Netizens in Combat:
Conflict on the Internet in Indonesia[1]

by

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In exploring some of the ways the Internet is being used in Indonesia, we take our cue from Manuel Castells' seminal two-volume study, *The Information Age*, in which he argues that "the social dimension of the Information Technology Revolution seems bound to follow the law of the relationship between technology and society proposed … by Marvin Kranzberg: [that] technology is neither good nor bad, nor is it neutral" (1996, 65). Castells concurs that the "actual deployment [of technology] in the realm of conscious social action, and the complex matrix of interaction between the technological forces unleashed by our species, and the species itself, are matters of inquiry rather than of fate" (ibid).

In proceeding with such an inquiry, we focus on developments in post-Suharto Indonesia to make two general arguments about the Internet and its social implications. First, we argue (as we have done elsewhere in Hill and Sen 1997) against the technological determinism that marks the current debate about the Internet in particular, and new information technology (IT) in general, and in so doing return to the human actor – the users of the Internet – as the subject of social action. Secondly, we propose a localized and political approach to the Internet in contrast to the largely globalized-economic one that dominates current analyses. In particularly, through a close reading of on-line discussions in and on the Moluccas (1998-2000) we want to account for some of the specific ways in which the Indonesian consumer/citizen is using the Internet at particular points of political contestation and social conflict.

Popular Positions

It is not surprising that analyses of the Internet tend to arise from a global perspective given that its technological faculties are those of global communication. The authoritative position on this matter is summarized in the G8 Okinawa Communiqué: "IT empowers, benefits and links people the world over, allows global citizens to express themselves and know and respect one another" (Kyushu-Okinawa Summit Meeting 2000, para. 10). This kind of globalist official and popular commonsense about the Internet is backed up by the widely available and frequently-cited data and projections about the growth of Internet use worldwide and the relative paucity of nation-specific information.[2] Even in the rare instances

where academics look at the Net in a national context (including our own work on the Internet in Indonesia), a certain valorization of global connectivity seems to overshadow the acknowledged national specificities.[3]

Indeed, our attempt to speak about the Internet *in Indonesia* is problematic in several ways. How does one define national boundaries in virtual space? How do we mark the Indonesian patch of the Internet where conversations go on without spatial reference to either source or target of information? One could start with sites or mailing lists using principally Internet Service Providers (ISPs) located in Indonesia. Or we could follow the major search engines in dividing the Internet by language. These are inadequate markers. The single best known Indonesian mailing list, and later website, popularly known as *apakabar*, carries approximately equal amounts of material in Indonesian and English and uses an American ISP.

We have, nonetheless, taken language and subject matter as our starting point for this paper. We proceed from a working definition of *Internet in Indonesia* as (i) those sites and lists which use substantial amounts of Bahasa Indonesia and deal mainly with Indonesia-related matters; (ii) those aspects of Internet usage that are observable either *within the physical borders* of Indonesia or in the sites and lists noted in (i).

The unequal spread of the Internet is well known. "A survey towards the end of 1999 suggested that 259 million people are now Internet users. Of these 111 million were in the United States, six times as many as the next largest figure which was for Japan" (Ferdinand 2000, 1). But almost inevitably such figures are followed by growth predictions across the globe: "The survey predicted that the figures would rise to around 490 million by the end of 2002. Another recent survey claimed that over 28 million people visited the World Wide Web every day and confirmed that it was now rapidly spreading outside the US. Foreign domains already account for nearly 50 per cent of all Internet traffic" (Ferdinand 2000, 1).

The debate about the economic implications of the information revolution moves between these two kinds of data – current inequities, on the one hand, and the speed of growth of the Internet, on the other. On the one hand, the United Nations' own statistics show that a fifth of the world's population, living in Europe, US and Japan constitute 93 per cent of Internet users. On the other hand every international agency sees the problem of underdevelopment being solved by this IT. Many of the Asian national governments have also pinned their hopes on the Internet and its consequent "knowledge economy" to enable them to leap frog into equality with the developed west. One can map this faith in the knowledge economy on an

older developmentalist discourse where education and technology were seen as the salvation for the underdeveloped. But that is not the purpose of this paper. We want only to draw attention here to a contradiction that marks both the optimistic and pessimistic side of the debate over the Internet's socio-economic impact. On the one hand this discourse is technologically deterministic. Either IT is "enabling the developing countries to 'leapfrog' stages of development" or it "is contributing to even wider economic divergence between developing and industrialized countries" (Braga 1998). In either case information technology itself is the social actor – it does things, good or bad. On the other hand, the discussion about the new media and information technology has also shifted the individual consumer from being a "passive audience" to being an "active user". So on the one hand IT empowers the individual consumer, on the other, it inexorably drives the world in one direction or another. We turn to Indonesia with the questions suggested in the gap between the determinist technology and empowered user: Who is this user? Should we necessarily conceive of the "user" as "individual" or is the technology being used *against* individual consumers and citizens, and *for* and *by* particular kinds of collectives? Clearly the technology transports massive amounts of information across great distances at great speed. But is the nature and consequences of this information movement necessarily predetermined by the technology itself?

The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. In the first we develop a picture of how the Net is spreading in Indonesia. We then turn to the quite different ways in which the Internet has been implicated in two different points of political struggle in recent Indonesian history: the initial transition to a post-authoritarian electoral democracy, and internecine conflict in the Maluku archipelago.

Who is on the Net in Indonesia?

If the global spread of the Internet has been uneven -- flooding America and parts of Europe while barely even trickling into Africa and the Middle East[4] -- it would be of little surprise that, within a developing economy such as Indonesia, access to the Internet too reflects a similar inequity. While this may be predictable, noteworthy in Indonesia is the multiplication of public-access Internet points servicing a growing number of users outside home and office.

As with the rest of Southeast Asia, the Internet started growing substantially in Indonesia in the mid 1990s. Like other governments in Southeast Asia, the "developmentalist authoritarian"[5] government of Indonesia under President Suharto, and particularly B. J. Habibie, as Minister of Technology, later Vice President and still later President, embraced

the Internet as a major conduit of national development. In its last decade the New Order state seemed committed to extending the Internet both horizontally across the regions and vertically across the socio-economic classes. The international projections were optimistic. In 1997, Indonesia was included by the *Inter@ctive Week* as one of the "Emerging 20" nations offering "a plethora of untouched opportunities for expanding the Internet". The Latin American, Asian and Eastern European countries listed were noted for having "two qualities that make them extremely attractive to U.S. equipment providers: All are in their technological beginnings and all are headed by governments that realize the vital need for advanced communications to sustain an economy in the new Internet frontier" (CyberAtlas 1999). While projections of growth have been consistently optimistic, the growth of the Internet in Indonesia has remained relatively low compared to its Southeast Asian neighbours.

The exact number of Internet users in Indonesia is notoriously difficult to establish. Prior to 1995 the Internet had been restricted to a handful of science students in the major universities. It is estimated that by the end of 1995 there were fifteen thousand Internet users in Indonesia, serviced by five commercial ISPs and the old university-based network IPTEKnet. By the middle of the following year there were fifteen ISPs in operation and forty thousand subscribers. In May 1997, on the eve of the Asian financial crisis, the government had issued permits to forty-one ISPs, of which thirty-two appeared to be operational. In the year after the Asian financial crisis, which hit Indonesia in July 1997, the growth in subscription numbers slowed and remained at about 85,000 through 1997-98.[6] Figures in September 1999 from the Indonesian Association of Internet Service Providers (APJII) indicated there were 250,000 paid-up subscribers,[7] a six-fold increase in the two and a half years since the end of 1996. By 2001, APJII estimated that there were about 511,000 Internet subscribers.[8] Even with this burgeoning, with parallel growth in Indonesian domain registrations,[9] since Internet's commercial introduction in 1995, subscribers amounted to less than one quarter of one per cent of the country's 210 million inhabitants.

Prospects for growth in subscriptions is limited by the existing economic, technological and educational infrastructure of the nation. At the end of the millennium there was approximately one telephone line for forty people. Wages figures from Indonesian Central Statistical Bureau (BPS) suggest that the price of the cheapest personal computer is well over the median monthly earnings of the overwhelming majority of working Indonesians. For instance, BPS figures for weekly earnings of workers in the manufacturing industry and in the hotel sector was just around fifty thousand rupiah in early 1999 when the cheapest personal computer cost about three million rupiah. Our observations and anecdotal evidence suggest that this price was well over the monthly income of all but senior executives and successful professionals,

and even exceeded the per capita Gross Regional Domestic Product of at least four of the twenty-six provinces for which the BPS provided data.[10]

Subscription numbers, however, provide only a very incomplete picture of the extent of Internet usage. Corporate connections are frequently used by more than one staff, and within a home, several members may use the same subscription, raising the number of people with access to the Net substantially above the total of financial subscribers. In Indonesia the practice of sharing passwords and accounts is common. APJII estimated that in 2001 the mere 511,000 subscriptions represented nearly two million actual Internet users, while the Deputy Minister for State Efficiency (*Deputi Menteri Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara*), J.B. Kristiadi indicated in August 2001 he believed the figure to be closer to three million.[11]

Moreover, the provision of public access points has put the technology within reach of people who could not afford a computer or even a telephone connection. The popularity of public access Internet emulated an earlier boom in public telephone and facsimile services, through the government-owned and private "*wartel*" (*warung telekomunikasi*, telecommunication café/kiosks), which began to dot the Indonesian urban landscape in the mid-1980s. By the early 1990s there were 25,000 public phones and 800 *wartel* around the country (Idris and Ibrahim 1993, 63). Expansion of the *wartel* continues.[12] Many *wartel* added Internet to their existing telecommunications facilities, and adopted the name "*wartelnet*" (Internet telecommunication kiosks) or "*warnet*". More commonly, cafés or *warung* (roadside stalls selling food, the word from which the *warnet* takes its name) set up a couple of tables with computers for customers who might pay Rp.1,000 for a cup of coffee and Rp.5,000 for an hour of web access. There are now a variety of organisational support structures the Internet kiosk owners and information in books and web pages on how to start up such operations. By the end of 1998, the Internet was accessible to subscribers in more than a hundred cities and towns (Baskoro 1998) with public access points in most provincial capitals. By the end of 2000, the industry estimated that there were 1,500 *warnet* operating in cities and town across Indonesia (Indonesia Cyber Industry & Market Research and Analysis Team 2001, 16).

To the Indonesian enthusiasts of the Internet, the growth of *warnet* is the answer to the problem of the enormously unequal distribution of technology (generally, and IT in particular) both across regions and across social classes in Indonesia. In commenting on what has been dubbed the "cyberspace divide" separating those with or without access to the Internet, Harold Thimbleby (1998) quipped "serfs don't surf". But, extolling the egalitarian benefits of *warnet*, Deputy Minister J.B. Kristiadi has claimed that among the "approximately two and a half million Internet users using […] *warnet*" were farmers in several locations

throughout Indonesia who were using them to monitor price fluctuations for their agricultural commodities, thereby maximising their market price (*Kompas* 31 August 2001). There is very little statistical data on who uses the *warnet*. So we can only attempt a very rough thumb-nail sketch of which Indonesians have possible access to the global information highway through these small local coffee-shops on the basis of observations – our own, and of those working in this sector.

Onno W. Purbo, an engineer turned Internet Guru of Indonesia, in his 1999 book of instructions on how to set up a *warnet* recommends an hourly rental of Rp. 5,000 to Rp. 10,000. He suggests that some of the larger *warnet* may be able to charge as little as Rp.3,500 (Purbo 1999, 143-4). That is, roughly between 35 US cents and a dollar US. However, even these prices cannot promise widespread access in a country where the official minimum daily wage is Rp. 5,000 in the capital and lower in many regional towns.

The locations of the *warnet* provide a second index of exclusion. In August 2000, AWARI (Assosiasi Warnet Indonesia), an informal organization of *warnet* owners (founded by Onno Purbo, mentioned above, as a virtual forum for exchange of information) listed 364 *warnet*. It had a complete list of these in Jakarta and the surrounding area – 265 in all – but only a handful in other cities in Java and Bali. The Idaman.com website (owned by another association of *Warnet*) provided a more representative list of 340 public access points across the archipelago. Given that membership of these groups and the provision of information to such web sites is voluntary, no such list was exhaustive. But 314 warnet on the Idaman list provide sufficient information for verification of their existence. Of these, 264 or nearly 85 per cent were located on the island of Java, where a little over half the Indonesian population live. On this list, the capital Jakarta accounted for 80 or just under a quarter of all public access points, though only about 5.5 per cent of the nation's population lives in Jakarta. Another 105 were in the three provincial capitals (Surabaya, Bandung and Semarang) and 42 in Yogyakarta and Solo, the old University towns and the cultural heartland of Java. The remaining 37 were spread across several district capitals. Outside of Java, we found no public access Internet outside of large provincial capitals and in Bali in the tourist areas.

Growth of *warnet* was phenomenal – much faster than the rise in subscription, which grew about six fold between 1996 and 2000. For example in Yogyakarta, there were three *warnet* at the end of 1996, and at least 31 by mid-2000. In Jakarta and Surabaya, the largest cities in Indonesia, the growth has been even more pronounced in the same period. By mid-2001 an industry study, using data from the Warnet Directory (at natnit.net), claimed 1,151 *warnet* had registered on the online directory, but declared the actual number across Indonesia may be

more than 2,000 since many "do not yet have a license to operate"(Indonesia Cyber Industry & Market Research and Analysis Team 2001, 58-9). The study noted more than 50 per cent of these *warnet* were in Jakarta, where the ratio was more than 50 *warnet* per million people. Although it found "the number of *warnets* available throughout Indonesia is quite a considerable amount", the ratio fell to around one *warnet* per million inhabitants in places like West Nusa Tenggara, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Maluku (Indonesia Cyber Industry & Market Research and Analysis Team 2001, 59-61). The *warnet* are clearly spreading, but not to the corners of the archipelago, drawing all citizens equally into a cyber community.

Concentration of political and economic resources, primarily in Jakarta and on Java, through the New Order years is well documented. At best, the Internet has been unable to escape this underlying logic of centralisation that marks the last 30 years of Indonesian development, at worst, it is adding a new dimension to regional inequality in Indonesia. Such inequities are almost inevitably ignored in discussions of the growth of the Internet globally or even nationally, but must be taken into account if we are to understand if and how the Internet is transforming Indonesia.

Net Political Gains

What difference did the Internet then make to the citizens of Indonesia? There is little doubt that the Internet, in the hands of a small university educated minority in large cities, played some role in the erosion of political censorship of the Suharto government and as such contributed to the fall of the three-decade old authoritarian regime. From the mid-1990s opposition groups, largely students and professionals, filled news-groups, chat-rooms and web sites with criticism of the Suharto government. In a characteristically Indonesian play on words, one observer in 1997 suggested that INTERNET might stand for "*INdonesia TERkenal NEgatif Terus*" – the acronym is lost in the translation "Internet = Indonesia is always infamous."

The e-mail discussion list "Indonesia-L", popularly known as *apakabar* ("how's life?"), moderated by John MacDougall in Maryland, USA was the first net-based activity to become central to political communication between the critics of the New Order in and out of Indonesia. The list's content -- a mix of "hard news" on Indonesia from papers and broadcasts from around the world, as well as a variety of commentaries, opinions, snippets of political gossip, mainly in Indonesian language, not only uncensored but also unedited -- established *apakabar* as a valuable means of disseminating their materials amongst many NGO activists.

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Around the end of 1995, MacDougall estimated that the number of identifiable recipients of *apakabar* material was about thirteen thousand, with the majority of them Indonesians living in Indonesia, followed by Indonesians living or studying abroad (personal email communication, 19 January 1997). Around the same time several articles in the mainstream national print media drew attention to *apakabar*, especially to the speed with which politically sensitive news got posted on the list. The weekly *Gatra* wrote, for instance, that news of the arrest and release of some prominent political activists was on *apakabar* within hours, but could not make the local papers until the following morning (*Gatra* 2 December 1995). Increasingly too, *apakabar* was cited in the Indonesian print media as a source of information, particularly on activities of opposition groups. The list's web site was popular amongst the clientele of the *warnet,* as they spread across the cities. When the first Internet cafés opened in Yogyakarta six weeks after the 27 July 1996 Jakarta riots (after the New Order military orchestrated a brutal attack on an opposition party headquarters), one of the café owners estimated that about 40 per cent of Indonesian clients sought out *apakabar* and consulted it regularly. The two privately owned Internet cafés in Yogyakarta kept information on hand to assist those customers who wanted help to connect to *apakabar*. While *apakabar* remained important as a meeting place for diverse ideas and information, beyond the control of state censors, from early 1996 a variety of political organisations within Indonesia started their own mailing lists, most of them cross-posting with each other and with *apakabar*.

Apakabar served as a platform for defiance of state control over information flow, but beyond that had no specific political creed. The first Indonesian political group to establish its own presence on the Net was PIJAR (The Centre for Information and Reform Action Network), an organization established by student activists as a "mechanism for democratic struggle" in September 1989. PIJAR pursued its aim of social and political justice through a program of publications, education and training, and public advocacy. Its print periodical, *Kabar dari PIJAR* [News from PIJAR] (KdP) was one of a number of unauthorized publications that circulated amongst students, mainly in Jakarta, particularly after the banning of three prominent newsweeklies in June 1994 for their critical stance on various government policies. In July 1995 KdP editor Tri Agus S. Siswowihardjo was charged with insulting the president in an article in the magazine, and sentenced to two years in jail.

Early in 1996 *Kabar dari PIJAR* went on-line as a mailing list, called KdP-net, which made it possible for PIJAR to distribute its messages much more easily to NGO groups outside Jakarta, to expatriate Indonesians and to international Human Rights groups. Like many of the formal and underground publications going on-line in the early years of the Internet in Indonesia, PIJAR used a server outside Indonesia, provided by the Association for

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Progressive Communication in the United States. The underground periodical *Independen* also appeared on-line, on the same server around the same time. *Tempo*, the once highly successful mainstream journal banned in 1994, appeared with far more radical content as *Tempo Interaktif* in March 1995. *SiaR-list*, closely connected to both *Independen* and *Tempo*, started with the aim of becoming an "alternative news agency" trying to reproduce what its founders saw as standard journalistic practices which were being corrupted by censorship and propaganda of the New Order government.

By 1999 there were hundreds of mailing lists relating to Indonesia.[13] The reform movement spawned its own collection of sites dedicated to political change in Indonesia; KdP-net and SiaR are only the oldest and longest surviving of them. The importance of these groups is not in how, or whether, individually they constituted a challenge to the Suharto regime or to the mainstream news media (which were also going on-line at the same time) but rather in the ways they functioned together as a forum in which to discuss, question, and supplement what was formally defined as news. News stories that journalists wrote but could not get printed in newspapers regularly got posted on one or more mailing lists. Letters to editors, which could not be printed whether for editorial policy or through lack of space could easily be accommodated on a bulletin board. The on-line news groups were a constant reminder that censorship could be got around and much that could not be said in the formal media whether for state-imposed restriction, or commercially or politically driven editorial policy or simply lack of page space, could be circulated on the Internet. On the Net, also, one did not have to be limited to a particular source of news (a particular paper), one web-page was necessarily an entry point to another. Web-sites such as PIJAR's were linked to a variety of international human rights organizations, providing a connection for the Indonesians on the Net to talk to audiences around the world.

This technological faculty of the Net to interconnect across the world was actively used in the final days of the Suharto regime by the student demonstrators. "Bypassing the government-controlled television and radio stations, dissidents shared information about protests by e-mail, inundated news groups with stories of President Suharto's corruption, and used chat groups to exchange tips about resisting troops. In a country made up of thousands of islands, where phone calls are expensive, the electronic messages reached key organisers" (Marcus 1998, 73). When the students occupied the parliament in the days before the resignation of Suharto, Abigail Abrash, of the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Centre for Human Rights in Washington, was able to receive reports which appeared to come from "someone [who had] brought a laptop inside Indonesia's parliament building, and went on-line while [the Parliament was] surrounded by armed troops" (Marcus 1998, 74).[14]

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The Internet in Indonesia functioned as a weapon against state censorship, until that censorship crumbled in the final few weeks of the Suharto regime. Political parties, which emerged within the formal structures of electoral democracy in Indonesia after Suharto, did not, however, embrace the Internet as the informal semi-underground opposition to Suharto had. Political liberalisation resulted in 180 political parties formally registering with the Department of Justice by 1999. However, only 48 fulfilled the pre-conditions required that year for participation in Indonesia's first free and fair election since 1955. Only a small minority of them had their own websites.[15] Onno Purbo noted that those party websites that did exist were not interactive, providing mainly static information. Furthermore, there was very little if any use by the parties of emailing lists to generate two-way communication with sympathisers.[16] Most of the constituencies of these parties were not the young university students and graduates who had posted to news-groups, designed web-pages and filled the *warnet*. Unlike the technophiles, the overwhelming majority of voters did not have access to Internet. Suggestions from Internet advocates like Purbo that the community should be using the Internet and email to pressure legislators, fell largely upon deaf ears. The Democratic People's Party (PRD), with its base in the radical student movement, used the Internet more actively than any of the other political parties, but did not even come close to winning a seat.

The Internet had no direct impact on the ballot. It was not central to the game plan of any of the political parties in Indonesia's first serious experiment with electoral democracy since 1955. But this historical event in the life of the Indonesian nation was nonetheless more fully displayed for the world to watch than had been any previous Indonesian election because of the Internet technology employed. The National Electoral Commission (KPU) had its site on which it provided full transcripts of all electoral legislation, regulation and forms (http://www.kpu.go.id/ sighted 29 August 1999). After election day, the site carried a running tally of the results in Indonesian, English and Japanese, broken down not only to specific provinces but even to district level. In the first week or so of counting, television news reports did provide national statistics with provincial breakdowns of the major parties, sometimes on an hourly basis. But the KPU web page offered a range and depth of statistical information and recorded the unfolding detail with a speed that could not be matched by any other medium. Many of the country's news media also included election sites on their web pages, carrying more detail than was being published or broadcast, some of these hyper-linked to the Electoral Commission. All election pages were inundated with hits.

The display was not just to legitimise the election before a world community. It had a very significant local audience: the young urban professionals who had set up the networks of

dissent on the Internet, as well as the students who had demonstrated against Suharto and announced their political presence via the Internet to the world. These groups had had a strong conviction about the Internet as a democratic technology. They had seen their victory in the information war against a dictator. Now, the election on the Internet, to some extent, authenticated the newly emerging democracy in their eyes. On the eve of the election, Onno Purbo making an explicit link between politics on the streets and on the Net, called on the "community" to use the Internet to express their opinion rather than go out on the streets and face the military. The Internet in Indonesia had become the space from which educated middle class liberal democrats could become guerrilla combatants in defence of democracy and against the military.

The Internet's predominant feature is its capacity to transport information and knowledge, and it does so even handedly – it does not choose between democratic principles, economic innovations or communal histories. We turn briefly now to another point of political combat in Indonesia, Maluku, to watch the Internet in the context of the deadly communal strife in that region.

Maluku

Maluku (known in English as the Moluccas) is a group of islands, which colonial trade made famous as the "spice islands". They lie at the eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago. Until the archipelago was divided into two provinces in September 1999 under President Habibie, it had been a single province with Ambon as capital.[17] As in several of the outlying areas of Indonesia, separatism has long simmered and on occasion burst into flame, to be quickly suppressed by Jakarta. But Maluku has also seen relatively harmonious relations between its very large Christian minority (41 per cent) and the Muslim majority (59 per cent).[18] Experts were baffled when violent conflict between Muslims and Christians broke out in January 1999.

With the departure of President Suharto and the ascendancy of civilian presidents – first B.J. Habibie in May 1998, then Abdurrahman Wahid in October 1999, and more recently Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 2001 – national politics, though more open and transparent, became more contested as power became more diffuse. Communal and religious tensions between the nation's 87 per cent Muslim population and the Christian and other minority faiths began to surface, and be expounded more vocally in a freed-up mass media, long constrained under Suharto to avoid topics which touched upon ethnic, religious, racial or class divisions. In contrast to the other political hotspots in Indonesia, the conflict in Maluku is not

a centre-versus-region battle. It is, on the surface at least, distinctly religious, which on this scale has never happened in post-colonial Indonesia. Estimates of casualties in an on-going civil war are necessarily difficult. On best available figures some four thousand people are dead and possibly over 300,000 displaced. As we finish this paper at the end of 2001 there are few signs that the conflict is abating.

Maluku On-Line

As one might anticipate from our earlier account about the unequal spread of the Internet in Indonesia, the Internet is not widely available in Maluku generally or even in the capital Ambon. We were not able to establish the precise number of subscribers in Ambon. But the local manager for Wasantara.net, the main provider in the region, indicated that the level of connectivity was very low compared to Java and had dropped by about 50 per cent since the start of the religious wars in January 1999. There are two public access Internet points in the whole of Maluku in its two port cities, the capital Ambon and Ternate. It appears that for a period early in the communal war, Internet service had broken down completely in Maluku as the Wasantara staff were unable to travel from their homes in one religion's stronghold to the Wasantara office in another. Gradually, some parts of the service resumed and the Ambon *warnet* was again by September 2000. On the other hand, since the beginning of the religious strife Ambon's presence on the Information Super Highway has risen sharply.

Hundreds of sites centrally concerned with Islam or Christianity began to include information -- online media articles, individuals' postings -- referring to the religious conflict in Maluku and taking up the cudgels for their fellow believers in Maluku. "Project Open Book" (www.domini.org/openbook/home.htm, sighted 3 August 2000), for example, is dedicated to "Documenting the Persecution of Christians in the Islamic World", and includes information on places as diverse as Maluku and the Maldives, Sudan and Palestine. The "Christian Portal News" (www.christianportal.com/News/index_html, sighted 3 August 2000) covered the massacres in Ambon, alongside papal news, and the Christian Coalition in the USA backing then presidential aspirant George W. Bush. Within the national frontiers, Surabaya's Petra Christian University (www.petra.ac.id/, sighted 3 August 2000), hosts a "discussion forum" which often posts Maluku-related information.

More significantly, dozens of Maluku-specific sites have emerged since 1999. "Djangan lupa Maluku" [Don't Forget Maluku] (www.dlm.org/en/eng.htm, sighted 3 August 2000) provides one window into the range of these. It listed not only 16 specifically named "Maluku Sites", with another 12 Moluccan sites listed under other sub-headings, and a further nine sites

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named after specific islands or villages in Maluku! Of the sites listed on Jangan Lupa Maluku, "Ambon Berdarah On-line" (Bloody Ambon On-line) is the most popular Christian site expressly dedicated to "News and Pictures about Ambon/Maluku Tragedy" <www.geocities.com/alifuru67/noframe/index.htm or www.go.to/ambon> (sighted 3 August 2000). With postings in both Indonesian and English, this site's counter indicated nearly fifty thousand "visitors" in the twelve months since August 1999. The site's religious affiliation is flagged with a cross on the opening page, appeals for donations to various Christian organisations in Maluku (and in Jakarta). For the rest of this paper, we focus one particular mailing list which we observed through from its inception in 1998 for its first two years, to see how its content and its social role was transformed by the communal war.

AMBONnet

AMBONnet (www.egroups.com/group/ambon, sighted 3 August 2000) started as an "e-mail group of the Global Moluccan Community and its Sympathisers" [Masyarakat Maluku Sedunia dan Para Simpatisan]. Established on 31 August 1998, on the first anniversary of the related website, http://www.ambon.com, it is an open list, which initially linked just a handful of individuals in America, the Netherlands, Germany, Ambon and Jakarta. By early August 2000 it had an acknowledged membership of 334. It is unmoderated, primarily uses Indonesian (sometimes with Moluccan inflections, not understood by standard Indonesian speakers), and its archives are public. The archive and statistics provide a valuable insight into the changing traffic and focus of the group.

In the opening posting on 31 August 1998 P.C. ("Noce") Wattimena, who established the list, addressed the three other initial members, informing them that twenty-nine others had been contacted to encourage them to join. Wattimena , who appeared to live in Jakarta, asks his friends [19] if they are aware of any other Ambonese mailing lists. In a follow-up posting on 2 September he exhorts "Elya" (E.G. Muskitta) to post "Daily Reflections" (*Renungan Harian*), "Linda" to "occasionally include humorous stories from wherever", and "to Clint, how about economic perspectives on Indonesia, specifically Maluku".

There were no symbols of Christian militancy (for example, unlike Ambon Berdarah On-line, Bloody Ambon On-line,[20] there was no crucifix or Christian symbol, or biblical quotation), although clearly it was a space for Christians to commune on spiritual issues. Of the eighty-four postings in August and September, the first two months of operation, fifty-four (64 per cent) were "Daily Reflections" on bible passages from E.G. "Elya" Muskitta, a US-based "consultant" active in his local Los Angeles church. Intensely personal postings (such as the

three on "My joys and sorrows today" [*Sukaduka saya hari ini*]) were only occasionally interrupted by restrained, and studiedly non-sectarian, political statements. For instance Wattimena re-posted an open letter (originally on the Christian Paroki-net) from the Indonesian Christian Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Kristiani Indonesia, FKKI) to President B.J. Habibie urging him to investigate and prosecute those responsible for damaging churches during his presidency. The letter detailed the attacks on fifteen churches in Java, far from Maluku (the ostensible geographical focus of AMBONnet) – but did not blame any community for these attacks.

The non-personal postings were not only non-sectarian, but at least overtly, also non-religious. These included two reports of a student demonstration (one from the print media, the other based on a radio broadcast), two exchanges about the value of the rupiah against the US dollar, and five exchanges about the concept of a federal (as opposed to a unitary) state.[21] All but four of the first two months' eighty-four postings were by either Muskitta or Wattimena, with only two others participating. Neither Muskitta nor Wattimena was living in Maluku. They were addressing an expatriate readership, either in Jakarta or abroad. A close reading of the correspondence shows that this was a dialogue within a group of Christians, known to each other, and linked by their faith and their ethnicity. The group showed only a peripheral interest in the politics of religion in taking up the cudgels for other Christians under threat. In these early postings, as we observe the formation of a virtual community, it is greatly aware of the global and individual nature of its identity. But, there is nothing in these postings to indicate animosity for other religions or a sense of embattlement or marginalisation, or a desire to mobilise to defend their faith against attack.

Although there were only twenty-six messages in December 1998 the number of active contributors, together with the breadth, variety and political tenor of the postings had increased noticeably. There were postings (some forwarded from other lists, like Paroki-net, mentioned earlier) about political prisoners,[22] violence against Christians in Ketapang (Jakarta), and open letters of protest to Parliament from the Maluku People's Voice Forum [*Forum Suara Rakyat Maluku*].[23] The original non-sectarian voice in the group continued to emerge in such postings as one from Wattimena announcing that the Jakarta alumni of an Ambon government high school were to celebrate both Christmas and the closing of the Muslim Fasting month, both events organised by the same committee.[24]

On New Year's Day 1999, Mickey Soukotta sent his greetings from "NYC-USA" (New York City – USA). With the salutation "Hello to my nation" ("*Hello Bangsa*"[25]), he wrote of his hope that "in the coming year life in Indonesia, especially in Maluku, will become better", but

ended (in English) with "Only God knows!!!!"[26] His concluding flourish was an ominous opening to the year, for the increase in the pace and volume of traffic on AMBONnet from only twenty-six in December 1998 to 192 in January 1999 was largely associated with escalating conflict in Maluku. Rioting broke out in mid-January. Eight were killed in Dobo, southeast Maluku, on 14 January, beginning a string of battles and conflagrations which by the end of March had already resulted in hundreds of deaths with tens of thousands rendered homeless.

By January 1999, the majority of the month's 192[27] postings were materials drawn from other mailing lists (such as the Federation of Indonesian Christians in America's FICA-net), news organisations (e.g. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Associated Press, Antara news agency), or political/activist groups, both international and national, self-consciously mobilising on the Internet. Many postings were foreign-sourced. There were now seventeen active participants ranging from frequent posters like "tali_hulaleng" (60), "Noes Souisa" (59) and "Samuel" (30), to eight individuals who posted only one message each for the month. Only six of the 192 postings were from Wattimena, and none were by Muskitta whose "Daily Reflections" had provided 64 per cent of AMBONnet's first two months' traffic.

Included in the traffic were several "eye-witness" accounts of the violence in Ambon which appear not to have been published in the commercial (print) media, but which originate from Ambon itself. "Petrov" using the email address of Ambon's Pattimurra University computer technology unit (UPT-Komputer) posted a second-hand account (passed on by telephone) of the murder of four members of a Christian church by "hundreds of people armed with long swords (*golok panjang*)". There is no mention of the religion of the assailants, though the account makes clear that victims were killed because they were Christians. The posting refers to the "atmosphere of racial hatred" (*suasana permusuhan rasial*), but does not attribute blame to any particular religious community.[28]

In June 1999 there were 878 postings, rising to 1431 in July 2000.[29] As violence escalated in Maluku, AMBONnet, which started as essentially a religious chat group for a handful of friends, was being transformed into a relatively high volume communal forum.

On 1 July 2000 a signatory "Chaumont (Joe) Devin" (using the "screen-name" or "e-nickname" "devil") posted a message in English addressed to "Dear Moluccan Friends Worldwide". He quoted a conversation he had had with "a Moluccan 'Christian'" in California whom he had approached "to ask for money to buy guns".[30] The person declined, and "devil" was scathing in his condemnation of his co-believers who "having gained the

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safety of the US, … turn their backs upon their fellow Moluccans in Ambon and say, 'We are very sorry, but it is clear that Jesus wants you all to die, there is nothing we can do, and to help you by sending you guns with which to defend yourselves would be a sin.'"[31]

"Devil" is the first unashamedly violent sectarian in the group. That the members of the eGroup were still, at least to some extent, personally known to each other is suggested by the first of several replies to "devil"'s posting. Using extremely colloquial Moluccan Indonesian, "wie.wie" not only chides Devin to "watch how you speak/write", but adds "you're the child of a Missionary, aren't you?!"[32] Wie.wie's position is supported by Petrus Satian, an ethnic Dayak Christian apparently working with a mining company in the hinterland of East Kalimantan.[33] Satian's long message details his personal spiritual journey to unite various Christian groups in Kalimantan.

On 3 July, a heated exchange triggered by a posting from the "devil" email address (with postings signed "Tete") demonstrated the heightened physical conflict in Maluku had triggered virtual warfare and sabotage strategies on the net. The increasing number of interventions on AMBONnet by Muslims angered some Christian participants. The temperature and intemperance of the postings escalated. When Septiaji Eko Nugroho ("adjie") forwarded from a Muslim list a piece entitled "Does Pope Condemn the Christians [sic] Barbarity in Maluku?" "devil" responded aggressively. Addressing his readers as "Moluccan comrades", he invited them to "silence the lying dog [adjie]". He strategised:

> "How about all Moluccans, all around the world, at this moment send empty (e-)mails in their thousands to [the Muslim list] istiqlal-subscribe@egroups.com? Wouldn't this crash their server? What do you say we try it? Come on, not just one individual by themselves, but let's wait until we have a general agreement, and then we can all hit them at once and not give them any rest for dozens of days. What do you reckon?"[34]

Adjie's measured response highlighted the futility of the gesture, for Christians and Muslims on AMBONnet shared the same common fate in cyberspace they did on the ground at war in Maluku: an attack on Muslims was an attack also on the Christians themselves. "Oh, gee!", wrote Adjie to "devil"'s plans to crash the Muslims' server, "Don't to that. If the istiqlal server crashes, this mailing list [AMBONnet] will also crash. (We're both on eGroups). And then where would our discussion go? Wouldn't it be better to just hack it (or even hot it up a bit [*lho kok malah manasin*])".[35]

Tete/"devil" was the dominant voice on AMBONnet in the first week of July. During this week "devil"/Tete posted 14 per cent of the four hundred postings with identifiable authors (email addresses) on AMBONnet. There were fifty-one identifiable participants (plus four

with "no author"), of whom fourteen posted ten or more messages. While the majority of posters whose religious affiliation is able to be determined (with at least some degree of certainty) appear to be Christian, 38 per cent (10 out of 26) – are Muslim.[36] In stark contrast to the total absence of Muslim participation in the first months of AMBONnet's existence, by July 2000 two of the four most active posters were Muslim. Christian "devil" led with 57 messages, followed by Muslim "Oemar-Moyo" (36), Christian "anandadesa" ("village kid") (32), and Muslim "zUlFaN Z" (28). "Oemar-Moyo", the most prolific Muslim, who appears to have only joined the eGroup (with a test message) on 2 July, contributed 36 messages by 7 July. His frequent anti-Ambonese racist slurs included derogatory descriptions of Ambonese as resembling chimpanzees, and veiled threats of rape (in locally inflected language).

The tone set by these most active posters was one of vitriol and verbal violence directed at the "other", most commonly defined according to religion, but often too with ethnic connotations. The dark complexion and crinkly hair of the ethnic Ambonese was mocked by (ethnic Javanese Muslim) "ali-susanto74" (5 postings) who asserted passionately "it's fair enough if we massacre [you] because you attacked us first during Lebaran [the celebrations after the Muslim fasting month] two years ago. Do you still remember?????? So don't whine if you're now the ones being slaughtered like rats." [37]

Arguments were often couched within a nationalist debate. Muslim posters often regarded Christians as inevitably supporters of the (separatist and largely Netherlands-based) Republic of South Maluku (RMS).[38] Meanwhile, Ambonese (Christian) ethnic nationalists, such as "Helmi Wattimena" (from the email address "anandadesa"), regarded their opponents as imposing a process of "Javanisation" and "Islamisation", and called for support for a Moluccan (or Alifuru) nation ("*Viva Alifuru Nation*").[39] The identities of religion, ethnicity, nationalism (and indeed gender) were all drawn into the fray in an atmosphere of communal battle.

Not all messages spoke with communal and violent language. Some such as the posting signed "Willy" and addressed to "Dear friends in Sydney [Australia]" (posted from the "anandadesa" email address), provided a description of a series of running skirmishes in the area around Ambon in relatively non-emotional language. Entitled "A Letter from the Ambon battlefield", it was clearly a Christian perspective, but was measured and controlled, for example, describing those conducting the aggression neutrally as "*perusuh*"(rioters, terrorists) and not identifying the rioters in any obvious religious category.[40] Similarly, a posting by the "Masariku Network" (from "peter") described an attack on a Christian area of Ambon by "rioters", whose religious or ethnic identity was not specified. This kind of linguistic

neutrality – that is ways of stating problems without naming perpetrators – had been honed in the media under the New Order, where such neutrality was often the only way of writing about a social conflict. But on AMBONnet it had become impossible to speak from a neutral position. Peter's vague reference to terrorists necessarily invited demands for a clear positioning. An immediate response from a Surabaya Muslim "elha" asked: "Just who are these 'rioters'? And who is being terrorised?"[41]

There had been a dramatic change in AMBONnet during the two years since its establishment in August 1998. From a spiritual forum for a few friends scattered around the world, it had developed into a vitriolic sectarian battlefield in which loyalties to religion, state, nation, and ethnic group were all open to vilification and attack from outside. Some early participants were still active, such as "tali_hulaleng" (who had been the most prolific poster in January 1999 with sixty of the months' 192 messages, and who had nine postings between 1-7 July 2000). But there was little trace of founders Wattimena and Muskitta. Those participants active in late 2000 were mobilising to raise money for their compatriots' military operations. They were seeking to crash or hack opponents' Internet access. They wanted to mobilise an international community in support of their faction in a local civil war. AMBONnet did play a role in transmitting information about events in Maluku to Moluccans outside of their archipelagic homeland – either elsewhere in Indonesia, in Europe, USA or Australia. But it was predominantly a debate outside -- and almost divorced from – the specific events of life in Ambon itself. AMBONnet was not a forum for current residents of Ambon to talk amongst themselves; it was people outside of Maluku speaking about them, on behalf of them, taking up in cyberspace -- from scattered keyboards around the world -- the physical battles being fought on the soil of Ambon.

Netizens as Citizens

We have looked at the ways in which the Internet has become articulated in two different political constellations in Indonesia. We have shown that the consequences of the presence of the Internet in those two situations are quite different. Methodologically, global, statistical, macro approaches to the Internet tend to obfuscate the content and look at the technology of the vector. We suggest that the focus of Internet research needs to be not so much on the technology of the Net but on the actions of the netizens. The Internet clearly does leave a political impact on any society into which it is introduced, but it does so not in technologically pre-determined ways. In the accounts we have provided above the Internet has at best speeded-up and aggravated social and political directions overdetermined by other, older, forces. As Denise Murray has observed, while in its infancy the Internet may have been

the preserve of a tight core of academics and scientists with a "shared social consensus", the net's embrace by now many tens of millions of netizens means that "the same destructive and deviant behaviour found in the real world is found in the virtual one" (1995,161 quoted in Mann & Stewart 2000, 39).

There is a normative issue that needs to be addressed in the end. There is no doubt that the Internet is capable of giving social, economic and political advantages to its users – whether these users are individuals setting up cottage industries in defiance of the multinationals, or communities practicing alternative medicine or fundamentalist religious groups running roughshod over the individual human rights of those who live around them. The users of the Internet played a role in bringing down the repressive Suharto regime – and more significantly they seemed to the rest of the world to be at the forefront of the democratic movement. But, if we think of democracy as inclusive of all citizens, then in Indonesia and indeed in any situation where access to Internet technology is unequal, it is at best yet another index of inequality, at worst, yet another impediment to equal rights of all individuals in a democracy.

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Notes

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[2] Popular sources on Internet statistics such as the Cyberatlas web site, for instance, carry a plethora of global statistics on Internet use but very little data that is nationally specific. A search of that site on Indonesia (undertaken 2 August 2000) produced only four entries, all placing Indonesian national usage in a comparative framework. Even India, only produced twelve entries.

[3] For instance in a rare and very informative article on the Internet in the context of Tibetan politics, the author though clearly aware of the limits of Internet access in that country, concludes his account thus: '[T]he Internet provides a means whereby an otherwise obscure news from the markets and bazaars of Tibet can be broadcast cheaply and efficiently across the world to everyone who wishes to listen …' (Bray 2000, 172). Our own first publication on the Internet in Indonesia (Hill and Sen 1997) similarly starts and ends with the Internet's global connectivity.

[4] The inequity in worldwide Internet access is indicated by 1997 figures on Internet users per 10,000 people, with Finland (653.61), Norway (474.63) USA (442.11), New Zealand (424.34) and Australia (382.44) ranked very highly, by contrast to Angola, Benin, Tanzania, and Tunisia with 0.02; Algeria, Burundi, Libya, Rwanda, Togo, Uganda, and Cambodia with 0.01; and Bangladesh, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Laos, Malawi, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nigeria, Oman, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Yemen where the number of users was too low to even register (0.00) (Moschovitis, Poole, Schuyler, and Senft 1999, 274-5 cites *World Development Indicators, 1998*).

[5] A label for the New Order government first used by political scientist Herbert Feith in 1970s, and quickly accepted as a good working description of that regime.

6. Estimate totalled from figures in Samik-Ibrahim, 1997, with number of permits given in Indonesian Internet Service Provider Association (APJII), 'D. Profile', on http://www/apjii.or.id, both sighted 17 May 1997. See also *Kompas Online*, 9 April 1998.

[7] http://www.insan.co.id Source: *Kompas*, 20 September 1999.

[8] APJII's website, http://www.apjii.or.id/ind/index.html sighted 15 November 2001, provides the following growth statistics for Indonesian Subscribers and Users of Internet:

Year	Subscribers	Users	Information
1996	31,000	110,000	
1997	75,000	384,000	
1998	134,000	512,000	
1999	256,000	1,000,000	Estimate
2000	384,000	1,450,000	Estimate
2001	511,000	1,980,000	Estimate

[9] .id domains have increased from 87 in 1995 to 2,165 in 1999, to 4,270 in 2000, according to APJII data at http://www.apjii.or.id/ind/statistik.html, sighted 15 November 2001.

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[10] While the number of Indonesian provinces was recently increased to thirty-three in re-structuring after the fall of President Suharto, the BPS still provides data according to the earlier division into twenty-six provinces. According to BPS data cited in *Warta Ekonomi* (2001, 81), the "provinces" of Bengkulu, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Sulawesi Tenggara and Maluku had per capita Gross Regional Domestic Product of less than three million rupiah (based on 1999 prices).

[11] For APJII estimate, see table in endnote 8 above. Kristiadi is quoted in *Kompas* 31 August 2001.

12. For example, in Bandung the 40 *wartel* in 1990 had tripled to 120 by 1997 according to 'Tentang Wartelnet', at http://wartelnet.melsa.net.id/tentang.htm , sighted 21 August 1999, quoting an unnamed article from *Pikiran Rakyat* daily newspaper of 5 April 1997.

13. Budi Rahardjo gives the figures of 240 mailing lists on his *Indonesian homepage*, http://indonesia.elga.net.id/political-parties.html, sighted 20 August 1999, which has a link to the list, *Milis*, where there were 268 mailing lists (http://indonesia.elga.net.id/milis.html sighted 3 September 1999). However quite a number of these appear to be inactive or with incorrect URLs.

14. This observation also appears in Baskoro 1998 which appears to draw heavily on Marcus 1998.

[15] Ahyani 1999 claims nine out of 48 parties had websites. However, *Almanak Parpol Indonesia*, (Yayasan API, Jakarta, revised edition, 1999) produced by an independent foundation of 13 non-government organisations, provides details of 141 political parties, of which only seven provided website details. Nine had email addresses but no webpage listed; six had both web and email; and one provided a webpage but no email. None of the three New Order parties, Golkar, PPP or PDI, listed either email or website in this authoritative listing, though they do appear to have had sites operating.

[16] Onno Purbo's views are given in Ahyani 1999.

[17] In this paper we use the terms 'Maluku' and 'the Moluccas' to refer to the region which includes these two provinces: Maluku and North Maluku.

[18] Figures from http://www.websitercg.com/ambon/Malukupop.htm sighted 20 August 2000, which cites percentages based on 1997 Indonesian Bureau of Statistics figures. Christians were in majority until the 1980s. The Muslim numbers have been increasing since then in part through migration from other parts of Indonesia.

[19] We are assuming 'Noce' is a male name.

[20] Ambon Berdarah On-line includes a cross on the top left of the screen as an indication of its religious persuasion.

[21] Federalism was an issue of considerable concern in outer islands of Indonesia, like Maluku where that model was thought by many to be more suitable for a multi-ethnic, multi-religious state.

[22] Alexa80 <ayr1501@b...> 'Pius Lustrilanang: "Yesus Menggantikan Saya di Sel"', 26 Dec 1998, at http://www.egroups.com/message/ambon/120, sighted on 15 August 2000.

[23] 'tali_hulaleng', "Tragedi Ketapang", 30 December 1998 at http://www.egroups.com/message/ambon/123, sighted 15 August 2000.

[24] Wattimena P.C. 'Natal dan Halal Bi Halal', 12 December 1998, at http://www.egroups.com/message/ambon/112, sighted on 15 August 2000.

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[25] In this context 'bangsa' could be translated 'nation, people, race'. See John M. Echols and Hassan Shadily (1990) *Kamus Indonesia-Inggris: An Indonesian-English Dictionary*, Gramedia, Jakarta (3rd edition), p.49.

[26] Mickey Soukotta ' Salam Bakudapa', 1 January 1999, www.egroups.com/message/ambon/131 (sighted 15 August 2000).

[27] The homepage of AMBONnet (www.egroups.com/group/ambon, sighted on 3 August 2000) claims 194 messages for January 1999, but a counting of the actual messages in the archive (from No.129 to No.320) totals only 192.

[28] 'Mujizat', from UPT-Komputer UNPATTI, 29 January 1999 on www.egroups.com/message/ambon/303

29. Statistics and information on the AMBONnet site are given on www.egroups.com/group/ambon, sighted on 3 August 2000.

[30] 'devil' was actively soliciting funds on AMBONnet to purchase weapons for the Christian forces in Maluku. Providing his actual name (Chaumont Devin) and his Honolulu postal address, he urged readers to send US$ 10 a month to support the cause, 'so that if we have weapons, we can finish off all the Muslims who are in Ambon so we can begin afresh with a new Maluku based on justice'. See 'Apa Tempo Hitu Rata?' on www.egroups.com/message/ambon/8434, sighted 19 August 2000.

[31] 'Moluccan 'Christians' in California', posted by 'devil' 1 July 2000, at www.egroups.com/message/ambon/8417, sighted 16 August 2000.

[32] 'Re:[Ambon] Moluccan 'Christians' in California', from 'wie.wie', 1 July 2000, at www.egroups.com/message/ambon/8436, sighted 16 August 2000. The original reads: 'Buat Saudara Devin… jaga cara bicara/tulisan elo deh…elo khan anak seorang Missionaris?!'
[33] 'RE: [Ambon] Moluccan 'Christians' in California', by Satian, Petrus (kem), dated 2 July 2000, at www.egroups.com/message/ambon/8456, sighted 16 August 2000. He writes 'saya sambil kerja di tambang emas PT.KEM juga sebagai ketua Yayasan Pelayanan Bersama dari Dayak Pedalaman Kalimantan Timur'.

[34] Original: Apakah server mereka tidak akan macet? Mau coba ka seeng? Ayo, jangan satu yang coba sendiri, tapi tunggu dulu sampai ada persetujuan umum baru katorang samua hantam satu kali dan jangan kasi banapas sampai puluh2 hari. Mau ka seeng?

[35] Septiaji Eko Nugroho ('adjie') posted 'Re:[Ambon] Su Pastiu Dusta2 Eslam ka Baloong?', 3 July 2000, at www.egroups.com/message/ambon/8563, sighted 17 August 2000.

[36] In these general comments, our method of determining whether a participant is either 'Christian' or 'Muslim' is an imprecise one. In some cases the content of the posting makes it evident; in the case of less active participants it may be gleaned from a 'name', e.g. 'Peter' is assumed to be Christian, while 'Abdurrahman Al-Mujury' is assumed to be Muslim. While the AMBONnet archive indicates there were 416 messages for 1-7 July 2000, we identified only 404 postings, four of which had 'no author'. Our percentages are based on the remaining 400.

[37] The two contrasting accounts of the Lebaran 1999 Muslim-Christian clashes in Ambon are given in van Dijk 2001, 385-6.
[38] 'zUlFaN K', for example, rails against 'rioters from the Christian RMS' in his posting on 2 July 2000, at www.egroups.com/message/ambon/8466, sighted 17 August 2000.

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[39] 'Re: [Ambon] Seruan', posted from 'anandadesa' on 1 July 2000, at www.egroups.com/message/ambon/8418, sighted 17 August 2000. This is a reply to a call that same day from (Christian) Agnes Patti urging "moluccan women [to] maintain the struggle and give the spirit of Moluccan nationalism (semangat kebangsaan Maluku) to husbands and children."

[40] 'Surat dari Medan perang Ambon', posted by 'anandadesa', 1 July 2000, at www.egroups.com/message/ambon/8413, sighted 17 August 2000.

[41] The initial posting can be found at www.egroups.com/message/ambon/8423 (sighted on 17 August 2000) with the response from 'elha' at www.egroups.com/message/ambon/8425 (sighted 19 August 2000).

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