School of Social Sciences and Asian Languages

US-Pakistan Cooperation and Pakistan’s Security Post 9/11

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Declaration

To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgment has been made.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university.

Signature: ........................................

Date: 25 Nov 2010
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Af-Pak</td>
<td>Afghanistan - Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Awami National Party</td>
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<td>ATM</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Mechanism</td>
</tr>
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<td>BLA</td>
<td>Balochistan Liberation Army</td>
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<td>BLF</td>
<td>Balochistan Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>US Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JM</td>
<td>Jaish-i-Mohammad</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUI [F]</td>
<td>Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam [Fazal-ur-Rehman]</td>
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<td>JI</td>
<td>Jamaat-i-Islami</td>
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<td>LJ</td>
<td>Lashkar-i-Jhangvi</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line of Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Lashkar-i-Tayyaba</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMA</td>
<td>Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal</td>
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<td>MQM</td>
<td>Muttahida Qaumi Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCBMs</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North West Frontier Province</td>
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<td>PML [N]</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League [Nawaz]</td>
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<td>PML [Q]</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League [Quaid-i-Azam]</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAW</td>
<td>Research and Analysis Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South East Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNJ</td>
<td>Tehrik-i-Niwaz-i-Jafaria</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WTC</td>
<td>World Trade Centre</td>
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MAP 2
FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA)

Characteristics of the FATA
- Rugged Terrain
- Poor Economic Conditions
- Low Literacy Rate
- Underdeveloped Infrastructure
- Separate Legal Structure

The boundaries and names used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the U.S. government.

Sources: GAC, USAID and Map Resources (maps).
ABSTRACT

The thesis addresses the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 on World Trade Center and Pentagon necessitated US-Pakistan cooperation to combat terrorism, which had mixed consequences for Pakistan’s security. At the domestic level, on the one hand, US-Pakistan collaboration helped strengthen the wide consensus in Pakistani society opposed to terrorism. Further, the US encouraged and supported Pakistan’s transition to democracy in 2007-2008. On the other hand, political violence grew in Pakistan, in part due to Pakistan’s close alliance with the US, especially in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan which eroded Pakistan’s domestic security. At the regional level, US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 enhanced Pakistan’s security in two significant ways. First, during India-Pakistan military standoff in 2001/2002, the US played a vital role in averting a war between the two adversaries. Second, the US encouraged composite dialogue between India and Pakistan that played a major role in ensuring peace between the two hostile states post 9/11.
INTRODUCTION:

The thesis addresses the nature of the US-Pakistan relations in the post 9/11 era and its implications for Pakistan’s security. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington necessitated cooperation between the US and Pakistan to combat terrorism both in Afghanistan as well as in the Pakistan-Afghanistan bordering areas. Regarding the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 and its implications for Pakistan’s security, the thesis delves deeply and provides fresh insights into three very important questions: 1) Why and how did Pakistan become the US main ally in combating global terrorism especially in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region? 2) Why and under what historical circumstances did Al Qaeda and Taliban led terrorism grow in Pakistan’s tribal region and in Pak-Afghan bordering region? and 3) Why is the US engagement with Pakistan so necessary for Pakistan’s domestic and regional security?

From the early 1950s – 9/11, the history of the US-Pakistan relationship has been one of engagement and disengagement. From the 1950s through to the 1980s, the US engaged with Pakistan, while during the 1970s and 1990s, the US disengaged from Pakistan. This was largely because the US other global interests were more important. During the early 1950s and 1960s, the US engaged with Pakistan to combat Soviet communism in Asia. Within this context, Pakistan signed security pacts such as South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) with Southeast Asian countries in 1954 and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955.

During the Cold War era, the conflict between the US global interests that represented the Cold War realities and Pakistan’s regional interests, which were India centric, exposed differences between the two states. It is true that the US and Pakistan were very close allies during the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1980s, both states closely
cooperated to fight against the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Yet, the US and Pakistan differed on various strategic issues such as the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars, Pakistan’s Kashmir dispute with India and Pakistan’s search for nuclear technology. During the 1970s and 1990s, US-Pakistan relations reached a new low point when Pakistan’s search for nuclear technology led to the US sanctions against Pakistan.

Previously, the US engaged with Pakistan when the military regimes were in power and withdrew much of the support when democratic governments were reestablished. It was only in the post 9/11 phase that the US remained engaged closely with a democratic Pakistan following the removal of General Pervez Musharraf from power in 2008. The US also indicated that it was determined to have a long-term relationship with Pakistan although many Pakistanis are cynical about United States long-term commitment to supporting Pakistan’s efforts to build a strong democratic state.

THEORETICAL CONTEXT:

Several theories of International Relations have emerged since the turn of the century to describe, explain and predict phenomena such as war, conflict, peace, cooperation, the working of international system and the behavior of states. Most of the theories lie between two ends of a single spectrum – Realism and Idealism. For decades, Realism remained the most powerful theory, guiding the conduct of state behavior and foreign policy. Many theories have emerged to explain phenomenon, which classical theories of Realism and Idealism left unexplained. However, Realist notions such as perpetual struggle for power and security in an anarchic system continue to be relevant in contemporary international politics. The theories of ‘Security Dilemma’ and ‘Balance of Power’, which result from that anarchy, are still playing important roles in international politics today.

The thesis has utilized the concept of ‘security dilemma’ which has both its advocates and critics. Its proponents belong to the ‘Realist’ and ‘Neo-Realist’ schools of thought.
Like the neo-realists, the thesis accepts both the primacy of the state along with the state’s preoccupation with the notion of security. In an anarchical international system, there is a constant zero-sum competition for security and security dilemma is a structural feature of anarchy. States are seen as rational actors in a system that dictates self help because of which accumulation of material power becomes necessary. However, states are never certain of other states’ intentions. It is this very uncertainty which forces states to rely on their own devices to guarantee their security. According to Butterfield, the inability to ‘enter into the other man’s counter fear’ is the central feature of security dilemma.¹

Within this context, increase in power of one country directly exacerbates the insecurity of the other. The theory originated by John Herz holds that in the anarchic international environment, groups, states, regions are concerned about their security from being attacked, subjugated, dominated or annihilated by the other. Security thus becomes the first priority. They are driven to acquire more power in order to secure themselves. States try to gain security by obtaining military superiority. This, in turn, renders others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. The vicious cycle of security and power accumulation ensues,² which gives rise to the phenomenon of ‘Security Dilemma’. According to Herz, ‘states are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of the others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.’³

According to Robert Jervis, in situations where security dilemma exists, security is viewed as a zero-sum game, resulting in greater instability as the opponent responds to

the resulting reductions in security.\(^4\) In his own words, ‘when states seek the ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too little. Too much because they gain the ability to carry out aggression; too little because others, being menaced will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state’s security.’\(^5\) Moreover, according to Jervis, ‘unintended and undesired consequences of actions meant to be defensive constitutes the security dilemma.’\(^6\) For Booth and Wheeler, ‘unintended and undesired consequences’ of Jervis constitute a security paradox, while security dilemma has uncertainty and unsatisfactory solutions as its central characteristics. In their own words:

> If the threat posed by one state to another, be it inadvertent or deliberate, is accurately perceived by the potential or actual target state, then the situation cannot be classified as a security ‘dilemma’. It is simply a security ‘problem’, albeit perhaps a difficult one. Whenever the actual intentions of the state engaging in the military preparation, it is the un-resolvable uncertainty in the mind of the potential or actual target state about the meaning of the other’s intentions and capabilities which creates the ‘dilemma’.\(^7\)

Buzan, arguing from a Neo-Realist view calls this security dilemma a ‘power-security dilemma’. Power-Security dilemma has two components: First, the struggle for power reflects the traditional Realist view where international system is seen as a constant struggle for power. The second reflects a more moderate view of international system as a struggle for security. Buzan’s notion of power-security dilemma emerges from the interaction of the two.\(^8\)

According to Montgomery, ‘Defensive structural realism’ builds on the logic of security dilemma. It places significant emphasis on factors that influence the severity of security dilemma between states, such as military technology, geography and estimates of adversary’s intentions and motives. Benign states can reveal their motives to reassure

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\(^6\) Ibid., p.66.


the adversary and avoid conflict with costly signals – actions that greedy actors would be unwilling to take.9

On the contrary, both idealists and the adherents to critical security studies propagate the idea of existence ‘beyond the security dilemma’ and thus emphasize peaceful change10 within states which, according to them, comprise of individuals. Critical security studies maintain that the notion of ‘security’ and its related ideas of ‘deterrence’ and ‘spiral models’ are unrelated to the anarchical nature of the international system. These ideas only exist because ‘security dilemma’ enables particular groups within a given society to maximize their own interests and ‘legitimate their practices’. According to Jason G. Ralph, the ‘reliance on a military approach to security and the resignation to the unsatisfactory solutions that such an approach offers, is not determined by the international system. Rather, it is a consequence of particular groups that have the political power to define the ‘national interest’ in a way that is satisfactory to them if not to the nation as a whole. Finding a solution that satisfies all is the key to transcending the security dilemma.’11

The emphasis of the advocates of Critical Security Studies on ‘solution for all’ empowers the individual to break the cycle of conflict and enter into a new arena of cooperation among humans beyond the borders of any particular state. According to Ralph:

Political constituencies which hold non-exclusive conceptions of the national interest do exist across states and can transform interests and identities so that war and security competition becomes unthinkable. Their political opposition to statist, elitist, exclusivist definitions of security demonstrates that the self help, militarist rationality identified by Neo-Realists is not universal. Redefining the security dilemma in a manner that reflects

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the contested nature of a politically contingent reality, is necessary both to interpret the world and to demonstrate the possibility of changing it'.

It shows that Critical Security Studies emphasize human security as opposed to state security. According to critical security theoreticians, while groups and societies can be constructed and deconstructed, individuals are ‘permanent and indestructible in a sense in which groupings of them of this or that sort are not’. A security community, therefore, ‘cannot exist solely on the mutual understanding of elites, particularly if these elite deny individuals their basic needs and dismiss their aspirations without consideration.’ It implies that the individuals would undermine social structures which do not take ‘human security’ into account.

Despite their idealism and desire for change, critical theorists point out that the transformation of the international system through the voice and empowerment of the individual would be indeed slow. Certain groups ‘may define their state’s interests in universal terms and advocate a policy of security cooperation. The strength of their advocacy may be limited, however, by the fear that their idealism will be exploited by states that are less inclined to cooperate.’ This realization compels one to look at the neo-realists as offering a more realistic model to understand the ‘security’ of the states in the contemporary era.

Buzan’s definition of the concept of ‘security’ is most useful for this thesis because it is wide in scope. According to Buzan, military, political, societal and economic dimensions define security. In addition, he argues that security must be analyzed at all

12 Ibid, p.5.
15 Ralph, op.cit, p.11.
16 Ibid, p.4.
three domestic, regional and global levels. According to Buzan, at the global level, there is interaction between ‘higher level security complex’ and ‘lower level security complex’ which determines the security of the lower level security complex. During the Cold War era, the US and the Soviet Union defined the higher level security complex. During the post Cold War era, there were debates regarding whether the world has become unipolar, multipolar or a hybrid called uni-multipolar. During the post 9/11 period, the US defines a higher degree security complex, which interacts with several lower level security complexes. Within this context, the thesis is extremely significant as it explores the relationship between a higher level security complex defined by the US and a lower level security complex, which is formed by Pakistan and India in South Asia. Moreover, the thesis explores the interaction among all these levels of security.

At the domestic level, Buzan maintains that the analytical focus of security analysis should be the concept of ‘strong/weak state’ taking into account the issues of ‘socio-political cohesion’ and ‘political violence’. According to Buzan’s criteria, a weak state has all or some of the following six characters: 1) a high level of political violence in the society. 2) A political role for political violence in the everyday life of citizens. 3) Political conflict over what ideology would organize the state. 4) Either the lack of a coherent national identity or the presence of contending national identities within the state. 5) The lack of a clear and observed hierarchy of political authority. 6) A high degree of state control over media. Socio-political cohesion, on the other hand, can be measured through the interaction between the following three factors that define the nature of a state: The physical base of a state (the state’s territory); the idea of the state in the minds of the state’s citizens as well as the institutional expression of the state.
These concepts are highly relevant and readily applicable to Pakistan. First, one can categorize Pakistan as a ‘weak state’. Secondly, the twin issues of the degree of ‘socio-political cohesion’ and the level of ‘domestic political violence’ within Pakistan are effective analytical tools to determine Pakistan’s security at the domestic level. On the basis of these tools, it is argued that Pakistan is a weak state with low level of socio-political cohesion and high levels of domestic political violence. As a weak state, therefore, Pakistan’s foremost security concerns at the domestic level are two fold: First, to maintain or promote socio-political cohesion within its society; and second, to reduce or eliminate political violence in the country.

In order to understand Pakistan’s security at the regional level, it is important to comprehend Pakistan’s security relations with India. In the case of India and Pakistan, Realism has been the guiding principle of their conduct for 62 years. The rivalry and competition that characterizes their relationship, their threat perceptions vis-à-vis each other, the fact that the two countries have gone to war four times, has ensured that Realist notion of security has been a paramount concern for both. Despite the emergence of several traditional and non-traditional security threats internally and externally, military security concerns continue to dominate the politics of India and Pakistan.

Buzan’s idea of ‘security complex’ adequately explains Pakistan’s occupation with its security vis-à-vis India. According to him, ‘a security complex exists where a set of security relationships stands out from the general background by virtue of its relatively strong, inward looking character, and the relative weakness of its outward security interactions with its neighbors’. Further, the ‘principle factor defining a complex is usually a high level of threat/fear which is felt mutually among two or more major states…. These states will usually be close neighbors’. Pakistan and India’s mutual fears and suspicions of each other form a security complex between them. This security complex, in turn, leads to ‘security interdependence’ between the two rivals. It implies

22 Ibid, p. 194.
that the security of the two traditional rivals becomes so inter-connected that one rival automatically reacts to any change in the other’s security. The idea of ‘security interdependence’ helps in understanding Pakistan’s perceptions of India’s attitudes and actions towards Pakistan. Most importantly, it implies that any discussion of Pakistan’s security at the regional level must involve Pakistan’s security relationship with India. Against this backdrop, the thesis will examine the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis India.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

The thesis is based on qualitative analysis and has used both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include publications of Foreign Office of Pakistan such as around fifty volumes of *Foreign Affairs Pakistan* from 9/11 – 2010, which include significant foreign policy documents such as speeches and statements of the state and government policy-makers, their official interviews, joint communiqués, de-classified agreements, etc. that cover both US-Pakistan relations and the question of Pakistan’s security. Moreover, the research would be based on primary documents, which are released from the US Department of State, US Congressional debates and Congressional research reports regarding the US-Pakistan relations post 9/11.

The secondary sources include books, journals, newspapers and websites. The thesis uses books from a range of diverse disciplines such as International Relations, History, Strategic Studies, Pakistan Studies as well as US Studies, which deal with the nature of US-Pakistan relations along with Pakistan’s security. Articles from international journals such as *Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Orbis, Pacific Affairs, International Security, South Asia, World Politics* have been used. Articles from Pakistani journals such as *Regional Studies, Strategic Studies, Pakistan Horizon* and *Defence Journal* have also been used. Articles and editorials in the US newspapers such as *Washington Post, New York Times* along with Pakistani newspapers such as *The News, Dawn and The Daily Times* have been utilized. In addition to using scholarly articles and reports from the internet, websites of international think tanks such as the Henry Stimson Center,
The research benefited from access to Urdu language resources, which were very useful for the research. Among primary documents, the study has strongly benefited from the speeches, statements and interviews of the Pakistani decision makers which were rendered in Urdu. For gaining an in depth insight into US-Pakistan relations post 9/11, secondary sources including news reports, articles and editorial in Urdu language newspapers such as Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt along with Urdu internet sources were utilized. Moreover, from 9/11 to 2010, the study was also assisted by various programs of news analysis on Pakistani television such as Capital Talk and Aaj Kamran Khan kay Saath on Geo-TV. The knowledge of Urdu language also helped enormously to closely observe Pakistan’s grass root reaction to the US war on terror.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Before gathering the research material, a structural framework was used to understand possible ways in which a subtle discourse could occur about Pakistan’s security. According to this framework, a given state’s security must involve military, political, societal and economic dimensions while the notion of security must include domestic, regional and global levels. Within this context, the gathering of research material around the fundamental question thoroughly explored Pakistan’s security at all three levels – domestic, regional and global – with special emphasis on Pakistan’s military, political, societal and economic dimensions. The following review of literature, therefore, is based on a critical analysis of all the material, which fell within the boundaries of the research at hand and is based on a careful analysis of both primary and secondary sources.
The US and Pakistani official decision makers and their public experts held diverse opinions on the nature of US-Pakistan relations prior to 9/11. From the US perspective, during the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s, the US engaged with Pakistan due to the US foremost global interest which was to check the spread of communism in Asia. This viewpoint was projected well in Tahir-Kheli’s *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship*, Ronald J. Stupak’s *American Foreign Policy: Assumptions, Processes & Projections* and Lavrentyev’s *USA and Asia*. During the 1970s and 1990s, the US disengaged from Pakistan due to the US nuclear non-proliferation interests, which dominated the US other interests. During this period, the Brooking Institution’s publications such as the *Task Force Reports* projected this view.

Within Pakistan, a group was excited about building a relationship with the US which was primarily based on the underlying assumption that Pakistan gained militarily and economically due to the US engagement with Pakistan. The same group, simultaneously, warranted caution in Pakistan’s engagement with the US due to the US disengagement during the 1970s and 1990s which, in their opinion, undermined Pakistan’s security. This group, however, is convinced that the US engagement brought benefits for Pakistan at all three domestic, regional and global levels and that the act of US disengagement from Pakistan would present a grave crisis for latter’s security. This outlook particularly represented the views of Pakistan’s civil and military bureaucracy that included Musharraf regime, Pakistan’s foreign office, some of Islamabad’s foreign policy related think-tanks and many political parties such as Pakistan People’s Party, Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) under the leadership of Chaudhury Shujaat, Muslim League (N) under the leadership of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

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25 This interpretation is based on a careful reading of around 50 Volumes of *Foreign Affairs Pakistan* Islamabad, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This publication includes statements and speeches of Pakistan’s decision makers, their interviews anywhere in the world, all opinions expressed on foreign policy matters,
This opinion was well reflected in the secondary sources on US-Pakistan historical relationship from 1950s-9/11. S.M. Burke’s *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy* and *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* accommodated this viewpoint well. Moreover, former Pakistani President Ayub Khan’s autobiography *Friends Not Masters* told a similar story.26 In addition to books, from 1960s onwards, the articles and editorials in Pakistan’s English and Urdu language newspapers, with both liberal and rightist leanings, advocated this perspective.27

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 once again led to the US-Pakistan cooperation. From the US standpoint, it was imperative to build cooperation with Pakistan in order to combat terrorism in Afghanistan and to help Pakistan emerge as a moderate state. Christine Fair’s Rand Corporation funded study, *The Counter Terror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India*, presents a cost and benefit analysis of the US cooperation with both countries after 9/11 and holds that cooperation with both Pakistan and India is essential for the US.28 Many US think tanks’ sponsored studies preferred India over Pakistan. Ashley J. Tellis 2005 *Carnegie Report*29 and *Joint Task Force Report*30 of the Pacific Council on International Policy and Observer Research Foundation at the Brookings Institution are examples.

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27 From the 1960s to 1980s, Pakistan’s English language newspapers included a plethora of dailies which were state controlled via the National Press Trust. These included *The Pakistan Times* which was published both from Lahore & Rawalpindi and Urdu newspapers, such as *Mashriq*, published from Lahore, Karachi and Quetta and *Imroz* from Lahore are examples. It was therefore through no coincidence that these newspapers pursued the governmental line. It is, however, interesting to note that the shades of opinion propagated in the so called independent newspapers such as *Dawn*, Karachi, and the *Pakistan Observer*, Karachi were no different to their relatively controlled counterparts.


Given the central question of the thesis, it was necessary to critically examine the literature which could facilitate the understanding of the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level. To elaborate on Pakistan’s security at the domestic level, research material was gathered with a view to gain fresh insights into the implications of US-Pakistan Cooperation post 9/11 for: a) Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion; and b) political violence within Pakistani society.

What then were the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion? To respond to this question, it is imperative to understand Pakistan’s socio-political structure. Pakistan is predominantly a Muslim country which provides some sense of a common identity but ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, sectarian violence, oscillation between military dictatorship and partial democracy, politico-economic instability including overwhelming mass poverty define Pakistan’s socio-political structure. Within this context, a plethora of literature exists on the nature of Pakistan’s attempts to develop socio-political cohesion post 9/11. Pakistani decision makers’ speeches and statements, parliamentary debates and their interviews before domestic and foreign media address this question. Moreover, articles in Defence Journal, National Development and Security and IPRI Papers especially highlight this aspect. Mazari’s Internal Dynamics of Pakistan’s Security31 is an example of articles on Pakistan’s socio-political structure and its vital relationship with Pakistan’s security.

Second, US-Pakistan relations and the idea of federalism in Pakistan have been extensively covered in the literature that, in turn, has two dimensions: a) Centre-Provinces relationship within Pakistan, on the one hand, and b) the level of socio-political cohesion within Pakistani provinces, on the other. Pakistan’s decision makers’ speeches, statements and interviews especially in the domestic media cover this subject well. A plethora of articles and editorials appear on the subject in Pakistan’s both English and Urdu language newspapers. Urdu language newspapers, in general, are more concerned with Pakistan’s internal security and therefore are more vocal on these

issues. The newspapers published from the provinces themselves like the *Frontier Post* (Peshawar), *Daily Times* (Lahore), *Baluchistan Times* (Quetta) and *Dawn* (Karachi) give more coverage to provincial and centre-state issues.

A third aspect on which a wide selection of literature is available deals with the complex relationship between US-Pakistan cooperation after 9/11 and civil-military relationship within Pakistan. This dimension includes the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for the present nature and future of democracy in Pakistan. Articles in Pakistan’s major English and Urdu language newspapers from late 2001-2010 as well as articles in *Pakistan Horizon*, *Defence Journal*, *IPRI Papers*, *IPRI Factfile* cover this area well. Hussain’s *Back to Barracks – Pakistan Army’s Experience of Withdrawal from Active Control of the State*, Khan’s *Pakistan’s Political Scenario* and Niazi’s *‘Time to Remedy some Negative Political Trends* represent this category well.32

The fourth important aspect on which literature is available is the relationship between three entities: US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11, the significance of Pakistani madrassas (seminaries) and Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion. The fifth category of literature deals with the relationship between the US economic & military aid to Pakistan post 9/11 and its implications for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion. In their speeches and statements within and outside Pakistan, their interviews to domestic and foreign media, Pakistani decision makers find a positive connection between the US economic and military aid and increase in Pakistan’s internal socio-political cohesion. All these primary sources are available in volumes of *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*.33 Articles in Pakistan’s Urdu and English language newspapers, in *Pakistan Horizon*, *Defence Journal*, *Strategic Studies*, *National Defence College (NDC) Journal*, *IPRI Papers* and *IPRI Factfile* are particularly concerned with these issues. Hussain’s *Finally

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33 *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, around 50 volumes cover the period from 9/11-2010.
Another significant aspect of Pakistan’s domestic security is the level of political violence prevailing within its society. In the light of the central question, the vital question is: How did the literature represent the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for political violence within Pakistani society? This segment of the thesis would explore whether there was any negative or positive correlation between US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 and ethno-sectarian violence in Pakistani society. Two categories of literature deal with this dimension. The first category covers the positive or negative inter-connection between the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11, Pakistani religious clergy and political/sectarian violence within Pakistan. Khan’s *Fundamentalism, Jehad and Terrorism*, Alam’s *Foreign Policy and Religion*, Hassan’s *Islamic Society and Civil Society: A Direction for Pakistan* and Soherwordi’s *Terrorism, Islamic Concept and Current International Developments – An Analytical View of the Responsible Factors* and Hali’s *Bid to Reform Madrassas in Pakistan* are very useful examples.35

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The second category of literature deals with the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for combating terrorism in Pakistan’s provinces of Baluchistan and North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). It is interesting to note that very few primary documents are available on this issue. Foreign Affairs Pakistan does not publish any of Pakistani decision makers’ speeches or statements on this issue. Moreover, any negotiations between the US and Pakistani decision makers on this issue are also suppressed. Pakistan’s major Urdu and English newspapers only deal with this issue as small news items. Hardly any elaborate articles have appeared in any of Pakistan’s newspapers on this issue. It is again interesting to note that Defence Journal and IPRI Factfiles have covered this issue well. On Baluchistan, Khan’s Cantonment in Baluchistan and IPRI Factfile called Baluchistan: Changing Politico-Economic Paradigm are primary examples. On combating terrorism in Pakistan’s NWFP, Cheema & Nuri (eds.), Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses, Dr. Noor-ul-Haq (ed.) Operation against Terrorists in South Waziristan, Haq, Khan & Nuri’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Ahmed’s A Pragmatic New Approach to the Tribal Areas are most useful examples.

The idea of Pakistan’s domestic security, however, is closely tied to Pakistan’s security at the regional level. Within this context, it was necessary to review the literature which dealt with the implications of the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security at the regional level. The post 9/11 international developments, specially the US-Pakistan cooperation to combat terrorism had strong implications for Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. Since its independence on 14 August 1947, Pakistan felt a permanent threat to its regional security from India. Despite the Indo-Pakistan wars, the Indian threat was not diluted in the minds of Pakistan’s decision-makers.
It is interesting that even first India and then Pakistan’s tit for tat nuclear explosions in May 1998 did not dissolve India-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir which led to their continued strategic rivalry. Within this context, it was the US engagement with both India and Pakistan which could resolve Indo-Pakistan rivalry and act as a balancer in nuclear South Asia.

What then were the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis India? On the regional question, the majority of literature deals with India-Pakistan relations post 9/11. In such articles, the implications of US-Pakistan post 9/11 cooperation for two rivals can only be derived. A plethora of articles published in *Defence Journal* post 9/11 cover current issues in Indo-Pakistan rivalry without commenting on the effect of US-Pakistan cooperation on the rivalry. For example, Lodi’s *Mounting Tensions with India*, Quadir’s *Vajpayee – Converting the Drums of War into Shots of War* and S. M. Rahman’s *Seeking South Asian Enlightenment* are a few examples.

Another off-shoot of the above category deals with India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir and the rivals’ strategic and nuclear equation. Moonis Ahmar’s *Paradigms of Conflict and Cooperation in Kashmir* is one example of a plethora of literature which endlessly exists on this topic. Where Indian-Pakistani nuclear equation is concerned, Inayatullah’s *Nuclearisation of India and Pakistan: Security or Holocaust?*, Zulfqar Khan’s *India-

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39 From 2001-early 2010, See articles in *Defence Journal* which is a publication of General Headquarters (GHQ), Rawalpindi.
Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry: Perceptions, Misperceptions, and Mutual Deterrence \textsuperscript{45}, IPRI Factfile: India’s Strategic Goals behind Standoff\textsuperscript{46} represent this classification.

The second and most useful category of literature for the thesis deals with the implications of US engagement in South Asia post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis the latter’s regional rival – India. Faruqui’s *Can the US Prevent Armageddon in South Asia*\textsuperscript{47}, Malik’s *US-Indian Convergence of Interests: Challenges for Pakistan*\textsuperscript{48} and Winner’s *The US Balancing Act in South Asia*\textsuperscript{49} represent well this classification. In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan’s security at the regional level was also closely interconnected with Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan.

Published after 9/11, all literature on Pakistan-Afghan border region strongly suggests that post 9/11 US-Pakistan cooperation shifted Pakistan’s earlier pro-Taliban policy paradigm vis-à-vis Afghanistan. This paradigm shift, in turn, had strong implications for Pakistan’s regional security vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Given the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11, four categories of literature deal with the implications of this engagement for Pakistan’s security on its border with Afghanistan. The first category of literature is critical of Pakistan’s earlier engagement with the Taliban and holds that Pakistan’s security would have suffered had Pakistan continued with its earlier pro-Taliban policy after 9/11. Niaz’ *The Taliban and Pakistan’s National Security Policy*\textsuperscript{50}, Bukhari’s *Taliban Phenomenon: The Security Imperatives for Pakistan*\textsuperscript{51} and Zaidi’s


\textsuperscript{46} Muhammad Arshad Tariq & Sobia Haidar (eds.), ‘India’s Strategic Goals behind Standoff’, *IPRI Factfile*, Vol. IV, No.7, August 2002.


The second category of literature deals with post Taliban Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan’s security. Most of the publications on Afghanistan-Pakistan relations post 9/11 fall in this group. Rasul Bakhsh Rais’ *Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan* and General Aslam Beg’s *Afghanistan Turmoil and Regional Security Imperatives* represent this classification. They argue that Pakistan’s security interests demand a break from its earlier pro-Taliban policy and Pakistan should opt instead for a friendly regime in Afghanistan.

The third category of literature argues that India’s involvement in Afghanistan post 9/11 has negative implications for Pakistan’s regional security. This is largely so due to the Indian influence with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Within this context, Pakistan needs to support the Karzai administration against the possibility of the establishment of a Northern Alliance dominated regime in Kabul. Simultaneously, Pakistan needs to convince the US that a Pashtun dominated regime is in the US security interests as well. Aly Zaman’s *India’s Increased Involvement in Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan* strongly argues this case.

**ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE:**

The thesis bridges the existing gap in literature on the subject and hence attempts to make an original contribution to knowledge for three reasons. First, a plethora of literature is available on US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in general but does not build a relationship between their engagement and Pakistan’s security. The thesis makes

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an original contribution to knowledge through establishing a linkage between US-
Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 and Pakistan’s security. Then, the thesis minutely
examines the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security
both at the domestic and regional levels. Last but not least, the thesis examines in detail
the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation in Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas such as
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan, and in stabilizing
Pakistan-India strategic relationship.

STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS:

The thesis is divided in three parts and has six chapters in all. The first part ‘historical
context’ has one chapter, which explores the historical context of US-Pakistan relations
from 1950s to 9/11 in order to provide a foundation for the discussion of US-Pakistan
cooperation post 9/11.

The second part of the thesis comprises chapters 2-4 and discusses the implications of
US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level. Within
this context, the second chapter provides insights into the nature of US-Pakistan
cooperation post 9/11 at the domestic level and the way it impacted on Pakistan’s socio-
political cohesion. This chapter highlights that the US played a central role in bringing
democracy in Pakistan, as well as in creating a consensus in Pakistani society to combat
terrorism. The third chapter deals with the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11
in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which border Afghanistan, for
Pakistan’s security. The fourth chapter discusses both the nature of US-Pakistan
cooperation post 9/11 in Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan, which
borders Afghanistan and the implications of such engagement for Pakistan’s security.

The third part of the thesis explores the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post
9/11 for Pakistan’s security at the regional level. Within this context, Chapters 5-6
analyzes the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security
vis-à-vis its traditional rival, India. Chapter 5 discusses the US strong role in averting an
Indo-Pakistan war in 2001/02, which enhanced Pakistan’s security at the regional level. Chapter 6 provides fresh insights into the US role in the continuation of Indo-Pakistan composite dialogue, which was once again a positive move for Pakistan’s regional security.

The main findings of the thesis are discussed in the conclusion to the thesis.

The following diagram (Figure 0.1) illustrates the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security. At the domestic level, US-Pakistan cooperation led to the enhancement of latter’s socio-political cohesion, while violence increased in FATA, Balochistan and other parts of the country. At the regional level, the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 enhanced Pakistan’s security through the US playing a strong role in averting Indo-Pakistan military conflict in 2001/2002 and through persuading both rivals to continue the composite dialogue post 9/11.
Figure: 0.1
US-Pakistan Cooperation post 9/11 and Pakistan’s Security

U.S-Pakistan Cooperation post 9/11
(Military, Political, Societal)

Pakistan’s Security

Pakistan’s Domestic Security

Pakistan’s Socio-Political Cohesion

Political Violence in FATA & Balochistan

Pakistan’s Regional Security

US averted Pak-India military conflict 2001-2

US role in Pak-India composite dialogue post 9/11
PART ONE
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
CHAPTER ONE:


INTRODUCTION:

This chapter discusses the US-Pakistan relationship from the 1950s to 9/11. It argues that the patterns of US engagement and disengagement from Pakistan defined the broader parameters of US-Pakistan relationship during this period and that Pakistan strongly benefited from this relationship during the periods of engagement. In contrast, the US disengagement from Pakistan in the 1970s and 1990s severely eroded Pakistan’s security.


In order to combat the perceived threat of Soviet communism to Asia, US global strategies led it to build an alliance with Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960s. Within this context, Pakistan became a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Pakistan, however, had predominantly regional perceptions of security, and therefore, saw this alliance as an opportunity to strengthen itself strategically vis-à-vis its major regional rival – India.

This section emphasizes the connection between the policies of the US President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Pakistan during the Cold War era. It is important to understand the US-Pakistan relations during the President Eisenhower era as Eisenhower and Dulles were responsible for forging a formal alliance with Pakistan. For the sake of comparison, this section also provides a background of US-Pakistan relations prior to Eisenhower’s presidency.

As Pakistan emerged as an independent state from British India on 14 August 1947, its leadership had decided to join the West in order to combat the threat of global communism. There was a significant policy divide at the beginning of two independent states – India and Pakistan. In August 1948, the Economist reported that in case of war, Pakistan would side with the free countries against Russia.¹ As early as 9 September 1947, Pakistan’s founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, himself highlighted Pakistan’s foreign policy choices. On 9 September 1947, in his address to the Cabinet meeting, Jinnah stated that ‘Pakistan [is] a democracy and communism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam. It [is] clear therefore that our interests [lie] more with the two great democratic countries, namely, the U.K and the U.S.A, rather than with Russia.’²

¹ Special Correspondent, Economist, London, 14 August 1948. The correspondent noted that in case of a war between the West and Russia, India would remain neutral.
Jinnah’s statement showed that in the emerging Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, Pakistan would side with the free world which the US led.

Pakistan’s leadership largely agreed with Jinnah on this issue. For example, on 10 May 1949, at a press conference which was held at Cairo, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan stated that Pakistan would help combat communist incursions in Southeast Asia.³ On 12 May, in an interview with the Cairo correspondent of The Times, Liaquat Ali underlined that the countries of the world were split along pro-communist and anti-communist lines. He asserted that the Muslim countries between Cairo (Egypt) and Karachi (Pakistan) would play a major role in combating communism. Within this context, he urged the western powers to strengthen the Middle Eastern countries.⁴ It implied that from the very early years of its independence, Pakistan was aware of how it could fit into the US perceptions of security during the Cold War era.

From 1949 through to the early 1950s, the US was convinced that Pakistan could act as a bulwark against Soviet communism. Liaquat visited the US in May 1950, while the US President Harry Truman (1945-53) initiated the technical assistance agreement with Pakistan in December 1950. Earlier, both countries had signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949. Both countries also signed the Mutual Security Act of 1951. In 1952, the US provided economic assistance to Pakistan as ‘defence support’ and discussed close US-Pakistan military cooperation. The Eisenhower administration (1953-61) wanted to establish the ‘northern tier of defence’ against communism in Asia. According to this strategy, the US planned to reduce its involvement in Korea-type operations and instead buildup the indigenous fighting capability of countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Iraq against communism. The US called these countries the ‘front line states’ because they were supposed to provide military assistance in the case of any communist subversion in West Asia. It implied that the US had decided to provide Pakistan with economic and defence supplies to build its capacity as a US ally against Soviet communism.

Contrary to popular belief, the US policy to engage with Pakistan was formed long before Dulles took office. By November 1952, probably on the initiatives of the Pentagon and the State Department, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the US Commander-in-Chief in Pacific, had visited Pakistan as the guest of Pakistan’s Governor General in Karachi and went to the Khyber Pass where he met Pakistan’s Prime Minister at a reception.\(^5\) In this ‘on the ground’ visit, the US officially recognized the geo-strategic significance of Pakistan. In Karachi, Radford stated that by virtue of its strategic position, Pakistan would play an important role in fighting communism in the world.\(^6\) Selig Harrison was critical of the nature of US-Pakistan relations during the Cold War era. He stressed that ‘Dulles was carrying to its logical conclusion a policy which had been allowed to go very far with the Pentagon and the State Department before he (Dulles) ever took office.’\(^7\) It showed that despite Pakistan’s strategic significance for the US global interests, certain groups within the US administration were not in favor of extensive US-Pakistan cooperation since the beginning. The US administration, however, did choose to make Pakistan its ally.

The Eisenhower administration inspired important changes in Pakistan and in the US-Pakistan relations. Partly because of his pro-US outlook, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan’s former ambassador to the US, became Pakistan’s Prime Minister in 1953. On 19 May 1954, the US and Pakistan signed a ‘Bilateral Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement’. Under the provisions of the Agreement, the US government would provide military equipment and training assistance to Pakistan’s armed forces. According to an 18 May 1954 US Department of State press release on the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with Pakistan, the agreement followed both Pakistan government’s ‘request’ for ‘military assistance’ and Eisenhower’s ‘determination’ that Pakistan was ‘eligible’ for the grant under the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951.\(^8\) It showed that in the mid 1950, the US-Pakistan defence cooperation was fast developing as part of the

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5 *Dawn*, Karachi, 10 November 1952.
US strategic measures against the Soviet Union. However, both the US and Pakistan did not want to alarm the world about the possible global implications of their defence relations.

Within this context, the 1954 agreement was a cautious document. It was carefully worded and contained ‘a customary provision’ for a US military advisory Group to countries like Pakistan that were already receiving US military assistance and contained a ‘customary provision’ for a US military advisory Group. These recipient countries had to provide ‘assurances’ that they would ‘not use’ the US military aid for ‘aggressive purposes.’ Interestingly, both the US and Pakistani governments agreed that the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement neither established a military alliance between the two governments, nor did it oblige Pakistan to ‘provide military bases’ for the US use. However, the truth emerged that the US did establish a military base near Peshawar at Badaber in north-western Pakistan from which the US launched spy plane ‘U-2’ to the Soviet Union. The draft of the agreement, nevertheless, followed the recognized norms of international relations.

US-Pakistan cooperation was forged within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations. The text of the Mutual Defence Agreement implied that Pakistan could not unilaterally take aggressive action against any nation. Under Clause 2 of Article 1, Pakistan could only use US aid ‘to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defence, or to permit it to participate in the defence of the area, or in UN’s collective security arrangements and measures.’ The Clause, however, prohibited Pakistan from using the US military assistance without prior permission of the US government. The agreement thus imposed a serious limitation on Pakistan’s use of US arms. Ensuing events showed that Pakistan did not understand this restraint well enough.

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
Within the context of its own global security interests, in September 1954, the US encouraged Pakistan to join SEATO which already included the US, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines. SEATO was firmly committed to combat communism both at home and abroad. The US felt that Pakistan, being a Muslim state, was fully committed to combat communism, and that the US interests coincided with those of Pakistan. On 23 September 1954, Horace A. Hildreth, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, in his speech at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, highlighted the congruence in US-Pakistan interests to combat communism both at home and abroad.\(^{13}\) This showed that US-Pakistan security interests strongly converged at that time.

Within this context, in September 1955, when Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact or Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the US response was welcoming. CENTO included Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Britain as members, while the US acquired observer status. On 24 September 1955, a Department of State Press release expressed US ‘sympathy’ for countries such as Pakistan for providing for its ‘legitimate self-defence through a collective arrangement within the framework of the UN’.\(^{14}\) The obvious reference was to Pakistan’s joining CENTO. The same press release emphasized that the US saw this arrangement between the ‘Northern Tier’ Middle Eastern countries as useful for ‘effective area defense structure.’ Specifically, the release welcomed Pakistan’s joining the Pact, which in the US opinion, would ‘facilitate cooperation’ between the signatories for their ‘mutual benefit’ as well as ‘common defense’.\(^{15}\) For the US, Pakistan had a central role to play in the Baghdad Pact. In 1955, the Chief of MAAG (Pakistan) Rothwell H. Brown strongly advocated Pakistan’s role in the defense

\(^{13}\) In his speech at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy on 23 September 1954, Hildreth highlighted that Pakistan ‘has definitely repudiated communism as being utterly unacceptable to the principles of the Muslim religion.’ Moreover, he stated that ‘having rejected communism largely on religious grounds, Pakistan has definitely cast its lot with the West with a degree of courage and firmness that is heartening to the entire Western world. The leadership of Pakistan is devoted to sound Muslim principles and is willing and anxious to take full advantage of modern developments that have occurred in the Western world in all walks of life...’. Moreover, according to him, the US assistance to Pakistan was helping ‘to build a nation that is dedicated to the same principles for which the US is working throughout the world’. For the text of the speech, See Department of State Bulletin, Washington D.C., 4 October 1954, p. 492.


\(^{15}\) Ibid.
of the Middle East. On 18 November 1955, he addressed a letter to John K. Wilson, Office of the Military Assistance Program in the Office of the Secretary to Defense in which he wrote:

> Whether you can defend the Middle East without a mobile force from Pakistan appears to be problematical. I may be entirely wrong and perhaps all that is required of Pakistan is a defense of the Afghani border, and the presentation of a buffer between Russian penetration of Iran and the ‘neutralism’ of India. But sitting out here close to the situation it seems to me, personally, that the Pakistan concept is the correct one and that the Middle East cannot be defended without a more positive use of the fighting manpower of Pakistan in a mobile, offensive role.16

In accordance with such views, the US provided technical and economic assistance as well as military support to Pakistan. The US aid program (exclusive of military assistance) for 1955 fiscal year amounted to $114.2 million.17 US economic assistance to Pakistan during the period 1951-1981 totaled over $5 billion. The program began modestly but reached annual commitments approaching the $400 million range in the early 1960s.18 During the 1950s, total US assistance amounted to some $960 million.19

In order to build up Pakistan’s defence structure, the US military assistance to Pakistan reached over $700 million during 1954-1965.20 It highlighted the US and Pakistan’s shared security interests at the time.

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17 In 1953, the US gave a special wheat grant of $73.7 million to Pakistan. In 1955, the technical assistance amounted to $5.3 million, and covered fifty project agreements in all fields with more than half of the funds going to agriculture and natural resources and to industry and mines. In 1953, a special wheat grant of $73.7 million was made to meet famine conditions, and in 1954, project type economic assistance of $14.5 million was extended, but large scale economic type aid was not undertaken until fiscal year 1955. The total US aid program (exclusive of military assistance) for that fiscal year amounted to $114.2 million. ‘Technical Assistance in the Near East, South Asia, and Middle East, A report by Senator Theodore F. Green, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and African Affairs of the Senate, CFR, 13 January 1956. US Senate, 85th Congress, first session, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report No. 139, Technical Assistance, Washington, 1957, p. 542.


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.
On 5 March 1959, the US and Pakistan signed a bilateral ‘Agreement of Cooperation’\(^{21}\) to cooperate in ‘security and defense’ issues within the framework of Article 51 of the UN. The preamble of the Agreement underlined that the US perceived the ‘preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan’ as ‘vital’ to the US ‘national interests’. Article I of the Agreement clearly stated that ‘in case of aggression against Pakistan, the government of the US…. will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the government of Pakistan at its request.’ Article II of the Agreement stated that the US would provide military and economic assistance to Pakistan for the ‘preservation of its national independence and integrity’ and for ‘economic development.’

Apparently, Article III gave two different views of the use of US military assistance. On the one hand, Article III of the Agreement limited the use of US military and economic aid to Pakistan through allowing Pakistan to use this aid only within the framework of a bilateral Declaration signed at London on 28 July 1958.\(^{22}\) This signified that Pakistan could use this aid only to combat communism. On the other hand, the same Article stated that Pakistan must utilize the US aid, both military and economic, in ways which would preserve Pakistan’s ‘independence and integrity’. It showed that there were bars on Pakistan’s use of the US military and economic aid, which Pakistan’s decision makers failed to understand until much later.

This section has discussed the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation during the 1950s especially in the context of the bilateral agreements which both states signed during this


\(^{22}\) This Declaration held that members of the Baghdad Pact would ‘strengthen further their united defence posture in the area.’ The US, pursuant to Congressional authorisation, agreed to cooperate with Baghdad Pact members to strengthen the members’ security and defence. Document 161: Communique of the ministerial meeting of members of the Baghdad Pact, London, 28 July 1958, in Jain, US-South Asia Relations, Vol. 2, op. cit. p. 151.
period. The defence relationship between the US and Pakistan was forged during the Eisenhower administration although the seeds for it were sown much earlier. During the Cold War era, the US and Pakistan became formal allies due to both countries’ resolve to combat Soviet communism. The US and Pakistan signed Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in 1954 and Pakistan became a member of US sponsored defence treaties such as SEATO in 1954 and CENTO in 1955. Both countries signed bilateral Agreement of Cooperation in 1959. All these agreements were signed with the US global interests in mind and prohibited Pakistan from initiating any aggression against its main regional rival – India. During this period, the potential conflict between US global security interests and Pakistan’s specific regional security interests was not apparent. The 1962 Sino-Indian war and the subsequent Indo-Pakistan wars, however, tested the US-Pakistan alliance creating deep divisions between the once close allies.


This section discusses the implications of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 along with the US nuclear non-proliferation interests for US-Pakistan cooperation from 1962-1979. During the 1960s, the US remained engaged with Pakistan. However, the clash of US-Pakistan security interests regarding the 1962 Sino-Indian war and Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 embittered US-Pakistan relations. During the 1970s, the US disengaged from Pakistan due to its strong nuclear non-proliferation interests which clashed with efforts of Pakistan to become a nuclear power.

This section is divided in four sub-sections: 1) The 1962 Sino-Indian War and US-Pakistan relations; 2) The 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and US-Pakistan relations; 3) The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and US-Pakistan relations; and 4) US nuclear non proliferation interests and US-Pakistan relations.
The 1962 Sino-Indian War and US-Pakistan Relations:

The first issue which soured the US-Pakistan relationship was the brief 1962 Sino-Indian border war. Both the US and Pakistan had different security perceptions regarding this dispute. During the war, the US favored India while Pakistan was tilted towards China. Because of US military and economic aid to India in the wake of the Sino-Indian war, Pakistan became disillusioned with the policies of the US.

During the Sino-Indian war, which lasted from 8 September to 21 November 1962, the US supported India against China and also wanted Pakistan to side with India in the conflict. In his autobiography, *Friends not Masters*, Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan recalled Kennedy’s letter which persuaded General Ayub Khan to take no action on Pakistan’s border with India that would alarm India. This move, in Kennedy’s view, would have enabled India to concentrate all its military power on its border with China. In order to please the US, Ayub refrained from military maneuverings against India but he was disappointed because of the US efforts to bolster the Indian military.

In the wake of the Sino-Indian border clashes, the US considerably strengthened India’s defense. On 3 November 1962, the first US arms shipment arrived in four planes, which landed at Calcutta. By 16 November, the Indians were not only requesting the Americans for transport planes but ‘in further modification of the non-alignment policy’, were also asking for pilots and crews to fly the aircraft. A squadron of US C-

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23 The Sino-Indian border war opened on 8 September 1962, when the Chinese crossed Thagla Ridge, which India claimed as the boundary, and threatened the Indian post of Dhola. On 12 October, the situation worsened as Nehru declared that the Indian Army had been ordered to clear the Chinese out of Indian territory. The Indian move evoked a massive Chinese counter-attack on 20 October on both the eastern and western fronts, putting the units of the Indian Army to ignominious flight everywhere. So one-sided was the clash that, while the Chinese rounded up some 4000 Indians as prisoners of war, the Indians could not capture even one Chinese soldier. The fighting ended on 21 November with a unilateral declaration by the Chinese that they would cease fire and withdraw to positions twenty kilometres behind the line of actual control, as it had existed on 7 November 1959. See S.M. Burke, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, Oxford University Press, London, 1973, p. 238.


25 Ibid. p. 141.
130 transport planes, having arrived during November, threw a ‘crucial air bridge’ across the Himalayas from central India to Leh, the main city in Ladakh closest to the frontier conflict. The planes flew fifteen to seventeen runs a day to the front, moving 150 to 180 tons of ‘desperately needed supplies, ammunition and equipment daily’. On 22 November, a high-powered American team headed by Averell Harriman arrived in India to assess India’s needs. The US efforts to boost India’s defense vis-a-vis China continued even after the end of the war. The US policy to strengthen India confused Pakistan and made it feel unsure of the nature of US-Pakistan friendship.

The US assured Pakistan that US aid to India would not be used against Pakistan. On 17 November 1962, the US Department of State press release concerning defense assistance to India especially highlighted that the US assistance to India would only be ‘furnished’ to build Indian defense to counter Chinese communist aggression against India. The statement asserted that if the US aid to India was ‘misused’ and ‘directed against another in aggression’, then the US ‘would undertake immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the UN to thwart such aggression.’ This showed that the US did not want India to use the US arms against Pakistan.

The US understood well Pakistan’s concerns regarding the US efforts to bolster Indian military. On 20 November 1962, President Kennedy himself addressed Pakistan’s concerns over US military supplies to India. He emphasized that the US military aid to India was directed against China and therefore did not undermine the US alliance with Pakistan. According to Kennedy, ‘Chinese communist subversion’ posed a threat to both India and Pakistan and both therefore had a ‘common interest’ in opposing ‘Chinese incursions into the sub-continent.’ In Kennedy’s own words, ‘our aid to India

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28 Ibid.
in no way diminishes or qualifies our commitment to Pakistan’.\textsuperscript{30} Despite such assurances, Pakistan did not share the US views on the military aid to India, which paved the way for Pakistan’s disillusionment with the US.

Pakistan disliked the grant of American arms to India on four counts. First, Pakistan objected that India was getting the US aid because, unlike the US allied Pakistan, India was not a member of any US alliance system. Pakistan held that it was getting aid in return for the costs it paid to keep the alliance. Foreign Minister Bhutto, for example, recalled that at the time of the U2 incident, ‘Krushchev did not say that India will be annihilated. He said Peshawar would be annihilated.’\textsuperscript{31} It signified that due to being a US ally, Pakistan had become more vulnerable vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, while India did not have to pay any cost for its relationship with the US.

Second, from Pakistan’s perspective, India was militarily far more powerful than Pakistan but had pleaded that US arms to Pakistan were threatening India’s safety. Within this context, Pakistan held that the latter has far more to fear if India were to be strengthened with American weapons. Third, according to Pakistan, India’s increased strength would encourage those individuals and groups in India who wanted to destroy the Pakistan state. Fourth, Pakistan felt that the disparity in strength between the two countries would ultimately become so great that India would be in a position to achieve its objectives by simply overawing Pakistan with a show of far superior military might. It implied that the US military aid to India aggravated Pakistan’s insecurity vis-à-vis India.

Interestingly, in the wake of the Sino-Indian war, Pakistan was not entirely opposed to US aid to India but rather wanted the US to use its influence over India to get the latter to settle the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. On 2 January 1963, Ayub wrote to Kennedy: ‘Only a speedy and just Kashmir settlement can give us any assurance that the contemplated increase of India’s military power is not likely to be deployed against

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{31} Bhutto quoted in S. M. Burke, \textit{Pakistan’s Foreign Policy}, op. cit, p. 278.
Pakistan in future.\textsuperscript{32} Ayub also conveyed to India through the US that Pakistan would not do anything to worsen India’s military problems, making it possible for the Indians to switch troops from the Pakistani frontier to the Chinese one.\textsuperscript{33} Pakistan’s concerns implied that the US arms supplies to India could help stabilize the region if the US could pressurize India to resolve the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. However, Pakistan’s reaction to the US policy during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war was another matter.

The 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and US-Pakistan Relations:

This section discusses the implications of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war for the US-Pakistan relations. The US and Pakistan had divergent views about the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war which undermined the US-Pakistan alliance. The US distanced itself from Pakistan largely because the conflict in South Asia was against US global interests in the region. The US was disappointed with the 1965 war because it saw the war as a ‘complete failure’ of its ‘diplomacy’ and a total ‘waste’

\textsuperscript{32} Mohammad Ayub Khan, \textit{Friends not Masters}, op. cit., p. 150.
of the US resources. In South Asia, the 1965 war amounted to a tactical collapse of the US global strategy against the Soviet Union during the Cold War era.

The 1965 war between India and Pakistan had alarmed the US policy makers due to its potential implications for the US interests in the region. On 7 September 1965, Robert McCloskey, the US Department of State press spokesman, highlighted the fact that both India and Pakistan were freely using US military supplies. The US would never have approved the use of its armament in such a drastic way. On 4 September, the US Department of State had already issued a statement that formally declared US neutrality in the Indo-Pakistan war. It was ironic for the US that two of its friendly nations were fighting a war against each other with the use of ammunition provided by a third friendly state, the US. On 8 September, the US suspended arms delivery to both India and Pakistan. It was a wise US strategy which led both rivals away from military hostility towards diplomatic engagement.

The US imposed an arms embargo on the regional rivals because the US wanted them to heed to the Security Council’s call for a cease-fire. A White House spokesman stated that the US was unwilling to diplomatically intervene in the war and underlined that the war must end via the United Nations. From 4 September to 22 September 1965, the US representative to the UN, Arthur J. Goldberg made several statements in the Security Council which highlighted the Indo-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir as threatening to international peace and security. Within this context, on 17 September 1965, Goldberg stated in the Security Council:

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35 S.M. Burke, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*, op. cit., p. 341.
38 The US White House spokesman was quoted in *Hindu Weekly Review*, Madras, 20 September 1965. Some authors hold that it was only when it appeared that China might intervene in the war that the US influenced the UN to pass the 20 September resolution.
We have suspended arms shipments to both countries, since we want, in support of the Security Council’s resolutions calling for a cease-fire, to help bring about an end to this conflict and not to escalate it. … We deplore the use of arms supplied by us in this conflict in contravention of solemn agreements. The US… profoundly believes that the differences between India and Pakistan can be resolved, must be resolved under conditions of peace.  

The US emphasis on peace between India and Pakistan continued despite the fact that the main irritant – the Kashmir conflict – remained unresolved between the two regional rivals. Given the significance of peace in the subcontinent for US security interests, the US secured the passing of the UN Security Council resolution of 20 September 1965. The resolution ‘demanded’ a ceasefire to occur on Wednesday, 22 September 1965 and the subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel ‘back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965.’

Both India and Pakistan accepted the cease fire.

The US strongly appreciated India and Pakistan’s acceptance of the cease fire. On 22 September 1965, President Johnson commended the ‘statesmanship and restraint’ of Indian and Pakistani leaders in accepting UN Security Council’s call for a cease-fire. He appreciated both countries’ leadership initiatives which took ‘us a long step away from the terrible dangers’ which ‘threatened’ the India-Pakistan sub-continent. This signified that the India-Pakistan conflict strongly alarmed the US and that the US was
relieved when peace returned to the warring states. For Pakistan, however, it was difficult to understand why the US had adopted an even-handed policy in the 1965 war, when Pakistan was a formal US ally.

During the 1965 war, the US even-handed policy towards both India and Pakistan did baffle many scholars. The US neutrality in the war showed that the US did not want a partisan approach as the US could not apportion blame to any side in the conflict. This is evident from Assistant Secretary of State for Defense, Douglas MacArthur’s letter which he wrote in reply to Senator Wayne Morse’s letter. McArthur wrote:

We do have evidence of the use of American-supplied equipment by Pakistan during the India-Pakistan hostilities. Under our military assistance agreements, Pakistan is of course free to use United States military equipment for legitimate self-defense. Equipment furnished to India under the 1962 agreement between India and the United States was furnished for the purpose of defense against outright Chinese aggression directed from Peking. We have been informed that India made some use of American-supplied equipment in the hostilities with Pakistan. But India has alleged Chinese-Pakistani collusion in the recent conflict. As you know, the circumstances under which the hostilities developed were such that the blame could not be assessed.

In the wake of the 1965 war, the US interests in the region did not allow the US to blame either India or Pakistan for initiating the war. On its part, Pakistan felt disillusioned with such US policy because it felt that the US neutrality in the event of war in fact favored India. Pakistan argued that the US arms embargo imposed on both India and Pakistan affected Pakistan more because the latter was primarily dependent on the supply of American military equipment while India, on the other hand, had earlier received Soviet armament and the Soviet Union continued to supply arms to India without interruption.

On 10 September, because of frustration with the lack of US support, Pakistan formally invoked the US assurances of assistance against aggression. The US responded that

43 For the text of MacArthur’s letter see Rais Ahmad Jafri, Ayub, Soldier and Statesman, Mohammad Ali Academy, Lahore, 1966, p. 519.
the matter must be dealt with in accordance with the appeal of the UN Security Council to end hostilities. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto rejected this approach when he stated: ‘If the US could only act through the Security Council, then there was no need for alliances.’ The US reacted bluntly to Bhutto’s demand. On the same day, a US Presidential assistant warned Pakistan’s embassy official that the US would make it ‘crystal clear that Pakistan could not expect US assistance in case of a conflict with India.’ It implied that the US was not in favor of isolating India in the region although the US had a defense pact with Pakistan. The US had provided substantial aid to both regional rivals and it was frustrating to watch them wasting the US military assistance away against each other.

Both Pakistan and India had received substantial aid from the US. Lt. Colonel Woolf P. Gross of US army admitted that the US aid to Pakistan from 1954-1965, with exception of the small military training programs which continued since then, was about $672 million worth of material hardware. There was another $700 million for supporting assistance, ‘building’ Pakistan’s ‘cantonments, supporting (Pakistan’s) defence budgets a total of about $1.3 billion over 11 year period. According to this estimate, the US gave $92 million aid to India from 1962-1965. The US aid to Pakistan during the 1960s was approximately $2.8 billion and represented 53% of total foreign assistance to Pakistan.

The difference in the amount of US aid to Pakistan and India appeared large. Pakistan, however, had received this aid over eleven years, whereas India had received it over three years. The US delivered military assistance to India and Pakistan to strengthen

45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 *Security and Economic Assistance to Pakistan*, op. cit.
their defence against Soviet and Chinese communism. It was frustrating for the US, therefore, when both Pakistan and India entered into another bloody war in 1971.

**The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War and US-Pakistan Relations:**

This section discusses the implications of 1971 Indo-Pakistan war for US-Pakistan relations. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war adversely affected the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation. It disillusioned Pakistan from the US because the US was unable to prevent Pakistan’s dismemberment which resulted from this war.

India-Pakistan war of 1971 was the extension of a civil war between East and West Pakistan. Bengalis who formed the overwhelming majority of the eastern wing, strongly resented West Pakistan’s military, political, economic and cultural domination. Among others, the civil war was closely related to Bengalis’ resentment of the outcome of Pakistan’s national elections in December 1970. In the national elections, Awami League won in East Pakistan, while Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto won in West Pakistan. Of the total population of Pakistan, the population of East Pakistan formed 54% while that of West Pakistan constituted 46% implying that Awami League had the right to form the government in Pakistan. However, General Yahya Khan, a military dictator, in alleged conspiracy with Bhutto, denied the Bengalis the right to rule, which fuelled widespread Bengali separatist movement. As Pakistan military’s atrocities grew against the Bengalis in order to crush separatism, India fuelled the separatist sentiments, trained the Bengali militia and went to war with Pakistan. India won the war which led to the birth of Bangladesh from the eastern wing of Pakistan in December 1971.

Due to the US inability to save Pakistan’s dismemberment, Pakistan viewed the US as an unreliable ally. From Pakistan’s perspective, the US had failed to protect Pakistan’s territorial integrity in the 1971 India-Pakistan war even though both the US and
Pakistan were still defense allies under the treaties of SEATO and CENTO.\textsuperscript{50} The perception of some analysts that the US more strongly supported Pakistan in the 1971 war arose from the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s warning to India in August 1971.\textsuperscript{51} During the civil war in East Pakistan, Kissinger informed the Indian ambassador in Washington that if China intervened on Pakistan’s side in the case of an Indo-Pakistan war, the US would not assist India. Kissinger’s words provided a good excuse to India for promptly signing the ‘Indo-Soviet friendship treaty’ before the Indian army entered in East Pakistan.\textsuperscript{52}

Kissinger’s warning was interpreted differently in Delhi and Islamabad. India felt that Kissinger had told India that the US would not support India’s position in East Pakistan due to amicable US-Pakistan relations. On the contrary, Pakistan thought that Kissinger had allowed India to have a formal security alliance with the Soviet Union, which would restrict China from supporting Pakistan’s sovereignty\textsuperscript{53} and territorial integrity. What Kissinger wanted to achieve through his warning to India would remain controversial.

As a result of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, both the US and China distanced themselves from Pakistan in the wake of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war in order to avoid extra-regional ramifications of the Indo-Pakistan conflict. The treaty signaled that it was neither in the security interest of the US nor China to intervene in the Indo-Pakistan conflict on behalf of Pakistan. In case of its involvement in the India-Pakistan confrontation, the US would have encountered a direct conflict with the Soviet Union.

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\textsuperscript{52} Basant Chatterjee, Indo-Soviet Friendship, Ibid., p. 118. According to the author: ‘It was the emergence of this China-US-Pakistan axis against India’s security which convinced the Indian government that it did not need to waste any time in holding further talks on projected treaty.’ Within this context, Andrey Gromyko and Swaran Singh signed the ‘Indo- Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation’ on 9 August 1971.
\textsuperscript{53} During informal conversations with the author, various security analysts argued that Kissinger’s move, which resulted in the Indo-Soviet deal, actually sealed Pakistan’s fate in the 1971 war with India.
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and India that would have hurt the US global interests. The US was then striving to build a détente with the Soviet Union and cooperation with India. China, on the contrary, could ill afford to displease both the US and the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, it was Pakistan’s strategic miscalculation to expect any support from a major power.

The US, however, did try to avert the 1971 war in its own way. Before the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, the US initially wanted to prevent a war between India and Pakistan, while during the war, the US stressed the urgency of negotiating a cease-fire. On the one hand, the US told Pakistan that ‘a lasting political solution could be found only on the basis of some form of autonomy for East Pakistan’ and on the other, the US warned India that the US would view an Indian resort to arms as a ‘tragic mistake.’\(^{54}\) Moreover, the US Secretary of State Rogers gave notice to the Indian Ambassador on 11 August 1971 that the administration could not continue economic assistance to a nation that started a war.\(^{55}\) The US development loans to Pakistan had already been cut off in April 1971 after Pakistan’s President General Yahya Khan had ordered the army to restore order in East Pakistan. The aid to Pakistan was fully resumed on 19 June 1972. Nixon also obtained an assurance from Yahya that East Pakistan’s National Awami Party (NAP) leader Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman would not be executed.\(^{56}\) Thus, the US tried to handle the situation taking into consideration its own wider global strategic interests. Henry Kissinger’s ‘balance of power’ diplomacy led to the Sino-US rapprochement and the US-Soviet détente. For the US, India clearly emerged as the pre-eminent power in the region after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war.

As Pakistan’s alliance with the US could not prevent Pakistan’s dismemberment in 1971, Pakistan decided to withdraw from SEATO in 1972. Most importantly, Pakistan had assumed the membership of SEATO due to its eastern wing. Once Pakistan was dismembered, SEATO membership became a matter which the newly independent state of Bangladesh needed to consider. When disillusioned with its alliance with the US,

\(^{55}\) Ibid.  
\(^{56}\) Ibid.
Pakistan began to concentrate on an alternative way to strengthen its own defense against India.

**US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Interests and US-Pakistan Relations - 1970s**

During the 1970s, the US had strong global nuclear non-proliferation interests which clashed with Pakistan’s attempts to acquire nuclear technology. Pakistan pursued its nuclear program to enhance its security vis-à-vis India. As a consequence, in its own global security interests, the US imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its ongoing nuclear program and remained disengaged from Pakistan until the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979.

During the 1970s, the US had strong nuclear non-proliferation interests which were global in nature, whereas Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear power emerged out of its regional security concerns. The US did not want the proliferation of nuclear weapons especially in regions that were of strategic interest to the US. Pakistan’s emphasis on its nuclear program, conversely, was a response to India’s nuclear explosion at Pokharan in May 1974. Despite the US warnings, Pakistan continued to pursue its nuclear ambition to strengthen its security vis-à-vis India, which was always a major concern for Pakistan. The clash in security interests distanced the US from Pakistan. Despite the US disengagement from Pakistan in the 1970s, Pakistan continued to develop its nuclear technology.

From 1965 - early 1970s, the US did not have much leverage to influence Pakistan’s foreign policy particularly as the US had placed an arms embargo on Pakistan following the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. Interestingly, the US perceived lack of interest in Pakistan’s security further intensified Pakistan’s efforts to achieve nuclear deterrence against India. The US, however, had continued its marginal economic assistance to Pakistan. During the 1970s, the US assistance amounted to US $1.5 billion which averaged less than 20% of the total foreign assistance.\(^{57}\) In 1978, US assistance was

\(^{57}\) *Security and Economic Assistance to Pakistan*, op. cit.
limited to PL 480 sales and support for debt rescheduling. During this period, Pakistan’s efforts to gain nuclear technology and US pressure to deter Pakistan from doing so continued side by side which hurt their mutual relations.

During the 1970s, the US arms embargo became a major irritant in US-Pakistan relations. The US held that its arms embargo would prevent a fourth war in the subcontinent. Pakistan argued that if the US dropped its arms embargo against Pakistan, then Pakistan might give up its nuclear program. On 9 October 1974, in an interview with Bernard Weinraub, correspondent of the *New York Times*, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto stated that the resumption of US arms aid to Pakistan would ‘blunt our yearning’ to develop a nuclear device. He underlined that if Pakistani people felt secure, then they would not like to ‘squander’ their resources in the nuclear direction. On 6 February 1975, while talking to a US journalist in Washington, Bhutto stated that if the US gave Pakistan conventional weapons, then Pakistan would be prepared to place all his nuclear reactors under international inspection to prevent secret production of nuclear weapons. It implied that Pakistan was inclined to give up its nuclear pursuit in exchange for the supply of US arms to Pakistan.

Within this context, on 24 February 1975, the US lifted its ten year arms embargo on Pakistan. This did not involve direct US military assistance grant to Pakistan but rather enabled it to purchase arms from the US. As the spokesman of the US Department of State, Robert Anderson rightly explained: ‘This is cash only policy….We are not planning to provide any equipment on a grant military assistance basis or non credit.’ According to Anderson, the US would consider Pakistan’s requests for military exports in the light of ‘progress toward normalization of relations between India and Pakistan.

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58 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Bhutto’s statement to American correspondents in Washington, 6 February 1975 in the *Times of India*, New Delhi, 7 February 1975.
and the effect any particular sale’ would have on ‘regional peace and stability.’ This signified that the US had to evaluate each and every weapon’s sale to Pakistan on a case-by-case basis. It also indicated that the lifting of embargo was unlikely to facilitate the sale of all US weapons to Pakistan for cash.

On 1 March 1976, Francis R. Valeo, Secretary of the US Senate, in his report on South Asia to the majority leader Committee on Foreign Relations, summarized the difficulties that Pakistan would face in purchasing arms from the US. He stated:

The US Congress insisted that transactions with Pakistan be on a cash basis and carried out under strict legislative surveillance. The legal requirement for Congressional concurrence in all sales over $25 million acted as a powerful brake [on sales]. Cash purchases are difficult for Pakistani government as it is likely to remain cash-short, unless there were inflows of funds from sympathetic Muslim countries.

Pakistan understood fully the shortcoming of the restricted lifting of the embargo. On 11 September 1976, in his interview with George Hutchison, Deputy Editor of Spectator, Bhutto stated that the end of the US embargo would not ‘result in an unrestricted flow of arms to Pakistan.’ According to him, Pakistan’s ‘financial constraints and the obstructing conditions imposed on the US Congress’ would continually ‘hamper’ Pakistan’s efforts to ‘fulfill’ its ‘essential defense requirements.’ This statement showed that Pakistan was dissatisfied with the restricted lifting of the arms embargo. It also demonstrated that Pakistan was unconvinced that limited US arms sales would meet Pakistan’s security requirements. This insight reinforced Pakistan’s quest for nuclear technology.

In 1976, Pakistan bought a reprocessing plant from France, which Pakistan insisted was for peaceful purposes alone. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board

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63 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
of Governors, which included a representative of the US, approved this deal.\textsuperscript{67} The US representative’s approval of a nuclear processing plant for Pakistan was an interesting development. On 8 July 1976, Bhutto told a press conference in Tehran that the US should consider that Pakistan’s reprocessing plant was for ‘peaceful purposes, for the harnessing of our atomic energy for fuel purposes and for no other purpose’.\textsuperscript{68} Such diplomatic statements made little difference to the US, which strongly suspected that Pakistan desired to achieve nuclear capability.

The US attitude towards the reprocessing plant was at best cautious. On 9 August 1976, during his visit to Pakistan, Secretary Kissinger expressed his views on the reprocessing plant at a news conference in Lahore. He admitted that Pakistan’s negotiations with France on the plant took many years and that the ensuing Pakistan-France agreement had ‘all the international safeguards that were considered appropriate at the time when those negotiations started.’ However, he expressed the US concern on the deal in these words:

\begin{quote}
We have studied the problem, developed increasing concerns about the spread of reprocessing plants, even with the safeguards that were considered appropriate several years ago. Our concern is not directed toward the intentions of Pakistan, but toward the general problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons which can have, in our view, disastrous consequences for the future of mankind.\textsuperscript{69}
\end{quote}

At the same conference, when asked whether the US required further safeguards on the reprocessing plant or was it the US position that Pakistan ‘should not have it at all under any circumstances’, Kissinger replied that the US would ‘try to elaborate general principles with respect to reprocessing that would apply equally to all countries’ and that these would not involve discrimination against any particular country.’\textsuperscript{70} The reply showed that a hesitant Kissinger found it difficult to elaborate on the US position regarding the reprocessing plant agreement. Kissinger’s hesitancy could have been due to his awareness of US Congress’ inclination to deal severely with the agreement.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
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1976, in order to control the export of nuclear technology, the Congress made an Amendment to its Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). The Congress passed the Symington Amendment for the termination of aid to non-weapon countries which imported uranium enrichment technology. This Amendment was readily applicable to Pakistan.

The Symington Amendment frustrated Pakistan because the Amendment implied that the US did not want Pakistan to acquire nuclear technology. Accordingly, Pakistan reacted bitterly to the Amendment. On 5 October 1976, in an interview with J. G. Heitink of an Amsterdam daily De Telegraf, Bhutto expressed distress over the US alliance and advocated instead a policy of bilateralism. He stated that if the US administration wanted to implement the Symington Amendment and ‘apply it to Pakistan, if (the US) decided not to sell arms to us’, then Pakistan has the option of withdrawing from CENTO.’ He added:

> We are members of alliances, yet we do not get any military assistance. Pakistan has two bilateral agreements with the US, we are members of CENTO, and yet we have to pay cash for every little nut, bolt and bullet we get from the US. We too are not married to CENTO … if a new US administration can have a new policy towards CENTO or this area, we too can have a new policy. If events force us, we might also consider Pakistan’s withdrawal from CENTO and that would, at least bring about a better understanding in our relations with the Soviet Union.

Bhutto not only threatened to leave the western alliance but also indicated that he wanted to improve Pakistan’s relationship with the Soviet Union. Bhutto’s assertion must have alarmed the US, especially when the Soviet forces were to invade Afghanistan just after three years.

The US continued to block Pakistan’s efforts to acquire nuclear technology. In 1977, the US imposed the Glenn Amendment, which barred US assistance to countries that imported nuclear reprocessing technology. This Amendment was once again applied to Pakistan. On 6 April 1979, the US President Jimmy Carter invoked both Symington

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72 Ibid, pp. 7-10.
and Glenn Amendments against Pakistan after CIA reports accused Pakistan for quietly engaging in the production of weapon grade uranium.\textsuperscript{74} In response to the US stance over the nuclear issue, Pakistan withdrew from CENTO in 1979. It was the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan on the Christmas eve of 1979, which compelled the US to resume its military and economic relations with Pakistan.

THE SOVIET INTERVENTION OF AFGHANISTAN AND US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: 1980s

This section discusses the implications of the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan for the US-Pakistan relations. During the 1980s, with the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, the US once again engaged with Pakistan in order to combat the global threat of Soviet communism. Pakistan became a conduit for the sending of arms to the Afghan resistance forces against the intervening Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

In December 1979, the Soviet military intervention of Afghanistan was crucially important for both Pakistan and the US. For Pakistan, Afghanistan was a neighboring state, which shared a 2430 kilometer long border with it in the northwest. Pakistan’s apprehension of Soviet intentions across its north western border with Afghanistan necessitated Pakistan’s collaboration with the US in the 1980s. Due to Pakistan’s long border with the Soviet occupied Afghanistan, Pakistan acquired a geo-political relevance for US global strategy. The US-Pakistan collaboration in the 1980s was a logical continuation of the US commitment made in its 1959 bilateral agreement with Pakistan, which related to help Pakistan dispel aggression from a communist or a communist dominated state.\textsuperscript{75} Thus, the potential threat emanating from the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan instigated the US to seek Pakistan’s help as a frontline state to support the Afghan freedom fighters – the ‘Mujahidin’ – to counter the Soviet troops.

Within this context, US offered both military and economic assistance to Pakistan. In 1980, the US President Jimmy Carter offered US$400 million assistance to Pakistan.


\textsuperscript{75} See sub-section (b) of Section 620 E. Amendment to US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
which President General Zia-ul-Haq refused calling it ‘peanuts’. Pakistan’s refusal was due to two inter-related issues. First, the amount which the US offered was meager. Second, despite its concerns about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan was reluctant to get actively involved in the Afghan war due to Pakistan’s incapacity to sustain an open military confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan, however, posed a serious security threat to Pakistan on its north western border. Within this context, when the Reagan administration offered substantial amount of aid, Pakistan accepted the offer and agreed to play an active role in combating Soviet communism in Afghanistan.

For the first time, Pakistan became a front line state for the US against Soviet communism. The US offer of military and economic assistance in return for Pakistan’s support to Afghan resistance resulted in US $3.2 billion US aid package in 1981 for Pakistan, which was spread over five years – 1981 to 1986. Out of this package, US $1.55 billion was specified for military procurement. The proposed US assistance of US $100 million in ESF funds for financial year 1982 represented less than 10% of the expected total foreign assistance commitments during that year. The US further approved US $4.2 billion assistance in 1987 for the 1987-93 period, which made Pakistan the fourth largest recipient of US aid after Israel, Egypt and Turkey. This agreement specified US $1.74 for military purchases. Under this agreement, US leased nine ships to Pakistan. In accordance with the agreement, in 1988, Pakistan procured eight Brooke and Garcia Class frigates from the US Navy on a five-year lease and PNS Moawin in April 1989. It was the first time in the history of US-Pakistan relations that both countries’ security interests had strongly converged against their mutual enemy, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

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77 Tamana, op. cit., p. 17.
78 *Security and Economic Assistance to Pakistan*, op. cit.
80 For further detail, see the interview of Pakistan’s Naval Chief Admiral Mansurul Haq, *The News*, Islamabad, 6 September 1995.
The renewed US strategic interest in Pakistan resulted in extensive US-Pakistan cooperation in various spheres including sophisticated military supplies. Besides the supply of 100 M-48A5 tanks and three Gearing class destroyers, the US approved the sale of 40 F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan in 1984 that significantly enhanced Pakistan’s ground, naval and air combat force. The US also announced to supply Air-borne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to Pakistan. This deal did not go ahead due to India’s objection. Pakistan, nevertheless, was designated a critical ‘allied role’ within the framework of Central Command (CENTCOM) during the second half of the 1980s.\(^{81}\) The US and Pakistani strategists built a highly effective guerrilla training base, intelligence service and logistic support network for the Afghan fighters which significantly benefited the anti-Soviet resistance within the Afghan territory. Since the mid 1980s, under the strong UN mediation, both the US and Soviet Union started to shift their emphasis from military conflict to diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan.

The resumption of the US-Soviet dialogue on peaceful withdrawal of the Soviet forces form Afghanistan shifted the US security preferences. Far-reaching US-Soviet negotiations commenced in 1985 that involved the issues of strategic arms reduction and the resolution of regional disputes, including Afghanistan, through a bilateral dialogue.\(^{82}\) The strategic development between the two Cold War rivals as well as the

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\(^{81}\) The US CENTCOM was the sixth such American military command to be created after World War II and was operationally considered at par with NATO and the Pacific command. Its area of responsibility specifically covered 19 countries, three more than NATO, in Southwest Asia, the Gulf, and the Horn of Africa, a region ranging from Kenya and Somalia to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s strategic position in the Gulf had been incorporated into Washington’s security planning in the region. In 1986-87, Pakistan’s overseas military missions were active in 22 countries in the Middle East and Africa. According to one report, Pakistan had emerged as the largest exporter of military manpower in the Third World during those days. Nearly 50,000 or 10% of country’s armed forces were deployed outside its borders. Lawrence Lifshultz, ‘The Strategic Connection: Pakistan and the US Cooperation on Building Up Forces’, *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER), 18 Dec. 1986, pp. 24-26; Amitav Acharya, ‘AWACS Controversy Fuels the Arms Race’, *Pacific Defence Reporter*, Vol. XIII, No. 10, April 1987, pp. 45-47.

\(^{82}\) In the Summit meetings held since 1985, Soviet leader Michael Gorbachev and President Reagan made significant progress in developing a framework for holding a positive dialogue between the two countries. This unexpected shift in US-Soviet relations was a result of Michael Gorbachev’s outgoing and far-reaching diplomacy which called for a peaceful resolution of mutual conflicts between the two superpowers and saw a broader reconciliatory role for the UN since 1984. Brian Urquhart, ‘Conflict Resolution in 1988: The Role of the United Nations’, *SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament*, Oxford University Press, London, 1989, pp. 445-47.
US domestic imperatives prompted the US Congress to enact the Pressler Amendment against Pakistan’s nuclear program in 1985.

This Amendment, however, was not implemented until 1990 which enabled the US to cooperate with Pakistan until the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988. The US Amendment did not immediately affect US military and economic assistance to Pakistan because the Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan. The US cooperation with Pakistan remained significant for the US strategic interests in the region. Within this context, until 1990, the US President continued to certify each year that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. However, as the last Soviet troops moved out of Afghanistan, the US President changed his stance on Pakistan’s nuclear capability. This development was bitterly resented in Pakistan.

Although various events in the 1980s did indicate Pakistan’s involvement in the manufacture of a nuclear device, the US ignored them because the fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan was of paramount importance. For example, both before and after the passing of the Amendment, a number of Pakistanis were arrested in the US while trying to smuggle out either material or equipment which was useable in making nuclear explosives. The US intelligence had also informed the US administration about the advanced level of Pakistan’s nuclear program. The US President was sufficiently informed from 1987 onwards that he should not certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device. President Reagan’s (1980-88) Ambassador on nuclear non-proliferation, Richard Kennedy, told a Congress Committee in 1987 that Pakistan had enriched uranium beyond 5%, a level that President Zia had promised President Reagan that Pakistan would not exceed. Richard Kennedy, however, argued that to cut off the

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83 Tamana, op.cit., pp.16-19.
US aid ‘would not only harm the US foreign policy but make Pakistan even more
determined to go ahead with a bomb.’ It implied that the US made fighting the anti-
Soviet war in Afghanistan a priority over and above its nuclear non-proliferation interests.

The US ignored Pakistan’s nuclear program even when Pakistan claimed that it had
acquired nuclear technology. In the middle of 1987, when India conducted its largest-
ever military exercise, Brasstacks, on Pakistan’s eastern border, Pakistan claimed that it
could now assemble a nuclear device. Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, the then head of
Pakistan’s nuclear program, told Indian journalist Kuldeep Nayar in 1987, ‘Pakistan has
a nuclear device’. Pakistan chose this particular moment to announce its nuclear
achievement in order to deflect immediate pressure both from the US and India.
President Zia himself stated in an interview with the Time magazine that Pakistan had
the capability to build the bomb. This showed that at that time the US nuclear non-
proliferation interests were subordinated to the US interests in Afghanistan.

The US preference for the Soviet containment in Afghanistan over nuclear non-
proliferation was due to the immediate significance of the Afghan war. For example, US
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy told the US Senate Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee in 1987 that the US administration was committed to enforce the Pressler
Amendment, ‘but we must be acutely mindful of our global security interests and the
importance of these interests for maintaining our support for Pakistan’. The US was

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86 Ibid.

87 According to a published interview, Dr. A. Q. Khan told the journalist ‘What the CIA has been saying
about our possessing the bomb is correct and so is the speculation of some foreign newspapers. They told
us that Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but they now know we
have done it.’ Quoted in Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from
South Asia, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999, pp. 102-03. Under the US administration’s
pressure, Pakistan’s embassy in the US issued a statement in which Dr. Khan criticized the journalist for
quoting an informal talk out of its context. See Nayan Chanda, ‘Yes, We Have No Bomb: The Pakistani
Scientist Denies Device Claim’, FEER, 12 March 1987, p. 34.

88 According to some analysts, Pakistani leaders and officials deliberately encouraged the impression in
foreign media that Pakistan was on the threshold of making a nuclear device. For example, in his
interview, President Zia-ul-Haq stated: ‘You can write today that Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it
wishes. Once you have acquired the technology which Pakistan has, you can do whatever you like’,
Time, 30 March 1987, p. 42. See also Hagerty, op. cit. p. 123.

89 Richard Murphy quoted in Tamana, op.cit, p. 25.
criticized for following the dictates of realpolitik instead of its principled stand against Pakistan’s nuclear program. However, the criticism ceased in September 1990, soon after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, when the US President refused under the Pressler Amendment to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. It was the implementation of the Pressler Amendment that drastically altered and soured the US-Pakistan relations in the 1990s. Interestingly, not only Pakistan but many ensuing US administrations were to regret the imposition of the Pressler law against Pakistan.


This section discusses the implications of the implementation of the Pressler Amendment for US-Pakistan relations from 1990-9/11. During the 1990s, US nuclear non-proliferation interests gained foremost priority under which the US implemented the Pressler Amendment against Pakistan in 1990 and disengaged from Pakistan until September 11, 2001.

In August 1985, the US Congress passed an Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. Since Republican Senator, Larry Pressler, moved this Amendment, it became generally known as the ‘Pressler Amendment’. This Amendment amended Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Section 620 E dealt with ‘International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985’. The Pressler Amendment added a new sub-section (e) at its end. ‘Section 620E’90 provided:

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\text{Section 620 E. Assistance to Pakistan:}
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a) The Congress recognizes that Soviet forces occupying Afghanistan pose a security threat to Pakistan. The Congress also recognizes that an independent and democratic Pakistan with continued friendly ties with the US will help Pakistan maintain its independence. Assistance to Pakistan is intended to benefit the people of Pakistan by helping them meet the burdens imposed by the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and by promoting economic development. In authorizing assistance to Pakistan, it is the intent of Congress to promote the expeditious restoration of full civil liberties and representative government in Pakistan. The Congress further recognizes that it is in the mutual interest of Pakistan and the United States to avoid the profoundly destabilizing effects of the proliferation of

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nuclear explosive devices or the capacity to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear devices.

b) The United States reaffirms the commitment made in its 1959 bilateral agreement with Pakistan relating to aggression from a communist or communist-dominated state.

c) Security assistance for Pakistan shall be made available in order to assist Pakistan in dealing with the threat to its security posed by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The US will take appropriate steps to ensure that defense articles provided by the United States to Pakistan are used for defensive purpose.

d) The President may waive the prohibitions of Section 669 of this Act at any time during the period beginning on the date of enactment of this section and ending on 1 April 1990, to provide assistance to Pakistan during that period if he determines to do so in the national interest of the US.

e) No assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities contained in this Act or any other Act, unless the President shall have certified in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, during the fiscal year in which assistance is to be furnished or military equipment or technology is to be sold or transferred, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.

This Amendment (sub-section e) made US assistance and military sales to Pakistan conditional upon Pakistan not acquiring nuclear technology. It required the US President, as a condition of US assistance to Pakistan, to certify each year that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, and that the ‘proposed US assistance [would] reduce significantly the risk of Pakistan possessing such a device.’91 The defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan strengthened the US opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear program. Not surprisingly, Pakistan felt betrayed and disillusioned with the US.

According to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Amendment was directed at Pakistan because it was the only US aid recipient with a statutory exemption from the existing nuclear non-proliferation requirements contained in Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act.92 The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, therefore, changed

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91 Ibid.
92 The Committee’s comments on the Pressler Amendment reflected a contradiction within US foreign policy. For example, on the one hand, the Committee believed that ‘continued US assistance to the people of Pakistan is in the national security interests of both countries.’ On the other hand, the Committee was ‘deeply concerned by the continued development of military capabilities in Pakistan’s un-
US strategic perceptions in the region. There was no longer a threat of Soviet communism in the region and, therefore, Pakistan lost key importance as the frontline state for the US. Now, nuclear proliferation became the main concern of US foreign policy. Under this scenario in 1990, President Bush refused to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. As a result, all economic and military aid to Pakistan, negotiated in 1987 under a four-year package worth US $4.02 billion dollars, was cut off from the October 1990 financial year. Under the changed strategic circumstances, the US found itself in a position to insist that Pakistan should roll back its nuclear program to the pre-April 1990 level in order to regain US economic assistance and military supplies. This ended the informal US-Pakistan alliance of the 1980s.

From 1990-9/11, the Pressler Amendment embittered US-Pakistan relations on military, political, societal and economic levels. During the 1980s, within the context of the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, the US had signed two aid packages for Pakistan. Under the 1987 agreement, the US had leased nine ships to Pakistan. However, in October 1990, under the Pressler Amendment, the US retracted the nine ships, which the US had earlier leased to Pakistan. The US policy shift resulted in strong anti-US resentment and disillusionment in Pakistan. Due to its nuclear non-proliferation interests, the US disengaged from Pakistan in the 1990s.

Despite having developed a nuclear device, Pakistan’s security dilemma had not been resolved because the Pressler Amendment had prevented the sale of F-16 planes to Pakistan. During the Afghan war in the 1980s, Pakistan received 40 F-16 planes from the US, but the US refused to supply additional 28 F16s due to the Pressler Amendment. In 1989, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto persuaded the US to supply an additional 71 F-16s including 11 two-seater trainer aircraft to Pakistan. The $1.4 billion agreement provided a facility for advance payments in installments under an agreed schedule.

safeguarded nuclear program, which jeopardizes future US economic and military assistance’, Text of the Pressler Amendment, Ibid.

93 For further detail on this issue see the interview with Pakistan’s Naval Chief Admiral Mansurul Haq, The News, Islamabad, 6 September 1995.

94 Ibid.

Pakistan continued to pay the installments, whereas the US put an embargo on the sale of F-16s to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment. After paying $658 million, Pakistan withheld a $92 million installment on the planes in mid 1994 and demanded either the delivery of planes or the reimbursement of the pre-payment. The US refused to deliver the fighter planes to Pakistan and conditioned the remuneration of funds with the sale of the entire F-16 fleet to a third country.

The sale of F-16 planes became one of the most contentious issues between the US and Pakistan after the implementation of the Pressler Amendment. When Pakistan withheld a US $92 million installment in July 1994, a US negotiating team headed by Major General Joseph P. Hoar, visited Islamabad with a four-point plan to break the impasse. The team had advised Pakistan to follow the agreed schedule of payments by installments and wait for lifting of the embargo or the sale of the entire fleet of the planes to a third country. It was believed that the Hoar team had warned Islamabad that the failure to pay the installments that were due could lead to the forfeiture of all the sums paid so far. In a single decade, the Pressler Amendment largely destroyed the networks of US-Pakistan formal and informal cooperation which had existed ever since the foundation of Pakistan.

The Pressler Amendment had a direct impact on Pakistan’s military. In the absence of access to US tactical planning, US weaponry or training, Pakistan’s military began to feel nervous and insecure. Due to earlier combined US-Pakistan military training, Pakistani military had developed broad contacts with the West reinforcing its pro-western orientation. The Pressler Amendment terminated the US military training assistance and the opportunity to conduct joint exercises with US armed forces.

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97 Visit of Joseph P. Hoar and his team to Islamabad, July 1994, Foreign Affairs Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, July/August 1994.

Consequently, there was an emergence of a variety of conservative forces in Pakistan’s military which were opposed to the West and to the US in particular. The divisions in the military began to take shape along pro-Western, pro-Islamic and ethnic lines. Such developments had strong implications for Pakistan’s internal security. 

From 1990-9/11, the US disengagement led to Pakistan’s political instability. Pakistan’s relationship with the US was crucial in strengthening the newly emerged democracy in Pakistan in the 1990s. From 1993 onwards, the dominant theme of President Clinton’s administration was to promote and stabilize democracy in Pakistan. In September 1993, when Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary visited the US, the discussions focused on the US persuading Pakistan to hold free and fair elections to set Pakistan on the path to democracy. During the 1990s, however, the democratic governments in Pakistan continued to be unstable because in the absence of active assistance to Pakistan, the US had lost the leverage to help bring about political stability in Pakistan. The US disengagement from Pakistan had monumental negative consequences for Pakistan, the region and for the US and its allies. Among other consequences, the decision weakened the development of democracy in Pakistan.

The US withdrawal also led to socio-economic instability in Pakistan. As a result of US imposed economic sanctions, Pakistan was forced to follow strict IMF instructions to bring about economic reforms in Pakistan. These reforms, which involved the imposition of higher taxes and reduction of subsidies, brought the business community in conflict with the government, which resulted in further deterioration of Pakistan’s national economy. The economic crisis, in turn, was partly responsible for political instability and further growth of ethnic / religious sentiments within Pakistan.

The US withdrawal also marginalized the liberal forces and strengthened conservative elements within Pakistan. The liberal forces in Pakistan were pro-US, secular and pro-democracy. On the contrary, the conservatives were anti-US, having their roots either in

100 Report on a Visit of Foreign Secretary to the US, 7 September 1993, Foreign Affairs Pakistan, Vol. XX, Nos. 7-12, July – December 1993, p. 176.
radical Islamist forces or had an alliance with the Pakistani military. As a result of the US disengagement, many former liberals in Pakistan turned from supporting the US instead switching their allegiances to either religious or ethnic political groups and individuals that worked against the socio-political cohesion of the country. Despite the heavy cost of the Pressler Amendment to Pakistan’s security, however, the US Congress did not rescind the Amendment.

After 9/11 terrorist attacks on twin towers in New York and Pentagon in Washington, the US once again wanted to forge an informal alliance with Pakistan in order to combat global terrorism. Within this context, the US President George Bush (Junior) waived the Pressler Amendment on 22 September 2001. Ironically, it was Bush (Senior) who had implemented the Pressler Amendment against Pakistan in 1990. The nature of the US-Pakistan relations demonstrated that this alliance was formed only when the US national interests allowed it. On the contrary, Pakistan always desired a strong alliance with the US, which was essentially due to Pakistan’s national security concerns. It is, therefore, this dichotomy between the US global interests and Pakistan’s regional interests which have historically defined the US-Pakistan relationship.

CONCLUSION:

This chapter has discussed the nature of US-Pakistan relations from 1950s – 9/11. In order to combat the Soviet communism during the Cold War era, the US built an alliance with Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960s. Within this context, Pakistan became a member of CENTO and SEATO. Pakistan, however, had predominantly regional perceptions of security, which sometimes were divergent from US strategic interests, and therefore, saw this alliance as an opportunity to strengthen itself strategically vis-à-vis its regional rival – India. Regarding regional security issues, the clash of US-Pakistan perceptions eventually led to the US disengagement from Pakistan in the late 1960s. During the 1970s, the US had strong global nuclear non-proliferation interests, which led it to remain disengaged from Pakistan until the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in December 1979.
In the 1980s, the US once again engaged with Pakistan to combat the global threat of Soviet communism. Pakistan became a conduit for sending arms and thus strengthening Afghan resistance forces vis-à-vis the intervening Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988, the US disengaged from Pakistan in 1990. The US nuclear non-proliferation interests gained foremost priority under which the US imposed Pressler Amendment on Pakistan in 1990 and remained disengaged from Pakistan during the 1990s. Immediately after 9/11, the US forged new cooperation with Pakistan in the US war against terrorism.

It is crucial to understand the implications of the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security. Within this context, the next chapter of the thesis explores the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion.
PART TWO

IMPLICATIONS OF US-PAKISTAN COOPERATION POST 9/11 FOR PAKISTAN’S SECURITY AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL
CHAPTER 2

US-Pakistan Cooperation Post 9/11: Implications for Pakistan’s Socio-Political Cohesion

This chapter discusses the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level. More specifically, it explores the implications of both countries’ cooperation for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion. The US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 had mixed consequences for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion. On the one hand, US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 strengthened moderate Islam in Pakistan, which helped the Pakistani authorities to combat Islamist militancy within the society. Moreover, the US support helped Pakistan’s peaceful transition from military rule to democratic government in 2008. Furthermore, due to US-Pakistan cooperation, a broad consensus emerged within Pakistan opposing militancy and extremism. On the other hand, the militants strongly rejected ‘moderate Islam’ as the idea of the state and engaged in widespread violence within Pakistan.

According to Buzan, twin concepts of ‘socio-political cohesion’ and ‘political violence’ define the security of a state at the domestic level. A high degree of ‘socio-political cohesion’ within a given state leads to enhancement of the state’s security, while a low degree of such cohesion implies decrease in a country’s security. Further, the prevalence of high degree of ‘political violence’ within a given state demonstrates the erosion of a country’s security, while the existence of low level of political violence shows the augmentation of a state’s security. This chapter attempts to determine the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion, while chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis deal with the issue of ‘political violence’.
This chapter is divided into the following four sections: 1) Defining security at the domestic level and Pakistan’s socio-political structure; 2) The emergence of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11; 3) The role of the US in Pakistan’s transition to democracy; and 4) US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 and Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion.

DEFINING SECURITY AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL AND PAKISTAN’S SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE:

This section attempts to define the notion of ‘security’ at the domestic level and explore the nature of Pakistan’s socio-political structure. It argues that being a weak state, Pakistan has fragile socio-political institutions.

For Buzan, the idea of a weak state is intertwined with the concept of low socio-political cohesion and the idea of a strong state is directly related to the concept of high level of socio-political cohesion. According to him, weak states have six characteristics in common: 1) high level of political violence; 2) strong ‘role for political police’ in citizens’ lives; 3) ‘major political conflict’ over the idea of the state; 4) absence of ‘coherent national identity’ or existence of ‘contending national identities’ within a state; 5) absence of a ‘clear … hierarchy of political authority; and 6) state heavily controls the media. 1 All six characteristics are readily applicable to Pakistan. However, according to him, it is the idea of the state which binds the people into a socio-political and territorial entity. 2 This implies that idea of the state forms the backbone of a given state’s socio-political cohesion.

Pakistan does have a well defined territory but it remains a weak state because it neither has a strong idea of the state nor strong institutions. Buzan finds a similarity between a state’s territory and an individual’s body, whereas the idea of the state is similar to an individual’s mind. According to him, while territory and population are concrete, the

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2 Ibid, p. 70.
idea of the state is metaphysical in nature.\(^3\) It implies that although Pakistan possesses a well defined territory and population, not having a strong idea leaves it without a mind.

As far as its territory and population are concerned, Pakistan has a total area of 803,940 square kilometers with 778,720 square kilometers of land and 25,220 square kilometers of water.\(^4\) Geographically, Pakistan shares a 2,912 kilometer long border with India, 2,430 kilometer long border with Afghanistan, 909 kilometer long border with Iran and 523 kilometer long border with China.\(^5\) Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, however, remains contested due to Afghanistan’s refusal to accept the Durand Line. According to July 2008 figures, Pakistan has a population of around 168 million.\(^6\) Pashtuns living both in Afghanistan and Pakistan have also refused to accept the Durand Line.

Pakistan is a ‘multi-nation’ and ‘imperial state’. Multi-nation refers to the existence of many ethno-linguistic groups within a state, while an imperial state refers to the domination of a country’s institutions by a single ethnic group.\(^7\) Pakistan has five major ‘ethno-linguistic groups’\(^8\) including Punjabi (55%), Pashtun / Pathan (15%), Sindhi (14%), Muhajir (8%) and Balochi (4%).\(^9\) As a compromise, Pakistan’s decision makers chose English as the official language and Urdu, which 8% of the population speaks, as the national language. This proved to be another hurdle in Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion as the clash between the Urdu speakers and those who spoke regional dialects could also be viewed as a clash between ethnicities, which Pakistan’s decision makers tried to bridge through political means. However, Punjabis continued to dominate Pakistan’s socio-political institutions, which fuelled sub-nationalistic tendencies among other ethnic groups especially the Sindhis, Balochis and Pashtuns.

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\(^3\) Ibid, p. 63.
\(^5\) Pakistan’s coastline along the Arabian Sea is 1,046 kilometer long which extends from the fully functional port Mohammad bin Qasim of Karachi which falls in Pakistan’s southern province of Sind to newly built Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. Ibid.
\(^6\) Ibid.
\(^7\) Buzan, People, States and Fear, op.cit., p. 76.
Due to its pre-dominantly Muslim population, Pakistan’s decision makers tried to use Islam as the idea of the state. Pakistan has 97% Muslims which are divided across sectarian lines - 77% Sunnis and 20% Shi’as. Interestingly, Sunni and Shi’a sects are further sub-divided into numerous sub-sects. The rest of 3% population is Hindu, Christian, Bahai, Sikh, Buddhist and Ahmadiyya - also known as Qadiani. Having a large Muslim population, the state authorities attempted to assimilate various ethnicities through the political use of Islam. However, Islam as the state ideology did not help resolve Pakistan’s chronic socio-political problems because the state failed to effectively use the idea of moderate Islam to unite the population. It was only due to US cooperation with Pakistan post 9/11 that Pakistan’s decision makers tried to do so.

It is essential to understand that Pakistan has low socio-political cohesion because it has weak political institutions. Pakistan has faced numerous political crises during its sixty year brief history. The country faced civil wars, dismemberment, military dictatorships, ethno-linguistic killings, sectarian bloodshed, tribal feuds, economic meltdowns and chronic institutional failure. Pakistani society suffered from national insecurity despite becoming a de-facto nuclear state in 1998. Instead of promoting self-reliance, the country developed a dependency on the outside world to help run its strategic, political and economic affairs.

Despite having the 1973 constitution which ensured a parliamentary form of government, the country has oscillated between political governments, which honor the constitution, and military regimes, which abrogate the constitution. Pakistan experimented with democracy from 1947-1958, 1972-1977, 1988-1998 and from 2008 onwards. Presently, Pakistan has a parliamentary system of government. According to the constitution, President is the formal head of the state while Prime Minister is the head of the government. Owing to constant constitutional changes, the President had extensive powers including the power to dismiss the Prime Minister and the elected assemblies. In April 2010, the Parliament of Pakistan passed the 18th Amendment, which modified the 17th Amendment curtailing the power of the President to dismiss the
Prime Minister and the Parliament. During the February 2008 elections, the members of the assemblies were elected for a five year term through universal franchise system with 18 being the age for voting. The provincial governments were formed on the principle of majority seats in the assemblies. The governors were appointed to represent the federal government in the provinces.

A major issue that has been eroding Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion is the tug of war between civil and military rulers to choose the right form of government for Pakistan. For example, the democratic forces preferred a parliamentary system that helped develop a consensus among the elected members to make laws and implement policies in the general interest. On the contrary, the military regimes favored the presidential rule that allowed the accumulation of executive powers in a single person. This conflict between the two governing systems has been continuing since the early years of Pakistan. The first military President, General Ayub Khan captured power in October 1958 in an army coup. He cancelled the 1956 constitution based on parliamentary system of governance and imposed the 1962 constitution with a weak legislative assembly and a President with substantial legislative, executive and economic authority. Since 1969, when Ayub was forced out after public agitation against him, Pakistan oscillated between democratic and military regimes. Democratic regimes came to power in the 1970s and the 1990s, while military ruled the country in the 1960s, 1980s and from 1999 to early 2008.

Musharraf combined both administrative and legislative powers like the previous military rulers through exploiting Pakistan’s weak political structure. He manipulated the religious political leaders and other splinter groups to get another constitutional Amendment approved by the Parliament. The famous 17th Amendment allowed Musharraf to keep his position as the Chief of Army Staff as well as that of President of Pakistan. He appointed hand-picked crony Prime Ministers with a feeble parliament and ruled the country from the military headquarters in Rawalpindi. From 2007 onwards, he lost grip over the flow of events due to excessive use of power, which led to his unpopularity within Pakistan.
The Red Mosque incident further eroded Musharraf’s domestic image. In mid July 2007, an army action was taken against the militants in the heart of Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, which left more than a hundred people dead. The incident became famously known as the Red Mosque incident or Waqaya-i-Lal Masjid. The deceased were the male and female madrassa students who had fortified themselves in the madrassa along with some foreign militants. They were kept under siege for a week and eventually the army crushed the rebels within the mosque complex. The event turned into a deeply bitter experience nationally due to the authorities’ failure to resolve it politically and the use of excessive firepower against the madrassa students. As an aftermath of this military operation, suicide bombing attacks increased in the country including Islamabad.

The two clerical brothers who used to organize this madrassa, and the famous Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) attached to it, reportedly had covert relations with the Taliban militants in the north of Pakistan. Most of their madrassa students came from the tribal areas of NWFP. The cultural and educational orientation of the students led them to sympathize with the religious armed activists within Afghanistan and Pakistan. They had adopted Taliban style activities such as demanding the imposition of Islamic law, interfering with the local businesses such as video shops and harassing citizens who were perceived to be engaging in immoral activities. People, especially women and foreigners, felt insecure with the growing religious intolerance in a liberal city like Islamabad. There was an impression among people that the authorities were losing control of the state to the Taliban forces.

The military action against the Red Mosque widely polarized Pakistani society between pro-action and anti-action groups which had competing arguments concerning the event. The nature of these mutually exclusive arguments was not different from those in the broader debate over the Taliban and al Qaeda operatives. Those who supported the army

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12 Ibid.
action in the Red Mosque agreed that the menace of religious militancy needed a strong response. Those who opposed the action believed that the matter could be resolved through meaningful negotiations without bloodshed. Both the groups agreed, however, that the Musharraf regime deliberately allowed the Red Mosque crisis to reach the point of no-return. The assumption implied that an army action against madrassa students helped Musharraf appear good against the war on terror and provided an escape from the US pressure for not doing enough about it.

The anti Musharraf lobbies also suspected that Musharraf intended the Red Mosque episode to distract the public opinion away from the oncoming Supreme Court (SC) decree on the dismissal of the Chief Justice. On 20 July 2007, the Supreme Court turned down Musharraf’s order to dismiss the Chief Justice. The Red Mosque incident and the Supreme Court verdict politically isolated Musharraf in Pakistan. A noted Urdu journalist, Hamid Mir, wrote that ‘20 July was the beginning of Musharraf’s end.’ Mir implied that after the Supreme Court’s decision against him, Musharraf could not enjoy the position that he had before it. On 3 November 2008, marking the first anniversary of the state of emergency, Mir wrote in daily Jang that:

On 5 November [2007], the Supreme Court was about to announce its verdict on a petition against Musharraf’s right to contest presidential elections. The Supreme Court was expected to decide that Pervez Musharraf could not do so while he was in army uniform. On 3 November, Musharraf used his military might and imposed Martial Law (read: state of emergency) in the country suspending constitution under a Provisional Constitutional Ordinance (PCO).

In his 3 November 2008 speech at the Rawalpindi district courts, deposed Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Chaudhary held that judiciary was the target on 3 November [2007]. Chaudhary’s statement signified that the state of emergency was actually imposed to target the judiciary. More than sixty judges of the superior judiciary

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14 Ibid.
including Chaudhary were deposed. Within the next few days, five thousand political workers were arrested and on 8 November, the leader of Pakistan People’s Party ‘Benazir Bhutto’\textsuperscript{16} was put under house arrest in Lahore.\textsuperscript{17} While Musharraf was fast losing ground domestically on judicial crisis, the Red Mosque incident and the imposition of the state of emergency in Pakistan made him further unpopular in the country.

In February 2008, Musharraf held parliamentary elections under great domestic and global pressure. However, he withheld powers to sack the Prime Minister and the elected assemblies. Following the elections, a power struggle began between the President and the new elected leaders which exposed the frailty of country’s political structures. On 18 August, Musharraf resigned after the US intention to support the new democratic government.\textsuperscript{18}

The military’s leading role in national affairs and the military’s ever increasing emphasis on security concerns saw these concerns taking precedence over all other issues including political and economic wellbeing of the people. Pakistan’s military regimes favored central authority over sharing of power between head of the state and head of the government as well as between the centre and the provinces. The legislative and judicial institutions were made subservient to the will of the ruler. Every time a General toppled an elected government, the superior courts were forced to uphold the military intervention in the name of ‘law of necessity.’ The parliaments were assembled to create the image of public legitimacy to otherwise unpopular military rulers. National

\textsuperscript{16} Like her father, Benazir had a large political following in the country and carried the global image of a stateswoman. She spent most of her political life campaigning for the return of democracy in Pakistan. Out of nearly three decade long political career, she spent around five years in power. She struggled against General Zia-ul-Haq who removed her father Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as prime minister in the July 1977 coup and then hanged him. In the 1990s – a turbulent decade of fragile civil rule – her two terms as Prime Minister were cut short in their mid terms. Since 2000, she lobbied against the Musharraf regime while living in exile. She was allowed to return home in late 2007 through a National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that was negotiated between President Musharraf and herself with US mediation. The day she returned in mid October, hundred and eighty people died and nearly 600 were wounded in a suicide bomb attack on her procession in Karachi. In late December, she was assassinated under mysterious circumstances as she was leaving after her public address in the famous Liaquat Bagh of Rawalpindi.

\textsuperscript{17} Hamid Mir, ‘Tabahi kay Rasty par Mat Chaliay (Don’t Walk on the Way of Destruction)’, op.cit.

constitution was repeatedly annulled and amended to suit unconstitutional governments.\textsuperscript{19} Pursuing national security through military means alone discouraged the growth of other nation building measures such as the promotion of political stability, economic sustainability and the provision of justice through the judicial system.

Pakistan has been a weak state due to its ineffective military, political, societal and economic structures. The country failed to build a sustainable political system that could help evolve a society based on economic well being and social harmony. Owing to this structural failure, ethnic and sectarian violence as well as a general sense of insecurity prevailed in the society. A constant struggle for power between the military regimes and democratic forces consumed most of the country’s energy and resources. This strife isolated the general society which already faced serious economic and social consequences. Despite the misrule of the military, the US adopted the shortsighted policy of supporting military regimes opposed to the democratic forces in Pakistan. In the absence of global support for a viable democratic process, Pakistan became a security state rather than a welfare state which could have helped Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion. At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to explore why and how cooperation emerged between the US and Pakistan post 9/11.

THE EMERGENCE OF US-PAKISTAN COOPERATION POST 9/11:

In the aftermath of 9/11, the US engaged with Pakistan within the context of the threat which the 9/11 terrorist attacks posed to US global security interests. In the post 9/11 environment, Pakistan was especially relevant to the US due to Pakistan’s geo-strategic location, Pakistan’s relations with the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s and the history of US-Pakistan relations. Within this context, the US wanted Pakistan to become a frontline state against the al Qaeda and the Taliban related terrorism in Pakistan-

\textsuperscript{19} Pakistan’s 1973 constitution was suspended on 5 July 1977, while it was restored 30 December 1985. The constitution was once again suspended on 15 October 1999, restored in stages in 2002, amended on 31 December 2003, suspended again on 3 November 2007 and restored on 15 December 2007.
Afghanistan border areas. In order to combat global terrorism, therefore, the US engaged with Pakistan at military, political and economic levels.

During the post 9/11 era, however, there remained tension between the US national security interests which were global in nature and Pakistan’s national security concerns which were both domestic and regional in character. Being the most powerful dominant global power, the US security interests dominated Pakistan’s narrower security interests and was largely instrumental in Pakistan’s joining the US coalition against terror. Even though US-Pakistan cooperation emerged post 9/11, their often conflicting strategic interests created ongoing tensions and mistrust between the two countries.

It is important to understand the context in which Pakistan gained significance for the US post 9/11. The terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and Twin Towers, waged by Osama bin Laden’s militant network Al Qaeda challenged the US position as the sole superpower in the early 21st century and dramatically forced the transformation of US national security paradigm. Following the death of 3000 citizens, the destruction of the twin towers in New York and severe damage to the Pentagon building in Washington ‘in a single day’ a lasting tragedy had struck the heart of the American nation according to the Bush administration. Most strikingly, the emergence of a worldwide guerrilla network signified a global security crisis with unpredictable implications. The events of 9/11 changed the US perceptions of its security and its role as a superpower demanding a strong response from the US Bush administration.

The global war against terrorism in which Pakistan was to be the US key frontline state and ally, therefore, became the prime concern of the Bush administration post 9/11. On 20 September 2001, while addressing the Joint Session of the US Congress, President Bush was mindful of the enormous challenge at hand. In his address, reflecting on the magnitude of the threat of the terrorist attacks to global peace, Bush stressed:

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Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years they have seen wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941 [Pearl Harbor]. Americans have known the casualties of war, but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. … This is not just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us.21

Shocked by the unique experience of al Qaeda attacks in New York and Washington and mindful of the strength of the United States, the majority of the world states supported the US stance against terrorism. The US received widespread support and cooperation of the international community in its resolve to combat terrorism. The day after 9/11, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted resolution 1368, which was ‘guided by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.’22 Using the strongest language in the ‘condemnation of terrorist attacks’ in the US, the four point UNGA resolution stressed that the global community:

1. Strongly condemns the heinous acts of terrorism which have caused enormous loss of human life, destruction and damage in the cities of New York, host city of the United Nations, Washington, D.C., and in Pennsylvania;

2. Expresses its condolences and solidarity with the people and Government of the United States of America in these sad and tragic circumstances;

3. Urgently calls for international cooperation to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of the outrages of 11 September 2001;

4. Urgently calls for international cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism, and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of such acts will be held accountable.23

Under the provisions of the UNGA resolution 1368 and UN Security Council resolution 1373, it became obligatory for the UN member states to cooperate with the US in its fight against the enemy that had attacked the US homeland.24 This meant that Pakistan

21 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 On 28 September 2001, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reaffirmed the UNGA resolution 1368 in its ‘unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist acts’ of September 11 by adopting a ‘wide-ranging, comprehensive resolution (1373) with steps and strategies to combat international terrorism.’ The UNSC resolution 1373 (2001) also established a Committee of the Council to monitor the resolution’s implementation and ‘called on all states to report on actions they had taken to that end’ within 90 days. See ‘Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation’ *UNSC 4385th Meeting*, Press Release, 28
being a member of the UN had the obligation to cooperate with the US against global terrorism.

The two resolutions, respectively adopted by the UNGA and UNSC, endorsed the use of force to eliminate al Qaeda network and its leadership including Osama bin laden. The US also attained the right to invade Afghanistan, the host country of Osama and his al Qaeda followers, and to dislodge the Taliban regime in Kabul. Both the resolutions were adopted following the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter\(^\text{25}\). 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members’ decision to side with the US in the war on terror also became an important factor in Pakistan’s decision to support the US post 9/11. NATO, for the first time in its history, invoked Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which held that ‘an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them.’\(^\text{26}\) Article 5 of NATO Treaty makes a specific reference to Article 51 of UN Charter and directs the member states to cooperate with the member state against which aggression has been committed.\(^\text{27}\) Under such arrangements, NATO member states sent their troops to fight alongside the US

\(^{25}\) The United Nations emerged as an international body after immense suffering caused by the two World-Wars of the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century, with the primary function of promoting peace and security in the world. Beginning with its preamble, the UN Charter has a strong apprehension towards the use of force. In Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Article 51 reads: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of the individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security… Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.’ See ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaching of the Peace and Acts of Aggression’, Article 51, Chapter VII, *Charter of the United Nations* http://www.hrweb.org/legal/unchartr.html retrieved 5 January 2007.


\(^{27}\) Article 5 of NATO Treaty reads: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Ibid.
forces in Afghanistan. Within this context, along with other members of the United Nations, Pakistan also joined the US war on terror.

The case of Pakistan, however, was very different from the rest of the pro-US anti-terrorism coalition. Pakistan had been the principle supporter of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan from 1996 to 9/11 because the Taliban were regarded as Pakistan’s ally in the region particularly in opposition to India with its predominant Hindu population. The 9/11 Commission Report stressed that Pakistan’s ‘vast un-policed regions’, Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, could act as safe havens for the extremists. The 9/11 Commission Report saw President Musharraf as the promoter of stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan and recommended that the US should make a long term commitment to Pakistan provided Pakistan remained committed to combating extremism and to a policy of ‘enlightened moderation’. The cooperation implied that Pakistan had to readjust its policy towards the Islamist Taliban and related militant groups who were active across Pak-Afghan border and in the South Asian region.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US soil, the US, therefore, forged strategic cooperation with Pakistan in order to combat terrorism. Within this context, the US President George W. Bush waived the Pressler Amendment on 22 September 2001, which had imposed military and economic sanctions on Pakistan because of its nuclear policy. Ironically, it was Bush (Senior) who had implemented the Pressler Amendment due to the end of the Cold War, and it was Bush (Junior) who waived this Amendment due to his war against global terrorism.

The Congress passed and the President signed into law, S.1465 (P.L.107-57) in October 2001. With this law, Congress exempted Pakistan from all sanctions related to democracy and debt arrearage for 2002, and granted the President authority to waive such sanctions through FY [Financial Year] 2003. Presidential Determination 2003-16 exercised this authority for FY 2003 on March 14, 2003.²⁹

This waiver removed the last hurdle for Pakistan to receive US economic and military aid. In November 2001, the US announced a US $1.08 billion aid package for Pakistan that included US$ 73 million for border security and US $6.5 million for an anti-terrorism interdiction training program.³⁰ Thus began another phase of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11. From 2002-2008, the US aid to Pakistan amounted to over $11 billion. The US provided 72% or $8.1 billion as security related aid which included Coalition Support Fund (CSF) to reimburse Pakistan for its counter terrorism activities and military assistance, while only 23% of the entire aid or $3.1 billion came as economic assistance.³¹

Table 2
US Assistance to Pakistan: 2004-2008
(Thousands of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSH</td>
<td>25,600</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>22,757</td>
<td>22,385</td>
<td>39,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
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<td>29,000</td>
<td>26,990</td>
<td>95,327</td>
<td>18,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>297,600</td>
<td>296,595</td>
<td>283,677</td>
<td>382,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>74,560</td>
<td>298,800</td>
<td>297,000</td>
<td>297,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>2,037</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>31,500</td>
<td>32,150</td>
<td>34,970</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADR</td>
<td>4,930</td>
<td>7,951</td>
<td>8,585</td>
<td>9,977</td>
<td>10,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>187,374</td>
<td>688,386</td>
<td>688,934</td>
<td>734,358</td>
<td>785,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2 provides an overview of the overt US aid and military reimbursements to Pakistan from Financial Year (FY) 2002 to FY2008. This Table highlights the breakdown of both security and economic related aid to Pakistan. Security Related Aid includes what the US provided under section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006, Counter Narcotics Funds (CN), Coalition Support Funds (CSF), providing training and equipment to Pakistan’s Frontier Corps (FC), Foreign Military Funding (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) including border security and Nonproliferation, Anti Terrorism, De-mining and Related (NADR) activities. The economic related aid included aid for purposes of Child Survival and Health (CSH), Development Assistance (DA), Economic Support Fund (ESF), Food Aid, Human Rights and Democracy Funding (HRDF) as well as Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA). According to the Table, the total US security and economic aid to Pakistan from FY 2002 to 2009 amounted to $ 12.1 billion.

This Table further demonstrates that the total US Security Related Aid to Pakistan from 2002-2008 amounted to US $ 8.13 billion with the US highest security related aid to Pakistan in a single year being $ 1.5 billion in FY 2003 closely followed by $ 1.34 billion in FY2002 and $1.31 billion in FY2005. The US security aid to Pakistan remained over a billion dollars with the exception of FY 2004, FY 2008 and FY2009. Interestingly, the US security related aid to Pakistan dropped below a billion dollars in FY2004 when it amounted to $818 million and in FY 2008 when it was $ 774 million. The amount requisitioned for FY 2009 was the lowest and stood at $ 545 million.

According to Table 2, the total economic related aid to Pakistan from FY 2002 to 2008 amounted to $ 3.1 billion with the highest amount being 654 million in FY 2002 followed by $539 million in FY 2006 and $ 521 million in FY 2007. The lowest
amounts of US economic aid were provided to Pakistan in FY 2003 when it stood at $274 million, followed by $296 million in FY 2004. For all the years under study, the US security related aid varied from being between twice to five times the size of US economic aid to Pakistan. For example, in FY 2006, security aid was twice the amount being worth $1.26 billion when compared to US economic aid which stood at $539 million. Then, in FY 2003, security related aid to Pakistan amounted to a high $1.5 billion, while US economic aid was as low as $274 million dollars – five times lesser than the US security aid to Pakistan. However, the Table shows that there is a break in the pattern of security aid being higher than its economic counterpart in FY 2009. In the requisitioned amount for FY 2009, the US economic aid to Pakistan amounts to $668 million, which is higher than the US security related aid, which is $545 million.

While Pakistan was willing to cooperate with the US in its own national security interests, the tension between US global interests and Pakistan’s national security interests remained. For the US, the 9/11 attacks focused its attention on terrorist activities emanating from Afghanistan which became the first military battleground of the war on terrorism. According to a report titled ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001’ which the US Department of State released on 21 May 2002, the US led coalition had three military objectives in Afghanistan: First, to destroy al Qaeda and its terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan; second, to remove the Taliban from power; and third, to restore a broadly representative government in Afghanistan. To fulfill these objectives and to protect its own strategic interests in the region, Pakistan became a coalition partner of the US.

The US required Pakistan’s cooperation to combat terrorism in the latter’s border region with Afghanistan. This area comprised the tribal belt in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the tribal areas of Balochistan. (Chapters three and four of the thesis discuss the nature of this cooperation in FATA and Balochistan in detail.) The US found it essential to do so because of the US war against the Taliban in October 2001, which

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the UN had mandated earlier. As stated earlier, on 12 September 2001, the UN General Assembly adopted a four point resolution condemning the terrorist attacks in the US. The third point of the resolution called for ‘international cooperation to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the outrages of 11 September 2001’, while the fourth point emphasized international cooperation to ‘eradicate’ terrorism.33 The UN mandate, therefore, brought the US and Pakistan together in the war against terrorism. Later, the US and NATO’s presence in Afghanistan also necessitated the US cooperation with Pakistan.

Pakistan was hesitant to join the US against the Taliban due to its national security interests which often clashed with the US security interests. Pakistan was reluctant to devote itself wholeheartedly to combat terrorism for three reasons. First, Pakistan had recognized and strongly supported the Taliban regime in Afghanistan from 1996–9/11. Second, the Taliban shared Pashtun ethnic identity with the inhabitants of Pakistan’s North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), FATA and the tribal areas of Balochistan. This meant that if Pakistan decided to combat terrorism in FATA and other tribal areas, then its national integration would be threatened from within by probable Pashtun separatism. Third and most importantly, Pakistan had felt that its support of the Taliban would give the country strategic depth vis-à-vis its major regional rival – India. Within this context, certain circles in Pakistan’s military and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), especially retired Generals and other officials, felt that the hardened Taliban could be useful for pressurizing India and could be a major force in liberating Kashmir from Indian control.

Pakistan, nevertheless, agreed to accept US policy to a certain extent and restructured its strategy to fight terrorism and to contain religious extremism. Pakistan felt that it was in its national interest to reverse its pro-Taliban policy when the Bush administration threatened Pakistan with all measures short of war in case of Pakistan’s non-cooperation

33 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, United States, A/RES/56/1, 12 September 2001.
with the US in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{34} The Musharraf regime in Pakistan decided to use military force to eliminate Al-Qaeda and the more extreme elements among the Taliban. Many analysts argue that Musharraf took strong measures against Al Qaeda and foreigners but was ambiguous in his efforts to suppress homegrown terrorists. To achieve this purpose, Pakistan mainly deployed a large number of military personnel on its western border with Afghanistan where Pushtun tribes lived on both sides of the Durand Line. Pakistan also launched organized army operations against the insurgents that had taken refuge in Pakistan to reorganize themselves for armed attacks both within Pakistan and in neighboring Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{35}

From 9/11 to 2008, the Bush administration supported Pakistan’s role in the war on terror. On 26 February 2003, the White House spokesman Ari Fleischer praised Pakistan’s efforts to combat Al Qaeda related terrorism. According to him, although al-Qaeda may have been regrouping in Pakistan, the country was doing its ‘level best’ to help the US combat Osama’s network.\textsuperscript{36} In his words, ‘there are portions of Pakistan that are very hard to police. But Pakistan is a stalwart ally of the US in this effort. They have been and they remain [so]. They do their very level best and they cooperate very strongly with the US in our efforts to bring al Qaeda to justice, wherever they are.’\textsuperscript{37}

From 9/11 to 2008, many in the Bush administration including President Bush, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, the US National Security Advisor and others issued similar statements of support for Pakistan.\textsuperscript{38} Pakistan was especially praised whenever it captured or killed a high level Al Qaeda leader. For example, on 2 March 2003, Bush praised Pakistan for the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad who belonged to Al Qaeda and was the alleged mastermind of 9/11


\textsuperscript{35} Pakistan’s military pursuits against Islamist militants increased the militants’ retaliation which created a nearly civil war like situation in Pakistan’s FATA where a series of battles occurred between Pakistan security forces and hardened tribal fighters.

\textsuperscript{36} White House Spokesperson Ari Fleischer quoted in \textit{The Nation}, Lahore, 27 February 2003.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{38} See volumes of \textit{Foreign Affairs Pakistan}, Islamabad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 9/11 – 2008 as well as US Department of State website.
attacks. On 4 May 2005, on the capture of Abu Faraj, Al Qaeda’s operational chief in Pakistan, Bush commented that his capture was significant because it represented ‘a critical victory in the war on terror. His arrest removes a dangerous enemy who was a direct threat to America and for those who love freedom. I applaud the Pakistani government for their strong cooperation in the war on terror.’

Nevertheless, the US continued to emphasize that Pakistan was neither ‘doing enough’ to combat Al Qaeda and Taliban related terrorism in Pakistan, nor was it contributing to stability in Afghanistan. For example, in January 2007 Senate testimony, John Negroponte, the former Director of National Intelligence stated that ‘Pakistan is a frontline partner in the war on terror. Nevertheless, it remains a major source of Islamic extremism and the home for some top terrorist leaders. [Al Qaeda’s] core elements … maintain active connections and relationships that radiate outwards from their leaders secure hideouts in Pakistan.’ Such statements implied that Pakistan was not doing enough and needed to do more to combat Islamist extremism and Al Qaeda related terrorism. This showed the level of mistrust in US-Pakistan relations despite their cooperation post 9/11.

Pakistan’s government and media bitterly criticized the US for blaming Pakistan for not wholeheartedly supporting the war against terrorism. Pakistan argued that from 2002-2008, it had placed a large number of its armed forces, which numbered between 70,000-130,000, on a very tough mountainous Pakistan-Afghanistan border in response to demands from the US. Pakistan further criticized the US for not appreciating more fully that Pakistan was doing far more than any other US ally in the war on terror. Pakistan’s media, especially the Urdu newspapers, played a very active role in building an anti-American sentiment within Pakistan. They did so through arguing that the Musharraf regime went out of the way to support the US at the cost of the country’s

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42 See articles and editorials in Urdu language national newspapers such as *Jang*, Rawalpindi, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, Lahore and *Khabrain*, Islamabad from 9/11 to 2008 which emphasized an anti-US view.
national security interests. Various articles and editorials in national dailies such as *Nawa-i-Waqt* emphasized that Musharraf’s support to the US could endanger the identity and survival of Pakistan.

On his part, Musharraf held that if his regime had not supported the US in the war on terror, then Pakistan’s very survival would have been in danger. In his autobiography, *In the Line of Fire*, Musharraf highlighted that he had saved Pakistan by siding with the US after 9/11. According to him, his decision to join the US war on terror:

> was based on the well being of my people and the best interests of my country – Pakistan always comes first. I war-gamed the US as an adversary. There would be a violent and angry reaction if we did not support the US. Thus the question was if we do not join them, can we confront them and withstand the onslaught? The answer was no, we could not ….

According to Charles H. Kennedy, ‘most Pakistani decision makers (even in the military) had been looking for a face-saving way to disassociate themselves from the support of the Taliban for years.’ For Kennedy, ‘Musharraf’s decision was obvious to go along with the US against the Taliban…. But for domestic and international consumption, it was portrayed as a difficult and bitter pill to swallow.’

Kennedy’s argument is open to criticism because Pakistan had maintained links with the Taliban in order to gain ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan vis-à-vis Pakistan’s main rival – India. Within this context, it was not an ‘opportunity’ but a ‘burden’ especially for Pakistan’s military decision makers to reverse the country’s policy vis-à-vis the Taliban. The Musharraf regime, nevertheless, required US support to remain in power and therefore agreed to cooperate with the US. The inherent clash of perceptions between the US and Pakistani decision makers on combating terrorism was evident even during the early stages of their cooperation post 9/11.

This section has discussed the emergence of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11. In order to combat global terrorism post 9/11, the US rescinded the Pressler Amendment

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43 Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, op.cit., p.201.
and began to engage with Pakistan at military, political and economic levels. Pakistan was a ‘reluctant partner’ in the newly formed anti-terrorism coalition because it feared negative repercussions for its own security. Pakistan’s hesitation also flowed from its earlier support to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan from 1990s-9/11. However, Pakistan decided to engage with the US and reverse its policy vis-à-vis the Taliban for three reasons. First, Pakistan feared a very hostile, potentially violent US reaction if Pakistan did not cooperate with the US post 9/11. Second, Pakistan did not want to isolate itself from the US and the global community. Third, Musharraf’s military regime needed the US support to remain in power. Ironically, the US played a strong role in establishing democracy in Pakistan.

THE ROLE OF THE US IN PAKISTAN’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY:

This section discusses the crucial role of the US in Pakistan’s transition to democracy. It argues that the US supported the Musharraf regime as long as the US felt that the military in Pakistan was better able to combat terrorism. When the US considered that a democratic regime could do better to suppress militancy on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as well as combat radicalism within Pakistan, the US began to support democracy in Pakistan. Ultimately, the US role combined with the anti-Musharraf sentiments within Pakistan led to Pakistan’s transition to democracy.

Interestingly, during the first Bush administration (2000-2004), the US continued to support the military regime in Pakistan but wanted at least the appearance of democracy in Pakistan. Within this context, Pakistan held a referendum in 2002 according to which Musharraf became the President of Pakistan. On 13 April 2002, White House spokesman Ari Fleishcher, during his daily news briefing in Washington, highlighted that Pakistan’s constitution allowed for a referendum but the law governing the referendum should be open to review by the country’s judicial court.  

45 It meant that the US wanted prolongation of the Musharraf regime but wanted a legal sanction for the referendum.

The US continued to urge the restoration of democracy in Pakistan at least publicly. For example, on 22 August 2002, US President Bush stated that he ‘hoped’ that President Musharraf would hold free and fair elections in October.46 Once again, on 13 September 2002, during a meeting with President Musharraf himself in the United Nations, Bush urged him to adhere to democracy in Pakistan.47 Within this context, Musharraf held elections in Pakistan in October 2002. Unfortunately, Musharraf did not allow the leaders of Pakistan’s main political parties, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N), to participate in these elections. The elections brought pro-Musharraf groups such as the Pakistan Muslim League - Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q) and an alliance of religious parties called Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) to power, which provided limited political legitimacy to Musharraf’s military rule.

When the Musharraf regime became unpopular within Pakistan, it was the US which helped Pakistan’s transition to a democracy. The Musharraf regime became unpopular within Pakistan for two reasons. First, many Pakistanis disliked Musharraf’s pro-US policies in the US War on Terror. Second, civil society in Pakistan strongly reacted to Musharraf’s authoritarianism such as the removal of Chief Justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary on 9 March 2007 and the imposition of emergency in the country in November 2007. With Musharraf’s unpopularity at home, the US supported a movement towards democracy in order to build a closer relationship with the people of Pakistan because the US saw Pakistan as an important ally in the War on Terror. Within this context, on 5 May 2008, the US Deputy Secretary of State, John D. Negroponte, made the following remarks at the National Endowment for Democracy’s Pakistan Forum. ‘On February 18, the Pakistani people expressed a clear vision for what they want their nation to look like: responsible, democratic [and] grounded in rule of law, with institutions that provide good governance and the basic

47 Ibid. p. 91.
necessities of life to all its citizens. It is in America’s national interest to help Pakistanis make that vision a reality.48

Negroponte’s statement signified major policy change in the Bush administration towards Pakistan from backing a military regime to working with a democratic government in pursuit of fighting terrorism. It was a long process of opinion building in the US and Pakistan that eventually convinced the White House to support the democratic aspirations of Pakistani society. For the US, however, it was a strategic move to reassess its anti-terrorism measures that were going astray across the Pak-Afghan border. In comparative analysis, the US security interests converged with the need for a civil regime in Pakistan.

Since ousting the Taliban from Kabul in late 2001, the US allied forces fought the Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents for years without containing them. The allied forces could neither stabilize the post Taliban government of President Karzai in Kabul nor did they have a strategic edge over the terrorists because the US commitment to the war or to nationbuilding in Afghanistan was weak. The US did not deploy sufficient troops and it received limited support from its allies. This unexpected outcome of a long drawn war on terror exposed the limits of the US anti-terrorist policy. A range of studies produced by various think-tanks and eminent scholars in and outside the US criticized White House for its single-minded pro-military option. For example, Ahmad Rashid’s Descent into Chaos is highly critical of the US for its failure in nation building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia to deal with terrorism.49 Many critics claimed that the US war on terror was unpopular in Pakistan due to the US support for military rule in Pakistan.

The post 9/11 US military action in Afghanistan resulted in unprecedented militant violence in Pakistan. For example, following the US action, a vast number of hardened militants of al Qaeda and the Taliban crossed into Pakistan. They soon resurfaced

49 Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos, op.cit.
launching attacks on Pakistani and Afghan targets with an ever increasing strength. According to Anthony Cordesman, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), from 2004 onwards, the militants’ area of influence continued to expand every year in Afghanistan ‘spreading out’ to Pakistan’s ‘border areas.’ In real terms, Pakistan was hit harder than any other individual country by the militants. A Pakistani media analyst, Farrukh Saleem, in a report, mentioned that terrorist attacks had consumed over eleven thousand lives in Pakistan by the end of September 2008. According to the report, only in the first nine months of 2008, 683 bomb blasts and other terrorist acts killed over 4100 people. The Pakistani authorities claimed that no other country suffered more than Pakistan in the war on terror.


51 Dr Farrukh Saleem, ‘Can We Win?’, The News, Islamabad, 5 October 2008. According to this Islamabad based analyst, ‘in NWFP, at least 20 of the 24 districts were under militant control. At least 10,000 square kilometers of Pakistan’s physical terrain between the Tochi River to the north and Gomal River to the South have been lost to the de facto ‘Islamic Emirate of Waziristan’’. Saleem ends his eye-opening analysis on the thought provoking line: ‘When would we realize that we cannot win this war without outside help?’

52 ‘Dahshat-gardi kay Khilaf Jang Main Pakistan say Zayada Nuqsan Kisi Mulk Nay Bardast Nahi Kiya (No other Country Suffered more than Pakistan in the War against Terrorism: PM Gilani’, Jang (Urdu), 8 October 2008. Talking to media on the eve of high security closed door session of the Parliament in Islamabad, Pakistan’s Prime Minister said that only a stable Pakistan could ensure a peaceful region. He added that in order to eliminate terrorism, the global community needed to resolve all the pending issues. Importantly, the closed door parliamentary session was called to brief the members on the issue of national security. This briefing session was called at a time when there was a widely held impression within and outside the country that Pakistan was somewhat under siege due to al Qaeda and the Taliban suicide bombings in various parts of the country including the capital city of Islamabad. Moreover, the US aerial and ground attacks were occurring inside Pakistan’s FATA region agitating the tribesmen as well as the general public in Pakistan. For a glimpse into everyday security conditions in Pakistan, See Farrukh Saleem, ‘Pakistan is under Siege’, The News, Islamabad, 23 September 2008; Javed Aziz Khan, ‘Afgan Envoy in Peshawar Kidnapped: Driver Killed in Ambush; Search Operation Launched’, The News, Islamabad, 23 September 2008; ‘13 Soldiers Killed in Swat Suicide Attack’, The News, Islamabad, 23 September 2008; Sabz Ali Tareen, ‘10 militants Killed in Shabqadar Encounter: Militants Claim Killing 20 Policemen’, The News, Islamabad, 23 September 2008; ‘NWFP Governor Owais Sees Suicide Bombers Network in Punjab’, The News, Islamabad, 23 September 2008; ‘Stay away, Zardari Tells American Troops: Terms US incursions a violation of UN Charter’, The News, Islamabad, 23 September, 2008; ‘US Drone Strikes kill in North Wazirian: 12, including foreigners, killed in Mohammad Khan Village, The News, Islamabad, 4 October 2008; ‘Zardari Says He escaped assignation at Marriott’, The News, Islamabad, 4 October, 2008; Wali Survives Suicide Attack, Four Killed: ANP Chief Vows Attack Not to Change Party’s Stand on Terrorism’, The News, Islamabad, 4 October 2008; ‘US Jet Pounds Border Towns: Bombs, Shells land inside Pakistan; Drones violate Pak Airspace’, The News, Islamabad, 6 October 2008; Pakistan Made a ‘Scapegoat’ in War on Terror, Qureshi: FM condemns US incursions
Pakistan became so infamous due to terrorist concentration in its tribal areas that President Bush identified Pakistan as the epicenter of next probable attack on the US soil.

Initially, the US ignored the erosion of democracy in Pakistan in its dealing with the Musharraf regime. In a bid to maintain his grip on power, Musharraf had isolated the democratic leadership from the national affairs. The PPP leader, Benazir Bhutto was in exile overseas while her husband languished in a Pakistani jail. The PML-N leader, Nawaz Sharif was jailed after being deposed as prime minister and then exiled for many years. Hence, the US showed preference for a military regime rather than civilian rule. The US support of the military regime harmed the US interests because Musharraf lacked popular support, which ultimately translated into increased anti-US sentiment in Pakistan. This political dilemma even gave legitimacy to Islamist activism that opposed a military ruler staying in power with the US help.53 Musharraf’s lack of public support

53 Due to the traditional nature of US-Pakistan relations which were primarily based on military cooperation, the US naturally chose to work with the Pakistani military against global terrorism post 9/11. It is not easy to make an irrefutable argument against the US wisdom to do so due to the fragile history of democracy in Pakistan. However, there is a qualitative difference between the pre 9/11 and post 9/11 US-Pakistan cooperation which has been largely ignored in the post 9/11 literature on terrorism. For example, the US-Pakistan security alliances of SEATO and CENTO of the 1950s were based on the US threat perception from Soviet communism to Asia. Similarly, the US-Pakistan strategic cooperation in the 1980s involved the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In both these cases, Pakistani military elite perceived itself as the beneficiary of the Cold War conflict between the two Superpowers. These were the Cold War times when Pakistani military organized and equipped itself with US training and procurement and became the most powerful institution of the country. During this period, the US-Pakistan friendship symbolized a decrease of Indian threat to Pakistan’s security. Most of all, Pakistan had been an eager participant in US-Pakistan security relations before 9/11. However, the post 9/11 developments brought in an entirely new set of assumptions for Pakistan’s hardcore strategic mindset. For example, the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 emerged out of fear and shock for Pakistan which disrupted its security and foreign policy pursuits. This time the US did not ask Pakistan to assist against a foreign enemy such as Soviet communism that constituted a ‘common enemy’ for both the US and Pakistan. This time, the US told Pakistan to end its pro-Taliban policy and help the US to eliminate the Taliban regime and al Qaeda terrorist network. For Pakistan, it entailed giving up its long cherished idea of gaining ‘strategic depth’ against India in Afghanistan through installing a ‘Pakistan friendly’ regime, and withdrawing its active support to the Kashmiri militants. It was not a promising start for the Pakistani military strategists that habitually based their ideas on India-Pakistan enmity. The authorities in Pakistan were further disappointed by the eventual developments in Afghanistan that involved the opening of various Indian Consulates in Afghan cities close to the Pak-Afghan border. India’s influence in Kabul through both countries economic and military cooperation, President Karzai and NATO/ISAF accusations against Pakistan over the Islamist violence in Afghanistan, and the US incursions in FATA devastated Pakistan. Pakistan strategically felt encircled by India in Afghanistan where NATO and ISAF were supposed to hold control. In addition, the religious militant groups of Pakistan that had self-righteously fought against
forced him to rely on such elements that were poised to sabotage US security agenda post 9/11.

Musharraf allowed the MMA, an alliance of six religious parties, to rule the two provinces of NWFP and Balochistan. In the 2002 national elections that were rigged by the Musharraf regime, the MMA was able to form government in the NWFP and to become a part of the ruling coalition in Balochistan. Musharraf appointed a pro-Taliban politician, Mulana Fazl-ur-Rahman as the leader of opposition in the National Assembly. Musharraf could argue that in doing so he intended to isolate the Taliban from religious groups within Pakistan. Historically, the army including Musharraf has traditionally used Islamic political parties against secular democratic opponents.

Analyzing the October 2008 suicide attack on Awami National Party (ANP) chief Asfand Yar Wali, a prominent scholar Hassan Askari Rizi commented that the ‘Musharraf regime and the MMA government in NWFP allowed the [militants] to

the Soviets along with the Afghan guerrilla fighters using US financial and military support in the 1980s also felt isolated and targetted in the post 9/11 scenario. Interestingly, the same Jamaat-i-Islami that was characterized as the ‘US agent’ by the Pakistani leftists in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s due to its anti-communist stance during the Cold War, now stood against the US. These pro-Taliban segments were in the forefront of organizing the anti-US public opinion in Pakistan. They liberally consumed the recently acquired freedom of the press to freely demonize Musharraf and denounce the US using nationalist and religious symbolism. This loud criticism multiplied with the US policy loopholes, such as the lack of concern for democracy in Pakistan but it did so at its own convenience.

54 Taking notice of October 2002 election results, a February 2004 Congressional report read that, ‘an unexpected outcome of the 2002 elections saw the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA or United Action forum), a coalition of six Islamic parties, win 68 seats – about 20% of the total – in the national assembly. MMA also controls provincial assembly in the NWFP and leads a coalition in the Balochistan assembly. These western provinces are Pashtun majority regions that border Afghanistan where important US anti-terrorism operations are ongoing. This result has led to concerns that a shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy might be in the offing, most especially with growing anti-American sentiments and renewed indications of the ‘Talibanization’ of western border regions. See K. Alan Kronstadt, ‘US-Pakistan Relations’, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington D.C, 6 February 2004. The same report further stated that ‘in June 2003, the Islamist coalition of the NWFP passed a shariat bill in the provincial assembly. These laws seek to replicate in Pakistan the harsh enforcement of Islamic law seen in Afghanistan under the Taliban….The Islamists are notable for their virulent of their anti-American sentiment; they have at times called for ‘jihad’ against what they view as the existential threat to Pakistani sovereignty that alliance with Washington entails.’

55 Hassan Askari Rizvi, ‘Understanding the Insurgency’, Daily Times, Lahore, 5 October, 2008. According to Rizvi, ‘...the anti-Americanism is not the sole explanation of the activities of Islamic militants. Pakistan faces an insurgency led by the Pakistani Taliban with their core base in the Tribal areas. They appear well entrenched there, and their activities are most aimed at the Pakistani state than at supporting the Afghan Taliban, as was the case in the past (though they still cooperate with each other)….This state of affairs did not develop in a year, but gradually since 2001. The Musharraf regime and the MMA government in NWFP allowed the [militants] to entrench themselves and expand their influence.’
entrench themselves and expand their influence.’ In a well calculated way, Musharraf used the MMA support to remain the Army chief and become the President of Pakistan simultaneously through the 17th Amendment of the Constitution. Commenting on the MMA in her book *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West*, the PPP leader Benazir Bhutto observed: General Musharraf wanted to exaggerate the so-called strength of Islamic threat to Pakistan and paint his authoritarian regime as a bulwark against it. The State Department, Congressional reports and various US think tanks also had concerns over the US engagement with a military regime at the cost of failing democracy in Pakistan.

The US support for democracy in Pakistan varied according to the nature of US interests in the region. The US concerns over the return of democracy in Pakistan continued during Musharraf’s military rule. In a 12 February 2002 Congressional report, Peter R. Blood, who was a Congressional analyst, held that the US had ‘strongly urged Pakistan’s military government to restore the country to civilian democratic rule.’ On 6 February 2004, a *Congressional Report* summarized the US views over democratic development in Pakistan in the following words:

There had been hopes that national elections in October 2002 would reverse Pakistan’s historic trend of unstable governance and the military interference in domestic institutions. Such hopes were eroded by the passages of some highly restrictive election laws, including those that prevented the country’s two leading civilian politicians [Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif] from participating, as well as President Musharraf’s unilateral imposition of major constitutional amendments in August 2002…

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56 See Benazir Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West*, Simon & Schuster, London, pp. 214-5. Elaborating her viewpoint, Bhutto further wrote that Musharraf ‘could and would use the [election] results in Balochistan and the NWFP as a scare tactic in the world community to convince that that he was the only thing that stood in the way of a nuclear armed fundamentalist, mullah led government….As I write, the flag of the Taliban flies over parts of the tribal territories. They intimidate the settled areas of the Frontier Province and force the closure of girls’ schools, barbershops and video stalls. They are training youth in paramilitary techniques. They are housing, arming, and equipping terrorists. By the end of 2007, the people of Swat, other areas of the Frontier Province, and FATA fell under their shadow. If neighboring Besham falls, the militants will be approximately a hundred miles from the capital city of Islamabad. The Taliban are slowly capturing larger parts of the country. Pakistan’s north is a perfect demonstration of why dictatorships cannot defeat extremism.’

States has expressed concerns that seemingly non-democratic developments may make the realization of true democracy in Pakistan more elusive.58

Despite the US interest in democracy for Pakistan, however, the Bush administration preferred to work with the military regime of Musharraf which appeared to be in a better position to combat terrorism. This was not a new policy. Supporting strong military dictators remained a key feature of US foreign policy towards Pakistan.

On 14 July 2004, in her Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Director of CSIS South Asia Program, Teresita Schaffer, referred to four main US objectives in Pakistan. These objectives included: 1) Combating terrorism; 2) Maintaining peace in the region, 4) Ending nuclear proliferation and 5) Rebuilding Pakistan’s political and economic institutions.59 In her list, rebuilding the political institutions came last. Journalist Ahmad Rashid criticized the failure of the US to seriously support nation building including democratic institutions.60 In Schaffer’s words, rebuilding political institutions ‘means democratic government, and that is what most Pakistanis want, but I do not believe that full democratic government will happen soon.’61

In her September 2007 analysis, Schaffer pointed to pro-Musharraf stance of the US as follows: ‘The United States expected Musharraf to help the United States fight the Terrorism in and near Afghanistan; in return, the United States will support his continued rule in Pakistan. Washington had other goals as well – strengthening Pakistan’s institutions over the long term. But these were secondary. The stability of the

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60 Ahmad Rashid, Pakistan’s Descent into Chaos, op.cit., p. 64.
61 Teresita C. Schaffer, ‘US Strategy in Pakistan: High Stakes, Heavy Agenda’, Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 14 July 2004, op.cit. In her elaboration of ‘building the political and economic institutions’, she further states: ‘I also believe that the US tendency to build its policy around the person of President Musharraf is a mistake…. we need to have a broader base to our policy. He [Musharraf] is not the only person who matters, especially if one believes, as I do, that Pakistan’s ability to face down its internal extremists ultimately depends on its ability to rebuild viable political and economic institutions.’
Musharraf government, seen as the passport to anti-terrorism work, came first. Schaffer’s views, with the hindsight of six year Bush-Musharraf cooperation against terrorism, had two major flaws. First, the US based its anti-terrorist policies on cynical real politic that overlooked the socio-political realities of Pakistan. Second, the US failed to achieve the intended results. Instead, it increased the terrorist threat to both the US and Pakistan.

The journalist and diplomat, Hussain Haqqani discussed this very failure of US policy before the US Senate. On 21 March 2007, in his testimony before the US Senate subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Haqqani criticized Bush’s reliance on Musharraf for winning the war against terrorism in Pakistan. Haqqani observed that since 9/11, ‘most discussion in Washington [centered around] General Musarraf, rather than the Pakistani nation, as the linchpin of American foreign policy in the region.’ Citing Musharraf’s political isolation, his legitimacy problems and seeking adjustments with the Islamists, Haqqani held that ‘this personalization of relations between the world’s sole super power and a nuclear armed nation of 150 million people is not the best way forward either. It does not even fulfill the short-term purpose of securing Pakistan’s cooperation in the Global War against Terrorism.’

Haqqani referred to Musharraf’s harsh treatment of his political opponents and demanded a return of democracy to Pakistan. Pointing to the US weak commitment for democracy in Pakistan, Haqqani indicated that out of some US $3.3 billion US aid to

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62 Teresita Schaffer, ‘Not the Same Pakistan’, CSIS Commentary, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 18 September 2007. Also See ‘Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants’, Asia Report No. 125, International Crisis Group, Brussels, 11 December 2006. This ICG report is of the view that the Musharraf regime’s ‘ambivalent approach and failure to take effective action is destabilizing Afghanistan…but the international community, too, bears responsibility by failing to support democratic governance in Pakistan, including within its troubled tribal belt.’

63 See ‘U.S. Policy towards Pakistan’, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, Serial No. 110-21, 21 March 2007. Retrieved 15 October 2008. Husain Haqqani, a journalist turned diplomat was the Director of Center for International Relations in Boston University at the time of this testimony before the subcommittee. He became the Pakistan envoy to US as the PPP formed government following 2008 elections in Pakistan.
Pakistan during 2001-2007 only a token $64 million was used for the promotion of democracy.\textsuperscript{64}

A crucial reaction to the US neglect of supporting civil authority in Pakistan came from the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph R. Biden, who stressed the need for a serious overhaul of the US policy towards Pakistan. On 25 June 2008, following testimonies of the senior US administrative experts of US-Pakistan relations before the Senate, Biden reflected that ‘we need a new strategy, to set the relationship [with Pakistan] on a stable course.’ Putting the wavering nature of relations in perspective, Biden said: ‘For far too long, the US-Pakistan relationship had been in desperate need of a serious overhaul. For too many years, through too many administrations, it has been unsteady balancing-act in one of the most turbulent spots on earth that in the last year alone has seen a Taliban resurgence, a State of Emergency, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the return of democratic government and now political stalemate.’\textsuperscript{65} Biden commented that, ‘we’ve spent billions of dollars and have gotten far too little to show for it. From the Pakistani perspective, America is an unreliable ally that will abandon Pakistan the moment it’s convenient to do so, and whose support to date has done little more than bolster unrepresentative rulers, both in and out of uniform.’\textsuperscript{66} Biden wanted the US to resolve this persistent dilemma in the US-Pakistan relationship.

In his profound statement, Biden laid out four critical elements for a ‘New Approach to Pakistan’. The four elements included: 1) Triple non-security aid to $1.5 billion annually, sustained over 10 years; 2) Tie security aid to performance; 3) Help Pakistan

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid. Haqqani ironically pointed out that ‘the actual budgeted US AID figures for Pakistan from 2001 to 2007 showed that there was $1.2 billion in foreign military fund; $1.9 billion in economic support fund; only $117.7 million for child survival and health; and a token $64 million for democracy promotion, $16 million of which is allocated for the Election Commission of Pakistan, ‘as if the Election Commission of Pakistan is the instrument for bringing democracy to Pakistan.’

\textsuperscript{65} Before issuing the statement, Senator Biden had chaired a hearing under the title of ‘A New Strategy for Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan.’ In this hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimonies from Richard Boucher, Mitchell Shivers, Mark Ward, General Anthony C. Zinni and Wendy Chamberlin. All these highly placed people were closely aware of the strategic context of the US relations with Pakistan. See ‘Biden on Pakistan: We Need a Serious Overhaul’, http://biden.senate.gov/press/statements/

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
enjoy a ‘democracy dividend’; and 4) Engage the Pakistani people, not just their rulers.67 Biden’s analysis was a sharp criticism of the past trends in US-Pakistan relations including seven year long Bush policy towards Pakistan post 9/11. Biden’s alternative guideline for US-Pakistan cooperation highlighted that:

Ever since the start of the Bush Administration, we’ve had a Musharraf policy rather than a Pakistan policy. The Democracy Dividend will help the secular, democratic, civilian political leaders establish their credibility with the Pakistani public. They must prove that they - more so than the generals or the radical Islamists - can bring real, measurable improvement to the lives of their constituents.68

Biden’s words indicated a conceptual shift in the US-Pakistan relations from mere military connections to an extended socio-political relationship. The US has been a major factor in the institutional stability or instability in Pakistan. Being a client state, Pakistan acquired a habit of depending on the US support for its institutional wellbeing including politics, economy and military since the 1950s. It is an on going debate in Pakistan whether the US helped Pakistan emerge as a growing nation or hindered its development as a stable country. It can be strongly argued, however, that military vastly benefited from close US strategic links while democracy was weakened. The post 9/11 Bush administration’s perspective of supporting military regime in Pakistan to fight terrorism speaks for itself. The US, however, gradually shifted its stance and began to support civil leadership under certain considerations.

By 2007-2008, various factors were responsible for the US support for democracy in Pakistan. There were three main elements that worked for democratic transition in Pakistan: First, PPP leader Benazir Bhutto’s sustained campaign for democracy in Pakistan; second, the US frustration with Musharraf’s failure against insurgents in FATA; and third, Musharraf’s political isolation at home. These three factors complemented each other in forming resistance against the Musharraf regime.

67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
Musharraf, who had dominated the constitutional, judicial and political force using his military position, failed to resist the pressure against his regime especially after the general elections held in Pakistan on 18 February 2008, and resigned in August. However, the victory of democracy in Pakistan was tarnished by Bhutto’s assassination days before the election.

In her book published in 2008, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West Benazir has given an account of the process that led to political reconciliation between Musharraf and herself concerning 2008 elections. She wrote:

The question arose as to how there could be a smooth transition to democracy when General Musharraf was key ally in the war against terrorism and the PPP, the most popular party, according to the elections of 2002, and he were at loggerheads. It seemed inevitable that a rapprochement was needed if Pakistan were to break the cycle of dictatorship feeding into the needs of an extra ordinary security situation as the world confronted the forces of extremism.\(^69\)

On 10 December 2007, Benazir had argued in her article published in the Christian Science Monitor that dictatorship had fueled extremism in her country and credible elections were a necessary condition for the reduction of religious militancy.\(^70\) She claimed in her article that the all the countries of the world had a direct interest in Pakistan’s democratization. Benazir desired from the US that at least the US could and ‘should prod Musharraf to give Pakistanis an independent election commission, neutral caretaker administration and an end to blatant vote manipulation.’\(^71\) The statement showed her conviction that in free, fair and transparent elections, the people of Pakistan would surely honor a democratic government against a military regime.

In Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West, Benazir commented that Musharraf first called her in August 2006 suggesting that the moderate forces needed to work together and asking for her support for a bill related to women’s rights. Her statement


\(^{71}\) Ibid.
signified that a process of mutual understanding started to evolve from there. According to her, ‘throughout the process of dialogue I kept London and Washington and a small group of PPP leaders briefed on the process.’

To her, ‘as General Musharraf’s international supporters and key donors to Pakistan, the voices of London and Washington in support of democracy were essential.’ It meant that she was not working in isolation and an active global support was at work behind the process. Her close contact with the US and UK also underlined her confidence in these countries to help bring the civil rule in Pakistan.

With US mediation, after holding many rounds of talks with Musharraf’s emissaries, Benazir met Musharraf in January 2007 ‘to discuss the future of Pakistan.’ In one long meeting with Musharraf, Benazir ‘brought up all critical political issues, contentious issues, and General Musharraf’s response to all of them was positive.’ Benazir and Musharraf met again in Abu Dhabi in July 2007. They were meeting after two highly significant events that occurred in 2007 – first, the removal and reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Choudhary and second, the Red Mosque rebellion, which left more than a hundred people dead. These events had drastically harmed Musharraf’s reputation. However, he was still hopeful to maintain his grip over the events.

In the July 2007 meeting, Musharraf recoiled from some of his promises made in the previous meeting and a conflict of interest reemerged between the two parties. For example, ‘he said that he could not finish the cases [against politicians] as he had promised.’ Benazir suggested ‘perhaps he could instead lift ban on a twice elected

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73 Ibid. In her first meeting with Musharraf, Benazir emphasized that it was ‘absolutely necessary’ for him to shed his uniform as army chief of staff. She ‘made it clear that there had to be free, fair and transparent elections that were internationally monitored and a new, impartial Election Commission must be formed to supervise the elections. She also demanded that the ‘elections must be open to the participation of all parties and the party leaders and that procedures must be in place to guarantee only free voting but accurate counting. She said the ‘ban on twice elected prime ministers that he had written into constitution must be lifted. She demanded that ‘for true reconciliation, charges brought against parliamentarians from all political parties since [Musharraf] had taken office that had not resulted in convictions, must be dropped.’ Benazir emphasized that Musharraf ‘readily acknowledged that the charges that had been brought against me and my family had been politically motivated and designed to destroy my reputation.’
74 Ibid., p.64.
Prime Minister. He agreed. Again nothing happened.\textsuperscript{75} Benazir referred to some details of mutual bargaining that continued in the following days to reach a political understanding with Musharraf. Instead of ending cases or lifting the ban on the twice elected Prime Minister, Musharraf passed a National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO).\textsuperscript{76} However, despite issuing the NRO, a sense of confrontation continued against Musharraf which led him to declare an emergency in Pakistan by suspending the constitution. Benazir called it ‘Martial Law’ which put Musharraf ‘on a collision course with both the people of the country and the PPP.’\textsuperscript{77}

In her intriguing tale of political tug of war with Musharraf, Benazir recognized the US and British mediation for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. For example, she referred to the US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden and British Foreign Secretary David Milliband who spoke to her while she was negotiating with Musharraf.\textsuperscript{78} Her reference to these political figures implied that she was dealing with Musharraf from a position of strength. Faced with both the domestic and international pressures against his regime, General Musharraf was forced to allow a political process that would eventually diminish his authority in the country. Faced with domestic dissent to his policies and the US frustration over his performance against terrorism, Musharraf now had to only strive for a safe exit from politics.

On 18 August 2008, General Musharraf resigned as the President of Pakistan. This action represented a real shift in the US perceptions of Pakistan. The US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice’s statement which she made at the end of Musharraf’s rule showed the US thinking:

\begin{quote}
We strongly support the democratically elected civilian government in its desire to modernize Pakistan and build democratic institutions. The United States supported the transition to democratic government in Pakistan and respects the results of the election.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p.229.  
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., pp.229-30.  
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p.230.  
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., p.231.
We believe that respect for the democratic and constitutional processes in that country is fundamental to Pakistan's future and its fight against terrorism.79

In her statement, Rice appreciated General Musharraf for his critical choice to join the US fight. Rice counted Musharraf among the US friends and one of the world's most committed partners in the war against terrorism and extremism.80 However, after losing his grip on seven year long fight against Islamist militants in the Pak-Afghan border area, Musharraf had become dispensable for the US. Indeed, the US had become quite frustrated over Musharraf’s ambivalent policies towards home grown terrorists.

General Musharraf’s credentials as a military ruler had come under criticism at the early stages of the US war on terror. Musharraf’s unconstitutional steps to strengthen his power and his political patronage of religious parties were not approved in the US congressional reports and other US security analyses since 2002. Since the US invaded Iraq in 2003, the White House concentrated to win in Iraq giving secondary preference to post Taliban Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the situation started to deteriorate for the US allied forces due to the lack of military strength and other reasons on the Pak-Afghan border.81 Following the increased suicide bombing incidents and resurgent attacks on the NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan, the Bush administration viewed Musharraf’s role in the war on terror with deep concern.

On 24 September 2006, the Telegraph published details of a truce between Pakistani authorities and the militant tribes in Waziristan According to the report, in return for an

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80 Ibid.
81 In the case of two simultaneous US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a new pattern was emerging in the US strategic thinking in 2005-2006. Faced with strong domestic and global criticism of the US in Iraq, the US showed its intention to move out of Iraq but finding a military solution was still part of the strategic mindset in the US. Meanwhile, the Taliban insurgency intensified in Afghanistan. It appeared as if Karzai was presiding over a failed state and the terrorists were free to launch attacks even when the NATO and ISAF were present on the ground in Afghanistan. Changing from a military to diplomatic perspective in Iraq and moving towards finding an intense military solution in Afghanistan magnified the Afghan issue in diplomatic and media circles in the US. See for example David Patterson, ‘Bush says U.S. not Winning War in Iraq’, Associated Press, 2 December 2006. http://newstrust.net/stories/3124/reviews/7624; Also See K. Alan Kronstadt, ‘US-Pakistan Relations’, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 22 February 2008, pp. 20-23.
end to the US backed government campaign in Waziristan, the tribal elders agreed to halt attacks on Pakistani troops.\textsuperscript{82} The \textit{Telegraph} reported that the head of the deposed Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Mullah Umar, had personally backed the deal because it benefited the Taliban. The truce was widely criticized in the west as a ‘dangerous climb-down’ by Musharraf who was under pressure from the Islamists in his own country to curb US-backed fight against militant Islam.\textsuperscript{83} The report implied that Musharraf deceived the US in its war against terror to prolong his rule in Pakistan. The US applied great pressure against Musharraf in 2006 to use force against the militants. However, the year of 2007 was decisive for Musharraf due to multiple reasons.

In February 2007, Vice President Richard Cheney made an unannounced visit to Pakistan and warned Musharraf of the Taliban attacks against the allied forces in Afghanistan from Pakistan. In a 26 February report, the \textit{New York Times} referred that Cheney’s visit to Pakistan was to give Musharraf ‘an unusually tough message and warning.’\textsuperscript{84} Cheney warned that the newly democratic Congress could cut aid...unless Musharraf’s forces became far more aggressive in hunting down operatives with al Qaeda. Before Dick Cheney, the US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates had met Musharraf on 12 February to ‘discuss the spring offensive against the Taliban.’\textsuperscript{85} As if the US pressure was not enough to face, Musharraf took many miscalculated measures that led his regime to collapse.

On 9 March 2007, Musharraf dismissed the Chief Justice of Pakistan Supreme Court Iftikhar Chaudhary, on unspecified charges of misconduct which triggered a countywide

\textsuperscript{82} ‘Waziristan Deal with Mullah Umar: Did Musharraf ‘Cave in’ to Taliban?’, \textit{The Telegraph} report mentioned in the \textit{Daily Times}, Lahore, 25 September 2006. The report enunciated that the deal between the Pakistani authorities and the pro-Taliban militants in the tribal provinces bordering Afghanistan was designed to end five years of bloodshed in the area. The Taliban leader, Mullah Umar, sent one of his most trusted and feared commanders, Mullah Dadullah, to ask local militants [in Waziristan] to sign the truce. In return for a reduction in the army’s 80,000 strong presence and the release of about 165 hardcore militants arrested for attacks on the armed forces, the local Taliban agreed to stop supporting the foreign militants in their midst, and promised not to establish their own fundamentalist administrations.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.


reaction. According to a February 2008 Congressional Report, critics widely believed that Musharraf sacked the Chief Justice to remove a potential hurdle to his continued roles as President and army chief. In response, the lawyers in Pakistan organized street rallies against Musharraf which grew in scale and both the secular and Islamist opposition activists joined in. The judicial crisis soon turned into a ‘full-fledged political crisis and posed the greatest threat to Musharraf’s government since it was established in 1999.’ Musharraf faced hard criticism from the West losing credibility both at home and abroad. The US condemned Musharraf’s imposition of emergency in Pakistan. On 3 November 2007, the US Department of State issued the following statement condemning Musharraf’s extra constitutional measures:

The United States is deeply disturbed by reports that Pakistani President Musharraf has taken extra-constitutional actions and had imposed a state of emergency. A state of emergency would be a sharp setback for Pakistani democracy and takes Pakistan off the path towards civilian rule. President Musharraf has stated reportedly that he will step down as Chief of Army Staff before retaking the presidential oath of office and has promised to hold elections by January 15th. We expect him to uphold these commitments and urge him to do so immediately.

This comprehensive US statement indicated that the US was no longer supporting General Musharraf and the military rule in Pakistan. The US Secretary of State Rice expressed similar sentiments saying that ‘the United States has made it clear that it does not support extra-constitutional measures because those measures would take Pakistan away from the path of democracy and civilian rule.’ The US Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte, in his statement before House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, commented that ‘As President Bush said on Monday, November 5, we had stressed before President Musharraf decided to issue the Proclamation of Emergency that emergency measures undermine democracy. President Bush called for democracy to be

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87 Ibid.
restored quickly, for elections to be held as scheduled and for President Musharraf to resign his position as Chief of Army Staff.’

These and other White House statements highlighted the US policy shift from a military regime to a civil government in Pakistan which could deal with terrorism more effectively as it would have people’s moral support behind it.

In its support for civil rule over a military regime in Pakistan, the US maintained the strategic nature of US-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism. The US saw the democratic transition and the continuity of war against terrorism in Pakistan as interrelated to each other. This intertwined nature of civil rule and the war on terror was prominent in the policy statements of the White House officials from 2007 onwards. On 25 July 2007, for example, the US Under Secretary of State Nicolas Burns closed his statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on this note:

We ask [Pakistan] for its continued support to defeat the extremists, and commit our support in return. In this year of momentous transition for Pakistan, we are determined to ensure that the substantial resources the American people provide to Pakistan are utilized efficiently, effectively, and to support what all of us want: Pakistan’s transformation into a more stable, open, and secure nation where its people can, in the future, live peacefully.

On 1 August 2007, the link between the US war on terror and democracy in Pakistan was discussed in the US Deputy Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, John Gastright’s testimony in the Capitol Hill. In his Remarks before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Gastright remarked:

A successful transformation of Pakistan—politically, economically, and democratically—would bring the benefits of prosperity, good governance, and justice to 160 million

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Pakistani people. This, in turn, would help to reverse the inroads made by violent extremism and help Pakistan to move towards modernity and moderation, eventually becoming a model in the Muslim world.92

The US official’s remarks in the Senate implied that a new policy for Pakistan was underway which had the support of both the US executives and the legislatives. The new policy recognized that a democratic transition had become essential to fight the war on terror across the Pak-Afghan border. The single-minded military approach to curtail militancy by using force had failed. Musharraf regime did not destroy the militants. The US support for a military ruler had increased anti-US resentment in Pakistan and weakened people’s support for fighting against terrorism. The US Senate was concerned about the White House’s approach on terrorism. Following Musharraf-Bhutto reconciliation, the general elections in Pakistan were due soon. The US presidential election of 2008 was approaching fast. Having all these imperatives concerning US policy, therefore, a tilt towards democracy in Pakistan was a pragmatic move from the US.

The US support for civil rule in Pakistan also showed the US confidence in Pakistan’s democratic process to effectively respond to domestic and international challenges. On 20 September 2007, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher, in his remarks to Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Studies, commented that ‘this transition in Pakistan is really important. We want it to be smooth and we want it to be successful and we want it to result in sort of a continuation of the success that Pakistan is having and has had over the last few years. But it has to result in a more stable and democratic system. I think everybody realizes that it’s time for that.’ 93


RePLYING TO a QUESTION ON a MUSHARRAF-BHUTTO DEAL WITH THE US HELP, BOUCHER GLADLY ANNOUNCED THAT ‘WE’VE TRIED TO ENCOURAGE THAT IN A LOT OF WAYS: SUPPORTING THE ELECTION COMMISSION, DEALING AND MEETING WITH REALLY ALL THE MAJOR POLITICAL GROUPS. I’VE DONE THAT, AND I’VE MET WITH PEOPLE FROM ALL THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES AND HAVE TALKED TO THEM ABOUT WHAT’S IT GOING TO TAKE TO HAVE A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION, WHAT’S IT GOING TO TAKE TO GET A STABLE POLITICAL CENTER AFTERWARDS?’

BOUCHER’S DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH A BROAD RANGE OF PAKISTANI LEADERSHIP SIGNIFIED THE US KEEN INTEREST IN PAKISTAN’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY.

NEGROPONTE’S STATEMENT FURTHER POINTED TOWARDS THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE US ATTACHED TO ITS RELATIONS WITH A DEMOCRATIC PAKISTAN. ON 7 NOVEMBER 2007, IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT BEFORE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, NEGROPONTE REMARKED, ‘PARTNERSHIP WITH PAKISTAN AND ITS PEOPLE IS THE ONLY OPTION. AS WE ASSESS OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN, WE NEED TO PROTECT OUR VITAL, LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN BY HELPING THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE, ENSURE PAKISTAN’S PROGRESS TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND CIVILIAN RULE.’

NEGROPONTE’S STATEMENT WAS A SOBER ANALYSIS OF THE US-Pakistan RELATIONS IN THE PAST WHEN HE STATED: ‘UNFORTUNATELY, MANY AVERAGE PAKISTANIS BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN VERY INCONSISTENT IN ITS ENGAGEMENT WITH THEIR COUNTRY OVER MANY DECADES AND VERY INCONSISTENT IN OUR COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT THEIR DEMOCRATIC ASPIRATIONS.’ HOWEVER, RESPONDING TO THIS GENERAL BELief IN PAKISTAN, NEGROPONTE EMPHASIZED: ‘I THINK THE ANSWER IS THAT THERE'S NOTHING MORE IMPORTANT AT THIS TIME THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES TO BE CONSISTENTLY ENGAGED AND COMMITTED TO TRY TO DO THE RIGHT THING WITH PAKISTAN AND HELP THAT COUNTRY TO BECOME MORE STABLE AND DEMOCRATIC.’

This statement and similar comments by Secretary Rice, Negroponte, Boucher and a range of US Department of

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94 Ibid. According to Boucher, ‘as they [Pakistanis] go through this democratic transition, this transition from military rule to civilian rule, they’re also facing some real serious threats not only in the tribal areas but in other parts of their society as we saw with the Red Mosque, in Islamabad. We’re trying to help them. We’re trying to help them with the immediate threats that they face.’


96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.
State officials helped define the US initiative in support of democracy at a crucial stage of Pakistan’s history. The US support for democracy in Pakistan was a significant way to enhance latter’s socio-political cohesion and help the country to more effectively pursue the war on terror.

This section has discussed the US role in the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Following 9/11, the Bush administration and Musharraf regime worked closely to fight terrorism. During Bush’s second term, the US suspected that the Musharraf regime was not doing enough to curb the militants on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Eventually, as the Musharraf regime became unpopular within Pakistan, the US decided to support democracy in Pakistan. The circumstances involved a wide criticism, within the US, of Bush’s policies regarding Pakistan which failed to defeat terrorism. Instead, terrorism expanded and intensified in many parts of the world. Bhutto’s struggle for democracy, early 2008 elections in Pakistan, and the US elections in late 2008 worked for the US support for democracy in Pakistan. Musharraf isolated himself by committing successive unconstitutional acts that proved fatal for his rule. It was a significant step for the US to decide to work with the civil leaders of Pakistan on security issues, which had earlier been a domain of military experts alone. As the crisis of terrorism loomed large, the US decided to use policies other than military options to contain terrorism.

US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 and Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion:

This section discusses the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion. It argues that US-Pakistan cooperation helped Pakistan build ‘moderate Islam’ as the idea of the state. However, Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion suffered as the idea of ‘militant Islam’ contested the idea of ‘moderate Islam’ thus producing conflict and violence within Pakistan – which is already a weak state.

US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 helped build a consensus against Taliban related militancy in Pakistan. The society at large supported a moderate view of Islam rejecting
the Talibanization of Pakistan. However, Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion was also eroded as the terrorist attacks increased within the country.

US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 provided a unique opportunity to Pakistan to enhance its socio-political cohesion through changing its idea of the state in favor of moderate Islam. One could argue that US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 brought havoc for Pakistan’s security because radicals began to challenge the writ of the state as they heavily engaged in violence against Pakistan. However, according to Migdal, sometimes only the massive disruptions of war, revolution or mass migration can create the flexibility necessary to break weak states out of the social and political structures that constrain their development.  

Within this context, Pakistan was presented with a unique opportunity to transform itself from a sympathizer of Taliban militants in the 1990s to a moderate Islamic state after 9/11, which understood well the complex political and economic realities of the international system.

Following 9/11, a general consensus against Al Qaeda and Taliban emerged in Pakistan which remained the central paradigm of national security as the terrorist insurgency continued. In Pakistan’s fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda, the militants challenged Pakistan’s writ of the state in various parts of the country. Many observers feared that the radicals might dominate the state compromising its sovereignty. For example, referring to the Taliban’s virtual control in the Waziristan agencies in the northern tribal areas of Pakistan, an editorial in the Daily Times commented that ‘the Taliban will not be able to survive as rulers of the tribal areas and the NWFP alone. They will have to take the rest of the country to stay in power. The politicians may grow beards and reconcile even with that, but the world will not allow a nuclearised Pakistan to fall into the hands of these Taliban.’ This grim view implied that an ineffective policy to deal with the Taliban could harm even Pakistan’s territorial integrity allowing outside powers to take charge of the country’s affairs as they did in Afghanistan in 2001. This

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view demanded a firm response from Pakistan’s decision makers against the militants that had turned the country dysfunctional since long.

Pakistan severely suffered from terrorist violence because it was the frontline state in the US led war against terror post 9/11. Both al-Qaeda and the Taliban viewed Pakistani rulers as traitors because they abandoned the Taliban and instead followed US policy post 9/11. Shaikh Saeed Abu Yazeed, a top ranking leader of al Qaeda network, told a Pakistani journalist that Pakistan harmed his organization the most. He stated that the Musharraf regime killed, arrested and handed over al Qaeda members to the US in a large number including the master mind of 9/11 attacks, Khalid Shaikh Muhammad. Abu Yazeed’s statement showed that al Qaeda saw the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 as a means to destroy the Islamists. The US pressure, therefore, was a decisive factor behind Musharraf regime’s post 9/11 resolve to fight against the radicals. Pakistan’s domestic security factors, however, equally helped build consensus against al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Besides the Musharraf regime, there were political forces and the civil society in Pakistan that willingly supported a broad consensus against terrorism. Pakistani society had suffered from political violence, which the radicals triggered. The citizens had directly faced the brutal acts of militancy even before 9/11. In the case of political leadership, there were two opposing camps prior to 9/11: One that favored the radical Islamists and others who rejected them. Eventually, however, both camps opposed the terrorists because of the damage they caused. Interestingly, the military regime of General Musharraf turned against the militants under US pressure post 9/11. To one analyst, it was Pakistan which had repositioned its Afghan policy ‘in a new balance of

100 Najeeb Ahamad, ‘Aaj Kamran Khan Kay Sath (Today with Kamran Khan)’, GEO TV, Karachi, 21 July 2008. The GEO TV network showed a comprehensive interview of Shaikh Abul Yazeed with Journalist Najeeb Ahmad who worked for the largest Jang Group of Newspapers of Pakistan in GEO’s late night current affairs program with the help of an Arabic-Urdu interpreter. According to Ahmad, the interview was recorded in a tent which was located somewhere in a mountainous place of the Khost region in Afghanistan where al Qaeda operatives took him blindfolded. In this interview, Abul Yazeed claimed the responsibility for carrying out a bloody attack on the Denmark embassy in Islamabad that was executed by a young Saudi Muslim who came from Mecca to Pakistan to avenge the blasphemous caricatures of Prophet Mohammad in Denmark. Yazeed also agreed that al Qaeda enjoyed the support of the tribal Muslims in Pakistan’s FATA region.
power and in a vastly changed environment."^101 This was a reference to the US influence on Pakistan to re-define the latter’s policy towards the Taliban in Afghanistan. Therefore, it was Pakistan’s own global security that took precedence over its indefensible pro-Taliban policy.

Traditionally, Pakistani authorities measured the state’s national security by the yardstick of Pakistan’s relations with the US. In this context, Pakistan’s civil and military elite considered amicable US-Pakistan relations to be positive for national security. Pakistan was a security partner of the US during the Cold War. Its role to reverse the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s was a significant example of US-Pakistan cooperation during the Cold War era. Despite being criticized as a client state of the US, Pakistan felt justified to receive the US military and economic assistance as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet communism in Asia. Moreover, Pakistan’s defence structure was essentially built on US training and military procurement. In order to improve the quality of its defense structure, therefore, Pakistan’s military always desired to have positive relations with the US.

Having a history of military cooperation, it came naturally to the Musharraf regime to join the US war on terror post 9/11. The fact that 9/11 attacks brought the world together under the UN obligations to act against global terrorism further obliged Pakistan to be part of the US led coalition forces.^102 The US relied more strongly on Pakistan to combat the Taliban and al Qaeda. Pakistan had over two decade long

^101 Dr. Rasul Bux Rais, ‘A Troubled Partnership’, Daily Times, Lahore, 29 July 2008. Professor Rais rejected sporadic criticism in the domestic media and political circles of Musharraf regime’s ‘U-turn’ against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after 9/11. He referred to Machiavelli saying that politics has ‘a morality of its own’ and that ‘the states in the modern world system have to adapt and adjust to new circumstances.’ Dr. Rais pointed out that the problem emerges from the fact that many Pakistanis do not ‘look at the world system and the pressure of power politics from a pragmatic point of view.’

^102 Pakistan was especially obliged to cooperate with the US due to the Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 12 September 2001. It was a four point resolution. The first two points strongly condemned acts of 9/11 terrorism and expressed condolences and solidarity with the US, while the third point ‘urgently’ called for ‘international cooperation to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the outrages of 9/11’. The fourth point ‘urgently’ called ‘for international cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism, and [emphasized] that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of such acts will be held accountable.’ See Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly A/RES/56/1 at the Fifty-sixth Session, Agenda item 8, first plenary meeting, 12 September 2001.
strategic experience of managing Afghanistan. After the Afghan war of the 1980s, Pakistan once again became the frontline-state in the US security agenda post 9/11. Pakistan army had the task to eliminate the Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents who moved into Pakistan after the October 2001 US attack on Afghanistan.

After the collapse of the Taliban regime, Pakistani military’s mission was critical of the success of the US Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. The Pakistan army first had to destroy the militants who crossed over into Pakistan and then to stop the remaining insurgents from slipping back into Afghanistan where they could attack the coalition forces. In order to fulfill this twofold task, Pakistan took a number of intelligence and operational measures on the Pak-Afghan border. For the Musharraf regime and the army, combating terrorism post 9/11 became a national security issue due to the insurgents’ violent attacks in Pakistan. Musharraf always claimed the war on terror as Pakistan’s own war.

Many of the religious political groups, however, remained loyal to the radicals in the immediate phase of post 9/11 due to their lack of appreciation for the policy shift in the country, which occurred as a result of US engagement with Pakistan. Religious parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), which had earlier followed the political agenda of implementing Islamic law (Sharia) in the country, favored the radicals. They had actively supported the Mujahedin or holy warriors against the Soviet army in Afghanistan. They were directly involved in the factional power struggle within Afghanistan in the 1990s. When Pakistan was pushing the Taliban to fill the political and security vacuum in Afghanistan, many religious groups worked with the authorities to achieve such a goal in the neighboring Muslim country. They vigorously supported the Taliban and many madrassas (religious seminaries) on the Pakistani soil as well as trained their young supporters to fight along with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s religious parties projected the personality cults of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar as if they resembled the heroes of early Islam. Such projection created a false impression before the world that Pakistan was falling into the hands of the radicals as had happened in Iran during the 1979 revolution.
After the collapse of the Taliban regime post 9/11, the religious parties in Pakistan organized street rallies against the US war on terror. They soon realized, however, that their religious activism would harm their political standing due to changing political scenario both on the international and domestic levels. Changing their posture from hostile activism to electoral politics, therefore, they engaged themselves in the process of general elections which were held in early 2002. Both the JI and JUI along with other religious pressure groups fought the 2002 elections under the banner of Mutahadda Majlis-i-Amal (MMA). For the first time in Pakistan, the MMA - a coalition of Islamic parties, won enough seats to form the NWFP government and also to become part of the government in Balochistan. The success of religious politicians in the two smaller provinces helped the anti-terrorist move in an interesting way.

During the Musharraf regime, the leaders of mainstream liberal parties were forced to live in exile and the emerging political vacuum was filled with the religious leadership. Following 2002 elections, the JUI and the JI, who were in the government in two provinces, were virtually obliged to contain their pro-Taliban posture and to give up their street politics. This was so because religious political leaders were part of the government in two provinces, NWFP and Balochistan and therefore, they could not bring crowds on the streets against their own government. Despite the earlier promises to mobilize people against the pro-US Musharraf regime, the MMA could never manage to demonstrate street power because it developed a political stake in the ruling structure. It was so because JUI-F and JI belonged to the opposition in the parliament. JUI-F’s leader Maulana Fazal ur Rehman was the opposition leader in the National Assembly. As such, his role was to oppose Musharraf’s policies on the floor of the parliament rather than to mobilize crowds on the street. This political setup suggested that the MMA now shared the responsibility to restrain radicalism.

Among the liberal political leadership, both mainstream parties, the PPP and Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N), were opposed to terrorism. Both parties had their vote bank mainly in the two largest provinces of Punjab and Sind which accounted for
more than 70% of the country’s total population. Among them, the PPP was considered a secular liberal party with the largest vote bank in the country. The PPP had criticized General Zia for the Islamization of Pakistan in the 1980s and opposed General Musharraf for appeasing the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the 1990s. PPP’s leader, Benazir Bhutto, who was later assassinated, claimed in her book *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West* that foreign terrorists such as Ramzi Yousaf and Khalid Shaikh Mohammad were given the task to assassinate her. It signified that the PPP totally opposed religious militancy in Pakistan. The PML-N also did not accommodate Islamist radicals in the political sense.

The PML-N was a centrist party mainly representing the moderate Muslim mindset in the country. The party had a strong support base in urban Punjab. The PML-N competed for the votes in rural Punjab with the PPP, which always aggravated the political rivalry between the two leading parties. The PML-N leader Sharif’s expulsion from power in a military coup and his exile to Saudi Arabia in 2000 eventually brought both the PPP and the PML-N to political reconciliation before the 2008 elections. After winning elections, both parties agreed to mutually run the federal government led by the PPP and the Punjab government to be led by PML-N. The cooperation among mainstream political forces also strengthened their will against terrorism. Besides the mainstream PPP and PML-N, there were other regional and ethnic parties that were averse to violence.

The Awami National Party (ANP) was the Pashtun secular party in the NWFP opposed to Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rahman (JUI-F), which represented the religious political ethos of the Pashtuns. During the JUI-F dominated MMA government in the NWFP, the ANP was largely sidelined from 2002-2008. After the 2008 elections, however, the ANP formed the government in the NWFP with the PPP as its coalition partner. The ANP government faced a severe reaction from the militants due to its

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103 Benazir Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West*, op.cit., p.205. Benazir writes, ‘In the fall of 1993, my assassination was ordered and the chosen assassin had ties to the ISI during the Afghan war. He was named Ramzi Yousaf. Yousaf failed twice to kill me during the election campaign in the fall of 1993. He had earlier planned and executed the first attack on the World Trade Center on February 26. The man who supplied Yousaf with weapons to assassinate me was Khalid Shaikh Mohammad. After 9/11, he was identified as the mastermind of al Qaeda and was arrested from the house of a Jamaat-i-Islami supporter.’
strong military actions against the radicals. A large majority of the Pashtuns living in
the settled areas of NWFP were against the Taliban. This is evident from the fact that
during the military operation against the radicals in Swat and Malakand in early 2009,
over three million Pashtuns, who opposed the Taliban, left their homes as Internally
Displaced People (IDPs).

Other regional parties opposed the radicalism of the Taliban. The Muttahida Qaumi
Movement (MQM), an ethnic party made up of the descendents of Muslims who had
migrated to Pakistan after partition, essentially represented the Urdu-speaking
community with a strong political hold in urban Sindh. In August 2008, Altaf Hussain,
the leader of MQM, warned the ruling authorities to ‘use all resources against the
conspiracies of Talibanising Karachi.’ Referring to suspicious activities of the
Taliban elements, Altaf stated that Karachi should not be taken for FATA and that the
people of Karachi would resist all such conspiracies. Altaf’s statement showed that the
political forces representing the city of Karachi with a population of 18 to 20 million
were ready to fight the Taliban militants. It revealed that there was a strong political
will to combat militancy in the MQM leadership, which was trickling down to the
societal level.

The vast majority of the people of Pakistan had a long simmering resentment against
Taliban led violence because their lives had been deeply disrupted due to lack of peace
and security. The mainstream Pakistanis did not view the Taliban any differently from
the rest of the world. They denigrated the militant mullahs who were charged with
violent religious fervor and wanted to establish a medieval style regime in
Afghanistan. Their brand of Islam was unacceptable for most Pakistanis. Further,

workers convention in Karachi via phone from London on 3 August 2002, Altaf Hussain provided
categorical detail of Umme Hassan’s (the wife of Maulana Abdul Aziz of Red Mosque fame and the
administrator of women’s madrassa called Jamia Hafsa in Islamabad) address to the Jihadi elements
during her recent visit to Karachi. Umme Hassan had been vocal and active both before and after the
Military operation against the Red Mosque and the Jamia Hafsa. Altaf also warned that a group of Taliban
had entered Karachi to conduct suspicious activities in the city.
105 Ibid.
106 Altaf soon got a response from a Pakistan based militant outfit called Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
spokesman Maulvi Umar who termed Altaf Hussain an ‘Indian agent’ saying that his statement against
people were widely frustrated and angry that Pakistani ruling elite had once cultivated the Taliban militants. The liberal and tolerant forces among the civil society were not averse to overcome religious militants in one way or another.

Following 9/11, Pakistani authorities isolated the militants and joined the US led coalition forces which routed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan quickly. The coalition forces deposed the Taliban regime in less than six weeks – starting with the US and British aerial bombing on 7 October and the Northern Alliance Militia capturing Kabul on 13 November 2002. However, it was another matter that the US forces were still fighting the Taliban resurgence until mid 2010 with no end in sight. With the twist of fate for the Taliban and al-Qaeda, Pakistan military followed the militants along the Pak-Afghan border and handled them as criminals. The rulers and the general society alike condemned terrorist generated violence in Pakistan. In the visible absence of governmental support post 9/11, many religious leaders came to realize the self-inflicting nature of radicalism for the Muslims themselves.

As the Taliban and Al Qaeda violence grew in Pakistan in FATA post 9/11, religious leaders – whether political or non-political, along with religious scholars condemned suicide attacks. For example, a renowned religious scholar, Allama Sarfaraz Naeemi, was killed on 12 June 2009 in a Taliban suicide bombing at his seminary in Lahore for criticizing the militant brand of Islam that killed innocent people. Naeemi called the suicide attacks as haraam meaning prohibited in Islam. Allama Javaid Ghamadi, another renowned Islamic scholar, called the militants’ violent activities against the TTP carried no credentials. Umar claimed that presently Taliban’s Jihad against the US is quite successful and that Altaf had become a ‘tool of foreign agencies and would do anything to please his bosses.’ See for example, ‘Maulvi Umar Lashes Out at Altaf’, The News, Islamabad, 5 August 2008.

On 7 October 2001, the US and British forces began to bomb the Taliban and al-Qaeda targets. The Northern Alliance, in its fight against the Taliban who were already weakened by the US bombing and massive defections, captured Mazar-i-Sharif on 9 November. The Northern Alliance rapidly gained control of the north of Afghanistan and took control of Kabul on 13 November, after the Taliban unexpectedly fled the city.

Allama Naeemi was widely known as a respected scholar. He was the head of a madrassa called Jamia Naeemia in Lahore. He held that strong-arm tactics employed by the militants were tarnishing the image of Islam. Baiteullah Mahsud’s TTP claimed the responsibility for Naeemi’s murder. Naeemi’s death was mourned as a national tragedy with countrywide anti-Taliban demonstrations and businesses were closed in his honor. See Muhammad Faisal Ali, ‘Suicide Bomber kills anti-Taliban Cleric Allama Naeemi, Dawn, 13 June 2009.
innocent people as anti-Islamic. In his observations on the text of Quran, Ghamadi asserted that the militants were wrong to challenge the writ of the state and that no private army could wage _jihad_ because only the Islamic state had the authority to initiate a holy war. Mufti Muneeb-ur-Rahman, a significant religious figure in Pakistan and President of the _Tanzeem-ul-Madaris_ (a country-wide organizing body of religious schools), constantly rejected the Taliban style assertion of Islam. After Dr. Naeemi’s death in a suicide attack, Mufti reiterated his views against militant Islam and urged the government to provide security to the large number of anti-Taliban religious scholars in the country. JI’s leader, Senator Professor Kurshid Ahmad also criticized Taliban regime’s brutal behavior towards women in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s spread of violence in Pakistan post 9/11.

Maulana Fazlur Rahman, who was once considered the architect of the Taliban, did realize that Islamist militancy post 9/11 would not favor Islam. He held that the authorities should negotiate peace-deals with the militants to avoid political violence in the country. Thus, whenever the military acted against the radicals in FATA, Fazlur Rahman along with other JUI-F leaders attempted to reconcile the opposing groups. In 2003-2004, with the help of JUI-F, the first major operation in FATA ended in a verbal

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109 A widely respected Islamic scholar among tolerant Muslims in Pakistan, Javaid Ghamadi, appeared in a regular TV talk-show. He either responded to questions from the audience or chose to explain Quranic teachings on a particular socio-political issue. The reason of his popularity among liberal Muslims was his use of common sense and logic to reach conclusions. See for example, various weekly TV shows ‘Ghamadi’, GEO TV from 2005-2009.

110 ‘Ghamadi’ GEO TV, June 2009.

111 Following the death of Allama Naeemi, a large group of prominent religious personalities met the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, assuring their full support to government’s anti-terrorist efforts. The group, led by Sahibzada Fazl-e-Kareem, the head of a religion based political party – Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan, included a galaxy of political and non-political scholars from all over the country. The scholars requested the PM to strongly deal with those madrassas that were involved in spreading extremism in the country. See for example, ‘Hakoomat Shidat-Pasandi Phailanay Waly Madaris kay Khilaf Karawai Karay: Wazir-e-Azam say Mulaqat (There should be a Government Crackdown Against Religious Schools that Spread Extremism: Meeting with the Prime Minister’, _Jang_ (Urdu), Rawalpindi, 19 June, 2009.

112 Jamaat-i-Islami’s top leader (Amir) Qazi Hussain Ahmad had visited the US prior to 9/11 in 2000. In his meetings with the US middle level officials, he had explained his party’s position on the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan and Musharraf’s military regime in Pakistan. These meetings were facilitated by the Pakistan embassy in Washington. Dr. Maliha Lodhi was the Pakistani envoy in the US at that time. Author’s informal conversations with various strategic analysts in Islamabad created an impression that Qazi showed his party’s dislike for many Taliban policies in Kabul and assured the party support for a newly emerging power structure under the Musharraf regime if invited to join it in some way. In his post 9/11 statements, Qazi did not endorse Taliban militancy within Pakistan.
agreement between the military and the local militants who then handed over foreign militants to the authorities. Ever since, JUI-F consistently aided post-operational reconciliation deals between the army and the Taliban. In 2009, when the new PPP government began a reinvigorated anti-terrorist military campaign in NWFP, Fazlur-Rahman persuaded the authorities to reconcile with the Taliban rather than create security crises such as in Swat and Malakand of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs). Although the Bush administration remained uncertain about such reconciliatory efforts, yet these moves implied that even religious forces did not want political violence in Pakistan.

Significantly, US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 brought Pakistani authorities into a sharp conflict with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Before 9/11, Pakistan had recognized the Taliban regime as the representative of Afghanistan, and accordingly, Pakistan had provided Taliban ambassador Mullah Zaheef, who was stationed in Islamabad, diplomatic protocol. The Taliban lost their authority as they lost control of Afghanistan. The Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan were also beyond Pakistani authority. Due to their cooperation with the US post 9/11, Pakistani authorities began to view Al Qaeda members as outlaws who had no moral or legal privileges attached to their activities. Pakistan saw both the Taliban and Al Qaeda related militants as non-

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114 In May 2009, as government announced that after Swat and Malakand, the military operation would extend to North and South Waziristan, the JUI leader Fazlur Rahman actively sought to save FATA from another military action. He met the President and Prime Minister to suggest the signing of a new peace accord in FATA. A report in the Urdu press said ‘Maulana Fazalur Rahman did not deem Islamic militancy [to be] any useful for the radicals.’ The report added that in early June, links were established between the ISI and Fazlur Rahman to resolve issues between the government and the Taliban in FATA. See ‘Drone Hamlay…Kaamyabi ki Sharha Mehez 16 fisad (Drone attacks: Success only 16% ....!)’, Akhbare-i-Jahan (Urdu weekly), Karachi, 8-14 June, 2009, p. 9. On 16 June, A JUI Senator Dr. Khalid Mahmood condemned militancy on a popular TV talk-show saying that the authorities should use political means to resolve the issue of political violence in Pakistan. See Hamid Mir, ‘Capital Talk’, GEO TV, Islamabad, 16 June 2009.
115 The Afghan embassy in Islamabad continued to function as par diplomatic routine after 9/11 even while the US allied forces were destroying the Taliban regime in Kabul. The Afghan ambassador, Mullah Zaheef, addressed a press conference daily at his embassy with the international media present to know the ‘Taliban’s version of the developments in Afghanistan. This exercise continued until the allied forces captured Kabul in the second week of October 2001 which ended the Taliban rule in Afghanistan.
116 Pakistan told the Afghan ambassador to shut the embassy down as the Taliban regime fell in Kabul because there was no government left in Kabul to rule Afghanistan that he could represent anymore.
state actors who posed a grave danger to Pakistan’s security. The authorities opposed the radical militants because they rejected the writ of the state as well as severely harmed people and property using indiscriminate violence.

The Taliban and al Qaeda’s defiance of state authority was dangerous for Pakistan’s domestic security. The militants refused to accept Pakistan’s sovereign right to protect itself from inner security threat. They captured parts of the state territory, suspended the state laws and issued their verdicts to run affairs particularly in FATA. They fought tough battles against the Pakistan army and killed a large number of security personnel from 9/11 to 2010. They attacked military complexes, foreign embassies and big hotels in Pakistan to warn the state against the danger of containing them. There were at least two assassination attempts on Musharraf because his policies were pro-US and as such went against the militants.

Pakistan faced a security crisis when the enemy existed within the country hiding in difficult to reach areas causing death and destruction to life and property. A wide majority of Pakistanis condemned the Taliban and al-Qaeda related terrorist activities and supported the state to curb it. Pakistanis showed their anti-militant sentiments in February 2008 elections, when they voted for the PPP with full knowledge that the party leadership was strongly committed to combating terrorism in the country.

On 20 September 2008, in his maiden speech to the Parliament, President Zardari condemned terrorism in the strongest words. He said, ‘We must root out terrorism and extremism wherever and whenever they may raise their ugly heads.’ He emphasized that the government should be firm in its resolve not to allow the use of its soil for carrying out terrorist activities against any foreign country. It indicated that the new

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Mullah Zaeef left for Afghanistan at the end of his ambassadorial duties where he was captured and sent to Guantanamo bay jail where he was imprisoned for many years before being released.

117 Asim Yasin, ‘President Willing to Surrender Powers’, The News, Islamabad, 21 September 2008. Zardari elaborated his government's three-pronged strategy to meet the challenge posed by the extremist and terrorist elements in the tribal areas and the adjoining regions. His strategy comprised of three elements. First, to make peace with those who were willing to make peace and renounce violence. Second to invest in the development and social uplift of the local people. Third, to use force as the last resort against those who refused to surrender their arms, took the law into their own hands, challenged the writ of the government and attacked security forces.
government continued Pakistan’s post 9/11 policy to side with the US against terrorism. The new leaders believed that fighting the insurgents was in their national interest because militants posed a threat to Pakistan.118 This commitment of the political forces showed that the people of Pakistan were behind them in fighting terrorism.

This section has discussed the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion. The US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 had mixed consequences for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion. On the one hand, the collaboration strongly helped build consensus against terrorism in Pakistan. The general society that had been facing militancy even prior to 9/11 was widely against religious terror. The mainstream political parties such as the PPP and the PML-N as well as popular regional parties such as the ANP and the MQM were also averse to terrorism. The post 9/11 policy shift of Pakistan’s military regime against al Qaeda and the Taliban paved the way for a national stand against militancy. Even Islamic parties such as the JI and the JUI withdrew their support from Taliban related violence. In this sense, the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 helped Pakistan’s politicians, military leadership and society to decide in favor of moderate Islam. On the other hand, terrorism related incidents multiplied many times in Pakistan, thus increasing violence in the country.

CONCLUSION:

This chapter has addressed the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion. Pakistan is a weak state because of its political instability, economic meltdown, religious and ethnic violence coupled with

118 Within hours of Zardari’s address to both houses of the Parliament, there was a huge suicide bomb blast in the famous Marriott Hotel which was just a few minutes stroll away from the Parliament House. According to the Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, it was the largest bomb attack anywhere in Pakistan since 2001 in which 600 to 1000 kilogram explosives were used killing 80 and injuring over 250 people. Many foreigners including the Czech Ambassador and two US citizens were among the dead. Many analysts called the incident the ‘9/11 of Pakistan.’ According to Prime Minister Gilani, the attack was meant to kill the top civil and military leadership which was to have dinner at the hotel after the Presidential address to the Parliament. For more detail of the incident, See the following: Shakeel Anjum, ‘60 Dead in Pakistan’s 9/11’, The News, Islamabad, 21 September 2008. ‘All roads Lead to Waziristan: Malik’, Daily Times, Lahore, 22 September 2008. ‘Pakistan’s 9/11’ (Editorial), The News, Islamabad, 22 September 2008. ‘Digesting the Marriott Blast’ (Editorial), Daily Times, Lahore, 23 September 2008.
dysfunctional institutions and intermittent military coups. US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 helped Pakistan to achieve a national consensus against militant Islam and supported Pakistan to move from military rule to democracy. Without US cooperation, the authorities in Pakistan would not have been able to reverse their pro-Taliban policy, which had polarized Pakistani society for a long time.

However, the militants strongly rejected ‘moderate Islam’ as the idea of the state, and as a reaction, they engaged in widespread violence within Pakistan, especially in Pashtun dominated tribal region of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) which also borders Afghanistan. Within this context, the next chapter discusses the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in FATA for Pakistan’s domestic security.
Following the US invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11, al Qaeda and the Taliban militants escaped to Pakistan’s western tribal areas through a widely porous Pak-Afghan border. Soon, the most severe militancy erupted from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan with the collaboration of the Taliban, al Qaeda and the local Pashtun militants. FATA became the epicenter of terrorism that alarmed both the US and Pakistan.¹ From largely autonomous tribal sanctuaries with a gun carrying population estimated at nearly 3.4 million in 2000, the militants continued to perpetrate violence beyond FATA despite the US-Pakistan efforts to contain them in the area. In the process, various local militant groups emerged intensifying violence under the umbrella of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) within the country, while the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda operatives targeted the US coalition forces across the border in

¹ On 30 November 2009, a US Senate report directly accused the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his top Commander, General Tommy Franks for the escape of Osama bin Laden from Tora Bora to FATA. The Chairman Senate, John F. Kerry presented this report to members of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee just a day before the announcement of President Obama’s Afghan policy that underlined a transition from the Bush administration’s policy on Afghanistan. John F. Kerry, ‘Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to get Bin Laden and Why it Matters Today?’ Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, November 2009. It is puzzling that having the strongest 21 century military machine with highly complex multi-layered structures, the US forces decided to let loose a few thousand unorganized armed rebels, whom the US considered as its most dangerous enemy. Interestingly, no vigorous debate is available as yet on the essential US strategic lapses in the long drawn US war against terrorism in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan. From the breeding ground of FATA, therefore, the centrifugal extremist forces collaborated to erode Pakistan’s security creating a state within state.⁵ Owing to ineffective US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 against the radicals in FATA, critics have argued that the US and Pakistan followed incompatible policies to fight terrorism that increased political violence threatening Pakistan’s security.

This chapter then discusses the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in Pakistan’s tribal region of FATA and its implications for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level. Comprised of seven tribal agencies – Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, North Waziristan and South Waziristan, FATA extended over 27,220 square kilometers forming about 3% of Pakistan’s territory. It argues that US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 was complicated due to diverging perceptions of both the countries regarding FATA. The US viewed extremism in FATA in a global context while Pakistan perceived the issue in a regional perspective. The chapter further argues that US-Pakistan cooperation in FATA diminished Pakistan’s security due to increased political violence in the country. FATA, consequently, became the major focus of US war against terrorism.

In order to develop the above argument, this chapter is divided in the following three sections: 1) The geo-strategic significance of FATA; 2) The nature of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in FATA; and 3) US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in FATA and political violence in Pakistan.

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THE GEO-STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF FATA:

This section discusses the geo-strategic significance of FATA for US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11. It argues that due to its geographical, historical and socio-political conditions, FATA turned into the epicenter of global terrorism acquiring great geo-strategic significance in the US war on terror post 9/11.

In December 2001, Osama bin Laden, the most wanted fugitive on earth, escaped to South Waziristan giving new geo-strategic significance to FATA. Following the end of the Taliban regime in Kabul, Osama made FATA the base camp of al Qaeda operatives plotting bomb blasts in London, Madrid, Bali, Islamabad and other parts of the world. The insurgents were trained in FATA to execute guerrilla attacks against the US led forces in Afghanistan. The Pakistan state had little control over FATA thus allowing the foreign militants to run a virtual state within the state in that area and engage in violence beyond it. Despite extensive US-Pakistan military cooperation over the two terms of the Bush administration (2000-2008), the numbers of insurgents continued to grow in FATA. On 30 March 2009, the Inspector General of NWFP, Malik Navi d, told Pakistan’s National Assembly Standing Committee on Interior that the ‘Taliban were trying to turn the tribal areas into the Islamic Emirates of Waziristan.’ The NWFP police chief informed the Committee that the ‘militants’ influence is not restricted to FATA. Their people are present in every city and town. In some places they are active, in others dormant. The Taliban’s philosophy is to create pockets everywhere.

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3 Ahmad Rashid, *Decent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Terrorism is being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia*, Allen Lane, London, 2008, p. 265.
4 Muhammad Bilal, ‘Qaeda, Taliban Planning 9/11 Like Attacks in US, Europe: NWFP IG: Navid Says Taliban are Spreading throughout Pakistan, Claims 5-10 Percent of madrassas are involved in indoctrinating Suicide Bombing’, *Daily Times*, Lahore, 31 March 2009. A member of Pakistan’s National Assembly from Chakwal district of Punjab as well as a noted media analyst, Ayaz Amir, called the leading hostile agencies of FATA as ‘Islamic Emirate of Waziristan’ while discussing the failure of the state to maintain its writ in the country’s tribal area. *Dunya TV*, 28 February 2009.
statement implied that operating from FATA the militants were making a major impact on the rest of the country. To understand how FATA became an incubator of terrorism, one needs to explore its geographical, historical and socio-political factors that led the area to achieve a renewed importance post 9/11.

The geographical location of FATA increased its geo-strategic importance during the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in two significant ways. First, FATA was situated close to Pakistan-Afghan border that remained the theater of the US war against terror in Afghanistan after the end of the Taliban regime in Kabul. Second, FATA comprised a terrain that deterred the military action of regular forces. A region of extremely rugged terrain, FATA formed part of the mountains called Koh-i-Sufaid and Koh-i-Suleman that were linked to the massive Hindu Kush mountain range. These mountains lay across the Pak-Afghan border in FATA. This wall of vast mountains provided FATA with a buffer between the border and the settled areas of the NWFP. Being part of the same geographical domain, therefore, FATA provided an easy cross-border access between Pakistan and Afghanistan. As such, the porous nature of the border presented a crucial dilemma for the US in its war on terror in the area.  

A landscape featuring high hills and ridges, intercepting watercourses and narrow valleys, rivers, border passes and thick jungles in which lived fierce warrior tribes, FATA was an intimidating place. The mountains generally rose between 1500 to 3500 meters with the highest Sikram peak climbing up to 4755 meters above the sea level. This challenging mountainous terrain posed a severe challenge to the many invaders throughout history. Nevertheless, the legendary Khyber Pass and other passes served as

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corridors of invasion and trade between the Indus plains and Central Asia.\(^8\) Around 30% of the area, which had thick impenetrable jungles, offered a perfect hideout for the militants.

FATA saw the invading armies come and go throughout the passage of history leaving the tribesmen more resolute in keeping their independence with minimal foreign interference. From the Central Asians in 1600 BC to the Soviets in the late 20\(^{th}\) century AD, the tribes of FATA came in contact with numerous invading forces such as the Persians, Greeks, Indians, Arabs, the British and other imperial armies in between.\(^9\) They fought for or against these conquerors as their circumstances called. Despite changing the destinies of various empires around them, the people of FATA evolved little beyond their fierce tribal structures. Their fortunes revolved mainly around constant infighting and blood feuds, which were interspersed with frequent combats with the invading forces.

FATA has been a vital part of the Pathan majority landmass, which lies between the Hindu Kush and the Indus river, and as such the physical proximity of FATA to the Pak-Afghan border called the Durand Line, had long been a cause of strategic concern for both the neighboring countries.\(^10\) According to a local expert of the area, Mahmood Shah, ‘the world, with modern nation states concept sees Pakistan and Afghanistan as two different states and also appreciates the role played by Pakistan as a frontline state in this War on Terror. Yet they fail to understand the reason for interference in Afghanistan from its tribal area because they fail to understand the historical inter-connectivity between the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan overarching the modern nation boundaries.’\(^11\)

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8 Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans 550 BC-1957 AD*, Macmillan & Co. Ltd, London, 1958, p. xxi. The Khyber Pass is the only passage that is still open for the transportation of all sorts of supplies to the coalition forces in Afghanistan through Pakistan from military hardware to food to other non-military items.


The Durand Line – an imaginary line marking the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan - was drawn on the map in 1893. The agreement signed between the British India and the Tzarist Russia for 100 years had expired in 1993. The Durand Line that divided the Pashtun tribes and territory between British India and Afghanistan could not fracture the tribal solidarity that went beyond the state boundaries. The Durand Line was drawn because London perceived a threat from Russia’s southward expansion in Central Asia.\(^\text{12}\) Amir Abdul Rahman, the ruler of Afghanistan, agreed to draw the boundary line giving up parts of Afghan territory, which became incorporated into British India. However, Afghanistan never fully reconciled with the divide even after the creation of Pakistan in 1947, when the Durand Line became the Pak-Afghan border. As such, Pakistan and Afghanistan inherited a border dispute that remained a simmering geo-strategic crisis between them.\(^\text{13}\) This border conflict, as a legacy of British-Russia


\(^{13}\) Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmad Rashid, ‘From Great Game to Grand Bargain’, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2008. Bettina Robotka, ‘Pakistan Re-Invented: The Struggle for FATA’, *Defence Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 7, February 2005. Selig Harrison, ‘Pakistan, Afghanistan and US policy’, Remarks at a seminar on ‘What’s Next for Afghanistan: The War, the Peace and the Impact on South Asia’, *Defence Journal*, Pakistan, Vol. 5, No. 7, February 2002, pp. 120-23. Interestingly, the Durand Line has maintained its geo-strategic significance from the late 19th century until today despite the end of both the British and Soviet empires. The famous Great Game that started between the two European empires in Asia survived beyond the end of British India in 1947 due to the beginning of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. The US joined the imperial contest after the British departure. It was wrongly assumed that the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan and the Soviet disintegration would end the Great Game, which did not happen. Following the end of the Afghan war of the 1980s, the civil war and the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan brought all the regional and global attention back to the region. In the aftermath of 9/11 in 2001, the emergence of new players in the New Great Game including the US, China and Russia indicated that South Asia and Central Asia would be the theater of a global power-game with the inclusion of India, Pakistan, Iran and even Australia. Along with the state actors, the non-state actors would play an equally decisive role with unpredictable implications for the regional and global security. See for example, C. Dale Walton, *Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century: Multi-polarity and Revolution in Strategic Perspective*, Routledge, New York, 2007. FATA being the most crucial link in the geo-politics of the region since marking the Durand Line has a special reference in the regional security issues. The realities of the US-Soviet Cold War times determined the fate of FATA as an isolated backwater and provided the rationale for FATA’s being maintained as a tribal belt of warriors. It was US-Pakistan cooperation pre-9/11 which determined the fate of FATA in order to combat the Soviet communism. Pakistan has been a frontline state in the US strategic interest since the 1950s to deter the Soviet expansion in the region. Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan was mortally exposed to Soviet aggression in the 1980s. Pakistan was saved only with the combination of US
imperial rivalry in the region, continued to destabilize Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. The same inter-state border issue attained global significance as the US invaded Afghanistan in October 2001.

The terrain of FATA regained its strategic significance due to its being a safe haven for the militants who remained outside the reach of US-Pakistan anti-terror forces post 9/11. In Pakistan, FATA was commonly called ‘elaqa ghair’ (foreign territory) because fleeing there, outlaws could escape country’s law, while they could enjoy local hospitality under the tribal code of honor – the ‘pashtunwali’. 14 This code based itself on three principles: Hospitality (melmastia), hospitality for fugitives (nanawati), and revenge (badal). The code provided hospitality and shelter in FATA for fugitives from Afghanistan seeking to avenge those who harmed their brethren in Afghanistan after 9/11. 15 Understanding the tradition of ‘Pashtunwali’ code of honor is, therefore, crucial to understand the mindset of the tribal areas. Alongside the violence, the code of ‘pashtunwali’ ensured that the Pashtun tribes provided safety and hospitality to outsiders who sought sanctuary. This code of hospitality partially explained the nature of post 9/11 security conditions in FATA, where the foreign militants received local assistance against the US. 16 Pakistan could not effectively deal with foreign militants in FATA due to the government’s lack of power in the tribal areas.

Prior to 14 August 2009, Presidential reforms to the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), FATA existed as socio-political backwater of Pakistan with no access to national network of political and judicial systems. The long due reforms gave a renewed hope to strategic support and the guerrilla warfare of the Pashtun tribesmen living on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. After the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan continued to support the fierce fighting spirit among the tribes of FATA in the regional context vis-à-vis both India and Afghanistan. Owing to such thinking among Pakistan’s decision makers, the integration of FATA into mainstream society did not materialize over the years.

15 See for example, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Asia Report No. 125, International Crisis Group, 11 December 2006, p. 13. Since the Taliban’s ouster from Afghanistan, the local militants and tribesmen in FATA have received generous financial support from the Afghan fugitives in return for receiving shelter and logistical support. The local tribesmen, however, insist that harboring the ‘mujahidin’ is their religious (read ethnic and tribal) duty.
16 Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Ibid., pp. 13-14.
turn Pakistan’s wild west into an integrated part of the country which would have political, judicial and economic linkages with the mainstream society. 17 Previously, however, Pakistan’s federal government ruled FATA with only nominal state autonomy under the FCR that was enacted by the British in 1901. The FCR was imposed to control the Pashtun tribes, which the British did not rule directly in India. 18 In Pakistan, only the President had the authority to impose rules in FATA and the NWFP Governor oversaw the tribal affairs as the President’s representative. A Political Agent for each of the seven tribal agencies administered the agency with the assistance of local elders called Maliks. 19

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17 On 14 August 2009, the 63rd independence day of Pakistan, President Asif Ali Zardari announced political, judicial and administrative reforms for the tribal areas that allowed ‘political activities in FATA, setting up an appellate tribunal, curtailing arbitrary powers of the political agents.’ The new regulation also gave people the right to appeal and bail, excluded women and children from the territorial responsibility clause and envisaged audit of accounts by the auditor general. Syed Irfan Raza, ‘Far-reaching FATA Reforms Unveiled’, *Dawn*, Karachi, 16 August 2009. The reform package liberated the tribesmen of FATA from over a century old Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) imposed on them by the British in 1901. The implementation of new FATA Regulation would extend the political parties act to FATA bringing them to the mainstream political spectrum and broadening their socio-political horizon. The regulation would also give the people of FATA the right of judicial bail and legal appeal against the punishment that they never had before. As such, the people of FATA would now be able to join the mainstream political and judicial systems of the country that will immensely increase and protect their exercise of human rights. The reform package still needs further amendments to determine an improved new constitutional status of FATA. However, this over due rearrangement would help FATA in various ways. The northwestern tribal areas would move towards a territorial and socio-political integration within Pakistan. As the administrative infrastructure will increase, the writ of the state will establish within FATA. The introduction of mainstream secular politics will help change the political fabric in the area opening up the tribal culture to further liberating ideas. It would not happen overnight. With the help of extended political and judicial rights, however, the people of FATA would have far better opportunities to improve their existential realities. One would hope that the new regulation would help transform FATA from the chronic dens of erratic crime and violence into a homogenous part of Pakistan’s civil society. See Rahimullah Yusufzai, ‘FATA the Way Forward’, *The News*, Islamabad, 23 August 2009. Rahimullah Yusufzai, ‘Constitutional Amendments are Required’ *The News*, Islamabad, 23 August 2009. Yousaf Ali, ‘Power to People: The Announcement Regarding the FCR Reform Package has Met with a Popular Nod of Approval among the Locals’, *The News*, Islamabad, 23 August 2009. Khalid Kheshgi, ‘Amendments are an Important Step towards a Big Change: Habibullah Khan, Additional Chief Secretary, FATA’, *The News*, Islamabad, 23 August 2009.

18 In 1947, the Indian Independence Act abrogated any special treaties the British had signed with the tribesmen, but the tribal elders of FATA agreed to continue the FCR in return for autonomy and the removal of all Pakistani troops from their territories. See ‘Government’s Agreement with the Tribal people (1951-52)’, States and Frontier Regions Division, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, Federal Secretariat, Islamabad, Pakistan.

19 See Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Asia Report No. 125, op.cit., p. 3. The political agent, a civil servant running the agency affairs, maintained contacts with the select group of local elders who received money from the government for their services. The seven tribal agencies stretched from southwest to northwest on Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan each having a different measure of area and population.
The successive civil and military governments of Pakistan continued to follow discriminatory policies in FATA allowing it to drift further away from the mainstream society. This area remained underdeveloped both socio-politically and economically. People survived on meager agricultural and trading activities supplemented by drug and arms trade, smuggling, kidnapping for ransom and other such crimes. The dilemma of searching for national integration while applying divergent means to pursue such cohesion produced negative results for both the state and the tribesmen of FATA.

Restrictions on national political parties and judicial institutions operating in FATA stunted the socio-political growth of the tribal area in two interrelated ways. The absence of political party system alienated the tribesmen from Pakistan’s mainstream politics leaving the task of political leadership to the clergymen, who worked with the mosque and madrassa. Similarly, the absence of country’s judicial system in FATA left the tribesmen in the oppressive grip of the FCR and local Jirga [Elders gathering]. The political and legal segregation, therefore, created a socio-political gulf between the mainstream society and people of FATA that hampered national integration. The divisive mechanisms at work in FATA indicated that the state deliberately kept the tribal areas separated from Pakistan’s mainstream society. The inward looking mode

21 In 1996, Benazir Bhutto’s government granted universal adult suffrage to the people of FATA. Earlier, under the 1973 constitution, around 37,000 Maliks (the tribal elders) used to choose eight Members of National Assembly (MNAs) with the advice of the political agent. Under the Musharraf regime’s Legal Framework Order (LFO), the number of MNAs increased to 12. Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan, ‘FATA after Independence: 1947-200’ in Haq, Khan, & Noori, Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan, op.cit., pp. 44-45. In the absence of any political party system in FATA, the tribesmen’s strong adherence to ethno-religious culture made religious parties influential among them. The religion based political parties such as the JUI and the JI had deep roots in FATA as they had participated in the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s, post Soviet civil war and rise of the Taliban in the 1990s. According to Robotka, these parties strongly supported the militants of FATA against the post 9/11 war on terror. See Bettina Robotka, ‘Pakistan Re-Invented: The Struggle for FATA, Defence Journal, op.cit., pp. 37-43. The lack of integration of FATA in the mainstream Pakistan further encouraged the tribesmen to turn towards Afghanistan for their economic, socio-political and even religious inspirations. Owing to its strategic thinking, Pakistan deliberately overlooked such developments in the tribal area; Ahmad Rashid, op. cit., p. 276.
22 Raza Khan, ‘Trouble with Tribalism’, The News, Islamabad, 30 August 2009. Khan holds that colonial sovereigns and Pakistani rulers respectively used and are still using the tribal territory to act as a buffer between empires and states. The strategic location of these tribal areas, as they not only straddle two countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also lie at the crossroads of Central and South Asia, has been responsible for their misfortune. To understand the history of Pakistan’s western tribal areas as a buffer
of tribal culture remained strong in FATA due to its complex geography along with its ethno-religious integrity.

The post 9/11 influx of the Taliban and al Qaeda operatives to FATA was acceptable for the Pashtun tribes due to ethnic and religious solidarity that prevailed beyond the Pak-Afghan border. According to such norms, the inter-tribe and intra-tribe affinities survived with least restrictions imposed by the authorities on either side of the border. The borderline, which was not even properly marked at various places, had insignificant impact on the daily lives of the people in the tribal area. Between 20,000 to 35,000 Pashtuns crossed the Pak-Afghan border on daily basis. This pattern of uninterrupted cross-border movement proved to be a major obstacle for the US-Pakistan cooperation in the tribal areas. Despite creating check-posts and other means to control the unauthorized movement across the front, the militants increasingly continued to operate from FATA. Consequently, FATA achieved paramount geo-strategic significance in the US war on terror.

This section has discussed the geo-strategic significance of FATA for US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11. FATA became the most vital area in the US war against terror post 9/11 for three reasons: The area was situated in close proximity of the Pak-Afghan border that predisposed it as a sanctuary for al Qaeda and the Taliban activities against both the US and Pakistan. Owing to the lack of FATA’s integration within the mainstream, Pakistan had nominal access to the tribal area. As such, FATA remained isolated and traditionally immersed in its ethnocentric solidarity, which was based on geographic and tribal unity. In order to combat terrorism in FATA, therefore, both the US and Pakistan faced harsh geographic and ethno-tribal realities that severely

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23 For example, many Pashtuns travel daily from the Afghan tribal area to Pakistan’s southwestern areas of Balochistan to conduct daily business. The tribesmen and their families frequently cross the border to attend social ceremonies. As such, the Pak-Afghan border has never been a hindrance to their movement between the two countries.

disrupted US-Pakistan efforts to contain Al Qaeda and Taliban related militancy in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas.

THE NATURE OF US-PAKISTAN COOPERATION POST 9/11 IN FATA:

This section discusses the complex nature of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in FATA. It argues that the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism in FATA was complex due to diverse perceptions of both the countries concerning the war against terrorism. As a superpower, the US strategic interests were global while Pakistan’s interests were regional. The differing strategic concerns regarding terrorism in FATA were reflected in the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation in FATA post 9/11.

For the US, a short to medium term goal of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 was to eliminate the Taliban and al Qaeda militants who organized insurgency in Pakistan’s tribal areas after fleeing from Afghanistan. Containing the militants in the Pak-Afghan border area was a part of the Bush regime’s ‘broad war against a global menace.’ On 8 April 2004, in her remarks before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the US, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice ably explained the anti-terrorist policy post 9/11 under the Bush administration. In one of her concluding paragraphs, she observed that ‘after the September 11 attacks, our nation faced hard choices. We could fight a narrow war against al Qaeda and the Taliban or we could fight a broad war against a global menace. We could seek a narrow victory or we could work for a lasting peace and a better world. President Bush chose the bolder course.’ The statement implied that the Bush administration perceived al Qaeda and the Taliban as part of global security threat to the US interests in the context of 9/11.

As such, US-Pakistan cooperation targeted the geo-strategic importance of FATA from the beginning. For example, in May 2008, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report based on its testimony before the sub committee of US Senate

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which observed that ‘according to US officials and intelligence reports since 2002, al Qaeda and the Taliban have used Pakistan’s FATA and the border region to attack Pakistan, Afghanistan, as well as US and coalition troops; plan and train for attacks against US interests; destabilize Pakistan; and spread radical Islamist ideologies that threaten US interests.’ The report testified to the fact that the militants in FATA emerged as the most critical challenge for the US war on terror under the Bush administration. The US had Pakistan’s ‘unstinted cooperation’ against terrorism in the region. However, both the countries mistrusted each other’s strategic approach in the region.

The Islamist insurgency in FATA was part of a global threat for the US while Pakistan viewed it in the regional context particularly in relation to Kashmir. For example, in her 2002-2003 article titled ‘US Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners have Divergent Policies’ in the Washington Quarterly, Teresita Schaffer pointed out differing perceptions of the US and Pakistan. In Schaffer’s words, ‘for Pakistan, the anti-terror alliance with the US was important, but not at the cost of its interests in Kashmir.’ The Kashmir issue has been Pakistan’s main contention with India since 1947-48. The divergence in perceptions, therefore, was not a new phenomenon in the US-Pakistan relations as both had experienced it during the Cold War and post Cold War eras. The divergent pattern of mutual cooperation continued to prevail post 9/11 in FATA. The US strategic view of FATA was consistent with US perceptions of the Taliban regime and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

28 Schaffer wrote: ‘The same pattern was also apparent in earlier periods of bilateral partnership, in the 1950s and particularly in the 1980s. In both cases, the United States and Pakistan were allies against the Soviets. In the 1950s, despite the clear limitations in its treaties with the United States, Pakistan thought it had lined up an ally against its Indian adversary and was bitterly disillusioned when the United States cut off arms supplies during its 1965 war with India. In the 1980s, Pakistan’s nuclear program undid the two countries’ cooperation.’ Ibid.
The US had a UN mandated task to eliminate the terrorist menace in Afghanistan after 9/11. The US led invasion to oust the Taliban government pushed many Taliban and al Qaeda operatives across the border into Pakistan. According to a July 2002 report in weekly *Time*, the US bombardment in Tora Bora region in late 2001 and Operation Anaconda in mid 2002 had forced up to 5,000 Islamist fighters to flee to Pakistan. It was suspected that Osama bin Laden had entered South Waziristan with his followers. In mid 2002, the US sources estimated that up to 3,500 foreign militants were hiding out in South and North Waziristan.29 Over the years, increasing attacks on the NATO and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan signified that militancy in FATA was on the rise despite the use of excessive force to eliminate it. The Bush administration feared the rise of the militants in Pakistan in large part due to insurgents’ potential access to country’s nuclear arms which would pose a grave threat to global peace and stability.30 Many analysts have argued that the threat of militants’ seizure of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has been overstated. It is extremely unlikely that the Pakistan armed forces would allow this to happen in part because Pakistan would face the might of US military power including its huge nuclear arsenal. The Pakistan military of course have used this threat to pressurize the US for further support. The safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets, therefore, remained a contentious issue between the US and Pakistan in the broader context of US-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism.

From the US perspective, the twin issues of extremism in FATA and Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear proliferation activities were intricately interlinked. According to a May 2005 US *Congressional Report*, ‘in theory, achieving the two most crucial US policy objectives relating to Pakistan – defeating radical Islamist terrorism and deterring

30 See Richard P. Cronin, K. Alan Kronstadt and Sharon Squassoni, ‘Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: US Policy Constraints and Options’ CRS Report for Congress, *Congressional Research Service*, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., 24 May 2005, p. 13. This report referred to CIA director, George Tenet’s testimony on 24 February 2004 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in which he had mentioned the involvement of Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan net-work in supplying nuclear technology to North Korea. However, many analysts argue that this threat is nowhere near as severe as it is often made out to be. It has been argued that the Pakistan military would never permit the seizure of the country’s nuclear weapons. In addition, India, the US and even Israel would take immediate action probably including the use of nuclear weapons.
nuclear proliferation – should be complementary, since the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the terrorists is...the ultimate nightmare.\textsuperscript{31}

The report referred to the remarks of the Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, Lee Hamilton, which he made at a hearing on 24 August 2004 on Commission’s recommendations for US diplomacy. Hamilton stated: ‘I think Pakistan represents as tough a problem as there is in American foreign policy today.’\textsuperscript{32} Such remarks underlined the complex nature of US-Pakistan relations considering the increased militant attacks planned in FATA and frequent media reports in the West on Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation network. On 26 December 2004, the \textit{New York Times} published a report on the extent of Pakistan’s nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan’s network support from Libya to Iran to North Korea.\textsuperscript{33} Given the disputed nature of Pakistan’s nuclear program, the US concerns over a potential global security crisis were not unwarranted.

Many in the US feared that the militants might get access to Pakistan’s atomic bomb in one way or another threatening the world security. Pakistan’s tight military control over its nuclear program had long been known to the US. The linkages between Pakistani military and the militant groups who were active in Pak-Afghan area also concerned the US. For example, a 31 August 2005 \textit{US Congressional Report} entitled ‘Terrorism in South Asia’ mentioned that the ‘relationship between international terrorists, indigenous Pakistani extremist groups, and some elements of Pakistan’s political-military structure are complex and murky, but may represent a serious threat to the attainment of key US policy goals.’\textsuperscript{34} The report claimed that there were past indications that elements in Pakistan’s intelligence service and Islamist political parties provided assistance to US designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO). The US concerns implied that the

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. According to the report, the extent and degree of threat posed by Khan’s network has become apparent through the discovery in Libya of plans of an atomic bomb and other elements of a ‘nuclear starter kit’, evidence that Pakistan has been the source of most of Iran’s uranium enrichment know-how and technology, strong indications that Pakistan has been the main source of centrifuges or components of North Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program. The US and officials/experts of the IAEA strongly suspect that Khan’s network was also involved in transporting North Korea’s uranium hexafluoride gas (UFC), the feedstock for uranium enrichment center to Libya.
US suspected the existence of a probable link between the rise of religious militants and Pakistan’s nuclear program.

The expanding influence of the radicals in Pakistan and Musharraf regime’s reluctance to effectively fight them was a serious irritant in the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in FATA during the Bush era. According to Charles H. Kennedy, the ‘A. Q. Khan affair [was] a ticking time bomb.’ Kennedy referred to a news conference where President Musharraf announced that he had pardoned Khan for his involvement in the nuclear proliferation network although he was confined to house arrest. Addressing the Pakistani media, Musharraf speculated that if the government, the army or both were implicated in nuclear proliferation, then ‘the UN Security Council [would] immediately impose sanctions against us, next we will be asked to sign the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) and the CTBT and roll back, then we will be declared a rogue state and finally our vital interests would come under imminent physical danger.’ This statement showed that Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation issue was used by the US to persuade Pakistan for using its armed forces against the militants in FATA. Despite Pakistan’s use of force, however, the desire to eliminate the resurgence in FATA remained elusive for the Bush administration. Pakistan, on its part, was more concerned about its own security and viewed the nature of militancy in FATA differently.

Like many European and other coalition countries in the US led war on terror post 9/11, Pakistan did not support the US invasion of Iraq soon after toppling the Taliban regime in Kabul. Even within the US, unilateral attack of the US forces came under strong

36 See Charles H. Kennedy, ‘‘Political Issues in 2004’ in Charles H. Kennedy & Cynthia A. Botteron (editors), *Pakistan 2005*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2006, p. 7. According to Kennedy, ‘the US government had long been concerned about the sanctuary provided to the Taliban and foreign mercenaries in Pakistan’s tribal area and had encouraged Pakistan to close this escape route. Until 2004, Musharraf was able to stave off such pressure. But, perhaps owing to the fallout from the A. Q. Khan affair, Pakistan’s cooperation in this venture became a litmus test of Pakistan’s continued participation in the global war against terrorism.’ Also See M. Ziauddin, ‘Dr. A. Q. Khan Pardoned’, *Dawn*, Karachi, 6 February 2004.
criticism making President Bush one of the most unpopular Presidents of America. Thomas Biersteker, a US scholar from Graduate School of International Studies, Geneva, admitted to the US mistake to attack Iraq in an informal conversation with the author on 7 April 2009 at Islamabad. He observed that ‘it was one of the bloodiest blunders of US strategic history to leave Afghanistan and Pakistan behind for invading Iraq in 2003. It ruined Bush’s chances to win his war against terrorism in this part of the world.’

This implied that the US did not anticipate the ensuing insurgency in FATA. Moreover, the US did not even seriously attempt to redress the situation in Afghanistan as the militant attacks continued on the NATO forces and ISAF from Pakistan’s tribal areas. The NATO commanders constantly complained about the shortage of troops in Afghanistan. The projects of building an Afghan army and police force were in disarray. The Afghan economy was largely based on illicit drug trade under the thoroughly corrupt Karzai regime and Afghanistan remained a failed state with a figurehead President who was not safe outside his residence in Kabul.

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37 An expert of security studies, Thomas Biersteker was in Pakistan to attend an international conference on the issue of the State of International Relations in Pakistan which was organized by the Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. The author had an extended talk with him on various aspects of US war against terrorism including the US invasion of Iraq.

38 The military commanders of US led forces complained about the shortage of troops since the beginning of US operation in Afghanistan which the Bush administration constantly ignored due to US engagement in Iraq. At the end of its two terms in the office, President Bush left the decision to send more troops to Afghanistan to the incoming administration. Even the new Barak Obama administration, that wanted to change the course of events in Afghanistan, showed reluctance to grant the request for more troops by General David McKiernan who was sent as the new commander of International forces in Afghanistan. See, for example, Tom Baldwin ‘US sacks top military commander in Afghanistan’, Times online, 12 May 2009 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6269236.ece Retrieved 11 June 2009. According to this report, the top US military commander in Afghanistan was sacked after both the Pentagon and the White House decided that “fresh thinking” was needed to win the war. General David McKiernan, who has spent just 11 months in charge of NATO forces in Afghanistan, will be replaced by Lieutenant-General Stanley McChrystal who previously led the special operations command and is credited with killing the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Also see Bob Woodward, ‘McChrystal: More Forces or Mission Failure: Top U.S. Commander for Afghan War Calls Next 12 Months Decisive’, Washington Post, 21 September 2009. According to Woodward’s report, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan warns that he needs more forces within the next year and bluntly states that without them, the eight-year conflict ‘will likely result in failure.’

blamed Pakistan for the instability in Afghanistan, Pakistan questioned the nature of the US commitment in the region.

There was an impression in Pakistan that the US strategic interests lay elsewhere, while Pakistan faced the direct consequences of the US War on Terror more than any other country. In particular, Pakistan was worried about the growing US-India relations. For example, the 9 November 2001 joint statement of President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee showed a strong compatibility of mutual interests in the South Asian region. According to the statement, Bush and Vajpayee ‘noted that both countries were targets of terrorism as seen in the barbaric attacks on 11 September on the United States and on 1 October in Kashmir.’

Pakistan was alarmed at the nature of emerging US-India strategic partnership. The tribesmen of FATA had played a crucial role in the first India-Pakistan war on Kashmir in 1948. Pakistan had trained the Afghan and Pashtun fighters in FATA for combating the Soviet army in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Pakistan continued this policy in the 1990s to support the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the post 9/11 era, while Pakistan reversed its pro-Taliban policy, the Afghan Taliban enjoyed the hospitality of their Pashtun brethren in FATA. The militants of FATA joined forces with the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda operatives. In addition, the US-India strategic partnership was confirmed by signing the joint nuclear deal. Consequently, Pakistan felt isolated in the region. Pakistan showed its security concerns over both the US war on terror in FATA and the weak US commitment to solve the issue of terrorism.

People in Pakistan believed that Musharraf failed to effectively bargain over Pakistan’s involvement in the US war on terror. In her article ‘The Washington Summit: Terms of

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40 ‘Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of India’, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, 9 November 2001. White House website
Pakistan-US Engagement’ published in the *Defence Journal* of February 2002, Nasim Zehra observed:

By virtue of the public acknowledgement by Pakistan of a ‘no-option’ position in the post September 11 scenario, Pakistan had already foreclosed the hard bargain option for itself. In fact, even now, with US military and multi-agency presence in Pakistan and with the logistics related engagement of Pakistan’s men, territory and airspace with the US military operations, Pakistan showed no apparent signs of leveraging this situation to extract sufficiency from the US.”42

This view strongly prevailed in Pakistan during the Musharraf regime, which constantly eroded the credibility of his rule. The lack of US support for Pakistan’s efforts in the War on Terror was made obvious by comparing the US spending in Pakistan and Iraq. The US spent approximately one trillion dollars on Iraq war from 2003 to 2008, whereas Pakistan received nearly $11 billion from 2001 to 2008 to fight the US war on terror. Out of $11 billion spent in Pakistan, $5.8 billion were ‘directed at efforts’ to eliminate the terrorist sanctuaries in FATA plus other expenses.43 Pakistan remained concerned about the US commitment in the region due to the US habit of deserting Pakistan. Having apprehensions about each other, however, both the US and Pakistan continued to engage despite their differing interests in the region.

The uncertain nature of US-Pakistan cooperation was reflected through new developments in FATA during the Bush presidency from 2001-2008. According to Major General Shaukat Sultan, former Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the Pakistani ‘troops…moved into the highly strategic positions of Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency and portions of Kurram Agency bordering the…Tora Bora region of Afghanistan in December 2001.’ He further stated that Pakistan’s ‘Army and Frontier Corps (FC) troops’ moved ‘in the Shewal area of North and South Waziristan Agencies in June 2002. Finally, the elimination of the ‘no go’ areas of Mohmand Agency was done in June 2003. This was followed by [Frontier Corp’s]  

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opening of inaccessible areas of Bajaur Agency [which] marked the elimination of all … ‘no go’ areas of FATA.\textsuperscript{44}

However, despite Pakistani troops’ movement near Tora Bora and elimination of ‘no-go’ areas in FATA, the Afghan fugitives escaped in a large number to Pakistan’s tribal areas. According to the Governor NWFP, Lt. General Syed Iftekhar Hussain who played an active role in the developments in South Waziristan agency, ‘after the coalition forces replaced the government in Afghanistan, some of the foreign militants entered our tribal areas of South Waziristan Agency….A sizeable number of them, numbering five to six hundred settled in the mountainous areas between North and South Waziristan Agencies.’\textsuperscript{45}

However, both the US and Pakistan’s authorities insisted that US coalition forces did not pursue Afghan fugitives into Pakistan. On 10 March 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in a TV program stated that the US did not anticipate any US troop movements into Pakistan pursuing possible Al-Qaeda or Taliban fighters. He considered Pakistan to be quite capable of controlling its own terrain.\textsuperscript{46} On 26 March 2002, Donald Rumsfeld, the then US Secretary of Defense also stated in Washington that the US had no plans to send its troops into Pakistan to search for possible Al-Qaeda and the Taliban escaping from Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{47} It implied that the Pentagon had not officially permitted the US forces to cross the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan agreed with the US position. On 28 March 2002, in an interview to the \textit{Washington Post}, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar stressed that Pakistan and the US forces had cooperated in preventing Al-Qaeda cadres from escaping into Pakistan and that there had been no need for the US forces to chase after those who

\textsuperscript{44} Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, ‘Government’s Initiatives in FATA before and after 9/11’, in published proceedings of a seminar on ‘Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses’, IPRI, Islamabad, 2005, p. 168.
\textsuperscript{45} Inaugural Address by Lt. General Syed Iftekhar Hussain in published proceedings of a seminar on ‘Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses’, IPRI, Islamabad, 2005, p.11.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
escaped from Afghanistan into Pakistan. It implied that the US forces were not to chase the militants into Pakistan.

Reacting to al Qaeda’s attacks since 2002 from Angur Adda in South Waziristan to US bases at Shikin and Lawara inside Afghanistan, the US troops asked for permission to chase the attackers who retreated to FATA. The US Commander, Lt. General Dan McNeill did not have permission from Pentagon to do so. Finally, his patience ran out. In 2003, McNeill threatened to cross the border into Pakistan. One such statement read, ‘US forces acknowledge the internationally recognized boundaries of Afghanistan, but may pursue attackers who attempted to escape into Pakistan to evade capture or retaliation.’

The US troops and intelligence officials were involved in anti-terrorist pursuits in FATA since the beginning. A US Congressional Report released in March 2004 referred to the US activities in Pakistan’s tribal areas as follows:

During 2002, the US increasingly took a direct, if low-profile role in both law enforcement and military operations being conducted on Pakistani territory. These operations have led to favorable results in tracking and apprehending dangerous Islamic militants, but the activities of the US personnel in the country have led to increasing signs of anti-American backlash and Pakistani sovereignty concerns.

The US understood well that Pakistan’s pro-US policies in FATA would cause public resentment within the country. The CRS report pointed out that the US and Pakistani officials did not respond to such information due to the concerns of public reaction. The report referred to a Los Angeles Times report which mentioned that ‘US counter-terrorism agents in Pakistan [had] been reported at between ‘several dozen’ to ‘the low hundreds.’ On 24 April 2002, a report in New York Times claimed that the US advisers

were allowed to accompany Pakistani troops into the tribal areas of Pakistan during raids on suspected Taliban and Al-Qaeda hideouts. Pakistan’s Foreign Office denied the *New York Times* report about Pak-US troops’ joint operations. The Foreign Office stated that there was no such new development concerning joint operations with the US in the tribal areas to search for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters.\(^\text{52}\) Pakistan avoided admitting the extent of its cooperation with the US for fear of violent reaction in the tribal areas and political criticism especially from the Islamic parties. Ambiguity, therefore, shrouded the affairs related to the war on terror in FATA.

According to the Bush administration’s strategy, the US wanted Pakistan to send its troops to FATA. For the first time in its history, Pakistan army had to enter the tribal areas to combat militancy. Due to the lack of Pakistani forces’ combat training to control insurgency, the Bush administration agreed to provide financial and technical support to Pakistan under the US Foreign Military Financing (USFMF) program.\(^\text{53}\) On 18 September 2003, in a US-Pakistan meeting in Washington, the US proposed military to military exercises and training for Pakistan’s military. Such US facility was cutoff in 1990 at the end of the Soviet-Afghan war. On Musharraf’s visit to the US in 2003, Bush announced an aid package worth $3 billion for Pakistan over five years.\(^\text{54}\) The US financial support was meant to reinforce the US-Pakistan cooperation to effectively combat terrorism in FATA.

Before the launch of 2004 military operation in FATA, many US officials praised Pakistan’s efforts in the US war against terrorism. On 10 January 2004, the US Secretary of State Collin Powell, in a CBS interview, highlighted that the coalition of US-Pakistan and Afghan forces would be able to deal with the threat posed by a ‘kind of rogue presence’ in the tribal belt.\(^\text{55}\) On 17 February, the Commander of US forces in Afghanistan, General David Barnes stated that Pakistani military [would be] going into

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areas where it had never gone before. Again, on 26 February, Powell stated that Pakistan was a key US ally in the war against terrorism. It was evident because the Pakistani military had arrested more than 500 Al-Qaeda terrorists, which had been possible ‘only through the leadership’ of Musharraf’s border security measures.\(^56\)

The year 2004 was an election year in the US and any breakthrough on the front of US war on terror could help President Bush win a second term in the White House. Ahmad Rashid commented that ‘the early capture of Osama Bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar would provide an enormous boost to President George W. Bush as he sets out to win re-election in November. That is the view I was hearing from US officials in Washington during a recent lecture tour of the US – and it's a view shared by US officials in Islamabad.’\(^57\)

Pakistan’s March 2004 military operation in FATA, therefore, was significant for Bush’s War on Terror both personally and officially. Before the operation, CIA Director George Tenet made a secret trip to Pakistan to discuss the hunt for Osama bin Laden believing that bin Laden was hiding in FATA.\(^58\) Both in the US and Pakistan, many people were optimistic about Osama’s capture before the US elections.

Within Pakistan, there was an entire circle of civil and military officials who were keen to promote US-Pakistan cooperation through capturing Osama bin Laden. They wanted to capture bin Laden before the November 2004 US elections which to them, would ‘bolster Bush’s re-election prospects’ and also ‘solidify’ the US-Pakistan relationship.\(^59\) In March-April, there was an upbeat mood in Pakistan of impending capture of the elusive Bin Laden from the Pak-Afghan border. In February, there were even

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56 Ibid., p. 134.
speculations that Osama was already detained and that the disclosure could be timed just before the November 2004 US elections.\textsuperscript{60} The US-Pakistan cooperation to capture bin Laden gave a fresh impetus to the military operation in Waziristan.

The March 2004 military operation in South Waziristan has a major significance for US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 because it was a typical manifestation of Pakistan army’s later anti-terrorist operations in FATA which continued until 2008. The operation involved Pakistan army’s 2000 soldiers and militiamen (Waziristan Scouts and Khasadars in the villages of Zarkai, Kaloosha and Azam Warsak).\textsuperscript{61} The Quick Reaction Force, based in Tarbela was also part of the action. The operation was concentrated on a 50-square-kilometer area near Wana, district headquarter of South Waziristan, around the villages of Shin Warsak, Daza Gundai, Kalusha, Ghaw Khawa and Kari Kot.\textsuperscript{62} Around 14 helicopters ferried these troops on ‘search and destroy’ missions. The army and local scouts established 26 new check posts to block entry and exit points before launching the operation. On 17 March 2004, Secretary FATA Brigadier Mahmood Shah informed the media that ‘the operation will continue unless these elements combed out of Pakistan.’\textsuperscript{63} The statement showed authorities’ strong commitment to clear the menace of foreign elements from FATA.

This major ‘Search-and-Destroy’ operation began in the belief that a quick, surgical strike against the foreign terrorists and their local allies would succeed. The area selected for the operation was under the control of five militants – Nek Mohammad, Noor-ul-Islam, Mohammad Sharif, Molvi Abbas and Molvi Abdul - who had links with the Afghan Taliban. It was suspected that the militants were harboring Saudi, Egyptian, Yemeni, Uzbek and Chechen militants in the area.\textsuperscript{64} The Commander of Pakistani

\begin{footnotes}
\item[62] This area was under the control of five Islamist militants. See \textit{Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants}, Asia Report No. 125, 2006, op.cit., p. 14.
\item[64] See \textit{Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants}, Asia Report No. 125, op.cit, p. 15.
\end{footnotes}
troops in the area reported ‘fierce resistance’ during the fight. Based on the reports which came from the battle field, President Musharraf claimed that ‘a senior al Qaeda figure was surrounded, but at this time we are not sure who he is.’ He further commented that the ‘resistance being offered by the people there [is such that] we feel that there may be a high-value target.’ No high-value figure was either killed or captured, however, and the operation badly backfired. On 19 March, the BBC remarked on the situation in FATA in the following words: ‘The ferocity of the latest fighting suggests that the Pakistan armed forces have clearly underestimated the military challenge arising from these complex tribal areas….Whatever the result of the latest operation in South Waziristan, it is unlikely to bring a speedy improvement to many of the region’s underlying problems.’

Pakistani authorities claimed that the operation was successful while the ground realities in FATA were different. Officially, around 20 local tribesmen including some foreign women were captured while the houses of those tribesmen suspected of providing shelter to militants were razed to the ground. According to officials, there were 400-500 foreign terrorists engaged in fighting against the Pakistani military. However, there were media reports claiming that alongside the foreign fighters, there were between 2,000 to 2,500 local tribesmen whom the foreign militants had trained and recruited. These trained guerrilla fighters must have surprised the troops who were untrained in the ‘hit-and-run’ tactics. On 18 March, The News reported that the ‘militants killed 16 military and paramilitary personnel and took 19 Frontier Corps (FC), a paramilitary force under army command, personnel and two tehsildars (local officials) hostage. The

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68 According to Charles Kennedy, although the Pakistan government has kept tight control over the media’s coverage of the Waziristan Operation, a consensus has emerged that the Operation has cost the lives of well over a hundred Pakistani soldiers as well as resulted in considerable ‘collateral’ damage to tribal militants and civilians’. Thousands of villagers have sought refuge in surrounding districts of Pakistan. See Charles H. Kennedy, ‘‘Political Issues in 2004”, in Pakistan 2005, op.cit, p. 7.
bodies of these local officials and some eight soldiers were found a few days later.‘69

Significantly, the US-Pakistan joint strategy to push the Taliban and al Qaeda militants back into Afghanistan where the US troops were to encircle, capture and destroy them also failed. On 23 March 2004, addressing a gathering at Pakistan embassy in Washington, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfwitz praised Pakistani soldiers who gave their lives in fighting the suspected terrorists.70 The US pressure behind Pakistan’s military action in FATA seemed to be a major reason for the criticism of the Musharraf regime. Musharraf escaped two assassination attempts following the army action in FATA.71 Other than feeding the anti US sentiments, the ambiguous nature of US-Pakistan relations confused many analysts in Pakistan.

While there was some direct evidence of the US involvement in the 2004 military action in FATA, the authorities in Pakistan denied it. On 15 March 2004, in his address to a grand tribal Jirga at the Governor’s House in Peshawer, Musharraf stated that the foreign troops including Americans would not be allowed to carryout any operations in the tribal area. He emphasized: ‘I assure you that US troops would not be engaged in South Waziristan’s operation’.72 However, Musharraf’s statement was proved wrong within days. On 20 March 2004, a US helicopter gunship bombarded the Madakhel Wazir tribe’s area, nearly three kilometers inside Pakistan’s territory in the North Waziristan Agency injuring three tribesmen.73 The incident showed a direct US involvement in combating terrorism within Pakistan but Musharraf regime denied it to
avoid public resentment on the domestic front. On 21 March 2004, Brigadier Mahmood Shah admitted, however, that the firing incident by some US gunship helicopters occurred after 4 pm on 20 March and halted at 4 pm on 21 March.\(^{74}\) Even the US officials freely talked about the nature of their involvement in the Wana operation.

In its war on terror in FATA, the US received the help of other allies such as Britain and there was a certain level of intelligence cooperation between the US and Pakistan in the tribal areas. On 21 March 2004 at Washington, US Senator Jay Rockefeller, a member of Senate Intelligence Committee stated on CNN that some countries other than America were helping Pakistan in the operation in South Waziristan.\(^{75}\) On Rockefeller’s statement, a diplomat told the US based Pakistani correspondent of the *Daily Times* that one of those countries was Britain. The diplomat added: ‘...Some of the work that the Americans avoid doing in certain parts of the world is willingly performed for them [Americans] by the British.’\(^{76}\) It implied that if the US was not directly involved in FATA because the Pentagon would not allow it to do so, then the US could use other NATO allies to get involved in FATA. The US did not accept any such bar on US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in intelligence sharing. President Musharraf himself accepted that 12-15 Pakistan based US special agents and technical experts were assisting Pakistan’s military to track down suspected terrorists in the tribal belt.\(^{77}\) Amid the ambiguity surrounding the military operation in Waziristan, there was a combination of factors, therefore, that propelled a strong domestic reaction against the Musharraf regime.

On 24 April 2004, the military action was ceased under an unwritten truce in a reconciliation ceremony that occurred in Shakai Valley. It was Fazl-ur-Rahman’s pro-Taliban JUI-F government in the NWFP that brokered the deal between the military and Mujahidin Shura of South Waziristan, an umbrella organization of pro-Taliban militants. Two JUI-F parliamentarians from FATA, Maulana Merajudin Qureshi and

\(^{74}\) ‘Operation Wana: Bodies of Six Sent for DNA’, *Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 22 March 2004.
\(^{76}\) Ibid.
Maulana Abdul Malik Wazir with the support of Peshawar Corps Commander, Lt. General Safdar Hussain, had brought the two parties to an agreement.\textsuperscript{78} The local Taliban commander Nek Mohammad, who had links with Osama bin Laden and other foreign militant leaders, agreed to surrender and to register the foreign elements in return for amnesty. In the Shakai celebration, the pro-Taliban militants made triumphant speeches and presented gifts to the officials. The Corps Commander himself delivered a pro-Jihad speech. It was generally believed that the agreement had legitimized the local militants’ status as power brokers.\textsuperscript{79} The truce implied that the Musharraf regime was further withdrawing from country’s nominal authority in FATA while surrendering to the militants. However, the truce did not help contain the militants in FATA.

Soon after the Shakai event, many militants rejected the agreement. The truce broke down causing economic sanctions against the local pro-Taliban tribesmen under the FCR.\textsuperscript{80} The sanctions were followed by renewed military action that involved the use of jet fighters and gunship helicopters destroying militant sanctuaries in Shakai area. In June 2004, a missile fired from a US predator drone killed Nek Mohammad who was one of the leading Taliban commanders.\textsuperscript{81} The military then renewed its amnesty offer and even pledged not to hand over the foreigners to a third country. But Haji Mohammad Omar, acting head of the Mujahidin Shura of South Waziristan, remained defiant.\textsuperscript{82} In November 2004, when some militant commanders including Omar finally

\textsuperscript{78} Report No. 14, ICG, op. cit., p. 16.
surrendered in South Waziristan, the Musharraf regime admitted that it gave the commanders $540,000 to pay back their debts they owed to al-Qaeda. Since then, Pakistani military followed a pattern to first launch actions against the insurgents in FATA and then to conclude deals with them.

The March 2006 military offensive in FATA ended in September after a deal was struck between Pakistan military and the extremists. In early March 2006, Pakistan military entered North Waziristan on the eve of President Bush’s visit to Pakistan. In retaliation, ‘nearly 1,500 Taliban militants overwhelmed the military garrison in Miram Shah and captured the town.’ In the three day severe fighting, army used heavy artillery to repulse the Taliban. The battle destroyed the town taking 150 lives. In May 2006, Musharraf appointed General Orakzai as the new governor of the NWFP who signed an agreement with seven Pakistani Taliban leaders on 5 September. According to reports, the ‘deal between the authorities and the pro-Taliban militants was designed to end five years of bloodshed in the area.’ The violence, however, continued unabated. The militants continued to shed blood inside Pakistan while increasing their attacks on the NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan. The October 2009 operation in South Waziristan was not any different in nature from earlier operations despite the minor change of details.

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83 Ahmed Rashid, ‘Descent into Chaos’, op. cit., p. 276. On 8 November, a US missile hit a Madrassa in Bajaur agency killing 80 people. In response, a suicide bomber blew himself up at an army training camp in Dargai that killed 35 soldiers and injured 40.
85 After a relatively successful action against the militants in Swat and Malakand area in the NWFP in early 2009, Pakistan army launched a massive military attack in South Waziristan on 17 October 2009. With 3 divisions of the Army, 3 Corps of the FC, having 11 and 12 corps of the Army already stationed in FATA and one division in reserve – the total strength reached over 80,000 military force and used the support of Pakistan air force as well. It was a major offensive against the TTP insurgents. Once the go ahead was given by the Federal and NWFP governments, operation Rah-i-Nijat was unfolded from three directions on 17 October. Still an insider defense analyst was reluctant to call it an ‘extermination’ exercise. ‘We are not going to be able to kill every Talib, or even take out their top leadership at the offset. But like in Swat, we can do plenty to ensure that the Khasadar and the FC forces are able to comfortably enforce the writ of the state.’ See Abdullah Saad, ‘Operation Rah-i-Nijat (Path to Salvation) – An operational assessment’, 18 October 2009. http://abdullahsaad.com/337-operation-rahenijat-path-salvation-operational-assessment Retrieved 21 October 2009. Also See Asif Haroon Raja, ‘Operation Rah-i-Nijat’, Pakistan Observer, Islamabad, 7 November 2009. Interestingly, most of the TTP commanders along with their fighting force had already escaped from South Waziristan to avoid a decisive defeat at the hands of a larger military force when the Pakistan army reached the area. Another analyst had this to say on the escape of TTP militants: ‘Unlike in previous operations in other troubled tribal areas, there is unlikely to be any peace agreement. The militants, headed by the TTP, are bent on a
The US blamed Pakistan’s peace deals with the insurgents in FATA for the continued attacks on international forces in Afghanistan and demanded that Pakistan do more in the war on terror.

During the Bush administration, the US followed a two-pronged strategy based on support and persuasion to press upon Pakistan to do more. For example, the annual report of the US Department of State in 2003 lauded Pakistan’s role as the ‘most important partner in the global coalition against terrorism’ and termed the cooperation as ‘extensive’. During his visit to Kabul on 17 March, the US Secretary of State Powell praised Pakistan’s raid against the militants in FATA. He emphasized that the ‘Taliban elements are forced from Pakistan back into Afghanistan as a result of actions on the Pakistan side of the border. I am sure that our military forces here, working with Afghan forces, will deal with those elements. I am sure that nothing would be done
along that border which is not done without coordination with both sovereigns – Afghanistan and Pakistan.\(^{87}\)

While appreciating Pakistani efforts in the global war on terror, on the one hand, the US officials criticized Pakistan for not doing enough to combat terrorism in its tribal areas, on the other. On 10 April 2004, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated that Pakistan was cooperating with the US in destroying Al-Qaeda network and its leaders but was not doing so in the case of the Taliban.\(^{88}\) Other than displaying a mixed US opinion on Pakistan’s performance, the statement underlined the prevailing divergence in the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation in FATA. On 10 April, the US envoy to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad also stated that ‘we have told the Pakistani leadership that either they must solve this problem or we will have to do it ourselves…. We prefer that Pakistan takes responsibility and the Pakistan government agrees. However, one way or the other, the problem will have to be dealt with.’\(^{89}\)

It turned out in the following months that Khalilzad’s statement was an indication of a US action plan on the ground. On 20 August 2004, a spy plane from Afghanistan entered Pakistan’s airspace flying over Kudakhel village in Mohmand Agency of FATA. On 1 September 2004, more than a hundred US coalition forces entered into Pakistani territory from Afghanistan in search of Al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects.\(^{90}\) The incidents of US violation of Pakistani border and airspace further increased anti-US sentiments and Musharraf regime’s isolation within Pakistan. On the US drone attacks, a Peshawar based noted journalist, Rahimullah Yousufzai commented that ‘the US government’s insistence on using CIA-operated drones to target militant hideouts in

\(^{87}\) ‘Powell Hails Wana Operation’, The News, Islamabad, 18 March 2004. Powell stated that the US was doing everything it could to encourage Pakistani leadership especially President Musharraf to be more active in patrolling the border and preventing infiltrations by the militants.


Pakistan’s tribal area stems from its belief that Islamabad cannot be trusted to effectively do the job.  

The comment indicated that both the US and Pakistan had divergent views on the drone attacks. The US claimed success and validity of drone attacks in destroying some militant commanders including Nek Mohammad and Baitullah Mehsud. However, the death of hundreds of non-combat ordinary tribesmen, women and children in such attacks aggravated anti US reaction in Pakistan that increased support among the locals for the militants to avenge their bloodshed. As the Bush and Musharraf presidencies reached their respective end in 2008, a new generation of the Taliban radicals was ready to take over in FATA.

This section has discussed the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in FATA. The US and Pakistan had divergent perceptions of the insurgents breeding in Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas. While the US treated the militants as a global menace, Pakistan saw certain brands of militants as advantageous to its regional security. However, neither the US policy of using force against the militants nor Pakistan’s appeasement policy with the insurgents deterred violence in FATA. In fact, a strategic division between both the countries allowed the extremists to increase violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The US lack of providing sufficient resources to fight terrorism and Pakistan’s inability to contain insurgents in FATA increased distrust between the US and Pakistan. Both countries suspected each other’s intentions in FATA. At this juncture, it is important to understand the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation in FATA post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level.

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92 See Amir Mir, ‘60 Drone Hits Kill 14 Al Qaeda Men, 687 Civilians’, The News, Islamabad, 10 April 2009. This official report referred to 60 cross-border predator attacks carried out by the Afghanistan based American drones in Pakistan between 14 January 2006 and 8 April 2009. Among the 60 air strikes only 10 were able to hit their actual targets. The success rate of the attacks was mere 6%.
US-PAKISTAN COOPERATION POST 9/11 IN FATA AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN:

US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in FATA eroded Pakistan’s security for three reasons. First, foreign and local militants waged violence within Pakistan and challenged the writ of the state in FATA. Second, Afghanistan’s anti-Pakistan posture post 9/11 and the recurrence of the Pakhtunistan issue intensified security concerns for Pakistan. Third, due to India’s increased influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan protected certain extremist elements within Pakistan, which in turn, diminished Pakistan’s security.

During the last three decades, Pakistan’s northwestern tribal areas have played a decisive role in two major events of modern history. During the 1980s, the Muslim Mujahidin (fighters) were trained and armed in FATA to combat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Since 2002, a large number of local and foreign militants in FATA have been trained, armed and sent to fight the US led forces in Afghanistan. In the first instance, the US and Pakistan vigorously cooperated against the Soviets in the 1980s. In the second, both the US and Pakistan suspected each other’s intentions despite their being crucial partners in the war against terrorism. The US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 against terror was in disarray since the beginning. The militants eroded the writ of the state using violence in Pakistan while the US coalition forces struggled hard to maintain their grip over Afghanistan. The post 9/11 US presence in the region seemed to be highly complex. It contributed to increased global, regional and local insecurities. After 9/11, Pakistan faced the most crucial moments of its history in FATA since 1971, when as a result of a civil war, Bangladesh emerged as an independent state from the eastern wing of Pakistan. In the post 9/11 era, in the absence of an effective strategy, both the US and Pakistan were unsure how to pull out of this quagmire of terrorism.

The US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in FATA added a new dimension to political violence that numerous militant groups waged in Pakistan, which eroded latter’s security. There were generally four sets of insurgent groups that used violence to
intimidate people and disrupt the authorities in their efforts to maintain security in Pakistan. The categories of these groups ranged from al Qaeda and other foreign bands to the Afghan Taliban to Pakistani Taliban to ethno-sectarian militants. These groups were loosely structured from within having active functional links with other such organizations. As for the foreign militant groups active in FATA, there has been no example of a non-state terrorist organization such as al Qaeda threatening the global peace in modern history and taking a country hostage like Pakistan post 9/11. Since its inception on 11 August 1988 in Peshawar, al Qaeda’s rise to fame due to 9/11 incidents made it synonymous with global terrorism. The US invasion of Afghanistan that pushed Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda and Mulla Umar’s Taliban into Pakistan’s tribal areas, was the defining moment that turned FATA into the main battleground in the US global war on terror.

The Taliban were once the proxy warriors of Pakistan who turned their guns against the country that ‘abandoned’ them in the midst of a terminal threat to their rule in Kabul. The end of the Taliban regime in Kabul was frustrating for Pakistan itself on two vital counts. First, Pakistan had to reverse its long pursued policy of gaining ‘strategic depth’ vis-à-vis India through increasing its influence in Afghanistan. Second, Pakistan had to face the Taliban’s retaliation. Pakistan reluctantly agreed to US terms in Afghanistan under the UN mandate.

The Taliban’s own dilemma in FATA was serious in nature. The Taliban confronted the US led forces in the east in Afghanistan, and Pakistani troops in the west in the tribal areas. As a result, the Taliban had to fight on two fronts and in the process ruthlessly destroyed peace and security in both the countries. It is significant that the US-Pakistan cooperation in FATA intensified a resurgence of violence in the tribal areas, which

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93 With the deep erosion of state authority in FATA post 9/11, various militant groups ran state within the state in the tribal area which was already ripe with all sorts of criminal activities. It is well known that criminal elements had also become part of militant activities in order to escape the brutal criminal code imposed by the Islamists in their areas of authority. As such, FATA became a place of apocalyptic chaos which was free for all in the game of death and destruction.

eventually eroded Pakistan’s security. Inspired by al Qaeda and the Taliban, a new variety of militant groups emerged among the local tribes within FATA post 9/11.

In December 2007, various local militant organizations came under the umbrella network of TTP escalating threats to Pakistan’s security. The TTP transpired as the largest militant organization numerically greater than the sum of the other extremist groups in FATA. On 17 December 2007, *Globe and Mail* reported that the militant groups in the northwest of Pakistan had ‘come together in a single organization for the first time, threatening to step up operations against the army in Pakistan and the NATO forces in Afghanistan.’95 The militants belonging to these groups were active since early post 9/11 and in some cases before then as well. The TTP emerged when 40 independent bands agreed to set up an over-arching structure for their activities.

The militant chieftains came to join TTP from FATA agencies and other parts of NWFP like Swat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. Baitullah Mehsud, a tribal chieftain from Waziristan, in his early 30s, became the chosen head of the TTP. He had fought along with the Taliban in the 1990s in Afghanistan and held a fearsome reputation.96 Mehsud’s spokesman Maulvi Umar told the media that ‘the sole objective of TTP was to unite the Taliban against NATO forces in Afghanistan and to wage a defensive jihad against Pakistani forces.’97 The birth of the TTP indicated the ferocious rise of violence in Pakistan. Alongside such anarchic forces, there was also the growth of widespread ethno-sectarian bloodshed in Pakistan.

96 ‘Baitullah Mehsud Poses Growing Threat to US’, *Daily Times*, Lahore, 3 April 2009. Baitullah grew in strength and stature after 9/11. He had fought along with the Taliban in Afghanistan and had close links with al Qaeda. He had over 20,000 pro Taliban militants under his command and had a $5 million bounty on his head. He was accused of playing a major role in the advances which the Taliban made in Pakistan since 2005. After a failed accord with Pakistani army in February 2005, Mehsud’s guerrilla fighters nearly pushed the army out of Waziristan and virtually ruled the area as his personal fiefdom. Musharraf regime accused him of murdering former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. Mehsud denied the accusation. According to intelligence reports, Mehsud’s forces included large number of foreigners. He had become the most powerful militant commander in Waziristan, FATA, who had made plans to attack the US territory. Baitullah Mehsud died in a CIA drone attack on 5 August 2009. His death severely damaged the TTP organization, however, leaving the legacy to violence mainly intact.
97 Saeed Shah, op.cit.
Other militant groups who were linked to al-Qaeda and the Taliban contributed to the rise of political violence in Pakistan. The Punjab based ethno-sectarian groups have been actively participating in the violence that overwhelmed Pakistan since 2002. On March 2009, the International Crisis Group in its Asia Report No. 164 entitled *The Militant Jihadi Challenge* explained the nature of linkages among various Islamist groups within Pakistan. The report highlighted that the ‘Pakistani Taliban…loosely united under the Deobandi Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have attacked not just the state and western targets, but Shia as well. Their expanding influence is due to support from long-established Sunni extremist network, based primarily in Punjab that have served as the army’s proxies in Afghanistan and India since the 1980s.’

These Punjab based radical Deobandi groups such as Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its splinter group Lashkar-i-Jangvi (LJ) provided weapons, recruits, finances and other resources to TTP groups. The ICG report mentioned that the SSP and LJ were ‘al Qaeda’s principal allies in the region.’ However, they mainly conducted murderous attacks on Shia population and their Imam-bargahs (sacred places). For example, FATA’s Kurram and Orakzai agencies due to Shia majority population became a ‘focal point’ for Sunni extremists and SSP took control of lower Kurram valley. The groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JM) and Lashkar-i-Tayyaba (LT), which were apparently involved in extremist activities in Kashmir, also participated in al-Qaeda’s global jihad. After Musharraf’s supposed shift in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy in 2002, they moved to FATA and actively participated in local and cross border violence. They also funneled finances, arms and trained suicide attackers to the militants in FATA. This overlapping relationship among various militant groups, with al Qaeda as a main strategic source, undermined the state authority and terrified large sections of the

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99 Ibid. ; Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ), Unclassified
After escaping the US forces in Afghanistan, al Qaeda’s resurgence in FATA led to the growth of multiple extremist groups which posed a severe threat to Pakistan’s security.

The significant issue – why the US led forces allowed the militants’ exodus from Afghanistan to Pakistan post 9/11 – was not discussed during the Bush administration. Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister at the time of the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, referred to this issue. On 6 April 2009, in his keynote address to an international conference in Islamabad, Sattar made certain interesting observations on the strategic nature of US-Pakistan cooperation stating that ‘we [in Pakistan] did not anticipate that the US would not stop the militants [al Qaeda and the Taliban] from crossing the border [into Pakistan]. We also did not anticipate that the local tribesmen [in western Pakistan] would cooperate with the [in coming] militants. And we did not anticipate that they [native and the foreign militants] would turn against Pakistan.’

It was perplexing that a senior Pakistani diplomat was that unmindful of the Pashtun reaction in case of the US invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11. At best, Sattar’s statement was a simplistic excuse which overlooked subtle factors that lurked behind divergent US-Pakistan policies in FATA. The statement, however, magnified the inherent pitfalls in anti-terror war post 9/11.

On its part, the US was already mindful of the nature of Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban. For example, referring to the ‘al Qaeda-Taliban-Pakistan connection’ Condoleezza Rice in her statement before the 9/11 Commission on April 2004 stated that ‘Al Qaeda was both client of and patron to the Taliban, which in turn was supported

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102 Brigadier Mahmood Shah, a close observer of the Taliban movement in Pakistan, opined in a TV news show that the Taliban groups strived to establish authority in Pakistan through the use of violence. ‘News Hour’, Geo TV, 26 April 2009.
103 Abdul Sattar, ‘Challenges for Pakistan’s Foreign Policy’, (keynote address), at an international conference on ‘The State of International Relations in Pakistan’, organized by Quaid-i-Azam University and Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF), Islamabad, 8 April 2009. Talking to the author, Abdul Sattar mentioned that there were tactical gaps between the US and Pakistan’s understanding of post 9/11 cooperation. He asserted, however, that Pakistan had no other choice except to go along with the US. ‘Even with the hindsight’ he maintained, ‘no one could suggest that Pakistan had an alternative course except the one that Musharraf followed.’
by Pakistan. Those relationships provided al Qaeda with a powerful umbrella of protection, and we had to sever them. This was not easy.  

The linkages between al Qaeda and the Taliban signified that the events in FATA and Afghanistan were interconnected which posed a complex problem for the US counter-terrorism strategies. To further complicate matters, the US and Pakistan were faced with their conflict of interests in the context of the South Asian region. In Rice’s words ‘integrating our counter-terrorism and regional strategies was the most difficult and most important aspect’ of anti-terrorist strategy to get right.  

Rice articulated well the predicament of US foreign policy in South Asia when she observed that ‘America’s al Qaeda policy wasn’t working because our Afghanistan policy wasn’t working. And our Afghanistan policy wasn’t working because our Pakistan policy wasn’t working. We recognized that America’s anti-terrorism policy had to be connected to our regional strategies and to our overall foreign policy.’  

Rice explained how the US convinced Pakistan to cooperate in the war on terror. She stated that the US ‘new approach to Pakistan combined the use of carrots and sticks to persuade Pakistan to drop its support for the Taliban.’  

The US approach to use ‘sticks’ in dissuading Pakistan from the Taliban worked accordingly as Pakistan promptly agreed to sever its support to the Taliban post 9/11. However, an unforeseen trail of events emerged that no one took the responsibility for. The dejected Taliban and al Qaeda fighters moved in thousands to Pakistan engaging in extreme violence against their host country for its change of policy towards them. Pakistan, on its part, seemed hopelessly ‘unable’ or ‘unwilling’ to respond to these hardened guerrilla fighters.

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104 Condoleezza Rice, *Opening Remarks*, op. cit.
105 Ibid. The hindsight of two terms of the Bush administration in the White House showed that Bush’s terrorism policy hindered the progress on countering terrorism on both the international and domestic fronts. Seeking a single-minded military solution to terrorism came under strong criticism globally. Domestically, Bush’s counter-terrorism policy became the main issue in the 2008 presidential election debate in which neither of the presidential candidates was ready to endorse the use of indiscriminate military force in the US war on terror. The quagmire of terrorism in FATA, not to mention Iraq, implied that severing Pakistan’s support for the Taliban did not curtail the threat emanating from al Qaeda. In fact, the US push of the Afghan fugitives into Pakistan compromised Pakistan’s security as well as increased the threat from extremist violence for the US itself.
106 Ibid.
107 Condoleezza Rice, *Opening Remarks*, Ibid.
At this juncture, the two major questions which arise are: Why did Pakistan and the Taliban convert from friends to foe and why were the furious Taliban pushed across the border from Afghanistan to avenge Pakistan for its betrayal? In his May 2004 article ‘A Pragmatic New Approach to the Tribal Area’ published in Pakistan military’s Defence Journal, Sultan Ahmad wrote that ‘Americans…want the Pakistan government to do far more to oust them [al-Qaeda] from there [FATA] or eliminate them altogether. The Pakistani government is finding that a hard task [which demands] a heavy loss of life on both sides as the military operation in the second half of March demonstrated.’

The statement showed the US pressure upon a reluctant Pakistan to opt for a military solution in FATA. Interestingly, the war on terror on either side of the Pak-Afghan border was worsening when the US dramatically reduced its commitment in the region in order to concentrate on the invasion of Iraq. The US approach, therefore, let the people of Pakistan think that Pakistan’s security was of little significance in the Bush administration’s policy against terrorism. The US concentration on Iraq from March 2003 onwards, therefore, both complicated and weakened Pakistan’s anti-terrorism resolve.

The scenario where two Muslim states of Afghanistan and Iraq were directly under attack by the US military made the Musharraf regime’s task of winning against the militants in FATA extremely difficult. Musharraf’s military actions in FATA, therefore, were widely criticized in Pakistan. The use of military in Waziristan and related areas alienated many Pakistanis. The use of force which caused large scale damage and the killing of non-combat tribesmen motivated many to take arms against the military to avenge their dead. It deeply demoralized the Musharraf regime. Despite condemning the

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109 K. Alan Kronstadt, ‘Pakistan-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation’, CRS Report for Congress, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., 28 March 2003. Pakistan’s military was indulging in the local affairs of FATA since 2002 as the militants began to arrive from Afghanistan. It was the first time for Pakistani military to enter the tribal area and they had no experience to deal with a situation like FATA. They cleared the no-go areas in the mountainous and bushy terrain and indulged in minor conflicts with the local tribesmen. These activities developed anger among the tribesmen of FATA against the military presence in their territory. Especially, since the Taliban and al Qaeda operatives had developed some kind of ‘working relationship’ with the locals, it became further difficult for the military to sustain its reputation in the area. See for example, Ahmad Rashid, ‘Musharraf's Bin Laden Headache’ op. cit.
extremist violence in Pakistan, people saw military’s role in FATA as an act of state aggression against its own people. Criticizing the 2004 military action, former Director General ISI, General (Retd.) Asad Durrani, observed that the non-military means were not properly applied that undermined the local support. The local tribesmen complained that the military failed to take them into confidence before attacking the suspected militants. According to an official, ‘the military arrived armed with helicopter gun ships when negotiations were underway.’ As such, the use of military force severely compromised the civil administrative structure in FATA run under the FCR.

The ill-planned use of force in FATA showed that instead of wiping out the militants, it ended up with the erosion of the influence of political agents and the elders, which turned FATA into the wild west of Pakistan. It was estimated that over two hundred elders, who were part of the local administration as levies in their specific areas, were killed by the militants in FATA. The situation allowed the Taliban and al Qaeda commanders to further permeate within the tribal population strengthening their grip in the area and expanding their militant activities at their will.

In a fierce collaboration, al Qaeda, the Taliban and local tribesmen unleashed unparallel violence in Pakistan. They fought pitched battles with Pakistani troops, attacked military installations such as ammunition factories, training camps and army transport. They even attacked the General Headquarters (GHQ) of Pakistan Military in Rawalpindi. They killed and attempted to kill politicians, civil and military officers, diplomats, journalists and kidnapped people for ransom. In December 2003, the militants twice attempted to kill President Musharraf in Islamabad. In December 2007, popular leader Benazir Bhutto was murdered outside Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi. The TTP commander, Baitullah Mehsud became the chief suspect for Benazir’s murder. The

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110 Talking to the author, General Asad Durrani criticized Wana operation of 2004 due to its ill-planning. Under the US pressure to ‘do more’, he said ‘the troops were sent to North Waziristan without using the help of neutral tribesmen to resolve the conflict through dialogue’.

111 See Asia Report No. 125, ICG, 11 December 2006, op. cit, p. 15.

whole country appeared to be in the fatal grip of bloodshed. Suicide bombings, car bomb blasts, and armed attacks on mosques, churches, hospitals, schools, embassy buildings, police stations, hotels and market places took above 22,000 lives. This extremist frenzy physically crippled and injured many thousands more in Pakistan. Resulting from this carnage was the rapid erosion of security in Pakistan and strong denunciation of the US and the Musharraf regime.

Pakistan had three main security concerns emerging out of its engagement with the US. First, war against terrorism in FATA was unpopular within Pakistan. Second, Pakistan’s security eroded in the wake of insurgency in FATA. Third, Pakistan remained skeptical of the US commitment in the region. The renewed US policy for South Asia decreased mutual trust between the US and Pakistan. In late 2002, Teresita Schaffer had already referred to the US-Pakistan divergence on Kashmir. In her article ‘U.S. Influence on Pakistan: Can Partners Have Divergent Priorities?’ published in the *Washington Quarterly*, Schaffer wrote that ‘the more fundamental problem in the U.S. policy towards Pakistan is the clash between the U.S. and Pakistani priorities, specifically, Pakistan’s relations with India and its policy on Kashmir. Just as the United States was unable to sway Pakistan’s nuclear policy in the 1980s, it will be extraordinarily difficult to persuade Pakistan to change its policy on Kashmir now.’

Interestingly, Pakistan agreed to review its Kashmir policy according to US advice. Pakistan largely discouraged militant activities in Kashmir in favor of a peacefully negotiated solution of Kashmir with India. Therefore, it was not Pakistan’s eastern border with India where a potential nuclear conflict concerned the US. For the first time,

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113 See, for example, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies’ (PIPS) security reports: 2006, 2007, 2008 on [http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=ra&id=psr_list_1](http://san-pips.com/index.php?action=ra&id=psr_list_1) Retrieved May 2009. The death toll of innocent people and non-combat civilians continued to rise as militant attacks continued to occur in response to army operations in and around FATA and various news reports mentioned these casualties on daily basis. The figure of 22,000 deaths in terror attacks, therefore, must be considered as a conservative estimate.


115 Ibid. According to Schaffer, ‘the United States wants Pakistan to confine itself to peaceful means in the freedom struggle in Kashmir and wants India and Pakistan to work towards a settlement together.'
it was the Pak-Afghan border that crucially endangered Pakistan’s security following the US presence in Afghanistan post 9/11.

Pakistan had persuaded the US to follow a relatively ‘moderate course’ to save post 9/11 Afghanistan from falling into utter anarchy and instability. Pakistan was convinced that the ‘sudden departure of the Taliban would create a massive political vacuum in Afghan society’ and argued that the invading foreign armies should engage the ‘moderate’ Taliban in the political process. Pakistan presented the solution that instead of displacing the Taliban, the US should support an ‘in-house’ change within the Taliban. The Pentagon rejected Pakistan’s proposal and embarked on a policy of overthrowing all the Taliban militia. In early 2002, the Bonn conference installed an interim government under President Hamid Karzai in Kabul. Karzai – a Pashtun from Kandahar’s Popalzai tribe – belonged to a family that was loyal to King Zahir Shah. His father, Abdul Ahad Karzai who held the post of Deputy Speaker, was murdered by the Taliban in 1999. Karzai drew his support from Washington and only the American security guards could ensure his security. His cabinet ministers came not from the majority Pashtun population but from the minority Tajik-Uzbek dominated Northern Alliance that was strongly supported by India. Consequently, Pakistan perceived a new threat emerging from a post-Taliban Afghanistan.

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116 Syed Saleem Sahzad, ‘Pakistan, the Taliban and Dadullah’, *PSRU Brief No 3*, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK, 2008, p. 5. [http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/661/Brief+3.pdf](http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/661/Brief+3.pdf) Retrieved 2 May 2009. In the post-Taliban regime phase, Pakistan tried to create moderate Taliban which could be acceptable to the US as the key player in Afghanistan. With this aim in mind, in early 2002, an organization called Jamiat-i-Khudam-ul-Quran (or Furqan) was established in Peshawar with middle ranking former Taliban. Jamiat condemned Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and also condemned Mullah Omar’s decision to support Al-Qaeda. The organization was raised by the ISI to present a moderate face of the Taliban and encourage the Americans to engage them in the political process. The idea of moderate Taliban was not popular with the Americans. Washington did not agree to provide support to Pakistan’s proposals. The ISI could not, therefore, hold the organization together and let it melt again into the Taliban led by Mullah Omar. At the end of the Bush administration in 2008, the idea of the Taliban’s political involvement in the power structure of Afghanistan was once again revived and negotiations with the moderate Taliban were underway with the help of the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia.

117 Ahmad Rashid, *Decent into Chaos*, op. cit., pp. 3-6.

118 Ibid.

119 Syed Saleem Sahzad, *PSRU Brief No 3*, op. cit., p. 4. The ministerial portfolios went to the warlords of non-Pashtun stock like Younus Qanooni, Abdullah Abdullah, Marshall Fahim and others who were well known military commanders of the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance was known for its
By mid 2002, the Afghan government raised the sensitive issue of the Durand Line. The flags of Pashtunistan were hoisted in the Afghan cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar. Many Pakistani Pashtun organizations once again talked about Pashtunistan and maps were published, in which Pakistani cities of Quetta and Peshawar were shown as part of greater Pashtunistan. It revived the long simmering threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty from across 2430 kilometer long Pak-Afghan border. Under the US led military control of Afghanistan, a reignited threat to Pakistan’s security on the western border was a security nightmare for Pakistan’s military establishment.

During its rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 9/11, the Taliban had maintained a status quo on the question of the Durand Line. In the post Taliban period, however, Islamabad could sense the resurrection of the Pashtunistan issue. The US presence in Afghanistan post 9/11 reignited Pakistan’s border crisis with Afghanistan. It was very unsettling for Pakistan’s security elite that the US pressurized Pakistan to maintain its border sanctity in the west, where no acceptable boundary line currently existed. Another concern for Pakistan was India’s increasing influence in post 9/11 Afghanistan.

Pakistan saw the new political developments in Afghanistan as tilted towards New Delhi, which threatened Pakistan’s security. India established new consulates in many major Afghan cities close to Pak-Afghan border. It also built schools in Kunar which is just across Bajaur agency which is one of the most sensitive seven agencies of FATA. Pakistan suspected ‘Indian involvement’ in many acts of sabotage especially in western Pakistan. In May 2007, in his interview with *India Abroad*, Stephen Cohen, the US
expert on South Asia, referred to Pakistan’s concerns over increased Indian influence in Afghanistan. Responding to a question on Pakistan’s efforts to regain strategic depth in Afghanistan through the Taliban, he said:

This strategic depth theory is a misnomer. They are very much worried about encirclement by India. They are driven in Afghanistan because of what they imagined to be an Indian move to encircle them or put pressure on them. … So, from their point of view, the Taliban or Pashtun are legitimate assets and that is all that they have. So, as long as they believe that India is expanding its presence in Afghanistan and Afghanistan has pro-Indian government, you are going to see Pakistan pushing in that direction. This is counter encirclement with Pakistan.¹²³

Cohen’s view of Pakistan’s concerns vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan reflected how differently the US and Pakistan viewed the developments in South Asia. While the US perceived the Islamist resurgence in FATA as a threat to global security, Pakistan treated the Pashtun Taliban in its tribal areas as a strategic asset in the regional context. Further, while Indian influence increased dramatically during the US presence in Afghanistan, the Afghan government did not have amicable relations with Pakistan. In April 2009, the US journal Foreign Affairs published a roundtable discussion involving South Asian experts including Stephen Cohen, Christine Fair, Shaun Gregory and others. The discussion ‘What’s the Problem with Pakistan?’ revolved around exploring reasons for Pakistan’s inability to eliminate terrorism in FATA. Christine Fair of RAND Corporation stated that ‘it would be a mistake to completely disregard Pakistan’s regional perceptions due to doubts about Indian competence in executing covert operations.’ She revealed to the discussants that:

Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main activity! Moreover, India has run operations from its mission from Mazar (through which it supported the Northern Alliance) and is likely to do so from other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Qandahar along the [Pak-Afghan] border. It is also building schools on a sensitive part of the border in Kunar across from Bajaur.¹²⁴

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Christine Fair explained that the Indian officials had told her privately that they were pumping money into Baluchistan, which has a very strong separatist movement. The construction of strategic 217-kilometer Zaranj-Delaram highway by an Indian firm was another example of threatening Pakistan’s economic and security interests in Afghanistan. Responding to Fair, an Indian analyst Sumit Ganguly conceded that ‘I never suggested that the Indians have purely humanitarian objectives in Afghanistan. Their vigorous attempts to limit Pakistan’s reach and influence there stems largely from being systematically bled in Kashmir. Their role in Afghanistan is a pincer movement designed to relieve pressure in Kashmir.’ Ganguly’s statement implied that India wanted to find a way to avenge Pakistan for what the militants had done on the Indian side of Kashmir in the 1990s. Indian pursuits in the US occupied Afghanistan, therefore, directly affected Pakistan’s strategic behavior in FATA. The US, however, insisted that Pakistan should not be worried about Indian intentions in Afghanistan and that Pakistan would be better off fighting the US War on Terror in FATA. In Pakistan, people clearly saw the inconsistencies in the US statement which the US chose to ignore.

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125 Syed Saleem Sahzad, op.cit., p. 6. The contract to build the highway was awarded to India's Border Roads Organization. It would link Zaranj, which is on Afghanistan's border with Iran, to Delaram, situated on the "garland highway". The Garland highway linked Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz. Through this highway, Zaranj would be linked to several Afghan cities also connecting Iran with the Garland highway. Iran improved the road links from its ports to towns that lied on its border with Afghanistan. It constructed a vital bridge on the Helmand River marking the frontier between itself and Afghanistan, and upgrading the road from Chabahar, where its new port on the Makran coast was being established, to Zaranj. After the Zaranj-Delaram highway’s completion, goods from Afghanistan's main cities could be brought overland to the border with Iran from where they would be transported to Chabahar and vice versa. The Zaranj-Delaram highway would be a valuable lifeline for a landlocked Afghanistan. Until now, Afghanistan's access to the sea had been through Pakistan via the port of Karachi. The Delaram-Zaranj highway would open up another option for Afghanistan via Iran. The overland option through Iran to the port of Chabahar would be shorter than the one available through Pakistan. This route will facilitate Indian-Afghan trade. Historically, Afghan-Indian trade was transited through Pakistan. With Zaranj-Delaram Highway, it would be independent and free of Pakistan's influence. Since 2003, India and Iran have been cooperating in developing the Chabahar port complex. Iran extended huge concessions to Afghanistan to attract it to Chabahar port rather than the port Pakistan developed with Chinese help at Gwadar in Balochistan.


127 There has been a strong impression in Pakistan that despite being concerned about India-Pakistan rivalry, the US overlooked Pakistan’s security concerns vis-à-vis India in the region. For example, after India’s disinterest, Holbrooke’s portfolio as the US envoy for South Asia was trimmed only to Pak-Afghan relations, which originally included India as a part of the problem. See ‘India behind Terror in Pakistan: Qureshi’, *The News*, Islamabad, 23 November 2009. ‘Holbrooke to be special US envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan’, 22 January 2009 [http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/ian/22holbrook-to-be-special-us-envoy-to-afghanistan-and-pakistan.htm](http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/ian/22holbrook-to-be-special-us-envoy-to-afghanistan-and-pakistan.htm). Retrieved 9 May 2009. According to the news, Richard Holbrooke was to be appointed the envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was left unsaid that Holbrooke's
The US advice might have been effective if Pakistan had faith in the US approach of ‘carrots and sticks’ for Pakistan as US Secretary of State ‘Rice’ described it. The US used the proverbial stick since the beginning, but the provision of ‘carrots’ for Pakistan remained elusive during the seven long years of the Bush administration. In June 2008, Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was bitter in his statement when he emphasized that the ‘$11 billion we’ve spent on Pakistan in six years is less than we spend on Iraq in six weeks.’ Significantly, the strategic failure of the Bush administration’s War on Terror was the major issue in 2008 presidential elections in the US. The other issue was economic meltdown of the US economy that was also rooted in the mismanagement of Bush’s War against Terrorism.

The resounding criticism of the US war against terrorism in FATA came from the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) itself. On 20 May 2008, the Acting Comptroller General of GAO, Gene L. Dodaro, in a testimony before the US Senate stated that the US ‘has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA. In 2006, the United States and Pakistan began an effort to focus on other elements of national power beyond military.

brief could extend to India, which has been a victim of terrorism from Pakistan but was suspicious of third-party intervention in the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. Earlier, US media reports had said that Holbrook would be named as the Special Envoy for India and Pakistan with a mandate to resolve the Kashmir problem; ‘I’m not here to negotiate on Kashmir: Holbrooke Tells Pak’, ExpressIndia.com, 20 August 2009. http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Im-not-here-to-negotiate-on-Kashmir-Holbrooke-tells-Pak/504434/ Retrieved 21 August 2009; Lalit K. Jha ‘Holbrook’s Portfolio includes India: Petraeus’, OutlookIndia.com, 25 April 2009. http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?658893 Retrieved 11 May 2009. According to this report, General David Petraeus said that India is part of the ‘portfolio’ of Richard Holbrooke, the Special US Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, a fact which so far has been denied by the Obama Administration and to which New Delhi has also shown discomfort. ‘There are people who have rightly said that Ambassador Holbrooke's title should be Afghanistan, Pakistan and India’, Commander of the US Central Command told a Congressional Committee in response to a question from a lawmaker’. This report reflects the US dilemma concerning India-Pakistan relations in an interesting way. Holbrooke stated that ‘improving US-India relations has been a continual goal of the last three administrations, all of whom have been successful in that regard ...starting with President Clinton's term in 2000.’ Responding to a question, Holbrooke stated that India was outside the portfolio of his job. ‘India a Dominant Power in South Asia: Holbrooke’, Indian Express, New Delhi, 13 August 2009.

128 Condoleezza Rice, Remarks, op. cit.

The main criticism of the GAO’s testimony underlined the fact that the US lacked a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy in FATA. The strategy was incomprehensive because it mainly revolved around the military aspect of fighting extremism. There have been limited efforts to address other underlying causes of terrorism in FATA such as providing development assistance and improving the political status that could help contain the radical violence within the tribal areas. The testimony mentioned that out of approximately US $5.8 billion directed at efforts to combat terrorism in FATA and the border region, only one percent (about 40 million) went to US AID development assistance activities.\footnote{Ibid, p.9.} In the light of GAO’s testimony, one could infer that the constant US pressure on Pakistan for the use of unrelenting military force was rendering the course of US war on terror in FATA counterproductive. The statement further implied that having an ineffective plan already disrupted, the US was hardly in a position to advise what course of action Pakistan should take to defend its security.

The implications of US-Pakistan cooperation in FATA were crucial from the security point of view for both the countries. According to the GAO statement, a 2008 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) assessment stated that ‘al-Qaeda [was] now using the FATA to put into place the last elements necessary to launch another attack against America.’\footnote{Ibid.} According to this view, while the US had not met its national security goals in FATA, the US DNI assessment for Pakistan was even bleaker which concluded that radical elements had the potential to undermine Pakistan itself. It observed that ‘an unparalleled increase in suicide attacks against Pakistan’s military and civilians over the past year, with total casualties in 2007 exceeding all such attacks in the preceding five
years. These attacks were ordered by Pakistan based militants, many of whom are allied with al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{133}

This statement in the GAO document on the US inability to meet the national security goals in FATA clearly identified the security crisis that Pakistan faced in its tribal areas post 9/11. Compared to a probable threat to the US security in future, Pakistan faced the existential reality of violence occurring in the daily life of its people. If the total casualties from suicide attacks in 2007 exceeded all such attacks in the preceding five years, then 2008 was the bloodiest. According to \textit{Pakistan Security Report 2008} issued by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), in around 2,577 attacks, nearly 8,000 people died while 9,670 were injured in the country during the year.\textsuperscript{134} The report mentioned that the security forces killed more people (3,182) during their operations in FATA and Swat as opposed to terrorist attacks that killed 2,267 people in 2008. In its 2008 operation in Bajaur agency in FATA, the military used gunship helicopters and jet fighters that dislocated 550,000 to 600,000 people including women and children with meager support for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).\textsuperscript{135} The IDP issue turned into a large scale humanitarian crisis in Pakistan as the military launched a new anti-terrorist operation in early 2009.

In 2009, the US-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism in the northwestern province gave way to the most disastrous internal migration in Pakistan. After a failed attempt to bring peace in Swat district of NWFP in February 2009 through signing a deal with an Islamist leader Sufi Muhammad, the Pakistan military launched a major operation in the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{} Ibid.\textsuperscript{133}
\bibitem{} \textit{Pakistan Security Report 2008}, Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, 2009.\textsuperscript{134}
\bibitem{} Khalid Kheshgi, ‘Peshawar Valley Hosts 0.7m IDPs’, \textit{The News}, Islamabad, 7 May 2009; ‘Human Exodus and War against Taliban’ (Editorial), \textit{Daily Times}, Lahore, 7 May 2009. The War against Terrorism in FATA involved refugees such as Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda who entered Pakistan post 9/11. Pakistani authorities’ war against them created more refugees who were forced to leave their homes situated in the areas where foreign and domestic militants fought against the security forces. By the end of 2008, nearly one million IDPs were living in and out of camps in various districts of NWFP and the Punjab. Following the Swat and Malakand military operations in April 2009, new waves of exodus forced people to move away from their houses. The UNHCR and NWFP government departments tried to cope with IDPs crises. However, the flood of people kept flowing in various directions in search of shelter and security while Pakistan troops and the militants were fighting the US war on Terror in the mountains and valleys of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{135}
\end{thebibliography}
area. Beginning in early April 2009, it was the first full scale military offensive initiated by the new PPP government with 15,000 troops of Pakistan army fighting against terrorism in the tribal area.136 While the army troops fought vigorously using air and ground attacks against the militants in the area, heavy collateral damage was reported in the process. Most of all, due to this military action, the number of IDPs reached 3,000,000 by the end of May 2009.137 These three million homeless Pakistanis were dispersed throughout the country in a desperate search for security. According to the head of Peshawer based Regional Institute of Policy Research, Khalid Aziz, ‘people [IDPs] are moving from place to place aimlessly and directionless. They have lost their homes, families, children and livelihoods. They are people without identity’ and the ‘forced migration from Swat, Dir and Waziristan makes this displacement bigger than that of Darfur or of the Rawandans a few years ago.’138 As such, Pakistan faced a crisis which was beyond Pakistan to overcome. Such a large scale human displacement further diminished Pakistan’s security.

The US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in FATA deeply eroded Pakistan’s security. Pakistan used its military forces to contain the Taliban and al Qaeda from attacking the US led forces in Afghanistan. In retaliation, various militant groups of both foreign and local origins converged against Pakistan. They randomly attacked military and civilian targets weakening Pakistan’s socio-political structures. However, faced with the US pressure to ‘do more’ against terrorism in FATA and ruthless violence waged by the militants, the Musharraf regime appeared to be locked up in a ‘no win’ situation. Pakistan’s security predicament led to the US-Pakistan mistrust and ruptured its socio-political cohesion. By the end of 2009, it seemed obvious that the US war on terror had drastically diminished Pakistan’s security due to ineffective measures and insufficient resources to fight terrorism in FATA.

CONCLUSION:

This chapter has discussed the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation in FATA post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level. It has especially emphasized the intensity of political violence both in FATA and within Pakistan resulting from US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 to combat terrorism. Following the US invasion of Afghanistan in December 2001, FATA resumed strategic significance due to al Qaeda and Taliban’s new insurgent base there. Being a remote tribal territory of Pakistan, FATA has been the least incorporated area politically, judicially and economically in mainstream Pakistan. The US-Pakistan cooperation in FATA post 9/11 was based on mutual understanding to contain the militants in those tribal areas. Pakistan’s efforts to contain the insurgents, however, failed because of limited access and its reluctance to use massive force in FATA. Pakistan’s reluctance in FATA was due to divergent interests of both the US and Pakistan in South Asia. Pakistan viewed the US presence in the region as favorable to India that harmed Pakistan’s interests. Owing to the lack of mutual trust, both the US and Pakistan suspected each other to the benefit of militants in FATA. As such, the US-Pakistan cooperation in FATA strongly eroded Pakistan’s internal security.

Besides FATA, US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 also led to political violence in the tribal region of Pakistan’s south-western province of Balochistan that borders Afghanistan. Within this context, the next chapter analyses the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation in Balochistan post 9/11 and its implications for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level.
CHAPTER 4

US-PAKISTAN COOPERATION POST 9/11 IN BALOCHISTAN AND PAKISTAN’S DOMESTIC SECURITY

Following the US-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism post 9/11, Balochistan acquired a new geo-strategic significance due to the Taliban activities, the Baloch nationalist movement and renewed US interest in Pakistan’s southwestern province being a trans-border energy route. After the Taliban regime collapsed in Kabul, Taliban militants crossed the Pak-Afghan border into Balochistan and organized guerrilla warfare attacking the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Alongside the Taliban militancy, the Baloch nationalist revolt also reemerged to further complicate Pakistan’s internal security. The Baloch insurgency was revitalized with the prospects of a mega development project of Gwadar sea port that attracted strong US interest in Balochistan. Balochistan territory will become a main corridor of energy transportation from Central Asia and Iran to other parts of the region and beyond in due time. The US has a defining role to play in the new great game of resource development in Balochistan and in other parts of Asia. Such prospects have revitalized the Baloch insurgency now demanding to share the benefits of the Gwadar project. As such, the Taliban militancy, Baloch insurgency and future significance of Balochistan as an energy transit route show that US-Pakistan cooperation in Balochistan has serious implications for Pakistan’s security.
This chapter discusses the implications for Pakistan’s domestic security of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 against terrorism in Balochistan. It argues that US-Pakistan cooperation in Balochistan eroded Pakistan’s security at the domestic level for three reasons. First, following the US invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11, the Afghan Taliban entered Balochistan and organized an anti-US insurgency in Afghanistan that rendered Pakistan’s southwestern border area widely insecure. Second, the Baloch nationalists were eager to ensure that the Baloch got a fair share in the new petro-economic resources, which were being developed within Balochistan. They were engaged in prolonged political violence demanding more regional autonomy or even independence. Resulting from these two concurrent insurgencies, political violence further eroded the writ of the state in Balochistan.

This chapter has three sections: 1) Balochistan’s geo-strategic significance and associated socio-political factors; 2) The nature of US-Pakistan cooperation in Balochistan post 9/11; and 3) US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 and political violence in Balochistan.

BALOCHISTAN’S GEO-STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE AND ASSOCIATED SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS

This section explores the geo-strategic importance of Balochistan in the US war against terrorism post 9/11. It argues that Balochistan played a significant role in the early success of US war on terror post 9/11 due to its territorial proximity with Afghanistan. Pakistan provided sensitive intelligence, the use of its airspace and its airfields in Balochistan for the essential US aerial bombing on Kabul to dismantle the Taliban regime as well as destroy the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan. This section has two sub-sections: a) The Geo-strategic significance of Balochistan; and b) The socio-political culture of Balochistan.
The Geo-Strategic Significance of Balochistan

This sub-section argues that Balochistan has been playing a pivotal role in the geo-strategic development of South and West Asia long before the US war on terror post 9/11. In the case of the US war on terror, it was Balochistan’s territorial proximity to Afghanistan which was of strategic advantage to the US.

Balochistan – the largest landmass among the four provinces of Pakistan – stretches over 343,000 square kilometers forming 43.2 per cent of country’s total area. It covers a vast territory with tracks of rugged barren land, lush green valleys, low and high mountain ranges and a pristine sunny coastline. To its east lie the two provinces of Punjab and Sind, while NWFP lies in its north. Balochistan has around a 1200 kilometer long Pak-Afghan border in the north and a 909 kilometer long Pakistan-Iran border previously called the Goldsmid Line.¹ In the south runs a 770 kilometer long coastline of warm waters of the Arabian Sea. Access to the sea through half a dozen ports, especially Gawadar, is a great asset for Balochistan, especially when compared to the landlocked states of Central Asia and Afghanistan to the north.² Being on the coastline, Balochistan has emerged as a focal point in the US strategic policy for the South Asian region since 9/11.

Balochistan is also close to the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Its extended seaboard running along the Seistan region of Iran ends up at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Balochistan lies in a commanding position vis-à-vis the

¹ The Goldsmid Line, now called Pak-Iran border, was surveyed in 1871 by Maj. Gen. Fredric Goldsmid who played a significant role in demarcation of many areas between British India and Persia. A large area now included in Iran was the one ceded by the British to Persia under his demarcation of borders in Balochistan. See, Dr. Mansoor Akbar Kundi, ‘Borderland Interaction: The Case of Pak-Iranian Baloch’, IPRI Journal, ¹vol. IX, No. 2, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Islamabad, 2009, p. 94.
² According to Ahmad, ‘thinking of Balochistan, one is reminded of Tibet, the largest and the most isolated province of China. Balochistan and Tibet, both are plateaus surrounded by mountain ranges with varying altitudes. Both have a large territorial extent with low population densities. Both have proven reserves of several very important minerals. Both enjoy great geo-strategic location. However, Tibet is completely landlocked and isolated, while Balochistan is gifted with a long coastline providing a direct access to the sea. See, Qazi Shakil Ahamd, ‘Balochistan: Overview of Internal and International Dimensions’, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 58, No. 2, April 2005, p. 27; Balochistan, Pakistan 2003-2004: An Official Handbook, Directorate of the films and Publications, Islamabad, 2004, p. 342.
Strait of Hormuz, which is one of the choke points of the Indian Ocean.\(^3\) Its tri-junction border in the northwest links Seistan (Iran) and Helmund (Afghanistan) with Noshki (Pakistan) overlooking the Mashad-Zahedan-Chahbahar highway. In the northeast, the inland constraints like the Khojak and Bolan Passes are some of the important bottlenecks in the region. The Bolan Pass, a natural route into Afghanistan towards Kandahar, has significant geo-strategic advantage.

Balochistan has witnessed the passage of large armies over the past 2,000 years that have influenced world history. Over time, various Eurasian invaders entered Balochistan including the Aryans, Persians, Greeks, Kushans, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, Mughals, Afghans and the British.\(^4\) Until its encounter with the army of Alexander the Great in 325 B.C., Balochistan was part of the Persian Empire.\(^5\) Alexander led his army back from his Indus campaign to Babylon across the Makran Desert with terrible suffering and high casualties.\(^6\) Then, Balochistan lay for centuries on the shadowy borderlands of the Zoroastrian rulers of Iran and the local Buddhist and Hindu dynasties of northwestern India. In 711 AD, a 17-year old Arab General Muhammad bin Qasim came to conquer Sindh across the Makran route and brought Islam to Balochistan.\(^7\) Proceeding the Afghan warlords and Mughal expeditions, Balochistan later acquired a new significance during European colonial endeavors in Asia from the mid-19\(^{th}\) century. The British Empire in India and the Russian empire in Central Asia came face to face in the second half of the 19\(^{th}\) century.\(^8\) A consensus over the demarcation of captured lands avoided a potential collision of the two great superpowers of their time.

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\(^4\) Interestingly, the Soviet Army failed to cross the Durand Line and to set its foot in Balochistan in the late 20\(^{th}\) century as its last leg to the warm waters of Arabian Sea, which it desired for a long time.

\(^5\) Archaeological discoveries confirmed that Balochistan was already inhabited in the Stone Age, and the important neolithic site at Mehrgarh is the earliest (7000-3000BC) in the subcontinent. See \textit{IPRI Factfile}, p. 12, ibid.


\(^7\) Ibid., p. 19.

\(^8\) Both the British and the Russian empires were moving close to each other in Asia by absorbing territories respectively in India and Central Asia. After capturing Sind and Punjab and establishing effective control over Balochistan by the end of the 1940s, the British in India were concerned about Russia’s southward movement towards Afghanistan. Russia on its part had captured the valley of Syr-
The Durand Line, a legacy of British India vis-à-vis Russian empire, now constitutes the Pak-Afghan border and divides Balochistan from Afghanistan. The geopolitics of the Durand Line has affected relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan due to Afghanistan’s irredentist claims over Pakistan’s border area in Balochistan and NWFP. The Soviet intervention of Afghanistan (1979-88) is a recent memory when Balochistan became a base-camp of the Afghan war of resistance against the Soviet army. Balochistan remained significant after the Soviets left Afghanistan.

Balochistan has been in the eye of the storm even after the end of the Cold War. Following the withdrawal of the Soviet forces and ensuing civil war in Afghanistan, the Taliban captured Kabul and ruled Afghanistan from 1996 up to the fateful events of 9/11. After 9/11, the US decision to invade Afghanistan with Pakistan’s cooperation in the war against terrorism, exposed Balochistan’s strategic potential in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). As such, ‘Balochistan’ continued to be important for Pakistan’s security since 2001.

Balochistan’s geo-strategic significance also emerged from its economic potential. The province had the potential to emerge as an important commercial hub due to its natural resources such as gas, coal, copper and a range of other minerals. Particularly, with the

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Darya named Georgia, Samarkand and Bukhara. In the last quarter of the 19th century, both Britain and Russia came face to face along the line north of the Hindu Kush. ‘By imposing neutral territory between their empires, they indicated a desire to avoid an armed clash.’ Following a number of treaties thereby, Russia and Britain recognized the status of Afghanistan as a buffer state by the St. Petersburg Convention of 1907. Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan, *The Durand Line: Its Geo-strategic Importance*, Peshawar: University of Peshawar, 2000, p. xiii.

9 Under the grave concern of the Soviet movement in Central Asia towards the south, British India signed an agreement with Afghanistan in 1883 that both parties would not exercise interference in each other’s territories lying beyond the line. The signatories to the agreement were Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India, and Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan. The demarcation of the Durand Line was divided into sections and was carried out for the most part by the joint Anglo-Afghan Commission during the year 1894 and 1896. In British India’s strategic understanding, the Soviet forces could occupy Afghanistan and then use Balochistan as a corridor to enter into India as many invaders had done before at various stages of history. Ibid, p. xvi.

10 It is the irony of Balochistan’s strategic situation that in the 1980s, Afghan Mujahideen used the territory of Balochistan as their base-camp to launch attacks on the Soviet military in Afghanistan. Then, the US forces used Balochistan as a launching pad to destroy the Taliban and Al-Qaeda post 2001. Now, the Taliban militants hiding in Balochistan are accused of attacking the US led forces who are residing across the border in Afghanistan.
development of a fully operational Gwadar port, the transportation of Central Asian oil and gas to the regional countries and other parts of the world through Balochistan would potentially open unprecedented economic possibilities for the local population and the rest of Pakistan.\(^{11}\) Owing to its geo-strategic significance for Pakistan in the post 9/11 era, the Musharraf regime intensified work on the mega development project of Gwadar deep sea port in Balochistan. The construction of an ambitious project such as the multi-billion dollar Gwadar port had two major objectives to serve for Pakistan. First, the port would improve Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis India in the Indian Ocean region. Second, the port would facilitate the transportation of Central Asian energy resources to the outside world.\(^{12}\) Having the provision of cargo services to the global shipment industry, the Gwadar project promised extensive commercial possibilities for Pakistan. Moreover, the Central Asian energy resources attracted the keen attention of the regional and global powers to this part of the world. Balochistan is certain to play its role as a transit route for these energy resources through land and sea to the industries worldwide. As such, Balochistan would acquire an unparallel strategic and economic significance.


\(^{12}\) Robert G. Wirsing, op. cit, pp. 15-18. An obscure fishing village with a population of about 5,000 when the project was begun in earnest in 2001, Gwadar has already grown into a bustling town of at least 125,000—with prospects of far greater expansion. Its location 650 kilometers west of Karachi provides some needed strategic depth for Pakistan’s modest-sized naval force, subject in the past to the blockade of its major base at Karachi by the Indian navy. It had at the time of the inaugural event three functional berths, with space for at least 14 more. Gwadar lies on major maritime shipping lanes close to the region’s vast oil and gas resources, and also close to the rapidly growing and dynamic Persian Gulf economies. Gwadar is an all-year, all-weather, deep-channel port that will eventually be able to offer accommodations for the largest oil tankers, along with ease of access to the docking area and unusually short turn-around times. Pakistani plans for Gwadar envision its evolution into a major multi-dimensional hub of economic activity, to be linked in coming years to a rapidly expanded web of road, rail, air, and pipeline networks to neighboring states, and potentially satellited by a liquid natural gas (LNG) terminal, a steel mill, an automobile assembly plant, a cement plant, and facilities for oil refining. Plans also call for a first-rate international airport at Gwadar. In his speech while inaugurating the Gwadar Port in March 2007, Musharraf warned the militants to lay down their arms otherwise ‘they will be eliminated and allowed to exist no more.’ He utterly lacked the understanding of deep rooted socio-political and economic isolation that prevails among the Baloch people when he said, ‘These elements are opposed to development and want their hegemony to prevail. I warn them to surrender, otherwise they will be eliminated and they will not be allowed to exist any more ... these miscreants are minimal in number, and we will deal with them. If they want to fight, I know (how) to fight more than them,’ said Musharraf. ‘Musharraf Tells Militants to Surrender: President Opens Gwadar Port’, Daily Times, Lahore, 21 March 2007.
The protection of such a vast strategic infrastructure would have justified the erection of new military outposts in the area. Building this landmark complex, however, commenced without any consent or involvement of the people of Balochistan. When the Baloch demanded an equitable involvement in the project, the state used force to silence them. The Baloch resistance, however, continued. Under strong pressure from the political forces and civil society, Musharraf allowed his political allies to discuss Baloch grievances with their leaders.

The Socio-Political Culture of Balochistan

This sub-section discusses Balochistan’s ethnic diversity and its socio-political culture. It argues that Balochistan essentially has been a tribal society based on deeply entrenched ethnic divisions and a volatile socio-political culture. It has been the most troublesome region of Pakistan due to its long ethno-political unrest. Although the largest in territory, it is the smallest province demographically. The highest population growth rate is among the Afghan refugees. The total population is estimated at nearly 9 million or around 5% of Pakistan’s nearly 180 million people that make the average density less than 20 persons per square kilometers. The descendents of the numerous tribes that invariably migrated over centuries from various parts of the world such as Iran, Central Asia, Middle East, Afghanistan and southern India now live here. These tribes have further sub-tribal splits with a tradition of blood feuds.

13 These refugees entered Balochistan after the 1979 and 2001 invasions of the Soviet Union and the US respectively of Afghanistan. They are now permanent residents of Balochistan with the voting right in Pakistan. See Kundi, IPRI Journal, 2009, p. 93, op. cit.
14 In other parts of the country, the average of persons per kilometer is 164. According to the Census of 1998 held in Pakistan, Balochistan’s population was 6.56 million. According to Kundi, the population in Balochistan had risen up to 7.5 million in 2005. Kundi, Pakistan An Immigrant Country: Afghan Migration and Its Implications’, Strategic Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 64. However, due to the fluid situation in the region, these numbers are in constant fluctuation.
15 Historically, Bolochistan was an agrarian society and a contemporary civilization of Mesopotamia, Harappa and Mohenjodaro and had a certain degree of trade and cultural exchanges with them. Dr. Noor ul Haq, IPRI Factfile, op.cit., p. 18.
These tribes are drawn from three major ethnic groups: Baloch, Brahvi and Pashtun. Baloch tribes are supposed to have had Syrian and Kurdish ancestry while Brahvi tribes are considered to have a South Indian origin. The Baloch are further subdivided into the prominent Rind, Marri and Bugti tribes. The Brahvi are divided into leading Mengal and Mohm Hasni tribes while Pashtuns diversify into main Kakar and Durrani tribes. This lineage of tribal subdivision goes down to further 400 minor tribes and clans with an open end. All these tribes which comprise the local inhabitants of Balochistan, are loosely estimated to form around 98% of the provincial population. Understanding the ethnic and tribal division among the local people of Balochistan is important in order to comprehend fully the ongoing political unrest in the troubled province.

Table 4
Division of Major Ethnic Groups into Tribes in Balochistan

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<th>Baloch</th>
<th>Brahvi</th>
<th>Pashtun</th>
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<td>Rind</td>
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<td>Mengal</td>
<td>Kakar</td>
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<td>Marri</td>
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<td>Mohm Hasni</td>
<td>Durrani</td>
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Table 4 demonstrates the division of major ethnic groups into tribes in Balochistan. It shows that the Rind, Marri and Bugti tribes belong to the Baloch ethnic group, Mengal and Mohm Hasni are ethnically Brahvi, while Kakars and Durranis are ethnically Pashtun.

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17 Interestingly, among the locals, Pushtuns are the largest group constituting some 39% of the population in Balochistan while Baloch are 29% and Brahvi 16%. The Sindhi speaking inhabitants are also 16%. However, a demographic fluctuation keeps the numbers in flux. The Afghans who have been settled now with property and national identity cards in hand claiming to be ‘local’ are strongly resented by the Baloch and Brahvi people. There is a perception that the Baloch and Brahvi have already become a minority in their own province in the presence of overwhelming Pashtun speaking people in the area. These new ‘locals’ have support of the JUI-F, the leading rightwing party, as they hugely add to the party’s vote bank. Kundi, op. cit, p. 93.
The huge Afghan refugee presence in Balochistan has serious repercussions for the local politics. The refugee influx changed the demography of Balochistan. According to estimates, the number of Afghans both in Balochistan and FATA reached almost 3.5 million during the Soviet-Afghan war. Balochistan’s population almost doubled in size in 24 years with the Afghan influx, from 4 million in 1979-80 to over 7.9 million in 2003. It received the largest number of Afghans after the NWFP following 9/11 due to its proximity with Afghanistan. This demographic shift further greatly transformed the socio-political fabric of Balochistan.

The majority of Afghan refugees spoke Pashtu and easily intermingled with the local Pashtun community adding to the numerical preponderance of the Pashtun population when compared to the Baloch and Brahvi community. The Afghan influx became a major source of frustration for these two major ethnic groups. It impacted in a marked way on the cultural and political life of Balochistan. The rising cost of living, unemployment, the decline of law and order and fewer economic opportunities for the locals widened the ethnic gap between the Baloch / Brahvi and the Pashtun communities. The situation caused frustration because of greater competition among the indigenous Pashtun tribes resulting from shrinking share of scarce resources. Consequently, the predominance of Pashtuns aggravated already prevalent discontent among various ethnic groups. Significantly, the hostility between the two ethnic groups, Pashtun and Baloch, was always due to the fact that they were segregated from each other living separately in their own communities in Balochistan.

The Baloch and Pastun who have been living in two distinct areas of the province have led to two separate socio-political cultures that have differing strategic implications for

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18 Dr. Mansoor Akbar Kundi, ‘Afghan Migration and Its Implications’, Strategic Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 2, 2005, Islamabad,
19 Ibid. According to the author, three factors were primarily accountable for the Afghan refugees’ arrival in Balochistan: First, the geographic proximity of the province to the Durand Line. Second, the cultural affinity between the Afghan refugees and the Pushuts of the NWFP and Balochistan. Third, the ongoing ‘Jihad’ or counter-revolutionary factor, with active western support and the help of Afghan resistance groups. Also see Military Analyst, ‘Terrorism in Pakistan’, Defence Journal, Vol. 8, No. 5, December 2004, pp. 69-77.
20 Ibid.
Balochistan. This factor partly explained the nature of two-prong security crisis namely the Taliban insurgency and the Baloch insurgency facing the state of Pakistan. The division between the Pashtun speaking northwest Balochistan and the Baloch / Brahvi speaking districts of central and southern part of the province is sharply obvious in their socio-political discourses. \(^21\) The Pushto speaking region of Balochistan is adjacent to the southern districts of NWFP, a factor that facilitated the movement of the Pashtuns from the NWFP into Balochistan. \(^22\) The northwestern Balochistan is also situated on the Pak-Afghan border and just across that widely unprotected porous borderline in Afghanistan live other Pashtuns. The northwestern Balochistan consequently posed a severe security dilemma post 9/11 for Pakistan in respect to the Taliban insurgency.

THE NATURE OF US-PAKISTAN COOPERATION POST 9/11 IN BALOCHISTAN

This section analyses the nature of US-Pakistan strategic cooperation against Al-Qaida and the Taliban in Balochistan. It argues that US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in Balochistan significantly helped the US coalition forces to dislocate the Taliban regime and destroy the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. Later, in the anti-terrorist campaign in Pakistan’s western border areas, from 2003-2004 onwards, the US expected more from Pakistan in Balochistan. Pakistani forces’ attention to a more pressing nationalist insurgency in the province, however, strained the US-Pakistan relations concerning the war against terror in the area.

Following 9/11, Balochistan became the foremost operational area within Pakistan for the US war on terror. Using Balochistan as a springboard, the US coalition forces launched attacks against the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan. Pakistan provided airbases, ports, right to flyover its territory and other ground facilities to the US for operational purposes in Balochistan. These facilities were available in various parts of Balochistan such as Dalbandin, Pasni, Shamsi, Zhob, Khost and near the Sind-Balochistan border in Jacobabad. According to the US Department of Defense:

\(^{22}\) Ibid.
Pakistan is providing basing and over flight permission for all United States and coalition forces engaged in Afghanistan. The airbase near Jacobabad has been vital to US military operations in the region, and the airport of Dalbandin, near the Afghan border, is a key forward operation base. More than 57,000 US military sorties have been originated from Pakistani territory. US military personnel reportedly have installed extensive radar facilities at three Pakistani airfields, allowing for coverage of the entire Pakistani airspace.23

The statement added that Pakistan deployed over 115,000 regular and paramilitary troops along the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan and Iran in support of US efforts to capture the Taliban and al Qaeda fugitives. The statement, therefore, indicates that Balochistan played a vital role in the success of US Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan during October-November 2001. Owing to Balochistan’s proximity and tactical access to Afghanistan, the US air and ground attacks dislodged the Taliban government and dispersed Al-Qaeda operatives with Pakistan’s vital support.24 The US authorities have appreciated Pakistan’s contribution in the US war on terror over the years. Pakistan’s support in terms of ‘access (basing, sea and air access), intelligence support and logistics’ received high value in the US White House and Pentagon although there was a sense of uncertainty about the future cooperation of Pakistan with the US.25 Following the initial success of the US OEF, a situation emerged in Balochistan, which strained the US-Pakistan relations.

There was a tension between the US and Pakistan in Balochistan regarding the Taliban insurgency, which crucially challenged the safety of coalition forces in Afghanistan.

24 During the Operation Enduring Freedom, most coalition strike aircrafts were based in the south. The only alternative to over-flying Pakistan’s territory including Balochistan would have been to use Iranian air space – an unlikely prospect. See Pakistan - an Enduring Friend, United States Central Command, 4 March 2002; US Department of Defence, Office of Public Affairs, Coalition Contribution to the War on Terrorism, Fact Sheet, Washington File, 10 June 2002, mentioned in Christine Fair, The Counterterrorism Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India, RAND Corporation, Washington, 2004, pp. 27-31.
25 Christine Fair, Ibid.
24 Most US officials in the Pentagon, United States Central Command and the Department of State have praised Islamabad for providing extensive access to the US both in the context of OEF and in the post OEF phase of operations. For detail, See Ibid, pp. 1-3.
After the collapse of the Taliban regime in Kabul, many of the Taliban fugitives fled across the Durand Line which constituted half of the Pak-Afghan border in Balochistan. Despite the deployment of the armed forces to seal the border, infiltration from Afghanistan into Pakistan continued through the long porous border.\textsuperscript{26} The Pashtun ethnic affinity facilitated the Taliban intruders’ melt-away into their kin’s ethnic population as had happened in FATA. These militants soon resurfaced and retaliated against the coalition forces. From their hideouts, they organized an insurgency based on the strategy to move across the border and conduct attacks against the foreign forces in southern Afghanistan. The militants’ illicit cross-border movement increased US suspicions of Pakistani military and government motivations and commitment to the common battle against the Taliban.

The US alleged that the militants who were involved in attacking the coalition forces and military installations in Afghanistan freely came from and returned to Pakistan. It implied that the militants used Balochistan (like FATA) border areas to cross into Afghanistan ignoring the territorial sanctity of the two countries. The Taliban attacks mostly occurred in southern Afghanistan around Kandahar and Helmand area which was close to Balochistan. As such, Balochistan acquired new significance turning from a vital area of support to a vicinity of insurgency where militants prepared to attack the US forces in Afghanistan. The transition of Balochistan from a strategic asset to a security crisis area for the US reflected the uncertain nature of the US-Pakistan cooperation in the war on terror. Within this context, the US increased its pressure on Pakistan to act against the Taliban militants in Balochistan.

From 2003, the US military commanders who supervised the OEF began to complain that al Qaeda and the Taliban fighters continued to attack the coalition troops in Afghanistan and then return to safety in Pakistan. A March 2003 \textit{Congressional Report} claimed that while the U.S. Department of State and White House were positive in their

\textsuperscript{26} India engaged Pakistan on Pak-India border in the east by initiating 10 month long brinkmanship during December 2001-October 2002 period. India stationed massive troops on India-Pakistan border after Kashmiri activists attacked the Indian parliament in New Delhi in October 2001. Pakistan also moved part of its troops from Pak-Afghan border to its eastern border. However, Pakistan kept 45,000 troops on the western front to help the US OEF.
statements about Pakistani cooperation, concerns were emanating from top military and Congressional leaders.\(^{27}\) Earlier, two senior members of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar and Senator Josef Biden had shown concerns about the links between the ISI and the Afghan militants. On 13 February, the *New York Times* mentioned that both Senators were concerned that the ‘elements of Pakistan’s powerful ISI might be helping members of the Taliban and al Qaeda, who operate along the border and infiltrate into Afghanistan.’\(^{28}\) Among other factors, the US suspicions of Pakistan were partially grounded in the political developments following the 2002 national elections in Pakistan, which were held during the Musharraf regime.

In 2003, the Islamist coalition of MMA with its strong anti-US and pro-Taliban sentiments was a coalition partner in the Balochistan government. The MMA did not exclusively control the government of Balochistan as it did in the NWFP, but MMA held a strong position in the coalition government along with Musharraf’s king party – the PML-Q. Owing to its conservative orientation, the PML-Q leadership empathized with the MMA, which helped the latter to assert itself both within and outside the government. After one month of passing the Shariat bill in the MMA led provincial assembly of the NWFP, the government of Balochistan established an Islamic Legal Council\(^{29}\), which would examine the laws and propose amendments in the light of recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology. Observers in the US and Afghanistan were concerned that ‘these efforts might seek to replicate in Pakistan the harsh enforcement of Islamic law seen in Afghanistan under the Taliban.’\(^{30}\)

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As if the US capture of Afghanistan was not a reason enough to stir anti-US emotions among the religious politicians and their supporters in Pakistan, the Bush administration invaded Iraq in 2003. On 11 April 2003, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Amir of the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), a leading coalition partner of the MMA alliance, advised President Musharraf to disengage the country from the US.\(^{31}\) Qazi warned the government to ‘get all the US bases in Pakistan vacated.’ Otherwise, he warned, ‘the public outrage and hatred might take the ultimate turn towards the ruling clique.’ Qazi also told the people of Pakistan to ‘greet’ Islamic revolution.\(^{32}\) Such assertions of the Islamic leaders rightly gave the impression of a deepening hatred for the US policies in Pakistan.

According to a 2003 Congressional report, the ‘anti-American sentiment’ was not confined to Islamic groups. The report added that ‘a US senator returned from the region in February to report ‘extremely high’ levels of anti-Americanism there, and a 2003 public opinion survey found that 45% of Pakistanis had at least ‘some confidence’ in Osama bin Laden’s ability to ‘do the right thing’ regarding world affairs.’\(^{33}\)

Corresponding with such political environment, the presence of Taliban insurgents close to Pak-Afghan border in Balochistan was a matter of deep concern for the US war on terror.

On 11 December 2003, the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that al Qaeda and the Taliban Sanctions Committee (ATSC) of the UN told the Pakistani officials of a need to share information of arrests related to terrorism in Pakistan.\(^{34}\) The report highlighted

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32 *Dawn*, Karachi, 12 April 2003. Also See, ‘Rally Condemns US invasion of Iraq’, *Dawn*, Karachi, 12 April 2003. According to this report, Shia organizations such as Markazi Anjuman Asna Ashri, Anjuman-i-Jaan Nisaran Ahl-i-Bait, Anjuman-i-Zulfikar Haidari and several others held a rally on 1 April to condemn the US war on Iraq. They demanded that the coalition forces should make sure that no harm was done to the holy sites and every means of communication should be restored to the pilgrims.
34 Scott Baldauf & Owais Tohid, ‘Where Taliban Go to Find Beds and Recruits’, *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 December 2003. According to this report, the ATSC also suggested that bank accounts of all pro-Taliban and al Qaeda organizations should be frozen to halt their activities. It was believed that the Taliban fighters were still getting financial support from the banned al-Rasheed and al-Akhtar Trust, which worked in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime, and other welfare organizations. The militants also collected huge amount of donations from the rich and influential traders in Karachi. Many of these traders donated to the Taliban on monthly basis. ‘Chairman of Al-Qaeda, Taliban Sanctions Committee to
that the seven-member visiting ATSC team believed that the Taliban had entered Pakistan in significant numbers, posing as refugees in camps along the border in Balochistan. Referring to a Pakistan based Western diplomat’s views, the report added:

Balochistan has always been, and still is a second home to the Taliban….It has served as second headquarters after Kandahar during the Taliban rule and now is providing a new lease of life to its guerrilla warfare against the US and its western allies….The more they gain ground in Balochistan, the more their movement will get strengthened….They can easily channel their financial support and regain their ideological support.\(^\text{35}\)

These views reflected the fact that many of the Taliban militants who escaped from Afghanistan post 9/11 had actually been born, lived and studied in the villages of Balochistan. Their families were settled in the Pashtun majority areas close to Pak-Afghan border in the 1980s and 1990s. In that sense, probably, they were returning home.

A May 2006 report, ‘Balochistan Feeds Taliban’s Power’, stressed that Balochistan was the most serious blind-spot, a vast, mostly lawless province where the Taliban drew support from the local members of the Pashtun tribe.’ The report claimed that the ‘Taliban insurgents melt into the camps that house more than 231,000 Afghan refugees in Balochistan, while others seek shelter in madrassas run by the local sympathizers and funded with Middle Eastern money.’\(^\text{36}\)

\[\text{http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2003/sc7892.html}\] Retrieved 29 August 2009. The UN report elaborated: ‘The Chairman will be undertaking this mission in accordance with paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1455 (2003), which requests the Chairman to consider such visits with a view to encouraging States to implement all relevant Council resolutions. In addition, the Chairman, on behalf of the Committee, will seek to initiate a dialogue with the States to be visited by listening to their experiences and concerns with regard to the implementation of the Council’s measures (arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban on individuals and entities belonging to or associated with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban) and he will also explore ways by which the Committee might assist States in obtaining any required technical assistance.’

\[\text{http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f+/c/a/2006/05/31/MNGTIJ4UL11.DTL\&TYPE}\] retrieved on 16 July 2008. The report referred to Pakistan’s response over the presence of the Taliban in Balochistan mentioning Pakistan’s military spokesman, Major General Shaukat Sultan’s statement which read,
from Waziristan, Abdullah Mehsud, was killed in a Pakistani security forces raid on a house in the Zhob district of Balochistan. The house belonged to Balochistan’s coalition ruling party JUI-F senior member Shaikh Ayub. Abdullah Mehsud killed himself in Ayub’s guest room when the police surrounded the house.37 In February 2008, Pakistan security forces captured another senior Taliban figure, Mullah Mansoor Dadullah, along with five others from a Madrassa in Zhob city of Balochistan. Mansoor was the military Commander of Taliban forces in the strategic southern provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul provinces.38 These events showed that the Taliban were active in a very supportive environment in Balochistan.

A November 2008 Congressional report entitled ‘Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy’, referred to major Afghan militant organizations that apparently had a measure of safe-haven in Pakistan. The report particularly mentioned the presence of the following in Balochistan:

The original Taliban leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar. His purported associates include Mullah Bradar and several official spokespersons, including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid. This group — referred to as the ‘Qandahari clique’ or ‘Quetta Shura’ — operates not from Pakistan’s tribal areas, but from populated areas in and around the Baluchistan provincial capital of Quetta. Its fighters are most active in the southern provinces of Afghanistan, including Qandahar, Helmand, and Uruzgan.39

The report referred to the analysts who believe that Pakistan’s intelligence services knew the whereabouts of these Afghan Taliban leaders but did not arrest them as part of a hedge strategy in the region. On their part, the report added that the Pakistani officials

‘Everyone has a black or white turban, shalwar kameez and a beard. Everyone looks like a Taliban. You cannot arrest them all.’

37 Abdul Hai Kakar & Ayub Tareen, ‘Taliban Commander Abdullah Mehsud Halaaq (Taliban Commander Abdullah Mehsud Dead)’, BBC Urdu, 24 July 2007. Abdullah Mehsud had spent 25 months in Guantanamo Bay jail. After his return from the jail, he became famous for kidnapping and killing two Chinese engineers in Pakistan. He lost one of his legs in fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. He was closely associated with the TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud.


contended that the security deterioration was due to the ‘Kabul government’s inability to effectively extend its writ in its own country, in its corruption and in the lack of coalition forces to defeat the Taliban insurgents.’ While tension persisted between the US and Pakistan over the containment of militancy, the Islamist insurgents further increased violence in Afghanistan learning from anti-US insurgency in Iraq. The breeding of Taliban militants in Balochistan, therefore, remained an issue of concern between the two allies.

In his 2008 book, Descent into Chaos, the noted Pakistani journalist and author Ahmad Rashid has discussed the scale and nature of Taliban insurgency in Balochistan in great detail. Rashid wrote:

The Taliban did not just slip back across the border in the winter of 2001/2002; they arrived in droves, by bus, taxi, and tractor, on camels and horses, and on foot. Militants from Pakistani extremist groups and the Jamiat-i-Ulema in Pakistan – like benevolent charity workers – welcomed them at the border with blankets, fresh clothes and envelopes full of money. ISI officials, standing with the Frontier Constabulary guards and customs officials at Chaman, the border crossing into Balochistan province, waved them in.

In the winter of 2002, after being underground with a handful of bodyguards, Mullah Omar reached Quetta from Afghanistan. The ISI immediately accommodated him. He stayed in safe houses provided by the JUI Party, which was now part of the provincial government in Quetta. Soon after settling in Quetta, ‘Mullah Omar appointed four senior commanders to reorganize the fighters in the southern provinces of Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul. These were Mullah Baradar Akhund, the former Deputy

40 Kronstadt and Katzman, Ibid. Also see, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Khurshid M. Kasuri at the Ministerial Meeting on Combating Terrorism Held at the UN Security Council, New York, 20 January, 2003 in IPRI Factfile, ‘Pakistan’s War on Terror’, Vol. VIII, No. 2, February, 2006, pp. 23-4. According to the statement, the minister asserted that Pakistan arrested and deported over 400 suspects of Al Qaeda, including some of its top leaders, such as Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh. According to him, several members of Pakistan security forces made the ultimate sacrifice in these operations. Pakistan had also been the target of al Qaeda’s retaliation, in which a number of Pakistani civilians lost their lives.
41 Ahmad Rashid, ‘Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Extremism is being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia’, Allen Lane, London, 2008, p. 240. According to the author, the ‘US failure to commit ground troops in the south and then at Tora Bora convinced [Pakistan] army headquarters that the Americans were not serious, preferring that the Northern Alliance militias do their fighting for them. Pakistani officers told me they were amazed that Rumsfeld would not even put one thousand soldiers into battle.’
42 Ibid., p. 242.
Defence Minister; Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Usmani, former army chief; Mullah Dadullah, a famed one-legged Corps Commander; and former Interior Minister Mullah Abdul Razzaq. According to Rashid, all four men had close links with bin Laden and were known for their belief in global jihad. Omar was appointed as his successor in case he was killed or captured. Razzaq, who was born in Chaman, became chief fund raiser and recruiter in Balochistan, touring mosques and madrassas to motivate the Afghans there. During late 2002, the Taliban moved weapons, ammunition and food supplies in large quantity to Afghanistan adding to the stockpiles that they had saved away during their retreat. An organized insurgency initiated from Balochistan seemed imminent in Afghanistan.

A significant armed clash began in Afghanistan in the spring of 2003. The Taliban started their guerilla campaign by launching attacks in Helmand and Zabul provinces. The first major battle occurred at the end of January 2003 near Spin Boldak where the US B-I bombers dropped bombs killing dozens of Taliban. In February, there were rocket and mortar attacks on US army bases in eastern Afghanistan and on the US compound at Bagram. The Taliban attacks on the foreigners, either military or non-military personnel, continued which increasingly disrupted the NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan. The US moved part of its forces from Afghanistan to invade Iraq in March 2003 which encouraged the Taliban insurgents to regain areas and public influence in southern Afghanistan that borders with Balochistan. The escalation in Taliban guerilla attacks worried the Bush administration and Pentagon which sent their diplomatic and military representatives to persuade Pakistani authorities to restrain the rebels. The US effort was ineffective.

On 22 April 2003, Hamid Karzai met Musharraf in Islamabad urging him to arrest the Taliban leaders living in Quetta. Karzai gave a list of Taliban leaders to Musharraf that

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43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., p. 244.
46 Gen. Tony Frank and Zalmay Khalilzad both visited Islamabad to convince the Pakistani authorities against the Taliban insurgency and convey its serious implications for Pakistan. However, the surge continued further debilitating the nature of governance in Afghanistan. Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos, op.cit., pp. 245-46.
included the names of Mullah Omar, Dadullah, Usmani and Baradar who were believed to be residing in the capital city of Balochistan. Karzai told Ahmed Rashid the very same day that ‘We have given the names of some top Taliban leaders for the Pakistani authorities to take action on. …. Pakistan has to address this issue of extremism – the actions of these extremists, if they continue, will have implications in Pakistan.’

While the US had turned its attention to Iraq and the Taliban expanded their operations in Afghanistan, Karzai’s statement reflected deep frustration and impaired Pak-Afghan relations. The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan continued to deteriorate as the Taliban perpetually attacked the coalition forces as well as both military and civil targets in various parts of Afghanistan.

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47 Ahmed Rashid, Ibid., p. 246. In response to the Afghan and the US allegations of cross-border movement, Pakistan actively engaged in curtailling the militants’ activities. For example, during his visit to Afghanistan in September 2006, Musharraf proposed to Karzai to barricade the borderline between their two countries to terminate Taliban infiltration. Karzai disagreed stating that it would make it difficult for the Pashtun peoples to move across the border. See, Joint Statement on Visit to Afghanistan by Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, Pakistan, 7 September 2006.


48 Pakistani authorities constantly denied the presence of Taliban in Balochistan. For example, in a radio interview with the US NPR on 7 September 2006, in response to a question on the ISI and the Taliban’s link in Balochestan, President Musharraf said: I want to give a brief answer. This is humbug, and it is all wrong. Quetta is our capital of Baluchistan. There's a provincial government functioning there. There is an Army Corp headquartered there. And there is an intelligence set up jointly by CIA and Pakistan intelligence. If they're all fools that they don't even know that there's headquarter of Taliban there, it's a pity. [http://www.npr.org](http://www.npr.org) retrieved on 21 August 2009. Earlier, on leaking a secret report to the western media that was prepared by the Afghan intelligence agency about the Taliban in Balochistan, Musharraf remarked: ‘these kinds of nonsensical (allegations) are not acceptable… This list was months old and outdated … contained dead telephone numbers … even the CIA knows about it because we have coordinated our actions with them.’ The 5 March 2006 CNN interview with Wolf Blitz mentioned in, Anwar Iqbal, ‘Musharraf says Kabul Stirring Trouble’, Dawn, Karachi, 6 March 2006. Also See Anwar Iqbal, ‘Pentagon Views Pakistan as Key Partner’, Dawn, Karachi, 8 March 2006. This news quoted the
The coalition forces in Zabul found it difficult to stop the increasing Taliban attacks in Zabul which was the main entry point into Afghanistan for the Taliban based in Balochistan. In June 2003, Mullah Omar constituted a ten-man leadership council and created four committees to deal with military, political, cultural and economic affairs. This reorganization produced more coordinated attacks in Afghanistan. On 13 August, sixty-one people were killed in multiple attacks in three provinces in a single day. In early September, the coalition forces launched Operation Mountain Viper to clear out some five hundred Taliban led by commander Dadullah. Despite heavy US air and artillery bombardment that killed more than 100, the Taliban stood and fought for nine days. By the winter, the Taliban controlled 80% of Zabul with an extended pro-Taliban clerical and tribal network intact that helped them receive men, weapons and money from Balochistan. With such access, ‘the Taliban leaders treated Quetta as their new capital.’ Rashid depicted the scene of a large suburb of Quetta called Pashtunabad that the JUI-F had virtually handed over to Afghan Taliban: He wrote:

Thousands of long-haired, kohl eyed, black turbaned Taliban roamed the streets. They forced or bought out the local residents and soon owned every home, shop, tea stall and hotel in Pashtunabad. New madrassas were built to house a new young generation, who banned television, the taking of photographs and the flying of kites, replicating Kandahar in the early 1990s. Local people including the police and journalists were frightened to enter the suburb.

Faced with this scenario, President Obama’s Af-Pak policy was a renewed US effort to curb the Taliban insurgency. On 19 March 2009, the US Secretary of Defense Robert

US Department of Defence statement that ‘Pakistan remains a key US partner in the war on terror and its military is playing an important role in providing intelligence and support to the forces of the US-coalition in Afghanistan.’ According to the news, at a meeting with senior Pakistani journalists in Rawalpindi on 7 March, President Musharraf said that he had not only rejected Afghan accusations as false when he met Mr Bush but also had given him a copy of a classified document detailing Afghanistan’s involvement in Pakistan’s internal affairs.

49 ‘Afghan clashes, bomb blast leave 61 dead’, *Dawn*, Karachi, 14 August 2003. According to the news, an Afghan border police officer, Major Ghafar, said the insurgents used heavy guns, rifles, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades to attack a base used by a border battalion in the Shinkai area east of Khost and adjacent to the border with Pakistan. Ghafar described it as the biggest attack in the area since the Taliban fell; also see, Ahmed Rashid, op. cit., p. 247. The US stopped its officials to travel in the south and aid agencies left Kandahar and Helmand. Out of twenty-two western NGOs in April in Kandahar only seven were working in August.

Gates asked Pakistan to curb the increasing activities of the Taliban in Balochistan. The US Secretary of Defense Gates was quoted as saying that ‘I think we all have a concern about the Quetta Shura and the activities of the Taliban in that area, but I think this is principally a problem and a challenge for the Pakistanis to take on and as we have indicated, we are prepared to do anything we can to help them to do that.’\footnote{US Asks Pakistan to Curb Taliban in Balochistan’, 19 March 2009. http://blog.taragana.com/n/us-asks-pakistan-to-curb-taliban-in-balochistan-19404 retrieved on 7 June 2009. In early March when the details of President Obama’s Af-Pak policy were about to be announced, the New York Times reported that the US was considering drone attacks on the Taliban targets in Balochistan. The report mentioned that the attacks would be similar to what the US was doing in FATA area of Pakistan. However, the US officials denied any such US plan. There was a concern among the US strategists that the US action in Balochistan would further destabilise Pakistan and could jeopardize US-Pakistan cooperation on other issues. See ‘Gates Against Strikes in Balochistan: Taliban ‘Quetta Shura’ a new US headache.’ http://www.paperarticles.com/2009/03/gates-against-strikes-in-balochistan.html retrieved on 13 June 2009.}

During his visit to Islamabad on 6 April 2009, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen reiterated the issue saying that ‘the top leadership of the Taliban is hiding in Balochistan.’\footnote{Taliban Shura Hiding in Balochistan, Says Admiral Mullen’, Daily Times, Lahore, 7 April 2009.} The Taliban leaders’ activities in Balochistan were not only the concern of US officials. Pakistani media also pointed out the cross border movement of the Taliban militants from Pakistan’s southern province to Afghanistan.

In its 30 July 2009 issue, the Islamabad based English daily Pakistan Observer published an analytical report about the Taliban in Balochistan. The author of the report, Mahrukh Khan, held that the Quetta Shuira was based in and around northeastern parts of Balochistan including Quetta, Chaman, Pishni, Qila Saifullah and also in refugee camps outside Quetta. Khan further wrote that the ‘Quetta Shura reportedly functions as a board of governors of Taliban where the Shura council comprises 30 members who deal in policy making and other different tasks ranging from top commanders and secret operatives to their spokesperson. Their total strength is estimated around 10,000 of whom 20 to 30 per cent are full time fighters. This is where most of the decisions take place and are obligatory.’\footnote{Mahrukh Khan, ‘Resurgence of Taliban in Balochistan’, Pakistan Observer, Islamabad, 30 July 2009.}
Significantly, the Quetta Shura supervised the larger insurgency in the northern province of Pakistan as well as the southern province of Afghanistan. The Taliban center in Quetta was probably the place, where volunteers from Iran, Middle East and other Gulf countries were trained and sent as fighters to Afghanistan. The support for these groups usually came from revenues from the drug trade, foreign linkages and various other means. The Quetta Shura was taken as a serious threat for the US due to the anti-western intellectual and ideological underpinnings of the Taliban. However, the active presence of the Taliban in Balochistan added to Pakistan’s security crisis with the growth of Sunni-Shia sectarian violence in the province.

The Taliban who escaped the US invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11 and crossed into Balochistan fueled Shia-Suni sectarian violence in the province. The Taliban is a staunch Sunni organization and its ideological links with al Qaeda and Pakistan’s Sunni militant groups such as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) have been deadly for Pakistani Shias. Along with a Sunni majority of 77%, Shia Muslims constitute 20% of 180 million people of Pakistan. LJ is regarded as Pakistan’s fiercest Sunni militant group that is accused of killing hundreds of Shias over the years. Shias have been targeted in Balochistan for quite some time. On 4 July 2003, for example, more than fifty people died and sixty-five were injured in an attack on an Imam-bargah (Shia sacred place) in central Quetta during a Friday payer. Earlier, eleven police recruits of Shia origin from the Hazara tribe were killed in an attack on 8 June. Shia-Suni violence is a legacy of Soviet-Afghan war that intensified due to Afghan civil war in the 1990s and spread into Pakistan. The sectarian violence is sporadic with unspecific periods of communal calmness.

54 Ibid.
57 Iffat Idris, Ibid. According to the author, for a period, Shi'a and Sunni sectarian groups were sponsored by Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively. These two rivals fought a proxy war in Pakistan. Their support reduced as relations between Tehran and Riyadh improved. However, the sectarian groups found other
Since late 2008, Balochistan witnessed a series of target killing of Shias belonging to the Hazara tribe. On 21 November, two Shias including a leading scholar Agha Hassan Zakari were killed. Then, four policemen, three of whom were Shias, were killed including a Deputy Superintendent of Police on 14 January 2009. On 26 January, a leader of Shia Hazara Democratic Party (HDP), Hussain Ali Yousfi, was shot dead in Quetta. The LJ claimed responsibility for the killings. Earlier, a Shia leader and his gunman were killed on 5 January. The 24 February killing of a Shia trader along with his three sons and the murder of a Shia family of five on 3 March reflected the intensity of sectarian violence in Balochistan. In spite of nearly 50 such deaths within few months, the authorities did not make a single arrest.

The violence against Shias added a new layer to sectarian bloodshed with the activities of a Baloch militant group called the Jundullah (Soldiers of God). The Jundallah, a Sunni Baloch insurgent group, has claimed to be responsible for a series of deadly guerrilla raids in Iran's southeastern province of Sistan-Balochistan. The group has been active in Pakistani Balochistan since 2003. Jundallah’s head, Abdul Malik Rigi from the Rigi Baloch tribe, who is in his mid twenties, goes by the title of Emir Abdul Malik Baloch. Jundallah has claimed at least twelve attacks during last few years in Iran. In its recent attack on 27 May 2009, a Jundallah suicide bomber killed thirty and wounded sixty people in a mosque in Zahedan, the capital of Iran’s Sistan-Balochistan province.

Sources of sustenance. The Sunni groups derived ideological inspiration from the ultra-orthodox Taliban that came to power in Afghanistan. The Taliban had strong links with madrassas in Pakistan.

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60 According to Alexis Debat, a senior fellow on counterterrorism at the Nixon Center and an ABC News consultant, ‘Abdul Malik Regi is essentially commanding a force of several hundred guerrilla fighters that stage attacks across the border into Iran on Iranian military officers, Iranian intelligence officers, kidnapping them. He's part drug smuggler, part Taliban, part Sunni activist.’ ‘The Secret War Against Iran’, *ABC News Exclusive*, 3 April 2007.

61 Jason Ditz, ‘At least 30 Killed in Mosque Bombing in Iranian Balochistan.’
On 13 July 2009, Iran hanged fourteen Jundallah militants who were convicted of involvement in a 2006 terrorist attack near Zahedan that killed twenty-two people.\(^{62}\) The Jundallah was supposed to be working with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. However, according to an April 2007 *ABC report*, Jundallah's guerrilla raids in Iran were ‘secretly encouraged and advised by American officials since 2005.’\(^{63}\) Besides, Pakistan’s security predicament has been complicated by the fast brewing tension between the Taliban and Baloch nationalists in Balochistan.

There is a growing resentment among the Baloch / Brahvi population against the so-called Talibanization in Balochistan. On 5 January 2009, for example, a leader of Balochistan National Party (BNP) Sanaullah Baloch told the *Daily News* that the government had failed to establish its writ in Quetta, where the Taliban and their supporters were consolidating the grip. According to him, ‘several parts of the provincial capital have become ‘no-go areas’ where the Taliban hold a strong position.’\(^{64}\) The BNP leader claimed that the Taliban supporters enjoyed the support of
the government and its intelligence agencies who wished ‘to pit the religious elements against the Baloch nationalists.’ Significantly, the ethnic balance has been tilting since the 1980s due to Afghan influx in Balochistan. As a consequence of the US invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11, the Taliban presence and the political empowerment of the Islamist forces in Balochistan have harmed the secular Baloch nationalist cause. The Taliban and the Baloch have been competing for political domination thus adding to the complex security environment of Balochistan.

This section has discussed the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism in Balochistan. There have been two distinct phases of US-Pakistan cooperation in Balochistan. During the first phase from October 2001 onwards, Balochistan became the foremost strategic area for the US to attack Afghanistan and depose the Taliban regime in Kabul with strong wide-ranging Pakistani support. In early 2003, began the second phase, when the Balochistan based Taliban insurgency against the US coalition forces in Afghanistan, caused tension between the US and Pakistan. Neither the US led military nor Pakistani forces could effectively counter the Taliban insurgency on either side of the Pak-Afghan border. In both the phases, however, Pakistan’s security was very severely eroded in its western border area. The complex nature of increased Shia-Sunni violence and ethnic tension between the Taliban and the Baloch to gain political edge over each other has further eroded Pakistan’s security.

June 2009. In the first week of June 2009, the Awami national Party (ANP) organised a seminar in Quetta where the speakers asserted that the people of Balochistan would not tolerate the Taliban and al Qaeda in the province. They urged the Baloch and Pashtun nationalists and religio-political parties to forge unity for coping with the changes in the province.

65 ‘Baloch Protest against ‘Talibanization (editorial), Daily Times, Lahore, 6 January 2009. The BNP leader referred to the Afghan refugees as ‘a burden on the economy of Balochistan and the biggest cause of lawlessness and terrorism in the country’s largest province, Balochistan.

66 See Samuel Baid, ‘Talibanization of Balochistan’, Daily Excelsior, 3 February 2009. http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/web1/09feb03/edit.htm#3 retrieved 21 June 2009. In the 1990s, the Baloch would not allow the 10-year census until the Afghan refugees were sent away. However, these refugees have permanently settled by marrying the locals and buying property and business in Balochistan. The post 9/11 Afghan influx and pro-Islamist political empowerment in Balochistan has further changed the provincial demography. According to this report, the Taliban are making the Pashtun a stepping stone to attempt control of the province. The Taliban strategy, however, may create civil war-like condition in Balochistan because the Baloch will not accept Talibanization.
US-PAKISTAN COOPERATION POST 9/11, 
AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN BALOCHISTAN:

This section discusses the Baloch nationalist insurgency and its implications for Pakistan’s security post 9/11 in the context of US-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism in Balochistan. It argues that Balochistan acquired new significance in the US policy post 9/11 due to the US interest in the region’s energy resources. The Baloch nationalist movement, therefore, faced new challenges along with the issues of socio-political discontent and economic neglect of Balochistan. In the context of US-Pakistan cooperation, therefore, the current Baloch insurgency carried deeper security implications for Pakistan.

Largely, the Baloch nationalist movement in Pakistan is a legacy of various factors such as regional tribal and ethno-centric culture, socio-political and economic backwardness and a long standing resentment against what is seen as the Punjabi domination of Pakistani national politics, the bureaucracy and the armed forces. With its reluctant accession to Pakistan in March 1948, Balochistan did not acquire a Provincial Assembly and representation in the federal Parliament until 1970. In 1972, Prime Minister Bhutto dissolved the Balochistan government of Chief Minister Attaullah Mengal blaming certain Balochi leaders for triggering insurgency with the support of foreign

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powers, mainly the Soviet Union. In response, the Baloch guerillas began to attack army convoys. In 1973, Bhutto launched military action against the rebellious Baloch tribes to crush their violent dissent. Both the civil and military regimes of Pakistan maintained nearly the same colonial status in Balochistan for long as the Baloch had held under

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68 Islamabad blamed the provincial government for a consignment of arms coming from Iraq and bound for its destination in Balochistan that was caught at the Islamabad airport. From 1973-1977, around 80,000 Pakistani troops and 55,000 Baloch tribesmen fought against each other in the mountains of Balochistan. See Selig Harrison, ‘A Sophisticated Armed Fight for a Province’s Autonomy: Pakistan’s Baluch insurgency’, Le Monde Diplomatique, 16 October 2006. According to the report, ‘in the fighting that started in January 2005’, the independent Pakistan Human Rights Commission had reported that ‘indiscriminate bombing’ by F-16s and Cobra gun ships were used. The rebel Baloch leaders sought support beyond Pakistan and escaped to Afghanistan along with their tribesmen. Islamabad has long suspected a foreign link in the Baloch nationalist movement for interesting reasons. People of Balochistan, both Baloch and Pashtoon, have their kin ethnic communities living across the border in Iran and/or in Afghanistan. Their frequent and mostly unhindered cross-border movement has given little significance to newly drawn borders. A strong heritage of kin ethnic communities living across the national borders is still a part of sociopolitical culture in postcolonial South Asia. The partition of British India in 1947 created a number of such ‘kin communities’ living under different nationalities. On the western border of Pakistan, the issue of kin ethnic communities took an acute strategic dimension due to Afghanistan’s irredentist claim over Pakistani territory in Balochistan and FATA. (It is somewhat similar to the situation on Pakistan’s eastern border with India where Pakistan claimed the right of self-determination/independence for Kashmiri Muslims in India). On various occasions in the last sixty years, Afghan rulers identified themselves with the nationalists across the Durand Line in Pakistan. This made Pakistan watchful of any political and strategic development in Afghanistan. See Hamid Mir, ‘Kabul Express’, Jang, Rawalpindi, 8 January 2007. Pakistan’s concerns regarding a ‘foreign hand’ in Baloch nationalism also stemmed from its US sponsored SEATO and CENTO military pacts signed in 1954-55 to combat Soviet communism in Asia. Afghanistan’s fatal leaning towards the Soviet Union and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 justified Pakistan’s suspicions. The Soviets could access the warm waters of the Arabian Sea through Balochistan with a stepping stone like Afghanistan under their feet. In this context, the US and Soviet Union played the same Great Game during the Cold War which the British and the Soviet empires had played before them with some fraction of details. See Mahtab Ali Shah, Ethnic Impact on Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, I. B. Tauris, London, 1997, p. 102. According to the author, former Governor of NWFP, Sir Olaf Caroe who was an expert on Central Asia, had pointed out the strategic significance of Balochistan to Pakistan government at the time of independence advising it to keep Balochistan firmly in its control, both in its own interest and in the interest of the western world. The US probably brought Pakistan into CENTO in the 1950s due to the strategic significance of Balochistan. President Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zabigniew Brzzenzinski, suggested that the Soviet Union might be tempted to cross into Balochistan and occupy either the Gulf oilfields or the fishing harbors of Gwadar and Pansi. He thought that in this case there would be serious problems for the freedom of navigation. To avert such a possibility, the then US naval chief, Admiral Thomas Moore, suggested the building of a US naval base at Gwadar to serve as one of the Central Command’s operational headquarters. President Zia-ul-Haq gave base facilities to the Pentagon. Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan, Memoirs, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1993, p. 1. Lord Lytton, British Viceroy of India from 1876-80, realized the strategic significance of Balochistan well when he persuaded the Khan of Qalat to cede Quetta to the British for setting up military cantonments there. This perspective would help further understand Pakistan’s security concerns in Balochistan. See Fred Scholz, ‘Nomadism and Colonialism: a Hundred Years of Balochistan: 1872-1972’, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 91. Also see Rahul Mukand, ‘Ethnicity and Nationalism in Balochistan’, Brief No. 34, Pakistan Security Research Unit, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, May 2008. To understand the nature of both internal and external dynamics of the separatist insurgency, see Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California, Berkeley, 1985, p. 230.
British India. Other than maintaining military installations in certain strategic areas, the province was loosely administered through tribal chiefs. The actions of Pakistan’s Frontier Constabulary (FC) inculcated resentment and hostility among people. The state’s neglect of the Baloch people along with a heavy handed policy against a proud tribal society only intensified the security crisis when US-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism post 9/11 unfolded in Balochistan.

This shows that political dissent based on Baloch nationalism had long simmered in Balochistan. The largest and the most resource rich province remained neglected and the most backward in the country. The health, education and economic indicators are the lowest in Balochistan when compared with other provinces of Pakistan. According to the Social Policy and Development Center (SPDC), 88% people in Balochistan lived in high degree of deprivation\(^{69}\) post 9/11. The main reason for such level of deprivation in Balochistan is in large part due to the nature of governance in the province. Balochistan has been governed under a security policy that determined the limits of socio-political and economic activities in the province. Generally, Pakistan has been a security state rather than a welfare state. Central authorities established administrative control over Balochistan due to latter’s restless internal politics and external geo-strategic influences.\(^{70}\) Balochis could not fulfill their political and economic aspirations due to excessive central control.

After nearly 25-years of relative peace, the resurgence of Baloch insurgency post 9/11 was both a response to state’s repression of the Baloch people and a reaction to uncertain geo-strategic developments in the region. As such, the current Baloch predicament represented both continuity and change. For example, the socio-political and economic plight of the Baloch remained despite the state’s promises and half

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\(^{69}\) Ibid.
\(^{70}\) Ibid.
measures.\textsuperscript{71} Then, there was a massive military crackdown in 2005-2006 to suppress nationalist unrest in Balochistan.

Regionally, the end of the Cold War had drastically changed the geo-strategic environment in the 1990s from South Asia to Central Asia bringing in new global and regional forces to fill the vacuum.\textsuperscript{72} Following the US invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11, the contest among these forces intensified for the natural resources that were buried in the vast areas from Central Asia to Iran to Balochistan. Owing to its geo-strategic location, Balochistan stood as a pivotal landscape in this scenario both at the domestic and regional levels. Informed with such a renewed significance, the Baloch insurgency post 9/11 acquired a logical connection with the US-Pakistan cooperation against terror in Balochistan.\textsuperscript{73}

In the context of US-Pakistan cooperation against terror, three main factors explain the current Baloch insurgency. First, the Taliban influx into Balochistan post 9/11. Second, the 2002 general election and its pro-Islamist aftermath in Balochistan. Third, Musharraf regime’s military action in Balochistan and Sardar Akbar Bugti’s murder in 2006. There is enough evidence to suggest that the Baloch and Pashtun co-existed grudgingly at least since the Soviet-Afghan war when Balochistan became a destination of mass exodus of the Afghan refugees in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{74} The Taliban’s post 9/11 escape to Balochistan strongly added to Baloch concerns over the ethnic imbalance in the province. The Baloch feared that they would become a minority in their own territory.\textsuperscript{75} Such an imminent threat weakened their faith in parliamentary process which had


already failed them in achieving their political aspirations. The 2002 general elections which were held under the Musharraf regime in Pakistan strongly confirmed the Baloch suspicions.

The 2002 elections were widely engineered to exclude political forces that opposed Musharraf’s military rule. These forces included the PPP and PML-N in the mainstream politics, whereas the secular Awami National Party (ANP) in NWFP and the Baloch secular nationalist parties in Balochistan were also sidelined. With not a very covert manipulation of the election process, Musharraf empowered the pro-Taliban JUI-F as a coalition partner in the Balochistan government. In return, the JUI-F both covertly and overtly helped the Taliban insurgents reinforce their position. These developments increasingly turned the Baloch youth away from electoral politics towards participating in a violent struggle. As such, the US-Pakistan cooperation against the Taliban strangely became instrumental in strengthening the nationalist insurgency in Balochistan. Inevitably, the undesirable developments brought the Musharraf regime and Baloch nationalists to a point of confrontation that added another sad chapter in Pakistan’s troubled history.

Even before Bugti’s death in 2006, the Baloch insurgency had gained pace since 2001-2002. Rocket attacks on Frontier Corps (FC) posts, landmine and dynamite explosions against FC personnel were witnessed in the Dera Bugti tribal agency. Similar attacks


77 The Baloch insurgency is intricately linked with the post 9/11 developments in South Asia. The US had two underlying policy objectives to invade Afghanistan. First, the US wanted to punish those who were responsible for the 9/11 attacks. It was a short term objective. The second and long term objective was to advance US interest in an area that was emerging as the focus of the 21st century geo-strategic interaction in the world. Both of these US objectives were inter-connected in nature. Interestingly, both the initiatives had a direct bearing on the current phase of Baloch unrest. For example, the US invasion pushed the Afghan militants into Balochistan that directly harmed the Baloch nationalist interests. The military regime in Islamabad took advantage of the Afghan influx and used it against the Baloch to pacify their nationalist pursuit. In the context of long term objective, the US required an unhindered access to Balochistan through land and water as an energy transit area, which also ran contrary to Baloch nationalist claim over their territory. According to author’s informal talks with various Baloch academics and political workers, from a Baloch vintage point, both the US and Pakistan seemed together against Baloch nationalism more than their intended cooperation against the Taliban insurgency.
were launched in Balochistan’s Kalat, Dalbundeen, Khuzdar and Gwadar areas. The nationalist violence intensified over time and a violent resentment against military presence in Balochistan continued. In 2004, the political upheaval in Balochistan took a drastic turn, as hundreds of militants prepared for an armed struggle against the government. The fully armed Marri tribesmen took up position on the Kohlu mountains to fight for the rights of the Baloch. In September 2004, Shahzada Zulfiqar reported in the Newsline:

The tribesmen, who call themselves ‘guerillas’ waging a war for the rights of the Baloch population, are armed with Russian Kalashnikovs, heavy machine and anti-aircraft guns and RPGs, picked up in Afghanistan during their self-exile. Most of them are educated with military/guerilla training received in Afghanistan. Their chieftain, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, who was in self-exile, called his tribesmen to leave their homes and join him in Afghanistan. More than 12,000 Marris responded to their leader's call and left Pakistan to settle in the Afghan provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, who believes that the Baloch cannot get their political and economic rights without an armed struggle, called his tribesmen to Afghanistan to train them in guerilla warfare.79

The report implied that the Baloch insurgents were a well trained and well equipped guerrilla force to perform public sabotage activities, conduct attacks on the strategic targets and fight the security forces. The leader of this guerilla force was Nawabzada

According to a report, in 2002, in the wake of increased attacks on the gas pipelines, para-military forces took under siege the Bugti fort in Dera Bugti. The forces later withdrew after reaching an understanding with the Bugti tribe. One dimension of the latest Baloch resentment against the Musharraf regime stemmed from the military’s plan to set up three proposed cantonments at Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Gwadar. It was feared that such a plan would adversely affect the current situation. Some local observers pointed out that two of the cantonments were aimed at policing the people on the pattern followed by the British. Dera Bugti and Kohlu were Sardar Bugti’s areas of influence and it was a point of contention for the Nawab to live under the watchful eyes of the military. It was estimated that the construction of the cantonments would cost Rs. 80 billion (around $US one billion).
79 Ibid, Shahzada Zulfiqar. The report mentioned that in 2004, the government decided to take action against the militants and secure the mountains between Kohlu and Kahan that were still in the possession of the Marri militants. An army of Levy forces and Bajarani tribesmen loyal to the government, backed by the Frontier Corps, battled with the militants for two days. After gauging the capability of the militants and their political support from nationalist parties, the government ended their operation for the time being. According to government agencies, there were around 15 training camps in the mountains at that time where the youth had joined the militants to train in guerrilla warfare. A visit of two-member journalist team from Quetta to some of these camps revealed that each camp had 300 to 500 recruits. The camps were established in militarily strategic and protected areas, housed in abandoned buildings set up by the Pakistan army during the 1973 operation.
Mir Balach Marri, the youngest son of Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri.\textsuperscript{80} Balach was born in Moscow in 1968 during Nawab Marri’s long stay in the Soviet Union. It was known that Balach Marri was running the separatist militant organization, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). The BLA was first formed by the Marxist Sardar Khair Bux Marri in 1974.\textsuperscript{81} It was also known that Akbar Bugti and Balach Marri collaborated in their nationalist pursuits.

The Baloch insurgency intensified under different contexts in the province. On 3 May 2004, for example, in a car bomb attack, the BLA killed three Chinese engineers working on the Gwadar port project and on 21 May, Gwadar airport was attacked by rockets at midnight.\textsuperscript{82} The construction of Gwadar port and the presence of Chinese experts on the project had strongly irritated Baloch nationalists. The Baloch insurgents believed correctly that China was supporting Islamabad to develop and export Balochistan’s natural gas resources.\textsuperscript{83} By 2004, nearly 500 Chinese nationals were working on the mega project of Gwadar deep sea port. The Baloch nationalists also had strong reservations that Gwadar project, which was being developed with the help of China, would bring the outside workers in a massive number and turn the Baloch population into a minority. Moreover, Baloch nationalists feared that the potentially

\textsuperscript{80} Mir Balach Marri escaped to Afghanistan after Bugti’s death in 2006 where he was later killed along with his bodyguards in suspicious circumstances in 2007. Balach studied electronic engineering in Moscow. He was elected as a member of the Balochistan Assembly in the 2002 general elections. He resigned in early 2003 to join the Baloch nationalist movement. On 21 November 2007, he was killed along with his seven bodyguards and six other people in a blast inside Afghanistan. Some sources suggested that Balach was killed in an air strike by NATO forces in Gramshar area of Afghanistan’s Helmand province. The Marri family refused to disclose the location of Balach’s death and blamed Pakistani forces for his demise. Many members of Marri tribe believed that Brahmdagh Bugti was involved in Balach’s murder who according to them had taken the revenge of Akbar Bugti’s killing because Marris had taken the responsibility of Akbar Bugti’s security and it was on their suggestion that Akbar Bugti had left Dera Bugti. Balach’s death was considered to be a blow to the Baloch nationalist movement. See Saleem Shahid, ‘Balach Marri killed: Violence in Quetta, Schools Closed’, \textit{Dawn}, Karachi, 22 November 2007; Mohammad Jamil, ‘Enigma of Balach Marri’s Murder’, \textit{Pakistan Observer}, Islamabad, 4 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{81} Khuram Iqbal, ‘Counter Insurgency in Balochistan: Pakistan’s Strategy, Outcome and Future Implications’, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, 15 July 2008.


\textsuperscript{83} In July 2007, a bus full of Chinese engineers was bombed in Balochistan. No Chinese was hurt or killed but many policemen, who were on duty to protect the Chinese workers, lost their lives.
highly lucrative financial benefits would go to outsiders. The demographic threat was a major motivation in the violence against Chinese.

Two main events of January and December 2005 proved to be the catalyst for carrying out military operation in Balochistan. On 2 January 2005, a female doctor who probably belonged to the Bugti tribe was raped by a junior military officer which sparked outrage and increased insurgent attacks. Dr. Shazia Khalid, the rape victim, worked for Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), which operated the Sui gas fields. Both PPL and the government tried to cover up the rape. The accused military officer appeared on the TV and denied the charges. Musharraf himself sided with the accused criticizing the opponents to use the rape issue for violence. Eventually the lady doctor and her husband were sent to England to cool down the crisis. The government mishandled the allegations and inflamed a sense of outrage. Between 7 to 11 January, the Bugti tribesmen attacked the Sui gas fields firing hundreds of rockets in response to the rape incident. Sui gas fields produced much of Pakistan’s natural gas. The guerrilla insurgents also stormed the gas company compound which left eight people dead. The damage caused to the plant disrupted supplies for over a month in various parts of the country. In political agitation turned militant revolt, 89 people died and over 280 were injured in January 2005. However, it was only the beginning of an armed conflict, which was to cause many more deaths and destruction in the coming days.

85 See Saleem Shahid, ‘Gun Battle leaves Two Dead in Sui’, Dawn, Karachi, 11 January 2005. ‘FC Takes Over Sui Gas Plant: Supply across Country Partially Shut; Four Killed in Gun Battles’, Dawn, Karachi, 11 January 2005. ‘President Warns Tribesmen of Tough Action’, Dawn, Karachi, 12 January 2005. In an interview with a TV channel, the President asked the so-called 'nationalist' elements to stop subversive activities in the province. 'Don't push us. This is not the seventies' he said, referring to an insurgency in Balochistan which was put down by the military in the 1970s. 'They will not even know what has hit them,' he said. However, the insurgents fired hundreds of rockets and mortar shells during 11 hours of heavy gun battle. Though rocket and mortar shell firing stopped after the night long battle in the morning, firing with light weapons continued throughout the day in Sui. Heavy fighting erupted late night when armed men launched an attack on the positions of Frontier Corps and Defence Security Guards (DSG) in the Sui area. All shops and bazaars remained closed for the fourth consecutive day due to firing and exchange of rockets between armed men and law-enforcement personnel, while the town of Sui and its gas field was cut off from the rest of the country as a result of continuous fighting. The government responded with house-to-house searches by 7000 regular troops plus Frontier Corps personnel supported by armor, artillery and gun-ships. The houses of those “suspected” of launching the attack were bulldozed. More than 1500 insurgent attacks were mounted between 7 January and 3 April 2005. There were pitched battles between the FC and Bugti tribes. According to independent Pakistan Human Rights Commission Report, in the fight that began in January 2005, ‘indiscriminate bombing and strafing by F-
On 14 December 2005, a rocket attack on an FC camp was the second incident that gave a new lease to the Baloch insurgency. On that day, Musharraf met the local elders at the camp, which was situated in the outskirts of Kohlu. The area was a stronghold of Marri tribes. Eight rockets were fired which caused no damage. Security forces blamed the insurgents for the incident. The tribal chief Nawab Marri, however, claimed that the attack was engineered by Musharraf’s supporters. The following day, rockets hit a helicopter that carried the FC’s Inspector General and his deputy. Both of the officials were injured in the attack.86 Three days later, Pakistani forces launched a major attack bombarding farari camps (guerrilla bases) in Kohlu mountainous area.87 According to the late Nawab Bugti, Pakistani military forces in the region increased after December 14 to 50,000 regular army troops and 30,000 FC. On 3 February 2006, Senator Amanullah Kanrani of Balochistan’s Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) told the Senate that more than two hundred people, including women and children, were killed in the Kohlu operation since December last.88 Kanrani called the operation ‘state terrorism.’

In the Senate debate, Senators from both the opposition and treasury demanded that the government stop military operations in the province, resolve the issue through talks and give maximum authority to the provinces. Musharraf denied that there was any military


86 ‘Saboteurs will Fail, says Musharraf: Rockets Fired during President’s Kohlu Visit’, Dawn, Karachi, 15 December 2005. No causality or property loss was reported. Mirak Baloch, spokesman for the Baloch Liberation Army, claimed that the rocket attacks in Kohlu had been carried out by the BLA. Also see Saleem Shahid, ‘FC Chief, Deputy Injured in Firing’, Dawn, Karachi, 16 December 2005.

87 Saleem Shahid, ‘Troops Move Against Marris in Kohlu’, Dawn, Karachi, 19 December 2005. Accurate information on Pakistani army deployments was largely unavailable as the military continued to deny that large-scale operations even happened and the region was closed to outside journalists.

88 Mohammad Imran, ‘Over 200 Killed in Kohlu, Senate Told’, Daily Times, 4 February 2006. Fact-finding missions, sent by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) to the Kohlu area, Sui and Dera Bugti in December 2005 and January 2006, under the leadership of HRCP’s Chairperson Asma Jahangir, found that fighting had caused widespread damage to the buildings, and 85 percent of the 25,000 or so people of Dera Bugti had been forced to leave the town. Dera Bugti appeared like a ghost town where almost the entire population, their belongings tied atop trucks, vans, lorries or donkey carts, had left the town. Meanwhile, the town of Kohlu remained under a state of siege. Entry to the area was barred and 12,000 or so people of the town were virtually cut off from the outside world since the middle of December. The normal life had come to a standstill. See ‘Balochistan – the Plot Thickens’, Daily Times, Lahore, 4 February 2006.
operation going on in Balochistan. ‘There is no military operation in the province and there is no collateral damage there’, he insisted. Musharraf asserted, however, that the private militia in Balochistan must disarm for peace to prevail.\(^{89}\) By mid June, between 400-to-500 Baloch were killed in the army attacks and air raids. In July 2006, Prime Minister Shauket Aziz ruled out amnesty for ‘miscreants’ in Balochistan.\(^{90}\) For almost 20 months, from January 2005 to August 2006, security forces engaged the Baloch militants in the mountains and the surrounding area.

Pakistan’s security crisis continued to deteriorate when the state fought the US war against terror as a frontline state, on the one hand, and engaged its forces against the Baloch insurgents, on the other. The Baloch dissidents probably benefited from a critical security environment, in which both the US and Pakistan had difficulty to curtail Islamist militancy. The Baloch insurgency, therefore, was an irritant for US-Pakistan cooperation in Balochistan.\(^{91}\) The clash between the armed forces and Baloch militants reached the climax on 26 August 2006 when Nawab Bugti, the driving force behind the current Baloch rebellion, was killed in a military operation in the Bhambore Hills. The 79 year old tribal chief was attacked in a mud-cave situated between the cities of Kohlu and Dera Bugti in Balochistan.\(^{92}\) Bugti had a vigorous political carrier spanning over nearly five decades.

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\(^{89}\) ‘Musharraf Wants Militia to Disarm for Balochistan Peace’, *Daily Times*, Lahore, 4 February 2006. He proposed four-point solution, beginning with the surrender and disarming of the local militia, to end unrest in the province saying, ‘we will not let them flourish and challenge the writ of the government.’ He said that the government will adopt a political solution to the issue only if the local sardar (tribal chiefs) give up arms and stop hampering oil and gas exploration activities and development projects.


\(^{91}\) From 2005-2006, Taliban militancy in Afghanistan reached unparalleled extreme since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001-2002. Random anti-US attacks in Afghanistan culminated into regular skirmishes between the coalition forces and the Taliban fighters. In 2006, indiscriminate suicide bombings became frequent and numbers of deaths increased. It was during this period that General David Richard, the NATO Commander with 32,000 troops under him in Afghanistan, complained about the shortage of military strength to deal with the Taliban. According to an article in *Daily Times* of 4 February 2007, what he had in Afghanistan was ‘a tough assignment with an undemanned and under-equipped NATO force, a lack of international commitment and having to deal with the Generals in Washington, London and Brussels and the warlords in Afghanistan.’ The US criticism of Pakistan for ‘not doing enough’ against Taliban resurgence in Balochistan sharply increased during 2005-2006. Also See ‘NATO and Afghan Forces Prepare to Reclaim Musa Qala’, *Daily Times*, Lahore, 4 February 2007.

Born on 12 July 1927, Nawab Akbar Shahbaz Khan Bugti was the son of Nawab Mahrab Khan Bugti and grandson of Sir Shahbaz Khan Bugti. He served as Chief Minister (1989-90) and Governor (1973-1974) of Baluchistan and also as the Minister of State (1958). Bugti’s political fortune changed frequently, however, due to his involvement in struggles, which involved the use of arms at times, in Balochistan during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Following the armed struggle since 2004, Bugti was identified as the leading force behind the Baloch insurgency post 9/11. He fought for the greater autonomy of Balochistan and died as a martyr for his cause. Many in Pakistan including Baloch nationalists perceived Bugti’s killing as an assassination and as an act of state terrorism.

The incident of Bugti’s death irreparably damaged Musharraf’s image in Pakistan and further eroded country’s security. In the federal parliament, the opposition accused Musharraf for the murder of Nawab Bugti and demanded for Musharraf to be declared a traitor under Article Six of Pakistan’s Constitution. Bugti’s assassination gave the Baloch nationalists a martyr to further legitimize their political cause and to uplift their

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Restoration of Pre-Partition Status of the Province’, *Pak Tribune*, 22 September 2006. Bugti’s killing led to the convening of a grand Jirga (elders meeting) in Balochistan under the Khan of Qalat, Mir Sulaman Daud after 126 years. Around 85 Sardars (Chiefs) and 300 tribal elders attended the gathering. Jirga demanded that the pre-partition status of Balochistan be restored and the issue of the annexation of Qalat be taken up by the International Court of Justice against what it termed violation of agreements signed by the State of Kalat, the Crown of Britain and the government of Pakistan pertaining to the sovereignty and rights of the Baloch people. The declaration rejected the mega development projects, including the Gwadar uplift program saying that the Baloch people would not accept the agreements signed by the government with international companies. The declaration also demanded reunification of all divided Baloch lands into one entity.

93 Irfan Ghauri, ‘MNAs Say Bugti was Murdered’, *Daily Times*, Lahore, 29 August 2006. On 28 August 2006, the opposition MNAs gathered outside the Assembly hall, made angry speeches, shouted anti-Musharraf slogans and passed a resolution which condemned the ‘extra-judicial killing of Bugti’ as a serious blow to the federation. On the same day, in an emergency meeting, the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) agreed to register a first Information report (FIR) against the security officials who participated in killing Bugti. See Rana Ghulam Qadir, ‘Nawab Bugti Sayasat danon Ki Nazar Main’ (Politicians’ Reverence for Nawab Bugti), *Jang*, Rawalpindi, 28 August 2006. The member parliament and Deputy Secretary General of MMA, Hafiz Hussain Ahmad remarked that Pakistan was becoming a part of a hidden conspiracy as America’s think tank had issued a map of this region where Balochistan was placed outside the map of Pakistan. Interestingly, the US Armed Forces Journal has just published material akin to such idea in its June 2006 issue. It showed MMA’s suspicion of the US to create conditions for the secession of Balochistan from Pakistan. See, Ralph Peters, ‘Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East would Look’, *Armed Forces Journal*, June 2006. http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899 retrieved June 2006.
armed struggle. As Senator Sanaullah Baloch wrote in March 2007, the killing of Bugti in a controversial military operation plunged Balochistan into further unrest and was followed by ‘a new round of arbitrary arrests and disappearances.’

Musharraf regime’s policy in Balochistan closely resembled the Bush Administration’s approach to Pakistan as US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained in the 9/11 Commission Report. The US concurrently used both financial incentives and military pressure to obtain Pakistan’s cooperation against terrorism. Similar to US frustration with Pakistan, Islamabad’s efforts were also mired in Balochistan due to same reasons: An over-emphasis on the use of military force compromised the political and economic empowerment at the local level.

However, it was a politically sensible step for the Musharraf regime to open a political dialogue with the Baloch leaders. On 29 September 2005, a 29 member Parliamentary Committee, which Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, the President of PML-Q headed, was formed to ‘examine the current situation in Balochistan and make recommendations thereon.’ The Committee held several meetings with Baloch leaders and especially with Nawab Akbar Bugti. Finally on 3 May 2005, the Committee issued its recommendations that included increased share of gas revenue, more jobs for the Baloch in the development projects and withdrawal of the military forces from the province among the measures. According to these suggestions, one of the two

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95 Amir Wasim, ‘Parliamentary Panel on Balochistan Formed’, *Dawn*, Karachi, 30 September 2004. According to the Senate secretariat notification, a 29-member parliamentary committee on Balochistan was formed with Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain as its chairman. The notification said, the committee was formed by the Senate chairman in consultation with the National Assembly Speaker and parliamentary leaders of other parties in pursuance of the resolutions, passed by the Senate and National Assembly on 23-24 September. The committee was to make recommendations before both the houses within 90 days. The committee was also given the task to make recommendations for promotion of inter-provincial harmony and protection of the provinces’ rights with a view to strengthening the federation. Interestingly, the committee was formed when several opposition members from Balochistan, delivered fiery speeches accusing the military government of launching an unannounced military operation in the province.
96 ‘Committee Discusses Concurrent List Issue’, *Dawn*, Karachi, 4 May 2009. The Parliamentary Committee discussed issues pertaining to provincial autonomy, concurrent and federal lists and possible amendments to the constitution. The committee decided to recommend to the government the deletion of 30 items from the concurrent legislative list and their devolution to provinces with the passage of a
Parliamentary Sub-committees, led by Senator Mushahid Hussain, prepared a report to improve the center-province relations. On 13 July 2006, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz stated that implementation of recommendations of the sub-committee had begun. In reality, nothing came out of this exercise on the ground. The other sub-committee, led by Senator Sujjad Wasim, never made any recommendations. Given the political vacuum, Baloch nationalists felt further isolated with the killing of Sardar Bugti.

The dilemma of Baloch nationalism is a consequence of their perpetual sense of isolation. The Baloch strongly resented being isolated in the process of national development. For example, the veteran nationalist leader and a leading Baloch Sardar, Nawab Khair Buksh Murri, in his January 2009 interview with daily Post encapsulated the Baloch predicament when he emphasized that ‘the Baloch has been out of all competitive fields. Now, the Baloch is harboring fears for his identity. He has never been a part of decision-making. He dwelt in the mountains. Now his mountains are throwing up gold and silver and he fears that he may be ousted from his mountains as well. He fears that he will be divested of his mineral resources.’

Supporting Marri’s sentiments, Sanaullah Baloch stressed that ‘mining contracts for the province’s copper and gold deposits were awarded to Chinese and Chilean companies without consulting the provincial government. Balochistan receives only two percent royalty out of its wealth but Islamabad and Beijing share 48% and 50% of the profits respectively.’ Such practices created an undesirable conflict of interest between the state constitutional amendment. The committee believed that the strengthening of the provinces would mean the strengthening of the federation.


99 Senator Sanaullah Baloch, ‘The Balochistan Conflict’ Brief No. 7, op. cit, p. 5. According to the paper, ‘not a single human resource centre or college has been established in the mineral rich part of the province to produce a future work force which could benefit Balochistan directly.’
and its most restless province forcing people to a total defiance. On 21 September 2006, a Grand Jirga was called by the Khan of Qalat, Mir Sulaman Daud, to commemorate Sardar Bugti’s death. Around 85 Sardars and 300 tribal elders attended the gathering. The Jirga, in a unanimous declaration, called for the pre-1947 restoration of an independent status of Balochistan and rejected mega development projects including the Gwadar port. The declaration claimed that the Baloch people would not accept the agreements signed by the government with international companies. In such a critical environment, the Baloch Sardar referred to the ground reality when he said, ‘Now the situation is that some Baloch are fearful of the changing times.’

In his long perceptive interview, Nawab Marri, who led the 1973-77 revolt with thousands of his armed tribesmen, discussed Islamabad’s conduct of Balochistan and Baloch reaction to that. ‘We do not have a lot of time’ he warned. ‘We have no patience for elections or democracy and parliament. We understand that in a period of 20-25 years, the Baloch may become a minority in their own backyard.’ ‘They [non-Baloch] will plunder our resources ‘ he lamented. In his version of the post 9/11 shift in the region and its impact on Balochistan, Marri observed:

The breakup of the Soviet Union has transformed the situation in our region. There are a greater number of options before the people now. They can trade their resources in a larger market. All states can be part of such a bargain now. In Gwadar and other parts of Balochistan, we can expect a lot of prosperity in the near future because of mineral resources. Gwadar can be a huge market – call it a gateway or doorway. That possibility has also brought about the fears of a change in our ethnic or demographic profile.

Nawab Marri’s view of a changing environment in and around Balochistan and the threat it posed to the Baloch tribal heritage reflected the deep anxiety of a Baloch nationalist. It was not only the demographic shift that occurred in the last three decades suggesting that the Baloch might already have become a minority in Balochistan. It

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101 Ibid.
102 Rashed Rahman, ‘We Fear Extinction: Nawab Khair Buksh Marri’, The Post, op. cit. Marri clearly depicted the long living instinct of Baloch nationalism when he said, ‘Pakistan was not made by the Baloch. The Baloch were not a party to the decision to join Pakistan. They did not join Pakistan through their free will or their political alliances.
103 Ibid.
would be the new influx of people that would sharply transform the Baloch cultural image as the Gwadar port would become fully functional. Robert Wirsing rightly pointed out in his analysis of the current stage of Baloch nationalism when he emphasized that:

Modernization, globalization, Pakistan’s steadily rising population, and the massive forces of change unleashed by economic development are threatening to leave the Baloch far behind. They are among the poorest, least educated, and least urbanized of Pakistan’s population; and they are too easily passed over or pushed aside in the highly competitive social and economic environments now gaining traction in Pakistan.104

Wirsing emphasized that the growing process of economic development in Pakistan and India increasingly required the untapped energy resources. He discussed in detail the proposed trans-national energy pipelines running from Iran and Turkmenistan to Pakistan and then to India.105 Both of these transit routes involve Balochistan projecting its economic significance as a major commercial hub in the area. Pakistan was prepared to take an economic leap and therefore offered its support to regional and extra regional efforts in this direction.

Having security concerns vis-à-vis India, Pakistan desired to take advantage of the regional development and enhance its energy security that would potentially help improve regional integration through peace and prosperity among neighbors.106 As such, Pakistan chose to relate with the historical forces of change. Within Pakistan, however, the Baloch nationalists viewed the process of change with a sense of fear and denial. For example, Nawab Marri, who lived quietly in Afghanistan with his large tribe

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104 Robert G. Wirsing, ‘Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources: The Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan’, SSI, op. cit., p. 27. The author estimates that as much as 5,000,000 people could enter Balochistan in the years to come with reference to Gwadar port and other related activities.
106 Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War, a new wave of economic development projects has swept the region including China, India and Pakistan. Many other global and regional players are also active in the region spanning from South Asia to Central Asia, to fill the void created by the crumbling Soviet empire that left behind five Central Asian states which occupy large deposits of natural resources such as gas and oil. The post 9/11 events have given boost to such globally inspired regional development. Pakistan is predestined to be part of such historic transformation of the area. Letting this historic opportunity pass idly will ruin Pakistan’s chances to be a viable state in the context of political and economic stability. The stability will minimize both internal and external security crises building trust, peace and cooperation in the region.
in the 1980s without taking sides either with the Afghan fighters or the Soviet invaders, criticized the post 9/11 interest of the global forces in the region that involved Balochistan. He felt that the development of the Gwadar Project in Balochistan would not lead to the progress and prosperity of the Baloch, but to their eventual destruction. In his words:

We have one precedent of mega projects that were installed in North America. What happened to the indigenous people of that region? This is all a game of classification, a hierarchical process. America was called the land of opportunity. What opportunity came to the original inhabitants of that land? The basic notion in that paradigm is the destruction of one group and prosperity for the other. Those originally dwelling in the region were destroyed so that the outsiders could prosper. They were not adjusted. There was no sharing of emerging opportunities. They were just eliminated. 107

Observed closely, Balochistan is a complex case of mismanagement at the state level. A state structure that centered on strong central authority increased the sense of deprivation and isolation among the Baloch, who belonged to the periphery. Pakistan lost its writ in the hostile parts of the territory. The local populace endured poverty and political violence to no avail.108 This zero-sum game, however, does not have to be a fait accompli, especially when exceptional opportunities of economic growth and prosperity are at hand in the region.

The new opportunities that emerge in a changed energy context bring new pragmatic ways for Pakistan to address the issue of Baloch nationalism in a mutually useful manner without the use of force. The history of five military operations in Balochistan from 1948 to 2006 proved that such measures simply destabilized Pakistan in the past and if continued will hurt the country more in the future. A prolonged insurgency in

itself has an element of undermining the state structure as the latest studies of insurgencies suggest. Continuity in the use of military force to subdue the Baloch would hurt Pakistan’s politico-economic interests drastically. In the absence of any safe passage for the regional energy channels through Balochistan and without a major commercial hub like Gwadar port, global pressures would increase on Pakistan with serious security implications.

In the absence of support from the global powers, Pakistan’s security would be eroded especially because of its opposition to the ‘insurgency’ in Balochistan. The US actively promoted the democratic changeover in Pakistan to draw public support behind the government’s anti-terrorist efforts, which the Musharraf regime had failed to attain. The elected government of PPP did show signs of reconciliation since its inception in 2008 in order to minimize the political differences in the country with strong US support. It would benefit both the authorities in Islamabad and the Baloch leadership to convert their mutual hostility into mutual cooperation. It is an unusual time in the history of this region but equally presents an opportunity to courageously build a prosperous future for its people. The post Musharraf environment of democratic governance in the centre and provinces should prove conducive to achieve a win-win situation through building a positive approach on either side.

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109 See, for example, Steven Metz, ‘Rethinking Insurgency’, June 2007. This study is based on the analysis of Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies essentially. One of its emphases is on the implications of a lingering insurgency which harms more the interests of its opponents due to various reasons including monetary and strategic. Both the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies frustrated the US despite highly expensive counter-insurgency efforts. The issues discussed in this study are readily applicable to the Baloch insurgency in the Southwest of Pakistan, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm retrieved 3 September 2009.

110 On 26 August 2007, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez presided over the dedication of a 673-meter long bridge over the Pyanj River dividing Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The bridge, costing over $37 million and able to handle as many as 1,000 trucks per day, is the largest U.S. Government-funded infrastructure project in Tajikistan. The commerce secretary described it as a ‘physical and symbolic link between Central Asia and South Asia. U.S. Embassy press releases at the time called attention to Karachi (also read Gwadar) as a “warm water port” and to Pakistan as the southern destination of the bridge’s future traffic. See, ‘Embassy of the United States in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, Press Release: Fact Sheet on Tajik-Afghan Nizhny Pyanj Bridge, www.dushanbe.usembassy.gov/bridge_fact_sheet.html retrieved on 15 September 2007, mentioned in, Robert G. Wirsing, op. cit, pp. 18-19. Wirsing called it ‘the strategic significance of Washington’s own increasingly aggressive engineering activity in the region.’
Along with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the Baloch insurgency posed threats to the US and Pakistan’s security interests equally in the region. Pakistan’s failure to reverse the Baloch rebellion would pose a serious problem for the US to use Balochistan as a transit route. During the Musharraf regime, there was futile use of military force in Balochistan. Within this context, the PPP government followed a conciliatory policy to address the Baloch issue. For example, President Asif Ali Zardari apologized for the injustices done to the Baloch people in the past. Political prisoners such as ex-Chief Minister of Balochistan Akhtar Mengal were released from jail. The government ended the construction of the military cantonments and began to provide financial support to the Balochistan government. It still required concerted political and economic efforts, however, to improve peace and harmony in Balochistan.

This section has discussed the Baloch insurgency and its implications for Pakistan’s security in the context of US-Pakistan cooperation against terror in Balochistan post 9/11. As a corollary of the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11, the recent Baloch insurgency deeply eroded Pakistan’s security. Following the US invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11, the Baloch activists increased violence due to three main reasons. First, the influx of the Afghans into Balochistan revived fears among the Baloch that they would become a minority in their own province. The demographic tilt in favor of the Pashtuns was unacceptable for the Baloch indigenous claim over Balochistan. Next, the outcome of the 2002 elections widely isolated the Baloch from mainstream socio-political structures and turned them towards politics of agitation, which was mixed with violence. Finally and significantly, the US energy interest in the region including Balochistan alarmed the Baloch nationalists about outside influence in their internal affairs. The US pursuits in the region and Baloch nationalism, therefore, were contrary in nature. As the Baloch insurgents attacked the state infrastructure

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111 See, ‘Balochistan ma Aman aur Iktsadi Taraqi Wafaqi Hakoomat Ki Awaleen Tarjeeh Hai: Sadr Zardari (Peace and Economic Development in Balochistan is the First Priority of the Federal Government: President Zardari) Jang, Rawalpindi, 7 October 2009. According to the news, Zardari, in his meeting with the chief minister of Balochistan, stated that his government will eliminate poverty from Balochistan and elevate its economic status to the level of other provinces. President also hinted that that the recommendations made in the Parliamentary committee favorable to Baloch people would soon be announced. Also see, ‘Naraaz Balochon Say Rabtay main Takhir na Karain (Contact Angry Baloch Without Delay)’, Editorial, Jang, Rawalpindi, 28 August 2009.
eroding Pakistan’s security, the US-Pakistan cooperation security interests further converged in Balochistan.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in Balochistan for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level. Due to the US engagement in Afghanistan, Balochistan faced two major insurgencies: Taliban militancy and Baloch nationalist revolt. Despite being divergent in their stated objectives, both insurgencies overlapped in destabilizing Pakistan mainly through eroding the writ of the state in Balochistan. The flow of the Taliban from Balochistan into Afghanistan rendered Pakistan’s southwestern border widely insecure. Moreover, the Baloch militants attacked Pakistan’s security personnel along with the country’s economic and strategic installations. Pakistan’s contradictory strategy to tolerate Taliban’s activities in Balochistan, while using coercive means against the Baloch rebels eroded the country’s security. To make matters worse, sectarian violence occurred sporadically in which Sunni militants killed Shias in and around Quetta. Thus, a combination of interconnected factors from US engagement in Afghanistan to the emergence of Taliban and Baloch militancy to Pakistan’s discriminatory treatment of the two militant groups pushed the country to the brink of insecurity.

Interestingly, Pakistan’s situation in Balochistan was identical to the US predicament in Afghanistan. Musharraf failed to defeat the Baloch insurgency through force. The revolt further intensified eroding the country’s security. As a spillover effect, the Taliban influx in Balochistan harmed Pakistan’s security interests, while the rising Baloch militancy caused concerns for US energy interests in the region. The Baloch demanded the withdrawal of Pakistan’s military forces from Balochistan and called for total autonomy. Similarly, the Taliban demanded a total withdrawal of US coalition forces from Afghanistan. After years of facing strategic setbacks, both the US and Pakistani decision makers reached similar conclusions: Empower the local people, help them reconstruct their socio-political structures and try to win their hearts and minds. In
practical terms, such plans require generous economic assistance, long-term political support and mutual tolerance.

The second part of the thesis has explored the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to view the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security at the regional level. Within this context, the next chapter of the thesis analyses the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis its regional rival – India.

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PART THREE

THE IMPLICATIONS OF US-PAKISTAN COOPERATION POST 9/11 FOR PAKISTAN’S SECURITY AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL
CHAPTER FIVE

THE US ROLE IN INDIA-PAKISTAN MILITARY STANDOFF (2001/02) AND PAKISTAN’S REGIONAL SECURITY

This chapter discusses the US role in India-Pakistan military standoff from December 2001 to October 2002 and its implications for Pakistan’s security at the regional level. It argues that the US was alarmed about the possibility of an India-Pakistan war that could lead to a probable nuclear conflict. The US also wanted to prevent another war in South Asia because this conflict could have disrupted Pakistan’s essential role in the US war on terror post 9/11. The US diplomacy to avert the military standoff, therefore, helped protect Pakistan’s security at the regional level.

This chapter is divided in the following four sections: 1) Defining Pakistan’s security at the regional level; 2) India’s concerns over emerging US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11; 3) The US role in preventing an Indo-Pakistan war; and 4) The US, India-Pakistan standoff and Pakistan’s security.

DEFINING PAKISTAN’S SECURITY AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL:

This section argues that due to the nature of geo-historical rivalry along with the strategic relationship between the two rival states, Pakistan’s security relationship with India defines Pakistan’s security at the regional level. Buzan has provided a theoretical framework for the discussion of Pakistan’s security at the regional level. Buzan’s twin concepts of ‘security complex’ and ‘security interdependence’ are useful to understand
Pakistan’s security at the regional context. According to Buzan, ‘Security Complex’ has a ‘strong, inward looking character.’ Further, ‘the principle factor defining a complex is usually a high level of threat/fear which is felt mutually among two or more states…. . Unless they are world class powers, these states will usually be close neighbors.’¹ In his own words, ‘a security complex exists where a set of security relationships stands out from the general background by virtue of the relatively strong, inward looking character and the relative weakness of its outward security interactions with its neighbors.’² The traditional rivalry between Pakistan and India shows that both states do form a security complex. Being close neighbors, both feel a high level of threat / fear from one another and their security relations do have a ‘strong, inward looking character’ compared to their security relations with other states, which are predominantly weak.

The mutual fear which both countries experience leads to ‘security interdependence’ between them. The concept signifies that the security of the two traditional rivals becomes so inter-connected that one rival automatically reacts to any change in the other’s security.³ Buzan holds that there is a wide spectrum of patterns of amity and enmity between states. Strong interdependence suggests enmity, while weak interdependence implies amity. In the case of India and Pakistan, there is strong interdependence, which implies a strong adversarial relationship between the two states. This insight helps the understanding of Pakistan’s perceptions and behavior vis-à-vis India.

Pakistan’s rivalry with India had geo-historical roots, which strongly affected their strategic rivalry. In geo-historical terms, Pakistan emerged out of British India in 1947. The Kashmir dispute between the two states was a legacy of the partition of India, which led to three wars between them in 1948, 1965 and 1971 and low intensity conflicts occurred in Siachen since the 1980s along with the Kargil conflict in 1999. As a result of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan’s eastern wing seceded from the country and became the separate state of Bangladesh. In strategic terms, both states

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³ Ibid.
compete with each other in both conventional and unconventional defense. There is an arms race between them in conventional weapon systems. Both states became de facto nuclear weapon states with their peaceful explosion of nuclear devices in May 1998. Ever since, both have engaged in a nuclear missile race as well.

For over fifty years, Kashmir dispute had brought India and Pakistan to the battle ground more than once. In 1948, the first India-Pakistan war occurred that resulted in United Nations resolutions for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir, which never materialized.\(^4\) The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war failed to resolve India-Pakistan dispute over

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\(^4\) Following the first Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir, Indian government approached the UN Security Council on 1 January 1948 to intervene in the Kashmir dispute. The UNSC, after complicated negotiations, secured an agreement between India and Pakistan that the future of India and Pakistan would be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite under the UN arrangements. The underlying principal of this and rest of the following resolutions adopted by the UNSC or the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was the right of self-determination exercised by the people of Kashmir through the democratic process of holding a plebiscite. The proposed plebiscite entailed, however, the option of joining either India or Pakistan. In its key resolution of 21 April 1948, the UNSC clearly indicated that ‘both India and Pakistan desire that the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.’ This resolution preceded the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, maintaining that ‘the governments of India and Pakistan reaffirmed their wish that the future status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people of Kashmir and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both governments agree to enter into consultation with the Commission (UNCIP) to determine the fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expressions will be assured.’ On 5 January 1949, another UNCIP resolution gave the arrangements of the plebiscite. Both India and Pakistan accepted the arrangements of the resolution regarding ceasefire, troop withdrawal and plebiscite. The ceasefire came into effect on 1 January 1949 and UN observers were deployed in the area to supervise it. On 27 July, a ceasefire line was established in Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission failed, however, to reach an agreement with the parties on the terms of demilitarization of the state before a plebiscite could be held. Since then, the UN has been unable to resolve the differences between India and Pakistan. On 14 March 1950, UNSC adopted a resolution stressing the implementation of the earlier adopted UNSC and UNCIP resolution to no avail. On 30 March 1951, 10 November 1951 and 23 December 1952, the UNSC adopted three more resolutions reaffirming the preceding resolution towards the free and fair plebiscite in disputed Kashmir territory knowing that India was initiating steps towards reshaping the future of Kashmir territory under its control according to India’s own geo-strategic interest. When in January 1957, the Kashmir constituent assembly under the regime of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad ratified Kashmir’s accession to India, the UNSC adopted another resolution on 24 January rejecting Indian manipulation of the status of Kashmir. It followed 21 February 1957 resolution asking India and Pakistan to offer any proposals which were ‘likely to contribute to the settlement of the dispute in the light of previous UNSC and UNCIP resolutions. The eleventh resolution of the UNSC and the last one on the issue of plebiscite in Kashmir came on 2 December 1957, which confirmed that both India and Pakistan agreed with the first three UNSC and UNCIP resolutions towards the plebiscite. Since its last resolution of December 1957, the UN has practically withdrawn from the issue. Following the 1965 war, the Kashmir dispute came up in 10 January 1966 Tashkent Declaration between India and Pakistan where both countries held their respective positions and agreed to ‘settle the dispute through peaceful means’ and ‘observe ceasefire terms on the ceasefire line.’ After the 1971 India-Pakistan war in East Pakistan, now sovereign state of Bangladesh, the Simla Agreement was signed between both rival countries and the ceasefire line of 1949 in divided Kashmir was converted into the virtual Line of Control (LOC) with minor readjustments. LOC
Kashmir. Since 1990, Indian side of Kashmir saw violence between Kashmiri Muslim separatists and Indian security forces. A conservative death estimate of Kashmiri Muslims at the hands of Indian security forces is more than 70,000. The limited Kargil war in 1999 was also related to the Kashmir dispute. India blamed Pakistan for providing more than moral and political support to the Kashmiri separatists. Pakistan, on its part, demanded a political solution of Kashmir from India but the latter’s reluctance to find any negotiated resolution of the dispute led to the continuation of militancy and violence in Kashmir. Indian decision makers saw the US response to 9/11 as an opportunity to settle the Kashmir issue on their own terms.

The resolution of the Kashmir dispute holds the key to the normalization of relations between the two traditional rivals. From the 1980s, the US encouraged Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan, and supported nuclear CBMs between them after their nuclear explosions. Both rivals were locked in the conflict in a
way that they were unable to resolve their issues on their own. They strongly needed the US as a facilitator to resolve the Kashmir dispute. In the post 9/11 era, the US encouraged the on-going India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue, which among others, included the issues of Kashmir and terrorism on its agenda as issues to be bilaterally resolved between the two rivals. Soon after post 9/11, both states came close to a war in 2001/02. Fortunately, the US defused the tension. Since Pakistan’s security is intertwined with India, it is worthwhile to understand how India and Pakistan were caught in the military stand off of 2001-2002, which was once again related to the unresolved Kashmir dispute.

**INIDA’S CONCERNS OVER EMERGING US-PAKISTAN COOPERATION POST 9/11:**

This section discusses India’s concerns over emerging US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11. It argues that following the attacks, which Kashmiri militants carried out on the parliament building in New Delhi on 13 December 2001, India tried to convince the US to blame Pakistan for the act of state sponsored terrorism. However, due to Pakistan’s willingness to support the US in the war against terrorism, the US decided to make Pakistan a frontline state to combat global terrorism and thus refused to blame Pakistan.

As the US coalition forces completed the task of destroying the Taliban regime post 9/11, India mobilized its troops on Pakistan’s eastern border in January 2002 blaming Pakistan for the 13 December terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. India blamed Pakistan when a small group of Kashmiri militants attacked the Indian parliament on 13 December. While Indian guards killed all the attackers, India accused Pakistan of supporting the attack calling the event an example of state sponsored cross border terrorism. Within this context, India moved its forces to its western border with Pakistan. In response, Pakistan rejected India’s allegations and moved Pakistan’s own forces to its eastern border with India. As a result, from January to October 2002, over one million Indian-Pakistani troops confronted each other across the Indo-Pakistan border. The situation not only threatened regional peace and security but also the US security interest post 9/11.
With the reversal of its policy towards the Taliban post 9/11, Pakistan’s image transformed into that of an informal US ally in the war on terror. Since the mid 1990s, Pakistan had supported the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which harbored Osama and his al-Qaeda network. The global community was seriously concerned about this nexus in the region. However, 9/11 changed the regional equation when Pakistan apparently abandoned the Taliban and joined the US war against terrorism as a front line state.

The conventional India-Pakistan hostility, nevertheless, increased due to the attack on the Indian parliament in December. According to reports, five attackers armed with assault rifles and plastic explosives including grenades, used a fake pass to drive a stolen white Ambassador sedan on the grounds of the Indian parliament and attempted to enter the circular building. Their apparent plan was to attack the legislators. The plan failed due to sheer luck. One of the militants blew himself up outside the parliament door that was to be used by the Ministers. Four others died in crossfire with the Indian security guards, who took seven casualties. The attack triggered outrage, particularly among the Indian ruling elite.

The leaders of ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) immediately attributed the attack to two Pakistan based religious militant groups, Lashkar-i-Taiba

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6 Harish Kahare, ‘Suicide Squad Storms Parliament: 5 Militants Killed, Army Deployed, Terrorists will Pay – Advani’, *The Hindu*, Delhi, 12 December 2001. According to the report, ‘a terrorist squad sneaked into the Parliament House, but before all five of them could be gunned down by the security officials, they did succeed in killing six security personnel and one civilian’. As many as 12 security personnel and 6 civilians were hurt. The report added that the violent drama lasted for about just 30 minutes but ‘its reverberation will be felt for a long time’ to come. The report pointed out that ‘police and other intelligence agencies were not able or willing’ to identify the terrorists. However, Home Minister Advani told newspapers that as far as he could make out, the terrorists did not appear to have ‘Indian faces’. The unstated inference, according to the report, was that the terrorists were perhaps of Afghan origin. Following the attack, Prime Minister Vajpayee addressed his nation saying that ‘now the fight against terrorism’ has reached its last phase. He further stated that ‘we will ‘fight a decisive battle’ to the end. It implied that Vajpayee and other BJP leaders in the government had reached a consensus to initiate a war against Pakistan. ‘Terrorism will be Fought Decisively, Says Vajpayee’, *The Times of India*, New Delhi, 14 December 2001.

7 Laurie Goering, ‘5 Gunmen Strom India’s Parliament, Killing 7’, *Chicago Tribune*, 14 December 2001. Celia Dugger, ‘India Weighs Using Troops to Hunt 2 Groups in Pakistan’, *New York Times*, 23 December 2001. According to one account, the attackers’ vehicle crashed into an official car, forcing them to go on foot. In addition, a power outage in the capital knocked out the television broadcasts of the parliament session. The militant who was to alert the attackers by cell phone when key members arrived was therefore unaware that the 400-plus legislators had instead adjourned and that many ministers therefore would not be present. Rama Lakshmi, ‘Gunmen with Explosives Attack Indian Parliament’, *Washington Post*, 14 December 2001.
and Jaish-i-Mohammad. Blaming Pakistan for ‘cross-border terrorism’, India hastily launched Operation Parakaram moving over 500,000 army troops with Indian Air Force and Navy redeployment close to Pakistan’s border and Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. The BJP government’s swift military mobilization to pressurize Pakistan for the attack on the parliament could also be ascribed to a sequence of events that had earlier provoked Indian outrage. Among others, there was the militant attack on the assembly house on the Indian side of Kashmir in Srinagar on 1 October 2001, which took 40 lives. More events of higher strategic and diplomatic significance had preceded these two attacks that had left India blaming Pakistan for the incidents.

Earlier, in May 2001, the Agra Summit was unable to resolve the differences between the two rivals. Following successful negotiations between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf, the table was set to sign the final communiqué when last minute mishandling made the conference unproductive. The failing of the Agra Conference was a lost opportunity that further deteriorated the India-Pakistan peace process after Kargil. From May to July 1999, the Pakistan Army’s misadventure of beginning a limited war with India in the Himalayan range of snowy hills in the Kargil area of Kashmir had unleashed anti-Pakistan chauvinism in India.

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10 A suicide car bomb attack killed 40 and injured over 60. For Indian government’s response, See S. Rajagopalan, ‘India’s Patience Running Out, PM: Bush Reminded of Kashmir Terrorism’, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 3 October 2001; Also See Brahma Chellaney, ‘Failing in the Shadow: If India is to Stem Terrorism, it has to Fight its own War’, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 3 October 2001.
These narratives must have been fresh in the minds of Indian policy makers when India decided to plan Operation Parakaram post 9/11.

Due to India’s adversarial relationship with Pakistan, Indian political and strategic circles were concerned about the probability of Pakistan joining the US war on terror, which could affect India’s interests in the region. India feared that due to US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11, the US would have a much more evenhanded approach towards both India and Pakistan. India saw the renewed US-Pakistan relationship as an unwelcome development especially when India had inculcated a strong relationship with the US since the early post Cold War era.

With increased confidence in its relationship with the US, India had proposed to form a coalition of democratic states against global terrorism that technically would have ruled out a military ruled Pakistan. India has wanted to persuade the US because the US had become the largest investor in India in the 1990s and Indo-US cooperation had significantly increased in the area of military procurement. Within this context, immediately after 9/11 events, India supported the US against global terrorism.

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14 In his letter to President Bush, Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote: ‘This dark hour is a stark and terrible reminder of the power and the reach of the terrorists to destroy innocent lives and challenge the civilized order in this world. It sends a strong message to democracies to redouble our efforts to defeat this great threat to our people, our values and our way of life’. See ‘India’s Response to September 11, 2001 Terror Attacks’, *Strategic Digest*, Vol. XXXI, No. 10, IDSA, New Delhi, October 2001, p. 1371. Again in an exclusive interview with the CNN on 16 September 2001, Jaswant Singh reiterated the same idea saying that ‘what India stands for is really the establishment of a ‘concert of democracies against terrorism, unified in their purpose and resolve.’ See *Strategic Digest*, Vol. XXXI, No. 10, October 2001, p. 1378. The idea of building an anti-terror coalition of democracies originally came from President Bush himself who had appealed for such an ‘alliance’ on 9/11. Faced with the fact of diverse political structures in the prevailing world, however, this idea did not hold much ground beyond its rhetorical significance.

On the evening of 9/11, India offered its total support to the US. On 9/11, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee sent a letter to President Bush, according to which India was ‘ready to cooperate in the investigations into this crime and to strengthen [Indian] partnership in leading international efforts to ensure that terrorism never succeeds again’. On 13 September, India’s Cabinet Committee on security, in the presence of the Foreign Secretary, Chokila Iyer, and the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal A. Y. Tipnis, met to discuss a response strategy. The Committee reached a consensus that India must develop an active identification with US administration’s counter-terrorism drive. India was prepared to go a long way to join the US led coalition.

Yet, India was not clear in geographical and logistical sense as to how it could meet US strategic needs in case of a military operation in Afghanistan. The idea of being part of the US anti-terrorism drive in Afghanistan was so strong that India even ignored geo-strategic realities that barely allowed it to provide necessary operational support to the US. On 15 September, Prime Minister Vajpayee chaired a parliamentary meeting in which both the government and opposition, except the Communist Party of India (Marxist), were united to offer base facilities to the US. Reading the mind of its political elite, the Indian media argued that the best strategy for India would be to use the US military presence in the region to silence Pakistan sponsored militancy in Kashmir. India felt that its chronic Kashmir issue, the Achilles’ heel of India, could
now be healed with US support. It implied that India was ready to use the US card to get Kashmiri separatism recognized as terrorism, and to get Pakistan designated as a supporter of cross-border terrorism.

India’s intention was obvious in the statement of India’s Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, who refused to differentiate between the freedom fighters and the terrorists. On September 17, in an interview with Star News, Jaswant, commenting about the fine line between those who practiced terror and those who claimed they were freedom fighters, summed up his response: ‘I think this is a very old story now. That is a debate which was resolved long time back and this distinction [between] freedom fighters and terrorists and terrorists employing means of destruction against innocent men, women and children. What kind of freedom fighters are they?’

Responding to another question about Pakistan, Jaswant Singh stated that after 9/11, the fine line between freedom fighters and terrorists was completely blurred and Pakistan could no longer use that distinction. When asked, what were his views on Pakistan’s role in the war on terror, he emphasized that because of its history of sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir, Pakistan did not deserve to be the frontline state in the war against terror. The statement clearly reflected India’s mindset against Pakistan.

India wanted the US and India to collaborate closely against the Taliban in Afghanistan, which could have helped India to effectively use US support to combat the insurgents in Kashmir particularly if Pakistan was excluded from the campaign. India, consequently, was disillusioned and disappointed when the US decided to use Pakistani air bases along with Pakistan’s logistical and intelligence support. The US Ambassador against terrorism’. ‘Seeking an Active Role’ (Editorial), The Hindu, Delhi, 16 September 2001. The editorial argued that India has to be ‘clear and specific about its objectives’ in siding with the US led coalition.’


21 Strategic Digest, Ibid. Also See ‘Transcript of Interview Given by External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh to Aaj Tak on 20 September 2001’ reproduced in Strategic Digest. Vol. XXXI, No. 10, October 2001, pp. 1384-86. According to Jaswant Singh, ‘the roots of terrorism are in Pakistan... Our fight will continue. We have our own plans, ideology and principles to combat terrorism. We are not dependent on any other country for these things. Yes we would like to have support of other countries on this issue. If it is there, fine. If not, even then it does not affect us much. We will continue with our actions.’

to India, James Blackwell personally met India’s Union Minister L. K. Advani to break the upsetting news that India was not getting an important role in the US led coalition.23 On September 18, Vajpayee and Jaswant had a rough day in the Indian Parliament on the issue of US concerns over Pakistani sensitivities. The cabinet also showed its utter disappointment for the second time in less than a week over Indian government’s not receiving any US request for Indian assistance. In the evening, Prime Minister Vajpayee told the press that ‘no specific request’ for assistance had been made by the US.24 India seems to have ignored the basic logistical and geographical factors in that any operation against the Taliban had to be based primarily in Pakistan due to its long border with Afghanistan. These were taxing moments in New Delhi, yet there was a glimmer of hope.

On 20 September 2001, an editorial in *The Hindu* read, ‘Regardless of tacit assurance that present tie-up between the US and Pakistan need not destabilize peace and politics elsewhere on the international stage, the plan of forming the nucleus of a globalised alliance against terrorism does not yet seem to have crystallized.’25 This assertion reflected a strong desire on India’s part to play a significant role in the US led coalition against terrorism. On the one hand, India wanted to significantly improve its relationship with the US. On the other hand, India wanted the US to deal strongly with terrorism against India for which the latter blamed Pakistan. India, consequently, felt disillusioned with the US because the US wanted to forge close cooperation with Pakistan post 9/11.

An Indian academic from the School of International Studies at Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University, Kanti Bajpai commented on India’s interests and apprehensions post 9/11. In his views published in *The Hindu* of 22 September, Bajpai argued that ‘storm clouds [were] gathering on India-US relations’ because ‘Indian middle classes [were] worried that the US, out of its present needs, has struck a kind of deal with Pakistan [which is] reminiscent of [the] 1950s and 1980s.’26 Moreover, according to Bajpai,

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‘Indian concerns and anxieties are to Americans dispensable’ and that the ‘US has sold India down the Indus’. However, Bajpai stressed that the US need to get Pakistan in its ‘coalition of moderate Islamic influentials is understandable’ and it might be that the benefit of ‘having India in that coalition at this stage’ is ‘unclear’ but Washington needed to take a long view. In the long term, in Bajpai’s view, it was the large democratic and developing India that would be the United States best ally. Further, India, due to its conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, had ‘a stake in the outcome of US policies in the region.’ Within this context, India mattered more ‘in a coalition dedicated to managing terrorism problems.’

Bajpai emphasized that ‘Washington must, at least privately, tell New Delhi that it will go beyond the immediate terrorism problem focused on Afghanistan.’ It implied that besides Afghanistan, Kashmir required active US involvement in fighting terrorism. Bajpai proposed that the US should publicly emphasize that it would not make a deal with Pakistan, which would be inimical to India’s interests. He pointed out that the US ignored India in the first few days and Pakistan successfully created the impression that it had a special relationship with the US and that a new deal between the two countries was in the offing. He suggested that the US should also be seen cooperating with India. ‘It may not be something big or dramatic but it should be visible enough to the Indian middle classes to reassure them.’

India’s desire to join US led coalition against terrorism stemmed mainly from two factors. First, India was primarily concerned with its own entanglement in Kashmir. Second, India was concerned about its adversarial relationship with Pakistan, which was waging a proxy war in Kashmir. India hoped that the anti-terrorism drive in Afghanistan could lead to elimination of militancy in Kashmir. Bajpai, however, believed that the US efforts in Afghanistan would not automatically help India to control and bring normalcy to the Indian side of Kashmir. He, therefore, suggested that

\[27\] Ibid.
\[28\] Ibid.
\[29\] Ibid.
the US needed to take certain measures to allay India’s concerns. For example, according to him:

The US should apply pressure on Pakistan to wind down fundamentalist influences. This means at the very least, redefining the role of madrassa education in Pakistan. In addition, it means rooting out fundamentalist element in the armed forces [which] implies shutting down the militant groups operating in Kashmir. Lashkar-i-Taiba, Jaish-i-Mohammad, and the Hizbul Mujahideen are the three most important outfits. Washington should get Islamabad to act hard and fast against these groups and at least disarm them.30

Bajpai implied that in time, the religious militant groups might seize political power in Pakistan. According to him, if these groups intensified their operation in India or did something similar to 9/11 ‘against Indian targets’, then there would be pressure on India to ‘retaliate massively’.31 It would lead to ‘a conflict with Pakistan … with nuclear weapons not far away’.32 This analysis showed that Kashmiri militants not al-Qaeda terrorists stirred India’s strategic thinking. It was India’s enmity with Pakistan even with the threat of a nuclear conflict which most mattered. In an ironical twist, India which had earlier decided on ‘no first use’ of nuclear arms as a doctrine now seemed to abandon this principle.

India, nevertheless, wanted to draw the US into the Kashmir dispute. On 25 September, the National Security Adviser and the Principal Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra was in Washington to meet the senior officials of the Bush administration. In this period, the US administration was most obsessed with the war against terrorism. In particular, Mishra found the American administration obsessed with ‘get Osama’ project. He, however, tried to point out that beyond all the immediate concerns and objectives, the long term implications should not be brushed aside. Mishra drew the Bush administration’s attention, in particular, to the al-Qaeda network as having links with the Kashmiri militants.33 He expressed his concern that the US had ignored India’s Kashmir problem.

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid. It is apparent now that the US forced Pakistan to take measures that Bajpai desired such as banning the militant organizations, reorganizing the Madrassa education system and the cleansing of at least some of the upper brass of the Pakistani military.
The report from Washington on Mishra’s visit that was published in The Hindu of 26 September 2001 observed that at least in the short term, the ‘focus here is quite limited as far as the Bush administration is concerned.’ Senior officials ‘have made no bones of the fact that the prime attention’ was on ‘Osama bin Laden, his network and training camps.’ The report noted that Mishra was in Washington at a time when there was ‘a tremendous amount of support and political sympathy’ for Musharraf for his decision to fully align Pakistan with the US in targeting the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.\(^{34}\) Historically, a Pakistan-US alliance had never been acceptable to India and various US administrations were well aware of such Indian concerns.

On 26 September, the US Ambassador to India called a press conference to dispel the gloomy perception in New Delhi about US-Pakistan collaboration post 9/11. Blackwell diplomatically tried to refute the impression that since the terrorist attacks against the US, Pakistan had once again become the main focus of US policy in the subcontinent. On the Indian offer to support US military operations against Afghanistan, Blackwell maintained that Washington had made no request to India so far.\(^{35}\) Blackwell’s conference induced a sudden shift of mood in New Delhi.

On 27 September, while addressing a parliamentary meeting, Prime Minister Vajpayee declared that India had given no assurance either ‘directly or indirectly’ on the use of its bases. India’s role was limited to intelligence sharing with the US. In pledging its support to the government, the opposition also expressed caution against deviating from the long-standing policy of non-alignment.\(^{36}\) This shift of strategic stance was remarkable. On 15 September, the whole spectrum of Indian political opinion, except the Communist Party of India – Marxist (CPI-M), had agreed to extend air bases to the US for its operation in Afghanistan. Following the meeting, the Parliamentary Affairs Minister, Pramod Mahajan, told a press conference that the government was not under any illusion and was not dependent on anyone in its fight against terrorism.\(^{37}\) It was a revealing statement by an Indian Minister who strongly pushed the cause of India’s own

\(^{34}\) Ibid.
\(^{37}\) Ibid.
war on terror in Kashmir while the rest of the world was totally absorbed by the US war on global terrorism. Yet, India’s hopes were not totally dashed.

At the end of September 2001, when the US forces were about to launch attacks on Afghanistan, Jaswant traveled to Washington to brief the White House on militancy in Kashmir. On 1 October 2001, The Hindu from Delhi observed that his ‘arrival barely caused a ripple’ in Washington. On the same day, an unprecedented militant attack on the Kashmir Assembly building left 40 dead and over 60 injured. India accused Jaish-i-Mohammad for the attack. In his letter to President Bush that day, Prime Minister Vajpayee emphasized the need to immediately restrain Pakistan from its support to international terrorists in Kashmir. According to him, ‘Pakistan must understand that there is a limit to the patience of the people of India’.

Vajpayee hinted that India would take matters into its own hands if Washington did not convince Islamabad to curb the terrorist groups in Kashmir. On 2 October, Jaswant spent over an hour with US National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice in her office in the White House where President Bush spent around 40 minutes to reassure Minister Singh on the issue of attack on Kashmir assembly house. The US showed its concern regarding militancy in Kashmir but did not blame Pakistan, which disappointed India.

In the afternoon of 2 October, Jaswant Singh met US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon in Virginia. Later, talking to the media in Singh’s presence, Rumsfeld disagreed with the Indian position that Pakistan was the breeding ground for terrorism. Rumsfeld saw the issue of terrorism as a global phenomenon in contrast to a problem which was confined within a particular region. He stressed, ‘we have had discussions about a number of countries and the issue of terrorism and [there is] the

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importance of addressing it in a variety of different ways as different as countries are. And it is a problem … one network called al-Qaeda is in 50 or 60 countries…there is al-Qaeda activity in the United States of America.42 Jaswant Singh also met the US Secretary of State Colin Powell at the US Department of State in Washington D.C. on 2 October. Responding to media on the issue of India blaming Pakistan for the militancy in Kashmir, Secretary Powell diplomatically stated, ‘We are going to be conducting a campaign that goes after terrorism. And we will use many tools – financial tools, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic and political tools – to accomplish the mission that the President has set before us.’43

On 3 October, while in London on his way back to India from the US, Jaswant Singh discussed the attack on the State Assembly in Srinagar at a joint Press Conference with British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw. Responding to a question about British and/or US military assistance for India in its fight against Kashmiri terrorism, Jack Straw took a neutral approach. In his view ‘military decisions [were] a matter entirely for the Indian government’ and he ‘did not think that they [Indians] needed assistance from the British or American forces.’44 It was sufficiently clear by now that neither the US nor the British governments agreed with the Indian perceptions of Pakistan as a terrorist state or promised any military support to India that could be used against Pakistan. It was also obvious that US led coalition against terrorism was based on global paradigm that was different to India’s Pakistan specific regional paradigm. India’s realization of two distinct and contradictory agendas, global and regional, frustrated the state.45

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43 ‘Media Availability with Secretary of State Colin Powel and Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs and Defence following their meeting at the State Department, Washington D.C., (October 2, 2001)’, Strategic Digest, Vol. XXXII, No. 10, October 2001, pp. 1407-1408.
45 Brahma Chellaney, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 3 October 2001, op. cit. According to hawkish Chellaney, ‘with Pakistan now at centre stage and a groundswell of positive US sentiment for this rediscovered buddy, Vajpayee’s accomplishment suddenly looks faded.’ J. N. Dixit, ‘Think National, Not Global’, The Indian Express, New Delhi, 8 October 2001. The author, referring to Jaswant Singh’s meetings with the US leadership after the Srinagar attack, admits to the fact that ‘no senior US government official publicly acknowledged Pakistan being the base for terrorist acts against India.’
In October, to India’s dismay, when the US and British war planes began to bomb Afghanistan to provide cover for the movement of the Northern Alliance in its move towards Kabul, Pakistan was strongly engaged in providing assistance to the US led coalition. The main purpose of the US diplomacy at this point in the region – after realizing the extent of Indian discontent on being excluded – was to appease India in a way that could prevent the latter from creating trouble for the US operation in Afghanistan. On 11 October, in Washington, CBS TV asked Powell whether the US was worried that India might take advantage of the situation and ignite a conflict [with Pakistan], which would distract the world. Powell replied: ‘I don’t think that will be the case. In fact, we have been in touch with both governments and they both realize the volatile nature of this situation and I think both of them understand that it is not the time for provocative action.’ It was within this context that Secretary Powell’s visit to the troubled region of South Asia was announced.

In his visit to both Pakistan and India, Powell assured Pakistan that the US would take a long-term view of the region and would thus maintain its engagement with Pakistan beyond Afghanistan. In a press conference at Islamabad, in which President Musharraf was present, Powell described Kashmir as central to India-Pakistan relations and encouraged a dialogue between the two countries. He stressed, ‘We believe a dialogue on Kashmir is important. We believe maintenance of the Line of Control and exercise of restraint is also very important. Issues must be resolved through peaceful, political and diplomatic [means], not through violence and reliance on force, but with a determined respect for human rights.’

During Powell’s follow up trip to India, Jaswant Singh denied there was any international mediation on the Kashmir dispute. According to Jaswant, Kashmir was ‘strictly a bilateral issue’ and the purpose of Powell’s visit to India was to ‘discuss

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terrorism not Kashmir because the US acknowledges India’s position that it is a bilateral matter.’  
India’s official statement clearly showed an underlying sense of confusion about the US approach towards South Asia post 9/11.

The US and Indian security interests diverged on Pakistan. India sought the US support against Kashmiri militants by portraying them as terrorists who had Pakistan’s backing. India was reluctant to act on the US advice to show restraint and open a dialogue with Pakistan. Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote to the US President warning Pakistan about the limit of India’s patience. After 9/11, India advocated that insurgency in Kashmir was part of global terrorism. When the US did not adhere to the Indian view, India declared that it knew how to fight terrorism without anyone’s help.

It was hard for India to get the US attention because when the attack on Srinagar occurred on 1 October, the US attention was already focused on Afghanistan. Kabul fell on 13 November to Northern Alliance, but Taliban surrendered Qandahar on 7 December. On 13 December, five unidentified militants attacked Indian parliament. They were killed without causing any serious harm. India instantly claimed that ‘dead attackers’ had Pakistani origin. The Indian case was weakened, however, when India refused to show faces of the dead to the press. The Indian claims of Pakistani involvement were further weakened when Indian officials twice refused Pakistan’s request for a joint inquiry and declined FBI offers for investigation into the crime. Pakistan condemned the attacks and offered help to conduct a common investigation. The Indian Home Secretary L. K. Advani described the attacks as ‘most audacious and

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48 ‘India Won’t talk Kashmir with Powell, Says MEA’, *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 16 October 2001; ‘India Raises Powell’s Remarks on Kashmir’, *The Hindu*, Delhi, 17 October 2001; ‘Powell Leaves, Differences Stay’, *The Times of India*, 18 October 2001. According to the news, ‘while appreciating India’s support for the US war against Afghanistan, Powell made it clear that Washington would be working closely with Pakistan, both in the fight against Osama bin laden and in the formation of a post Taliban regime.’


most alarming act of terrorism in the history of last two decades’ of Kashmir militancy.\textsuperscript{52} Five days after the attack, India launched Operation Parakaram, an intensive buildup of military forces along the India-Pakistan border. Thus began the course of India’s coercive diplomacy in South Asia where the armies of two Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) faced each other.

THE US ROLE IN PREVENTING AN INDO-PAKISTAN WAR

This section discusses the US role in preventing an Indo-Pakistan war in the wake of India-Pakistan military stand-off of 2001/02. It argues that it was primarily due to the US strong role that a probable war was averted between two nuclear rivals – India and Pakistan. This section is divided in the following two subsections: 1) The US response to India’s Operation Parakaram; and 2) The US prevention of an Indo-Pakistan war.

The US Response to India’s Operation Parakaram:

This sub-section discusses the US response to Indian military Operation Parakaram which India launched against Pakistan in December 2001 and called off in October 2002. It argues that after mobilizing military forces to the India-Pakistan front, India could not move further across the international border mainly due to intense US led global pressure.

To pressurize Pakistan, India brought all of its military might to bear on Pakistan attempting to pressurize the state into submission. The 2001-2002 Standoff was the largest military mobilization since World War II\textsuperscript{53} and it occurred less than four years after India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear tests in May 1998.

Under operation Parakaram, India concentrated its forces along its entire border with Pakistan. It was the largest Indian military movement against Pakistan in thirty years since the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh from the eastern wing of Pakistan. India moved such a large number of its troops to the border that none was available to perform internal security duties. During the massacre of


Muslims in Indian Gujarat, India pulled out a brigade from forward areas and sent it by air in a vain attempt to control the Hindu-Muslim crisis in the state.  

According to one respected analyst, ‘the move from peacetime locations to the forward areas’ was very swift which indicated that ‘the warning to deploy was given even before the attack on the Indian Parliament House.’ India even moved its divisions from the Indo-Chinese border to the Pakistani border.

India activated all forward airbases and brought forward all the three strike corps. Naval ships from Bay of Bengal were navigated into north Arabian Sea. The chances of enforcing a naval blockade were also considered which was aimed at cutting off the oil supplies from the Gulf to Pakistan. Targets for air strikes had been chosen. All formations and units were present with their full compliment of arms and live ammunition, and base and forward ammunitions depots were established. Extensive mine fields were laid all along the front. Almost 52,000 hectares of land along the international border, the working boundary and the LoC were mined with around 1,000,000 mines. The 333 Missile Group which was equipped with the nuclear-capable Pirthavi Missile was deployed along the LoC and the international border. It appeared that Indian military had planned a long term stay on the borderline to put sustained pressure on Pakistan.

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56 For offensive formations, India’s, Strategic Reserves, 39 Mountain Division remained on the Indian side of Kashmir. 6 Mountain Division moved 400 kilometers from Bareilly (UP) up to Indian Kashmir. 1 Corps in ‘Mathura moved some 600 kilometers to the desert sector. 21 Corps in Bhopal-Jhansi moved around 800 kilometers to the desert sector. 2 Corps in ambala-Patiala moved 500 kilometers to Punjab/semi desert sector. 3 Corps in Silchar, moved 2,800 kilometers to Punjab. 4 Corps in Tanga Valley-Rangiya did not move during the standoff. 33 Corps in Binagori-Kalimpong moved partly to Indian Kashmir and partly to the desert sector. See Lt. Gen Kamal Matinuddin, ‘India-Pakistan Standoff’, Ibid. Also See ‘Force Deployment Boosts Kashmir Tension’, Strategic Digest, Vol. 32, No. 2, Ibid; Rana Qaisar, ‘India Mounts Massive Troop Movement: Military Takes Forward Positions: Movement a ‘Precautionary Measure’ Exchange of Fire Across LoC’, The Nation, Islamabad, 23 December 2001.
57 Ibid.
On 21 December, New Delhi also recalled India’s High Commissioner from Islamabad and reduced the High Commission staff to half. Indian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nirupama Rao explained the decision as follows:

Since the December 13 attack on Parliament, we have seen no attempt on the part of Pakistan to take action against the organizations involved. India’s Foreign Secretary had, in a meeting with the Pakistan High Commissioner on December 14, elaborated on some of the steps that were required…in view of this complete lack of concern on the part of Pakistan and its continued promotion of cross-border terrorism, the government of India has decided to recall its High Commissioner in Islamabad.58

It was the first time since the India-Pakistan war of 1971 that the diplomatic communication was disrupted between the two South Asian rivals. India decided to cutoff its air, train and bus transportation with Pakistan as well.59 On 22 December, discussing the Indian High Commissioner’s summoning back from Islamabad, Jaswant declared that India did not have ‘infinite’ patience. On the same day in Kabul at Hamid Karazai’s inauguration ceremony as the interim President of Afghanistan, Singh stated: ‘This step was only a signal, a message to Pakistan so that it recognizes the enormity of the situation.’60 India continued to exercise coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan, while the military standoff on the border was gaining momentum.

On December 23, the prestigious newspaper The Hindustan Times published news that the Indian government had asked for an evaluation report to decide whether ‘India should strike or should not strike’ across the border in Pakistani territory of Kashmir. The report referred to a meeting of Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) where the government had asked the Army and intelligence sources to prepare an evaluation report on various scenarios of Indian attack on so called terrorist camps in Pakistani Kashmir.61 These scenarios included four different probabilities of attack such as land

58 ‘Angry India Recalls High Commissioner to Pak’, The Times of India, New Delhi, 21 December 2001.
61 Mohua Chatterjee, ‘India to Strike after 10 Days’, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 23 December 2001; Iftikhar Gilani, ‘India may go in for Limited Warfare: CCS Meeting to Discuss Pak Buildup’,
operation, air strikes, crossing the LoC and surface to surface strikes of Prithvi missiles. According to the report, in its next meeting, the CCS would decide whether the government would go ahead with the strikes even if Pakistan banned terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad.  

It indicated that the BJP government in India had even considered going beyond mere brinkmanship despite calls for restraint from all across the world.

On December 30, India handed over a list of 20 alleged terrorists, who had committed criminal acts in India during the mid 1980s, to Pakistan. India wanted those 20 persons to be extradited quoting the UNSC Resolution 1373, which urged all countries to extradite all terrorists to help stamp out the ills of terrorism. Other Indian demands included: Do not arm the so called terrorists; do not shelter any one who has committed any terrorist acts in India; dismantle their camps on the Pakistani side of Kashmir; take action against 3,000 terrorists and end cross border infiltration. Along with these strong demands, the uncompromising statements of India’s ruling elite against Pakistan indicated that South Asia was on the verge of an unpredictable crisis. It showed that India’s coercive diplomacy was in full swing making stringent demands on Pakistan.

The harsh rhetoric of Indian leaders against Pakistan was at least in part the hurt and anger at the terrorist attacks on their key state buildings. Because of the worldwide post 9/11 anti-terrorism sentiments, the world at large was on India’s side when the state assembly building in Srinagar and the Indian parliament building in New Delhi were attacked. However, the ‘battle cry’ of the BJP leaders against Pakistan was too extreme...
for many observers.\(^6\) Those who saw the post 9/11 shift of global emphasis against terrorism to South Asia linked India’s anti- Pakistan brinkmanship with the US war on terror in Afghanistan.\(^6\) Many keen observers of BJP politics on the domestic front described its militaristic euphoria as an electioneering technique to regain party’s sinking strength in the forthcoming elections in various states of India.\(^6\)

It seems likely, therefore, that it was a combination of both deep concerns on the Indian side as well as other complex realities of BJP such as making capital of Hindu-Muslim divisions in India. The aggressive policies towards Pakistan, nevertheless, attracted sharp criticism from India and around the world.\(^6\) Within India, there was a wide spectrum of opinions from experienced military personnel to professional media and academic analysts who cautioned against rushing into cross border military action.\(^6\) For example, in a parliamentary discussion on responding to the December 13 Attack, an ex army General Shankar Roy Choudhury pointed out that ‘any action across the border

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\(^6\) Kanti Bajpai, ‘Merits of Inaction: India has six Military Options, not one is Promising’, *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 24 December 2001. In a thoughtful analysis of India’s predicament of military action against Pakistan, the author refers to an essential fact, ‘Let’s stop drawing parallels with the US action in Afghanistan. The US faces a ragtag militia without nuclear weapons. We face 5th largest army in the world with nuclear weapon on its disposal.’


\(^6\) John Cherian, ‘Upping the Ante’, *Frontline*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 5-18 January 2001. According to the author, ‘international sympathy was with new Delhi immediately after the attack on Parliament House. But the talk of ‘hot pursuit’ across the borders by the top Indian government functionaries and BJP leaders has alarmed the international community.’

\(^6\) See ‘December 13: Ex Army Chief Calls for Response with Caution’ *Indian Express*, New Delhi, 20 December 2001; ‘Armed Forces Want Centre to Weigh All Options’, *The Hindu*, Delhi, 19 December 2001; Apratim Mukarji, ‘Time not Ripe for Military Action: Gill’, *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 17 December 2001; ‘Pull Back from the Brink’, *The Hindu*, Delhi, 29 December 2001; Shekhar Gupta, ‘On the Brink, Watch Your Step: Remember, There will be a Tomorrow and then Day after Tomorrow, *Indian Express*, New Delhi, 22 December 2001; Seema Mustafa, ‘I War, so I am’, *Asian Age*, New Delhi, 29 December 2001; Ranjit Bhushan, ‘Defending Restraint: The Initial Saber Ratting Posture has given Way to a More Sober Appraisal of the Situation’, *Outlook*, New Delhi, 31 December 2001. These news items and journal articles are just an example out of many which observed that India’s ill considered push for its military pursuit into Pakistani territory entailed disastrous consequences for South Asia at large due to the lack of precise intelligence, unpreparedness of the Indian army, fear of a full-fledged India-Pakistan war and most of all the fear of eventual escalation of limited warfare into a nuclear exchange.
means targeting Pakistan’s air bases which are as now occupied by the US forces. We have to respond with a composite, unified response and with caution. Before that, several things need to be taken into account, including economic sustainability.70

Another former Army Chief, General V. P. Malik who led the Indian army during the 1999 Kargil operations, stressed that it might not be wise to attack the camps in Pakistan. Referring to Pakistan being a nuclear state, he warned that even with a symbolic military action, India could be getting ‘closer and closer to an all-out conflict with Pakistan.’71 In his opinion, the ‘covert operations by Indian agencies in Pakistan’ were a better option to deal with the terrorists. A retired Lt. General Satish Nambiar emphasized that it was ‘utterly ridiculous to suggest we go across now. We do not even have exact intelligence on their location. This is plain rhetoric and a verbal war waged.’72 It implied that professional soldiers, who were in the business of fighting wars, did not approve of the BJP government’s jingoistic rhetoric that was probably more directed towards certain gains in domestic politics.

Among Indian analysts, Kanti Bajpai adequately reiterated most of the issues relating to India’s aggressive policies towards Pakistan. In his article ‘Merits of Inaction’ published in the Indian Express on 24 December, while criticizing BJP government’s desire for aggression, he stressed that ‘sometimes not doing anything is the best strategic course.’73 In his view, the Indian political class as a whole had ‘become increasingly aggressive and chirpy over the years.’ Its imagination is submerged with thoughts of ‘India as a great economic and military power’, but at the same time there is ‘panic that [India] is a weak and reactive country.’74 In Bajpai’s view, ‘the events of December 13 have put the BJP in a quandary…In private, it knows that India has few if any credible military or diplomatic options. But having risen to power on the ‘cult of action’, it is under tremendous pressure to do something.75

70 ‘December 13: Ex Army Chief Calls for Response with Caution’, Indian Express, Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Kanti Bajpai, ‘Merits of Inaction: India has Six Military Options, not one is Promising’, The Indian Express, New Delhi, 24 December 2001.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
Bajpai examined six military options available to India for military intrusion into Pakistani territory of Kashmir in response to the 13 December attacks. He then concluded that ‘none of these options [was] promising’ due to various technical and tactical limitations of Indian army and air force. Diplomatically, to him, India had ‘done most of what it could reasonably do’ from asking Pakistan to act against the particular militant outfits to implicate Pakistan into the attacks and limiting diplomatic links to severing air and land transport links. These, he said, were symbolic steps which would ‘not hurt Pakistan materially.’ The BJP led National Democratic Alliance (BDA) government, he observed, had ‘positioned itself as a hyper-rational, energetic defender of India’s interests’ and had ‘created expectations which it [could] not fulfill.’ He viewed the 13 December attacks on the Indian parliament as a ‘palpable failure’ and advised his government to ‘capitalize on the failure and to cool things down.’

He advised India to ‘stop drawing parallels with the US action in Afghanistan. The US faces a ragtag Afghan Militia without nuclear weapons. We face the fifth biggest army in the world with nuclear weapons at its disposal.’

The final observation made in Bajpai’s article about Pakistan being a Nuclear Arms State (NAS) was a major dilemma that India could not resolve until the end of its standoff with Pakistan. The apprehension that Pakistan could use the option of first nuclear strike in case of India’s move across the border helped keep the Indian military machine in check. It implied that South Asian nuclear dimension had a direct bearing on global security concerns and the stakeholders of world peace required undertaking a constant vigilance of the region. An intense pressure from the US on India to exercise restraint in its brinkmanship was the main reason which maintained peace in the region. In the presence of US led military coalition in South Asia, there was little room for India’s own military adventure against Pakistan while the latter was the US ally in the war on terror. This hard fact dawned on the Indian decision makers soon after mobilizing their armed forces to the front.

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76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
None of the states involved in the invasion of Afghanistan approved of India’s strategic move against Pakistan. All of them, in their own ways, warned India to restrain itself against provocations from Kashmiri insurgents. For example, the United Kingdom, the closest European ally of the US, was directly in touch with the Indian leadership urging India to negotiate the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Secretary of Defence, Jack Straw, separately traveled to India suggesting restraint. Britain had warm relations with India and cared for Indian sensitivities in diplomatic affairs. Both Britain and India had signed a declaration of partnership against global terrorism after 9/11. Britain forcefully condemned terrorist attacks on the Kashmir assembly and the Indian Parliament.79 Britain, however, followed the US lead in urging India to open a dialogue with Pakistan.

The other major US coalition partners — Germany and France — also advised India to open a dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir. Germany’s Chancellor Schroeder, for example, during his visit to Pakistan and India in late October 2001, urged both South Asian countries to resume the dialogue process that had started at Agra.80 On 2 August 2002, in a press conference during his visit to New Delhi, French Foreign Minister, Dominique De Villepin, insisted upon India-Pakistan dialogue to eliminate mutual hostility. According to him ‘the spirit of dialogue illustrated by Simla and Lahore [was] the heart of any solution.’81 It reflected that there was a consensus among European coalition members that security in South Asia required a peace dialogue between India and Pakistan instead of relying on military option.

India’s trusted strategic partner Russia also joined the western nations in warning India not to attack alleged terrorist bases inside Pakistan. According to a media report,

80 The report of Germany’s Chancellor Schroeder’s visit to Pakistan cited in Foreign Affairs Pakistan, October 2001, p.64.
81 See ‘Joint Press Conference with French Foreign Minister Mr. Dominique De Villepin and External Affairs Minister Shri Uashwant Sinha (New Delhi, 2 August 2002)’, reproduced in Strategic Digest, Vol. 32, No. 8, IDSA, New Delhi, pp. 1040-43.
President Vladimir Putin, in a telephone call to Prime Minister Vajpayee, sought to discourage New Delhi ‘from launching any retaliatory strikes on Pakistan’ in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament. Although, in a Joint Statement on 3 February 2002, Russia had supported India in blaming Pakistan for the 13 December and other attacks on Indian targets, but it did not want India to use military retaliation against Pakistan. Pakistan’s ‘tested ally’, China, also urged both sides to avoid military escalation. China was among the first countries to condemn the attack on Indian Parliament. According to India’s Economic Times, the Indian government was unhappy about China giving a large development package to Pakistan’s ministry of Kashmir affairs. India also felt annoyed that Beijing described the Kashmir dispute as the ‘core issue’ in Indo-Pakistan relations. On the issue of India-Pakistan hostility, however, both major powers, Russia and China, wanted India to avoid military means to resolve the conflict that could be better solved by peaceful means.

India’s Operation Parakaram against Pakistan faced strong pressure at both domestic and global levels. The strategic value of a military standoff against Pakistan came under suspicion by India’s own military experts from the very beginning. The BJP government was widely condemned for its hasty decisions based on narrow domestic political concerns. Globally, India read the post 9/11 signals wrongly. For example, dealing with Kashmiri Muslim dissidents as global terrorists and implicating Pakistan as a terrorist state was not on the agenda of the US led military coalition. India’s mounting forces on the international border with intent to move across and hit targets inside Pakistan also burdened India with global criticism. The BJP leaders continued their rhetoric against Pakistan as the breeder of Kashmiri militants. Indian decision makers,

82 Vladimir Radyuhin, ‘Putin Urges India to Maintain Restraint’, The Hindu, New Delhi, 16 December 2001. According to The Hindu, a report in a Russian newspaper Noyie Izvestia commented that Putin told Vajpayee that the attack could have been masterminded by Osama bin laden to provoke an India-Pakistan conflict to facilitate his escape from the region.
84 Indrani Bagchi, ‘Rongji’s India Visit not to be a Bhai-Bhai Affair’, Economic Times, New Delhi, 28 December 2001.
however, gradually realized that their hastened and miscalculated military action was uncalled for.

**The US Prevention of an Indo-Pakistan War**

This sub-section discusses the US role in preventing a major India-Pakistan conflict in 2001/2, which had become imminent due to India’s coercive diplomacy against Pakistan. It argues that the US played a central role in resolving the India-Pakistan military standoff in 2001-2002. The US Department of State, using remarkable diplomatic skills, advised Pakistan to take measures that helped minimize tension between India and Pakistan.

India’s aggressive policies towards Pakistan were opposed to US interests in South Asia. The US was absorbed by the war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan was the US frontline ally. A further escalation of Indian brinkmanship carried the highly dangerous threat of an all out India-Pakistan war. First, the region would have been engulfed in two wars simultaneously: the US war on terror in Afghanistan and the India-Pakistan war. Second, Pakistan would have been fighting two different wars on its two different borders, on the western front against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and on its eastern front against India. The dilemma facing the US would have been its obligation to support Pakistan yet at the same time needing India as an ally in its fight against terrorism. The US diplomacy very effectively averted India-Pakistan war while continuing its war against terrorism in Afghanistan.

The US diplomatic process did not come into action immediately after October 1 attack in Srinagar due to Washington’s deep concentration on the fast moving events in its military campaign in Afghanistan. According to Poly Nayak & Michael Krepon’s revealing study on India-Pakistan standoff, 2001-2002 called *US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peak Crisis*, released by the Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D.C. in 2006, ‘Kashmir was not even on the radar screens of most Washington policy
makers on October 1, 2001’. Richard Falkenrath, Senior Director for Policy and Special Assistant to the US President in the White House’s Office of Homeland Security from 2001-2003, indicated how focused senior US officials were on prosecuting the global war on terrorism:

You can’t even imagine the ... problems, especially for the President, the national Security Adviser, and most cabinet and sub-cabinet officials. They paid little attention to anti-Indian militants mounting cross-border attacks. There was so much going on...9/11 was gravitational black hole for the principals and the duties, who rushed into the Situation Room.

Indo-Pakistan relations were highly tense in late 2001 and demanded US attention. Indian leaders were bitter that Pakistan had become a primary ‘beneficiary of the Bush administration’s global war on Terror.’ The 13 December attack on India’s Parliament marked the beginning of a crisis in South Asia for the US. For many Washington policymakers, at the time of US need for Pakistan’s help in blocking al-Qaeda’s retreat from Tora Bora, ‘the December 13 attack and the subsequent India-Pakistan military deployment were serious and unwelcome diversions from the war on terror.’ It signified that the US was now required to give attention to this new South Asian development - even higher consideration than the US gave to the limited Indo-Pakistan war in Kargil in 1999.

On 14 December 2001, President Bush called President Musharraf and later made a call to Prime Minister Vajpayee counseling patience and calm. The Deputies Committee met immediately and asked that a paper with recommendations be prepared by the

86 Poly Nayak & Michael Krepon, US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peak Crisis, Henry L. Simpson Centre, Washington D.C., 2006, p. 19. This report is based on primary sources which mostly include authors’ interviews of US high officials who were directly involved in the diplomatic process of India-Pakistan crisis management such as the US Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage, Senior State Department officials who either helped the process or kept closely in touch with the developments as well as senior diplomats appointed at the US embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad. In that sense, this report is the closest view that an outsider could get of the inner dynamics of US diplomacy during the India-Pakistan military standoff of 2001-2002.
88 According to one senior Washington observer ‘every meeting with Indians had one topic: Pakistan.’ Pakistan was getting some of the advantages that India had just won – including the lifting of sanctions. Indians were also angry that Secretary of State Powell called Kashmir a ‘central issue’ between India and Pakistan in a joint press conference in Islamabad along with President Musharraf on 15 October. Ibid., p. 20.
89 Ibid, p. 22.
National Security Council staff and Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca. Accordingly, Director for Asia prepared a paper for the Principal Committee.\(^91\) The principals signed on a strategy of engagement with both India and Pakistan, which was to be coordinated closely with the United Kingdom. Among others, the strategy advised for senior officials’ continuous visits to the region with an eye to defuse tension and to postpone launching hostilities.\(^92\) Bush called Vajpayee and Musharraf again on December 29, amid rising tension in South Asia and US concern about a possible Indian strike against Pakistan.\(^93\) It showed that Washington was seriously concerned about a probable India-Pakistan war that could harm US priorities of eliminating the terrorists in the region.

The mobilization of Indian military troops received the US attention as intended and caught the Pakistan army off guard, which had two army corps deployed along the Afghan border. Secretary Powell watched the Indians ‘moving the trains up’ with the understanding of a ‘General who had seen and played the leading role’ in similar dramas. The diplomatic task for Washington was to play for time and eventually to ‘tell the [Indian] Generals to go home, to pull back.’\(^94\) The reports about Indian Cabinet Committee on Security’s decision to mobilize for war and the intentions of political leadership to move against the militant bases in Pakistani Kashmir forced Musharraf to put Pakistan army on high alert. The US worried that ‘these moves and counter moves could trigger unintended escalation to a general war or even nuclear use.’\(^95\) A particular concern was that India and Pakistan could misperceive or not recognize each other’s ‘red lines’. It was high time for the US policy makers to treat the military concentration on India-Pakistan border as a real threat of war and use US influence to avert it.

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\(^91\) Torkel Patterson was the first US official who met with Indian officials after the attack in New Delhi. Torkel had his first meeting with Indian National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, who charged that Washington did not take seriously the problem of Pakistani support for terrorism. Ibid., p. 22.
\(^92\) ‘Interview with a National Security official on 4 May 2005 in Ibid, p. 23.
\(^94\) The general impression was that ‘the longer the Indian army was deployed in the field, the more unwise the deployment would seem, harming morale and training’ and ‘after a while the generals were ready to go home’ if they were not going to be given orders to fight. Poly Nayak & Michael Krepon, op.cit., p. 24.
\(^95\) After India’s initiation of Operation Parakaram on 18 December, the US concern was that ‘would things get out of hand and prompt one side or the other to slide toward [nuclear weapon] use…Once started, Pakistani issues would lead to pressure to use [nuclear arms]….Escalation could come quickly. Ibid., p. 24.
Secretary of State Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Assistant Secretary of State Rocca took the leading responsibility in shaping the US diplomatic response to South Asian crisis. Interestingly, while the US Defence Department was preoccupied with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, the crisis of India-Pakistan standoff was entirely handled by the State Department under Secretary Powell’s leadership alongside the efforts of Armitage and Rocca with President Bush’s occasional calls to and meetings with the South Asian leaders.96 The US Congress was not much involved because the Bush administration did not encourage a Congressional role in this crisis management. The National Security Council (NSC), under the National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, did not play a substantive role either in most executive branch deliberations. The NSC did, however, mediate some interagency disagreements relating to South Asia, such as the timing of F-16 sales to Pakistan. The Pentagon wanted to sell the aircraft in 2002, while the State Department urged that ‘this could torpedo US-India relations’ as Washington was trying to improve its ties with New Delhi.97 The NSC decided to defer the sale.

The US worked with other concerned governments to ‘choreograph’ a stream of senior official visits to the region from Washington, London, the European Union, Tokyo and Beijing in order to keep the two sides ‘talking and thinking’ about peace. Rocca traveled to the region almost once a month all through the duration of the crisis. Senior US officials hoped that neither India nor Pakistan would attack each other while foreign leaders were awaited or physically present in the region. China and Russia fully cooperated in this effort. This was a good example of the US working with Russia and China. It signified that the US plan to deal with the South Asian situation was broad and inclusive inviting all the major powers to help in averting war in one of the most dangerous parts of the world. There was a global consensus on US War on Terror in Afghanistan. India seemed to ignite a parallel military adventure in the same region to no avail. In that sense, the US was pointing towards a global obligation to put pressure on the South Asian rivals for pulling their forces back from the brink of a futile war.

96 Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld’s role was not coordinated well with the South Asian crisis. He visited South Asia very late in the event when de-escalation had already been agreed upon and the crisis had been averted. Ibid., p. 26.
97 Ibid, p. 27.
While there was much action in the US State Department concerning the South Asian quagmire, the two US embassies in India and Pakistan were also engaged exchanging signals between the US and their respective countries of assignment. Both embassies were least in touch with each other about their performance and both Ambassadors operated very differently. In Islamabad, Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin was a career Foreign Service officer who tended to operate through the traditional department chain. In New Delhi, Ambassador Robert Blackwell – a Harvard professor – routinely ignored standard operating procedures due to his own contacts with Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice. He preferred to communicate directly with the State Department. Some Embassy officials in New Delhi worried that the Bush Administration’s proactive and preemptive approach to countering terrorism could make it easier for India to disregard US warnings against attacking Pakistan. This observation must have resulted from India’s apparent hostility against Pakistan.

As Indian forces were deployed on the Pakistani border, the BJP government warned the US embassy that the US support for Pakistan must end once and for all. Embassy officials recognized that these messages were a provocative attempt to make the US lean hard on Pakistan. The Indian posturing, however, could not be taken as a mere ploy. Indian coercive diplomacy could have been a prelude to military retaliation. Those with access to the fullest range of information on the crisis saw the threat of an Indian attack as real. Some close observers of the crisis believed that India and Pakistan came close to conflict between December 2001 and January 2002. India kept the US guessing through its coercive moves against Pakistan both on diplomatic and military levels. According to one statement, the challenge for Washington was to avoid either leaning on Pakistan too hard, which could hurt OEF, or not to lean on Pakistan hard enough, which would alienate New Delhi. Other Embassy officers, while worried about the risk of unintended escalation, suspected that the US government was being ‘played by’

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98 Ambassador Blackwell’s tendency to stay in direct contact with Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice instead of going through the proper channel of the US Department of State was not appreciated in the Department of State offices. Blackwell’s distaste for consultation with staff and his management style in New Delhi embassy triggered Department of State’s investigations into his personal practices and eventually he had to quit as Ambassador. See Anwer Iqbal and Harbaksh Singh Nanda, ‘Blackwell Quits as US Envoy to India’, *United Press International* (online), 21 April 2003.
99 Interview with an official formerly posted to US embassy at New Delhi in Polly Nayak & Michael Krepon, op. cit., p. 29.
Indian government. The US Embassy in Pakistan, however, was more surprised than the US Embassy in New Delhi by the December 13 attacks on the Indian Parliament.

On 13 December, Ambassador Chamberlin and Colonel David Smith, the Army Attaché, were in the office of the Inspector General of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps when they learnt of the attack. On 22 December, a Pakistani official told Colonel Smith that Pakistan had indications that India was going to attack before dawn on the following day. Smith notified the ambassador, the national Military Command Center at the Pentagon and the Defence Intelligence Agency. Smith had earlier received warnings from Pakistani officials that if the Indian military buildup continued, Islamabad would have to pull forces from the Afghan border where they were positioned to help US forces which were conducting counterterrorism operations. General Michael DeLong, then Deputy Commander of the Central Command, conveyed to his Pakistan joint staff counterpart the significance of keeping the Pakistani forces in place. In the last week of December, al-Qaeda operatives were arrested in a big number along the border with Afghanistan. To the dismay of US officials in Islamabad and Washington, these were the last such comprehensive arrests for two years after the redeployment of Pakistani troops to the eastern border.

The redeployment of Pakistani troops from its western border to the east had short term and medium term consequences for both the US and Pakistan. After removing the large chunk of troops from Pak-Afghan front, an already porous border further thinned out and limited the attempt to prevent al-Qaeda and the Taliban remnants from infiltrating

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100 Interview with a former US diplomat in Ibid., p.29.
101 Interview with Colonel David Smith (Retd.) in Ibid, pp.29-30.
102 See ‘Pakistan May Withdraw Logistic Support to Coalition’, The News, Islamabad, 29 December 2001. In late December, Pakistan delivered a notice to Washington that Pakistan may not be able to provide crucial logistic support to the US and British troops operating in Afghanistan in the face of possible conflict with India. Pakistan also informed the UN that it will be pulling out its 4,000 soldiers from the UN peace keeping mission in Sierra Leone’. According to the news, there were two divisions of troops in NWFP and Balochistan, bordering Afghanistan, to prevent Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda fighters from entering Pakistan and provide support for the US led coalition forces. The report highlighted that the pullout was likely to ‘seriously hamper the hunt for bin laden and the fleeing al-Qaeda fighters, who were trying to find refuge in Pakistan’s semi-autonomous tribal areas from their over-run mountain hideouts in eastern Afghanistan’s Tora Bora region.’ The report stated that Pakistan particularly needed Jacobabad air strip in its southern Sindh province, where the concentration of Indian troops was the largest. Also See Nayak & Krepon, Ibid, p.30.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
into Pakistan. The immediate effect of this action was to be the apparent escape of much wanted militant leaders such as Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omer and their accomplices. Despite toppling the Taliban regime and destroying the al-Qaeda network, the US forces could not totally eradicate these terrorist forces, supposedly in part, due to this early setback in border security. In the medium term, the unrestrained terrorist elements resurfaced on either side of Pak-Afghan border and waged a resurgent war against the US army and the ISAF in Afghanistan. The US officials and media criticized Pakistan for ‘not doing enough’ to curb the Taliban insurgence on its western border. This issue caused tension between the US and Pakistan despite Pakistan’s extraordinary contribution in the war on terror. It showed that the legacy of coercive diplomacy kept disrupting the US and Pakistani efforts against terrorism even after years of the Indian forces’ de-escalated. The redeployment of troops to its eastern border made Pakistan feel less vulnerable in the face of an Indian assault.

According to ‘South Asia’s Twin Peak Crisis’ report, three events helped avert an Indo-Pakistan military conflict from December 2001 to January 2002 period: the reversal of India’s offensive military movements, Musharraf’s speech of January 12 in which he agreed to ban various militant groups and the deployment of Pakistani troops to the eastern border. The report mentioned an Indian account that ‘US pressure had helped avert conflict in early January when India withdrew offensive forces preparing to launch a limited war with Pakistan’ in Kashmir. The US officials had shared some satellite images with Indian authorities showing offensive military movement near Pakistan border. The US strongly advised India to quit those positions. Musharraf’s December 12 speech also borrowed time for Pakistan to act upon the commitments made by Musharraf. The speech afforded India time to think over its plan of a limited war with

105 The redeployment of Pakistani troops from Pak-Afghan border to Indo-Pak border was a strategic setback for the US war on terror in Afghanistan and the US commanders in the area did not view it favorably. The thinning surveillance of the long western border of Pakistan allowed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants to slip through unprotected border areas and disappear into harsh mountainous Pakistani tribal hideouts. In time, these hardened militants resurfaced against the US coalition forces in Afghanistan as well as anti-Jihad Pakistani establishment. Pakistan paid dearly against terrorist attacks throughout the country for its pro-US policies since then. The US and NATO forces constantly struggled against individual suicide bomb attacks and the Taliban guerilla attacks not only in southern Afghanistan but also in the capital city of Kabul and various other parts of northern Afghanistan.

Pakistan as well.\textsuperscript{107} The deployment of Pakistani troops to Indo-Pakistan border in the same time period made a low-cost Indian military action across the LoC improbable.\textsuperscript{108} The crisis did not wither away entirely, yet it provided certain breathing space to all the parties involved including the US to avert an imminent threat of a catastrophic Indo-Pakistan war.

From late January 2002 onwards, the looming threat of an India-Pakistan military conflict apparently began to recede after reaching a high intensity level despite the Indian government’s furious statements against Musharraf’s failing to crackdown on militants who were linked with Pakistan. The India-Pakistan standoff continued and minor militant acts routinely occurred in Indian Kashmir. Some accounts later revealed, however, that ‘the Indian forces had begun planning and training in late January to fight a wider conflict with Pakistan across the international border’, should it be authorized.\textsuperscript{109} Being aware of India’s preparedness for war and BJP leaders’ continued

\textsuperscript{107} C. Raja Mohan, ‘Vajpayee’s Third Shoot at Peace’, \textit{The Hindu}, New Delhi, 18 January 2002. According to Mohan, the Indian response to the 12 January speech of President Musharraf suggested that the two sides had turned an important corner. Now it was a matter of time before India and Pakistan would sit down again to find answers to the difficult challenge that confronted them. Also See Jyoti Malhotra, ‘Act on Our List, We Will Relax Our Curbs, India’, \textit{Indian Express}, New Delhi, 19 January 2002. According to this report, ‘in the wake of worldwide approval to General Musharraf’s speech’ India had formulated a two pronged strategy on dealing with Pakistan, which would separately address a return to the diplomatic normalization with Islamabad as well as military de-escalation from the border. ‘Unity of Problems’ (Editorial), \textit{Telegraph}, Calcutta, 19 January 2002. This editorial indicated that all the problems that President Musharraf talked about in his 12 January speech that plagued Pakistani society were also faced by the Indian society. It suggested therefore that the time had come perhaps to set cynicism aside and to give development a chance. ‘The Case for De-Escalation’, \textit{The Hindu}, Delhi, 22 January 2002. ‘Be Practical and Reasonable; Need to Calibrate India’s Pakistan Policies’, \textit{The Indian Express}, New Delhi, 24 January 2002.

\textsuperscript{108} R. S. Bedi, ‘India’s Diplomatic Offensive: Thinking Beyond the Coercive Drive’, \textit{The Tribune}, 31 December 2001. The author of this article, being a retired Indian Air Marshall and a former Director General, Planning Staff, Ministry of Defence, indicated that ‘crossing the LoC would lead to military action that would engulf the nation in four to six weeks war. And if pressed hard, Pakistan might be compelled to use the nuclear button in keeping with its policy of ‘First Use’ when dictated by circumstances. Besides, both nations being nuclear capable, Pakistan’s military might is considerable with near parity with India’s conventional prowess in the western sector.’ Also See Ranjit Bhushan, ‘Defending Restraint: The Initial Sabre-Rattling Posture has Given Way to a More Sober Appraisal of the Situation’, \textit{Outlook}, New Delhi, 31 December 2001. Nayak & Krepon, op. cit., p.31.

\textsuperscript{109} ‘India-Pakistan May Go Nuclear, US Fears’, \textit{Aviation Week & Space Technology}, 18 February 2002, cited in \textit{Strategic Digest}, Vol. 32, No. 4, April 2002, pp. 719-20. According to this account, the standoff between India and Pakistan continued to perturb US intelligence officials, who feared that situation could explode into an armed conflict that might escalate into the use of nuclear weapons. CIA Director told the Senate Intelligence Committee that ‘the chance of war between these two nuclear-armed states is higher than at any point since 1971. We are deeply concerned ….that a conventional war, once begun, could
hostile posturing probably forced Musharraf to condemn ‘India’s great power illusion’ and told India ‘to count on the fact that if pressure on Pakistan becomes too great, then nuclear weapons’ use is possible as a last means of defence.’\textsuperscript{110} The US officials in New Delhi and Washington worried that ‘another major attack by militants’ would trigger an Indian military response.\textsuperscript{111} It showed that mutual tension still prevailed in the region and signs of even an unintended India-Pakistan conflict still occupied the decision makers.

On 14 May 2002, the militant attack at Kaluchak in Indian Kashmir evoked strong hostility increasing the probability of war in South Asia. Following the incident, the crisis in South Asia appeared to be reaching a point of no return. Despite India’s message of ‘no war’, the signals of confrontation were so obvious that Washington’s South Asian experts were ‘nearly unanimous’ that war was, indeed, imminent. The US officials monitoring the South Asian situation had gathered evidence that Indian forces had taken the last remaining steps necessary to initiate hostilities, if they were ordered to do so. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which had played down the prospect of conflict in January, now shared the view of the US government. It indicated that the US was deeply concerned about the high probability of the eruption of a military conflict and therefore the US was prepared to begin another round of preventive diplomacy. The entire responsibility for crisis management, as it happened in the previous round in December-January, was on Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage. The firm guideline from the White House was to prevent war in South Asia.


\textsuperscript{111} Christina Rocca told a press conference in New Delhi on 10 April 2002 that US was closely watching the Indo-Pak border situation because it remained seriously worried about an accidental war breaking out between the nuclear foes. On 16 April, the Assistant Secretary of State for non-proliferation John Wolf stated in Washington that the US was actively engaged in discussions on the risks that the nuclear weapon programmes of Pakistan and India posed to stability in South Asia. For the text of documents, See \textit{Pakistan Horizon}, Vol. 55, No. 3, July 2002, p. 109.
Powell was of the view that India-Pakistan war was still preventable because India’s military options were still complex and risky. Powell saw military mobilization on both sides of the border as ‘political’ and believed the both leaderships expected the US government to continue acting as a ‘separator’. Powell reasoned that ‘if India could see no way to gain advantage by waging a war, then war could be avoided by skilled US facilitation.’ Both Powell and his deputy Armitage doubted the imminence of a war between India and Pakistan. They both worried, however, about the nuclear dimension of the crisis which was prominent at the time. The December-January phase of the crisis had coincided with an Indian test of a new version of the Agni missile with a range suited to reach targets in Pakistan. During the second phase of the crisis commencing in mid May, however, Pakistan had tested three ballistic missiles in quick succession. These unsettling signals did not fit well with US efforts to promote peace in South Asia.

On May 26-27, when Pakistani public statements were focused on the nuclear dimension of the crisis, Powell called Musharraf from Paris and talked about toning down the rhetoric of nuclear use. His message to Pakistan was to control infiltration across the LoC while at the same time he was concerned that India might attack

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113 ‘Short-Range Agni Test Fired’, Strategic Digest, Vol. 32, No. 2, IDSA, New Delhi, February 2002, pp. 351-352. India test fired a short-range version of Agni ballistic missile with a range of 700km on 25 January 2002. Indian sources gave two ‘important technical reasons’ for test firing this version. First, to improve the accuracy of the missile, and second, after the government decided to give the Agni missile to the army there was a need for a lighter weight Agni missile for operational mobility. Indian authorities clarified that the launch was not intended against any country and that its timing was solely determined by technical factor. The sources signaled that the missile could carry a one ton heavy nuclear warhead. According to an Indian newspaper report, ‘notwithstanding the official view’, Agni test fire ‘could not be seen outside the South Asian ambit involving Pakistan and China.’ See ‘Short-Range Agni Test Fired’, The Hindu, Delhi, 26 January 2002; Also See ‘Muscle Flexing with Missile’, Telegraph, Calcutta, 26 January 2002; ‘Future-Fire, The Shorter, Smarter Agni Heralds a New Genre of Missiles Directed towards Pakistan’, India Today, 29 January 2002; ‘Sattar Terms Missile Test Unwarranted’, Dawn, Islamabad, 26 January 2002; ‘Provocative Move’ (Editorial), Dawn, Islamabad, 27 January 2002; ‘Wrong Signal Sent, Says Britain’, The Hindu, Delhi, 26 January 2002. According to a news report, Secretary Powell said that he would have preferred India not to have tested the short range variant of Agni missile but believed that this would not inflame the situation in South Asia. See ‘Missile Test will not inflame Situation’, The Hindu, 26 January 2002.
Pakistan.\footnote{Hataf-V Marks 3rd Test of Ghauri’, \textit{Dawn}, Islamabad, 26 May 2002; ‘US Regrets Missile Test Decision’, \textit{Dawn}, Islamabad, 25 May 2002; Tariq Butt, ‘The Timing Significance’, \textit{The News}, Islamabad, 25 May 2002. According to this report, since Pakistan did not have any global designs like India, Islamabad’s entire defence preparedness and pursuit to make its defense technology sophisticated was meant to ‘counter aggression by the regional bully which found it easy to lay blame of its own blundering and bungling on Pakistan’s shoulders.’ ‘Hataf-III Ghaznavi Missile Test Fired’, \textit{Dawn}, Islamabad, 28 May 2002; ‘Pakistan to Unleash Storm in Case of War: Musharraf Says PAF to Play Lead Role in Case of Aggression’, \textit{The News}, Islamabad, 30 May 2002. According to this news, Musahrraf warned that ‘any incursion by the Indian forces across the LoC even by an inch will unleash a storm that will sweep the enemy. Musharraf stated that Pakistan would counter-attack if India started a conflict. Masood Hayder, ‘Islamabad Refuses to Accept ‘No First Strike Doctrine’, \textit{Dawn}, 31 May 2002; ‘If India Attacks, Pakistan doesn’t Rule Out Nukes’, \textit{Dawn}, Islamabad, 31 May 2002.} Armitage, like Powell, agreed that skillful US diplomatic means could provide a solution to the dilemma that both India and Pakistan required. As Armitage prepared to travel to the region in early June to urge restraint in New Delhi and to extract new assurances from Musharraf, he thoroughly consulted South Asia experts at the State Department. Almost all of them agreed that there would be a war between India and Pakistan. At Pentagon, the discussions were held on evacuating the embassies and US nationals in the event of nuclear exchange. South Asia appeared to be slipping away from finding a peaceful solution of Indo-Pakistan disharmony towards an unpredictable disaster.\footnote{‘Time for Action: Army Chief’, \textit{The Hindu}, Delhi, 17 May 2002; Sujan Dutta and Mukhtar Ahmad, ‘Pakistan Authorizes Action’, According to the report, ‘Indian Parliament’s blank check to the centre to take action against Pakistan today has put the onus on the defence and security establishment’ to come up with viable options for a military strike; ‘India Invokes Treaty with Russia as War Clouds Gather’, \textit{The Hindu}, Delhi, 20 May 2002; Atul Aneja, ‘Army Takes Command of First Tier of Defense’, \textit{The Hindu}, Delhi, 20 May 2002; Atul Aneja & Sandeep Dikshit, ‘Military Preparedness at a Brisk Pace’, \textit{The Hindu}, Delhi, 21 May 2002; Atul Aneja & Sandeep Dikshit, ‘Grounded MiG-21s Cleared’, \textit{The Hindu}, Delhi, 22 May 2002; ‘Naval Ships Head West’, \textit{The Hindu}, Delhi, 22 May 2002; Luv Puri, ‘Be Ready for Decisive Battle, PM Tells Jawans’, \textit{The Hindu}, Delhi, 23 May 2002. According to the report, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee addressed the military soldiers saying that ‘army should be ready for sacrifices but our aim should be victory.’ He said that the ‘time has come for a decisive battle and we will have a sure victory’ in this battle. Kanwar Yogendra, ‘We should have Responded after December 13: PM’, \textit{The Hindu}, Delhi, 27 May 2002.} On 30 May, at a meeting of the US embassy staff and their families in New Delhi, Ambassador Blackwell urged the dependents and nonessential embassy personnel to leave India as soon as possible. On 31 May, the State Department issued a ‘voluntary evacuation order’ for nonessential embassy and consulate personnel and dependents in India ‘citing the growing risk of conflict’ between India and Pakistan and of terrorist
attacks against Americans.\textsuperscript{117} The order issued on June 5 also urged that non-official Americans leave India and that US citizens avoid traveling to the region.\textsuperscript{118} Other western governments immediately followed suit. Blackwell’s departure order and State Department’s travel advisories had unintended benefits for US crisis management. Many American officials believed that these moves helped convince New Delhi to seek a face-saving exit from the crisis. New Delhi might have seen the evacuation of western citizens from India as harmful to Indian economy due to extended mobilization of its forces. Blackwell and many others, however, sincerely thought that a war was possible and that if war were to begin, its course would be unpredictable, including a ‘possible breach’ of the nuclear threshold. This viewpoint dictated that as many Americans as possible be removed from harm’s way. It was obvious that US officials took the threat of war in the region as real which could lead to millions of deaths due to its nuclear potential.

At the US embassy in Islamabad, the first evacuation of embassy’s nonessential personnel was ordered after 9/11. The US embassy officials in Pakistan remained preoccupied with the war on terror and operations in Afghanistan. They operated under difficult conditions due to the threat of terrorist attacks to their lives. After the attacks at Kaluchak, most families of embassy officials had evacuated again after being allowed to return to Pakistan in January following post 9/11 evacuation.\textsuperscript{119} With the departure of Ambassador Chamberlin, the embassy became leaderless at a crucial time.\textsuperscript{120} Most embassy employees also thought that an Indo-Pakistan war was imminent. A few like Colonel Smith thought that a conflict could still be averted, though he also felt alarmed about involuntary escalation between the two rivals. Before Armitage returned to South


\textsuperscript{119} On 1 June 2002, a UN official Onder Yucer stated in Islamabad that the UN headquarters in New York had also ordered the evacuation of the dependents of its foreign staff living in Pakistan and India because of the fear of war. See document in \textit{Pakistan Horizon}, Vol. 55, No. 3, July 2002, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{120} Ambassador Chamberlain requested the State Department to allow her to rejoin her daughters in the US who were evacuated from Islamabad due to the US impression that an India-Pakistan war was imminent. Chamberlain left Islamabad without her replacement in the US embassy. For further details, ‘US Looking for a New Ambassador to Pakistan’, \textit{The News}, Islamabad, 3 May 2002. ‘Wendy Meets Musharraf’, \textit{Dawn}, Islamabad, 15 May 2002.
Asia in early June, Ambassador Nancy Powell was sent to Islamabad as ‘acting’ ambassador.\textsuperscript{121} It showed that the US embassy in Islamabad agreed with US embassy in New Delhi in matters such as the threat of Indo-Pakistan war and precautionary evacuation of US embassy personnel. The wider strategic concerns of the US embassy Islamabad, however, were different from its New Delhi counterpart, which led the former to perform its tasks in its own different ways.

US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage’s visit to South Asia from 6-8 June was by far one of the most vital phases of the India-Pakistan standoff, 2001-2002, because US diplomacy finally found a way for de-escalation of the Indian troops. Bush called Musharraf to support Armitage’s mission before it arrived in the region.\textsuperscript{122} In the June 6 meeting with President Musharraf where Ambassador Nancy Powell was also present, Armitage asked Musharraf for new assurances that could help Indian leaders return from the brink. Musharraf told Armitage that ‘nothing is happening’ across the LoC. Armitage, however, needed more than a ‘present tense commitment’ from Musharraf.\textsuperscript{123} The conversation focused on the need for assurances about infiltration and Armitage believed that he elicited, confirmed and reconfirmed Musharraf’s commitment to make cessation permanent.\textsuperscript{124} Musharraf emphasized the significance of resuming a substantive dialogue with India on Kashmir. He sought and received confirmation of US interest in helping to improve Pakistan-India relations. Having discussed it with

\textsuperscript{121} ‘Nancy Powell Set to Take Over’, \textit{Dawn}, Islamabad, 31 May 2002. The news was that ‘Ms. Powell will head the US embassy in Islamabad until a permanent replacement is found for Wendy Chamberlin’.\textsuperscript{122} Sridhar Krishnaswami, ‘Bush Rings up PM, Musharraf’, \textit{The Hindu}, Delhi, 6 June 2002. President Bush did not clearly communicate to Musharraf the real nature of Armitage’s visit to Islamabad. In fact, everyone involved in the India-Pakistan crisis was actually searching an excuse to move out of the South Asian quagmire. See Nayak & Krepon, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 35. \textit{Pakistan Horizon}, Vol. 55, No. 3, July 2002, \textit{op.cit.}, p.114. On 5 June, in a telephone conversation with President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee, President Bush made a personal appeal to both the countries to reduce tension in the region. Bush further expected Musharraf to live up to the commitment which latter had made to end all support for terrorism.\textsuperscript{123} Musharraf tried to tell Armitage that there were no training camps on the Indian side of Kashmir which the US messenger could not digest and shared the information on the contrary with the Pakistani President. Nayak & Krepon, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 35. In his June 6 meeting with Richard Armitage in Islamabad, President Musharraf had made it clear that Pakistan would avoid to initiate a war with India. The Text of the document cited in \textit{Pakistan Horizon}, Vol. 55, No. 3, July 2002, p. 114.\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Pakistan Horizon}, Vol. 55, No. 3, July 2002, p. 114. On June 7, talking to reporters in New Delhi, Armitage said that President Musharraf had made it clear to him that he intended to do everything to avoid a war and made ‘a commitment to the US to stop ‘cross border infiltration.’ Sridhar Krishnaswami, ‘Musharraf has Promised to Dismantle Terrorist Camps’, \textit{The Hindu}, Dehli, 12 June 2002. Interview with Richard Armitage’ cited in Nayak & Krepon, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 36.
Musharraf, Armitage was ready to communicate Musharraf’s pledge to India and make it public.

On 7 June, Armitage met Vajpayee and his inner circle of advisors in New Delhi and communicated the commitment he had attained a day earlier from Musharraf. New Delhi’s positive response to the news of Musharraf’s pledge reaffirmed Armitage’s view that India’s ‘cost benefit assessment of a war with Pakistan’ remained fundamentally unchanged. Armitage recalled that Minister Jaswant Singh particularly welcomed Musharraf’s idea and asked Armitage to make it public. One US official who had been present at the Armitage-Musharraf meeting was ‘very surprised’ when Armitage went public in New Delhi with Musharraf’s commitment, but ‘not nearly as surprised as the Pakistanis,’ who strongly complained to US embassy Islamabad. The nature of Musharraf’s pledge made in his 6 June meeting with Armitage soon became a subject of dispute. The disparity between Musharraf’s perceptions and Vajpayee’s expectations was evident in separate interviews given to Newsweek Journalist Lally Weymouth in June 2002:

Weymouth to Vajpayee: US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told you that Pakistan’s President Musharraf had promised to stop the flow of Militants into India-controlled Kashmir… Did Musharraf also promise to get rid of the training camps in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and in Pakistan?

Vajpayee: That was the promise. There are 50 to 70 terrorist training camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and in Pakistan.

Weymouth to Musharraf: Did you tell Deputy Secretary of State Armitage that you would stop cross-border terrorism and shut down the training camps?

Musharraf: First of all, I don’t call it cross-border terrorism. There is a freedom struggle going on in Kashmir. What I said is that there is no movement across the Line of Control…I have told President Bush nothing is happening across the Line of Control. This is the assurance I have given. I am not going to give you an assurance that for years nothing will happen. We have to have a response from India, a discussion about Kashmir…

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125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Lally Weymouth,’ ‘Voices from a Hot Zone’, Newsweek (US edition), 1 July 2002. Also See ‘Interview with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (July 2002) interviewer: Lally Weymouth’, Strategic Digest, Vol. 32, No. 7, IDSA, New Delhi, pp. 963-64. In this Interview, Vajpayee’s stance towards Pakistan’s involvement in the US war on terror was entirely different from his earlier conviction that US was wrong to bring Pakistan in the fold of US coalition against global terrorism. When asked:
Most of the US policy makers believed that Musharraf’s commitment to Armitage was of a temporary nature rather than substantive. In one official’s view, Powell and Armitage knew that the government of India knew that it could not bank on Musharraf’s promises.

The commitment was nonetheless useful in defusing the crisis. A former State Department officer described Armitage’s ‘snap decision’ to publicize Musharraf’s pledge in New Delhi as ‘very creative [and] tactically brilliant’ in that it gave the Indian government an exit strategy from a war it did not want to fight. Although skeptical of Musharraf’s statements, Vajpayee and his inner circle apparently welcomed Armitage’s intervention. While keeping forces in place, India announced that elections in Kashmir would proceed in late 2002. An election process would give India an opening to pull its troops back. Operation Parakaram was officially abandoned on 16 October 2002 following the Kashmir elections. Pakistan followed the suit immediately bringing 10-month long India-Pakistan military crisis to a close.

‘hasn’t the US emerged as a third party’ in dissolving India-Pakistan standoff over Kashmir while India always rejected third party mediation, Vajpayee replied that he called the US a facilitator, not a mediator.

128 ‘Text of Colin Powell Briefing to Newsmen on Board His Plan on way to Thailand after Completing His Visit to India and Pakistan resealed by the State Department, Washington D.C., July 30, 2002’ reproduced in Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 55, No. 4, October 2002, pp. 98-106. According to Secretary Powell, ‘there was no [India-Pakistan] crisis to be resolved at the moment. In fact, the tension level had gone down over the last six weeks as a result of a lot of effective diplomacy on the part of the United States.’ Powell said, ‘I was able to make sure that the commitment from the Pakistani side remained solid, with President Musharraf to end cross-border infiltration.’ According to Powell, Musharraf ‘reaffirmed’ to end the ‘cross-border activity and reaffirmed it as a permanent decision that they have made, and not a tactical decision.’ Powell said that he was pleased that on the Indian side there was a solid commitment to dialogue. The Indians ‘understood that their dialogue had to include all the issues between the two nations but especially it had to include Kashmir.’ Powell remarked that ‘it was not that we were on the eve of war, as it was six weeks ago.’ Talking to the press, Secretary Powell observed that ‘only a productive and sustained bilateral dialogue on all issues, including Kashmir would prevent future crisis and finally bring peace to the region.’ Powell declared that ‘Kashmir is on the international agenda’ and it is time to make regional stability permanent. To further comprehend the significance of Powell’s remarks, See ‘Excerpts from a Press Conference Jointly Addressed by the Minister of State of Foreign Affairs Mr. Inamul Haq and the US Secretary of State Colin Powell (28 July 2002)’, Foreign Affairs Pakistan, Vol. XXIX, No. V, July-September 2002, p. 188. Also See Nayak & Krepon, op.cit., p. 37.


130 According to a report, presiding over a 90-minute meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), Prime Minister Vajpayee announced the pulling back of Indian troops from forward positions along the international border between the two countries. ‘India to Withdraw Troops from Border’, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 16 October 2002. Another editorial referred to Indian Defense Minister, George Farnandes’ claim that the decision of CCS was based on a cost-benefit analysis. In this context, the editorial mentioned that the Minister’s statement was not sufficient to dispel the impression that
The US Department of State defused the India-Pakistan military crisis from December 2001 to October 2002 using the diplomatic skills of Secretary Powell and his Deputy Armitage. During the first peak of the crisis, December 2001- January 2002, Indian military moved to Pakistani border intending a ‘quick hot pursuit’ across the LoC in Pakistan. The US warned India to avoid military escalation beyond the border. Owing to the war on terror in the region, Indian military buildup to fight a limited war against Pakistan was an unwelcome development for the US. The Bush government’s diplomatic pressure forced India to suspend its military threat to Pakistan. During the second high-tide of crisis following May 14 attack in Kaluchak, an India-Pakistan conflict seemed imminent enough to evacuate nonessential staff of western embassies.
from both the rival countries. The skillful diplomacy of Armitage effectively pulled South Asia back from the brink of a futile war.

THE US, INDIA-PAKISTAN MILITARY STANDOFF AND PAKISTAN’S REGIONAL SECURITY

This section discusses the implications of US strong role in averting India-Pakistan military stand off for Pakistan’s security at the regional level. The US strong role in the aversion of the conflict enhanced Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis India in three ways. First, as both Pakistan and India were de facto nuclear powers, a war between them could have led to an accidental use of nuclear weapons, which would have seriously eroded Pakistan’s security and possibly its very existence as a viable state. Second, Pakistan was uncertain in fighting a war with India because the former was not fully aware of India’s conventional and unconventional defense capabilities. Last but not least, Pakistan was involved in combating terrorism on the Pak-Afghan border. A war with India would have diverted Pakistan’s attention away from the war on terror, which would have eroded Pakistan’s security at the regional level.

This section is divided in the following two sub-sections: 1) The US, the risk of an Indo-Pakistan nuclear war and Pakistan’s security; and 2) The US, Pakistan’s response to Indo-Pakistan military standoff and Pakistan’s security.

The US, The Risk of an Indo-Pakistan Nuclear War and Pakistan’s Security:

This sub-section discusses the relationship between the US, the risk of an Indo-Pakistan nuclear war and Pakistan’s security. It argues that India-Pakistan military standoff in 2001-2002 brought about the risk of an Indo-Pakistan war which could have escalated into a nuclear war. The US efforts to defuse India-Pakistan crisis of 2001-2002 enhanced Pakistan’s security at the regional level.

The presence of US forces in the region post 9/11 discouraged India from opening international border against Pakistan. India has the largest military structure in South Asia. Indian forces were more than twice the size of Pakistan military with a very large
Research and Development (R&D) military industrial complex. Yet, Indian Generals were reluctant to move across the border knowing that various Pakistani airfields were being used by the US military at that time. If the Indian rulers still aspired for military infiltration across the LOC, the US diplomatic pressure restrained India. US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 against terrorism in Afghanistan had improved Pakistan’s strategic significance for the US thus enhancing Pakistan’s regional security vis-a-vis India.

Pakistan feared that India-Pakistan conflict could transform into a nuclear catastrophe. Since the beginning of the standoff, both rivals faced a potential threat of escalation of conflict from conventional warfare to nuclear exchange. Moving from low intensity ‘proxy war in Indian Kashmir’, as India would call it, to an all-out combat between the two de facto nuclear weapon states, India and Pakistan, would possibly trigger an even more disastrous scenario than the Cuban missile Crisis of 1962.\(^{131}\) India’s intention to favour military aggression on the Pakistan side of Kashmir was probably inspired by Pakistan’s earlier misadventure in Kargil. According to an analyst, Dr. Zulfqar Khan, the entire security paradigm between the two de facto NWS had changed in the aftermath of the Kargil war.\(^{132}\)

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\(^{131}\)The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was still a proxy conflict among the two super powers of the Cold War era, the US and the Soviet Union. Navigating the Soviet ships, loaded with nuclear missiles, across the Trance-Atlantic waters did not signify much strategic determination to ignite a real conflict on the part of the Soviets. Moreover, the command and control systems of the US and the Soviets were much more advanced compared to India and Pakistan. A probability of India-Pakistan war after 1998 nuclear explosions always entailed a high risk of nuclear holocaust through their miscalculations and unintended mistakes Moreover, the internal and mutual constraints, which had prevented the US and the Soviet Union from using their nuclear arsenals during the Cold War era, are ‘absent on the subcontinent.’ Barry Bearak, ‘Indian Leader’s Threat of War Rattles Pakistan and the US’, The New York Times, 23 May 2002.

\(^{132}\)Dr. Zulfqar Khan, ‘Pakistan-India Military Standoff: A Nuclear Dimension’, IPRI Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, winter 2003, p. 101. According to the author, “soon after the Kargil conflict, the hawks in India developed a risky misperception that they could manage a limited war with Pakistan without it escalating into an all-out war and without each side resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. The mid 1999 Kargil adventure in Kashmir was the first limited conflict to occur after Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998. The conflict in Kargil ended abruptly due to US arbitration on Prime Minister Sharif’s request to President Clinton. Bruce Riedel, ‘American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House’, Center for the Advanced Study on India, University of Pennsylvania, Excerpts in Strategic Digest, Vol. 32, No. 7, July 2002, pp.966-73. It ended in Sharif’s signing of Washington Declaration unilaterally. Both the limited course of the Kargil conflict and its abrupt end involved President Clinton’s concerns about the news that Pakistan’s nuclear missile forces were preparing for action. Riedel was the only person sitting in the July 4 meeting between with President Clinton and PM Sharif when Pakistan’s withdrawal from Kargil was discussed. According to Riedel, ‘Clinton asked Sharif if he knew how
Many decision makers in India believed in the doctrine of engaging in a ‘limited conventional conflict’ with Pakistan. As early as 5 January 2000, in a seminar organized by Institute of Defense and Strategic Analysis (IDSA) at New Delhi, Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes, stressed that there was a provision for a low intensity and a high intensity conventional conflict where a limited unconventional war was possible.\(^{133}\) He emphasized that ‘nuclear weapons did not make war obsolete’. The weapons ‘simply imposed another dimension on the way warfare was conducted.’\(^{134}\) It was a flawed hypothesis because it was based on the misinterpretation of an inappropriate example of the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969. In his own words:

30 years ago (in 1969) two nuclear armed neighboring countries – China and the Soviet Union – had fought a bitter war across their borders. So the issue was not that war had been made obsolete by nuclear weapons, and that covert war by proxy was the only option, but that conventional war remained feasible, though with definite limitations, if escalation across the nuclear threshold was to be avoided.\(^{135}\)

Fernandes mentioned the Sino-Soviet conflict as a rationale for his concept of a limited India-Pakistan war. But he missed the fact that the Sino-Soviet clashes of 1969 were of low-intensity and had never erupted into an open conflict.\(^{136}\) The model of Sino-Soviet hostility was, therefore, irrelevant for the advocacy of the doctrine of ‘limited conventional war’ in the India-Pakistan case.

As states act according to the perceptions of their decision-makers, the Indian belief in the doctrine of ‘limited conventional war’ in a nuclear environment did threaten Pakistan’s security during both rivals’ military standoff of 2001-2002. Since early 2002, India believed that a limited conventional war was possible with Pakistan. For advanced the threat of nuclear war really was? Did Sharif know that his military was preparing their nuclear tipped missiles? Sharif seemed taken aback and only said that India was probably doing the same. The President reminded Sharif how close the US and the Soviet Union had come to having a nuclear war in 1962 over Cuba. Did Sharif realize that even if one bomb was dropped, it would be a catastrophe?’ This signified that even a limited military conflict between India and Pakistan had nuclear prospects. It also showed how alarmed the US was about India-Pakistan confrontation and the possibility of the use of a nuclear bomb. Fortunately, the conflict ended without India or Pakistan having to cross the international border.

\(^{133}\) ‘The Challenges of a Limited War: Parameters and Options’, Inaugural address by the Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes at Gulmohar, Habitat Centre, New Delhi, national seminar organized by the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA), 5 January 2002, p.64.

\(^{134}\) Ibid.

\(^{135}\) Ibid.

example, on January 12, India’s Army Chief General S. Padmanabhan announced that ‘conceptually, the scope [existed] for a limited conventional war.’\footnote{Sujan Dutta, ‘Delhi Adds War Drums to Diplomacy Chorus’, \textit{Telegraph}, Calcutta, 12 January 2002.} Talking to the world media, Padmanabhan stressed that the Indian forces were ready for an ‘offensive.’ Further, he emphasized that ‘the possibility of a conflict snowballing into a nuclear war was not inevitable’ given the international scenario.\footnote{Ibid.} Probably, he understood the flaw in his own argument when he stated, ‘should they [Pakistan] be mad enough – to use nuclear weapons against India, its military or economic assets, the perpetrators of that outrage shall be punished so severely that their continuation in any form and fray will be doubtful…Yes, we have the capability of second strike.’\footnote{Ibid.} Indian decision makers’ self-contradictory statements had potential dire implications for Pakistan’s security.

Fortunately for Pakistan, the US understood that a conventional war between the two rivals could very easily lead to nuclear exchange, which motivated the US to restrain India. Due to the US influence as well as the presence of the US troops in Afghanistan, India was willing to re-think its military policy. According to General Padmanabhan, one of the primary factors which inhibited India was the ‘presence of the American troops in the subcontinent’. Yet, he was defiant. He stressed that when ‘two bulls decide to fight in the jungle’, they don’t care.\footnote{Ibid.} It showed that despite his assertions on the contrary, Padmanabhan understood that an accidental nuclear war could occur through miscalculation. The perils of nuclear dimension were so closely attached with an India-Pakistan military encounter that the US became excessively concerned about resolving the crisis.

The US media wanted to communicate clearly to India that a limited conventional exchange could indeed lead to non-conventional warfare between the two rivals. The \textit{Washington Post} decided to interview Musharraf on 27 May 2002 when India-Pakistan tensions had risen to an extent that a military conflict seemed unavoidable between them. It was largely due to India’s blaming Pakistan for Kaluchak Massacre on the
Indian side of Kashmir on May 14 which left 31 people dead and nearly 50 injured.\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Washington Post} bluntly asked Musharraf that under what ‘circumstances’ he would ‘consider’ the use of nuclear weapons if an India-Pakistan war were to erupt.\textsuperscript{142} Musharraf, mindful of global and regional concerns on the issue, did not reply in plain ‘yes’ or ‘no’. He emphasized that he would not ‘even like to imagine that we could come to a stage’ where a nuclear weapon could be used. He meant that there was a possibility of Pakistan’s using a nuclear weapon in case of an India offensive. He took an aggressive stand in order to deter India from attacking Pakistan. In his own words:

They [Indians] keep talking of punishing us, going across the border, [saying] “We have given two weeks to them … We have given two months to them.” Let me tell you that we don’t accept this kind of gimmick. Pakistan is no Iraq. India is no United States. We have forces. They follow a strategy of deterrence. And we are very capable of deterring them. And in case that deterrence fails, we are very capable of an offensive defense. These words are very important. We are not only on the defensive. We will take the offensive into Indian territory.\textsuperscript{143}

What he meant by an offensive defense was that there were around 150,000 retired soldiers of Pakistani army living on Pakistani side of Kashmir. They would take arms in case India crossed the LOC, and would fight in Kashmir for their brothers on the other side.\textsuperscript{144} This was to establish conventional deterrence.

In the same interview, Musharraf also wanted to deter India in terms of unconventional defence. He mentioned ten Indian missile tests during the past one year and referred to Pakistan’s own missile tests warning India that ‘miscalculation’ in the military field could lead to ‘blunders.’\textsuperscript{145} This indicated that the Musharraf regime was pursuing the policy of restraint asking India for de-escalation, on the one hand, and for the resumption of dialogue on Kashmir, on the other.

\textsuperscript{141} According to the details, three terrorists boarded a Himachal tourist bus going from Pathankot to Jammu on 14 May 2002. They stopped the bus near Kaluchak, shot the driver and the conductor of the bus and opened fire on the passengers inside the bus. Later, they exchanged fire with the sentries of an army unit located nearby. Later, they escaped to the army family lines where they eventually got killed. According to the Indian version, the terrorists had infiltrated across the LoC. ‘Kaluchak Massacre’, \textit{Strategic Digest}, Vol. 32, No. 5, May 2002, p. 731.


\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., p. 178.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., pp. 178-9.
It was in Pakistan’s own national security interest not to indulge in any sort of conflict with India and therefore Pakistan wanted the US to play an important role to avert the conflict. In his 27 May 2002 address to the nation, Musharraf urged the world community led by the US to ‘ask India to move towards the normalization of relations which really implies de-escalation, which is of mutual benefit’ to both countries. Musharraf strongly condemned the attack in Kaluchak and held that whosoever was involved in such terrorist attacks wanted to destabilize Pakistan.\footnote{Text of President General Pervez Musharraf’s Address to the Nation, 27 May 2002 reproduced in \textit{Strategic Digest}, Vol. 32, No. 5, May 2002, pp. 739-41.} Through this, he sent a clear message to both the US and India that Pakistan did not favour an Indo-Pakistan war.

Musharraf’s dual policy of restraint and military preparedness vis-à-vis India left observers uncertain about Pakistan’s nuclear intent. While maintaining his reconciliatory posture, Musharraf emphasized that ‘the enemy is trying to intimidate us’ through its threats of war. He stressed that ‘our national security, honor and dignity are being challenged. The armed forces of Pakistan are in a state of ever preparedness.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 741.}

Strategic analysts in the West gave a deep insight into India-Pakistan military standoff and where it could lead. The 21 January 2002 issue of \textit{Aviation Week and Space Technology} published a comparative study of several US and British analyses of India-Pakistan military standoff.\footnote{‘South Asia Nuclear War Deemed Unlikely, But…’, \textit{Aviation Week and Space Technology}, 21 January 2002 reproduced in \textit{Strategic Digest}, Vol. 32, No. 3, March 2002, pp. 553-9.} The analyses by defense experts from prestigious research institutes viewed particular aspects of military buildup which could potentially lead to a nuclear exchange. The analytical frameworks of such studies were invariably based on the Cold War scenarios which had emerged from the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. It was not obvious that in every analysis, such framework would justify the conclusion, but the US-Soviet nuclear context was the only analytical model that was frequently used since the nuclear arsenals emerged in the mid 1940s. When compared to the conflict behaviour of the nuclear capable superpowers during the Cold War era, India and Pakistan’s nuclear capability was significantly limited and they did not qualify to pose any nuclear threat to each other.
An expert of South Asian affairs, Michael Krepon of Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, while referring to Pakistan initiated ‘missile rattling’ maintained that the country moved its short-range, unguided Hatf missiles to the combat corridors of Rajasthan desert on the Indian Pakistani border in Punjab. In response, India’s short-range, guided Prithvi missiles were also moved into position. To Krepon, it raised the stakes and compounded the risks of war. Yet, the risk of conventional war’s escalation into nuclear devastation was remote due to the ‘minuscule’ number of nuclear devices that India and Pakistan had produced. Compared with the mammoth thermonuclear arsenals that the superpowers fielded in the tens of thousands in the second half of the 20th century, the count of Indian and Pakistani nuclear arms was small, perhaps a few dozens on each side. Contrary to Krepon’s view, however, the geographical proximity of India and Pakistan along with the fact that they were fighting a direct war, did not require a massive number of nuclear weapons to annihilate each other.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace maintained that India had not tested nuclear missile warheads, although it would have developed them. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 and waited for 24 years to conduct another five tests in 1998. Pakistan also had a limited number of nuclear experiments to its credit. The total South Asian tests, therefore, were a mere handful, far fewer than the ever-multiplying detonations conducted by the US and the ex-Soviet Union in the formative years of nuclear age post 1945. The operational reliability and effective yield of Indian and Pakistani devices were distinctly in doubt. According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), both India and Pakistan heavily depended on Russia and China respectively. Reliance on foreign technology and the weakness it reflected about the subcontinent’s indigenous defense industry base also affected the missiles India and Pakistan could operationally deploy to deliver nuclear warheads.

The command and control structure, the nervous system of nuclear as well as conventional forces, was poorly structured and in its embryonic phase. Lacking enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium to make nuclear warheads in case of India and

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149 Ibid., p. 554.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., p. 556.
Pakistan, and insufficient economic resources to build advanced military structures also obstructed the nuclear ambition of both countries. Within this context, according to Gregory S. Jones, a specialist in weapons of mass destruction at the RAND Corporation, the ‘talk in Western political and media circles about a hair-trigger nuclear attack by either country [was] just silly…There is no evidence that I know of that India and Pakistan are readying their nuclear weapons’\textsuperscript{152} for attack.

Nevertheless, the US scholars continued to indulge in India-Pakistan war simulations to understand, under what circumstances, a nuclear weapon was likely to be used. For example, Gregory S. Jones indicated that ‘if there were a major war in the Punjab and somehow Pakistani forces collapsed and Indians captured Lahore, then Pakistan might have to seriously consider deploying its nuclear forces.’\textsuperscript{153} This observation showed the high degree of uncertainty in case of any conflict between India and Pakistan. Jones also noted that the emotion in New Delhi and Islamabad ran very high over the Kashmir issue and that rationality did not always prevail in politics. Inevitably, emotionalism and extremism would arouse concerns about whether nuclear deterrence would work in the subcontinent as it did in the Cold war. What concerned the security observers in the West was that both India and Pakistan were trying to find their way through a potential nuclear standoff when emotions ran extremely high. This inflamed situation could lead to miscalculation or misunderstanding, which could, in turn, lead to a nuclear exchange.

Many US scholars emphasized that India-Pakistan nuclear war scenario was at best uncertain and unpredictable. For example, Shireen Hunter, Director of the Islam program at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, emphasized that India and Pakistan did not enjoy the same confidence and predictability that the US and the Soviets did.\textsuperscript{154} She maintained that both South Asian rivals did not know the technological pace of each other’s nuclear development. This kind of doubt caused a higher level of unpredictability, which in turn compounded the risk that the political and military leadership in either capital might miscalculate the nuclear prowess and the next military moves of their adversary. No one knew with precision where that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{152} Ibid, p. 556-7.
  \item \textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p. 557.
  \item \textsuperscript{154} Ibid., pp. 557-558.
\end{itemize}
threshold was on the subcontinent. For Hunter, the command and control was particularly worrisome in Pakistan. Islamabad’s military forces were basically quite cohesive, but there were some disruptive local elements that raised questions about how secure the chain of command and control was. It implied that the absence of communication between the nuclear rivals provided the basis for the prevalence of nuclear threat in South Asia. In the case of Pakistan, internal political discord and the presence of hostile disruptive forces also caused nuclear danger.

Various studies in the West regarding India-Pakistan military standoff can be divided into two main groups. One group, under the influence of the US-Soviet nuclear model of the Cold War era, maintained that neither India nor Pakistan reached a level where a state qualified to pose a nuclear threat to the other. Both superpowers of the Cold War era were highly advanced technologically and hence their nuclear structures were so sophisticatedly up to the mark that the weapons of mass destruction truly emerged as nuclear deterrents.

Interestingly, using the same premise of unreliable nature of Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces, the other group of analysts asserted that the absence of well established and reliable nuclear structures could be the major cause of nuclear escalation in South Asia. During a conventional military conflict, both rivals would face dire consequences due to the lack of an effective command and control structure and unreliable communication systems. In Pakistan’s case, nuclear threat scenario would be rather more alarming. It is within this context that a nuclear exchange would have harmed Pakistan’s security far more than India. In fact, Pakistan would not have survived as a state in the case of a nuclear exchange.

The above discussion clearly shows that the India-Pakistan military stand-off did have the potential to erupt into a conventional and unconventional nuclear war, which would have threatened the very existence of Pakistan as a state. The studies emerging from the West clearly hinted at the possibility of the conversion of a conventional India-Pakistan war into a nuclear war through escalation. Moreover, the statements of the Indian and

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155 Ibid., p. 558.
156 Ibid.
Pakistani decision makers also pointed towards this possibility. The military standoff clearly demonstrated that the leaders of India and Pakistan were incapable of resolving their tensions on their own. It was primarily due to the US influence on India, which helped defuse India-Pakistan military tension. The US was willing to exercise its own influence in the sub-continent due to its on going cooperation with Pakistan post 9/11, which proved beneficial for Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis India.

The US, Pakistan’s Response to Indo-Pakistan Military Standoff and Pakistan’s Security

This section discusses the complex relationship between the US, Pakistan’s response to Indo-Pakistan military standoff and Pakistan’s security. It argues that the US was a strong factor in shaping Pakistan’s response to Indo-Pakistan military stand off. Pakistan closely followed the US advice to avert the crisis, which not only averted an all out India-Pakistan war but also strongly enhanced Pakistan’s security.

The US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 was essentially based on the commitment to fight terrorism in Afghanistan and to eliminate the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban from Pakistan and Afghanistan. As such, US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 against terrorism brought a convergence of security interests between the US and Pakistan. India’s attempt for a military showdown with Pakistan, therefore, became an irritant for the US-Pakistan strategic equation in the region. In retrospect, the US-Pakistan convergence proved more relevant than India’s coercive approach against Pakistan in 2001-2002.

From Pakistan’s perspective, India used coercive diplomacy to designate Pakistan as a terrorist state. Within this context, Pakistan moved carefully to respond to the Indian moves. On December 13, as the news of attack on Indian parliament was out, President Musharraf sent a message of sympathy to Prime Minister Vajpayee in which he strongly condemned the attack.\footnote{‘Message of Sympathy from the President to the Prime Minister of India on the Attack on the Indian Parliament Building by Armed Intruders, 13 December 2001’, \textit{Foreign Affairs Pakistan}, Vol. XXVIII, No. 12, December 2001, p. 270; Also See ‘Transcript of the Press Conference addressed by the Foreign}
firmly denied Vajpayee’s allegations for holding the militants in Pakistan responsible for sponsoring the attack. The spokesman stressed that Pakistan, ‘itself being a victim of terrorism, condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.’

On the question of Pakistan’s preparedness to avoid Indian probable attack, he stated that ‘we want to resolve all outstanding disputes including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir through negotiations through peaceful means… . Pakistan would not want tension to rise. Pakistan would like all matters to be resolved peacefully and the efforts on diplomatic level are going on in this regard.’ The spokesman apprehended that the ‘terrorist attack was aimed at maligning and harming the legitimate Kashmiri struggle on the Indian side of Kashmir.’ The foreign office statement signified that Pakistan neither wanted to fight another war with India nor desired to abandon the cause of Kashmiri people’s right of self determination. It reflected in President Musharraf’s delicately prepared and globally awaited policy speech in response to India’s military standoff.

Pakistan closely followed the US advice in responding to India’s aggressive overtures. For example, Pervaiz Musharraf made a speech on Pakistan television on 12 January 2002 in which he showed a reconciliatory approach to India. This speech was of immense value to avert the crisis. This speech was, in fact, a well contemplated version of detailed advice from Washington to Musharraf through the then US ambassador Wendy Chamberlin. Being unaware of whether the Indian intentions were to coerce or to fight Pakistan, the US assumed that the possibility of war was real and chose to act accordingly. The US convinced Musharraf to blacklist certain terrorist groups. It

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159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
161 Amir Mateen, ‘Bush Keen to Hear Speech’, The News, Islamabad, 12 January 2002. According to the news, Musharraf’s expected speech generated immense interest in the top US leadership including President Bush ‘hoping that it will change the course of history in the South Asian sub-continent.’ Some important TV channels did televise it live at 9.30 am on Saturday morning in Washington D.C.
indicated that through his anti-terrorist reforms, Musharraf reinforced the US efforts to keep India from attacking Pakistan.

It is important to analyse the US influenced Musharraf speech as it played a central role in diffusing the tension between the two traditional rivals. In his televised speech on 12 January 2002, Musharraf discussed significant issues that had vexed Pakistan since long such as religious extremism, violence and terrorism, and were directly related to Indian brinkmanship. Reiterating his government’s efforts to introduce tolerance and moderation in the society, he recalled introducing the Anti-Weaponisation Ordinance in early 2001. 163 He also mentioned banning two sectarian militant outfits – Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) and Sipah-i-Mohammad (SM) – a month before 9/11, and placing Sipah-i-Sahaba (SS) and Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) under observation. Referring to such measures, he emphasized that ‘the campaign against extremism undertaken by us from the very beginning [was] in our own national interest.’ He also reaffirmed the joining of post 9/11 international coalition against global terrorism on the same principle of ‘national interest’. 164 In a carefully measured way, Musharraf moved to the point where he would pose a critical question to his fellow citizens in mid January 2002. 165

Do we want Pakistan to become a theocratic state? Do we believe that religious education alone is enough for governance or do we want Pakistan to emerge as a progressive and dynamic Islamic welfare state? The verdict of the masses is in favor of a progressive Islamic state.166

Musharraf then tactfully criticized pro-Taliban extremists in Pakistan who wanted to tarnish the country’s image in the world and to bring it down economically. He harshly blamed them for sectarian bloodshed and for their ignorance of true Islamic values. He elaborated upon religious seminaries’ disappointing conditions in Pakistan and a dire need to reform them. He explained to his people that ‘Jihad [was] not confined to armed struggle only.’ To him, Jihad against illiteracy, poverty, hunger and backwardness was a

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165 In mid January 2002, there was anti-US sentiment in Pakistan due to the US military operation in Afghanistan. Muslim sentiments in general were running high and pro-Taliban religious-political parties were out in the streets demonstrating against the US military operation against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. In this uncertain and highly charged pro-Taliban environment, Musharraf’s question was not simply rhetorical. It had real implications.
more pressing need of the hour. It implied that while persuading his nation in favor of tolerant and moderate values, Musharraf was actually trying to build a county wide consensus in favor of exercising restraint against Indian brinkmaship. He was indicating to the US, in particular, that his efforts were directed more towards following the US agenda in the region post 9/11.

Musharraf forwarded a message of restraint and peaceful resolution of mutual disputes to India when he delivered the most commended part of his speech. He announced that ‘no organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir. We condemn the terrorist acts of September 11, October 1 and December 13. Anyone found [involved] in any terrorist act would be dealt with sternly.’ Musharraf also announced to ban many militant groups including Jaish-i-Mohammad (JM) and Lashkar-i-Taiba (LT). India had specifically accused these two Pakistan based militant organizations for their attacks on the parliament building in New Delhi.

Musharraf did deliver an inclusive policy speech as far as India-Pakistan standoff was concerned. Beside showing preference for toleration and moderation, he chose restraint against Indian military buildup and banned militant organizations. Moreover, through his speech, he sent two important messages to India. His first message was that if India and Pakistan wanted to normalize relations and bring harmony to the region, the Kashmir dispute needed ‘to be resolved peacefully through a dialogue’ according to the ‘aspirations of the Kashmiri people.’ Second, the ‘Armed Forces of Pakistan’ [were] fully prepared and ‘deployed to meet any challenge.’ Any Indian attempt of crossing the border would be ‘met with full force.’ During the ten month long standoff, Pakistan closely followed the tenets that Musharraf had given on 12 January under the US advice.

Musharraf’s speech turned the course of India’s standoff into a standstill in many ways. Strong condemnation of religious militancy and sectarian violence had a universal appeal which India could not ignore. Moreover, his assurance that all the terrorist acts

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167 Ibid., p. 20.
168 The other three militant religious groups that were banned were Sipah-i-Sahaba (SS), Tehriq-i-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) and Tehriq-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM).
169 Musharraf’s Address to the Nation, Foreign Affairs Pakistan, op.cit, p. 20.
related to Kashmir were criminal was also a massive step forward which had an enormous impact on the US as well as on the Indian perceptions of Pakistan. Musharraf’s commitment to practice restraint in the face of Indian military buildup was another positive posture which diluted Indian aggression.

The US appreciation of Musharraf’s speech persuaded India to reciprocate favorably to Pakistan’s overtures. Even the Indian press saw a new beginning in President Musharraf’s policy statement.\textsuperscript{170} The BJP leadership, however, did not want the de-escalation of the Indian forces. Jaswant was rather disappointed with the ‘continuing lack of action’ against fugitives from law about whom detailed information [had] been provided to Pakistan on several occasions.\textsuperscript{171}

In contrast to the Indian response, the US ‘unequivocally welcomed’ Musharraf’s speech saying that ‘it provided a basis for the reduction of tension between India and Pakistan.’\textsuperscript{172} In his 12 January statement, Secretary Powell declared that Musharraf had ‘taken a bold and principled stand to set Pakistan squarely against terrorism and extremism both in and outside Pakistan.’ Powell stressed that the speech reconfirmed ‘Pakistan’s role as a frontline state in the war against global terrorism.’\textsuperscript{173} President Bush, on his part, called President Musharraf and praised him for his ‘candid, courageous and statesman-like’ address to the nation, and ‘assured the US continued full support’ to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{174}

Under the US influence, the UN played a strong role in defusing the tension between India and Pakistan. For example, on 24 January 2002, during his visit to Pakistan, the UN Secretary General Kofi Anan stressed that President Musharraf deserved a ‘high place’ for his courageous speech. Anan particularly appreciated the emphasis Musharraf

\textsuperscript{170} ‘A Positive Gesture from Pakistan’ (Editorial), \textit{The Hindu}, Delhi, 1 January 2002. The editorial mentioned that the ‘political courage exuded by the Pakistani President in addressing India’s concerns’ raised the vision of a truly promising turn in the crisis ridden bilateral relationship.’ Also See Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, ‘Hints of Change’ \textit{The Telegraph}, Calcutta, 15 January 2002.


\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.
had placed on the importance of tolerance, the rule of law and the need to fight terrorism and extremism. He also commended Musharraf for anti-terrorist measures. According to him, these ‘steps’ were in the ‘right direction’. Regarding India-Pakistan military standoff which had brought the region to the brink of an all out war, Anan stressed:

… the need to resolve Pakistan’s differences with India including over Kashmir through peaceful means. Pakistan and India have much in common, much they [have to] lose from tension and confrontation, and much they gain through cooperation. … what they need is military de-escalation. But de-militarization and an end to the immediate crisis is not enough. The world does not want another crisis in a few weeks or a few months’ time. [They need] sustained and determined action against extremist armed groups of the kind announced by President Musharraf, and then equally sustained and determined dialogue between Pakistan and India to resolve their differences by peaceful means. There is enormous support and encouragement in the international community for this twin-track approach. My own good offices remain available should both parties wish to avail them.

Kofi Anan’s statement implied that the US led global community neither favored terrorist pursuits nor military solutions to interstate conflicts. It appeared that Pakistan, by taking anti-terrorist measures and showing conviction to peacefully solving India-Pakistan dispute, had significantly defused the pressure emanating from India’s coercive diplomacy.

Musharraf, while trying to find a diplomatic solution of the Kashmir dispute, emphasized the Kashmir issue. On 15 January 2002, in his inaugural address at the National Kashmir Committee (NKC), he stated that Pakistan would ‘continue to support the just freedom struggle of Kashmiris politically, diplomatically and morally.’ He said the NKC would ‘work for peaceful promotion of Kashmir cause in accordance with the UNSC Resolution’ and the wishes of Kashmir people. He stated that the Kashmir issue was not confined to Kashmir or Pakistan, ‘rather it was a global issue which

176 Ibid.
177 ‘Transcript of the Press Conference Jointly Addressed by the Foreign Minister and the UN Secretary General, His Excellency Mr. Kofi Annan, on 24 January, 2002’ in Foreign Affairs Pakistan, Vol. XXIX, Nos. 1-2, January/February 2002, p. 238.
deserved support and attention of all individuals, groups and states’ who believed in the supremacy of international law and of fair play. He warned that ‘an unresolved Jammu and Kashmir problem’ undermined ‘global peace and security’\textsuperscript{179} and therefore required urgent attention.

Again on 5 February, in his address to AJK legislative assembly in Muzaffarabad, he referred to the Indian security forces’ abuse of human rights and the atrocities committed against the Kashmiri youth. He stressed that India accused Pakistan of a proxy war in Kashmir. If the Kashmiri struggle was being sponsored and orchestrated from outside, he asked, then who were ‘those 80,000 martyrs buried in the graveyards of occupied Kashmir?’\textsuperscript{180}

Over-viewing Musharraf’s 12 January speech, then Pakistan’s ambassador to the US, Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, in an interview with WNTV proposed three parameters within which a solution of the Kashmir issue could be pursued. According to her, one parameter was to agree that there could be no military solution to Kashmir, and second, to ensure that a solution was acceptable to the people of Kashmir. The third parameter was to also ensure that the status quo, which was part of the problem, could not be part of the solution.\textsuperscript{181}

The US role in defusing India-Pakistan military tension in 2002 made Pakistan optimistic about the US future role in resolving disputes in the sub-continent. On 11 February 2002, in a press conference with President Bush in Washington, Musharraf asked for the ‘immediate return of Indian forces to peace-time location’ and early resumption of the composite dialogue between Pakistan and India. He welcomed the constructive role, which President Bush and Secretary Powell played ‘in urging restraint

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., p. 31.
\textsuperscript{181} ‘Excerpts from an Interview of Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi with Channel 13 of WNTV PBS, 15 January 2002’, \textit{Foreign Affairs Pakistan}, Vol. XXIX, No. 1-2, January/February 2002, pp. 77-80. Lodhi observed that efforts made bilaterally to resolve this issue have come to naught. That’s why, ‘we must find international means…to resolve this longstanding issue.’
and defusing military tension’ with India.\textsuperscript{182} Pakistan had long wanted the US to act as a facilitator for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, which would ultimately bring peace to the region.

According to the US advice, Musharraf chose to exercise restraint against India’s brinkmanship. Keeping in mind India’s edge over Pakistan in conventional military terms, it was in Pakistan’s own interest to avoid a collision with India. While avoiding confrontation with India, Musharraf continued to pressurize India on two points. First, India must return to negotiations on the Kashmir dispute and on other matters of mutual interest. Second, Pakistan would use all the available means to deter any Indian move across the border. However, it was in Pakistan’s own security interest to avoid aggression vis-à-vis India in 2001-2002 and US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 provided this opportunity.

CONCLUSION:

This chapter has discussed the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security in the context of India-Pakistan military standoff from December 2001-October 2002. After 9/11, India used 13 December attack on the Indian Parliament to project Pakistan as a terrorist state. Despite launching operation Parakaram, India did not cross the border due to intense global and domestic pressure to avoid military escalation. The India-Pakistan standoff reached a stalemate because Pakistan kept its military buildup on low intensity level. Pakistan requested India to de-escalate tension on the border and to return to a peaceful dialogue on Kashmir. A threat of nuclear war also prevented India from attacking Pakistan. Significantly, due to the US War on Terror in Afghanistan, the Indian military buildup was an unwelcome development for the US. The US State Department’s diplomatic pressure on India forced the latter to de-escalate and thus averted another Indo-Pakistan war.

In its desire to be the only powerful state in the region, India decided to play a prominent role in the US war against terrorism. In the event, Pakistan could be isolated

as a terrorist state and punished for its earlier involvement with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Under Bush, the US plan to fight global terrorism did not accommodate India’s regional pursuit. In reaction, India deployed its military against Pakistan. The almost one year long Indian standoff created fear of a nuclear conflict in the global community. In response, Pakistan showed restraint in brinkmanship while it simultaneously stood firm on the Kashmir issue. Being part of US coalition against terrorism, Pakistan was able to reject Indian pressure on Kashmir. India misperceived the strategic realities in the region and consequently suffered a futile military stalemate with Pakistan. Finally, US power prevailed and forced both rivals to engage in peaceful diplomacy.

The course of India-Pakistan standoff, 2001-2002, brought two ground realities to the fore. First, it showed the total collapse of bilateralism in the region. The breakdown of mutual communication and weak will of the leaders for peaceful coexistence left both rivals with two very divergent paths to follow. One way would have been of regional exclusiveness rejecting any outside mediation. In South Asia, this would have led to continued mutual suspicion and conflict as exemplified by India’s brinkmanship. The other approach would have been to allow outside mediation to work and ultimately get the conflict resolved. Resolving India-Pakistan crisis through US preventive diplomacy exemplified this perspective clearly.183 Second, nuclear deterrence emerged as a strong factor which fostered military restraint during India-Pakistan military standoff. Warnings of intended and unintended exchange of nuclear weapons induced reluctance in both rivals against taking the conflict to the next level. The India-Pakistan military projection during the long standoff exemplified, however, that nuclear deterrence alone might not be sufficient without extra-regional support for perpetual peace in South Asia.

It was the nuclear dimension of the standoff which later paved the way for India-Pakistan peace process. Within this context, the next chapter explores the US role in encouraging Indo-Pakistan composite dialogue post 9/11 and its implications for Pakistan’s security at the regional level.

183 K. K. Katyal, ‘Bilateralism the Casualty’, The Hindu, Delhi, 6 June 2002. Hailing the outcome of the Richard Armitage mission to India and Pakistan due to its help in averting the war, Katyal underlined the triumph of third party role or ‘facilitation’ over bilateralism.
India-Pakistan composite dialogue is deeply related to Pakistan’s security at the regional level for three reasons. First, as Pakistan’s regional security is interdependent on India, a peaceful dialogue with India would enhance Pakistan’s security. Second, because Kashmir has been the basis for Pakistan’s geo-historical rivalry with India, positive discussion with India on the Kashmir issue under the composite dialogue would increase Pakistan’s regional security. Finally, as both India and Pakistan are de facto nuclear states, it is in Pakistan’s security interest to have a responsible dialogue with India on strategic issues. Within this context, the composite dialogue also covered nuclear CBMs (NCBM)s which augmented Pakistan’s security.

The commencement of the composite dialogue can be traced back to February 1999 when during his visit to Lahore, India’s Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration. The agreement highlighted that both India and Pakistan would:

1. Intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
2. Refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs.
3. Intensify their composite and integrated dialogue for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.
4. Take immediate steps for reducing the risk of [an] accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborate measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.¹

¹ The Text of the Lahore Declaration signed by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on 21 February 1999. Foreign Affairs Pakistan, January/February 1999, Nos. 1 & 2, p.64.
However, in the first week of May 1999, the emergence of the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan along with their military standoff of 2001/2002 once again established both neighbors as strong adversaries thus destroying the earlier spirit of the composite dialogue. It was only the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 which necessitated the resumption of the peace process between India and Pakistan.

Following the Bush administration’s post 9/11 policy in South Asia, the US Department of State vigorously made efforts to replace India-Pakistan hostility with a peace process towards settling their regional disputes. After reversing the India-Pakistan standoff 2001-2002, the US engaged both the countries in a composite dialogue. (See Section 1 below for a detailed discussion of the official structure and substructure of the composite dialogue). Due to the US strong role, India-Pakistan composite dialogue formally began in early 2004. The dialogue process was based on eight disputed issues which both countries had agreed to discuss and resolve in high official group meetings which were held periodically. These were: 1) Peace and security including Confidence Building Measures (CBMs); 2) Jammu and Kashmir; 3) Siachen; 4) the Wullar Barrage project; 5) Sir Creek; 6) Terrorism and drug trafficking; 7) Economic and commercial cooperation; and 8) Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields. The dialogue process improved their security relations by approving NCBMs. By late 2008, both countries had implemented several CBMs and accepted many others relating to security and economic development. Pakistan expected some tangible progress on Kashmir. In November, however, terrorist attacks in Mumbai which killed 173 people led to a pause in the composite dialogue. In 2010, Pakistan is still waiting for India to resume the regular dialogue.

This chapter discusses the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s regional security in the context of the India-Pakistan peace process. It argues that the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 enhanced Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis India by engaging both the countries in a composite dialogue to resolve their disputes peacefully instead of fighting wars.
This chapter is divided into three sections: 1) The US role in commencing India-Pakistan composite dialogue; 2) Implications of US role for India-Pakistan composite dialogue; and 3) US-Pakistan cooperation, India-Pakistan composite dialogue and Pakistan’s security.

THE US ROLE IN COMMENCING INDIA-PAKISTAN COMPOSITE DIALOGUE:

This section discusses the US initiatives post 9/11 concerning the India-Pakistan peace process. It argues that the US diplomacy effectively engaged India and Pakistan in a dialogue process to solve their bilateral disputes thus leading them away from war.

The post 9/11 Bush administration unraveled a comprehensive security paradigm for South Asia in an attempt to move this region from conflict to cooperation. In July 2002, after India and Pakistan had moved away from a military standoff that had very nearly led to war between the two countries, the US Secretary of State Powell briefed the media in Islamabad on the next stage of India-Pakistan relations. He emphasized:

> It’s time to make regional stability permanent. Kashmir is on the international agenda. The United States will extend a helping hand to all sides so that they can achieve a more peaceful, less divisive future. The problem of Kashmir cannot be resolved through violence, but only through healthy political process and only through dialogue between the parties….Only a productive and sustained bilateral dialogue on all issues, including Kashmir, will prevent future crisis and finally bring peace to the region.2

US Secretary of State Powell’s statement signified that US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 led to an India-Pakistan dialogue process that aimed at bringing a sustainable peace in the region.

Reflecting upon the security crisis in South Asia, Powell further reminded the press that a short time ago, the prospects of war between India and Pakistan were very real. He stated, ‘with the efforts of international community’ and ‘with the efforts of the parties themselves’, the tensions had been reduced and ‘both sides reaffirmed their desire for a

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peaceful political solution to the problems’ that existed.3 Addressing his Pakistani counterpart, Inam-ul-Haq, Powell stressed, ‘we must continue on this path, and the United States – Mr. Minister, I assure you – will travel this road with you.’4 Powell’s reassuring words implied that the Bush administration was firmly behind a dialogue process that would lead the two South Asian rivals – India and Pakistan – towards mutual peace and enhance the potential for economic development and prosperity. For Pakistan, the US willingness to address Pakistan’s security concerns vis-à-vis India was a reward for Pakistan’s cooperation with the US against terrorism. The US showed reluctance, however, to be seen as the mediator of India-Pakistan peace process due to India’s long held aversion to third party involvement in the India-Pakistan conflict resolution.

Responding to a question concerning US proposals to solve the Kashmir dispute, Powell stated that the US could ‘facilitate the start of a dialogue’, but as far as the agenda and action plan for a solution to the dispute were concerned, ‘the two parities [would] have to resolve it.’ He also stated that ‘if they wish to share ideas with us, we would be more than happy to respond to any ideas that might come from either side’.5 Interestingly, in the same press conference held on 28 July 2002, Pakistan’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Inam-ul-Haq showed optimism that the US was willing to play a positive role in the composite dialogue. He emphasized:

We deeply appreciate the United States engagement and the personal involvement of President Bush and Secretary Powell in defusing tension in South Asia and for the efforts to promote peace and stability in this region. Pakistan has taken substantive steps for the reduction of tension between India and Pakistan. We believe that it is time for military de-escalation and the resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan to resolve the core issue of Kashmir in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir, as well as all

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. Secretary Powell was asked if the US would help in implementing the UN resolutions of the 1940s-1950s on Kashmir to resolve the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan. Powell said ‘there is a long history with respect to Kashmir that goes back these many years, and there are different points of views as to what is binding, what is not binding, what is appropriate, what is not appropriate.’ Powell’s statement indicated that the US was not prepared to support Pakistan on its stand of resolving the Kashmir dispute according to the UN resolutions because India strongly rejected third party involvement in this matter. Owing to its own national interests in the region, therefore, the US avoided to be seen as a party to the dispute between India and Pakistan.
other outstanding issues and differences between the two countries. We appreciate the role that the United States is playing in achieving this very desirable goal.6

Later, on 31 October 2002, the Director of Policy Planning in the US Department of State, and an Advisor to US Secretary of State Powell, Richard Haas, reiterated the same point during a television interview in Islamabad. When asked about the US policy on Kashmir, Haas replied that Kashmir ‘obviously is at the core of the differences between India and Pakistan.’ He stated that the US wanted to ensure that the issue was resolved diplomatically and peacefully, but in any settlement, the interests and perspective of the people of Kashmir would have to be taken into account. He asserted that ‘the US [did] not hold in its pocket any secret plan or framework’ for this solution.7

The statement by Haas indicated that the Bush administration was reluctant to mediate in the India-Pakistan dialogue in full public view knowing India’s aversion to the extra-regional concerns in the region. 8

The constant US support for an India-Pakistan détente, nevertheless, helped improve security and a sense of mutual peace in South Asia.9

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6 Ibid.


8 In the past, India resisted extra-regional involvement in South Asia mainly due to India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s approach. After gaining sovereignty from the British Empire in 1947 and with the beginning of the Cold War, Nehru pursued an isolationist posture to distance India from the politics of the Cold War. India joined the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) which represented the developing world of the Third World Countries. Nehru was particularly averse to the US influence which, in his view, represented the capitalist imperialism of the First World. Under the Nehruvian discourse, India was opposed to US-Pakistan military cooperation against Soviet Communism under SEATO and CENTO in the mid 1950s. Despite India’s posturing as a Non-Aligned state during the East-West conflict of the Cold War, however, a close Soviet-Indian military relationship emerged. India became the largest buyer of Soviet military equipment before initiating India-Pakistan war in 1971. During the 1962 China-India border clashes, India called for and received help against China from the US, Britain and the Soviet Union. In 1971, India signed a treaty with the Soviet Union before entering into East Pakistan and to keep China – the strategic friend of Pakistan – away from the South Asian theater of war. As such, India has an ambiguous stance regarding global interference in South Asia. After winning the 1971 war against Pakistan, India took a hegemonic posture in South Asia. The Kashmir dispute was only aggravated because India refused to implement UN resolutions of 1948-49. India blocked efforts of Pakistan to bring in an international mediation on the Kashmir issue. International Crisis Group (ICG) in one of its reports on India-Pakistan relations in 2004 referred to an Indian law that presented a problem for greater international involvement in the establishment of various forms of dialogue. The report indicated that ‘much more could be done by the donors to fund civil society contacts and other forms of discussions’ but ‘activities are blocked’ by the Foreign Contribution (regulation) Act (FCRA) of 1976 that was originally passed to ‘stop the infiltration of money’ from ‘extremist Islamic groups and to reduce the activities of Christian’ missionaries. The act regulated India based NGOs attendance and funding for conferences in Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka. The Indian government has often used diplomatic pressure to prevent civil society from meeting outside India. According to the report, the German
Showing satisfaction over improved peace and security conditions between India and Pakistan, the US Department of State expected to further stabilize South Asia with effective US support. On 22 June 2004, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Christina Rocca testified before the Congressional House Committee on international relations reflecting upon the changing environment of the South Asian region post 9/11. According to her testimony, ‘September 2001 placed a South Asia driven by conflict and division at the front lines of the global war on terrorism.’ Rocca stressed that almost after three years, ‘with the support of the American people, the Congress and the administration, the region stood at the verge of political breakthroughs.’ Her obvious reference was to the India-Pakistan 2001/02 military stand-off. She emphasized that the next few years would provide a ‘crucial opportunity’ for the US to help South Asia become a ‘peaceful, democratic and prosperous region, free from terror and nuclear threat.’

The recent rapprochement between India and Pakistan has enabled a new composite dialogue and given a boost to regional cooperation meeting – in stark contrast to the threat of a possible nuclear threat in 2002….The agreement between India and Pakistan to pursue a wide ranging composite dialogue with the objective of reaching a peaceful settlement on all bilateral issues, including Kashmir, is a real breakthrough….We will watch closely and encourage positive steps. Our public diplomacy funds are used to help facilitate deeper ties and understanding.

Rocca’s testimony reflected that the US wanted to be seen as an honest peace-broker in South Asia. Nevertheless, the US efforts to bring sustainable peace in South Asia also represented strong ‘US strategic interests in the region’.


10 Ibid.

11 In October 2003, the Council on Foreign Affairs, a Washington based leading research organization on US foreign policy issues, published a 105-page Task Force Report that emphasized the US foreign policy contours on South Asia in the immediate future. The report entitled ‘New Priorities in South Asia: US
Both India and Pakistan offered worthwhile security and economic incentives to the US for projecting peace and prosperity in the region. In India’s case, for example, US-India defense relations substantively developed in 2001-2002. Dennis Kux, a former US diplomat, who had served both in India and Pakistan and extensively written on South Asian politics, wrote in 2002, ‘Surprisingly, it is in the security field that the new [US] relationship with India has moved ahead fastest.’ According to him, a steady stream of high-level military visitors traveled to and from India. Sales of U.S. military equipment and training of Indian military personnel in the US resumed. There had been joint naval patrols in the Malacca Straits and joint special-forces exercises in Agra near the fabled Taj Mahal. It signified that increased security relations with India benefited the US strategic interests in the region.

In its geo-strategic context, the scope of US-India military relations was not limited to the South Asian region alone. In March 2005, the Bush administration took the US-India strategic partnership to new heights by signing a nuclear deal with India which would allow the transfer of US nuclear material to India for peaceful purposes. The deal helped in projecting India’s strategic image within and beyond South Asia reflecting the extent of US-India links in military matters. The deal signified an increased US

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Policy towards India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan’ identified the ‘critical importance’ of the 9/11 incidents and India-Pakistan military standoff (2001-2002) for global and US national security. The report concluded that ‘securing a moderate Muslim state in Pakistan’ and ‘actively encouraging peaceful relations between India and Pakistan’ must be foreign policy priorities for the US. The report stressed that the challenge to US policy over the medium term was to design and implement a stable and sustained approach that would solidify bilateral ties with key countries in the region and give the US an opportunity to influence major regional developments. It signified that the Bush administration was proactively devising new foreign policy initiatives for South Asia following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in US and post 9/11 military standoff between the two nuclear weapon states, India and Pakistan. Along with India and Pakistan, the Task Force Report also counted Afghanistan as being a part of the conflict ridden South Asian region and the epicenter of 9/11 attacks. The report advised US administration to ensure an Afghanistan in which terrorists could never again find shelter, and redouble support for the Karzai government’s security initiatives. It showed that rising militancy in South Asia was the principle driving force behind the 2003 report. These militant forces, in some cases, had crossed the national and even regional boundaries. For example, al-Qaeda terrorist network that was based in Afghanistan since the mid 1990s, committed militant acts in various parts of the world including 9/11 attacks in America. The 9/11 attacks required an immediate US military response against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the medium term however, the US needed a diplomatic course of action to stabilize the key South Asian states. Notably, the list of the Task Force members included some renowned experts on South Asia such as Stephen Philip Cohen, Dennis Kux, Karl Inderfurth, Michael Krepon, Sumit Ganguly and Mahnaz Ispahani. See ‘New Priorities in South Asia: US policy towards India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan’, Task Force Report No. 49, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, October 2003.

geopolitical influence in the region that never existed before. According to an expert on South Asia Dr. Mavara Inayat:

The US-Indian strategic partnership forged in 2005 was a pointer to the fluidity of the existing international order. The US posture towards India, which is in the process of being shaped right now, would determine the military, political, societal and economic realities in South Asia, Central Asia, Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, China, Russia, Japan and the entire Indian Ocean region. Due to the probable shift in the world order, all state actors in these regions would have to revise their national security interests considerably.13

Further, in 2005, the US and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement14 that called for expanding bilateral security cooperation. It indicated that the security relations went hand in hand with US economic cooperation with India.

An increasing US investment in Indian economy had contributed to the development of India into one of the world’s most important economies as the US eagerly promoted its fiscal interests in South Asia.15 According to an August 2007 US Congressional report, India was in the midst of a rapid economic expansion. Many US companies viewed India, with its huge population and rapidly growing economy, as a lucrative market and a candidate for foreign investment.16 According to the same report, bilateral merchandise trade between the US and India had grown from $6 billion in 1990 to $33 billion in 2006. Owing to the growth in India’s export to the US in 2006, the US became

13 Mavara Inayat, ‘US-India Strategic Partnership: Implications for South Asia and Beyond’, Regional Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Spring 2006, Islamabad, pp. 3-64. In her comprehensive analysis, the author explores the US-India nuclear cooperation along with its implications for regional and global security.


15 See for example, Robert D. Blackwell, ‘The United States, India and Asian Security’ at 5th Asian Security Conference organized by Institute of Defense and Security Analysis (IDSA) at New Delhi on 27 January 2003. Blackwell, a retired Harvard University professor and US ambassador to India from 2001-2002, was a strong proponent of warm Indo-US ties. In his paper, Blackwell was highly appreciative of India’s strategic, economic and political potential which read: ‘Why, you may ask, does the Bush administration care about US-India economic ties, and the future of the Indian economy? After all, there are over 190 nations in the world. What is so special about India in this regard? The President recently issued The National Security Strategy for the United States of America, which sets forth our diplomatic and security approach to the current openings and dangers within the international system, an approach based on America’s democratic values. This report bears President Bush’s personal stamp and describes India as one of the great democratic powers of the 21 century.’ http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/16884.htm Retrieved 10 June 2007.

India’s leading trade partner and the US trade deficit with India totaled $13 billion that year.\footnote{Ibid. Admitting that India’s economic growth (9.2% in 2006) has brought about the emergence of a sizeable ‘middle class’ and the largest number of billionaires in Asia, the report stresses that the country’s rural population remains comparatively poor and largely isolated from the benefits of growth. Moreover, despite several years of strong growth, investment in infrastructure is lagging far behind.} It signified that the convergence of security and economic interests between the US and India increased rapidly after 9/11 to the benefit of both countries.

It was crucial for US foreign policy to combat terrorism and to assist the shift in Pakistan from religious extremism to enlightened moderation post 9/11. To a certain extent, 9/11 encouraged the US to help transform Pakistan into a politically stable and economically viable society. A US Congressional report dated 31 December 2001 referred to US Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher’s statement on 29 October which declared that Pakistan would receive well over one billion dollars in US assistance but most US assistance has gone to the military. Moreover, according to the report, international organizations gave several billion dollars to help strengthen Pakistan as a key member of the US-led anti-terrorism coalition.\footnote{See Barbara Leitch LePoer, ‘Pakistan-US Relations’, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington D.C., 31 December 2001, pp. 6-7. http://fdc.state.gov/document/organization/78559 Retrieved 31 August 2007. According to this report, direct assistance programs for Pakistan included aid for health, education, food, education promotion, child elimination, counter-narcotics, border security and law enforcement, as well as trade preference benefits. The US also supported grants, loans, and debt rescheduling programs for Pakistan by various international financial institutions including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank. In addition Pakistan had received promises of substantial aid, debt relief and trade concessions from Japan and the European Union in recognition of its support for the international anti-terrorism coalition.}

It showed that the US initiatives in Pakistan post 9/11 intended to advance Pakistan’s security.

‘to strengthen the foundation of a strong, stable and enduring’ relationship. Both leaders also agreed to ‘work together with Afghanistan to make Pakistan and Afghanistan a land bridge linking the economic potentials of South Asia and Central Asia.’

It was important for the US to collaborate with Pakistan to stabilize unruly post-Taliban Afghanistan. Moreover, the cooperation of Pakistan was vital in helping the US secure access to Central Asian energy resources which had been a major goal of the US ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990-91.

Following the granting of independence to the Muslim states of Central Asia at the end of the Cold War, the world’s major industrialized nations had competed for the region’s vast local energy resources. For some analysts, that was in many respects a return of the first ‘Great Game’, the 19th century imperial rivalry between the British Empire and Czarist Russia.

In this new Great Game, powerful players once again positioned themselves to control the heart of Eurasian landmass following the post-Soviet vacuum of power in the region. In the new Great Game, the US took over the leading role from the British. Due to its location and strategic interests, Pakistan, in conjunction with India and Afghanistan, had a significant role in the Central Asian region. As such, for the first time in the South Asian history, the US could equally influence both Indian and Pakistani decision makers owing to its post 9/11 strategic partnership with the two

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21 Ibid.


24 Dr Mavara Inayat, ‘The Broadening Horizon of SAARC’, Regional Studies, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Summer 2007. In this pioneering study, the author analyzes the inclusion of Afghanistan as a member and the US as an observer of SAARC pointing out that ‘the US participation in SAARC is based on its own security interests. The US desires to encourage regional cooperation, promote cooperation between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, build consensus in the region against Iran’s nuclear program, provide an alternative to Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project, and develop transit routs from South Asia to Central Asia. The US involvement in the Association would strongly influence regional security dynamics and hence the entire nature of SAARC.’ This idea was further highlighted when US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, was quoted saying in Germany that there should be ‘regional integration strategy’ of closer economic ties between Afghanistan and Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan as well as Pakistan and India. See Mahtab Haider, ‘Indo-US Nuclear Pact Signing Delayed’, The News, Islamabad, 5 October 2008.
countries and the three countries had mutual strategic and economic interests in the Central Asian oil and gas rich states.

The US military and economic engagement with India and Pakistan significantly helped stabilize the region post 9/11. For example, the de-escalation of India-Pakistan standoff in 2001-2002 was a remarkable US diplomatic settlement to what was potentially a highly destructive military crisis. However, the withdrawal of nearly one million soldiers from the India-Pakistan border was still an act of merely managing the crisis not resolving it. The cause of ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan – the Kashmir dispute – remained unsettled and could ignite yet another crisis in the future. It implied, therefore, that simply managing the crisis would not be sufficient to protect the US interests and to have an enduring peace in South Asia. The US correctly feared that unless resolved, the core conflict of Kashmir would always pose a threat to peaceful relations between India and Pakistan.

In a RAND Corporation study, Christine Fair, a US based analyst of South Asia, comprehensively discussed several US policy options on Kashmir. She rejected the ‘crisis managing’ option for the US on Kashmir which, in her view, would do little to advance US objective to ‘minimize the prospect of an Indo-Pakistan conflict to as near to zero’ as possible.25 The lasting peace demanded lasting measures. If the US desired its interests to last long in the region, it needed to resolve India-Pakistan conflict on long

25 See C. Christine Fair, ‘The Counter-Terror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India’, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004, pp. 106-7. In this study of US cooperation with both Pakistan and India post 9/11 against global terrorism, Christine Fair has analyzed the nature of India-Pakistan relations with reference to the Kashmir dispute. She indicated that in order to maintain amicable relations with both South Asian rivals, the US needed to define its Kashmir policy one way or the other. She offered five options to choose from as the US Kashmir policy. First, maintain the status-quo and continue with generally ambiguous position on the disposition of Kashmir. Second, take an active role in resolving the Kashmir dispute. Third, complete disengagement from the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Fourth, side with India. Lastly, side with Pakistan. On the first option, Fair argued that it did not address several structural concerns. First, this option relegated the United States to ‘playing the role of a crisis manger’ on an ‘as needed’ basis. Referring to the US contribution in averting India-Pakistan standoff of 2001-2002, Fair feared that the US could not sustain such diplomatic efforts over the long term. She viewed the crisis management as doing little to advance US objective to ‘minimize the prospect of an Indo-Pakistan conflict to as near to zero’ as possible. This goal could not be realized until both New Delhi and Islamabad have a Kashmir settlement with which they are satisfied. According to her, without resolving the Kashmir issue, the US would not be able to forge relations with both India and Pakistan, which would be possible otherwise in the absence of such an issue.
term basis. Her analysis signified that India-Pakistan composite dialogue, in conjunction with US support, could lead to a lasting peace between India and Pakistan.

The US efforts towards India-Pakistan rapprochement could not be sustained without the support of majority of South Asians. Despite the opposition from extreme nationalists in both India and Pakistan, the majority of the 1.35 billion inhabitants of the region were eager to break the deadlock of India-Pakistan hostility that had kept their mutual progress arrested. Both India and Pakistan had struggled at various stages of their turbulent history to sign treaties and to live in peace with each other. The short lived reciprocal goodwill and stillborn efforts of conflict management, however, could not break the cycle of hostility between the two rival states. In recent history, both Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore in 1999 and President Musharraf’s visit to Agra in 2001 aimed at mutual reconciliation were unfortunately sabotaged by the lack of mutual trust. The failure of both visits demonstrated both countries’ chronic inability to trust each other and to build amicable relations without the help of third party mediation.26

Faced with US pressure and forced by domestic and regional realities, India and Pakistan again attempted to negotiate a peace process in 2003. On 18-19 April, during his visit to the Indian side of Kashmir, Vajpayee extended the ‘hand of friendship’ to Pakistan during a public address in Srinagar.27 Pakistan could not wait to reciprocate the offer. Both countries resumed diplomatic relations, reopened their High Commissions and began the exchange of foreign missions the same year. They also restored their

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26 See Dennis Kux, ‘India-Pakistan negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue?’, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, May 2006. In this book, exploring the history of India-Pakistan negotiations, the former US diplomat and a known expert of South Asian affairs, Danis Kux, explained that India-Pakistan negotiations rarely had any lasting impact on improving their mutual relations. According to him, the only positive example was of the Indus Water negotiations ‘that has achieved, and so far endured, its principal objective – to solve the dispute over how India and Pakistan would share the waters of the Indus river and its tributaries.’ Interestingly, Kux maintains that ‘a strong argument can be made that post-independence diplomatic failure have largely been a continuation in another form of the impasse between the Muslim League and Indian National Congress in their on-again, off-again negotiations between 1937 and 1947.’

27 See ‘PMs Statement in Lok Sabha on his two day Visit to Jammu & Kashmir’, Ministry Of External Affairs, New Delhi, 22 April 2003, http://meaindia.nic.in/secframe.php?sec=ss Retrieved 3 May 2005. Vajpayee told the parliamentarians: ‘I expressed the hope that a new beginning can take place between India and Pakistan. I said that we have extended our hand of friendship. Let us see how Pakistan responds to this. Stopping cross-border infiltration and destruction of terrorist infrastructure can open the doors for talks. Talks can take place on all issues, including that of Jammu & Kashmir.'
suspended air and railway links as well as the Delhi-Lahore bus service. President Musharraf reiterated the call for a ceasefire along the LOC in his address to UN General Assembly in late September and in late November, a formal ceasefire came into effect in Kashmir. On 17 December, Musharraf made a highly significant suggestion stating that in the interest of achieving a settlement, he might compromise on Pakistan’s insistence on a plebiscite to resolve the Kashmir issue. The year 2003 thus marked the progress towards official preparation of the ground for a well anticipated composite dialogue between India and Pakistan which began in early 2004.

The year 2004 proved to be beneficial for India-Pakistan relations. The 12th annual Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) held in Islamabad from 4-6 January was particularly important for two main reasons. First, the annual SAARC Summit occurred after two years of Kathmandu Summit which was held in Nepal in January 2002. During rest of the year 2002, India and Pakistan were engaged in a military standoff which prevented the SAARC Summit from being held in 2003. Second, the reversal of India-Pakistan standoff and a real possibility of having a rapprochement between the two rivals brought a great sense of relief in the region and for the global community at large in 2004. Although the SAARC Charter disallows the discussion of bilateral disputes, India and Pakistan held ‘on-the-side’ preliminary discussions for India-Pakistan dialogue at the Summit. On 6 January, the conclusion of SAARC Summit produced the Islamabad Declaration. An India-Pakistan Joint Press Statement was also issued on the same occasion in favor of normalizing India-Pakistan relations. Both regional rivals had agreed to pursue their bilateral issues in a peaceful diplomatic manner.

28 ‘Pakistan, India Need to be Bold on Kashmir: UN Resolutions can be ‘Set Aside’; Musharraf’, Dawn, Karachi, 19 December 2003. In November 2004, addressing the South Asian media in Lahore, Musharraf ‘ruled out any unilateral stepping back by Pakistan from its historical stand over Kashmir and asked India to show courage to find a solution acceptable to all parties to the festering dispute over the Himalayan region.’ He added, ‘Pakistan could meet India halfway and budge from its stand for a UN mandated plebiscite in Kashmir only if New Delhi also gave up its insistence that the disputed former princely state was an integral part of Indian Union.’ Excerpts from an Address by President General Musharraf to a Conference of South Asian Journalists’, Lahore, 20 November 2004, Foreign Affairs Pakistan, Vol. XXXI, Issue, XI, November 2004.

The Joint Statement of 6 January 2004 was a remarkable outcome of India-Pakistan negotiations, which could have shaped a secure and prosperous future for South Asia. The statement recommended a composite dialogue on controversial issues including Jammu and Kashmir. It emphasized the need for greater flexibility and mutual trust in the process of normalization through Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Prime Minister Vajpayee highlighted that in order to develop and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented. President Musharraf assured the Prime Minister that he would not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any form although such a policy would be resisted by many within the Pakistani military and the intelligence service. Nevertheless, Musharraf hoped that a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results. To maintain a flexible procedure for the peace process, the joint statement proposed the formal commencement of the composite dialogue from February 2004. After the failure of coercive diplomacy, both South Asian rivals had found a better alternative in a peaceful dialogue process to protect their national interests within the global context.

This section has discussed the post 9/11 US foreign policy imperatives in South Asia arguing that the US Department of State engaged India and Pakistan in a composite dialogue in 2004 to promote peace in the region. The US wanted to eliminate al-Qaeda and the Taliban terrorism from South Asia as well as liberalize Pakistan’s politics and economy. The US also wanted India-Pakistan rapprochement to avert a potential nuclear conflict in the region. The US-India cooperation in economic and military matters and the US need for Central Asia’s energy resources also required sustainable peace between India and Pakistan. Consequently, US interests converged well with both India and Pakistan’s interests and encouraged the two rivals to open a dialogue for resolving their mutual disputes.
IMPLICATIONS OF US ROLE FOR INDIA-PAKISTAN COMPOSITE DIALOGUE:

This section discusses the implications of US role for India-Pakistan composite dialogue, while emphasizing the nature of the dialogue itself. The major result of this process was that for the first time in India-Pakistan history, the sense of a mutual destiny between the two countries prevailed and their citizens looked forward with confidence to peaceful coexistence in the region.

The US engagement in South Asia post 9/11 was the crucial factor behind India-Pakistan peace process. The Bush administration required political and economic stability in the region in order to succeed in the war on terror. To achieve this goal, the US engaged both India and Pakistan in a composite dialogue to resolve their bilateral issues. As strategic partners of the US against terrorism, both South Asian rivals opened a dialogue process negotiating mutual peace and prosperity. For the first time in the region’s history, India and Pakistan’s security and economic interests converged because of the US simultaneous engagement with both adversaries post 9/11. The dialogue, however, had its limitations owing to the traditional mistrust between the rivals. Nevertheless, US policy for South Asia post 9/11 brought a unique opportunity for both countries to reconcile their differences and develop mutual interdependence for a peaceful and prosperous future. In the process, Pakistan’s security concerns towards India were positively addressed.

The India-Pakistan composite dialogue was an act of political and strategic maturity due to the fact that both the countries possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The fact that both countries had nuclear weapons in their strategic arsenals heightened the importance of a peaceful dialogue for India and Pakistan. Both adversaries had acquired nuclear parity after conducting multiple nuclear tests in 1998 respectively. The possession of nuclear weapons ensured that both regional rivals could not wage all out wars against each other as they did in 1965 and 1971 as this would involve the risk of a catastrophic nuclear holocaust. Pakistan’s ill fated Kargil adventure in 1999 and India’s military standoff in 2002 had demonstrated the folly of searching a military solution in post 1998 South Asia. The Kargil conflict and 2001-2002 military stand-off also
demonstrated that the ruling elite in both countries were ignorant of the potential dangers of their military options which could lead to nuclear war. The significance of nuclear development in the South Asian region had a strong global dimension as well.

The US had deep security concerns over the possibility of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. The US concerns did not attract much serious attention of the Indian and Pakistani analysts despite the fact that the US had emerged as the main strategic factor in the region since the early 1980s. In order to continue the development of their nuclear arsenals, both countries had downplayed the possibility of the break out of an accidental nuclear war and overplayed the idea of nuclear deterrence. The 1998 nuclear tests and US engagement in the region post 9/11 established two important facts for the 21st century South Asia. First, an all out war would not be an option for India and Pakistan. Second, without global support, no strategic venture would be feasible in the region. Faced with such realities post 9/11, peace process became the most logical path for India and Pakistan to follow.

Following the directives of the joint press statement issued on 6 January 2004, the officials of both India and Pakistan moved ahead with peace initiatives ‘through different CBMs.’ The first round of talks at Joint Secretary-Director General level was held on 16-17 February in Islamabad and preceded the India-Pakistan foreign secretaries meeting on 18 February. Both sides agreed to tackle outstanding bilateral problems from May-June following the India-Pakistan cricket series in both countries and the Indian general elections. The discussions achieved the formation of a framework structure and modalities for the composite dialogue – a roadmap towards lasting peace, security and economic development. The eight working groups that were

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30 India’s repulsion to third-party-option in bilateral disputes in the region has probably induced measured reluctance among many analysts to openly discuss the extent of US influence in its dealing with the native ruling elite.
32 See ‘Press Statement on India-Pakistan talks’, *Ministry of External Affairs*, New Delhi, 16 February 2004, [http://meaindia.nic.in/](http://meaindia.nic.in/). Retrieved March 2005. According to the statement, ‘talks between the delegations of India and Pakistan were held in Islamabad in a cordial and constructive atmosphere. The two delegations discussed modalities and time frame for resumption of composite dialogue. Some proposals were exchanged in this regard.’
structured to discuss the issues which concerned both India and Pakistan were: 1) Peace and security including CBMs; 2) Jammu and Kashmir; 3) Siachen; 4) the Wullar Barrage project; 5) Sir Creek; 6) Terrorism and drug trafficking; 7) Economic and commercial cooperation; and 8) promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields. The following discussion focuses on CBMs, Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek issues.

In the entire process of the composite dialogue, the Kashmir dispute and the Nuclear Confidence Building Measures (NCBMs) assumed prominence due to their strategic and political significance both regionally and globally. Both of these issues were also mutually linked in their security implications. These developments signified that within the structured parameters of India-Pakistan dialogue, both states were set to begin a peace process in their own security interest and for the security of the global community at large.

Notably, the peace process concurrently moved at two different levels. One was the three-step formal official level where the high officials of both governments met periodically, discussed specific issues and reported the progress to their respective foreign secretaries. As a second step, the foreign secretaries then met to review the progress made in the past official meetings and discussed the issues of mutual peace and security. Finally, the foreign ministers of the two countries reviewed the overall progress together and set the agenda for the next schedule of bilateral talks. The other level of engagement was the back channel diplomacy and/or the track-II diplomacy.

From Pakistan’s side, the back channel diplomacy was led by the Secretary of Pakistan’s high powered National Security Council (NSC), Tariq Aziz, who was a

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friend and aide of President Musharraf. On the Indian side, Prime Minister Vajpayee’s national security advisor and former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, J.N. Dixit, led the dialogue under the track-II diplomacy. This level of talks included distinguished retired civil and military officials, and civil society representatives such as intellectuals and other public figures. The back channel diplomacy was an informal and less binding process which occurred in the absence of media lime-light. Due to strict security, only a limited number of people actually knew the nature and range of Track II proceedings. Certain keen observers such as former foreign service officials and senior journalists understood that back channel talks were relatively much advanced and that their deliberations impacted on the outcomes of track-I diplomacy. The issues that came to be approved in the official meetings had always been dealt with in the back channel discussions. Both India and Pakistan allowed their Track-II representatives to be creative and engage in conflict transformation rather than conflict management alone.

In the entire process of the composite dialogue, NCBMs and the Kashmir dispute assumed prominence due to their strategic and political importance both regionally and globally. On 19-20 June 2004, following the March-April meetings on various CBMs and Indian general elections in April, talks on nuclear CBMs were held in New Delhi at the Additional Secretaries level. The US interest in India-Pakistan peace process was

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34 After the February 2008 general elections in Pakistan, both India and Pakistan intended to change their point men for back channel diplomacy. For 2003 SAARC conference, President Musharraf had designated Tariq Aziz while Prime Minister Vajpayee deputed J. N. Dixit to lead the back channel diplomacy. Dixit had been India’s Foreign Secretary. On Dixit’s sudden death, S. K. Lamba took the job who had also been the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan. According to a media report in early May 2008, it was speculated that a seasoned diplomat, Riaz Mohammad khan, who had recently retired as Foreign Secretary of Pakistan would replace Tariq Aziz. As for India, M. K. Narayanan, a former Indian spy master and current National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, could take up the job. See for example, Muhammad Saleh Zafar, ‘Back-Channel Diplomacy: India, Pakistan may Replace Negotiators’, The News, Islamabad, 6 May 2008. However, these predictions were not materialized until August/September 2008, and the rumors were that after the removal of Musharraf from Pakistan’s political scene in mid August, Tariq Aziz was advised by the new ruling elite to continue his job as usual.

35 For example, the author tried to discuss the progress of back-channel diplomacy with Niaz A. Naik, Pakistan’s former Foreign Secretary and a renowned diplomat of Pakistan. He was part of the track-II diplomacy and the father of ‘Chanab Formula’, one of the methods suggested by Pakistan for solving the Kashmir issue. Naik, a decent gentleman and a family friend, however, turned the subject from track-II diplomacy to the beautiful beaches of Australia. Obviously, he did not want to disclose any information about the track-II diplomacy, which was secretive in nature, before issues were taken up in the composite dialogue that was open before the media.

obvious from the fact that on the occasion of these talks, Secretary Powell was present in Islamabad deliberating on the change of government in India and its probable impact on the dialogue.\(^37\)

At the conclusion of the 19-20 June round of talks between Indian and Pakistani experts on NCBMs, the joint statement stressed that the talks revolved around four main issues. First, to establish a ‘dedicated and secure hotline’ between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan through their respective foreign offices. Second, to continue bilateral discussions towards the implementations of Lahore Declaration of 1999, and third, to resume and continue dialogue on security and nonproliferation issues. Finally, the negotiators explored the possibility of an agreement on pre-notification of flight testing of missiles under technical parameters.\(^38\) Significantly, all these matters were nuclear arms related issues. The concluding statement issued on this occasion reflected the mutual anxiety of both India and Pakistan over the nuclear dimension of their security. These discussions also referred to global apprehension over South Asia’s de facto nuclear status. Both the global and regional factors, therefore, reinforced the need for having a nuclear security regime in the region.

Nuclear proliferation in South Asia has been a vital issue and a contentious matter of concern between India and Pakistan. Both countries tried to strike a common ground in order to accommodate each other to reduce nuclear risk in South Asia but the difference

\(^{37}\) Remarks of Secretary Colin L. Powell with Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs Mian Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri, *US Department of State*, Washington DC, 19 May, 2004, [http://state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/32627.htm](http://state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/32627.htm) Retrieved 2 August 2007. According to this report, as the post election talks between India and Pakistan were about to resume, Secretary Powell was in Islamabad to discuss a range of issues such as the ‘situation concerning nuclear proliferation’ and the ‘actions of A. Q. Khan.’ In a joint media appearance in Islamabad, it was obvious however that Powell’s essential concern in this trip was to ensure that the talks were not interrupted due to the change of government in India. Secretary Powell and Minister Kasuri both agreed that after the April 2004 general elections, the new coalition government of India, the United Progressive Front (UPF) headed by the Congress Party, had sent positive signals for the continuation of India-Pakistan composite dialogue. Minister Kasuri also gave a total ‘commitment’ of his government to ‘continuing with the peace process.’ Kasuri said: ‘We have invested a lot of time and effort and it would be a pity if the process did not continue.’ Powell concluded that the ‘statements coming from the new government (of India) certainly [suggested] that, both in terms of US-India relations…and India-Pakistan relations, remain on track.’

of approach remained. For example, India reiterated its proposal of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons while Pakistan proposed a ‘strategic restraint regime’ both in conventional and nuclear fields. Both parties refused to reconstruct their previously held nuclear stands. The talks signified that India-Pakistan divergence on nuclear issues required further discussions which could lead to bilateral understanding and accommodation of each other’s strategic concerns. Nuclear CBMs, therefore, appeared to be a prologue to a more substantive dialogue on nuclear proliferation and regional security issues. This realization brought solid progress a week later in the next round of talks in New Delhi.

Despite their difference on certain issues, both India and Pakistan produced concrete results on others proving the validity of the peace talks. On 27-28 June, following the Secretaries’ level talks on peace and security, CBMs and Kashmir, both parties concluded an agreement on pre-notification of flight testing of missiles and asked the experts to finalize the draft agreement. The agreement reflected continued US concerns over missile proliferation in South Asia, which appeared in the US Department of State as well as in the US Congressional reports.\(^{39}\) India and Pakistan also agreed to implement the clauses of the Simla agreement on India’s request.\(^{40}\) Showing the

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\(^{39}\) According to a US Congressional report in October 2003, the US had long been ‘concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems’ in South Asia. The report mentioned that the ‘proliferation of missile capabilities [had] been identified as a potential major threat to regional stability and to the key US foreign goals.’ A persistent aspect of US engagement in the region has been the difficulty of maintaining a balanced approach towards the two agonistic countries ‘while at the same time promoting perceived US interests.’ The report indicated that the Bush administration ‘shifted to a more pragmatic approach emphasizing restraint’ abandoning the ‘1990s US security policy towards South Asia which focused on preventing weapon proliferation.’ Significantly, the report indicated that ‘for perhaps the first period in history, the US enjoyed simultaneously positive relations with both countries.’ It warned however, that ‘while relations between the US, India and Pakistan have taken on a positive hue, potential for regional instability persists.’ The report was not certain if missile defenses will offer a degree of stability to the region or if they will create an imbalance, thus promoting the other country to build more missiles to compensate for the disparity. For further details on the issue of missile proliferation in South Asia and the US role in the strategic stability of the region, see Andrew Feickert & K. Alan Kronstadt, ‘Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia’, CRS Report for Congress, the Library of Congress, Washington DC, 17 October 2003.

\(^{40}\) In Pakistan’s case, the India-Pakistan Simla Accord of 1972 strongly favored India. This was an accord between a victorious power and a vanquished country following the 1971 India-Pakistan war in which East Pakistan emerged as the sovereign state of Bangladesh and Pakistani prisoners of war were over 90,000. The 1971 war and the corresponding Simla agreement undoubtedly shifted the balance of power in India’s favor which strongly aggravated Pakistan’s security concerns. In the 1970s, India began a new phase of military development and conducted its peaceful nuclear test at Pokharan in 1974. It emerged as a regional hegemon and acted like one. Pakistan, on the other hand, was defeated and demoralized as well
significance of nuclear CBMs and the Kashmir dispute, the joint statement issued on this occasion read as follows:

Both sides reaffirmed the need to promote a stable environment of peace and security, recognizing the nuclear capabilities of each other constituting a factor for stability, [and] working towards strategic stability. [They] reiterated the hope that the dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides. They held detailed exchange of views on Jammu & Kashmir and agreed to continue the sustained and serious dialogue to find a peaceful negotiated final settlement.41

Interestingly, this joint statement affirmed the nuclear capabilities of both countries as a factor for stability in the region. On Kashmir, the two sides agreed to find a mutually acceptable solution of the dispute that showed the spirit of reconciliation on both sides to build a consensus over issues.

as isolated and ignored globally. Only China was there to nurse Pakistan’s wounds. In these testing times, Pakistan was left with no bargaining chips of any significance while India held all its cards in its hand. In response to returning 90,000 prisoners of war (POWs) to Pakistan, India demanded that the cease-fire line (CFL) between divided Kashmir that was demarcated according to 1949 UN resolution No. 47, should be converted into actual Line-of-Control (LOC). Later, Indian sources also claimed that during private talks between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Z. A. Bhutto, Bhutto had conceded to convert the LOC in Kashmir into an international border between India and Pakistan at some point of time in future. India further demanded that beginning with the Simla Accord, both countries should deal with their disputes bilaterally without any third party mediation. Although, there were provisions in the Accord for judicial or other consultations in case of a deadlock between the two parties, India consistently blocked Pakistani efforts for a third party involvement. The US and many other European and Asian powers such as Russia, Germany, France, Britain, China and Japan showed concerns over military hostility between the two nuclear rivals in South Asia offering help to resolve their disputes but India rejected all such efforts. After winning the 1971 war, India’s hegemonic posture of disallowing any extra-regional initiative in South Asia became known as the ‘Indira Doctrine’ in some circles. Out of the Simla Accord of 1972, therefore, India extracted two great strategic advantages. First, India achieved converting a CFL into an actual LOC in Kashmir. Second, it succeeded to add a clause in favor of resolving the mutual disputes without third-party mediation. After losing the 1971 war, Pakistan conceded most of its strategic advantage on the Kashmir issue in the Simla agreement of 1972. India’s stance to include the Simla Accord as a backdrop in India-Pakistan dialogue process therefore, demonstrated an Indian advantage over Pakistan in many ways. In Simla agreement, Pakistan had supposedly compromised its long held position on Kashmir which based itself upon resolving the dispute according to the UN resolutions. Since 1972, therefore, Pakistan had no viable blueprint for resolving the Kashmir issue. Pakistani leadership, nevertheless, continued to advocate the UN resolutions for domestic consumption while neither India nor even the UN intended to deal with the Kashmir problem with those ‘dated’ resolutions. For a detailed study of both Indian and Pakistani perspectives on the Simla Accord, See for example, P.R. Chari & Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Simla Agreement 1972: Its Wasted Promise, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, 2000.

Following the dynamics of peace talks, India and Pakistan discussed a range of issues in various rounds of secretaries, additional secretaries and expert level meetings between July-September 2004 including the Siachen glacier and Sir Creek. The other issues included the promotion of greater trust and confidence at grassroots level taking measures such as relaxing the visa requirements for both countries. Cooperation on the problems of terrorism, drug trafficking as well as economic and commercial promotion were also discussed. On issues of Siachen and Sir Creek, both countries explained their diverse positions. However, they agreed to further discuss and resolve both the disputes.

The Siachen glacier, which marks the non-demarcated India-Pakistan border in Pakistan’s remote northeast, is the cause of India-Pakistan conflict over Siachen. The Siachen conflict has been a major corollary of the Kashmir dispute. The issue came to the public view in 1984 when Pakistan discovered that the Indian troops had landed on the glacier tops. Pakistan responded by deploying its forces on this highest battleground of the world. The word Siachen means ‘wild mountain flower’ or more precisely the ‘mountain rose’. The glacier is the great Himalayan watershed demarcating Central Asia from the Indian subcontinent. It also separates Pakistan from China in this region.\(^{42}\) It is 78 kilometer long and situated at an altitude of 5,400 meters above the sea level between the Saltoro ridge line to the west and the main Karakoram range to the east.

At the end of India-Pakistan hostility on Kashmir in 1948, the ceasefire line (CFL) between the two parts of Kashmir was not fully demarcated on the western side on the map beyond the end point NJ9842.\(^{43}\) The NJ9842 on the Saltoro Ridge was near the northern most point where the troops were deployed as the firing ended in 1948. The CFL was subsequently changed into Line of Control (LOC) in 1972 Simla agreement.


but its end points remained the same. Both the 1949 Karachi and 1972 Simla agreements presumed that it was impossible for humans to survive north of NJ9842. It was the non-demarcated area beyond NJ9842 in Siachen, therefore, where both India and Pakistan found room for differing interpretations of the boundary line. According to Sandia Report prepared by a US based Sandia Corporation:

The Siachen conflict has its genesis in the formulation of the cease-fire line in the 1949 Karachi Agreement. The text defines the cease-fire line in this area as running to map coordinate NJ 9842 and ‘…thence north to the glaciers.’ The line was never demarcated. The Indian interpretation is that the current line of control (LOC) should run northeasterly from NJ 9842 along the Saltoro Range to the Chinese border. The Pakistani interpretation is that the LOC should run from NJ 9842 straight to the Karakoram Pass (KKP) on the Chinese border.\(^{44}\)

The confusion resulting from the non-demarcation of boundary in Siachen aggravated India-Pakistan conflict over the LOC in Kashmir further adding to their loss of men and material in the highest battleground of the world. Since 1984, both India and Pakistan have been running a wasteful war, both in material and human terms, in Siachen. It is a low intensity conflict at 16,000 to 20,000 feet above sea level where nine out of ten deaths are due to harsh climate. Thousands of men have perished on both sides in below minus 40 to 60 degree temperature and far more have lost their body limbs due to frostbites.\(^{45}\) The conflict is costing more than two billion US dollars annually and is accelerating glacial melting due to the building of huge military infrastructure by both armies. The troop deployments, daily military flights to the helipad, diesel fumes, lorry movements, the use of kerosene oil and the dumping of chemical and human waste put millions of South Asians at risk of catastrophic floods, drought and food shortages.\(^{46}\) A 2007 study found that Siachen had lost 35 per cent of


\(^{45}\) Tim McGirk & Aravind Adiga, ‘War at the Top of the World’, Time, 4 July 2005. According to this report, both India and Pakistan refuse to disclose their mounting casualties since they have been fighting in Siachen, but some military analysts put the combined death toll at anywhere from 3,000 to 5,000 lives. More soldiers are killed in avalanches than by gunfire. Only one out of ten killed in this battle field actually dies in a combat.

its volume over the previous 20 years.\textsuperscript{47} Like Siachen, the Sir Creek is another boundary dispute between India and Pakistan.

Sir Creek is a disputed 96 kilometer strip of water that divides India and Pakistan in the south. The strip is situated in the uninhabited marshlands of Rann of Kutch which makes part of the Indian state of Gujarat on the southeast side and crosses to the Sindh province of Pakistan on the southwest.\textsuperscript{48} The Creek opens in the Arabian Sea and holds substantial economic benefits for both India and Pakistan such as underwater oil and gas resources in the area. The conflict goes back to 1908 when Sindh was part of the Bombay Presidency under the British rule. The conflict was between the ruler of Sindh and the Raja of Kutch over a pile of firewood lying in the east of Sir Creek which divided these two principalities. The dispute was referred to the British government in Bombay which gave its ruling in 1914 through a resolution which had a map attached to it.\textsuperscript{49}

After the partition in 1947, India and Pakistan inherited the controversy over Sir Creek which resurfaced in the 1960s. The 1965 India-Pakistan war which began in the Rann of Kutch was partly about the Sir Creek issue.\textsuperscript{50} The current conflict between India and Pakistan stemmed from their differing interpretations of the boundary line dividing the Sir Creek. India claims that this line should run through the middle of the Creek. Pakistan argues that the boundary should run along the eastern bank of the Creek.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} See Bharat Bhushan, ‘Boundary Dispute along the Sir Creek’, \textit{South Asian Journal}, No. 7, January/March 2005. India and Pakistan both refer to the 1914 resolution of the Bombay government about the dispute between Sindh and Kutch over the Kori Creek and the map attached to it. The map shows a green line running along the eastern edge of Sir Creek on the Kutch side and Pakistan claims that this was the boundary between Sindh and Kutch. This was the map that India had relied on prior to the constitution of the India-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, Bharat Bhushan, \textit{South Asian Journal}, No. 7. The talks on Sir Creek are going on since 1969. There have been many rounds of talks between India and Pakistan. The boundary dispute was referred to the India-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal. The tribunal was chaired by a Swedish judge, Gunnar Lagergren and comprised two others – Ales Bebler of Yugoslavia who was Indian nominee and Nasorallah Intezam of Iran who was Pakistan's nominee.
\textsuperscript{51} India supports its case by referring to the Thalweg Doctrine in International Law. According to India, river boundaries between states are divided by the mid channel using the Thalweg law. Pakistan does not agree arguing that the Thalweg Doctrine is only applicable to water bodies that are navigable. Since the
Pakistan supports its position by referring to the map attached with the Bombay Government’s Resolution of 1914. According to Pakistan, the Green Line on the map that lies on the eastern bank of the Creek is the historical boundary line. According to India, this line could have been drawn on any convenient side of the Creek before the demarcation stage. India rejects this line as only a symbolic representation. However, India and Pakistan have made some progress towards resolving the dispute through the dialogue process.\textsuperscript{52}

The promising feature of India-Pakistan talks was their mutual will to continue the peace process. Following the Secretaries’ level meetings, the Foreign Ministers met on 5-6 September 2004. Natwar Singh and Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri’s meeting in New Delhi reviewed the process of composite dialogue. At the end of their meeting, a joint statement showed satisfaction over the previous talks held under the composite dialogue. The statement included a list of issues for the ensuing talks the following month.\textsuperscript{53}

Creek, according to Pakistan, is not navigable, the Thalweg Doctrine is not applicable to this case. India maintains that even if the Creek is navigable only during high tides, it is still navigable and in reality fishing boats are used in the Sir Creek to go out to the sea.

\textsuperscript{52} Sajjad Malik, ‘Pakistan-India Nearing Solutions on Sir Creek’, \textit{Daily Times}, Lahore, 17 May 2008. After the fourth round of composite dialogue in 2007, \textit{Daily Times} reported that ‘tangible progress had been made on Sir Creek. The report mentioned that progress to determine the final status of Runn of Kutch marshland was made possible by a 20-day joint survey of Sir Creek by Indian and Pakistani hydrographers. The survey that began in January 2008 was conducted both on land and off the coast to verify the outermost points of the coastline. On 22 March, the experts of both countries exchanged their maps and despite having differences, both countries found points of agreement on these maps. According to the report, the agreement on the maps was the first concrete step towards ending the dispute.

\textsuperscript{53} See ‘India-Pakistan Joint statement’, Ministry of External Affairs, India, New Delhi, 8 September 2004. http://meaindia.nic.in/ Retrieved 21 March 2007. The foreign Ministers’joint statement had the following list of issues to be discussed in the forthcoming peace talks: (a) Expert level meetings on Conventional and Nuclear CBMs, inter alia, to discuss the draft agreement on advance notification of missile tests; (b) Meeting between railway authorities on the Munnabao-Khokhrapar rail link; (c) Biannual meeting between Indian Border Security Force (BSF) and Pakistan Rangers in October 2004; (d) Meeting between Narcotics Control Authorities, including for finalisation of an MOU in October/November 2004; (e) Meeting between the Indian Coast Guards and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency in November 2004 to, inter alia, discuss the Memorandum of Understanding for establishing communication link between them; (f) Establishment of Committee of Experts to consider issues related to trade; (g) On Siachen, the outcome of the August 2004 meeting of Defence Secretaries would be implemented; (h) Joint Survey of the boundary pillars in the horizontal segment (blue dotted line) of the international boundary in the Sir Creek area; (i) Meeting on all issues related to commencement of a bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad; (j) Add a new category of Tourist Visa in the visa regime between the two countries, and to promote group tourism; (k) Set up a mechanism to deal with the issue of civilian prisoners and fishermen, effectively and speedily; (l) Further measures for facilitation of visits to religious shrines, and
The spirit of reconciliation helped project the positive impact of the composite dialogue on improved India-Pakistan relations. On 8 September, following India-Pakistan foreign ministers joint statement, a declaration was issued concurrently from New Delhi and Islamabad reaffirming the continuity of the composite dialogue that would lead to resolving all the disputes including Jammu and Kashmir. As one Indian journalist wrote:

The Natwar-Kasuri talks have had two positive outcomes: One, there would be no rigid time-frame for a solution of Kashmir; two, the bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad will continue in spite of difficulties. The positive composite dialogue has covered a wide range of subjects – from terrorism to trade and from nuclear threat to exchange of newspapers. All discussions have been ‘positive and fruitful.’

This statement reflected the desire of both countries to maintain peace and harmony in the region.

The peace process took another significant step on 23 September when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf met on the occasion of the UN General Assembly session in New York. The Manmohan-Musharraf meeting resulted in a joint statement reiterating mutual commitment to pursue the peace process and substantive India-Pakistan composite dialogue. It reinforced both countries’ desire to reach reconciliation through a dialogue process. This process had full US diplomatic support which continued in the next year when an earthquake hit Pakistan on a massive scale.

A devastating earthquake in 2005 proved to be one of the most traumatic times in the post 1947 history of South Asia which ironically improved India-Pakistan relations. Over one hundred thousand people perished and hundreds of thousands were dislocated in a devastating earthquake on 8 October that mainly hit the Pakistani side of Kashmir. It was a natural disaster of a grand-scale which brought the global community together to help out Pakistan deal with the aftermath of the earthquake. The events following the

upkeep of historical sites; (m) Enhanced interaction and exchanges among the respective Foreign Offices, including study tours of young diplomats/probationers to each other’s country.


earthquake left some positive impact on India-Pakistan peace process. Other than providing relief goods for the quake suffering Kashmiri people, India agreed to open the LOC in Kashmir at five different points providing easy access to the Kashmiri families living across the LOC. On 7 November, five points were opened along the LOC at Nauseri-Tithwal, Chakothi-Uri, Hajipur-Uri, Rawalakot-Poonch and Tattapani-Mendhar. Earlier in 2005, various positive steps were already taken such as launching of Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service on 7 April. On 18 April, President Musharaff went on a three-day visit to India and signed the ‘Delhi Joint Statement’ along with Prime Minister Manmohan Sigh. On this occasion, both the leaders termed the peace process ‘irreversible.’

On 17-18 January 2006, Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries met in New Delhi to commence the third round of bilateral talks. The joint statement issued on this occasion referred to the matters discussed in their two-day meetings relating to peace and security including CBMs and Jammu and Kashmir. Between 17-18 January and 22-23 June, a number of meetings were held between different working groups taking the composite dialogue further towards conflict resolution.

The peace process was moving forward in a positive environment when tragic train blasts in Mumbai suddenly brought the talks to a halt. In July 2006, the tragic incident of train blasts in Mumbai killed around 200 commuters leading to a pause in the peace dialogue. India accused Pakistan of master minding the terrorist act. Pakistan denied the blame asking India to substantiate its anti-Pakistan claims with evidence. Following the Mumbai blasts, the exchange of accusations between India and Pakistan exposed the

56 See ‘In Response to Questions on Reports of Large Numbers of People Trying to Reach the Indian Relief Camp at Poonch’, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 7 November 2005. According to this official statement, India and Pakistan had agreed on 29 October 2005 on five crossing points to be operationalised along the LOC and using the same procedures as are applicable for the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service.

57 ‘Joint Statement, India-Pakistan’, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 18 April 2005. From May-October 2005, talks continued between the two countries on issues of building new road transport and railway links across the border besides relaxing visa regime and communication links. Other than moving ahead on various CBMs, they signed a five-year agreement on issuing 72 hour notice prior to ballistic missile testing.

fragile nature of the peace process.\textsuperscript{59} It indicated that the process of bilateral talks had not yet reached a sufficiently high level of mutual trust between the regional rivals.

Faced with mistrust, it required another meeting between Singh and Musharraf to revive the composite dialogue. On 6 September 2006, both South Asian leaders met at the Summit of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) in Havana in the aftermath of Mumbai blasts. They had a ‘cordial, frank and detailed exchange of views’ on all aspects of India-Pakistan relations. They both reaffirmed their ‘determination’ to implement the Joint Statement of 4 January 2004.\textsuperscript{60} During the Singh-Musharraf meeting, both leaders condemned all acts of terrorism and agreed that terrorism was a scourge that needed to be effectively dealt with. They decided to establish an India-Pakistan antiterrorism institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations. The two leaders advised their Foreign Secretaries to shortly meet in New Delhi to revive the bilateral talks. This meeting on the sideline of NAM summit reactivated the dialogue process between the two countries showing that the leadership in both countries was firm on bringing sustainable peace in the region.

The active pursuit for continuing the peace talks amid mutual friction implied that the relations between the South Asian leaders had now reached a more mature stage. This act of maturity also showed that the security and economic interests of India and Pakistan began to converge after nuclear deterrence was created by both countries. Through their mutual efforts for peace, both countries also agreed to transform South Asia from being a nuclear flash point to a region of harmony and progress.

The India-Pakistan peace process followed soon after the Havana meeting between Manmohan Singh and Musharraf. On 15 November 2006, following the directives of their respective leaders, Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries met in New Delhi to discuss the progress made in the third-round of talks that was concluded in June 2006.


\textsuperscript{60} ‘India-Pakistan Joint Statement, Havana, Cuba, 16 September 2007’, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, http://meaindia.nic.in Retrieved 15 December 2006. In their meeting, the two leaders directed their Foreign Secretaries to meet shortly in New Delhi to continue the composite dialogue.
According to the joint press statement, the ministerial talks covered a range of issues that came under the composite dialogue. These issues ranged from peace and security including CBMS, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Wullar Barrage and Sir Creek to terrorism and drug trafficking, economic and commercial cooperation, and the promotion of friendly exchange in various fields. Most importantly, both Foreign Secretaries agreed to meet in February 2007 in Islamabad to launch the next round of talks. Before the opening of the fourth round, Prime Minister Singh suggested that India and Pakistan sign a friendship treaty. Singh’s diplomatic move further highlighted the significance of the peace talks.

Pointing towards the establishment of long term peace and security in the region, Singh hoped for an interdependent South Asia in his 8 January 2007 address at the conference of the Federations of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries. Singh expected that India and Pakistan would eventually be able to sign a long-term peace and friendship treaty. According to Singh, ‘I earnestly hope that relations between our two countries become so friendly that we can generate an atmosphere of trust between each other and that the two nations are able to agree on a treaty of peace, security and friendship.’ Elaborating on his proposed peace and friendship treaty, Singh stated, ‘I dream of a day, while retaining our respective national identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore and dinner in Kabul. That is how my forefathers lived. That is how I want my grandchildren to live.’

Pakistan’s official reaction to the Indian Prime Minister’s optimistic statement was rather mixed. In a same day reply to Singh’s statement, Pakistan’s foreign office spokesperson Tasnim Aslam stressed that New Delhi’s ‘desire for a peace and security
pact with Islamabad was in the context of something that might happen at a future date and not in the immediate term.’

Briefing the media further on this issue, she stated, ‘We are working to normalize relations with India and for that it is important that we resolve the outstanding issues between us, and Kashmir being the most important of them. … Once we are able to resolve the outstanding issues, then perhaps we can move towards such a scenario.’

Pakistan’s foreign office statement indicated that following the Bombay train blasts, certain level of mutual suspicion still prevailed that was obvious in Pakistan’s reluctance to sign a friendship treaty with India in the near future. However, both countries were obliged to return to the peace dialogue due to pressing global and regional concerns.

The global concerns over the India-Pakistan peace process strongly converged with both countries’ interests in the region forcing them to continue the process. Responding to a question on the US interest in India-Pakistan composite dialogue, the Pakistani spokesperson Tasnim Aslam emphasized that the international community had been encouraging both India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute. She highlighted that Pakistan ‘welcomes the interest of the international community in the resolution of the disputes between Pakistan and India for [the] establishment of durable peace in the region’. A combination of global, regional and domestic interests in favor of India-Pakistan peace process thus indicated that the dialogue between the two South Asian rivals could not be averted for long.

Following the Havana spirit of 16 September 2006, diplomatic interaction continued, albeit with less warmth between the two counties. On 13-14 January 2007, Paranab Mukherjee, the Indian Minister for External Affairs, visited Pakistan following an already approved program. Both Mukherjee and his Pakistani counterpart Khurshid

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65 Ibid. According to the report, ‘the spokesperson was noncommittal when asked whether India had shown any flexibility on the issue of Kashmir. She simply referred to the Indian Prime Minister’s recent public statements welcoming the various ideas floated by President Pervez Musharraf to move forward for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.’ In response to a question about the UN resolutions on Kashmir, the spokesperson said that they are still alive and that Kashmir was still on the UN Security Council Agenda.
66 Ibid.
Mehmood Kasuri reviewed the status of India-Pakistan relations and discussed the progress of composite dialogue so far. In their joint press conference held in Islamabad, they informed the media about the proceeding talks between the working groups of both countries under the composite dialogue in 2007. Mukharjee excluded any time-frame to resolve their bilateral disputes commenting that there was no ‘redrawing of the borders’ and that the Kashmir dispute could not be resolved overnight. He emphasized that Kashmir would have to be addressed in a ‘calibrated manner’.

Some analysts in Pakistan were concerned that India-Pakistan dialogue was moving in a sporadic manner with much emphasis on the CBMs and with little progress on the core issues of Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek. According to Daily Times, the India-Pakistan talks were ‘high on atmospherics’ but low on results. In such an atmosphere, echoing

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69 ‘Indo-Pak Talks High on Atmospherics, Low on Results’, Daily Times, Lahore, 15 January 2007. This report quoted Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Talat Masood, saying that ‘there was a new level of atmospherics. There is great hope. But we have to wait until something concrete comes out.’ The report also mentioned a former Indian Foreign Secretary, Shashank, being unsure if both India and Pakistan could get support from their political constituents. Also See Tayyab Siddique, ‘India’s Delaying Tactics on Kashmir’, The Post, Islamabad, 23 January 2007. In this article, the author argued that ‘since January 2002, when the composite dialogue commenced, there has been no progress or advance on any of the real issues. To sustain hopes, it was announced that the fourth round of talks will be held on March 13-14 in Delhi. It is about time that the government realized that no good is likely to come out of these visits and rounds of talks, as the record of the last three years suggests. India has succeeded in relegating the ‘core’ issues to the lowest pedestal. The ‘out of the box’ solutions suggested by President Musharraf were not deemed worthy of any political response, let alone reciprocity or providing counter-proposals. India is playing for time. In the process, it has made Pakistan lose ground and compromise its position on Kashmir. Internationally, it is no longer a flashpoint and internally it is no more a core issue.’ Tayyab Siddique’s article represented the general mass opinion that did not trust Indian intentions, and for that matter the US policies towards Pakistan. It also voiced a lobby in the official and political domain that observed India’s hegemonic delaying tactics on the Kashmir dispute since 1947-48. A third and foremost vocal group that argued against India-Pakistan composite dialogue was the Islamic extremists who perceived India-Pakistan peace process as an act against Kashmiri people’s struggle for independence on the Indian side of Kashmir. Yet, there was another political cum intellectual group that expected little from India-Pakistan peace-talks. For example, Pakistan’s noted left-wing political intellectual and a peace activist, Dr. Mubashir Hassan, argued that India-Pakistan talks will not bring peace to the region. Speaking in the Jammu University, Hassan was hopeful of India and Pakistan settling the Kashmir dispute but he held that the peace process will not succeed due to the lack of peoples’ participation in it. ‘Across the whole of South Asia, real power lies with the elite, primarily, in the hands of the army, the police, the intelligence, the tax collector and the executive officer…that is why when the expectations have risen sky high, actual improvements in the lot of the common man is trailing far behind.’ The solution of the problem of peace lied, according to him, in the empowerment of the people and the ‘people themselves must strive’ for it. ‘Peoples Empowerment is the Only Way Out’, Kashmir Times, Srinagar, 17 February 2007.
the bitter feelings related to Mumbai train blasts, India and Pakistan revived the peace talks to resolve their mutual differences.

After the Manmohan-Musharraf meeting in Havana, India and Pakistan seemed to be more willing to sustain the peace process. On 18 January 2007, the *Daily Times* reported that India was ‘favorably considering’ a Pakistani proposal to pull out troops from the Siachen glacier.\(^70\) If both armies could pullout from the glacier, it would signify a real shift in India-Pakistan relations from zero-sum to a win-win situation. In his 18 January interview with CNN/IBN TV, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz mentioned that the ‘trust deficit’ between India and Pakistan had been reduced in the last three years. Aziz stated that the talks were making headway, especially on the recent proposals made by President Musharraf.\(^71\) Even the 18 February 2007 act of terrorism near Delhi on a Pakistan bound train ‘Samjhota Express’ did not deter Indian and Pakistani officials from holding their scheduled talks. The incident took 68 lives of mostly Pakistani nationals.\(^72\) Both countries recognized the fact that mutual rivalry would only lead them to mutual disaster. Seemingly, the reduction in mistrust between India and Pakistan implied that in their case, one could not opt for a war against the other and win.

Arguably, two major developments in South Asia, the India-Pakistan nuclear tests of 1998 and the post 9/11 US strategic partnership with both India and Pakistan, forced the two regional rivals to reconsider the hostile nature of their relationship. The nuclear dimension of arms race focused concerted global attention on South Asia. These developments had effectively curtailed both countries’ military options against each other. The US involvement post 9/11 with India and Pakistan similarly helped defuse tensions between the two rivals. The US relationship with both countries was based on

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\(^70\) See Iftikhar Gilani, ‘India Considering Siachen Proposal’, *Daily Times*, Lahore, 18 January 2007. The report mentioned that Indian forces’ pull out of Siachen, would pave the way for Manmohan Singh’s first trip to Islamabad as prime minister to break further ice with President Pervez Musharraf in resolving various disputes between the two neighbors, including the vexed Kashmir issue.

\(^71\) In an interview with an Indian TV channel, Shaukat Aziz asserted that the ‘progress on Kashmir will determine the progress on economic relations. We have to reach a point where India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people are happy, and that will take courage, magnanimity, flexibility and leadership.’ ‘Indo-Pak Trust Deficit has Narrowed: PM’, *Daily Times*, Lahore, 19 January 2007.

\(^72\) See Terrorist Act Aboard Samjhotha Express’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 19 February 2007; Also See ‘Joint Press Interaction of External Affairs Minister, Mr. Paranab Mukherjee with Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri during his Visit to Islamabad’, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 21 February 2007.
different security paradigms. The US-India relations were mainly structured around dealing with China as a potential adversary of the US, while the US war against terrorism determined US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11. Despite being engaged in diverse strategic paradigms, both India and Pakistan’s security and economic interests strongly converged due to US strategic interests in the region. The post 9/11 dynamics of regional and global developments strongly favored India-Pakistan peace process, and both countries could use such an historic opportunity to their mutual advantage.

Having a rare opportunity for reconciliation, both India and Pakistan continued to work for peace in the region. In his 13 March 2007 address to an international audience at a business seminar hosted by the Economist, Manmohan Singh stated that his country’s ties had improved with Pakistan. ‘We are moving forward on our dialogue with Pakistan and there certainly is a climate of reconciliation.’ Manmohan Singh’s statement was based on real evidence of mutual understanding. In the Foreign Secretaries meeting held on 21-22 February 2007 in New Delhi, India and Pakistan signed a nuclear risk reduction pact including various other agreements. It was one of the many accords that both countries had previously signed to avoid situations where accidents in nuclear installations could cause devastation. This pact came into force immediately. Its significance lay in the context of radioactive fallout from a possible accident involving nuclear weapons. The statement signified that despite the tragic events of Mumbai bomb blasts and firebomb explosions in Samjhota express train, both countries had agreed to continue the talks not allowing such distractions to hamper the dialogue. It showed that both countries were ready to fulfill their security obligations towards each other and their own people.

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74 Ibid, pp. 9-63.  
77 Ibid.
Following Manmohan Singh’s public statement of reconciliation, the next round of dialogue started with a schedule of consecutive talks in the months ahead. On 13 March 2007, the Indian Secretary for External Affairs, Shiv Shankar Menon and his Pakistani counterpart, Riaz Mohammad Khan, launched the fourth round of a wide ranging dialogue. In a joint media conference at the end of the two day peace talks, the top diplomats of the two countries explained their respective standpoints on issues such as Kashmir and Anti Terrorism Mechanism (ATM). Pakistan’s emphasis was on moving towards solving the Kashmir issue while India linked the progress with the elimination of militancy on the Indian side of Kashmir.  

A divergence of perceptions also existed on the ATM. According to the ATM agreement, both countries were required to share the information and findings of the investigation of all terrorist activity. Pakistan showed concerns that India did not take Pakistan into confidence on the investigation of Samjhota Express firebomb incident near New Delhi that took many Pakistani lives. In Pakistan’s view, the pace of the dialogue needed to increase and substantive efforts were required on Kashmir to positively sustain the peace process. It signified that while India-Pakistan composite dialogue helped to develop a consensus on several CBMS, Pakistan felt the need to resolve the Kashmir dispute without unnecessary delay.

The need for accelerating the process of dispute resolution was strongly expressed in the joint statement following the two-day talks. On 14 March 2007, in their joint press conference the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan agreed to ‘expedite negotiations’ on all issues including Jammu and Kashmir and peace and security with a view ‘to bring peace’ in the region. The Secretaries stated that they had detailed discussion on Kashmir related CBMs. They indicated that 2007 would be the

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‘watershed year’ for the India-Pakistan peace process. They informed the media about the impending talks in the following months between the working groups of both countries. These talks mainly involved the issues of peace and security, nuclear CBMs, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, and people to people contacts. A dialogue on both countries’ security doctrines was also an important part of these talks. From April onwards, the working group meetings continued to reach many agreements while implementing some of them such as on increased exports and the provision of first ever truck transport service across the border. In his 4 October 2007 TV interview with *Dawn*, Musharraf was concerned that India-Pakistan dialogue process had been slowed down due to uncertain reasons. By the end of 2007, a substantive development on disputes such as Kashmir was still awaited by many keen observers of India-Pakistan peace process.

Following the 18 February general elections, Pakistan returned to democratic rule in 2008. The new Prime Minister took over in March and Musharraf resigned as President in August. India-Pakistan composite dialogue continued with the commitment to resolve issues with mutual consensus. On 21 May, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, met his Indian counterpart, Pranab Mukherjee in Islamabad to ‘review the progress made in the Fourth Round of Pakistan-India composite dialogue.’ By the end of 2007, a substantive development on disputes such as Kashmir was still awaited by many keen observers of India-Pakistan peace process.

Both the ministers agreed that the CBMs on all eight categories of the dialogue moved further during the previous year and the peace process had improved relations between the two countries. Other than signing an agreement about consular access to prisoners most of whom were fishermen caught in the disputed region of Sir Creek, the meeting agreed to launch the fifth round of the composite dialogue in New Delhi in late July.

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81 Ibid, Akhlaque.
82 Zafar Abbas, *Dawn, Karachi*, 4 October 2007. President Musharraf admitted that the slowing down of India-Pakistan peace process might have been the result of Pakistan’s internal situation. He did not clearly identify the situation. He probably referred to the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Pakistan which were to occur soon. The Indian political analysts had regularly remarked that India should follow ‘wait and see’ policy concerning Pakistan’s domestic scenario. This advice could be taken as India’s procrastination in matters of India-Pakistan disputes.
On 7 July 2008, a suicide car bomb attack outside the Indian embassy in Kabul raised suspicions of Pakistan’s involvement in the incident. The attack killed 60 people including five employees of the Indian embassy and injured over 150 others. The bombing was the deadliest attack in Kabul since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Indian officials and media accused Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency for the incident. On 13 July, India’s National Security Advisor, M. K. Narayanan’s comments concerning the embassy attack in Kabul made headlines in the Indian newspapers stressing that ‘the ISI is playing evil. The ISI needs to be destroyed.’

84 On 14 June 2008, before launching the fifth round in July, a meeting of India-Pakistan judicial committee on prisoners took place in Islamabad to make recommendation to both India and Pakistan regarding the prisoners who were jailed in each other’s country. The eight-member committee that had four retired senior judges from each country held its first meeting on 26 February 2008 in New Delhi. As agreed in the February meeting, the committee members had visited the Pakistani jails in Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi from 9-13 June, met the prisoners in these jails and held discussions with the officials of both countries. The Committee made eleven recommendations in its Islamabad meeting including the provision of consular access and early repatriation of physically and mentally sick prisoners. See ‘Joint Press Statement by Pakistan-India Judicial Committee on Prisoners’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 14 June 2008. http://www.mofa.gov.pk/press_Releases/2008/June/PR_175_08.html Retrieved 30 August 2008.

85 The Indian ambassador in Kabul Jayant Parasad held that the embassy was attacked because of projects which India was carrying out in Afghanistan. He stated that India had spent $750 million in aid since 2001. According to Parasad, ‘we were targeted because we are doing certain things in Afghanistan for the social and economic development of Afghanistan, and some elements, some people, don’t want us to do what we are doing here.’ The Ambassador did not speculate on who might have been behind the attacks. The news cited Barnett Rubin, an expert on Afghanistan at New York University, who noted that Indian road construction teams in southwest Afghanistan were repeatedly attacked. According to him, ‘these teams are constructing a road linking Afghanistan to the Persian Gulf via the Iranian rail and road network, which would bypass both Karachi and Pakistan’s new port in Gwadar. The road also passed through the Baloch parts of Afghanistan and Iran, next to Balochistan, where Pakistan charges India with supporting nationalist/separatist insurgents.’ Rubin cited in ‘Bomber Kills 41 outside Indian Embassy in Kabul’, Associated Press, 11 July 2008, http://newsok.com Retrieved 1 August 2008.

blame against the ISI involvement in Kabul incident was repeated during the India-Pakistan officials meeting in New Delhi to launch the fifth round of the composite dialogue.

Following the 21 July meeting between the Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries, Indian Secretary for External Affairs, Shivshankar Menon briefed the media that the seen no evidence or proof that the foreign agents were involved in the Kabul attack. See ‘US Sees no Foreign Hand in Indian Embassy Attack’, The News, Islamabad, 10 July 2008. Interestingly, besides India’s allegation of ISI’s involvement in the embassy bombing in Kabul, there has been a pattern in India and Pakistan’s behavior to blame each other in order to divert public attention from their domestic political dilemma and to take advantage of each other’s internal crises. In this particular case, India was faced with two serious political issues. First, India faced the largest civil unrest in Jammu and Kashmir since June 2008. Between 100,000 to 200,000 Kashmiri Muslims had chanted slogans of freedom from India. In order to control the people, the state government was dissolved and the Governor’s Raj was imposed in Kashmir and the region was directly controlled from New Delhi. The Indian forces were shooting at unarmed demonstrators, the Kashmiri leaders were arrested, the media was banned and strict curfew was imposed. The other looming crisis for the Manmohan government was of getting the vote of confidence from the Indian parliament on the issue of US-India nuclear deal. The left wing and communist parties had refused to support the Congress led coalition government on Prime Minister Singh’s push for a nuclear deal with the US. At some point, in directly elected lower house of 545 seats, Congress had only 225 assured seats which were far short of the number required for a simple majority. In such tense internal situations, the emotionally charged patriotic bouts helped release the pressure by shifting blame to the neighboring enemy. On the vote of confidence for the Congress led government in India See ‘Indian Government to Win Confidence Vote, Says Sonia Gandhi’, The News, Islamabad, 12 July 2008; A. G. Noorani, “Vote of Confidence: Necessary?”, Daily Times, 28 July, 2008. As benefiting from the rival country’s internal crisis is concerned, Pakistan was under crucial political and security pressure in the short and medium terms when the 7 July incident in Kabul occurred. In the short term, a new democratic coalition government led by the PPP had just taken over in March 2008 after nine years of military rule. However, General Musharraf with vast discretionary powers such as dissolving the elected government was still calling the shots as President. The new government was in a dangerous tug of war with Musharraf to force him to resign or otherwise impeach him through the parliament. Musharraf stubbornly refused to step down amid the rumors that the military might take over again ending the short lived democracy. Musharraf only resigned on 18 August 2008 when the new Army Chief General Kayani publicly announced that the defense forces under his command would support the new political process in the country. The US administration was also tilted in favor of the new democratic setup and indicated that Musharraf should leave. In the medium term, Pakistan was under constant US pressure concerning the ISI support for some of the Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents across the Pak-Afghan border. Despite the official denial from the Pakistani authorities, evidence was emerging from within and outside Pakistan that a certain loose kind of ISI-Taliban nexus was in place. As such, India and Afghanistan agreed that some elements of ISI had encouraged the Taliban suicide bombing outside the Indian embassy in Kabul. During Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilini’s first official visit to the US in late July 2008, Bush and Gilani discussed the issue of ISI’s involvement with the radicals. In early August, during the 2008 SAARC conference in Colombo, Gilani informed Manmohan Singh that he intended to investigate accusations against the ISI involvement in the Kabul attack. Gilani requested both Singh and Afghan President Karzai to provide any evidence and share information about the ISI involvement in the Kabul incident so that an inquiry could be initiated.
meeting was ‘an opportunity’ to discuss the situation in which ‘we find ourselves.’ To explain the ‘situation’, Menon stated:

Unfortunately, in the recent past, several events have vitiated the atmosphere between India and Pakistan; and the composite dialogue process has itself been under stress. There have been incidents on the Line of Control. There has been cross-border terrorism and incitement to violence in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. There have been public statements by leaders in Pakistan reverting to the old polemics. And this sequence of events culminated in the suicide bomb blast outside our Embassy in Kabul on the 7th of July. Our information so far in the ongoing investigation, which still has to continue, points to elements in Pakistan being behind the blast.

The statement reflected long persisting mistrust between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir did not accompany Menon in the media briefing to respond to the Indian allegations probably because of increased tension between the two sides due to the civil strife in Kashmir and the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul. The desire to continue the dialogue, however, prevailed despite various distractions in the way of regional peace process.

On 24 September 2008, Manmohan Singh and President Zardari met on the sideline of the 63rd session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Both leaders ‘welcomed the several positive outcomes of the four rounds of the composite dialogue’ that had brought their people, businesses and institutions closer and allowed ‘sustained efforts to be made to resolve all outstanding issues.’ Both of them agreed that these gains needed to be consolidated. They ‘agreed to work for an early and full

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89 In late August 2008, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir discussed Pakistan’s stance on the peace process as well as the bombing of Indian embassy in Kabul while speaking to the concluding session of an international seminar held in Islamabad’s beautiful hilltop Pir Sohawa restaurant on the issue of India-Pakistan peace process. He reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to continue the composite dialogue with India and take the peace process forward for the benefit of both countries and their deserving people. He refuted ISI’s involvement in the embassy bombing in Kabul explaining why such activities were against Pakistan’s own national interest. Papers read on ‘Pakistan-India Peace Process: The Way forward’, International Conference organized by Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) in collaboration with Hans Seidel Foundation (HSF), Islamabad, 26-27 August 2008.
normalization of relations between India and Pakistan on the basis of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and non-interference.’\textsuperscript{91} Both leaders desired to defeat the forces which were behind the disruption of the peace process. Within weeks of this meeting, however, another act of sabotage postponed hopes of an early resumption of the composite dialogue indefinitely.

On 26 November 2008, a series of terrorist attacks in Mumbai took 173 lives and injured over 300 people shocking the world. The main attack occurred in the famous Taj Mahal hotel, which the militants armed with automatic rifles and other explosives occupied for three days. The bloody episode ended on 29 November when nine out of ten attackers were killed by the Indian security forces and one, Ajmal Qassab, was captured alive.\textsuperscript{92} India accused a banned Pakistani based militant group Laskhar-i-Taiba and the ‘elements’ in Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI for instigating the attacks. On 1 December, in its early investigation report to Pakistan, India claimed that the perpetrators of Mumbai terror attacks came from Pakistan.\textsuperscript{93} New Delhi warned Islamabad to take ‘strong action’ against those elements that India suspected to be behind the blasts which were globally criticized.\textsuperscript{94} The world leaders warned both India and Pakistan to restrain from hostility and maintain peace in the region.\textsuperscript{95} The world also showed strong concerns over the India-Pakistan peace process.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} According to India’s official and media reports, the decision to suspend the composite dialogue came after more evidence emerged, linking not just Pakistan-based elements but its ISI to the Mumbai blasts. New Delhi seemed convinced “without a shadow of doubt” about Pakistan’s spy agency ISI’s involvement in the Mumbai terror attacks and was ready to present to Islamabad “a list of ISI handlers” who allegedly masterminded the terror strikes. For this line of argument, See ‘Chill is Real, India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue ‘On Hold’, (IANS Report), New Delhi, 5 December 2008. \url{http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/chill-is-real-india-pakistan-composite-dialogue-on-hold_100127441.html} Retrieved 9 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} After the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, tension mounted between India and Pakistan and some officials in New Delhi refused to rule out a brief Indian military response to destroy the militant
Responding to the tragic events in India, Pakistan strongly denounced the Mumbai attacks and offered a joint investigation of the incident. India rejected the idea of joint interrogation demanding that Pakistan should curb cross-border terrorism. Pakistan opened its own investigation into the matter. On 12 February 2009, Pakistan handed over a dossier based on the Federal Investigation Agency’s (FIA) findings about the Mumbai attacks to the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad. On the same day, Pakistan’s Minister of Interior, Rehman Malik, told the media that many suspects from the banned Lashkar-i-Taiba had been arrested and might be prosecuted. According to Malik, ‘some part of the conspiracy [of Mumbai attacks] has taken place in Pakistan. We have lodged an FIR (First Information Report) into the case.’ India’s Ministry of External Affairs welcomed Pakistan’s efforts in this regard. However, the India-Pakistan deadlock over the composite dialogue continued.

The Mumbai attacks allowed the ruling Indian Congress Party to postpone peace talks and condemn Pakistan for political motives. The forthcoming national elections in India, which were due in less than six months after the blasts, provided a strong motivation to both the Congress and the BJP to rally the Indian public around the issues of nationalism and national security. Pakistan believed that the leaders of both the Congress and the BJP would use anti-Pakistan rhetoric for domestic politics. Within this context, analysts in Pakistan rightly predicted that the composite dialogue would not resume before the Indian elections of 2009. Even after winning the second term in training camps on the Pakistani side of Kashmir. Responding to such security crisis, foreign ministers and other government officials of various countries visited South Asia to ask both rival countries to restrain themselves from engagement in military confrontation.

98 See articles in Pakistan’s newspapers such as The News, Islamabad and Jang (Urdu), Rawalpindi prior to Indian General Elections especially from January to April 2009.
power, the Congress led government of Manmohan Singh was reluctant to return to peace talks with Pakistan due to strong BJP opposition in the Indian Parliament. Nevertheless, Pakistan consistently attempted to persuade India to resume the dialogue process to resolve the issues of terrorism and Kashmir.99 However, the India-Pakistan composite dialogue did not resume after the blasts.

On 16 July 2009, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, Manmohan Singh and Yousaf Raza Gilani met on the margins of the 15th Summit of NAM at Sharm-ul-Sheikh in Egypt. According to the Joint Statement issued on that occasion, both leaders ‘considered the entire gamut of bilateral relations with a view to charting the way forward in India-Pakistan relations.’100 The matters that were discussed ranged from the Mumbai attacks and its aftermath to development and elimination of poverty in South Asia. Interestingly, the joint statement read: ‘Both Prime Ministers recognized that dialogue is the only way forward. Action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed. Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues.’101

This excerpt contained two elements of surprise. First, Manmohan Singh agreed to the need for continuing a composite dialogue as the ‘only way forward’ between India and Pakistan. Second, both leaders agreed that the issue of terrorism did not need to be bracketed with the process of the composite dialogue. Apparently, the second element –

99 Interestingly, even after five years of India-Pakistan composite dialogue which began in early 2004, both countries were not flexible enough in their demands. India demanded that Pakistan should eliminate terrorist camps and eradicate cross-border terrorism while Pakistan demanded tangible progress over the Kashmir dispute with India. In mid 2009, both countries still faced a deadlock over the same issues. The implementation of various measures such as nuclear CBMs along with allowing public movement across the LOC did not break the mistrust between the two adversaries. India-Pakistan peace process, thus, became a process of containing and managing the problem rather than the means of resolving the disputes. See Maleeha Lodhi, ‘Mazakarat kay liay Mazid Mazakarat? (Further Talks for Composite Dialogue?)’, Jang, Rawalpindi, 4 August 2009.


the de-linking of ‘action on terrorism’ and the ‘composite dialogue process’ – protected the dialogue process even in the absence of adequate Pakistani action against the terrorist acts. This statement, however, was open to further interpretation. In times of amicable India-Pakistan relations, this provision would help continue the peace talks and increase mutual harmony between the two rivals. During crises, however, the same condition could be used to aggravate differences between the two countries.102

Ironically, the mid July meeting of the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers at Sharm-ul-Sheikh in Egypt did not indicate an immediate beginning of the composite dialogue. A flicker of hope remained, however, that both states would return to peace talks in the near future.

Despite the pause in their composite dialogue, the peace process continued. Due to the initiation of the dialogue in 2004, Pakistan’s involvement in promoting militancy in Jammu and Kashmir began to decline. This is evident from civilian and Indian Security Forces (SF) personnel and terrorists’ fatalities in Jammu and Kashmir, which continued to decline from 2001 to 2009. The statistics in Table 6 demonstrate this fact.

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102 The India-Pakistan composite dialogue has been disrupted more than once due to sabotage acts in India for which India accused Pakistan. The interruption of the dialogue since late November 2008 was also due to India’s holding Pakistan responsible for the Mumbai attacks. Now, if both the rivals agreed to de-link ‘action on terrorism’ and the ‘composite dialogue process’, then India should have agreed to begin the dialogue soon after India and Pakistan’s leadership met in Egypt on 16 July. It did not happen. Separating the action on terrorism and the dialogue process has more than one interpretations. Pakistan could refuse to interrogate those who were captured in connection with the Mumbai attacks and could still insist on resuming the composite dialogue. From India’s perspective, Indian security forces could continue using excessive force in Kashmir and Pakistan would still be obliged to negotiate the CBMs on Kashmir with India. As such, India could not stall the peace process alleging that Pakistan was supporting cross-border terrorism. Another interpretation is that India would not resume the dialogue process irrespective of how hard Pakistan tried to curb militancy within its borders. Such ambiguities in the ‘joint statement’ indicated that the future of India-Pakistan composite dialogue was uncertain. The 16 July statement at Sharm-ul-Sheikh, therefore, created a strong controversy between the treasury and the opposition in New Delhi. The BJP led opposition targeted Manmohan Singh on two issues: Separating action against terrorism from the composite dialogue and the inclusion of Pakistan’s concerns over the Indian involvement in nationalist insurgency in Balochistan. For further details, see Hamid Mir, ‘Sharm-ul-Sheikh main Bharat ki Pareshanian (India’s dilemma in Sharm-ul-Sheikh)’, Jang (Urdu), Rawalpindi, 16 July 2009.
Table 6

Comparative Fatalities in Jammu & Kashmir: 2001-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>SF Personnel</th>
<th>Terrorists</th>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This section has discussed the US role in encouraging India-Pakistan composite dialogue along with an elaboration of the dialogue itself from 2004 to present. The issues discussed among both countries included nuclear security related CBMs, trade and public movement across the LOC. Issues such as Siachen, Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic cooperation and promoting friendly exchanges in various fields were also discussed. Owing to nuclear dimension of India-Pakistan conflict on Kashmir and the US war on terror post 9/11, the security concerns had converged at the global, regional and domestic levels to bring peace in South Asia. With the US support, therefore, India-Pakistan composite dialogue helped implement several CBMs. Among them, nuclear CBMs and Kashmir were of primary importance due to their wider security implications. Pakistan resented that the Kashmir issue received less attention because India linked militancy in Kashmir with the alleged Pakistani support for the militants. The November 2008 attacks in Mumbai caused suspension of the dialogue process once again increasing tension in the region. The suspension of the dialogue further postponed any India-Pakistan bilateral discussion on the Kashmir dispute. Until April 2010, the composite dialogue was not resumed. However, the leadership of both the rival states reiterated their commitment towards the peace process.
US-PAKISTAN COOPERATION POST 9/11, INDIA-PAKISTAN COMPOSITE DIALOGUE AND PAKISTAN’S SECURITY:

This section discusses India-Pakistan composite dialogue within the context of US support for the peace process and its implications for Pakistan’s security. It argues that the US encouragement of the dialogue brought relative improvement in India-Pakistan security relations through the composite dialogue. However, Pakistan was concerned over the lack of tangible progress on the Kashmir issue.

Kashmir has been the Achilles’ heel of India-Pakistan relations since the two countries emerged as sovereign states in 1947. The separatist movement in ‘Kashmir’ has posed a dire challenge to India’s domestic politics and seriously harmed India’s claim to be a democratic and pluralistic society. A persistent divergence between the Indian Union and Kashmiri separatists has been the source of major India-Pakistan wars in South Asia. Owing to its conflict with India over Kashmir, Pakistan has also suffered heavily at the domestic and regional levels. Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policies became hostage to its India-specific orientation stemming from the Kashmir issue. Excluding the 1971 war, the other India-Pakistan military conflicts – such as the 1948 war, the

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103 Despite using various political and military options against the Kashmiri Muslims’ desire to decide their own fate outside the Indian Union, India has failed to resolve the innate Kashmir issue. Since the beginning, Kashmir has been the major irritant for the Indian democracy at the domestic, regional and international levels. After six decades of independence, post colonial India is still adamant over Kashmir while paying a heavy cost concerning its strong ambition to play a significant role on the world stage.

104 Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan’s foreign policy revolved around its territorial conflict with India over Kashmir. Pakistan’s India centric policy, therefore, deeply compromised its political and economic development. Pakistan turned into a security state mostly ruled by the military dictators under the pretext of security concerns both on the domestic and regional levels. As such, Pakistan mostly stood on the brink of a failing state during the six decades of its existence. See Waqar Gillani, ‘Our Policy is Security Driven; Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi’, The News, 17 January 2010. According to Rizvi, ‘on key foreign policy issues – like India, Afghanistan, war on terrorism, nuclear policy and the US – the military and the ISI provide the decisive input.’ Also See ‘The Foremost Challenge is India: Asif Ezdi’, The News, 17 January 2010. According to this former member of the Pakistan foreign service ‘the foremost external challenge that we have been facing since independence is the threat from India.’ Moeed Yousaf, ‘On the Foreign Side’, Special Report, The News, Islamabad, 17 January 2010. Yousaf’s report mentions that ‘the structural premise on which [Pakistan’s] foreign policy is based will remain unaltered unless the Indian equation normalizes. This demands a mutually acceptable solution of Kashmir followed by a sustained period of relative peace between the two sides.’
1965 war, the 1999 Kargil war and the 2002 military standoff including the icy conflict of Siachen Glacier – occurred due to the Kashmir dispute.

Most disturbingly, the global concerns over a potential nuclear war in South Asia are squarely linked to the dynamics of Kashmir. As such, the Kashmir conflict was the single most significant regional issue that could precipitate a nuclear war. All India-Pakistan wars, limited armed conflicts and military standoffs were followed by global and regional diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflicts. For example, the UN Security Council, the former Soviet Union and the US have acted as mediators or facilitators between the two South Asian foes on different occasions. India and Pakistan have tried to solve their mutual disputes bilaterally more than once in the past. All these efforts, however, have miserably failed.

The first India-Pakistan war was fought over Kashmir in 1947. The war ended in a ceasefire and a ceasefire line (CFL) was demarcated dividing the territory of Kashmir between India and Pakistan under the famous resolution No. 47 of the UN. The defining provision of the resolution – a plebiscite to be held among the people of Kashmir to decide their joining either India or Pakistan – never materialized because India withheld its commitment to the resolution. Following the 1965 war, the 1966 Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan through the Soviet mediation, underlined the peaceful solution of disputes between the two rivals. Indian forces, nevertheless, entered East Pakistan in 1971 and played a decisive role in the dismemberment of Pakistan. In 1972, India being the victor of the 1971 war, dictated the terms of the Simla Accord turning the ceasefire line (CFL) into the line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir. India emphasized the bilateral resolution of mutual disputes in Simla Accord practically rejecting the third-party mediation. In real terms, Indian forces landed in Siachen Glacier unannounced in 1983 opening a prolonged security conflict.

with Pakistan. Indian military amassed on the Pakistan border on many occasions as a pressure technique and often deescalated under the US pressure. At the end of the Cold War, the disintegrating Soviet Union allowed the independence of the Eastern European and Central Asian satellite states. Following Vajpayee’s goodwill visit to Lahore in February 1999, the Pakistan army provoked a limited war in Kargil across the LOC in May. The Kargil war alarmed the global community with a possibility of yet another India-Pakistan war which could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. It took President Clinton’s personal efforts to end the war in Kargil which was a military and political fiasco for Pakistan. The Kargil incident signified that both India and Pakistan did not always comply with their commitments to one another. India-Pakistan treaties failed to promote peace and security in the region. India’s use of repression in Kashmir and Pakistan’s attempt to fuel the Kashmir insurgency had adverse consequences for both the countries. The US presence in Afghanistan post 9/11, however, forced India and Pakistan to reconsider their conflict over Kashmir.

Responding to India for its use of delaying tactics on Kashmir, Pakistan carried out an intensive propaganda campaign in Indian Kashmir and promoted civil unrest through the infiltration of civilian and military personnel across the LOC. Many of these infiltrators were fanatical jihadis, many of whom had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. While Pakistan signed treaties with India to peacefully solve the bilateral issues, in practice, Pakistani military supported the insurgents to disrupt the large number of Indian forces in Kashmir and to keep them engaged in the area. India accused Pakistan of fighting a proxy war with India in Kashmir in the 1990s while Pakistan helped the insurgents in Kashmir to counter India’s use of force in Kashmir.

At the end of the Cold War, the disintegrating Soviet Union allowed the independence of the Eastern European and Central Asian satellite states. Following Vajpayee’s goodwill visit to Lahore in February 1999, the Pakistan army provoked a limited war in Kargil across the LOC in May. The Kargil war alarmed the global community with a possibility of yet another India-Pakistan war which could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. It took President Clinton’s personal efforts to end the war in Kargil which was a military and political fiasco for Pakistan. The Kargil incident signified that both India and Pakistan did not always comply with their commitments to one another. India-Pakistan treaties failed to promote peace and security in the region. India’s use of repression in Kashmir and Pakistan’s attempt to fuel the Kashmir insurgency had adverse consequences for both the countries. The US presence in Afghanistan post 9/11, however, forced India and Pakistan to reconsider their conflict over Kashmir.

Following 9/11, the India-Pakistan detente became a primary focus of the US policy in South Asia. The region had become the theater for the US war against terrorism. The US considered the Islamist militancy as a menace which had three main features: It was anti-US, pro-violence, and involved non-state actors such as al-Qaeda. India argued that Kashmiri militants were linked with al-Qaeda network of Afghanistan. India supported its claim with the fact that Pakistan had supported the Taliban regime in Afghanistan since the mid 1990s up to 9/11.

As 9/11 occurred, Pakistan’s two prong policy to support the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to encourage the separatist Muslims on the Indian side of Kashmir backfired drastically. India linked the events in Kashmir and Afghanistan and branded the Kashmiri militants as terrorists. The Indian position prevailed. To concentrate on its own war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the US convinced Pakistan to renounce militant separatism in Kashmir. After withdrawing support for the Taliban regime, therefore, Pakistan also distanced itself from the separatist violence in Kashmir. As such, the change in the security environment of South Asia post 9/11 helped initiate a paradigm shift in Pakistan’s strategic posture in the region.

Pakistan’s response to fast changing regional environment was most obvious in the promises made by President Musharraf on 12 January 2001. In his widely quoted speech which Musharraf prepared with some editorial help of the US Department of State, Musharraf denounced militancy across the LOC in Kashmir calling it terrorism. It was a basic turnaround of Pakistan’s official policy on the separatist Kashmiri movement which amazed many around the world. Musharraf banned several Pakistan based Islamist organizations deeming them responsible for committing acts of terror in

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108 Alok Kumar Gupta & K. Kruthika Rao, ‘Kashmir and Islamic Fundamentalism in India’, *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2003. This article is based on three basic assumptions on the revivalism of Islamic fundamentalism in India: 1) British colonial policy to divide and rule; 2) Revival of religiosity and traditionalism in the post colonial states of both Islamic and non-Islamic orientations; 3) Discrimination against minorities in the nation states. Another interesting assumption made in this article is that Hinduism is inclined to change with the progression of time whereas Islamic ideology is static which makes Muslims return to the fundamentals making them rigid in their stances thus turning them into fundamentalists. Muslim militancy in Indian Kashmir therefore has been analyzed in the light of such assumptions which, according to the authors, are generally prevalent in the Indian society since the British Raj in India.

Indian Kashmir.\textsuperscript{110} Pakistan’s shift on militancy in Kashmir – from ‘legitimate freedom struggle’ to ‘non-state terrorism’ – demonstrated two important points. First, the post 9/11 US administration had perceived separatist violence in Kashmir as terrorism. Second, Pakistan reversed its pre 9/11 policies in Afghanistan and Kashmir due to paramount US security interests in the region. The new security developments led Musharraf to shelve the demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir provided India agreed to solve the Kashmir issue through an India-Pakistan peace process. It was Pakistan’s desire for India to respond according to the strategic change in the region.

Recognizing the shift in South Asia, Musharraf took an unprecedented initiative on Kashmir. On 17 December 2003, Musharraf told Reuters that he had ‘left aside’ the 55-year-old demand for a UN mandated plebiscite on Kashmir and wished to meet India ‘halfway’ in a bid for peace in South Asia.\textsuperscript{111} Anticipating the beginning of India-Pakistan composite dialogue, both governments declared a ceasefire on the LOC in November 2003. Earlier in 2002, Musharraf had reassured India on the cross-border activities accepting responsibility to rein in the militants operating from areas under Pakistan’s control.\textsuperscript{112} Before Musharraf publicly disclosed the blueprint of his redrawn Kashmir policy in late October 2004, a resolution in the US House of Representatives urged President Bush to appoint a special envoy for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The resolution showed deep US concerns over the security implications of the Kashmir conflict and the US desire to resolve it. The US strongly supported Musharraf’s new initiative on Kashmir to bring peace in the region.

Appreciating the Musharraf regime’s new initiative, the US Congress showed a strong desire for solving the intricate problem of Kashmir. Issued on 22 October 2004, a comprehensive resolution of the US House of Representatives recounted the history of

\textsuperscript{110} Other than Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) and Sipaha-i-Mohammad (SM) that were banned in August 2001 for their sectarian violence, Musharraf banned Sipaha-i-Sahaba (SS) and Tehreek-i-Jaffarria Pakistan (TJP) along with Jaish-i-Mohammad (JM) and Lashkar-i-Taiba (LT) on 12 January 2002.


the Kashmir dispute from the partition of colonial India in 1947. It referred to the UN Security Council resolution No. 47 of 21 April 1948 that called for holding a plebiscite for the people of Kashmir. The US resolution pointed to the ‘numerous human rights reports’ detailing the ‘extensive suffering of the Kashmir people’ at the hand of the security forces, militias, paramilitary forces and militants. The document urged the governments of India and Pakistan to ‘include Kashmiri leaders in the dialogue’ and ‘constructive engagement’ on Kashmir. \[113\] The resolution also urged the US President to ‘appoint immediately a special envoy to work with the governments and people of India, Pakistan, and Kashmir in order to support further dialogue, negotiations and the resolution of the Kashmir conflict.’ \[114\] The members of the US House of Representatives concluded in their resolution that the designation of a special US envoy to help resolve the issues relating to Kashmir would signify the importance of the region to the US and international security and stability. The US thus favored the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

Having the US support over Kashmir, Musharraf took fresh initiatives to lead the peace process further. On 25 October 2004, Musharraf articulated his ideas on the new Kashmir policy for the first time to the journalists in Islamabad. He called his proposals ‘off the cuff’ ideas asking the media to open a public debate on the options for Kashmir. His four point list of proposals read: First, identify seven regions, demilitarize them, and change their status before seeking possible options to resolve the dispute. Second, the status quo in Kashmir is unacceptable and LOC cannot be a solution to the lingering dispute. Third, as a starting point for a step-by-step approach on the demilitarization, the regions on both sides of the LOC need to be analyzed for local culture and demographic composition. After identifying these regions, there could be gradual demilitarization, following which the two sides could discuss who should control these areas. Finally,


\[114\] Ibid.
Pakistan and India could also have joint control of these areas or the United Nations could be asked to play a role.\textsuperscript{115}

On 8 January 2006, Musharraf further explained his ideas on CNBC TV suggesting the concept of self-governance and joint management for the entire Kashmir area. According to him, ‘Self governance is more than autonomy but less than independence. In other words, both India and Pakistan will keep the parts of Kashmir they control but under their joint management. Self governance is devolved to the Kashmiris, independence being firmly ruled out.’\textsuperscript{116}

Later, the host of CNBC TV program, Kiran Thapar, explained this concept in his article elaborating that ‘self-governance’ would ‘apply to the full state of Jammu and Kashmir as it existed in 1947.’ According to Thapar, the concept would be applicable to Northern Areas such as Gilgit and Baltistan. In addition, the borders within the old Kashmir state would be open and hence irrelevant.\textsuperscript{117} It showed that Musharraf’s new approach on resolving Kashmir had aroused a strong interest in India.

Being curious about Pakistan’s new proposal on Kashmir, the Indian media further probed into Musharraf’s new approach to the Kashmir issue. In its 12-25 August 2006 issue, the Indian fortnightly journal \textit{Frontline} published a comprehensive interview of Musharraf with Indian analyst, A. G. Noorani which further clarified Musharraf’s views. Musharraf stressed, ‘Kashmir will have the same borders but people will be allowed to move freely back and forth in the region. …The region will have self-governance or autonomy, but not independence. …The troops will be withdrawn in a phased manner. …A joint supervision mechanism will be set up with India, Pakistan and Kashmir represented in it.’\textsuperscript{118}

Besides giving up the demand for holding a general plebiscite in Kashmir, Pakistan accepted the role of pro-Indian Kashmiri leadership in the future management of

\textsuperscript{116} See Kiran Thapar, President Musharraf’s interview on \textit{CNBC TV}, 8 January 2006.
\textsuperscript{117} Kiran Thapar, ‘Musharraf Calling’, \textit{The Hindustan Times}, New Delhi, 14 January 2006.
Kashmir. During his April 2005 visit to New Delhi, Musharraf stated that the President of the National Conference Omar Abdullah and the leader of the Progressive Democratic Alliance (PDP) Mahbooba Mufti had a role to play in the Kashmiri political discussions.\textsuperscript{119} Previously, Pakistan had asserted that only the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) should represent Kashmiri people in the negotiations.\textsuperscript{120} It reflected that Pakistan was offering a comprehensive package to India in return for a mutually agreed solution of Kashmir despite facing a harsh reaction at home.

On the domestic front, Musharraf's policy shift on Kashmir was highly contentious. For Pakistan, the question of Kashmir had always been a highly emotional issue. There always has been a great deal of anger over what was regarded as India's illegal occupation and brutal suppression of Kashmiri self determination. There was a great deal of support and compassion for the suffering of the Kashmiri people. Musharraf’s departure from the long entrenched Kashmir policy, therefore, was strongly criticized by Pakistani media and politicians alike. The religious political forces and pro-Kashmir media, in particular, turned Musharraf’s four-point blueprint on Kashmir into a highly controversial issue and damaged Musharraf’s image in Pakistan beyond repair. On the contrary, the United States and India showed interest in Musharraf’s formula for Kashmir.

A lobby of retired military and civil servants in Pakistan believed that the time to resolve the Kashmir dispute with India was inappropriate. They argued that while Pakistan was under US pressure to crush al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the US-India strategic cooperation constantly improved meaning that Pakistan could expect little from India on Kashmir.\textsuperscript{121} The bureaucrats advised the government to shelve the


\textsuperscript{120} Ershad Mahmud, ‘India-Pakistan Peace Process: An Appraisal’, \textit{Policy Perspective}, Vol. 5, No. 2, July-December 2007, Islamabad, p. 50. According to Mahmud, ‘the proposals offered by Musharraf sent clear signals that: a) Islamabad was ready to compromise its traditional stance that the people of Kashmir will decide their destiny through free and fair plebiscite; b) India and Pakistani sovereignty would remain as it currently was at the end of the day; c) The LOC would be irrelevant except as a line on a map to demarcate both parts of the state; and d) Self-governance and self-rule will be granted to both parts of Kashmir and joint management established.’

\textsuperscript{121} During informal conversations with the author from 2005 to 2009 in Pakistan, several serving and former high ranking officials such as Akram Zaki, former Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Kashmir issue until Pakistan was able to benefit from the negotiations. There was strong resentment in some sections of Pakistani society against Musharraf on his compromising the Kashmiris’ right of self determination. The right wing political parties and defense analysts were particularly vocal against Musharraf’s Kashmir policy. On 22 December 2005, a political analyst, Inayatullah, reviewed the past two years of India-Pakistan peace process in The Nation pointing to India’s non-commitment on Kashmir.\(^\text{122}\) ‘There is no corresponding pledge on India’s part to stop or reduce state terrorism against the protesting Kashmiris’, he wrote. Most of Indian demands have been more or less conceded and ‘almost all items on the agenda have been taken up for discussion’ except for Kashmir. Reflecting on the intricate history of the Kashmir dispute, he concluded, ‘If there is no military solution, let there be a political one but no compromise on the right of self determination. Let the struggle for it go on. Pakistan as a recognized international party has a right to stand by this struggle.’\(^\text{123}\) The general opinion in Pakistan disapproved of what they saw as the Musharraf regime’s weak and shortsighted surrender of basic principles on Kashmir.

Many observers in Pakistan disagreed with Musharraf on his sense of urgency over Kashmir. On 20 December 2006, a political analyst and expert of International Law, Ijaz Hussain criticized Musharraf in the Daily Times for being in a ‘great hurry’ to resolve the Kashmir issue with India. He observed that Musharraf ‘seemed to believe that [now] was the time for a deal on Kashmir’ which would be ‘favorable to Pakistan’, as India was destined to become a global player before long. According to him, the opposition parties in Pakistan ‘have denounced’ Musharraf’s Kashmir initiative. Hussain referred to the right wing party Jama’at-i-Islami’s leader Qazi Hussain Ahmad who termed the new Kashmir policy a ‘sellout’.\(^\text{124}\) Calling Musharraf’s strategy of public diplomacy ‘flawed’, Hussain wrote:


\(^{123}\) Ibid.

Musharraf is trying to deal with the people of Pakistan, directly bypassing their public representatives. This strategy might not work for a number of reasons. First, hostile public representatives could mar Musharraf’s party on Kashmir by bringing people to the street. Second, it is a moot point whether there are takers for Musharraf’s thinking in the army, particularly the corps commanders.\footnote{Ibid.}

Hussain warned that Kashmir had been the graveyard of many governments in Pakistan. According to him, western public opinion favored India and expected Pakistan to align its position with the West. He was doubtful whether the strategy of public diplomacy would bear fruit.

Musharraf regime’s criticism on the Kashmir issue did not emanate only from the right wing hardliners. A defense analyst, Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, questioned Musharraf’s sense of urgency that time might be running out on Kashmir. In her 6 April 2007 article in the \textit{Daily Times}, ‘What’s the hurry on Kashmir?’, Siddiqa wrote, ‘Is there a fear of extraterrestrial entity taking over the country or does General Musharraf believe that he will face greater problems at home from next year, especially after holding general elections in the country?’ She admitted that the solution of the Kashmir dispute would bring honor to the leadership on both sides of the border. To her, it was more important for Musharraf as a possible way out for winning greater legitimacy at home.\footnote{Ayesha Siddiqa, ‘What’s the Hurry on Kashmir?’, \textit{Daily Times}, Lahore, 6 April 2007.} Siddiqa pointed to one of the likely outcomes saying that:

The question, which must be asked, is: What do the two sides really want? Is it merely to solve a long-standing dispute or to create a new framework for long-lasting peace and stable bilateral relations? It is vital to solve the territorial dispute but it is even more important to reform hostile relations which remain subnormal due to ideological reasons. The ideology is based on the peculiar nature of the two states and their perceptions of each other.\footnote{Ibid.}

Musharraf’s change of heart, however, did little to motivate India to review its conventional position on Kashmir. To many in Pakistan, Musharraf ‘came close to almost acknowledging the Indian claim that Kashmir could not be receded from the [Indian] Union.’\footnote{Ershad Mahmud, \textit{Policy Perspective}, op. cit, p.50.} Musharraf’s objection to the unsustainable ‘status-quo’ in Kashmir and India’s acceptance of Pakistan as a party to the Kashmir dispute was an effort to
find a middle ground between the two nuclear contenders. Among the two, Pakistan showed eagerness to solve the Kashmir dispute by ‘putting aside’ its fundamental stand, while India’s political approach did not allow much leverage on Kashmir. Pakistan took a revisionist approach while India preferred the status quo on Kashmir.

India’s Kashmir dilemma presented a perpetual source of concern for its political structure. India has been accused for resorting to undemocratic practices in Kashmir. In September 2001, India’s Home Minister, L K Advani admitted that polls in Kashmir, barring that of 1977, were never fair and free.\(^{129}\) Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Right Watch blamed India for using brutal force and the severe violation of human rights in Kashmir. In that sense, India appeared to be the largest dysfunctional democracy of the world. Kashmir represented the most crucial India-Pakistan dispute which being the oldest in the annals of the UN, remained unsolved due to India’s resistance. It signified that India itself compounded the problem because of its unproductive policies in Kashmir.

India’s Kashmir policy has been inconsistent at best. On 1 January 1948, India took the dispute against Pakistan to the UN. The UNSC resolved to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir accepting India and Pakistan as two contending parties of the dispute.\(^ {130}\) India agreed. Later in the mid 1950s, India rejected the holding of a plebiscite claiming Kashmir was an Indian internal affair thus shutting Pakistan out of the issue.\(^ {131}\) India conferred a special status to Kashmir under the constitutional article 370, which gave political and constitutional autonomy to Kashmir but then systematically schemed to undo its special status. After dissolving an elected government in Kashmir in 1988-1989, India directly controlled it from New Delhi. India’s actions caused popular uprising in Kashmir in the 1990s, which eventually turned into extensive armed resurgence.\(^ {132}\) It indicated that its lack of consistency worked against India’s own interest in Kashmir.

\(^{131}\) Ibid.
\(^{132}\) Ibid.
Since the beginning of the uprising in the 1990s, both foreign and domestic observers advised India to re-examine its Kashmir policy. After 9/11, pressure mounted on India to break the deadlock. Representing global concern, the US suggested that India initiate a broad based peace process with Pakistan. The US proposed to include Kashmiri representatives in the peace process and to let the process follow its own dynamics. On its domestic front, India’s ‘hard-line’ approach on Kashmir had been hotly contested in a political debate. On 6 August 2000, a noted Indian foreign policy analyst working with the United Nations University in Tokyo, Ramesh Thakur, wrote in *Japan Times*:

The biggest obstacle to peace in Kashmir is not an insurgency armed and financed by Islamabad, but a policy vacuum in New Delhi. The forcible occupation of Kashmir has left several harmful legacies for India. Its democratic institutions have been corrupted by repeated rigging of votes in Kashmir and by refusal of Delhi to accept the province being ruled by other than a pliant government.\(^{133}\)

The domestic criticism of India’s political and military actions in Kashmir demonstrated the negative nature of New Delhi’s Kashmir policy. On 22 January 2002, as India mounted its forces on Pakistan border, Navnita Chadha Behera wrote in *The Hindu* that the ‘battle for resolving Kashmir’ must shift to the political arena. In her article, ‘Kashmir: Lessons of History’, Behera noted that the ‘root cause of fissures in the relationship between the Kashmiris and the Indian state laid in successive central governments’ imposition of their political choices through a steady erosion of the state’s special status and by manipulating the electoral process over the years.’\(^{134}\) Behera criticized the ‘erroneous belief shared by many in New Delhi’s ruling elite that the Kashmiri identity was a threat to the Indian identity and that needed to be demolished’ because as along as it existed, it would be exploited by Pakistan.\(^{135}\) This implied that New Delhi perceived the political divergence of Kashmir as a threat to India’s security and forcefully treated it as such. In his December 2002 article, ‘Time for Policy Orientation’ in *India Together*, political analyst Firdous Ahmed categorically argued that tragic human loss and socio-political alienation in Kashmir was due to India’s


\(^{135}\) Ibid.
heavy handedness against the popular uprising in Kashmir in 1989-90. The observers believed that a soft approach along with a fair democratic process could win the hearts and minds of the Kashmiri people.

India’s approach in Kashmir was also rejected as an instrument to promote Hindu nationalist politics. A 24 June 2004 report, ‘India-Pakistan Relations and Kashmir: Steps towards Peace’, sponsored by International Crisis Group, observed that:

Much Indian rhetoric on Kashmir has focused on how any change might lead to two catastrophes – the breakup of India into a number of smaller states and a wave of anti-Islamic violence across the country. Whether realistic or not, these scenarios play a powerful role in electoral politics, particularly among right wing parties and Hindu nationalists. Given the often-stated importance of Kashmir as a national and security issue, there is surprisingly little discussion on it and an absence of a national consensus.

The report showed that India’s handling of Kashmir increased the ethnic divide and hostility, which in turn, threatened India’s own security.

Many Indian scholars wanted global assistance to solve the Kashmir crisis between India and Pakistan. In the July/August 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs, Indian political analyst Sumit Ganguly held that the Kashmir issue might not frustrate India’s ambition to become a major Asian and a global power. However, the crisis over Kashmir could distract Indian leaders and could result in a nuclear war with Pakistan. He suggested that the ‘US could and should play a role in facilitating an end to the conflict’ by urging both sides to reach an accord. It indicated that left on its own, India was unable to resolve the Kashmir issue due to its internal politics.

Domestic criticism in India revealed certain aspects of the country’s Kashmir policy which had harmed the state’s political cohesion and its image as a rising global power over the years. For example, despite being identified as the world’s largest democracy,

India had consistently deprived the people of Kashmir of their democratic rights. Indian misrule had alienated the Muslim majority of Kashmir who were politically and economically disadvantaged in a supposedly secular India. Rather, the popular revival of ethnic Hindu radicalism since the early 1980s aggressively threatened the secular character of Indian politics. India’s policy of bilateralism in South Asia also proved futile in the changed global and regional environment post 9/11.

It was the global pressure created by the US diplomatic efforts that forced India to begin discussions on the Kashmir issue and begin a comprehensive process of reconciliation with its regional rival - Pakistan. It signified that India had agreed to manage the Kashmir crisis not as a domestic issue but as a regional conflict. It was a significant reversal in India’s earlier position on Kashmir, which former had held since the 1950s.

The India-Pakistan composite dialogue thus opened new ways of cross border cooperation giving hope for a change in conflict ridden Kashmir. In November 2005, both countries agreed to facilitate some movement of the Kashmiri people across the LOC. New Delhi began to hold a dialogue with the leaders of the Indian side of Kashmir for improving security, political and economic mechanisms in the state. Islamabad took into confidence the Kashmiris of both sides of the LOC to build their support for the ongoing peace process. In March 2007, an Indian commanding officer in Kashmir, Lt. General A. S. Sekhon told the media that the infiltration of militants into Kashmir had ceased.139 Responding to Musharraf’s 2004 proposals on Kashmir, Manmohan Singh put forward his own alternative Kashmir plan in 2007.

On 24 April 2007, Manmohan Singh spoke of his vision of dividing the state of Indian side of Kashmir into three regions – Naya Jammu, mainly Hindu, the Kashmiri valley, mainly Muslim, and Ladakh, mainly Buddhist. Speaking at the opening of the third roundtable conference on Kashmir in Delhi, Singh stated that his ‘simple vision’ of Naya Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh ‘can and must become a model of real

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empowerment of the people and comprehensive security’ for them. Singh promised to minimize human right violations and harassment by the Indian security forces. In August 2007, India’s task force group, which was constituted under Defense Minister, A. K. Antony, recommended that the residential buildings, orchards, government buildings, schools, and agricultural lands occupied by the security forces in Kashmir should be evacuated. However, as the CBMs continued under the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan, violent encounters also occurred between the Indian forces and Kashmiri activists.

Both India and Pakistan have strongly opposed views on the nature of violence in Kashmir. Pakistan accused the Indian military’s use of widespread force towards the civilian population in Kashmir as a significant cause of violence. Pakistan constantly asked India to reduce its military presence in Kashmir. India, on the other hand, linked the reduction of its forces with the end of terrorism in Kashmir. India insisted that there would be no reduction or retreat of the security forces without the end of terrorist activities. However, as the political climate appeared to be changing after the parliamentary elections of 18 February 2008 in Pakistan, a new sense of harmony emerged between India and Pakistan. The newly elected government in Pakistan fully supported the India-Pakistan peace process and the Indian government gave strong indications to introduce further CBMs in Kashmir.

After winning the spring 2008 election, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) co-chairman, Asif Ali Zardari, stated that amicable relations with India would not be held hostage to the Kashmir issue. He stressed that the ‘two countries would wait for the future generations to resolve the issue’ in an atmosphere of trust. On 1 March, Pakistan’s new Minister for Kashmir affairs, Qamar Zaman Kaira, stated in a press talk that ‘we would pursue for normalization of relations’ and termination of ‘confrontation’ between

143 ‘Zardari Wants Fear Free Ties with India’, Ibid.
India and Pakistan. The new PPP government did not even discard Musharraf regime’s four-point formula to solve Kashmir. During her first visit to Pakistan in early March, Mehbooba Mufti, an Indian Kashmiri leader, suggested that Zardari should continue Musharraf’s new policy on Kashmir. With the change of government in Pakistan, India-Pakistan composite dialogue along with the will to resolve the Kashmir dispute stayed intact. India’s response to the new Pakistani government was equally positive.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh offered to meet the new government in Pakistan halfway. Addressing the Indian Parliament on 5 March, Manmohan Singh stated, ‘I would like to assure the newly elected leaders of Pakistan that we seek good relations with Pakistan. I hope sir that the newly elected leaders in Pakistan can quickly move forward with us on this. We would welcome this and meet them halfway.’ In his government’s most comprehensive response to 2008 elections in Pakistan, Manmohan Singh highlighted that India wanted ‘to live in peace with Pakistan. The destinies of our two nations … are closely interlinked. We need to put the past behind us; we need to think about our collective destiny, our collective security and our collective prosperity.’ The statements of Indian and Pakistani leadership showed their strong commitment for regional peace and security. Both the countries seemed to be searching for solutions of their disputes including Kashmir.

On 20 May 2008, the Indian Minister for External Affairs met the leaders of new coalition government of Pakistan in Islamabad showing India’s strong confidence in

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147 Ibid.
148 Pakistan warmly welcomed Indian government’s response to the new government of Pakistan. Talking to the journalists in Islamabad, the foreign office spokesman said, ‘this is certainly reaffirmation of the Indian leadership to continue with the composite dialogue between the two countries.’ The spokesman further said, ‘we believe that opportunity exists that must be seized to reach a just settlement of this longstanding dispute which is acceptable to Pakistan, India and most importantly to the people of Kashmir.’ Ibid. Also See Mariana Babar, ‘Pakistan Welcomes Manmohan’s Statement.’ The News, Islamabad, 6 March, 2008.
Pakistani leadership to take India-Pakistan peace process further.\textsuperscript{149} Indian Foreign Secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon, told the media in Islamabad on the same evening that India and Pakistan would soon find solutions to all issues including Kashmir.\textsuperscript{150} On 21-22 May, the final sessions of the fourth round of composite dialogue were held in Islamabad. Both India and Pakistan agreed in their talks to ‘continue discussions to build on convergences and narrow down divergences on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.’\textsuperscript{151} They also agreed to continue with the implementation of cross-LOC CBMs with a view to enhance interaction and cooperation across the LOC.\textsuperscript{152} India’s faith in new Pakistani government and interest in Kashmir related CBMs implied that the two countries were moving closer to resolving the most complicated dispute between them.

On 26 May 2008, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh presided over a high level meeting of senior Indian military commanders and defense experts to discuss the issue of reducing forces on the LOC in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{153} The National Security Advisor, the defense, interior and external affairs’ ministers as well as the army, navy and air chiefs of Indian forces attended the meeting. Several Indian experts of Pakistani affairs were also present on the occasion. The meeting reached three important decisions according to which India would reduce 100,000 of its army and other forces on the LOC in Kashmir. Another 50,000 personnel would be removed from the outer areas of Indian

\textsuperscript{149} Asim Yaseen & Muhammad Anis, ‘Mukherjee discusses CBMs with Zardari, Nawaz’, The News, Islamabad, 21 May 2008; ‘Mukherjee Pins His Hopes on New Pak Govt’, The News, Islamabad, 21 May 2008. During his separate meetings with these party heads – such as PPP’s Asif Zardari, Pakistan Muslim League’s (PML-N) leader Nawaz Sharif and Awami National Party’s (ANP) leader Asfand Yar Wali – Paranab Mukherjee informed them about the progress on various CBMs including Kashmir.


\textsuperscript{152} Iftikhar Gilani, ‘India Announces Kashmir CBMs’, Daily Times, 26 April 2008. On 25 April, nearly a month before Paranab Mukherjee’s two day visit to Islamabad, India had announced several CBMs on Kashmir, whose implementation required Pakistan’s approval. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that Indian government was ‘committed to liberalize the entry permit system to allow free flow of people and trade’ between the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir. The CBMs also included the issue of demilitarization on the Indian side of Kashmir, a package of Rs. 16,000 for the Kashmiri Pandits and a package for educational support of the refugees from Pakistan.

Kashmir while 15% army would be reduced in Srinagar and other districts.\textsuperscript{154} India’s decision to reduce its military presence in Kashmir showed that India intended to address Pakistan’s concerns over the human rights abuse and torture of Kashmiri people by Indian forces. From June, however, a new wave of civil unrest erupted in Jammu and Srinagar bringing death and brutality to the Kashmiri people.

The 2008 uprising sent a strong message to both India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue or allow the Kashmiri people to decide their own future. The revolt began after an unconstitutional transfer of land to a Hindu shrine in Jammu. The Kashmiri Muslims rejected this action as one of New Delhi’s attempts to change the ethnic demography of Kashmir by favoring the Hindus over the Muslims.\textsuperscript{155} The allocation of 100 acres of land to Shiri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) by the BJP Governor of Kashmir, Lt. Gen. S. K. Sinha, caused the resignation of Congress led state government. The new government cancelled the land transfer to avert the crisis. This action also backfired due to Hindu reaction in Jammu against the cancellation. The transfer of land and then its reversal heightened communal tensions and violence.\textsuperscript{156}

To end the communal killings and to restore peace in the streets, Indian military and police used force killing more unarmed activists in Kashmir and further fuelled

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{155} Praful Bidwai, ‘Kashmir Turmoil and the Amarnath Crisis’, \textit{The News}, Islamabad, 12 July 2008; Praful Bidwai, ‘Playing with Fire in Jammu & Kashmir’, \textit{The News}, Islamabad, 17 August 2008; A. G. Noorani, ‘Dangerous Portents in Kashmir’, \textit{Daily Times}, Lahore, 8 September 2008. India’s two renowned political and security analysts, Bidwai and Noorani shared their views on South Asian affairs in Pakistani print media on weekly basis. They explained the nature of 2008 uprising in Kashmir in detail within the context of mainstream Indian politics, which has been polarizing the society using the Hindu-Muslim divide. According to Bidwai, nationally, the BJP was the greatest gainer of June 2008 insurgency, ‘which has cynically exploited the issue to foment violent Hindu communal protests in different parts of India.’ Bidwai reported that due to these Hindu communal agitations, the death toll crossed the double-digit mark. Noorani held that the BJP’s mother organization RSS was behind the scheme of allocating the land to Amarnath Shrine in Jammu because RSS wanted to divide the state of Jammu and Kashmir in three separate areas making Jammu a state independent of the Raj Bhawan of Srinagar. Both the Indian analysts called 2008 communal riots ‘unfortunate’ because all the positive impact of the composite dialogue on socio-political life in Kashmir in the last five years was in serious jeopardy.

emotions. On 11 August 2008, a Kashmiri leader, Shaikh Abdul Aziz, and six others were killed when the security forces fired on the public demonstration in Srinagar. Pakistan’s parliament condemned the killings in Kashmir. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi condemned the ‘excessive and unwarranted use of force’ against the people of Kashmir. Other than Pakistan, there were voices within and outside India that advised authorities to refrain from human rights violation in Kashmir. However, India officially criticized Pakistan’s concerns over the latest uprising in Kashmir calling the resolution passed by Pakistan’s Senate on Kashmir crisis a ‘gross interference’ in India’s ‘internal affairs.’ Interestingly, India conveniently ignored that Kashmir was a disputed territory between India and Pakistan since 1947. On 12 August 2008, regarding Pakistani authorities’ statements over the critical situation in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian spokesperson highlighted that ‘such statements by leaders of a foreign country do not help the situation. Nor do they contribute to creating the atmosphere necessary for the dialogue process between India and Pakistan to move forward.’

The statement implied that India did not consider Pakistan a party to the Kashmir dispute. The assertion also indicated that despite an ongoing India-Pakistan composite dialogue, India was still hesitant to move beyond the interim measures of CBMs on Kashmir. Nevertheless, the civil unrest continued in the face of excessive use of force in Kashmir. On 22 August 2008, between 100,000 to 200,000 Kashmiri people filled the streets chanting ‘aazadi’ (freedom) slogans while the Kashmiri leaders were under arrest.

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and curfew was imposed in the Kashmir valley. The observers called it the largest show of solidarity in Kashmir against India in the last 18 years since 1989.\textsuperscript{160} However, the Amarnath Shrine unrest in Kashmir did not cause much harm to the peace process.

As the Amarnath Shrine issue was local, India authorities could not attribute the unrest to Pakistani sponsored cross border terrorism. There were voices in the Indian media, however, that speculated Pakistan’s involvement in the uprising. Pakistan itself gave a measured reaction to the insurgency in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{161} There appeared to be some signs of an emerging paradigm shift between India and Pakistan. The peace process among the two rivals seemed to be strengthening and the composite dialogue gradually moving ahead.\textsuperscript{162} On 9 September 2008, after his oath taking ceremony as the 12\textsuperscript{th} President of


\textsuperscript{161} Besides issuing official statements against the excessive use of force, Pakistan restrained from arranging public demonstrations chanting anti-India slogans in the main city streets of Pakistan. Pakistan’s restraint was due to four reasons. First, Pakistan was undergoing political transformation from military rule to democracy. Second, Pakistan suffered from a deep internal security crisis due to political violence. Third, the peace process was working well for Pakistan reducing its security concerns vis-à-vis India. Most importantly, the US partnership with both India and Pakistan post 9/11 ensured that the interests of both rivals somewhat converge with each other.

\textsuperscript{162} On 27 September 2008, in his address to the UN General Assembly session 63 held in New York, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh welcomed the return of democracy to Pakistan. He stated, ‘We are committed to resolving all the outstanding issues between India and Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, through peaceful dialogue.’ See Muhammad Saleh Zafar, ‘Mannmohan Vows to Resolve all Issues including Kashmir’, \textit{The News}, Islamabad, 2 September 2008; Khalid Hassan, ‘India Committed to Resolving Kashmir Problem: Singh’, \textit{Daily Times}, Lahore, 28 September 2008. Following his speech to UNGA, President Zardari, in a media conference, emphasized the bilateral settlement of all the outstanding issues with India. In his words: ‘If the people of India and Pakistan stand together, the Kashmir issue can be resolved.’ Khalid Hassan, ‘Zardari Favors Bilateral Solution of Kashmir Dispute with India’, \textit{Daily Times}, Lahore, 25 September 2008.
Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari told the media that there would be good news on Kashmir within a month. Although the Kashmir dispute remained unresolved, Zardari’s statement showed his optimism regarding India-Pakistan relations.

The growing atmosphere of mutual accommodation signified that post 9/11 US engagement with South Asia was positively impacting upon the political dynamics in the region. Apparently, the world community was now aware about the strategic potential of the Kashmir dispute and they wanted to resolve it as a global security issue. India and Pakistan, the two main players of the Kashmir equation, needed to act accordingly. Regretfully, the November 2008 terrorist acts in Mumbai derailed the peace process in the region once again.

Following the 26-29 November carnage at Taj Mahal hotel in Mumbai, India hardened its anti-terrorism stance halting the India-Pakistan composite dialogue. Pakistan continually invited India to resume the dialogue process, while India persistently declined to rejoin the peace talks. The new Obama administration in the White House initially wanted to facilitate the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Besides reasserting against the Taliban and al Qaeda across the Pak-Afghan border, President Obama’s Af-Pak Policy of March 2009 had originally considered a broader agenda to usher both India and Pakistan towards a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Through rigorous diplomatic efforts, however, India successfully prevented the US from including the Kashmir issue in the Af-Pak agenda which disappointed Pakistan. According to an Indian media report on 6 April 2009:

During the policy review on Pakistan-Afghanistan, India threw its weight to tell the Americans that no attempt should be made to link India. As revealed by the US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Boucher, the issue was raised both during the visit of Mr. Holbrooke to New Delhi and India’s Foreign Secretary Shiv Shanker Menon to Washington last week. Menon’s visit to Washington took place even as the State Department and Pentagon were giving final touches to the policy review. Some reports emerged that during the visit of Menon, the US raised the Pakistani security concerns

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163 In response to a question on Kashmir, Zardari referred to Track II diplomacy going along with the mainstream India-Pakistan composite dialogue. What he left unsaid was that Pakistan’s Tariq Aziz and India’s Mr. Lamba had been busy negotiating the Kashmir issue in London during the recent month and that Musharraf’s four point formula on Kashmir was still alive despite the latter’s departure from the scene. The follow-up of Zardari’s statement on Kashmir later clarified that he was probably referring to solving the Siachen and Sir Creek issues and improving trade with India.
over the Kashmir border and suggested that India pull back or at least reduce the number of troops along the LoC so that Pakistan could be made to focus more on fighting terrorism on its western border. India politely but firmly rejected the suggestion.164

The report mentioned that Pakistan’s Prime Minister made the demand again when CIA Chief Leon Panet visited Islamabad in late March 2009. The report showed that the US tilted in favor of India, which Pakistan criticized due to its being a frontline state in the US war on terror.165 Commenting before the foreign media on 28 March, Obama’s National Security Adviser, General James Jones emphasized that the ‘US would not like to involve itself in Pakistan’s Kashmir dispute with India.’166 As such, the Af-Pak policy through excluding the Kashmir issue restored little confidence in Pakistan about US interest concerning Pakistan’s security dilemma vis-à-vis India.

Circles within the US have criticized the Obama administration’s limited focus on South Asia’s security environment on two main grounds. First, the lack of effective US initiative to help resolve the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. For example, in his 18 September 2009 report, ‘No solution to AfPak without India’, Andrew Lebovich asserted that the ‘Obama administration's metrics for measuring success in Pakistan and Afghanistan ignore a large part of the puzzle in South Asia…. [It] fails to acknowledge the tremendous impact on South Asia of the mutual fear and distrust that has animated relations between India and Pakistan since their founding.’167

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165 Ibid, ‘Obama Unveils ‘AFPAK’ Policy’. Also see, ‘US Actively Consulted India on AfPak Policy, says Boucher’, Indian Express, New Delhi, 29 Mar 2009; ‘Foreign Secretary’s Interview on ‘Devil’s Advocate’ by Karan Thapar’, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 17 January 2010 http://mea.gov.in/ retrieved 18 January 2010. In her first interview with CNN-IBN, the new Indian foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao asserted that ‘US will not play mediator between India and Pakistan.’ She also ruled out that Washington would link Kashmir to Afghan unrest. On India’s reluctance to rejoin the peace process, Rao pointed out that terrorism affected the climate of dialogue: ‘It [terrorism] affects the progress of this dialogue. And when Pakistan refers to the need to resume Composite Dialogue, we say you have to create the right atmosphere for that dialogue to move forward.’ On the issue that Indian Government’s refusal to talk created anti-India resentment in Pakistan, the Indian foreign secretary’s response to Pakistan was….‘do more.’
167 Andrew Lebovich, ‘No Solution to AfPak Without India’, 18 Sep 2009,
This report clearly emphasized the need for a broader US agenda to achieve sustainable peace in South Asia, especially between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The other main aspect of criticism concerned the US ‘exit strategy’ from Afghanistan that President Obama announced on 1 December 2009. According to the President, coalition forces would start moving out of the most crucial theater of war against terrorism from July 2011. For the Obama administration, the announcement of withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan had various compelling reasons both at the domestic and global levels. In the regional context of South Asia, however, an imminent US departure from this part of the world would neither leave a stable Afghanistan behind nor the Kashmir issue resolved for many years to come. Since the Mumbai attacks, therefore, the geo-political developments in the region during 2009 suggest that the nature of India-Pakistan composite dialogue would remain elusive indefinitely.

This section has discussed the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s regional security especially within the context of the inclusion of Kashmir as

http://digg.com/submit?phase=2&url=http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2009/ October 2009. Reporting the launch of the AfPak Channel, the new joint project between the New America Foundation and Foreign Policy magazine, Andrew Lebovich referred to New America Foundation’s President Steve Coll. Coll defined US interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan as going beyond the standard aim of disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al Qaeda. Coll stated that our other paramount interest is to ensure ‘a stable, modernizing South Asia, particularly including Pakistan, but not limited to Pakistan. Lebovich also referred to Sameer Lalwani, a PhD student at MIT and Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, who recently released a ‘richly-detailed analysis of Pakistan's counterinsurgency challenges and capabilities.’ According to Lebovich, ‘one conclusion Lalwani draws is that it would be nearly impossible for Pakistan to conduct a true counterinsurgency in the tribal areas without a serious reorientation of its military posture towards India. For Pakistan to have the appropriate number of troops in the west to fight according to classic counterinsurgency theory, it will need to redeploy up to 359,000 troops from the Indian border, something that is unlikely to happen owing to Pakistani military strategy, training, and persistent fears of Indian attack. He further writes: India has resisted any outside efforts to resolve the disputed region of Kashmir and an Indian lobbying push kept Richard Holbrooke from dealing with India as part of a broader AfPak strategy. Lalwani asserts, however that ‘for a stable and secure South Asia from Kabul to Delhi and beyond, there must first be engagement between Delhi and Islamabad.’

an issue in the India-Pakistan composite dialogue. The composite dialogue between India and Pakistan, which the US encouraged, was directly related to Pakistan’s security at the regional level. Significantly, among other areas, the dialogue included the Kashmir dispute, which both adversaries had strongly contested for more than six decades. Ever since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, Pakistan’s regional security has been intricately connected with India due to the persistence of the Kashmir dispute between the two traditional rivals. Both countries had fought conventional wars over Kashmir. Moreover, India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998 made Kashmir a nuclear flash point. As such, without the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, an accidental nuclear war could erupt between the two rivals post 9/11. It further implied that only the resolution of the Kashmir dispute would be able to manage India-Pakistan rivalry, which would enhance Pakistan’s security at the regional level.

US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 had mixed consequences for Pakistan’s security at the regional level, especially within the context of the India-Pakistan Composite dialogue and the Kashmir dispute. US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 enhanced Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis India in three important ways. First, the US helped avert a potential India-Pakistan war in 2001/02 and moved both rivals towards holding a composite dialogue. Second, from 9/11 to 2009, the US encouraged both nuclear and other CBMs between both rivals.\footnote{Iftikhar Gilani, ‘Indian Cabinet Okays Indo-Pak N-Risk Treaty’, \textit{Daily Times}, Lahore, 19 January 2007. According to the news report, ‘the treaty provides that each side maintain its existing organization and technical arrangements to guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control. It also stipulates that both sides immediately notify each other in the event of an accidental, unauthorised or unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of nuclear weapons in order to avert an outbreak of nuclear war. Also See Duryodhan Nahak, \textit{South Asia Politics}, Vol. 6, No. 4, August 2007, op. cit.} Some of these CBMs were directly related to the Kashmir issue. Last but not least, the US encouraged both rivals to include Kashmir as an issue which needed to be resolved between the two rivals through bilateral discussion. However, Pakistan’s security at the regional level was eroded to the extent that the US, despite its amicable relations with India, remained unwilling to influence both rivals to resolve the Kashmir dispute. This insight shows that Pakistan’s security at the regional level is intricately linked with the US willingness and efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue.
Nevertheless, the US efforts to move the rivals towards peace cannot be negated. Since 2004, various Kashmir related CBMs were implemented which gradually enhanced Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis India. Moreover, permitting the public and commercial movement across the LOC brought some relief to the Kashmiri people. India’s reluctant efforts to bring normalcy back in the streets by reducing security forces in Kashmir met with mixed results. The US encouraged Musharraf’s four point formula on Kashmir, which generated interest among the concerned parties to the dispute. However, Pakistan resented the lack of any visible progress on resolving the Kashmir dispute itself. Following the Mumbai blasts of November 2008, India halted the peace process. President Obama’s policies concerning the US war on terror in Afghanistan during 2009 also negatively affected the composite dialogue. However, the occasional US official statements in favor of finding a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute helped reduce hostility between the two states.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored the implications of the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security in the context of India-Pakistan composite dialogue. The dialogue was viewed at three levels. Firstly, the US efforts brought India and Pakistan back from the brink of war towards a peace process. Second, the dialogue was discussed with reference to implementation of several security and economic CBMs. These CBMs ranged from nuclear related safety measures and missile testing to cross-border and cross-LOC trade and transport. Third, the solution of Kashmir issue which was the major thrust of Pakistan in the peace process remained unresolved. For Pakistan, the success or failure of the dialogue process largely rested on the nature of results obtained over Kashmir.

The idea of regionalism in South Asia could be identified according to the prevailing effects of global politics in the region. For example, besides the local causes of India-Pakistan rivalry since the independence in 1947, the global politics of the Cold War era played a significant role in the continued hostility among the two regional foes. As such, the prolonged security crisis in the South Asian region cannot be seen in isolation. In the
post 9/11 paradigm shift in South Asia, strong US interests began to reshape the region from conflict to cooperation. The converging interests of India and Pakistan were of primary importance to achieve lasting peace and security in the region. However, the final outcome of India-Pakistan composite dialogue would eventually emerge from the global support, or lack of it, for the process. With the US assistance, the pivotal states of India and Pakistan together could achieve sustainable peace and prosperity which, in return, should have a positive impact even beyond South Asia.

The main findings of the thesis are discussed in the conclusion to the thesis.
CONCLUSION

The thesis has discussed the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security. The thesis has largely benefited from theoretical insights regarding the notion of ‘security’. The thesis draws upon theoretical insights provided by Buzan regarding the relationship between a ‘small state’ and a ‘superpower’, on the one hand, and a small state’s ‘security’, on the other. In order to apply Buzan’s theoretical insights with specific reference to Pakistan, the thesis is divided into three parts and six chapters in all.

The first part of the thesis ‘historical context’ has one chapter titled ‘US-Pakistan relations: 1950s - 9/11’, which enables the discussion to commence on the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 and its implications for Pakistan’s security. The division of the rest of the thesis is directly related to theoretical insights about the idea of ‘security’. According to Buzan’s elaboration of the concept of ‘security’, a state’s security is divisible in three parts: 1) domestic security; 2) regional security; and 3) global security.

The second part of the thesis deals with the nature of US-Pakistan cooperation and its implications for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level. Buzan maintains that the notion of security at the domestic level can be sub-divided into the concepts of degree of ‘socio-political cohesion’ and ‘political violence’. He argues that through determining the degree of both ‘socio-political cohesion’ and ‘political violence’, it can be inferred whether a particular state’s domestic security has been enhanced or eroded. Accordingly, Part Two of the thesis has been divided into three chapters (Chapters Two, Three and Four) to explore the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s ‘socio-political cohesion’ as well as for the ‘degree of political violence’ in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan.

The third part of the thesis analyses the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security at the regional level. Buzan maintains that Pakistan’s
security at the regional level is intertwined with the country’s security relationship with India. Accordingly, the thesis explores the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security relationship with India. Chapter Five of the thesis examines the US role in averting a possible Indo-Pakistan war in 2001/2002 and its implications for Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis India. Chapter Six discusses the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue. Pakistan’s security at the global level has been discussed throughout the thesis as the dissertation itself deals with Pakistan’s relationship with the US, a matter which lies at the heart of Pakistan’s security at the global level.

The first chapter of the thesis ‘The US-Pakistan relations: 1950s-9/11’ argues that in order to win global support to combat Soviet communism during the Cold War era, the US built an alliance with Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960s. Within this context, Pakistan became a member of CENTO and SEATO. Pakistan, however, had predominantly regional perceptions of security, and therefore, saw this alliance as an opportunity to strengthen itself strategically vis-à-vis its regional rival – India whereas the US was more concerned about the global battle against the Soviet Union. Regarding regional security issues, the clash of US-Pakistan perceptions eventually led to the US disengagement from Pakistan in the late 1960s. During the 1970s, the US had strong global nuclear non-proliferation interests, which led it to remain disengaged from Pakistan until the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in December 1979.

In pursuit of its own national interest, the US engaged with Pakistan during the 1980s, while the US disengaged from Pakistan from 1990 – 9/11. In the 1980s, the US once again engaged with Pakistan to combat the global threat of Soviet communism in order to wage a proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Pakistan became a conduit for sending US funding and arms along with Saudi Arabia, thus strengthening Afghan resistance forces vis-à-vis the intervening Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988, the US disengaged again from Pakistan in 1990 because Pakistan was no longer central to its most important global strategic objectives particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US
nuclear non-proliferation interests gained foremost priority under which the US imposed the Pressler Amendment on Pakistan in 1990, which punished Pakistan by imposing military and economic sanctions on it for pursuing its nuclear policy option and thus the US remained disengaged from Pakistan until 9/11. This action of the United States was – and still is – bitterly resented throughout Pakistan.

As the above discussion illustrates, a weak state’s relationship with a superpower is almost entirely dependent on the perceptions and national interests of the global power. Within this context, the superpower defines both the direction and duration of such a relationship. By the same logic, a weak state can neither forge nor define the duration of its relationship with a given superpower. Moreover, the perceptions and interests of the superpower power would always dominate the interests of the weaker power. All these insights are readily applicable to the US-Pakistan relationship from 1950s to 2010.

From 1950s to the present, the US-Pakistan relationship favored US strategic interests but did not address Pakistan’s security interests. The US interests were global in nature, while Pakistan’s interests were regional in character. The US-Pakistan relationship was forged when the needs of the US could be met in Pakistan: From 1950s to 1960s to combat Soviet communism, in the 1980s to combat Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, from 9/11 to 2010 to combat terrorism and religious extremism. In contrast, Pakistan’s security interests vis-à-vis its major regional rival - India - were left outside the equation of US-Pakistan relations. It is clear then that the decisions of the US to engage with or disengage from Pakistan were very much dependent upon the US own agenda. These decisions were to have very serious repercussions for both the US and Pakistan.

The three chapters of Part Two of the thesis explore the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level. Chapter Two ‘US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 and Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion’ analyses the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s socio-political cohesion. It argues that Pakistan was a weak state because of its weak and ineffective democracy, political instability, economic meltdown, religious and ethnic differences
resulting in ever growing violence coupled with dysfunctional state institutions and the dominance of the military in politics and economic affairs involving, on occasions, military coups. US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 helped Pakistan to achieve a national consensus against militant Islam and strongly supported Pakistan to move from military rule to democracy. Without US cooperation, the authorities in Pakistan would not have been able to reverse its pro-Taliban policy, which had polarized Pakistani society for a long time. Interestingly, as Pakistan returned to democracy in February 2008, the US continued to engage with Pakistan and played an effective role in Pakistan’s return to democracy. This was the first time that the US willingly engaged with a democratic Pakistan in the entire history of US-Pakistan relations.

Chapter Three ‘US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Pakistan’s domestic security’ analyzed the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation in FATA post 9/11 for Pakistan’s domestic security. US-Pakistan cooperation in FATA widely eroded Pakistan’s internal security through the increase of political violence in the tribal areas. Owing to the US invasion of Afghanistan, FATA assumed strategic significance because it was located on Pakistan-Afghanistan border and due to its becoming a sanctuary for al Qaeda and the Taliban. US-Pakistan cooperation in FATA post 9/11 was based on the understanding that both countries would aim to contain the militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Despite having a strong Pakistani military presence, which varied between 80,000 and 150,000 soldiers on the Pak-Afghan border, it was difficult to combat terrorism in FATA for three inter-related reasons. First, the tough nature of the mountainous terrain along with the porous Pakistan-Afghanistan border inhibited Pakistan from effectively combating terrorism. Second, as the remote tribal territory of Pakistan, FATA was the region least integrated into Pakistan in political, administrative and economic terms. The tribal areas have had a long history of vigorously opposing any attempt to impose authority from outside. This meant that the writ of Pakistani state did not exist in FATA, which greatly complicated the task of combating terrorism in the area. Last but not least, due to Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policies of the 1990s, Pakistan was reluctant to
use massive force in FATA to combat terrorism. However, Pakistani military’s certain resolve to combat terrorism in FATA increased the degree of violence in that area and other parts of Pakistan as well, thus eroding Pakistan’s security.

The fourth chapter ‘US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 in Balochistan and Pakistan’s domestic security’ has discussed the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 against the militants in Balochistan for Pakistan’s security. The US invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11 initiated the Taliban militancy and strengthened largely secular Baloch nationalist revolt in Pakistan. Despite being divergent in their stated objectives, both insurgencies overlapped and contributed to the destabilization of Pakistan. Both the militant organizations are concurrently undermining Pakistan’s security mainly through eroding the writ of the state in the largest province of the country. While the Taliban surges from Balochistan into Afghanistan rendered Pakistan’s border area widely insecure in the southwest, the Baloch militants directly hit Pakistan’s security personnel as well as economic and strategic installations within the province. Pakistan’s tolerance of the Taliban activities in Balochistan and the use of coercive means against the Baloch rebels added to deep erosion of security. Sectarian violence also occurred sporadically in which the Sunni militants killed Shia Muslims particularly in and around Quetta, which also contributed to the instability of Baluchistan. As such, a combination of three key events brought Pakistan to the brink of collapse: the US invasion of Afghanistan, the emergence of a Pakistani Taliban militancy and the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan.

The Third Part of the thesis ‘implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s regional security’ comprises two chapters. Chapter Five ‘The US role in India-Pakistan military standoff (2001/02) and Pakistan’s regional security’ has discussed the implications of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 for Pakistan’s security in the context of India-Pakistan military standoff from December 2001-October 2002.

US efforts to avert the India-Pakistan military standoff in 2001/2002 enhanced Pakistan’s security at the regional level. US pressure and mediation prevented three potentially highly dangerous developments. First, the outbreak of an all out war
between two South Asian de-facto nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, could have accidentally led to nuclear war, which would have severely jeopardized Pakistan’s security if not its very existence as a viable state. Second, while Pakistan was engaged in combating terrorism on its western Pak-Afghan border, an outbreak of a war with India would have rendered Pakistan vulnerable on its eastern border as well. It could have presented a two front war scenario for Pakistan thus endangering the country’s regional security. Third, in the case of a war with India, Pakistan would have had to divert its military from western to eastern front leaving the threat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban largely unaddressed. As such, while Pakistan would have been fighting an outside enemy, the militants would have fought Pakistan from within. Fortunately, due to the US diplomatic efforts, the war between India and Pakistan did not materialize.

After 9/11, India used the 13 December attack on the Indian Parliament by terrorists allegedly linked to the Pakistani state to try to project Pakistan as a terrorist state. India launched operation Parakaram, according to which India stationed its army on its western border with Pakistan in 2001/02. However, Indian forces did not cross the international border due to US pressure against military escalation. As a consequence, Pakistan invited India for mutual de-escalation of the forces and to develop a peaceful dialogue on Kashmir. The threat of the potential outbreak of a nuclear conflict also kept India from invading Pakistan. Significantly, due to the US War on Terror in Afghanistan, India’s military buildup against Pakistan was an unwelcome development for the US. The US pressure forced India to de-escalate its advancement towards war which helped to avert the Indo-Pakistan war.

In its attempt to establish regional hegemony, India desired to play a prominent role in the US war against terrorism. Such a role would have allowed Pakistan to become isolated as a terrorist state and punished for its earlier involvement with the Taliban alongside Afghanistan. The Bush administration’s war plan against terrorism, therefore, conflicted with India’s pursuit of its regional interests. India’s military deployment against Pakistan threatened the US plan for the region. This deployment became a matter of worldwide concern because of the fear of a nuclear exchange in South Asia.
Pakistan showed restraint in brinkmanship while staying firm on the Kashmir issue. The strategic flow of events in the region thwarted India’s threat towards Pakistan. The US diplomacy, therefore, successfully reversed a probable Indo-Pakistan war.

The course of the India-Pakistan standoff, 2001-2002 created two major problems. First, it showed a total collapse of bilateralism in the region. The breakdown of communication and weak will for peaceful coexistence left both rivals with two distinct paths to follow. One way would have been of regional exclusiveness rejecting any outside mediation. In South Asia, this would lead to the persistence of mutual suspicion and ongoing conflict. India’s brinkmanship was a good evidence to prove that case. The other approach would have allowed third-party mediation to help resolve the conflict. The US diplomacy to avert an Indo-Pakistan war clearly exemplified this fact. Second, nuclear deterrence emerged as a strong factor that fostered military restraint during India-Pakistan standoff. The threat of nuclear weapons helped prevent the escalation of the conflict. The events demonstrated, however, that nuclear deterrence alone might not be sufficient without extra-regional support for peace in South Asia.

Chapter Six ‘US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11, India-Pakistan composite dialogue and Pakistan’s security’ analyzed the implications of the US-Pakistan cooperation for Pakistan’s regional security in the context of India-Pakistan composite dialogue. The dialogue was examined at three levels. Firstly, the US efforts brought India and Pakistan back from the brink of war and towards a peace process. Second, the dialogue was discussed with reference to the implementation of several US supported security and economic CBMs. These CBMs ranged from nuclear related safety measures and missile testing to cross-border and cross-LOC trade and transport. Third, the efficacy of the dialogue was ascertained in seeking the solution of the Kashmir issue which remained a major concern for Pakistan to initiate the India-Pakistan peace process. The success or failure of the peace process would largely rest on whether the dialogue would help resolve the Kashmir dispute or not.
One major insight of the thesis is that the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 had mixed consequences for Pakistan’s security at the domestic level. The judgment on Pakistan’s domestic security involved the degree of enhancement or erosion of twin conflicting concepts of ‘socio-political cohesion’ and ‘political violence’. As a consequence of US-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism, political violence widely spread in Pakistan. In particular, FATA in the Northwest and Balochistan in the southwest, which were both situated on Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, suffered two concurrent insurgencies. In FATA, it was al-Qaeda and the Taliban militancy that jeopardized country’s security. In Balochistan, the Taliban’s insurgent presence and Baloch nationalist revolt overlapped to endanger security and to challenge Pakistan’s writ of the state. On the other hand, due to US-Pakistan cooperation against terrorism, a wide-range consensus emerged within Pakistani society to combat terrorism. The hostile reaction toward terrorism was a result of frustration of the majority of Pakistanis over indiscriminate political violence that perpetually eroded individual’s security. A combination of US-Pakistan cooperation against terror and the reactive violence, therefore, ushered the Pakistani society towards building certain socio-political cohesion to avoid a total security collapse.

The US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 had significant implications for Pakistan’s security at the regional level. Owing to this cooperation, Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis India was neither enhanced nor eroded but remained stable as both countries sustained a status quo with each other. The US involvement with both India and Pakistan resulted in the prevention of an Indo-Pakistan war in 2001/2002. In the wake of 2008 Mumbai blasts, US mediation with both rivals was again essential to resolve the crisis. Due to the US influence with both the countries, they entered into a composite dialogue in 2004. The dialogue process led to an agreement, which provided that despite the absence of mutual trust, both countries would resolve their disputes through bilateral negotiations. After the Mumbai blasts, India restrained its military forces. However, the composite dialogue was temporarily disrupted. Although the talks were not resumed even in 2010, both India and Pakistan continued to express their commitment to the composite dialogue due to the US pressure to resume the talks. The US formally denied mediation between India and Pakistan on the vexed issue of Kashmir, the issue that was central to
Pakistan’s security policy, but the US ensured that both countries did not engage in hostile actions.

Pakistan was concerned that Indo-US strategic partnership that was forged in 2005, would harm Pakistan-US cooperation and would erode Pakistan’s security at the regional level for three reasons. First, Pakistani media believed that while the country was combating terrorism at home, India continued to convince Washington that Pakistan was not doing enough. Second, Pakistan believed that the US suspicions of Pakistani military and security agencies such as Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) were emanating from an increasing Indian influence among the US policy makers. Last but not least, Pakistan believed that the US helped India increase its influence in Afghanistan, an attempt that seriously ignored Pakistan’s regional security concerns. Pakistan considered that such US move would allow India to encircle Pakistan on latter’s both eastern and western borders.

US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 had serious implications for Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan. From 1950s – 1970s, due to Afghanistan’s non-recognition of the Durand Line and its irredentist claim over Pakistan’s northwestern areas, Pakistan’s security had eroded on its western border. In the 1980s, Afghanistan’s claim to Pakistan’s border areas was diluted due to US-Pakistan joint resistance against the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan. During the 1990s, Afghanistan laid no claim on the border region both due to the on-going civil-war in Afghanistan along with Pakistan’s support to the Taliban. After 9/11, Afghanistan’s acceptance of the Durand Line could have eased the US task to combat Pakistan-Afghanistan cross border terrorism as well as enhanced Pakistan’s security on its western border with Afghanistan. However, the US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 could not influence Afghanistan to recognize the Durand line. Therefore, post 9/11 cross-border terrorism deeply eroded Pakistan’s security on the western border.

The thesis is timely because of three significant reasons. First, US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 has great contemporary importance because the US War on Terror still
continues beyond the period of the Bush administration. Having the geo-strategic proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan will continue to play a significant role as a frontline US ally to combat terrorism. Second, the Obama administration’s policies to combat terrorism in Afghanistan such as the ‘Af-Pak’ and ‘Pakistan First’ initiatives directly involve Pakistan as a mainstay of anti-terrorist US strategies. Third, the persistence of US-Pakistan relationship would have serious consequences for Pakistan’s security at both the domestic and regional levels. The recent debate within Pakistan was centered on the implications of Kerry Lugar Bill that approved US$1.5 billion non-military aid for Pakistan’s socio-economic security. Similarly, the on-going US-Pakistan cooperation would have implications for Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis its eastern neighbor India and its western neighbor Afghanistan. In the near future, the insights of the thesis would be useful to understand both the direction of US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11 as well as its implications for Pakistan’s security.

Despite the differences that surfaced in US-Pakistan cooperation post 9/11, US strategic relationship with Pakistan is important for Pakistan’s endurable security at the domestic, regional and global levels. First, although Pakistan is a multicultural society with potentially divisive ethno-sectarian, linguistic and territorial divisions, a liberal pluralist model would help build a more cohesive society and reduce the current degree of political violence in Pakistan. The US anti-terror engagement with Pakistan is significant for Pakistan to survive given the impact of religious extremism, sectarianism and anti-western mindset of so many Pakistanis. With US support, Pakistan’s political and military leadership, in conjunction with the mass of the population, can evolve a broad social consensus against violence, intolerance and lack of general cohesiveness. Such attitudes, in return, would strongly enhance Pakistan’s domestic security.

The continued US engagement with Pakistan will also increase Pakistan’s security at the regional level because the US has recognized the mutual benefit of having Pakistan as an ally. With its significant geo-strategic location, Pakistan is situated on the cross roads of South Asia, Southwest Asia and Central Asia. Along with the most post 9/11 terrorist concerns, the US presence in this region involved a long-term economic interest to
connect Central Asian energy flow to South Asian outlets. Pakistan would enormously assist the US in this mutually useful project. Moreover, a politically liberal and economically viable Pakistan could emerge as a model for other developing countries to emulate. The US energy interests, therefore, were an important factor in the US moves to enhance Pakistan’s regional security. Currently, Pakistan perceives that threats to its regional security emanate from both India and Afghanistan, which have close relations with the US in the post 9/11 scenario. With US support, Pakistan could secure peaceful relations with its rival India and its western neighbor Afghanistan in the longer term. Such developments could produce a win-win situation for both the US and Pakistan as well as ensure peace and cooperation in South Asia.

The US has wanted long-term and broader cooperation with Pakistan believing that a politically and economically viable Pakistan will be in a better position to combat terrorism. Stephen P. Cohen maintains that ‘the US cannot afford to see Pakistan fail nor can it ignore the extremists operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, al-Qaeda, and the war in Afghanistan keep US national security firmly anchored in Pakistan. Afghanistan cannot succeed without success in Pakistan.’1 Within this context, the US has been concentrating on broadening its assistance to Pakistan ranging from military to political, economic, developmental and educational spheres. US scholars’ recent recommendations for strengthening US policy towards Pakistan2 and bilateral understanding resulting from the ‘US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue’3 which was held at Doha in Qatar in February 2010 have been pointers in this direction.

There has been an increasing convergence of US-Pakistan security interests during the Obama administration as Pakistan increasingly combated terrorism especially due to the

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2 Ibid., pp. 2-3. His recommendations covered strengthening US policy towards Pakistan in the areas of Counterterrorism and Internal Security, building Regional Relationships as well as broadening US Assistance to Pakistan to include ‘economic aid on projects in basic education, health care, water resource management, law enforcement and justice programs.’ This report was endorsed by Richard Armitage and Lee Hamilton.
emergence of the TTP which widely engaged in violence within Pakistan. According to Michael E. O’Hanlon, ‘total Pakistani troops in the NWFP, Balochistan and the tribal areas’ in 2010 ‘number about 150,000 up from 50,000 in 2001’ and ‘there are 90,000 paramilitary troops of the Frontier Corps in the area’ which are ‘far better equipped’ since 9/11.⁴ Pakistan’s military spokesman, Major General Athar Abbas, told O’Hanlon that the Pakistan army has 821 posts on the Afghan-Pakistan border in 2010 compared to 112 NATO and Afghan forces manned posts on the Afghanistan side. Further, Pakistan has ‘carried out 209 operations in 2009 of brigade size or larger (that is involving at least 3,000 troops), twice as many as in the previous two years combined.’⁵ Moreover, the convoys carrying goods to the NATO mission in Afghanistan via Pakistan have been far safer now.⁶

During the Obama administration, the US has been more willing to understand Pakistan’s regional concerns which could strengthen US-Pakistan cooperation in the coming years. The US has understood well that it needs to strongly encourage Pakistan’s cooperation with the regional states in order to allay Pakistan’s suspicion of India and Afghanistan. The US, however, still needs to realize that Pakistan will relinquish its fear of India only if the Kashmir dispute were settled between them. Within this context, the US could help resolve the Kashmir issue between the two adversaries. The US allocation of a dominant role to India in Afghanistan while isolating Pakistan, will further erode regional cooperation and obstruct US-Pakistan cooperation, which would, in turn, harm the US security interests in South Asia. The US must consider the strategic and cultural linkages which have long existed between Pakistan and Afghanistan and further strengthen them. Such US policy would dispel mistrust among Pakistan, India and Afghanistan and eventually help secure the US interests in the region.

⁵ Ibid.
⁶ ‘Convoys bringing supplies for the NATO mission in Afghanistan used to be preyed on frequently by terrorists and thieves, but as a result of the improved security, NATO is now losing only about 0.1 percent of the goods it ships across Pakistan.’ ibid, p. 2.
At this juncture, a crucial question which arises is: Among the domestic, regional and global levels of analysis, which level carries more relative weight for Pakistan’s security post 9/11? Owing to its being a weak state with low levels of socio-political cohesion along with having strong patterns of enmity with India due to the unresolved Kashmir dispute, it is the global level which carries the most relative weight for Pakistan. The US engagement with Pakistan post 9/11 not only strengthened Pakistan’s security at the global level, but it also improved its security vis-à-vis its regional rival, India. It is highly probable that despite the increase of political violence in Pakistan from short-term to medium-term, the long-term US engagement with Pakistan will enhance Pakistan’s security at both domestic and regional levels. At the domestic level, US support is essential if Pakistan is to develop a strong viable democracy. Further, the liberal forces in Pakistan need US assistance to contest the conservative modes, which have been occupying much of the socio-political space through violence. Continued US political, military, societal and economic support is crucial to curtail terrorism in Pakistan and help ensure lasting peace with India.

If Woolf’s ideas about ‘imperialism and civilization’ were to be applied to the US desire for imperialism, then it would appear that the anti-western revolt of Al Qaeda and the Taliban militants was neither religious nor racial nor ethnic in nature but only a revolt against the harshness of US imperialist policies in Asia. According to Woolf, it is the resentment of the subjugated peoples against the imperialist forces, which leads to the clash of civilizations and the best solution of the problem is to end all immigration and leave each continent to its own inhabitants. Woolf ignored the fact that the engagement of civilizations would not necessarily mean conflict but it could signify cooperation as well. Such collaboration is essential for the evolution of civilizations for how else do civilizations move forward except through the diffusion of cultures and ideas? In an ideal world, the civilizations would not remain isolated from one another but walk hand in hand towards universalistic values and mutual toleration.

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CHRONOLOGY

US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

1947  Pakistan emerged as a sovereign state on 14 August.

1954  Pakistan becomes a US ally by joining US sponsored
      SEATO to combat communism.

1955  Pakistan joins another US sponsored alliance CENTO
      to combat Soviet communism in Central Asia and the Middle East.

1959  Pakistan extends air base at Badaber and over-flight rights to the US
      for U2 flights over the Soviet Union.

1962  The US sends military and economic aid to India in the Sino-Indian
      war, which disillusions Pakistan from its alliance with the US.

1965  The US imposes an arms embargo on Pakistan in the wake of
      Indo-Pakistan war that hurts Pakistan’s security.

1971  The US role in the Indo-Pakistan war and the subsequent emergence
      of Bangladesh
      further disillusions Pakistan from its alliance with the US.

1972  Pakistan withdraws from SEATO.

1970s The US disengages from Pakistan due to its nuclear program.

1979  Pakistan withdraws from CENTO and the Soviet intervention of
      Afghanistan.

1980s A new phase of the US engagement with Pakistan begins due to the
      Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in December 1979. Pakistan
      assumes the status of the US frontline state to combat the Soviet
      forces in Afghanistan and the US provides Pakistan with military and
      economic aid.

1989  The US becomes disinterested in Pakistan due to the withdrawal of the
      Soviet forces from Afghanistan.
1990 The US implements the Pressler Amendment against Pakistan in 1990, which imposes both military and economic sanctions on Pakistan due to its ongoing nuclear program.

1990s Under the Amendment, the US remains disengaged from Pakistan throughout the 1990s.

1998 India and Pakistan carry out nuclear tests in May.

1999 India-Pakistan Kargil conflict ends with Pakistan signing the Washington Declaration on 4 July.

9/11 Terrorist attacks occur on World Trade Centre in New York and Pentagon in Washington D.C.

Post 9/11 The US rescinds the Pressler Amendment against Pakistan on 22 September and Pakistan becomes a frontline state for the US to combat global terrorism.
APPENDIX A

EXCERPTS FROM THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States

WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY
REFLECTING ON A GENERATIONAL CHALLENGE

Three years after 9/11, Americans are still thinking and talking about how to protect our nation in this new era. The national debate continues. Countering terrorism has become, beyond any doubt, the top national security priority for the United States. This shift has occurred with the full support of the Congress, both major political parties, the media, and the American people.

The nation has committed enormous resources to national security and to countering terrorism. Between fiscal year 2001, the last budget adopted before 9/11, and the present fiscal year 2004, total federal spending on defense (including expenditures on both Iraq and Afghanistan), homeland security, and inter-national affairs rose more than 50 percent, from $354 billion to about $547 billion. The United States has not experienced such a rapid surge in national security spending since the Korean War.

This pattern has occurred before in American history. The United States faces a sudden crisis and summons a tremendous exertion of national energy. Then, as that surge transforms the landscape, comes a time for reflection and reevaluation. Some programs and even agencies are discarded; others are invented or redesigned. Private firms and engaged citizens redefine their relationships with government, working through the processes of the American republic.

Now is the time for that reflection and reevaluation. The United States should consider what to do—the shape and objectives of a strategy. Americans should also consider how to do it—organizing their government in a different way.

Defining the Threat

In the post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by the fault lines within societies than by the territorial boundaries between them. From terrorism to global disease or environmental degradation, the challenges have become transnational rather than international. That is the defining quality of world politics in the twenty-first century.

National security used to be considered by studying foreign frontiers, weighing opposing groups of states, and measuring industrial might. To be dangerous, an enemy had to muster large armies. Threats emerged slowly, often visibly, as weapons were forged, armies conscripted, and units trained and moved into place. Because large states were more powerful, they also had more to lose. They could be deterred.

Now threats can emerge quickly. An organization like al Qaeda, headquartered in a country on the other side of the earth, in a region so poor that electricity or
telephones were scarce, could nonetheless scheme to wield weapons of unprecedented destructive power in the largest cities of the United States.

In this sense, 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests “over there” should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against America “over here.” In this same sense, the American homeland is the planet.

But the enemy is not just “terrorism,” some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism—especially the al Qaeda net-work, its affiliates, and its ideology.

... Usama Bin Ladin and other Islamist terrorist leaders draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within one stream of Islam (a minority tradition), from at least Ibn Taimiyyah, through the founders of Wahhabism, through the Muslim Brotherhood, to Sayyid Qutb. That stream is motivated by religion and does not distinguish politics from religion, thus distorting both. It is further fed by grievances stressed by Bin Ladin and widely felt throughout the Muslim world—against the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, policies perceived as anti-Arab and anti-Muslim, and support of Israel. Bin Ladin and Islamist terrorists mean exactly what they say: to them America is the font of all evil, the “head of the snake,” and it must be converted or destroyed.

It is not a position with which Americans can bargain or negotiate. With it there is no common ground—not even respect for life—on which to begin a dialogue. It can only be destroyed or utterly isolated.

Because the Muslim world has fallen behind the West politically, economically, and militarily for the past three centuries, and because few tolerant or secular Muslim democracies provide alternative models for the future, Bin Ladin’s message finds receptive ears. It has attracted active support from thousands of disaffected young Muslims and resonates powerfully with a far larger number who do not actively support his methods. The resentment of America and the West is deep, even among leaders of relatively successful Muslim states.

Tolerance, the rule of law, political and economic openness, the extension of greater opportunities to women—these cures must come from within Muslim societies themselves. The United States must support such developments.

But this process is likely to be measured in decades, not years. It is a process that will be violently opposed by Islamist terrorist organizations, both inside Muslim countries and in attacks on the United States and other Western nations. The United States finds itself caught up in a clash within a civilization. That clash arises from particular conditions in the Muslim world, conditions that spill over into expatriate Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries.

Our enemy is twofold: al Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorists that struck us on 9/11; and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world, inspired in part by al Qaeda, which has spawned terrorist groups and violence across the globe. The first enemy is weakened, but continues to pose a grave threat. The second enemy is gathering, and will menace Americans and American interests long after Usama Bin Ladin and his cohorts are killed or captured. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda net-work and prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.
Islam is not the enemy. It is not synonymous with terror. Nor does Islam teach terror. America and its friends oppose a perversion of Islam, not the great world faith itself. Lives guided by religious faith, including literal beliefs in holy scriptures, are common to every religion, and represent no threat to us.

Other religions have experienced violent internal struggles. With so many diverse adherents, every major religion will spawn violent zealots. Yet understanding and tolerance among people of different faiths can and must prevail.

The present transnational danger is Islamist terrorism. What is needed is a broad political-military strategy that rests on a firm tripod of policies to:

• attack terrorists and their organizations;
• prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism; and
• protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.

More Than a War on Terrorism

Terrorism is a tactic used by individuals and organizations to kill and destroy. Our efforts should be directed at those individuals and organizations.

Calling this struggle a war accurately describes the use of American and allied armed forces to find and destroy terrorist groups and their allies in the field, notably in Afghanistan. The language of war also evokes the mobilization for a national effort. Yet the strategy should be balanced.

The first phase of our post-9/11 efforts rightly included military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al Qaeda. This work continues. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.

Certainly the strategy should include offensive operations to counter terrorism. Terrorists should no longer find safe haven where their organizations can grow and flourish. America’s strategy should be a coalition strategy, that includes Muslim nations as partners in its development and implementation.

Our effort should be accompanied by a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military. The strategy must focus clearly on the Arab and Muslim world, in all its variety.

Our strategy should also include defenses. America can be attacked in many ways and has many vulnerabilities. No defenses are perfect. But risks must be calculated; hard choices must be made about allocating resources. Responsibilities for America’s defense should be clearly defined. Planning does make a difference, identifying where a little money might have a large effect. Defenses also complicate the plans of attackers, increasing their risks of discovery and failure. Finally, the nation must prepare to deal with attacks that are not stopped.
Measuring Success

What should Americans expect from their government in the struggle against Islamist terrorism? The goals seem unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be terrible.

With such benchmarks, the justifications for action and spending seem limitless. Goals are good. Yet effective public policies also need concrete objectives. Agencies need to be able to measure success.

These measurements do not need to be quantitative: government cannot measure success in the ways that private firms can. But the targets should be specific enough so that reasonable observers—in the White House, the Congress, the media, or the general public—can judge whether or not the objectives have been attained.

Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and its affiliates are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. The American people are thus given the picture of an omnipotent, unslayable hydra of destruction. This image lowers expectations for government effectiveness.

It should not lower them too far. Our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters. Yet the group was fragile, dependent on a few key personalities, and occasionally left vulnerable by the marginal, unstable people often attracted to such causes. The enemy made mistakes—like Khalid al Mihdhar’s unauthorized departure from the United States that required him to enter the country again in July 2001, or the selection of Zacarias Moussaoui as a participant and Ramzi Binalshibh’s transfer of money to him. The U.S. government was not able to capitalize on those mistakes in time to prevent 9/11.

We do not believe it is possible to defeat all terrorist attacks against Americans, every time and everywhere. A president should tell the American people:

- No president can promise that a catastrophic attack like that of 9/11 will not happen again. History has shown that even the most vigilant and expert agencies cannot always prevent determined, suicidal attackers from reaching a target.
- But the American people are entitled to expect their government to do its very best. They should expect that officials will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see some standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.

ATTACK TERRORISTS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS

The U.S. government, joined by other governments around the world, is working through intelligence, law enforcement, military, financial, and diplomatic channels to identify, disrupt, capture, or kill individual terrorists. This effort was going on before 9/11 and it continues on a vastly enlarged scale. But to catch terrorists, a U.S. or foreign agency needs to be able to find and reach them.
No Sanctuaries

The 9/11 attack was a complex international operation, the product of years of planning. Bombings like those in Bali in 2003 or Madrid in 2004, while able to take hundreds of lives, can be mounted locally. Their requirements are far more modest in size and complexity. They are more difficult to thwart. But the U.S. government must build the capacities to prevent a 9/11-scale plot from succeeding, and those capabilities will help greatly to cope with lesser but still devastating attacks.

A complex international terrorist operation aimed at launching a catastrophic attack cannot be mounted by just anyone in any place. Such operations appear to require:

• time, space, and ability to perform competent planning and staff work;
• a command structure able to make necessary decisions and possessing the authority and contacts to assemble needed people, money, and materials;
• opportunity and space to recruit, train, and select operatives with the needed skills and dedication, providing the time and structure required to socialize them into the terrorist cause, judge their trustworthiness, and hone their skills;
• a logistics network able to securely manage the travel of operatives, move money, and transport resources (like explosives) where they need to go;
• access, in the case of certain weapons, to the special materials needed for a nuclear, chemical, radiological, or biological attack;
• reliable communications between coordinators and operatives; and
• opportunity to test the workability of the plan.

…. [There is both a] direct and indirect value of the Afghan sanctuary to al Qaeda in preparing the 9/11 attack and other operations. The organization cemented personal ties among veteran jihadists working together there for years. It had the operational space to gather and sift recruits, indoctrinating them in isolated, desert camps. It built up logistical net-works, running through Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates.

Al Qaeda also exploited relatively lax internal security environments in Western countries, especially Germany. It considered the environment in the United States so hospitable that the 9/11 operatives used America as their staging area for further training and exercises—traveling into, out of, and around the country and complacently using their real names with little fear of capture.

To find sanctuary, terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed, most lawless places in the world. The intelligence community has pre-pared a world map that highlights possible terrorist havens, using no secret intelligence—just indicating areas that combine rugged terrain, weak governance, room to hide or receive supplies, and low population density with a town or city near enough to allow necessary interaction with the outside world. Large areas scattered around the world meet these criteria.

In talking with American and foreign government officials and military officers on the front lines fighting terrorists today, we asked them: If you were a terrorist leader
today, where would you locate your base? Some of the same places come up again and again on their lists:

- western Pakistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region
- southern or western Afghanistan
- the Arabian Peninsula, especially Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the nearby Horn of Africa, including Somalia and extending southwest into Kenya
- Southeast Asia, from Thailand to the southern Philippines to Indonesia
- West Africa, including Nigeria and Mali
- European cities with expatriate Muslim communities, especially cities in central and eastern Europe where security forces and border controls are less effective.

In the twentieth century, strategists focused on the world’s great industrial heartlands. In the twenty-first, the focus is in the opposite direction, toward remote regions and failing states. The United States has had to find ways to extend its reach, straining the limits of its influence.

Every policy decision we make needs to be seen through this lens. If, for example, Iraq becomes a failed state, it will go to the top of the list of places that are breeding grounds for attacks against Americans at home. Similarly, if we are paying insufficient attention to Afghanistan, the rule of the Taliban or warlords and narco-traffickers may reemerge and its countryside could once again offer refuge to al Qaeda, or its successor.

Recommendation: The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. We should reach out, listen to, and work with other countries that can help.

We offer three illustrations that are particularly applicable today, in 2004: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia.

**Pakistan**

Pakistan’s endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and often ineffective government create opportunities for Islamist recruitment. Poor education is a particular concern. Millions of families, especially those with little money, send their children to religious schools, or madrassahs. Many of these schools are the only opportunity available for an education, but some have been used as incubators for violent extremism. According to Karachi’s police commander, there are 859 madrassahs teaching more than 200,000 youngsters in his city alone.

It is hard to overstate the importance of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism. Within Pakistan’s borders are 150 million Muslims, scores of al Qaeda terrorists, many Taliban fighters, and—perhaps—Usama Bin Ladin. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and has come frighteningly close to war with nuclear-armed India over the disputed territory of Kashmir. A political battle among anti-American Islamic fundamentalists, the Pakistani military, and more moderate mainstream political forces
has already spilled over into violence, and there have been repeated recent attempts to kill Pakistan’s president, Pervez Musharraf.

In recent years, the United States has had three basic problems in its relationship with Pakistan:

• On terrorism, Pakistan helped nurture the Taliban. The Pakistani army and intelligence services, especially below the top ranks, have long been ambivalent about confronting Islamist extremists. Many in the government have sympathized with or provided support to the extremists. Musharraf agreed that Bin Ladin was bad. But before 9/11, preserving good relations with the Taliban took precedence.
• On proliferation, Musharraf has repeatedly said that Pakistan does not barter with its nuclear technology. But proliferation concerns have been long-standing and very serious. Most recently, the Pakistani government has claimed not to have known that one of its nuclear weapons developers, a national figure, was leading the most dangerous nuclear smuggling ring ever disclosed.
• Finally, Pakistan has made little progress toward the return of democratic rule at the national level, although that turbulent process does continue to function at the provincial level and the Pakistani press remains relatively free.

Immediately after 9/11, confronted by the United States with a stark choice, Pakistan made a strategic decision. Its government stood aside and allowed the U.S.-led coalition to destroy the Taliban regime. In other ways, Pakistan actively assisted: its authorities arrested more than 500 al Qaeda operatives and Taliban members, and Pakistani forces played a leading part in tracking down KSM, Abu Zubaydah, and other key al Qaeda figures.

In the following two years, the Pakistani government tried to walk the fence, helping against al Qaeda while seeking to avoid a larger confrontation with Taliban remnants and other Islamic extremists. When al Qaeda and its Pakistani allies repeatedly tried to assassinate Musharraf, almost succeeding, the battle came home.

The country’s vast unpolic ed regions make Pakistan attractive to extremists seeking refuge and recruits and also provide a base for operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Almost all the 9/11 attackers traveled the north-south nexus of Kandahar–Quetta–Karachi. The Baluchistan region of Pakistan (KSM’s ethnic home) and the sprawling city of Karachi remain centers of Islamist extremism where the U.S. and Pakistani security and intelligence presence has been weak. The U.S. consulate in Karachi is a makeshift fortress, reflecting the gravity of the surrounding threat.

During the winter of 2003–2004, Musharraf made another strategic decision. He ordered the Pakistani army into the frontier provinces of northwest Pakistan along the Afghan border, where Bin Ladin and Ayman al Zawahiri have reportedly taken refuge. The army is confronting groups of al Qaeda fighters and their local allies in very difficult terrain. On the other side of the frontier, U.S. forces in Afghanistan have found it challenging to organize effective joint operations, given Pakistan’s limited capabilities and reluctance to permit U.S. military operations on its soil. Yet in 2004, it is clear that the Pakistani government is trying harder than ever before in the battle against Islamist terrorists.
Acknowledging these problems and Musharraf’s own part in the story, we believe that Musharraf’s government represents the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

• In an extraordinary public essay asking how Muslims can “drag our-selves out of the pit we find ourselves in, to raise ourselves up,” Musharraf has called for a strategy of “enlightened moderation.” The Muslim world, he said, should shun militancy and extremism; the West—and the United States in particular—should seek to resolve disputes with justice and help better the Muslim world.

• Having come close to war in 2002 and 2003, Pakistan and India have recently made significant progress in peacefully discussing their long-standing differences. The United States has been and should remain a key supporter of that process.

• The constant refrain of Pakistanis is that the United States long treated them as allies of convenience. As the United States makes fresh commitments now, it should make promises it is prepared to keep, for years to come.

Recommendation: If Musharraf stands for enlightened moderation in a fight for his life and for the life of his country, the United States should be willing to make hard choices too, and make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan. Sustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own.


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APPENDIX B

TORA BORA REVISITED:
HOW WE FAILED TO GET BIN LADEN
AND WHY IT MATTERS TODAY

John F. Kerry
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations (US Senate)

On October 7, 2001, U.S. aircraft began bombing the training bases and strongholds of Al Qaeda and the ruling Taliban across Afghanistan. The leaders who sent murderers to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon less than a month earlier and the rogue government that provided them sanctuary were running for their lives. President George W. Bush’s expression of America’s desire to get Osama bin Laden ‘‘dead or alive’’ seemed about to come true.

Two months later, American civilian and military leaders celebrated what they viewed as a lasting victory with the selection of Hamid Karzai as the country’s new hand-picked leader. The war had been conceived as a swift campaign with a single objective: defeat the Taliban and destroy Al Qaeda by capturing or killing bin Laden and other key leaders. A unique combination of airpower, Central Intelligence Agency and special operations forces teams and indigenous allies had swept the Taliban from power and ousted Al Qaeda from its safe haven while keeping American deaths to a minimum. But even in the initial glow, there were concerns: The mission had failed to capture or kill bin Laden.

Removing the Al Qaeda leader from the battlefield eight years ago would not have eliminated the worldwide extremist threat. But the decisions that opened the door for his escape to Pakistan allowed bin Laden to emerge as a potent symbolic figure who continues to attract a steady flow of money and inspire fanatics worldwide. The failure to finish the job represents a lost opportunity that forever altered the course of the conflict in Afghanistan and the future of international terrorism, leaving the American people more vulnerable to terrorism, laying the foundation for today’s protracted Afghan insurgency and inflaming the internal strife now endangering Pakistan. Al Qaeda shifted its locus across the border into Pakistan, where it has trained extremists linked to numerous plots, including the July 2005 transit bombings in London and two recent aborted attacks involving people living in the United States. The terrorist group’s resurgence in Pakistan has coincided with the rising violence orchestrated in Afghanistan by the Taliban, whose leaders also escaped only to re-emerge to direct today’s increasingly lethal Afghan insurgency.

This failure and its enormous consequences were not inevitable. By early December 2001, Bin Laden’s world had shrunk to a complex of caves and tunnels carved into a mountainous section of eastern Afghanistan known as Tora Bora. Cornered in some of the most forbidding terrain on earth, he and several hundred of his men, the largest concentration of Al Qaeda fighters of the war, endured relentless pounding by American aircraft, as many as 100 air strikes a day. One 15,000-pound
bomb, so huge it had to be rolled out the back of a C-130 cargo plane, shook the mountains for miles. It seemed only a matter of time before U.S. troops and their Afghan allies overran the remnants of Al Qaeda hunkered down in the thin, cold air at 14,000 feet.

Bin Laden expected to die. His last will and testament, written on December 14, reflected his fatalism. "Allah commended to us that when death approaches any of us that we make a bequest to parents and next of kin and to Muslims as a whole," he wrote, according to a copy of the will that surfaced later and is regarded as authentic. "Allah bears witness that the love of jihad and death in the cause of Allah has dominated my life and the verses of the sword permeated every cell in my heart, 'and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together.' How many times did I wake up to find myself reciting this holy verse!" He instructed his wives not to remarry and apologized to his children for devoting himself to jihad.

But the Al Qaeda leader would live to fight another day. Fewer than 100 American commandos were on the scene with their Afghan allies, and calls for reinforcements to launch an assault were rejected. Requests were also turned down for U.S. troops to block the mountain paths leading to sanctuary a few miles away in Pakistan. The vast array of American military power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines. Instead, the U.S. command chose to rely on airstrikes and untrained Afghan militias to attack bin Laden and on Pakistan's loosely organized Frontier Corps to seal his escape routes. On or around December 16, two days after writing his will, bin Laden and an entourage of bodyguards walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan's unregulated tribal area. Most analysts say he is still there today.

The decision not to deploy American forces to go after bin Laden or block his escape was made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his top commander, Gen. Tommy Franks, the architects of the unconventional Afghan battle plan known as Operation Enduring Freedom. Rumsfeld said at the time that he was concerned that too many U.S. troops in Afghanistan would create an anti-American backlash and fuel a widespread insurgency. Reversing the recent American military orthodoxy known as the Powell doctrine, the Afghan model emphasized minimizing the U.S. presence by relying on small, highly mobile teams of special operations troops and CIA paramilitary operatives working with the Afghan opposition. Even when his own commanders and senior intelligence officials in Afghanistan and Washington argued for dispatching more U.S. troops, Franks refused to deviate from the plan.

There were enough U.S. troops in or near Afghanistan to execute the classic sweep-and-block maneuver required to attack bin Laden and try to prevent his escape. It would have been a dangerous fight across treacherous terrain, and the injection of more U.S. troops and the resulting casualties would have contradicted the risk-averse, "light footprint" model formulated by Rumsfeld and Franks. But commanders on the scene and elsewhere in Afghanistan argued that the risks were worth the reward.

After bin Laden's escape, some military and intelligence analysts and the press criticized the Pentagon's failure to mount a full-scale attack despite the tough rhetoric by President Bush. Franks, Vice President Dick Cheney and others defended the decision, arguing that the intelligence was inconclusive about the Al Qaeda leader's
location. But the review of existing literature, unclassified government records and interviews with central participants underlying this report removes any lingering doubts and makes it clear that Osama bin Laden was within our grasp at Tora Bora. For example, the CIA and Delta Force commanders who spent three weeks at Tora Bora as well as other intelligence and military sources are certain he was there. Franks’ second-in-command during the war, retired Lt. Gen. Michael DeLong, wrote in his autobiography that bin Laden was “definitely there when we hit the caves”—a statement he retracted when the failure became a political issue. Most authoritatively, the official history of the U.S. Special Operations Command determined that bin Laden was at Tora Bora. “All source reporting corroborated his presence on several days from 9–14 December,” said a declassified version of the history, which was based on accounts of commanders and intelligence officials and published without fanfare two years ago. The reasons behind the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and its lasting consequences are examined over three sections in this report. The first section traces bin Laden’s path from southern Afghanistan to the mountains of Tora Bora and lays out new and previous evidence that he was there. The second explores new information behind the decision not to launch an assault. The final section examines the military options that might have led to his capture or death at Tora Bora and the ongoing impact of the failure to bring him back “dead or alive.”

1. FLIGHT TO TORA BORA

Whether Osama bin Laden was at Tora Bora in late 2001 has been the topic of heated debate since he escaped Afghanistan to the tribal belt of Pakistan. The evidence is convincing that the Al Qaeda leader was in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan in that critical period. The information comes from U.S. military officers at Tora Bora, from detainees who were in the camps with bin Laden, from the senior CIA officer in Afghanistan at the time, and from the official history of the special operations forces. Based on that evidence, it is clear that the Al Qaeda leader was within reach of U.S. troops three months after the attacks on New York and Washington.

In the middle of August 2001, two Pakistani nuclear scientists sat down in a mud-walled compound on the outskirts of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, the spiritual and tactical headquarters of Taliban fundamentalists who controlled most of the country. Seated with them were bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian surgeon who was his chief deputy and strategist. The four men spent two days discussing Al Qaeda’s determination to obtain nuclear weapons before bin Laden and Zawahiri abruptly excused themselves and left the compound. Before departing, bin Laden promised the Pakistanis that something momentous was going to happen soon.

American intelligence had already picked up indications that something momentous was coming. George Tenet, who was Director of Central Intelligence at the time, later testified before the 9/11 Commission that the “system was blinking red” from July 2001 until the actual attacks. The first reports of possible attacks on the United States had been picked up in June and the warnings increased steadily from then on. On July 12, Tenet went to Capitol Hill to provide a top-secret briefing for Senators about the rising threat of an imminent attack. Only a handful of Senators turned up in S-407, the secure conference room in the Capitol, to hear the CIA Director warn that he
was extremely worried that bin Laden and Al Qaeda were preparing an attack on U.S. soil. Tenet told them the attack was not a question of if, but when.

Less than a month later, on August 6, President Bush’s daily briefing repeated the warning under the ominous headline “Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in U.S.” The text described previous plots carried out by Al Qaeda against American targets overseas and said the FBI had uncovered “patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.” At the time, President Bush later told the 9/11 Commission that he regarded the warning as historical in nature. The Commission’s voluminous report said its investigators “found no indication of any further discussion before September 11 among the President and his top advisers of the possibility of a threat of an Al Qaeda attack in the United States.”

Bin Laden’s movements in the days surrounding September 11 remain sketchy. Some facts have emerged from reputable journalists, U.S. military and intelligence sources and Afghans who said they saw the Al Qaeda leader at various points along his path to Tora Bora. He was spotted in Khost in eastern Afghanistan around September 11. On November 8, he and Zawahiri met in Kabul with Hamid Mir, a respected Pakistani journalist. By then, U.S. special operations forces and Northern Alliance troops were closing in on the Afghan capital. The Al Qaeda leaders had risked the trip to attend a memorial service honoring the Uzbek militant leader Juma Khan Namangani, who had been killed in a U.S. airstrike. Before Kabul fell, bin Laden and Zawahiri traveled 5 hours east to the ancient trading center of Jalalabad. From there, by all reliable accounts, they went to ground at Tora Bora, one of bin Laden’s old haunts from the days of fighting the Soviets in the 1980s. Tora Bora is a district about 30 miles southeast of Jalalabad.

Rather than a single place, the name covers a fortress-like section of the White Mountains that stretches about six miles long and six miles wide across a collection of narrow valleys, snow-covered ridgelines and jagged peaks reaching 14,000 feet. During the 1980s, when he was fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, bin Laden turned the site into a formidable stronghold. He built a rough road from Jalalabad and brought in heavy equipment to fortify the natural caves and dig new ones. He supervised the excavation of connecting tunnels so fighters could move unseen between locations in the fights against Soviet troops.

After the defeat of the Soviet Union in 1989, bin Laden left Afghanistan and eventually set up the operations of his fledgling terrorist organization in the northeastern African nation of Sudan. After pressure from the United States, Sudan expelled bin Laden in 1996 and he flew with his wives and children to Jalalabad on a chartered jet. Upon his return to Afghanistan, bin Laden began expanding the fortress at Tora Bora, building base camps at higher elevations for himself, his wives and numerous children, and other senior Al Qaeda figures. Some rooms were reported to be concealed 350 feet inside the granite peaks. The mountainsides leading to those upper reaches were steep and pitted with well-built bunkers cloaked in camouflage. In the years that followed, Bin Laden got to know the surrounding geography well from spending hours on long hikes with his children. His familiarity with the worn trails used over the centuries by traders and smugglers to traverse the few miles into Pakistan would serve him well.
The United States rightly anticipated that bin Laden would make his last stand at Tora Bora. The precise dates of his arrival and departure are hard to pin down, but it’s clear that U.S. intelligence picked up his trail well before he got there. The CIA had evidence that bin Laden was headed for the mountain redoubt by early November, according to Tenet, the former CIA Director. Outside experts like Peter Bergen, the last American to interview bin Laden, estimate that he arrived by the end of November, along with 1,000 to 1,500 hardened fighters and bodyguards. In a television interview on November 29, 2001, Vice President Cheney said he believed the Al Qaeda leader was in the general area of Tora Bora. “He’s got a large number of fighters with him probably, a fairly secure personal security force that he has some degree of confidence in, and he’ll have to try to leave, that is, he may depart for other territory, but that’s not quite as easy as it would have been a few months ago,” Cheney said.

The Sheikh Arrives

Bin Laden’s presence was more than conjecture. A major with the Army’s Delta Force, who is now retired and uses the pen name Dalton Fury, was the senior U.S. military officer at Tora Bora, commanding about 90 special operations troops and support personnel. He and his fellow commandos from the elite and secretive Delta Force arrived in early December, setting up headquarters in a former schoolhouse near the mountains alongside a handful of CIA operatives who were already there. The Americans were there to direct airstrikes on Tora Bora and work with Afghan militias assembled by two local warlords who had been paid by the CIA to help flush out bin Laden and the Al Qaeda contingent. The Delta Force soldiers were disguised to blend in with the Afghan militia, wearing local clothing, growing bushy beards and sometimes carrying the same types of weapons.

Fury recounted his experiences in a book, Kill Bin Laden, which was published in 2008. He expanded on them in interviews with committee staff. Both the book and the interviews left no doubt that Fury’s team knew bin Laden was holed up at Tora Bora and that he was eager to go get him. In the interviews, he explained that Al Qaeda fighters arrayed in the mountains used unsecure radios, which meant their communications were easily intercepted by his team and by a sophisticated listening post a few miles from the mountain. As a result, the Delta Force and CIA operatives had real-time eavesdropping capabilities on Al Qaeda almost from their arrival, allowing them to track movements and gauge the effectiveness of the bombing. Even more valuable, a few days after arriving, one of the CIA operatives picked up a radio from a dead Al Qaeda fighter. The radio gave the Americans a clear channel into the group’s communications on the mountain. Bin Laden’s voice was often picked up, along with frequent comments about the presence of the man referred to by his followers as “the sheikh.” Fury, who still uses his pen name to protect his identity, said there was no doubt the voice on the radios was bin Laden. “The CIA had a guy with them called Jalal and he was the foremost expert on bin Laden’s voice,” he said. “He worked on bin Laden’s voice for seven years and he knew him better than anyone else in the West. To him, it was very clear that bin Laden was there on the mountain.”
Another special operations expert who speaks fluent Arabic and heard the intercepted communications in real time in Afghanistan told the committee staff that it was clearly bin Laden’s voice. He had studied the Al Qaeda leader’s speech pattern and word choices before the war and he said he considered the communications a perfect match.

Afghan villagers who were providing food and other supplies for the Al Qaeda fighters at Tora Bora also confirmed bin Laden’s presence. Fury said some of the villagers were paid by the CIA for information about precise locations of clusters of fighters that could be targeted for bombing runs. The locals also provided fragmentary information on bin Laden’s movements within the Al Qaeda compound, though the outsiders never got near the sheikh. The cooperating villagers were given rudimentary global positioning devices and told to push a button at any spot where they saw significant numbers of fighters or arms caches. When the locals turned in the devices to collect their payments, the GPS coordinates recorded by pushing the buttons were immediately passed along to targeting officers, who programmed the coordinates into bombing runs.

For several days in early December, Fury’s special ops troops moved up the mountains in pairs with fighters from the Afghan militias. The Americans used GPS devices and laser range finders to pinpoint caves and pockets of enemy fighters for the bombers. The Delta Force units were unable to hold any high ground because the Afghans insisted on retreating to their base at the bottom of the mountains each night, leaving the Americans alone inside Al Qaeda territory. Still, it was clear from what they could see and what they were hearing in the intercepted conversations that relentless bombing was taking its toll.

On December 9, a C-130 cargo plane dropped a 15,000-pound bomb, known as a Daisy Cutter, on the Tora Bora complex. The weapon had not been used since Vietnam, and there were early fears that its impact had not been as great as expected. But later reports confirmed that the bomb struck with massive force. A captured Al Qaeda fighter who was there later told American interrogators that men deep in caves had been vaporized in what he called “a hideous explosion.” That day and others, Fury described intercepting radio communications in which Al Qaeda fighters called for the “red truck to move wounded” and frantic pleas from a fighter to his commander, saying “cave too hot, can’t reach others.” At one point, the Americans listened on the radio as bin Laden exhorted his men to keep fighting, though he apologized “for getting them trapped and pounded by American airstrikes.” On December 11, Fury said bin Laden was heard on the radio telling his men that he had let them down and it was okay to surrender. Fury hoped the battle was over, but he would soon determine that it was part of an elaborate ruse to allow Al Qaeda fighters to slip out of Tora Bora for Pakistan.

Fury is adamant that bin Laden was at Tora Bora until mid-December. “There is no doubt that bin Laden was in Tora Bora during the fighting,” he wrote in Kill Bin Laden. “From alleged sightings to the radio intercepts to news reports from various countries, it was repeatedly confirmed that he was there.” Other Voices, Same Conclusion

Fury was not alone in his conviction. In some cases, confirmation that bin Laden was at Tora Bora has come from detainees at Guantanamo Bay. A “summary of
evidence’’ prepared by the Pentagon for the trial of an unnamed detainee says flatly that the man ‘‘assisted in the escape of Osama bin Laden from Tora Bora.’’ The detainee was described as one of bin Laden’s commanders in the fight against the Soviets. The document, which was released to the Associated Press in 2005 through a Freedom of Information request, was the first definitive statement by the Pentagon that the mastermind of 9/11 was at Tora Bora during the American bombing before slipping away into Pakistan.

Another confirmation came from the senior CIA paramilitary commander in Afghanistan at the time. Gary Berntsen was working at the CIA’s counterterrorist center in October 2001 when his boss summoned him to the front office and told him, ‘‘Gary, I want you killing the enemy immediately.’’ Berntsen left the next day for Afghanistan, where he assumed leadership of the CIA’s paramilitary operation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. His primary target was bin Laden, and he was confident that the Al Qaeda leader would make his last stand at Tora Bora. His suspicions were confirmed when he learned bin Laden’s voice had been intercepted there.

From the outset, Berntsen says he was skeptical about relying on Afghan militias ‘‘cobbled together at the last minute’’ to capture or kill the man who ordered the 9/11 attacks. ‘‘I’d made it clear in my reports that our Afghan allies were hardly anxious to get at al Qaeda in Tora Bora,’’ he wrote in his own book, Jawbreaker, which was published in late 2005. He also knew that the special operations troops and CIA operatives on the scene were not enough to stop bin Laden from escaping across the mountain passes. In the book, Berntsen uses exclamation points to vent his fears that the most wanted man in the world was about to slip out of our grasp.

‘‘We needed U.S. soldiers on the ground!’’ he wrote. ‘‘I’d sent my request for 800 U.S. Army Rangers and was still waiting for a response. I repeated to anyone at headquarters who would listen: We need Rangers now! The opportunity to get bin Laden and his men is slipping away!!’’

At one point, Berntsen recalled an argument at a CIA guesthouse in Kabul with Maj. Gen. Dell Dailey, the commander of U.S. special operations forces in Afghanistan at the time. Berntsen said he renewed his demand that American troops be dispatched to Tora Bora immediately. Following orders from Franks at U.S. Central Command (CentCom) headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, Dailey refused to deploy U.S. troops, explaining that he feared alienating Afghan allies.

‘‘I don’t give a damn about offending our allies!’’ Berntsen shouted. ‘‘I only care about eliminating al Qaeda and delivering bin Laden’s head in a box!’’ Dailey said the military’s position was firm and Berntsen replied, ‘‘Screw that!’’

For those like Franks, who later maintained that bin Laden might not have been at Tora Bora, Berntsen is respectfully scornful. ‘‘We could have ended it all there,’’ he said in an interview. Berntsen’s views were generally shared by Gary Schroen, another senior CIA operative in Afghanistan. Schroen, who had spent years cultivating ties to Afghanistan’s opposition elements, bemoaned the reliance on local tribal leaders to go after bin Laden and guard escape routes. ‘‘Unfortunately, many of those people proved to be loyal to bin Laden and sympathizers with the Taliban and they allowed the key
guys to escape,’’ Schroen, who retired from the CIA, said in a television interview in May 2005. He added that he had no doubt that bin Laden was at Tora Bora. Franks’ second-in-command during the war, General DeLong, was convinced that bin Laden was at Tora Bora. In his memoir, Inside CentCom, DeLong described the massive, three-week bombing campaign aimed at killing Al Qaeda fighters in their caves at Tora Bora. ‘‘We were hot on Osama bin Laden’s trail,’’ he wrote. ‘‘He was definitely there when we hit the caves. Every day during the bombing, Rumsfeld asked me, ‘Did we get him? Did we get him?’ I would have to answer that we didn’t know.’’ The retired general said that intelligence suggested bin Laden had been wounded during the bombings before he escaped to Pakistan, a conclusion reached by numerous journalists, too.

DeLong argued that large numbers of U.S. troops could not be dispatched because the area surrounding Tora Bora was controlled by tribes hostile to the United States and other outsiders. But he recognized that the Pakistani Frontier Corps, asked to block any escape attempt by bin Laden, was ill-equipped for the job. ‘‘To make matters worse, this tribal area was sympathetic to bin Laden,’’ he wrote. ‘‘He was the richest man in the area, and he had funded these people for years.’’

The book was published in September 2004, a year after DeLong retired from the Army. That fall, the failure to capture or kill bin Laden had become an issue in the presidential campaign. Franks had retired from the Army in 2003 and he often defended the events at Tora Bora. On October 19, 2004, he wrote an opinion article in The New York Times saying that intelligence on the Al Qaeda leader’s location had been inconclusive. ‘‘We don’t know to this day whether Mr. bin Laden was at Tora Bora in December 2001,’’ he wrote. ‘‘Some intelligence sources said he was; others indicated he was in Pakistan at the time; still others suggested he was in Kashmir. Tora Bora was teeming with Taliban and Qaeda operatives, many of whom were killed or captured, but Mr. bin Laden was never within our grasp.’’

Two weeks after the Franks article was published and barely two months after publication of his own book, DeLong reversed the conclusion from his autobiography and echoed his former boss in an opinion article on November 1 in The Wall Street Journal. After defending the decision to rely heavily on local militia and the Pakistani Frontier Corps, DeLong wrote: ‘‘Finally, most people fail to realize that it is quite possible that bin Laden was never in Tora Bora to begin with. There exists no concrete intel to prove that he was there at the time.’’

DeLong said in an interview with committee staff that the contradiction between his book and the opinion article was the result of murky intelligence. ‘‘What I put in the book was what the intel said at the time,’’ he said. ‘‘The intel is not always right. I read it that he was there. We even heard that he was injured. Later intel was that he may or may not have been there. Did anybody have eyeballs on him? No. The intel stated that he was there at the time, but we got shot in the face by bad intel many times.’’ DeLong amplified the reasons for not sending American troops after bin Laden. ‘‘The real reason we didn’t go in with U.S. troops was that we hadn’t had the election yet,’’ he said in the staff interview, a reference to the installation of Hamid Karzai as the interim leader of Afghanistan. ‘‘We didn’t want to have U.S. forces fighting before Karzai was
in power. We wanted to create a stable country and that was more important than going after bin Laden at the time.”

“A Controversial Fight”

Military and intelligence officers at Tora Bora have provided ample evidence that bin Laden was there. Al Qaeda detainees have maintained that he was there. And the Pentagon’s own summary of evidence in the case against a former senior jihadi commander at Guantana Bay concluded the detainee helped bin Laden escape. But the most authoritative and definitive unclassified government document on bin Laden’s location in December 2001 is the official history of the United States Special Operations Command.

The Special Operations Command, based alongside CentCom at MacDill Air Force Base, oversees the special forces of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. The heavy reliance on special operations forces during the first stages of the Afghan campaign meant that the command played a central role in executing the war plan. Its units included the Delta Force team on the scene at Tora Bora.

In preparing the official history of the command, a team of historians working for the command interviewed military and intelligence officials from every branch of the armed forces. The unclassified version of the history was published in 2007 and includes a lengthy section on the operations at Tora Bora. The section opens by saying that bin Laden and a large contingent of Al Qaeda troops had fled the area around Kabul for Nangahar Province and its provincial capital, Jalalabad, in early November. “Analysts within both the CIA and CentCom correctly speculated that UBL would make a stand along the northern peaks of the Spin Ghar Mountains at a place then called Tora Gora,” says the history. “Tora Bora, as it was redubbed in December, had been a major stronghold of AQ for years and provided routes into Pakistan.” The history said bin Laden had “undoubtedly” chosen to make his last stand there prior to the onset of winter, along with between 500 and 2,000 others, before escaping into Pakistan. In the concluding passage assessing the battle of Tora Bora, the historians from the Special Operations Command wrote: “What has since been determined with reasonable certainty was that UBL was indeed at Tora Bora in December 2001. All source reporting corroborated his presence on several days from 9–14 December. The fact that SOF (special operations forces) came as close to capturing or killing UBL as U.S. forces have to date makes Tora Bora a controversial fight. Given the commitment of fewer than 100 American personnel, U.S. forces proved unable to block egress routes from Tora Bora south into Pakistan, the route that UBL most likely took.”

Franks declined to respond to any questions about the discrepancies about bin Laden’s location or the conclusion of the Special Operations Command historians. “We really don’t have time for this,” one of his aides, retired Col. Michael T. Hayes, wrote in an email to the committee staff. “Focused on the future, not the past. Gen Franks made his decisions, based on the intel at the time.”
2. THE AFGHAN MODEL: A FLAWED MASTERPIECE OR JUST FLAWED?

Writing in Foreign Affairs in the spring of 2002, the military analyst Michael O’Hanlon declared Operation Enduring Freedom “a masterpiece of military creativity and finesse.” The operation had been designed on the fly and O’Hanlon praised Rumsfeld, Franks and CIA Director George Tenet for devising a war plan that combined limited American power and the Afghan opposition to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda with only 30 U.S. casualties in the first five months. But O’Hanlon tempered his praise, calling the plan “a flawed masterpiece” because of the failure to capture or kill bin Laden and other enemy leaders. The resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in recent years, and the turmoil they have wrought in Afghanistan and Pakistan, raise the question of whether the plan was a flawed masterpiece—or simply flawed.

The Afghan model required elite teams of American commandos and CIA paramilitary operatives to form alliances with Afghans who opposed the Taliban and had the militias to help topple the religious fundamentalists. Some of these Afghans were legitimate ethnic and tribal leaders who chafed at the restrictions of the Taliban and the sanctuary it provided to Al Qaeda. Others were allies of convenience, Taliban rivals who held power by force and paid their men by collecting tolls and taxes on legitimate commerce and trafficking in heroin. By providing money and weapons, the U.S. forces helped the warlords destroy their rivals and expand their personal power. Many later entered the Afghan government and remain influential figures. The strategy was a short cut to victory that would have consequences for long-term stability in Afghanistan.

When it came to bin Laden, the special operations forces relied on two relatively minor warlords from the Jalalabad area. Haji Hazarat Ali had a fourth-grade education and a reputation as a bully. He had fought the Soviets as a teenager in the 1980s and later joined the Taliban for a time. The other, Haji Zaman Ghamsharik, was a wealthy drug smuggler who had been persuaded by the United States to return from France. Ghamsharik also had fought the Soviets, but when the Taliban came to power, he had gone into exile in France. Together, they fielded a force of about 2,000 men, but there were questions from the outset about the competence and loyalties of the fighters. The two warlords and their men distrusted each other and both groups appeared to distrust their American allies.

The Delta Force commandos had doubts about the willingness and ability of the Afghan militias to wage a genuine assault on Tora Bora almost from the outset. Those concerns were underscored each time the Afghans insisted on retreating from the mountains as darkness fell. But the suspicions were confirmed by events that started on the afternoon of December 11. Haji Ghamsharik approached Fury and told him that Al Qaeda fighters wanted to surrender. He said all they needed to end the siege was a 12-hour ceasefire to allow the fighters to climb down the mountains and turn in their weapons. Intercepted radio chatter seemed to confirm that the fighters had lost their resolve under the relentless bombing and wanted to give up, but Fury remained suspicious.

“This is the greatest day in the history of Afghanistan,”’ Ghamsharik told Fury.
“Why is that?” asked the dubious American officer. “Because al Qaeda is no more,” he said. “Bin Laden is finished.”

The Special Operations Command history records that CentCom refused to back the ceasefire, suspecting a ruse, but it said the special ops forces agreed reluctantly to an overnight pause in the bombing to avoid killing the surrendering Al Qaeda fighters. Ghamsharik negotiated by radio with representatives of Al Qaeda. He initially told Fury that a large number of Algerians wanted to surrender. Then he said that he could turn over the entire Al Qaeda leadership. Fury’s suspicions increased at such a bold promise. By the morning of December 12, no Al Qaeda fighters had appeared and the Delta Force commander concluded that the whole episode was a hoax. Intelligence estimates are that as many as 800 Al Qaeda fighters escaped that night, but bin Laden stuck it out. Despite the unreliability of his Afghan allies, Fury refused to give up. He plotted ways to use his 40 Delta Force soldiers and the handful of other special ops troops under his command to go after bin Laden on their own.

One of the plans was to go at bin Laden from the one direction he would never anticipate, the southern side of the mountains. “We want to come in on the back door,” Fury explained later, pointing on a map to the side of the Tora Bora enclave facing Pakistan. The peaks there rose to 14,000 feet and the valleys and precipitous mountain passes were already deep in snow. “The original plan that we sent up through our higher headquarters, Delta Force wants to come in over the mountain with oxygen, coming from the Pakistan side, over the mountains and come in and get a drop on bin Laden from behind.” The audacious assault was nixed somewhere up the chain of command. Undeterred, Fury suggested dropping hundreds of landmines along the passes leading to Pakistan to block bin Laden’s escape. “First guy blows his leg off, everybody else stops,” he said. “That allows aircraft overhead to find them. They see all these heat sources out there. Okay, there is a big large group of Al Qaeda moving south. They can engage that.” That proposal was rejected, too.

About the time Fury was desperately concocting scenarios for going after bin Laden and getting rejections from up the chain of command, Franks was well into planning for the next war—the invasion of Iraq.

A Shift in Attention and Resources

On November 21, 2001, President Bush put his arm on Defense Secretary Rumsfeld as they were leaving a National Security Council meeting at the White House. “I need to see you,” the President said. It was 72 days after the 9/11 attacks and just a week after the fall of Kabul. But Bush already had new plans.

According to Bob Woodward’s book, Plan of Attack, the President said to Rumsfeld: “What kind of a war plan do you have for Iraq? How do you feel about the war plan for Iraq?” Then the President told Woodward he recalled saying: “Let’s get started on this. And get Tommy Franks looking at what it would take to protect America by removing Saddam Hussein if we have to.” Back at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld convened a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draft a message for Franks asking for a new assessment of a war with Iraq. The existing operations plan had been created in 1998 and it hinged on assembling the kind of massive international coalition used in Desert Storm in 1991.
In his memoir, American General, Franks later described getting the November 21 telephone call from Rumsfeld relaying the President’s orders while he was sitting in his office at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. Franks and one of his aides were working on air support for the Afghan units being assembled to push into the mountains surrounding Tora Bora. Rumsfeld said the President wanted options for war with Iraq. Franks said the existing plan was out of date and that a new one should include lessons about precision weapons and the use of special operations forces learned in Afghanistan.

“Okay, Tom,” Rumsfeld said, according to Franks. “Please dust it off and get back to me next week.”

Franks described his reaction to Rumsfeld’s orders this way: “Son of a bitch. No rest for the weary.”

For critics of the Bush administration’s commitment to Afghanistan, the shift in focus just as Franks and his senior aides were literally working on plans for the attacks on Tora Bora represents a dramatic turning point that allowed a sustained victory in Afghanistan to slip through our fingers. Almost immediately, intelligence and military planning resources were transferred to begin planning on the next war in Iraq. Though Fury, Berntsen and others in the field did not know what was happening back at CentCom, the drain in resources and shift in attention would affect them and the future course of the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan. “We’re Going to Lose Our Prey.”

In his memoir, At the Center of the Storm, former CIA Director Tenet said it was evident from the start that aerial bombing would not be enough to get bin Laden at Tora Bora. Troops needed to be in the caves themselves, he wrote, but the Afghan militiamen were “distinctly reluctant” to put themselves in harm’s way and there were not enough Americans on the scene. He said that senior CIA officials lobbied hard for inserting U.S. troops. Henry Crumpton, the head of special operations for the CIA’s counterterrorism operation and chief of its Afghan strategy, made direct requests to Franks. Crumpton had told him that the back door to Pakistan was open and urged Franks to move more than 1,000 Marines who had set up a base near Kandahar to Tora Bora to block escape routes. But the CentCom commander rejected the idea, saying it would take weeks to get a large enough U.S. contingent on the scene and bin Laden might disappear in the meantime.

At the end of November, Crumpton went to the White House to brief President Bush and Vice President Cheney and repeated the message that he had delivered to Franks. Crumpton warned the President that the Afghan campaign’s primary goal of capturing bin Laden was in jeopardy because of the military’s reliance on Afghan militias at Tora Bora. Crumpton showed the President where Tora Bora was located in the White Mountains and described the caves and tunnels that riddled the region. Crumpton questioned whether the Pakistani forces would be able to seal off the escape routes and pointed out that the promised Pakistani troops had not arrived yet. In addition, the CIA officer told the President that the Afghan forces at Tora Bora were “tired and cold” and “they’re just not invested in getting bin Laden.”

According to author Ron Suskind in The One Percent Solution, Crumpton sensed that his earlier warnings to Franks and others at the Pentagon had not been
relayed [to] the President. So Crumpton went further, telling Bush that ‘‘We’re going to lose our prey if we’re not careful.’’ He recommended that the Marines or other U.S. troops be rushed to Tora Bora. ‘‘How bad off are these Afghani forces, really?’’ asked Bush. ‘‘Are they up to the job?’’ ‘‘Definitely not, Mr. President,’’ Crumpton replied. ‘‘Definitely not.’’

**Flight from Tora Bora**

On December 14, the day bin Laden finished his will, Dalton Fury finally convinced Ali and his men to stay overnight in one of the canyons that they had captured during daylight. Over the next three days, the Afghan militia and their American advisers moved steadily through the canyons, calling in airstrikes and taking out lingering pockets of fighters. The resistance seemed to have vanished, prompting Ali to declare victory on December 17. Most of the Tora Bora complex was abandoned and many of the caves and tunnels were buried in debris. Only about 20 stragglers were taken prisoner. The consensus was that Al Qaeda fighters who had survived the fierce bombing had escaped into Pakistan or melted into the local population. Bin Laden was nowhere to be found. Two days later, Fury and his Delta Force colleagues left Tora Bora, hoping that someone would eventually find bin Laden buried in one of the caves.

There was no body because bin Laden did not die at Tora Bora. Later U.S. intelligence reports and accounts by journalists and others said that he and a contingent of bodyguards departed Tora Bora on December 16. With help from Afghans and Pakistanis who had been paid in advance, the group made its way on foot and horseback across the mountain passes and into Pakistan without encountering any resistance.

The Special Operations Command history noted that there were not enough U.S. troops to prevent the escape, acknowledging that the failure to capture or kill bin Laden made Tora Bora a controversial battle. But Franks argued that Tora was a success and he praised both the Afghan militias and the Pakistanis who were supposed to have protected the border. ‘‘I think it was a good operation,’’ he said in an interview for the PBS show Frontline on the first anniversary of the Afghan war. ‘‘Many people have said, ‘Well, gosh, you know bin Laden got away.’ I have yet to see anything that proves bin Laden or whomever was there. That’s not to say they weren’t, but I’ve not seen proof that they were there.’’ Bin Laden himself later acknowledged that he was at Tora Bora, boasting about how he and Zawahiri survived the heavy bombing along with 300 fighters before escaping. ‘‘The bombardment was round-the-clock and the warplanes continued to fly over us day and night,’’ he said in an audio tape released on February 11, 2003. ‘‘Planes poured their lava on us, particularly after accomplishing their main missions in Afghanistan.’’

In the aftermath of bin Laden’s escape, there were accusations that militiamen working for the two warlords hired by the CIA to get him had helped the Al Qaeda leader cross into Pakistan. Michael Scheuer, who spent 15 years working on Afghanistan at the CIA and at one point headed the agency’s bin Laden task force, was sharply critical of the war plan from the start because of its reliance on Afghan allies of dubious loyalty. ‘‘Everyone who was cognizant of how Afghan operations worked
would have told Mr. Tenet that he was nuts,” Scheuer said later. “And as it turned out, he was. ... The people we bought, the people Mr. Tenet said we would own, let Osama bin Laden escape from Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan into Pakistan.”

The American forces never had a clear idea how many Al Qaeda fighters were arrayed against them. Estimates ranged as high as 3,000 and as low as 500, but the consensus put the figure around 1,000—at least until so many escaped during the fake surrender.

Regardless of the exact number of enemy fighters, assaulting Tora Bora would have been difficult and probably would have cost many American and Afghan lives. The Special Operations Command’s history offered this tightly worded assessment: “With large numbers of well-supplied, fanatical AQ troops dug into extensive fortified positions, Tora Bora appeared to be an extremely tough target.” For Dalton Fury, the reward would have been worth the risk. “In general, I definitely think it was worth the risk to the force to assault Tora Bora for Osama bin Laden,” he told the committee staff. “What other target out there, then or now, could be more important to our nation’s struggle in the global war on terror?”

3. AN ALTERNATIVE BATTLE PLAN

Rather than allowing bin Laden to escape, Franks and Rumsfeld could have deployed American troops already in Afghanistan on or near the border with Pakistan to block the exits while simultaneously sending special operations forces and their Afghan allies up the mountains to Tora Bora. The complex mission would have been risky, but analysis shows that it was well within the reach and capability of the American military.

In the years following the Vietnam War, the U.S. military developed a doctrine intended to place new constraints on when the country went to war and to avoid a repeat of the disastrous and prolonged conflict in Southeast Asia. In its most simplistic form, the doctrine focused on applying overwhelming and disproportionate military force to achieve concrete political goals. It called for mobilizing the military and political resources necessary for ending conflicts quickly and leaving no loose ends. The concept was known informally as the Powell doctrine, named for General Colin Powell, who outlined his vision at the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

The Afghan model constructed by Rumsfeld and Franks in response to the attacks on September 11 stood the Powell doctrine on its head. The new template was designed to deliver a swift and economical knockout blow through airpower and the limited application of troops on the ground. Instead of overwhelming force, the Afghan model depended on airpower and on highly mobile special operations forces and CIA paramilitary teams, working in concert with opposition warlords and tribal leaders. It was designed as unconventional warfare led by indigenous forces, and Franks put a ceiling of 10,000 on the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Despite the valor of the limited American forces, the doctrine failed to achieve one of its most concrete political goals—eliminating the leadership of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The result has turned out to be nothing close to decisive victory followed by quick withdrawal. Assembling the size force required to apply overwhelming force across a country as large and rugged as Afghanistan would have taken many weeks.
The only country in the region likely to provide the major bases required to prepare an invasion by tens of thousands of troops was Pakistan, and political sensitivities there would have made full cooperation both doubtful and risky for its leadership. The Pakistanis provided limited bases for U.S. operations in the early stages of planning and the invasion; the footprint was kept small to avoid a public outcry. But soldiers and scholars alike have argued that there were sufficient troops available in Afghanistan and nearby Uzbekistan to mount a genuine assault on Osama bin Laden’s position at Tora Bora. And they could have been augmented within about a week by reinforcements from the Persian Gulf and the United States.

The most detailed description of the assault option was laid out in an article in the journal Security Studies by Peter John Paul Krause of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Entitled “The Last Good Chance: A Reassessment of U.S. Operations at Tora Bora,” the article described a large-scale operation called a block and sweep. The plan is simple enough: One group of American forces would block the likely exit avenues to Pakistan on the south side of Tora Bora while a second contingent moved against Al Qaeda’s positions from the north. Simplicity should not be mistaken for sure success: Variables like weather conditions, the effectiveness of the remaining Al Qaeda fighters and the ability to close the escape routes would have made the mission risky. The dangers of attacking fortified positions manned by hardened fighters would likely have resulted in significant U.S. casualties. The assault would not have required thousands of conventional forces. A large number of troops would have taken too long to deploy and alerted Al Qaeda to the approaching attack. “My opinion is that bin Laden would have left even earlier as soon as he received word that the U.S. troops were surrounding him,” Fury told the committee staff. “I think he only stayed as long as he did because he thought the mujahedin would not aggressively pursue him.”

The preferred choice would have been a small, agile force capable of deploying quickly and quietly and trained to operate in difficult terrain against unconventional enemies. The U.S. military has large numbers of soldiers and Marines who meet those criteria—Delta Force, Green Berets, Navy Seals, Marine special operations units and Army Rangers and paratroopers. The effectiveness of U.S. special operations commandos, even in small numbers, was demonstrated on December 10. Two U.S. soldiers were able to get close enough to the Al Qaeda positions to call in air strikes for 17 straight hours, forcing enemy fighters to retreat and enabling the Afghan militia to capture key terrain near bin Laden’s suspected location. It was an example of what a larger U.S. force could have accomplished, with support from available air power.

The CIA’s Bernsten had requested a battalion of Rangers, about 800 soldiers, and been turned down by CentCom. A battalion would have been a substantial increase in the U.S. presence, but it probably would not have been enough to both assault the stronghold from the north and block the exits on the south. Krause estimated that as few as 500 troops could have carried out the initial northern assault, with reinforcements arriving over the course of the battle. At least twice as many troops would have been required to execute the blocking mission on the southern, eastern and western reaches of Tora Bora. Krause proposed spreading about 1,500 troops to capture or kill anyone trying to flee. O’Hanlon estimated that closing off escape routes to Pakistan would have required 1,000 to 3,000 American troops. In all, an initial force of roughly 2,000 to
3,000 troops would have been sufficient to begin the block-and-sweep mission, with
reinforcements following as time and circumstances allowed.

**Troops Were Ready to Go**

Assembling the troops to augment the handful of special ops commandos under
Fury’s leadership at Tora Bora would have been a manageable task. Franks had set the
celing of 10,000 U.S. troops to maintain a light footprint. Still, within that number there
were enough ready and willing to go after bin Laden. In late November, about the time
U.S. intelligence placed bin Laden squarely at Tora Bora, more than 1,000 members of
the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units, among the military’s most mobile arms,
established a base southwest of Kandahar, only a few hours flight away.

They were primarily interdicting traffic and supporting the special operations
teams working with Afghan militias. Another 1,000 troops from the Army’s 10th
Mountain Division were split between a base in southern Uzbekistan and Bagram Air
Base, a short helicopter flight from Tora Bora. The Army troops were engaged mainly
in military police functions, according to reports at the time. Both forces are trained in
unconventional warfare and could have been redeployed rapidly for an assault. Lt. Col.
Paul Lacamera, commander of a 10th Mountain battalion, later said that his men had
been prepared to deploy anywhere in Afghanistan since mid-November. “We weren’t
just sitting there digging holes and looking out,” said Lacamera, whose actions in a
later assault on Al Qaeda forces won him a Silver Star. “We were training for potential
fights because eventually it was going to come to that.”

The commander of the Marines outside Kandahar, Brig. Gen. James N. Mattis,
told a journalist that his troops could seal off Tora Bora, but his superiors rejected the
plan. Everyone knew that such an operation would have conflicted with the Afghan
model laid down by Franks and Rumsfeld. But there were other reasons to hesitate. One
former officer told the committee staff that the inability to get sufficient medical-
evacuation helicopters into the rough terrain was a major stumbling block for those who
considered trying to push for the assault. He also said there were worries that bad
weather would ground transport helicopters or, worse, knock them out of the sky.

In addition to the troops in country, a battalion of Army Rangers was stationed
in the Persian Gulf country of Oman, and 200 of them had demonstrated their abilities
by parachuting into an airfield near Kandahar at night in October. In Krause’s analysis,
a battalion of about 800 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, could have been deployed to Tora Bora in less than a week, covering the
7,000 miles in C-17 transport aircraft. No one should underestimate the logistical
difficulty and danger of deploying even specially trained troops into hostile territory at
altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 feet. Landing zones for helicopters would likely have come
under fire from Al Qaeda positions and drop zones for paratroopers were few and far
between in the jagged terrain. But Chinook helicopters, the work horse for rapid
deployments, proved capable of carrying combat troops above 11,000-foot mountain
ranges as part of Operation Anaconda, a similar block-and-sweep mission carried out in
February 2002 in eastern Afghanistan.

Former U.S. military officers said that sending American troops into Tora Bora
was discussed at various times in late November and early December of 2001. The
CIA’s Afghan chief, Hank Crumpton, made specific requests to Franks for U.S. troops and urged President Bush not to rely on Afghan militias and Pakistani paramilitary troops to do the job. CentCom went so far as to develop a plan to put several thousand U.S. troops into Tora Bora. Commanders estimated that deploying 1,000 to 3,000 American troops would have required several hundred airlift flights by helicopters over a week or more.

DeLong defended the decision not to deploy large numbers of American troops. “We didn’t have the lift,” he told the committee staff. “We didn’t have the medical capabilities. The further we went down the road, the easier the decision got. We wanted Afghanistan to be peaceful for Karzai to take over. Right or not, that was the thinking behind what we did.”

The Afghan model proved effective in some instances, particularly when Afghan opposition forces working with American advisers were arrayed against poorly trained Taliban foot soldiers. The precision bombs and overwhelming airpower also played a major role in dispersing the Taliban forces and opening the way for the rapid takeover of the country, though critics now say scattering the Taliban simply allowed them to regroup later. In the early days at Tora Bora, the light footprint allowed a handful of CIA and special operations operatives to guide bombs that killed dozens, if not hundreds, of Al Qaeda fighters. But the model was ineffective when it came to motivating opposition militiamen of questionable skills and doubtful resolve to carry the fight to the biggest concentration of Al Qaeda fighters of the war, particularly when the jihadis were battling to protect their leader. Fewer than 100 special operations force soldiers and CIA operatives were unable to turn the tide against those odds.

Some critics said bin Laden escaped because the United States relied too heavily on Afghan militias to carry the fight forward at Tora Bora and on Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps to block any escape. As Michael O’Hanlon pointed out, our allies did not have the same incentives to stop bin Laden and his associates as American troops. Nor did they have the technology and training to carry out such a difficult mission. The responsibility for allowing the most wanted man in the world to virtually disappear into thin air lies with the American commanders who refused to commit the necessary U.S. soldiers and Marines to finish the job.

The same shortage of U.S. troops allowed Mullah Mohammed Omar and other Taliban leaders to escape. A semi-literate leader who fled Kandahar on a motorbike, Mullah Omar has re-emerged at the helm of the Taliban-led insurgency, which has grown more sophisticated and lethal in recent years and now controls swaths of Afghanistan. The Taliban, which is aligned with a loose network of other militant groups and maintains ties to Al Qaeda, has established shadow governments in many of Afghanistan’s provinces and is capable of mounting increasingly complex attacks on American and NATO forces. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer who helped develop the Obama administration’s Afghan policy, recently referred to the mullah’s return to power “one of the most remarkable military comebacks in modern history.”

Ironically, one of the guiding principles of the Afghan model was to avoid immersing the United States in a protracted insurgency by sending in too many troops and stirring up anti-American sentiment. In the end, the unwillingness to bend the operational plan to deploy the troops required to take advantage of solid intelligence and unique circumstances to kill or capture bin Laden paved the way for exactly what we
had hoped to avoid—a protracted insurgency that has cost more lives than anyone estimates would have been lost in a full-blown assault on Tora Bora. Further, the dangerous contagion of rising violence and instability in Afghanistan has spread to Pakistan, a nuclear-armed ally of the United States which is now wracked by deadly terrorist bombings as it conducts its own costly military campaign against a domestic, Taliban-related insurgency.

**The Price of Failure**

Osama bin Laden’s demise would not have erased the worldwide threat from extremists. But the failure to kill or capture him has allowed bin Laden to exert a malign influence over events in the region and nearly 60 countries where his followers have established extremist groups. History shows that terrorist groups are invariably much stronger with their charismatic leaders than without them, and the ability of bin Laden and his terrorist organization to recover from the loss of their Afghan sanctuary reinforces the lesson.

Eight years after its expulsion from Afghanistan, Al Qaeda has reconstituted itself and bin Laden has survived to inspire a new generation of extremists who have adopted and adapted the Al Qaeda doctrine and are now capable of attacking from any number of places. The impact of this threat is greatest in Pakistan, where Al Qaeda’s continued presence and resources have emboldened domestic extremists waging an increasingly bloody insurrection that threatens the stability of the government and the region. Its training camps also have spawned new attacks outside the region—militants trained in Pakistan were tied to the July 2005 transit system bombings in London and several aborted plots elsewhere in Europe.

Closer to home, the Federal Bureau of Investigation says two recent suspected plots disrupted by U.S. authorities involved longtime residents of the United States who had traveled to Pakistan and trained at bases affiliated with Al Qaeda. One of the plots involved two Chicago men accused in late October of planning to attack the Danish newspaper that published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad. In the other, an Afghan-born man who drove a shuttle bus in Denver was arrested on suspicion of plans to detonate improvised explosives in the United States. Court papers said the man had been trained in weapons and explosives in Pakistan and had made nine pages of handwritten notes on how to make and handle bombs.

For American taxpayers, the financial costs of the conflict have been staggering. The first eight years cost an estimated $243 billion and about $70 billion has been appropriated for the current fiscal year—a figure that does not include any increase in troops. But the highest price is being paid on a daily basis in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where 68,000 American troops and hundreds of U.S. civilians are engaged in the ninth year of a protracted conflict and the Afghan people endure a third decade of violence. So far, about 950 U.S. troops and nearly 600 allied soldiers have lost their lives in Operation Enduring Freedom, a conflict in which the outcome remains in grave doubt in large part because the extremists behind the violence were not eliminated in 2001.
Good evening. To the United States Corps of Cadets, to the men and women of our Armed Services, and to my fellow Americans: I want to speak to you tonight about our effort in Afghanistan -- the nature of our commitment there, the scope of our interests, and the strategy that my administration will pursue to bring this war to a successful conclusion. It's an extraordinary honor for me to do so here at West Point -- where so many men and women have prepared to stand up for our security, and to represent what is finest about our country.

To address these important issues, it's important to recall why America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place. We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people. They struck at our military and economic nerve centers. They took the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or station. Were it not for the heroic actions of passengers onboard one of those flights, they could have also struck at one of the great symbols of our democracy in Washington, and killed many more.

As we know, these men belonged to al Qaeda -- a group of extremists who have distorted and defiled Islam, one of the world’s great religions, to justify the slaughter of innocents. Al Qaeda’s base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban -- a ruthless, repressive and radical movement that seized control of that country after it was ravaged by years of Soviet occupation and civil war, and after the attention of America and our friends had turned elsewhere.

Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of force against al Qaeda and those who harbored them -- an authorization that continues to this day. The vote in the Senate was 98 to nothing. The vote in the House was 420 to 1. For the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5 -- the commitment that says an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. And the United Nations Security Council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks. America, our allies and the world were acting as one to destroy al Qaeda’s terrorist network and to protect our common security.

Under the banner of this domestic unity and international legitimacy -- and only after the Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden -- we sent our troops into Afghanistan. Within a matter of months, al Qaeda was scattered and many of its operatives were killed. The Taliban was driven from power and pushed back on its heels. A place that had known decades of fear now had reason to hope. At a conference convened by the U.N., a provisional government was established under President Hamid Karzai. And an International Security Assistance Force was established to help bring a lasting peace to a war-torn country.
Then, in early 2003, the decision was made to wage a second war, in Iraq. The wrenching debate over the Iraq war is well-known and need not be repeated here. It's enough to say that for the next six years, the Iraq war drew the dominant share of our troops, our resources, our diplomacy, and our national attention -- and that the decision to go into Iraq caused substantial rifts between America and much of the world.

Today, after extraordinary costs, we are bringing the Iraq war to a responsible end. We will remove our combat brigades from Iraq by the end of next summer, and all of our troops by the end of 2011. That we are doing so is a testament to the character of the men and women in uniform. Thanks to their courage, grit and perseverance, we have given Iraqis a chance to shape their future, and we are successfully leaving Iraq to its people.

But while we've achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al Qaeda’s leadership established a safe haven there. Although a legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people, it's been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, and insufficient security forces.

Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government. Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating attacks of terrorism against the Pakistani people.

Now, throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan remained a fraction of what they were in Iraq. When I took office, we had just over 32,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan, compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war. Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did not arrive. And that's why, shortly after taking office, I approved a longstanding request for more troops. After consultations with our allies, I then announced a strategy recognizing the fundamental connection between our war effort in Afghanistan and the extremist safe havens in Pakistan. I set a goal that was narrowly defined as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies, and pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian efforts.

Since then, we've made progress on some important objectives. High-ranking al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, and we've stepped up the pressure on al Qaeda worldwide. In Pakistan, that nation's army has gone on its largest offensive in years. In Afghanistan, we and our allies prevented the Taliban from stopping a presidential election, and -- although it was marred by fraud -- that election produced a government that is consistent with Afghanistan's laws and constitution.

Yet huge challenges remain. Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards. There's no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum. Al Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border. And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the population. Our new commander in Afghanistan -- General McChrystal -- has reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short: The status quo is not sustainable.

As cadets, you volunteered for service during this time of danger. Some of you fought in Afghanistan. Some of you will deploy there. As your Commander-in-Chief, I
owe you a mission that is clearly defined, and worthy of your service. And that's why, after the Afghan voting was completed, I insisted on a thorough review of our strategy. Now, let me be clear: There has never been an option before me that called for troop deployments before 2010, so there has been no delay or denial of resources necessary for the conduct of the war during this review period. Instead, the review has allowed me to ask the hard questions, and to explore all the different options, along with my national security team, our military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and our key partners. And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people -- and our troops - - no less.

This review is now complete. And as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.

I do not make this decision lightly. I opposed the war in Iraq precisely because I believe that we must exercise restraint in the use of military force, and always consider the long-term consequences of our actions. We have been at war now for eight years, at enormous cost in lives and resources. Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have left our unity on national security issues in tatters, and created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort. And having just experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the American people are understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and putting people to work here at home.

Most of all, I know that this decision asks even more of you -- a military that, along with your families, has already borne the heaviest of all burdens. As President, I have signed a letter of condolence to the family of each American who gives their life in these wars. I have read the letters from the parents and spouses of those who deployed. I visited our courageous wounded warriors at Walter Reed. I've traveled to Dover to meet the flag-draped caskets of 18 Americans returning home to their final resting place. I see firsthand the terrible wages of war. If I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home tomorrow.

So, no, I do not make this decision lightly. I make this decision because I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak. This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. And this danger will only grow if the region slides backwards and al Qaeda can operate with impunity. We must keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and to do that, we must increase the stability and capacity of our partners in the region.

Of course, this burden is not ours alone to bear. This is not just America's war. Since 9/11, al Qaeda's safe havens have been the source of attacks against London and Amman and Bali. The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered. And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because
we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them.

These facts compel us to act along with our friends and allies. Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future.

We will meet these objectives in three ways. First, we will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months.

The 30,000 additional troops that I'm announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010 -- the fastest possible pace -- so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers. They'll increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.

Because this is an international effort, I've asked that our commitment be joined by contributions from our allies. Some have already provided additional troops, and we're confident that there will be further contributions in the days and weeks ahead. Our friends have fought and bled and died alongside us in Afghanistan. And now, we must come together to end this war successfully. For what's at stake is not simply a test of NATO's credibility -- what's at stake is the security of our allies, and the common security of the world.

But taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground. We'll continue to advise and assist Afghanistan's security forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long haul. But it will be clear to the Afghan government -- and, more importantly, to the Afghan people -- that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.

Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security.

This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over. President Karzai's inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction. And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance. We'll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable. And we will also focus our assistance in areas -- such as agriculture -- that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.
The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They've been confronted with occupation -- by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes. So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand -- America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect -- to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron.

Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan.

We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That's why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.

In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who've argued that the struggle against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little or seeking accommodation with those who use violence. But in recent years, as innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani army has waged an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan. And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy.

In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear. America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan's democracy and development. We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting. And going forward, the Pakistan people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.

These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.

I recognize there are a range of concerns about our approach. So let me briefly address a few of the more prominent arguments that I've heard, and which I take very seriously.

First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam. They argue that it cannot be stabilized, and we're better off cutting our losses and rapidly withdrawing. I believe this argument depends on a false reading of history. Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action. Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency. And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain a target for those same extremists who are plotting along
its border. To abandon this area now -- and to rely only on efforts against al Qaeda from a distance -- would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies.

Second, there are those who acknowledge that we can't leave Afghanistan in its current state, but suggest that we go forward with the troops that we already have. But this would simply maintain a status quo in which we muddle through, and permit a slow deterioration of conditions there. It would ultimately prove more costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because we would never be able to generate the conditions needed to train Afghan security forces and give them the space to take over.

Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a time frame for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort -- one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests. Furthermore, the absence of a time frame for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.

As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I don't have the luxury of committing to just one. Indeed, I'm mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who -- in discussing our national security -- said, "Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs."

Over the past several years, we have lost that balance. We've failed to appreciate the connection between our national security and our economy. In the wake of an economic crisis, too many of our neighbors and friends are out of work and struggle to pay the bills. Too many Americans are worried about the future facing our children. Meanwhile, competition within the global economy has grown more fierce. So we can't simply afford to ignore the price of these wars.

All told, by the time I took office the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan approached a trillion dollars. Going forward, I am committed to addressing these costs openly and honestly. Our new approach in Afghanistan is likely to cost us roughly $30 billion for the military this year, and I'll work closely with Congress to address these costs as we work to bring down our deficit.

But as we end the war in Iraq and transition to Afghan responsibility, we must rebuild our strength here at home. Our prosperity provides a foundation for our power. It pays for our military. It underwrites our diplomacy. It taps the potential of our people, and allows investment in new industry. And it will allow us to compete in this century as successfully as we did in the last. That's why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended -- because the nation that I'm most interested in building is our own.

Now, let me be clear: None of this will be easy. The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and
Pakistan. It will be an enduring test of our free society, and our leadership in the world. And unlike the great power conflicts and clear lines of division that defined the 20th century, our effort will involve disorderly regions, failed states, diffuse enemies.

So as a result, America will have to show our strength in the way that we end wars and prevent conflict -- not just how we wage wars. We'll have to be nimble and precise in our use of military power. Where al Qaeda and its allies attempt to establish a foothold -- whether in Somalia or Yemen or elsewhere -- they must be confronted by growing pressure and strong partnerships.

And we can't count on military might alone. We have to invest in our homeland security, because we can't capture or kill every violent extremist abroad. We have to improve and better coordinate our intelligence, so that we stay one step ahead of shadowy networks.

We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction. And that's why I've made it a central pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of a world without them -- because every nation must understand that true security will never come from an endless race for ever more destructive weapons; true security will come for those who reject them.

We'll have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can meet the challenges of an interconnected world acting alone. I've spent this year renewing our alliances and forging new partnerships. And we have forged a new beginning between America and the Muslim world -- one that recognizes our mutual interest in breaking a cycle of conflict, and that promises a future in which those who kill innocents are isolated by those who stand up for peace and prosperity and human dignity.

And finally, we must draw on the strength of our values -- for the challenges that we face may have changed, but the things that we believe in must not. That's why we must promote our values by living them at home -- which is why I have prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay. And we must make it clear to every man, woman and child around the world who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak out on behalf of their human rights, and tend to the light of freedom and justice and opportunity and respect for the dignity of all peoples. That is who we are. That is the source, the moral source, of America's authority.

Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents and great-grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs. We have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents. We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies. We have joined with others to develop an architecture of institutions -- from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank -- that provide for the common security and prosperity of human beings.

We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades -- a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, and markets open, and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress and advancing frontiers of human liberty.

For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination. Our union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations. We
will not claim another nation’s resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different from ours. What we have fought for -- what we continue to fight for -- is a better future for our children and grandchildren. And we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity.

As a country, we're not as young -- and perhaps not as innocent -- as we were when Roosevelt was President. Yet we are still heirs to a noble struggle for freedom. And now we must summon all of our might and moral suasion to meet the challenges of a new age.

In the end, our security and leadership does not come solely from the strength of our arms. It derives from our people -- from the workers and businesses who will rebuild our economy; from the entrepreneurs and researchers who will pioneer new industries; from the teachers that will educate our children, and the service of those who work in our communities at home; from the diplomats and Peace Corps volunteers who spread hope abroad; and from the men and women in uniform who are part of an unbroken line of sacrifice that has made government of the people, by the people, and for the people a reality on this Earth.

This vast and diverse citizenry will not always agree on every issue -- nor should we. But I also know that we, as a country, cannot sustain our leadership, nor navigate the momentous challenges of our time, if we allow ourselves to be split asunder by the same rancor and cynicism and partisanship that has in recent times poisoned our national discourse.

It's easy to forget that when this war began, we were united -- bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack, and by the determination to defend our homeland and the values we hold dear. I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity again. I believe with every fiber of my being that we -- as Americans -- can still come together behind a common purpose. For our values are not simply words written into parchment -- they are a creed that calls us together, and that has carried us through the darkest of storms as one nation, as one people.

America -- we are passing through a time of great trial. And the message that we send in the midst of these storms must be clear: that our cause is just, our resolve unwavering. We will go forward with the confidence that right makes might, and with the commitment to forge an America that is safer, a world that is more secure, and a future that represents not the deepest of fears but the highest of hopes.

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Aazar Tamana

Signed:

Date: