralitas agama serta kecerdasan bangsa, pembentukan opini publik yang positif dan peningkatan nilai tambah secara ekonomi’ (1999, p. 31).

³² The cultural parks (*taman budaya*) and the provincial museums had already been transferred to the Provincial governments. The UPT which remained were the Historical and Traditional Values Research Bureaus (11), the Preservation of Historical Remains and Archaeology Reserves (9), Archaeology Bureaus (10), special museums and the National Museum (6), the National Gallery, and the Borobudur Research and Conservation Bureau (NAR, 2003).

Presidential Decree 29/2003 dissolved the Development Board and merged its 4300 employees into the State Ministry of Culture and Tourism (600 employees). The announcement of the move started a media standoff between the State Minister for Culture and Tourism, I Gede Ardika, and the Head of the Development Board, Setyanto Santoso between the last week of April and the first week of June in 2003. Ultimately, the presidential decree backed by the Minister could not be overcome by opposition within the department, but this did not stop opposition within the Directorate from fighting it all the way. The Minister's reasons for the move were to prevent the duplication of tasks and to improve effectiveness and efficiency (COK, 2003). The reasons given for the resistance to the move were multiple: the operational activities and the UPT would not be allowed to continue within the smaller confines of a state ministry (TRI, 2003); the work of the employees would be disturbed; there will be internal unrest (COK, 2003); and any reorganisation should be delayed until after the 2004 election, as there was a good chance of future restructuring (NAR, 2003).

The subtext to this argument about bureaucratic processes and efficiency only occasionally broke through to the surface in the newspaper articles. The key issue, masterfully avoided by the Minister and his upper echelon of bureaucrats, was the government's changing use of culture. From an approach where the government, in the words of the Secretary of the Development Board, Nunus Supardi, provided 'cultural leadership' with the goal of creating national unity (TRI, 2003), the government moved towards a more commercially aware approach that takes account of the cultural industries and is less inclined to run programs itself. Teuke Jacob, a Professor of Anthropology at Gadjadara University, and cultural observer Rahman Arge, labelled the change in method 'sacrificing culture' (NAR, 2003). In an interview with Kompas, Jacob stated:

This policy [of fusing the two bodies] mirrors the weakness of the government's commitment to culture. An institution which already possesses concrete authority to manage culture is then fused to an institution which does not run programs. (NAR, 2003)

Kebijakan itu mencerminkan betapa lemahnya keberpihakan pemerintah terhadap kebudayaan. Lembaga yang sudah punya wewenang konkret untuk mengurus kebudayaan justru dilebur ke lembaga yang tidak operasional.

Free of the burden of state employment, these two commentators accused the government of neglecting its duty of cultural leadership as set out in the 1945 Constitution and therefore 'stunting' cultural growth. Their preference was for a separate institution for

culture or a return to the Department of Education.³³ The media stoush ended with Santoso pressing defamation charges against a number of members of the tourist industry after a no-confidence motion was passed against his leadership of the Development Board. The substance of the motion was that Santoso was an ineffective leader and more oriented ‘towards projects, not towards the market’.³⁴

Underlying the Minister’s agenda is a reconsideration of the role of culture in policy. Culture’s utility seems to be shifting from a tool of nation building to include employment and revenue raising through its association with tourism. Such a change is consistent with developments in other countries, but contradicts the underlying rationale of cultural policy during the New Order era. The extent of the Reform era change can be underlined by the outrage felt by ex-Director-General of Culture Edi Sedyawati. In a conference in 2003, she strongly criticised the restructure:

I see those two departments [Education and Culture] together in a single domain of activities, educating and providing culture. Educating at its base provides culture, while providing culture is a process of education. There is the connection. (EH, 2003)

Saya melihat kedua departemen tersebut sama-sama dalam satu ranah kegiatan, mendidik dan membudayakan. Mendidik pada dasarnya membudayakan, sementara membudayakan adalah proses pendidikan. Di situlah keterkaitannya,

At the end of 2003 it was difficult to see if tourism was indeed ‘commodifying’ culture or, alternatively, if the connection to tourism had in fact freed indigenous cultural forms from the priorities of the New Order era. However, another position provides a different perspective on the debate. In contrast to the opinions of Indonesian cultural observers and bureaucrats, Philip Yampolsky’s study of the effects of New Order era cultural policy on indigenous art forms suggest that the two processes are not opposed, but instead reinforce each other as they both redesign indigenous arts ‘for external consumption, whether by tourists ... or festival audiences’ (Yampolsky, 1995, p. 714). The ‘national’ and ‘cultural’ positions are in fact two contending rationalities within the Directorate that are both ‘reforming’ culture in ways that are not dissimilar. From this perspective, the position of the Directorate remains oriented towards strengthening the nation through economic growth.

³³ It should be noted that more criticisms were loudly expressed during the Fifth Cultural Congress held at Padang Panjang in West Sumatra in October 2003. Ex-Director General Sedyawati was particularly stinging and evoked wide agreement (EH, 2003). The recommendation for an ‘autonomous’ Department of Culture was even one of the formal recommendations of the conference (MAM, 2003).

³⁴ ‘... *cenderung berorientasi proyek, bukan orientasi pasar*’ (ADP, ETA, & TRI, 2003).

Making Cultural Policy in Decentralised Indonesia

Decentralisation, in addition to making the state more sympathetic to popular concerns about local majority ethnic cultures and the demands of ethnic cultural organisations, has also created opportunities for the non-national levels of government to reassess policy content. Although the responsibility for most cultural policy activities was decentralised to the regency and city governments, some responsibility was shouldered by the provincial governments, including management of the cultural parks (*taman budaya*),³⁵ museums and the provincial level cultural office and coordination of province-wide cultural activities.

At the end of April 2001, the provincial government of West Java decided to consolidate the cultural apparatus that it had inherited through the decentralisation process. Four departments in West Java³⁶ were brought together to form the Provincial Office for Culture and Tourism (*Dinas Kebudayaan dan Parawisata Propinsi Jawa Barat*, commonly referred to with the acronym *Disbudpar*). West Java provides an interesting study of the different pressures that exerted themselves on cultural policy at a sub-national level. Below I focus on two aspects of cultural policy in West Java: *Disbudpar*'s strategic plans that were developed early in 2001; and a planning meeting that engaged with elements of the arts community in West Java held in November 2001.

a. Strategic Planning in West Java

The province developed strategic plans (*rencana strategik*) to guide policy between elections (2001-2005). The strategic plans indicate that *Disbudpar* embraced the merger of culture and tourism without the antagonism that occurred in the Directorate of Culture at the national level. There was little evidence of divisions amongst bureaucrats or criticism from the arts community regarding what the strategic plans represented as a mutually beneficial union (*Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata*, 2001b, p. i). Nonetheless, differences between strategic plans indicate the presence of different policy directions.

³⁵ I examine the history of the cultural parks and the impact of decentralisation in chapter six.

³⁶ The four offices were: the Provincial Tourism Office (*Dinas Pariwisata Daerah*); Regional Office for Tourism and Art; (*Kantor Wilayah Pariwisata dan Kesenian*); Provincial Office for Education and Culture (*Dinas Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan*); and the Archaeology and Arts Sections from the Regional Office of National Education (*Kantor Wilayah Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, Bidang Kepurbakalaan dan Kesenian*) (Aritonang & Maulana, 2001).

The strategic plans for the areas that were previously under central control continue to exhibit features from the cultural discourses of the New Order era. For instance, the *Cultural Preservation and Development Strategy in West Java (Strategi Pelestarian Pengembangan Kebudayaan di Jawa Barat, Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001c)* adopted a broad definition of culture borrowed directly from the New Order era. Culture was defined as ‘the materialisation of humankind’s capacity to actively adapt to their environment’.³⁷ In the discussion of the ‘usage’ of culture, culture was once again linked to national development:

West Java’s Regional culture that has developed throughout history is the basic capital and the dominant factor in supporting the success of national development. (2001c, p. 5)

Budaya Daerah Jawa Barat yang berkembang sepanjang sejarah merupakan modal dasar dan faktor yang dominan untuk menunjang keberhasilan pembangunan nasional.

Similarities were present throughout all of the strategic plans in other policy fields designated as cultural. The arts program had the goal of ‘caring for and protecting the kinds of West Javanese art that can be passed on to the following generation’.³⁸ The arts strategic plan also emphasised the arts’ role in ensuring national unity, prioritised ‘high value’ and ‘lofty values’³⁹ and managing ‘negative foreign cultural influences’.⁴⁰ These features reinforced the emphasis on ‘authentic’ indigenous forms and ignored contemporary or highbred art forms. The history and traditional values program was represented as ensuring continued national unity and protecting against foreign disintegrative influences (2001b, pp. 22-3). There was also a repeated emphasis regarding threats of extinction to cultural heritage and values (2001c, p. 2)⁴¹ and traditional indigenous arts (2001d, p. 2) that required state intervention and direction.

An element of *Disbudpar*’s cultural strategic plans that deserves some attention is the cultural and geographic limitations of the policies. At their broadest, the limit of the cultural policies was West Java. However, a number of other limitations focused the cultural policies on a particular brand of culture linked to a particular community,

³⁷ ‘Kebudayaan ... adalah perwujudan kemampuan manusia untuk menyesuaikan diri secara aktif terhadap lingkungan’ (2001c, p. 1).

³⁸ ‘Memelihara dan menjaga berbagai jenis kesenian daerah Jawa Barat agar dapat diwariskan kepada generasi penerus’ (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001b, p. 19).

³⁹ ‘Nilai tinggi’ and ‘nilai luhur’ (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001d, p. 1).

⁴⁰ ‘Menanggulangi pengaruh budaya asing yang negatif’ (2001d, p. 7).

⁴¹ Cultural objects, practices and also ‘values, social norms and world view’ are considered to be threatened by decay, outside influences and the destructive tendencies in society (2001c, p. 2).

excluding other types of culture and communities. The most common limitation was an exclusive focus on the traditional indigenous culture and arts of West Java, excluding contemporary and popular culture and arts and the indigenous culture and arts of migrants from other countries and regions (2001c, pp. 1-5; 2001d, p. 2). When discussing the arts and history and traditional values programs, there was in two places a slippage between West Javanese culture and Sundanese culture (2001b, pp. 19,22). Although the Sundanese are the largest ethnic group in West Java, they are by no means the only ethnic group. However, the slippages indicate the ethnic community that the province most wanted to address. The focus on traditional culture and the arts was justified through the assertion that these were national cultural forms (2001b, p. 23; 2001c, p. 5), including the use of the phrase ‘the lofty values of a national ethnicity’⁴² in relation to justifying the protection of West Javanese art.

Two alternative understandings of strategic planning for the Reform era contrast with the strategic plans in the cultural areas. Firstly, the *Mental Framework for the Apparatus of the West Java Cultural Office towards the Reform Era (Kerangka Pemikiran Aparatur Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata Propinsi Jawa Barat ke Era Reformasi, henceforth Mental Framework)* introduced new ideas about the role of the bureaucracy and the conduct of public administration (*Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001a*). The *Mental Framework* began by interpreting *reformasi* as a demand for the implementation of ‘good governance’, using the English term in the original. Good governance was then interpreted as a style of public administration that draws heavily on Western ideas and terminology.⁴³ The major elements of the *Mental Framework* were: managing learning; creating change agendas; reinventing government management; and customer service. The first two elements were about achieving work potentials, planning and change management. The final two elements revolved around the term ‘customer driven government’ and emphasised that the purpose of the public service was to meet the needs of ‘customers’, not the bureaucracy (*Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001a, p. 6*). Rather than the bureaucracy providing services itself, *Mental Framework* advocated privatisation and cooperation with private companies, the introduction of market competition as a tool of reform and a more hands-off style of public management where intervention only occurs when it looks like outcomes are not going to be achieved.

⁴² ‘*Nilai luhur etnis bangsa*’ (2001d, p. 1).

⁴³ Many terms are in English, the majority but not all accompanied by an Indonesian interpretation.

This neo-liberal interpretation of *reformasi* reflects the education and outlook of the Head of *Disbudpar*, Memet Hamden. Hamden majored in development studies at American University in Washington DC. In an interview in 2001, he described the role of *Disbudpar* as ‘coordinating’ and his own ambition as wanting to ‘be the best facilitator’ (Interview with Memet K. Hamden, 13 November 2001). The attempts to move away from what Hamden called a ‘top-down model’ to a neo-liberal model would involve a major reinterpretation that is not reflected in the strategic plans for the cultural areas discussed previously. A key element of the neo-liberal model is that the market is considered more efficient than the government when it comes to providing services which contrasts sharply with the New Order rationale that the state should lead cultural programs to ensure ordered development.

Another perspective on strategic planning regarding culture can be gleaned from the thoughts of the arts community in West Java, as expressed in a seminar in May 2000, ‘Archipelago/Inter-Islands: Considering the Future’ (‘Nusantara/Antar-Nusa: Menimbang Masa Depan’, Aritonang, 2000a). In this seminar, there were calls for greater participation by civil society and to build the capacity for greater participation, clean government, greater attention to human rights and a review of Indonesia’s place in global economics. Culture was invoked in two ways. First, Yasraf Amir Piliang, a lecturer from the Bandung Institute of Technology, argued that art should be used in the strategy of national reconciliation to encourage a ‘holistic’ assessment of the relationship between the past and future. Art and culture, according to Piliang, could be used to encourage a broadening of world view and a reflection on the national condition. This contrasted with *Disbudpar*’s cultural strategic planning, which was aimed at strengthening pre-existing values and reinforcing the place of local ethnicities in the nation. Second, filmmaker Garin Nugroho called for a broad cultural strategy to address the large changes and sense of disorientation following the events of 1998. Nugroho used a broader definition of culture to advocate creating new institutions with the larger aim of growing a ‘new society’⁴⁴ through addressing five national problem areas: geopolitics, the speed of history, political crises, challenges of modernity and communications crises. Soon after this seminar, elements of the arts community were offered a chance to participate in developing provincial cultural policy.

⁴⁴ ‘Masyarakat baru’ (Aritonang, 2000a, p. 18).

b. The Planning Dialogue

On 5-7 November 2001, *Disbudpar* invited many of the stakeholders in the cultural industries in West Java to participate in the development of a new cultural policy for West Java to be implemented by the new institution. The three-day conference, entitled Planning Dialogue for Culture and Tourism in West Java (*Dialog Peta dan Agenda Budaya dan Pariwisata Jawa Barat*, henceforth, *Culture and Tourism Dialogue*), divided the participants up into eight groups dealing with language, literature and script (two groups); fine and performance arts; art activities and festivals; history; traditional values; museums and other cultural venues; and archaeology. The *Culture and Tourism Dialogue* was considered a continuation of a series of strategic planning meetings that had taken place across West Java in connection with decentralisation and also a follow-up to the suggestions that emerged from KIBS that had taken place seven weeks before (Aritonang et al., 2001). The broad goals for the *Culture and Tourism Dialogue*, as set out in the *Summary of Findings (Rumusan Hasil)*, reflected the priorities of the provincial government. The *Culture and Tourism Dialogue* was to establish an agenda for cultural and tourism in West Java and address the issues, concerns and potential benefits of combining culture and tourism.⁴⁵ More specifically, the eight groups were asked to ‘map’ criticisms of the current policies in their area, develop solutions to these criticisms and use these solutions to create an agenda for their specific area (summarised in Table 5.1).

The *Summary of Findings* includes a recurring criticism regarding the scope of cultural policy in West Java:

Until now, concepts about the treatment of culture and cultural inheritance were sporadic and rested too much on certain institutions’ programs. In other words, not enough space was given for public participation, such as the scholarly community, the arts community, tourism, industry groups and businesses. (Aritonang et al., 2001, p. 12)

Selama ini, konsep perlakuan dan pewarisan kebudayaan lebih banyak dilakukan secara sporadis, dan terlalu bertumpu pada program-program instansi tertentu. Dengan kata lain, belum banyak memberikan ruang pada partisipasi publik seperti masyarakat terpelajar, masyarakat kesenian, masyarakat pariwisata, masyarakat industri, dan usahawan.

⁴⁵ There was some evidence in the report of concern about combining culture and tourism, which was expressed as combining the regulation of ‘non-profit’ activities (culture) with ‘profit’ activities (tourism) (Aritonang et al., 2001, p. 1).

The most direct criticism of past cultural policy practice was on the first page of the report, where, drawing from Rosidi's address at *KIBS*, the cultural policy of all of the post-independence periods is criticised as understanding culture as 'static', 'pre-existing' and 'continuing its existence without a creative process'.⁴⁶ Past cultural policy was accused of ignoring cultural change and stifling creativity.

Some of the suggested changes cut across a number of different policy areas. Almost all of the groups called for legislative reform. The *Summary of Findings* called for 'total change'⁴⁷ of the legislation to include the fields of history, archaeology, museums and traditional values, where the old legislation only addressed language, literature, script and the arts. The *Summary of Findings* also called for clear sanctions, greater accommodation of subcultures and for the exclusion of 'technical' areas, such as the shaping or administration of institutions.⁴⁸ Another suggestion that was mentioned by almost every group was initiatives to increase and improve education about culture in schools. There were multiple calls to review the cultural curriculum, increase local content and make use of local experts in schools. Indeed, education received more attention than tourism, which also cut across the different groups. Recommendations relating to tourism were summarised as 'creating a mutually symbiotic relationship'⁴⁹ and tended to take the form of meetings with the purpose of facilitating cooperation. Many groups made calls for increased training and human resources development, for more programs to develop public appreciation for culture and moves to involve the private sector in funding cultural activities.

There were also differences between the findings of different groups. While many groups criticised the limited scope and activities of *Disbudpar*, the fine and performance arts group was the most critical of past policies which they considered as not addressing artists' aspirations or concerns. The traditional values group had the largest number of criticisms regarding the dilapidated condition of traditional values, which they blamed on

⁴⁶ 'Statis', 'sudah jadi', 'tetap keadaannya tanpa proses kreatif' (Aritonang et al., 2001, p. 1).

⁴⁷ 'Diubah total' (Aritonang et al., 2001, p. 18).

⁴⁸ In *Pikiran Rakyat* on 15 November 2001, a statement from the committee that wrote the report was published. After the call for the exclusion of 'technical areas' ('hal-hal yang bersifat terlalu teknis'), the article clarified that shaping and administering cultural institutions (like the Arts Council that I also discuss in chapter six) should be passed to the 'cultural community' and that state-attempts to define these institutions were misguided (Aritonang, 2001). These statements were excluded from the report despite the presence of the author of the article on the report's steering committee.

⁴⁹ 'Tercipta hubungan simbiosis mutualistik' (Aritonang, 2001, p. 19).

state neglect. The recommendations regarding both history and traditional values incorporated previous cultural policy programs regarding documentation, research and also made similar criticisms regarding the negative impact of foreign cultural influences. The museums group had the largest focus on developing human resources and professional management skills for cultural institutions. Although there was a recommendation in the *Summary of Findings* that the legislation should address all ‘sub-cultures’,⁵⁰ Sundanese culture received the most attention. Although there is some justification for a disparity given that the population of West Java is predominantly Sundanese and West Java is their place of origin, there were few recommendations that addressed the cultures of groups considered non-indigenous. The language, literature and script groups were particularly focussed on Sundanese language and culture, one group recommending that Sundanese be taught to Chinese and Javanese in urban areas (2001, p. 51).

The *Culture and Tourism Dialogue* can be summarised as calling for a broadening of cultural policy in three ways. First, the number of different individuals involved in the planning process indicated broader participation in making cultural policy. Second, the *Culture and Tourism Dialogue* strongly recommended a broadening of the kinds of cultural practices to be addressed by cultural policy. There was a repeated request to include history, archaeology, museums, traditional values and the contemporary arts in cultural policy. Third, the range and number of activities recommended (253) were well beyond the smaller field of activities that were previously the focus of cultural policy in West Java. The criticism of past cultural policy as limited, prescriptive and not encouraging broader participation, although only briefly mentioned, underlies the desire to expand the scope of cultural policy. However, it should also be noted that some groups, most notably history and traditional values, retained the perspective of the New Order era regarding the preservation of pre-existing values, which was directly criticised in the *Summary of Findings* (Aritonang, 2001, p. 1). Although, as journalist Abdullah Mustappa observed,⁵¹ not many of the suggestions were new and some differed little from present practice, the level of access to and debate with the provincial state had the

⁵⁰ ‘*Subkultur*’ (Aritonang, 2001, p. 18).

⁵¹ Mustappa writes: ‘Everyone knows the greater part of what now has been submitted in the form of suggestions or recommendations has already been submitted previously’ (2000). (‘*Apa yang sekarang disampaikan dalam bentuk usulan atau rekomendasi, semua orang tahu, sebagian besar juga sudah disampaikan sebelumnya.*’)

Table 5.1: Recommendations of the Different Groups at the Planning Dialogue for Culture and Tourism in West Java

Area	Summary of Recommendations
Language, Literature and Script (Traditional)	This group critiqued the literature and everyday usage of Sundanese language and called for it to be 'resurrected' to 'strengthen identity and enrich cultural diversity' (19). They recommended: changes to the legislation to encourage new books in and about Sundanese and other local languages, including dictionaries and translations; improving formal and informal Sundanese language teaching through new publications for teachers and students, better teacher training and language competitions; and developing and promoting Sundanese electronic and print media.
Language, Literature and Script (Contemporary)	This group called for 'good and correct' language to be encouraged. They recommended that the teaching of language and literature be upgraded through: formalisation of Sundanese language for education; increased funding for Sundanese language teaching; compulsory local language teaching in all schools; more Sundanese language competitions; facilitating Sundanese language authors' school visits; printing Sundanese language articles in the mass media; and publishing local Sundanese folk stories as comic books in local languages.
Fine and Performance Arts	This group began with the position that human resources in the arts were weak. This group was particularly critical of past policies as being insular and not representing artists' aspirations or addressing their problems. They recommended: improving understanding and appreciation of the arts through researching, writing about, documenting and mapping the arts of West Java, developing an arts network, publicising West Javanese arts through performances and festivals and socialising art in schools; improving the legislative framework; improving human resources and management; and improving financing and financial procedures through training seminars and encouraging donations.
Calendar of Arts Activities and Festivals	This group recommended that tourist industry activities which contribute to culture be developed and the group itself developed a number of ideas for festivals. They recommended: the legislative framework be broadened to include other areas of culture and include sanctions; human resources in tourism and the arts receive more training; and a series of festivals be developed including festivals for film, theatre, West Javanese culture (in Indonesia and overseas), for localities (regencies and municipalities) and an international percussion festival. They also recommended a working committee be formed to organise workshops, seminars, dialogues, festivals and to promote activities.
History	This group focussed on making 'inherited values' and 'the wisdom of Sundanese history' the basis of Sundanese society's world view and also encouraging research into and writing about local and regional histories. They recommended: inventorying, documenting and 'making functional' cultural artefacts (<i>benda cagar budaya</i>) and their environment; 'guidance' (<i>pembinaan</i>) for local historians so that they could undertake thematic local histories; upgrading the history curriculum; organising a history conference; and developing historical archives.
Traditional Values	This group called for the two contradictory goals of preserving traditional values and for traditional values to be 'transformed for conditions today' (20). They recommended: promoting traditional Sundanese values; inventorying local sayings and <i>adat</i> ; organising a forum for research and tradition; working through families, the mass media, education and groups to promote cultural values; encouraging appreciation for the 'cultural values' of other ethnic groups; and developing research initiatives into cultural traditions.
Museums and Other Cultural Venues	This group began by noting that museums and cultural sites in West Java lacked professional staff and were not appreciated by the public. They also noted that cultural venues lacked a legal foundation. They recommended: standardising recruitment for staff; management training; technical training in conservation, restoration and marketing; organising seminars; increasing cooperation between organisations through networking sessions; organising activities to grow public participation; and developing promotional and marketing activities.
Archaeology	This group called for increased preservation and use of archaeological assets. They began by highlighting the absence of legislation, planning, and training relating to archaeology. They recommended: developing a legal framework that addresses cultural artefacts; a program of research and development involving inventorying, cultivating and securing artefacts; the development of cultural artefacts as tourist assets, including training for engagement with the tourist industry.

Source: Aritonang et. al. (2001).

potential to open up new cultural policy directions and possibilities for the future.⁵²

In a highly centralised system where the central government made cultural policy and regional offices implemented programs, such as existed in Indonesia during the New Order era, centrally determined policies and directives generally took precedence over the differences between levels of government. However, the centralism of the New Order era did not prevent alternative understandings of cultural policy from proliferating at lower levels of government and amongst local communities. Decentralisation has increased the importance of local perspectives and has opened up greater possibilities for cultural policy perspectives that were previously ignored by the centralised administration. The Culture and Tourism Planning Dialogue indicates that in West Java there was a greater engagement with non-state groups that desired a more inclusive cultural policy when compared to the West Java cultural bureaucracy. Decentralisation also made the entry of a neo-liberal perspective on cultural policy into *Disbudpar* possible. Despite the greater inclusiveness due to decentralisation, New Order era cultural discourses remained influential, particularly in the cultural bureaucracy and certain cultural policy areas relating to history and traditional practices. In West Java, the emphasis on indigenous ethnic identity in cultural policy was recognisable, particularly in the strategic plans, but was diluted in the Culture and Tourism Planning Dialogue by the inclusion of cultural practices and organisations considered not ethnically aligned such as the contemporary arts. The example of cultural policy in West Java demonstrates that there is greater potential for broad participation and change in cultural policy in the Reform era than during the New Order era as non-state groups can more easily access and apply pressure to local governments and local governments in the Reform era are now free to pursue different cultural policy directions.

5. Conclusion

Cultural policy in Indonesia, although never homogenous, is becoming even more heterogeneous and plural, *while* still generally using the cultural discourses of the New

⁵² Yogyakarta held a one-day seminar on 16 November 2000 to discuss cultural policy as it related to the fine arts. The keynote speaker was the Sultan of Yogyakarta, who was also the Governor of Yogyakarta. Papers were also given by the Head of the Provincial Office of National Education, where the arts portfolio resided at the time and the Rector of the Indonesian Arts Institute, one of the premier fine arts colleges in Indonesia. The focus was on how to reformulate arts policy in Yogyakarta. See Susanto (2000).

Order state *and* being subject to the political pressures of the reform era. Unlike the beginnings of Guided Democracy and the New Order, where there were preferred cultural discourses that were soon linked with policies, the governments of the Reform era have not provided or adopted strong alternative cultural discourses. The most substantial impact on cultural practices, the end of the licensing regime for cultural events, was not a government initiative but a popular initiative by urban artists. One of the two most substantial cultural policy reforms from the national governments has been to link culture more closely to tourism – a highly contested move initiated during the Suharto era that reflects more a broader trend that began before the Reform era than policy leadership by the reform era governments.

A more far reaching reform with greater scope for change has been the process of decentralisation and its partner, ethnic and regional identity politics. Sub-national levels of government have always interpreted the New Order regime's cultural discourses in accordance with their local situations. The events of the reform era and the process of decentralisation have both increased the importance of differences in interpretation between the national government and non-national governments and provided autonomy that is beginning to produce greater differentiation. Additionally, local arts communities have more access to lower levels of government and can more easily apply pressure for cultural policy change. However, the regional governments have found policy innovation difficult and have struggled to move away from the methods and discourses of the New Order era. The result is a slowly increasing diversification of cultural policy rather than the striking transformations that characterised previous regime changes. Despite the speed of change, decentralisation has created a climate conducive to cultural policy innovation as increasing numbers of jurisdictions shape their own cultural policy. The drivers of change will be the rationalities through which lower-level administrations engage with and promote local cultural practices. Cultural policy could be driven by the conservative agendas of local ethnic cultural organisations or it could encourage broader participation using a wide variety of local cultural practices. A third possibility is that cultural policy may be ignored altogether.

In addition to the continued market provision of culture discussed in the previous chapter, decentralisation has further contributed to the withering of the command model. The weakening of the central state and the related policy of decentralisation has caused

greater divergence in cultural policy implementation across Indonesia. Increasing cultural policy plurality renders the enforcement of a centrally-defined command culture impossible, although elements survive in the cultural policies of the non-national levels of government. The move of culture into the tourism portfolio signalled a small step towards a model that regulated market provision but even this step, because of the way it combined culture and profit, was resisted by the cultural bureaucracy and established cultural observers. The centralised command culture model, a feature of cultural policy for much of the twentieth century, has become more ineffective during the Reform era.

Part II.

Cultural Policy Case Studies

Chapter 6

Nation-Wide Cultural Institutions: the Spread of the Cultural Parks and the Arts Councils

The two most prominent state-affiliated arts institutions of the New Order era were the *taman budaya* (cultural parks) and the *dewan kesenian* (arts councils). The cultural parks were the product of central government planning that dates back to a Minister of Education and Culture Decree (*Keputusan Mendikbud*) in 1978. Twenty-four cultural parks were established between 1978 and 1994 in provinces across the archipelago and managed through guidelines fashioned by the Directorate of Culture. The advent of the Reform era substantially changed the cultural parks' institutional location when, as part of the decentralisation process, the cultural parks were removed from central control and placed within the jurisdiction of provincial governments. The arts councils present a more diverse set of institutions in regards to both how they were established and the way they were run. Although they were based on the model of the Jakarta Arts Council (*Dewan Kesenian Jakarta – JAC*, established in 1968), there has never been a requirement to follow a single mode of operation. They exist at both the provincial and sub-provincial levels and may or may not receive state funding. The majority of the arts councils were established after 1992 following an initiative involving Salim Said, the then Director of the JAC, and the Interior Ministry that provided funding for arts councils to the provincial governments.

This chapter examines the New Order regime's expectations for the cultural parks and arts councils and their outcomes in a variety of locations across Indonesia. Three issues in particular are explored. First, the differing locations of the cultural parks and arts councils provides an opportunity to examine the diverse operation of cultural institutions during the New Order era. Despite the tendency towards a highly centralised mode of policy creation and implementation, the diversity of local power structures could produce outcomes far removed from the regime's expectations. This chapter is particularly interested in how cultural discourses were used in local institutions since these discourses

both inform and are shaped within the practices of institutions. Second, both institutions (although more so the cultural parks due to their higher degree of regulation) offer the opportunity to explore how the New Order regime attempted to employ indigenous ethnic arts in its governmental programs. Third, the cultural parks and arts councils are also assessed to provide greater insights into the changes that the Reform era has brought for cultural institutions.

The time between the conceptualisation of both the cultural parks and the arts councils and when the institutions were built was varied and in some cases quite long. Although the cultural parks were conceived and legislated in 1978, the last cultural park constructed was in 1994. The arts councils were established in two waves. The first wave, initiated by artists outside Jakarta as a response to the success of the JAC in the early 1970s, generally failed to replicate that success and were largely inactive by the 1980s. The second wave began in 1992 and was driven largely by the New Order government, although independent arts councils were also established during this time. Arts councils were still being established well into the Reform era (including the West Java Arts Council, which is studied in detail in the final two sections). The time differential between conceptualisation and formation (of up to 26 years in the case of the final cultural park) requires careful consideration when analysing governance of and within the cultural parks and arts councils.

1. The Cultural Parks

The cultural parks were developed in the late 1970s following the success of two cultural institutions that served as models. The first kind of cultural institution, the cultural centres (*pusat kebudayaan*), were encouraged by the Director-General of Culture from 1968 to 1978, Ida Bagus Mantra. Following trips to Europe where he observed the role of European cultural centres in sustaining culture and the arts and encouraging tourism, Mantra began to orchestrate the establishment of cultural centres in provincial capitals in Indonesia (Yuga, 2000, pp. 43-4).¹ A cultural centre was established in Bali in 1972 that

¹ Surya Yuga, the author of the thesis, is now the Director of the Art Department in the Directorate of Art, Film and Traditional Values.

was judged particularly successful at stimulating activities and attracting locals and tourists (Yuga, 2000, p. 44).²

The other institution was the Ismail Marzuki Cultural Park (*Taman Ismail Marzuki* – TIM), that was enormously successful in the first half of the 1970s (see chapter three for a more detailed description and analysis). TIM, as the premier national performance venue, became the space of choice for national conferences and competitions managed by the Directorate of Culture, which worked closely with TIM's managing body, the JAC. Many of the Directorate of Culture's employees, including Mantra, attended or participated in its activities.³ Both TIM and the Cultural Centre in Bali were showcasing indigenous arts and performance styles, although TIM was better known as a venue for contemporary modern arts.⁴ TIM was also the location for the development of a new understanding of regional arts, which used them as a source of inspiration for new forms.⁵ Both venues were regularly attracting large numbers of visitors and contributed to a revival of traditional art forms in the 1970s.⁶

In TIM, artists explored indigenous cultural forms with a new-found freedom to alter and interpret them without regard for the political imperatives of Guided Democracy, in the process attracting a new audience amongst the urban middle-class youth. Keith Foulcher, in his analysis of the revival of the *Betawi* performance genre *Lenong* in TIM, captures something of this climate when he writes:

... when modernisation came [to *Lenong*], it was at the hands of a new metropolitan culture, the great wave of confidence and rebuilding which characterised the period after the demise of the communist party [PKI] and the thinking about Indonesian culture that came to be associated with it. (2004, p. 3)

² Director of the High School of Performing Arts (KOKAR), I Nyoman Sumandhi, also states that Mantra was behind the Bali Arts Centre (Foley & Sumandhi, 1994, p. 277), which in 1978 became the Bali Cultural Park. A discrepancy between Sumandi and Yuga's accounts is the year the Cultural Centre was established with Sumandi stating 'around 1976' (1994, p. 277).

³ Edi Sedyawati, Director-General of Culture from 1993 until 1999, was intimately involved with events at TIM during this time and was a member of the JAC and Chair of its Dance Board (*Badan Tari*). Sedyawati was involved with collaborations between the Directorate of Art and JAC in the 1970s.

⁴ For instance, Hill writes: 'While popular folk performances have had a place in TIM, far more pronounced overall have been the 'modern', 'high' cultural forms, appealing to a metropolitan elite' (1993b, p. 256).

⁵ Playwright and cultural commentator Putu Wijaya labelled the movement the 'New Traditionalism' (*Tradisi Baru*) and called it the most important development in TIM (Wijaya, 1997).

⁶ See Foulcher's article on the revival of the *Batawi* folk form *Lenong* in the 1970s that was kick-started with 'scaled-down and professionalised' performances in TIM (2004, p. 24). Sedyawati attributes a revival of indigenous performance genres to activities in TIM (Interview, 7 September 2001).

As has been mentioned previously, attempts to 'modernise' indigenous art forms were not new. The source of the continuities was the shared 'metropolitan superculture' of Indonesia's political elite and its quest for progress (McVey, 1986, pp. 27-8), of which TIM was unquestionably a part.

Part of the attractiveness of TIM as a model for state planners lay in the 'modernisation' of indigenous performance genres. Performers in TIM rejected the promotion of political ideologies and messages that had occurred in Guided Democracy,⁷ but continued to make technical changes that state-planners considered desirable. The process of adapting the indigenous genres for stages and urban audiences has continuities with the concept of 'upgrading' by state-bureaucrats that has been the target of much criticism from anthropologists and cultural observers (Acciaioli, 1985; Widodo, 1995; Yampolsky, 1995). Of course, this should not overshadow the differences between Guided Democracy and New Order cultural policy. The rejection of the promotion of political ideologies by TIM's founders was interpreted through the ideological lens of the state in the cultural parks. While political ideologies (such as communism and liberalism) and criticism of the regime's policies were rejected, the New Order regime's priorities were designated as 'modernising' and integrated into art forms, as will become apparent when the programs in the cultural parks are examined. Also important was the status of TIM and the cultural centres. TIM self-consciously styled itself as a national performance venue,⁸ while the cultural centres were state-run provincial centres.⁹ They provided a showcase of the arts and were able to exert some control over the representations of nation and province.

Mantra's plan to build centres of artistic and cultural activity across Indonesia received approval from the National Planning Board (BAPENAS) on the strength of the examples of TIM and the Bali Cultural Centre. The cultural parks were created by Ministerial Decree No. 0276/0/1978 of the Minister of Education and Culture. The New Order regime's support was confirmed when the cultural parks were included in the third Five

⁷ Hill notes that TIM fulfilled 'an important ideological function in demonstrating the primacy of certain interpretations of culture over the vanquished LEKRA' (1993b, p. 256).

⁸ See Hill, (1993b, pp. 245-6). Sedyawati also mentioned TIM's national status in an interview (7 September 2001).

⁹ TIM conducted many debates and seminars about national culture, some of which are collected together in *Pembebasan Budaya-Budaya Kita* (Sarjono, 1999) and *Menengok Tradisi* (Malaon, Malna, & Dwi, 1986). It should be noted that in these seminars a variety of views were expressed without any one view gaining dominance. This is an important difference between TIM and the cultural parks.

Year Development Plan that began in 1979. Eleven cultural parks were officially established in 1978, most of which were converted cultural centres established during Mantra's time as Director-General. Three more were established in the 1980s and another nine in the 1990s. Jakarta does not have a cultural park because it has TIM. The cultural parks predominantly utilised architectural styles derived from traditional houses of the region, reinforcing their relationship to the indigenous ethnic groups. The buildings are generally large, spectacular and dominated by markers of ethnicity. However, once built they are often poorly maintained due to the small size of the recurring budget. State-built buildings in quasi-traditional styles and various states of disrepair are a feature of most provincial capital cities.

Table 6.1: Cultural Parks by Province and Year Established.

Province	Year	Province	Year
Aceh	1978	Bengkulu	1982
North Sumatra	1978	Lampung	1984
West Sumatra	1978	West Java	1991
West Kalimantan	1978	Riau	1991
East Kalimantan	1978	West Nusa Tenggara	1991
North Sulawesi	1978	Central Sulawesi	1991
South Sulawesi	1978	Maluku	1991
Central Java	1978	West Papua	1991
Yogyakarta	1978	Southeast Sulawesi	1992
East Java	1978	Jambi	1993
Bali	1978	Central Kalimantan	1993
South Kalimantan	1982	East Timor	1994

A document that provides insights into the purposes of the cultural parks at the time they were established is the *End of Term Memorandum (Memorandum Akhir Masa Jabatan)* for Mantra, when he left to become the Governor of Bali in 1978. The *Memorandum* (which, despite its title, is a document of over 100 pages) discussed the purpose and functions of the cultural parks in two sections that emphasised slightly different elements of its operation. The first section, 'Basic Policy of Cultural Development', emphasised how the cultural parks provide spiritual sustenance through cultural activities (1978, p. 24). The report then outlined two core functions for the cultural parks. Firstly, the cultural

parks were a ‘means of communication’ that enrich society’s information and experience about all cultural aspects of the nation, including national unity (1978, p. 24). Secondly, the cultural parks introduced different kinds of indigenous cultures to each other, increasing initiative and creativity for society in general and for cultural experts in particular who actively participate as the ‘managers, supporters and developers of Indonesian national culture’.¹⁰ In the second section, ‘Implementing Cultural Development’, the report emphasised the cultural parks’ role in developing the arts, rather than culture more broadly, and their role in ‘improving and cultivating society’s appreciation for art’.¹¹

The differences in emphasis between the sections reflect the role of the cultural parks. First, the cultural parks were to contribute to the evolution of a national culture that accorded with the Directorate of Culture’s model. Two elements of the first section tie the cultural parks to the broader goal of spreading a state-defined version of the national metropolitan superculture: it demonstrated an understanding of aesthetics that positions culture as a way of improving spirituality; and it reflected the Directorate’s increased attention to cultural heritage, in particular indigenous cultural forms. The second section displayed the privileged role of the arts within the cultural parks. The cultural parks’ programs were predominantly centred on the indigenous arts in the region where the cultural park was located, but with the imperative of ‘modernising’ indigenous forms.

Subsequent reports and legislation indicate that the goal of the cultural parks and its emphasis on indigenous arts only underwent minor changes during the New Order period. The 1987 *End of Term Memorandum* of the following Director-General of Culture, Haryati Soebadio, indicates that the cultural parks had been incorporated into the state’s arts infrastructure. In the discussion of future policy directions, Soebadio stated that art, ‘as the national Indonesian materialisation of beauty,’¹² needed to be developed and managed in order to build national pride and unity, increase society’s appreciation of art and develop the creativity of artists in order to ensure prosperity in the arts. By 1987 it would appear that the operation of cultural parks had been aligned with national arts policy and the Directorate viewed as their role the implementation of national arts policy

¹⁰ ‘... pembina, pendukung dan pengembang kebudayaan bangsa Indonesia’ (1978, p. 24).

¹¹ ‘Tujuan kegiatan ini ... memberikan kesempatan untuk menumbuhkan dan membina apresiasi masyarakat dalam kehidupan seni’ (1978, p. 24).

¹² ‘... sebagai perwujudan rasa keindahan bangsa Indonesia’ (1987, p. 56).

in the regions. The legislative changes of the New Order period that affected the cultural parks were to do with physical infrastructure and administrative structure rather than the parks' function.¹³

Unlike TIM, the cultural parks were subjected to the strictures of the Directorate of Culture and its command culture model. They were expected to adhere to centrally-created guidelines regarding their operations, and they reported their activities to the Director of Art. The Directorate envisioned the cultural parks as a site where indigenous cultural forms could be articulated within its national cultural project. From this perspective, the cultural park buildings were a metaphor for the project as a whole. They were large, modern structures, built by the state, that utilised the cultural symbols and forms of indigenous groups, often with little regard for their original purpose or meaning. However, the Directorate viewed the changes it made to art forms as improvements that were entirely in accordance with their indigenous character, as I explore in the next section that discusses the different tasks and programs the Directorate allocated to the cultural parks.

2. Programs in the Cultural Parks

A feature of the cultural parks is the broad range of programs, activities and responsibilities that they have been assigned by the Directorate of Culture. In his 1978 *Memorandum*, Mantra listed sixteen activities that were undertaken by the cultural parks (Mantra, 1978, p. 35). The number of activities increased over the New Order era. The *Technical Instructions* for the cultural parks, published in 1997, lists twenty-one tasks that are within the parks' field of operations (*Direktorat Kesenian*, 1997). The diversity of activities within the cultural parks meant that they were sites where different practices of government that utilised the arts were situated next to each other, but, I argue, with common goals connected to New Order governmentality.

¹³ A 1982 directive from the Directorate of Culture standardised the infrastructure requirements of the cultural parks so that there would be parity between different regions (*Pedoman Standardisasi Taman Budaya, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan*, 1982). In 1991, a Ministerial Decision simplified the administrative structure of the parks themselves to facilitate their spread to new provinces and formally made the cultural parks responsible to the Director of Art rather than the Director-General of Culture (*Keputusan Mendikbud No. 0221/0/1991*).

The Three Kinds of Programs

The 1991 Ministerial Decision gives the cultural parks four ‘functions’:

- 1) Develop the quality of the arts through training.
- 2) Providing cultural activities.
- 3) Documenting and providing information about the arts.
- 4) Administering the cultural parks.¹⁴

Of the twenty-one activities outlined in the *Technical Instructions*, twenty correspond with at least one of the first three functions. The fourth function, ‘administering the cultural parks’ refers to maintenance and is not specifically addressed in the *Technical Instructions*. The activity that does not align with the first three functions is the activity of *pengolahan* that, according to the legislation, referred to the entire operation of the park.¹⁵ The term *pengolahan* in the context of the cultural parks was the task of making art or increasing art expertise in order to create a situation where the arts were ‘effective, efficient, have quality and are relevant’ for Indonesia today.¹⁶ The process of bureaucratic management and intervention into the arts encapsulated by the term *pengolahan* was central to the cultural parks’ operation.

Table 6.2 below lists the activities of the cultural parks. Listed alongside each of the activities is the function to which it most closely corresponds. *Training* has been used to capture those activities which are concerned with increasing the quality of art, but does not include performances in front of audiences. *Activities* refer to programs that involve a public performance. There is some overlap with training because most performances are preceded by instruction from bureaucrats for the performers. *Documentation* refers to activities oriented towards documenting the arts, data collection and dissemination of information.

¹⁴ *Keputusan Mendikbud No. 0221/0/1991, pasal 3*. Mantra’s *Memorandum* also lists four functions for the cultural parks. The first three of both are quite similar. However, Mantra neglects to mention the administration of the park itself in the parks’ functions and includes the provision of ‘healthy entertainment’ for the community, which is arguably an element of the 1991 function of ‘providing cultural activities’ (1978: 35).

¹⁵ *Kepmen Dikbud Nomor 0221/0/1991 pasal 2*: ‘The cultural parks have the task of implementing the upgrading [*pengolahan*] of art as an element of culture in the provinces.’ (*‘Taman Budaya mempunyai tugas melaksanakan pengolahan seni sebagai unsur budaya di Propinsi.’*)

¹⁶ *‘Mencapai keadaan yang efektif, efisien, bermutu dan relevan dengan perkembangan zaman’* (*Direktorat Kesenian, 1997, p. 2*).

Table 6.2: Cultural Park Activities as Specified in the *Technical Instructions for the Management and Development of the Arts in the Regions*

No	Activity	Description	Function
1	Pengolahan	Pengolahan refers to the operation of the cultural parks as a whole rather than a particular activity. It is the task of making art or increasing art expertise in order to create an arts dynamic that 'is effective, efficient, has quality and is relevant' to Indonesia today (2).	
2	Performance rehearsal	A process of rehearsing performance art in order to make it 'worthy of staging' (3).	Training
3	Repair and prepare works	Caring for, restoring and improving the condition of an artwork.	Activities
4	Technical guidance and training art workers	Activities to enhance the capabilities and skills of people who work in the arts.	Training
5	Translation	Translation of texts (generally from local languages) into Indonesian.	Documentation
6	Changing scripts	Translating scripts of local languages into the Latin alphabet.	Documentation
7	Art training and development	Activities involving the polishing and enhancement of arts using creative ideas and a systematic organisational framework to bring about creative adaptation in an art form.	Training
8	Experimentation	Introducing new ideas and mixtures into art activities or applying a system, method or technique to create an artwork to encourage the artistic creativity of artists.	Activities
9	Staging performances	Presentation of art performances.	Activities
10	Exhibitions	Staging fine arts exhibitions of one or more artists of any fine arts genre.	Activities.
11	Lectures	Giving guidance and instructions to arts workers in order to ensure the survival of an art form.	Training
12	Seminars	Organising seminars to discuss problems and disseminate information about the arts.	Training
13	Artist meetings	Organising meetings between artists of the same profession to exchange ideas and knowledge.	Training
14	Workshops	Giving guidance and technical instructions regarding art works and techniques.	Training
15	Arts libraries	The cultural parks were to be centres of information for arts-related research.	Documentation
16	Arts documentation	Collecting and keeping data on the arts in the region.	Documentation
17	Administer documentation	The cultural parks were to organise and manage their documentation in order to ensure its relevance and easy access.	Documentation
18	Compilation of art works	Collecting art works through donations or purchases and classifying them by type and function.	Documentation
19	Organising documentation	Making sure that the cultural parks have the tools to undertake arts documentation and storage.	Documentation
20	Advertising activities	The cultural parks were to advertise all of their arts-related activities to the public.	Activities
21	Arts information	To provide information and explanations about the arts to the public through writings, publications and recordings.	Documentation

Source: *Direktorat Kesenian (1997)*.

a. Training

The training function of the cultural parks had two broad goals. The first was to increase the capacity of artists and arts workers. For example, the task of ‘Technical guidance’ had as its goal ‘preparing educated and competent arts workers,’¹⁷ while ‘art training and development’ had the goal of forming ‘artists with creative potential’ (1997, p. 9). While the first goal related to altering art workers, the second goal was to shape the ‘art’ itself. For instance, the goal of ‘performance rehearsal’ was to produce a work of art that is ‘as optimal as possible, both in interpretation and in its technical production,’¹⁸ while the desired results of an ‘artists’ meeting’ was ‘the birth of serious art.’¹⁹

The two goals of training reflected the two elements of the training regime. The first goal of maximising the potential of artists and arts workers was *disciplinary*. Training programs aimed to increase the capacity of artists and art workers in areas such as their performance skills, productivity, knowledge and creativity and also to increase technical skills in staging performances. Training programs were structured around a hierarchical relationship between the organising bureaucrats and the participants that was present in the technical instructions themselves. For instance, the ‘explanation’ of a ‘performance rehearsal’ states:

A performance rehearsal of an art work is a process of presenting a performance (of dance, music, theatre, and *Wayang*) to reach a suitable standard for a stage, both in its script production and the technical capabilities of its actors. (1997, p. 3)

Geladi pementasan karya seni adalah proses pergelaran seni pertunjukan (tari, musik, teater, dan pedalangan) guna mencapai tahap layak pentas, baik garapan naskahnya maupun kemampuan teknis pemeran-pemerannya.

The standards were not taken from the actors, but were present within the institution. The bureaucrats in the cultural parks selected the performance, the artists, and, most importantly, set standards (of acting, technical skills and script) the performance was to achieve in order to be deemed suitable.²⁰

¹⁷ ‘Menyiapkan pekerja seni yang terdidik dan memadai’ (1997, p. 5).

¹⁸ ‘Upaya mengumpulkan karya seni seoptimal mungkin baik interpretasi maupun teknis pelaksanaannya’ (1997, p. 3).

¹⁹ ‘Lahirnya karya seni yang berbobot’ (1997, p. 19).

²⁰ This model of training for indigenous art forms was widespread within the arts bureaucracy across Indonesia (Effendi, 1998; van Groenendael, 1985, pp. Ch7-8; Widodo, 1995; Yampolsky, 1995; Zurbuchen, 1990, pp. 134-6).

The second goal referred to the characteristics that the Directorate was trying to inscribe within the arts through training artists or commissioning performances. The previous discussion provides an introduction to the Directorate's preferred characteristics of indigenous arts. The 'performance rehearsal' aimed to change an 'art work' to be 'suitable for a stage'. It is safe to assume that the term 'art work' here referred to local community practices, given the prioritisation of the cultural parks and arts policy more broadly towards such practices. To call such practices 'art works' (*karya seni*) already positioned them within New Order era discourse of aesthetics about art and its function. In order to appear on the regional stage, indigenous arts were adapted to the aesthetic criteria that were considered appropriate. One ex-Director of a cultural park during the 1990s stated that he would often participate in changing local practices for the stage in the cultural park. If a song repeated ten times, he would 'suggest' that it be reduced to five times (interview, 13/11/2001). He also held that the artists who participated in traditional community practices were 'agrarian' in outlook and 'did not know time or money' and therefore needed instruction about making their performance 'agreeable for conditions today' (interview, 13/11/2001).

Other commentators have noted how the state's cultural training regimes were geared towards reproducing a local version of the metropolitan national culture rather than providing training to strengthen indigenous arts within the local communities. The art that was produced was, to borrow from Philip Yampolsky, 'neat and orderly, disciplined, inoffensive, attractive or impressive to look at, pleasant to listen to' (1995, p. 712). Additionally, Amrih Widodo notes that training was likely to remove any elements of the performance considered immoral or likely to offend religious groups (1995, pp. 13-15, 17-23).²¹ The spirituality and beauty of the 'arts' performed in the cultural parks corresponded to the Directorate's requirement that indigenous arts did not contravene standards of taste or morality. It is also, in the case of many community practices, completely different from its original form. Widodo notes in relation to *tayuban*: 'Once it had become a symbol of district identity, however, *tayuban* could no longer be associated with prostitution ... and other activities considered immoral by the state' (1995, p. 9). The many references to 'improving' the quality of art or the skill of artists refer to this process

²¹ Widodo's study of the transformation of *Tayuban* dancing in Blora, Central Java, by officials from the Directorate of Culture provides an account of the removal of alcohol and gifts of money previously associated with the ceremony and the introduction of the requirement that the female performer remain at least one metre away from the male partners that attend to dance with her (1995, pp. 20-3).

of aesthetic transformation through programs (*Direktorat Kesenian*, 1997, pp. 3,4,11,18,19). Similarly, Andrew Weintraub's account of a *Wayang Golek* competition in East Java demonstrates that the changes required by the Directorate include, in addition to technical skills and ability to entertain, the incorporation of themes of 'mental and spiritual development', must 'encompass information, education and entertainment that is healthy and useful for the masses', correctly communicate development messages and use 'good and correct' language (2001, pp. 92-3).²²

The cultural discourse that underpinned the training regime within the cultural parks was the discourse of national development.²³ 'Development' encapsulated a particular relationship between the state and society where the state leads society in order to 'develop' at a faster rate. Development informed training in two ways. Firstly, training turned the arts into a tool to disseminate lessons about behaviour and development messages. The second method of assistance was more prominent in the regulations and was a less direct governmental method of achieving development goals: the New Order cultural apparatus perceived the cultural parks' training role as making the arts 'relevant with the developments of the age'.²⁴ National art forms, which included regional arts, were to be made appropriate for the pastimes of a 'developing' national population. From this perspective, bureaucratic intervention is not viewed as negatively influencing indigenous art forms, but as improving them and updating them to remain in step with national development. The political implications of 'training' programs reside in the weakening of links between local arts and local communities and the strengthening of links between the revamped art and the Directorate's concept of a national community.

b. Activities

The cultural parks were also state-resourced performance venues that were focussed on the local arts of particular regions. They were particularly important as the site of state-run arts competitions (*lomba*) and festivals (*festival, pesta*) across Indonesia. The most

²² Weintraub notes that the inclusion of these standards centres a particular understanding of indigenous arts in a region, marginalising local variations (2001, p. 93). Although performances that accord to these standards win competitions and achieve access to the national stage, their 'correctness' also divorces them from local audiences and can limit artistic innovation. Senior *Dalang* in West Java emphasise the need to move beyond the 'standards' in order to satisfy audiences outside of state-institutions (2001, pp. 96-8).

²³ *Pembangunan*, as was discussed in chapter three, is the Indonesian translation of 'development' in the sense of 'development programs' and economic or social development/growth.

²⁴ '... *merelevanzikan dengan perkembangan zaman*' (1997, p. 1).

prominent event that was held in the cultural parks was *Arts Week (Pekan Kesenian)* which was held annually across Indonesia. *Arts Week* was usually run by the Provincial Cultural Office (*Dinas Kebudayaan*) in conjunction with the cultural parks. Its goals were to increase appreciation of the traditional arts, promote the revitalisation and preservation of traditional arts, to develop the creativity and skill of artists and, in the words of the Governor of West Java, to protect and care for ‘regional arts in accordance with the effort to develop the national arts.’²⁵ The preparations for *Arts Week* began months ahead with a request for each regency and city to choose a group of artists from an indigenous genre to represent it. Either a competition was held at the city or regency level or a group was chosen by a committee to perform at the *Arts Week* festival in the provincial capital city.²⁶

The *Arts Week* was often the busiest time for the cultural parks, as they are the primary location of performances. The size of *Arts Week* celebrations differed substantially between provinces. The equivalent of the *Arts Week* in Bali, for instance, is the Bali Arts Festival (*Pesta Kesenian Bali*). It was originally called the *Bali Arts Week*, but changed its name after it was extended to a month (Foley & Sumandhi, 1994, p. 286). It incorporates events at night and during the day, displays of handcrafts, stalls, cooking, the wearing of traditional dress and also the attendance of participants from other parts of Indonesia and/or overseas.²⁷ Most *Arts Week* celebrations tended to only involve performances, held at night, over the course of one week. At the end of most festivals, two groups were chosen to go to Jakarta to represent the province in a national *Arts Week* festival. Although the *Arts Week* festivities were generally the largest event held in the cultural parks, other festivals and competitions were held there on the instigation of local bureaucrats.²⁸ The frequency of such events varied considerably between cultural parks.

The ‘activities’ function of the cultural parks incorporated training into the process of producing festivals and performances. Yampolsky states, ‘Depdikbud’s festivals, competitions, and commissions are the crucial means by which it inculcates the aesthetic

²⁵ ‘Kegiatan Pekan Seni ... adalah besar manfaatnya dalam rangka memelihara, mumupuk, melestarikan seni Budaya Daerah, selaras dengan upaya dalam mengembangkan kesenian nasional’ (Wibisana, 1983, p. 3).

²⁶ See Wibisana (1983, p. 1) and Hough (2000, pp. 288-90).

²⁷ For a more detailed description of the Bali Arts Festival, see Hough (2000, pp. 302-10) and Foley (1994).

²⁸ For instance, while I was staying in Bandung, I spent a night in the West Java Cultural Park watching a *Topeng* festival involving three groups from three different cities in West Java.

of respectability' (1995, p. 712). The incentives for artists to accord with the changes were great: the chance to perform in front of larger audiences at the provincial and national level, prizes, prestige and an expectation of more work due to the fame of 'winning' (Hough, 2000, p. 294; Yampolsky, 1995, p. 714). While there is some merit to Yampolsky's highly critical assessment of these activities, he ignores the productive aspects of these activities. Festivals also offer opportunities for artists to innovate and experiment. Kathy Foley, for instance, highlights how removing arts from their traditional contexts in festivals makes them a 'significant forum for modern experimentation and development' (1994, p. 276). The cultural parks to some degree provided a space, albeit limited by the cultural discourses of the New Order regime, for experimentation and creativity.

A goal of 'activities' within the cultural parks was to provide state-sanctioned cultural entertainment for the local residents. 'Providing entertainment for all of the community'²⁹ was a function of the cultural parks that Mantra listed when they were created in 1978. Two of the goals of the 'staging performances' activity listed within the *Technical Instructions* indicate that the role of parks as entertainment venues was continuing:

To give opportunities to society to increase their comprehension and appreciation of performance arts.

An effort to cultivate the community of performance arts fans. (*Direktorat Kesenian*, 1997, p. 11)

Memberi kesempatan kepada masyarakat untuk meningkatkan penghayatan dan apresiasi di bidang seni pertunjukan.

Sebagai upaya pembinaan masyarakat peminat seni pertunjukan.

The parks were all constructed with stages and theatres, and the larger parks had galleries for fine art exhibitions. These venues accord with the qualities that were viewed as suitable for national culture. They were large, imposing structures that separated actors and audience, while providing a clear view of the performance. Such an area was far removed from the homes, streets and fields where many community arts were usually performed.

The final element examined regarding the activities provided within the cultural parks is their role as a gateway to the national stage. In order to reach the state-run national festivals, a performance had to satisfy a set of conditions. A 1983 report on *Arts Week* in

²⁹ 'Tempat mengadakan rekreasi bagi seluruh ... masyarakat' (Mantra, 1978, p. 24).

West Java provides an insight into the ‘relevant criteria’ for the musical and dance performances that would be sent to Jakarta to represent West Java in TIM. Four criteria are listed:

- 1) Qualities of the genre of art that was considered to increase the prospect of positive interest from observers, the jury and spectators;
- 2) The extent to which the art is authentically West Javanese when viewed from a national viewpoint;
- 3) The extent to which the art still contains its ambience or the spirit of traditional community art after there is a process of ‘training’ from peers; and
- 4) The extent to which the art, and its accompanying music, is established and has received ‘training’.

By the time the arts reached the national stage, they had already undergone a thorough process of training and vetting which had weeded out the arts viewed as immoral, lacking in quality or not yet developed, leaving art forms which accorded with the regime’s preferred cultural discourses. Sanitising ethnic arts produced representations of ethnic cultures that accorded with New Order notions of the place of ethnicity within the nation. Nowhere was this more clear than during national performances in TIM in Jakarta, where the arts of different regions could be seen together. National festivals provided an example of the regime’s construction of cultural difference. All of the arts admitted had been viewed in the cultural parks and chosen by agents of the state, excluding politically radical or uncouth art, and were now placed together, side by side, in the national capital.

c. Documentation

Documentation tended to only receive serious attention in the larger cultural parks, and even here the libraries tended to be small and with relatively few new additions besides the cultural parks’ own reports. Given that most of the cultural parks’ resources were allocated to training and activities, documentation is not discussed in detail here. The key goal of documentation was to preserve the indigenous arts, as an element of national cultural heritage, through recording it (via written description, audio or video) or, in the case of the visual arts, building a collection. The cultural parks were also envisaged as information centres for both accessing information through libraries and archives, and for disseminating information about the arts through articles, publications and recordings.³⁰ Finally, the cultural parks were also given the tasks of translating both local language texts to Indonesian and local language scripts to the Latin script, although I did not come

³⁰ See the libraries, documentation, compilation and arts information functions in table 6.2.

across any evidence that this task was carried out in any of the cultural parks I visited. The direction of both of these tasks was towards making local cultures accessible to all Indonesians and creating the possibility of inclusion within both the national metropolitan culture and the officially recognised regional culture.

Cultural Governmentality and the Arts in the Cultural Parks

The cultural parks were sites where ethnic indigenous arts were remade to accord with the New Order regime's governmental discourses. The changes the programs sought to make can be identified as belonging to one of two groups. The first group, discussed previously in my analysis of training regimes, consisted of changes aimed at 'developing' the arts to both be appropriate to Indonesia's advancing stage of development and to assist in achieving the regime's goal of achieving a 'developed' society. The cultural discourses of the New Order era were important here in defining the features that were deemed 'developed' and therefore to be incorporated into indigenous art forms. Particularly important was an aesthetic discourse that applied the standards of contemporary urban arts (such as staging, costumes, time limits) to community arts. Other changes were more oriented towards assisting the development of Indonesians by excluding 'immoral' elements and incorporating development messages. These changes were made through putting performers through disciplinary regimes. However, the policies were ultimately aimed at local populations. The regime wanted to ensure that Indonesians partook in 'healthy' entertainment that would assist, rather than impede, national development.

Second, the cultural parks attempted to regulate the relationships between ethnicity and the nation and between different ethnic groups. The disciplinary regime previously discussed was justified through the identification of indigenous arts as elements of national culture. Popular forms considered foreign were excluded from the cultural parks since they were not deemed Indonesian or local, while popular forms considered indigenous were included in the cultural parks' programs. The result of inclusion was the incorporation of particular art forms into the official canon of regional/national arts at the cost of the exclusion of elements that were deemed inappropriate. The cultural parks' version of ethnic arts positioned ethnicity to contribute to national goals and created regional art forms that could sit comfortably next to each other. The national festivals, for

instance, showcased the ‘unity in diversity’ of Indonesia where all ethnic groups lived harmoniously next to each other and had a place in national development.

3. Uniformity and Diversity within the Cultural Parks

The operation of the parks outside of the *Arts Week* struggled to match the expectations of the Directorate. The Directorate of Culture only rated five cultural parks as being of a good standard (*dinilai baik*), since they conducted one or more activities a week (*Direktorat Kebudayaan*, 1999b in Yuga, 2000, p. 6).³¹ The Directorate’s acknowledgement of differences between the operation of the cultural parks indicates that there is some divergence between their uniform instructions and goals and how the cultural parks functioned in specific locations. It could be that the highly centralised state had produced a diverse set of institutions despite its command culture model of operation and detailed instructions. The ambitious goals of the centrally-determined policy could not be achieved by cultural parks that were only organising one to two activities a month that involved the public. The major cause of the parks’ haphazard program was the centrally-distributed budget. According to a 1999 report, the 19 cultural parks that were not assessed as being of a ‘good standard’ received an average yearly recurring budget of Rp. 16.3 million (approx. \$2 750 Australian) and an average yearly grants budget of Rp. 10.6 million (approx. \$1 800 Australian) (*Direktorat Kebudayaan*, 1999b in Yuga, 2000, p. 7).

Local communities and, in particular, artists often felt alienated from the cultural parks. This alienation was evident even in the cultural parks that were considered to be of good standard, as became evident in interviews I conducted with artists and observers about the West Java Cultural Park (WJCP) in 2001.³² A local journalist expressed the view of many local artists when he said that even though activities were continuing in the WJCP, there were not many attendees and there was no artistic community connected with it. He said that the government facilities in Bandung were all isolated from the busy places and that the cultural bureaucracy had money and projects, but no support. (Interview 30/10/2001, Bandung). The issue of the WJCP’s location recurred in many of the interviews with

³¹ These are West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java and Bali (Yuga, 2000, pp. 6-7).

³² The interviews were conducted just after decentralisation had occurred, but took care to address the operation of the cultural parks during the New Order era, as well as the changes of the Reform era.

artists and has to a degree become a symbolic expression of the WJCP's prioritisation of reaching administrative goals over engaging with local artists. Deciding on a location for the Cultural Park had been a long process. Five different locations were explored between 1981 and 1991 as possibilities before the current site at the Dago Tea Rooms was chosen and developed. The choice of the final location at the Dago Tea House was criticised by many artists for being far from Bandung's centres of activity. Deputy-Governor of West Java then lead a Study Team, which concluded that the Tea House was the 'correct' location and the WJCP was subsequently built.³³

An alternative story of the choice of location which I was told on three occasions by artists, two of whom were involved in the planning process, emphasises the lack of consultation and arbitrariness of power holders towards culture and the arts during the New Order era.³⁴ The story goes that the Governor of the day liked to jog. One day, he jogged to the top of Dago Atas and saw the view. He then decided to place the WJCP there. His subordinates were scared so they followed his wishes (Interview, 24/10/2001). Most performances at the WJCP were of regional arts. The community of contemporary artists in Bandung rarely performed there and certainly not for events organised by the WJCP itself, which were exclusively focused on 'traditional' performances (Interview with Iyus Supriatna, Director, West Java Cultural Park, 5 October 2001).

Observers and artists have voiced similar complaints about cultural parks in other locations. Brett Hough has noted that 'there has been a great deal of criticism' directed at the Bali Cultural Park 'for not fulfilling its perceived role of providing a venue conducive for artistic expression' (2000, p. 279) and for being 'too bureaucratic in its operation' (2000, p. 280). A more passionate criticism was made recently by Elmustian, the Director of the University of Riau Press. Elmustian focuses on the Riau Cultural Park's place in the bureaucratic hierarchy that leads to TIM and Jakarta, which has proven difficult for artists from Riau to access. He states:

³³ There were also protests by Padjadjaran University (*Unpad*) staff, who were renting housing on the area and were forced to move by the state.

³⁴ The WJCG has even produced a brochure in 2000 about the choice of location to address the ongoing rumours.

The [Riau] Cultural Park, with all of its bureaucracy, came to be seen as impeding artists' ability to express themselves and ultimately was also considered an extension of the Centre colonising the artistic periphery in Riau. (2001, p. 754)³⁵

Taman Budaya dengan segala birokrasinya kemudian dianggap menyulitkan para seniman untuk berekspresi dan akhirnya dianggap pula tangan-tangan pusat menjajah wilayah periferi kesenian di Riau.

The above criticisms underline the problems caused by the cultural parks' preoccupation with the programs set by the Directorate of Culture and a subsequent lack of support from local arts communities.

Like many of the New Order era bureaucratic institutions, the cultural parks suffered from corruption. An ex-Director of a cultural park in the mid-late nineties was quite open in an interview about fabricating reports for the Directorate of Culture in order to avoid the Directorate's strict guidelines. He would run activities according to his own prescriptions, then submit a report that met the Directorate's expectations. At the end of his time as Director, he gave each of the staff a present of money taken from his Cultural Park's funds. Artists who had dealings with the cultural parks also complained about the cultural parks' use of funds that should be going to artists and the arts (Interview, 29/11/2001).

Only one cultural park came close to becoming the centre of artistic activity that Mantra envisioned in his original plans. The Surakarta Cultural Park (SCP) is well known for its regular performances of indigenous arts.³⁶ The SCP also regularly stages performances of contemporary arts from local and visiting Indonesian artists and occasionally artists from outside Indonesia. During the 1990s, the SCP staged several national festivals such as the Indonesian Theatre Assembly (*Temu Teater Se-Indonesia*), the contemporary arts festival *Nur Gora Rupa* and Reflections on the Republican Half Century (*Refleksi Setengah Abad Republik*). Its regular performance schedule and involvement in the arts in Surakarta has raised its standing amongst the cultural parks and its Director, Murtijono, who has been Director of the SCP for over twenty years, was considered a 'star' of the Indonesian cultural parks (Halim HD, personal communication, 16 December 2004).

³⁵ Elmustian's criticism, although made in 2001, is aimed at the Riau Cultural Park's activities since it was built in 1991.

³⁶ These include *kroncong*, *wayang kulit*, and *karawitan*.

More importantly, the SCP has been embraced by artists. Suyatna Anirun, a famous thespian and theatre director who resides in Bandung and has never performed in the WJCP, has said that the SCP feels like his ‘own house.’ (Halim HD, personal communication, 16 December 2004). Credit for the support from artists should go to Murtijono. Halim HD, an organiser and observer of the arts who resides in Surakarta, states that Murtijono was ‘open, accommodating and had the courage to accept differences in artistic perspectives’.³⁷ Halim has related an event in the early 1980s which illustrates how Murtijono’s management assisted the staging of new and exciting contemporary art and gain the support of artists for the cultural park.

The theatre group *Dinasti* wanted to perform the play ‘Beloved Statue’ and ‘Cone Mask’, but the police banned them and the Yogyakarta Cultural Park (YCP) would not consider using that theatre group, because there must be a license from the police. The YCP would only consider performances if there was police approval. ... I offered *Dinasti* the chance to perform in Solo. I contacted SCP. And Murtijono asked me for the scripts. He read them. Then, he allowed the performance to take place. (Halim HD, personal communication, 16 December 2004)

Grup teater Dinasti ingin mementaskan naskah Patung Kekasih dan Topeng Contong, polisi melarang. Taman Budaya Yogyakarta tidak bisa menerima grup teater itu, sebab perijinan harus dari polisi. Taman Budaya Yogyakarta hanya bisa menerima jika ada ijin polisi. ... Lalu saya tawarkan [kepada grup Dinasti] main di Solo. Saya kontak Taman Budaya Surakarta. Dan mas Murtijono meminta kepada saya naskah drama itu. Dia baca. Lalu mengizinkan pementasan itu.

Dinasti’s two plays were then performed in Surakarta, Surabaya and also Malang, which would not have been possible without Murtijono’s initial support. The SCP did not have to seek licenses due to an agreement with the local police, providing a degree of protection from the repressive arm of the state.

The success of the SCP has not been built around its attention to the centrally defined guidelines, which would have hampered its operation. Halim states:

I am certain that Murtijono as the Director of the SCP made a subjective interpretation of the instructions from the centre. By subjective interpretation, I mean that the SCP’s activities would be organised only in accordance with the needs of the group of artists that are in Solo and are known by Murtijono, who indeed received much input and information from many artists in Solo and what’s more in other cities. (Halim HD, personal communication, 16 December 2004)

Saya yakin bahwa mas Murtijono sebagai Kepala TBS memberikan tafsiran yang subyektif atas instruksi dari pusat itu. Tafsiran subyektif itu, artinya, bahwa

³⁷ ‘Terbuka, akomodatif dan berani menerima perbedaan dalam perspektif kesenian’ (Halim HD, personal communication, 16 December 2004).

kegiatan berjalan hanya sesuai dengan kebutuhan yang ada dari kalangan seniman yang ada di Solo dan yang dikenal oleh mas Murtijono, yang memang menerima banyak masukan dan informasi dari banyak seniman di Solo maupun kota-kota lainnya.

It was Murtijono's support of the local arts community that gave the SCP the opportunity to be successful.

Despite the uniform brief and detailed instructions from the Directorate of Culture, the cultural parks were not uniform in their operation. Small budgets, fabrication of reports, corruption and the creativity of particular directors all contributed to an array of different practices. In the cultural park that most successfully managed to engage with the local arts communities, it was 'interpreting' the centrally defined directives to suit local conditions that made the SCP's success possible. Open criticism of the cultural parks' bureaucracy is, however, a nation-wide feature at least since the 1990s. By the end of the New Order era, observers and artists were demanding a more autonomous operation connected to local community agendas rather than a nationally determined set of practices, thus indicating dissatisfaction with the command culture model. With this in mind, the decentralisation of cultural parks in the Reform era could provide further incentives for localised artistic engagements.

4. Decentralisation and the Cultural Parks

In January 2001 control of the cultural parks was passed from the Directorate to the provincial governments as part of the broader decentralisation process. The impact of decentralisation on the cultural parks has been varied. In some areas such as West Sumatra, South Sulawesi and North Sumatra, the cultural parks have collapsed and are now only used as venues for rehearsals. The Riau Cultural Park also is used less frequently; the provincial government has funded the creation of a separate arts centre with a broader brief, the *Bandar Seni Raja Ali Haji*, which is discussed further in the analysis of the arts councils. However, other cultural parks, including those located in Surakarta, West Java and East Java, have had their funding increased, since they have been located under the provincial governments. Funding in decentralised Indonesia is dependent on the relationship between the Director of the cultural park, the Director of the Provincial Office of Tourism and Culture (*Dinas Kebudayaan dan Parawisata*) and

the members of the provincial legislature (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah – DPRD*). The relationships are varied and unstable.

The WJCP has become more focussed on holding performances and exhibitions and drawing in visitors from the local community and abroad. The increased activity has assisted its standing amongst members of the local arts community, although it is still viewed as overly concerned with bureaucratic goals rather than contributing to the arts. Iyus Supriatna, the Director of the WJCP, has noted a slight change in performance types. While the WJCP was under the Directorate, there were more visiting performances from other areas, while the Provincial government is more focussed on art from West Java. Supriatna also noted that although approval now comes from the provincial government for the budget and yearly schedule of activities, at the end of 2001 the same *Technical Instructions* were being used and that the WJCP's routines remain unchanged. In the strategic plans developed by the West Java Provincial Office for Culture and Tourism (*Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata Propinsi Jawa Barat*), the WJCP was given the task of 'developing culture and increasing the appreciation of society towards culture'.³⁸ Its three tasks were: developing art through collaboration, revitalisation, increasing appreciation, increasing the creativity and capacity of artists; nurturing art through protecting, researching, inventorying, reconstructing and documenting art; and using art for education, rituals, religion, helping the economy, tourism and enriching art diversity (*Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata*, 2001e, p. 2). In summary, the role and programs of the WJCP has remained relatively unchanged although it is becoming more prominent as a performance venue.

The arts community desired a change in operation, as demonstrated by their suggestions at a seminar to discuss the 'repositioning' of the WJCP following decentralisation. The thrust of a number of the speakers was similar to criticisms made during the New Order era. The most frequently mentioned reform was to minimise the 'bureaucratic style' of the WJCP³⁹ through increasing its flexibility, increasing its networks with other arts institutions and artists and making strategic decisions to make the WJCP a 'public

³⁸ 'Pengembangan kebudayaan dan peningkatan daya apresiatif masyarakat terhadap kebudayaan' (*Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata*, 2001e, p. 1).

³⁹ F.X. Widaryanto, a renown choreographer and dance teacher, stated: 'The mentality of civil servants must be changed in the work-ethos to reposition the WJCP' (Maulana & Imran, 2000, p. 18). ('*Mentalitas pegawai negeri harus diubah dalam etos kerja mereposisi TBJB.*')

possession' (Maulana & Imran, 2000). Suggestions included privatisation, reducing the number of events to focus on large, popular performances, broadening the performance genres and making the institution independent from the provincial government.

There were few signs of change in the programs and techniques of cultural parks that were still functioning when I conducted my fieldwork at the end of 2001. Cultural parks retained the practices of the New Order era despite the change in their political masters. Many artists I interviewed felt that attention was still directed to the goals of power holders rather than the arts community. However, there was evidence that change was on the way in some locations. The SCP had continuous support and more funding and steps were being taken in Bandung to consult a much wider group of stakeholders in the arts community in an effort to change cultural policies to address their concerns while also growing tourism. The WJCP, despite its continuation of New Order era practices, had grown in prominence in the local arts community through the increased number of performances and activities involving local artists.

5. The Arts Councils

An important division in the ranks of arts councils was between those that were state-funded, who were responsible to the provincial governors for the use of their funds, and the arts councils that were not state-funded. Given the focus of the thesis on state-run and sponsored cultural institutions, my analysis is limited to the state-funded arts councils. The arts councils' structure was determined in each location. Their autonomy from each other and the absence of tight central government control shaped a plurality of institutions that used the same name despite quite different aims. For this reason, the arts councils are assessed individually below rather than following the method used to assess the cultural parks, which were much more uniform in their expressed operation and goals.

The rest of this section outlines the historical development of the arts councils, in particular the inaugural Arts Council in Jakarta (JAC), and provides the reasons for their spread across Indonesia in the 1990s. The JAC receives close attention because it was the inspiration and/or model for the subsequent arts councils and because the dynamics between the JAC and the provincial government provide an insight into what has generally been the most important relationship for all of the arts councils. The next

section provides the histories of two other arts councils. The final section identifies the shared features and differences of the arts councils and assesses the changes of the Reform era.

The Jakarta Arts Council

The JAC originated from the activities of artists who were planning the establishment of TIM and exploring possible management structures. Following general discussion about the establishment of an arts centre in Jakarta, a group of seven artists⁴⁰ met with Governor Ali Sadikin on 9 May 1968. The seven artists present (known as the *formateur* committee) were charged with choosing twenty-five members of the Cultural Management Board (*Badan Pembina Kebudayaan*), which later renamed itself the Jakarta Arts Council in its first meeting (Yusra, 1994, p. 28). In a decree on 7 June 1968, Sadikin endorsed the first JAC (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 246). According to Sadikin's decree, the JAC was to be the 'only artistic/cultural institution at the highest regional level for the territory of the special Area of the City of Jakarta' and was responsible for the management of TIM.⁴¹ Its founders intended the JAC to be funded by the Jakarta Provincial government (*Daerah Keistimewaan Ibukota – DKI*), while operating with a large degree of autonomy in an attempt to secure artistic freedom within TIM. The JAC consisted of six committees: music, dance, literature, fine arts, film and theatre, which were responsible for organising activities in their area. The June 1968 decree also called for the establishment of an honorary council of artists and cultural intellectuals who were recognised as paramount in Indonesia, called the Jakarta Academy (*Akademi Jakarta*). The Jakarta Academy was responsible for determining membership of the JAC every three years (which would then be inaugurated by the Governor), as well as granting awards and providing advice to the Governor (Wahono, 1994a, p. 44). It was to consist of ten members who were prominent in the fields of art and culture, displayed dedication, and were over forty years of age at the time of their appointment (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 248; Wahono, 1994a, p. 45). The Jakarta Academy appoints its own members for life with the approval of the Governor.

⁴⁰ These artists were: Usmar Ismail, Rudi Pirngadi, Mochtar Lubis, Asrul Sani, D. Djajakusuma, Gayus Siagian and Zulharmans (Yusra, 1994, p. 27).

⁴¹ The decree is quoted in English in the official guide book written by Rosidi (1974, p. 63).

The concern with creative freedom reflects the ‘universal humanist’ affiliation of the artists who were central to TIM’s establishment and were well-represented in the JAC.⁴² Taufiq Ismail, in an editorial in the literary magazine *Horison*, cited Sadikin’s statement at the opening of TIM: ‘Politics may not intervene inside this arts centre, as occurred during the times before the 1965 coup.’⁴³ The notion of protecting artistic expression from political intervention paradoxically gave rise to exclusion from and exclusivity within TIM from its beginnings. Artists who had been affiliated with LEKRA were barred from performing (Budiman, 1969). David Hill writes that TIM tended to focus on ‘the ‘modern’, ‘high’ cultural forms, appealing to a metropolitan elite’ (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 255) and, as explored in the first section, the indigenous arts that were performed in TIM had been altered in a way that appealed to this audience. TIM and the JAC were protecting a particular version of artistic expression and a particular group of artists.

Although the JAC and the Jakarta Academy were at times subject to DKI intervention under Sadikin,⁴⁴ in practice DKI and the two institutions generally had a good working relationship during Sadikin’s tenure. It was not until after Sadikin’s retirement in 1977 that pressure between DKI and the two institutions escalated due to increased DKI interventions.⁴⁵ Hill’s research into TIM outlines a series of standoffs during the 1980s over appointments to the JAC, largely because the Jakarta Academy would not submit the candidates that DKI requested (1993b, pp. 248-9). Additionally, two ex-ministers were appointed to the Jakarta Academy as a compromise by the Academy to have its JAC nominations accepted in 1982 (1993b, p. 249).⁴⁶ It was between 1977 and 1991 that TIM (and the JAC) most felt the tension between artists’ aspirations for complete freedom of expression and the will of the interventionist state. A series of changes in the provincial legislation that reduced the JAC’s autonomy reflected this tension. In 1973, the JAC was

⁴² The inaugural JAC was led by Trisno Soemardjo and included Arief Budiman, Goenawan Mohamad, Taufiq Ismail, H.B. Jassin, who were all active in the *Manikebu* polemics in the late Guided Democracy period.

⁴³ ‘Politik tidak boleh intervensi ke dalam Pusat Kesenian ini, semacam waktu pra-Gestapu dulu.’ (Ismail, 1968, in Mohamad, 1993, p. 107).

⁴⁴ This included the appointment of the Director of the Provincial Cultural Office (*Dinas Kebudayaan DKI*) to the JAC board (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 248) and Sadikin’s criticism of works in TIM as ‘wrong’ (Mohamad, 1993, p. 113).

⁴⁵ Sadikin himself calls the term of Governor Tjokropranolo the beginning of TIM’s decline. He made the criticism: ‘The Jakarta Government did not seek money to develop TIM but instead made TIM a tool to seek money’ (Chudori, 1990). (*Pemda bukannya cari dana untuk membangun TIM, tapi itu justru dijadikan alat untuk mencari uang.*)

⁴⁶ These were H. Boediardjo (formerly Minister of Information) and Mukti Ali (formerly Minister of Religion).

made to consult with, and made responsible to, the Jakarta Academy for all of its activities. In 1986, it was made responsible to the Governor for its administration and to the Jakarta Academy for its artistic direction.

The largest change for the JAC came in 1991 when responsibility for the management of TIM was taken away from the JAC and, as was mentioned in chapter three, given to the Jakarta Arts Foundation (*Yayasan Kesenian Jakarta*), which was formed in 1989 in an attempt to address funding shortfalls through collaboration with the private sector (Gondomono & Murgiyanto, 1994, p. 62; Wahono, 1994b, p. 53). TIM was effectively removed from the system that was designed to allow a degree of artistic freedom, and placed in the hands of an institution that was much more amenable to DKI direction (Effendi, 2001, p. 681). With the removal of its core function, the role of the JAC was redefined with a broader focus than activities within TIM. Sri Warso Wahono, a fine-artist and member of the JAC from 1985-1993, writes:

The JAC functions as an institute of arts cultivation that is shaped by the community of artists and is inaugurated by the Governor. ... The JAC manages all arts activities in society, especially in the capital city of Jakarta. (1994b, p. 53)

DKJ berfungsi sebagai lembaga pembina kesenian yang dibentuk oleh masyarakat seniman dan dikukuhkan oleh Gubernur. ... DKJ mengelola seluruh kegiatan seni budaya di dalam masyarakat, khususnya di Ibukota Jakarta.

The JAC was envisioned after 1991 as a tool for shaping the arts rather than the management body of an arts-space, and the governor was to retain control over the appointments process. The 1991 speech by then State Minister for Population and Environment Emil Salim at TIM's 23rd anniversary celebrations highlights this change in perspective. Salim encouraged the JAC to 'not situate art as art, but art activities as a basic element of culture in development.'⁴⁷

The third Indonesian Arts Councils' Assembly in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi, in November 1992 was a pivotal point in the history of the arts councils. It was at this assembly that Salim Said, the Director of the JAC, successfully lobbied for the arts councils to be spread across Indonesia. We can get a sense of the model Said was advocating, and that the JAC had adopted, through the recommendations presented at the end of the conference. These recommendations included:

⁴⁷ *'Dewan Kesenian Jakarta janganlah mendudukkan seni sebagai seni, melainkan kegiatan seni sebagai unsur pokok kebudayaan dalam pembangunan'* (Wahono, 1994b, pp. 56-7).

- 1) That in the Broad Outline of National Policy, art is declared to be an integral part of the effort to increase the quality of the Indonesian people.
 - 2) That cultivating arts appreciation and achievement be increased in order to generate energy and passion to develop national pride.
 - 3) That a climate be developed that better encourages artists to create quality art (Wahono, 1994b, p. 57).
- 1) *Agar dalam Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN), kesenian dinyatakan sebagai bagian yang tak terpisahkan dari upaya peningkatan kualitas manusia Indonesia.*
 - 2) *Agar pembinaan apresiasi dan prestasi seni ditingkatkan untuk membangkitkan semangat dan gairah membangun kebanggaan nasional.*
 - 3) *Agar dikembangkan iklim yang lebih mendorong seniman untuk menciptakan karya seni yang bermutu.*

The recommendations of the conference demonstrate that the arts councils had moved a long way from the original concerns of the JAC with freedom of artistic expression. Instead, the concern is with positioning the arts as a potential tool for achieving governmental goals of the state – improving the ‘quality of the Indonesian people’ and strengthening national pride. On 7 December 1992, Salim Said presented the recommendations of the Indonesian Arts Councils’ Assembly to Suharto (Ridwan, 2000). Suharto responded positively and made the observation in a speech at the end of 1992 that every province should have an Arts Council (Elmustian, 2001, pp. 756-757). BAPENAS agreed to allocate funds for arts councils to the Department of Internal Affairs (*Departemen Dalam Negeri – Depdagri*) which would be distributed to the provincial governments who in turn would supervise the establishment of the arts councils.⁴⁸

Suharto’s announcement in 1992 inspired the creation of a number of arts councils across Indonesia, including in Riau and West Sumatra. However, these were not the first arts councils created outside of Jakarta. Following the establishment and early success of the JAC in the late 1960s and early 1970s, artists began forming arts councils using their own initiative and often with funding from the provincial governments. The Surakarta Arts Council started in 1972 and two arts councils were formed in Ujung Pandang in the 1970s: the South Sulawesi Arts Council and the Makassar Arts Council (Halim HD, 2000). More arts councils followed the fall of Suharto in 1998, such as the Cirebon Arts Council, as artists took advantage of the freedom of association of the Reform era to form groups that could lobby for the arts in their areas.

⁴⁸ The decision to bypass the Directorate of Culture was the cause of much friction among *Bappenas*, *Depdagri* and the Directorate of Culture, which was not pleased about its exclusion from a project so squarely in its field. However, they came to an agreement that the creation of arts councils in the provinces would involve the arts sections of the regional offices of the Directorate of Culture.

The 1993 Legislation

The general reasons why the arts councils were attractive to the New Order regime can be gleaned from the 1993 directive from the Minister for Interior Affairs that executed Suharto's expressed desire for every province to have an arts council.⁴⁹ This brief piece of legislation consists of only five sections. Its primary purpose is achieved in its first section where the governors are informed that provinces without arts councils are to form them, with their membership consisting of artists, intellectuals interested in culture and other related parties. Payment to establish arts councils is to be made to the governor through the annual provincial budget allocations. It is also worth noting that the JAC is designated in the legislation as the official consultant on any plans to build new arts council facilities.

The role that the regime envisioned for the arts councils is indicated in two of the sections. Sections two and three state:

Guidance and development of the arts should consider characteristics of the region.

Pembinaan dan pengembangan kesenian hendaklah mempertimbangkan karakteristik daerah.

In the effort of guidance and development of art, the art councils should become a catalyser of the entire potential of art in each region.

Dalam upaya pembinaan dan pengembangan kesenian Dewan Kesenian hendaknya menjadi katalisator segenap potensi kesenian di daerah masing-masing.

Instead of leaving the arts councils to develop whatever art is most creative or most popular, the state directs them to focus on the regional 'characteristics'. The arts councils were to become the stimulators and regulators of the arts in the regions. Like the cultural parks, the arts councils were to be a part of how the state constructed regional and national culture. However, the actions of arts councils varied from supporting the regime's vision and plans to opposing them.

The Jakarta Arts Council in the Reform Era

Following the fall of Suharto, the JAC and Jakarta Academy fell further in stature and had lost the last of its vigour from the 1970s. By 2002, the JAC had been languishing under interim management for over two years. Artists had lost faith in the management

⁴⁹ *Instruksi Menteri Dalam Negeri 5A/1993.*

and gone elsewhere and attendance levels had dropped further. The Jakarta Academy was, in practice, defunct. Some members had passed away and there had been no new appointments to fill their positions. Others were elderly and no longer actively involved. On 11 October 2002, a team was formed to review the activities and finances of the JAC (NAR, 2002a). Starting from the review, a growing movement began amongst the arts and cultural community to review the roles of the JAC and the Jakarta Academy. After public criticism from some highly regarded public individuals,⁵⁰ the membership of the Jakarta Academy was reviewed and twenty seven members appointed, twenty of whom were new. The appointments included a number of prominent figures from the New Order period such as W.S. Rendra, Taufiq Abdullah, Goenawan Mohamad, as well as Sitor Situmorang, who had been imprisoned by the New Order in 1966 for his leftist connections (NAR, 2002b). Although the institutional structure of the Jakarta Academy has not changed, it now has a more critical and charismatic membership with greater sway in the Indonesian arts community.⁵¹ The new appointees were already lobbying for changes to the nominations for the new JAC, which had occurred a few months before the new Jakarta Academy was appointed (NAR, 2002f).⁵²

6. Other Arts Councils

The arts councils have some shared characteristics that correspond with the JAC, although there is no single organisational structure. The arts councils all consist of artists and were formed to be advocates for the arts in particular regions. Like the JAC, most arts councils are divided into different sections addressing different branches of the arts. Arts councils also generally viewed themselves as the organisers of discussions, performances, festivals and other arts events, with sponsorship from the state, the private sector or artists themselves. Within these broad parameters there was much diversity. The two arts councils discussed below are chosen to demonstrate the arts councils' variations in goals and operation. The Riau Arts Council demonstrates a quite different engagement with local politics when compared to the JAC. Secondly, the arts councils in West Java (two were formed simultaneously), which were established in the Reform era, provide an

⁵⁰ See, for instance, the comments of Salim Said, widely regarded poet Sapardi Djoko Damono, cultural observer Mohamad Sobary, and poet critic and essayist Goenawan Mohamad (NAR, 2002c; 2002d; 2002e).

⁵¹ Two well regarded members of the arts community, arts critic and researcher Nirwan Dewanto and poet Remy Novaris, were very supportive of the new members (NAR, 2002f).

⁵² Interestingly, two of the antagonists from the mid-1960s from opposite sides of the political spectrum, Pramoedya Ananta Toer and Taufiq Ismail, were not prepared to become members of the Jakarta Academy.

example of an ultimately failed attempt to set up an arts council. The events surrounding the two arts councils in West Java and the critical reflections of artists are used to explore the arts councils' dynamics and perceived problems.

The Riau Arts Council

The Riau Arts Council (RAC – *Dewan Kesenian Riau*) has fashioned quite a different role for itself when compared to the JAC.⁵³ Although there had been plans to establish an arts council in Riau since 1978, it was not until after Suharto's speech that the Riau Arts Council was formed (Elmustian, 2001, p. 756). Following Suharto's announcement, a series of meetings was held in late 1992 and early 1993 that were attended by senior bureaucrats in Riau from the national and provincial bureaucracy, artists and intellectuals. The RAC was one of four institutions that the Riau provincial government formed to address the concerns raised in these forums that were established in 1993.⁵⁴ The model adopted was based on TIM and received substantial support from the governor and the Provincial legislature. The RAC included eight committees that were devoted to different streams of the arts.⁵⁵

While most of the senior positions in the RAC were filled by bureaucrats, including the post of Director, which was held by the Director of the Regional Planning Board (*Kepala, Badan Perencanaan Daerah*), the council fulfilled two important functions for the arts in Riau. Firstly, the RAC stimulated arts activities through providing funding for arts activities. From 1993, a payment of up to Rp. 250 000 was made for large performances which was increased to Rp. 600 000 in 1998 (Elmustian, 2001, p. 758). Secondly, the RAC provided a degree of protection from interference by the police, who had closely monitored arts performances during the New Order era. Permits for performances were not always granted and required a fee. The RAC provided a government-backed body that was regularly granted police permits and covered all costs.

⁵³ Information is mostly taken from an article by Elmustian (2001) and from interviews conducted in Pekanbaru, Riau, July 2001.

⁵⁴ The others were the Riau Arts Deliberation Council (*Dewan Pertimbangan Kesenian Riau*), Riau Cultural Centre (*Balai Budaya Riau*) and the Riau Arts Foundation (*Yayasan Kesenian Riau*) (Elmustian, 2001, p. 757).

⁵⁵ These were: literature; fine arts; music; dance; theatre; film; research and development; and promotions, publications and documentation (Elmustian, 2001, p. 757).

Additionally, the regular presentation of local arts and artists contributed to a broader cultural movement in Riau based on ethnic Riau-Malay identity. Elmustian, Director of the University of Riau Press and active participant in this movement, notes that the RAC is one of a number of institutions that have a shared goal for the Riau Malay population:

The institutions, which are based upon the same scenario, enrich local society by building self confidence, ‘moral villages’ as has occurred in several attractive fishing villages, moral-cultural strength, and other aspects of [Riau’s] local ‘genius’. (2001, p. 761)

Institusi yang dilandasi oleh senario yang sama memberdayakan masyarakat setempat untuk membangkitkan percaya diri (self-confidence), moral village seperti berbagai pelayanan kampung yang ranggi, kekuatan moral budaya, dan local genius lainnya.

This movement reached the high point of its popularity following the fall of Suharto in 1998.⁵⁶

A change in position holders in 1998 coincided with a growing movement in Riau for increased autonomy from Jakarta. The following year, a new foundation focussed on the arts and culture was created by the Governor: the Raja Ali Haji Arts Centre Foundation (*Yayasan Bandar Seni Raja Ali Haji – SERAI Foundation*). The SERAI Foundation was responsible for building and managing a new arts centre in Pekan Baru that would include facilities for the RAC. In practice, the activities and staff of the RAC overlapped considerably with the SERAI Foundation. In 1998, artists and intellectuals were moved into key positions in the RAC and, not long after, into the SERAI Foundation. Al azhar, the Head of the Free Riau Movement (*Riau Merdeka*), was prominent in both institutions. The RAC’s activities were also altered to fit with the changed climate in the arts in Riau. For instance, one of its ‘significant’ programs from this time was running workshops for artists about ‘rereading’ old Malay texts that originated in Riau with the goal of reinterpreting them for contemporary times (Elmustian, 2001, p. 762).

The provincial government and artists coalesced around the goal of strengthening local identity and self-confidence through the arts, in particular through traditional art forms. In contrast to the JAC, the local arts community in Riau has been generally supportive of the RAC’s program and agenda and continues to support the SERAI Foundation. The RAC’s integration into the broader cultural movement to build local identity and confidence

⁵⁶ See Al azhar (1997a), Al azhar (1997b), and Colombijn (2003) for a discussion of the growth of the cultural movement in Riau.

strengthened its relationship with both the provincial government, which has been fostering links with the indigenous peoples of Riau, and with local artists who are attracted to its advocacy of indigenous arts and artists.⁵⁷

The Arts Councils of West Java

The first arts council in West Java was formed in 1968 and, after a few years with little activity, it disbanded (Romli HM, 2000b). Following Suharto's 1992 speech and the 1993 legislation, the Province of West Java began preparations for the creation of a new arts council, and in 1996 the legal framework was established.⁵⁸ According to the legislation, the West Java Arts Council (WJAC) was to be shaped by and responsible to the governor and was focused on 'regional' art and culture, which was defined as 'having roots in local traditions and giving features to national cultural life'.⁵⁹ Although the legislation preceded the fall of Suharto, steps to establish the arts council were not taken until 1998. It is important to remain cognisant of the two-year intermission in assessing the legislation and the events surrounding its creation and collapse, since the early Reform era promised much more for independently minded artists than the late New Order period. The chasm between the legislation and the expectations of a large segment of the arts community was central to the series of events that resulted in the demise of the arts council.

In 1998, Salim Said asked the leadership of a local arts body, the Board for Cultural Concerns (*Badan Pertimbangan Kebudayaan – BPK*) to establish an arts council in West Java.⁶⁰ The BPK accepted and put together the Preparatory Body for Shaping the West Java Arts Council (*Badan Persiapan Pembentukan Dewan Kesenian Jawa Barat*). A concept of the basic structure and goals was formed, and an Artists' Assembly (*Musyawarah Seniman*) in West Java was held on 30 March, 1999. The Assembly put in place regulations for running the WJAC. The WJAC was responsible to the arts

⁵⁷ In my short time in Riau I did identify an issue of equity amongst the desires of the cultural leaders. Pekanbaru, the capital city of Riau, consists of forty percent *Minangkabau* from West Sumatra. Extensive affirmative action programs could marginalise the large non-indigenous segments of the population.

⁵⁸ *Peraturan Daerah Tingkat 1 Jawa Barat No. 7/1996 tentang Pelestarian, Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Seni Budaya Daerah Jawa Barat.*

⁵⁹ '... berakar pada tradisi daerah dan memberi corak pada kehidupan budaya Nasional' (*Perda Jawa Barat No. 7/1996 (1) f*).

⁶⁰ In provinces that did not autonomously establish an Arts Council or have an equivalent organisation, the central state initiated the process of forming an Arts Council. The BPK was established in 1976 by artists in Bandung.

community through a three-yearly Assembly and not to the Governor, as is usually the case.

A structure was formed at the Artists' Assembly, and positions were filled through election by attendees. The majority of positions were filled by 'modern' artists rather than 'traditional' artists (*seniman daerah*), who did not feel adequately represented.⁶¹ As a result of their feeling of exclusion from executive positions, some traditional artists organised a closed meeting at the restaurant in the Hotel Homan after the Assembly on 30 March 1999. After spirited and tense discussion, the West Java Regional Arts Council (WJRAC) was formed by the participants. A letter was sent to the governor with fifty six arts related institutions backing the change. The support of most traditional artists shifted to the WJRAC. A point of contention was the appointment process for positions on the WJRAC. The appointments were made in a closed meeting without informing some of the appointees.⁶² In order to prevent dissent, many of the position-holders in the WJAC were offered positions in the WJRAC. The General Chair, Yusuf Affendi,⁶³ and central committee were chosen privately in the Hotel Homan, although the appointments were meant to occur through the committee structure. The governor sided with the WJRAC, and the WJAC was disbanded.

According to participants in the events, there were two elements to the Governor's decision. Firstly, the WJRAC represented itself in its letter as standing for the indigenous arts in West Java and therefore in accordance with the Provincial Regulations, while the WJAC lacked the support of practitioners of indigenous arts (Interview with Agus Safari and Ari Nurtanio, 15 November 2001). The traditional artists were able to oppose the WJAC by taking advantage of the state's conceptualisation of regional culture as described in the legislation. Secondly, the decision was a choice between two groups within the arts community, and the governor chose the group that was closer to government officials and tended to have positions in the bureaucracy. In that sense, the WJRAC outmanoeuvred the WJAC through its political contacts and representing itself as corresponding to the institution envisioned within the legislation. Both the WJRAC

⁶¹ A particularly sore point was that the Chairperson of the Dalangs' Union (*Persatuan Dalang*), Asep Sunarya, was not chosen for a position.

⁶² Ari Nurtanio, the Secretary IV (of four), learnt of his appointment through a letter which was sent to them and signed by the governor, demonstrating the WJRAC's legitimacy (Interview, 15 November 2001).

⁶³ A professor in fine arts at Bandung Institute of Technology.

and the WJAC were of considerable size. The WJAC had 41 positions, including eight committees for various branches of the arts. The WJRAC had 87 positions, including thirteen committees beneath three supra-committees. The large structure reflects the desire for both the groups to be inclusive. According to the WJRAC's official structure, the committees would consider proposals from various groups and artists and recommend which should receive funding to the Central Committee. However, the structure was never used despite the disbursement of almost all of the funds.

Internal corruption crippled the WJRAC in a very public and embarrassing manner. The office of Affendi in the Bandung Technological Institute also doubled as the office of the WJRAC. Over a period of eighteen months from April 1999, almost all of the money (Rp. 417 785 865, approximately \$90 000 AUD) was dispersed without using the WJRAC committee structures. Complaints were made about the conduct of the WJRAC throughout the year 2000⁶⁴ but bank reports were not produced until August 2000. On 17 August 2000, Agus Safari, one of three treasurers of the WJRAC, wrote a letter drawing attention to the misappropriation of funds, criticising Affendi and highlighting the moral obligation of the position holders of the WJRAC. After a series of three meetings,⁶⁵ the WJRAC was effectively ended on 19 September 2000. A report⁶⁶ was produced listing the activities that the money went to (but not the names of those involved), although none of my interviewees, most of whom were active members of the arts community, could recollect any of the activities ever taking place. At the end of March 2001, the Provincial Legislature called all of the position holders to account. Yusuf Affendi did not attend. A small group attended. The governor was asked to account for the WJRAC, and all concerned were still waiting for a call from the Governor nine months later. When the term of the WJRAC ended in May 2001, the Governor discontinued the funding.

The problems facing cultural policy were amplified in West Java by divisions within the arts community and within the arts councils. There was always a high level of

⁶⁴ See Maulana (2000b). Agus Safari wrote an open letter to the position holders of the WJRAC criticising its operation in March 2000.

⁶⁵ A meeting was organised on 3 September 2000 where a number of position holders withdrew from their positions ('Mayoritas Pengurus DKJB Mundur,' 2000). Another meeting followed on 7 September and a third on 19 September. The first two meetings concluded that the short-, medium- and long-term plans were not realised and that the blame lay with Affendi and Faturohman. The third froze the Rp. 40 000 (approximately \$9 AUD) of the funds that were left and effectively ended the WJRAC.

⁶⁶ *Laporan Penggunaan Dana Dewan Kesenian Daerah Jawa Barat*. The report was produced for the meeting of 19 September 2000.

disaffection amongst the arts community with the arts councils.⁶⁷ There were also two opposing councils formed in opposition to the WJAC in March 1999. The West Java Arts Assembly (*Majelis Kesenian Jawa Barat*) was formed by Taufik Rahzen. A second protest-council was the Bandung Jeprut Arts Council (*Dewan Kesenian Jeprut Bandung*) formed by Tisna Sanjaya.⁶⁸ The deeply felt diversity of artists in Bandung made the creation of a representative body difficult.

7. Assessing the Arts Councils

The events surrounding the arts councils in West Java opened up an opportunity for reflection on the role of arts councils and the state's attempts at government. After the WJRAC was wound up, artists voiced their opinions in the local media, where a conflict was revealed between artists and the state over the role of the arts councils and cultural governance more generally.

Pikiran Rakyat published a number of critical articles in September and October 2000 in response to the WJRAC's collapse. Of particular interest are four longer opinion-style pieces published on 26 October 2000 for a seminar titled 'Discussion of the Problem of the Arts Council' held on the same day. The pieces were written by four prominent artists working in Bandung: Suyatna Anirun (a famous actor and director of Indonesian contemporary theatre), Benny Yohanes (a theatre director and Director of the theatre section at the Indonesian College for the Arts, Bandung), Saini KM (well-known poet and Director of the Indonesian Arts College) and Juniarso Ridwan (a poet and former Director of the Preparatory Body for Shaping the WJAC). All four identified the WJRAC as a 'top down' institution with little support from artists. Anirun, Ridwan and Yohanes went further and put forward that the institution was, in the words of Anirun, 'a political accessory of power-holders' (2000). Ridwan stated:

The Arts Council's presence, as we came to understand, much less than assuming a form as a partner of the government that gave some consideration to the arts, but still continued to be subordinated to the influence of power-holders. All the actions of the Arts Council's position-holders had to be justified to power-holders. In my view, that is where power demonstrates its domination. (2000)

⁶⁷ When the Governor held a ceremony to commemorate the beginning of the WJAC on 27 March 1999, a group of artists and students protested outside the opening (Imran, 2000a).

⁶⁸ Jeprut is an art form that is spontaneous, anti-order and anti-hierarchy. The purpose of the Bandung Jeprut Arts Council was to make the point that the arts do not need an Arts Council. The acronym for the Bandung Jeprut Arts Council is the same as the West Java Arts Council (DKJB).

Kehadiran Dewan Kesenian, sebagaimana kita maklumi, kendati menjelma sebagai mitra pemerintah yang memberikan berbagai pertimbangan di bidang kesenian, akan tetapi tetap berada pada subordinasi pengaruh penguasa. Segala tindak-tanduk pengurus Dewan Kesenian harus dipertanggungjawabkan kepada penguasa. Saya memandang, di sanalah kekuasaan menunjukkan dominasinya.

Anirun and Ridwan called for artists to shape an independent Arts Council or similar institution that was autonomous from government. Yohanes made a similar call for independence, but based it on a modernist conception of art as having intrinsic qualities – creativity, flow, anti-hierarchy – that would be lost if it came into contact with a political power-structure (2000). Yohanes's view of art is commonplace amongst artists in Bandung.⁶⁹ Saini, in contrast to the other three artists, viewed the WJRAC's role as at odds with role of an Arts Council (Saini KM, 2000). He viewed arts councils as advisory bodies that exist only to make recommendations to government, not to run programs, organise events or make policy. He suggested a model like the city of Mannheim where nine respected critics, all of whom have had over 25 years experience in the arts, distributed funding. He argued that confusion over the role of the Arts Council caused considerable problems.

Indeed, the confusion over the role of both arts councils in West Java underlay the series of events. The national legislation clearly established the arts councils as 'advisers' to the governor and the provincial legislation confirmed this role. Power still rested in the hands of the governor to shape the councils and accept or reject the advice. However, a substantial portion of the active artists in Bandung desired, or at least said they wanted, an independent body that could develop arts infrastructure and plan for the future. They wanted the WJAC to be an advocate for artists and the arts communities with a large degree of autonomy. The state's understanding of cultural governance did not envision the artists using the arts councils in ways that clashed with its goals.

The WJRAC was able to take advantage of the difference between the state's conceptualisation of culture, as defined in the arts council legislation, and the view of the artists in the WJAC. Particularly relevant is the definition of culture in the provincial legislation, which states that it should 'have a root in local traditions and give features to national cultural life'. The artists of the WJAC wanted to act independently of the state's

⁶⁹ A number of artists voiced similar opinions in interviews I conducted in November 2001. Yohanes's decision to cordon off art is itself a political decision with political consequences for arts management and policy. A similar view dominated the artists who were involved with the formation of TIM.

national cultural framework and put in place structures that moved away from the administrative framework that was clearly present within the legislation. The WJRAC exploited this difference and used its closer links with the provincial bureaucracy to outmanoeuvre the WJAC and then, through a closed appointments process, brought some of the WJAC artists into the WJRAC's structure. The WJRAC's willingness to adopt the cultural discourses preferred by the bureaucracy and its ability to mobilise support from the governor linked the WJRAC with the state's conception of national culture. The linkage with, and the sense that the WJRAC in particular was giving its approval to, the state's paternalistic conceptions of national culture was at the forefront of many critiques of both arts councils when the WJRAC collapsed.

Hill writes about TIM:

TIM's identity was caught between that of a free-flowing artistic community ... and that of a complex bureaucratic structure linked to an increasingly powerful and interventionist state. (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 247)

The tension that Hill identifies in TIM provides an insight into an issue that was central to the success or failure of all of the arts councils: perceptions about the role of the arts in governance and governance in the arts. Following the elimination of the largest group of left-wing artists and the marginalisation of their perspectives on the arts and culture, a key issue for artists in Indonesia has been freedom of expression. The role artists have defined for themselves has tended towards that of providing insight from the perspective of unattached individuals, as can be seen from the issues identified in many of the arts centres discussed previously. However, the central government during the New Order era and continuing into the Reform era has defined the arts and artists within its cultural discourses that have centred on attempts to shape the attributes and behaviours of Indonesians in accordance with national development. The place of artists in the regime's governmental discourses has often been resisted by groups of artists, as can be seen in the clashes surrounding the JAC and the arts councils in West Java. This was not the case in all locations. In the RAC, one of the most active arts council in the 1990s, artists agreed with the governmental programs of the provincial government that used culture as a way of building indigenous identity and worked hard to see them succeed.

Reformasi has impacted the arts councils in two ways. Firstly, the body that oversees and finances many of the arts councils, the provincial governments, has a greater degree of

autonomy from the state and has greater incentives to build constituencies in local communities through promoting local arts and culture because of decentralisation. In some provinces, there is more money and a larger degree of freedom in forming budgets. In some areas, such as Riau, new organisations have been formed that have incorporated the role of the arts councils. The West Sumatra Arts Council remains the most active organiser of festivals in the region despite low levels of funding. However, the freedom of provincial government also includes the freedom not to fund the arts councils, while either funding other bodies (as in Riau) or spending the money elsewhere.⁷⁰ Secondly, the end of repressive measures, such as the licensing of arts events and censorship of the mass media, has encouraged artists to become more openly critical of government policy. The RAC and the SERAI Foundation could not have been as openly critical of central government policies before the Reform era. Criticisms of the JAC resulted in a revision of its role and a series of new appointments. However the changed climate has not automatically produced clean and active institutions, as the case of the West Java arts councils demonstrates.

8. Conclusion

The cultural parks and the arts councils examined in this chapter were the product of central initiatives and as such were formulated within the governmental discourses of the New Order regime. The broad purpose of both institutions as defined by the national government was to promote the arts in the region in ways that accorded with the governmental goals of the New Order regime. Both cultural institutions were concerned with producing art that was appropriate for the regime's broad goal of societal development and the management of ethnic/regional identity. These concerns were particularly evident in the cultural parks, but were also evident in the arts council legislation and statements by political power-holders. However, the different locations of the cultural parks and arts councils counted against a uniform interpretation or agreement with the models provided by the central government. The cultural parks had differing fortunes and outcomes across Indonesia during the New Order era despite having a single master in the Directorate of Culture. The arts councils demonstrated even greater plurality due to their reliance on artists' involvement and input into the institution and the coordinating role of provincial governments rather than the central government. The

⁷⁰ Lampung, for instance, abolished both its cultural park and its arts council.

regime's version of cultural governance through this diverse plethora of institutions was not secured, but instead was constantly under negotiation.

An important governmental issue within both the cultural parks and arts councils was regional identity. As representative institutions of particular regions, the cultural parks and arts councils had a privileged position in articulating both regional identity and the region's place within the nation. The cultural parks were integral to the process of articulating a New Order regime-approved regional culture that fitted with its version of national culture. The arts councils, although not part of this network, were often articulated within provincial legislation that was focused on regional and national identity and citizenship. However, the arts communities of particular regions were often at odds with how the arts and the role of artists were articulated by both the provinces and the national government. Riau is a particularly interesting case, since the RAC articulated a version of ethnic identity that was in direct conflict with the desires of the New Order regime and Reform era governments. In other locations, artists contested the subordination of their concerns to the state's concerns. Without the support of local arts communities, the cultural parks and arts councils were always going to struggle. It was only where either the institutions accorded with the desires of local arts communities, like the SCP and the JAC in the 1970s, or where the governmental goals of the province were supported by artists, like the RAC, that they were able to attract broader support.

The major changes of the Reform era were the transfer of cultural policy (including the cultural parks to the provincial governments) to the sub-national levels of government and the sub-national levels of government's greater autonomy from the central government. The resulting raft of changes brought about the decline of some of the cultural parks and arts councils, but also an increase in funding and activities in others. In short, the diversity that always existed between the different regions has already begun to intensify and new state-sponsored institutions have already been formed. However, close examination of the operations of the state-sponsored cultural institutions reveals the uncertainties of change. In 2002, the programs of many of the newly decentralised cultural parks remain unchanged and the cultural discourses circulating in the legislation and reports are generally those of the New Order era. The arts councils, due to their greater autonomy in their activities and programs, have responded more positively and, like the JAC, are adapting or being adapted to the new climate.

Chapter 7

Making Local Culture National:

Cultural Management, State Publications and Local Cultures

As demonstrated in chapter four, the New Order regime's cultural discourses gained prominence in policy at the same time as the boom in oil prices sponsored an expansion of state-run activities in the mid-1970s. The Directorate of Culture was assigned the task of converting oil money into programs that accorded with the regime's understanding of national culture and its political strategies. The revenue pumped into the Directorate was used to run, among other things, a series of cultural research projects that produced a large number of publications about Indonesian culture and history. Topics covered included biographies of national heroes, city histories, provincial histories of the struggle for independence against the Dutch, customary law, traditional architecture, folklore and, in some more recent texts published since 1995, the impact of television, changes brought by foreign culture through tourism and even relations between different ethnic groups, which was generally a taboo topic in all media during the New Order era (Astuti, 1998/9).

The texts produced by the Directorate of Culture were generated by projects within its different sub-directorates. For instance, the Directorate of Museums managed the Museum Development Project, the Language Centre managed the Library Development Project and the Development of Indonesian and Local Language and Literature Project, and so forth.¹ The sub-directorate that produced by far the most texts including the texts that are the subject of this chapter was the Directorate of History and Traditional Values (*Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai-Nilai Tradisional – Ditjarahnitra*). The publications of *Ditjarahnitra* follow one of two streams. The history stream published texts focussing largely on the revolution and national heroes. The second stream encompasses topics that revolve around the 'local' cultures of the archipelago, with each text focussing on a particular province. In this chapter, I focus on the second stream. Local culture is not

¹ The Indonesian names of these projects are: *Proyek Pengembangan Permuseuman*; *Proyek Pengembangan Perpustakaan*; and *Proyek Pengembangan Bahasa dan Sastra Indonesia dan Daerah*.

considered here as a domain of objects grouped together because of their own intrinsic features, but is instead considered to be a field of social management that shapes the features of objects located in that domain. After providing an overview of the cultural research projects' history and administration, I analyse two texts produced by the cultural projects, focussing in particular on their representations of local cultures.

In addition to analysing research into local culture, this chapter engages with two other cultural policy issues. The 'Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature' Theme Park (*Taman Mini Indonesia Indah*, commonly referred to as *Taman Mini*) has become the most important representation of, and most used research topic in analysing, how the New Order regime understood ethnicity. I use the research publications about local culture as a point of comparison to assess whether there were other models of cultural management with different constructions of ethnicity present within the New Order bureaucracy. Secondly, the time span of the research projects, which covers most of the New Order era and all of the Reform era, provides an opportunity to assess how cultural discourses altered as a result of the transition from the New Order to the Reform era and how the transition impacted the construction of local culture in the texts.

The phrase *kebudayaan daerah* can be translated as either local culture or regional culture due to the two meanings of the term *daerah*.² The slippage between 'regional' and 'local' is an interesting feature of the local culture projects. While the publications all focus on particular regions, the subject matter is generally much more localised cultural practices within the region. For this reason, I translate *daerah* as 'local' in the titles of the publications and the publication series.

1. State-Run Cultural Research and Publications

History

State sponsored cultural publications preceded the New Order era. The Directorate of Culture's precursor, the Cultural Office (*Jawatan Kebudayaan*), released a small number of publications during the 1950s and early 1960s.³ The amount of publications produced

² A similar translation has occurred for the label of the Reform era decentralisation process, *otonomi daerah*, which has been translated as both regional autonomy and local autonomy.

³ The earliest of these that I have come across is a 1953 publication by an anonymous author about the poet Chairil Anwar (*Chairil Anwar: Bara Api Kesusasteraan Indonesia*, 1953).

during the New Order era far outstripped the pre-1965 publications in both numbers of titles and the number of copies printed. The Directorate of Culture first began publishing book-length texts about regional cultures in 1972. Ten separate projects have sponsored cultural research and publications in *Ditjarahnitra* (See table 7.1 for project names and details). The early projects focussed on cataloguing cultural artefacts and practices. From the mid-1970s, the projects can be divided into two types.

Firstly, a stream of projects focussing on the customs and traditions of local cultures has continued to the present. Beginning with the ‘Research and Recording of Local Culture Project’ (*Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah – P3KD*), this stream included the largest and most widely known project, the ‘Inventorisation and Documentation of Local Culture Project’ (*Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Daerah - IDKD*), the ‘Inventorisation and Management of Cultural Values Project’ (*Proyek Inventarisasi dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya – P3KN*), and the ‘Study and Management of Cultural Values Project’ (*Proyek Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya – P3NB*). These projects were concurrent and had overlapping themes, such as folklore and customary law of various regions.⁴ This stream of projects produced the bulk of the cultural texts.

I group under the second project ‘type’ all of the non-IDKD stream projects – an eclectic mix of projects that focus on a variety of topics. The ‘Development of Cultural Media Project’ (*Proyek Pengembangan Media Kebudayaan – PMK*) itself included an assortment of topics since 1975. Other projects have been focussed on the decorative arts and the production of photographic albums (‘Cultural Media Project’, *Proyek Media Kebudayaan – MK*), while the ‘Study and Management of Contemporary Culture Project’ (*Proyek Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Kebudayaan Masa Kini – P3KMK*) engages with a range of themes from contemporary life, including the impact of tourism and television.

The local culture projects primarily, but not exclusively, produced printed manuscripts. A *Ditjarahnitra* publication lists 1373 titles that were printed between 1976 and 1991, with

⁴ I also include the ‘Research and Study of Archipelagic Culture Project’ in this stream as it was a sister project to IDKD. P3KN focussed on written cultural traditions, whereas IDKD focussed on oral traditions. There were also some differences as the local culture projects were assessed and altered across time.

Table 7.1: The Ten Local Culture Projects, their Duration and a Brief Description.

Years	Name of Project	Brief Description
1972-1976	<i>Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Nasional (IDKN)</i>	Focus was on listing local cultural practices and cataloguing cultural artefacts and manuscripts.
1975-	<i>Proyek Pengembangan Media Kebudayaan (PMK)</i>	A number of texts were produced in the seventies. Publication slowed, then quickened again in late 1990s. Eclectic mixture of texts, including pictorial albums.
1976-1979	<i>Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah (P3KD)</i>	Focus was on elements of local cultures, such as folk law, marriage ceremonies and local customs.
1979-1987	<i>Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Daerah (IDKD)</i>	Continues the local cultures themes from P3KD. This project produced more texts and is better known than any of the other projects.
1979-1984	<i>Proyek Media Kebudayaan (MK)</i>	Focus was on the decorative arts. Also produced a number of photographic albums and some recordings.
1984-1995	<i>Proyek Penelitian dan Pengkajian Kebudayaan Nusantara (P3KN)</i>	Focus was on written traditions, in particular local language manuscripts.
1989-1992	<i>Proyek Inventarisasi dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya (IPNB)</i>	Continuation of local cultures themes from IDKD.
1992-1995	<i>Proyek Penelitian, Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya Daerah (P3NBD)</i>	Themes covered education, modernisation and economic systems. This project was oriented towards social-science themes.
1993-	<i>Proyek Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya (P3NB)</i>	Continuation of local cultures themes from IDKD. Includes republications of earlier texts.
1995-	<i>Proyek Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Kebudayaan Masa Kini (P3KMK)</i>	Examines everyday contemporary culture. Indicates a broadening in the meaning of culture.

small print runs of between ten and five hundred.⁵ However, this does not include research carried out by the Regional Offices (*Kantor Wilayah*) of the Directorate. The

⁵ The titles are listed in a publication by the Sub-Directorate of Documentation and Publication (*Subdit Dokumentasi dan Publikasi*, 1991) but the accuracy is questionable due to the poor documentation within the Directorate. Zurbuchen also notes the difficulty of evaluating the extent of the research (1990, p. 138).

Australian National Library's Indonesian language collection has 1,817 titles in the local culture projects series with publication dates between 1972 and 2003 and with more texts likely to be collected in the future. In addition to the texts, a number of video and audio recordings of traditional rituals and practices were published and circulated. The local culture projects also funded a number of capital works projects, including the building of Research Centres for Studying History and Traditional Values (*Gedung Balai Kajian Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional*), Centres of Cultural Documentation (*Pusat Dokumentasi Kebudayaan*) and Cultural Information Centres (*Pusat Informasi Budaya*) across the archipelago (*Direktorat Kebudayaan*, 1994, pp. 20-21).

Ditjarahnitra's publications reflect the features of two streams of writing in Indonesia. Firstly, the publications within the history stream are bound to what Gerry van Klinken labels the 'orthodox nationalist stream' of Indonesian history (2001a, p. 326).⁶ The second trend relates more closely to the local culture projects. In the late 1970s, a stream of research about Javanese culture began in Yogyakarta by Prof. Sudarsono. He labelled his research *Javanologi* and managed to procure state funding through the national cultural projects.⁷ Budhisantoso, in his capacity as Director of History and Traditional Values, instigated a policy of various '*suku-ologi*' in order to balance the emphasis on *Javanologi*, although this was limited to ethnic groups with written traditions. The '*ologi*' studies, including '*Sundanologi*', '*Batakologi*', '*La Galigologi*' (on Bugis culture), '*Malayologi*' (based on writings found around Tanjung Pinang in Riau), along with *Javanologi*, were funded through 'Research and Study of Archipelagic Culture Project' (P3KN), followed by the 'Study and Management of Cultural Values Project' (P3NB).

Resources

Table 7.2 lists the amount of money that IDKD received each year from 1989/90 until 1999/2000. Unfortunately, figures before 1989 were elusive due to the difficulties of accessing government archives of old reports. In any case, the figures can only give an indication of what impression the Directorate of Culture wanted to pass onto the National Planning Board. Budgets changed regularly under the New Order and budgeting

⁶ Particularly striking are the number of texts about heroes, which were an important element of the 'hero' phenomenon of Indonesian history writing identified by Reid (1979, pp. 292-5) and elaborated on in local contexts by Cunningham (1989) and Hoskins (1987).

⁷ Information taken from an interview with Budhisantoso (7 September 2001).

definitions are unclear. However, the figures do demonstrate some important information about the project. Until 1999/2000 the project used over 10 percent of the Directorate's budget, indicating its centrality to the role of the Directorate. Also the decline in 1999/2000 reflects its more marginal position in the new, decentralised cultural bureaucratic structure.

Table 7.2: Funding for IDKD Stream Projects by Year (Rp. Thousand).

Year	Program	Project	Total	Prog. as % of Total Funding	References
89/90	1,381,271	1,159,052	11,218,572	12.31	Report 89/90-93/94 pp91, 106
90/91	2,379,042	1,799,035	16,034,187	14.84	<i>Ibid.</i>
91/92	4,176,675	3,016,500	25,874,187	16.14	<i>Ibid.</i>
92/93	4,897,786	3,045,132	32,048,478	15.28	Report 94/95, p48
93/94	5,187,864	3,171,765	40,023,152	12.96	Report 94/95, p49
94/95	6,521,300	3,859,026	46,596,570	14.00	Report 94/95, p50
95/96*	7,052,292	4,160,743	58,981,723	11.96	<i>Ibid.</i>
96/97*	7,052,292	4,160,743	58,981,723	11.96	<i>Ibid.</i>
97/98*	7,052,292	4,160,743	58,981,723	11.96	<i>Ibid.</i>
98/99	7,423,422	4,363,376	69,750,000	10.64	Report 94/95-98/99, p14
99/00	6,649,138	4,357,203	74,232,158	8.96	Report 99/2000, p41.
Total	59,773,375	37,253,320	492,722,473	12.13	

* Average amounts are given for the 95/96-97/98 period as records of individual years were not available.

Planning

The choice of topic and research process was, and still is, intricately tied up with the bureaucratic structure and policy-making system discussed in chapter four. The annual process begins with a meeting between the Head of *Ditjarahnitra* and the Heads of the Sub-directorates. The results of the discussion are taken to the technical team within the Documentation and Publication Sub-directorate who formulate the Terms of Reference (ToR) between May and June. The ToR are checked by *Bappenas* and the Directorate of Estimates, guaranteeing their connection to the *Repelita* and the 1945 Constitution, as the connection determines the amount of money that is given. Around June all of the regional

coordinators are flown to Jakarta for a meeting, after which they return to their areas and complete the research between June and October. The research is returned to the technical team whose members edit the drafts and prepare them for publication between November and December. Publication takes place the following year.

The Directorate of Culture attempted to demonstrate through the ToR that they were implementing the policies outlined in the *Repelita*. A quick examination of the ToR for the planning of the ‘Rainbow of the Archipelago Series’ (*Seri Pelangi Nusantara*) in 2001, which produced texts for children, reveals the priorities of the Directorate. The most revealing section of the ToR is the ‘Background and Problems’ section, which also serves as an introduction. The ToR began by connecting the Republic of Indonesia together with cultural diversity through the state-slogan, ‘Unity in Diversity’. It continued with a statement that summarised the purpose of the series:

These days, knowledge of cultural differences and similarities between Indonesian ethnic communities has become important for strengthening national unification and unity. Knowing and having an attitude that values and respects differences and develops intercultural similarities needs to be constructed in the generation that is the future of the Indonesian nation. (*Pemimpin Proyek Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya Jakarta*, 2001, p. 1)

Dewasa ini, pengenalan perbedaan dan persamaan budaya masyarakat suku bangsa akan menjadi penting dalam rangka memperkuat persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa. Mengenal dan bersikap menghargai serta menghormati perbedaan dan mengembangkan persamaan antarbudaya perlu ditumbuhkan di kalangan generasi penerus bangsa Indonesia.

A second concern in the ToR was the absence of children’s books about the diversity of ethnic cultures. These two concerns came together in the ‘Objective’ of the series: to spread information about cultural diversity in Indonesia to children in a form that is easily read and understood and develops knowledge and empathy about other cultures and helps children ‘understand and revere the meaning of the slogan of the Indonesian nation: Unity in Diversity’.⁸ Once these concerns were outlined, the ToR turned to the features of local cultures that were considered suitable for inclusion within the texts. These features included the regional environment, including natural and man-made features, histories (including ‘heroes’), traditional knowledge and technology, customs, cultural values such as folk tales for children and art, social solidarity (including ‘*gotong royong*’) and

⁸ ‘... anak-anak akan lebih memahami dan menghayati arti semboyan bangsa Indonesia, yaitu *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*’ (2001, p. 1).

cultural and natural tourism (2001, pp. 1-2). Finally, the ToR listed the writing style and format appropriate for children's texts.

The ToR thus established the governmental goals of the series, including the national framing of local cultures within the texts, before the features of the local cultures were mentioned. The bureaucrats in the Directorate of Culture had to conform as closely as possible to the New Order regime's cultural discourses in order to guarantee continued funding for their projects and the extra salary and prestige that came with it. The local culture projects constituted key programs within this structure for the Directorate of Culture.⁹ The policy system gave financial and professional incentives for the continuation of the local culture projects and discouraged variance from the established model.

2. Locating Local Culture

When discussing the New Order regime's concepts and management of ethnic culture, scholars regularly invoke the image of *Taman Mini*. Patricia Spyer observed that when discussing the state's interpretation of cultural diversity, 'it has become almost perfunctory to invoke the image of Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park' (1996, p. 26).¹⁰

A recent study that uses *Taman Mini* as a representative example of the links between culture and governance in the New Order era is Tom Boellstorff's article, 'Ethnolocality' (2002). Boellstorff defines ethnolocality as the 'spatial scale where 'ethnicity' and 'locality' presume each other to the extent that they are, in essence, a single concept' (2002, p. 25). In other words, ethnolocality refers to the various indigenous Indonesian ethnicities – Javanese, Balinese, Torajan – that are linked to spatial locations. Boellstorff uses *Taman Mini* to illustrate how ethnolocality was instrumental to the New Order regime's construction of an 'archipelagic culture' for Indonesians (2002, p. 32). The centre of *Taman Mini* is a reflective pool containing small artificial islands that form a map of Indonesia, surrounded by twenty-seven pavilions, one for each province. Each

⁹ For instance, in the report, *Evaluation of the Implementation of Repelita V*, the 'Inventorisation and Management of Cultural Values Project' (IPNB) was the first project mentioned in the list of 'cardinal activities' ('*Kegiatan-kegiatan kardinal*') within the Directorate of Culture (*Direktorat Kebudayaan*, 1994, p. 20).

¹⁰ See Bowen (1991, pp. 125-7), Anderson (1990a, p. 182) and Hellman (1999, pp. 48-53).

pavilion includes a customary house that contains arts and crafts from each province. Boellstorff writes:

Taman Mini draws together ethnicity and locality so that each presupposes the other. Region and *adat* are rendered isomorphic in a spatial scale that claims the mantle of ethnolocal tradition but is incomprehensible outside the reworked logic of racial dualism, the ‘framework generated by the unifying agency of the state’ (Spyer, 1996, p. 31). (2002, p. 32)

Boellstorff uses *Taman Mini* to demonstrate how the New Order regime contained and depoliticised ethnic cultures within Indonesia (2002, p. 31). To be Javanese or Batak or Torajan is also to be an Indonesian citizen.

Greg Acciaioli’s article ‘Pavilions and Posters,’ (1996) provides a more detailed analysis of *Taman Mini*. Acciaioli writes that *Taman Mini* was more than an illustration of an ideal, but was envisioned as an educational tool for influencing Indonesian’s subjectivity. He writes:

[*Taman Mini*] stands now and through the future as the New Order’s exhibitionary showcase for building citizenship, for fulfilling its project of constructing the subjectivity and subjection of the Indonesian citizenry. (1996, p. 40)

As has been argued in this thesis, Acciaioli notes that ‘cultural development’ was ‘one of the priorities of the New Order state’ (1996, p. 27) that shaped how ethnic culture was represented in *Taman Mini*. The core of Acciaioli’s argument is similar to Boellstorff’s argument that ethnicities were articulated within the framework of the Indonesian nation-state, which he expresses through identifying a ‘purported ... basic cultural substratum of Indonesianness’ within *Taman Mini*’s representations of ethnic cultures (1996, p. 39). However, he provides greater detail about *how* different ethnicities were articulated. Four points in particular require greater attention here.

Firstly, Acciaioli uses a number of different illustrations to demonstrate that the more peripheral a culture, the more likely its features are to be an ‘assemblage’ of generic traits considered suitably Indonesian. He demonstrates this point through analysing the location of the pavilions around the lake and demonstrating that the distance from the centre of the park coincided with the marginality of an ethnic group’s culture to the nation. Hence the pavilions for the provinces in Java and Bali are close while West Papua (until 2000 called Irian Jaya) and East Timor are given the most peripheral locations (1996, pp. 29-32). Acciaioli emphasises the marginal position of particular ethnic cultures within the nation

by examining the ‘traditional costumes’ of the different ethnic groups. The Javanese styles were reasonably accurate depictions, while the ‘regional style’ for West Papua were silk pants and blouse, well removed from the penis sheaths for which the region is renowned (1996, p. 35). If regional cultures varied too far from the styles of cultural centre, like West Papua, they were erased in *Taman Mini* in favour of broadly ‘Indonesian’ generic styles (1996, p. 35).

Secondly, Acciaioli notes the existence of a number of ‘children’s gardens, parks and museums’ around *Taman Mini* that were not devoted to ethnic cultures. The museums told the success stories of the New Order regime. They were devoted to the armed forces, sports, information services, oil and natural gas development, science and technology and communications (1996, p. 32). Acciaioli writes that celebrating the success stories of development emphasises how the regime provides the ‘shelter of modernity which can allow regional cultures to thrive, be renewed and reinvigorated’ (1996, p. 32). Thirdly, Acciaioli, following John Pemberton’s research, notes how *Taman Mini* effaces time through reproducing cultural symbols that are ‘more complete and more perfect’ (Pemberton, 1994b, p. 40) than their originals (Acciaioli, 1996, p. 40). The cultural symbols of Javanese and Balinese royalty that saturate the structures situated at the entrance to the park link the New Order regime to the traditions of the previous rulers (1996, pp. 33-4). Finally, Acciaioli offers a slightly different spatial scale to Boellstorff. While Boellstorff is careful to note that ethnocity, as an intermediate spatial scale, does not necessarily correspond to an administrative area (2002, fn. 9), Acciaioli notes that *Taman Mini* tends to conflate administrative region and cultural region (1996, p. 38). Where ethnicities are represented as coexisting within a province, they tend to be attributed to a lower level of administration such as regencies (*kabupaten*).

The local culture project texts, as another form of representation of the New Order regime’s models of local culture and cultural diversity, offer a point of comparison to *Taman Mini* regarding the New Order regime’s cultural management techniques. There is a large overlap in subject matter and both were governmental interventions into Indonesians’ understandings about themselves. In her research into writings about customs and folklore, Susan Rodgers notes that the regional identity under consideration (‘Angkola Batak-ness’) was ‘an ideological construct, built up in relationships with other ‘peoples’ and with states’ (2003, p. 135). Rodgers continues: ‘More recently, other

parties to the conversation have been authors in the New Order state's own investigations of Batak customs, through programs such as the '*Proyek Dokumentasi dan Inventarisasi Kebudayaan Daerah*' (2003, p. 135). Here we have an Indonesian example of how culture is 'a historically produced surface of social regulation' (Bennett, 1992, p. 27) that is contested at many levels. Whereas Rodgers's analysis pursues how Angkola Batak writers have resisted colonial and New Order representations of their local culture, this chapter pursues a trajectory focussed on the New Order regime's production of local culture and its links to governance.

3. Analysis of Local Culture Project Texts

The local culture projects cover a broad range of topics over a period of almost thirty years, making the choice of representative texts difficult. I have chosen the two texts analysed here, *Marriage Law and Ceremonies in the Special Region of Aceh* (Syamsuddin, 1978/9) and *Yogya in Passing* (Guritno & Setiawati, 2000), for two reasons. Firstly, the two texts were produced in two different periods. The Aceh text was the product of early New Order cultural policy and one of the first waves of texts sponsored by oil revenues, whereas the Yogyakarta text was produced and published during the Reform era. Comparing texts from two different periods opens up opportunities to assess the changes that have occurred since the beginning of the project and to assess the impact of the reform movement within an official cultural text. Secondly, the geographical and historical differences between the two regions raises interesting questions about cultural representations. Aceh is located at the North-Eastern tip of Indonesia and was one of the last areas incorporated by the Dutch after prolonged warfare. The long resistance to Dutch control has made Aceh an 'exemplary case' for Indonesian nationalist historical consciousness constructed in the Sukarno and Suharto eras (Reid, 2005, pp. 335-6). Since the early 1990s, Aceh has been the location for a military crackdown on separatist fighters. Yogyakarta, by contrast, is located in Java and is often represented as the cultural centre of Java. It was the location of the government of the Indonesian republic for much of the war of independence. Although both provinces are important for the nationalist imagination, their differences open up interesting points of comparison given the nationalist framing of the texts. I do not dispute or accept the accuracy of the texts' depiction of Acehnese marriage law or life in Yogyakarta. The issue I engage with is the representation of local culture.

Acehnese Marriage as a National Cultural Ritual

The series of government publications about marriage law and ceremonies was part of the ‘Research and Recording of Local Culture Project’ (*Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah*, P3KD). Unlike IDKD, whose primary goal in the late 1970s was to collect and disseminate information about local cultures that would strengthen nation unity and national values, P3KD’s primary goal was to collect as much information as possible about marriage law and ceremonies for the Department of Education and Culture to assist with policy development and implementation. In *Marriage Law and Ceremonies in the Special Region of Aceh* (henceforth, *Marriage Law in Aceh*), this goal was tied to strengthening nationalism:

Marriage law and ceremonies in the region of Aceh, as an element of national culture, makes a contribution to securing nationalism in the younger generation. (Syamsuddin, 1978/9, p. 1)

Adat dan upacara perkawinan di daerah Aceh sebagai salah satu unsur kebudayaan Nasional memberikan andil bagi memupuk kebangsaan Nasional dikalangan generasi muda.

The method of educating the ‘younger generation’ into the nation was to record for them how past generations ‘developed and regulated noble values’ within their cultural traditions.¹¹

a. Researching Local Culture in *Marriage Law and Ceremonies in the Special Region of Aceh*

In this section I explore the two most important elements of the discursive structure that underpins the process of articulating Acehnese marriage law and ceremonies. Firstly, I analyse how local culture was located within a national spatial-cultural order through exploring the history of *adat* and how it was represented in the text. Secondly, I explore the research methodology used in the texts and reveal its links to the Indonesian intellectual climate and related research trends in the late 1960s and 1970s. This form of research expertise was central to how knowledge about local culture was generated in the local culture project texts.

The topic of *Marriage Law in Aceh* can be summarised as marriage *adat*. *Adat* is often translated as ‘customary law’ (Boellstorff, 2002, p. 28) and can incorporate related

¹¹ ‘[Mereka] dari generasi yang lalu mengembangkan dan membina nilai-nilai luhur’ (1978/9, p. 1).

ceremonies and practices. Although the word *adat* appears on almost every page of the text, it was never defined and its history was never interrogated. However, the term *adat* carries a long history with many links to governance. Spyer captures the complex uses and history of *adat* when she writes:

Itself a foreign term and a derivative of the Arabic word for custom, *adat*, which applies today somewhat paradoxically to that which is held to have evaded the influence of time itself, clearly developed within the historical context of a complex interaction between Dutch hegemonic ambitions, colonial practices of rule (or divide and rule), foreign religions, and the political alliances that ordered the populations of the Malay region along religious and ethnic lines (1996, p. 28)

The formative period for ethno-localities was the colonial era (Gouda, 1995, pp. 43-5; Lev, 1985). Although fashioned by a complex group of factors, ethno-localities were strengthened by the Dutch administration's need for an organising principle that was larger than the village and smaller than the categories of 'native' and Islam (Boellstorff, 2002, p. 30). The Dutch administration found their mode of organisation through the concept of '*adat* groups' (2002, pp. 29-30). The Dutch conceived *adat* in legal terms as the traditional law of a particular area. In the decentralised Dutch system of governance, Indonesia was divided into *adat* areas with their own set of laws.¹² Legal status was conflated with a generalised, politically expedient concept of cultural identity. Over time these areas became the ethnic groupings of Indonesia today.

The idea of *adat* continued to play a role in governance in independent Indonesia as can be demonstrated in *Marriage Law in Aceh*.¹³ *Adat* was used in the text to order different cultures and regions within a national framework. To illustrate this point I return to a statement in the previous section:

Marriage law [*adat*] and ceremonies in the region of Aceh, as an element of national culture, makes a contribution to securing nationalism in the younger generation. (Syamsuddin, 1978/9, p. 1)

The statement occurred on the first page of the introduction and was made as a statement of fact that requires no further support or elaboration. Two points are worth noting here. First, the statement ties Acehnese *adat* to the nation: it is 'an element of national culture'. Second, the statement ties particular indigenous law and ceremonies to a particular region which conflates region with indigenous ethnic groups. This second point was soon

¹² Boellstorff writes: 'Colonial rule was predicated not on a different customary law for every 'village', nor a single customary law for all 'natives', but upon a mediating spatial scale, formed through a drawing together of bloodline and place, ethnicity and locality' (2002, p. 29).

¹³ For further discussion of *Adat* in independent Indonesia, see Acciaioli (1985), Lev (1985), Spyer (1996), and Boellstorff (2002, pp. 30-2).

elaborated by dividing the province into ten administrative regions and seven ‘*adat* regions’.¹⁴ The marriage *adat* of five of the seven *adat* groups identified as indigenous to Aceh form the basis of the study. Each of these five *adat* regions was identified with an administrative region or regions. Thus by the end of the second page a spatial scale was established between nation, region and constituent *adat* groups.

The organising principle of nation-region-ethnie was an ideal that even the text itself had trouble maintaining. Despite the focus on the particular ethnic groups within Aceh, the historical section (1978/9, pp. 24-33) wrote the history of the province, rather than the histories of the ethnic groups that were the subjects of the research. The demographic data raise more issues. Although some of the groups dominated particular regions (for instance, according to the text the Gayo make up 90 percent of Central Aceh), most of the areas were culturally plural (for instance, the Alas are 60 percent of Southeast Aceh and the Aneuk Jamee are 35 percent of South Aceh). In addition, migrants are a significant portion of the population. Batak Indonesians, for instance, made up 35 percent of Southeast Aceh, and the Javanese were also noted as a sizable ethnic group. However, the nation-region-ethnie ideal did not allow for the *adat* of migrant groups to be analysed and they were ignored in this and other local culture projects publications. Even in the text the cultural model was fragile.

The second element of the discursive structure on which the text relied was the use of a particular research methodology. The research was conducted with certain methodological assumptions not disclosed in the text and possibly not recognised by the researchers. An indication of these methodological assumptions was the organisation of the chapters that provide details about marriage *adat*. The authors broke down each practice or ceremony into their constituent parts, recorded its symbolic meaning and made comparisons between the different *adat* groups. This research methodology was closely linked to the dominant trend in Indonesian cultural research in the 1970s that was labelled by its critics ‘culturalism’ or ‘the cultural approach’ (Heryanto, 2005, p. 76) and was closely related to the theory and research methods of the anthropologist Koentjaraningrat (Heryanto, 2005, pp. 69-71).

¹⁴ ‘*Daerah adat*’ (1978/9, p. 2).

Koentjaraningrat, as was mentioned in chapter three, made great use of the concept of ‘cultural value orientation’ (*orientasi nilai-budaya*) which he borrowed from the works of Clyde and Florence Kluckholm (Koentjaraningrat, 2000, pp. 27-8), who were involved in the functionalist movement in post-World War II American social science. According to Koentjaraningrat:

A cultural value orientation system consists of concepts, which live in the natural thought of the largest part of a society, about the things that they must consider to have the most value in their lives. (Koentjaraningrat, 2000, p. 25)

Suatu sistem nilai-budaya terdiri dari konsepsi-konsepsi, yang hidup dalam alam pikiran sebagian besar warga masyarakat, mengenai hal-hal yang harus mereka anggap amat bernilai dalam hidup.

Cultural value orientations function as the ‘highest directive for human action’¹⁵ and, following Florence Kluckholm and Fred Strodbeck (1961), differed between societies through variations in decisions regarding universal problems (Koentjaraningrat, 2000, pp. 29-31). Koentjaraningrat pursued a qualitative research method using formal questionnaires with the aim of identifying cultural value systems and recommending changes where they conflicted with his ideal values for national development.¹⁶ Heryanto writes that ‘Koentjaraningrat’s model was reproduced, albeit with methodological distortions depending on the practical needs of the different groups making reference to his model’ (2005, p. 70).¹⁷ *Marriage Law in Aceh* adopted a methodology that used quantitative surveys and description (1978/9, p. 6)¹⁸ and an official, simplified version of cultural value orientation, where the discovery of traditional values, and how they are maintained, was an object of study (1978/9, pp. 1,10).

This method reflected a form of analysis that Rex Mortimer identifies as ‘comparativism’ in his critique of Indonesian Studies in Australia (1973, p. 105). Developed from the functionalist theories in American social science research and related to theories of political and economic development, comparativism, like the local research projects,

¹⁵ ‘Pedoman tertinggi bagi kelakuan manusia’ (Koentjaraningrat, 2000, p. 25).

¹⁶ See Koentjaraningrat (1999) where he discusses his ideal cultural values for development and uses a table (1999, p. 375) to assess if different aspects of different Indonesian regions (with ‘Chinese’ as a separate category) are barriers or catalysts for development.

¹⁷ Hadiz and Dhakidae write: ‘More than any other Indonesian anthropologist, it was [Koentjaraningrat] who established the parameters of anthropological concerns in Indonesia in the 1960s – which included ‘defining’ the features of ‘an Indonesian culture’ – and therefore played a major intellectual role in the state-led modernisation and nation-building process’ (2005, p. 12). They also highlight Koentjaraningrat’s importance for the prominence of quantitative research methods in Indonesian social science research (2005, p. 12).

¹⁸ The guide for the questionnaire was included as an attachment (1978/9, pp. 181-2).

broke down social and political systems into their constituent ‘functions’ in order to make comparisons based on a normative set of ideal functions (1973, p. 105). Parallels between ‘comparativism’ and the research in the Directorate of Culture are not surprising given the Indonesian intellectual climate of the 1970s (Liddle, 1973; Ward, 1973, pp. 74-7)¹⁹ before the structuralist critique of the 1980s (Heryanto, 2005). Ward notes that intellectuals who supported these theories were averse to investigating older indigenous traditions which they denigrated as impeding national development (1973, p. 79). When these traditions were explored in the local culture projects, the use of a ‘comparativist’ methodology meant that indigenous traditions were articulated within a framework that did not acknowledge larger social formations.²⁰

Another feature of the research methods in *Marriage Law in Aceh* is the absence of the informants in the texts. The authors only mention the names of their informants in a list attached to the end of the text. They do not record personal interactions between informants and researchers or give accounts of their experiences at particular ceremonies. Instead, following the North American tradition of empiricism (Hadiz & Dhakidae, 2005, p. 3), the authors recorded Acehnese marriage *adat* from the standpoint of an observer who impartially records practices and interprets symbols at a remove from the ceremonies themselves. This method accords with what Pierre Bourdieu calls *objectivism*:

Objectivism constitutes the social world as a spectacle presented to an observer who takes up a ‘point of view’ on the action, who stands back so as to observe it and, transferring into his object the principles of his relation to the object, conceives of it as a totality for cognition alone, in which all interactions are reduced to symbolic exchanges. This point of view is the one afforded by high positions in the social structure. (1977, p. 96)

Locating meaning in the exchanges allows the researchers to reify community practices and ignore how the practices change to address new circumstances, as well as ignoring their political and personal dimensions.²¹ Research takes the form of typology where marriage *adat* was divided into its different ceremonies and interpreted in a symbolic way

¹⁹ The goal of the social and political transformation promoted by leading intellectuals, particularly in the early 1970s, was economic and social development in line with the ‘idealised, pragmatic stability of American democracy’ (Ward, 1973, p. 78).

²⁰ The most obvious omission was class, which Hadiz and Dhakidae identify as an ‘anathema to the New Order’s discourse of harmony and co-operation under the aegis of a wise and benevolent state’ (2005, pp. 18-9).

²¹ Tsing mentions the ‘neutral eye/I’ of Western social science which was invoked here by Indonesian researchers (1993, p. 32).

that ignores the relationships that create meaning. The process of classification was central to how the text produced Acehnese marriage *adat*. The visiting researcher interpreted data to fit within a pre-existing framework devised by the cultural bureaucrats.

The adoption of a research methodology that emphasised symbolism over socio-political formation is an important feature of *Marriage Law in Aceh*. Objectivism is a version of what David Spurr describes as aestheticisation: ‘a certain possession of social reality which holds it at arm’s length and makes it into the object of beauty, horror, pleasure, and pity’ (1993, p. 53). Through this process, the text separates local culture from other areas of life as a realm that is saturated with ‘noble values’ that can be used to provide pedagogical lessons in behaviours and attitudes. In this sense they operated in a similar way as Toby Miller and George Yudice identify for museums: they were a ‘delimited ethical zone, a space that divides worthy and unworthy conduct’ (2002, p. 148).

Marriage Law in Aceh drew on an established discourse about *adat* and Western research and writing methods to construct an awareness that local culture is an element of the Indonesian nation and to present its particular organisation of the text as objective and logical rather than subject to the political goals and preferences of the New Order bureaucracy. The critical reading of the texts in the next two sections explores two aspects of the research that are touched on by the previous discussion of research methodology: first, how the ‘comparativist’ typology constructed cultural difference and, second, the normative ideals that formed the basis of comparisons between types.

b. Cultural Difference

The ‘Kinds of Marriage’ section in the ‘*Adat before Marriage*’ chapter (1978/9, pp. 55-85) provides an interesting example of how the five ethnic groups whose marriage law and ceremonies under consideration were compared in the text. The text lists six kinds of marriage in Aceh. These are: the ‘usual type’ (*bentuk kawin biasa*); elopement; polygamy (up to four wives); the ‘exchange of mats’ where one spouse will marry an in-law if their spouse dies; a ‘hanging marriage’ that involved a long engagement and was generally used for under-age engagements; and ‘special types’ that included the ‘temporary

marriage' category²² and two other variants. The practices and variants of the ethnic groups for each 'type' of marriage were listed within the sub-sections.

An example of the organisation of the text is its analysis of the 'usual type' of marriage. After defining the 'usual type' as marriages that were undertaken in accordance within the parameters of Islam and the ethnic groups' customs and stating other similarities (it occurs between a man and a woman and is monogamous), the text began moving chronologically through the different stages and listing the differences between different ethnic groups. The first step was the proposal from the groom's family to the bride, followed by an engagement period and an exchange of dowry. The text lists the local language words for the engagement period and presents. The multiple listings of different words for what was represented as the same object is a feature of *Marriage Law in Aceh*.

Over half the text (three of six chapters consisting of 92 of 177 pages) lists the customs and ceremonies of the five ethnic groups using this method. Instead of tackling these groups separately, the text divided then subdivides their customs and ceremonies into predetermined categories, then notes the differences and similarities in languages, tools, customs and meanings. Starting from a typology of marriage laws and ceremonies defined as analogous hides the assumptions that allow the laws and customs to be represented as analogous. Instead of locating cultural differences as elements of larger variations in social structure or history, small differences become the markers of the cultural plurality of Indonesia. This construction of cultural difference can be distinguished from how cultural difference has been represented within *Taman Mini*. Instead of the details of culturally marginal groups blurring, cultural differences in the Aceh text are articulated in detail within a framework that assumes an underlying cultural similarity. Cultural difference, in this location, strengthens the nation as difference becomes a local variation of a shared national activity. The various ethnic groups are articulated into the nation as *Indonesia's* local cultures.

Although there are differences between the *Taman Mini* and local culture project versions of state-approved cultural difference, they both are consistent with the New Order regime's strategy of depoliticisation of the populace to reduce older forms of

²² The 'temporary marriage' category was for couples that have divorced three times and, according to Islamic law, cannot be wed again, but wish to proceed despite previous experiences.

identification and ‘naturalise’ the state’s preferred forms of identity. The ‘comparativist’ methodology, which it should be remembered was the preserve of groups that were averse to traditional forms of affiliation, concealed broader socio-political groupings. Spyer notes a similar trend of ‘depoliticisation’ in the New Order regime’s use of *adat*, which she illustrates with a familiar example. She writes:

Since the colonial period, and in particular under the Suhartos, the domain to which *adat* is applicable has been shrinking, while *adat* has become increasingly bereft of power as it is redefined to codify highly limited aspects of ‘traditional’ sociocultural life – those for instance, reflected in the emblematic silhouettes of the *adat* houses contained in [*sic.*] Jakarta’s Beautiful Indonesia pond. (1996, p. 28)

A popular interpretation of the New Order’s representation of difference is that it is limited to a cultural sphere that is shorn of political and historical connections. While *Marriage Law in Aceh* affirms this interpretation, it also suggests that this process was an element of the production of a new organisation of social and cultural life that was connected to the spread of a new social knowledge. Heryanto writes:

a specific ideology about the world, truth and social knowledge had gained momentum from the material and immaterial conditions of the time to develop and become dominant in the socio-political context of the New Order. (2005, p. 70)

Acehnese marriage customs were represented through this process as part of the local culture of national citizens, who, as I explore in the next section, were subject to national priorities as part of the national community rather than the reproduction of pre-existing community structures.

c. Development Priorities and Acehnese Marriage *Adat*

In the opening chapter, the authors make the following point about marriage law and ceremonies in Aceh:

In facing the current state of development, one needs to ask what extent of efficiency is found in the implementation of marriage laws and ceremonies in the region of Aceh. From this point of view, the problems that need to be explored are the elements that cause wastefulness from the point of view of money, time and what’s more human resources (1978/9, p. 4).

Dalam menghadapi masa-masa pembangunan dewasa ini perlu diketahui, sejauh mana terdapat efisiensi dalam pelaksanaan adat dan upacara perkawinan di daerah Aceh. Sehubungan dengan itu masalah yang perlu ditinjau adalah unsur-unsur mana yang menyebabkan pemborosan, baik dilihat dari segi pembiayaan, waktu maupun tenaga.

This statement draws attention to one of the core governmental principles behind the construction of marriage law and ceremonies as a field of cultural activity by the New Order bureaucracy. The cultural practices discussed in the text were held up against the regime's ideal norms for the practices of everyday life as articulated in its programs for accelerated development. Although also underlying the categories and judgements discussed in the previous sections, the comparison was most clearly present within the final 'analytical' chapter and, in particular, the section about the relationship between marriage law and ceremonies and the state's family planning program.

The Indonesian family planning program was one of the New Order regime's success stories and one of the regime's most high profile interventions into the lives of Indonesians as part of its plans for accelerated development (Hull, 1994; Mackie & MacIntyre, 1994, p. 46; Ricklefs, 2001, p. 371). Suharto was its patron from the late 1960s, and it received substantial resources from the state budget and from international sources (Hull, 1994, pp. 126-31; Newland, 2001, pp. 25-30). *Marriage Law in Aceh* discussed family planning in the section 'The relationship between marriage law and ceremonies and the family planning program'. The section, as its title indicates, traced how marriage practices supports and hinders the state's family planning goals. The section began with the statement that the family planning program was opposed to the local priority of having large families and Islamic ideas of leaving such planning in God's hands (1978/9, p. 158). However, the text then observed that local customs were a form of planning that included ensuring that births do not closely follow each other. These practices accorded with the concepts of the family planning program, in so much as local customs indicated that people could take a degree of control over their fertility. Four practices are listed: constructing a temporary hearth to warm a mother after childbirth and a restricted diet; massage to stop menstruation; segregation of husbands and wives for nine months after the birth of a child; and a 'child tithe' (*zakat anak*) where the twelfth child born is given up for adoption to an elder or *ulama*.²³

The authors then considered the problem of population growth and its relationship to a host of different issues including education, unemployment and housing and noted that all of these problems influenced the 'success of development and shape of society that is

²³ The text notes that the latter two practices rarely occurred by the 1970s.

strongly desired.²⁴ Given the importance of the goals of national development, the authors declared that the family planning program must be implemented. They then established that the principles of family planning accorded with the principles that underlay Acehnese marriage law and *adat* (1978/9, p. 162). The evidence for this similarity was the three goals of the Family Planning Program that were represented as also underlying marriage law and customs:

- 1) Give marriage counselling;
 - 2) Give assistance/medication for sterility;
 - 3) Give advice/help for reducing pregnancies (1978/9, p. 162).
- 1) *Memberi nasihat perkawinan;*
 - 2) *Memberi pertolongan/pengobatan dalam kemandulan;*
 - 3) *Memberi nasihat/bantuan dalam menjarangkan kehamilan.*

Additional evidence was Aceh's low rate of population growth, which was understood as an indication that marriage customs kept birth rates down (1978/9, p. 163). The section then turned to some of the inconsistencies. The desire for large families was criticised as not according with the principles of family planning or marriage law and customs. The 'openness' of the family planning program was contrasted with the 'guardedness' of the families in the areas studied regarding contraceptive discussion and purchases – a difference which was attributed to traditional Acehnese society 'not yet being able to receive modernisation ideas'.²⁵ Also noted was the tendency of couples to marry whilst young and the continued practice of polygamy. The authors argued both of these practices should be discouraged and claimed they were in decline.

The regime's development goals were understood as following the same principles as traditional practices. In matters where elements of local culture were viewed as impeding the implementation of these principles, the development goals were interpreted as perfecting local culture. Thus, the state's program of development was not understood in the text as clashing with local culture, but as completing it. This provides an insight into how local culture was connected to the reformist programs of the New Order regime. The way local culture was constructed here was normative in the sense that it made the lives of Indonesians amenable to the regime's development programs. Marriage law and customs were articulated in the text through this normative grid that reconstructed them

²⁴ *'Mempengaruhi berhasilnya pembangunan dan wujud masyarakat yang diidam-idamkan'* (1978/9, p. 162).

²⁵ *'Masyarakat adat Aceh ... belum dapat menerima ide-ide modernisasi cara-cara tersebut'* (1978/9, p. 163).

as practices to be encouraged or altered.²⁶ Development goals provided the set of ideal practices that are conceived of as both indigenous and modern.

The New Order regime's model of cultural management is completed when all of the marriage law and ceremony texts from each province are placed next to each other. Each of the texts had the same goals, chapter headings and sub-chapter headings. The framing and the issues addressed are identical in each region and the focus on national unity and the New Order regime's development goals are also shared. Together, these texts complete the articulation of local culture as part of the fabric of national life. The nation is divided into provinces. Each provincial region is divided into *adat* regions that neatly correspond with the administrative boundaries. Each *adat* region has a comparable *adat* that signifies both ethnic group and national culture and is assessed against the norms set out in the reformist agenda of the New Order regime. The New Order regime's version of local culture is produced through such state programs and its features determined by the regime's governmental strategies and goals. From this macro perspective, the cultural order moved Indonesians towards the attitudes and behaviours desired by the New Order regime.

Taman Mini has its own version of an Indonesian wedding. Located on the ground floor of the *Taman Mini* museum, a large diorama depicts the wedding ceremony of a Central Javanese couple, attended by guests wearing the 'traditional' ethnic costumes representing the other provinces of Indonesia. Jörgen Hellman writes of the wedding:

The wedding reception staged in Museum Indonesia is intended to represent the diversity of the cultural heritage in Indonesia at the same time as it promotes a metaphor for grasping this diversity as a unified whole. (1999, p. 52)

This is a common metaphor used to understand how the New Order regime constructed plurality.²⁷ The marriage law and ceremonies series of texts presented a slightly different use of ethnic culture to promote plurality, one that perhaps better accorded with the construction of cultural diversity across the nation and not just from the national capital. In the series, local culture was constructed through the discourses of archipelagic culture,

²⁶ The relationship to development ideals does infer a hierarchy between groups in different texts. Tsing writes of state-sponsored research about an indigenous group in South Kalimantan: 'All reports include an invocation of the narrative of progress and development in which the Meratus are portrayed as backward, illiterate, unhealthy, and disorderly' (1993, p. 172). However, she also notes that 'a stable structure of authority' (1993, p. 173) creates an equivalence between cultures.

²⁷ Acciaioli draws a parallel between the 'domestication' of culture by the state and the use of weddings as the point where a new domestic unit is formed (1996, p. 40).

national unity and modernisation in a similar way to *Taman Mini* and confirmed the awkward attempts to merge administrative and cultural area. However, it also indicated a more complex construction of cultural difference that, rather than blurring difference, incorporated it into national culture while all the time attempting to ‘perfect’ local culture in accordance with the state’s discourse of national unity and the goals and discourses of development.

Yogyakarta, Cultural Heritage and the Child-Citizen

The ‘Introducing the Cultures of the Archipelago Series’ (*Seri Pengenalan Budaya Nusantara*) was planned, written and published in 2000 as part of the Study and Management of Cultural Values Project (P3NB). The text analysed below, *Yogya in Passing* (*Yogya Selayang Pandang*, Guritno & Setiawati, 2000), was conceived in a political climate with striking differences to *Marriage Law in Aceh*. During the publication of the latter, the New Order was strengthening its grasp on power and formulating its version of governance. *Yogya in Passing* was published after the Indonesian elections of 1999 during the Wahid administration at a time when democratic reform held a high priority in public debate and the press had a degree of freedom of expression not seen since the 1950s. Despite these changes, the goals of the Introducing the Cultures of the Archipelago Series, as stated in the preface by Director-General of Culture I Gusti Nurah Anom, were very similar to those of IDKD:

The management of Indonesian cultural values is pushed towards trying to inventorise and socialise Indonesian cultural values that are based on the *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. In relation to this, the cultural management programs are directed towards developing Indonesian cultural values that mirror noble national values in order to strengthen national character, increase self-respect, create expressions of national pride and also further strengthen the spirit of unity. (Gurning & Lestariningsih, 2000, p. iii)

Pembinaan nilai-nilai budaya Indonesia ditekankan pada usaha menginventarisasikan dan memasyarakatkan nilai-nilai budaya Indonesia yang berlandaskan Pancasila dan UUD 1945. Sehubungan dengan itu, program pembinaan kebudayaan diarahkan pada pengembangan nilai-nilai budaya Indonesia yang mencerminkan nilai-nilai luhur bangsa sehingga dapat memperkuat kepribadian bangsa, mempertebal rasa harga diri, memunculkan kebanggaan nasional serta memperkuat jiwa kesatuan.

Although differing slightly to the goals of *Marriage Law in Aceh*, there are similarities in the emphasis on national unity and cultural values.

An important difference between the two texts is that *Yogya in Passing* is written for children. Its language is simpler and it repeatedly uses the informal personal pronoun *ku* to refer to the narrator whereas personal pronouns were absent from *Marriage Law in Aceh* that represented the authors position as objective. The narrative also varies in an attempt to engage its child-readers. For instance, the first chapter is written from the perspective of the narrator who is returning to Yogyakarta to visit grandparents. The following chapters vary this theme slightly as they engage with different places and themes (see table 7.3).

Table 7.3: Narrative Structure of Chapters in *Yogya in Passing*

Chapter	Narrative Structure
1	Return to Yogyakarta to visit Grandparents. Gives details of the area.
2	Trip along Malioboro Street giving details of the sights, sounds, statues and some historical buildings.
3	Discusses the building of houses in a customary regional style, listing the names of the tools, people involved and purposes of the rooms.
4	Relates a story told by the narrator's Grandmother and describes a traditional children's game.
5	Describes the Yogyakarta palace and gives the details and historical background on the rite of <i>Sekaten</i> , a festival honouring the prophet Mohammad's birthday.
6	Describes two museums and two tourist destinations.

a. Whose Yogyakarta?

Yogya in Passing begins with a description of Yogyakarta by a returning traveller (Guritno & Setiawati, 2000, p. 1). The view described is not what we would commonly expect from an infrequent visitor or a returning relative. The narrator notes, amongst other things, different methods of getting to Yogyakarta, the date the province was established and all of the names of its constituent regencies and their locations. The narrator continues by noting the percentage of land in Yogyakarta which is still forest, the major mountains and their heights and the names and locations of all the rivers. The narrator moves onto the official crest of Yogyakarta and explains the meaning of each of

the crest's elements, providing an account of the city-region in accordance with the government's understanding of the 'province'.²⁸

In the second preface of *Yogya in Passing*, the project leader of the 'Introducing the Cultures of the Archipelago Series' writes:

With the publication of this book, it is hoped that children's knowledge about the diversity of Indonesian culture will progressively increase. Due to this, cultural imbalance can increasingly be addressed and the spirit of unification and unity can be further strengthened. (Guritno & Setiawati, 2000, pp. v-vi)

Dengan diterbitkan buku ini diharapkan pengetahuan anak-anak tentang keanekaragaman budaya Indonesia semakin bertambah. Dengan demikian, kesenjangan budaya dapat makin dipersempit serta jiwa persatuan dan kesatuan dapat diperkukuh.

In this respect, *Yogya in Passing* is more directly pedagogical than *Marriage Law in Aceh*. Its chapters are a series of lessons for the child-citizen about the meaning of culture and the kinds of relationships it establishes between different areas of life. Using Yogyakarta as the site for these lessons has implications for how Yogyakarta is represented in the text. Other characteristics of Yogyakarta, such as its diverse student population and important role as a centre of contemporary Indonesian art and performance, are absent.

A similar form of representation can be found in the *Yogya in Passing*'s twenty-four illustrations. Instead of using photographs, the illustrations are water-colour pictures that depict various buildings, rooms and objects mentioned in the text. The illustrations focus on a particular object and remove surrounding details. For instance, the *Gending Archway* (2000, p. 13) is illustrated with some detail in the middle of the page. However, it blurs on either side of the page before disappearing completely. The foreground is also a blur. People and cars are absent from the picture, as are any indications of contemporary life, such as signs, electricity wires, roads, rubbish or surrounding houses. The process of separating particular objects and items from their surroundings mirrors the process that occurs throughout the text. The authors identify certain things as cultural heritage and invest them with historical and cultural meaning and significance. This

²⁸ Due to events during the fight for independence, in particular the Sultan of Yogyakarta's strong support of the Indonesian Republic, Yogyakarta was granted the status of 'special region' (*Daerah Istimewa*). Therefore, it has similar status to a province despite its small size and land area.

process involves a choice between objects and practices based on their cultural significance and worth or, in other words, judgements of cultural value.

The way that culture is framed in *Yogya in Passing* is in some respects quite similar to the understanding of culture within *Marriage Law in Aceh*. Three characteristics in particular indicate that some of the cultural discourses of the New Order regime remain important to cultural governance in the Reform era. Firstly, the text still divides the cultural sphere from the political sphere in the discussion of local customs and practices. The text emphasises, like *Marriage Law in Aceh*, the ‘traditional values’ contained in the customs and practices. Chapter four, ‘Drawing from Grandma’s Experience’, provides an example of how presenting the past as cultural heritage is used to identify and promote particular behaviours and attitudes rather than others. The chapter begins with a description of the location of Grandma’s village. Grandma then begins to tell a folktale about the founder of the village, Ki Ageng Paker, that demonstrates how the virtuous are rewarded.²⁹ The past is mined here for moral lessons for Indonesian children. In the text, ‘traditional values’ continue to provide a model of behaviour that the government regards as ideal although without the strong connections to state programs, like family planning, that were in evidence in *Marriage Law in Aceh*.

The second characteristic is the continued use of the nation-state-province model that conflates location and ethnicity. The use of this model is not as transparent as *Marriage Law in Aceh*, but two features of the text ensure it is still present. Firstly, the opening chapter of the text quickly establishes that the borders of the text correlate with those of the province. On the second page, the province is situated in Java and its size compared to other provinces. As was mentioned earlier, the text lists the neighbouring regencies, the geographical features of the province and the official provincial symbol. Secondly, all

²⁹ The text relates the story as follows: back in the time of the Majapahit, Sultan Prabu owned a turtle dove with a beautiful call called Jaka Mangu. One day, Jaka Mangu escaped and could not be found. The Sultan sent out servants without success and eventually disguised himself and went looking for his dove. Jaka Mangu had been found by Ki Paker, who was amazed by his melody. Ki Paker refused many offers for the dove. The Sultan eventually tracked down Jaka Mangu and met with Ki Paker. Ki Paker, without knowing who the Sultan was, gave him the bird and accepted no payment. A few weeks later, Sultan Prabu sent many riches to Ki Paker whose wealth became renowned. The story finishes with these lines: ‘Even through [Ki Paker] was rich, nevertheless his behaviour remained simple and not arrogant. In his day-to-day life, Ki Paker continued to associate with anyone. He was not selective with his friendship, [associating with] people from wealthy and also not wealthy families’ (2000, p. 52). (*Meskipun [Ki Paker] sudah kaya, namun tingkah lakunya tetap sederhana dan tidak sombong. Dalam kehidupan sehari-hari Ki Paker tetap bergaul dengan siapapun. Ia tidak memilih dalam berteman, baik orang itu dari keluarga mampu maupun tidak mampu.*)

of the local customs and ceremonies in the text are those of the central Javanese and the buildings discussed in chapter three are traditional Javanese structures. Chapter four mentioned above discusses a Javanese folk-tale and game. Chapter five relates a customary ritual of the Sultan of Yogyakarta. Unlike *Marriage Law in Aceh*, there is no demographic breakdown of the place of birth or ethnicity of the inhabitants in the text, reinforcing the picture of the province of Yogyakarta as thoroughly and unambiguously Javanese.

The third characteristic is the use of the same model of national history to frame the history of Yogyakarta. Although not a central feature of *Marriage Law in Aceh*, the nationalist model of Indonesian history was important in the texts produced by other *Ditjarahnitra* projects. The establishment of the orthodox perspective of Indonesian history has been traced by historian Anthony Reid (1979). Reid identifies the central elements of the ‘historical orthodoxy’ as:

Great Hindu kingdoms bringing political unity to the archipelago, followed by 350 years of Dutch oppression dignified by the resistance at some time or another of each Indonesian region and people. (1979, p. 298)

The historical elements within the text emphasise Yogyakarta’s connections to the Majapahit empire, which nationalists have long used as evidence of Indonesia’s unified past (1979, pp. 287-92) and the nationalist struggle for independence. Grandma’s story in chapter four clearly draws links between local customs and Majapahit, as does the account of the rite of *Sekaten*, which is discussed in detail below. In a recent article, van Klinken (2001a) has recorded challenges to the historical orthodoxies of the New Order regime since 1998. *Yogya in Passing*, like *Marriage Law in Aceh*, belongs to the ‘orthodox nationalist stream’ which van Klinken notes remains dominant after Suharto (2001a, p. 326). The challenges to this view of history that have surfaced in the Reform era have yet to penetrate the bureaucracy, which remains committed to the Suharto-era narratives.

b. New Constructions of Culture

Although there are a number of similarities between the Aceh and Yogya texts under discussion, two features in *Yogya in Passing* indicate that new governmental uses of culture have evolved in the period between the publications. The first is the way that tourism is embedded in the text. The narrator is established as a visitor to Yogyakarta in

the first page of the text, through the method of discussing Yogyakarta as seen ‘through the glass windows’³⁰ of a bus returning to the city. Other elements of the text reinforce the narrator’s transient status. Malioboro Street is described as a tourist destination for ‘both Indonesian and foreign tourists’ (2000:16). Forms of travel and the locations of bus terminal and train stations are routinely mentioned (2000, pp. 1,11,15-16,59). The buildings that the text describes in detail, such as the *Gedung Agung* and the Sultan of Yogyakarta’s palace (2000, pp. 22-8,59-68), are tourist destinations. However, the chapter that is most notable for its tourist theme is chapter six, ‘The Cultural Magic of the City’. Chapter six gives brief descriptions of two museums, including opening hours, and two prominent tourist destinations, *Tamansari* and *Kota Gede*. The text mentions the locations and origins of the areas and highlights points of historical interest. The text also mentions the importance of tourist guides in order to gain more knowledge about the Golden Carriage Museum (2000, p. 84) and notes that in *Kota Gede*, a region famous for its silverwork, that ‘tourists can see for themselves the process of making objects from silver.’³¹

The text locates the reader as a visitor engaging with Indonesian cultural heritage rather than exploring the experiences of Yogyakartaans whose lives are embedded in culture as was the case with earlier publications like *Marriage Law in Aceh*. Museums and tourist destinations of historical and cultural interest are placed next to folk tales, children’s games and palace rituals as elements of Indonesians’ cultural heritage. The text encourages the child-citizen to engage with cultural tourism as a way of learning lessons about national unity and traditional values. The move to sanction cultural tourism as an acceptable way to access national cultural heritage is linked to the relocation of the Directorate of Culture from the Ministry of Education to the State-Ministry of Tourism which began in 1997.³² The administrative link established by the move has corollaries in the texts.

The second feature of the *Yogya in Passing* is not as prominent as the presence of tourism. It involves elements of the description of Malioboro Street that do not conform with the character of the rest of the text. Malioboro Street is celebrated for its busyness,

³⁰ ‘*Dari kaca jendela*’ (2000, p. 1).

³¹ ‘*Para wisatawan dapat melihat langsung proses pembuatan barang-barang dari perak ini*’ (Guritno & Setiawati, 2000, p. 91).

³² The restructure was explored in more detail in chapter five.

bustle and trade. It is ‘always dense with cars’ (2000, p. 15) along with bicycles and horse-drawn carts. The text emphasises different features of the street. Shops pack both sides of the street, and visitors are present from morning to evening. Tourists visit the shops and the side-walk stalls that line the road. The sounds of car-horns and horse-hooves hitting the street ring out all day, along with street-singers playing guitar and singing. The authors then comment, ‘You can imagine how interesting it is, all of those people mixed together with their own concerns.’³³ The busy street-life becomes an object of attention for the reader. Traffic jams and commerce are considered a cultural attribute of this section of the city. The street life of Malioboro can be contrasted with chapter three’s discussion of housing, where only two forms of traditional housing are mentioned. Although not a prominent or large part of the text, the brief discussion of Malioboro Street does indicate that the definition of local culture has at least come under pressure to include practices and experiences that were not previously considered part of local traditions, such as shopping and the noises of commerce.

c. Learning within the Cultural Sphere

An important element of *Yogya in Passing* is how it uses culture to construct relationships between different areas of life. For example, the discussion of the Sultan of Yogyakarta’s palace includes a description of a large hall that the Sultan used to pass down decrees that governed his Sultanate, but now is used as a museum (2000, p. 63). The changed status of the hall indicates that the feudal practices of the Sultan, although now part of Indonesia’s past, are to be appreciated in the present as cultural heritage. Representations of how the past relates to the present are particularly prominent and repeated in the text. For instance, the phrase ‘land of my ancestors’ that was prominent in the first chapter³⁴ establishes Yogyakarta as a culturally relevant location whose history and customs the narrator is able to explore for lessons in life today.

A lesson about the complexity of the relationship between past and present is the account of the *Sekaten* ceremony in chapter five (2000, pp. 67-81). Here I provide a truncated version of the text’s description of the event. *Sekaten* is the name of an old gamelan that

³³ ‘Dapat dibayangkan betapa menariknya, semua itu berbaur dalam kepentingan masing-masing’ (Guritno & Setiawati, 2000, p. 16).

³⁴ The phrase ‘land of my ancestors’ (*tanah leluhurku*) is part of the title of, and is used throughout, chapter one (Guritno & Setiawati, 2000, pp. 1-14).

is one of the palace heirlooms. On the sixth day of the third month of the Islamic calendar, the rite of *Sekaten* begins when musicians begin to play the gamelan. People from the area flock to the palace on hearing the music. At midnight, the gamelan is moved from the palace to the Agung Mosque, accompanied by a large crowd. In the mosque, the gamelan is played again for six days straight until Thursday night prayers. After the Friday afternoon prayers finish at one o'clock, the gamelan begins playing again. At eight o'clock, the Sultan leaves the palace and proceeds to the mosque to attend the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad's birth, accompanied by crowds of people. Around a thousand crowd into the mosque. The sound of the gamelan is hushed as the Sultan enters. The Sultan indicates to the *Kyai*³⁵ that he is ready, and the *Kyai* begins reading the story (*riwayat*) of the Prophet Muhammad, which finishes at midnight. The Sultan returns to the palace with the gamelan and a crowd of revellers.

After relating a detailed account of the ceremony, the text turns to the history of the ceremony (2000, pp. 75-8). According to the text, *Sekaten* was present during the time of the Demak kingdom in the sixteenth century. During that time, a group of nine holy men travelled to Java to spread Islam. They are called the *Wali* and are still revered in Java today. One of the, *Wali Sanga*, the nine *Wali* was a talented musician who could play the gamelan. Every year, the *Wali* would gather together to report their activities and celebrate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad and one would play his gamelan that was named *Kyai Sekati*. Although this celebration was the start of *Sekaten*'s links with Islam, the authors link it to an even older ceremony from the Hindu kingdoms that preceded Islam. The rituals of *Asmaweda* and *Asmaradana*, which also went for seven days, were a time for offering up prayers and songs of praise to departed ancestors.

The ritual of *Sekaten* provides a location where a number of different elements within the discourse of cultural heritage are related to each other. Yogyakarta's history, Islam, Javanese culture in the form of the gamelan and Yogyakarta's links to the pre-Islamic Hindu kingdoms are brought together in this one ceremony. The text's ideal readers, Indonesian child-citizens, are given a lesson in the cultural complexity of their country. A number of legacies coexist here as elements of cultural heritage. However, the text emphasises two points that have the effect of establishing relationships between the

³⁵ Islamic scholar and teacher.

elements. Firstly, the text lists the goals of *Sekaten* as celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad and spreading the teachings of Islam. Islamic heritage is tied to the culture of Yogyakarta and the region's Hindu past is pushed back in history. Secondly, the text directly addresses the relationship between Islam and local culture. The authors write: '*Sekaten* is proof that Islam is receptive towards local tradition and is not opposed to *adat*.'³⁶ *Sekaten* provides a lesson in how Islamic and local cultural practices should peacefully coexist and an example of how the organisation of different spheres of life is an important governmental function of culture.

4. Conclusion: The Continuing and Changing Construction of Local Culture

Underlying the use of local culture, in state-sponsored cultural research and *Taman Mini*, is its use as a field of social management. The Directorate of Culture intended the local culture projects to educate Indonesians about their own and other indigenous ethnic cultures and to strengthen national unity. However, it also defined the characteristics and limits of local culture itself. The local culture projects constructed a sphere of life that imparted lessons about the nation, appropriate behaviour and morals, and cultural difference. Such governmental use of culture is not restricted to Indonesia. Tony Bennett writes:

The concept [of culture] is caught up in and helps to constitute a normative grid through which the areas of social life to which it is applied are constructed as objects and practices to be acted upon. (1998, p. 101)

In this sense local culture itself is a governmental concept that was used to understand and intervene into the lives of Indonesians, while also defining the significance and purpose of the objects and practices that came within its scope.

While each text examined in this chapter is an intricate combination of a variety of discourses, the basic operation of the texts is identifiable as a form of governmental power that was central to cultural policy during the New Order period. It applied a normative grid to the practices of Indonesians in order to make their attributes and behaviours accord with those articulated within national development, while also attempting to manage the relationship between indigenous ethnic populations within the nation. Particularly interesting was the construction of a cultural-spatial scale across the

³⁶ '*Sekaten merupakan bukti bahwa Islam menerima tradisi dan tidak menentang adat*' (Guritno & Setiawati, 2000, p. 75).

nation which, by ordering space, simultaneously incorporated some of the most intimate aspects of daily life, such as sexual relations, into national culture and disciplinary programs. Techniques of representation and the priorities of cultural management were more influential in shaping the representation of local culture in local culture project texts than the practices of local communities.

The local culture projects, as a set of key programs within the Directorate of Culture, indicate a large degree of continuity in perspective within the national cultural bureaucracy despite the advent of the Reform era and substantial institutional changes. The similarities in the representation of local culture in the two texts, despite disparities in location, culture and time of publication, are striking. The nation-region-ethnic spatial model, including the coupling of administrative and cultural regions, remains central to the construction of local culture and its placement within a national framework. Also still present is the aestheticisation that ascribes 'noble values' to local cultures which allows them to be used for pedagogical lessons. Similarly, the advent of the reform era had little impact on constructions of Indonesian history within local culture project texts with the orthodox nationalist stream remaining unchallenged. Both texts produced a version of local culture preferred firstly by the New Order regime and also apparently by the Reform era governments. The breaks have been minor and are more connected to institutional change within the directorate, such as the promotion of cultural tourism and the change from targeting an adult audience to children, than any reconsideration of culture's utility for government or the importance of culture to local communities.

The similarities between *Taman Mini* and both of the analysed publications are conspicuous in both their representation of local culture and how cultural discourses are put to use. In all three instances, culture is cordoned off from politics and contemporary life and made a special sphere for the education of Indonesians. All three also accord with the regime's effacement of time through the connection of traditions from previous eras to its political and social imperatives. The regime and its programs were 'indigenised' in TIM and the local culture projects. Finally, TIM, like the local culture projects, demonstrates the connection between governmental programs and the New Order regime's construction of indigenous ethnic culture.

Despite these similarities, the local culture projects indicate that there are variations in the regime's construction of indigenous ethnic cultures and possibly provide a more complete model of how ethnic culture was understood. The major difference between *Taman Mini* and the texts is the representation of cultural difference. In the local culture projects, the differences between ethnic cultures are emphasised and mapped within the nation which contrasts to the blurring of peripheral cultures in *Taman Mini*. Articulation of cultural difference in the local culture projects divides more thoroughly and offers more flexibility than is the case in *Taman Mini*. *Taman Mini*'s centralisation of Javanese court culture, rather than being reproduced in the local culture project texts, is replaced by the multiple centres of local indigenous cultures across Indonesia.

The local culture projects also provide a more detailed account of *how* the daily routines of indigenous ethnic culture are invested with significance and meaning because of their location within governmental discourses. For instance, the texts demonstrate how bureaucrats relied on a particular kind of research expertise in their efforts to know and modernise indigenous ethnic cultures. Another example is how wedding customs were incorporated into development programs through knowledge of the detail of the customs. Additionally, the local culture projects demonstrate that the characteristics and limits of local culture were in a constant state of revision and change. Unlike *Taman Mini* which underwent few changes since its inception, the ongoing production of texts in the local culture projects constantly incorporated new elements and objects into local culture. The introduction of cultural tourism into *Java in Passing* replicates *Taman Mini*'s own status as a tourist destination. Cultural tourism is not new to Indonesian cultural policy, but its role and visibility have grown substantially since 1998. Another new element is the expanded definition of culture in sections of *Java in Passing* and local culture project texts published since 1995, which indicates a broadening of objects and practices considered appropriate for inclusion within the category of local culture and the realm of cultural policy.

Conclusion

This thesis is the first extended historical study of cultural policy in Indonesia and provides new analysis of cultural policy in the Reform era. It has identified the foundation of contemporary cultural policy in Indonesia in the policies of the colonial administration for indigenous populations and explored the different expressions of cultural policy through Indonesia's modern history. While significant differences and changes in the features of cultural policy were identified between and across periods, cultural policy retained the same broad governmental function across the twentieth century, where it was used to shape the behaviour and attributes of subjects (culture's 'civilising' function) and to manage the relations between populations, in particular relations amongst indigenous ethnic populations and between those populations and the nation.

While cultural policy emerged from liberal democracies as a form of governmental power capable of shaping the attributes and behaviours of self-governing subjects, its application in the Indonesian colonial setting had significant differences. Imperial states did not grant their indigenous colonial subjects the same freedoms as the subjects of Western states as they were assumed to possess lesser capacities. While considered to be on the same evolutionary path as Western populations, the racial hierarchy of colonialism placed indigenous Indonesians a few steps behind. Like minors, criminals and the mentally unwell, colonial populations were subjected to greater state control as part of the liberal process of 'improvement'. The Japanese occupation dramatically reversed the racial hierarchy, placing Japanese culture at the top of the evolutionary ladder. While Dutch administrators had conceived their role as guiding a natural process of cultural development, the Japanese attempted to control cultural institutions and cultural expression. Japanese cultural policy, which was tied to wartime propaganda, had the twin goals of shaping East Asian subjects and contributing to the war effort. As the Pacific War progressed, the latter goal increasingly dominated cultural policy. A major change of the Japanese period was that an administration addressed indigenous populations for the first time as Indonesians and promoted an 'Indonesian' culture.

During the Constitutional Democracy and Guided Democracy periods, a liberal model was initially applied where Indonesians were understood to have the capacity for autonomous citizenship. Later, Sukarno implemented a model drawn from his critique of Western liberalism and promotion of mass mobilisation, though the drive to ‘improve’ the population remained central. While cultural policy during Constitutional Democracy sought to facilitate cultural development through supporting the activities of non-government groups and individuals, developing educational institutions and giving commitments to maintaining artistic freedom, the cultural policy of Guided Democracy was more prescriptive of styles and content. A more gradual change in the conceptualisation of national culture across the period is also evident. Cultural policy during constitutional democracy began with the premise that a new synthesis of Indonesian national culture would evolve for the new nation that would replace the different ethnic cultures. This perspective was soon challenged by the strength of ethnic cultures that increasingly became the focus of cultural policy. During Guided Democracy, ethnic cultures were sanctioned as forms of national culture, as long as they were national in essence. Through these changes, ethnic cultures were linked to national culture and included in cultural policy programs.

For the thirty-two years of the New Order era, the longest period of continuous government since the end of colonialism, a cultural policy model was pursued that shared many features with colonial era policy. As in much of Southeast Asia, the New Order regime emphasised economic and social development in its policies and programs, while contrasting the spiritual and moral benefits of Indonesian cultural values to ‘decadent’ Western values. Once again, greater intervention and control were justified through the assumption that Indonesians were backward compared to ‘developed’ nations and had limited capacities. The imperialist ‘improvement’ of colonial populations was replaced, in both Indonesian and international discourse, by the imperative of ‘development’. Cultural policy adopted the task of preparing Indonesians for economic development and making Indonesian culture ‘developed’, while ‘protecting’ Indonesian cultural values – processes that shaped cultural practices to fit with pre-existing aesthetic and moral norms. The regime reshaped the cultural subject of the New Order era to accord with its method of political rule and development goals. In contrast to Guided Democracy, cultural policy discouraged themes designated as ‘political’ and encouraged appreciation of Indonesian culture’s spiritual qualities. As Indonesia’s economic success integrated it more closely

with international markets, increasing concern with the penetration of Western cultural practices did not cause a major cultural policy review. The regime's response was to strengthen its emphasis on protecting Indonesian values and negating the effect of foreign cultural influences. The cultural subject formulated in the first decades of the New Order era was not revised, but confirmed.

During the New Order era, ethnic cultures became even more central to cultural policy. Managing the relations amongst ethnic populations and between ethnic culture and national culture was a priority and a justification for cultural policy. Ethnic cultures continued to be understood as elements of Indonesian national culture and therefore subject to Directorate of Culture programs that had the task of regulating national culture. The process of subjecting indigenous ethnic cultural practices to programs made them national in two senses: ethnic cultural practices were capable of teaching lessons about behaviours, aesthetics and morals to shape a national population and those practices exhibited the characteristics considered appropriate for national culture. Ethnic cultural forms, after undergoing this transformation, were then displayed together in national festivals. The sanitised plurality of these festivals encapsulated the relationship that ethnic populations had to each other and to the nation in cultural policy. Each ethnic population was constructed as harmoniously contributing to national development and displaying the characteristics considered appropriate for a developing nation. In contrast to ethnic cultural practices, contemporary cultural forms generally did not receive much attention from cultural policy makers.

Part II of the thesis examined the operation of two sets of cultural institutions and a group of cultural research programs during the New Order and Reform eras. The two sets of case studies demonstrated the presence and effects of central control, as well as the diversity of cultural policy outcomes across Indonesia. The cultural parks and arts councils examined in chapter six verified that, despite the presence of a strong central state, the operation and outcomes of official New Order cultural institutions were varied across Indonesia. Although both types of institutions were centrally funded, they were active and broadly supported only where they prioritised the desires of local arts communities over centrally generated regulations. Local histories and priorities often intervened to alter centrally defined programs. The local culture research project texts did not simply describe local cultural practices, but instead imbued certain practices with

cultural value and therefore were pedagogic texts for the training of citizens in appropriate 'Indonesian' behaviour. The kind of knowledge that produced the texts *made* local culture in two senses: it defined a sphere of social practices and objects that were labelled as local culture; and it made local cultural practices knowable to the state and therefore amenable to state programs.

This thesis also provided insights into cultural policy during the Reform era. Unlike previous experiences of regime change, the so-called Reform era did not herald sweeping reforms of governance driven by the new political power holders. A drive for democratic reform instigated and sustained by popular and international pressure has been consistently mitigated by entrenched interests that survived Suharto's fall. More influential for cultural policy was the rise of ethnic identity politics and the most important policy initiative of the period – decentralisation. All cultural policy offices below the national level were decentralised and came under the control of the local regency, municipality or province, as did a number of other cultural institutions including the 'cultural gardens' and museums.

The major direct cultural policy change of the early Reform era was, in fact, a Suharto era initiative that the Habibie, Wahid and Megawati administrations implemented – the separation of the culture portfolio from the education portfolio (these had been located under one ministry since 1945) and culture's reconfiguration with tourism. Bureaucrats in the Directorate of Culture resisted the move to tourism and generally adhered to the processes and discourses of the New Order era. For instance, the analysis of the local culture projects demonstrated that the Directorate has not substantially revised the cultural discourses it employed during the New Order era, with the small exception of a greater recognition of cultural tourism. Greater changes have occurred outside Jakarta where the engagement of different localities with cultural policy has led to a plurality of outcomes across Indonesia, as was demonstrated by the case study of the cultural parks and arts councils. Despite organisational changes, New Order era cultural discourses generally continued to dominate decentralised cultural policy across Indonesia in 2003. However, there have been initiatives in the more distant, politically marginalised provinces, such as Riau, to move away from New Order cultural policy. These could be the beginning of a gradual movement towards a diversification of cultural policy models.

Research about Indonesian Cultural Policy

In addition to being the first extended historical study of Indonesian cultural policy and utilising archival material from the 1950s and 1960s and certain key New Order cultural policy documents for the first time, this thesis has contributed in two other ways to research about cultural policy in Indonesia. First, this thesis interrogated how culture is articulated in governmental discourse. Understanding cultural policy and culture itself as a discursive formation accommodates detailed analysis of its shifting meaning and features. I consider social, political and economic changes in this method of analysis alongside technical innovation and the background of key personnel in studying the deployment of discourses, which shape the changing characteristics of cultural policy. This method considers a broad set of influences without privileging any particular relationship or considering any characteristic permanent.

Second, the thesis can be used to assess widespread characterisations of New Order cultural policy. This thesis challenged representations that New Order cultural policy had a singular rationale imposed by the central state by analysing the variety of official cultural discourses that informed cultural policy and the differences between their deployments in different locations. New Order cultural policy is also frequently seen as destructive – that is, in terms of what it banned, excised or prevented. The critiques from the Indonesian left in particular tend to emphasise how New Order cultural policy negated and repressed local, working class or oppositional cultural practices. While to some extent confirming that critique, this thesis also focussed on cultural policy's productive effects, in particular how cultural policy contributed to the shaping of Indonesian subjects with the capacities to participate in accelerated development, who would peacefully coexist with other indigenous ethnic groups and who would accept the regime's claims to legitimacy. Cultural policy was powerful because it promoted and circulated a particular set of practices for everyday life *while* discouraging other practices. It created certain options and choices, while foreclosing others.

Another characterisation of New Order national culture has been that it was a construction based on upper-class Javanese culture. While there was some slippage between national culture and Javanese and Balinese culture in *Taman Mini*, much more central to New Order cultural policy was the discourse of development with its goals of

shaping modern Indonesian subjects and making indigenous culture appropriate for such a society. Even the most emblematic of Javanese art forms, *wayang*, was subject to 'development' ideals and was made to include development messages (Sutton, 1991; van Groenendael, 1985). While Javanese and Balinese cultural symbols have been used as the emblems of New Order era national culture in Jakarta, the features of national culture in cultural policy have been determined primarily by its use as a tool of government, in particular the normative grid applied in official cultural programs.

Understanding the Cultural Policies of Postcolonial Polities

Researching postcolonial polities like Indonesia required a rethinking of the purpose of cultural policy which in turn required a consideration of how contemporary techniques of government were applied in Indonesia. Colonial cultural policy in Indonesia, as was explored in Part I, was an expression of the liberal rationalities of government from which Western cultural policy emerged, but its features differed to correspond with liberal understandings of, and justifications for, colonial rule.

A useful framework for thinking about the continuities and breaks between different periods of postcolonial government and Western and postcolonial settings is considering cultural policy as a set of governmental techniques and technologies focussed on managing populations and shaping individuals' attributes and behaviours. Undertaking cultural policy analysis in a postcolonial polity like Indonesia requires an appreciation of the varying expressions that contemporary methods of government took in non-Western locations. Analysing the types of populations targeted and the kinds of attributes and behaviours that were intended for annihilation or articulated as norms assists in divorcing cultural policy as a method of governance from liberal democracies and helps explore the forms it took in other settings. Secondly, this thesis draws attention to the importance of the colonial context for the features of postcolonial cultural policy, particularly during periods of authoritarian rule. Postcolonial governments inherited cultural policies that were based on a set of assumptions that although liberal in origin were not democratic. While colonial cultural policy was critiqued by many postcolonial governments that developed alternatives, it was still the basis on which postcolonial cultural policy was built. It also provided a model for authoritarian cultural policy which was supported by international discourses about development. My account of the processes by which

cultural policy breaks were made or continuities established with colonial cultural policy provides a starting point for cultural policy research in postcolonial settings.

A Cultural Policy Research Framework for Indonesia

Inevitably, a thesis raises some questions and possibilities that cannot be explored within its limits. In this final section, I reflect briefly on the possibilities of ‘doing things otherwise’ that can grow from Foucaultian analysis (Dean, 1999, p. 37) from a research perspective.

One possible direction in cultural policy research is suggested in Foucault’s concept of biopower. Foucault defines biopower in *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1* as the spread of ‘power over life’ (1990, p. 139) through which sexuality became an important domain of government. The term biopower designates ‘what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge/power an agent of transformation of human life’ (Foucault, 1990, p. 143). Cultural policy emerged in Western liberal democracies at the time when biopower was becoming important to governance. Cultural policy can be considered part of the ‘society of normalisation’ that Foucault considers a ‘consequence of [the] development of biopower’ (1990, p. 144). Government in such a society is more concerned with regulatory and corrective mechanisms than with ensuring the continued rule of the sovereign. Biopower itself has two poles, which are parallel to cultural policy: one individualising at the level of the body (through disciplinary techniques), the other totalising at the level of the population (1990, pp. 139-40).

Biopower and cultural policy begin to differ when biopower is defined as ‘a power whose task is to take charge of life’ (1990, p. 144). Three sets of questions arise. The first is the deployment of cultural knowledge, in particular knowledge related to race and ethnicity, where culture has been linked to a range of different policies focussing on human life. In this sense, cultural policy could be considered much broader than the narrow definition that is commonly adopted, including in this thesis. The second concerns the development of technologies of government that have shaped cultural policy in its narrow sense. How did cultural policy grow out of the milieu that was made possible by the spread of biopower? Questions arise regarding two issues in particular: the racial taxonomies that initially underlay cultural policy; and the extent to which cultural policy itself contains

elements of biopower. The capacity to construct ethnicity is clearly a form of biopower where bodies are categorised and marked and populations defined and managed. The third concerns how cultural policy is analysed. An analysis of biopower in cultural policy would be located at the point where power is applied – the techniques and technologies of the cultural programs, the operations of cultural institutions – rather than tracing the links between cultural policy and political history as done in this thesis. Such research has the potential to reveal further connections between colonies and imperial centres through tracking the transfer of techniques of power.

While I have focussed on official cultural policy and programs, a number of organisations, both foreign and domestic, have their own cultural policies and programs within Indonesia. These organisations provide alternative cultural policy models that can be contrasted to the official model and, in many cases, can demonstrate how local organisations have resisted or contested official cultural programs through their own policies and programs. The benefits of such research would be twofold. First, it would contribute to a more complete account of cultural policy in Indonesia. Second, it would challenge the limits of official cultural policy. Given the slow pace of official cultural policy change since the fall of Suharto, progressive cultural policy change is more likely to come from outside the existing official political and cultural institutions.

Néstor García Canclini, in an article about contemporary cultural policy challenges, makes a relevant statement regarding countries, such as Indonesia, that have exalted local traditions in the face of economic and cultural opening:

In spite of the political, cultural, and aesthetic qualities sometimes found in artists in ... localist movements, the decisive question for cultural policy is: how does one move on from the separatist exaltation of difference which in the long term perpetuates inequality and fosters discrimination, to the shared acknowledgement of the different and the heterogeneous in symbolic searchings capable of intercultural communication? (Canclini, 2000, p. 315)

Indonesian cultural policy has for the most part been ‘localist’ – focussed on retaining the authenticity of Indonesian culture through tightly controlled interaction with outside forces. This narrow focus has created tensions with the way that culture is circulated and consumed in Indonesia through increasing integration with international markets. A reconsideration of the context of Indonesian culture in what is now a globalised system of cultural circulation could challenge cultural policy through centring on a different set of

problems. For instance, according to Canclini, innovation and transcultural exchange are essential to creativity and critical thinking in a global society (2000, p. 315). Rather than 'protecting' the practitioners of traditional cultural practices from such interactions, would the state be better advised to assist such exchanges and provide information about how communities could retain as much control as possible of the representation of indigenous Indonesian cultures in a global environment? Such questions challenge the limited pluralism of official cultural policy by focussing on cultural exchange and innovation.

All policy analysis holds the danger of confirming inequalities rather than challenging them. Cultural policy researchers have to choose between projects that 'transform the social order ... or replicate it – a struggle between cultural policy as a transformative versus a functionalist sphere' (Miller & Yudice, 2002, p. 3). After all, researchers are not obliged to contribute towards the efficient operation of the state, but instead choose how, where and to what causes they contribute.

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