MULTICULTURALISM AND THE WHITENING MACHINE, OR HOW AUSTRALIANS BECOME WHITE

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There is, still, remarkably little work on the construction of the racial category of 'white' in Australia.¹ By comparison, in the United States there has been an outpouring over the last ten years.² Why the difference? Well, the short answer is that, in the United States, white hegemony has been much more seriously challenged and unsettled than in Australia. This challenge has had many sources but the one I want to discuss briefly here, both because of its importance in the American context and its relevance for Australia, is that of the ideology of multiculturalism. In connection with Australia, Ghassan Hage has argued that, 'Anglo-Celtic Australians as a group did not form a national aristocracy except for a short period in the post-World War II era, a status which is now threatened by the rise of multiculturalism.'³ If, as I will explain, we can take the term Anglo-Celtic to describe what is now considered to be the whitest group of Australians, then I will be arguing that, far from challenging the hegemonic position of white cultural and political power in Australia, official multiculturalism has entrenched it.

In White Nation, Hage writes that:

*Categories such as 'White Anglo-Saxon Protestants', 'Whites', 'Anglos', 'Anglo-Celtic', 'European', while usually communicating the specific feature of the dominant group that the user wishes to emphasise, also manages to mystify either the logic behind, or the mode of conceiving different periods in Australian history that correspond to, the specific usage of each.*⁴

In this article I will briefly outline the history of the use of the discourse of whiteness in Australia. What we will find is that, as an aspect of the discourse of race, in the period up to around World War II, white implied a reductive understanding of the relation between whiteness and a particular culture, often thought of as British culture. This was thought to be in some way determined as a
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racial characteristic, or at least a capacity, of those designated as white. In the period after World War II, there was a gradual discursive shift which culminated in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to an understanding of race as the signifier of a particular kind of culture. In an important sense, the claim that the Australian policy of multiculturalism is non-racial was made possible by this discursive shift. In this new regime, race is not thought of as determining culture but as signifying a fundamental moral difference which grounds a cultural difference. This cultural difference signals a culture thought to be more or less irreconcilable with what is thought of as the dominant Australian culture held by a population considered to be predominantly white.

Historically, whiteness has itself been thought of, and still is thought of, as a stable and reductive category. That is, white is popularly thought of as having had an unchanging descriptive designation throughout the period known previously as 'white settlement' and now usually known as 'European settlement' – both titles bellying the presence of numbers of people among these new settlers designated then and now as racially different. The shift from 'white' to 'European', which I shall discuss below, does not alter the descriptive designation which continues to denote a particular skin colour.

What I will argue in this article is that, first of all, the skin colour designated as white has not remained stable. In fact, in the post-Second World War period, when large numbers of Eastern and Southern Europeans, and Levantines, were allowed into Australia, the category of 'white skin' underwent a considerable broadening to include people of much darker skin pigmentation than was previously considered acceptable for a 'white Australian'. Through the 1950s and 1960s the term 'white' was gradually replaced by 'European'. This was not a new designation, as we shall see, but its acceptance as common usage expresses the discursive shift which has already mentioned from a reductive and determinist understanding of race to one which understands race as suggesting membership of a particular cultural grouping. Arthur Calwell's post-war broadening of 'white' to allow for migration from all of Europe and some of the Levant took place in the context of this terminological shift which reflected a new understanding of the similarity of cultures within Europe. This was made possible by the demise of the thinking that allied race with nation, that had allowed for the idea of a 'British race', and the move away from an emphasis on phenotype, 'white', to an emphasis on culture signalled by 'European'.

It is important to note that while official multiculturalism, with its emphasis on the acceptance of cultural difference, has made great use of continent-based definitions of race (European, Asian, African) which signify claimed cultural groupings rather than a product within the very which became race. This discourse of multiculturalism was indeed a policy of the 'White Race', the distinction between the white man and the coloured man was acceptable most to the claim of Christianity, of course complicated by the fact that the distinction was not-so-white between the white and the coloured. In Australia, the secondary to the primary ending of the White Australia policy, in the practice of multiculturalism, how the Amer version – is it a reality makes it possible for the idea of a 'British race', and the move away from an emphasis on phenotype, 'white', to an emphasis on culture signalled by 'European'.

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In the period dated in the late 1950s of a particular policy of multiracialism, this is no longer simply a fundamental difference thought of as a natural difference, as designated then, which I shall now refer to as a "white" - both titles - all cultural groupings rather than reductive racialised differences, the currency of this usage is not a product of multiculturalism. Rather, Australian multiculturalism operates within the version of the discursive regime of race which privileges culture and which became taken-for-granted in Australia at around the same time that multiculturalism was instituted as government policy. Thus, for example, signalling the discursive shift, A. C. Palfreeman, in *The Administration of the White Australia Policy*, published in 1967, makes great use of the distinction between "non-European" and "European".

It will be necessary in this article to discuss briefly the meaning of the Australian policy of multiculturalism. This is because, far from being unconnected with the discourse of race, practice of the policy relies on race, in particular the distinction between the white race and other races. However, whiteness here is abstracted into a claim about European moral assumptions, and this claim is articulated in terms of acceptable moral difference. The idea of a common morality has usually been tied to the claim of a common religious heritage, a claim that equates 'white' people with Christianity, or a 'Judeo-Christian value system'. Actually, the history is more complicated than this. As Theodore Allen has observed in *The Invention of the White Race*, the English developed a system of differentiation based on the distinction between Protestants and Catholics. While in Britain this distinction was an aspect of the racialisation of the Irish, in Australia, where the Irish were not racialised, it helped to distinguish the white, northern, Protestant Europeans from the not-so-white eastern and southern, Catholic and Orthodox Europeans, a distinction which mapped onto the later identification of the latter as 'non-European'. In Australia, the distinction between Protestants and Catholics has always been secondary to colour-based racial differentiation but, during the era of the White Australia policy, it was the crucial division within Australian whiteness. After the ending of the policy, what has been emphasised was the commonality of morality in Christianity. In order to understand how this idea of a common moral system works in the practice of official multiculturalism I will explain how the Australian policy of multiculturalism derives from the American ideology of cultural pluralism, and how the American version of multiculturalism - quite different from the Australian version - is based on a radical critique of cultural pluralism. Using this perspective makes it possible to see clearly how the Australian policy of multiculturalism, which, I am suggesting, puts into practice as government policy the ideology of cultural pluralism, is based on the assumption of a shared morality. It is this concern with a shared morality, translated in Australia's case into a rhetoric of cultural similarity, which is expressed in the distinction between ethnic groups, which
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supposedly share this similarity (and are of the same ‘European’/white race) with the ‘real’ – that is, among other things, really white – Anglo-Celtic Australians and those that are thought of as racially different, for example, ‘Asians’.\(^5\)

**Cultural Pluralism and American Multiculturalism**

Now, before I go any further, I want to establish something that Sneja Gunew\(^6\) discussed some years ago but which is still the source of much confusion. American multiculturalism is a very different beast to the Australian version. While there is no clear consensus on what multiculturalism means in the United States, nevertheless certain broad parameters can be extrapolated. Most important is the emphasis on race. The United States always has been, and is, at least as preoccupied with race as a categorising discourse as Australia continues to be. In the United States, the ideology of multiculturalism derives from African Americans’ recognition that, in spite of their inclusion as citizens, they continue to be excluded from a national cultural polity increasingly thought of in the terms of cultural pluralism, a polity which claims to be inclusive but which continues to discriminate against African Americans in particular.

In 1973, Al Grassby, the Minister for Immigration in Whitlam’s government, laid the ideological foundations for the Australian policy of multiculturalism in his speech entitled ‘A Multi-Cultural Society for the Future’. The term ‘multi-cultural’ appeared nowhere else in his speech. One suspects that it was a late addition, taken from Canada where a policy called ‘multi-culturalism’ had been introduced two years earlier.\(^7\) In the body of the speech itself, Grassby identifies three American theories that he takes from a 1966 discussion by Charles Price which includes ‘Permanent ethnic pluralism’, and then notes that:

*It is all too easy to overlook the pre-existence of the original Australians, millennia before the advent of us ‘white ethnics’. In consideration of the above American social philosophies, therefore, we must bear in mind that any theory which fails to accord these people an equal place in the family of our nation today is out of the question, today and in the future.*\(^8\)

Here, we find Grassby thinking of the white Australian population as made up, in part, of ethnic groups. He is taking on board cultural pluralism and presuming, naively and good heartedly, that it can incorporate Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. Likewise, Jerzy Zubrycki, Chairman of the Ethnic Affairs Council in the latter years of the 1970s, advocated a form of cultural pluralist multiculturalism.\(^9\)

At this point we must make a brief detour. The ideology of cultural pluralism, developed primarily by the Jewish thinkers Judah Magnes and Horace Kallen, and...
Randolph Bourne, was evolved in the second and third decades of the century to legitimate not only the continuing religio-cultural difference of the Jews in the United States, but also the cultural differences of the wide variety of European, and most especially southern European, migrant groups who, at that time, were migrating to the United States. Michael Omi and Howard Winant point out that:

The origins of the concepts of 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic group' in the US ... lay outside the experience of those identified (not only today but already in [Robert] Park's and Kallen's time) as racial minorities: Afro-Americans, Latin Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans (blacks, browns, reds, and yellows). The continuity of experience embodied in the application of ethnicity theory to both groups — to European immigrants and racial minorities — was not established.¹⁰

Cultural pluralism opposed the alternative ideological models of Anglo-assimilation which, through the 1920s, came to be known as '100% Americanism', and the 'melting pot', an ideology long countenanced in the United States but only taken up popularly as a consequence of Israel Zangwill’s play of that name first performed in 1910.¹¹ The use of the concept of ethnicity rather than race is closely bound up with cultural pluralist theory.

Even among advocates of cultural pluralism, there is a growing recognition that, in practice, racially O thered groups, most importantly African Americans, have not been incorporated into the pluralist order of American life. One staunch advocate of cultural pluralism who has now acknowledged this failure is Nathan Glazer. In We Are All Multiculturalists Now, Glazer has reluctantly come to admit that African Americans continue to be excluded from the dominant cultural system. He writes:

There were significant differences in the ways European groups assimilated. But there are orders of magnitude in difference. The differences between the rate of assimilation of Irish and Germans, or Italians and Jews, become quite small when we contrast them with the differences over time between white European immigrants of any group and American blacks.¹²

Glazer is using 'assimilation' loosely. Here, it means acceptance into a culturally plural society. We must remember that assimilation involves both the accepting society being willing for assimilation to take place, and for the person or people concerned to want to assimilate. In addition we can usefully distinguish between cultural assimilation and moral assimilation, which requires the acceptance of the dominant culture’s norms, values, and attitudes. Cultural assimilation implies moral assimilation but moral assimilation does not require cultural assimilation. In short, cultural pluralism requires moral assimilation but not cultural assimilation. Up until the advent of the policy of multiculturalism Australia had required its migrants to
assimilate culturally. Glazer should not have been too surprised at the continued predicament of African Americans; John Higham pointed out some twenty years ago that Kallen only once mentions African Americans in his philosophical discussions advocating cultural pluralism.\textsuperscript{13}

This is not to suggest that either Kallen or Glazer were racists. Quite the reverse is the case. Kallen simply did not concern himself with those who were racially different, concentrating on ‘ethnic groups’.\textsuperscript{14} In this way Kallen avoided the problem caused by the assumed connection between race and morality. Cultural pluralism is based on an assumption of a shared moral order from which cultural diversity can be negotiated, and of equalitarian entry into the social system established by that moral order. Unlike the European migrant groups regarded as white, and described as ethnics, the ‘black’ African Americans were ultimately thought of as morally different and were not granted equalitarian entry. Moreover, in any case, exclusion on the grounds of race can coexist with cultural pluralism.

We can now return to American multiculturalism. This form of multiculturalism arose as a consequence of the recognition by African Americans, that, as a race, they were never going to gain acceptance as part of the dominant cultural order.\textsuperscript{15} Having failed in the project of assimilation, at least partly because white American society would not allow them to assimilate, African Americans began to argue for their distinctiveness on the grounds of cultural difference, but a difference that questioned the integrative – Glazer would say assimilative – possibilities of cultural pluralism; that is, a cultural difference which, in often privileging a non-Christian heritage, suggested a moral difference. Hence, in the United States, multiculturalism expresses the claims of diverse racial (rather than ethnic) groups to their right to their cultural differences, and, just as importantly, it operates as a critique of the white and Eurocentric moral assumptions of cultural pluralism by arguing for the legitimacy of other sets of moral assumptions. In making this argument, American multiculturalism also criticizes the exclusivist moral order which forms the basis of cultural pluralism and which derives from Western Enlightenment thinking. In this way, American multiculturalism makes a profound attack on the white privilege taken-for-granted at that very basis of cultural pluralism.

Where cultural pluralism was previously seen as a liberal and inclusive ideology, it is now identified by American multiculturalism as an ideology that privileges a European, and in American terms ‘white’, moral order. Marla Brettschneider has explained that:

\textit{Multiculturalist critique shows the fallacy of [the] claim to neutrality [of cultural pluralism], for example, in its analysis of the relationship of pluralist self-interest with the ## been view called con certain pa}

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We should, of course, be wary of morality. The claim to a particular outlook is not unique to the rhetoric of multiculturalism, but it is thoughtful to take seriously the implications for multiculturalism. According to Grassby, the structure of this argument is the following:

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with the common good... A critical reading... reveals that non-dominant groups have been viewed excessively as having the dangerous 'differences' that threaten the so-called common good. This 'common good' was thus exposed as a means to protect certain particular privileges and inequalities.¹⁶

Elsewhere, Brettschneider tells us that under the guise of a claim to this apparently universal 'common good' the American political system privileges those who are property holders and 'male, light-skinned, Christian, middle-aged, and able'.¹⁷ Much the same can be argued for Australian society. We can understand the claim to a 'common good' as being premised on an assumption of a common moral outlook. Cultural pluralism limits acceptance to those groups which, it is thought, subscribe to the same moral order. In Australia, with the White Australia policy in place, the key distinction had always been between Protestants and Catholics. The advent of cultural pluralist multiculturalism emphasised the moral similarities in a shared Christianity. The ending of the White Australia policy, and the new emphasis on race as a signifier of cultural difference, meant that Christianity, as the moral system of Europeans (whites), could be counterposed against other religions/races.

We should also remember that it is possible that those identified as racially different but morally the same can continue to be excluded because the discourses of morality and race are distinct. There is no reason why official multiculturalism should be officially multiracial and, indeed, in everyday life in Australia discrimination on racial grounds continues as a regular occurrence.¹⁸ In Australia, the rhetoric of ethnicity is used to signal a commonality of moral assumptions, an acceptance of the existing common good, while that of race signals a value system thought to be at odds with this common good.¹⁹ The reason whiteness has started to be interrogated in the United States is that the white hegemony, bound up with the success of cultural pluralism, especially its claim to be inclusive of difference, has been challenged by the American version of multiculturalism.

Grassby used the language of cultural pluralism and tied it to the problem of how to incorporate migrants into Australian society. Referring to ethnic groups, he said:

... they lead a way of life which, while in living touch with its ancient forms and impulses, is imperceptibly coming to terms with— or at least learning to coexist with— that of many other ethnic groups in our society and of course with the 'old Australians'. Such pluralism is not operating within a time scale, but looks ahead far into the future.²⁰

Grassby's assumptions about cultural pluralism, and his progressive liberal ideals, repeat to a surprising extent, those of Kallen and the other proponents of cultural pluralism in the United States some fifty years earlier. Indeed, the primary
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problem Grassby was addressing – how to manage southern European, and Jewish, migrant groups who did not seem to want to assimilate – was analogous to the problem identified by Kallen and the other American proposers of cultural pluralism. The difference is that Kallen was proposing cultural pluralism from a relatively subaltern position, as an ambiguously white academic rather than a member of government, putting this forward as a solution to the problem of social acceptance for his, and other marginal white groups. Whereas, for Grassby, and more especially for Malcolm Fraser, cultural pluralism/multiculturalism was a population management policy to solve the problem caused by the failure of assimilation. In the American case cultural pluralism had been proposed as the liberal alternative to the dominant society’s insistence on assimilation. In the Australian circumstance, cultural pluralist multiculturalism, while being pushed for the same reasons by migrant pressure groups, was adopted by the Fraser government in such a way as to contain cultural difference. As Gunnew notes, ‘Multiculturalism in Australia is acceptable as a celebration of costumes, customs and cooking.’\(^{21}\) It does not, for example, extend into the political or legal spheres.

Since the institutionalisation of multiculturalism in Australia, ethnic has become a key rhetorical term, replacing race. Ethnic implies membership of a group, called an ethnic group, whose cultural difference is an accepted part of the fabric of Australian multicultural society; that is to say people who are thought to share the same moral understanding as that which dominates and determines the Australian social order. Illustrating the new prevalence of ethnicity thinking in the 1970s, William Bostock’s book, *Alternatives of Ethnicity: immigrants and Aborigines in Anglo-Saxon Australia*, was published in 1977. Bostock defined ethnicity as ‘a feeling of closeness felt between people who share a common language, way of life, past and possibly also a common racial origin.’\(^{22}\) Note, here, Bostock’s assumption that ethnicity somehow operates as a category within race. Bostock’s anxiety was for those who lacked competence in the English language and Australian culture and for whom, therefore, in his words, ‘ethnicity becomes a prison.’\(^{23}\) Here, as in the Galbally report of the following year that provided the blueprint for Malcolm Fraser’s institutionalisation of multiculturalism, ethnicity has taken over from race as the key factor defining difference in the Australian population.\(^{24}\) In Australia ethnicity is defined by national origin. In both the United States and in Australia the meaning of ethnic has been historically associated with European and, therefore, white.\(^{25}\) Indeed, there is a sense in which ethnic groups are thought of as having a presence within a particular race, in the first instance the white race but, by analogy, other races can also have ethnic groups. In fact, ethnic has been used in both countries to refer to those groups that I call marginal whites, that is, southern and eastern Europe of cultural div cultures that, a moral tradition reasons why it racially differ designation. It usage of ethn designation, \(i\) pluralist mull race exclusive

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Like Glazer, Grassby thought of cultural pluralism, or multiculturalism as it became known in its Australian version, as an inclusive policy because of its acceptance of diversity. What was not apparent to Grassby, and the other Australian proponents, were the same things that the Americans had also missed: that racism could still operate conjointly with cultural pluralism, and that in practice the ideology was exclusive because it depended on the migrant and other groups’ acceptance of the pre-existing moral system. In other words, cultural pluralism, and Australian multiculturalism, allows for cultural diversity but this is premised on moral homogeneity. Indeed, this is an assimilatory moral homogeneity in which migrant and indigenous groups have to assimilate to the moral order already in place within the society. There is, here, not even a melting pot accommodation of elements of alternative moral systems. The most profound critique of cultural pluralism in the United States is that it can coexist with racism but that the assimilatory moral order on which the diversity of cultural pluralism rests, is one located in the values of the European Enlightenment, and in Christianity. In this sense, then, cultural pluralism is white and works most effortlessly for white, European ethnic groups who are thought to already share the moral order which enables ethnic diversity to flourish harmoniously. Since the moral order imbricated with cultural pluralism is the same one which developed the universalist racialised categorisation of people we should not be surprised that the two, and racism as the outgrowth of racialisation, should be able to operate so well together.

**Whiteness in Australia**

At this point I want to consider how the category of white has been used in Australia. As I have already suggested, white is a constructed category, the meaning, and the content, of which have both varied considerably over time. Most importantly, what we shall see is that, with the advent of multiculturalism, white became a much
more abstracted category than it had been before. The putting into place of the White Australia policy was a product of the assumption that culture is determined in some way by race. 'White' had signified a particular racial grouping which was presumed to have, or whose members could easily acquire (as in the discourse of assimilation), a particular culture. As I have already noted, from around World War II there was a gradual shift to an understanding of whiteness as signifying the presence of a particular type of culture – that is to say, cultures between which difference was limited because of their common moral basis – rather than determining it. Douglas Cole has noted the moral quality to the White Australia policy. He has written that, ‘Keeping Australia ‘morally’ white, white ‘in the broadest sense of the term’, meant aversion even to ‘technically’ white groups.’ It was these marginal white groups who would subsequently be acknowledged as sharing the same moral order as the truly white ‘Anglo-Celt’ Australians during the era of official multiculturalism.

By the time of multiculturalism, when it was the culture itself that was the ostensibly privileged entity, and when this was located in a more general moral system, white was no longer utilised as a classificatory term. Instead, ‘mainstream’, ‘real Australians’ and, most commonly, ‘Anglo-Celtic’, all terms that evolved their current meaning during the 1980s, were used.

It is worth noting that in Alternatives of ethnicity, Bostock still used the term Anglo-Saxon to describe the race of the dominant Australian group. All the terms I have mentioned, including Anglo-Celtic, are terms without the ethnic connotations of a non-Australian national origin. All these terms, which have been applied to those people who, it is claimed, carry Australia’s ‘core culture’ – another term from the era of official multiculturalism – are applied to people who are simply presumed to be white.

In order to understand this development we can go back to the second half of the nineteenth century. Charles Price argues that, in Australia, white:

- was not in common use as a racial term during the 1850s and 1860s; then men usually spoke of Europeans, Chinese (or Mongolians), Negroes or – even more commonly and specifically – Anglo-Saxons, Germans, Italians, and so on. In the 1870s and 1880s, though still using these terms, they were beginning also to use more generalised racial terms such as ‘white’, ‘Caucasian’, ‘yellow’, and so on.

Price’s suggestion is that white came into popular use via a decade or so’s earlier, more scientifically specialised, use as a way of describing those civilised people who were unable to work in the heat of Australia’s tropical north.

As Leon Poliakov has explained, the differentiation of races by colour goes back to the seventeenth century. The Scottish philosopher, David Hume, as long ago as 1753 had written that:
I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor ever an individual, eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturers among them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the Whites such as the Germans, the present Tartars, still have some thing eminent about them in their valour, form of government or some particular.32

Dilip Hiro notes that, ‘It was in the British plantation colonies in the western hemisphere that race relations emerged in their clearest form: the whites, as masters, were the superior race; the blacks, as slaves, were the inferior race.’33 It was the great Swedish classifier Linnaeus (1707-1778) who produced the model of colour-based racial difference from which the nineteenth and twentieth century version most derives. He identified a four-fold division by colour: white (European), red (Native American), yellow (Asiatic), and black (African). He equated each with a particular set of qualities. For example, the white race operated according to law, the red according to custom, the yellow race was proud and avaricious, the black lazy.34 Through the nineteenth century, and associated with the rise of the nation-state, the identification of race by colour became a part of popular culture. When coupled with the social evolutionism that derived from Charles Darwin’s work – The Origin of Species was published in 1859 – by 1899 it was possible for Rudyard Kipling to write his hugely popular poem ‘The White Man’s Burden’,35 which urged Americans to take over the governing and civilizing role borne by the British.

The precise designation of white was extremely variable. In Britain, it was used to describe the English, Scottish and Welsh, though not for a long time the Irish, and northern Europeans. White signified the civilised and the coloniser, the so-called coloured races, including most importantly those designated as black (which included the Irish and Jews36 in different ways at different times), were uncivilised and the colour signified these people’s colonised status. Ann McClintock argues that, ‘The English stereotype of the Irish as a simianized and degenerate race ... complicates postcolonial theories that skin color ... is the crucial sign of otherness’.37 However, this is only the case if one presumes that a person has to be thought of as actually having a black skin in order to be described as black. In the post-Darwinian second half of the nineteenth century, the Irish could be thought of as ‘white negroes’ as Gustave de Molinari described the English newspapers calling them in 1880,38 and as ape-like. However, Richard Dyer makes the point that, ‘[in the USA] in the nineteenth century, in a country not in the same exploitative relation to Ireland as Britain was, the Irish were a sector of the immigrant working class who might be hailed as white as against the Native Americans, African slaves and even some other European migrants.’39 In the Australian colonies there seems to have
been a similar whitening of the Irish while, within the category of white, the Irish, as Catholics, often continued to be regarded as inferior.\textsuperscript{40}

In the United States, white has always been defined within understandings of the American nation in a dichotomous binary with black or, as the historian Nathan Huggins puts it, ‘black-white dualism has always been manifest in American life.’\textsuperscript{41} This is because, while it has been possible to exclude other races, white America has struggled since at least the end of slavery with the problem of African Americans as members of the national polity.\textsuperscript{42} Other races identified by colour have never had as powerful a presence within the American national understanding. At the same time, the Chinese, often designated by national origin, but often also by colour, were the anxiously excluded racial group, first in California and then in the United States as a whole.\textsuperscript{43}

In Australia, by the 1880s white came to identify the defining characteristic of what was becoming thought of as the national group. Richard White quotes the Bulletin from 1887 asserting that, ‘All white men who come to these shores — with a clean record — and who leave behind them the memory of the class-distinctions and religious differences of the old world … are Australian’.\textsuperscript{44} Here, white was not defined in opposition to black, as it was in the United States, because no group defined as black, or yellow for that matter, was allowed into the national polity. Rather, white was constructed as a core identity opposed to ‘coloured’. Hence, in Australia, there was the sense of a gradual fading away from a true or proper white until other races were reached, all of which were classifiable together as coloured. In post-Federation Australia whiteness has most often been defined visually, with the emphasis being on a person’s visual similarity and therefore possible acceptance, assimilability, into the majority population. In the United States, while the legal definition varied from state to state, one Black ancestor could make a person black no matter how white one appeared to be. Katya Givel Azoulay writes that, ‘the social custom of applying the ‘one-drop [of black blood] rule’ has endured in the public imagination — among both American blacks and whites.’\textsuperscript{45} In this context we could say that white was actually defined by black.

In the colonial legislation before Federation, the concern was to regulate or exclude particular designated groups, most usually the Chinese, sometimes ‘Asiatics’ more generally. In 1861, for example, New South Wales passed the Chinese Immigration Restriction Act and in 1876 the Queensland government passed the Goldfields Act Amendment Act which attempted to restrict migration by charging a higher license fee to ‘Asiatic and African aliens’.\textsuperscript{46} The Governor reserved this Act, and subsequently the Royal Assent was deferred so that its obvious discriminative relationship to restrict it was developed self-conscious federation passed the provisions coloured race island adjac to the Governor test on the subject for the later time.

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of white, the Irish, and white America has African Americans or have never had white American life. White quotes the Chinese shores – with distinctions and white was not because no group had national policy. Hence, in the or proper white other as coloured. Visually, with the visible acceptance, the legal race a person blacks that, 'the social 196 The Governor so that its obvious

discrimination against the Chinese could be made subtler because of Britain’s treaty relationship with China. With concerns over Japanese migration there was a move to restrict immigration more generally. This happened at the same time that there was developing a greater self-consciousness about Australia as a ‘white’ outpost, a self-consciousness linked with the nationalism associated with the forthcoming federation of the colonies. In 1897 the New South Wales Legislative Assembly passed the Coloured Races Restriction and Regulation Bill. This generalised the provisions of the 1888 anti-Chinese legislation to ‘all persons belonging to any coloured race inhabiting the Continent of Asia, or the Continent of Africa, or any island adjacent thereto, or any island in the Pacific or Indian oceans.\textsuperscript{47} Reserved by the Governor, New South Wales subsequently passed an Act requiring an ‘education test’ on the model of the South African Natal legislation which would form the basis for the later Federal legislation.\textsuperscript{48}

By the time of Federation in 1901, whiteness had become the defining racial marker of the Australian nation. The Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 had, as its purpose, like the New South Wales legislation that had preceded it, the exclusion of all who were not white or, to use the term I have already mentioned that had a currency through the period of the White Australia policy, coloured. Like the New South Wales Act, because of pressure from Britain, the Federal Act did not identify those groups which Australia wished to keep out, but masqueraded as an Act concerned with the literacy level of intending migrants. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when culture was commonly thought to be an attribute of race, limiting migration to Australia to white people was considered to be the way to build a culturally homogenous nation.

It is well known that the White Australia policy never designated, in a limiting way, who was considered to be white. Certain national groups were preferred as migrants, that was all. In this way, whiteness was preserved as a naturalised quality. At the same time, those people positively identified as members of other races, as coloured (white, here, then, was not a colour), such as members of the ‘yellow’ race, were excluded.\textsuperscript{49} Hence, the British (and the Irish) were the most preferred migrants, suggesting that they were to be thought of as the most white, followed by other northern European national groups, especially the Germans but including the French and people from Scandinavia.

When Calwell became the first Minister for Immigration in 1945 he announced that the Government’s objective was to increase the population by two per cent per annum, which was considered to be the ‘maximum absorptive rate’.\textsuperscript{50} Jock Collins notes that:
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Despite the commitment to a continuation of the White Australia policy, the ‘racial purity’ guarantees of Calwell were violated almost immediately. It was not possible to implement the stated policy of 70,000 migrants per year and ten British migrants to one foreigner.\(^{51}\)

What Calwell did was expand the Australian category of white. He did this by including Eastern and Southern Europeans. One discursive shift that made this possible was the move away from the idea of a ‘British race’ which was a branch of an ‘Anglo-Saxon race’. This shift had been going on since at least the end of World War I, but as late as 1939 Walter Bromhead, for example, in Shall White Australia Fail? had written of ‘The Anglo-Saxon peoples’, and described Australians as part of a joint ‘we’ when he went on to write of, ‘We, the British section of this great race ...’.\(^{52}\) Bromhead was a member of the Royal Empire Society. In fact, Calwell remained committed to a White Australia policy in the sense of the exclusion of those identified as members of other races. He always remained staunchly opposed to allowing those designated as ‘Asians’, including the Chinese of course, into Australia.\(^{53}\)

Calwell’s lifelong antagonism to those he racially designated as Asians was based in the discourse of racial determinism, as was his preference for the white race. Characteristic of the liberal version of racial determinism, and its connection with the White Australia policy, is this view of W. M. Hughes, who had been Labor Prime Minister during World War I. In The Splendid Adventure, published in 1929, he wrote that:

The ‘White Australia’ policy is a gesture of defence not defiance. We do not regard Asians as inferiors, but as different from ourselves, believing that the ideals, traditions and standards of living in the East are so incompatible with our own that we could never live with them as fellow-citizens. We could not assimilate Asians without radically changing our racial, social and economic character ... We believe that the welfare of mankind and the progress of civilisation will be best served if different race-stocks develop along their own lines.\(^{54}\)

The racial determinist thinking here is clearly indicated by the last sentence. The second sentence makes the connection between race, and morality and culture.

Calwell began by expanding white to include a variety of Eastern and Central European refugee groups. It was those people, some of whom came from Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, who became known in Australia as Balts. By 1949 members of ‘all European races’\(^{55}\) were being accepted. This term, ‘all European races’, suggests the official extension of the Australian usage of white to cover all those people who, in Europe, were technically thought of as white; that is, to include those that I have des ...

The first year of migration of British could have been a mar ...

This sense of: we could add, in the core-people within Australia connoting ‘A known as the ethno-geography of Irish-back Australians who sects is a mar ...

Throughout the period, the assimilation of those Europeans in service to the white population of the period before A ...
that I have described as marginal whites. The geographic definition of European had come, in Australia, to equate with the racial classification of white. The popular, or at least the political, was equated with the 'scientific.'

At the same time, as Collins argues:

the first years of the post-war immigration program established a 'two-tier' pattern of migration ... The refugees were 'second-class citizens', clearly inferior to their British counterparts. The precedents of two classes of migrant was established in those first years of the program, and was repeated in the subsequent decades whenever the net had to be cast wider to NES migrants to fill immigration targets.56

This sense of second-classness, of being not quite of equal worth to the British (and we could add, northern European) migrants, would subsequently be institutionalised in the core-periphery structure of official multiculturalism.57 In this structure now, within Australia, 'Anglo-Celtic' and its synonyms have replaced the more racially connoting 'Anglo-Saxon' as the site of privilege, and marginal whites are now known as ethnic. 'Anglo-Celtic' signals the sometimes still grudging, acceptance of Irish-background, Catholic Australians into the white core of a multicultural Australia where the identification of membership of other, non-Protestant Christian sects is a marker which helps to define ethnicity.

Throughout this period, whiteness in Australia continued to be thought of literally in terms of colour, or lack of it. An equation was made between whiteness and assimilation. As I have remarked, if one looked white, and could merge visually into the general population, then it was thought one could assimilate. In the pre-Second World War racial determinist period the logic to this was that whiteness equated with cultural compatibility. In the post-Second World War period, when race has been thought of as a signifier of culture, the argument tended more to be in terms of the kind of people that Australians would 'tolerate'.58 Of course, whom the population thought of as 'looking white' was gradually being transformed as numbers of darker, southern European people entered the country. Writing of the period before the Second World War, W. D. Borrie comments that: 'To the average Australian who had no direct contact with them, Italians were simply southern Europeans who, as shopkeepers, labourers and so on, performed an economic service to their community but otherwise never became a part of it.'59 Excluded from the white race, these Italians were also thought to be excluded from the racially defined social order. In 1934 there were riots in Kalgoorlie. Assuming the non-white racialisation of the Italians, Borrie notes how the riots, 'indicate how readily the tense situation created by economic depression could be fanned into racial hatred.'60
In 1951 the Department of Immigration made a ruling on how much coloured ancestry a person could have and still be allowed into Australia. A prospective migrant had to be of 75 per cent ‘European blood’. The assumption was that more than 25 per cent coloured ancestry would make a person too visually different, with the implication that they would be rejected by the Australian population, but also that the person would be too culturally different to assimilate.

I have argued that the assumption behind the White Australia policy was that racial homogeneity first of all determined, and then later signified, cultural homogeneity. The articulation between these two elements is best shown in the case of the two non-European groups allowed to immigrate. Between 1947 and 1969, mostly during the 1960s as the apparatus of the White Australia policy was being dismantled, 17,000 Lebanese were allowed to enter Australia. These were almost all Christians. However, the 12,000 Lebanese who were allowed in in the later 1970s after the ending of the White Australia policy, were mostly Muslims. The second group is the Turks. In 1967 Australia signed a migration agreement with Turkey and in the next four years about 10,000 Turks entered Australia. Now, while the Turks were Muslims, Turkey had aggressively Westernized its culture since the days of Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938) in the 1920s and 1930s. Taken together, the Christian Lebanese and the modern Turks suggest what was really at stake in the post-Second World War preoccupation with whiteness: a set of moral and cultural assumptions that would make easy assimilation into the unitary Australian culture.

**Whiteness and Official Multiculturalism**

While migrant lobby groups had argued for a cultural pluralist solution, multiculturalism was more or less forced on the government as the official population management policy, replacing assimilation and its indistinct successor, integration, because the expected assimilation of the white migrant groups had failed to occur. Nevertheless, the discursive connection of multiculturalism with migration, which is apparent in Grassby’s path-breaking speech as well as in the 1978 Galbally report, signals the presumption, still present in much discussion of multiculturalism today, that migrant groups will eventually assimilate. The official title of the Galbally report is *Evaluation of Post-Arrival Programs and Services* and the report begins: ‘On 31 August, 1977, the Prime Minister announced the establishment of a Review of post-arrival programs and services for migrants to examine the changing needs of migrants ...’ It is clear, then, that, at least during the 1970s, multiculturalism was being thought of by many people as a way of easing migrants’ lives as they gradually assimilated into Australian society. What might be meant by assimilation in this context is culture.

It is to be thought that policy, as managers of the design and consequence, as in the cults of whites, manage reaction to progress and racism. The ethnic is the basis of signals of assimilation, with white values. I have to talk about the four these cultures thought in this context.

**The White Race**

The notion of ‘white’, moral, return to the context. Are Chri
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It is of the utmost importance to remember that the advent of official multiculturalism had absolutely nothing to do with the official ending of the White Australia policy, which happened around the same time. What linked them were the Whitlam government’s progressive social liberalism and the historical shift in Western thought from a reductive emphasis on race to a more relativistic emphasis on culture. The assumption, which appears every so often, that multiculturalism was somehow designed to manage the increasing racial diversity in Australia, is itself a mistaken consequence of racialist thinking.

As I have already explained, multiculturalism’s primary purpose was to manage the cultural diversity of the white migrants, in particular those national groups such as the Italians, the Greeks and the Maltese which I have identified as marginal whites, who entered during the post-Second World War period of the White Australia policy. Though this may seem obvious, multiculturalism is a policy designed to manage cultural diversity not racial diversity. The problems caused by the racist reactions to Australia’s increasing racial diversity produced by the ending of the White Australia policy were addressed by the 1975 Racial Discrimination Act. Being apparently blind to race enables the policy of multiculturalism to appear very progressive. However, this blindness means that the policy can do nothing to counter racism other than to seek to change people’s way of thinking by emphasising ethnicity rather than race. Official multiculturalism preserves a moral unity and on the basis of this moral unity, a diversity of cultures. The emphasis on ‘ethnic groups’ signals this unity. Complicating this idea is the discursive understanding of race as signifying a moral difference. Thus, it is thought, members of non-white races can assimilate into, European – that is, Judeo-Christian, in Pauline Hanson’s terms – values. Equally, as culture is thought to be signified by race, it has become possible to talk about an ‘Asian culture’, or, at least, an ‘Asian morality’ which has provided the foundation for a variety of Asian cultures. The national groups identified with these cultures, for example the Vietnamese and the Indonesians, might then be thought of as being ‘ethnic groups’ within the ‘Asian race’.

The struggle for those identified by racial terms is to get themselves reidentified in ethnic terms. The very usage of the term ‘Asian’ implies the term ‘European’ which, as I have already discussed, stands in for the now uncomfortable term ‘white’. Moreover, ‘Asian’ is used as a descriptor regardless of the religious, or moral, order through which a person lives. Very many of those designated as Asian are Christian, or come from Christian backgrounds, but this similarity to the moral
order that informs official multiculturalism is not enough to overcome the assumption of a moral difference signified by the person’s visual difference from what remains the white Australian norm. The key to Hanson’s idea that small numbers of Asians are acceptable because they will assimilate is that, while visible, racial difference signifies a fundamental moral difference, these people can learn Australian ‘Judaean-Christian beliefs’ which she describes as the basis of the underlying moral order.63

Whiteness has not disappeared in Australia as a key category in the construction of the nation. Rather, it has become abstracted into a general moral system, and ex-nominated, coded through terminology that identifies certain people as Anglo-Celtic and mainstream. Australia now operates with a three-fold structure. The first part of the structure are the so-called real Australians who, the myth claims, are of British, and Irish, stock. This category provides a nation-founding myth of Australia as having had a white population at Federation except for the indigenous people, the Chinese, and a few, small other groups, Afghans and Kanakas and so forth, who have not been central to the production of the national phenotype. In this myth, the success of Anglo-Irish white Australia in excluding the indigenous people, and forcing out the Chinese, left Australia truly white and monocultural.

In connection with this myth the fear of racial intermarriage, and of mixed-race children, has always been very powerful. The historical existence of mixed-race children within the Australian polity would unsettle the claim to a white Anglo-Celtic core population. Seven years after Federation, in 1908, T. A. Coghlan made this argument very clearly:

*The most serious objection to the coloured races is, of course, ethnical: the economic objections might be waived were the other non-existent. In all Australian cities there are large communities of non-British Europeans who are greatly objected to on economic grounds, but whose presence is tolerated because they belong to the races with which Australians can intermarry; and who may thus become absorbed into the general population.*64

Here we have many of the themes that I have been outlining. We have the national Australian use of ‘coloured’ to identify all non-white races; we have identification of those national groups that were constructed as marginal whites – and who now form the ‘ethnic groups’ of official multiculturalism; and we have the concern over the incorporation of coloured people into the white Australian population – the population that seventy years later would be naturalised as the proper Australians using the epithets that I have already identified.
The failure of the marginal white migrants of the post-Second World War period to assimilate could be managed by claiming that, as ‘Europeans,’ they came from countries that shared Christian and Enlightenment values. Hence, we get the second part of the structure, the so-called ‘ethnics’. In this way Australian white monoculturalism was abstracted into a monomorality which was, by implication, white. The third aspect of the structure, is what Coghlan and others would have described as the ‘coloured races’. It is here that cultural difference is considered to signify moral difference, and that both these are identifiable in a claimed racial difference. Here it is that this signifying order gets easily reversed and those identified as racially different are presumed to live according to a different moral system. The problem works in two ways. The cultural difference of those perceived as racially different is identified with moral difference, and religious difference is also thought to express moral difference. Those who are of a different religion — that is, not Christian, and possibly not Jewish — are then thought of as likely to be of a different race.

In Australia religion has been presumed to be the bearer of morality, and Australia’s morality, as I have already quoted Hanson saying, is presumed to be ‘Judeo-Christian’. A good example of the effect of this presumption about religion is the case of Bankstown Council’s refusal in 1998 to allow Muslims use a former Presbyterian church as a mosque. The grounds for this were a legal technicality that enabled the Council to claim that a mosque is not a church. Justice Terry Sheehan of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales ruled in favour of the Council explaining that: ‘A mosque, while a place of worship, is not a church, which is a place of worship in the Christian tradition …’65 Whether or not there is anything deliberate here other than the claimed anxiety by the Council over parking and noise, the effect is to construct Islam, and by implication all non-Christian religions, as of secondary importance in Australia.66 The consequence is the preservation of Christian, European, indeed Anglo-Celtic white, morality as the only legitimate moral system in Australia. An everyday version of this has to do with holidays. Australia does not have an established religion, a religion acknowledged and given preference by the state. However, the making of Christmas and Easter as periods of official holidays has privileged the Christian religion (and indeed the Western Christian sects) over all others. While this convergence made sense during the era of the White Australia policy, when the population was, with the exception of the Jews, more or less completely Christian or secular, its unquestioned preservation when there are increasing numbers of Muslims, Buddhists and members of other religions, is not only an anachronism but also suggests the continued privileging of Western versions of Christianity — the holidays coincide with the Church of England and Roman Catholic calendar — over other religions.
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What, then, are the implications, if any, of having a large, let us say Muslim, population? What might a morally diverse Australia look like? This, latter, is the question that American multiculturalist critique has begun to address. Official multiculturalism must recognise its white monomorality and begin to confront these questions.

Conclusion

I started this paper by commenting that whereas in the United States, cultural pluralism has been critiqued for its white, Eurocentric assumptions, and the way it helps to preserve white hegemony, in Australia there is little challenge to official multiculturalism, which, when all is said and done, works with cultural pluralist assumptions. To a significant extent, the taking up of cultural pluralism in Australia as the philosophy for the management and governance of the Australian population has naturalised its assumptions. As a consequence, official multiculturalism, along with the reinforcement of white power and privilege, remain relatively unquestioned.

In this paper I have wanted to begin the problematising of the category of white in Australia as it has been transformed in political practice, and to show the very fundamental continuities in the thinking about whiteness that have carried over from the White Australia policy to official multiculturalism. I have also wanted to suggest how these continuities have helped to preserve the cultural and political power of those identifiable as white Australians, and how this has involved the strategic and limited incorporation of those I have described as marginal whites. In this system, where white is not thought of as a race and where we now think in the terms of ethnicity, and in terms of moral rather than racial homogeneity, those who have been racialised remain even more problematically situated in relation to official multiculturalism.

The real crisis for official multiculturalism is the challenge to this white monomorality, which is thought to function as the cohesive factor for the limited cultural diversity of multiculturalism. What Australian multiculturalism has to confront is not the challenge of racialisation and racism per se, though these are crucial problems for the national polity, but what is being played out in this racialisation – that is, the fear of moral diversity and the problem of how to manage it. This raises a host of questions about what kind of moral diversity is being talked about. The lack of public recognition of this problem reflects the extent to which there is still a white hegemony in Australia. The most pressing problem is that, within official multiculturalism, the battle over monomorality is played out in racial
terms. Race is, in the end, the language in which the differentiation between white multiculturalism and its morally distinct Other is expressed. The ideology that underlay the White Australia policy still haunts us.

Endnotes

1 There is a paper given by Susanne Schech and Jane Haggis entitled Incoherent Selves: migrancy, whiteness and the settler self in contemporary Australia, presented at the Adventures of Identity Conference, Sydney, 1998. Hopefully, a revised version will be published soon.


3 Ghassan Hage 'Anglo-Celts today: cosmo-multiculturalism and the phase of the fading phallus', Communal/Plural, no. 4, 1995, p. 50.


5 The idea that social cohesion depends on a shared moral order is the foundational premise of the key sociological ideology of functionalism. It develops out of Western, Enlightenment understandings of the meaning of 'society'.


9 See, for example, the submission of the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council to the Australian Population and Immigration Council on the Green Paper, Immigration Policies and Australia's Population', entitled Australia as a Multicultural Society, Canberra: AGPS 1978. It should be noted that the submission acknowledges the problem of moral order: 'Because of differences among minority cultures themselves and also because some minority values are totally inconsistent with fundamental values of the dominant Australian culture (e.g. the norm that the family takes the law into its own hands to redress a wrong done to one of its members), it would be nonsense to say that multiculturalism means that every culture is equally valued and equally legitimate.' p. 16.


13 John Higham, Send These to Me: Jews and other immigrants in urban America, New York: Atheneum, 1975.

14 It is possible that this absence of discussion of other racialised groups was one way in which Kallen helped to get Jews, ambivalently racialised in the United States, accepted as white, and therefore as ethnic.


19 Perhaps the best example of the highlighting of the limits to moral difference can be found in the complexities and ambivalences to be found in the croscurrents in the debate over female genital mutilation in Australia.


21 Gunew, p. 22.


23 ibid., p. 163.

24 It should be noted that Bostock still used the term 'Anglo-Saxon', 'Anglo-Celtic' did not become common currency until the 1980s. One discussion of the use of Anglo-Saxon in Australia is Peter Cochran, 'Anglo-Saxonness: ancestors and identity', Communal/Plural, no. 4, 1994, pp. 1-16.


27 The most marginal of marginal white groups in Australia has been the Jews. See my 'The colour of Jews: Jews, race and the White Australia policy,' Journal of Australian Studies, no. 50/51, 1996, pp. 51-65.

28 I discuss the meanings of these in chapter two of Race Daze: Australia in identity crisis, Sydney: Pluto Press, 1998.

29 Anglo-Saxon comes from the era of racial determinism. Anglo-Celtic is more ambiguously racial and ethnic, and it suggests the privileging of culture as its main feature.


33 Hiro, p. xv.

35 Addressed to the Americans, the poem begins:

*Take up the White Man’s burden –*
*Send forth the best ye breed –*
*Go bind your sons to exile*
*To serve your captives’ need;*
*To wait in heavy harness*
*On fluttered folk and wild –*
*Your new caught sullen peoples,*
*Half devil and half child.*


38 McClintock, p. 52.


45 Azoulay, p. 2.


48 See Yarwood, chs 1 & 2.

49 One example of the anxiety over the expansionist yellow race was Fleetwood Chidell, *Australia – White or Yellow*, London: Heinemann, 1926. Published in 1926, this book advocated massive migration from Britain to populate Australia in order to save it for the white race in the face of the threat of being overrun by the Japanese.

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51 Collins, p. 22.
52 Waller Bromhead, *Shall White Australia Fail?*, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1939, p 304.
53 I mention a number of anecdotes that illustrate Calwell’s racist attitude to Asians in *Race Daze*, p. 58.
55 Quoted in Collins, p. 22.
60 Borrie p. 149.
63 In ‘Speech At Australian Reform Party (Vic.)’ in *The Truth*, Pauline Hanson says: ‘Mainstream Australia is firmly based on its Anglo-Celtic-European heritage, Judaico-Christian beliefs, English law and the Westminster parliamentary system.’ (p. 12).
66 The Premier of New South Wales, Bob Carr, subsequently intervened in the matter of the mosque. An account in the *Sydney Morning Herald* 7/12/98 has the Premier announcing that NSW planning laws would be amended to include mosques as ‘places of worship’. Mr Carr is quoted as saying: ‘The current definition is unfair to communities who practice religious customs other than Christianity. NSW is home to many religious ethnic groups. It makes sense for our laws to recognise that fact.’ It should be noted bow Carr conjains religious and ethnic here.

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