The Decline of Cleavage Politics in Australia Revisited

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Introduction

One of the most substantial empirical contributions to the international literature on historical changes in the relationship between social cleavages and political alignments was the multi-authored book Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992). This was sponsored by the Committee on Political Sociology of the International Political Science Association and the International Sociological Association, and drew on longitudinal analyses of survey data (generally covering a period from about the mid-1960s to 1990) from sixteen western countries (including Australia) in an attempt to draw conclusions that would have cross-national validity.

One of the main conclusions of the authors (discussed in chapters 19 and 20 of their book) is essentially that there is a developmental process that started later in some countries than in others that explains the decline of social cleavages in relation to voting. In the case of Australia, they argue that it is an “early decline” country (i.e. the process had begun before the 1960s).

It is not completely clear what they project for the then-future (i.e. post 1990) nature and extent of the relationship between social groups and voting, but there seems to be a suggestion in places that at least several of the authors believed there would be no ongoing role for social cleavages (e.g. “our observations suggest that post-industrial society may no longer even have the capacity to socialize people into loyalties towards social groups” (van der Eijk et al 1992 : 416)). The chapter on Australia was authored by Ian McAllister, who concluded that “There seems little doubt that the decline in the electoral importance of class has been substantial” (but occurred mainly between 1967 and 1979) (1992a: 72), but also that “Class and its concomitants …. remain the main social bases of the political parties” (1992a: 81).

The Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992) arguments were, of course, reflective of a quite widespread belief (e.g. Clark et al 1993; Inglehart 1977) that social cleavages, of which class was most often the most significant, had already had (and would continue to have) decreasing political significance. Their evidence is quoted extensively and approvingly by Pakulski and...
Waters (1996: 136): “The importance of this study rests not only on its impressive comparative scope, but also on a sophisticated methodology that uses regression techniques to reveal electoral trends.”

There are, of course, critics of the argument (e.g. Evans 1999) and it is important that the validity of the evidence on which their conclusions are based should be well-established. One relevant concern in this regard results from the fact that, in order to maximize the degree of cross-national comparability, several compromises had to be made in the project. One of these was that the measurement level used for the social structure variables studied was very coarse; the core variables are all measured simply as dichotomies. This necessarily resulted in a definite understatement of the strength of association between social structure and (left) vote (the dependent variable selected for the project). The authors themselves acknowledged this and, in fact, van der Eijk and Niemoller (1992: 273-4) say they found a general increase for the Netherlands of 3-8% in $r^2$-squared when using polytomies in place of the dichotomies.

Also, in general there were only 3 time points used in each country, largely determined by the availability of suitable survey data, so the assessment of patterns (in specific countries at least) is potentially unreliable. In the case of Australia, the years used were 1967, 1979 and 1987 (two of Aitkin’s surveys and the first Australian Election Study, respectively). The assessment of Australia as an “early decline” country seems somewhat inconsistent with the conclusion of Jones and McAllister (1989) that there was no decline in class voting in Australia until after the middle of the 1960s, although a partial explanation for this might lie in a reduction in religious denomination effects from the mid-1950s onwards. Another possible explanation is that Jones and McAllister use more detailed sets of categories than simple dichotomies to measure their social structure variables. Again, though, Jones and McAllister use only 3 time periods (late 1940s/ mid-1960s/ early1980s) in their analyses.

A quite similar analysis to McAllister (1992a) appears in McAllister (1992b: 169), although with the 1990 AES replacing the 1987 AES. A possibly significant difference between the two is that the McAllister (1992b) analysis includes only ALP and Coalition voters, whereas the other analysis had also included voters for the DLP and the Australian Democrats, which one would
expect to dilute the apparent strength of the relationship between social cleavages and voting. His overall conclusion, however, remained the same viz. that there had been a decrease in the significance for voting of social structure, and a concomitant increase in the importance of issue voting.

Australia is potentially quite important from the point of view of providing an extended reassessment, because it was one of the earliest countries to begin ongoing opinion polling and hence is one of only a small number for which analyses can be extended much further backwards in time. Both Alford (1963) and Kemp (1978) (who also uses the ‘post-industrial society’ theme in his argument about the decline of class voting) made use of these early polls. The critique of Kemp’s work in Jones and McAllister (1989) also draws on some of them, as does Goot’s (1994) more general critique of the debate.

The most extensive recent analysis is in Weakliem and Western (1999), who conclude (among other things) that the conclusion of both Jones and McAllister and Goot that class voting did not steadily decline during the post-war period was more accurate than Kemp’s description of a steady decline. Another of their conclusions, though, is that, in contrast to Goot’s argument, they can find no obvious connection between political factors and the timing of declines in class voting.

None of this research both covers the whole of the post-war period and also analyses a full set of social structure variables such as those considered in the Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992) project; they either deal only with class voting specifically (Kemp; Goot; Weakliem and Western), or only analyse a limited number of time points (Jones and McAllister; McAllister). Since the detailed work on the 1996 election reported in Charnock (1997) shows that even in an election where traditional (or even extended) measures of occupational class had only weak associations with voting, other social structural variables remained significant, consideration of a broader set of variables over an extended period might well provide different conclusions.

This is not merely a question of improving the description of patterns of change, it also should help to explain them. For example, as the extent of class voting as measured by occupational
class has diminished, has this been replaced (partially, at least) by other social structural aspects (such as the private/government sector division) or has it begun to revolve more around other things, such as the sort of distinctions around values that some authors postulate.

A related question is that of the nature of the relationship between such values and social structural location. It is not possible to address this here, but it is worth noting that the (often associated) idea that any new value dimension (such as one based on post-materialist or –modern values) necessarily either replaces a left-right one or crosscuts it completely independently has had doubt cast on it by more recent research that suggests that the two dimensions are fairly strongly correlated with each other (see Kitschelt’s (1994, 1995) work on Europe, and Charnock and Ellis (2003a, 2003b) for Australia).

In addition to the constraints on the project design mentioned above, earlier researchers were also unable to take much account of the technical problems that might arise from the cluster sampling methods typically used in the surveys. Use of the more recently developed multilevel techniques (e.g. Jones et al 1992; Charnock 1996) can overcome these, when suitable detail about sample designs is available. This also has the potential to offer different, more accurate conclusions.

For these reasons, my purpose in this paper is to extend this previous work in the area in three ways:

(i) chronologically, to cover the full post-WWII period. Also to do it election by election, so that there is no difficulty disentangling isolated or temporary effects from long-term ones;

(ii) by using more complex measurements of social structure than those in McAllister (1992a, 1992b), in order to avoid under-estimating the strength of the association between social structure and voting;

(iii) by using multilevel analysis methods where possible, in order to avoid confounding changes in the strength of social structural influences with ones associated with varying strengths of effects at different spatial scales.
Data and Methods

I was unable to find survey data publicly available through the Australian Social Science Data Archives (ASSDA) that are completely comparable for the entire period. There is enough continuity in the earlier period to use Morgan Gallup Polls, but later Australian Gallup Polls conducted by McNair Anderson asked respondents about a more limited range of background characteristics (including omitting religion). The ASSDA does, however, hold the data for Age Polls between 1972 and 1981. The first of the large-scale general academic surveys was conducted by Aitkin in 1967 (with a second wave in 1969), but the next was not until Aitkin’s Australian Political Attitudes Survey in 1979. The National Social Science Surveys began in 1984 and the series of Australian Election Studies commenced in 1987.

An element of discontinuity is therefore inevitable, because there are some differences in definitions of categories and sometimes in the variables available. This could be a serious problem if we were assessing changes by examining estimated coefficients for individual categories, but the nature of the main measure used (an r-squared measure, for comparability with the approach used in Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992)) is such that the impact of category differences is not likely to be large. Even occasional differences in the availability of particular social structure variables can be approximately allowed for, though this is necessarily more speculative. As far as possible, polls were selected that had been conducted shortly before or shortly after an election date; analyses showed that the two gave similar results.

The analytical technique used is bivariate logistic regression for ALP vote v Coalition vote. This is consistent with the approach used in Jones and McAllister (1989) and McAllister (1992b), but differs from that used in McAllister (1992a), which uses ALP [Coalition + DLP + Australian Democrats]. This second approach would almost certainly have the effect of diluting the apparent impact of social structure, especially at times when voters for the Australian Democrats were closer to the ALP than to the Coalition. When necessary, however, I will also comment on the impact on my results of including DLP, Australian Democrats and ONP voters. I will also comment on the effect of using two-level rather than single-level models, when the data allow for this.
The measure focused upon in the Franklin, Mackie and Valen book was an r-squared value, representing the percentage of variance in ALP voting explained by the social structure variables. The measure used here is an analogous one for bivariate logistic regressions (the McKelvey and Zavoina r-squared coefficient; DeMaris (2002) indicates this is the best such one). Snijders and Bosker (1999) describe the multilevel equivalent.

The core variables used in the Franklin, Mackie and Valen project (in the McAllister 1992a chapter about Australia) were as follows:

- Manual occupation
- Trade Union member
- Minimum education
- Urban resident
- Sex
- NSW resident
- Aged below 45 years
- Self-identified working class
- Frequent religious attendance

Some analyses (in the ‘expanded set’ of variables) added Religious Denomination (categorized as Catholic/No religion/Other (the excluded, reference category, effectively Protestant)) and others (in the ‘country-specific’ set of variables) also added Country of Birth (categorized as S. European/ E. European/ Other (the excluded, reference category, effectively Australian and British)).

Jones and McAllister (1989) base their analyses on the following variables:

- Age (3 categories)
- Sex
- Large city resident
Religion (4 categories)
Occupational Class (5 categories)
Phone ownership
Car ownership

My analyses maintain a close degree of comparability with the variables incorporated (but, as in Jones and McAllister (1989), measured in more detailed sets of categories than the dichotomies used in McAllister (1992a)). I added State of Residence to the variables used in Jones and McAllister and used slightly more categories for each of Age, Religion and Occupational Class.

Results and Discussion
I will begin by making a direct comparison (based on the same data sets) of my results with those reported in McAllister (1992b: 169). As mentioned above, although the general nature of the social structure variables included is the same¹, several of those used in my analyses use more categories. The comparison is graphed in Figure 1 and, as expected, this shows that the more detailed categorization incorporated in my analyses reveals a stronger degree of association of vote with social structure, about 10 percentage points higher in each survey.
Figure 1: Variation in ALP voting explained by social structure variables (comparison with McAllister 1992b)


However, although the levels are different for the two sets of analyses, the pattern over time is essentially unchanged, showing an overall decline between 1967 and 1990, with most of this occurring between 1979 and 1990. This might seem to support an interpretation of an ongoing decline in the significance of social structure (as seems to be suggested in Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992), but when the analyses are extended beyond 1990 a different picture emerges. Figure 2 includes results from all three of Aitkin’s surveys and all of the Australian Election Studies from 1987 onwards, as well as the 1984-5 National Social Science Survey.
This shows that 1990 was actually a low point, with subsequent increases in 1993 and 1996, before a drop to around the 1990 level again in 1998 and 2001. While the inclusion of the NSSS results makes no difference to the pattern, that of the 1969 second wave of Aitkin’s study makes a substantial difference to the likely interpretation. Although various possibilities suggest themselves, the lack of other academic surveys through the 1970s makes it very difficult to choose an appropriate one at this stage. I will return to this period later on in this paper.

Clearly, examining this chronological extension beyond 1990 must modify our understanding of the relationship between social structure and voting because it does not confirm the pattern of continued decline that was suggested by the results in McAllister (1992a, 1992b). What happens when we extend the period in the opposite direction, from the mid-1960s back to the end of WWII? In light of the discontinuity between the early Morgan Gallup Polls and the later academic surveys, at this stage I will proceed by considering the Gallup Poll results by themselves and will leave a discussion of the complete post-war period until later.
The results are presented in Figure 3 and show a quite substantial drop between the beginning and the end of the two decades long period in the proportion of ALP voting explained by the social structure variables (from around 45% to just over 25%). As already seen in the later period, however, the pattern of change is not a smooth one. First, and perhaps most notably, there clearly appears to be a significant difference between the pre- and post-1950 periods, with a very large drop between 1949 and 1951. Second, the results from the 1950s show some fluctuations, though followed by consecutive decreases through to 1966.

Although my analyses are based on a group of social structure variables and his are based only on the occupational class variable, these features are quite similar to those identified by Goot (1994: 162-167) in his examination of odds ratios, and so seem to provide support for a good deal of his political interpretations of the changes. However, given that one of the social structure variables is religious denomination, the similarity of the overall pattern to that for occupational class alone might appear hard to understand for the elections around and following the ALP split and the subsequent formation of the DLP.
The fact that only ALP and Coalition voters are included in the analyses is part of the explanation for this; if DLP voters are also included (and effectively incorporated with Coalition voters in the logistic regressions for ALP vote) then the pattern alters a little, with the peak in 1958 not being quite as pronounced (because the r-squared value is reduced most in 1958, by 0.04).

Examination of the detailed differences, however, shows that the major explanation is that short-term fluctuations in this period were most likely to be associated with occupational class, while the smoother decline from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s occurred essentially simultaneously in both occupational class and religious denomination. The former aspect supports Goot’s argument that specific political factors are important, while the latter might be seen to support the Franklin, Mackie and Valen argument about longer-term changes in the significance of social structure more generally.

I have now dealt with two periods, within each of which separately there is enough internal comparability to draw reasonably secure conclusions about patterns of change during the period. Drawing on data from Age Polls, I will now proceed to attempt both to ‘splice together’ these two periods and also to fill in some of the missing detail from the 1970s. There are some difficulties in doing this, so the resulting patterns should be treated with some caution when assessing detailed patterns especially (though broad outlines are probably not as susceptible).

One of the main sources of difficulty is that almost none of the Gallup Polls and Age Polls gathered information about either trade union membership or religious attendance, whereas all of the academic surveys did so. Another problem is that information on employment sector (government, private, self-employed) was not collected in either of Aitkin’s 1967 and 1969 surveys, nor in the Gallup and Age Polls (although their occupational class measures do incorporate an element of the self-employed category), but it was included in the academic surveys from 1979 onwards.

Since all three of these aspects of social structure have potentially important associations with voting, it does not seem sensible to me to adopt a procrustean solution to the question of comparability by presenting results based on omitting them from the academic surveys. What
seems like a better approach, at least for the large gap in the 1970s between Aitkin’s surveys, is to hypothetically incorporate them where necessary by assuming that their additional contribution at an election to the r-squared measure would be equal to the average contribution at succeeding elections for which relevant data were collected (and hence where their contribution is actually known). This obviously has something of a ‘smoothing effect’ on the pattern of change, but should give a better indication of the overall levels of influence of social structure on voting. Suitable available data are so remote from the Gallup Polls between 1946 and 1966, however, that it does not seem desirable to adopt this approach for them and I have chosen to leave the results for them as they appeared previously in Figure 3.2. Adopting this approach gives the results seen in Figure 4. This is clearly a picture of overall decrease in the extent to which ALP voting has been related to social structure variables, but is not the kind of smooth decline that would be expected from some arguments. To this extent, my results support Goot’s point about the need to consider contemporary political factors. If anything, the period when Gough Whitlam was leader of the ALP appears as a relative low point in the influence of social structure, but the problems with data comparability make drawing such a detailed conclusion rather insecure.
However, I think we can be quite confident about the broader conclusion that the evidence of Figure 4 shows only relatively small changes between the early 1960s and the late 1980s and no indication that the association of these social structure variables with voting is fading away towards complete insignificance. It may be the case that results from 1990 onwards presage a further decrease, but this is not certain at this stage. It is, though, also true that changes in the extent of voting for major parties mean that the results for 1998 and 2001 take account of only about 80 per cent of the electorate, compared to amounts that were usually over 90 per cent prior to 1990.

Mention was made earlier of investigating the possibility that using multilevel modeling methods might give different results because of their being able to deal with the estimation problems involved with the cluster sample designs used by most of the surveys. In fact, when these analyses were carried out, the effect was to reduce the r-squared values by only small amounts (generally two percentage points) and, since the reduction was almost the same for each survey, the patterns of change over time are unaltered.
The question of what account to take of non-major party voters can make rather more difference to the results and does vary more over time. As mentioned earlier, with the main exception of 1958, the effect of including DLP voters is small, but including Australian Democrats voters has more influence on reducing $r^2$ and the decrease also varies more, being as small as one percentage point in 1993 but as large as five points in 1990 and four points in Aitkin’s 1979 survey. The analyses in McAllister (1992a) included both DLP and Australian Democrats voters. Since the inclusion of the former made little difference to $r^2$ whereas inclusion of the latter generally makes more, this helps explain why the extent of the decline between 1967 and 1987 in the influence of social structure found in McAllister (1992a) is greater than found here and shown in Figure 2 above.

Conclusion

The work reported here provides chronological extensions (both forwards and backwards) to previous comparable research, and also gives more detail about the period covered by earlier researchers. In addition, it explores the impact of incorporating some methodological improvements. Consequently, I think my findings are more firmly based than previous ones and also help in choosing between some previously argued positions about patterns of change in the relationship between aspects of social structure and voting.

A simple overall description of this pattern might subdivide the postwar period into four (possibly three) eras. The first appears to have ended in about 1950 and in the context of this study was characterized by a high degree of association between vote and a fairly small set of social structural variables, mainly reflecting socio-economic background (particularly occupational class), but with religion also having a notable effect. At this time, about 45 per cent of variation in ALP voting was associated with these variables.

The second period seems to have roughly coincided with the 1950s. The degree of association between social structure and vote during this period, although lower than pre-1950, remained quite high but fluctuated more often and in a wider range (between 31 and 39 per cent) than in
subsequent periods of the same length. Both religion and socio-economic background continued to be important, but the fluctuations were more generally associated with occupational class. This conclusion needs to be slightly modified if account is also taken of DLP voters; in that case, the effect of religion is reduced (and hence so is the overall degree of association between social structure and vote, by 4 percentage points in 1958).

The post-1960 period could possibly be described as a single era, but I think it is preferable for it to be divided into two, the first section covering approximately the three decades beginning in 1960 and the second shortly before 1990. In the first, the strength of association between social structure and vote (ranging from 25 to 30 per cent of variation explained) was lower than in the 1950s, but there are few short-term fluctuations and changes are generally fairly slow and smooth. In general, the influence of religion was further reduced during this period (the inclusion of DLP and Democrats voters does not alter this conclusion), as was that of occupational class.

The 1990-2001 period, although much shorter than the previous section, shows larger fluctuations and, on average, a further reduced strength of association, down to 22 per cent of variation explained in both 1990 and 2001 and 23 per cent in 1998. Further, at the end of this period increases in minor party voting meant that this association was applicable to only 80 per cent of the electorate. By this time, no single social structure variable dominates in the way that occupational class did in the early part of the post-war period, and although fluctuations are mainly associated with employment-related variables, the strength of association between vote and religion also varies somewhat.

What does this mean for our interpretation of underlying processes? One reasonable conclusion to draw from the short-term fluctuations that appear is that contemporary political factors cannot be ignored in assessing the way in which the decline in the strength of association between social structure and voting has occurred. It is not adequate to describe the decline as a simple and smooth reaction to (or consequence of) social change.

In the broader cross-national context considered by Franklin, Mackie and Valen (1992), it does appear that their inclusion of Australia in the group of ‘early decline’ countries was accurate.
While they do not explicitly address the question of why Australia might fall into that category, they argue in general that “…declining cleavage politics can be regarded as a consequence of the successful resolution by political systems of deep-seated conflicts of social interests” (van der Eijk et al 1992: 423). Perhaps, therefore, they would have regarded Australia’s relative economic prosperity and stability in the first part of the post-war period (together with Menzies’ willingness to use some government intervention and maintain aspects of a welfare state) as being the major part of the explanation. Equally, one could reasonably argue that more recent increasing levels of income inequality would help to explain the much slower rate of decline since the mid-1960s.

It is, nevertheless, the case that the broad pattern over the post-war period is one of an overall decrease in the influence of social structure on ALP voting, albeit a rather episodic decline modulated by the contemporary political factors mentioned above. In this sense, my results provide support both for some of Goot’s arguments (about the need to take political factors into account) and also for McAllister’s about the existence of a decline in the significance of social structure for voting. With regard to this latter, however, the use of dichotomies means that McAllister’s work does understate the degree of association between social structure and voting. The extension to 2001 presented here also demonstrates that the pattern of ongoing decline suggested by his work has not yet been convincingly borne out, although the results for 1998 and 2001 (including increases in minor party voting) might yet prove to be an indication that this is in process.
NOTES

1. In both cases, I have excluded the Parental Socialisation measures (because they were not included in the Franklin, Mackie and Valen study).

2. Note, however, that on two occasions where data on union membership was collected in Gallup Polls, its extra contribution to r-squared was only 2 percentage points in both cases, an amount that is generally similar to that from 1979 onwards.


References


