School of Management

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: THE COMPLEXITY AND CHALLENGES OF PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN KOSOVO

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ABSTRACT

Rehabilitation and reconstruction of social and economic infrastructure in a post-conflict environment are complex and long-debated issues in development cooperation. Both in pre-conflict and post-conflict situations, deepening chaos and disorder can be found at the highest social, economic and political levels, and serious development challenges remain insufficiently addressed. After almost a decade of the war in Kosovo, the providers of infrastructure services for the disaster affected, returning communities are faced with multifaceted problems characterised by a fragile society with political, economic and institutional breakdowns.

Planning and implementing reconstruction projects in areas that are affected by conflict has proven to be far more challenging than expected, and has often been considered to be a feeble response from practitioners, aid agencies and government. In addition, genuine community-level involvement in post-conflict planning and decision-making for programs are central to any process for empowerment. With the presence of multiple donors and aid organisations, making informed decisions about complex multifaceted solutions, promoting good governance and better allocation of scarce resources are required to achieve a good outcome in a post-war situation. This also entails having a clearer focus and understanding of planning and implementation of post-war reconstruction projects and programs, thereby leading to nation building.

The concept of managing post-conflict reconstruction and development projects according to internationally-accepted project management processes is a relatively new and developing field. The current study looked at how the planning and execution of post-conflict reconstruction and development projects in Kosovo could be used to develop a conceptual framework with which to design projects and programs that would be more likely to yield positive outcomes for society. The impetus for the study was to examine the planning and implementation challenges of rebuilding the economic infrastructure projects by agencies capable of supporting a stable society and economy in these complex, peace-building initiatives. In order to structure the complex question of post-conflict reconstruction and development projects in a more systematic way, a conceptual framework for planning and

implementing projects was developed to help rebuild communities in post-conflict settings.

The use of mixed method approaches was designed to explore and confirm the research questions, as well as help in understanding the phenomena in the social, cultural and governance context within the project development practice of multilateral agencies in Kosovo. Using a detailed case study approach to the interviews and survey data, the study not only identified program strengths and weaknesses of the current project management processes, but also identified the differences of opinion within the project team in project planning and implementation in their wider sense.

The findings of the study identified a poor quality of planning and implementation of reconstruction projects in an environment of complexity, change and uncertainty. The interpretation of respondents' data shows that there remain considerable challenges in Kosovo's reconstruction of key infrastructure. There is evidence that both aid organisations' constructed project management processes and international aid agencies practices do not work effectively in a community service delivery setting. However, the study raised some very significant findings for a broader approach to community involvement in project identification, planning and implementation. The study showed that there continue to be differences in project communication, cost, quality, procurement and risk management. Finally, the study's findings demonstrated that success in post-conflict reconstruction depends on the ability to understand the full complexities of the political environment, as well as the ability to coordinate peace-building operations in an effective manner.

DECLARATION

To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university.

Signed……………………………………….

Date:

THIS THESIS IS DEDICATED TO

My late parents

Juliet Earnest

and

Earnest Sylvester

The reconstruction of a country's physical infrastructure will not guarantee long-term peace; however, the absence of a viable infrastructure places a burden upon a fledging government and people that cannot be internally overcome, and it will prevent any chance of long-term peace from developing to its full potential (Williams, 2005, p. 268).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADPC Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre

AIPM The Australian Institute of Project Management

ARD Associates in Rural Development

AUSA Association of the United States Army

CIPE Centre for International Private Enterprise

CoM Chief of Mission/Country Director

COWI Consultancy within Engineering, Environmental Science and Economics (Consulting Group)

CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies

DFID Department for International Development

EAR European Agency for Reconstruction

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EU European Union

EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the United Nations)

FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GTZ German Agency for Technical Cooperation

HREC Human Research Ethics Committee (Curtin University)

IAPSO International Association for the Physical Sciences of the Ocean

IFIMES International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies

IPMA International Journal of Project Management

IT Information Technology

JIAS Joint Interim Administrative Structure

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

KFOR Kosovo Force/Kosovo Peace Keeping Force (KFOR contingent from NATO States)

KFW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German government-owned development bank)

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

LF Logical Framework or Log Frame

LFA Logical Framework Approach or Logical Framework Analysis

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO Non-Government Organisation

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PCA Principal Component Analysis

PCR Post-Conflict Reconstruction

PISG The Provincial Institutions of Self-Government

PM Project Manager/Project Engineer

PMBOK Project Management Body of Knowledge

PMI Project Management Institute

PMJ Project Management Journal

PMO Project Management Office

RIMS Reconstruction Intervention Monitoring System

ROM Research Outcomes Model

SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

USIP United States Institute of Peace

UNU-WIDER United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research

US United States

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WIIW The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

There is a need to re-focus the provision of humanitarian assistance to displaced populations through a 'development lens', viewing it not as a charity but as investment in the maintenance of human and social capital towards an eventual transition to peace and a reintegration of these populations into a peacetime society (Hotlzman, 1997, p. 1).

1.0 Introduction

War is noteworthy for creating large-scale human suffering, generating refugees, displacing populations, engendering psychological distress, obliterating infrastructure and transforming the economy. Both during and after the conflict, there is chaos and disorder at the economic and political levels. The disaster-affected and returning communities are faced with multifaceted problems characterised by fragile political and institutional environments. Understanding the far more complex and nuanced issue between peace and development of economic infrastructure in a post-conflict environment is a poorly understood and much debated topic. As a catalyst to achieve a good outcome in post-war restoration, it is necessary to make informed decisions and implement complex multifaceted solutions that promote good governance and better allocation of scarce resources. As part of these efforts, it is important to have a clear focus, understanding, planning and implementation of post-war reconstruction projects and programs that lead to nation building (De Coning, 2004).

The concept of managing post-conflict reconstruction and development projects with internationally-accepted project management processes is a relatively new and developing field (Lukic, 2010). The impetus for the current study was to examine the planning and implementation challenges of rebuilding the economic infrastructure projects by agencies capable of supporting a stable society and economy in these complex peace-building initiatives. In this study, the planning (design) and implementation (construction and operation) of post-conflict reconstruction and development projects in post-conflict Kosovo are examined to develop a *framework*

with which to design projects and programs that are likely to yield positive outcomes for society. *Chapter One* serves as an overview of the entire study by providing the background and rationale for the study. It also includes an outline of the conceptual framework, introduction of the research questions, explanation of the significance, limitations, and delimitations of the study, as well as an overview of the overall thesis.

1.1 Background to the study

War and its significant impact on the nation affect the domestic capacity and integrity of the state to build, legislate and promote economic growth, and improve education and health to achieve higher living standards and thus greater well-being. In particular, by damaging physical infrastructure such as public utilities and communication network, war limits the effectiveness of institutional aspects of peacebuilding. Subsequently, a failure to address institutional reform strategically will induce renewed political-economic tensions (Aron, 2003; Blunt, 2003). Peace and stability are prerequisites for the development process; they begin and can be developed long before cessation of hostilities are brokered and need to be sustained through years of post-war economic recovery and reconstruction (Barakat & Chard, 2002; Blunt & Turner, 2005). Senators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman (US Fed News Service, 2007, p. 2) in their address to the press on 'Better management of reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan' categorically stated that:

> *If we want Iraq and Afghanistan to become prosperous societies that will be our allies in the war ... we must help them build the infrastructure upon which prosperity depends – schools, roads, power projects, water and sewer, health care and communications systems – and we must help them strengthen democratic foundations that are necessary for long-term prosperity*

There appears to be an increasing push from development partners, government and civil society organisations that the international community has the moral obligation to help combat the brutal violence against fellow human beings. The organisations' leaders need take decisive action to stop indiscriminate killings, halt genocide and stop ethnic cleansing, but also to strengthen the effort required to help reconstruct the war-torn countries in their nation building (Knight, 2003). Peacebuilding and

rebuilding governance systems cannot be short-term matters, and are the responsibility of civil society and its leaders in post-conflict societies. External interventions by members of the international community and international agencies cannot by themselves *fix* a country's governance structure. They can however, support reconstruction and reform based upon more tightly defined projects and programs with clearer goals and prescribed methods (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Brown, 2003; Lange & Quinn, 2003; Overton & Storey, 2004).

Policymakers, practitioners, academic researchers and Non-Government Organisation (NGO) representatives have realised that peacebuilding is a complex and multidimensional exercise that cannot begin in earnest unless minimal conditions for peace are present (Knight, 2003). According to Berdal (1996), the challenges to consolidating peacebuilding research focused on finding processes to stabilise the conflict to curtail the spread of violence. A systematic and sustained national effort is required to end the violence, and there needs to be a focus on immediate humanitarian issues as a means to create politically and economically stable societies for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction (Berdal, 1996). There has been much research done on peacebuilding and peacekeeping by scholars, policy makers and field practitioners (Baranyi, 2005; Knight, 2003). Further, there has also been considerable debate by the international peacekeeping researchers to go beyond the current paradigms and develop strategies and long-term processes to achieve durable peace, good governance and promote sustainable development through local community participation in post-conflict societies (Chopra & Hohe, 2004; Knight, 2003).

Thomson, Bush and Shenstone (1998) reinforced the concept that obtaining peace was of no value unless it was evident in daily life. Conflict management and dispute resolution will not be sustainable in a damaged society if it is not undertaken by communities themselves, and reflected in constructive changes in the day-to-day experiences of those living in, or returning to, war-torn regions. In a transitional society, peace cannot be enforced in the community and, at the same time, sustainable peace cannot be imposed from outside. To foster local economic development and participation in local governance, peace must be cultivated within the community at all levels of nation building. If stability is to be maintained,

economic development needs to be advanced, lives saved and transnational threats reduced. The international community must develop a strategy and enhance capacity for pursuing post-conflict reconstruction. Significant international interventions to help rebuild countries are certainly not the answer for every failed or failing state; nevertheless, international involvement is essential in many cases and the international community should demonstrate their credibility and their commitment to making peace work (Thomson et al., 1998). The importance of community participation and engaged governance has been argued at length, but empirical research has shown that engagement of citizens can lead to successful development of policy and practice outcomes (Brinkerhoff, 2008; Nel, 2000).

1.1.1 Terrain of the study

For 78 days in 1999, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies attacked the Serbian forces in Yugoslavia, now the State of Serbia (Warbrick & McGoldrick, 2008), devastating its infrastructure, killing hundreds of civilians and displacing thousands of ethnic Albanians who left Kosovo, the southern province of Serbia (Cohn, 2002). After the end of the military operation, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established as the main governing body for the region with responsibility for all aspects of the peace operations, including reconstruction efforts and economic development (Matheson, 2001; Yannis, 2004). The Kosovo Force's (KFOR contingent from NATO States) presence in the province provided an increased physical security and enabling environment to implement reconstruction planning (Jackson & Gordon, 2007; USAID, 2009). Kosovo represents a litmus test about how to develop ways to find lasting solutions to the problems in post-conflict societies (Cvijic, 2007). It also serves as a model for future operations to determine the processes of planning and implementing sustainable restoration projects by international groups, local Non-Government Organisation (NGOs) and civil society organisations, and may lead to more effective post-conflict outcomes (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2009).

1.1.2 Kosovo's current situation

According to Lemay-Hebert (2011) ten years after the conflict the economic situation was in utter shambles and the World Bank (2011) reported that Kosovo remained the

poorest country in South Eastern Europe. Krasniqi (2010) summarised the situation facing Kosovo as one of increasing poverty, ongoing economic crisis and growing social unrest. This is a fair assessment given that Kosovo has faced demonstrations, violence and civil unrest by the citizens demanding improved living standards after the unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in February 2008. The territory continues to deal with poverty, having GDP per capita of €1,726 (US$2,346), with 45 percent of the country facing high unemployment. However, imports increased steadily by 66.6 percent between 2005 and 2008, from €1.16 billion to €1.93 billion. Exports declined significantly to dangerously low levels; as of 2010, exports remained less than 6 percent of GDP, although between 2005 and 2008 they increased from €56 million to €199 million. The trade deficit measured an estimated 43 percent of GDP in the 2009 fiscal year. Kosovo, two years after the declaration of independence, still needs to urgently address infrastructure weaknesses, energy shortages, water cuts, high capital costs, organised crime, corruption and low skills levels, which can be very damaging for investment. According to a World Bank study, between 2006 and 2010 Kosovo dramatically slowed in economic growth and, as a result, labour market developments have been poor (Krasniqi, 2010).

1.1.3 Reshaping the future: Kosovo and post-conflict reconstruction strategies

Reconstruction is about establishing and maintaining a system that will promote and safeguard a market-based capitalist economy (CIPE, 2002; Guttal, 2005). The success and/or failure of reconstruction efforts are not only assessed by more fundamental considerations of the economic, social and political security of domestic populations (Diallo & Thuillier, 2004), but also depend to a large measure on the speed with which, and the extent to which, an affected country complies with any externally applicable performance standards for establishing good governance, a market economy and social well-being (Guttal, 2005).

In assessing the post-conflict development and understanding the local perspectives on recent development, Kosovo appears to be a political risk for emerging investment opportunities. Kosovo's economy remains largely dependent on the international community and the various diasporas for financial, procurement and technical assistance (Corrin, 2000). Kosovo's weak infrastructure services, such as

its telecommunication network, problems with electricity and water supply to residents and businesses, and legislative and regulatory frameworks affect revenue, investments and proper business activity. In spurring economic recovery and driving long-term economic growth, most business opportunities have relied on individual enterprise in the fields of services and retailing, employing only a small fraction of the total labour force, which has contributed to weak economic performance (Sklias & Roukanas, 2007).

1.1.4 Reconstructing infrastructure

NATO's bombing not only killed and wounded several hundred civilians; it effectively destroyed Yugoslavia's economy and infrastructure. The country suffered an estimated US$4 billion of war damage, which affected bridges, highways, railroads, civilian airports, oil refineries, factories, construction equipment, media centres, hospitals, schools, apartment buildings, houses, buses, electrical plants and hundreds of acres of forest (Cohn, 2002). Exacerbated by the crisis, pre-conflict and post-conflict Kosovo continues to grapple with the economic recovery after years of technical and financial assistance (Gallagher, 2007; Kreiger, 2001;). The damage inflicted by the war on Kosovo's infrastructure was more manageable than that resulting from a decade of neglect by the Serbian authorities (Welch, 2006). For both reasons, the province needed to generate a more secure and promising sustainable environment for investment in infrastructure to prevent the worsening humanitarian situation. The level of investment in infrastructure projects is low compared with regional standards, and restitution and investment in infrastructure projects will lay the foundations for prosperity and improve the quality of life of the people (Kreiger, 2001).

Repairing war-damaged infrastructure in order to reactivate the local economy is a challenge for all post-conflict countries. It is worth considering cases such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Mozambique that have been comparatively successful. Investing in infrastructure was an essential driver for the growth and survival of these nations where sufficient resources were mobilised to invest in the infrastructure and pursue policies for private sector participation (Schwartz & Halkyard, 2006).

1.1.5 Reconstruction project planning and implementation

Generally reconstruction often takes place at various stages after conflict. The primary responsibility for reconstruction rests upon people within the local community. The provision of international mediation is critical, particularly in early stages of democratic transitions. More often the initial response, which is soon after the conflict, can be chaotic and the country will require military support to provide stability, humanitarian emergency services and security. The second phase, which is transformation or transition, focuses on developing the economy including physical reconstruction. This phase also strengthens the capacity of the local community by developing participatory mechanisms and establishing the basis for judicial processes and local reconciliation. The final phase, which is fostering sustainability, is the time for the local community - with the support of aid agencies - to consolidate recovery efforts and continue with the reconstruction and development program. In this phase, following the recovery efforts and development changes should pave the way for withdrawal of international peacekeeping services (AUSA/CSIS, 2002).

Given the considerable challenges, it is imperative for the local government and international community to do a feasibility study of the country's reconstruction requirements. The reconstruction planning and coordination measures should include the project objectives and goals, and develop processes to implement the projects within the available resources. It is also critical, corresponding to practical needs, that the process of developing systematic training program ensures long-term sustainable recovery. Finally, it is vital the aid agencies and the local government have the required funding, balancing the short-term needs with long-term reconstruction (AUSA/CSIS, 2002).

No single professional group can meet the practical complexities of transition from war to peace. No theoretical models have the potential to address effectively the complexities of post-war reconstruction and recovery (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2009; Hasic, 2004). There is notable research on civil wars devoted to analysing the causes, consequences, and duration of each conflict, and there is active research being done on the prevention and economic dimensions of civil war (Ackermann, 2003; Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Kang & Meernik, 2005). While there is a growing body of

both theoretical and empirical research in the field of project management in the IT, manufacturing and construction industries, there has been a lack of research done to support the effectiveness of post-conflict project management, which has the capacity to analyse the practice from planning to implementation of reconstruction development programs (Ahsan & Gunawan, 2010).

1.2 Research objectives and questions

The proposed reconstruction and development *project-based approach* initiative supports and reinforces the planning and organisation of projects, and improves upon the current system. It addresses poor implementation issues and responds to the current situation by incorporating the required capacity building to ensure a better understanding and improvement of project management practices such as the concept, methodology and tools. As a result, for the current study the following primary objective and three sub-objectives were developed.

The primary objective in the exploratory cross-sectional study was to develop an integrated project management framework for managing projects in a post-conflict society; the aim being to examine critically the challenges in planning and to identify deficiencies in implementation of post-conflict reconstruction projects. In order to achieve the main objective of the study, the following more specific objectives were established:

- to examine the significance of key factors determining the effectiveness of planning and implementing reconstruction projects in re-establishing good governance and stimulating the economy of a post-conflict society*;*
- to examine whether the internationally accepted project management tools and techniques (PMBOK)[1] can assist post-conflict governments and agencies in successfully implementing reconstruction projects; and

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[1] The PMBOK is an internationally recognised standard that provides the fundamentals of project management as they apply to a wide range of projects. (Retrieved on 09-05-2008 www.pmi.org)

- based on the foregoing analysis, to develop an alternative operational framework to post-conflict reconstruction programming that would be likely to yield more positive outcomes for society.

1.2.1 Key research questions

The aim of the study was to draw upon the knowledge and practical experience of project staff and to strengthen the reconstruction knowledge base. Identifying relevant research questions was an important step toward effective and efficient development of projects that can meet community and organisation objectives.

1 What planning/implementing criteria should be used for defining project success in post-conflict reconstruction and development?
2 How do current defined project management processes influence the planning and implementation of reconstruction projects in a post-conflict society?
3 What are the limitations and advantages of the current methods, tools and techniques being used for post-conflict reconstruction projects?
4 In post-conflict situations, such as those currently happening in Kosovo, does the application of internationally accepted project management tools and techniques facilitate more successful development programs?

1.3 The theoretical and conceptual framework for the study

In 1969, the United States Department of Defense and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) adopted the Logical Framework Approach (LFA), also referred to as log frames (LF). The LF approach was used by the World Bank in the mid-1990s and has been widely used by development agencies, NGOs and bilateral donors to analyse the effects of a project on various development goals and to strengthen the process of planning, designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating aid projects (Crawford & Bryce, 2003; Wield, 1999). Based on the practical experiences of Dearden and Kowalski (2003), LF often began with the analysing of issues. As a communication tool, it encapsulated a design process that promoted logical thinking.

Gasper (1999) documented that there remains much uncertainty in a post-conflict environment, as projects are prepared over a relatively short period of time. At the same time, some development agencies may have developed the process through staff from international consulting firms or the donor agency. Practical implementation of the resultant *blueprint* process is often a complex process. Aid organisations developed LF only because the funding agencies stipulated it be used (Gasper, 2000). In some situations, LF are often developed after the project has been designed, which negates the use of the instrument as a governing tool to connect one logical process to another so as to contribute to its overall objectives. Multiple agencies using LF may not select or use many important aspects of the project. Gasper (1999) also considered that organisations worked on LF as a bureaucratic form-filling exercise, but then never revisited and/or updated them for evaluating the effectiveness of a project. The LF strategy rose and declined in popularity in USAID and elsewhere during the 1970s and 1980s, and aid agencies started to look for something superior to the LFA.

The conventional *project-based approach* and other models (Prince 2, ISO 10 006, Project Management Maturity Model, Stage Gate) give strong guidance to the project management process. The tools and techniques are applied more in technology intensive areas of construction, engineering and information systems (Cicmil, Dirdevi & Zivanovic, 2009; Smith, 2003; Turner, 1999). Since the Second World War, the US Department of Defense has been using project management standards as a distinct managerial approach in major defence systems (Ayer & Bahnmaier, 1995; Wideman 1995). In 1987, Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) developed procedures and concepts with internationally-recognised standards and principles providing the fundamentals of project management as they apply to a wide range of projects (Duncan, 1995; Wideman, 1995). The proposed research study, governed by the research objectives, will be used to develop a framework for post-conflict reconstruction project planning and implementation, and the PMBOK will be used as a base model. Project management sub-processes common to most projects in the majority of applications areas are described in detail in PMBOK. Qualitative and quantitative analysis was used to address the most common causes of project strengths and weaknesses. It is anticipated that the framework will tie together the

various elements and sub-elements of project management, and organise and classify specific elements applicable to post-conflict settings.

1.4 Research methodology

In practice, there are many obstacles and challenges in obtaining high quality data in conflict settings. Regardless of the research methodology chosen, there is an obligation to ensure the approach applied is of the utmost professional standard (Ford, Mills, Zachariah & Upshur, 2009). In this study, a case study approach was used as the method of data collection. Conducted in Kosovo, the exploratory study was designed to identify how well the infrastructure reconstruction projects had been established, planned, organised, executed and controlled by multilateral agencies in a post-conflict society. Analysis of project attributes was aimed at identifying the areas of strength and weakness, but more importantly, it also focused on identifying the differences of opinion within reconstruction project teams. Interactive methods were established to gather high quality data to investigate the post-conflict reconstruction projects within social, physical and governance contexts. Several forms of in-depth interview were used, including face-to-face, telephone interviews and emails.

To address the study objectives, the five steps below were followed in the actual implementation of the study project.

Figure 1.1: The five-step approach for this study

STEP 1	STEP 2	STEP 3	STEP 4	STEP 5
Initial description and literature review analysis	Develop survey instrument and interview questions	Develop criteria to assess strengths and weaknesses of reconstruction and development projects	Examine current application of planning and implementation of projects in Kosovo	Develop framework for post-conflict reconstruction project planning and implementation

(THESIS) REPORT + GIVEN CONCLUSIONS

The most fruitful search for sound interpretations of the real world must rely upon triangulation strategies (Denzin, 1990), which implies the need for a "method of cross checking data from multiple sources to search for regularities in the research data" (O'Donoghue & Punch, 2003, p. 78). Combining data from a variety of observers is more likely to yield a more complete picture of the settings (Neuman, 2003), so a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodology was utilised in the study to collect and triangulate relevant data. The steps outlined in Figure 1.1 relate in specific ways to the theoretical constructs under examination.

A data collection survey was divided into two parts: Survey 1 for assessing the strengths and weaknesses in the different stages of planning and implementation of the project and Survey 2 to determine the practices of project management knowledge areas and processes. Involved in a diversity of local development efforts, respondents for Section 1 were the Country Directors and Program Coordinators; for Section 2, Project Managers (PMs) and Project Engineers. Questionnaires were developed for interviews and focus group discussions, designed for the Country Directors and PMs of the reconstruction projects respectively. To gauge an understanding of the current issues in project planning and execution, quantitative responses were analysed using S.P.S.S VII to ascertain the relevance and significance of results. Qualitative analysis was done manually using content analysis.

1.5 Significance and contribution of the study

Concerns arise due to the lack of a systematic theoretical framework that could identify the various elements of post-conflict reconstruction, support reintegration and peace building strategies for international organisations/states and clarify critical, integral understanding of the problems that exemplify the governance of post-conflict societies (Chimni, 2002). Despite being widely acknowledged that the recovery of war-torn societies is a development challenge, it has been shown that understanding of operational practices continues to contradict principles and lessons learned from proven experience (Barakat & Chard, 2002). Given the complexity and integrative nature of project management in a post-conflict society, humanitarian

practitioners and international development organisations working on post-conflict reconstruction and development projects need to have an appropriate and workable methodology to formulate, implement and evaluate projects. The purpose of the current study was to develop an alternative operational framework to post-conflict reconstruction programing. This process was achieved by developing an instrument that measures aspects of project planning and implementation processes supported by the local and international agencies and then validate and test the reliability of the instrument. The proposed study carries several potential benefits for the following reasons:

- The study is among the first academic research projects worldwide to examine what project management knowledge areas can be applied in a post-conflict society. The study will result in the development of new knowledge, an important element of effective internal control, and a series of recommendations that could help enhance the overall management of post-conflict reconstruction and economic development projects. The expanded theory about reconstruction will be useful to university staff and students.

- Grounded in the nuances of working in a complex environment, with almost non-existent regulatory challenges and rapid changes that affect the day-to-day operations, the findings may further encourage the Project Management Institute (PMI) and other aid organisations to do further research at the program level. The application of theory to enhance reconstruction practices will be useful to governments and professional organisations charged with improving post-conflict situations.

- This study is timely and beneficial in fulfilling its responsibility to post-conflict communities. The research will provide practical information on ways to plan and implement projects to promote a good work environment in the complex workplace. This in turn will encourage and support PMs who implement reconstruction projects.

- Learning from the study will be of great importance to NGOs and local and international aid organisations whose time and resource constraints normally do not allow for detailed research of post-conflict reconstruction and development project processes.

- The study should be of direct assistance to individual workers in wider communities, and practitioners and organisations that are involved in reconstruction operations in post-conflict societies. In particular, the theory/practice outcomes should assist workers achieve more successful outcomes in a timely manner. Similarly, it is expected that the research will extend to the development of 'maximum uncertainty managers' who will be able to enhance precarious living conditions, develop alliances and reconstruct community infrastructure.

- Being among the first studies to propose a *project management framework* for NGOs, local and international aid organisations on the planning and implementation of reconstruction/development projects in a post-conflict society, the study will facilitate further research and development and provide more specific information for researchers in the reconstruction discipline.

- Finally, the study will lead to aid organisations and other professional project management institutes developing the capability to solve problems by maximising learning, marshalling community cooperation and minimising top-down directions.

1.6 Limitations and delimitations of the study

As this is a unique study addressing an under-researched area, the study has some limitations. It also raises questions which future researchers may need to further address to ensure adequate understanding of the possible effects of their research. Some of the limitations include:

- Living in a divided society and managing a project in the Serbian minority community is extremely challenging. Albanian project staff implementing projects in Serbian areas of Kosovo have been critical about the local community and their responses may be biased.

- Respondents may feel obligated to international and donor organisations and find it difficult to express their feelings accurately, even when the project outcome has not contributed positively to the community.

- Respondents may have subconsciously adjusted their responses in a way that reflects on their competence and may perceive that when managing projects, they will be judged on, or held accountable to, criteria generally beyond their control.

- To date no studies have been done in a post-conflict setting on the subject of applying the PMBOK project management methodology. Therefore the outcome of the research will be exploratory and not directly comparable to other post-conflict environments managing the reconstruction of development projects.

- Conventional project management practices are perceived to be related to practical experience and there may be limited value in publishing results only in the Project Management Journal (PMJ) or the International Journal of Project Management (IPMA), which are not widely read by senior officers in aid organisations.

- After the declaration of independence, changes in Kosovo's cultural context and dimensions of reconstruction are continuing, which means the study needs to be regularly updated.

- Similarly, to confirm the value of the findings, the study needs to be replicated in other post-conflict situations.

- Patton (2002, p. 50)) stated that "it is clear that tests and questionnaires are designed by human beings and therefore are subject to the intrusion of the researcher's biases by the very questions asked". The researcher, having worked on several post-conflict projects, may have contributed to the development of the survey instrument by possibly drawing on his experience and skills, and querying issues that have always been considered an important part of development assistance in programs and projects.

1.6.1 Delimitations

It is important to maximise the impact of peacekeeping missions, to identify the major contributions to the theoretical concepts underlying the study and to ensure that it is comprehensively dealt with and complete. This is vital in continuing infrastructure development, especially as the field of enquiry is characterised by

limited prior research. In such cases, a natural response is to attempt too much at once for a generally accepted practice and standard.

- The research was conducted only in the key cities of Kosovo: Pristina, Prizren, Gjilane, and South Mitrovica; other cities could not be included for security reasons.
- The researcher limited the research to only infrastructure projects that had either been implemented or were currently under implementation by participating organisations.
- The research budget and time frame limited the number of organisations chosen from those operating across the country.
- Most local respondents were Kosovo Albanians and only a limited number of Serbians volunteered to participate in the study; hence generalisations to other ethnic groups should be made with caution.
- Response to some research questions may have been biased when projects were implemented by Kosovo Albanians in Serbian territories, and vice versa.

1.7 Definitions of terms

Countries emerge from social, economic and ethnic conflict under differing and distinctive conditions that attract various financial, human and material resources, as well as policy advice. Therefore, the priority, precedence, timing, appropriateness, selection and execution of reconstruction projects also vary from case to case. To establish a common understanding, the key words or the meaning of the terms used to describe the concepts and the processes generated in the current study are defined briefly below. Furthermore, more specific definitions associated with the study are identified in the literature review chapter.

Armed Conflict - a situation where both parties resort to the use of armed force; violent or armed conflict is categorised as interstate when waged between governments and intrastate when it occurs within a country between a government, a non-governmental party and some rebel groups (Fearnely & Chiwandamira, 2006).

Civil War - "when an identifiable rebel organisation challenges the government militarily and the resulting violence results in more than 1,000 combat-related deaths, with at least 5% on each side" (Collier, Elliot, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol & Sambanis, 2003, p. 11).

Conflict - the term "conflict" will be used to cover the period of armed conflict (as understood by international law) and/or large-scale violent human rights violation. The period before that will be labelled "pre-conflict", and the period after that "post-conflict" (Wouters & Naert, 2001, p. 541).

Conflicting communities – conflict-impacted communities in their transition to sustainable peace and development.

Contingency planning – "the development of a management plan that identifies alternative strategies to be used to ensure project success if specified risk events occur" (Newell, 2002, p. 386).

Local capacity building - "is not just synonymous of training of individuals, but requires changes in the institutions in which such individuals operate and in the policy and legal framework of those institutions" (Romeo, 2002, p. 6).

Physical infrastructure - in post-conflict society includes rehabilitation and reconstruction of schools, airports, markets and hospitals; building homes, roads and bridges; restoring water, telecommunications, fuel and electricity supplies; recruiting committed personnel; and providing all the necessary training for operations and maintenance (Anderlini & El-Bushra, 2004).

Project – "Defining a programme or project as peacebuilding implies that it promotes positive peace in three dimensions: the activities undertaken, the process of implementation, and the impact or outcomes" (Llamazares & Levy, 2003, p. 11).

Project based-management - ''the manner of implementation, of expertise, paraphernalia, knowledge and modus operandi to an extensive range of activities for

the fulfillment of prerequisite of the specific project. Project management knowledge and practices can be defined upon individual processes. These individual processes can be: Initiating, Planning, Executing, Controlling and Closing" (Qureshi, Warraich, Hijazi, 2009, p. 379)

Post-conflict economic recovery - involves "food security, public health, shelter, educational systems, and a social safety net for all citizens … [and] … an economic strategy for assistance that [is] designed to ensure the reconstruction of physical infrastructure, to generate employment, to open markets, to create legal and regulatory reforms, to lay down the foundation for international trade and investment, and to establish transparent banking and financial institutions" (Mendelson, 2002, p. 126).

Post-conflict reconstruction - the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through rebuilding the socio-economic framework of the society. It encompasses social reintegration, physical reconstruction and institution building (Holtzman, Elwan & Scott, 1998).

Post-conflict transition – the process facing countries "that have suffered the trauma of civil war or other internal conflict and have to embark on economic reconstruction and on political and social reform to provide the underpinnings of peace and promote democratization and national healing" (Del Castillo, 2001, p. 1969).

Post-conflict peacebuilding - "the various concurrent and integrated actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation" (Ramsbotham, 2000, p. 172).

Project success - "Each post-conflict society is unique in its needs and thus the reconstruction project must be tailored accordingly … a successful post-conflict rebuilding project is one which sets effective foundations for democracy, economic prosperity, peace and justice to take root in societies in transition" (Edomwonyi, 2003, p. 43).

Project team - the people who actually do the work of developing and implementing the project, including the managers, stakeholders and other key personnel involved to achieve the project goals and objectives (Erickson & Evaristo, 2006).

Stakeholder – "In nonprofit organizations, various stakeholders contribute resources in order to achieve a common purpose … every person or institution that provides valuable specific resources to a nonprofit organization without having a contractual claim on the 'return from the investment' is a stakeholder" (Speckbacher, 2008, p. 306).

1.8 Overview of the thesis

There are five chapters to the overall presentation of the study.

Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview. This chapter has provided a brief background on post-conflict reconstruction with the main focus on Kosovo. It has developed more specific research questions related to the different objectives set for the study. It has highlighted potential limitations as well as the scholarly significance of the study. However, in defining the problem and following the research objectives, the following chapters will provide the background for the major aspects of the study.

Chapter 2: Literature Review. The review of extant literature reflects the diversity of issues involved in project planning and its implementation in post-conflict societies. The chapter is divided into three sections to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature dealing with the broader context of the study.

Section One provides an outline of the historical context of Kosovo, a new independent and sovereign nation. It highlights the overall economy and deals with the transition of the country before and after the conflict. In this section, an overview is provided of the country's dilapidated infrastructure after decades of communist rule and under-investment in the critical infrastructure vital for its economy and sustainable development.

Section Two gives an overview of post-conflict societies in general and problems faced by societies in the implementation of projects and programs as they emerge from the conflict. The section reviews the empirical literature with respect to what is currently understood about the factors that contribute to the development of post-conflict societies.

Section Three highlights the development of a 'project-based management' approach for the planning and implementation of reconstruction projects and programs. It develops an overview of each project management knowledge area. Finally, a 'project-based management' conceptual framework is developed in order to effectively support real, complex project planning and implementation by local and international aid organisations and for the purpose of the current study.

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology. This chapter outlines and describes the proposed research design (methodology) used to collect and analyse the data required to answer the research questions and the objectives set out in the study. The chapter is used to outline how the case study methodology was applied in the study and the process of sample selection, interviewing methods and questionnaire design of the surveys. An overview is presented of different stages involved in the research process for both the qualitative and quantitative designs.

Chapter 4: Research Analysis and Findings. This chapter is used to report on, and critically analyse, the data drawn from interviews (qualitative) and surveys (quantitative) with local and international PMs, Program Coordinators, engineers and Country Directors from Kosovo. It provides the results of the case study and determines whether or not the conceptual framework put forward can be considered statistically significant in the complex challenges of post-conflict settings with reference to rebuilding governance in failed states and post-conflict contexts.

Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion. This chapter presents conclusions drawn from both the empirical and theoretical components of the study. The findings offer a 'post-conflict reconstruction project management' framework, and a practical set of recommendations at the operational level of planning, especially for practitioners, that can lead to organising and controlling the project processes for successful restoration. The chapter also proposes future research that needs to be undertaken in

the volatile and fast-changing circumstances of post-conflict societies transitioning to sustainable peace.

1.9 Conclusion

Post-conflict reconstruction, more so than any other development trajectory, must be underpinned by institutions capable of facilitating the transition from war to sustainable peace. It must also lay the groundwork for the physical, social and economic recovery of communities by adopting a comprehensive, well-sequenced and flexible approach. A brief summary of the background information in this chapter provides the objectives of the study and defines the research questions in the study. It also gives a brief overview of the current situation in Kosovo and its infrastructure, together with an overview of several strategies used in data collection.

In the next chapter, post-war reconstruction in Kosovo is reviewed together with development planning and implementation processes focused on post-conflict reconstruction/development operations. Knowledge of key elements and challenges for developing economic rehabilitation and reconstruction in long-term development strategies for post-conflict governance structures are identified. Much remains to be learned about the planning and implementation of reconstruction and development projects by the international/local community to make international donor assistance in conflict-related situations more effective. Finally, *Chapter Two* proposes a coherent 'project-based management' conceptual framework for the research and increases the understanding of project planning and execution within the wide-ranging practice across the full spectrum of socio-economic development.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

> *Without electricity, a community cannot heat its homes. Without water, a community suffers unsanitary conditions. Without roads or bridges, trade and integration is deterred. Without schools or medical facilities, a community cannot educate its children or care for its elderly. For thousands of residents throughout Kosovo the failure to meet basic infrastructure needs within their communities has drastically limited their standards of safe and normal living for years (USAID, 2003, p. 1).*

2.0 Introduction

In the build-up to and tumultuous aftermath of war and internal conflict, the new (the central and local government structure) or the interim (United Nations) administration must seize the opportunity for recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction of civil society. The socio-economic challenges faced by post-conflict transitioning of societies are multifaceted, interdependent and vary from one country to another. Given that the security situation is volatile, permissive and depends largely on the scale and context of any given disastrous situation, implementing agencies and the government need to design and implement Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) policies and projects that promote local community participation, equity and ownership in rebuilding programs. The reconstruction/development process is lengthy and requires a multifaceted, multiorganisational approach to overcome inequities caused by past and recent history, integrate culture and traditions and build viable sustainable structures to support democratic decisions that lead to a high quality of coordinated administration and governance practices (Muharremi, Peci, Malazogu, Knaus & Murati, 2003).

Every post-conflict country truly represents a unique situation (Kreimer, Muscat, Elwan & Arnold, 2000; Waters, Garrett & Burnham, 2007). During the past few decades, Kosovo, a southern province of Serbia and central to Serbian identity, experienced upheaval and instability. Peace, democracy and stability are critical for Kosovo, an impoverished territory which is undergoing a transformation of its domestic political, social and economic systems after the NATO bombing of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) comprising of Montenegro and Serbia in March 1999. The Provincial Institutions of the Self-Government (PISG) of Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008 (Tansey & Zuam, 2009). In supporting peace processes, the donors and international partners, through the United Nations (UN), played a valuable role in helping local communities fulfil their agenda of reconstruction and development, thereby shaping the future of the Republic of Kosovo.

Section One of the literature review provides a brief introduction to the history of Kosovo (also see Appendix 3), including the fragile situation of the infrastructure which suffers from lack of maintenance and poor management as well as its shattered economy following continuing domestic and regional political upheaval and the civil war in 1999. Despite the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo, and the fact that the then-province was at the time under UN administration, it still lacks the necessary physical infrastructure for the development of stable democratic and civil society structures critical to its socio-economic development. In the immediate aftermath of hostilities there were a large number of local, international and non-governmental agencies engaged in complex interactions to establish the reconstruction program. The absence of transparency, coordination and management in these operations resulted in the inadequate engagement of stakeholders in the peace-building process of reconstructing Kosovo.

In *Section Two* of the chapter, the general challenges for reconstruction in war-torn societies are discussed. It is important, both in the immediate post-conflict period and in the longer term, to promote efforts to re-establish governance and proper management of the reconstruction of basic infrastructure, the restoration of essential social services and the revival of commerce/trade. This in turn will ensure local economies are able to function effectively. The success of such projects depends on the required knowledge, overt understanding and experience of agencies involved in the planning and implementation of project activities operating in a complex, fast-changing environment.

Section Three elaborates on the concept of the project delivery process, planning, implementation and monitoring in post-conflict settings. Each aid organisation

constructs its own policy to design, plan and implement projects and programs. Recent challenges associated with the seemingly slow, inefficient progress towards reconstruction and unbridled development of post-conflict societies highlight the need for an effective and flexible approach to planning and implementing projects. The section seeks to draw attention to 'project-based management' and its knowledge areas, and to whether these principles can be applied effectively to plan, design, implement and control existing projects and programs in a post-conflict environment.

2.1 Kosovo: The context of the study

2.1.1 History

In January 1993, Broun (1993) stated that the history of what had happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, located in the Balkan peninsular, must never be allowed to happen again. Broun (1993) further affirmed that there would be disastrous consequences if the same were to extend to the province of Kosovo and to neighbouring Macedonia. The landlocked and impoverished province of Kosovo has a history of tension between two ethnic groups: the Albanians and the Serbs. The community has suffered from a host of economic, social and political/development problems arising from four generations of communism and a decade of serious financial crisis and continual ethnic discrimination (Balaj & Wallich, 1999). For the Serbs, Kosovo has been revered as a cradle of the Serbian medieval state and spirituality since the Middle Ages (Rogel, 2003; Vladisavljević, 2002). The Albanians, who form a majority in Kosovo, claim that their Illyrians ancestors, the Dardanians, had inhabited the area long before the Serbian tribes arrived in the Balkans in the 6th century AD (Rogel, 2003). For centuries, the whole province of Kosovo was ruled by Turkey and was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1455 until the first Balkan war in 1912, following which Serbia took control of the Kosovo region (Blumi, 2001; Salla, 1998). In 1974, Kosovo became an autonomous province with access to the federal structure of the government of Serbia, and the people of Kosovo had their own government: a parliament with legislative powers, constitution and state institutions (Salla, 1998).

After the Second World War and until about 1980, the FRY had 90 percent literacy levels and an exceptionally rapid economic growth. Between 1960 and 1980 it experienced one of the most successful socio-economic transformations in the region with an average life expectancy of 72 years, free medical facilities and a guaranteed right to income supplemented with annual leave pay (Parenti, 2000). In deciding to issue independent status to Kosovo, there were many statements put forward in Vienna; it was argued that 90 percent of the population were Muslim Albanians and also under Tito's[2] Yugoslavia, Kosovo had enjoyed a substantial autonomy within the province and thus its declaration of independence was considered legal (Berend, 2006).

After the death of Tito in early 1980, ethnic divisions and conflict grew in Yugoslavia. The political landscape began to change with Serb nationalists taking control of the Yugoslavian military and paramilitary structures. At the same time as the growing intra-ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, the economy began to falter under unprecedented foreign debt and soaring unemployment (Rogel, 2003). Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the Kosovo Albanians continued with their desire to gain the status of a separate federal republic and broke away from Yugoslavia; aspirations that were perceived in some circles as exacerbating a long and continuing climate of ethnic tensions (Salla, 1998).

In March 1989, the Serbian government stripped Kosovo of its autonomy and the overwhelming majority of ethnic Albanians were forced to resign from their state jobs in the province (Djilas, 1998; Ogden, 2000; Pula, 2004). This imbroglio led to the movement of a 'parallel state' of Kosovo Albanians in opposition to the Serbian authorities. The governance of the parallel state, headed by Dr Ibrahim Rugova[3] the eponymous leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, had its own extensive network of financial and social councils, education and health care institutions, political parties and a government-in-exile (Pula, 2004).

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[2] Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) was a leading Yugoslav communist. From 1945–1953 he was the Prime Minister and from 1953 he was the President of Yugoslavia. He was one of the founder members of the non-aligned movement (Klemenčič, 2002).
[3] Dr Ibrahim Rugova a veteran politician and charismatic leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo was appointed as President of the self proclaimed independence by the Kosovo Albanians in 1992 (Duke, 1998).

By the early 1990s, an estimated 200,000 Serbs still lived in Kosovo. Many had left the province long before the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 (Posen, 2000). The disintegration of the FRY started in the 1990s and, together with poor economic policies, social and economic development started to deteriorate in the region. Given the continuing tensions, development was further hampered by international sanctions and weak access to international flow of trade and finance. The issues in Kosovo, which proved far more complicated and deserved greater international intervention, received marginal attention from the international community (Bateman, 2000).

Fuelling tension and contributing to political instability in 1998, the ethnic Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) became progressively more prominent in the rural areas of Kosovo. The KLA engineered the struggle for independence from Serbia and the FRY (Charlesworth, 2002). The Serbian security forces' paroxysmal retaliation against the rebel group prompted international intervention in 1999, first in the form of negotiations being convened in Rambouillet, France[4], and then the US-NATO (United States/North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) intervention through its continuous bombing campaign of the FRY (Bellamy, 2002).

When the ethnic tensions, magnified by the significant weakening of economic management, deteriorating and inadequate infrastructure and services, and political frustrations, reached their peak NATO launched air operations against Yugoslavia in March 1999 without the authorisation of the UN Security Council (Roberts, 1999; Williams, 2005). The military intervention was necessary only after repeated attempts to withdraw the Yugoslav military and paramilitary troops engaged in human rights abuses against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo and after negotiations by the US and its NATO allies failed (Bekker, 1999; Naumann, 2002). Until then Kosovo (Figure 2.1), poor and deeply divided between the Kosovo Albanians and the minority Serbs, was relatively unknown to many Americans and the rest of the world (Griffith & Allen, 2007).

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[4] An agreement was negotiated that would give substantial autonomy for Kosovo and to guarantee security by NATO force, which was reluctantly accepted by the Kosovo Albanians and not signed by the Serbian authorities (Wilton, 2008).

Figure 2.1: Map of Kosovo

Note: The province is divided into 30 municipalities. Serbian names are in bold, Albanian in italics.

Source: Statistical Office of Kosovo. Cited in Bloom et al. (2006, p. 432).

Subsequent events that unfolded constituted a humanitarian tragedy of unimaginable proportions in Kosovo. Thousands of landmines were planted by the Serbian army, police and paramilitaries; more than 1500 cluster bombs, 10 tons of depleted uranium weapons and unexploded ordinances were used heavily in NATO bombings during the war (Cohn, 2002; Larsen, 2008). The Serbian armed forces escalated their attacks on the ethnic Albanians and inflicted heavy civilian casualties (Pevehouse & Goldstein, 1999). Within days of the start of war, a major humanitarian crisis arose

with 850,000 Kosovo Albanians forced to flee their homes into neighbouring Macedonia and Albania, creating a massive refugee crisis (Karadjis, 2005). The UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) estimated that 130,000 homes were destroyed (World Bank, 2005). The objective of the military intervention, albeit defined as humanitarian intervention[5] in Kosovo, was simply expressed as "Serbs out, peacekeepers in, refugees back" (Wilton, 2008, p. 368).

After 79 days of intensive bombings, the Yugoslav forces started to withdraw from Kosovo (Wheatley, 2000) and an estimated 130,000 Kosovo Serbs left the province (Buckwalter, 2002; Posen, 2000). Following the end of hostilities, the Kosovo Albanian refugees who had fled Kosovo returned to the shattered remnants of their war-ravaged homeland (Satterwhite, 2002). During this time, an international civil and security presence was deployed in the shape of the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and a NATO–led multinational Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) (Gerasimov & Temiashov, 2004; Williams, 2005). The challenge then was to lay the foundation for economic recovery and development. In contributing to the economic reconstruction of Kosovo, it was determined that pursuant to a widely applicable strategy under EU direction and under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, economic development should be coordinated and directed to be compatible with the largely market-driven economies of the EU (Skogstad, Bertone, Dimas, Long & Anderson, 2003).

2.1.2 Economy

Covering an area of only 10,887 square kilometres, Kosovo is a small, landlocked mountainous country which borders the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania (Ogden, 2000). Kosovo, with a population of 2.2 million was an integral part of the FRY (now Serbia) (Buwa & Vuori, 2006; Sklias & Roukanas, 2007), and a low-income province in the Balkan Peninsula (Bhaumik, Gang, & Yun, 2006a, 2006b; Sletzinger & Gelazis, 2005; World Bank, 2005). Approximately 45 percent of the population in Kosovo are poor (World Bank, 2007b) and 70 percent of the poor live in rural areas

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[5] The war in Kosovo had no general economic or strategic interest at stake; hence it was termed as humanitarian by some prominent international lawyers (Charlesworth, 2002; Cohn, 2002).

(SIDA, 2008). The demographic make-up of Kosovo is 90 percent ethnic Albanians (Keough & Samuels, 2004), 6 percent Serbs with the remaining 4 percent consisting of other minorities. Nearly one-half of the population is less than 24 years old and one-half of the labour force is plagued by unemployment (World Bank, 2011), implying a risk of social and security unrest (Bardos, 2008; SIDA, 2008). Poverty and unemployment rates are shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Poverty and unemployment rates in Kosovo

Year/Category	Poverty rate of unemployed	Poverty rate of employed	% of poor unemployed	% of non-poor unemployed
2002/03	40.8	32.3	52.7	43.5
2003/04	50.6	31.9	63	43.8
2004/05	40.8	25.9	59	42.1
2005/06	49.5	34.7	58.6	43.3

Source: Kosovo Poverty Assessment (World Bank, 2007b, p. 50).

After four decades of communist rule, Kosovo was destroyed by the ravages of civil war[6] in 1999 (Hasic & Bhandari, 2001). The province had little or no administrative function after the collapse of the state system (Muharremi et al., 2003; Ozerdem, 2003) and the structure of the economy shifted to rely on more service-oriented sectors. Growth of the business and agricultural sectors was seriously hampered by the area's poor physical infrastructure, lack of investments, weaknesses in the legal and regulatory frameworks for the private sector and the endemic corruption in public offices leading to an unbalanced trade structure (Korovilas, 2002; SIDA, 2008).

2.1.3 Post-conflict reconstruction

Since 1999, the UNMIK responsible for Kosovo's administration under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 inherited a war–ravaged province. The post-war rebuilding program which was governed by UNMIK and protected by KFOR focusing on security, stability, reconstruction and transition faced an uphill

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[6] The operation of NATO was not sanctioned by the UN, and, therefore was illegal under international law. Because Kosovo was an integral part of the FRY, the dispute between the Serbian and Albanian populations in that region constituted a civil war and not an invasion of one country by the forces of another (Bonsor, 2004).

challenge given the extensive damage to the province's economic and social infrastructure. During the emergency phase (1999-2002) the international donor community, in cooperation with the local institutions, provided substantial assistance in moving Kosovo forward in terms of its economic recovery and sustainable development (Mustafa, Demukaj & Kotorri, 2006). One of the key objectives of UNMIK was to establish an administrative structure based on a Western model of governance; thus, a Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) was established in 2000. It was envisaged that when domestic revenue increased it would enhance the government's accountability. Correspondingly, international aid could be reduced and, thereby, sustainable long-term economic growth would be promoted (UNMIK, 2000a, 2000b).

As envisioned by Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, the stabilisation and reconstruction of Kosovo was built on the four pillars of PCR. The UN was responsible for the provision of security and the development of legitimate and stable security institutions; the European Union (EU) was responsible for Justice and Reconciliation to ensure an impartial legal system was in place to deal with past abuses and on-going grievances arising from the conflict; the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was responsible for addressing social and economic well-being by restoring basic essential services and laying the foundation for economic and social development; and, finally, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was responsible for governance and participation by developing civil society and democratic institutions (Gennip, 2005; Yannis, 2004).

2.1.4 Challenges of reconstruction and development

As the war came to an end, it became apparent that there had been a significant level of destruction to life, property and business. To a large extent, key infrastructure such as roads, bridges, water supply systems, health centres, schools and telecommunication was severely damaged or destroyed. There was also an urgent need to address the problems of the humanitarian crisis involving a large number of internally displaced persons and returning refugees (Tarnoff, 2001). The stagnant economic growth and a decade of inchoate governance had deteriorated the public sector; for example health and education service provision for the country. The

agriculture sector which played a vital role in supporting the rural economy, was heavily disrupted and there existed vast unemployment. Business enterprises were not self-sufficient, and there was a substantial disruption of public utility services leading to intermittent supplies of water and electricity (Balaj & Wallich, 1999; Williams, 2005). Mustafa (1999) summarised the dynamic complexity of reconstruction and project development for Kosovo. In the report it was argued that international agencies are working in parallel on the same issues and at the same time working in different areas without involving the local community. Mustafa also stressed the need for coordination in the reconstruction processes to develop local capacities. The World Bank and EU approved assistance for the reconstruction of Kosovo at an approximate value of US$ 2.5 billion over a period of four to five years (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2: Annual aid inflow in the various sectors, 1999-2008

(Spent amounts are in million Euros)

Sector	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Housing	25894.50	155530.60	90831.60	17159.0	12697.0	5079.50	6754.80	3650	34.30	-
Transport & Infrastructure	174.17	47702.9	43015.00	9667.30	10239.2	1955.74	3529.79	2524.82	1381.38	1618.37
Education	7088.60	40614.14	26626.90	7573.90	5115.09	9085.63	6121.95	7209.1	6102.40	4384.7
Health	1336.39	20397.32	28217.00	3422.51	6882.16	6690.89	5543.3	5752.64	3725.40	2333.95
Energy	16006.20	111245.77	153826.00	52835.10	54039.90	47482.60	10391.70	2840.94	1343.61	12165.70
Water	683.36	7267.58	30144.50	6058.55	5967.39	3916.27	6062.24	1618.00	6402.69	4479.99

Source: Adapted from RIMS Database, cited in Demukaj (2011).

In Kosovo, the following six priorities were identified for intervention from 2001 to 2003 (Hasic & Bhandari, 2001):

- develop private sector reforms;
- ameliorate the performance of the education sector;
- rehabilitate and reform the crumbling health care system;
- develop and manage sustainable social welfare reforms;
- build the capacity of Kosovars to deliver higher standards of service in public administration; and
- develop the ability of the private sector to provide adequate housing and support services to ethnic groups.

2.1.4.1 Reconstructing the health care system

By most indicators, the health sector of Kosovo has been described as the worst in South-East Europe (World Bank, 2005). After the cessation of bombing by NATO, the retreating Yugoslav forces had undertaken a widespread campaign to damage and destroy the fragile heath care infrastructure, which was already in a state of disrepair (Davies, 2000). The health structure in the province consisted of one 2500 bed university hospital based in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, five 500-bed district hospitals, six institutes of public health, 30 municipality-based public health centres and around 280 smaller primary health care centres. Many of these neglected health centres suffered severe damage and the equipment was either obsolete or stolen by the departing forces (Buwa & Vuori, 2006; Shuey, Qosaj, Schouten & Zwi, 2003). Though the health facilities were badly maintained, the challenge for the local and the international communities was to continue to operate the state health system, albeit with inadequate medical equipment and limited supplies. The province had received no capital investment for more than a decade and the health delivery system that existed before the conflict was not designed to respond to the challenges that emerged from the conflict (Brennan, Valderrama, MacKenzie, Raj & Nandy, 2001).

Increased attention is focusing on the practice of private health care access centres in Kosovo which are competing with an inefficient and inequitable public health care system. In principle, it can be argued that they provide much-needed medical testing services, but there are challenging issues in the absence of appropriate regulations and controls over service performance. If not regulated in the early stages, service providers can be forced to compromise on the quality of the service which can then have adverse implications for the standards of health care providers and customers (Buwa & Vuori, 2006; Campbell, Percival & Zwi, 2003). The Serb minorities, the majority Kosovo Albanians and the international community all share primary responsibility for the peace-building endeavours within Kosovo's health care system to serve the majority and minority communities alike (Bloom, Hoxha, Sambunjak & Sondorp, 2006).

2.1.4.2 Reconstructing the education system

Before the conflict, communities in remote villages had access to primary education (Smulders, 2004). Soon after the cessation of hostilities education became a significant priority area for post-war reconstruction programs (Nelles, 2005). The impact of a decade of under-investment and the destruction caused by the conflict left the education system in a dilapidated condition. The educational infrastructure was grossly inadequate despite the investment in the sector. Approximately 45 percent of the schools were severely damaged or destroyed during the conflict, 668 schools needed major repairs and 135 schools were damaged beyond repair and had to be totally reconstructed. Water and sanitation facilities in schools were at critical levels and often constituted a health hazard. Along with the crumbling educational infrastructure nearly all schools lacked educational resources such as furniture, books, library services and laboratory equipment (Nelles, 2005; Smulders, 2004; Sommers & Buckland, 2004).

In post-conflict situations, it is critical to provide technical assistance and investment support for education to the young population; a study done by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) recommended that there was a need for qualified personnel in Western Europe. Given that the population of Kosovo was young and growing more rapidly than other populations in Europe, investment in education and training was needed to contribute to an improvement in the regional and local socio-economic conditions (SIDA, 2008).

2.1.4.3 Reconstructing the transport system

To achieve economic development and regional integration in Kosovo, another major area requiring infrastructure improvement is transport. Road transport is the common system used in Kosovo, though limited rail transport is used to mobilise merchandise. A national safe road infrastructure network can stimulate development of foreign trade and provide convenience for commercial interactions with neighbouring countries (COWI, 2006). A total road infrastructure was built or upgraded in the 1960s. The road network is comprised of 647 kilometres of primary roads, 1,347 kilometres of regional roads and some 6,600 kilometres of local roads,

which includes both urban and rural. The World Bank (2007b) estimated that 33 percent of the local paved network required reconstruction and 97 percent of the unpaved local roads required upgrading. It was also estimated that many of the bridges were in need of urgent repairs (World Bank, 2007c). Despite the increased investments of €136 million between 2000 and 2005 in road infrastructure, the roads deteriorated at an exceptional rate due to low maintenance (UNDP, 2008; World Bank, 2007c).

2.1.4.4 Reconstructing the energy system

In 2008, Kosovo's energy supply relied primarily on two ageing thermal power plants located near Pristina, together with electricity imported from neighbouring Serbia. Before the conflict, from 1990 to 1999, the plants operated at maximum capacity without due consideration of the long-term serious damage caused by low maintenance and investment. During the Kosovo conflict in 1999 heavy damage was inflicted on the power stations; they were severely crippled and put out of operation. The operation of the district heating systems drastically decreased, the coalmine maintenance was largely neglected and resources severely over-exploited. The older Kosovo plant suffered most damage during the conflict and a fire aggravated and seriously damaged the more modern power plant in July 2002 (EAR, 2008; KFW, 2007).

Despite sustained international funding from donor agencies to restore the power plants, the situation remained far from adequate. The sector remained critical, with recurrent collapses and the need for energy to be imported to strengthen domestic needs (Mustafa et al., 2006). There were plans to build a third power plant outside Pristina, although international environmentalist and other non-governmental organisations argued that the implementation of a new plant would damage the environment and was a perceived threat to the water table. There was also a fear that the government's proposal to open the project to foreign investors would drain profits after completion of the project (Finn, 2008).

Following years of political upheaval and economic instability, the greatest challenge for the sustainability of Kosovo's economic growth and stability was energy and

infrastructure development. After the conflict, the infrastructure which previously had fallen into disrepair could not guarantee continuous supply to satisfy the growing consumer demand. The existing production and uncertain supply of electricity had suffered from mismanagement and under-investment in infrastructure for many years. It was expected that the private sector, dominated by small and medium–sized business enterprises, would drive future economic growth in Kosovo. The inadequate and unreliable power supply was the biggest barrier to private sector development in Kosovo (UNDP, 2007). According to a public survey conducted by the Kosovo business community, 80 percent of entrepreneurs considered that the major impediment they had in developing their business was the uncertain energy system (Finn, 2008). This was despite the government's aim to create the necessary energy infrastructure and provide uninterrupted supply to help sustain economic growth and, in turn, boost employment opportunities to help alleviate poverty (UNDP, 2007).

2.1.4.5 Reconstructing the water system

Interruptions to the water service are a common problem in Kosovo; they result from frequent leakage due to poor conditions and illegal connections, and from long power cuts and the fluctuating voltage that affect the water supply systems. Thus, irregular water supply is a serious health issue given its importance for both hygienic lifestyles and as a source of dissatisfaction among households. The World Bank (2005) study found that only 54% of households were connected to the central water system and 31% relied on wells as their main source of water. In the past, water supply and wastewater disposal in Kosovo were performed by many small public utility enterprises. After the end of the war in 1999, the water sector was in a desolate condition: large parts of the infrastructure were destroyed, water losses in the mains network were considerable and water rates were insufficient to recover operating costs, let alone replacement costs. Water utilities were not able to provide services on a secure financial basis (MacDonald, 2006).

2.2 Kosovo: The challenge of transition

Regardless of the nature of international participation, the very thought of establishing an international administrative system, coupled with enormous levels of

authority and responsibility for the province after the 1999 conflict, posed novel challenges in developing both conceptual and operational frameworks to promote local development (Yannis, 2004). Pritchard (2001) impugned the complex peace operations that involved state-building and the function of governance programs by UNMIK. In particular, Pritchard (2001) questioned the capacity of the organisation to sustain a transitional administration that would support the recovery and reconstruction in territories brutally affected by conflict. Peace would depend on whether the UN contributed to the achievement of political stability through early recovery and what factors contributed to stabilising social and economic development through reconstruction operations.

It is important to recognise that the experience in Bosnia and Kosovo supports the view that political, social and economic challenges could not have been dealt with effectively without engendering international support (Lampe, 2004). To be specific, to ensure reconstruction efforts were effectively undertaken, the international community had to set up a system of governance at least for a short-term period in Kosovo. Without such a governance system, the muddled situation would have presented a severe threat of increasing violence and regional instability, as well as exacerbating the existing humanitarian crisis in the conflict-ridden society (Matheson, 2001). In their study on the post-war recovery of Kosovo, King and Mason (2006) argued that despite a governance system being in place, the international community largely failed in its efforts to achieve sustainable project outcomes in the build-up and tumultuous aftermath of the Kosovo conflict. The absence of a functioning nationwide legal system as well as incompetent staff, interethnic hatreds, corruption, scarce economic opportunity and lack of sustainable employment opportunities for its citizens, all contributed to slow post-war recovery.

2.3 Kosovo: The way forward

Steady and substantial progress has been made in the years following the conflict: schools have been rebuilt; basic health care has been made available to most rural and urban communities; electricity supply and access to drinking water have improved; many families have benefited from new or repaired homes; bridges and roads have been built. Progress was achieved largely due to the hard work and

dedication of the local Kosovars (Muharremi et al., 2003; World Bank, 2004) and with the support of 60,000 international aid workers and 40,000 military personnel (Corrin, 2003). There is still a need for major reconstruction of the country due to the dilapidated condition of its infrastructure.

Living conditions for communities continue to be tough and challenging. Ethnic divides still remain, with minorities facing severe hardship both in terms of security and freedom of movement. Large enterprises that were mostly operated by ethnic minorities before the war have been shut down, unemployment remains very high, and there is a need for more progress in the education and health sectors (Hasic & Bhandari, 2001). The immediate challenge for the international community when it arrived in 1999 was to promote peace and address the security vacuum, strengthen the rule of law, develop the economy of the province and consolidate the Interim Administrative Structure. In 2000, UNMIK and the donor community pledged to develop the infrastructure and human resources by rehabilitating hospitals, schools, roads, bridges, water, and electricity systems. There has been a continued, although inconsistent, effort and encouraging progress has been made in Kosovo. The political and security concerns remain and represent a risk that the conflict may recur (World Bank, 2004).

Examining the political and economic expansion, and given the situation on the ground, the mission in Kosovo was far from complete (Sletzinger & Gelazis, 2005; Yannis, 2004). Bonsor (2004) categorically stated that the world is focusing on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq but there is a lot of work still to be done in former Yugoslavia. In Kosovo, the issues include whether and how to accommodate the demands of a divided society and how to make existing state institutions more inclusive through power-sharing, constitutional reforms and a more equitable distribution of the benefits of development (Luckham, 2004; Sletzinger & Gelazis, 2005). It is the national identity and national existence of conflicts between the ethnic Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians, two different groups that do not want to work or live together, which continue to be major problems (Putnik, 2005).

Equally, the reconstruction efforts need to consider the participation of all members of society. Kosovo is a male dominated culture and women remain excluded from

meaningful participation in policy-making, planning and coordination efforts to stimulate coherence and inclusiveness in decision-making (Abdela, 2003). In coordinating the planning work, there is a need for the international community to ensure inclusion of women as well as men to formulate and express their views in the decision-making process (Corrin, 2003; Green & Ahmed, 1999; Kreimer, Eriksson, Muscat, Arnold & Scott, 1998; Zuckerman & Greenberg, 2004).

Predominantly, Kosovo's private sector is comprised of small-scale, low-capital intensive enterprises engaged in trade and construction activities (Muharremi et al., 2003; SIDA, 2008). The future of Kosovo depends on encouraging and promoting a competitive and dynamic private sector. Efforts to develop and strengthen new provincial government institutes, the education system or access to the health care system cannot come to fruition without encouraging private sector investments in reconstruction and capital intensive infrastructure work such as transport, communication, construction and electricity (Muharremi et al., 2003; Schwartz & Halkyard, 2006; World Bank, 2007c).

2.4 Summary – Kosovo History

Defined by ethnic, cultural and religious factors, the conflict in Kosovo between the Serbs and Albanians started with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, continued into the 1990s and eventually led to intervention by NATO forces in March 1999. The civil war in 1999 and the preceding decade of underinvestment destroyed much of the infrastructure and devastated the economy with a severe effect on civilian life. After the war, people were not only displaced but their residential homes had been either destroyed or set on fire. In addition, infrastructure such as education, health, water supply, roads, bridges and power supply stations had been destroyed and damaged. Investing in human capital and in the country's infrastructure plays a constructive, important role in rebuilding the domestic economy. Poor management has plagued reconstruction efforts; it is incumbent upon the government of the newly independent Kosovo, with the support of the international community, to do all it can to assist in the growth of civil society. In its reconstruction effort, the nascent private sector also has a critical role to play in rebuilding damaged infrastructure, largely by increasing investment across all

sectors. Women and ethnic minorities also must be empowered to take an active part in the planning and management of projects.

Drawing on Kosovo as a case study, the current study examined the processes of designing, planning and implementing reconstruction and development of infrastructure projects to ensure positive outcomes. Further, in order to demonstrate applicable lessons for development in similar environments, it has drawn out issues specific to the broader realm of PCR as it operates in divided societies in general.

2.5 Reconstructing post-conflict societies

In 2009, 36 countries were involved in internal armed conflict (UNESCO, 2011). Fifteen of the world's poorest countries have experienced armed conflict and 32 African countries have experienced violent conflict over the past 15 years (Gennip, 2005). While "every post-conflict country is unique and no single formula can respond to all reconstruction needs" (Kreimer et al, 1998, p. 9), the root causes of conflict need to be identified and must be addressed for the maintenance of peace, security and further conflict prevention (Grey-Johnson, 2006). It can be argued that the resolution of these issues represents a formidable task to peace builders. The process of development involves a myriad of international, national and local participants with scarce resources and limited skilled human capacity (Maresca, 2003a). These must be spread across the implementation of multiple projects and development goals harnessed in a synergistic manner. Evidently, the fundamental assumption as to the underlying causes of a conflict is that bad, fragile or non-existing governance structures often are shown to be the main cause. However, in many of these countries, the existing corrupt democratic institutions and structures, together with poverty, can themselves be contributing factors to the occurrence of conflict. There is a scarcity of resources, intra-national inequalities, disorganised and insecure living conditions, property and human rights issues, discrimination or exacerbated violent conflict; all of which stem from an exploitative and damaging political environment (Scholdan, 2000).

Jackson (2001) suggested that in steering conflict towards a sustainable resolution, the focus should be on state-building efforts through key economic reconstruction

activities, rather than undermining of state-building efforts. In Jackson's opinion, when a state can be identified reliably as being at risk, there are numerous intervention measures which can be undertaken such as: 'diplomacy and mediation' as in North Korea, (Park, 2005), 'fact-finding missions', 'arms embargo' as in Liberia and Angola (Lumpe, 2001), 'economic sanctions' as in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Elliott & Hufbauer, 1999), 'the creation of demilitarised zones' as in Rwanda and Sri Lanka (Landgren, 1995), 'disarmament and decommissioning of weapons' as in Northern Ireland (Pettyjohn, 2009), 'the preventive deployment of military or civilian peacekeepers and programs to deal with economic and humanitarian crises' as in Kosovo, East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ottaway & Lacina, 2003). The international practices used in promoting participation in conflict management range from diplomacy to peacekeeping, diplomatic bargaining, regional cooperation, international mediation, and UN task-sharing oriented towards state maintenance and international (and national) status quo. Should it be determined to intervene in a weak and unstable society, it is thought that multi-track diplomacy[7] and state reconstruction approaches are likely to be more appropriate and effective (Jackson, 2001, p. 77).

Rondinelli and Montgomery (2005) recommended that achieving a good outcome in a post-civil war situation required making informed decisions, promoting good governance and a better allocation of scarce resources. This also involves a clear focus and understanding of the planning and implementation processes of post-war reconstruction projects and programs which lead to nation building. Post-conflict countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Lebanon, Mozambique, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, Kosovo and Rwanda lack the institutional capacity to carry out reconstruction and development programs (Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2005). They often depend on a multitude of players and

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[7] Multi-Track Diplomacy is a conceptual way to view the process of international peacemaking as a living system. It looks at the web of interconnected activities, individuals, institutions, and communities that operate together for a common goal: a world at peace. (Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 2004). Retrieved from www.imtd.org

international development agencies[8] to design, develop and implement projects, programs and policies (Smojlan, 2003).

At the same time, relationships among the various international development agencies are multifaceted and contentious, as their long-term goals are often not transparent or officially acknowledged. When the international agencies lack coordinating mechanisms for carrying out development programs, their conflicting priorities can produce conflicting results. In turn, this can make policies and objectives for PCR uncertain and ambiguous (Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2005; Pugh, 1998). In addition, it is important to note that the presence of international agencies can create tension and disputes, which may have either a negative or a positive influence on the dynamics of conflict (Lange & Quinn, 2003; Utterwulghe, 2004).

During and after conflict, the disaster-affected areas and returning communities are faced with complex problems in responding effectively to the changing and diverging needs often characterised by a fragile political and institutional environment (White & Cliffe, 2000). There is competition for political power among individuals and ethnic groups. The affected communities are plagued by economic insecurity and inter-ethnic tensions remain high. Structural inequalities are created by the systems of war. There is a heavy burden of trauma resulting from communities' and individuals' experiences during the protracted conflict, a lack of employment opportunities, a lack of sustained economic opportunities and insufficient fundamental resources. More often than not, there is a high level of enduring violence and insecurity created by the factors that generated the war in the first instance. These many reasons adversely affect the reintegration of the displaced communities of people trying to rebuild their shattered lives. In the process of resolving post-war displacement, those returning also face increased conflict through issues relating to land and property ownership disputes (Utterwulghe, 2004).

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[8] Multilateral Development Bank (World Bank), regional development banks (ADB, AfDB, IADB, CDB), United Nations Associated Agencies (including UNDP, FAO, ILO, WHO, UNIDO ETC), bilateral and multilateral government agencies (such as USIAD, European Union or CDA), Non-Government Organisations (such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children) and Government agencies (Youker, 2003, p. 1).

2.5.1 A path to post-conflict reconstruction

2.5.1.1 Principles for post-conflict reconstruction

Key principles that guide reconstruction efforts in post-conflict inherently unstable countries are as follows:

- restoring security is critical to ensure economic recovery and a successful reconstruction process;
- little progress can be achieved in the absence of supporting transparency and community ownership in the decision-making process, and the allocation of resources;
- it is fundamental to embrace consensus on reconstruction planning resolutions with all members of the community, the government, various national, regional and local leaders, and between and among opposing groups from the conflicting country;
- other participants such as international donors and implementing agencies should be involved in the process;
- donor funding must be dispatched at the right time with no conditions attached, and there must be accountability and transparency when funding is released to the borrowing agencies;
- creating job opportunities and restoring confidence by providing basic health, common utilities and social infrastructure can broaden the sense that the community can recover from conflict or war; and
- the project schedule to implement the process should be driven by the local conditions and not by the funding agency's stipulations (Gennip, 2005).

The principal desire for reconstruction must emanate from the local community (Englebert, 2008). During the early *humanitarian* or *crisis* phase of post-conflict reconstruction, international intervention is crucial. In the initial stages, in order to maintain peace and stability and commence emergency services, it is critical to have military involvement for a certain period. In the next phase, which is *transitional* or *developmental*, the focus should be on developing local resources, with emphasis on building the economy and establishing a comprehensive approach to building governance structures and participation mechanisms. This phase also embraces

reconciliation and secures a transition to a democratic and peaceful society. In the final stage, all efforts must be directed towards consolidating a sustainable long-term reconstruction and recovery process leading to the gradual withdrawal of all international armed and security services. It is this phase which underpins long-term economic development for the country and lays the groundwork for the prevention of conflict and the re-occurrence of violence (Cliffe, Guggenheim & Kostner, 2003; AUSA/CSIS, 2002).

2.5.1.2 Role of the international community

The international community is making continued efforts to restore peace and strengthen the livelihood of many countries in the wake of conflict. Examples include the rehabilitation programs in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide to restructure the imbalanced economic, social and political institutions (Green & Ahmed, 1999), bilateral aid and development programs built on peace agreements by international financial institutions such as those in Guatemala and El Salvador (Pearce, 1999), the involvement of the US in nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq (Brownlee, 2007) and the UN involvement in the economic reconstruction programs in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor (Matheson, 2001).

Given the widespread, unsettling nature of uncertainty after a conflict, there can be strong indications that peaceful resolutions may not be imminent. The international community must put greater emphasis on economic recovery and social reforms to prevent an outbreak of further violence (Baly, 2004). The reconstruction of infrastructure projects in a post-conflict society commences after the emergency and recovery phase, which in most cases is three to four years, but can be even more after the conflict ends. Even with a relatively secured environment in which to implement long-term projects, PCR is deemed to be a development challenge (Barakat & Chard, 2002).

In the aftermath of a conflict, international and humanitarian organisations play a key role in the process of stabilising a fragile and split society (Korhonen, 2004). They need to develop a framework to ensure adequate investment opportunities in key infrastructure are part of comprehensive development projects. A post-conflict

society depends upon external funding to implement rebuilding projects for a considerable period of time after the war. When the situation stabilises, the resource development projects can be designed to provide opportunities and improve the future political and economic prospects of the conflict-prone and war-torn societies. The international community should aim to focus on conflict resolution by supporting and strengthening the local capacity. This can be achieved through economic revitalisation of society and reconstruction processes that ultimately, lead to long-term development plans (Maresca, 2003b, 2004).

2.5.1.3 Post-conflict infrastructure and social development needs

Primarily, reconstruction is a critical process which underpins development and is part of the solution to the conflict (Brown, 2005). PCR needs to support "the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of the society" (Holtzman et al., 1998, p. 14). As Oberg (cited in Fred-Mensah, 1999, p. 451) observed, "conflicts are not only rooted in individuals but also in structures, circumstances and trends". Civil war and violence destroy civil infrastructure and limit the availability of basic social services to the community. In turn, this has a pernicious effect on society, governance and the economy. The goal for reconstruction and development is to rebuild the basic socio-economic infrastructure capable of supporting a sustainable democratic society and spearheading a healthy economy that does not depend on donor monetary aid (Brinkley, 2007; Coyne, 2006; Grey-Johnson, 2006).

Reconstruction of sustainable infrastructure can be a significant contributor to uplifting the livelihood of shattered communities and, thereby, building economic security and a peaceful society. Sustainable infrastructure in a post-war environment can be defined as "physical assets which provide net benefits to a community, its neighbours and the environment on a long term basis" (Brown, 2005, p. 762).

According to Anand (2005), the nation's critical infrastructure includes goods and services that are key to improving the standard of life and increasing the level of economic development. In post-conflict settings, the related infrastructure that provides the nation with a basic system includes water supply, sanitation services,

health and education services, transport and communication, electricity and energy supply. At the same time, it must be noted that in a post-conflict society the ability to complete programs to reconstruct dilapidated infrastructure may prove to be cumbersome, often exacerbated by fraud, inflated contracts, violence, corruption and mismanagement. Building a stable nation requires proactive and sustained efforts of planning in the reconstruction and economic recovery process (Looney, 2006).

AUSA/CSIS (2002) recommends that to rebuild the shattered infrastructure after conflict, development agencies should assimilate the four pillars of reconstruction: establish a safe and secured environment to strengthen institutions; justice and reconciliation to deal with past and current crimes; governance and participation by building capacity in state institutions; and economic and social well-being by restoration and reconstruction of basic services.

The experience in many post-conflict settings has illustrated that the selection, management and implementation of local infrastructure projects can constitute a political undertaking. Political interference complicates the distributional consequence which leads to inefficiency and a lack of enthusiasm at the local level. The selection of projects - whether water, roads, bridges or rehabilitating schools or health centres - can have a significant impact on the lives of the community, thereby affecting local business and family incomes. If projects are designed in consultation with the local community to emphasise participation, transparency and accountability, development programs can improve local investment, promote local business and create employment opportunities. The development of a country's infrastructure projects, through community participation, can also be a major step towards tackling corruption (Gleichmann et al., 2006).

2.6 PCR project management problems

The World Bank and other agencies have conducted a systematic 'review and evaluation' of completed projects over a period of many years. In the reviews, it has been concluded that there was genuinely no mutual agreement on the primary goals and objectives of the projects implemented by funding agencies, civil society

organisations and the local community. In development projects, it was more often perceived that there was weak team leadership, inconsistent support from senior management and a lack of clarity from key stakeholders. In particular, not determining and clarifying the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders directly hampered the project's success. Such projects often lacked adequate local resources to fully implement and enforce programs. There were few feedback mechanisms, even though the objective in monitoring and controlling projects was to provide early detection of problems. Detailed analyses of major risks undertaken in the life cycle of the project were poor or non-existent. Similarly, effective implementation was often delayed by bureaucratic processes for obtaining financial, procurement and personnel approvals (Austin, 2000; Youker, 1999). Security and stability are major prerequisites for sustainable growth in order to continue the efforts of reconstruction (Ahmad, 2001).

2.6.1 Ineffective project planning and preparation

Good planning and project preparation are essential prerequisites to successful project implementation (Zwikael, 2008). Bruins (2000) further stated that management is as critical as the planning process itself. Project goals should be defined and understood by the project team on the ground. The goals and objectives need to be realistic to pursue the far-ranging concept of development, utilising the resources available and overcoming possible constraints (Conyers & Kaul, 1990). Crawford and Pollack (2004) considered a goal could be tangible or intangible; accordingly large infrastructure projects involve mostly engineering and civil construction, both of which are tangible and can be defined in clear and measurable milestones. Rathmell (2005) emphasised the need to identify the crucial requirements of conflicting communities in the planning process and ensure that inadequate resources, even when limited or inadequate, were applied appropriately. In such a complex and fragile environment, it is also fundamental to have a flexible process to accommodate rapidly changing circumstances.

It is essential to plan the entire task before the execution of a project, and estimate the cost and time of completion. More often than not, PCR donors approve funding with no feasibility studies being prepared for the formulation and implementation of

reconstruction projects. The identification of potential alternatives in project designs and their impact on people is virtually impossible in the absence of a feasibility study. Similarly, informed decisions to maximise benefits and lower the cost of the investment are virtually non-existent in such cases. Where feasibility studies are non-existent and planning processes are weak, borrower agencies acting in good faith encounter unexpected financial constraints during implementation (Partridge, 1989).

Rathmell (2005) asserted that in a post-conflict multifaceted society, the management, planning and reporting structures were often cobbled together in an ad-hoc manner. Experience from Iraq and Afghanistan reflects that there is a lot of criticism of the current reconstruction process because of the perceived lack of adequate planning, lack of resources, too little funding and lack of an exit strategy (Coyne, 2006). Moreover, it is well documented that agencies tend to bring with them their own crafted organisational policies, planning, project implementation and operating procedures (Rathmell, 2005).

To strengthen and ensure community ownership, it is important for the local population to be involved in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating PCR projects, particularly because in post-conflict societies there may be continuing violence and insecurity for a considerable period of time. Ethnic communities may not agree on the continuation of certain development projects for various reasons peculiar to them. Continued involvement in a complex and fragile environment requires organisations to ensure that there is flexibility in project planning and implementation (Natsios, 2005).

The planning and coordination phases must incorporate objectives, develop strategies, determine appropriate divisions of labour, mobilise necessary resources and manage competing demands by multiple agencies working together. Training is essential for both the development and maintenance of sustainable efforts. Finally, appropriate funding mechanisms and levels are integral to short-term and long-term reconstruction efforts (AUSA/CSIS, 2002).

2.6.2 Accountability and budgets

Transparency with accountability is a common goal shared by all development practitioners. Similarly, beneficiaries should play a greater role in the design, evaluation and monitoring processes of development programs early in the life of the project; only then can they also be made accountable for the successes and failures of socio-economic development (Natsios, 2005).

Corruption is endemic and pervasive in most post-conflict societies. As a result contractors and international organisations that are endeavouring to implement peace find it difficult to construct major infrastructure projects effectively (Grey-Johnson, 2006). For example, it is estimated that in Iraq, US$5 billion was lost annually to corruption according to the Iraq Commission on Public Integrity (Buckley, 2007). In Kosovo, there is evidence of corruption at all levels, despite donor countries and international financial institutions requiring clean and transparent financial transactions. The implementing agencies find it very difficult to institute transparency and reassure donors to maintain sustained funding (Naarden & Locke, 2004). With corruption being omnipresent in most post-conflict and post-disaster situations, government and aid agencies have established anticorruption monitoring systems to ensure transparency. This has been the experience in Iraq, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone (Grey-Johnson, 2006). However to help prevent fraud and corruption, building accountability is an important and complex issue in PCR for infrastructure projects (Anand, 2005).

2.6.3 Lack of communication and community participation

Members of civil society are seldom included in the decision-making processes; more often they are seen as partners in the implementation of development projects. To achieve sustained growth and development, beneficiaries must be engaged systematically in the planning and decision-making processes throughout the life cycle of the project (Gennip, 2005; World Bank, 2006). A study of the post-war recovery projects in Kosovo found that the views of the members of the community were not utilised effectively in the reconstruction process (King & Mason, 2006).

Community participation is a key component of development strategy, but consultation demands significant time and resources (Brown, 2005; Engel, 2003). It is difficult to strengthen early and continuous participation of local stakeholders and beneficiaries in the project design and implementation, as many skilled and educated persons do not return to the reconstruction zone immediately after the conflict. In the aftermath of war, donors also find it hard to communicate potential concerns or challenges about projects at an early enough stage, due to distance and poor communication infrastructure (Youker, 1999). To help restore and nurture the confidence of the local community throughout the reconstruction process, it is vital to develop a comprehensive communications strategy (Locurcio, 2005; Mashatt, Long & Crum, 2008).

2.6.4 Donor conditionality

In post-conflict situations, there is an apparent lack of funds to support local institutions to meet their objectives, fulfil their external obligations and discharge their responsibilities to the community. Donors are reluctant to entrust the management of funds to government institutions that have lost the capacity to manage economic and financial resources (Grey-Johnson, 2006). More often in an environment of scarce funding, the projects operate according to the priorities of the donors rather than the development needs of the local community (Evans-Kent & Bleiker, 2003).

2.6.5 Lack of resources

Human resource capacities may also be major institutional constraints in a post-conflict society implementing reconstruction projects. Strengthening of local institutions will not only be beneficial to the community, but will also maximise the long-term benefits of humanitarian aid. This enhancing of local institutional capacity will make better use of the available donor resources and will assist in mitigating risks and expectations (Collier et al., 2003). With multiple projects to administer, skilled people are scarce and agencies usually have difficulty meeting the resource requirements necessary to execute project planning and implementation (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Youker, 1999). Rathmell (2005) stated that a UN report noted that

the international community, in carrying out its mission, had frequently referred to the lack of resources as the main reason for limited success in reconstruction projects. In many cases, while more resources are needed to meet the competing demands to fill the critical gaps, even if the required tools do exist, it is often the organisation's implementation process that lacks a shared, coherent strategy to allocate limited or scarce resources.

Many post-conflict countries have rich natural resources, but without funds, trained and experienced people, technical expertise and suitable technology there is a limit to how far such countries can develop their resources to prevent conflict and build peace (Stuckenbruck & Zomorrodian, 1987). It is common practice that donors fund reconstruction of physical infrastructure, but they do not have comprehensive reconstruction programs that include plans for the training and expenses linked to the operation and staffing of these facilities (Dewdney, Grove, Ho, Whelan & Zwi, 2004). The competing demands for material, human and institutional resources raise a number of key issues and challenges which should be taken into account when designing and implementing PCR projects. An effective framework needs to be implemented for the application of reconstruction projects and programs using an approach that is flexible, while continuing to meet the needs of the civil society (World Bank, 2007a).

2.6.6 Poor procurement practice

"Procurement delays bedevil project implementation" (World Bank, 2007a, p. 7). In a PCR environment, scarcity of resources necessitates that a large percentage of material be imported for the execution of reconstruction projects. The traditional practice is to procure goods by a tendering process, where the lowest bidder is usually awarded the contract. Tenders can either be for procurement of goods only for the project, or to procure for, and implement, the total project. More often than not, reconstruction projects are implemented over a long period of time and, when awarding the contract, it is very difficult for the implementing agency to know the quality of the output (Quartey, 1996). Often international donors choose to be involved in the procurement process and usually exert pressure on the implementing agencies to procure goods from stipulated firms from the donor country that may not

match the local requirements (Youker, 2003). In general, it may be argued that the contractors are servile, submissive and compliant with the terms and conditions implied in the project tender. However, in reality they may not be fully committed to the task, even though at times the final output resulting in the project completion can fall short of the outcome sought by the beneficiary. In most cases, these donor-sponsored organisations are not very skilled, and the technology offered may not be suitable for a community severely destroyed by war (Quartey, 1996).

2.6.7 Lack of management and public service infrastructures

Due to the absence of state institutions in a post-conflict society there is limited management capacity, poor emphasis on manpower development and training, and a lack of established management or technical standards. The situation is made more complicated by bureaucratic systems that cause delay in implementing projects and programs (Brown, 2005). Due to a lack of coordination and information exchange between agencies, very often projects are duplicated. Furthermore, organisations also take over projects where they do not have the adequate competencies or adequate training. For example, development agencies that are specialised in water projects also compete for donor funding in psychosocial or housing projects (Evans-Kent & Bleiker, 2003).

2.6.8 Inappropriate design and implementation methods

To a great extent, much of the infrastructure in PCR regions suffers from low quality design or sub-standard construction (Barrett, 2008). Often project designs are implemented without taking into account the local conditions, needs and capacities. Many projects have failed before completion due to the non-involvement of the stakeholders or, when implemented, they were inappropriate to address community needs. Civil participation in the initial stages of planning and design of the project is usually very minimal, and this makes the project output less relevant to the beneficiaries. Selecting the proper process is critical for success where the intended beneficiaries make effective use of the project outcome. Participation in the selection process by locals will minimise negative sociological impacts among the vulnerable

and disadvantaged sections of communities (Cliffe et al., 2003; Sonuga, Aliboh & Oloke, 2002).

2.7 Summary of PCR Society

Literature highlights a number of polemics for PCR projects. The international community and its local partners face many strategic challenges in the execution of projects, which include weak assessments, planning at various stages of a project life cycle and, due to the complex environment, systematic issues with scheduling. In a post-conflict society deeply affected by periodic violence, the community and project team may not put together a risk management plan. A comprehensive strategic communication plan is vital given the complexity and politically sensitive nature of project implementation. Post-conflict countries also have extinguished, or at best limited, resources and lack the capacity to implement long-term projects; particularly lacking are standard procurement and cost estimating processes. Quality assurance mechanisms are rarely established for long-term project sustainability. Under these circumstances, while emphasising the importance of good governance, it is critical to develop processes and practices in a coherent and cohesive manner to promote and support reconstruction and development projects. Kosovo's recent history has been dominated by the PCR 'developmental' phase and international donors are financing major construction and engineering projects. The current study was used to examine the complexities of planning and implementing large infrastructure projects, to establish whether they address some of the problems facing post-conflict societies, to assess how they can be effectively implemented in actual communities and to explore what can be learnt from these projects to widen their application to other post-conflict situations.

2.8 Policies, projects and programs

Over 35 years ago, Rondinelli (1976b, p. 14) noted that "if policies are to be translated into development activities … planning in developing countries must become more project-oriented". This statement is still true for development experts and practitioners who undertake a wide variety of tasks, identify their work as project-based activities and consider development work as a series of projects and

programs: "a vast interlocking series of them" (Wield, 1999, p. 36). In many developing countries around the world, projects are the key element of implementing development activity and are the basic means of translating national policies into action programs. While there has been a sharp decline in state activity, many of the activities are implemented in the form of projects as "a process of projectisation" (Wield, 1999, p. 36). The implementation of major grants and loans being projectised is evidenced by UN agencies, NGOs and international financial institutions focusing on delivering aid in the form of projects or programs (Austin, 2000; Bell, 1999; Overton & Storey, 2004; Winter, Smith, Morris & Cicmil, 2006).

In a post-conflict society, chaos and disorder can be found at the highest political levels. Often, this leads to legal institutions failing to protect individuals, an increasingly complex or fragmented structure of local governance, minimum standards of transparency, absence of property rights, food shortages, lack of access to safe water, extremely limited health care and soaring unemployment (Blunt, 2003; del Castillo, 2001; Engel, 2003). While improved governance, reconciliation and institution building prevents the recurrence of conflict, approaches to resolving conflict should also include execution of infrastructure projects as a necessary condition for the transition to peace and sustained economic growth (Cole & Hsu, 2009). Even though international aid and support cannot automatically bring about a shift from conflict to peace, the practice of integrating development projects and programs in post-conflict societies will continue to be rewarding if effectively implemented (Fagen, 2003). There needs to be a strong commitment from development agencies to organise and plan for the long-term reconstruction and reconciliation processes in nation building (Fagen, 2003; James, 2003).

Establishing a strong nation and strengthening local governance require both short-term and long-term projects and programs. Reconstruction and development projects should reinforce the local capability of the governing regime to strengthen security, provide a stable political environment, eradicate violent conflict, generate sustained economic activities and combat poverty and inequality (Montgomery & Rondinelli, 2004; Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2005). In their development efforts, countries emerging from conflict will actively implement and execute development programs

and projects[9] of various sizes and complexity to deliver essential goods and services to their people. They include both 'hard'[10] projects like public housing, construction of roads, dams, bridges, commercial buildings, sanitation, power and water purification plants and 'soft' projects like education, health, social work, community empowerment, child protection, HIV prevention and capacity building (Diallo & Thuiller, 2005; Stuckenbruck & Zomorrodian, 1987; Youker, 1999).

Most stakeholders operate in an environment where projects may encounter many risks and uncertainties along the entire project timeline from initiation to execution, commissioning and post-handover of the project to the community. The commonly identified risks can be, but are not limited to, political, operational, technical, financial or commercial in origin. The occurrence of unforeseen risks and changing circumstances can have an enormous impact, resulting in the lack of satisfactory project implementation to both the community and donors (Lock, 2003).

Locurcico (2005, p. 26) emphasised that "well managed projects produce lasting benefits to the society". The planning and the application process of projects in the field is a complex exercise for the implementing partners in a post-conflict society, with limited knowledge and understanding, and insufficient resources and expertise, being major hurdles in this process (Fagen, 2003). PCR then should facilitate the transition from war to sustainable peace and permeate the groundwork for physical, economic and social development by adopting a comprehensive, well-sequenced and flexible approach.

Conventional 'project-based management' tools and techniques are usually applied to technology-intensive areas in construction, engineering and information systems industries. It has been recognised recently that project management knowledge and practices can be applied in many disciplines other than technological areas; these would include sociology, psychology, education and health management (Smith, 2003; Winter et al., 2006). The use of *project-based management* tools, techniques and methodologies assists the successful completion of projects in a wide variety of

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[9] 98 percent of the 21 billion US$ funding allocated for the rebuilding and reconstruction of Iraq have been endorsed for projects (Buckley, 2007, p. 9).

[10] A year long study has found that 75 percent of the projects implemented are engineering and technical in the early recovery process (IRC, 2007).

areas and within the agreed timeline, cost and performance criteria (Smith, 2003). It has great potential to address the complex process accompanying the risk and challenges of reconstruction efforts (Stuckenbruck & Zomorrodian, 1987).

2.8.1 A conceptual framework for intervention in PCR

Previous sections have examined the background and challenges to PCR. A major lack of capability in the identification, formulation, design and implementation of projects continues to be the substantial impediment to post-conflict countries attempting to augment the flow of capital for the benefit of the community (Rondinelli, 1976a). The challenge that emerges is to address the immediate concerns for laying the foundation for PCR by means of social and economic infrastructure through a 'project-based management' approach.

2.8.1.1 Definitions, objectives and contexts

Projects are the basic building blocks underpinning development in a post-conflict society. Awarded through grants, loans and technical aid to developing countries by international agencies, projects have reached a large number of people in developing countries for nearly a quarter of a century. Projects contribute to social and economic growth and can provide the means to exploit new economic opportunities and mobilise investment funds to implement domestic policies (Rondinelli, 1976b).

Projects are the key building blocks in the design and implementations of policies and strategies in PCR efforts (Hasic, 2004, p. 54; Rondinelli, 1976a). Gittinger stated that projects were the 'cutting edge' of development (Gittinger, 1972). Hirschman (1967, p. 72) professed them to be "privileged particles of the development process". The UN's view is that it is important to recognise that a broad range of stakeholders partake in the formulation and implementation of economic and social development. By way of example, stakeholders in all key aspects of development are largely more concerned with programs and projects administration than with the generic aspects of public administration in a post-conflict setting (United Nations, 1971).

Turner and Muller (2003, p. 7) defined a project "as a temporary organisation to which resources are assigned to undertake a unique, novel and transient endeavour

managing the inherent uncertainty and need for integration in order to deliver beneficial objectives of change". The project is a carefully selected set of activities chosen to use resources (time, money, people, materials, energy, space, provisions, communication, quality, risk and so forth) to meet pre-defined objectives.

A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK, 2008, p. 6) defined project management as "the application of knowledge, skills, tools and techniques to project activities to meet the project requirements". A mission-oriented definition was developed because "project management is a flexible, mission-oriented management tool that can be used to move both complex and simple projects along" (Anzalone, 2000, p. 54). In the words of Llamazares and Levy (2003, p.11) "defining a programme or project as peacebuilding implies that it promotes positive peace in three dimensions: the activities undertaken, the process of implementation, and the impact or outcomes".

Projects have to identify key stakeholders and, according to PMBOK (2008, p. 246), "are persons and organisations such as customers, sponsors, the performing organisation, and the public that are actively involved in the project, or whose interest may be positively or negatively affected by the execution or completion of the project". Voetsch and Myers (2005, p. 1) argued that, in a post-conflict setting, the key stakeholders were "the client (aid donor who is both the customer and sponsor), the counterpart (government, non-governmental personnel who are also a customer) and the project team (contractors who are the performing organisation and project team)".

A program is a grouping of existing projects managed in a coordinated way, and it is essential that the organisation has a set of guiding management principles to achieve all activities and project objectives (Pellegrinelli, 1997). In post-conflict settings, it is important that the organisation's project resources are combined and coordinated, so as to effectively achieve, within a time frame, the development of applications which would otherwise be impractical to manage independently. Similarly, "programme management is the coordinated support, planning, prioritization and monitoring of projects to meet changing needs" (Ferns, 1991, p. 149).

In order to ensure effective implementation of reconstruction and development programs, authorities and the wider society have to undertake a series of interrelated

and interdependent development projects (Nel, 2001; Wield, 1999). To respond to these challenges, the provision of services commences with the making of a policy. Policies are strengthened further through the establishment of a program that is implemented by a number of projects. It is evident that, even though the terms 'policy', 'program' and 'projects' in the post-conflict context are increasingly complex and often confused, they remain closely interrelated (Kerzner, 2001; Nel, 2001; UN, 1971).

2.8.2 Project 'development' application through project life cycle

A project life cycle is not just about the start and finish dates; rather, it is a defined and logical approach to planning and managing the development life cycle process. According to the PMI, the processes are guided through five Process Groups: defining and organising, planning, managing execution, controlling and closing (Muriithi & Crawford, 2003; Nel, 2001). PMBOK (2008) emphasises that though the project management processes are generally acknowledged and applied, this does not however imply that the practices should be broadly applied on all projects. In a post-conflict environment, the project management team, in collaboration and partnership with the wider project steering committee and the participating community, should be responsible for determining what knowledge, skills, tools and techniques are appropriate in the given situation.

The project cycle consists of a number of progressive phases that, broadly speaking, lead from the identification of needs and objectives through to the planning and implementation of activities to address pre-determined needs and objectives, and onto the assessment of the outcomes. It serves to provide structure and direction to development activities while, at the same time, allowing for key objectives and issues to remain in focus. Though the exact number of stages varies somewhat according to each organisation and each project, as do the names given to each stage, it is possible to identify certain generic phases that are present in almost all project cycles (Biggs & Smith, 2003).

Many other variations of the project cycle diagram exist, though most agencies develop their own version (see Appendix 2). UNICEF, for example, uses a simplified

"Triple A" circle: Assessment, Analysis and Action (Stetson, Hahn, Leege, Reynolds & Sharrock, 2007). The World Bank introduced the project cycle (see Appendix 1) over 30 years ago as a rational way of conceptualising and managing projects. It has since become standard practice for development agencies to use this type of project cycle framework (Biggs & Smith, 2003).

The project initiation phase represents a critical initial stage, where the options are identified and formulated as a preliminary project proposal by the stakeholders. From the outset, it is imperative that the project has clearly defined objectives and that the organisation has petitioned for all the expertise and resources it needs to ensure successful implementation (Locurcio, 2007). In the planning phase, the project proposal developed is tested through a series of feasibility analyses to enable a first appraisal of potential hurdles. These analyses also include scenarios for potential changes using project assumptions and possible risks involved in implementation. This phase identifies the many operational tasks or activities that need to be accomplished. It identifies potential and likely constraints that will impact on the time estimates in the complex environment. The formalised project plan is then implemented and reviewed with careful monitoring of progress by the project team and handed over to the local community after completion of the project (AIPM, 1996).

2.8.2.1 Creating a workable project plan (Managing scope)

The primary purpose of managing project scope is to ensure that all the work that is required under the project, and only that work, is undertaken so as to complete the project successfully (PMBOK, 2008). The planning of project development activities involves identifying, estimating and preparing all the activities that have to be executed in order to achieve strategic project objectives and outputs. The outcome of the project plan (Table 2.3) includes the project phases, deliverables, resources, time, cost, risk and quality dimensions (Cardinal & Marle, 2006; Globerson & Zwikael, 2002).

Table 2.3: Major output for each planning process

Knowledge area	Planning processes	Major output
Integration	Project plan development	Project plan
Scope	Scope planning	Project deliverables
	Scope definition	Work breakdown structure
Time	Activity definition	Project activities
	Activity sequencing	PERT or Gantt chart
	Activity duration estimation	Activity duration schemes
	Schedule development	Activity start and end dates
Cost	Resource Planning	Activity required resources
	Cost estimating	Resource cost
	Cost budgeting	Time phased budget
Quality	Quality planning	Quality management plan
Human Resources	Organisational planning	Role and responsibility assignments
	Staff acquisition	Project staff assignments
Communications	Communications planning	Communications management plan
Risk	Risk management planning	Risk management plan
	Risk identification	Risk list
	Qualitative risk analysis	Project overall risk ranking
	Risk response planning	Prioritised list of quantified risks
		Risk response plan
Procurement	Procurement planning	Procurement management plan
	Solicitation planning	Procurement documents

Source: Globerson & Zwikael (2002, p. 60).

The success of a project depends on how effectively the organisation plans the major project phases, activities and milestones. The project scope outlines the broad details of required project outcomes and defines objectives to guide the execution process (Locurcio, 2007). The process not only allows, but requires, constant review throughout the project life cycle (Wolfe & Swanberg, 1994). By applying a project-based management approach, the project plan can be organised and presented with a realistic justification of the activities with key deliverables, objectives and constraints clearly defined (Cabanis, 1998). It is important to stress that the approach must be flexible, and it is advantageous to identify the critical parts of projects where

flexibility is needed in the planning stage (Olsson, 2006). A project will proceed successfully only if the implementing organisation plans and understands the needs of the community to whom the project relates. It is crucial to define clearly the purpose, aims, goals and objectives at the beginning of the planning stage. The project planning stage involves subdivision of the tasks into smaller parts, and allocation of resources for the attainment of the objectives (Schneider, 1995).

2.8.2.2 Develop procurement strategy (Managing procurement)

Project procurement management is the knowledge area that deals with acquiring goods and services from outside the immediate project organisation (Hamilton, 1997). Managing the procurement process (see Figure 2.2) in a challenging post-conflict setting is fundamental to the effective implementation of projects. It is essential for international agencies to have both of the required fundamental assets of personnel and infrastructure in place before the project is initiated. Characterised by their extreme complexity, the risks and uncertainties associated with post-conflict environments include the lack of availability of goods and uncertainty of their timely delivery due to poor resources being available locally. This is particularly the case when multiple organisations execute parallel projects simultaneously in different operational areas. Organisations should have a detailed, coordinated procurement plan with clear objectives, timelines and responsibilities. It is considered good practice to develop a procurement schedule with key milestones and contingency plans; for example having a tool for mobilisation of resources that can provide appropriate direction to the project team and demonstrate a clear and detailed implementation schedule (UNDP/IAPSO, 2005).

The objective of best practice for every organisation should be to strive to deliver all goods and services on time to meet the needs of the target population. The standards for procurement of goods should be developed in accordance with local practices, and the agency should be able to hand over responsibilities to the local community after completion of the project. The participation of all stakeholders in the procurement process will ensure acceptance of the materials supplied to the community (UNDP/IAPSO, 2005).

Figure 2.2: The procurement process

Source: UNDP/IAPSO (2005, p. 2).

2.8.2.3 Understanding risks and developing mitigating strategies (Managing risk)

Managing project risk includes managing the processes concerned with identifying, analysing, and responding to uncertainty (PMBOK, 2008). The key objective should be to identify and manage (Figure 2.3) through feedback and monitoring systems (Cooper, Grey, Raymond & Walker, 2005). In a post-conflict society, there are many risks involved throughout the project life cycle and, potentially, risks that can be negated or reduced through proper planning. Assessing the risk is a participatory process which involves the community and all stakeholders in identifying the hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities of the recuperating community (Mazzei & Scuppa, 2006). The appropriate practice for any organisation is to conduct a detailed risk assessment survey of the environment in which the project is to be implemented. To manage growth and sustainable development of the community after a conflict, the challenge is to reduce the vulnerabilities and possible losses of local resources and opportunities. Therefore, it is vital to involve the local population in the decision- making process. Identifying the risks of a project creates ownership of the planning process and acts as a resource for future projects. Thus, participatory

planning reduces the occurrence of severe and long-term risks because risk assessment takes into account the socio-economic and socio-political factors that circumscribe the communities, as well as the implementing organisations' vulnerabilities to the likelihood of risks and threats (Kafle & Murshed, 2006).

Figure 2.3: The project risk management process

COMMUNICATE AND CONSULT

Establish the context	**Identify the risk**	**Analyse the risk**	**Evaluate the risks**	**Treat the risks**
Objectives	What can happen?	Review controls	Evaluate the risks	Identify options
Stakeholders criteria	How can it happen?	Likelihoods	Rank the risks	Select the best responses
Define key elements		Consequences		Develop risk treatment plans
		Level of risks		Implement

MONITOR AND REVIEW

Source: Cooper et al. (2005, p.15).

As an outcome of the risk assessment process, the ranking of risks provides a basis for planning and acts as a guide for the management of project-wide risk reduction. The reduction of identified risks must be based on community-based risk management. If each organisation and the conflict-ridden community are familiar with the identified risks, and have prepared mitigation measures, then the delay in implementing the project can be reduced (Kafle & Murshed, 2006).

2.8.2.4 Allocation and optimisation of resources (Managing human resources)

Managing human resources includes the processes required to ensure the most effective use of people with relevant skills on the project (Hamilton, 1997). Human resource issues such as staffing, training, compensation and succession planning can be highly sensitive, especially in a society divided by conflicts and disparate minorities' issues and in which there are minimal organisational and leadership skills available. In practice, the exceptional circumstances faced by donor agencies in post-conflict settings are constrained further where there is a lack of planning processes

for the effective implementation of human resources policies. Given the dynamic nature of the work environment in post-conflict zones, international agencies should play a major role in strengthening human resource capacities with emphasis on training and skills development amongst divided communities, thereby reducing inequity. The project plan should take into account the provision of specialist training to members of the local community in project reporting, monitoring and evaluation. It is important to examine the scope and requirement of mission staff before the donor approves the project. All participating agencies must plan and coordinate the services they intend to provide to the community, as well as the costs and associated quality standards. A combination of international and local community agencies operates in post-conflict settings under minimal local regulation, policy and frameworks. Therefore, it is critical that organisations understand and respond to local cultural differences by promoting 'cultural self-assessment' (Dewdney et al., 2004).

Agencies implement projects for a certain period, after which the team dissolves or is assigned to a different project (Figure 2.4). When the team withdraws, the planning process should give way to the acquisition of project-related knowledge and skills by the beneficiaries to ensure continuing and sustainable services provision (Dewdney et al., 2004; Huemann, Keegan & Turner, 2007).

Figure 2.4: HRM in the project-oriented company

Source: Huemann et al. (2007, p. 319).

2.8.2.5 Effective communication strategy (Managing communication)

Project communication management provides the critical links between people, ideas and information that are necessary for success. The knowledge area is required to ensure timely and appropriate generation, collection, dissemination, storage and ultimate disposition of project information (PMBOK, 2008). Communication plays a fundamental role in providing sustained, coordinated and focused support for the effective implementation of projects in PCR development. In a rapidly evolving society, an effective communication plan and active participation by all stakeholders in the decision-making process can significantly improve transparency and accountability (World Bank, 2006). They can offer appropriate opportunities to contribute to the decision-making process and policy development involving marginalised and isolated members of the community. It is also crucial that the project information shared is understood fully by the beneficiaries in order to foster acceptance of the services and resources associated with the project. The communication strategy aims to formulate coordinated action between development agencies and local stakeholders to promote community involvement in the design and implementation of projects and dissemination of results (FAO, 2006; Mazzei & Scuppa, 2006).

Within the framework of the communication plan, mechanisms must be created to:
- balance exchanges of information and establish strong consensus on key issues and problems among multiple stakeholders; and
- support the beneficiaries or target groups of the project by assisting in identifying and defining project objectives that reflect the needs of the community.

The framework can facilitate and strengthen the active participation of all relevant stakeholders at any moment in all stages of the project cycle. Full and effective involvement of all stakeholders of the project can promote sustainable development efforts (Mefalopulos, 2005).

2.8.2.6 Controlling project schedule (Managing time)

Management of the project timeline requires that the processes and activities are able to ensure timely completion of the project (PMBOK, 2008). Post-conflict environment projects certainly carry an element of risk and uncertainty and it is not possible for the project team to know with certainty the exact duration of activities. The fundamental premise is to establish a realistic time frame for the completion of projects. The implementing agency, in partnership with all stakeholders, should participate meaningfully in developing a feasible and workable activity plan. When formulating the plan, it is important to rely on past experiences in the establishment of a start and finish time for individual activities. To the extent possible, the base schedule should also take into consideration the resource constraints and meet the objectives set by the implementing agency. In practice, many projects or programs in a post-conflict context are implemented simultaneously in different areas of operations. To ensure successful, streamlined implementation, project teams should coordinate with one another, provide time estimates reasonable to all parties and develop careful planning so as not to cause disrepute later. By estimating project time frames and duration (Table 2.4), control mechanisms can be proposed to focus on the differences between estimated and actual performance once the project is underway (Stetson et al., 2007; Demeulemeester & Herroelen, 2002).

Table 2.4: Gantt chart format for an activity schedule

ACTIVITIES AND TASKS	YEAR 1												RESPONSIBILITIES
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
1. Train community members	xx	xx											Kwesi Ampong, Health Manager
1.1 Meet with community members	xx	xx											
1.2 Develop LNRA outline		xx											Consultant to be appointed
1.3 Prepare training materials			xx	xx	xx								Consultant to be appointed
etc.													

Source: Stetson et al. *(2007, p. 76).*

2.8.2.7 Develop quality standards for development projects (Managing quality)

Ensuring the quality of a project involves managing the processes and activities of the performing organisation. This in turn determines quality policies, objectives and responsibilities so that the project will satisfy the needs for which it was undertaken (PMBOK, 2008). A project needs to be monitored on an ongoing basis to ensure that it is progressing according to the plan. In practice, not all civil society organisations or agencies draw up a quality plan to define how quality can be achieved for reconstruction and development projects in a post-conflict society. At the same time, a lack of expertise and limited resources constrain procedures to assure quality and control. Therefore, irrespective of the size and complexity of the project, the quality plan should include how the organisation intends to handle disputes, documentation requirements, reporting and review procedures, beneficiary liaisons and so forth. In an environment characterised by scarcity of resources, the project team should monitor the changing needs of the situation on a continuous basis. This may require periodic updating and modification of the project (Figure 2.5 provides an example of quality plan content). In this context, creating feedback mechanisms may provide insights into what is actually required and what is non-essential in the planning and implementation of later projects or a similar project in another location (Gleichmann et al., 2005; Turner, 1999).

Figure 2.5: Management quality pyramid

Source: CRS Management Quality Pyramid, Adapted from the American Audit Association. Stetson et al. (2007, p. 42).

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2.8.2.8 Implementing financial controls (Managing cost)

Every project involves managing and controlling the costs of various components of the project. Managing cost is relevant in the process of planning, estimating, budgeting and controlling finance to ensure that the project can be completed within the approved budget (PMBOK, 2008). Corruption is a widespread phenomenon and represents obfuscation of actual costs in PCR and development efforts in nation-building (Balaj & Wallich, 1999). To overcome corruption in the overall humanitarian and development context, a detailed cost strategy and project cost estimate plan should be developed and communicated to all stakeholders. These cost estimates are then approved and implemented to ensure clarity in understanding of the expected outcomes of the project. The project organisation should conduct periodic analyses and make variations to costs in order to maintain control of the project. The project team should keep track of the changing financial and overall project objectives and seek approval for major changes to approved funding (AIPM, 1996).

2.9 Summary of the chapter

The concept of managing PCR and implementing development projects that subscribe to commonly accepted project management standards, such as the PMI PMBOK is a relatively new and evolving field. Given the complexities involved in post-war reconstruction and recovery, practitioners, academics and policy makers working in post-conflict environments have not established the essential "theoretical foundations" and "strict conceptual and operational framework" for successfully executing reconstruction project management processes (Hasic, 2004, p. 4).

Congruent with prior literature, managing projects in a post-conflict environment is a complex undertaking and, under these circumstances, the traditional management of projects is not the best structure for success. If the implementing agencies are to achieve project efficiency, then careful consideration of project management processes needs to be formulated and adapted to cope with uncertainty. The tools and techniques of the PMBOK areas could be applied in the planning and implementation of infrastructure projects in Kosovo. A proposed hypothetical

framework for the study is demonstrated in Figure 2.6. Based on the review of existing literature the current study was designed to provide a better understanding of how the application of project management principles can improve the efficiency of PCR projects.

An overview of the literature review resulting in the development of the hypothetical model for the study was presented in three categories: understanding the context of Kosovo's experience and lessons learned from the copiously informative post-conflict nation-building operations; the knowledge about reconstruction of post-conflict societies; and the potential of the eight knowledge areas of PMBOK project management processes.

Figure 2.6: Post-conflict reconstruction project management framework

Post-conflict Reconstruction
Project Management Framework

2.9.1 Understanding Kosovo's experience

Operating as an independent and sovereign state, Kosovo has faced decades of political and cultural repression that has hindered significant social and economic development. Given Kosovo's historical experiences of inter-ethnic discord and the worsening economy, there are a number of factors that need to be addressed when taking on the responsibility of rebuilding the society after the conflict. Anand (2005);

Brown (2005); Collier (2009); DFID (2005); Fedderke, Perkins and Luiz (2006); Fourie (2008); Mashatt et al., (2008); OECD (2006); Quartey (1996); Schwartz, Hahn & Bannon (2004) and others have corroborated the view that investing in extensive infrastructure is one of the key tenets for sustainable economic growth to achieve the goals of nation building. The damage and destruction after the Civil War and years of under-investment in the infrastructure in Kosovo are extreme examples of the challenges facing the international community and, in particular, the UN-led coalition in reconstructing the country.

As Kosovo moves from PCR to longer-term nascent economic growth, researchers of post-conflict societies suggest that coordination and common planning by both the international development partners and the local administration are lacking. It is essential that donors and the international community understand they cannot achieve development goals unless the local community is encouraged to partner the designing and planning of policies, projects and programs, and develop capacities over time to achieve social and economic goals (Montgomery & Rondinelli, 2004). There is a need for more practical and appropriate management tools to identify and adopt workable processes for post-conflict project planning and implementation. Consultations among key stakeholders with a direct relationship to the project are critical to ascertain what they perceive as essential components of project planning systems and processes to achieve beneficial social and economic change.

2.9.2 Conceptual framework for reconstruction of post-conflict societies

Addison and McGillivray (2004, p. 353) drew the conclusion that "if projects are well designed, well targeted, and well implemented … they can restore badly needed infrastructure, and can win broad-based local support for peace and reconstruction processes". Managing post-conflict projects in Kosovo has proven far more challenging to the international organisations and the local communities. Project planning and design must be informed by the accurate analysis of the post-conflict environment driven by local conditions. Sound preparation, execution and monitoring are vital for efficient and effective use of donor funds to help ensure that resources are utilised for the intended purpose and, more importantly, to achieve long-term goals. There is still a wide gap between theoretical and practical

knowledge, as well as a lack of research-based applications of systematic methods of project management in PCR development. This gap is evident in the dearth of literature and empirical research involving the practical application of management tools deployed in the international development aid sector (Diallo & Thuiller, 2005; Elonen & Artto, 2003; Khang & Moe, 2008; Themistocleous & Wearne, 2000). The objective in the current study, therefore, was to develop an integrated framework for managing projects in a post-conflict society by critically examining the challenges in the planning and by identifying deficiencies in the implementation of PCR projects.

2.9.3 PMBOK project management processes

In the beginning of 2008 there were 26 active armed conflicts worldwide (Hewitt, 2010), and in 2010 there were 24 major armed conflicts in Asia, Africa, in the Americas and the Middle East (Gill, 2011). Notably, there are post-conflict states undergoing reconstruction and development. In order to improve the development and governance in those countries, it is time for international development experts, researchers and practitioners to address the question of how a 'project management approach' to reconstruction processes in post-conflict societies differs from project management in peaceful countries. Consideration also needs to be given to what tools and techniques work best for the prevention, management and peaceful resolution of conflict when executing projects in such countries (Voetsch & Myers, 2005). In an increasingly precarious and unpredictable environment, the functionality of post-conflict societies needs to be improved so as to increase the physical and economic status of recipient communities. This requires a management approach which is highly responsive and flexible, thereby challenging the existing socio-economic status quo (Fielding, 2006).

2.9.4 Research Study Model

The current study was designed to examine how the reconstruction and development of infrastructure projects in Kosovo are planned and executed as well as how successful (or unsuccessful) criteria are used to develop operational processes and practices for the planning and execution of reconstruction projects and integrating a streamlined focused program for inter-agency cooperation. By examining the

existing planning processes and complex operational experiences of PCR development projects in a more systematic way, a hypothetical model (Figure 2.7) for planning and implementing projects in post-conflict settings using 'Project-based management' has been developed. This model uses the nine knowledge areas of PMBOK: integration, scope, time, cost, quality, human resources, communication, risk and procurement. The following chapter describes the research design and the methodology used in the study to test the hypothetical model.

Figure 2.7: Post-conflict reconstruction project management hypothetical model

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

If you have access to both quantitative and qualitative data, you can use both forms of data to understand your research problem and answer your research questions ... mixed method research has become popular as the newest development in research methods and in approaches to "mix" quantitative and qualitative research (Creswell, 2008, p. 551).

3.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the underlying principle for the selection of research methodology followed in the study is described. An outline of the plan of action is provided which includes research study design, sampling techniques, population, research instruments, data collection strategies and the methods of analysing data to answer the research questions governed by the research objectives. A mixed method research tool combining both qualitative and quantitative data collection, together with a case study strategy, was used to describe post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction project processes. This approach addresses the complexities of planning, designing and implementing post-conflict reconstruction projects.

As an exploratory case study, quantitative data was collected through a survey questionnaire to address questions concerning factors that influence the adopting organisations' decisions on project planning and implementation. The related data on post-conflict socio-economic analysis of conflict and its impact on project standards and implementation were primarily qualitative. To gain a better understanding of practice-based planning and implementation of projects in a post-conflict environment, a triangulation approach was applied for strengthening research rigour through the combining of both qualitative and quantitative research methods.

In the first part of this chapter, the methodological framework of the study is outlined. In the second part, details about the quantitative methods for the design and development of questionnaires are discussed. Qualitative data collection techniques

used in the study are discussed in the third part, and in the final section the issue of rigour within the case study research process is addressed. The chapter concludes with a concise summary of the overall methodology used in the study.

3.1 Methodological framework of the study

In this study, the complex challenges of planning and implementing post-conflict reconstruction projects in Kosovo were examined from a number of perspectives that included the historical aspect and current political, social and economic factors that contributed greatly to development effectiveness. There are many types of research design, and no single ideal research methodology can contribute specifically to the way in which data about a phenomenon should be gathered, analysed and used. Research design is underpinned by the notion of '*fitness for purpose*'; the purpose of the research leads to a decision on the methodology and design of the study (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007, p. 78). Despite the potential of a '*project-management approach*' and the complexity of the topic to be addressed, extant research on the topic of post-conflict reconstruction projects, which would provide a better understanding of the factors that may impact on project success, remains sparse, especially at the planning and implementation levels (Hasic, 2004).

The choice of a research method relates to the aim of the study; largely it depends upon the nature of the enquiry and maximising the availability of information. There are many research methods available to extract information, none of which is essentially better than the other, but which are used for different purposes. In this study, a mixed methods approach (Figure 3.1) was used. It is assumed, generally, that combining both qualitative and quantitative methods can provide a better analysis of the research problem and questions that can be achieved by using either method alone (Brewer & Hunter, 1989). Patton (2002) emphatically argued that the results in different methods could produce quite different interpretations. The challenge was to determine the appropriate strategy to be applied through the use of mixed methods evaluations which combined qualitative and quantitative data gathering techniques in a given situation. To design and broaden the understanding of reconstruction projects in Kosovo, the mixed method approach was applied in the study because, as summarised in the words of Porcino and Verhoef (2010, p.1):

Mixed methods research is increasingly being recognised for its ability to bring multiple points of view to a research project, taking advantage of the strengths of each of the quantitative and qualitative components to explain or resolve complex phenomena or results

Figure 3.1: Research methodology

3.1.1 Why case study research in post-conflict settings?

A case study approach draws together different forms of data on the same phenomena, processes and events in more than one way (Velde, Jansen & Anderson, 2004). Case studies have been used widely in management research to review processes which are uncertain, and events that are often unknown and/or entail change. Multiple case studies can also be used to examine the organisation's processes and practices in extreme situations where changes occur over time (Druckman, 2005; McCutcheon & Meredith, 1993). Hartley (2004) suggested that the case study often focused on the processes of change and was suitable to analyse complex organisational processes. A case study simultaneously gives the researcher

an opportunity to explore social processes in-depth and to develop a better understanding of research questions as they unfold in complex social settings. By providing a better understanding of the research topic that has significant socio-economic policy implications in a post-war environment, case studies allow process (how projects are managed), contextual (post-conflict) and longitudinal (dealing with processes) analysis. In the case of Kosovo's socio-economic development, many organisations tend to use their own crafted extraordinary processes to implement projects. In order to investigate this dynamic practice, a case study approach was determined to be the most appropriate.

Yin (2003, p. 13) described case study as an empirical inquiry which:

- investigated a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context were not evident; and

- relied on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulation fashion.

By focusing on the infrastructure projects' reconstruction development in one of the newest nations in the world (Kosovo), use of the case study reveals certain challenges inherent in project design and management so that new design elements can be developed and tested in other post-conflict societies. Although 'project-based management' processes have not been tested in a post-conflict environment, Druckman (2005) and Veal (2005) highlighted that a case study method can be used to confirm whether or not the theory was suited for adapting to a complex setting. Bassey (1999), quoting Stenhouse (1988), identified four broad styles of case study: ethnography, evaluative, educational and action research. An evaluative case study strives to collect in-depth information from a single case or a collection of cases, thereby providing helpful background information to decision-makers to determine the merit, worth or value of policies, programs, institutions and projects. Outlined by George and Bennett (2005, p. 19), case studies can "achieve a high level of conceptual validity and have powerful advantages in the heuristics identification of new variables and hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier cases and in the course of field work".

In a post-conflict society, it is vital to identify the various complex, interactive processes and functions carried out in an organisation, and to determine how this affects the development and implementation of systems and influences the way an organisation functions and is structured. In this context, the case study approach gives an ideal opportunity to study a problem in depth within an acceptable time frame (Bell, 2005). The practice of selecting and applying a data collection technique is the same as in any other research process (Veal, 2005). Stake (1994) posited that not all case studies were qualitative. Yin (1994) noted that a case study may even be limited to quantitative evidence and should not be viewed always as qualitative. Thus, case studies can be based on both qualitative and quantitative evidence. In the context of the current study, the case study research method provided a greater opportunity than other available methods to obtain a holistic, actual view of an empirical inquiry (Gummesson, 1988).

Kosovo represented a form of support and collaboration among the international donor community in countries emerging from a destructive civil war. Following the end of hostilities, the local community welcomed the military intervention, and the international community appeared poised to support the local development. Kosovo received a large amount of financial aid. Unlike other post-conflict states such as East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq, the presence of humanitarian organisations and the implementation of donor programs in Kosovo were more effective. In spite of having a history of ethnic conflict, the province has had substantially high levels of human capital concentrated in a small geographic region of Europe. Espoused by all these apparently causal factors, Kosovo is an optimal case study to examine the effectiveness of international engagement in implementing projects and programs in post-conflict societies (Percival & Sondorp, 2010)

3.1.2 Triangulation

Patton (2002, p. 247) advocated that "triangulation strengthens a study by combining methods". The most appropriate strategy to interpret the true world must rely upon triangulation strategies (Denzin, 1990). Further, combining data from a range of observers is more likely to capture a more comprehensive picture of the settings (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper & Allen, 1993; Neuman, 2003; Yin, 1994). According to

pragmatists, triangulation techniques can be successfully applied to all mixed methods designs (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).

In societies emerging from conflict, the absence of any systematic theoretical and legal framework is a serious concern. The lack of a regulatory framework makes it complicated for international organisations to assess their stabilising role and to have an integral understanding of the problems that characterise 'post-conflict' societies (Chimni, 2002). Since the case of Kosovo demonstrates the importance of appropriate governance in development and reconstruction management planning, the four principles fundamental to triangulation (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003, p 545) were selected to formulate in-depth answers to the guiding questions in the post-conflict society. To understand this critical concern, the first principle of a '*need for a clearly focused research question*' was the essence of the study. The second principle was '*the complementary nature of the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen methods*'. The strength of mixed methodology chosen for this study combines the two forms of methodology to seek convergence among the results: quantitative data 'provided for generalizability' (Creswell, 2008, p. 558), whereas qualitative data offered information about the setting in the case study of the post-conflict reconstruction phase. The third principle was the '*relevance of the methods to the nature of the phenomenon*': in a complex society the need to focus on projects and actions and to appreciate the complex environments in which interventions take place requires a coherent and strategic approach. The fourth principle was '*the need for continued evaluation of the chosen methodological approach*': in order to better understand the project planning and implementation processes in Kosovo, and develop relevant findings, both qualitative and quantitative data were collected.

Triangulation refers to the use of more than one research method to provide insight into the research question in order to augment assurance in the ensuing findings (Bryman, 2004). It was critical for the researcher to converge data from as many different perspectives to bring together a broad range of views. In the development of social and economic complexities in Kosovo, collecting a diverse set of data from the field, derived from different methods, had the prospect of producing new and alternative explanations for phenomena as suggested by Arksey (1999).

According to Arksey (1999), data collected from a number of sources may or may not be consistent. Arksey (1999) further added that these convergences could be useful to the researcher to gain more confidence if the different kinds of information gathered by different means led to the same conclusion. Conversely, triangulation which cuts across the qualitative and quantitative divide was not aimed merely at validating and strengthening the data from different sources (Jick, 1979), but also contributed to a widening of the understanding of projects managed in the post-conflict society, as suggested by Olsen (2004).

3.1.3 Pilot test

In designing and analysing a pilot study Lancaster, Dodd and Williamson (2004), suggested standards of good research practice for researchers. To strengthen methodological severity and validity, pilot studies should be built on clearly and concisely framed aims and objectives. Participants recruited should not be included in the main study. Analysis of the study should be mainly presented in descriptive terms. The findings should be treated with more caution than the results of the main study and, if any significant differences are found in the findings, circumventing them to proceed with the main study should be avoided. Foddy (1993) urged use of a pilot test of the questionnaire before administration, with a minimum of five respondents and a maximum of 30 (Foddy, 1993).

A pilot survey was done to determine the comprehensiveness of the questionnaire, to test the wording, sequencing, layout, survey completion time and analysis procedures (Ary, Jacob & Razavieh, 2002; Ticehurst & Veal, 1999; Veal, 2005) and to make meaningful changes based on the feedback from the pilot group respondents (Creswell, 2008). Wittes and Brittain (1990) urged that in order to collect meaningful data, participants should be familiar with the context and be representative of the target population in the larger study. In order to test the content validity of the questionnaire, the pilot survey was sent to 20 senior Program Coordinators and Project Managers(PMs) who had worked closely with project teams in Kosovo, and who had participated in projects long enough to have experience in post-conflict reconstruction. It was expected that the 12 respondents who took part in the pilot study of the project (response rate = 60 percent) would not be involved in the final

survey as recommended by Ary et al. (2002) and Velde et al. (2004). Four of the respondents contacted by email had moved to other organisations and their email contact details had changed. Two of the respondents said they would participate in the final study and therefore did not respond to the pilot study.

On the basis of the feedback obtained from the pilot test, the responses were used to revise and improve the questionnaire. Some questions contained errors, were considered irrelevant to the context or were repeated; while others were unclear and had to be reformulated or deleted and the questionnaire refined (Collins, 2003; Creswell, 2008). Some of the comments mentioned were:

> *Probably shorten or somewhat re-design the format, it's quite loaded and not easily readable.*
>
> *Some questions look like they are repeated.*
>
> *The script was very clear, professional and understandable.*
>
> *It's ok generally; general/specific objectives of information gathering groups could have made it clearer.*

Thus, the changes implemented were in response to the recommendations offered by the pilot group sharing their knowledge, expertise and skills required for the projects. This resulted in an improved internal validity and ensured that the questionnaire was more efficient and effective (Peat, Mellis, Williams & Xuan, 2002).

3.1.4 Key informants

The survey questionnaire was developed by drawing on the divergent fieldwork experiences of four key respondents who had been involved in a variety of projects from different international aid organisations. The key informants were development professionals and field-based practitioners working in post-conflict societies in particular Kosovo after the war in 1999. Hayward et al. (2007) advocated gaining ethical clearance to interview key informants which was obtained from the University (see Appendix 16). Informed consent was obtained by email from each key participant before being interviewed. To develop a common strategy and work together in post-conflict situations, the identified informants helped understand "what is happening and why" Patton (2002, p. 321) in the post-conflict setting. The

goal of the consultation process was to access the respondents' perspective of whether or not the implemented projects were capable of achieving the goals and objectives outlined in the initial project objective statements. This process helped to compare their current experiences with the way the project services were delivered and to indicate whether 'best practice' had been used in each project. The questionnaire surveys, presented in Appendices 9 and 12, were designed to extract from the respondents details of their perceptions on how projects were planned, designed, implemented and managed in their area of operations with emphasis on project management principles.

3.1.5 Selection and recruitment of participants

The goal of the international mission in Kosovo was to maintain peace between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in the Balkans, and to contribute to rebuilding the infrastructure, institutions and communities. Building on this concept, there were many international agencies involved in various development missions in Kosovo and most of these organisations had their own distinctive organisation structures, cultures and standard operating procedures (Holohan, 2003). Though the conflict was brief and there was not much loss of life, it still had all the problems of humanitarian intervention. Kosovo is a small country with a manageable population and by having a secured international protection force the challenges, both conceptually and operationally, of post-conflict reconstruction were manageable. Coordinating a large number of international aid agencies operating after the war was a major challenge for the local and the international community. If properly analysed the mission could yield valuable lessons for future operations at policy, strategic, operation and tactical levels for Kosovo, which could be used in the wider post-conflict societies (Mockaitais, 2004).

As a result, it was determined to use participants for the study who were practitioners within the NGOs, government personnel, donors and personnel from other national/international agencies who played a role in infrastructure reconstruction projects within the last four years, which is from 2004 to 2008. Access to potential participants for the study was through the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) whose main responsibility was to identify, prepare and implement reconstruction projects in Kosovo (EAR, 2009). A purposive sampling technique was

used to recruit the participants. Purposive sampling is the method by which the researcher chooses participants because of their insight and experience in the research topic (Cooper & Schindler, 2008; McMillan, 2004).

A list of international development and reconstruction organisations, NGOs and local ministries implementing infrastructure projects in Kosovo was given to the researcher by EAR. Purposive sampling was used to select the final study participants, that is those from the list who had met the criteria of having planned, designed and implemented infrastructure projects in Kosovo. Respondents from both public and private agencies were randomly identified from the four provinces of the country, and included participants implementing projects in ethnic minority communities. Snowball sampling was used to identify additional participants who could provide information on practice-based personnel during the process (Cooper & Schindler, 2008).

A formal approach was made to the Country Directors of the international and local reconstruction and development agencies in Kosovo. The Country Directors of these organisations were given an opportunity to complete the survey questionnaire and to take part in the interview. The Country Directors also provided the names of personnel working on their projects. The researcher made initial contact with these personnel and obtained their informed consent to participate (Appendix 6: English, Appendix 7: Albanian version and Appendix 8: Serbian version). All respondents were either taking part in a project or had recently participated in project work at the time of data collection. To help in providing a more complete understanding of the project environment, respondents were not informed about the purpose of the investigation, nor was it revealed to them that the questions were designed to identify a 'project-based model' to implement reconstruction projects. In total, 420 participants (73% of the 572 persons invited to participate) took part in the various stages of the research. Survey 1 received a response rate of 78 percent (117 out of 150 distributed), and for Survey 2 the response rate was 66 percent (231 out of 350 distributed). Table 3.1 shows a summary of their involvement, the number of project practitioners who took part in each stage of the research, and how they were recruited to take part.

Table 3.1: Summary of participants

Group	Involvement	Number	Recruitment Methods
1	Key informants	4	Personal Contact
2	Pilot test	12	Personal Contact
3	Interviews	36	Follow-up after survey
4	Survey 1 (CoM)	117	Purposive Sampling, Snowball
5	Survey 2 (PM)	231	Purposive Sampling, Snowball
6	Focus Group (4)	20	Follow-up after survey

The recruitment of participants was chosen from the following different groups involved in the process of reconstruction and development of Kosovo.

1) Donors or Funding agencies;
2) Implementing agencies (international and local development organisations);
3) Engineering contractors (local and international);
4) Management consultants; and
5) Beneficiaries.

The participants selected were representative of the following areas of infrastructure reconstruction programs:

1) Housing and transport;
2) Education and Science;
3) Health;
4) Energy;
5) Post and telecommunications; and
6) Water and environment.

3.1.6 Ethical issues

In the context of receiving ethics clearance to conduct the field data collection, the UN administration in Kosovo was approached and the UN advised that there was no procedure for seeking or gaining ethics approval. It is important to note that only a few post-conflict countries have had an Ethics Review Board (Ford et al., 2009), and there is no specific ethical framework developed to guide research practice in humanitarian emergencies (Black, 2003). The ethical guidelines that were explained in the 'National Statement on Ethical Conduct of Research involving Humans' and obtained ethics approval from the Curtin University Human Research Ethics

Committee (HREC), and as proposed by Babbie (2010), were followed in the current research. All respondents were required to sign informed consent forms to participate in the study (Appendix 6). Their consent could be withdrawn at any time without penalty and their continued participation was voluntary. Respondents were given an opportunity to ask questions about any aspect of the research at any time during and after their participation in the research. Confidentiality and privacy were assured for the research respondents; and their identity was protected through the use of non-identifiable code numbers and data received from the respondents was preserved in a confidential manner.

3.1.7 Instrument design

Druckman (2005) argued that the finest surveys were designed using the key doctrine and forms of qualitative work and could be reliable due to the volume of cases in a typical survey. Initial planning of the survey design and questionnaire began in April 2005 and continued until November 2007. There was no evidence of any similar survey having previously been conducted. Since there was no existing questionnaires from which to extrapolate, the survey questionnaire was designed by conducting telephone interviews with highly experienced humanitarian aid practitioners who had worked in Kosovo and from the review of literature on development projects. To avoid any misunderstandings and to maintain the reliability of the data collected, the interviews were transcribed immediately thereafter, and sent to the key respondents for comments. The review process increased the quality of the information obtained.

Questionnaires, being commonly used in management research (Moorman & Podsakoff, 2011), can be an effective means of gathering comparable information and making decisions when dealing with a wide range of complex information from organisations and individuals. Though objectivity is not always possible, it does provide information in transparent, succinct and easily understood form (Ticehurst & Veal, 1999). A separate questionnaire was constructed for the Chief of Mission/Program Coordinators (CoM) and for the PMs and project engineers implementing projects on the ground. The former survey related more to issues with respect to the practical problems of managing projects in a society damaged by war;

the latter survey was more focused on project management through the life cycle phases of a project.

The quantitative questionnaire and the qualitative semi-structured interview schedule design process (Figure 3.2, below) were the culmination of a careful thought process and discussions with key respondents on various issues of project planning and implementation, along with a review of literature on post-conflict reconstruction and development projects. As revealed by Collins (2003, p. 230), in designing the questionnaire, careful consideration of the following should be given before undertaking the survey:

- All respondents understand the question in a consistent way;
- The questions are asking for information that respondents have and can retrieve;
- The wording of questions provides respondents with all the necessary information they require to be able to answer them in a way required by the researcher; and
- Where interviews are being used, their questions should always be read as they are worded.

Figure 3.2: Questionnaire design process

Source: Adapted from Ticehurst & Veal (1999).

A statistician and an expert in questionnaire design reviewed the survey questionnaire developed. Changes were made as a result of the feedback obtained from them and the questionnaire was pilot tested in the field in Kosovo. For example, one of the changes requested was to re-arrange the variables and to include 'unsure' in the Likert scale. After incorporating suggestions from the feedback collected during pilot testing, the English variation was translated by local academics into the two main widely spoken ethnic languages: Serbian (Appendices 11 and 14) and Albanian (Appendices 10 and 13). To check the accuracy of the translation, the survey questionnaire was given to local interpreters working for international development organisations to back-translate the questionnaire into the original language. The back-translation was also orally done in the presence of the researcher to determine whether the questionnaire was understood. There were no changes made after the back-translation; the process helped to compare the translation and determine whether it clearly conveyed the intended meaning of the original version (Brislin, Lonner, & Thorndike, 1973; Burton, 2000; Douglas & Craig, 2000; Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995; Traindis & Berry, 1980).

A fundamental principle of the survey questionnaire is that the layout should be clear and easy to understand (Hawe, Degeling, Hall & Brierley, 1990). To make it easier for the respondents to complete the survey, the questionnaire items were grouped into logically coherent sections as suggested by Neuman (2003). Table 3.2 summarises the design sequence and overall questionnaire layout.

Table 3.2: Summary of questionnaire design elements used

Design Element	Questionnaire
Questionnaire items	The use of Likert scale Logically coherent sections
Questionnaire length	For Country Directors - items on 6 pages (Sections 1 and 2) Project Managers - items on 7 pages (Sections 1 and 2)
Questionnaire appearance	Professional appearance printed on high quality graphics printer with space between questions
Cover page	Brief explanation about research Statement of confidentiality Name and address of the researcher/supervisors

3.1.8 Data collection

Fieldwork took place over a period of eight weeks in Kosovo from August to October 2008. During this period, Kosovo was emerging from half a century of communist rule, and undergoing a slow process of privatisation. Kosovo had moved beyond the immediate support of post-war emergency recovery and reconstruction, and was bridging the gap from neglect and underdevelopment to long-term development (ARD/USAID, 2004). Having worked in Kosovo immediately after the end of war from 1999 until 2003, the researcher was familiar with the social, cultural and religious circumstances of the people. In addition, an understanding of the unique political and socio-economic factors of the operational area was crucial to the reliability of data collection and analysis. Understanding these factors prior to data collection significantly contributed to a more accurate assessment of the dynamics in given situations (Patton, 2002).

The research questions were explored by means of the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data. Data were collected from small to large international aid organisations, government agencies, donors and local NGOs working on a broad range of reconstruction projects funded by multilateral institutions. Project planning and implementation methods, therefore, have common factors influencing the project objectives, guidelines, processes and outcomes. Participation in the study was achieved by means of an information sheet distributed to the project staff before the questionnaire was administered, and consent was gained by means of a permission form, which they signed before completing their questionnaires. Neuman (2003, p.274) posited that the participants should be given "extra thinking time" and, taking this into consideration, the survey was given to respondents and collected the following week.

A local interpreter was recruited to act as a research assistant, driver and escort in all the provinces in Kosovo. Not only was the interpreter fluent in Albanian, Serbian and English, but he had previously managed and supervised reconstruction projects in Kosovo. The researcher and the interpreter were the only investigators actively involved in the field in drafting, planning and implementing the data collection. In addition to the planning, the local interpreter also assisted the researcher in

conducting interviews, keeping records, gathering and interpretation of data, thereby assuring confidentiality and the standardised recording of information. The data collection and analysis techniques used to address the research questions are summarised in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Data collection and analysis techniques

Questions	Data Collection	Data Analysis
1. What planning/implementing criteria should be used for defining project success in post-conflict reconstruction and development?	Interviews, Survey, Literature reviews	Thematic Analysis, Descriptive Statistics
2. How do current defined project management processes influence the planning and implementation of reconstruction projects in a post-conflict society?	Survey, Organisational documents and reports	Thematic Analysis, Descriptive Statistics
3. What are the limitations and advantages of the current methods, tools and techniques being used for post-conflict reconstruction projects?	Interviews, Organisational documents and reports Literature reviews	Thematic Analysis, Descriptive Statistics
4. In post-conflict situations, such as those currently happening in Kosovo, does the application of internationally accepted project management tools and techniques facilitate more successful development programs?	Interviews, Surveys, Organisational documents and reports	Thematic Analysis, Descriptive Statistics

3.1.9 The facet of time

Neuman (2003) posited that a cross-functional study involved the collection of data at the same point in time. Due to both time and financial constraints, all research data collection was undertaken at the same time in Kosovo from August to October 2008. Depending on the specific needs of the research subject and project goals, the timing of a study is very critical to the validity of the inferences sought from the study (Druckman, 2005). During the data collection period, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. Following the proclamation of sovereignty, Kosovo was undergoing a period of transition of civil administration from UNMIK to European

Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) (Delahunty & Perez, 2009). In March 2002, the functional ministries were formed in Kosovo and in the ensuing period Kosovo had already moved from a transition phase to the reconstruction process by shifting the focus from short-term relief to long-term economic recovery and development (Llamazares & Levy, 2003). Conversely, six years later, in assessing the post-conflict reconstruction mission of Kosovo prior to the donor conference in Brussels held on July 2008 by the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES), Bostic (2008) argued that effective economic reconstruction of the country as a means of securing lasting peace was needed more than ever. Collecting empirical data and information for the study during this critical period of economic uncertainty provided the researcher with timely information on how reconstruction projects were planned and implemented.

3.2 Qualitative data collection

Qualitative data as to the experiences of those implementing projects were obtained through semi-structured interviews and a focus group discussion conducted with key project personnel during the field trip from August to early October 2008. Permission forms were completed and signed by all interviewees as a part of this process. Individual interviews of 30 to 45 minutes each were conducted and taped by the researcher. Following transcription, the interviews were analysed for congruence, differences and insights into the research questions. The qualitative data from both the focus group discussion and the staff interviews (Table 3.4) were collated and interrogated for patterns and insights with respect to the key research questions.

<p align="center">Table 3.4: Sources of qualitative data collection</p>

Primary Data	Secondary Data
1. Thirty-six interviews with • Country Directors • Program Coordinators • Project Managers • Project Engineers • Management Consultants, and • Beneficiaries 2. Focus Group	1. Project documents 2. Organisation reports

3.2.1 Sample size

Marshall (1996) considered a suitable sample size for a qualitative study was one that adequately provided the information needed. In general, the necessary sample size for questions that are simple or use limited detail can be in single figures. For more complex research questions, the overall sample size should be increased substantially and it may be necessary to use a formal selection of sampling techniques. In practice, this means that the sample number selected usually becomes evident as the study progresses and when data saturation appears to have been reached. Creswell (1998) recommended that for a phenomenological study the participants' sample size should be between five and 25 interviews. The study sample involved considerable examinations of infrastructure projects with a variety of agencies.

3.2.2 Interviews

To understand particular processes in a case study, an interview is used to review participants' experiences (Cooper & Schindler, 2008) and follow up is suggested "to put flesh on the bones of a survey" (Bell, 2005, p 10). According to Lee (1999), a semi-structured interview has an overarching topic, highlights a number of themes at the heart of the research and investigates specific issues and questions for more focused information. In the current study, the layout of the interview questions designed for practicing PMs was intended to gather information on desirable skills and knowledge areas of project management, and to find the degree of satisfaction with current and previously implemented projects. As the main purpose of the interview was to gather in-depth information on program coordination by understanding program strengths and weaknesses, and capturing any recommendations and suggestions on post-conflict reconstruction project planning and implementation, the researcher took into consideration what Foddy (1993) had summarised as general principles in the design and conduct of such interviews. Foddy (1993) advocated that the dynamics of the interview process required that the researcher be aware that the questions asked should define the topic clearly to the respondents, have a clear idea of the information that was required about the topic and avoid biased/multifaceted questions that would change the meaning of the inquiry.

According to Eriksson and Wiedersheim-Paul (2006), as cited in Andersson and Heidaripour (2006), there are two ways in which an interview can be conducted: a structured method and an unstructured method. In a structured method, the same question is given to every respondent in the same order, whereas an unstructured method is more of a free form of conversation without support from a questionnaire. A combination of both these methods is called a semi-structured interview and in this method, an interview guide is applied. In an interview guide, the questions focus on a particular topic and the predetermined questions will define the topic of the research and help clarify the particular subject (Patton, 2002). For the current study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the informants. The interview comprised 10 to 12 questions spanning the nine knowledge areas of project management: scope, time, cost, quality, procurement, risk, communication and human resources. In this study, interview questions with an indirect focus on project management were developed after a review of the following:

- Implications of the trend of current international development assistance;
- Information obtained from the responses of key informants;
- Project management literature on success factors and criteria; and
- Literature dealing with political, economic and social post-conflict reconstruction.

Interview participants were recruited during the survey phase of the study. Country Directors and Program Coordinators who answered the survey questionnaire were asked if they were interested in a follow-up interview. Each interview was conducted at a time and location convenient to the participant as suggested by Creswell (2009). Holding the interviews face-to-face in a non-threatening environment (Taylor & Bogdan 1984), helped with understanding the complex processes and issues that face a transitional society aiming to respond to society-wide challenges.

During the interview process, it was important to recognise and respect the different cultural norms of the ethnic communities (Tierney, 1991). In the past, certainly immediately after the conflict, it was a custom to offer a cigarette, coffee and Rakia (a local alcoholic brew) before any discussion or meeting commenced; not accepting

the offer was a sign of disrespect and thoughtlessness. During the difficult period after the war and out of respect, the researcher used to accept the cigarettes, keep them in the drawer, and give them to a staff member at the end of the day. In order to be more culturally responsive (Druckman; 2005) the researcher allowed the participant to smoke when being interviewed. On average, each interview took 45 minutes (Tierney, 1991). At the beginning of each interview, the participants were asked if the interview could be tape-recorded. The recorded interview was saved in the researcher's computer as a MP3 audio file after the assurance of confidentiality and anonymity was explained. Recorded text was transcribed into a Microsoft word document. Copies of the interview questions are included in Appendices 4 and 5.

3.2.3 Focus group discussion

Usually a focus group is chosen because its members represent a particular category of interest and have personal experience with the topic being discussed (Morgan, 1996; Patton, 2002; Veal, 2005). Padgett (1998) noted that for the purpose of triangulation and to acquire more plausible results, the focus group should be big enough to construct a variety of opinions, but small enough to allow for individual contributions. In this study, the researcher purposely selected four categories of people from the community because of their technical expertise in post-conflict reconstruction and development. Each category contributed a group of five to six representatives. The purpose of using a focus group was to develop as many perspectives on the strengths and weaknesses of the project plan, and of the possible opportunities and threats to the project, taking into account the resources, the characteristics of the setting and the skills and motivations of the organisation implementing the project. Yin (1994), asserted that a focus group tends to have a synergistic effect of interaction in a whole group setting.

The four focus group categories chosen in this study were as follows:
- Management consultants training local and government agencies on project management skills;
- European Agency for Reconstruction (Electricity Generation) planning and delivery team;

- Local women's infrastructure community development organisation funded by the World Bank; and

- Ministry of Water and Sanitation.

3.2.4 Coding of interviews

Miles and Huberman (1994) posited that the coding or categorising process can be done after the data collection or during the field work by creating a provisional list of key variables. The coding process to find commonalities and patterns (Seidel & Kelle, 1995) involved subdividing the data and categorising it into a number of themes for the topic (Dey, 1993) after collection. According to Farber, (2006) a theme may be evident by searching for a word within a sentence or paragraph in an interview transcript. The goal of the researcher was to thoroughly examine the data in order to observe and categorise similar phenomena.

In order to answer the research questions, the findings of semi-structured questions were coded as summarised by Basit (2003). Several analytical techniques were used: listening to the interview tapes, transcribing the interviews, reading and summarising the transcripts, choosing categories and linking them to themes. During the processes, key quotations were highlighted and sorted in a coherent fashion. The emergent process was contemplated again and further condensed, culminating in decisive subheadings being identified. These themes were then placed in a table format with project management themes.

3.3 Quantitative data collection

Primarily quantitative data were collected through two sets of questionnaires (Table 3.5), which were developed with information from literature reviews and from interviews with key informants. Permission for the latter had first been obtained from the project staff by means of the permission form obtained from the university. Additional data were obtained from a series of internal evaluation reports of the projects implemented by multilateral organisations in Kosovo. The collated quantitative data were analysed and comparisons made to pinpoint significant

similarities and differences between the relevant characteristics of the various infrastructure projects implemented in the country.

Table 3.5: Sources of data collection of the quantitative portion

Primary Data	Secondary Data
1. Survey questionnaire with • Country Directors • Program Coordinators • Project Managers • Project Engineers	1. Project documents 2. Organisation reports

3.3.1 Survey 1

Post-conflict, poorly developed countries have long struggled with management problems in the implementation of policies, programs and projects. International development agencies have contributed significantly with financial, technical and administrative resources to strengthen the local organisational and management capacities; yet managerial problems still undermine the development capacity of these nations (Lawrence & Wynne, 2009; Rondinelli, 1986).

In Section 1 of the questionnaire, the focus of items was to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics of managing projects in the post-war reconstruction of Kosovo. The purpose of this section was to allow the respondent to suggest what he or she thought were the main reasons for the strengths/weaknesses of the project as a whole, or of the individual stages of the project, or both. Their viewpoints were influenced by their experience of the specialised nature of their infrastructure projects in the field. In Section 2, the focus was to glean information on the identity of individual respondents, along with technical specifics of the projects managed in the respondent's organisation.

The respondents taking part in the survey were the CoMs as head of the organisation and the Program Coordinators in the same organisation. The CoM and the Program Coordinators together oversee and contribute to the drafting of project plans in the areas of intervention. Together, they play a leading role in identifying the geographical area of interest for the organisation, along with the local governance

and the international donor community. Once the project area is approved by the aid organisation, the PM is assigned to start a feasibility exercise of the project with the local community.

3.3.2 Survey 2

The objective of this part of the study was to examine whether the internationally accepted project management tools and techniques (PMBOK) could be suitably applied in post-conflict societies. Austin (2000) in his address to a Global Project Management Forum emphatically argued that there were no specialised standards or tailor-made programs for professionals in the field of International Development Project Management. In Section 1 of the questionnaire, the focus of items was to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics of development project management processes in post-conflict physical reconstruction in war-torn Kosovo. Care was taken not to impose project management jargon, by avoiding the use of terms such as project scope management, project time management and so forth. The section was split into eight sub-sections, each considering one aspect of the project management knowledge areas as discussed in Chapter Two. Sections 1 to 8 were based on the project management bodies of knowledge, including project management concepts involving scope, cost, time, human resources, quality, procurement, communication and risk respectively. Project Integration Management was not included in the survey. Parts of the Project Integration Management were included within the eight knowledge areas and some questions were raised in Survey 1.

Respondents taking part in the survey were PMs working in development and government organisations implementing infrastructure projects in Kosovo. The CoM/Country Director was requested to give the names of the PMs working in the organisation. The PMs were asked to participate in the survey only after the CoM had granted approval for them to be approached. In a post-conflict situation, the PM is the key person responsible for overall project management and administration of the project process, from the start through to completion, and is expected to be fully conversant with the organisation's standards and the project operating environment/context. To obtain more significant information, the PMs participating in the survey were asked to reveal their own professional knowledge and personal

experience of the different phases in the planning and implementation cycles of the project, rather than how they would choose to manage the project they were implementing. The participants were asked to reflect on and rate the current pattern of practice in the latest infrastructure project they implemented at the time of the researcher's visit. Section 2 was similar to that in Survey 1; the focus was to get information on the identity of individual respondents, along with technical specifics of the projects managed in the respondent's organisation.

3.3.3 Data analysis

SPSS V 17.0 was used to analyse the data. Frequencies were run on all variables. A Chi-square analysis was used to determine if there were any significant differences between all responses based on demographic variables. A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used for each section of questions; the PCA focused on the planning, execution, and management of the projects to determine which factors were of the most importance, with cut-off points determined by eigenvalues.

3.4 Research rigour

Riege (2003) categorically argued that the findings of exploratory case studies were seldom accepted immediately by the scholarly community, and most likely required further research both in the form of qualitative or quantitative approaches. In spite of the assertion, the rationale for the research process was designed to ensure methodological rigour and to lend credibility to explain a phenomenon (see Figure 3.3) on how well reconstruction projects were established, planned, organised, executed and controlled by multilateral agencies in a post-conflict society. In search of relevance and rigour in research, Davies and Dodd (2002) ascertained that the term rigour in research more often appeared in reference to the concepts of reliability and validity. Golafshani (2003) emphasised the concepts of reliability, validity, trustworthiness, quality and rigour to discern good research from bad research, and mentioned the improvement of these stringent parameters a critical factor in any research. Drawing on these, the researcher has briefly labelled the rigour criteria in

terms of the concepts in this study, a technique recommended by Hamberg, Johansson, Lindgren and Westman (1994).

Figure 3.3: Indicators to describe scientific rigour in research

Source: Hamberg et al. (1994, p.178).

3.4.1 Ensuring rigour in qualitative research

According to Bashir, Afzal and Azeem (2008), pragmatic validation of qualitative research implied the goal of finding plausible, credible and trustworthy outcomes and that the data could be defended against reasonable challenge. Seale (1999) asserted that trustworthiness was an essential component to ensure reliability in qualitative research. While these criteria are more often mentioned for rigour in qualitative research, Table 3.6 illustrates the techniques to ensure trustworthiness following completion of the research.

Table 3.6: Techniques to ensure the trustworthiness of qualitative research

Traditional criteria	Trustworthiness criteria	Methods for meeting trustworthiness criteria
Internal validity	Credibility	Activities in the field that increase the probability of high credibility: • Referential inquiry (recorded interviews could be tested for adequacy) • Member checks (stockholding groups from which data was collected) • Triangulation of data types to establish validity with diversity of personal, professional and discipline backgrounds
External validity	Transferability (Fittingness)	Detailed (thick) description of: • Structures and processes related to processes revealed in the data • Everything required to understand the findings to make needed comparison in another similar setting
Reliability	Dependability (Auditability)	Purposive sampling (only PMs, Country Directors, Program Coordinators and Project Engineers working on infrastructure projects were used as representative of the population desired to generalise) Informants' confidentiality protected
Objectivity	Conformability (Audit trail)	Explicit separation of 1st order and 2nd order of findings Reporting clearly and meticulously data management and findings Verbatim transcription of interviews

Source: Adapted from Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 328) and Shah and Corley (2006, p. 1830).

3.4.2 Ensuring rigour in quantitative research

Credibility in quantitative research according to Patton (2002) depended on the careful construction of the instrument and determining whether it was achieving what was required to be measured. According to Burns and Grove (2005), in order to be rigorously conducted, a quantitative study needed to have scrupulous adherence to detail and accuracy in the findings. It is important to have a representative sample of the target population, together with clearly defined measuring tools and a more tightly controlled design such as a questionnaire survey. The rigour with which the current study was conducted is shown in Table 3.7, which demonstrates rigid adherence to quantitative research design and analyses.

Table 3.7: Rigour in quantitative research

Criteria	Methods for meeting rigour
Internal validity	The rigour in which the study design was conducted in a stable and controllable way, and decision concerning what is measured and what is not
Reliability	Given the complexity of the study, it could be repeated in another post-conflict environment
	Prerequisite for validity, inter-rater, test-retest, alternate forms, internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha)
Objectivity	Structured questions, representative sampling, randomisation, data free from bias
	Bias reduction of questions fostered by pilot study and back-translation
	Large enough sample size with individuals providing data anonymously and data corroborated via math leads to objectivity
Generalisation	Large sample size with numerous amounts of project management constituents from a post-conflict reconstruction allows an extrapolation to countries in similar situations
	Provision of defined limitations and delimitations of the study (see *Section 1.6*)

3.5 Documentary data collection

The major strength of case study data collection is the prospect of using diverse sources of evidence. This involves interviewing participants within its real-life context and reviewing appropriate sources of documents, memos or any written information related to the subject matter that is examined (Wilson, 2010; Yin, 2003). Primary data were collected specifically to obtain information for the purpose of this study. Secondary data were 'archival' data gathered to obtain background information about project specifics of the implementing organisation (Shah & Corley, 2006). Ericksson and Wiedershein-Paul (2006), as cited in Andersson and Heidaripour (2006), recognised that ultimately the choice of what data are gathered

in the field should primarily be dependent upon the purpose of the overall research objectives.

Post-conflict reconstruction 'project management' information was not available in mainstream literature sources such as topic-centred books and journal articles. Documentary data collection was exhaustive and the material collected was critically reviewed to ensure the achievements of the objectives guiding the research. The research strategy also included a collation and critical analysis of other available documentary data. This included seminars, conference papers, research publications of humanitarian organisations and communications between the organisations' project staff, as suggested by Johnson (2005). The process was used to identify general patterns of findings and trends, and look for disagreements and controversies (Patton, 2002).

3.6 Conclusion

Project Managers are required to effectively manage multiple complex projects with limited resources and funding, in order to achieve project completion on time, within budget and specifications. The increasing complexity of post-conflict management issues demands practical ways of investigating and finding solutions to a myriad of challenges and opportunities. The reasons for selecting the quantitative and qualitative methodology were outlined and discussed in this chapter.

The chapter also included the type of data collected, design of the instruments that were used, the sources of data collection, discussion of ethical principles and how the researcher applied this methodology to undertake the study. Finally, a brief sketch of the context of validity, reliability and dependability of data collection and interpretation was included. The next chapter presents the analysis of the research findings and an interpretive evaluation of the results.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

It should be noted that in mixed methods research, the data analysis stage can occur at any juncture of the data collection process … in a parallel/simultaneous mixed methods design, in which quantitative and qualitative data are collected at the same time, the data analysis often occurs after all of the data (i.e. both quantitative and qualitative data) have been collected (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003, p. 351).

4.0 Introduction

In Chapter One the research objectives and the research questions were outlined and discussed. It was stated that the main objective of the study was to develop an integrated framework for managing projects in a post-conflict society by critically examining planning challenges and identifying deficiencies in the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction projects. The purpose of this chapter, presented in two sections, is to report the analysis and interpretation of the data collected by survey questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions. The information will help in comprehending the key concepts essential for managing projects, the current realities and inherent instantiation uncertainty manifested in these complex decisions.

In this chapter, Section 1 is used to examine the quantitative analysis of the survey questionnaire. The descriptive statistics include measures of central tendency and summarising data distribution. The data review includes the results of both factor analysis and principal component analysis. The statistical methods discussed include standard deviation, cumulative percentages, regression, the factor correlation matrix which reveals inter-items correlation, and a graphical examination of data series.

Section 2 is used to report on the thematic analysis of qualitative data for all interviews and focus groups, and to summarise the main findings and preliminary conclusions for the research objectives. Given that the study is exploratory and very little research has been carried out to examine the most common components of a typical project management plan in a post-conflict situation, the researcher analyses and assesses the management of projects in a complex environment.

4.1 Quantitative results

4.1.1 Data analysis

SPSS statistics version 17.0 was used to analyse and interpret the basic research data, with frequency distributions executed on all variables. A Chi-square analysis was used to determine if there were any significant differences between responses and based on demographic variables. Due to small numbers in some categories, demographic variables were re-coded during the statistical analysis to maintain respondent confidentiality.

Questions in the PM and CoM surveys relevant to planning, execution and management of projects in Kosovo were measured on a scale from 1=not at all, 2=little, 3=somewhat, 4=largely, 5=great deal to 6=unsure. For education levels, all post-graduate levels of Masters, Doctorate and 'other' higher professional degrees were combined into the one category for both the PM and CoM analyses.

For the PM analysis, years of experience in implementing post-conflict reconstruction projects were combined into the categories of less than five years' experience, between six and 10 years' experience and over 10 years' experience. Years of experience for the CoM analysis were recoded into less than five years and greater than five years' experience.

For the PM analysis, the average length of project managed was collapsed into five categories: 1-6 months, 7-12 months, 13-18 months, 19-24 months and greater than 2 years. Initially, the average cost of the project managed was collapsed into the following categories: US$100,000 - $500,000, US$500,000 - US$1 million, US$1 million - US$2 million, US$2 million - US$3 million, US$3 million - US$4 million and greater than US$4 million. If numbers were still too small for particular questions, the following categories were used: US$100,000 - US$500,000, US$500,000 - US$1 million, US$1 - US$4 million and greater than US$4 million. For the CoM analysis, the average length of project managed was collapsed into two categories: less than 12 months and greater than 12 months. The average cost of the project managed was also collapsed into two categories: less than US$1 million, and greater than US$1 million.

Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used on each section of questions that focused on the planning, execution and management of the projects to determine the internal structure of the scales. The cut-off point used was an eigenvalue of at least 1.0 and it provided a meaningful lower bound for determination of factors (Hattie, 1985; Kaiser, 1960). Tables show the Varimax Rotated Component Matrix and the factor loadings for statements with the factor loadings representing the correlation between the individual variable and the overall factor. Only factor loadings of greater than 0.40 are indicative of some degree of relationship (Sakakibara, Flynn & Schroeder, 1993). Statements with higher factor loadings have an overall stronger relationship with the factor than those with lower factor loadings.

Total scale scores were calculated and ANOVAs or Mann-Whitney tests used to determine if differences existed between the total scale scores and demographic variables. A reliability analysis was used on each of the scales to determine the internal consistency. Items that were redundant or could be excluded in order to increase the reliability have been highlighted. Correlations between items as well as item-to-total correlations have been calculated to determine which items may be redundant.

4.1.2 Number of respondents

The respondents taking part in the survey consisted of practitioners who have been actively involved in managing reconstruction projects. The demographics of the PM survey respondents (n=231) and CoM survey respondents (n=117) are described below.

4.1.3 Highest level of education

The job of PM is a complex undertaking, with many stages and processes demanding multiple tasks to be completed simultaneously (Pant & Baroudi, 2008). Woodward (1986) reported having years of experience appears to benefit the project organisation but still may be inadequate. To have a more balanced approach the support for structured education of a significant period was also warranted. Participants taking part in this study, as managers of the project being executed, were

asked to indicate their highest level of education. In this context (Table 4.1), a majority of the respondents had qualified having a Bachelor's degree and above (PM 80% and CoM 74%) and had the required experience, which facilitated the organisations' ability to effectively plan and implement reconstruction projects.

Table 4.1: Participants highest level of education

Education levels	PM Survey Total (n=229)		CoM Survey Total (n=114)	
	#	%	#	%
High School	19	8	15	13
Some College	26	11	14	12
Bachelors	153	67	50	44
Masters	28	12	31	27
Doctorate	2	1	3	3
Other	1	1	1	1

The majority of PM respondents' highest level of education was a Bachelor's degree (67%), with a further 11 percent having attended college and 12 percent having a Master's degree. Forty-four percent of CoM survey respondents' highest level of education was a Bachelor's degree and 27 percent reported having a Master's degree.

4.1.4 Years of experience

In post-conflict societies, it is essential for managers to not only have some basic qualifications, but to also have relevant training and work experience to plan and deliver a project effectively in a resource poor environment (Mutebi, Stone & Thin, 2003). Given the atmosphere of instability, several issues have to be tackled simultaneously, and the inherent complexity in the planning process may not be witnessed in a normal working environment. Similar proportions of PM and CoM survey respondents (Table 4.2) had less than five years' experience in implementing post-conflict reconstruction projects (42% and 37% respectively), 45 percent of PM and 53 percent of CoM had between six and 10 years' experience and the remaining 13 percent and 10 percent had over 10 years' experience respectively.

Table 4.2: Participants' years of experience

Years	PM Survey Total (n=229)		CoM Survey Total (n=116)	
	#	%	#	%
0 - 5	96	42	43	37
6 - 10	103	45	62	53
11- 15	16	7	7	6
16 - 20	7	3	1	1
21 - 25	3	1	0	0
26+	4	2	3	3

4.1.5 Organisation standards

From a practical point of view, post-conflict societies have a very thin cadre of skilled human capital (Sprenger, 2005). Training plays a pivotal role in any project team and greatly enhances the team's performance (Aguinis, 2009; Forsberg, Mooz and Cotterman, 2005). According to Wysocki, Beck and Crane (2000), skills not present should be developed as needed through training and coaching. Kerzner (2000) emphasised that formal training was generally more effective and efficient than on-the-job training. Both groups of participants (CoM and PM) were asked to state if they had any formal training in managing projects in a post-conflict environment. Only a slight majority (53%) of both PM and CoM survey respondents had formal training on managing projects in a post-conflict environment (Table 4.3), and almost all (99%) PM survey respondents believed the organisation in which they worked had standards and procedures to implement projects.

Table 4.3: Training and organisational standards

Years	PM Survey Total (n=227)		CoM Survey Total (n=114)	
Formal Training	#	%	#	%
Yes	120	53	61	53
No	107	47	53	47
Organisation processes and standards				
Yes	207	99	-	-
No	1	1	-	-

It is acknowledged in the literature that most of the humanitarian organisations have their own crafted project planning processes and procedures (Rathmell, 2005). Post-conflict societies also do not have the capacity to train people in the required skills (Mutebi et al., 2003). With only half of the participants (53%) having received training it is vital to strengthen the capacity of the organisation's project team, and delivering training would promote and develop the necessary skills.

4.1.6 Length and cost of project

From Table 4.4, the majority of PM projects (69%) on average were less than a year long with 32 percent of projects being completed within six months and 37 percent of projects completed between six and 12 months. Ninety-one percent of projects were completed within two years. The majority of CoM projects (79%), on average, were less than two years long with 44 percent of projects being completed within one year and 35 percent of projects completed between one and two years.

Table 4.4: Length of the project

Project Length	PM Survey Total (n=219)		CoM Survey Total (n=102)	
	#	%	#	%
1-12 months	150	69	45	44
13-24 months	48	22	36	35
25-36 months	12	5	6	6
37-48 months	4	2	6	6
>4 years	5	2	9	9

A similar proportion of PM and CoM respondents from Table 4.5 claimed the

Table 4.5: Costs of the project

Project Costs	PM Survey Total (n=213)		CoM Survey Total (n=100)	
	#	%	#	%
100,000 - 500,000	65	31	28	28
500,000 - 1,000,000	33	16	16	16
1,000,000 - 1,500,000	18	9	11	11
1,500,000 - 2,000,000	11	5	14	14
2, 000,000 - 2,500,000	14	7	3	3
2,500,000 - 3,000,000	9	4	6	6
3,000,000 - 3,500,000	10	5	2	2
3, 500,000 - 4,000,000	10	5	1	1
> 4,000,000	43	20	19	19

average cost of the project managed was under US$500,000 (31% and 28% respectively), 16 percent between US$500,000 and US$1 million and 19-20 percent over US$4 million. Results obtained using the average cost of projects managed should be used with caution; the reliability of responses may vary where some respondents used the total cost of projects while others used the cost of the project components they had overseen.

4.2 Descriptive analyses

This section provides both statistical analyses and commonly used graphical displays useful for describing variables according to the sections in the questionnaire (see Appendices 9 and 12). In post-conflict and major development project-based organisations, the approach leads to an emphasis on projects (Overton & Storey, 2004). The PMs and CoM are in a better position to develop and implement strategies that build the society. The PMs and CoM can effectively address the common challenges of project planning and implementation within the overall management framework undertaken at all levels of the organisation (Hobday, 2000). The questionnaire was designed using a six-point Likert scale to measure the impact of decisions on how PMs plan, train, and manage the operations in a post-conflict society. Outlined below are analyses of the eight PMBOK knowledge areas given by respondents who were asked to draw on their experience by focusing on a recent

infrastructure project they had implemented. Section 4.3 to Section 4.11.2 was focused on the responses received from the PMs centring on the PMBOK knowledge areas. Section 4.12 to Section 4.19.10 was focused on the responses received from CoMs and Program Coordinators critical for completing projects successfully.

4.3 Project scope management

Table 4.6 provides summary statistics of project scope management responses regarding project delivery. The influence of the project scope management style factors on project delivery that measures the specific variables from the point of view of PMs/Engineers was examined.

Table 4.6: Responses to project scope management variables

Project Scope Management	Frequency Valid	Not at all	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great deal	Unsure	Total
The project goals and objectives were clearly defined	Frequency	2	9	45	103	64	4	227
	Valid %	.9	4.0	20.2	46.2	28.7		100.0
The project team facilitated discussions to assist in determining the priorities which fitted the community	Frequency	8	24	57	89	50	1	229
	Valid %	3.5	10.5	25.0	39.1	21.9		100.0
For the selection of projects the community was involved	Frequency	22	33	71	58	38	2	224
	Valid %	9.9	14.9	32.0	26.1	17.1		100.0
The stakeholders were committed to the achievement of project outcomes	Frequency	4	18	67	90	44	2	225
	Valid %	1.8	8.1	30.0	40.4	19.7		100.0
The project team members actively participated in project decision-making	Frequency	4	22	53	86	51	6	222
	Valid %	1.9	10.2	24.5	39.8	23.6		100.0
The projects team members took ownership of the project	Frequency	41	17	44	58	41	24	225
	Valid %	20.4	8.5	21.9	28.9	20.4		100.0
The organisation had people with the abilities to plan and implement projects realistically	Frequency	7	22	47	88	63	2	229
	Valid %	3.1	9.7	20.7	38.7	27.8		100.0
The project had a workable plan in the form of network schedules (milestones)	Frequency	3	18	67	88	46	6	228
	Valid %	1.4	8.1	30.2	39.6	20.7		100.0
In the project planning, alternative approaches were included to achieve project objectives	Frequency	10	25	78	77	33	6	229
	Valid %	4.5	11.2	35.0	34.5	14.8		100.0
The project changes were effectively controlled throughout the project life cycle	Frequency	4	26	63	87	38	10	228
	Valid %	1.8	11.9	28.9	39.9	17.5		100.0

Q1.0 The project goals and objectives were clearly defined.

To strengthen civil society's infrastructure projects, organisations should have a detailed work plan with specific and measurable goals and objectives (Mugisha & Berg, 2008). The PMs were asked to indicate if the project goals and objectives were clearly defined for the projects implemented. In explaining how planning was exercised for the local community infrastructure projects, there was a strong consensus (74.9%) that the objectives were clearly defined for the projects implemented: (46.2 percent indicated as 'largely', 28.7 percent reported 'great deal').

Only a small number (20.2 percent of the respondents) indicated that they had 'somewhat' defined the project goals and objectives for the project outcome they wanted to achieve (X̄ =3.98, M=4.00, and Mode=4).

Q1.1 The project team facilitated discussions to assist in determining the priorities, which fitted the community.

The project organisation should involve the community in the decisions that affect their lives (Johnson & Wilson, 2000). Participants were asked if the project team had facilitated discussion, which benefited the community in the reconstruction projects implemented by the organisation. More than 61 percent of the respondents stated that the project team had ongoing dialogue with the community to assist in identifying and establishing priorities (39.1 percent indicated 'largely', 21.9 percent believed a 'great deal'). Further, no more than 25 percent reported the team had 'somewhat' consulted the community in identifying and prioritising projects which are beneficial to the society (X̄ = 3.65, M=4.00, Mode=4).

Q1.2 For the selection of projects the community was involved.

The practice of community participation in the selection of projects helps to rebuild their shattered economy (Botes & Rensburg, 2000; World Bank, 2006). The PMs were asked if the community was approached by the implementing organisation and encouraged to participate in the selection of the projects. Only a marginal 43.2 percent of the PMs agreed to having encouraged community consultation (26.1 percent of the PMs indicated 'largely', 17.1 percent of the respondents reported as 'great deal'). A response rate of 46.9 percent of the respondents (32 percent alleged 'somewhat', 14.9 percent assumed 'little') considered that the organisation was not doing enough to encourage effective participation of the community in the selection of projects (X̄ =3.26, M=3.00 and Mode=3).

Q1.3 The stakeholders were committed to the achievement of project outcomes.

Related stakeholders should be committed to the achievements of the project's objectives and outcomes, and their contributions can benefit the project significantly

(Montgomery, Palma & Hoagland-Grey, 2008). Respondents were asked if they had observed strong stakeholder commitment and participation to influence achievements of project objectives in their region. In view of the complexity of the projects, 60.1 percent of the respondents replied that the stakeholders were committed to the project and its intended outcomes (40.4 percent of the PMs acknowledged as 'largely', 19.7 percent expressed as 'great deal'). Although stakeholder commitment is challenging in post-conflict settings, 30 percent of the respondents broadly endorsed that stakeholders were 'somewhat' committed to pulling together for the success of the project ($\bar{X}$ = 3.68, M=4, Mode=4).

Q1.4 The project's team members actively participated in project decision-making.

To build the capacity of the project team, members should be encouraged to actively participate in decision-making and problem-solving processes (Bonner, Ruekert & Walker, 2002). When respondents were asked whether project team members had contributed to the decision-making process, they revealed that 63.4 percent had actively participated (39.8 percent indicated as 'largely', 23.6 percent said 'great deal'). Although there was a strong perception of participation, 24.5 percent thought they had 'somewhat' contributed to motivate the team members to provide input and opinions ($\bar{X}$ =3.73, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q1.5 The project's team members took ownership of the project.

Project team members should take ownership of the project and have a strong buy-in and commitment to the project (Hobday, 2000). In order to obtain strong buy-in and develop a sense of partnership, the respondents were asked if the assembled project core team took ownership of the project from start to finish. Only 49.3 percent of the respondents answered that the organisation's project team had a strong sense of shared ownership and responsibility for project outcomes (28.9 percent of the respondents replied 'largely', 20.4 percent said a 'great deal'). The findings also indicated that 21.9 percent of PMs thought the team only 'somewhat' had a sense of ownership and responsibility for the project ($\bar{X}$ =3.20, M=3.00 and Mode=4).

Q1.6 The organisation had people with the abilities to plan and implement projects realistically.

Civil society organisations should have the ability to plan, facilitate and implement resources to the correct projects; and it should be done by the right people qualified for the job (Wescott, 1999). In response to the query about the organisation's ability to develop and implement realistic action plans, 66.5 percent of the respondents acknowledged that the organisation had the ability to formulate and plan for project implementation (38.8 percent reported 'largely' and an additional 27.8 percent said 'great deal'). Notably among the practitioners, 20.7 percent thought the organisation only 'somewhat' had the capacity crucial to develop a base plan within a changing and complex environment ($\bar{X}$ =4.00, M=3.78 and Mode=4).

Q1.7 The project had a workable plan in the form of network schedules (milestone).

The complexity surrounding the implementation of programs and project schedules varies greatly, and the assignments of tasks are best dictated by local conditions in post-conflict settings (Gennip, 2005). When respondents were asked if they had a workable plan in the form of network schedules, 60.3 percent indicated the organisation's projects had a work plan, (39.6 percent of the respondents indicated as 'largely', 20.7 percent saying a 'great deal'). Further, 30.2 percent of the respondents claimed the organisation only 'somewhat' had a workable plan in the form of network schedules to accomplish the project needs ($\bar{X}$ = 3.70, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q1.8 In the project planning, alternative approaches were included to achieve project objective.

Given the multifarious irregularities of each conflict situation, the organisation is encouraged to have flexible alternative approaches by which to achieve commonly agreed upon goals and objectives (Brown, 2005). Out of the 229 respondents, only 49.3 percent indicated that their organisation had alternative approaches (34.5 percent indicated as 'largely' and 14.8 percent selected 'great deal'). In considering the compound complexities in post-conflict societies, overall 35 percent of the respondents claimed 'somewhat' to having alternative strategies to accomplish project objectives ($\bar{X}$ =3.44, M=3.00, and Mode=3).

Q1.9 The project changes were effectively controlled throughout the project life cycle.

It should be recognised that post-conflict societies undergo rapid changes and for effective management of change it is particularly important to establish control of the limited available resources to plan and implement reconstruction activities (De Coning, 2009). In the study, respondents were asked to indicate whether the project changes were managed effectively: 57.4 percent of the PMs reported having addressed effectively the changes throughout the project's life cycle (39.9 percent of the PMs indicated 'largely', 17.4 percent saying a 'great deal'), with a significant percent (28.9) indicating they 'somewhat' managed to formulate effective change management strategies throughout the various phases of the reconstruction process ($\bar{X}$ =3.59, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

4.3.1 Standard deviation and skewness

The computed value of Standard Deviation (Table 4.7) implies that most variables from Q1.0 to Q1.9, with the exception of Q1.2, Q1.5 and Q1.8 are relatively consistent. This is in comparison to variables Q1.2, Q1.5 and Q1.8 which showed slightly more variation resulting in less consistency of opinion by the PMs. Overall Q1.0, asking respondents if the project goals and objectives were clearly defined, had the lowest response (s=.857) about managing the project. The presence of small variations in the responses tends to suggest that the extent to which the goals were defined did not differ to a large degree from project to project. Respondents were very uncertain in Q1.5 as to whether the project team took ownership of the projects; results showed a statistically significant variation in the response rates (s=1.405) indicating that there was not a substantial sense of ownership for the project.

In relation to the selection of projects, respondents were asked whether the community was involved; the high variation (s=1.196) across findings demonstrated the ability by the PMs to critically engage the community in the selection of the projects. Given the uncertainty in a post-conflict project environment, it is good practice to have alternative approaches in the planning process to achieve the objectives. Asking the respondents if they had alternative plans for reconstruction

projects, the small variation (s=1.020) showed that not all PMs believed that the organisation had alternative project delivery methods.

The degree of skewness of the responses was asymmetrical, indicating that the majority of respondents tended more towards the greater end of the scale. With some responses, e.g. Q1.6 with a skewness of -.706, there was a considerable (one-sided) tendency towards the right, whereas in Q1.9 with the skewness score of -.383, the pattern of responses was almost symmetrical.

Table 4.7: Standard deviation and skewness

	Project Scope Management	SD	Skewness
Q1.0	The project goals and objectives were clearly defined	.857	-.695
Q1.1	The project team facilitated discussions to assist in determining the priorities which fitted the community	1.044	-.578
Q1.2	For the selection of projects the community was involved	1.196	-.252
Q1.3	The stakeholders were committed to the achievement of project outcomes	.941	-.438
Q1.4	The project team members actively participated in project decision-making	.994	-.529
Q1.5	The projects team members took ownership of the project	1.405	-.368
Q1.6	The organisation had people with the abilities to plan and implement projects realistically	1.053	-.706
Q1.7	The project had a workable plan in the form of network schedules (milestones)	.933	-.386
Q1.8	In the project planning, alternative approaches were included to achieve project objectives	1.020	-.374
Q1.9	The project changes were effectively controlled throughout the project life cycle	.971	-.383

4.3.2 PCA analysis

PCA analysis performed on the statements in project scope management resulted in two components with an eigenvalue greater than 1 accounting for 51% of the variance in the data. The two distinct components in the project scope management statements (see Table 4.8) were named as follows:

Table 4.8: Varimax rotated component matrix for project scope management

Project Scope Management	Component 1	Component 2
The project team facilitated discussions to assist in determining the priorities, which fitted the community.	**.756**	.152
The stakeholders were committed to the achievement of project outcomes.	**.695**	.066
2 2The project goals and objectives were clearly defined.	**.654**	.037
For the selection of projects, the community was involved.	**.649**	.154
The organisation had people with the abilities to plan and implement projects realistically.	**.606**	.398
The project had a workable plan in the form of network schedules (milestones)	**.564**	.411
The project changes were effectively controlled throughout the project life cycle.	**.495**	.423
In the project planning, alternative approaches were included to achieve project objectives.	.361	**.674**
The project team members actively participated in project decision-making.	.320	**.581**
The projects team members took ownership of the project.	-.218	**.784**

4.3.2.1 Component 1: Planning community infrastructure

Component 1 was identified as measuring dimensions pertaining to planning and, consequently, was labelled 'planning for community'. Planning for community was associated predominantly with the seven items listed in bold in Table 4.8. Good planning and project preparation are essential prerequisites to successful project implementation (Zwikael, 2008) and, arguably, are even more critical in fragile post-conflict situations (Flavin, 2003). To support economic recovery, the ultimate target is communities as beneficiaries who are key stakeholders in a post-conflict society. The project team should facilitate and organise community involvement to identify and rank the projects within their jurisdiction. To maximise stakeholder commitment and achieve project outcomes, projects that do not get the support of the community should be excluded. In consultation with the community, the project team should identify clear and credible project objectives and deliverables. In addition, setting key milestones helps track and control the project planning process. Further, in order to gain the stakeholder commitment it is fundamental that the implementing agencies have the capacity to plan and lead effectively with a diverse team of people.

4.3.2.2 Component 2: Team participation

The second component in project scope management may be thought of as project team involvement. Dagron (2009, p. 456) posited, "ownership and participation in the decision-making process is a means of power being redistributed". In a post-conflict society, it is good practice for the project team to participate in the decision-making process and, by actively getting involved, take ownership and control of the development project. Fostering strong cooperation and collaboration by the community and project team can ensure the best outcomes are achieved. By developing alternative approaches to project activities, it is possible to avoid common problems that may be encountered in the field during implementation.

4.3.3 Regressions

There were no significant predictors for Component 1 or Component 2 (Table 4.9).

Table 4.9: Regression output management factors

	Coefficient	T	P
Component 1	-	-	-
Component 2	-	-	-

4.3.4 Correlation

Table 4.10 shows the inter-item correlation matrices for each scale and the item-to-total correlation. According to Streiner and Norman (2001), correlations of 0.4 - 0.8 have been suggested as representing acceptable validity. Carmines and Zellar (1979) suggested that at least 50% of item-to-total correlations in a scale should be between 0.4 and 0.7. Scores above 0.7 could suggest redundancy of items while scores below 0.4 indicate the item may not contribute information.

Ninety percent of item-to-total correlations in the scale were between 0.4 and 0.7. The item-to-total correlation for variable Q1.5 *'The project team members took ownership of the project.'* suggests this variable may not contribute information to the scale.

Table 4.10: Project scope management item inter-correlations

	Q1.0	Q1.1	Q1.2	Q1.3	Q1.4	Q1.5	Q1.6	Q1.7	Q1.8	Q1.9	Item-to-total
Q1.0	1.000										.439
Q1.1	.384**	1.000									.571
Q1.2	.379**	.488**	1.000								.498
Q1.3	.347**	.437**	.340**	1.000							.475
Q1.4	.306**	.383**	.265**	.220**	1.000						.489
Q1.5	.045	.011	.104*	.016	.254**	1.000					.184
Q1.6	.340**	.427**	.343**	.378**	.299**	.132	1.000				.597
Q1.7	.305**	.444**	.330**	.328**	.333**	.137*	.505**	1.000			.570
Q1.8	.179**	.351**	.304**	.301**	.410**	.243**	.427**	.403**	1.000		.568
Q1.9	.245**	.320**	.285**	.367**	.228**	.114	.471**	.387**	.476**	1.000	.514

*significant at the 0.05 level of significance
**significant at the 0.001 level of significance

4.3.5 Managing the project scope

Moderate scores indicate a sound consensus by the respondents (Table 4.11). Fundamentally they indicate that for the establishment of a project, the goals and objectives are well defined by the organisation prior to implementing the project. However, there was lack of community participation in the selection of the project and gaining consensus is the all-important process of getting honest buy-in from the people involved so that all aspects of the project are understood and agreed upon. Organisations did not have alternative approaches planned in case of any uncertainty during the implementation process. The scope established for each project should clarify alternative responsibilities among project stakeholders. The gaining of consensus by the project team and the community to determine priorities is critical in such an environment. Achieving consensus implies that a project chosen by the community will be accepted by the beneficiaries.

Table 4.11: Project scope management variables in rank order of means

Project Scope Management	Mean
The project goals and objectives were clearly defined	4.01
The organisation had people with the abilities to plan and implement projects realistically	3.80
The project team members actively participated in project decision-making	3.79
The project had a workable plan in the form of network schedules (milestones)	3.76
The stakeholders were committed to the achievement of project outcomes	3.70
The project changes were effectively controlled throughout the project life cycle	3.70
The project team facilitated discussions to assist in determining the priorities which fitted the community	3.66
The projects team members took ownership of the project	3.50
In the project planning, alternative approaches were included to achieve project objectives	3.51
For the selection of projects the community was involved	3.28

4.4 Project cost management

Table 4.12 provides summary statistics of project cost management responses regarding project delivery. The influence of the project cost management style factors on project delivery that measures the specific variables from the point of view of PMs/Engineers was examined.

Table 4.12: Responses to project cost management variables

Project Cost Management	Frequency Valid	Not at all	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great deal	Unsure	Total
The organisation had people with the ability to estimate its project cost.	Frequency	6	8	48	89	72	6	229
	Valid %	2.7	3.6	21.5	39.9	32.3		100.0
When the project was estimated the resources were accounted for effectively.	Frequency	4	13	66	94	46	6	229
	Valid %	1.8	5.8	29.6	42.2	20.6		100.0
Adequate provision was made for the estimated cost of the project.	Frequency	3	7	53	108	48	5	224
	Valid %	1.4	3.2	24.2	49.3	21.9		100.0
The project estimates were developed in consultation with appropriate stakeholders allocated to the task	Frequency	5	23	53	93	43	10	227
	Valid %	2.3	10.6	24.4	42.9	19.8		100.0
The project had standard method (graphical tools) for communicating the project cost and variance.	Frequency	9	22	69	67	53	10	230
	Valid %	4.1	10.0	31.4	30.4	24.1		100.0
Agreed financial management processes were implemented to monitor actual expenditure.	Frequency	2	20	56	79	59	10	226
	Valid %	.9	9.3	25.9	36.6	27.3		100.0
The project had a policy for cost contingency to allow for risks and uncertainty.	Frequency	19	25	78	64	33	8	227
	Valid %	8.7	11.4	35.6	29.2	15.1		100.0
Cost analyses were conducted and variations were implemented to meet complex changing circumstances.	Frequency	10	22	81	74	30	12	229
	Valid %	4.6	10.1	37.4	34.1	13.8		100.0
The project outcomes were reviewed to determine the effectiveness of cost management systems.	Frequency	4	29	59	82	43	11	228
	Valid %	1.8	13.4	27.2	37.8	19.8		100.0
For the project, cost control was an essential factor for the successful delivery of project.	Frequency	2	22	51	88	63	4	230
	Valid %	.9	9.7	22.6	38.9	27.9		100.0

Q2.0 The organisation had people with the ability to estimate its project cost.

Within the changing economic context, it would be logical for the organisation to have the capacity to provide an estimate of the project budget and connect it to project objectives (Diamond, 2006). The research findings indicate that 72.2 percent of the organisations surveyed had the capacity to calculate, and the capability to assess, their project costs (39.9 percent of the respondents consulted reported 'great deal', 32.3 percent said 'largely'). To appraise a more realistic estimate to fund the project, 21.5 percent had the view that the organisations only 'somewhat' had the

potential to calculate approximately the project expenditure (X̄ =3.96, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q2.1 When the project was estimated the resources were accounted for effectively.

Reconstruction activities are linked inextricably to the availability of resources. The organisation should ensure that the limited resources are used efficiently and effectively to complete the project on time and within budget (MacDonald, 2005). Allocating limited resources to create a stable economic environment, more than half of the respondents (62.8 percent) emphasised that the project resources were practically allocated to responsible parties (42.2 percent answered 'largely', whereas 20.6 percent stated 'great deal'). Further, 29.6 percent of the respondents considered that the organisation 'somewhat' allocated its project resources to achieve the maximum possible outcome (X̄ =3.74, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q2.2 Adequate provision was made for the estimated cost of the project.

The donor and the implementing organisation should warrant that there is adequate funding made available for what is proposed in the program budget to ensure long-term sustainability (Mutebi et al., 2003; World Bank, 2006). For the projects overall it was evident that 71.2 percent of funding that the respective organisations received was marginally adequate (49.3 percent reported as 'largely', 21.9 percent believed a 'great deal'). Of the respondents 24.2 percent assumed that reasonable funding was 'somewhat' made available within the proposed budgetary figures (X̄ =3.87, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q2.3 The project estimates were developed in consultation with appropriate stakeholders allocated to the task.

In post-conflict situations, the allocation of funds becomes restricted and the challenge for organisations is to engage more effectively with the stakeholders to have the right estimate (Mutebi et al., 2003). Little more than half of the PMs (62.7 percent) indicated that the inclusion of all the relevant stakeholders in the process of estimating the overall cost of the project was critical (42.9 percent of the respondents responded 'largely', and only 19.8 percent indicated a 'great deal'). In developing

cost estimates for the organisation, 24.4 percent of the respondents were of the opinion that stakeholders were 'somewhat' consulted to develop the project estimates ($\bar{X}$ =3.67, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q2.4 The project had standard method (graphical tools) for communicating the project cost and variance.

Traditionally, PMs tend to compare the scheduled expenditure of the project with the budget cost. In practice, the challenge for post-conflict transitions is the lack of funding for reconstruction, and it is critical to have real time, simultaneous access to the cost data (Mutebi et al., 2003). The data shown in tabular and graphical pattern can quickly communicate the cost variance and schedule progress status. A small majority of the respondents (54.5 percent) indicated that the organisations had real-time information using tools (30.4 percent expressed 'largely', and 24.1 percent reported 'great deal'). At the same time almost 30 percent of the PMs stated they had 'somewhat' used graphical tools to communicate project status ($\bar{X}$ =3.60, Median=4.00 and Mode=3).

Q2.5 Agreed financial management processes were implemented to monitor actual expenditure.

In this context, multiple donors with varying priorities are funders of projects. Ineffective management practices and corruption can be minimised if transparency is improved, and demand for greater accountability can be established by financial management practices which monitor actual expenditure (Lindberg & Orjuela, 2011; Sohail & Cavill, 2008). Almost two-thirds (63.9 percent) of the respondents stated the organisations had a financial management framework (36.6 percent agreed to 'largely', 27.3 percent said 'great deal'). Referring to the organisations having established financial systems, 25.9 percent stated they 'somewhat' had recognised financial management practices to audit the projects implemented ($\bar{X}$ =3.80, M=4.00, Mode=4).

Q2.6 The project had a policy for cost contingency to allow for risks and uncertainty.

A war-torn society is complex, uncertain and prone to delays; hence, there is a growing recognition of the importance for every implementing agency to include

contingency reserves in budgets to compensate for the uncertainty (Diamond, 2006). Only about 44.3 percent of the PMs indicated that their organisation's projects had some cost reserve for any uncertainty (29.2 percent saying as 'largely' and 15.1 percent saying a 'great deal'). Further, 35.6 percent of the PMs reported that their organisation's projects had a contingency reserve 'somewhat' allocated for risk and uncertainty inherent to projects (X =3.31, M=3.00, Mode=3).

Q2.7 Cost analyses were conducted and variations were implemented to meet complex changing circumstances.

In an ever-changing environment where tasks are often difficult to implement, it is vital for the project organisation to categorise the total expenditure of the project. Along with the explanation of actual costs and variations, subsequent decisions of the corrective actions should be included in the progress report (Diamond, 2006). Under half, 47.9 percent, of the respondents indicated that the cost analysis was conducted and variations applied (34.1 percent responded with 'largely', 13.8 percent said 'great deal'). Of these, 37.4 percent responded that organisations 'somewhat' conducted a cost-effectiveness analysis (X =3.42, M=4.00, Mode=3).

Q2.8 The project outcomes were reviewed to determine the effectiveness of cost management systems.

In a post-conflict setting, it is even more important than usual to call for greater mutual accountability and cost effectiveness of the reconstruction projects (Barakat & Chard, 2002). Over half of the respondents (57.6 percent) mentioned that the project outcomes were reviewed to determine the cost-effectiveness (37.8 percent reported 'largely', 19.8 percent indicated 'great deal'). Of the respondents 27.2 percent stated the project outcomes were 'somewhat' reviewed to determine the cost effectiveness of the project (X =3.60, M=4.00, Mode=4).

Q2.9 For the project, cost control was an essential factor for the successful delivery of project.

Given the uncertainty inherent in project forecasting and valuation, it is important to ensure that cost controls are considered in such intervention to maintain the delivery of a project (Diamond, 2006). Given the complexity of the task required, 66.8 percent of the respondents believed that cost control was the key to delivering

successful capital projects (38.9 percent confirming 'largely', 27.9 percent endorsing 'great deal'). Less than a quarter, 22.6 percent, assumed for the projects they 'somewhat' had cost control strategies to deliver critical projects successfully to the community ($\bar{X}$ =3.83, M=4.00, Mode=4).

4.4.1 Standard deviation and skewness

The argument of uncertainty would still hold true when it comes to complex international missions in a post-conflict environment. The respondents were very indecisive in Q2.6 as shown in Table 4.13; the SD of 1.126, having the highest variations, demonstrates that generally organisations vary substantially in having a cost contingency for any project delays and cost overruns. As mentioned in the literature, organisations tend to compete for donor funding and hence price contingencies are not built into project costs for unforeseen uncertainties, with the fear of losing funding awarded through a competitive project tender. The standard deviation of 1.082 in Q2.4 demonstrates that the respondents have various opinions and perspectives on the effect of project reporting structure on the variance between the actual and planned costs. In determining the project cost efficiency measures, the respondents were asked if the project outcomes were reviewed to determine cost effectiveness; the SD of 1.009 reveals the uncertainty by the project organisations in relation to costs and benefits of the available options.

In projects where cost requirements have fluctuated and can change, the degree of skewness in Q2.0 reflects that organisations do not have the right mix of people and skills employed to estimate project cost.

Table 4.13: Standard deviation and skewness

	Project Cost Management	SD	Skewness
Q2.0	The organisation had people with the ability to estimate its project cost.	.962	-.889
Q2.1	When the project was estimated, the resources were accounted for effectively.	.913	-.501
Q2.2	Adequate provision was made for the estimated cost of the project.	.836	-.658
Q2.3	The project estimates were developed in consultation with appropriate stakeholders allocated to the task	.985	-.564
Q2.4	The project had standard method (graphical tools) for communicating the project cost and variance.	1.082	-.425
Q2.5	Agreed financial management processes were implemented to monitor actual expenditure.	.975	-.441
Q2.6	The project had a policy for cost contingency to allow for risks and uncertainty.	1.126	-.353
Q2.7	Cost analyses were conducted and variations were implemented to meet complex changing circumstances.	1.002	-.374
Q2.8	The project outcomes were reviewed to determine the effectiveness of cost management systems.	1.009	-.369
Q2.9	For the project, cost control was an essential factor for the successful delivery of project.	.974	-.529

4.4.2 PCA analysis

PCA analyses performed on the statements in project cost management resulted in two components with an eigenvalue greater than 1, accounting for 52% of the variance in the data. Table 4.14 shows the Varimax Rotated Component Matrix and the component loading for the 10 statements.

4.4.2.1 Component 1: Cost-effective strategies

After determining the scope of the project, Component 1 of project cost management was labelled as 'cost-effective strategies' for reconstruction projects and programs. To restore financial balance and build a more cohesive society, the donor community should pay much more serious attention to cost-effective strategies. The significance of the variables was predominantly associated with the values in the upper range listed in Table 4.14. The funding agencies should have the ability to adapt to uncertainty, respond quickly to changing circumstances and support variations in complex adaptive systems in consultation with relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, the agency should have tools to track cost over-runs or delays, by developing cost control systems to avoid negative cash flow during project development.

4.4.2.2 Component 2: Cost estimating processes in project development

The main purpose of estimation is realistically to set and manage the resources, time and money effectively. Accordingly, the second component was labelled as 'cost-estimating processes in project development'. Knowing that a project timeline is a critical factor, organisations need to estimate the total costs of the project backed by adequate resources. Regardless of funding sources, sound planning requires that adequate financial support is made available within schedule, cost and quality constraints to undertake the project.

Table 4.14: Varimax rotated component matrix for project cost management

Project Cost Management	Component 1	Component 1
Cost analyses were conducted and variations were implemented to meet complex changing circumstances.	**.744**	.155
The project had a policy for cost contingency to allow for risks and uncertainty.	**.731**	.042
The project outcomes were reviewed to determine the effectiveness of cost management systems.	**.632**	.173
The project had standard method (graphical tools) for communicating the project cost and variance.	**.618**	.347
The project estimates were developed in consultation with appropriate stakeholders allocated to the task	**.581**	.375
For the project, cost control was an essential factor for the successful delivery of project.	**.533**	.244
Agreed financial management processes were implemented to monitor actual expenditure.	**.468**	.450
When the project was estimated, the resources were accounted for effectively.	.211	**.784**
The organisation had people with the ability to estimate its project cost.	.197	**.784**
Adequate provision was made for the estimated cost of the project.	.173	**.774**

4.4.3 Regressions

In Table 4.15, formal training was a significant predictor for Component 1, with respondents who had formal training having significantly higher Component 1 scores than respondents who did not have formal training. Respondents who ranked quality as the most important factor in defining, organising and structuring projects had

significantly higher Component 2 scores than respondents who did not rank quality as the most important factor.

Table 4.15: Regression output management factors

	Coefficient	T	P
Component 1			
Training	.182	2.418	.017
Procurement most important	.141	1.872	.063
Component 2			
Quality most important	.152	2.001	.047

4.4.4 Correlation

In Table 4.16, all item-to-total correlations in the scale were between 0.4 and 0.7.

Table 4.16: Project cost management item inter-correlations

	Q2.0	Q2.1	Q2.2	Q2.3	Q2.4	Q2.5	Q2.6	Q2.7	Q2.8	Q2.9	Item-to-total
Q2.0	1.000										.541
Q2.1	.511**	1.000									.553
Q2.2	.485**	.544**	1.000								.522
Q2.3	.363**	.346**	.363**	1.000							.580
Q2.4	.340**	.348**	.327**	.507**	1.000						.591
Q2.5	.432**	.361**	.286**	.373**	.431**	1.000					.539
Q2.6	.204**	.232**	.306**	.366**	.291**	.278**	1.000				.478
Q2.7	.317**	.352**	.247**	.413**	.389**	.378**	.531**	1.000			.570
Q2.8	.286**	.311**	.232**	.251**	.420**	.282**	.306**	.372**	1.000		.491
Q2.9	.263**	.261**	.283**	.351**	.340**	.307**	.266**	.238**	.394**	1.000	.462

*significant at the 0.05 level of significance
**significant at the 0.001 level of significance

4.4.5 Managing the project cost

In a post-conflict environment, it is difficult to accurately estimate the total cost and have the resources to deliver projects within approved budgets. In Table 4.17, the main object of project cost management is for the organisation to have the ability to estimate and understand how to control the project cost in consultation with the stakeholders. In practice, despite the inherent uncertainties faced by many infrastructure projects, agencies do not have reserve operational funding to account for emergencies and, very often, have continuing budget constraints. In an ever-

changing environment, project cost reviews and trend analysis should be carried out periodically and should be factored into the project plan.

Table 4.17: Project cost management variables in rank order of means

Project Cost Management	Mean
The organisation had people with the ability to estimate its project cost.	4.01
Adequate provision was made for the estimated cost of the project.	3.92
Agreed financial management processes were implemented to monitor actual expenditure.	3.90
For the project, cost control was an essential factor for the successful delivery of the project.	3.87
When the project was estimated, the resources were accounted for effectively.	3.80
The project estimates were developed in consultation with appropriate stakeholders allocated to the task	3.78
The project outcomes were reviewed to determine the effectiveness of cost management systems.	3.72
The project had standard method (graphical tools) for communicating the project cost and variance.	3.71
Cost analyses were conducted and variations were implemented to meet complex changing circumstances.	3.56
The project had a policy for cost contingency to allow for risks and uncertainty.	3.40

4.5 Project time management

Table 4.18 provides a summary of project time management responses regarding project delivery. The influence of the project time management style factors on project delivery that measures the specific variables from the point of view of PMs/Engineers was examined.

Table 4.18: Responses to project time management variables

Project Time Management	Frequency Valid	Not at all	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great deal	Unsure	Total
Appropriate stakeholders complied with established time schedules when implementing projects.	Frequency	2	26	72	87	35	6	228
	Valid %	.9	11.7	32.4	39.2	15.8		100.0
The organisation had set time and cost estimates too low, to secure project funding.	Frequency	17	15	81	69	34	12	228
	Valid %	7.9	6.9	37.5	32.0	15.7		100.0
The organisation obtained team ownership of schedules.	Frequency	8	22	56	82	40	15	223
	Valid %	3.8	10.6	26.9	39.4	19.2		100.0
The project outcomes were reviewed to determine if expected outcomes were attained as planned (per schedule).	Frequency	4	23	65	87	43	5	227
	Valid %	1.8	10.4	29.2	39.2	19.4		100.0
Scheduling techniques (bar charts, Gantt charts) was used to establish time schedules for project activities.	Frequency	5	27	64	75	50	5	226
	Valid %	2.3	12.2	29.0	33.9	22.6		100.0
For every planned and approved project, each activity had an estimated duration	Frequency	2	12	49	102	57	6	228
	Valid %	.9	5.4	22.1	45.9	25.7		100.0
By scheduling time for our projects, the project organisation could assign priority for resources between projects.	Frequency	7	12	70	93	38	7	227
	Valid %	3.2	5.4	31.8	42.3	17.3		100.0
Progress was monitored against schedule	Frequency	4	20	59	93	52	2	230
	Valid %	1.8	8.8	25.9	40.8	22.9		100.0
The project team responded to schedule changes to achieve project objectives throughout the project life cycle.	Frequency	2	11	51	99	60	5	228
	Valid %	.9	4.9	22.9	44.4	26.9		100.0
The time it took to approve project funding was satisfactory.	Frequency	9	21	71	94	25	10	230
	Valid %	4.1	9.5	32.3	42.7	11.4		100.0

Q3.0 Appropriate stakeholders complied with established time schedules when implementing projects.

Every post-conflict reconstruction effort faces different challenges and multilateral donor agencies involved in peace-building interventions often impose ambitious time frames (Strand, Toje, Jerve & Samset, 2003). Stakeholders often have varied and sometimes conflicting objectives where the stakeholders agreed to the established and more realistic time frames and milestones before project implementation. A total of 55 percent of the respondents noted that they had experienced stakeholders adhering to the established project time frames (39.2 percent of the respondents

reported 'largely', and 15.8 percent stated 'great deal'). Of note, in a post-conflict situation 32.4 percent indicated stakeholders 'somewhat' complied with time schedules (X =3.57, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q3.1 *The organisation had set time and cost estimates too low, to secure project funding.*

A major challenge for the reconstruction process is to get continued donor support for a diversity of activities (Gennip, 2005). At a national level, this can lead to a competitive environment for development programs and projects (Evans-Kent & Bleiker, 2003). To confront the challenge of securing donor-funding, occasionally organisations set time and cost estimates too low which, in turn, can have unexpected or negative impacts on the final output. In response to the research query, it was important to note that less than half of the respondents (47.7 percent) experienced that agencies consciously working for growth of the community developed low estimates for the project time and cost (31.9 percent indicated 'largely' and fewer than 15.7 percent noted 'great deal'). Almost 37.5 percent admitted that organisations 'somewhat' continued to believe in this process (X =3.41, M=4.00 and Mode=3).

Q3.2 The organisation obtained team ownership of schedules.

To work together as a coherent whole during post-conflict intervention, the challenge of the task and responsibility is enormous. In particular, it is critical for the implementing agency to maintain an aggressive project schedule, engage and develop ownership of the system in the overall reconstruction process (Natsios, 2005). In light of the enormous development challenge to build team ownership, 58.6 percent of the respondents agreed they had obtained team ownership of the project schedule (39.4 percent of the respondents said 'largely', and 19.2 percent said 'great deal'). More significantly, 26.9 percent claimed that they 'somewhat' developed team ownership of achievable project schedules (X =3.60, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q3.3 The project outcomes were reviewed to determine if expected outcomes were attained as planned (per schedule).

It is equally important in a post-conflict environment that the project management team periodically review the project outcome based on measurable indicators. Failure

to achieve the desired outcome can have a negative effect on growth for the donors and the community (Natsios, 2005). To determine whether the project has achieved the desired outcomes, 58.6 percent of the respondents reported that project outcomes were reviewed against the expected deliverables (39.2 percent reported 'largely' and 19.4 percent opted 'great deal'). In effect, 29.2 percent responded that the project outcomes were 'somewhat' analysed to determine if the desired results were actually achieved ($\bar{X}$ =3.64, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q3.4 Scheduling techniques (bar Charts, Gantt charts) was used to establish time schedules for project activities.

As scheduling tools Gantt charts, bar charts and milestone charts provide a graphical overview and are excellent models for scheduling. With skills lacking in many agencies involved in post-conflict processes, simple communication tools can be used to keep track of progress for each activity (Cobb, 2011). Asked if the organisations used such tools to track project progress, 56.5 percent acknowledged that the project teams have used the scheduling techniques to monitor the project progress (33.9 percent of the respondents said 'largely', while 22.6 percent said 'great deal'). As an effective tracking tool, 29 percent of the respondents said they 'somewhat' used them to identify and plan milestones and deadlines ($\bar{X}$ =3.62, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q3.5 For every planned and approved project, each activity had an estimated duration.

In conflict-affected settings, determination of the estimated period for each task as the project gets underway is vital for the project team. The process controls and puts measures in place to monitor actual progress and compare it to the planned schedule (Norman, Brotherton & Fried, 2008). Although the projects have been implemented differently in different locations, 71.6 percent of the total respondents answered that it was imperative to have an estimated duration for the projects they implement in the area of operations (45.9 percent of the respondents reported 'largely', and 25.7 percent said 'great deal'). In the relatively unstructured project environment, for each activity to be within a well-planned period, 22.1 percent claimed they only 'somewhat' had set time schedules. ($\bar{X}$ =3.90, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q3.6 By scheduling time for our projects, the project organisation could assign priority for resources between projects.

In unstable situations and unpredictable changes, there are project management conflicts over resources and priorities. There are many active projects implemented simultaneously by agencies and in different locations. In supporting reconstruction operations for organisations which have a scarcity of resources due to poor infrastructure, scheduling time frames and prioritising resources across function boundaries can benefit the implementing organisation (Bertucci, Cooley, Fn'Piere, Hughes & Manning, 2008; UNDP/IAPSO, 2005). In response to scheduling and setting operational priorities considering the reality on the ground, 59.6 percent of research respondents answered that by coordinating the time frame, the limited available resources could be prioritised across projects (42.3 percent said 'largely', and 17.3 percent said 'great deal'). In this regard, 31.8 percent said the project organisations 'somewhat' had resource scheduling between projects and institutional priorities (X =3.65, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q3.7 Progress was monitored against schedule.

To engage a civil society and in the process to bolster progress against the schedule, post-conflict reconstruction operations require continued long term monitoring (Garcia, 2008). In relation to monitoring the progress and its importance in achieving success, 63.7 percent of the respondents considered that continuously monitoring performance against the plan to give early warning and feedback to the project team was important (40.8 percent of the respondents said 'largely', 22.9 percent said 'great deal'). Of those PMs focusing on developing projects plans, 25.9 percent assumed they had monitored activities and milestones 'somewhat' against schedule (X =3.74, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q3.8 The project team responded to schedule changes to achieve project objectives throughout the project life cycle.

More often than not, in reconstruction development projects there are inherent changes in the project structure and delivery processes. The project team working on the deliverables of the project should accommodate changes to the project milestone plan in pursuit of the final objectives (Cleland, 1999). In response to the query, a large percentage (71.3) of the PMs responded with strong agreement that throughout

the project duration, the project team positively accepted schedule changes that were key to achieving its goals (44.4 percent believed 'largely', 26.9 percent assumed 'great deal'). Controlling changes to the project schedule that were necessary to achieve project objectives, 22.9 percent answered that they 'somewhat' accommodated changes throughout the project life cycle (X =3.91, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q3.9 The time it took to approve project funding was satisfactory.

At the national level, the responsibility to prepare, process and approve funding for infrastructure development projects in particular is crucial. Access to donor funds has delayed project implementation. The bureaucratic process to release funds by donor agencies can generate further tension within and across communities (Jha, Barenstein, Phelps, Pittet, & Sena, 2010). Only half (54.1 percent) of the respondents indicated the final approval and release of the funding of projects was within an acceptable timeframe (42.7 percent mentioned 'largely', 11.4 percent agreed 'great deal'). Only 32.3 percent of the PMs involved in the design and grant proposal responded that they 'somewhat' agreed with the period for the release of funds in processing the project grant (X =3.48, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

4.5.1 Standard deviation and skewness

Project planning delineates each major task to complete the project on time, and within specifications and budget. Sending a project proposal with lower estimates to the funding agency will look far more attractive, and in response to the query on setting the budget targets too low to secure a grant, the SD of 1.083 in Q3.1 in Table 4.19 has a larger variance. Respondents believed that funding organisations might contract out the operation to another agency if the financing mechanisms for projects with the possibility of applying different contingency factors to project time may significantly increase the cost. In encouraging project teams to take common ownership of the collective task of the project, the PMs had a SD variance of 1.036 in maintaining the ownership of the process. Gantt charts are useful tools for planning and scheduling projects and asking the PMs if the organisation had tools to establish activities, which are behind or ahead of schedule, the SD variance of 1.035

indicates that not all projects have the necessary scheduling tools to allow all activities to be managed and controlled effectively.

Table 4.19: Standard deviation and skewness

	Project Time Management	SD	Skewness
Q3.0	Appropriate stakeholders complied with established time schedules when implementing projects.	.923	-.231
Q3.1	The organisation had set time and cost estimates too low, to secure project funding.	1.083	-.491
Q3.2	The organisation obtained team ownership of schedules.	1.036	-.550
Q3.3	The project outcomes were reviewed to determine if expected outcomes were attained as planned (per schedule).	.968	-.401
Q3.4	Scheduling techniques (bar Charts, Gantt charts) was used to establish time schedules for project activities.	1.035	-.362
Q3.5	For every planned and approved project, each activity had an estimated duration.	.877	-.619
Q3.6	By scheduling time for projects, the project organisation could assign priority for resources between projects.	.936	-.594
Q3.7	Progress was monitored against schedule.	.966	-.526
Q3.8	The project team responded to schedule changes to achieve project objectives throughout the project life cycle.	.879	-.597
Q3.9	The time it took to approve project funding was satisfactory.	.958	-.580

4.5.2 PCA analysis

PCA analysis performed on the statements in project time management resulted in two factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1, accounting for 47% of the variance in the data. Table 4.20 shows the Varimax Rotated Component Matrix and the component loadings for the 10 statements.

4.5.2.1 Component 1: Activity-duration uncertainty

Table 4.20 shows the distribution of two factors, with the emphasis on the achievement of project time management experience for the respondents. Given the level of socioeconomic structure and uncertainty about current and future development, Component 1 was considered as 'activity-duration uncertainty'. For the development of programs, managing the project time management encompasses scheduling, prioritising team member activity, allocating work activities, analysing time spent, and monitoring and controlling the project. In a post-conflict environment performing schedule control, which includes periodically measuring the actual completion of significant milestones and project activities against its plan, can be a good governance tool.

4.5.2.2 Component 2: Cost and schedule control

The second component was deemed to be 'cost and schedule control', which was critical in addressing and controlling cost impacts and schedule delays. The aim was to estimate realistic time frames within the organisations' capacity for implementation.

Table 4.20: Varimax rotated component matrix for project time management

Project Time Management	Component 1	Component 2
For every planned and approved project, each activity had an estimated duration.	**.772**	.064
Scheduling techniques (bar charts, Gantt charts) were used to establish time schedules for project activities.	**.769**	.069
Progress was monitored against schedule.	**.768**	.194
The project outcomes were reviewed to determine if expected outcomes were attained as planned (per schedule).	**.758**	.252
The project team responded to schedule changes to achieve project objectives throughout the project life cycle.	**.634**	.181
By scheduling time for projects, the project organisation could assign priority for resources between projects.	**.542**	.423
The organisation obtained team ownership of schedules.	.404	**.592**
Appropriate stakeholders complied with established time schedules when implementing projects.	.328	**.579**
The organisation had set time and cost estimates too low, to secure project funding.	.211	**-.761**
The time it took to approve project funding was satisfactory.	.203	**.549**

4.5.3 Regression

Respondents with a Masters/Doctorate/other education had significantly higher Component 1 scores than respondents with a high school/some college/Bachelor's degree education (Table 4.21). Project cost was also a significant predictor for Component 1 with respondents who estimated the value of their project at over US$1 million having a significantly higher component score than respondents who estimated the value of their project at less than US$1 million. Education and project length were significant predictors for Component 2. Respondents with a Masters/Doctorate/other education had significantly lower Component 2 scores than respondents with a high school/some college/Bachelor's degree education.

Respondents whose projects were longer than a year had significantly higher Component 2 scores than respondents whose projects were less than a year in length.

Table 4.21: Regression output management factors

	Coefficient	T	P
Component 1			
Education	.204	2.753	.007
Project cost	.156	2.116	.036
Quality most important	.130	1.764	.081
Component 2	-	-	-
Education	-.155	-2.018	.045
Project length	.176	2.296	.023

4.5.4 Correlation

In Table 4.22, eighty percent of item-to-total correlations in the scale were between 0.4 and 0.7. The item-to-total correlation for variable Q3.1 *'The organisation had set time and cost estimates too low, to secure project funding'* and Q3.9 *'The time it took to approve project funding was satisfactory'* suggested these items may not contribute information to the scale.

Table 4.22: Project time management item inter-correlations

	Q3.0	Q3.1	Q3.2	Q3.3	Q3.4	Q3.5	Q3.6	Q3.7	Q3.8	Q3.9	Item-to-total
Q3.0	1.000										**.362**
Q3.1	-0.094	1.000									-.088
Q3.2	.331**	.008	1.000								**.423**
Q3.3	.341**	-.054	.346**	1.000							**.596**
Q3.4	.199**	-.045	.286**	.478**	1.000						**.522**
Q3.5	.099	-.065	.174*	.330**	.531**	1.000					**.465**
Q3.6	.159**	-.112	.315**	.414**	.274**	.366**	1.000				**.435**
Q3.7	.286**	.022	.276**	.402**	.422**	.423**	.395**	1.000			**.599**
Q3.8	.239**	-.047	.232**	.388**	.276**	.336**	.254**	.447**	1.000	.	**.463**
Q3.9	.280**	-.107	.156**	.273**	.194**	.150	.148**	.269**	.217**	1.000	.300

*significant at the 0.05 level of significance
**significant at the 0.001 level of significance

4.5.5 Managing the project time

Delaying infrastructure projects can frustrate a divided community and can be more complex and make it far more difficult to maintain peace-building milestones. As reflected in Table 4.23, in a post-conflict setting, completing the project within the determined time is essential for economic progress and stabilisation of the community. Despite having limited capacity, it is important that the PM allocates and prioritises critical resources available within the project. The implementing organisation should communicate with and get endorsement from all stakeholders on the project time schedules and ensure that the required outcomes have been achieved as planned. The project team should monitor the progress of the project against the planned schedule at some point in each phase of the life cycle. The organisation should have simple scheduled techniques (bar charts, Gantt charts) for measuring project progress and provide meaningful assessments of growth in relation to the desired outcome.

Table 4.23: Project time management variables in rank order of means

Project Time Management	Mean
For every planned and approved project, each activity had an estimated duration.	3.96
The organisation obtained team ownership of schedules.	3.76
Progress was monitored against schedule.	3.76
By scheduling time for projects, the project organisation could assign priority for resources between projects.	3.72
The project outcomes were reviewed to determine if expected outcomes were attained as planned (per schedule).	3.69
Scheduling techniques (bar Charts, Gantt charts) were used to establish time schedules for project activities.	3.68
Appropriate stakeholders complied with established time schedules when implementing projects.	3.64
The time it took to approve project funding was satisfactory.	3.59
The organisation had set time and cost estimates too low, to secure project funding.	3.54
For every planned and approved project, each activity had an estimated duration.	3.96

4.6 Project human resources management

Table 4.24 provides a summary of project human resources management responses regarding project delivery. The influence of the project human resources management style factors on project delivery that measures the specific variables from the point of view of PMs/Engineers was examined.

Table 4.24: Responses to project human resources management variables

Project Human Resources Management	Frequency Valid	Not at all	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great deal	Unsure	Total
The availability of scarce resources was taken into account when deciding upon projects.	Frequency	10	27	71	72	35	12	227
	Valid %	4.7	12.5	33.0	33.5	16.3		100.0
The project had a steering group to resolve issues.	Frequency	6	11	58	94	55	5	229
	Valid %	2.7	4.9	25.9	41.9	24.6		100.0
The organisation ensures that resources are appropriately allocated to manage projects.	Frequency	2	13	69	85	53	7	229
	Valid %	.9	5.9	31.0	38.3	23.9		100.0
Project team members could lead, influence and coach others to achieve desired results.	Frequency	3	26	58	87	49	4	227
	Valid %	1.3	11.7	26.0	39.0	22.0		100.0
Project team members had the capacity to work independently and handle multiple project tasks.	Frequency	3	19	64	82	57	3	228
	Valid %	1.3	8.5	28.4	36.5	25.3		100.0
People participating in projects were competent in their relevant field of expertise.	Frequency	4	23	68	78	54	3	230
	Valid %	1.8	10.1	30.0	34.3	23.8		100.0
Project team members had the knowledge of conflict resolution and problem-solving abilities.	Frequency	4	28	58	93	40	5	228
	Valid %	1.8	12.6	26.0	41.7	17.9		100
Project team members had adequate knowledge, information and understanding of project management skills.	Frequency	6	12	67	89	46	8	228
	Valid %	2.7	5.5	30.4	40.5	20.9		100.0
Project team members actively participated and consulted with others to achieve project goals.	Frequency	3	20	57	84	62	2	228
	Valid %	1.3	8.9	25.2	37.2	27.4		100.0
The project team could develop and manage training and development needs.	Frequency	11	26	85	70	32	4	228
	Valid %	4.9	11.6	37.9	31.3	14.3		100.0

Q4.0 The availability of scarce resources was taken into account when deciding upon projects.

During project planning it is essential that the decision on distribution of scarce human and material resources is properly informed (Scholdan, 2000). In the decisions on how scarce resources are used, the respondents were asked if there was a process to allocate the limited resources when developing a project implementation plan. Only 49.8 percent of participants involved in the planning process stated that the scarce resources were taken into account when deciding upon projects (33.5 percent of the respondents said 'largely', 16.3 percent said 'great deal'). At the same time, 33 percent said 'somewhat' and 12.6 percent reported very 'little' thought was put into the planning process when deciding upon the resources for the project ($\bar{X}$ =3.44, M=3.00 and Mode=4).

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Q4.1 The project had a steering group to resolve issues.

Challenging constraints can arise during the project planning and implementation process, and even during the handing over of a completed project to the community. It is a good practice to draw together senior stakeholders to resolve issues affecting the project (Natsios, 2005). While most of the work is managing people and projects for the economic and social reconstruction of Kosovo, 66.5 percent agreed that the organisation had a steering group accessible for project clarifications (42 percent responded 'largely', 24.6 percent said 'great deal'). No doubt there are operational issues that arise in the day-to-day delivery of the project, because 25.9 percent stated the steering committee was 'somewhat' being assembled to resolve difficulties before they affected the success of the project (X =3.81, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q4.2 The organisation ensures that resources are appropriately allocated to manage projects.

As a PM, the most critical responsibility is to manage the limited resources available to meet the overall project objectives (World Bank, 2007a). Being the responsibility of the PM to allocate the resources, 62.2 percent said that the implementing organisation ensures that resources are allocated appropriately against a host of conflicting demands (38.3 percent said 'largely', 23.9 percent said 'great deal'). To ensure provision of all the resources required for the project, 31 percent alleged organisations 'somewhat' ensured limited resources are used on the right projects (X =3.78, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q4.3 Project team members could lead, influence and coach others to achieve desired results.

In this increasingly complex and constantly changing project environment, the local and international teams present can influence the surroundings by leading and coaching cross-functional teams. Project team members have to deal with a broad range of issues, and almost 61 percent of the respondents stated that they could influence others to achieve success (39 percent reported 'largely', 22 percent said 'great deal'). To achieve project goals, 26 percent responded 'somewhat' and 11.7 percent of the respondents responded very 'little' was done by the project team to

guide and persuade others to identify what they want to achieve (X =3.69, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q4.4 Project team members had the capacity to work independently and handle multiple project tasks.

The project team assembled should also have the ability to multi-task, manage time effectively and set the priorities for initiating various project. To strengthen the post-conflict environment it is also essential to build the local capacity of the team to work independently as well as in a team environment. While the PMs recognise that these are difficult places in which to operate, 61.8 percent of the respondents said the project team had the ability to manage multiple complex tasks and work independently simultaneously (36.5 percent, as 'largely', 25.3 percent said 'great deal'). With a variety of projects, the respondents reported that 28.4 percent of the project team can 'somewhat' work independently to achieve goals (X =3.76, M=4.00, and Mode=4).

Q4.5 People participating in projects were competent in their relevant field of expertise.

Specifically relevant to a post-conflict situation, people promoting their full participation to work in the field should have relevant experience and be technically competent to work in the mission (Pouligny, 2005). Asking the PMs whether the project staff are professionals who are well regarded in their field of expertise, 58.2 percent stressed that the project staff have relevant experience in appropriate areas (34.4 percent said 'largely', 23.8 percent said 'great deal'). It should be emphasised that 30 percent reported 'somewhat' and 10 percent of the respondents assumed that the project staff had 'little' skills to work in the relevant field (X =3.68, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q4.6 Project team members had the knowledge of conflict resolution and problem-solving abilities.

An additional benefit of the project team is the ability to develop consensus building and conflict resolution skills (Richards, Bah & Vincent, 2004). Nearly 59.6 percent of the respondents emphatically said 'yes' to team members having conflict prevention and dispute resolution mechanisms to confront the challenges in the current conflict environment (41.7 percent stated 'largely, 17.9 percent said 'great

deal'). In building effective teams, 26 percent of the PMs said 'somewhat' and 12.6 percent reported to have demonstrated 'little' experience in conflict resolutions techniques and mediation skills to help resolve disputes (X̄ =3.61, M=4.00, Mode=4).

Q4.7 Project team members had adequate knowledge, information and understanding of project management skills.

From a practical perspective, most of the post-conflict reconstruction and development activities are project-based management. Receiving training or having an understanding of contemporary project management will strengthen the project staff's skills. Only 61.4 percent of the respondents acknowledged having some generic skills in project management from the organisation's training modules (40.5 percent said 'largely', and 20.9 percent said 'great deal'). Understanding the specific challenges of managing post-conflict reconstruction of infrastructure projects, 30.4 percent believed the project team 'somewhat' had the basic concepts of project management (X̄ =3.71, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q4.8 Project team members actively participated and consulted with others to achieve project goals.

Developing and maintaining the stakeholders' input and involvement could present many complex challenges. To participate actively in the local socio-economic development, project team members and the stakeholders should interact with each other; only then it will be feasible for the community to achieve goals and accomplish their mission (Zwikael & Unger-Aviram, 2010). Overall, 64.6 percent considered that the team members encouraged various stakeholders to participate in project reviews and to develop further plans (37.2 percent said 'largely', 27.4 percent said 'great deal'). As the organisations continued to face the challenge, 25.2 percent believed the project team 'somewhat' maintained continuous interaction with the stakeholders (X̄ =3.81, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q4.9 The project team could develop and manage training and development needs.

Furthermore, in examining the needs of the organisation, the project team and the stakeholders, there is a considerable push to develop training needs to sustain development projects (World Bank, 2006). The project team members are the key

players in the implementation process, and they can effectively assess the training needs given to the beneficiaries, who are passive recipients of the projects. In responding to the training needs, only 45.6 percent responded that the project team members had the capacity to develop primarily community-based training proposals (31.3 percent said 'largely', 14.3 percent said 'great deal'). Arranging for training and development for the community, 37.9 percent affirmed 'somewhat' and 11.6 percent stated the project team developed 'little' training needs ($\bar{X}$ =3.38, M=3.00 and Mode=3).

4.6.1 Standard deviation and skewness

In a post-conflict situation, an equally important measure for the agency is to allocate resources when deciding upon projects. In light of the situation, the respondents gave marshalling and allocating resources to implement the projects the highest SD of 1.052 (Table 4.25). They were not assured of having the required skills and competencies to deliver the targeted benefits when executing projects. Working in a dispersed team environment, the challenge for the PMs was to identify training and development to drive efficiency. The SD of 1.027 reveals that not all organisations were convinced to heavily invest in training and development to manage complex projects. Having the right expertise involved with the project at the right time is strategically vital, but the PMs have responded with a SD of 1.003, which implies that not every project executed has been understood to have people with the required skills, knowledge and expertise.

Table 4.25: Standard deviation and skewness

	Project Human Resource Management	SD	Skewness
Q4.0	The availability of scarce resources was taken into account when deciding upon projects.	1.052	-.355
Q4.1	The project had a steering group to resolve issues.	.954	-.703
Q4.2	The organisation ensures that resources are appropriately allocated to manage projects.	.907	-.331
Q4.3	Project team members could lead, influence and coach others to achieve desired results.	.986	-.415
Q4.4	Project team members had the capacity to work independently and handle multiple project tasks.	.971	-.418
Q4.5	People participating in projects were competent in their relevant field of expertise.	1.003	-.366
Q4.6	Project team members had the knowledge of conflict resolution and problem-solving abilities.	.979	-.440
Q4.7	Project team members had adequate knowledge, information and understanding of project management skills.	.948	-.565
Q4.8	Project team members actively participated and consulted with others to achieve project goals.	.983	-.507
Q4.9	The project team could develop and manage training and development needs.	1.027	-.298

4.6.2 PCA Analysis

A PCA analysis performed on the statements in project human resources management resulting in two components with an eigenvalue greater than 1, accounting for 57% of the variance in the data. Table 4.26 shows the Varimax Rotated Component Matrix and the factor loadings for the 10 statements.

4.6.2.1 Component 1: Team Capabilities

Component 1 in project human resources management was called 'team capabilities'. To proceed with the implementation of projects in a post-conflict society, the team must have the ability to communicate effectively, negotiate and deal with conflict, identify relevant technical knowledge and expertise, and have the ability to learn from experience. In a fluid environment, the capacity to identify problems areas more effectively and gradually, and develop workable solutions that meet the needs of the beneficiaries, are more likely to achieve the organisation's project objectives. To effectively promote economic development the project team must learn from experience and participate actively, and constructively consult appropriate stakeholders to analyse operational procedures.

4.6.2.2 Component 2: Importance of resource allocation

The second component was deemed to be 'importance of resource allocation'. To function as a team every stakeholder will need to accept the limited capability to operate in changing conditions, make conscious decisions to prioritise projects appropriately, and allocate scarce resources when keeping to a project schedule. In order to develop the skills required for the current role, imparting the essential training program by experienced team members mentoring and coaching others, can improve the working atmosphere in projects.

Table 4.26: Varimax rotated component matrix for project human resources management

Project Human Resources Management	Component 1	Component 2
People participating in projects were competent in their relevant field of expertise.	**.783**	.161
Project team members actively participated and consulted with others to achieve project goals.	**.764**	.215
Project team members had the knowledge of conflict resolution and problem-solving abilities.	**.755**	.193
Project team members had the capacity to work independently and handle multiple project tasks.	**.753**	.162
Project team members had adequate knowledge, information and understanding of project management skills.	**.750**	.169
The project team could develop and manage training and development needs.	**.629**	.175
Project team members could lead, influence and coach others to achieve desired results.	.484	**.511**
The project had a steering group to resolve issues.	.367	**.671**
The organisation ensures that resources are appropriately allocated to manage projects	.336	**.644**
The availability of scarce resources was taken into account when deciding upon projects.	-.082	**.801**

4.6.3 Regressions

In Table 4.27, respondents who ranked quality as the most important component in defining, organising and structuring projects had significantly higher Component 2 scores than respondents who did not rank quality as the most important factor.

Table 4.27: Regression output management factors

	Coefficient	T	P
Component 1			
Project cost	.182	2.447	.015
Component 2	-	-	-
Project length	.132	1.786	.076
Quality most important	.181	2.441	.016

4.6.4 Correlation

In Table 4.28, ninety percent of item-to-total correlations in the scale were between 0.4 and 0.7. The item-to-total correlation for variable Q4.0 'The *availability of scarce resources was taken into account when deciding upon projects'* suggests this item may not contribute information to the scale.

Table 4.28: Project human resources management item inter-correlations

	Q4.0	Q4.1	Q4.2	Q4.3	Q4.4	Q4.5	Q4.6	Q4.7	Q4.8	Q4.9	Item-to-total
Q4.0	1.000										.255
Q4.1	.293**	1.000									.566
Q4.2	.297**	.452**	1.000								.527
Q4.3	.228**	.496**	.373**	1.000							.582
Q4.4	.085**	.352**	.338**	.514**	1.000						.626
Q4.5	.125*	.372**	.364**	.418**	.592**	1.000					.653
Q4.6	.180**	.360**	.351**	.388**	.464**	.623**	1.000				.654
Q4.7	.178**	.321**	.391**	.302**	.454**	.574**	.639**	1.000			.635
Q4.8	.155*	.445**	.324**	.414**	.549**	.534**	.498**	.558**	1.000		.676
Q4.9	.092	.331**	.304**	.389**	.425**	.323**	.408**	.395**	.550**	1.000	.525

*significant at the 0.05 level of significance
**significant at the 0.001 level of significance

4.6.5 Managing the project human resources

The ability of the project team to work collectively in a dynamic environment and to achieve the project goals and objectives within tight budgetary and time constraints presents daunting challenges to PMs and the organisation. The PMs (Table 4.29) should identify detailed training requirements at various levels of the project to increase the skills of the development team. The PM should optimise the utilisation of scarce resources by scheduling activities collectively as a team rather than individually. The project team also should be encouraged to develop, practise and to actively participate in community problem-solving exercises and respond to

discussions in a timely manner. To achieve the desired goals, the team should be encouraged to consult with project team members to analyse issues and operational process improvements.

Table 4.29: Project human resources management variables in rank order of means

Project Human Resources Management	Mean
The project had a steering group to resolve issues.	3.86
The organisation ensures that resources are appropriately allocated to manage projects	3.85
Project team members actively participated and consulted with others to achieve project goals.	3.82
Project team members had the capacity to work independently and handle multiple project tasks.	3.79
Project team members could lead, influence and coach others to achieve desired results.	3.73
People participating in projects were competent in their relevant field of expertise.	3.71
Project team members had adequate knowledge, information and understanding of project management skills.	3.79
Project team members had the knowledge of conflict resolution and problem-solving abilities.	3.67
The availability of scarce resources was taken into account when deciding upon projects.	3.58
The project team could develop and manage training and development needs.	3.43

4.7 Project quality management

Table 4.30 provides summary statistics on project quality management responses regarding project delivery. The influence of the project quality management style factors on project delivery that measures the specific variables from the point of view of PMs/Engineers was examined.

Project Quality Management	Frequency Valid	Not at all	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great deal	Unsure	Total
The project team identified what quality standards were relevant to the project.	Frequency	3	23	78	89	35	2	230
	Valid %	1.3	10.1	34.2	39.0	15.4		100.0
The projects consistently met the technical performance specifications.	Frequency	2	10	65	117	34	3	231
	Valid %	.9	4.4	28.5	51.3	14.9		100.0
There were standardised checklists to ensure consistency in frequently performed activities.	Frequency	5	32	70	79	35	5	226
	Valid %	2.3	14.5	31.7	35.7	15.8		100.0
There were procedures for formal reviews to learn from project failures and /or successes.	Frequency	11	35	71	76	34	1	228
	Valid %	4.8	15.4	31.3	33.5	15.0		100.0
Planned project practices were compared with other projects in order to generate ideas for improvement.	Frequency	2	38	79	75	34	2	230
	Valid %	.9	16.7	34.6	32.9	14.9		100.0
The organisation reported to other agencies the results of inspections that addressed any area of non-conformance.	Frequency	9	38	49	76	41	18	231
	Valid %	4.2	17.9	23.0	35.7	19.2		100.0
The organisation had a procedure for taking corrective actions for problems encountered during the project cycle.	Frequency	4	20	75	74	46	10	229
	Valid %	1.8	9.2	34.2	33.8	21.0		100.0
The organisation had procedures for maintaining the Quality Records at each project phase.	Frequency	4	20	65	78	56	6	229
	Valid %	1.8	9.0	29.1	35.0	25.1		100.0
The organisation specified skills training with economic development initiative for the project team.	Frequency	13	34	69	71	29	11	227
	Valid %	6.0	15.8	31.9	32.9	13.4		100.0
Project progress was monitored and the delivery process and project outcomes were evaluated.	Frequency		19	66	76	60	6	227
	Valid %		8.6	29.9	34.4	27.1		100.0

Q5.0 The project team identified what quality standards were relevant to the project.

Project organisations and the planning team should ascertain compliance with all applicable local laws and design measurable quality standards essential for long-term sustainability (Musoni, 2005). PMs from different infrastructure projects varied in their responses; only a little more than half of the respondents (54.4 percent) reported to have developed quality standards relevant to the project (39 percent said 'largely', and 15.4 percent said 'great deal'). Given the large-scale number of activities and

projects involved, 34.2 percent of the respondents reported that they had 'somewhat' identified quality standards relevant to the project. It must also be noted that 10.1 percent of the respondents said the project team, demonstrating adherence, did 'little' to identify quality standards (X̄ =3.57, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q5.1 The projects consistently met the technical performance specifications.

Post-conflict infrastructure projects are critical for sustainable development in societies and should meet the technical requirements that are safe, reliable, sustainable, dependable, maintainable and measurable (Musoni, 2005). As far as most of the infrastructure projects' technical needs are concerned, 66.2 percent of the respondents reported that they were efficient, reliable and safe (51.3 percent of the respondents said 'largely', 14.9 percent said 'great deal'). In fulfilling the requirements of technical operations, 28.5 percent of the respondents said their projects were only 'somewhat' able to meet the required technical standards (=3.75, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q5.2 There were standardised checklists to ensure consistency in frequently performed activities.

Changes happen more frequently in post-conflict environment and similar projects are implemented across many areas. For quality control and to ensure operations are executed as planned, a checklist is used to assess the activities performed in the implementation process (Natsios, 2005). In making certain operating procedures are applied as planned, only 51.5 percent of the respondents believed that the organisations used standardised checklists to ensure consistency and quality (35.7 percent of the respondents said 'largely', and 15.8 percent said 'great deal'). 31.7 percent of the respondents said 'somewhat' and 14.5 percent of the respondents said their projects had 'little' in the way of standardised checklists to review activities performed (X̄ =3.48, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q5.3 There were procedures for formal reviews to learn from project failures and /or successes.

There is a need to discuss project reviews and their impact on the success or failure of projects. These reviews can increase the chances of success of similar activities or projects. When asked to indicate if there were procedures for formal reviews, fewer

than half of the respondents (48.5 percent) confirmed having formal review procedures (33.5 percent said 'largely', 15 percent said 'great deal'). With respect to the opportunity to review the success or otherwise of the project, 31.3 percent reported 'somewhat' and almost 15.4 percent believed that there was very 'little' in the way of formal review procedures and inspections (X̄ =3.38, M=3 and Mode=4).

Q5.4 Planned project practices were compared with other projects in order to generate ideas for improvement.

Where resources are limited, multilateral agencies need individuals and teams to connect and to harvest lessons learned to inform future project planning and implementation (Schindler & Eppler, 2003). In comparing the general opinion of the respondents with actual practice, only 47.8 percent thought that project teams compared the lessons learned from different aid organisations for projects that were concurrently implemented to see possibilities for improvement (32.9 percent said 'largely', 14.9 percent said 'great deal'). Responses to the sections of the questionnaire dealing with enhancing project quality and generating examples of good practice showed that 34.6 percent said 'somewhat', and 16.7 percent were reported to have done 'little' to compare their project with other projects within the area of operation (X̄ =3.44, M=3.00 and Mode=3).

Q5.5 The organisation reported to other agencies the results of inspections that addressed any area of non-conformance.

Donors and development agencies struggling for quality need to strengthen monitoring mechanisms and report on any evidence of major non-conformities with other agencies (Watt & Regehr, 2008). In recognising the need to strengthen the reconstruction effort to enhance the quality, only 54.9 percent of the respondents said participating agencies reported to other agencies abnormal activities that hinder positive outcomes (35.7 percent confirmed 'largely', 19.2 percent alleged 'great deal'). Though adequate monitoring and interagency reporting requirements are critical for project success, 23 percent of the respondents reported 'somewhat', and 17.9 percent assumed 'little' was done to ensure there was a reporting mechanism for development agencies to function collectively (X̄ =3.48, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q5.6 The organisation had a procedure for taking corrective actions for problems encountered during the project cycle.

Organisations uncover issues, concerns and challenges during project planning and implementation. In response to the quality assurance of having a procedure for taking corrective actions, a bare majority of 54.8 percent of the respondents believed the organisation did have a mechanism for addressing issues that arose and showed support for continuing the project (33.8 percent said 'largely' and 21 percent said 'great deal'). Nearly 34.2 percent of the respondents reported that they 'somewhat' effectively managed the issues that arise during the planning and execution phases of a project (X̄ =3.63, M=4, Mode=3).

Q5.7 The organisation had procedures for maintaining the quality records at each project phase.

Post-conflict agencies must establish periodic audits and control mechanisms, and document 'lessons learned' records for each phase of the project. In an attempt to measure standards, just over 60.1 percent of the respondents said that the organisation established and maintained records for monitoring project progress (35 percent of the respondents said 'largely', 25.1 percent said 'great deal'). As a quality measure for the projects implemented, 29.1 percent of respondents believed that the organisations had 'somewhat' referenced standards and procedures to control and maintain quality records for the project (X̄ =3.73, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q5.8 The organisation specified skills training with economic development initiative for the project team.

While every aid organisation may have hidden agendas, projects in post-conflict society should contribute to sound economic expansion and social development of the community (Hass, 2006). Through organisational development programs, only 46.3 percent of the respondents considered they had received skills training (32.9 percent of the respondents said 'largely', 13.4 percent said 'great deal'). To understand and respond to the challenges of social, economic and political reconstruction, an almost similar number of respondents reported 'somewhat' (31.9 percent), and 15 percent reported they had received 'little' contribution to their skills

and capacity building program with focus on economic development initiative ($\bar{X}$ =3.32, M=3.00 and Mode=4).

Q5.9 Project progress was monitored and the delivery process and project outcomes were evaluated.

Project implementation in the post-conflict environment should be monitored intensively to evaluate the progress, ensure quality and timely progress, and to report on the findings (Rummel-Shapiro, 2004). More than half (61.5%) of the respondents agreed that project outcomes were evaluated and that the progress of the project was being monitored (34.4 percent of the respondents said 'largely', and 27.1 percent confirmed 'great deal'). Primarily concerned with the delivery process, 29.9 percent believed the project's progress, outcomes, and impact on the beneficiaries were 'somewhat' being monitored by each participating organisation ($\bar{X}$ =3.80, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

4.7.1 Standard deviation and skewness

Non-conformance may be a result of several challenges in a post-conflict period and reporting to other agencies may provide an opportunity to minimise the problems and increase efficiency. The SD of 1.118 in Q5.5 in Table 4.31 indicates that organisations are sporadically reporting to the appropriate authorities on areas of non-conformance, more so with the fear of losing future grant opportunities to more competitive agencies. In facing various challenges in economic development initiative, the SD of 1.080 in Q5.8 highlights the fact that organisations do not effectively engage the project team in economic development processes. In post-conflict societies, there should be an opportunity to review the success or otherwise of the project; the SD of 1.068 in Q5.3 implies that the respondents are unsure if the organisation has any process established to review the findings of project performance.

Table 4.31: Standard deviation and skewness

	Project Quality Management	SD	Skewness
Q5.0	The project team identified what quality standards were relevant to the project.	.915	-.262
Q5.1	The projects consistently met the technical performance specifications.	.793	-.485
Q5.2	There were standardiSed checklists to ensure consistency in frequently performed activities.	.998	-.260
Q5.3	There were procedures for formal reviews to learn from project failures and /or successes.	1.068	-.308
Q5.4	Planned project practices were compared with other projects in order to generate ideas for improvement.	.967	-.044
Q5.5	The organisation reported to other agencies the results of inspections that addressed any area of non-conformance.	1.118	-.376
Q5.6	The organisation had a procedure for taking corrective actions for problems encountered during the project cycle.	.975	-.281
Q5.7	The organisation had procedures for maintaining the Quality Records at each project phase.	996	-.421
Q5.8	The organisation specified skills training with economic development initiative for the project team.	1.080	.307
Q5.9	Project progress was monitored and the delivery process and project outcomes were evaluated.	.937	-.228

4.7.2 PCA analysis

A PCA analysis performed on the statements in Section 5 resulted in two components with an eigenvalue greater than 1, accounting for 57% of the variance in the data. Table 4.32 shows the Varimax Rotated Component Matrix and the component loadings for the 10 statements.

4.7.2.1 Component 1: Importance of quality control

An environment which has serious difficulties and constraints of time and resources, often outside the control of project team, can encourage the project team to abandon quality control measures. In order to maintain the level of quality for each project element, the PM should establish controls and periodically evaluate overall performance to ensure the project meets applicable technical standards. It is also important for the organisation to perform periodic audits, provide team members with performance appraisals, and document post-project reviews as part of an effective management process. Feedback and suggestions for improvement are critical so that planned work practices can be compared with other projects. This in turn will generate ideas to enhance post-conflict project management practices.

4.7.2.2 Component 2: Procedures for maintaining project updates

In determining which acceptable qualities of standards are relevant to a project, the organisation should develop procedures and maintain quality records for future reference. The project team should also measure the quality of work executed in the different phases and perform quality assurance activities continuously to ensure project objectives are being achieved. It is also a good practice for the organisation to highlight discrepancies and communicate with other agencies about areas of non-conformance within the area of operation. To promote people's ownership of economic development initiatives, the PM should identify further skills and training needs with a social and economic development focus for the team and specifically provide training to the local community.

Table 4.32: Varimax rotated component matrix for project quality management

Project Quality Management	Component 1	Component 2
The projects consistently met the technical performance specifications.	**.794**	.007
The project team identified what quality standards were relevant to the project.	**.757**	.167
There were procedures for formal reviews to learn from project failures and/or successes.	**.720**	.319
There were standardised checklists to ensure consistency in frequently performed activities.	**.618**	.407
Planned project practices were compared with other projects in order to generate ideas for improvement.	**.584**	.392
Project progress was monitored and the delivery process and project outcomes were evaluated.	**.519**	.453
The organisation specified skills training with economic development initiative for the project team.	.307	**.613**
The organisation had procedures for maintaining the Quality Records at each project phase.	.295	**.762**
The organisation had a procedure for taking corrective actions for problems encountered during the project cycle.	.175	**.828**
The organisation reported to other agencies the results of inspections that addressed any area of non-conformance.	.082	**.675**

4.7.3 Regressions

In Table 4.33, respondents who ranked quality as the most important component in defining, organising and structuring projects had significantly higher Component 1 scores than respondents who did not rank quality as the most important component. Respondents who had formal training had significantly higher Component 1 scores than respondents who did not have formal training. Respondents whose projects were longer than a year had significantly higher Component 2 scores than respondents whose projects were less than a year in length.

Table 4.33: Regression output management factors

	Coefficient	T	P
Component 1			
Training	.168	2.301	.023
Quality most important	.227	3.117	.002
Component 2	-	-	-
Project length	0.22	2.973	.003

4.7.4 Correlations

In Table 4.34, all item-to-total correlations in the scale were between 0.4 and 0.7.

Table 4.34: Project quality management item inter-correlations

	Q5.0	Q5.1	Q5.2	Q5.3	Q5.4	Q5.5	Q5.6	Q5.7	Q5.8	Q5.9	Item-to-total
Q5.0	1.000										**.560**
Q5.1	.497**	1.000									**.474**
Q5.2	.478**	.377**	1.000								**.635**
Q5.3	.474**	.467**	.490**	1.000							**.639**
Q5.4	.437**	.357**	.484**	.513**	1.000						**.595**
Q5.5	.259**	.192**	.301**	.255**	.296**	1.000					**.432**
Q5.6	.300**	.254**	.369**	.362**	.452**	.483**	1.000				**.619**
Q5.7	.367**	.261**	.449**	.488**	.381**	.386**	.640**	1.000			**.656**
Q5.8	.310**	.197**	.466**	.365**	.341**	.231**	.439**	.471**	1.000		**.544**
Q5.9	.351**	.378**	.424**	.497**	.364**	.270**	.374**	.451**	.491**	1.000	**.594**

*significant at the 0.05 level of significance
**significant at the 0.001 level of significance

4.7.5 Managing the project quality

In general, the requirements for skills training for the implementation team and technical specifications for the project, should be outlined (Table 4.35) in the

planning phase and should have detailed and measurable goals to ascertain the progress. Emphasis should be placed on documenting project records, reporting progress and project findings. The PM should document the progress on project activities and compare them against the planned schedule. Formal reviews must be conducted and periodic progress reports should specifically address areas of non-conformance operating within the framework. These reports may result in operational changes being identified in the plan and the organisation should share lessons of operational practices and procedures with other agencies operating in the area to avoid future non-conformance.

Table 4.35: Project quality management variables in rank order of means

Project Quality Management	Mean
Project progress was monitored and the delivery process and project outcomes were evaluated.	3.86
The organisation had procedures for maintaining the Quality Records at each project phase.	3.79
The projects consistently met the technical performance specifications.	3.78
The organisation had a procedure for taking corrective actions for problems encountered during the project cycle.	3.73
The organisation reported to other agencies the results of inspections that addressed any area of non-conformance.	3.68
The project team identified what quality standards were relevant to the project.	3.59
There were standardised checklists to ensure consistency in frequently performed activities.	3.54
Planned project practices were compared with other projects in order to generate ideas for improvement.	3.47
There were procedures for formal reviews to learn from project failures and/or successes.	3.39
The organisation specified skills training with economic development initiative for the project team.	3.45

4.8 Project procurement management

Table 4.36 provides summary statistics of project procurement management responses regarding project delivery. The influence of the project procurement management style factors on project delivery that measures the specific variables from the point of view of PMs/Engineers was examined.

Table 4.36: Responses to project procurement management variables

Project Procurement Management	Frequency Valid	Not at all	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great deal	Unsure	Total
Procurement activities were planned early and refined throughout the project life-cycle.	Frequency	6	16	63	103	37	5	230
	Valid %	2.7	7.1	28.0	45.8	16.4		100.0
Procurement requirements were identified in consultation with appropriate stakeholders.	Frequency	11	24	58	96	34	8	231
	Valid %	4.9	10.8	26.0	43.1	15.2		100.0
Established selection criteria were determined in consultation with stakeholders.	Frequency	11	23	63	90	35	7	229
	Valid %	5.0	10.3	28.4	40.5	15.8		100.0
Agreed proposals were communicated to prospective contractors to ensure clarity of project objectives.	Frequency	5	21	62	85	47	6	226
	Valid %	2.3	9.5	28.2	38.6	21.4		100.0
Preferred contractors were selected in accordance with agreed selection processes.	Frequency	6	27	56	86	50	4	229
	Valid %	2.7	12.0	24.9	38.2	22.2		100.0
Procurement progress was reviewed to ensure project objectives were met.	Frequency	9	26	61	67	51	13	227
	Valid %	4.2	12.2	28.5	31.3	23.8		100.0
Contractual conflicts were identified and remedial actions were implemented.	Frequency	15	26	67	62	36	21	227
	Valid %	7.3	12.6	32.5	30.1	17.5		100.0
Contract deliverables met contractual and project requirements.	Frequency	3	11	55	100	51	9	229
	Valid %	1.4	5.0	25.0	45.4	23.2		100.0
Contractors critically assessed their capacity to operate in a challenging post-conflict environment.	Frequency	4	30	89	71	27	6	227
	Valid %	1.8	13.6	40.3	32.1	12.2		100.0
Procurement process was often criticised as slow, costly and complex in a post-conflict environment.	Frequency	13	39	50	67	50	8	227
	Valid %	5.9	17.8	22.9	30.6	22.8		100.0

Q6.0 Procurement activities were planned early and refined throughout the project life cycle.

Procurement is a most significant undertaking and, at the same time, a complex process. Early engagement of suppliers and contractors is critical in the developmental process (Watt, Kayis & Willey, 2010). Exacerbated by the post-conflict environment, acquisition of local supplies and services is minimal. In ensuring that procurement is planned early to maintain continuity and avoid unnecessary delays, 62.2 percent of the respondents stated that the project procurement requirements were known early in the life of the project (45.8 percent of the respondents confirmed 'largely', 16.4 percent said 'great deal'). To allow adequate time for procurement activities, 28 percent reported the organisations were

'somewhat' involved early in acquiring goods and services that were needed for the project (X̄ =3.66, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q6.1 Procurement requirements were identified in consultation with appropriate stakeholders.

As far as is practical, organisations should facilitate stakeholder involvement and consultations for satisfactory procurement decisions, and procure goods and services that benefit the community (Schultz & Soreide, 2008). Assessing the extent and quality of stakeholder participation, 58.3 percent of the respondents said that stakeholders made a considerable contribution to the establishment of procurement requirements (43.1 percent stated 'largely', and 15.2 percent alleged 'great deal'). Playing a central role in development, 26 percent stated the procurement practices were 'somewhat' identified in consultation with appropriate stakeholders (X̄ =3.53, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q6.2 Established selection criteria were determined in consultation with stakeholders.

The selection criteria for suppliers and contractors should be reviewed with the stakeholders of the conflicting society, which also includes organisational project representatives and beneficiaries of the project (Ewins, Harvey, Savage & Jacobs, 2006). When PMs were asked if the stakeholders were allowed to determine the selection criteria, 56.3 percent of the respondents felt that the stakeholders were consulted to determine the selection criteria for the project contractors and suppliers (40.5 percent said 'largely' and 15.8 percent said 'great deal'). Focusing on these process measures, 28.4 percent reported the relevant stakeholders were 'somewhat' contacted to give their input in the process (X̄ =3.52, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q6.3 Agreed proposals were communicated to prospective contractors to ensure clarity of project objectives.

To successfully manage the donor funding and ensure that goods and services are not delayed in the complex environment, the project organisation should work in partnership with contractors to specify what the project team would like to achieve, what quality of goods need to be delivered and at what time (OECD, 2010). When PMs were asked if they agreed proposals were clearly communicated to prospective

contractors, 60 percent of the respondents acknowledged that contractors were briefed on the agreed proposals in relation to the overall objectives of the project (38.6 percent acknowledged 'largely' and 21.4 percent stated 'great deal'). Despite the significance of communicating agreed proposals, 28.2 percent said the proposals were only 'somewhat' briefed to prospective contractors (X =3.67, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q6.4 Preferred contractors were selected in accordance with agreed selection processes.

Corruption is a central issue and is rampant at all levels of international development. In view of this, sourcing high-quality contractors to implement projects is overwhelmingly necessary. Nevertheless, organisations should select contractors in accordance with the agreed selection criteria (Schultz & Soreide, 2008). In the selection process of the preferred contractors for the projects implemented, overall 60.4 percent of the respondents stated that associated processes were directed towards the selection of contractors (38.2 percent reported 'largely' and 22.2 percent thought 'great deal'). However, 24.9 percent of the respondents alleged contractors were selected only 'somewhat' based on the principles outlined in the procurement process (X =3.65. M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q6.5 Procurement progress was reviewed to ensure project objectives were met.

By carrying out procurement efficiently, organisations are able to make certain that the project objectives are met. In consultation with the procurement department, project outcomes are monitored and evaluated using available procurement records (OECD, 2010). Of the total respondents, 55.1percent said an in-depth procurement audit was done on the completion of the project (31.3 percent said 'largely' and 23.8 percent said 'great deal'). To achieve the objectives of the project, 28.5 percent said the organisation's procurement progress was 'somewhat' accomplished through a review of reports (X =3.58, Median=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q6.6 Contractual conflicts were identified and remedial actions were implemented.

Clear reporting channels and addressing contractual conflicts are particularly fundamental in the context of post-conflict economies. Failure to address these issues adequately significantly affects cost and schedule overruns of projects (Schultz &

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Soreide, 2008; Shihata, 1997). Responding to contractual challenges in post-conflict contexts, only 47.6 percent of respondents determined that contracts were implemented according to agreed terms and conditions and all the necessary remedial measures were executed (30.1 percent said 'largely', 17.5 percent said 'great deal'). Of the total respondents, 22.5 percent of the respondents assumed 'somewhat', and 12.6 percent of respondents reported to have identified 'little' contractual risks and considered appropriate remedial action (X̄ =3.38, M=4.00 and Mode=3).

Q6.7 Contract deliverables met contractual and project requirements.

Typically, the PM is responsible for the appraisal of all project deliverables, and the process as a whole should be periodically reviewed to ensure timely delivery of goods and services. Consequently, it is also crucial to determine if the procurement contract deliverables meet all contractual requirements in the most efficient, cost-effective manner (OECD, 2010). In response to meeting contractual requirements before the acceptance of deliverables, 68.6 percent of the respondents considered their projects complied with effective performance monitoring of contract deliverables and its outcome (45.4 percent said 'largely', and 23.2 percent said 'great deal'). Twenty-five percent stated deliverables under the contract were 'somewhat' approved by the project procurement team (X̄ =3.84, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q6.8 Contractors critically assessed their capacity to operate in a challenging post-conflict environment.

The challenge for contractors in post-conflict economic reconstruction is to provide goods, services, and commitment to work in unstable and often fragile environments (MacDonald, 2005). In Kosovo, due to the destruction of infrastructure and lack of equipment and other resources, contractors needed to assess their capacity to carry out reconstruction projects. In such circumstances, it is important contractors take measures to protect themselves. Only 44.3 percent of the PMs stated that the contractors accurately assessed the capacity in which they had to operate (32.1 percent said 'largely' and 12.2 percent said 'great deal'). To carry out such inspections, 40.3 percent of the respondents said 'somewhat' and 13.6 percent reported the contractors had done 'little' to review their capacity to provide services at this critical time (X̄ =3.39, M=3 and Mode=3).

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Q6.9 Procurement process was often criticised as slow, costly and complex in a post-conflict environment.

With diverse transactions and often-arduous negotiating mechanisms in post-conflict reconstruction projects, a procurement process can be considered too costly, bureaucratic and uncertain which, in turn, affects the economic performance (MacDonald, 2005). Although there is a great deal of uncertainty, as well as criticism due to its slow processes, only 53.4 percent of the respondents expressed serious concerns that the organisation's acquisition process is often criticised for being complex, slow and costly (30.6 percent reported 'largely', 22.8 percent said 'great deal'). While acknowledging that the difficult environment leads not only to delay in completion but to more complexity, 22.9 percent said 'somewhat' and 17.8 percent of the respondents responded 'little' to the organisation's procurement process being slow and frustrating (X =3.47, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

4.8.1 Standard deviation and skewness

In terms of project procurement planning and policy formulation, the SD spread across most of the variables for the findings of this study in Table 4.37 demonstrates that there are challenges in operational procedures and practices. The spread of SD across the variables signifies that there is no such thing as best solutions and there is often a lack of coordination (Q6.1), lack of integration among different stakeholders (Q.6.2) and variably applied understanding of effective project practices (Q6.5 and Q6.6). The procurement policies and procedures can seriously affect an organisation's ability to deliver their intended outcomes (Q6.9). In managing expectations in a changing environment that lacks available resources and which otherwise may be vulnerable to corruption, the strength of aid organisations should be to establish and embed appropriate policy and best practice to deliver sustainable procurement strategies and tools.

Table 4.37: Standard deviation and skewness

	Project Procurement Management	SD	Skewness
Q6.0	Procurement activities were planned early and refined throughout the project life-cycle.	.927	-.637
Q6.1	Procurement requirements were identified in consultation with appropriate stakeholders.	1.034	-.633
Q6.2	Established selection criteria were determined in consultation with stakeholders.	1.037	-.577
Q6.3	Agreed proposals were communicated to prospective contractors to ensure clarity of project objectives.	.990	-.474
Q6.4	Preferred contractors were selected in accordance with agreed selection processes.	1.037	-.501
Q6.5	Procurement progress was reviewed to ensure project objectives were met.	1.105	-.426
Q6.6	Contractual conflicts were identified and remedial actions were implemented.	1.132	-.358
Q6.7	Contract deliverables met contractual and project requirements.	.885	-.601
Q6.8	Contractors critically assessed their capacity to operate in a challenging post-conflict environment.	.931	.078
Q6.9	Procurement process was often criticised as slow, costly and complex in a post-conflict environment.	1.193	-.359

4.8.2 PCA analysis

A PCA analysis performed on the statements in project procurement management resulted in two components with an eigenvalue greater than 1, accounting for 56% of the variance in the data. Table 4.38 shows the Varimax Rotated Component Matrix and the component loadings for the 10 statements.

4.8.2.1 Component 1: Strategic procurement planning

In a post-conflict environment, when building an economy emerging from a long period of conflict and with very limited resources, there is always a risk that a project will not be completed on time. Procurement therefore needs to be planned early in the life cycle of the project. It is also critical that the organisation places emphasis on strategic procurement practices in consultation with all stakeholders, and agrees on selection criteria and procedures for identification of suppliers. For the selection of the suppliers, the PM should also consult and involve the community who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the end product. During the project implementation process, the team periodically should monitor the compliance of the contracted work and confirm whether deliverables meet the agreed standards and the needs of the beneficiaries.

4.8.2.2 Component 2: Contractor's capability

In operating infrastructure services in challenging and volatile field conditions, the contractors providing goods and services to the community should critically assess whether they have the capacity to operate, succeed and deliver the required outcomes in conflict-affected areas. Conversely, the PMs have also acknowledged that while working in an environment that is complex and responding to the immediate and continuing needs of the community, the procurement process is criticised as slow and is administratively complex.

Table 4.38: Varimax rotated component matrix for project procurement management

Project Procurement Management	Component 1	Component 2
Procurement progress was reviewed to ensure project objectives were met.	**.801**	.123
Procurement requirements were identified in consultation with appropriate stakeholders.	**.780**	-.102
Established selection criteria were determined in consultation with stakeholders.	**.766**	-.019
Preferred contractors were selected in accordance with agreed selection processes.	**.701**	.115
Contract deliverables met contractual and project requirements.	**.683**	.211
Contractual conflicts were identified and remedial actions were implemented.	**.682**	.212
Procurement activities were planned early and refined throughout the project life cycle.	**.675**	-.305
Agreed proposals were communicated to prospective contractors to ensure clarity of project objectives.	**.667**	.001
Contractors critically assessed their capacity to operate in a challenging post-conflict environment.	.506	**.518**
Procurement process was often criticised as slow, costly and complex in a post-conflict environment.	-.088	**.820**

4.8.3 Regression

In Table 4.39, respondents whose projects were longer than a year had significantly lower Component 2 scores than respondents whose projects were less than a year in length. Project cost was also a significant predictor for Component 2, with respondents who estimated the value of their project at over US$1 million having a significantly higher component score than respondents who estimated the value of

their project at less than US$1 million. Respondents who ranked quality as the most important component in defining, organising and structuring projects had significantly lower Component 2 scores than respondents who did not rank quality as the most important component.

Table 4.39: Regression output management factors

	Coefficient	T	P
Component 1			
Component 2	-	-	-
Length of the project	-0.168	-2.093	.038
Project cost	0.249	3.095	.002
Quality most important	-0.154	-2.085	.039
Procurement most important	0.131	1.788	.076

4.8.4 Correlation

In Table 4.40, eighty percent of item-to-total correlations in the scale were between 0.4 and 0.7. The item-to-total correlation for item Q6.9 '*Procurement process was often criticised as slow, costly and complex in a post-conflict environment*' suggests this item may not contribute information to the scale. The item-to-total correlation for item Q6.5 '*Procurement progress was reviewed to ensure project objectives were met*' suggests this item also may not be needed in the scale.

Table 4.40: Project procurement management item inter-correlations

	Q6.0	Q6.1	Q6.2	Q6.3	Q6.4	Q6.5	Q6.6	Q6.7	Q6.8	Q6.9	Item-to-total
Q6.0	1.000										**.497**
Q6.1	.526**	1.000									**.657**
Q6.2	.432**	.685**	1.000								**.662**
Q6.3	.322**	.460**	.561**	1.000							**.547**
Q6.4	.432**	.415**	.418**	.389**	1.000						**.604**
Q6.5	.415**	.550**	.522**	.435**	.636**	1.000					.716
Q6.6	.378**	.425**	.406**	.343**	.399**	.591**	1.000				**.598**
Q6.7	.317**	.423**	.435**	.409**	.386**	.526**	.480**	1.000			**.593**
Q6.8	.241**	.273**	.267**	.280**	.395**	.352**	.404**	.477**	1.000		**.480**
Q6.9	-.145*	-.001	.053	-.009	.003	.008	.019	-.038	.117*	1.000	.004

*significant at the 0.05 level of significance
**significant at the 0.001 level of significance

4.8.5 Managing project procurement

In a post-conflict procurement environment (Table 4.41), contractors employed to do the task are frequently selected from the international market. In the interests of the contractors and their intended beneficiaries, they should assess the capacity to operate in a challenging field conditions and must understand the local dynamics and the perception of critical local issues. While acknowledging the difficult environment and procurement activities that are criticised as slow and excessively complex, to mitigate the risk the organisation and its stakeholders should plan and coordinate procurement activities early in the project life cycle. The project procurement process must also establish proper selection criteria for the suppliers and explicitly define the requirements and obligations of the contractors aligned with the project needs.

Table 4.41: Project procurement management variables in rank order of means

Project Procurement Management	Mean
Contract deliverables met contractual and project requirements.	3.93
Agreed proposals were communicated to prospective contractors to ensure clarity of project objectives.	3.73
Procurement progress was reviewed to ensure project objectives were met	3.72
Procurement activities were planned early and refined throughout the project life cycle.	3.71
Preferred contractors were selected in accordance with agreed selection processes	3.69
Contractual conflicts were identified and remedial actions were implemented.	3.62
Procurement requirements were identified in consultation with appropriate stakeholders	3.61
Established selection criteria were determined in consultation with stakeholders	3.59
Procurement process was often criticised as slow, costly and complex in a post-conflict environment.	3.56
Contractors critically assessed their capacity to operate in a challenging post-conflict environment.	3.46

4.9 Project communication management

Table 4.42 provides summary statistics of project communication management responses regarding project delivery. The influence of the project communication management style factors on project delivery that measures the specific variables from the point of view of PMs/Engineers was examined.

Table 4.42: Responses to project communication management variables

Project Communication Management	Frequency Valid	Not at all	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great deal	Unsure	Total
The key stakeholders were correctly identified.	Frequency	2	25	61	92	37	13	230
	Valid %	.9	11.5	28.1	42.4	17.1		100.0
There was a common understanding of agreement on stakeholders' requirements.	Frequency	4	19	58	108	30	11	230
	Valid %	1.8	8.7	26.5	49.3	13.7		100.0
The communication channels for reporting project problems are clear.	Frequency	3	11	63	94	58	2	231
	Valid %	1.3	4.8	27.5	41.1	25.3		100.0
The communication channels are clear between the organisation and the community.	Frequency	5	18	65	84	54	4	230
	Valid %	2.2	8.0	28.7	37.2	23.9		100.0
The project meetings provided helpful and accurate project information.	Frequency	3	7	55	101	58	5	229
	Valid %	1.3	3.1	24.6	45.1	25.9		100.0
The project is committed to keeping all stakeholders informed about the project's progress.	Frequency	3	8	53	98	62	6	230
	Valid %	1.3	3.6	23.7	43.7	27.7		100.0
Project team members often informally discussed project matters.	Frequency	5	11	54	84	67	10	231
	Valid %	2.3	5.0	24.4	38.0	30.3		100.0
The organisation had detailed information tracked for the project.	Frequency	5	14	69	72	60	7	227
	Valid %	2.3	6.3	31.4	32.7	27.3		100.0
Project stakeholders review information of the project and seek to address any issues raised.	Frequency	2	18	60	105	30	12	227
	Valid %	.9	8.4	27.9	48.8	14.0		100.0
The organisation could resolve conflict when it arose.	Frequency	3	17	64	87	52	5	228
	Valid %	1.3	7.7	28.7	39.0	23.3		100.0

Q7.0 The key stakeholders were correctly identified.

In societies emerging from conflict, there is a sense of commitment and urgency to identify and communicate with the stakeholders early in the life of the project (Mashatt et al., 2008). For timely and effective restoration of economic and social implementation of reconstruction program and projects, 59.5 percent of the respondents said they had identified all relevant stakeholders involved in the development of the civil society (42.4 percent of the respondents said 'largely', and 17.1 percent said 'great deal'). Of the respondents, 28.1 percent reported the most appropriate stakeholders were 'somewhat' identified, especially early in the project's life cycle ($\bar{X}$ =3.63, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q7.1 There was a common understanding of agreement on stakeholders' requirements.

A vital component of the project organisation is to secure a common understanding of the roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders and to ensure they are kept actively involved and informed (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2002). Though most PMs were involved in infrastructure reconstruction projects in Kosovo, only 63 percent of the respondents acknowledged that the stakeholders developed a common understanding of the goals and objectives that need to be achieved (49.3 percent of the respondents said 'largely', and 13.7 percent said 'great deal'). Approximately 26.5 percent of the respondents believed that the stakeholders 'somewhat' developed a common understanding and agreement for the purpose of the project ($\bar{X}$ =3.64, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q7.2 The communication channels for reporting project problems are clear.

In the light of changes in its operating environment, there is a need for a clear and transparent channel of communication to be outlined for reporting project problems (Gordon, Rodt & Wolff, 2006). In ensuring that there is an effective communication strategy maintained and respected between the various parties involved in the program, 66.4 percent of the respondents agreed that organisations do have a reporting strategy appropriate to a post-conflict environment (41.1 percent said 'largely', 25.3 percent said 'great deal'). At the same time, 27.5 percent said reporting project status within affected communities was only 'somewhat' clear ($\bar{X}$ =3.84, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q7.3 The communication channels are clear between the organisation and the community.

There is a lack of effective community participation in the decision-making process by representatives from all major groups in the society. This deprives the community of the right to participate and to be consulted before initiating any development projects. Implementing understandable mechanisms and processes of communication between the organisation and the community can assist effective community participation (Orr, 2002). The majority (61.1 percent) of the PMs in practice believed there was a two-way relationship between the community and the organisation (37.2 percent of the respondents said 'largely', and 23.9 percent said 'great deal'). Despite

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the existence of organisation and beneficiary communication channels, 28.7 percent of the respondents said the projects had only established a 'somewhat' lucid communication process (X =3.73, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q7.4 The project meetings provided helpful and accurate project information.

To address the complex and challenging issues, undertaking follow-up meetings and ongoing reviews on the progress of the project can have a positive impact on the beneficiary communities (Roche, 1999). The PMs were asked if the project review meetings were especially helpful. Remarkably 71 percent of the PMs said they were beneficial to all parties concerned (45.1 percent said 'largely', 25.9 percent said 'great deal'). However, 24.6 percent said they were 'somewhat' helpful to the organisation (X =3.91, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q7.5 The project is committed to keeping all stakeholders informed about the project's progress.

The implementing agency should be committed to openness and transparency in its decision-making, and must keep all relevant stakeholders proactively informed of the project's activities and anticipated impacts (Mutebi et al., 2003). In relation to approaches for drawing and sustaining stakeholder's participation and having an impact on local decision-making, 71.4 percent of the respondents gratefully acknowledged that the organisation's project team is committed to keeping stakeholders informed (43.8 percent said 'largely' and 27.7 percent said 'great deal'). Of the total respondents, 23.7 percent reported the PMs were committed 'somewhat' to keeping stakeholders informed about project progress, delays and milestones achieved (X =3.93, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q7.6 Project team members often informally discussed project matters.

Regardless of the approach undertaken, in order to build relationship and encourage teamwork it is good to exchange project-related matters in an informal way (Agadjanian & Menjivar, 2008). Asked within the team if informal communications were supported, 68.3 percent of the respondents believed they had experienced informal discussion of the project's progress in the organisation (38 percent said 'largely', while 30.3 percent responded 'great deal'). More than 24.4 percent

reported the team 'somewhat' encouraged informal communication in organisations ($\bar{X}$ =3.89, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q7.7 The organisation had detailed information tracked for the project.

Due to the lack of skilled resources and severe shortfalls of funding, PMs may control multiple projects simultaneously in different areas of operations. It is crucial for the project team to track systematically the progress of the project (Payne, 1995). Even though different team roles have different functional areas formally assigned, overall only 60 percent of the PMs stated that the organisation had sufficient information tracked for the projects implemented (32.7 percent said 'largely', and 27.3 percent said 'great deal'). Of the total respondents, 31.4 percent of the respondents indicated the projects only 'somewhat' tracked a record of information ($\bar{X}$ =3.76, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q7.8 Project stakeholders review information on the project and seek to address any issues raised.

Stakeholders are affected by the outcome of the project and responsibility for engaging the stakeholders rests with the project team to seek information on key issues and concerns about the project (Pinto, 2000). In engaging stakeholders in the review process, close to 62.8 percent of the respondents experienced that the stakeholders reviewed information and endorsed action to address them (48.8 percent said 'largely', and 14 percent said 'great deal'). In these initiatives, 27.9 percent said that stakeholders only 'somewhat' monitored and responded to the issues raised by the group ($\bar{X}$ =3.67, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q7.9 The organisation could resolve conflict when it arose.

In volatile and fast-changing circumstances, conflict is inevitable in project organisations, and project teams have to deal with many issues throughout the life cycle of the project (Nicholas, 2004). Drawing from the experience of the PMs, 62.3 percent believed the organisations they represented could successfully resolve conflict situations (39 percent stated 'largely' and 23.3 percent acknowledged 'great deal'). In examining the needs of the society, 28.7 percent reported the organisation

involved in reconstruction projects had a policy that 'somewhat' addressed conflict as and when it arose (X =3.75, M=4.00, Mode=4).

4.9.1 Standard deviation and skewness

In project communication management there was surprisingly a narrow range of SD for the entire 10 variables as shown in Table 4.43. The two main challenges in project communication at a program level are to establish and maintain open channels of communication with the beneficiaries and to ascertain meaningful participation of key stakeholders. From the responses gathered, the SD demonstrate that there was an understandable desire for the organisations to have devised appropriate strategies to involve the intended beneficiaries in the integral part of the planning process and to have effectively communicated these to all stakeholders in the development process.

Table 4.43: Standard deviation and skewness

Project Communication Management		SD	Skewness
Q7.0	The key stakeholders were correctly identified.	.929	-.354
Q7.1	There was a common understanding of agreement on stakeholders' requirements.	.889	-.620
Q7.2	The communication channels for reporting project problems are clear.	.904	-.510
Q7.3	The communication channels are clear between the organisation and the community.	.987	-.491
Q7.4	The project meetings provided helpful and accurate project information.	.863	-.628
Q7.5	The project is committed to keeping all stakeholders informed about the project's progress.	.880	-.656
Q7.6	Project team members often informally discussed project matters.	.971	-.712
Q7.7	The organisation had detailed information tracked for the project.	.997	-.459
Q7.8	Project stakeholders review information on the project and seek to address any issues raised.	.853	-.480
Q7.9	The organisation could resolve conflict when it arose.	.943	-.431

4.9.2 PCA Analysis

A PCA analysis performed on the statements in project communication management resulted in two components with an eigenvalue greater than 1, accounting for 60% of the variance in the data. Table 4.44 shows the Varimax Rotated Component Matrix and the components loadings for the 10 statements.

4.9.2.1 Component 1: Implement effective communication strategies

In stabilising a post-conflict situation, it is important to establish a process of information sharing and coordination both for the organisation and beneficiaries. Furthermore, it is important to find out what the beneficiaries actually want and develop a better mechanism for information sharing. The practice of sharing information within and across agencies will also minimise duplication of services, streamline operations, invest in resources in critical areas of need and identify key stakeholders, both internal and external, to the project for the decision-making process. Doing so early in the life of the project will assist the project team in implementing the project effectively.

4.9.2.2 Component 2: Engage stakeholders

The key issues PMs try to address with the diversity of post-conflict environment are outreach and engaging all stakeholders. Gaining the support of the stakeholders is crucial and, at the same time, it is important to keep them informed and consulted in the decision-making process. In a situation like this, the project team should initiate more informal discussion on technical aspects of the project and at times the discussion could help reduce potential disputes and assist to resolve conflicts and disagreements.

Table 4.44: Varimax rotated component matrix for project communication management

Project Communication Management	Component 1	Component 2
The communication channels for reporting project problems are clear.	**.834**	.123
The communication channels are clear between the organisation and the community.	**.792**	.257
The project meetings provided helpful and accurate project information.	**.671**	.417
There was a common understanding of agreement on stakeholders' requirements.	**.663**	.185
The key stakeholders were correctly identified.	**.607**	.234
The organisation could resolve conflict when it arose.	**.573**	.388
The organisation has detailed information tracked for the project	.446	**.706**
Project stakeholders review information on the project and seek to address any issues raised.	.431	**.548**
The project is committed to keeping all stakeholders informed about the project's progress.	.405	**.685**
Project team members often informally discussed project matters.	.016	**.888**

4.9.3 Regressions

In Table 4.45, respondents whose project length was longer than one year had significantly higher Component 2 scores than respondents whose projects were less than one year.

Table 4.45: Regression output management factors

	Coefficient	T	P
Component 1			
Component 2	-	-	-
Length of project	.196	2.654	.009

4.9.4 Correlation

In Table 4.46, all item-to-total correlations in the scale were between 0.4 and 0.7.

Table 4.46: Project communication management item inter-correlations

	Q7.0	Q7.1	Q7.2	Q7.3	Q7.4	Q7.5	Q7.6	Q7.7	Q7.8	Q7.9	Item-to-total
Q7.0	1.000										**.538**
Q7.1	.537**	1.000									**.550**
Q7.2	.363**	.438**	1.000								**.639**
Q7.3	.419**	.373**	.709**	1.000							**.693**
Q7.4	.433**	.463**	.553**	.618**	1.000						**.707**
Q7.5	.414**	.438**	.401**	.471**	.548**	1.000					**.669**
Q7.6	.295**	.227**	.205**	.263**	.378**	.512**	1.000				**.476**
Q7.7	.351**	.396**	.485**	.531**	.533**	.573**	.533**	1.000			**.716**
Q7.8	.298**	.327**	.384**	.524**	.458**	.443**	.366**	.536**	1.000		**.590**
Q7.9	.350**	.330**	.514**	.479**	.459**	.411**	.305**	.553**	.427**	1.000	**.601**

*significant at the 0.05 level of significance
**significant at the 0.001 level of significance

4.9.5 Managing project communication

In essence, before an organisation proceeds with the execution of the project, it is important that all key stakeholders are rightly identified (Table 4.47) and that they have a common understanding and acceptance of deliverables associated with milestones. The project team must ensure that there is clear and regular communication with the local community, have interagency interaction and keep stakeholders updated on the implementation process. There are project issues that arise during planning and implementation processes and PMs, in consultation with the community and stakeholders, should address grievances and resolve conflict

before they escalate. Finally, the project organisation should establish supportive mechanisms for the field staff to report, document activities, and encourage discussion of conflicting views on issues important to the community.

Table 4.47: Project communication management variables in rank order of means

Project Communication Management	Mean
The project is committed to keeping all stakeholders informed about the projects progress.	3.98
Project team members often informally discussed project matters.	3.98
The project meetings provided helpful and accurate project information.	3.96
The communication channels for reporting project problems are clear.	3.86
The organisation had detailed information tracked for the project	3.83
The organisation could resolve conflict when it arose.	3.80
Project stakeholders review information on the project and seek to address any issues raised.	3.79
The key stakeholders were correctly identified.	3.77
The communication channels are clear between the organization and the community.	3.77
There was a common understanding of agreement on stakeholders' requirements.	3.76

4.10 Project risk management

Table 4.48 provides summary statistics of project risk management responses regarding project delivery. The influence of the project risk management style factors on project delivery that measures the specific variables from the point of view of PMs/Engineers was examined.

Table 4.48: Responses to project risk management variables

Project Risk Management	Frequency Valid	Not at all	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great deal	Unsure	Total
The organisation developed a risk management plan to make informed decision.	Frequency	4	30	72	82	28	12	228
	Valid	1.9	13.9	33.3	38.0	13.0		100.0
The communities were involved in managing risk through the practice of identifying the risk in the early in the life of the project.	Frequency	12	47	77	61	24	9	230
	Valid %	5.4	21.3	34.8	27.6	10.9		100.0
The project team interacted with other project organisations to carry out risk analysis.	Frequency	10	33	69	85	18	12	227
	Valid %	4.7	15.3	32.1	39.5	8.4		100.0
Audit reports were used to monitor the progress and evaluate performance.	Frequency	8	29	64	79	34	16	230
	Valid %	3.7	13.6	29.9	36.9	15.9		100.0
The project teams were capable of monitoring risk response strategies and to deal with worst case scenarios.	Frequency	5	23	69	87	36	8	228
	Valid %	2.3	10.4	31.4	39.5	16.4		100.0
The project team continually addressed potential risk and continued to control risks throughout the project's life cycle.	Frequency	3	31	62	83	41	8	228
	Valid %	1.4	14.1	28.2	37.7	18.6		100.0
The organisation had a contingency plan to recover from each identified risk.	Frequency	8	32	75	65	35	13	228
	Valid %	3.7	14.9	34.9	30.2	16.3		100.0
The organisation concentrated on ensuring that the highest priority risks were attended to first.	Frequency	3	23	70	75	47	9	227
	Valid %	1.4	10.5	32.1	34.4	21.6		100.0
Responsibilities for the risk activities identified were delegated throughout the project organisation to individuals and groups.	Frequency	3	26	78	72	31	19	229
	Valid %	1.4	12.4	37.1	34.3	14.8		100.0
The organisation communicated risk reduction activities with other agencies.	Frequency	5	36	60	76	25	28	230
	Valid %	2.5	17.8	29.7	37.6	12.4		100.0

Q8.0 The organisation developed a risk management plan to make informed decisions.

After a conflict, the situation is fluid, volatile and uncertain; and organisations implementing project activities often face heightened risks (Barakat, 2005). Despite the growing uncertainty and instability, only 51 percent of the respondents stated that the organisation developed a risk management strategy (38 percent said 'largely', 13 percent said 'great deal'). To provide the structure necessary to identify and mitigate the risks, almost 33.3 percent of the respondents reported 'somewhat' and 13.9 percent of them stated the organisation's projects had established very 'little' plan to address risk (X =3.46, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q8.1 The communities were involved in managing risk through the practice of identifying the risk early in the life of the project.

To maintain broad community support for the project, it should be considered good practice to involve the community in order to make the members identify where project risks can occur and respond to changes that arise over the life of the project (van Aalst, Cannon & Burton, 2008). Regarding the management of complex risks, only 38.5 percent of the respondents said that community initiatives were involved in the process (27.6 percent reported 'largely', 10.9 percent confirmed 'great deal'). When asked if there was a program to assist the community in addressing these risk factors, 34.8 percent said 'somewhat' and 21.3 percent said the project team had 'little' affiliation with the local community in identifying the risk ($\bar{X}$ =3.17, M=3.00 and Mode=3).

Q8.2 The project team interacted with other project organisations to carry out risk analysis.

In post-conflict settings, project teams implement many programs for an organisation at the same time. Given the time and resource constraints and the complex implementation process, the project team by interacting with other organisations, can collaboratively benefit from project risk analysis and its management (Pouligny, 2005). On the issue of building of an inter-agency and inter-organisational partnership in the field, 47.9 percent of the respondents claimed to have interacted with other organisations in carrying out risk assessment (39.5 percent said 'largely' and only 8.4 percent said 'great deal'). When asked whether they were involved in interaction with other teams, 33.1 percent said 'somewhat' and 15.3 percent stated they had very 'little' interagency coordination to analyse and mitigate potential risks ($\bar{X}$ =3.32, M=3.00 and Mode=4).

Q8.3 Audit reports were used to monitor the progress and evaluate performance.

To promote stability and development it is imperative that a performance audit is done periodically. By routinely evaluating the project, its efficiency and administration, the agency, donor and the community will be kept informed of the project's development (Hennes, 1995). In evaluating the project performance against the objectives agreed, 52.8 percent of the PMs claimed that this practice was effectively executed (36.9 percent of the respondents reported 'largely', and 15.9

percent said 'great deal'). Significant to the audit objectives to measure the level of compliance, over 29.9 percent of the respondents said that the projects had 'somewhat' established an audit program to fully assess compliance (X =3.48, M=4.00, Mode=4).

Q8.4 The project teams were capable of monitoring risk response strategies and to deal with worst-case scenarios.

Project managers should have teams who are capable of monitoring and reassessing the response to risk (threats) and to deal with extreme cases (Audergon et al., 2010). On the issue of having an understanding to develop an effective risk management strategy, only 55.9 percent of the respondents said the teams were prepared to develop and deploy appropriate risk responses (39.5 percent of the respondents reported 'largely', and 16.4 percent said 'great deal'). Participating in the survey 31.4 percent of the respondents thought the project team 'somewhat' had the ability to monitor all risks and communicate them to stakeholders (X =3.57, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q8.5 The project team continually addressed potential risk and continued to control risks throughout the project's life cycle.

In its decisions and activities that impact on society and the environment, the project team should develop a strategy to proactively identify potential risk and continually implement risk strategies (Audergon et al., 2010). Highlighting and continuing to assess and control potential risk throughout the project, only 56.3 percent of the total respondents revealed that the project team were committed to managing and controlling risk identified in the project life cycle (37.7 percent of the respondents said 'largely', and 18.6 percent of the respondents said 'great deal'), 28.2 percent said 'somewhat', and 14.1 percent believed they had managed very 'little' risk routinely throughout all phases of the project's life (X =3.58, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q8.6 The organisation had a contingency plan to recover from each identified risk.

With the possibility of renewed violence and uncertainty, aid organisations should develop a reasonable contingency plan with schedule flexibility (UNDP/IAPSO, 2005). The study identified that only 46.5 percent of the organisations represented had a basic contingency plan for emergencies (30.2 percent reporting 'largely', 16.3

percent saying 'great deal'). A limited organisational response in preparing a contingency plan in advance was evident, with 34.9 percent saying 'somewhat', and 14.9 percent saying the organisations had 'little' contingency plan in place to deal with all the emergencies that could arise (X̄ =3.40, M=3.00 and Mode=3).

Q8.7 The organisation concentrated on ensuring that the highest priority risks were attended to first.

Due to security and governance concerns, not all identified risk can be addressed and effectively implemented. Particular care should be taken to minimise further conflict and tension by addressing risks that are of higher priority because they can have a severe impact on project development. To help ensure organisations give special attention to identified high-risk situations and take appropriate actions, only 56 percent of the PMs believed that organisations adequately recognised high-risk situations and implemented appropriate controls (34.4 percent of the respondents said 'largely', and 21.6 percent said 'great deal'). At the same time, 32.1 percent acknowledged that the authorities had 'somewhat' identified higher risk and had taken the required action (X̄ =3.64, M=4.00 and Mode=4).

Q8.8 Responsibilities for the risk activities identified were delegated throughout the project organisation to individuals and groups.

Project roles may be assigned to one or more individuals, and more specifically to groups working in conflict-sensitive areas of operation. The risk of implementing projects in these areas should be clearly identified and mitigating strategies clearly allocated with their potential impact on project delivery (Kafle & Murshed, 2006). In the circumstances under which the organisations operate, less than half of the respondents (49.1%) said they had clearly defined risk management roles and responsibilities for each member of the team (34.3 percent of the respondents reported 'largely', and 14.8 percent said 'great deal'). To assign responsibility for activities identified in the risks, almost 37.1 percent affirmed 'somewhat', and 12.4 percent expressed 'little' risk activities were allocated to individuals and groups (X̄ =3.49, M=3.00 and Mode=3).

Q8.9 The organisation communicated risk reduction activities with other agencies.

Given the complexity of the operational environment, close coordination of conflict resolution efforts may indeed be difficult and communication between agencies may be limited or non-existent (Tan, 2005). The project team may have responded effectively to a crisis, but may not have communicated the strategy to other agencies implementing related projects in the area. Only 50 percent of the PMs believed that the project team coordinated risk strategies with agencies within the area of operations (37.6 percent of the respondents said 'largely' and 12.4 percent said 'great deal'). While 29.2 percent of the respondents said 'somewhat', 17.8 percent reported the project team had communicated 'little' regarding risk reduction activities with other agencies (X =3.40, M=3.50 and Mode=4).

4.10.1 Standard deviation and skewness

In a fragile post-conflict situation, it is critical to develop a contingency plan for dealing with potential risks. In Table 4.49, the SD of 1.056 in Q8.1, dealing with the concept and practice of getting the community engaged in identifying risks, implies there was varied participation by the local community in identifying risk early in the life of the project. In this complex project environment, for every identified risk that is both known and unforeseen, the SD of 1.045 in Q8.6 demonstrates that not every project organisation has a contingency plan developed in advance as part of the risk management plan. The recommendations from an audit report can be used to measure performance; the SD of 1.033 in Q8.3 implies that not every organisation's report findings contribute to the quality by measuring the progress and monitoring performance of the project.

Project Risk Management		SD	Skewness
Q8.0	The organisation developed a risk management plan to make informed decisions.	.949	-.255
Q8.1	The communities were involved in managing risk through the practice of identifying the risk early in the life of the project.	1.056	-.069
Q8.2	The project team interacted with other project organisations to carry out risk analysis.	.987	-.435
Q8.3	Audit reports were used to monitor the progress and evaluate performance.	1.033	-.388
Q8.4	The project teams were capable of monitoring risk response strategies and to deal with worst-case scenarios.	.960	-.396
Q8.5	The project team continually addressed potential risk and continued to control risks throughout the project's life cycle.	.992	-.300
Q8.6	The organisation had a contingency plan to recover from each identified risk.	1.045	-.203
Q8.7	The organisation concentrated on ensuring that the highest priority risks were attended to first.	.979	-.271
Q8.8	Responsibilities for the risk activities identified were delegated throughout the project organisation to individuals and groups.	.939	-.133
Q8.9	The organisation communicated risk reduction activities with other agencies.	.998	-.255

4.10.2 PCA analysis

In Table 4.50, a PCA analysis performed on the statements in project risk management resulted in one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1, accounting for 55% of the variance in the data.

4.10.2.1 Component 1: Risk integration strategy

There was only one component for the variables in project risk management, which implies the critical importance of organisations having a strategy that involves development of alternatives to deal with the most challenging and dynamic social processes for implementing projects. Risk communication is an important aspect of project planning and should be implemented jointly with other relevant agencies. To expedite the reconstruction project process, it is important to get the community involved right from the design stage in finding solutions to many unforeseen impacts. The project team and the implementing agency should ensure all stakeholders are aware of the risks, develop contingency plans by sharing the responsibility, and implement a methodology and guidelines to periodically monitor compliance and progress. Finally, despite the fact that most post-conflict development is slow to

progress, the strategy should be to identify and prioritise higher risks within the overall economic development frameworks.

Table 4.50: Varimax rotated component matrix for project risk management

Project Risk Management	Component 1
The organisation developed a risk management plan to make informed decisions.	.717
The communities were involved in managing risk through the practice of identifying the risk early in the life of the project.	.645
The project team interacted with other project organisations to carry out risk analysis.	.718
Audit reports were used to monitor the progress and evaluate performance.	.663
The project teams were capable of monitoring risk response strategies and to deal with worst-case scenarios.	.794
The project team continually addressed potential risk and continued to control risks throughout the project's life cycle.	.788
The organisation had a contingency plan to recover from each identified risk.	.811
The organisation concentrated on ensuring that the highest priority risks were attended to first.	.795
Responsibilities for the risk activities identified were delegated throughout the project organisation to individuals and groups.	.766
The organisation communicated risk reduction activities with other agencies.	.681

4.10.3 Regressions

In Table 4.51, project cost was a significant predictor for Component 1, with respondents who estimated the value of their project at over US$1 million having a significantly higher component score than respondents who estimated the value of their project at less than US$1 million.

Table 4.51: Regression output management factors

	Coefficient	T	P
Component 1			
Project cost	.182	2.447	.015

177

4.10.4 Correlation

In Table 4.52, all item-to-total correlations in the scale were between 0.4 and 0.7.

Table 4.52: Project risk management item inter-correlations

	Q8.0	Q8.1	Q8.2	Q8.3	Q8.4	Q8.5	Q8.6	Q8.7	Q8.8	Q8.9	Item-to-total
Q8.0	1.000										**.642**
Q8.1	.435**	1.000									**.568**
Q8.2	.488**	.544**	1.000								**.649**
Q8.3	.404**	.381**	.439**	1.000							**.590**
Q8.4	.538**	.427**	.508**	.552**	1.000						**.727**
Q8.5	.508**	.460**	.457**	.457**	.615**	1.000					**.717**
Q8.6	.539**	.438**	.549**	.377**	.605**	.608**	1.000				**.741**
Q8.7	.493**	.446**	.500**	.423**	.591**	.660**	.661**	1.000			**.723**
Q8.8	.481**	.383**	.431**	.447**	.523**	.562**	.636**	.601**	1.000		**.695**
Q8.9	.423**	.335**	.424**	.494**	.464**	.444**	.506**	.434**	.558**	1.000	**.608**

*significant at the 0.05 level of significance
**significant at the 0.001 level of significance

4.10.5 Managing project risk

A post-conflict country is usually a divided society and to determine if the project should continue to operate, the significant groups within the community should be fully involved in identifying, prioritising and contributing to risk assessment processes that affect them. In addition, in order to make informed decisions (Table 4.53), the team should lay out guidelines for interactions with other agencies operating in the same location to provide for risk assessment and to eliminate conflicting practices. The reality is that most agencies do not handle unforeseen circumstances well and, by having a contingency plan, the project team can deal with its possible consequences. The PM should encourage auditing to evaluate whether the project meets cost, scheduled and performance targets. Finally, the optimal delegation of risk responsibilities shared with local communities and groups minimises the beneficiaries' attempt to criticise and blame aid agencies, donors and the local government when there are significant delays in implementation of the project.

Table 4.53: Project risk management variables in rank order of means

Project Risk Management	Mean
The organisation concentrated on ensuring that the highest priority risks were attended to first.	3.74
The organisation communicated risk reduction activities with other agencies.	3.71
Responsibilities for the risk activities identified were delegated throughout the project organisation to individuals and groups.	3.69
The project team continually addressed potential risk and continued to control risks throughout the project's life cycle.	3.67
The project teams were capable of monitoring risk response strategies and to deal with worst-case scenarios	3.66
Audit reports were used to monitor the progress and evaluate performance.	3.65
The organisation developed a risk management plan to make informed decision	3.60
The organisation had a contingency plan to recover from each identified risk	3.55
The project team interacted with other project organisations to carry out risk analysis	3.46
The communities were involved in managing risk through the practice of identifying the risk early in the life of the project.	3.28

4.11 PM Reliability analysis

Reliability of scales was measured using Cronbach's alpha as the most commonly used pointer for internal consistency (Ramaker, Marinus, Stiggelbout & Hilten, 2002). All scales in Table 4.54 showed significant reliability.

In the project scope management scale, deleting Q1.5 *'The project's team members took ownership of the project'* from the scale would increase the Cronbach's alpha to 0.830.

In the project time management scale, deleting Q3.1 *'The organisation had set time and cost estimates too low, to secure project funding'* from the scale would increase the Cronbach's alpha to 0.789.

Deleting Q4.0 *'The availability of scarce resources was taken into account when deciding upon projects.'* from the project human resources management scale would increase the Cronbach's alpha to 0.873.

Deleting Q6.9 *'Procurement process was often criticised as slow, costly and complex in a post-conflict environment.'* from the project procurement management scale would increase the Cronbach's alpha to 0.871.

Table 4.54: Scale reliability

Project Management Planning	Scale	Cronbach's alpha	P
Project Scope Management	1	0.79	<0.001
Project Cost Management	2	0.83	<0.001
Project Time Management	3	0.76	<0.001
Project Human Resources Management	4	0.85	<0.001
Project Quality Management	5	0.86	<0.001
Project Procurement Management	6	0.83	<0.001
Project Communications Management	7	0.88	<0.001
Project Risk Management	8	0.90	<0.001

4.11.1 Total scale scores analysis (PM)

Scores were totalled across each scale to determine if there were significant differences between total scale scores and demographic variables (scores of 6= unsure were excluded). Tests of normality showed that Scales 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 were significantly different from normal, whereas scales, 4, 5, 8 were not significantly different from normal. To test for significant differences between scales 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and demographic variables, Mann-Whitney tests were used. To test for significant differences between Scales 4, 5, 8 and demographic variables, ANOVAs were used.

There was a significant difference with respect to Scale 5 total ($F=6.549$, $p=0.011$) and whether the respondent had formal training. Respondents with formal training had significantly higher Scale 5 total scores than respondents without formal training.

There was a significant difference with respect to Scale 2 total ($z=-1.982$, $p=0.047$), Scale 3 total ($z=-2.203$, $p=0.028$), Scale 5 total ($F=4.119$, $p=0.044$), Scale 7 total ($z=-1.994$, $p=0.046$) and length of project. Respondents with project lengths greater than one year had significantly higher Scale 2, 3, 5 and 7 scores than respondents with project lengths of less than one year.

There was a significant difference with respect to Scale 3 total ($z=-3.300$, $p=0.001$), Scale 4 total ($F=6.155$, $p=0.014$), Scale 5 total ($F=10.586$, $p=0.001$), Scale 6 total ($z=-2.964$, $p=0.003$), Scale 7 total ($z=-3.332$, $p=0.001$), Scale 8 total ($F=7.819$,

p=0.006) and project costs. Respondents with project costs greater than US$1 million had significantly higher Scale 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 scores than respondents with project costs less than US$1 million.

4.11.2 Histogram

Appendix 15 actually communicates a more meaningful concept in terms of scope planning applied in projects. Within this context the importance of scope planning and controlling has a mean of 3.6 on the 7-point scale and the histogram has a slight skew to the left. The response pattern indicates that a majority of the participants place more emphasis on managing scope of the project as 'largely' important and very few respondents rate it as 'somewhat' important. There is only a marginal number of respondents who rate managing scope as being of no importance and few who rate the importance as 'little'.

The other histograms show a mean of 3.6 on the 7-point scale for time, quality, communication and risk; 3.8 for cost and human resources; and 4.2 for procurement. The responses pattern indicates that a majority of the participants place more emphasis on procurement of a project as largely important, even more so than the scope of project.

The histograms for cost, human resources, procurement and risk keep the same format, indicating no tendency to change meaningful concepts. The histogram for communication concentrated more in the middle of the chart, showing that most responses are giving an average of 3.6 for communication in projects (less discrepancy). The most revealing histograms are regarding time and quality: while time has a slight skew to the right, quality has a skew to the left, showing the controversy between time and quality planning in projects.

4.12 CoM Analysis

Table 4.55 to Table 4.59 analyses the perspectives of the CoMs and Program Coordinators in the assessment of project implementation and its effectiveness. In these tables, quantitative assessments give us the mean score aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of planning and implementing projects. They give a clear outcome of the variables after assessing the CoMs and Program Coordinators priorities for their existing programs. In identifying and selection of the projects, Table 4.58 clearly indicates that more efforts should be made by the organisation to involve the community in the process. In Table 4.56, the main reasons for project failure in a post-conflict environment have been associated with poor planning, poor identification and assessment of the risks involved and inadequate donor funding. Table 4.55 reflects that project goals should be clearly specified and objectives should be measurable to provide a benchmark of success. Further, in identifying the strategic success factors in operating in such an environment, Table 4.59 indicates that members of the project team having a clear definition of the scope of the project is an important part of the project management process.

4.12.1 Success criteria for operations

To what extent is each of the following important for the projects to be deemed successful in your area of operations?

Table 4.55: Success criteria for operations

Project Variables	Mean
Clear understanding of project goals and objectives by implementing agency	4.38
Clear understanding of project environment by donors and stakeholders	4.30
The project implementation team has the required competencies	4.13
Implementing agency has detailed and realistic project plans	4.09
Having adequate resources committed by the implementing agency	4.08
Project outputs are used by the conflicting communities	4.07
Having the approval of the project by the affected communities	4.05
Implementing agency addresses the needs of the conflicting communities	4.01
The donors have clear policies to sustain project activities	3.93
Having the commitment to the project by the conflicting community	3.88
Having ownership of the project by the beneficiaries	3.78

4.12.2 Reason for failures

To what extent is each of the following a reason for failures in the implementation of projects in your area of operations?

Table 4.56: Reasons for failures

Project Variables	Mean
Inadequate project planning	3.83
Poor analysis of a major risk factor	3.74
A lack of adequate non-financial resources	3.70
Insufficient project funding	3.69
Delays caused by bureaucratic administrative systems	3.66
Unrealistic project schedules	3.65
A lack of agreement on the objectives by the donor and the stakeholders	3.62
The project process is not clearly defined	3.00
A lack of project team participation in decision-making	3.52
Low participation by the conflicting communities	3.50
Complicated procurement systems	3.45

4.12.3 Critical implementation for project success

How important is each of the following in ensuring projects are successful?

Table 4.57: Critical implementation for project success

Project Variables	Mean
Engaging professional project management team	4.31
Effectively managing the entire project life cycle (not just implementation)	4.27
Having control of monitoring processes in place	4.20
Having greater involvement of local stakeholders	4.15
Identifying a realistic budget	4.11
Ensuring transparency to control corruption	4.09
Understanding the limits and capabilities of the project team	4.05
Having contingency plans to deal with potential problems	4.01
Having clear measurements to verify success	3.97

4.12.4 Identification and selection of projects

To what extent should each of the following determine the identification and selection of the projects for planning and implementation?

Table 4.58: Identification and selection of projects

Project Variables	Mean
The local community	4.16
The implementing agency	4.01
The government	3.98
The donor	3.84

4.12.5 Critical for successful implementation

To what extent is each of the following critical for the successful implementation of projects in your area of operations?

Table 4.59: Critical for successful implementation

Project Variables	Mean
Clearly defined scope of the project	4.20
Political stability	4.14
Skill training of staff for long-term development	4.11
Having a clear framework for managing projects	4.11
Managing risk effectively on projects	4.09
Participation in the project feasibility stage by the community	4.09
Communicating project plans clearly to the conflicting community	4.08
Effective coordination by implementing agencies	4.07
Effective meetings that include the conflicting communities	3.98
Effective procurement process to commence projects quickly	3.74
Good governance to promote reconstruction projects	3.72
Providing a security presence for the organisation implementing projects	3.50
Frequently shifting donor priorities	3.61
Participation of women in the project planning and implementation process	3.18

4.13 CoM Reliability analysis

Reliability of scales was measured using Cronbach's alpha. In Table 4.60 all scales from Survey 1 (see Appendix 9) showed significant reliability, although the reliability of Section 4 in Survey was lower than for other sections. In Section 3, deleting Q3h *'Having contingency plans to deal with potential problems.'* from the scale would increase the Cronbach's alpha to 0.894. Deleting Q5g *'Frequently shifting donor priorities.'* from Section 5 would increase the Cronbach's alpha to 0.905.

Table 4.60: Scale reliability

Project	Chronbach's Alpha	P
Section 1	0.86	<0.001
Section 2	0.87	<0.001
Section 3	0.88	<0.001
Section 4	0.45	<0.001
Section 5	0.89	<0.001

4.14 Total scale score analysis (CoM)

Scores were totalled across each scale to determine if there were significant differences between total scale scores and demographic variables (scores of 6=unsure were excluded). Tests of normality showed that all scales were significantly different from normal. To test for significant differences between scales and demographic variables, Mann-Whitney tests were used.

There was a significant difference with respect to Scale 1 total (z=-2.606, p=0.009), Scale 3 total (z=-2.485, p=0.013), and Scale 5 total (z=-2.907, p=0.004), and whether the respondent had formal training. Respondents with formal training had a significantly higher Scale 1 total score and significantly lower Scale 3 and Scale 5 total scores than respondents without formal training.

There was a significant difference with respect to Scale 1 total (z=-3.643, p<0.001), Scale 3 total (z=-2.082, p=0.037) and project cost. Respondents with project costs greater than US$1 million had significantly higher scale 1 and 3 scores than respondents with project costs less than US$1 million.

4.15   Factors to define and organise projects

Table 4.61 examines the order of importance and understanding of relevant knowledge areas in order to achieve the desired level of performance in post-conflict project planning and management processes. From the two groups (CoMs and PMs) invovled at different levels of project planning in the organisational structure, project scope, quality, and human resources were deemed to be important factors in the planning and management of reconstruction projects. Though project cost and project time were considered to be critical, without having an understanding of the scope and without the required human resources to implement, project cost and project time became less important.

Table 4.61: Importance of factors in helping to define, structure and organise projects

	PM		CoM	
	Most important (rank 1) %	Mode Ranking	Most important (rank 1) %	Mode Ranking
Scope	19	1	22	1
Time	11	2	8	4
Cost	8	4	15	1
Quality	23	1	17	1
Risk	11	6	12	7
Human Resources	12	1	13	2
Communications	9	7	8	6
Procurement	7	8	5	8

Figure 4.1: Factors to define, structure and organise projects (PM)

Figure 4.2: Factors to define, structure and organise projects (CoM)

4.16 Major risks faced in planning and implementing projects

In Table 4.62, the majority of CoM respondents ranked the importance of technical risks (81%), external risk (63%), environmental risk (79%) and personal risk (79%) as low to medium importance. Organisational risk (71%), project management risk (68%), operational risk (65%), governance risk (68%) and financial risk (76%) were ranked to be of medium to high importance by the majority of CoM respondents.

Table 4.62: Importance of major risks faced in planning and implementing projects

Major Risk	Low	Low/ Medium	Medium	Medium/ High	High	Mode
Technical risk	21	29	31	18	1	Medium
External risk	16	15	32	26	11	Medium
Environmental risk	16	28	35	12	9	Medium
Organisational risk	18	11	32	26	12	Medium
Project Mgt risk	17	15	22	26	20	Medium/high
Operational risk	15	19	27	32	6	Medium/high
Governance risk	11	20	32	24	12	Medium
Financial risk	11	12	22	23	32	High
Personal risk	38	22	18	15	6	Low

4.17 Qualitative analysis

> *If you look at the infrastructure in Kosovo there is a lot to be done,*
> *I mean the roads are in a bad situation, the water supply systems*
> *are in a very bad situation here, the sewage networks are in a very*
> *bad situation, you have 55 percent of the Kosovo villages still*
> *getting water from the wells and then there is no treatment of wells,*
> *so still much has to be done (Participant CD-G2-017, 2008).*

The responses collected from both groups, CoMs and Program Coordinators, through the interview process have been analysed and presented along with the discussion of relevant issues under different facets of project planning and implementation. The first set of questions covered a range of topics from general to specific project planning processes and were intended to facilitate discussion of Research Question One: W*hat planning/implementing criteria should be used for defining project success in post-conflict reconstruction and development*? The respondents were invited to comment on their perception of how projects were planned and implemented. The participants' experiences and reflections were categorised into emerging themes (or categories) under different headings and the themes summarised, interpreted and collated into summary tables.

4.18 CoMs/Program Coordinators

4.18.1 Assess planning and implementation

How would you assess the planning and implementation of post-conflict reconstruction projects in Kosovo? How does this compare to your experience of other post-conflict states?

At a minimum, regardless of the circumstances, international organisations are in the forefront of project conception, planning and implementation. Most agency staff interviewed were repetitive (see Table 4.63) in expressing the need for more in-depth cooperation and strongly believed coordination to be a critical element for project success. Respondents also stressed that agency coordination was required, not only before the project commences but also during the execution phase.

Category	Items	Participants' quotes
Complexity	Very complicated, complex, big mess, fragmented, very disjointed, not coherent, clusters in cooperation, big issues	*I would say it's quiet fragmented, not coherent, and not coordinated at all ... I have been here for 2 years now; I haven't found a single body that I think sort of coordinates this activity ... It is a very complex environment in Kosovo and I don't believe that this reconstruction effort is particularly well coordinated.*
Coordination	Not coordinated, not a single body to coordinate, no coordination in the decision-making process, coordination was missing, Poor donor coordination, do things independently, still don't have coordination, don't believe reconstruction effort is well coordinated, inter agency rivalry they don't want to coordinate together, community not involved, overlapping of projects	*Even though UNHCR was trying to co-ordinate, you still had many organisations coming in and doing whatever their mission wants to achieve without any proper coordination of donors.*
Lack of funding (Cost)	Un-coordinated funds, lack of funding, trouble with capital expenditure, spending not development oriented, did not spend the money properly	*Very disjointed and un-coordinated funds that came in here and did not go to the right places.*
Project Management issues	Did not plan or strategise, donor control and designed projects, no time to do any kind of planning, trouble in project management, poor implementation, community complaints about project implementation, no plan or strategies, not planned at all, no communication with local population, no feasibility assessment done, cannot control the process, no standard process	*Planning they are not bad, I'd say its equivalent at the other countries in the Balkans, if not a little bit better ... implementation they are absolutely zero ... they had significant trouble with capital expenditure, significant trouble in project management in terms of being able to complete things within time and budget.*

Based on the literature review and interview results, inter-agency coordination should take place at both the international and local levels of project participation. The interview results also emphasised the competitiveness among the agencies and challenges in securing funding, and respondents suggested a variety of ways forward.

Most emphasised was the view that funding was not adequately coordinated among donors. There were respondents who thought that project funding fuelled community division and some believed projects were under-funded amidst conflicting donor agendas. Respondents felt that funding should be allocated to the most critical capital expenditure (infrastructure) projects, and that there should be better coordination of funding by the donor community. Respondents mentioned that there had been many achievements which should be acknowledged; however, in addition to coordination, there was a need for more effective planning. On a practical level, respondents believed organisations should strive to adopt practices to improve consistency and provide better integration of development coordination.

4.18.2 Evaluate post-conflict reconstruction

What criteria are taken into consideration for evaluating post-conflict reconstruction and development projects?

When responding to evaluation of post-conflict reconstruction peace building project processes (see Table 4.64), the respondents' key variables were cost, community participation and quality. Literature on post-conflict studies strongly recommended buy-in from the local community on development projects. Community participation in the planning and decision-making of the programs emerged as a key variable, and it was an obvious concern for the majority of respondents. Several respondents expressed the view that in the complex decision-making processes, the local community was not actively involved in the planning process of the project. The respondents emphasised that the local community should be involved on a continuous basis in the decision-making process at all stages of the project cycle.

Table 4.64: Evaluating post-conflict reconstruction

Category	Items	Participants' quotes
Cost	Level of expenditure, under budget, financial management, money, dollar, minimising transaction cost, funding, what has been spent, budgeted expenditure, expenditure, funding properly utilised, preliminary cost, direct funding, euro or dollar, program cost, economic development fund	*Looking more in terms of what has been spent, which is not necessarily the most efficient way of gauging the development process, but unfortunately that is the way and also the donors have been sort of fixated on that. They want to know where their donor dollars are being used, but they are not necessarily looking at the question between those dollars and the actual output. Therefore, I would say right now it is really just a simple dollar sum or Euro sum in this case.*
Community	Community benefiting from the project, community satisfaction, community participation, beneficiaries are satisfied, community involvement, capacity of the beneficiary	*The measurable thing could be for the beneficiaries; are they satisfied in the community. How much the community was involved in the project?*
Quality	Check for quality, good quality, important to see quality	*It is not important just to provide to you the power supply. It is also important to see the quality of this energy that is provided, because if the quality is not good then all the machines, the apparatus can be damaged. Therefore the next factor that can be, for example, the quality of the supply.*
Project Management issues	No standards on time and money, under budget, implementation problems. Fit within the program goals, no feasibility study	*People were really working on assumptions much more that any kind of detailed plan using any particular criteria, so for a very long time it was just an ad hoc thing.*

The respondents also noted that in a post-conflict environment constraints of time and cost overruns associated with the project do not contribute to stability. Respondents experienced with the way in which projects are designed, noted that the local and international agencies are more concerned with various financial challenges throughout the project cycle. Respondents have said that many agencies underestimate the time and cost of the project, which gives rise to specific challenges during the implementation phase. Respondents also mentioned that, given the

environment of instability, donors and international agencies are more concerned with the dollar aggregates than other aspects of the projects.

Respondents also noted also that although the project quality in a post-conflict society is an important variable, few organisations are actually focussed on the final quality of the project. Many PMs are aware of the importance of quality on the outcome of the project, but stated categorically that because quality is not related to funding, it is not possible for the organisation to state proposed quality criteria in their application**.**

4.18.3 Significant factors for post-conflict reconstruction

What significant factors have the most influence on the outcomes of post-conflict reconstruction projects?

A review of the literature indicated that post-conflict peace building processes are complex, time-consuming and involve high project costs. In the current study, respondents argued that in a post-conflict society it is difficult to measure significant factors given the complexity of the project environment. Enabling factors that can help achieve the intended project outcome are cost, political influence and community participation. Overwhelmingly, respondents (see Table 4.65) noted that for implementation of programs, sustained funding is crucial and can have a substantial impact on the successful delivery of the project.

Table 4.65: Significant outcome factors for post-conflict reconstruction

Category	Items	Participants' quotes
Cost (Corruption)	Put your money, needs to be financed. Room for corruption, corruption, ability to spend the money, expenditure, availability of money	*Certainly in post-conflict societies you're still getting parties up and running and there's a tendency for a great deal of political turnover, and so the idea that what one Government has, may not be adopted by the subsequent administration, so you do get some planning issues that even now, in project implementation issues ... So I would say lack of continuity, lack of commitment to the medium-term expenditure, project implementation and I would also say corruption. Moreover, I think corruption is one of those issues that the public does have.*
Political	Political influence, political change, political turnover, political situation, political stability, political reasons, political attachment, political environment, political support, political championship, political security, political will	*The extent to which that is successful is largely a result of the political environment and the extent to which political support is provided for us in the project.*
Community participation	Community buy-in, in the hands of the local, community is not in, community involvement, community cooperation, needs of the community, community not approached properly, beneficiary request, grass roots community involvement	*Looking into the grass roots, community involvement is one of the most important factors in the beginning ... because even though there is assistance to be done, if there was no community involvement, I mean, there are no good results.*
Project management issues	Project implementation issues, lack of project management, planning issues, prioritising, quality of the project	*During the development of the project, it is important to have a good quality of the contractors who are going to deliver good quality of project, which is important for sustainability, and maintenance of the project for the future.*

It was also important to note that a large number of respondents stated that community participation was vital to achieve a positive outcome in post-conflict reconstruction processes. In addition to community consultation being highlighted, some respondents stated that through the development of projects and programs designed to enhance appropriate level of workforce, participation by the local

community would foster social cohesion. The difficulty highlighted by respondents was that political risks could underscore all successful development efforts. In the context of post-conflict reconstruction, many respondents asserted explicitly that local participation could add to political stability, thereby leading to the successful development of projects.

4.18.4 Challenges in designing and implementation

What are the challenges you face in designing and implementing post-conflict reconstruction projects?

Two main challenges to post-conflict administration, international aid organisations and NGOs are to achieve a minimum level of political stability and participation, and to achieve community involvement and empowerment. Respondents stated (see Table 4.66) that without the political will, full involvement and support of the local administration and its leaders, it is not possible to deliver projects effectively. Respondents explained that support requires coordination, integration and building upon the technical support of key ministries for the implementation of large infrastructure projects. Respondents emphasised the need for a broader involvement of the civil society as a factor of stability and reconciliation. In addition, respondents emphasised the need for political enlistment and the community partaking in key infrastructure projects to help build trust at the community level. This, in turn, would give the local administration much needed social cohesion.

Table 4.66: Challenges in design and implementation

Category	Items	Participants' quotes
Political	Political pressure, political development, political turnover, local political situation, political party have priorities, politics, political championship, fluidity of politics, political stability, political leadership, political conditions, government buy-in	*Moreover, without political stability you then always run the risk that you have agreed and have an identified direction, which is then undermined through a change in political leadership, and this is perhaps the most challenging.*
Community	Community involvement share, participation of the community, be flexible to approach the community, beneficiaries to be present, beneficiary fund part of the project, beneficiaries to present a project but it does not work that way	*In addition, you always have to be extremely flexible and find all the kinds of ways to approach the community because first you need to earn their trust; it is not very easy to do.*
Project management issues	Time factor, project management, project implementation, procurement planning, difficult technical standards	*We can design, we can get the money, we can get everything we need, but in terms of actually implementing, taking it from concept to reality, that is where there is a huge gap that is lost.*

4.18.5 Project reviews

How often are the organisations' projects reviewed to re-evaluate their viability and potential success? When is this review conducted?

When asked about the project review processes, there were differences of opinion from various participants. They indicated that traditionally (see Table 4.67), in a post-conflict environment the assessment of the organisations' projects was primarily carried out only as a donor requirement for funding, and not to find out the expected project outcomes in specifically measurable terms. Most respondents were of the view that organisations did review the project periodically, but strongly endorsed the view that it should be undertaken throughout the implementation process.

Table 4.67: Project reviews

Category	Items	Participants' quotes
Periodic reviews	3 months, 6 months, after completion of projects, rolling reviews, we work specifically on lessons learned from the project, mid-term budget review, every year, every three years, mid-evaluation, bureaucratic review process, not technical evaluation, technical assessments, donors do ad-hoc basis	*Really, on a very technical level it is not being done to a sufficient degree. It is being done politically through normal budgetary review processing, but in terms of project management, in terms of really taking the budget critical path and looking at cost over-runs, allocation of resources, value for money, those sort of aspects, there's nothing. So Kosovo on the one hand is doing it, but at a very superficial level, but not really doing it on a value for money, is the best use of our resources, where are the inefficiencies in what we're doing.*
Project management issues	Implementation issues, cost over-runs, risks management, allocation of resources	*It is not really an assessment of where we are in terms of the critical path, where we are in terms of cost over-runs, where the risks are and who is assuming those risks.*

Respondents stated that even during the project review, they had no input into the process, which was mostly conducted by external members of the project. Some respondents stated that it was critical to have the opinion of the beneficiaries, though only one agency stated that they had approached end users in the review of the organisation's project.

4.18.6 Recommendations to improve planning and implementation

If the international and the local aid organisations were to do anything different to improve the planning and implementation of reconstruction projects in Kosovo, what would you recommend, given your practical experience in the field?

Having stated that local governance with proficient coordination and planning in a complex environment is a key variable to demonstrate the ability to implement projects effectively in post-conflict societies, both MacDonald (2005) and respondents' evaluations cited project coordination, community participation and project funding listed as vital to improving the implementation and management of reconstruction projects. Respondents clearly stated (see Table 4.68) that the current international aid agencies' coordination structures were not well established and that

the multifaceted donors demonstrated pervasive ignorance of the reality on the ground.

Table 4.68: Recommendations to improve project planning

Category	Items	Participants' quotes
Funding (Cost)	Disbursement of funding, financial support, funding has to be coordinated	*Basically what I see is because it has very tough procedures, the donor has decided that this money is going to be allocated to this program and whatever happens the money will be allocated to the program and that's a huge mistake ... anything to improve the planning and implementation is the flexibility of the donor in their final allocation of the money, of the aid.*
Coordination	More coordination, coordination is the biggest issue, coordinate the international agencies, coordinate and prioritise, funding has to be coordinated, it's a coordination problem, sit down and coordinate, never coordinating, never checking, as much as cooperation, good cooperation, establish donor coordination	*They should establish a donor coordination mechanism, which does not exist in Kosovo.*
Community consultation	Give voice to the community, community know best, ask the community, community should be involved, talk to the people, beneficiaries should prepare for the future projects, beneficiaries should co-work with the donors	*A lot of the people are coming in and just assuming that something working in a specific country, it should work here as well ... this is where they need to be careful and I think the more they talk to people they will understand what people already went through and their needs might be completely different from what they think.*
Project management issues	Develop project management skills, teach project management, draft feasibility report, need assessment is crucial, improve planning and implementation, quality, time	*I think that the most practical thing and I am a huge advocate of this in Kosovo, is to develop project management skills, to teach project management, budgeting and contract management.*

In strengthening civil society post–conflict peace building processes, respondents stated that the community was actively involved, albeit only in the last couple of years. Immediately after the transition phase, the community was asked to participate in the project planning and implementation processes. Nonetheless, respondents

reported that during the emergency phase it was not possible to consult the community due to the critical need for the projects to be completed before the harsh winter set in. A significant number of respondents commented on the need to ensure continued citizen mobilisation and participation during the development phase of large infrastructure projects, knowing that eventually it would have a profound impact on the community at large, and help the beneficiaries to shape their national social and economic policies.

Marshalling funds for post-conflict countries was also reported by respondents as critical to sustain the continuous growth of the slowly progressing economy. In general, respondents felt rather uncertain as to whether their own organisation would be able to obtain continuity of project funding. Moreover, respondents expressed concern about the current political situation; with UNMIK closing down and EULEX taking over the administration of Kosovo, the current funding modalities by international donors may deny the organisations the required funding to implement identified and planned projects.

4.18.7 Alternative approaches to plan and implement projects

In your view, are there any methodologies or approaches that could be used more effectively to plan and implement reconstruction projects in a post-conflict society?

Respondents overwhelmingly expressed concern that the agencies' donor-funded programs have their own developed methodologies. The respondents stated that (see Table 4.69), given the appalling state of most of the local infrastructure, there could be a window of opportunity for including partners and the donor community in training and executing processes. This would help the local community to learn the processes and test the performance standards. Respondents noted that in most cases in the past couple of years, donors decided which projects should be implemented. Interestingly, they stressed that any methodology implemented should involve the community in the planning and execution process in order to encourage them to take ownership of the project outcome.

Table 4.69: Alternative approaches to plan effectively

Category	Items	Participants' quotes
Community	Involve community, give voice to the community, work with the community, teach the community, decide with the community, close cooperation with the community, good cooperation with the community, involve local people in the project	*Good cooperation with the community, because they are the beneficiaries of those projects, and they are the ones who are going to benefit from the project.*
Project management issues	Risk analysis, simple project management tools	*I think the organisation should have simple project management tools from the donor and from local agencies to assign responsibilities.*

4.18.8 Current post-conflict situation in Kosovo

What message would you like to give to the international aid community, NGOs and donors about the current situation of post-conflict reconstruction of Kosovo?

The respondents nominated cooperation, coordination, government buy-in and community engagement as key variables. Respondents were complimentary about the continued level of international military presence (NATO) in Kosovo, which promoted security. Many suggested (see Table 4.70) that with a strong security presence there was considerable scope for making coordination more efficient. However, Kosovo still lacked functional coordination among the donors, UN and the NGOs, which slowed the process of rebuilding. They also identified a low level of cooperation between the government and civil society.

Table 4.70: Current post-conflict reconstruction situation in Kosovo

Category	Items	Participants' quotes
Coordination and government buy-in	Lot of coordination, get this coordinated, with lack of coordination it doesn't happen, close cooperation with the government, dialogue with government, work more closely with government, not try and make decisions for government, need our government to feel empowered, local government needs to be developed, it is government who has the ownership now not UN	*A large number of donors have no capacity in Kosovo. Without the capacity to be able to make good decisions about how to spend money, they should not be here. They specifically should not be pre-identifying the areas they want to finance in the absence of a dialogue with a Government, which they are doing. So overall, I would say there is an over-abundance of aid organisations operating in Kosovo, it is unnecessary, they should not be here. Where possible, low capacity donors should be trying to provide their money through other donors or through collective mechanisms and their efforts should be done away from trying to influence Governments that are trying to work collectively in the international system.*
Community	Focus on community development, communities should be linked, address the needs of the local communities	*Indeed a lot has to be done, in a manner of helping communities, and of course, the local government's element is one of the elements that we need still be developed. I am not talking of the technical issues, but I am talking into that how close the communities should be linked with the municipal local authorities, how open they need to be and address their needs to the local community.*
Project management issues	Project implementation support	*They need help in terms of implementation and I think anticorruption measures in Kosovo are going to be critical to the sustainability of democracy.*

To play a constructive role in the development and reconstruction process, respondents said that the international community should empower the government and its local leaders, and indicated the need for strengthened dialogue and capacity building in management. The majority of respondents in the study also indicated that Kosovo's newly formed government should work very closely with the civil society, and empower and engage community members to make and act on decisions.

4.18.9 Integration of standards and processes

Do you think that it is possible to integrate and implement any standards or processes effectively in a post-conflict environment?

Respondents indicated that after the war, the organisations had the opportunity to test standards and processes (see Table 4.71), given the fact that there was no government in power and the UN administered the country. With a myriad of international organisations present after the war, most respondents thought that it was possible to take a process-oriented approach and to implement standards and best practice strategies in the post-conflict environment.

Table 4.71: Standards and processes

Category	Items	Participants' quotes
Community acceptance	Beneficiaries, donor	*I think it is possible if you make sure that the beneficiaries work with the donor and understand that there are very strict procedures to follow in terms of implementing, in terms of monitoring and that is, if these procedures are not respected by the beneficiary then this is not going to work.* *Certainly, there will always be forces that will be trying to cut corners and get away with it, but I think that in post-conflict societies particularly there is a great potential for standardising processes or in implementing best practices.*

Even though a number of respondents positively acknowledged that standards could be implemented, there were mixed opinions as to the extent to which it was possible to implement the processes effectively given the situation on the ground. Respondents stated categorically that organisations should impose certain quality standards to monitor and evaluate the projects. Respondents also considered that whatever strategy the organisations used to execute projects, the community, with the support of the government, should be part of the process and, over time, should be able to take over from the international community once the mission was satisfactorily accomplished.

4.18.10 Community input and participation

Do you view community input and participation as adequate in program design and implementation of post-conflict reconstruction projects?

Respondents were totally mixed in their response to the query of community participation in policy development (see Table 4.72), program design or implementation. No doubt, there was very limited community participation in Kosovo immediately after the war; however, there has been considerable progress made by the international community in promoting good governance to accept them in the political, social and economic processes of the society.

Table 4.72: Community participation

Category	Items	Participants' quotes
Limited community input	Low input, limited ongoing support, weak education, fragile society, local disunity, mentoring , coaching	*We are very supportive of community input too, whether it is adequate or not is another question. The level of expertise in the community is probably pretty poor, so when you are doing this, when you are launching a program, you are actually in the process of also educating people. So I guess, people out in the communities who are used to doing this, are getting better at it all the time. Arguably, Kosovo has been like this now for sort of 10 years, and there should be a level of knowledge out there for those who are used to it. But again education in Kosovo is a weak area, and therefore, and those people who are sitting in positions where you need implementers or you need somebody to support the implementation particularly at a Municipal level, it may not be working particularly well, sort of educating people. Then again, you are in this process of mentoring and coaching and educating them to make sure, they do their job correctly. Nevertheless, that does not mean they should not be involved, it just means that you have to approach it in a different way.* *No, in Kosovo's case not, Kosovo society was very fragile and non-united and local infrastructures were not existing in a standard so um, basically the reconstruction programs were carried out for the community and not so much with the community*

In summarising the general findings on the project management issues in the above 10 questions about undertaking reconstruction projects, *planning and implementation* were key themes that emanated from the interviews. Respondents argued that organisations did not have any strategic plans or standards during the transition phase of reconstruction and development. The coordination with donors and the aid agencies in shared planning and implementation was considered very critical but, too often, was poorly executed. The respondents indicated that many organisations were implementing several programs simultaneously and there was duplication of projects

by different agencies, which added to the lack of coordination. Project Managers were asked to implement projects in the field prior to local community consultation and without conducting any feasibility studies. Consequently, respondents identified that there was a need for standards and guidelines to plan and implement programs and projects. A program coordinator working for a school infrastructure project in Pristina had this to say about community participation:

> *If there is no participation by the local people to know what infrastructure the community requires, then the organisation is reigniting the economic and social tension.*

The second common theme was project *cost* management; almost all participants noted that project cost estimation and control were key issues for every organisation. The respondents stated that there was no doubt Kosovo had substantial pledged donor contributions, but the donors also retained full control of the cost disbursements and they dictated which projects were to be implemented in different municipalities. As a result, several respondents reported that in most cases they felt the project either was underfunded or had budget-related problems. Not surprisingly, respondents reported that implementing aid agencies compete for donor funding without doing a feasibility study or cost estimation and, in most cases, accepted projects in the field that ended up being underfunded. A respondent who works for a funding agency stated that:

> *Agencies could use simple but effective mechanisms to track and control cost – this could be a monthly meeting where you examine budget versus actual expenditure, procurement and logistical issues, performance against targets etc.*

Participants also reported on extended implementation *schedule* constraints due to poor planning and shortages of skilled human and material resources. In some cases, donors did not support the extended schedules, and the implementing agency had to deal with the beneficiaries within the overall context of those impediments. Respondents reported that given the complex and fragile environment there were bound to be issues and setbacks in implementation, which lead to increasing costs that may not be fully funded by donors. As a result, organisations tend to compromise on quality to achieve cost minimisation. The respondents commented on

how the local community became frustrated and lost credibility when international agencies delay reconstruction projects, which are supposed to help build the damaged economy and be a source of livelihood for the community. The quote below largely reflects the approach taken by the participants:

Here you have a donor imposed project schedule, which was not so well defined.

Respondents mentioned that poor *procurement* planning and the need for standardisation for tendering of essential goods and services were widely acknowledged. They mentioned that many organisations do have their own standards but most staff was not familiar with the processes and, given the limited time frame, the procurement process was compromised. One of the key issues mentioned by respondents was that, in post-conflict society, corrupt practices inflate the prices of goods and services and, in turn, this increases transaction costs. The respondents also considered procurement of goods for the projects as an important and sensitive issue due to the corruption and lack of transparency within the agencies. A local consultant, educated and having worked overseas, had implemented training programs in project management processes to government and local NGOs and had this to say regarding imposed standards:

Programs must be cognisant of corruption and power dynamics in post-conflict societies but there are ways to mitigating these. Certainly, any program should make an effort to reach out to every influential stakeholder group and bring them on board through dialogue and consultation.

The respondents also mentioned projects being implemented in an environment characterised by weak governance institutions and poor planning practices, which compromised the final *quality* of the product. One respondent mentioned it would be good to define quality audit standards along with the project proposals presented to the donor for review, and that they should be within strict cost limits. This would help monitor and identify project changes and put controls in place to administer quality. A local government official working for a health project had this to say:

What has been spent is not necessarily the most efficient way of gauging the development process.

Participants also commented about adopting a coherent communication strategy to be factored into the planning process on how reporting would be carried out with stakeholders to ensure the exchange of all relevant information. Respondents emphasised that not all those engaged in the process were aware of the project status and, as a result, there was a long-term development impact on a project. Lastly, and more importantly, potential beneficiaries themselves felt they were left out of the whole process when they had to use the project's resultant product and services. The following quote describes the impressions from many of the respondents:

> *I think communication is the heart of the problems in projects that we have implemented.*

Respondents mentioned that risk management had been introduced by agencies only very recently, so organisations now do prepare risk analysis for projects; however, detailed planning and mitigation of risk involved in implementing reconstruction projects are still limited. A university professor and education consultant in Kosovo had stated:

> *You have to take into account that in these post-conflict zones there is a huge need for any project, any infrastructure really … so the community is not always analysing risk.*

It was clear from all respondents that implementing projects in a post-conflict environment is very complex. Agencies should introduce projects and program them with components of good governance and planning jointly by the organisation and the community. All respondents had extensive field experience and were very senior in their organisation hierarchy; they mentioned the knowledge areas of project management in a different context and had been using them only randomly based on specific situations. They were not aware of standard processes and tools used in a project-based approach. The university professor also had this to say:

> *Programs still too often neglect capacity for all aspects of governance – including project management within government structure, and focus too much on civil society and community groups. It all needs to be done in partnership, and civil society and government need to be brought together if possible.*

4.19 Project Managers/Engineers

Project Managers who fundamentally led the project team on the ground and ensured compliance with the donor and organisation requirements addressed a second set of questions. The PMs, along with the implementing team, was responsible for addressing the needs of the community. By exploring the PMs' perception and evaluation of their current work and organisation, the set of questions enabled discussion around the line of Research Question Two: *What are the limitations and advantages of the current methods, tools and techniques being used for post-conflict reconstruction projects?* This section provided the researcher with an opportunity to review the facts about the current effects of project-based management in the post-conflict context.

4.19.1 Planning process for development projects

Does the organisation have a process to identify and describe the detailed plan for the development of reconstruction projects?

The majority of respondents felt that they had never come across any strategic or even basic project management plans for any of the reconstruction projects they had administered during the previous couple of years. The respondents argued that most organisations come with an assumption that because the projects were implemented in other post-conflict countries, they should work effectively in any post-conflict situation. Some respondents also felt that planning only starts after the funding or the donor approves the project budget.

Table 4.73: Reconstruction planning process

Category	Items
Ad hoc standards and process	Only in paper, build in headquarters, not in detail, not well coordinated, no plans with development strategy, no attention given to planning phase, come with their own plan, learning by doing, PMs come with their own plan

Respondents reported that, though some organisations have a tentative plan on paper (see Table 4.73), when it comes to implementing the project management plans, they are not detailed enough or the PMs execute what is more convenient at the time of implementation. Similarly, even though some respondents reported having reviewed

organisation manuals on how to implement projects in the field, they had not seen any PM following an organisation's structured planning steps and processes. Taking into account the resources available, the well-reasoned views of the implementing agencies on how planning is taken in consideration were stated as follows:

Planning comes from where the development aid agencies come from ... each project manager comes up with their own plan. I work for IOM and the planning for their projects is done in Geneva ... too many organisations like CRS who I used to work for, all planning came from Baltimore. They say this is how we do reconstruction projects everywhere.

Not a lot of them pay a lot of attention to the planning phase, the concept of spending a lot of time in the planning phase is a concept that means for most organisation it's a lost time, and you always have to just rush to working and doing stuff ... the planning phase is almost non-existent ... hence we have so many problems during implementation ... go over budget, longer time ... this is one of the major weaknesses that they have in the planning phase.

They have a plan on paper but when it comes to implementation, they do not do what is written on the plan.

4.19.2 Managing cost

How important is it to manage the cost of reconstruction projects, and what tools does the organisation have to support the cost of reconstruction projects?

Respondents stated that they were aware that the cost of financing community-based projects could have a significant effect on the overall outcome for the civil society. Several respondents mentioned that managing budgets and comparing costs were critical process for reconstruction projects; however, they do not have the tools that help to reduce costs and increase efficiency. Respondents stated that in the post-conflict environment, it is standard practice for the finance department to control the flow of funds, and the project team has little control over the handling of funds.

Table 4.74: Managing project cost

Category	Items
Poor cost estimation	Managed by finance and not by PMs, cost is driven by budget, feasibility study is not done in the field so difficult to know the cost, project staff are not experts in managing cost, need training in cost management, no tools to manage cost, no software to manage cost, costing not done effectively

Respondents also acknowledged that the primary tools in a post-conflict society are the project timelines and the budget and, by having appropriate tools (see Table 4.74) to manage and control the project, finance estimates help minimise costs. In the case of large infrastructure projects and donor dependent input, the respondents affirmed that organisations should have a clear understanding of cost estimates before they seek funds for the projects. The respondent's quotes below adequately convey the current practices and needs:

> *Projects have failed because the costing was not done properly.*

> *You need to go to the field and to find the exact cost estimate. It is different when you are in the field.*

> *When it comes to reconstruction projects in Kosovo …. I do not think they use any kind of sophisticated software to control time and cost … if they do not know how to manage time and cost they are going to suffer in quality.*

> *I think it is very important to manage the cost especially since most of these projects are driven by strict budgets and it takes a lot of bureaucracy to change the budgets if the need arises.*

4.19.3 Managing project time

Given the complexity of delivery of projects in a post-conflict society, what factors should you consider when developing a project time line for successful delivery of projects?

Respondents identified a range of divergent variables (see Table 4.75), which relate to the social, political, economic, environmental and managerial factors that could influence the successful delivery of projects in a post-conflict environment. Notwithstanding the variability in values, these nominated factors closely correlate with the literature review. The respondents revealed that almost a decade after the cessation of the war, a realistic summary of the current situation suggests Kosovo still has significant unmet basic needs in every sector. Due to the apparent lack of familiarity with the local environment and the changing political situation, respondents also stressed that in such an operational context, many international organisations working in Kosovo found the development processes were slowed down.

Table 4.75: Managing project time

Category	Items
Social, political and managerial	Resources, absorptive capacity, procurement, weather conditions, location, transport, feasibility study, risk assessment, lack of controls, human resources, communication, political will, money, external environment, government structures, obtaining licences, quality, legal issues, consultation with stakeholders, government buy-in

Respondents categorically stated that management of the program requires a special blend of experience and skills, and that many implementing partners were limited by resource constraints when trying to deliver quality projects within budget and time. Here are just some of the many factors quoted as likely to influence the project time line:

I think first and foremost you need to consider the human factor. Who you plan to engage in the implementation of those activities and, in most cases that was one of the short falls of international consultants who implemented projects here ... and then come the short falls of not being able to complete the task in time it's a multi-effect of one, not being able to complete in time, then everything else sort of stagnates.

Working in such an environment is really stressful ... when considering the complexity of a post-conflict society ... there are multiple factors which may slow down the implementing, even make it sometimes impossible to successfully implement it ... one of the many factors is the lack of efficient government structures.

Specifically in some Serb areas we have obstacles because the community is split into two, there are people who are loyal to the Kosovo Government and people who are loyal to the Belgrade Government and they come to conflict between themselves ... so sometimes it comes to a conflict of who actually takes the ownership of the project, and until such thing happen we can stop the project or it can also affect our project while it's being implemented. Therefore, it was not planned during the planning of the timeline of the project. Therefore, these would be the key factors.

4.19.4 Conflict resolution abilities

Does the project team have adequate knowledge/experience of conflict resolution and problem-solving abilities?

This question drew a mixed response from participants, though the majority of respondents said that within the multidisciplinary teams, not many team members have the analytic problem-solving and conflict-resolution skills (see Table 4.76).

They do however have the ability to spearhead a dialogue and resolve the problem within their own limitations.

Table 4.76: Conflict resolution capacity

Category	Items
Lack of training	Cultural issues, no organisation procedures, no training in conflict management, community consultation, require training, bureaucratic procedures

Respondents felt that the local staff have more experience in resolving conflict rationally and effectively as compared to international staff who are not fully conversant with the cultural issues within the divided communities. Respondents also stated that after more than two decades of conflict, the local staff had the ability to work through disagreements and resolve the differences. However, it was felt that the organisations should develop training programs for the local staff who are mostly in the field and have to work with the community. Respondents also stated that had it not been for the bureaucratic processes within an organisation's environment, the team by themselves could have resolved conflict amicably and enhanced cooperation and coordination within their own society.

> *They usually just delegate their problems to the owner ... they don't like to deal with every minor issue but the managers are not adequate to handle that situation, or they don't want to, or they don't feel that's their job to deal with conflicts. They just push them up. I do not think they have adequate knowledge.*

> *In most cases, they have knowledge, they have experience. Problem solving, I think also this, in some cases there are individuals who have really good problem solving abilities, but the organisations where they work don't enable them to use these abilities because they have too many bureaucracies, too many bosses who are stopping them. And that is why sometimes it becomes difficult for people.*

> *We do not necessarily have people using broadly researched techniques or more sophisticated techniques for conflict resolution.*

4.19.5 Project communication challenges

What communication challenges have the project team encountered in delivering reconstruction projects? How does this affect the delivery of the projects?

All respondents zealously stated that communication is one of the biggest problems in a conflicting society where one is working with the team, and multiple stakeholders, to deliver the project on time and to a given budget. Moreover, in addition to bureaucratic and political influences, most respondents indicated that by not having proper communications standards and processes planned out much earlier in the life of the project, it does have a strong impact on project success or failure. Respondents emphasised that, faced with a high level of uncertainty and complexity, miscommunication amongst project stakeholders, contractors and relevant government departments leads to a slowing down in the delivery of development programs.

Table 4.77: Communication challenges

Category	Items
Standard communication processes	Politics, bureaucratic process, time consuming, stakeholder management, no processes, no standards, no procedures, government structure, standards, lack of coordination, communication difficulty with contractors, no process in the planning phase, trust, miscommunication, honest feedback

To make a practical contribution to improve the project standards, respondents stated that, in some instances, giving and receiving honest feedback both good and bad among all stakeholders would facilitate timely and effective project delivery (see Table 4.77). Finally, respondents felt that there was a necessity for building relationships and trust between factions of the conflict-affected groups to support the peace-building agenda.

There is a lack of communication sometimes … there is sometimes miscommunication between different departments, which unnecessarily slows down the project implementation process and it does affect efficient delivery.

Well communication challenges are left out because the stakeholders are not always involved in the implementation of a project. Therefore, that could create a lot of confusion, and there are no proper procedures for communication … and if there is a problem, people gather around, but there are no standard procedures of how to do it.

In the planning phase we need to initiate, we need to clarify, what communications processes are used, who is responsible for what, and what

is the process of communication that needs to be used for decision-making, or for solving problem.

The Albanian community generally will tell us everything we do is great and they love us, even when we know that things were not so great, on the other hand, the Serbian community tends to be very critical of us, regardless of how great we do.

4.19.6 Risk identification

Are the communities involved in identifying and analysing risks in project development and implementation?

There was one respondent from a community development fund organisation sponsored by the World Bank, who said the community was involved in identifying and analysing the risks in projects, and planning mitigating strategies with the project team and other stakeholders. All other respondents stated categorically that though the organisations had limited community consultation, involvement in the risk management of the project was not the norm in the organisation (see Table 4.78).

Table 4.78: Managing risk

Category	Items
Risks issues	Limited community consultation, nepotism, corruption, no ethnic communities represented by local governments

Respondents mentioned that in many projects, the local municipal government was a partner in the project and controlled the power within a local community. Though many respondents considered the support of the local government to be vital, they also revealed that once the local government became involved in the project implementation process, nepotism and corruption became apparent in the system. Respondents reported that the local government then tried to impose its power and force the organisation to implement projects in areas not previously planned. Despite having to avoid all these scenarios, the organisations were cautiously optimistic about getting the community involved in the risk management of the project.

Not at all, they do not care … they see the immediate requirement on the ground, the risk to them is nothing. They have already gone through the conflict, now they want to get on with reconstruction.

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4.19.7 Managing project quality

How do you build the project team to oversee and monitor quality in a post-conflict environment? Do you plan for quality in a post-conflict environment?

Despite the challenges of reconstruction in a post-conflict and fragile environment, respondents revealed that only a small number of organisations' projects oversee the quality performance of all operations and ensure that administrative functions are undertaken.

Table 4.79: Managing project quality

Category	Items
Quality issues	No experts in the field, selection of contractors, selection of materials, no training, lack of qualified resources, no process to manage quality, no capacity to monitor and evaluate, plan during project proposal, critical path chart, reporting.

Respondents indicated that organisations do not have the required skills and trained resources (see Table 4.79) to monitor and evaluate projects as well as assess the quality of their operations. They considered that most project staff had limited understanding of quality assurance methods, and mentioned the importance of training in quality management for engineers and field staff. Four variables were mentioned to ensure quality: having responsibilities for the selection and management of contractors, defined roles and responsibilities for the selection of materials, having critical path charts and developing project management reporting structures. There was also mention of developing a quality plan for the project along with the project proposal submitted to the donor. Respondents also mentioned that organisations often implement more than one project at a given time; by having reporting strategies with stakeholders about the project's progress and by reporting of evaluation outcomes that needed special mention, control of the project was improved.

> *In the post-conflict, the quality is extremely important, because there is a huge need for infrastructure projects. Usually there is no set up unit to manage the process, to manage the quality of the infrastructure being serviced or built. Therefore, it is a big problem. Now they think of quality, they think of assembling right people to assess the quality, depends on the project of course ... now they are moving more towards it.*

Quality is definitely part of every project; sometimes it is not clear what quality is. It is not defined, is it quality to finish the project on time? Is it quality to finish the project on budget? Is it quality to build great houses with good materials? That has to be defined.

4.19.8 Managing project procurement

Is there a procurement plan defined and planned by the performing organisation and at what stage of the project is this undertaken?

Respondents revealed that, within the limited time available, procurement does not receive due attention because organisations have complicated and time-consuming processes. Respondents also noted that plans needed to be developed through an understanding of the complex situation the country faces. The respondents also revealed that a project procurement team should understand that fraud and corruption are committed at a very high level in post-conflict societies (see Table 4.80), and should ensure that the plan is flexible but also robust at the same time.

Table 4.80: Managing project procurement

Category	Items
Planning (procurement)	Not organised, complicated, time consuming, bureaucracy, have tendering procedures, corruption, lot of uncertainties, need to prioritise procurement, have plan in the beginning, need to be transparent

Almost all respondents mentioned that the procurement plan should be an early priority for the project organisation, and the understanding of these collaborative practices needs to be transparent and further reinforced. Most respondents commented that each donor organisation does have its own procurement policies and tendering procedures, but the project team has limited understanding of the organisation's practices and standards. Respondents also reported that the project staff were not happy with the resultant delay of goods and equipment as the procurement processes were thwarted by the complex, cumbersome and time-consuming approval processes of the organisation. In general, regarding the capacity to deal with conflict situations, the respondents stated that:

Procurement plans exist, but there is no one to force these people to implement the procurement plan.

I would say one of the weakest things that I found in the international agencies is procurement. There is a lack of setting priorities, because there are other things going on in post-conflict areas. I think they are worth their weight in gold, somebody who understands the procurement system ... and, different agencies have different standards, an example, the UN takes the lowest bid. That is absolutely foolishness! I mean why we would take the lowest bid when we know that the second one, second lowest has proven that they are capable. So you get different standards with different agencies.

In the beginning of every project here, they put together a procurement plan ... we have a project plan but we do an awful lot that is not planned for originally. Things just pop up automatically.

4.19.9 Implementing project standards

Do you think that the post-conflict environment is too complex and uncertain to integrate and implement any standards effectively?

All respondents agreed that, given the complexity of and uncertainty in a post-conflict society, it was hard to implement standards during the emergency and transition phase. The respondents remarked that the civil society is willing to learn and accept new standards from the international community in the development phase where things have settled down and progress can be measured.

Table 4.81: Managing project standards

Category	Items
Standards	Complex, uncertain, bureaucracy, time factor, no functional institutions, donors own strategy, communication issues, knowing the culture, governance and administration

Most respondents also said the donors do try to implement their own standards and procedures (see Table 4.81), without taking into consideration the cultural factors of the conflicting communities. Further, there are many governance issues in Kosovo due to its tumultuous history because of uncertainty as to who was actually administering the country for a decade. Respondents mentioned that having stability and continuity within local governance helped to facilitate aid organisations and government institutions to effectively implement standards and processes. Respondents argued that international agencies in Kosovo have cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and try to impose them on locals within a very limited time frame. The respondents outlined ways to deal with situations of conflict:

It is complex, yes, and I can say to a certain level uncertain, but it is possible to implement standards effectively. This again depends on the partners in the field, but it is very much how you approach these people.

It is extremely complex and uncertain ... just considering in a post-conflict environment where everything is disjointed ... it is difficult to stick to any standards efficiently. But it is possible, theoretically, it is.

Well depends on what stage of the post-conflict but initially in the 1ˢᵗ, 2ⁿᵈ. 3ʳᵈ year, yes, it's very hard to set the standards ... there was a huge need for any kind of infrastructure, so therefore standards kind of take a back seat, low standards ... it also depends on the human resources in the country, how capable they are to implement standards.

4.19.10 Recommendations to improve planning and implementation

If the international and the local aid organisations could do anything differently to improve the planning and implementation of reconstruction projects in Kosovo, what would you recommend given your practical experience in the field?

Many participants responded based on practical experience of working in the field and outlined all the things that can, and do, go wrong in a post-conflict environment. The key findings emanate from the interview on how to improve project planning and implementation with reflections based on the review of relevant literature. The common variables mentioned reflect unique project management circumstances and situations (see Table 4.82), which include scope, procurement, quality, human resources, cost and communication.

Table 4.82: Improving project planning

Category	Items
Improvement issues	Change procurement process, get experienced staff, empower local community, list priorities, do proper research, engage all stakeholders, control cost, control procurement, evaluate needs, monitor, quality, quality of human resources, report, be transparent, external audit, adequate finance, control corruption, legal structures, build capacity, effective communication between minorities/local government, post-evaluation, identify needs in cooperation with beneficiaries, training

It should also be noted that project risk management was not specifically mentioned by any of the participants. Respondents stated that all local and external stakeholders should be empowered to participate actively in the planning process. With heavy

reliance on external aid, donors should support a procurement process that is transparent and accountable. Respondents also mentioned that cost control, external audit and quality assurance procedures remain key considerations for any project. Furthermore, local communities lack many of the required skills, and aid agencies should facilitate training in project development and management issues. Respondents remarked that organisations should prioritise projects and coordinate necessary resources with the immediate needs of the community and its local government. Finally, respondents said that by having a secured environment in which to implement reconstruction projects in Kosovo, the international community should implement standards and processes acceptable to the local government and sustainable to the beneficiaries for long-term economic growth.

> *I think 70 percent of projects failed, the mistake was during the planning of the projects, assigning all the people, local and international, and there was no supervision there ... I think local people need to be more involved in the projects and designs, and to be monitored by the internationals.*

> *When you plan projects, you should really identify needs in cooperation with the recipients. Therefore, the recipient's side should be consulted, what are the most urgent needs, and then design projects according to that. Then should have ex-post evaluation when the projects are completed to learn and to see how successful they were.*

> *With training, it is very important, and not much has been done, in the training side of local counterparts in Kosovo in project implementation and project management. It was the internationals who were implementing and managing the projects on their own and not much has been done on our side. So start from maybe financing the university, where they teach project management, and then that might be something in the interim.*

4.20 Conclusion

In this chapter, the major findings developed from the data collection, through questionnaires surveys and a series of semi-structured interviews, were presented. The analyses carried out in relation to the aims of the study contributed to achieving the proposed objectives. The findings and interpretations revealed the level of agreement by practitioners referring to the processes and outcomes of managing projects in the complex working environment.

The conflict resolution must target the ultimate establishment of a new cooperative and mutually augmenting relationship, and must involve practices that pave a way to attaining such a relationship (Kelman, 1998). The next chapter, *Chapter Five,* is the concluding chapter in which the results of the study are summarised, and the conceptual post-conflict project management framework is put forward as a research outcome model (ROM). Implications of the findings are also briefly explained, together with possible limitations of the study and recommendations for future studies.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

> *The presence of a coherent strategy is indeed absolutely essential for post-conflict environments. Although every reconstruction case is different and must be treated differently, this work has drawn attention to the fact that the international community should observe a few general rules and have a clear framework if it is to develop and successfully implement a strategy on the ground (Hasic, 2004, p. 55).*

5.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the results of the work in this study are summarised and the overall objectives which pertain to post-conflict project planning and management are examined. The changing political, economic and social factors in Kosovo have had a significant influence on the limited adoption of a project management methodology in development and reconstruction projects. To meet the needs of the society and recognise the required functional components of project management, the overall contexts of managing projects in a post-conflict environment have been discussed in the study.

The purpose of this chapter is to recap the implications of managing projects in Kosovo and demonstrate how the international and local agencies can effectively adapt to change and respond to economic opportunities. Project Managers, Country Directors and engineers, by virtue of their experience and capacities, have identified relevant aspects of project planning and their organisations' comparative advantages, and nominated practical and pragmatic recommendations for managing projects. The Research Outcomes Model (ROM) provides a coherent development of knowledge about improved project management in post-conflict societies.

To clearly understand and plan the various stages and activities of a project in post-conflict reconstruction countries, an outline has been used in this chapter to identify the major project management limitations. In addition, recommendations for future research are presented. The findings reported in the chapter indicate that future

research reviews need to explore the distinctiveness of project management components, and identify and plan comprehensive responses to manage projects in countries recovering from crisis and in post-conflict settings.

5.1 Overview of the study

In the immediate aftermath of war, the ability to withstand the scale and complexity of transitional post-conflict reconstruction operations and activities cannot be understated. Accordingly, the scope of the study included the design and implementation of infrastructure projects in Kosovo. The findings indicated a need to promote a better understanding of how projects are undertaken at all levels of the organisation, and to describe processes, procedures and tools used for the actual application of projects. At the same time, it was understood that humanitarian aid organisations do apply some basic principles of project management for reconstruction and development activities, and these are expected to continue to be strengthened over the coming years. However, there have been limited opportunities, as well as challenges and concerns, for aid organisations, individuals and communities to balance competing issues and achieve significant economic benefits through the application of sound project management practices within the resources available.

With this emphasis on project selection, project design and stakeholder participation it is appropriate to mention that, as expected in practice, the processes of project implementation did vary substantially from organisation to organisation. Consequently, the goal in the study was to develop common standards to plan and implement projects in an environment where there are uncertainties and the economy is in transition. The ROM suggests that management of a project life cycle customised to local settings can assist practitioners, humanitarian organisations, donors and policy makers know what tools and techniques to use when planning projects to rebuild communities.

The ROM indicates the practical experiences of development and the resultant outcomes that exemplify factors such as the wider participation of key stakeholders, including civil society and communities. Due to the environment and in order to

reach a desired outcome at the end of the project, the model emphasises the importance of quality, procurement and risk management, which are critical factors given the complexity of the projects. While the PMBOK model does imply stakeholder participation, direct consultation with the community is not an essential requirement, as compared to the reconstruction and development project planning necessary in a post-conflict society.

Thus, it is critical for countries and their civil society organisations emerging from conflict to have committed to adopting some basic project management strategies. This will ensure effective, transparent, flexible and participatory delivery of services to the population. The study examined the challenges and constraints in the implementation of infrastructure projects in Kosovo and was guided by three specific objectives and the four related research questions.

5.2 Overview of the research design

The findings from the exploratory research study were aimed at improving understanding of the planning, pre-designing and implementation of infrastructure projects. Eight years after the Kosovo conflict, time was an important element of the research because, during this period, Kosovo was in the midst of developing its market economy and the cross-sectional study was conducted on representative samples of the population from July to September 2008.

In order to be reflective of the complexities of planning, the sample group included PMs, CoMs, Program Coordinators, engineers, donors and beneficiaries. They represented several international and local organisations within the housing and transport, telecommunication, water and sanitation, education, energy and health sectors.

The survey questionnaire and the interview questions were developed from the literature review and by interviewing key informants with substantial experience of working in post-conflict societies. This lead to the identification of characteristics of the projects they had worked on in Kosovo and other post-conflict societies. The survey instrument comprised two questionnaires to collect the primary data for the

study. The first set of questions given to PMs identified how organisations planned and implemented infrastructure development projects and project characteristics in terms of scope, cost, time, risks, procurement, human resources, communications and quality. The second section, answered by CoMs and Program Coordinators, identified the impact of various attributes on project performance.

A total of 420 respondents were involved in the study process, as follows: key informants (4), pilot test (12), semi-structured interviews (36), PM Survey (231), CoM survey (117) and focus group (20). Both Albanian and Serbian ethnic groups were represented in the sample for the study. Not surprisingly, the local participants were mainly from the ethnic Albanian community, although there were Serbians who participated in the study and were cautious about mentioning their ethnic identity.

The data collection in the field was a major challenge in the study and was undertaken for a period of eight weeks from July to September 2008. Most participants were well educated and the questionnaire addressed numerous aspects of project management development practices. Pragmatically, combining both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analytical approaches was useful in establishing the ROM for the application of post-conflict development projects.

No clear paradigm had emerged with standard strategies to underpin the research and conceptualisation of project management processes required for successful operations in PCR (Lukic, 2010). However, the case study method provided a systematic way to investigate the current approach in a practical manner and offered the researcher meaningful and applicable characteristics of the situation; a method proposed by Yin (2003). The reliability of the model was calculated using a number of statistical tests, such as Cronbach's alpha. Although project management practices were not fully understood by development aid organisations, the methodology assisted, appropriately, in revealing both existing practices as well as organisations' management processes.

5.3 Major findings of the study

Research findings were used to determine appropriate ways in which project management knowledge areas could be applied and to demonstrate what needs to be considered for the successful outcome of a project. The major findings in the study have been summarised in brief by addressing each research question and deciphering project management issues and challenges revealed by the experiences of the practitioners and policy makers.

1) What planning/implementing criteria should be used for defining project success in post-conflict reconstruction and development?

In the absence of a clear project management framework that can act as a reference point for countries emerging from conflict, the future depends increasingly on the effective idiosyncratic implementation of projects and programs. The following criteria should be considered by the myriad of agencies involved in planning and development, with each pursuing its own agenda, interest and priorities:

- Political and democratic governance in transition was identified as critical to the successful implementation of national programs and policies (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2002). Current findings indicated it remains important to recognise that, even a decade after the conflict, international donors should seek to resolve the current political impasse and shift full political responsibility to local authorities. As recommended by Chopra and Hohe (2004), they need a continued effort to build national and local capacities linked to development goals.

- Humanitarian agencies should no longer plan civilian reconstruction and development projects in isolation. In order to facilitate the planning and implementation on the ground, current research findings indicated it was critical to have an effective statewide consultation and coordination mechanism between local and international agencies operating in a country (noted also by Gleichmann et al., 2006).

Findings indicated there should be an appropriate level of flexibility and a greater level of participation by stakeholders in policy and project cycle activities. The organisation should consider varying levels of participation, as all stakeholders

cannot participate at the same time. Further, the PMs should be more flexible and should make special effort to ensure that the needs of the community are met and that their continued participation is meaningful (Natsios, 2005; Olsson, 2006).

Local beneficiaries should have ownership of and an operational stake in the development of a project plan and program (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2002; Montgomery & Rondinelli, 2004). Current research findings indicated that ownership not only introduces accountability but also increases the self-reliance of the recipients. It is critical that the project planning team consults the beneficiaries in project design and implementation.

- Projects should be approved only after understanding the overall goals and objectives, which should be clearly defined as easily measured, verifiable and finite (AUSA/CSIS, 2002).

- Coordination of project activities and consistency in the procedures require a proactive communication strategy and transparency in the decision-making process (Locurcio, 2005; Mashatt et al., 2008).

- Maintenance of a high level of operational awareness is necessary for project staff to achieve their targets i.e. there should be a clear exchange of information between agencies, donors and the beneficiaries (FAO, 2006).

- Control measures and policies within the project management framework should openly address the challenges of corruption at all levels of the project cycle (AIPM, 1996).

- Significantly, projects do not attract continued and sustained funding by donor institutions. It is therefore imperative that funds received are well coordinated and dispersed to implement critical projects (Grey-Johnson, 2006; Evans-Kent & Bleiker, 2003).

- The UN administration had implemented a number of safety measures. Security was not a key issue for projects implemented in the majority of the provinces in

Kosovo, although it remained necessary to provide a safe working environment in which agencies could operate (Ahmad, 2001).

- Schedule delays need to be avoided and costs must not exceed the sum of the amount allocated to projects. Organisations should initiate project risk assessments and potential mitigation strategies along with key stakeholders.

2) How do current defined project management processes influence the planning and implementation of reconstruction projects in a post-conflict society?

While UNMIK played a central role in post-war recovery and international aid played an important role in Kosovo, from the participants' responses it was apparent that the international agencies did not engage sufficiently with the local community. As recommended by Abdela (2003) and Corrin (2003), the study findings indicated that coordination of reconstruction activities is necessary at multiple levels within local and international agencies. Policies are needed to encourage effective planning and implementation, but at the same time, there should be flexibility to respond to local perceptions of need (Natsios, 2005).

Weaknesses in planning in post-conflict countries include areas of project control, tracking, reporting, stakeholder communication and decision-making. As suggested by Coyne (2006) and Rathmell (2005), the study also noted that it is also important to consider the lack of resources and the urgency for prioritisation in operation procedures. At a minimum, there are compelling reasons for an holistic approach to planning long-term development, as recommended by Moharremi et al. (2003), that includes the project management components of scope, cost, human resources, procurement, risk, quality, time and communication. Further, the model approach applied needs to be fully integrated.

In such a context, there are inherently high risks in the environment; hence, changes to the plan are inevitable and require continuous coordination of resources, activities, equipment and information. To reduce the high operating and transaction costs, and to allow continued growth, the ongoing assessment of risk is particularly important (AIPM, 1996).

The extent of the need for broader quality planning for infrastructure projects also cannot be understated. Though donors may have a monitoring and evaluation strategy for a project, the process tends to look at the cost effectiveness of the project and not only a management or product assessment.

As noted by UNDP/IAPSO (2005), the findings of the study also indicated that the application of agencies' procurement processes often delay and complicate project management. There are no adequate governing principles for bidding, establishing pre-qualifications or for the selection of contractors. In addition, donors/agencies often prefer the lowest bidder despite the fact that, in most cases, they fail to deliver for larger infrastructure projects. A contractor's performance can have a significant impact on the successful delivery of projects; limited capacities indicate the need to have a comparatively flexible procurement process and donors should not be encouraged to impose conditions on the process.

Approving project funding with a pre-defined, calendar-based schedule is the most difficult part of project management in an uncertain and complex environment. Nevertheless, it is critical to have scheduled activities that are performed and closely monitored for progress to be achieved and confirmed. Project teams should use simple tools to monitor project schedules and take swift action for non-compliance of the activities.

3) What are the limitations and advantages of the current methods, tools and techniques being used for post-conflict reconstruction projects?

Data presented by the practitioners point to both advantages and challenges in relation to the overall approach for setting up and managing projects, also summarized by (Ika, Diallo, & Thuillier, 2012), in his summary of research on critical success factors for international development projects. In particular, current management approaches are noted to be inadequate and have severe methodological limitations in respect to measuring the socio-economic impact of such projects.

Even after implementing projects between 2000 and 2008, Kosovo project teams do not have a thorough understanding of project implementation processes. The concepts developed through practical application and experience often consist of a

set of collaborative activities and can be predictable, repeatable and dependable. However, the implementing agencies have not documented and formalised lessons learned to help guide future implementations.

As recommended by (Partridge, 1989), it is important in this context that donors, in association with aid agencies, undertake a feasibility study before authorising construction for any given project. In addition to ascertaining its feasibility, the key stakeholders should define and understand its scope before a project is executed. Agencies and donors should ensure that project objectives and goals have measureable benchmarks by which to evaluate project milestones, and beneficiaries should participate in the selection and decision-making processes (Mefalopulos, 2005).

While international donors pledge to reconstruction and stabilisation efforts, it is important to recognise that financial risks faced by many organisations contribute to delays in project implementation. Post-conflict projects require very close monitoring and control (Natsios, 2005), which may also necessitate numerous changes; controlling overall project cost changes to the budget requires appropriate techniques and cost models for documenting and monitoring project plans.

The project team and the organisation should make information accessible to key stakeholders at key project stages in a transparent and timely manner. It is essential to establish formal channels of communication standards within the project plan (Locurcio, 2005).

Reference participants referred to a number of quality issues within the design element of the process, especially as decisions are made more complex by involving a number of stakeholders. In Kosovo, PMs had not drawn up a quality plan for the construction operations' product or services, nor were any provisions made for unexpected problems with a design element or the process.

The validity of current procurement practices in post-conflict societies needs to be examined, particularly because requirements are complex and there is a general scarcity of goods in the country. Speed and timely delivery of goods and services are

critical; however, lengthy bureaucratic practices cause delays in delivering services and exacerbate the situation. The study identified the need for a procurement strategy to build on lessons learned and best practices that can contribute to support aid agencies.

Despite the acute capacity limitations and urgent acquisition of goods and services in post-conflict situations (UNDP/IAPSO, 2005), due consideration is rarely given to this aspect of reconstruction in planning project risks. The current study demonstrated that the risk of diversion or misappropriation of resources is high at a time when it is essential for existing resources to be used as efficiently as possible. In addition, later planning for contingencies imposes additional investment pressure on the donors who have earmarked grants. Donors and aid agencies, before approving project grants, should encourage organisations to prepare a high-level risk management plan, in order to efficiently and effectively mobilise scarce resources in the midst of competing priorities.

In post-conflict situations, agencies are limited in scope and time, and the provision of skills training to the project team is reduced. Though most were qualified, based on the demographic characteristics of the respondents, training and guidelines should be made more available to the project field team on issues such as conflict resolution, project management practices and team building skills.

Finally, there should be interagency coordination of humanitarian, post-conflict and development 'strategic planning' and 'funding processes' in post-conflict societies. It is the responsibility of the organisations/donors to include technical experts while enhancing interaction with relevant stakeholders.

4) *In post-conflict situations such as those currently in Kosovo, how can the application of internationally accepted project management tools and techniques facilitate more successful development programs?*

From the review of literature in Chapter Two, the original hypothetical model for the study was as shown in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1: Hypothetical project management research model

As a result of the current study, the research outcomes were a substantial development on the hypothetical model derived from extant literature and four major themes emerged:

1. In the case of emergent national issues, the Kosovo experience was largely typical of post-conflict reconstruction societies; the major national issues were extensive and difficult to control, covering government, economic, financial, social and organisational problems. The challenge in reconstruction development was to determine the degree to which PMs should become involved in the local environment in order to achieve success in a development project.

2. The examination of post-conflict reconstruction strategies was undertaken to clarify which resources were necessary for the project team to complete the project on schedule. In tandem with changes in the current administration, the locals should gradually take over the primary responsibility for socio-economic development from the international community, assuming the coordination function temporarily entrusted to EULEX. The PM, along with

the project team deployed in the field, should identify best practices and formulate guidelines and generic methodologies.

3. Paradoxically, in an area where the two ethnic communities are still divided, and despite the lack of clear reconstruction development policy, the donors and the local community undertook many initiatives individually and collectively throughout the decade. However, there is growing consensus that there remains a critical need to work within a coherent strategy, establish priorities and mobilise the necessary resources.

4. Systematic and comparative project management at the country level remain underdeveloped areas with little, if any, disagreement in principle from PMs and CoMs. The key issues mentioned include:
    - Lack of practical experience and theoretical trained staff remains a theory-practice divide;
    - Little time to train staff prior to starting the job;
    - Little time to train staff on the job;
    - Lack of prior planning difficult to overcome;
    - Off-the-cuff planning too idiosyncratic;
    - Lack of consistency across projects;
    - Poor procurement practices, causing fraudulent and corrupt practices;
    - Lack of coordination between agencies;
    - Lack of community participation in design and planning;
    - Lack of coordination among responding organisation; and
    - Political uncertainty has been a significant source of instability.

As a result of this study, the findings suggest that detailed PMBOK strategies need to be included in a ROM. The PMBOK framework in Table 5.1, therefore, is divided into the four major life cycle processes: initiation, planning, controlling (executing) and closing. In addition, the outcome factors are listed according to the nine knowledge areas. The notation attached to each factor in Appendix 17 (e.g., 1A or 5.8) in the post-conflict reconstruction project management framework (as per Table 5.1) connects particular research findings to specific areas of the framework.

Table 5.1: Post-conflict reconstruction project management framework

Post-conflict Reconstruction Project Management Framework			
Initiation	**Planning**	**Controlling and Executing**	**Closing**
Project Integration Management			
Detailed knowledge and understanding of project environment by stakeholders	Develop procedures and activities to manage the project life cycle Develop detailed and realistic project plan (scope, financial, resource, communication, risk, quality, time and procurement)	Control changes and monitor processes Measure performance to verify success	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects
Project Scope Management			
Establish community priorities and recommendations Collaborate with community throughout the planning process Obtain support and commitment of all stakeholders Acquire team buy-in to the project plan	Develop clear project goals and objectives Develop plan in consultation with the project partners Develop alternative plans to achieve defined objectives	Control project development changes throughout the application	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects.
Project Cost Management			
Develop preliminary project cost estimate Provide adequate financial guarantees Approve the project funding specifically for the project	Develop estimates of the projects required resources Estimate project cost in consultation with stakeholders Develop appropriate financial management indicators Develop cost contingency plan Develop cost reporting protocols	Control project budget and expenses Conduct cost-effective analysis and implement variations Review project outcome with cost-effectiveness	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects

Post-conflict Reconstruction Project Management Framework			
Initiation	**Planning**	**Controlling and Executing**	**Closing**
Project Time Management			
	Develop an effective project schedule	Monitor project schedule	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects
	Develop project schedules network diagram	Respond to schedule changes	
	Obtain team ownership and responsibility for their project schedules	Review project outcome with schedule	
	Stakeholders complied with the sequence of project activities		
Project Human Resources Management			
Establish a project steering group	Allocate resources to activities based on actual consumption	Provide ongoing training and development to accommodate changes	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects
	Determine resource requirement for projects in consultation with PMs	Manage, lead and coach others	
	Outline measures for resources not available		
	Outline course of action for project conflict management		
	Develop procedures for inter-personal/project consultation		
	Develop PM training process for the organisation's project team		
	Develop ability to handle multiple tasks, work independently and as a team		
	Prepare work schedules		
	Prepare Resource Planning		
	Assign appropriate resources to projects		

Post-conflict Reconstruction Project Management Framework			
Initiation	**Planning**	**Controlling and Executing**	**Closing**
Project Quality Management			
Identify and prioritise areas for skills development	Establish quality standards for the project Develop plans for corrective actions Determine deliverables required for a project (checklist) Determine procedures for formal project review	Identify non-conformance and initiate continuous improvement Meet technical quality measurement approaches Maintain quality records Review practices with other projects for continuous improvement Review project outcome against standard performance criteria	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects
Project Procurement Management			
Initiate to expedite procurement early in the life cycle of the project	Plan project procurement Emphasise the need to consult with appropriate stakeholders regarding procurement requirements Determine selection criteria with appropriate stakeholders Plan contractor selection management Communicate project proposals to integrate contractor activities and schedules Assess contractor's capacity to operate in post-conflict environment	Manage contract deliverables Identify contractual conflicts and take remedial action Review procurement progress to determine effectiveness of procurement process	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects
Project Risk Management			
Understand how to assess risk early in the project Involve other organisations to analyse risk Engage the community to identify and minimise the project risk	Identify the highest priority risk Develop risk management plan Develop contingency plan	Address and control project risk Monitor risk response strategies Communicate risk reduction activities Use audit reports to monitor progress and evaluate the project outputs on completion	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects

Post-conflict Reconstruction Project Management Framework			
Initiation	**Planning**	**Controlling and Executing**	**Closing**
Project Communication Management			
Identify and define the characteristics of key stakeholders and develop a data base	Identify mechanism to enhance formal agreement among relevant stakeholders Develop clear communication and reporting channels Prepare project tracking matrix Integrated communication plan with the implementing agency and the community	Review and identify ways to improve accountability and transparency of project information Identify and manage to resolve conflict constructively Provide stakeholders with updates of project progress Review information from meetings and evaluate project progress Work-in-progress informal interaction often discussed Use audit reports to monitor progress and evaluate the project outputs on completion	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects

While not including the whole of the post-conflict reconstruction project management framework (Table 5.1) in the final, more sophisticated project management ROM as shown in Figure 5.2, the framework does add to the post-conflict reconstruction strategies concept generally and to the PMBOK aspects of the ROM in particular. This demonstrates that the Project Management discipline knowledge, in the light of a post-conflict society, has been moved forward as a result of the current study and the framework developed fills the current gap on post-conflict projects, hence is a major contribution to exiting knowledge.

Ahsan and Gunawan (2010) stressed the importance of developing an international development framework and the ROM is an up-to-date representation of how PMs can use the identified tools, factors and techniques to facilitate more successful post-conflict development programs.

Figure 5.2: Post-conflict reconstruction project management

Kosovo- emerging from conflict

Post-conflict reconstruction strategies

Current implementation processes

PMBOK

Initiation, Planning, Controlling, Executing & Closing

Scope, time, cost, communication, risk, procurement, quality, integration, human resources

Quantitative evidence

Qualitative evidence

Consensus of priorities with stakeholders

Post-conflict Reconstruction Project Management

5.4 Prioritised recommendations from the study

Based on the data analysed and the interaction with the interview participants, the ROM (Table 5.2) may well be funnelled through a set of common priorities for PCR PMs/CoMs, with a view to maximising opportunities for countries emerging from conflict to contribute to economic revitalisation and sustainable development. Recommendations may be grouped according to the standards of reconstruction and a set of principles of project planning and management in conflict-affected areas.

5.4.1 Critical establishment of donor coordination and coherence

It has been acknowledged that donor coordination has been poor in post-conflict societies (DIFD, 2010). Following the cessation of war in Kosovo, there was an influx of donor and aid agencies who wanted to contribute to the well-being of the economy, but there was no priority to coordinate and control the multilateral agencies by use of local governance. In such a situation, a far greater emphasis needed to be placed on having a workable donor and inter-agency coordination mechanism to avoid duplication of effort, to have structured reporting procedures and to ensure adequate financial requirements were in place before any planning for intervention was initiated. A related recommendation from the study is that there should be strong continuity of project staff to ensure continuity in coordination of the projects.

5.4.2 Support by broader community participation and responsibility

While post-conflict societies differ from one country to the other, the study indicated a need for recommendations to ensure engagement through broader community participation. Programs and projects should be aimed at supporting civil society participation throughout the project life cycle. In the volatile and fast changing circumstances of post-conflict societies, project risks are extremely complex when expediting the project development schedule, wider community participation can help minimise the risks. It is also recommended that the community become involved in the selection of projects in order to help reduce conflicting scope and increase acceptance of the project outcomes by intended beneficiaries (Steinfort &Walker, 2011).

5.4.3 Flexibility in programming and design

A similar recommendation is that there should be a window of opportunity for the international community to provide greater flexibility in programming and designing or rebuilding physical infrastructure, thereby allowing for greater adaptation to volatile and complex situations.

5.4.4 Prudent project management training

Given the size and scale of infrastructure operations in post-conflict settings, project priorities tend to continue to grow and change until the entire project reaches its completion. It is recommended that international agencies should provide continued guidance and implementation support to deliver projects effectively and develop local capacity for project delivery. To develop local capacity and skills, the donor community should allocate funds for training in project/program management. There were only a couple of consultants providing project management training in Kosovo. Therefore to maintain standards, processes and methods it is recommended that the Project Management Office in Kosovo (PMO), in collaboration with partner organisations, be developed to implement and coordinate practical field experience and knowledge in conflict resolution techniques for project teams and leaders.

Considerable training is available in project monitoring and evaluation methods; however, there is a greater need for understanding project risk management in post-conflict project settings. Currently no training resources are available to plan for and mitigate risk in such a complex environment. Agencies and donors should develop a risk management tool kit to focus and coordinate development practitioners regarding project risk management requirements.

5.4.5 Reconstruction and development strategies to review contractors and suppliers

Within Kosovo's post-conflict society, suppliers and contractors report having engaged in illicit exploitation and secured contracts that were not negotiated in a fair process. It is recommended that the community be involved in the selection of reliable and competent contractors through a competitive bidding process and in

project procurement of material and equipment. It is recommended that organisations ensure the participation of affected communities in the consultative process of project procurement. Not only should good governance be promoted, but also a transparency in the selection process; through accountability and adequate community participation in decision-making, corruption will be minimised.

5.4.6 Identifying, assessing and mitigating risks as an essential part of project planning

In accordance with an organisation's crafted project management practices, there is a critical need to establish economic recovery and for more integrated delivery processes. As part of the process, it is recommended that both the local and the international communities develop comprehensive plans to aggressively identify, assess and mitigate potential risks and establish prudent controls. In addition, it is recommended that, before any organisation is funded, the funding bodies ensure there is a minimum requirement to have all stakeholders map out the project implementation risks and provide a detailed contingency plan to the PMO on how the project team is going to mitigate risks.

5.4.7 Avoidance of donors promoting their own processes

In conflict settings, multi-project funds involve multiple donors, and donors have been known to have their own specific area of program interest and to earmark funding for projects in that area. The strongest recommendations are that donors should avoid pursuing their own political agendas, stop promoting their systems of management and assiduously support local governance and the target community. Donors should ensure that their programs provide realistic support and the local community is in a position to sustain the program after the funding ends and the international community winds up its operation.

5.4.8 Focus and responsibility for project quality

Post-conflict countries in transition present both complex challenges and opportunities in relation to project planning and implementation. It is possible that project teams may not adequately address these aspects or may not substantially analyse the quality outcome of project deliverables. It is recommended that project management teams outline project quality outcomes early and have reliable and

measurable indicators in the planning stages to contribute to the completion of more specific deliverables within the time frame.

5.4.9 Engage divided community in continuity of funding projects

It is recommended that the nexus between reconstruction/economic development and the peace process be viewed as a long-term process. Ten years after the war in Kosovo, the two communities remain divided and still have to overcome many reconstruction challenges to promote economic growth. While the international donor community has been heavily involved in Kosovo, they should continue to engage both parties in the divided community and fund post-war reconstruction projects. It is also recommended that the local government try to generate revenue locally through taxation and customs duties to fund identified projects within the municipality.

5.4.10 Monitoring of project schedules

In post-conflict operations, projects have forced deadlines established and dictated by international donors. It is recommended that, depending on the complexity of the projects, donors should only make grants and support projects that can be realistically implemented and have an achievable schedule. While it is recommended that organisations and the community together monitor schedules incorporated in the planning phase of the project to encompass all deliverables, the PM should ensure that all necessary controls are incorporated and followed throughout the project.

5.4.11 Reviewing application of the ROM

The ROM resulting from the current study was shown in Figure 5.2 and was presented as an extension of the original hypothetic research model developed in Chapter Two from extant literature. The findings in the study not only confirmed the hypothetical model but also indicated where aspects of the model could be addressed to extend the current theory of PCR activities.

However, by inverting the ROM (Figure 5.3*)*, the findings can be represented in an alternative order to suggest a practical sequence of application and implementation of the proposed model that development agencies could use to improve their overall performance. The alternative ROM view indicates that PMs should form a core team within the organisation that also includes key stakeholders and the community. Consensus-approved project plans can then be developed with a degree of flexibility in a living document which contains goals that are measurable and agreed timeframes. Donor agencies would be challenged by the mandatory requirements to submit communication, procurement and risk management intentions as part of the overall plan before execution of the project.

Figure 5.3: An alternative view of the Research Outcomes Model

The significant concept arising from the inverted ROM is that the proposed reconstruction process is only workable and justifiable when two fundamental aspects of the model are linked inextricably i.e. the current reconstruction implementation processes are improved = Kosovo successfully emerging from conflict.

5.5 Significance and implications of the ROM

Having briefly mentioned the anticipated significance of the study in Chapter One, as the completion of the study approaches it is considered worthwhile to outline some of the study findings that have more direct practical significance.

5.5.1 Significance for the donor and international agencies in a post-conflict society

The overarching aim of the study has been to contribute to the development of the discipline beyond the current intellectual foundations. This required a re-examination, in a constructive way, of the relationship between project management research and the field as practised. The new project management framework presented in this study as the ROM, provides a strategy with which organisations can conduct a formal assessment of their current project management practices and, thereby, determine change initiatives that need to be completed to improve project performance.

5.5.2 Significance for practitioners and project professionals

In circumstances where there is a widening gap between the needs of project management professionals and the requirements of skilled practitioners in post-conflict and disaster environments, the outcomes of the study provide a strong foundation for project practitioners' self-awareness as to how projects can be executed. Recognising that further study is required to build on the findings, the research outcomes are useful to the PMI and other professional bodies that want to look at establishing in-service training, workshops and short courses. The findings will also provide some essential information for the opening of project management chapters in post-war countries.

5.5.3 Significance for local governance and policy makers

The research findings provide local and national policy makers with a means of assessing implemented projects. This, in turn, can lead towards strengthening the capacity of local governance as a reform mechanism to enhance basic local services. It is anticipated that the identification of project elements will help better inform future planning processes, improve governance, assist service delivery and enhance local economic development processes.

5.5.4 Significance for the beneficiaries

Whilst project management processes are of considerable practical significance to PMs and aid organisations, they can be of important socio-political significance to aggrieved beneficiaries. The findings of the study have identified the needs of beneficiaries and the need for management to involve the community in the entire process of implementation and making operational decisions. Researchers and academics have consistently noted that meaningful community participation in the reconstruction process will reduce tension and thereby increase the effectiveness of project management. In the research data, there was little evidence that the rhetoric has been translated into practices in post-conflict Kosovo.

5.6 Contributions of the study

In general, there was a pervasive acknowledgment by research participants that there are gaps in international development assistance and that uncoordinated processes may be detrimental to reconstruction, peace building and state building. Therefore, the post-conflict project management approach contributes to the ability of multilateral agencies to pursue a coherent agenda, including:

5.6.1 Contribution to researchers on post-conflict reconstruction

The data presents new understanding of contributions to post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. It is recognised that peace and stability are important; nevertheless, managing project processes effectively is an integral part of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Researchers and project management

practitioners do not have the time and resources to engage in researching post-conflict project processes, either due to instability or not having adequate funds. At the same time, the project management processes applied have not been well understood. This study has given some guidance to future researchers and academics, and offers directions for further study. Researchers do not depend on one set of data; future academic researchers and practitioners may focus the framework to realise the full potential of project management processes.

5.6.2 Contribution to the field of post-conflict project management

To deal with the challenge of uncertainty in this type of environment and to accommodate changing priorities, aid agencies implementing reconstruction projects need a process that provides a great deal of functional flexibility, control and intervention. The organisation also needs a process that can deliver complex services in a transparent and traceable manner to balance the defined scope and deliverables. There is a low level of project management understanding in post-conflict societies and there are very limited initiatives for developing knowledge and competencies within the public and private sectors (Lukic, 2010). The post-conflict project management framework, which focuses on more common characteristics involving the community and the environment, can have significant relevance to agencies trying to develop and promote their own standards and techniques in managing projects.

5.6.3 Contribution to donors and international funding bodies

International donors such as the World Bank, USAID, EBRD and the European Commission fund a wide range of projects and programs, but do not plan for the breadth of activities and the resources required. Post-conflict societies do not have the financial capacity to train and promote project management concepts; hence, donor support is essential. The adequacy and stability of funding have become major concerns for post-conflict stakeholders. Application of the project management framework will ensure that the funding can be utilised effectively and the donors assured of the quality of the final product or services.

5.7 Research constraints

The study undertaken can make a significant contribution to post-conflict reconstruction and development, but along with the results presented in this study, it is also important to note the constraints. Though the limitations were addressed briefly in the Chapter One, the present study contains some practical research constraints that need to be acknowledged and addressed. Some of these constraints can be seen as fruitful avenues for future research.

5.7.1 Fluency in language

The participants were given the option of choosing English, Albanian or Serbian, but most of the respondents preferred to use the English version of the survey. Albanian was the primary language spoken in many organisations. English language skills have improved in Kosovo, but the ability to comprehend the technical concepts of project management terms may have been limited. During the data collection period, some participants were not sure of some questions and consulted the researcher at the time of the survey collection. In addition, during the interview the researcher had to rely on the interpreter and may have missed some aspects of the participants' responses. There were times when the researcher had not captured the full meaning during the interview and had to discuss it with the interpreter after the completion of the interview.

5.7.2 Limited time frame

Due to time constraints and budget limitations, it was not possible to travel to Kosovo several times. Accordingly, the researcher spent only eight weeks in Kosovo during the one period of data collection. It was a time which has been described by Reyes (2005) as a crucial period of transition. The time constraint limited the ability of the researcher to delve deeper into sectors and aspects other than infrastructure in managing projects in the post-conflict society. Although the Kosovo Agency for Reconstruction listed a good number of organisations participating in the reconstructions process, not all organisations in Serbian areas could be contacted due to time constraints and security reasons.

Despite an interest in making some generalisation of the results possible, it was not feasible to include more representativeness in project teams or get a broader overview of project planning and its execution. The results reported were largely from the perspective of the PMs or CoMs at the top of the hierarchy in the organisation's structure.

5.7.3 Cultural and other type of bias in divided communities

It should be noted that the cultural and contextual differences between the two ethnic communities may have caused some variation in the results. Some of the local respondents in the study were also beneficiaries of project outcomes in one way or another after the war. The Albanian communities were more complacent about the international donors and aid agencies, and were sympathetic towards the international community that helped in the civil war. Accordingly, some answers to the surveys/interviews may have been biased so as to not offend the donor community. The Serbians may also have answered some questions to offend the international community even where the projects were fully accepted by the community.

Organisational styles and culture often have a direct influence on the projects and may have influenced the project results (Andersen, 2003; Zwikael, Shimizu & Globerson, 2005). It is noteworthy that, while the research spanned a wide range of aid organisations implementing infrastructure projects, the operational paradigms peculiar to each project within each organisation could not be investigated in depth. The organisational culture may have had an effect that caused PMs to adjust or compensate.

At the same time however, Kosovo was in the European continent, and imposing the project management methodology from an international perspective may not have been well understood by the local community, where workers did not have the required technical and economic resources.

5.7.4 Lack of prior research studies on the topic and instrument used

There is a limited body of empirical literature available that deals with international development in project management (Lukic, 2010). On the other hand, academics, organisational bodies (PMI) and fellow practitioners have very recently been researching project management practices in a post-disaster environment after the Asian Tsunami in 2004 (PMI, 2005; Von Meding, Oyedele & Cleland, 2009). The review of literature demonstrated that there is very limited research in project management methodology in post-conflict reconstruction. The findings in this study could not be compared with other post-conflict settings but certain aspects may be extrapolated from other areas. Although the statistical assessment indicated that the data collection instrument was reliable, it was developed for a post-conflict project environment and could not be pilot-tested by visiting a post-conflict setting prior to doing the data collection in the field.

5.7.5 Bridging the politics of confusion on project management theory

There has been a great degree of confusion as to whether project management theoretical studies for post-conflict reconstruction and development come under the purview of a school of management, school of civil engineering or a school of social sciences. Largely, post-war reconstruction and social welfare programs are published in social science and development journals, and are read extensively within the scholarly community. At the same time, research on project management is published primarily in project management journals and read only by a small section of the scholarly community. Despite these trends, the current study should be taken into consideration as a mix of both social science and management, and any conclusions drawn should be examined cautiously, given that recommendations can vary from one context to another.

5.8 Suggestions for future research

Worldwide there are 37 countries - primarily in Asia, Africa, Middle East, and the Balkans and beyond - involved in conflict or in the process of post-conflict reconstruction and long-term development (Voetsch, 2005). In looking forward, the challenges of rebuilding post-conflict societies and project implementation of

reconstruction projects that develop the overall economic independence of these conflict societies are likely to increase. Research in the area of post-conflict project management processes is still in its infancy and, though this study has provided a number of contributions to the area, there is still much research to be performed in the field in other post-conflict societies.

5.8.1 Sustainable project management methodology

International development organisations and practitioner bodies have limited a better understanding of the dynamics of project management methodology in post-conflict settings. Despite a growing emphasis by aid agencies on local participation and consultation, practitioners should be encouraged to adopt project management policies in which sustainability is embedded in the development and management of projects (Grevelman & Kluiwstra, 2010). Future research in the area should strive to better understand how project management development, based on responsible practices of planning and development policy areas, is aligned with the community, the donor and the organisation.

5.8.2 Possibilities to bridge the gap in literature and publications

There is a range of literature and publications in post-conflict environments in relation to community development, conflict resolution and social/political reconciliation. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence in literature about project management processes, and this area presents an opportunity for future research. Current research participants proposed that future research should focus in detail on knowledge of procurement, quality and risk management. Publications are warranted to reach a wider community, but practitioners in project management should be encouraged to publish results and interpretations of their personal experiences and research findings in social science and development journals.

5.8.3 Replicate the studies in other post-conflict environment

The current study and analysis of data were focused on Kosovo; however, there are many other countries emerging from serious conflict. Strengthening governance, continuing to provide a secure and prosperous society and much needed support and technical assistance to develop appropriate policies and strategies are desperately

needed in post-conflict settings. The current study could be replicated in other post-conflict societies. The PMI and other development partners, particularly the World Bank and the UN, should fund research regarding NGOs and practitioners to continue to examine the processes of validating project management tools and techniques.

5.8.4 Opportunities for strengthening the design of the research instrument

The research instrument designed for the current study was based on the purpose of the study. Further development and revision of the instrument could be undertaken to test and maximise its validity. The revised instrument could be used as a pilot test in a study in another similar situation, and the adequacy of the instrument tested before embarking on a full-scale data collection in the field.

5.8.5 Opportunities exist for certification and training programs

Due to the very nature of managing projects in both the technical and non-technical disciplines, the PMI and other professional bodies should continue to gather information and analyse data from other post-conflict countries. The information gathered should be appropriate and feasible so that custom designed training modules can be developed to certify practitioners' skills and capacity in reconstruction.

5.8.6 Opportunities in other sectors

Post-conflict societies also implement projects which emphasise social, institution building and/or psychosocial factors. To examine the unique challenges of implementing projects in such complex and volatile communities, the study could be extended to include other non-technical sectors partaking in planning and implementing development work in post-conflict societies. A comparative study between technical and non-technical projects in such an environment could further improve understanding of the characteristics and use of the project management framework. Other researchers have also noted that in Kosovo, the Serbs were reluctant to participate in the reconstruction process (Bloom et al., 2006). Doing a comparative study of projects implemented between two divided communities could highlight key issues in the design of the project management framework.

5.8.7 Possibilities for more research

Further, it may be possible to explore in-depth planning and implementation of reconstruction projects. Research practitioners and international aid organisations could use the instrument and the data to explore practices of planning and other issues encountered in post-conflict settings. Project management researchers could look at only one instrument and focus on project management knowledge areas. Social science researchers could focus on the survey instrument for CoM/Program Coordinators and find out more about the project attributes.

5.8.8 Other factors

Having developed a base model from the current research it is now possible to assess the relative impact of other factors that can influence decisions in the planning processes. There are multifaceted agencies, individuals and organisations operating in this type of environment. Hence, it is critical that future studies include different organisational factors such as management style, training methods, motivation type and the political/organisational cultures in which the individuals are operating. This could improve the understanding of how projects are planned and implemented.

5.9 Concluding statement

In conclusion, the study has been useful in a number of different ways. First, the literature review highlighted the diversification of the challenges experienced by organisations, donors and practitioners in re-establishing livelihoods, planning and managing reconstruction projects. Secondly, research analyses and findings have provided more insight into the practical problems encountered by project teams, their approaches to decision-making to minimise the problems faced, and how to implement more successful engagement that is beneficial to both the organisation and the community at large. Thirdly, the project management approach developed has presented a coherent strategy to aid organisations in developing and successfully implementing a clear framework for post-war reconstruction and development. Finally, the study has gone some way to answering the following reconstruction questions raised by Natascha Zupan:

How does development assistance contribute to peace building? Do projects consider the local conflict settings and are they designed accordingly, or do they - unintentionally – prolong or even reinforce conflict? ... after all, programs and projects have to be adjusted to the difficult and ever changing context of violent conflicts and post-war societies (Zupan, 2005, p. 49).

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APPENDIX 1

World Bank project life cycle

PROGRAMMING:
An overall strategy is established in relation to the local, national and international context. Involves agreeing a broad framework of objectives for a particular country, region or sector within which individual projects can be identified and carried out.

IDENTIFICATION:
The problems and needs of a particular population are assessed, and ideas for ways to address them are generated and analysed. May involve consultation with potential beneficiaries, and/or use of PCM techniques like PRA, problem tree analysis and appreciative inquiry, or may be the 'brainchild' of a particular individual. Influenced by pressure from political, social, cultural, ethnic or other groups.

EVALUATION:
The degree of success/failure of the project is evaluated in terms of its impact on stakeholders and achievement of its objectives, and the lessons learned during the course of the project are reviewed. This information is then fed back into the Programming phase to inform the planning of future activities.

IMPLEMENTATION:
Planned activities are carried out while constantly monitoring progress towards project objectives. Adjustments often have to be made to the original plans in response to unanticipated circumstances or outcomes.

SUPPORT:
Assistance of various types is sought – financial support, political support, support from partner organizations, etc. Often, gaining the necessary support will require substantial negotiation and may result in changes to project design.

DESIGN:
Project ideas are developed into concrete operational plans that can then be assessed in relation to a number of criteria (e.g. feasibility, environmental impact, gender awareness, sustainability, etc.). Criteria included will depend largely on source and type of support required.

Figure 1. *The project cycle.*

Source: (Biggs & Smith, 2003, p. 1744).

APPENDIX 2

CRS project cycle

Source: CRS Project Cycle adapted from CARE original and CRS ProPack (Stetson et al., 2007, p. 29).

APPENDIX 3

Kosovo/Balkans facts and brief history

Source: (Murphy, 2007).

- The term "Balkans" refers to the entire region of southern Europe formerly Yugoslavia
  - The word "Balkan" is Turkish, and means "a wooded ridge or mountain"
  - The word "Yugoslavia" means "Land of the Southern Slavs"
- Kosovo's population estimates range from 1.9 to 2.4 million (over 90% Muslim)
- Kosovo's languages include Albanian, Serbian, Croatian, and some Turkish
- Kosovo is a territory disputed between Serbs and Albanians – both live there - and is bordered by Albania and Serbia
  - Albanians claim that they are its original inhabitants, being the descendants of the ancient Illyrians.
  - Serbs claim that Kosovo lay at the heart of its medieval kingdoms and that during the middle ages few, if any, Albanians lived amongst them
  - Kosovo was part of original Serbian kingdom
  - Key date in Kosovo's history is June 28, 1389
    - Serbs fought (and according to many historians, lost horribly) to invading Ottoman Turks – this battle is celebrated by Serbs
    - This loss led to Turkish advances and influence for next 300 years in the region. This is why there are Muslims in the Balkans region; mostly Albanian.

Brief Timeline of Kosovo Conflict

- 1912 – Serbia and other Balkan states drove the Turks out of the Balkans and took control of Kosovo – this action viewed as occupation by Albanians
- 1915 – Albanians exacted revenge on occupying Serbs
- 1918 – Serbs returned to exact revenge on Albanians as Yugoslavia established although not officially named this until 1929
- 1941 – Occupied by Axis power – Italy (WWII)
- 1942-45 – Ethnic Albanians promised reunification with Albania if they assisted Yugoslavia in driving out Axis powers – Promise broken – more unrest in Kosovo
- 1945 – Yugoslavia becomes communist republic under 'Tito'
  - Composed of six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro, and two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina.
- 1945 – 1974 – Kosovo unrest effectively suppressed by Yugoslavia leader 'Tito'
- 1974 – Kosovo granted autonomy – almost same rights as Yugoslavia's other six providences – by this time ethnic Albanians outnumbered Serbs 9 to1
- 1980 – 'Tito' dies; Yugoslav republic begins to deteriorate; previously contained nationalist, racial, and religious and ethic tensions begin to flare up
- 1981 – Yugoslavian troops suppress separatist riots
- 1987 – Slobodan Milosevic gains control of Serbia (which includes Kosovo)
- 1989 – Albanians in Kosovo begin to lose rights; lose authority for limited self-government, fired from jobs, denied health care, and so forth. This was the catalyst that began 'ethnic cleansing', such as driving out minorities from Serbia to include Kosovar Albanians

- 1991 – Yugoslavia break up in full swing – Slovenia and Croatia declare independence; Minority Serbs in Croatia, aided by Serbian government, begin wholesale executions of Croatians as Croatians attempt to evict Serbian population
- 1992 – Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina declare independence; estimates of population: 43% Muslim, 31% Serbian (Orthodox), and 17% Croatian (Catholic); this non-tolerant diversity leads to open warfare.
- Milosevic declares Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (not recognised by US and others) with Serbia and Montenegro
- 1992 - 1996 – Bosnian Serbs (aided by Milosevic) execute over 200,000 Bosnians
- 1993-1997 – Ethnic tension and armed unrest spill over to Kosovo
- 1995 – US led airstrikes against Serbs in Bosnia led to Dayton Peace Accords; these agreements did not effectively address Kosovo problem
- 1998 – Gun battles in Kosovo followed by mass protests for independence from Serbia; Serbs respond with force conduct military operations in Kosovo mainly against Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) but also against Albanian civilians
- 1999 – Peace talks fail and US led NATO air strikes force Serb military from Kosovo – NATO peace keepers introduced – does not solve the tensions between the Kosovo inhabitants
- 2001 – Milosevic arrested and turned over to UN International Criminal Tribunal
- 2004 – Mitrovica (in Kosovo) experiences worst violence since 1999. 22 deaths reported, NATO sends in 1000 additional troops
- 2007 – Kosovo elections show gain by Ex-Rebels party - Hashim Thaci's Democratic Party of Kosovo won 36 % of the vote (insufficient for total Kosovo control but the majority) – currently negotiating independent status of Kosovo (from Serbia); voter turn-out between 40 and 45% - lowest ever for Kosovo election
- 2008 – Kosovo declared independence

APPENDIX 4

Interview questions

(For CoMs/Program Coordinators)

1. How would you assess the planning and implementation of post-conflict reconstruction projects in Kosovo? (How does this compare to your experience of other post-conflict states?) (The latter part of the question is for international respondents).

2. What criteria are taken into consideration for evaluating post-conflict reconstruction and development projects?

3. What significant factors have the most influence on the outcomes of post-conflict reconstruction projects?

4. What are the challenges you face in designing and implementing post-conflict reconstruction projects?

5. How often are the organisations projects reviewed to re-evaluate their viability and potential success? When is this review conducted?

6. If the international and the local aid organisations were to do anything different to improve the planning and implementation of reconstruction projects in Kosovo, what would you recommend given your practical experience in the field?

7. In your view, are there any methodologies or approaches that could be used more effectively to plan and implement reconstruction projects in a post-conflict society?

8. What message would you like to give to the international aid community, NGO's and donors about the current situation of post-conflict reconstruction of Kosovo?

9. Do you think that it is possible to integrate and implement any standards or processes effectively in a post-conflict environment?

10. Do you view community input and participation as adequate in program design and implementation of post-conflict reconstruction projects?

APPENDIX 5

<u>**Interview questions**</u>

(**For Project Managers**)

1. Does the organisation have a process to identify and describe a detail plan for the development of reconstruction projects?

2. How important is it to manage **<u>the cost</u>** of reconstruction projects and what tools does the organisation have to support the cost of reconstruction projects?

3. Given the complexity of delivery of projects in a post-conflict society, what factors should you consider when developing a **<u>project time line</u>** for successful delivery of projects?

4. Does the project team have adequate knowledge/experience of conflict resolution and problem- solving abilities?

5. What **<u>communication</u>** challenges have the project team encountered in the delivery of reconstruction projects? How does this affect the delivery of the project?

6. Are the communities involved **<u>in identifying and analysing risks</u>** in project development and implementation?

7. How do you build the project team to oversee and monitor **<u>quality</u>** in a post-conflict environment? Do you plan for quality in a post-conflict environment?

8. Is there a **<u>procurement plan</u>** defined and planned by the performing organisation and at what stage of the project is this undertaken?

9. Do you think that the post-conflict environment is too complex and uncertain to integrate and implement any standards effectively?

10. If the international and the local aid organisations could do anything differently to improve the planning and implementation of reconstruction projects in Kosovo, what would you recommend given your practical experience in the field?

APPENDIX 6

Letter of information and consent for participants

'Post-Conflict Reconstruction: the complexity and challenges of planning and implementing infrastructure projects in Kosovo'. Research conducted by James Earnest, PhD candidate at Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Australia.

I am a PhD student at Curtin University of Technology conducting research on the effectiveness of post-conflict reconstruction projects under the supervision of Dr Victor Egan and Dr Wanda Curler. The purpose of this study is to investigate the planning and implementation application of reconstruction and development projects for building more effective governance in a post-conflict society.

You can help in this study by consenting to complete the attached questionnaire and participate in an Interview. It is anticipated that the time to complete the survey will be no more than 30 minutes. Contained in the survey are questions about how the projects are planned and implemented in your organisation. Participants can decide to withdraw their consent at any time. All information given during the survey is confidential and no names or other information that might identify you will be used in any publication arising from the research. Feedback on the study will be provided to participants.

This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee (Approval Number HR 74/2008). The Committee is comprised of members of the public, academics, lawyers, doctors and pastoral carers. Its main role is to protect participants. If needed, verification of approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee, c/ - Office of Research and Development, Curtin University of Technology, GOP Box U1987, Perth, 6845 or by telephoning 9266 2784 or by emailing hrec@curtin.edu.au

If you are willing to participate in this study, could you please complete the details below. If you have any questions about this project please feel free to contact either myself, James Earnest, on 61-8-94726867 (email: james.earnest@postgrad.curtin.edu.au) or my supervisors, Dr Victor Egan, on + 61-8-9266 3307 (email:Victor.Egan@cbs.curtin.edu.au) / Dr Wanda Curlee, on + 1 336 210 3787 (email: wanda.curlee@bearingpoint.com). My supervisors and I are happy to discuss with you any concerns you may have on how this study is being conducted.

****

Consent Form

I _____ have read the information above. Any questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to take part in this activity, however, I know that I may change my mind and stop at any time.

I understand that all information provided is treated as confidential and will not be released by the investigator unless required to do so by law.

I agree that research data gathered for this study may be published provided my name or other information which might identify me is not used.

Signature of Participant/Authorised Representative:

Date:

Signature of Investigator:

Date:

Investigator's Name:

APPENDIX 7

Albanian version – Letter of consent

Letër informimi dhe pëlqimi pjesëmarrëit në projektin hulumtues.

'Rindërtimi pas konfliktit:Ndërlikueshmëria dhe sfidat e planifikimit dhe zbatimit të projekteve të infrastrukturës në Kosovë'.,hulumtim I kryer nga, Kanditat PhD në Universitetin e Teknologjise në Curtin,Perth,Austraila.

Jam një student I PhD ne universitetin e Teknologjise në Curtin, që bëj hulumtime në efektivitetin e projekteve të rindërtimit pas konflikit nën mbikqyrjen e Dr Victor Egan dhe Dr Wanda Curlee. Qëllimi I këtij studimi është që të hetohet aplikimi i planifikimit dhe zbatimit të projekteve për rindërtim dhe zhvillim për ngritjen e një qeverisje më efektive në shoqëri pas konfliktit.

Ju mund të ndihmoni në këtë studim duke dhënë pëlqimin që të plotësoni pyetësorin e bashkëngjitur dhe për pjesëmarrje në intervistë.Është parashikuar që koha për plotësimin e këtij vështrimi nuk do të jetë më shumë së 30 minuta.ky vështrim përmban pyetje lidhur me atë se si planifikohen dhe zbatohen projektet në organizatën tuaj.Pjesëmarrit mund të vendosin të tërheqin pëlqimin e tyre në çdo kohë.Të gjitha informacionet e dhëna gjatë vështrimit janë konfidenciale dhe në publikimet që dalin nga ku hulumtim nuk do të përdoren emra e as informacione të tjera që do të mund t`ju identifikonin juve.Nga ky studim do të dërgohen reagime kthyese tek pjesëmarrsit.

Ky studim eshte miratuar nga Komoniteti I etikes se hulumtimeve njerzore te Universitetit Curtin (numri I miratimit HR 74/2008) Komomitetin e perbejne pjestare te publikut, jurist,akademike,doktore,dhe blegtore. Roli I tij primar eshte qe te mbrojne pjesemarersit. Nese kerkohet ,munet te merret verifikimi I miratimit duhet I shkruar komunitetin ne adresen: Curtin University of Technology, GOP, Box, UI1987, Perth ,Office of Research and Development, Cutin University of Technology, GOP Box UI1987 Perth 6845 apo duke telefonuar ne 9266 2784 ose per mes postes elektronike ne adresen : hrec@curtin.edu.au

Nese deshironi te merrni pjese ne kete studim ju lutem te plotesoni detajet e meposhtme. Nese keni ndonje pytje ne lidhje me kete projekt ju lutem ndihuni I lire te me kontaktoni ose mua James Earnest, ne 61-8-94726867 (email: J.Ernest @ postgrad .curtin .edu.au) ose mbykqyrsit tim Dr Victor Egan ne + 61-8-9266 3307 (email: Victor .Egan@cbs .curtin.edu.au) /Dr Wanda Curlee ne + 1 601 263 7175 (email: wanda.curlee@bearingpoint.com) Mbikeqyrsit e mi dhe une do te kemi knaqesine te diskutojm me ju ndonji shqetesim qe munde te keni ne lidhjme ate se si do te kryhet ky studim.

■■■

Fletë pëlqim

Unë _____ kam lexuar informacionet më lart.Për cdo pytje që kam parashtruar është dhënë përgjegjeja e knaqëshmeper mua.Une pajtohem te marr pjes ne kete aktivitet, meghithat e di se munde te ndryshoj mendjen dh eta ndryshoj kete ne cdo kohe.

E kuptoj s ete gjitha informacionet e dhena trajtohen me konfidencialitet dhe nuk do te leshohen nga hetuesi, derisa kjo nuk kerkohet me lgj.

Une pajtohem qe te dhenat hulumtuese te grumbulluara per kete studim munde te publikohen me kusht qe emri apo informacionet e tjera qe do te munde te identifikonin mu ate mos perdoren.

Nenshkrimi I pjesmarrsit / Perfaqesuesit te autorizuar:

Data:

Nenshkrimi I hetuesit:

Data:

Emri I Hetuesit:

APPENDIX 8

Serbian version – Letter of consent

Informacija I prijem za ucesnike istrazivanckog projekta

Rekonstrukcija Post- Konflikta: slozenost i izazov planiranja i izvrsavanje projekata infrastrukture na Kosovu', istrazivanjem rukovodio Dzejms Ernest PhD kandidat sa Tehnickog Univerziteta Curtin , Perth, Australija

Ja sam PhD student s Tehnickog Univerziteta Curtin, vodja istrazivanja za uspesnost rekonstrukcije projekata post- konflikta pod nadzorom Dr. Egan Viktora i Dr. Karle Vanda . Svrha proucavanja je istrazivanje planiranje i ostvarivanje primene u odnosu na rekonstrukciju i razvoj projekata za izgradnju racionalnije (efektivnije) uprave u post-konfliktnom drustvu.

Vi mozete pomoci tako sto cete pristati da popunite dodata pitanja i ucestvovati u intervju (ispitivanju). Upozorenje vreme ispunjavanja izvestaja nece biti duzi od 30 min. Izvestaji sadrze pitanja otprilike na koji nacin projekti su planirani i izvrseni u vasoj organizaviji.Ucesnici mogu odluciti da odustanu u svako doba. Sve informacije date za vreme istrazivanja su poverljive, bez identiteta ili drugih informacija koje bi mogle da Vas identifikuju u javnosti. Povratne studije bice obezbedjene ucesnicima.
Ove studije su odobrene od strane Curtin Univerziteta komisije za istrazivanje ljudskog morala (odobrenje Br.HR 74/2008) . Komisija je sacinjena od clanova iz javnog zivota, akademika, pravnika doktora i svestenika.Glavna uloga je zastita ucesnika. U koloko je potrebno verifikacija potvrde moze biti dostavljena napismeno od strane saveza za istrazivanje ljudskog morala Curtain Univerziteta, - Kancelarije za istrazivanje i razvoj, Curtin Tehnickog Univerziteta , GOP BOX u1987, Perth,6845 ili telefonom 9266 2784 ili emajlom hrec@curtin.edu.au

Ukoliko ste voljni da ucestvujete u ovim istrazivanjima molimo Vas da popunite detalje ispod.Ako imate bilo kakva pitanja u vezi projekta, molim Vas osecajte se slobodno da me kontaktirate licno Dzejms Ernest na
 61-8-94726867(email:J.Earnest@postgrad.curtin.edu.au)
 ili mog upravnika Dr. Egan Viktora, na + 61-8-9266 3307 (email :Victor.Egan@cbs.curtin.edu.au)/ Dr. Wanda Curlee, na + 1 610 263 7175 (email:wanda.curlee@bearingpoint.com).

Moji upravnici i ja bicemo srecni ukoliko budemo mogli da diskutujemo sa vama o nacinu na koji se moze izvesti studija.

Forma pristanka

Ja _____ procitao/la sam navedene informacije. Na svako moje postavljeno pitanje dobicu zadovoljavajuci odgovor. Ja se slazem da ucestvujem u ovim aktvnostima, medjutim ja znam da mogu promeniti misljenje i prestati u bilo koje vreme.

Ja razumem da su sve informacije tretirane kao poverljive i nece biti dostupne istraziteljima od strane zakona.
Saglasan/na sam da sve informacije sakupljene za ovo istrazivanje mogu biti objavljene bez mog imena ili ostalih informacija koje me mogu identifikovati.

Potpis Ucesnika/Ovlasceni Predstavnik:

Datum:

Potpis istrazitelja:
Datum:
Ime ispitivaca

Appendix 9

<u>Survey 1</u>

The purpose of this survey is to gain an understanding about current practices for the planning and implementation of **post-conflict reconstruction projects in Kosovo.** You have been chosen to participate in this survey due to your knowledge and experience in the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction projects in Kosovo. Your responses to the survey questions will be especially valuable in this research. Please read each item carefully and select the response that best reflects your viewpoint by putting an 'X' in the appropriate box. Kindly also provide comments whenever possible. I greatly appreciate your time and effort and sincerely value your feedback

In order to make the analysis of the results most useful, it is necessary to define important terms for the purpose of this questionnaire. Please read this definition before you begin and come back and look at these again as necessary to make it easier to respond :

- ***Conflicting communities*** refers to conflict-impacted communities in their transition to sustainable peace and development.

- ***Contingency planning*** refers to identifying alternative strategies to be used to ensure project success if specified risk events occur*.*

- ***Project*** refers to a planned approach to meet specified objectives by using resources and a team of people to get it done.

- **P*ost-conflict reconstruction*** refers to the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of the society. It encompasses social reintegration, physical reconstruction and institution building.

- ***Project life cycle*** *refers* to managing the work required for achieving a defined objective through four phases: the initiation, planning, implementation and execution phases.

- ***Project success*** in a post-conflict society requires that there is a significant benefit to the conflicting community, which the project was intended to serve.

- ***Project team*** refers to the people who actually do the work of developing and implementing the project and includes the managers, stakeholders and key personnel.

- ***Stakeholder*** refers to the members of the international and local policy and practitioner communities concerned with the end results of a project. Not all stakeholders are involved in completing the actual work of the project.

Section 1

1. To what extent is each of the following important for the projects to be deemed successful in your area of operations?	Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
Clear understanding of project environment by donors and stakeholders						
Clear understanding of project goals and objectives by implementing agency						
Implementing agency addresses the needs of the conflicting communities						
Having adequate resources committed by the implementing agency						
Having the approval of the project by the affected communities						
Implementing agency has detailed and realistic project plans						
The project implementation team has the required competencies						
Project outputs are used by the conflicting communities						
The donors have clear policies to sustain project activities						
Having ownership of the project by the beneficiaries						
Having the commitment to the project by the conflicting community						

2. To what extent is each of the following, a reason for failures in the implementation of projects in your area of operations?	Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
Low participation by the conflicting communities						
A lack of project team participation in decision-making						
Unrealistic project schedules						
A lack of agreement on the objectives by the donor and the stakeholders						
A lack of adequate non-financial resources						
Poor analysis of a major risk factor						
Delays caused by bureaucratic administrative systems						
The project process is not clearly defined						
Complicated procurement systems						
Insufficient project funding						
Inadequate project planning						

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3. How important are each of the following critical in ensuring projects are successful?	Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
Identifying a realistic budget						
Understanding the limits and capabilities of the project team						
Having clear measurements to verify success						
Engaging professional project management team						
Having greater involvement of local stakeholders						
Ensuring transparency to control corruption						
Effectively managing the entire project life cycle (not just implementation)						
Having contingency plans to deal with potential problems						
Having control and monitoring processes in place						

4. To what extent should each of the following determine the identification and selection of the projects for planning and implementation?	Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
The donor						
The implementing agency						
The government						
The local community						

5. To what extent is each of the following critical for the successful implementation of projects in your area of operations?	Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
Participation of women in the project planning and implementation process						
Good governance to promote reconstruction projects						
Providing a security presence for the organisation implementing projects						
Effective coordination by implementing agencies						
Skill training of staff for long-term development						
Effective procurement process to commence projects quickly						
Frequently shifting donor priorities						
Political stability						
Clearly defined scope of the project						
Communicating project plans clearly to the conflicting community						
Having a clear framework for managing projects						
Managing risk effectively on projects						
Participation in the project feasibility stage by the community						
Effective meetings that include the conflicting communities						

SECTION 2

General Questions:

1. Highest level of education attained:

High School	
Some College	
Bachelors	
Masters	
Doctorate	
Other	

2. Years of experience in implementing post-conflict reconstruction projects:

0 - 5 Years	
6 -10 Years	
11-15 Years	
16 - 20 Years	
21- 25 Years	
26+	

3. Do you have any formal training on managing projects in a post-conflict environment?

Yes	
No	

4. What are the major risks you face in planning and implementing projects, where 1 represents little importance and 5 represents high importance.

	Low		Med		High
	1	2	3	4	5
Technical Risk					
External risk					
Environmental Risk					
Organisational Risk					
Project Management Risk					
Operational risk					
Governance Risk					
Financial Risk					
Personal risk					

5. Please rank the following in their order of importance to help you define, structure, and organise projects. (Where 1 represents most important and 8 represents least important).

Suggestion: Read the full list before responding.

Scope	
Time	
Cost	
Quality	
Risk	
Human Resources	
Communications	
Procurement	

6. What types of methodology or process are used by the organisation to implement projects?

7. What was the average length of the project you managed?

1- 12 months	
13- 24 months	
25 - 36 months	
37- 48 months	
> 4 years	

8 What was the estimated value of the project? (in US$)

100,000 - 500,000	
500, 000 - 1, 000,000	
1,000,000 - 1,500, 000	
1,500, 000 - 2,000, 000	
2,000,000 - 2,500, 000	
2,500,000 - 3,000 ,000	
3,000,000 - 3,500,000	
3,500,000 - 4,000,000	
> 4,000,000	

APPENDIX 10

Albanian version - Studim - 1

Qëllimi i këtij studimi është që të arrihet njohuri rreth praktikave aktuale mbi planifikimin dhe implementimin e **projekteve të rindërtimit pas konfliktit në Kosovë.** Ju jeni përzgjedhur që të merrni pjesë në këtë studim për shkak të njohurive dhe përvojës tuaj në implementimin e projekteve të rindërtimit të pas konfliktit ne Kosovë. Përgjigjet e juaja në këtë pyetësor do të jenë posaçërisht të vlefshme për këtë hulumtim. Ju lutem qe të lexoni secilin element me kujdes dhe të zgjidhni përgjigjen qe me së miri e reflekton pikëpamjen tuaj duke e vendosur 'X' ne kutinë e duhur. Ju lutem qe gjithashtu te jepni komente kudo qe është e mundur. E çmoj shume kohën dhe mundin tuaj dhe sinqerisht e vlerësoj komentin tuaj.

Me qëllim që analiza e rezultateve të jetë më e dobishme është e nevojshme që të përkufizohen termet e rëndësishme për qellim te këtij pyetësori. Ju lutem qe t'i lexoni këto përkufizime para se te filloni e poashtu kthehuni e lexojeni përsëri sipas nevojës ashtu qe te lehtësohet përgjigjja ne pyetje

-Komunitetet ne konflikt i referohet komuniteteve te ndikuara nga konflikti ne tranzicionin e tyre drejt paqes se qëndrueshme dhe zhvillimit.

Planifikimi i rastit i referohet identifikimit te strategjive alternative qe përdoren për te siguruar suksesin e projektit nëse paraqiten raste specifike rreziku.

- P*rojekti* i referohet qasjes se planifikuar për arritjen e objektivave specifike duke i shfrytëzuar resurset dhe ekipin e njerëzve për ti kryer ato.

- *Rindërtimi i pas konfliktit* i referohet tranzicionit nga konflikti ne paqe ne vendin e ndikuar përmes rindërtimit te kornizës socioekonomike te shoqërisë. E përfshinë riintegrimin shoqëror, rindërtimin fizik dhe ndërtimin e institucioneve.

 - *Cikli jetësor i projektit* i referohet menaxhimit të punës që kërkohet për të arritur objektiven e definuar përmes katër fazave: nisja, planifikimi, implementimi dhe fazat e zbatimit.

- *Suksesi i projektit* shoqëria e post-konfliktit kërkon që të ketë përfitim të rëndesishëm për komunitetet ne konflikt qe projekti ka pasur qellim te ju shërbej

- *Ekipi i projektit* i referohet njerëzve të cilet faktikisht e bëjnë punën e zhvillimit dhe implementimit të projektit dhe i përfshinë menaxherët, palët e interesit dhe personelin kyç.

- *Palët e interesit* i referohet anëtareve të politikes ndërkombëtare dhe lokale dhe profesionistëve te komuniteteve që merren me rezultatet përfundimtare te projektit. Jo te gjitha palët e interesit janë te përfshire ne përfundimin e punës aktuale te projektit.

Seksioni 1

1. Deri ne çfarë shkalle është e rëndësishme çdo njëra nga ato qe vijojnë për te vlerësuar se projektet janë te suksesshme në zonën tuaj të veprimit?	Aspak	Pak	Disi	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/pasigurte
Të kuptuarit e qartë të projektit nga ana e donatoreve dhe palëve të interesit						
Të kuptuarit e qarte të qëllimeve te projektit dhe objektivave nga agjencia implementuese						
Agjencia implementuese i adreson nevojat e komuniteteve në konflikt						
Për të pasur resurse adekuate të zotuara nga agjencia implementuese						
Për te pasur aprovimin e projektit nga ana e komuniteteve të ndikuara						
Agjencia implementuese ka plane të detajizuara dhe realiste						
Ekipi implementues i projektit i ka kompetencat e kërkuar						
Te arriturat e projektit te shfrytëzohen nga komunitetet ne konflikt						
Donatoret kanë politika te qarta për ti mbështetur aktivitetet e projektit						
Për te pasur pronësi te projektit nga ana e përfituesve						
Për te pasur zotim ndaj projektit nga komunitetet ne konflikt						

2. Deri ne cfare shkalle është çdo njëra nga ato që vijojnë arsye për dështime në implementimin e projektit në zone tuaj të veprimit?	Aspak	Pak	Deri diku	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/e pasigurte
Pjesëmarrja e ulet e komuniteteve ne konflikt						
Mungesa e pjesëmarrjes se ekipit të projektit në vendim-marrje						
Orari joreal i projektit						
Mungesa e marrëveshjes mbi objektivat nga donatori dhe palët e interesit						
Mungesa e resurseve adekuate jo financiare						
Analiza e dobët e faktorit kryesor te rrezikut						
Vonesat e shkaktuara nga sistemi burokratik i administratës						
Procesi i projektit nuk është i definuar qarte						
Sisteme të komplikuara të prokurimit						
Fonde të pamjaftueshme të projektit						
Planifikim jo adekuat i projektit						

3. Sa te rëndësishme janë çdo njëra nga ato që vijojnë për të siguruar që projektet të jenë të suksesshme?	Aspak	Pak	Deri diku	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/e pasigurte
Identifikimi realist i buxhetit						
Të kuptuarit e kufizimeve dhe aftësive të ekipit te projektit						
Për te pasur masa te qarta te verifikimit te sukseseve						
Angazhimi i ekipit profesional menaxhues te projektit						
Angazhim më i madh i palëve vendore të interesit						
Sigurimi i transparencës për ta kontrolluar korrupsionin						
Menaxhimi efektiv i ciklit jetësor të projektit (jo vetëm te implementimit)						
Për te pasur plane te rastit qe merren me problemet potenciale						
Për te pasur kontroll dhe për te monitoruar proceset ne vend						

4. Deri në çfarë shkalle duhet që çdo njëra nga ato që vijojnë të përcaktojnë identifikimin dhe zgjedhjen e projekteve për planifikim dhe implementim ?	Aspak	Pak	Deri diku	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/e pasigurte
Donatori						
Agjencia implementuese						
Qeveria						
Komuniteti vendor						

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5. Deri ne çfarë shkalle është çdo njëra nga ato qe vijojnë kritike për implementimin e suksesshëm te projekteve në fushën tuaj te veprimit?	Aspak	Pak	Deri diku	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/e pasigurtë
Pjesëmarrja e grave ne planifikimin e projektit dhe në procesin e implementimit						
Qeverisja e mire për të promovuar projektet e rindërtimit						
Lejimi i pranisë së sigurimit për projektet implementuese te organizatës						
Koordinimi efektiv nga agjencionet implementuese						
Trajnimi i shkathtësive të stafit për zhvillim më jetë zgjatës						
Procesi efektiv i prokurimit për nisje të shpejtë të projekteve						
Ndryshimi i shpeshtë i prioriteteve të donatorëve						
Stabiliteti politik						
Shtrirja qartë e definuar e projektit						
Planet e projektit të iu komunikohen qartë komunitetit në konflikt						
Të pasurit e një kornize të qartë për menaxhimin e projekteve						
Menaxhimi efektiv i rrezikut në projekte						
Pjesëmarrja e komunitetit ne fazën e realizueshmërisë të projektit						
Takime efektive që përfshijnë komunitetet në konflikt						

Pyetje të përgjithshme:

1 Niveli më i lartë i arritur i edukimit:

Shkolla e mesme	
Ca vite shkollimi	
i/e diplomuar	
Magjistraturë	
Doktoraturë	
Tjetër	

2 Vitet e përvojës në implementimin e projekteve të rindërtimit të post konfliktit:

0 – 5 vite	
6 – 10 vite	
11- 15 vite	
16 – 20 vite	
21 - 25 vite	
26+	

3 A keni ndonjë trajnim formal mbi menaxhimin e projekteve në mjedis të post konfliktit?

Po	
Jo	

4 Cilat janë rreziqet më të mëdha me të cilat ballafaqoheni në planifikimin dhe implementimin e projekteve, ku 1 paraqet pak rëndësi ndërsa 5 paraqet rëndësi të madhe.

	Pak		Mes.		Madhe
	1	2	3	4	5
Rreziku teknik					
Rreziku i jashtëm					
Rreziku i mjedisit					
Rreziku organizativ					
Rreziku i menaxhimit të projektit					
Rreziku operacional					
Rreziku i qeverisjes					
Rreziku financial					
Rreziku personal					

5 Për të ju ndihmuar t'i definoni, strukturoni dhe organizoni projektet ju lutem që ti radhisni ato që vijojnë në varg sipas rëndësisë. (Ku 1 paraqet më së shumti rëndësi dhe 8 parqet më së paku rëndësi).

Sugjerim: Lexojeni listën deri ne fund para se të përgjigjeni.

Fusha e veprimit	
Koha	
Shpenzimi	
Kualiteti	
Rreziku	
Burimet njerëzore	
Komunikimet	
Prokurimi	

6 Cilat lloje të metodologjisë apo procese janë përdorur nga organizata për implementimin e projekteve?

7 Cila ka qenë mesatarja e zgjatjes së projektit që e keni menaxhuar?

1 - 12 muaj	
13 - 24 muaj	
25 - 36 muaj	
37 - 48 muaj	
> 4 vite	

8 Cila ka qenë vlera e përafërt e projektit? (në US$)

100,000 - 500,000	
500,000 - 1,000,000	
1,000,000 - 1,500,000	
1,500,000 - 2,000,000	
2,000,000 - 2,500,000	
2,500,000 - 3,000 ,000	
3,000,000 - 3,500,000	
3, 500,000 - 4,000,000	
> 4,000,000	

APPENDIX 11

<u>Serbian version - Ispitivanje - 1</u>

Namera ovog ispitivanja je da bolje razumemo sadasnje prakse planiranja i implementiranja post.konfiktnih rekonstrukcijskih projekata na Kosovu. Vi ste odabrani da ucestvujete u ovom ispitivanju zbog vaseg znanja i iskukstva u implementiranju post/konfliktnih rekonstrukcijskih projekata na Kosovu. Vasi odgovori na pitanja u ovom ispitivanju bice posebno cenjeni u ovom istrazivanju. Molimo vas pazljivo procitajte svako pitanje i odaberite odgovore koji najboje odrazavaju vase misljenje tako da upisete x u odgovarajuce polje. Budite ljubazni i takode napisite svoje komente gde god je to moguce. Iznimno cenim vase vreme i trud i iskeno vrednujem vaše povratne informacije.

Kako bi analiza rezultata bila što korisnija, nužno je definisati važne termine u svrhu ove ankete. Molimo vas pročitajte ove definicije pre nego počnete i ponovo se vratite na ove definicije po potrebi kako bi vam bilo kaše odgovarati na pitanja :-

- **Konfliktne zajednice** odnosi se na zajednice zahvaćene konfliktima u njihovoj tranziciji prema održivom miru i razvoju.

- **Planiranje nepredviđenog** odnosi se na identificiranje alternativnih strategija koje bi se koristile kako bi obezbedili uspeh projekta u slučaju da dođe do nekih određenih rizičnih događaja.

- **Projekt** odnosi se na planirani pristup kako bi ostvarili određene objektive koristeći resurse i tim ljudi.

- Pos-konfliktna rekonstrukcija odnosi se na tranziciju iz konflikta u mir u pogođenim zemljama kroz ponovnu gradnju socioekonomskog okvira društva. To obuhvata socialnu reintegraciju, fizičku rekonstrukciju i izgradnju institucija.

- **Projekt životni ciklus** odnosi se na upravljanje radom potrebnim za postizanje određene objektive kroz četiri faze: inicijacija, planiranje, implementacija i faza izvršenja.

- **Uspeh projekta** u post-konfliktnom društvu zahteva postojanje značajne koristi za konfliktnu zajednicu kojoj treba da služi ovaj projekt.

- **Tim projekta** odnosi se na ljude koji zapravo rade na razvoju i implementiranju projekta i uključuje menađere, dioničare, i ključne kadrove.

- **Dioničar** odnosi se na članove međunarodne i lokalne policije i stručnjaka zajednice zainteresovani za konačne rezultate projekta. Nisu uključeni svi dioničari u završavanju aktuelnog rada projekta.

1. Do koje mere je svaka od navedenih izjava važna za uspeh projekta u vašem području delovanja?	Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Uglavnom	Mnogo	Neizvesno
Jasno razumevanje ambijenta projekta od donora i dioničara						
Jasno razumevanje ciljeva projekta i objektiva od agencije za implementiranje						
Implementiranje agencije koja se bavi potrebama konfliktnih zajednica						
Posedovanje adekvatnih resursa predanih od agencije za implementaciju						
Posedovanje odobrenja projekta od strane pogođene zajednice						
Agencija za implementiranje ima detaljne i realistične planove za projekt						
Ekipa za implementiranje projekta ima potrebne kompetencije						
Project outputs are used by the conflicting communities						
Donori imaju jasnu politiku za podržavanje aktivnosti projekta						
Posedovanje vlasništva nad projektom od strane korisnika						
Predanost projektu od strane konfliktne zajednice						

2. Do koje mere je svaka od sledećih izjava razlog za neuspeh implementacije projekta u vašem području delovanja?	Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Uglavnom	Mnogo	Neizvesno
Niski udio učestvovanja pogođenih zajednica						
Nedostatak projektnog grupnog učestvovanja u donošenju odluka						
Nerealni rasporedi projekta						
Nedostatak dogovora o objektivama od donora i dioničara						
Nedostatak adekvatnih ne-finansijskih resursa						
Slabe analize velikih faktora rizika						
Kašnjenja uzrokovana birokratskim administrativnim sistemom						
Proces projekta nije jasno definisan						
Komplikovan sistem nabavke						
Nedovoljna sredstva za finansiranje projekta						
Neadekvatno planiranje projekta						

3. Koliko su važni sledeći navedeni kriteriji za obezbeđenje uspeha projekta?	Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Malo	Uglavnom	Neizvesno
Identifikovanje realnog budžeta						
Razumevanje limita i sposobnosti ekipe project						
Posedovanje jasnih merila za potvrdu uspeha						
Uključivanje profesionalne ekipe za upravljanje projektom						
Veće uključivanje lokalnih dioničara						
Obezbeđenje transparentnosti kako bi kontrolirali korupciju						
Efikasno upravljanje celokupnim životnim ciklusom projekta (ne samo implementacija)						
Imati planove za nepredviđene slučajeve kako bi se suočili sa potencijalnim problemima						
Imati monitorne i kontrolne procese na pravom mestu						

4. Do koje mere bi svaki od navedenih trebali određivati identifikaciju i selekciju projekta za planiranje i implementaciju?	Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Uglavnom	Mnogo	Neizvesno
Donor						
.Agencija za implementiranje						
Vlada						
Lokalna zajednica						

5. Do koje mere su dole navedeni kritični za uspešnu implementaciju projekata u vašem području delovanja?	Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Uglavnom	Mnogo	Neizvesno
Učestvovanje žena u planiranju projekta i procesu implementacije						
Dobar sistem upravljanje kako bi promovisali rekonstrukcione projekte						
Pružanje bezbednosti organizaciji koja implementira projekt						
Efikasna kordinacija agencija za implementiranje						
Usavršavanje veština osoblja za dugoročni razvoj						
Efikasni proces nabavke kako bi brzo započeli projekte						
Učestalo pomeranje priorieta donora						
Politička stabilnost						
Jasno definisan doseg projekta						
Jasno saopštenje planova projekta konfliktnoj						
Posedovanje jasnog okvira za upravljanje						
Efikasno upravljanje rizicima u projektu						
Učestvovanje zajednice u fazi ostvarljivosti projekta						
Efikasni sastanci koji uključuju konfliktnu zajednicu						

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II DEO

Opšta Pitanja:

1 Najviši stepen obrazovanja koji ste dosegli:

Srednja Škola	
Neki Fakultet	
Diplomirani Student	
Magistar	
Doktorat	
Ostalo	

2 Godine iskustva u implementiranju post-konfliktnih rekonstrukcijskih projekata:

0 - 5 godina	
6 - 10 godina	
11- 15 godina	
16 - 20 godina	
21 - 25 godina	
26+	

3 Da li ste prošli bilo kakvu zvaničnu obuku vezano uz upravljanje projektima u pos-konfliktnom okruženju?

Da	
Ne	

4 Koji su najveći rizici sa kojima se suočavate kod planiranja i implementiranja projekta, 1 pretstavlja najmanji rizik, a 5 pretstavlja najveći rizik.

	Nizak		Srednji		Visoki
	1	2	3	4	5
Tehnički rizik					
Vanjski rizik					
Ambijentalni Rizik					
Organizacioni Rizik					
Rizik Upravljanja Projektom					
Operativni rizik					
Upravni Rizik					
Finansijski Rizik					
Lični rizik					

5 Molimo vas poredajte sledeće pojmove prema njihovoj važnosti kako bi vam pomogli da definišete, konstruirate i organizirate projekte. (Gde 1 pretstavlja najvažniji, a 8 najmanje važan pojam).

Predlog: Pročitajte celu listu pre nego odgovorite.

Doseg	
Vreme	
Trošak	
Kvaliteta	
Rizik	
Ljudski Resurs	
Komunikacije	
Nabavka	

6 Koju je vrstu metodologije ili procesa koristila organizacija kod implementacije projekta?

7 Koliko su u prosjeku trajali projekti kojima ste vi upravljali?

8 - 12 meseci	
13 – 24 meseci	
25 - 36 meseci	
37 – 48 meseci	
➢ 4 godine	

8 Koja je bila procenjena vrednost projekta? (u US$)

100,000 - 500,000	
500,000 - 1,000,000	
1,000,000 - 1, 500,000	
1,500,000 - 2,000,000	
2, 000,000 - 2,500,000	
2,500,000 - 3,000 ,000	
3,000,000 - 3,500,000	
3, 500,000 - 4,000,000	
> 4,000,000	

APPENDIX 12

<u>Survey 2</u>

The purpose of this survey is to gain an understanding about current practices for the planning and implementation of **post-conflict reconstruction projects in Kosovo.** You have been chosen to participate in this survey due to your knowledge and experience in the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction projects in Kosovo. Your responses to the survey questions will be especially valuable in this research. Please read each item carefully and select the response that best reflects your viewpoint by putting an 'X' in the appropriate box. Kindly also provide comments whenever possible. I greatly appreciate your time and effort and sincerely value your feedback

In order to make the analysis of the results most useful, it is necessary to define important terms for the purpose of this questionnaire. Please read this definition before you begin and come back and look at these again as necessary to make it easier to respond :

- ***Conflicting communities*** refers to conflict-impacted communities in their transition to sustainable peace and development.

- ***Contingency planning*** refers to identifying alternative strategies to be used to ensure project success if specified risk events occur.

- ***Project*** refers to a planned approach to meet specified objectives by using resources and a team of people to get it done.

- ***Post-conflict reconstruction*** refers to the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of the society. It encompasses social reintegration, physical reconstruction and institution building.

- ***Project life cycle*** *refers* to managing the work required for achieving a defined objective through four phases: the initiation, planning, implementation and execution phases.

- ***Project success*** in a post-conflict society requires that there is a significant benefit to the conflicting community, which the project was intended to serve.

- ***Project team*** refers to the people who actually do the work of developing and implementing the project and includes the managers, stakeholders and key personnel.

- ***Stakeholder*** refers to the members of the international and local policy and practitioner communities concerned with the end results of a project. Not all stakeholders are involved in completing the actual work of the project.

Section 1

Questions in this section focus on the planning, execution and management of the projects in Kosovo. Please use your own professional knowledge and personal experience of what actually happened and not what is suppose to happen on the project you implemented in Kosovo.

No		Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
1.0	The project goals and objectives were clearly defined						
1.1	The project team facilitated discussions to assist in determining the priorities, which fitted the community						
1.2	For the selection of projects, the community was involved						
1.3	The stakeholders were committed to the achievement of project outcomes						
1.4	The project team members actively participated in project decision-making						
1.5	The projects team members took ownership of the project						
1.6	The organisation had people with the abilities to plan and implement projects realistically						
1.7	The project had a workable plan in the form of network schedules (milestones)						
1.8	In the project planning, alternative approaches were included to achieve project objectives						
1.9	The project changes were effectively controlled throughout the project life cycle						

No		Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
2.0	The organisation had people with the ability to estimate its project cost						
2.1	When the project was estimated, the resources were accounted for effectively						
2.2	Adequate provision was made for the estimated cost of the project						
2.3	The project estimates were developed in consultation with appropriate stakeholders allocated to the task						
2.4	The project had standard method (graphical tools) for communicating the project cost and variance						
2.5	Agreed financial management processes were implemented to monitor actual expenditure						
2.6	The project had a policy for cost contingency to allow for risks and uncertainty						
2.7	Cost analyses were conducted and variations were implemented to meet complex changing circumstances						
2.8	The project outcomes were reviewed to determine the effectiveness of cost management systems						
2.9	For the project, cost control was an essential factor for the successful delivery of the project						

No		Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
3.0	Appropriate stakeholders complied with established time schedules when implementing projects						
3.1	The organisation had set time and cost estimates too low, to secure project funding						
3.2	The organisation obtained team ownership of schedules						
3.3	The project outcomes were reviewed to determine if expected outcomes were attained as planned (per schedule)						
3.4	Scheduling techniques (bar charts, Gantt charts) was used to establish time schedules for project activities						
3.5	For every planned and approved project, each activity had an estimated duration						
3.6	By scheduling time for projects, the project organisation could assign priority for resources between projects						
3.7	Progress was monitored against schedule						
3.8	The project team responded to schedule changes to achieve project objectives throughout the project life cycle						
3.9	The time it took to approve project funding was satisfactory						

No		Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
4.0	The availability of scarce resources was taken into account when deciding upon projects						
4.1	The project had a steering group to resolve issues						
4.2	The organisation ensures that resources are appropriately allocated to manage projects						
4.3	Project team members could lead, influence and coach others to achieve desired results						
4.4	Project team members had the capacity to work independently and handle multiple project tasks						
4.5	People participating in projects were competent in their relevant field of expertise						
4.6	Project team members had knowledge of conflict resolution and problem-solving abilities						
4.7	Project team members had adequate knowledge, information and understanding of project management skills						
4.8	Project team members actively participated and consulted with others to achieve project goals						
4.9	The project team could develop and manage training and development needs						

No			Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
5.0	The project team identified what quality standards were relevant to the project							
5.1	The projects consistently met the technical performance specifications							
5.2	There were standardised checklists to ensure consistency in frequently performed activities							
5.3	There were procedures for formal reviews to learn from project failures and/or successes							
5.4	Planned project practices were compared with other projects in order to generate ideas for improvement							
5.5	The organisation reported to other agencies, results of inspections that addressed any area of non-conformance							
5.6	The organisation had a procedure for taking corrective actions for problems encountered during the project cycle							
5.7	The organisation had procedures for maintaining the Quality Records at each project phase							
5.8	The organisation specified skills training with economic development initiative for the project team							
5.9	Project progress was monitored and the delivery process and project outcomes were evaluated							

No			Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
6.0	Procurement activities were planned early and refined throughout the project life cycle							
6.1	Procurement requirements were identified in consultation with appropriate stakeholders							
6.2	Established selection criteria was determined in consultation with stakeholders							
6.3	Agreed proposals were communicated to prospective contractors to ensure clarity of project objectives							
6.4	Preferred contractors were selected in accordance with agreed selection processes							
6.5	Procurement progress were reviewed to ensure project objectives was met							
6.6	Contractual conflicts were identified and remedial actions were implemented							
6.7	Contract deliverables met contractual and project requirements							
6.8	Contractors critically assessed their capacity to operate in a challenging post-conflict environment							
6.9	Procurement process was often criticised as slow, costly and complex in a post-conflict environment							

No		Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
7.0	The key stakeholders were correctly identified						
7.1	There was a common understanding and agreement of stakeholders' requirements						
7.2	The communication channels for reporting project problems are clear						
7.3	The communication channels are clear between the organisation and the community						
7.4	The project meetings provided helpful and accurate project information						
7.5	The project is committed to keeping all stakeholders informed about the projects progress						
7.6	Project team members often informally discussed project matters						
7.7	The organisation had detailed information tracked for the project						
7.8	Project stakeholders review information of the project and seek to address any issues raised						
7.9	The organisation could resolve conflict when it arose						

No		Not At All	Little	Somewhat	Largely	Great Deal	Unsure
8.0	The organisation developed a risk management plan to make informed decisions						
8.1	The communities were involved in managing risk through the practice of identifying the risk early in the life of the project						
8.2	The project team interacted with other project organisations to carry out risk analysis						
8.3	Audit reports were used to monitor the progress and evaluate performance						
8.4	The project teams were capable of monitoring risk response strategies and to deal with worst case scenarios						
8.5	The project team continually addressed potential risk and continued to control risks throughout the project's life cycle						
8.6	The organisation had a contingency plan to recover from each identified risk						
8.7	The organisation concentrated on ensuring that the highest priority risks were attended to first						
8.8	Responsibilities for the risk activities identified were delegated throughout the project organisation to individuals and groups						
8.9	The organisation communicated risk reduction activities to other agencies						

SECTION 2

General Questions:

1 Highest level of education attained:

High School	
Some College	
Bachelors	
Masters	
Doctorate	
Other	

2 Years of experience in implementing post-conflict reconstruction projects:

0 - 5 Years	
6 -10 Years	
11- 15 Years	
16- 20 Years	
21 - 25 Years	
26+	

3 Do you have any formal training on managing projects in a post-conflict environment?

Yes	
No	

4 Please rank the following in their order of importance to help you define, structure, and organise projects. (Where 1 represents most important and 8 represents least important).

Read the full list before responding.

Scope	
Time	
Cost	
Quality	
Risk	
Human Resources	
Communications	
Procurement	

5 Does the organisation have processes and standards to implement projects?

Yes	
No	

If 'No', do you feel the organisation will use the standards and processes developed to implement projects?

6 What was the average length of projects you managed?

1- 6 months	
7 - 12 months	
13-18 months	
19 - 24 months	
25 - 30 months	
31 - 36 months	
37 - 42 months	
43 - 48 months	
> 4 years	

7 What was the estimated value of the project? (in US$)

100,000 - 250,000	
250, 000 - 500,000	
500,000 - 750,000	
750,000 - 1,000,000	
1,000,000 - 1,250,000	
1,250,000 - 1,500,000	
1,500,000 - 1,750,000	
1,750,000 - 2,000,000	
> 2,000,000	

APPENDIX 13

<u>Albanian version – Studim - 2</u>

Qëllimi i këtij studimi është që të arrihet njohuri rreth praktikave aktuale mbi planifikimin dhe implementimin e **projekteve të rindërtimit pas konfliktit në Kosovë.** Ju jeni përzgjedhur që të merrni pjesë në këtë studim për shkak të njohurive dhe përvojës tuaj në implementimin e projekteve të rindërtimit të pas konfliktit ne Kosovë. Përgjigjet e juaja në këtë pyetësor do të jenë posaçërisht të vlefshme për këtë hulumtim. Ju lutem që të lexoni secilin element me kujdes dhe të zgjidhni përgjigjen qe me së miri e reflekton pikëpamjen tuaj duke e vendosur 'X' ne kutinë e duhur. Ju lutem që gjithashtu te jepni komente kudo qe është e mundur. E çmoj shume kohën dhe mundin tuaj dhe sinqerisht e vlerësoj komentin tuaj.

Me qëllim që analiza e rezultateve të jetë më e dobishme është e nevojshme që të përkufizohen termet e rëndësishme për qellim te këtij pyetësori. Ju lutem që t'i lexoni këto përkufizime para se te filloni e poashtu kthehuni e lexojeni përsëri sipas nevojës ashtu që te lehtësohet përgjigjja ne pyetje

-Komunitetet ne konflikt i referohet komuniteteve te ndikuara nga konflikti ne tranzicionin e tyre drejt paqes se qëndrueshme dhe zhvillimit.

Planifikimi i rastit i referohet identifikimit te strategjive alternative qe përdoren për te siguruar suksesin e projektit nëse paraqiten raste specifike rreziku.

- P*rojekti* i referohet qasjes se planifikuar për arritjen e objektivave specifike duke i shfrytëzuar resurset dhe ekipin e njerëzve për ti kryer ato.

- *Rindërtimi i pas konfliktit* i referohet tranzicionit nga konflikti ne paqe ne vendin e ndikuar përmes rindërtimit te kornizës socioekonomike te shoqërisë. E përfshinë riintegrimin shoqëror, rindërtimin fizik dhe ndërtimin e institucioneve.

- *Cikli jetësor i projektit* i referohet menaxhimit të punës që kërkohet për të arritur objektiven e definuar përmes katër fazave: nisja, planifikimi, implementimi dhe fazat e zbatimit.

- *Suksesi i projektit* shoqëria e post-konfliktit kërkon që të ketë përfitim me rëndësi për komunitetet ne konflikt qe projekti ka <u>pasur qellim te ju shërbej</u>

- *Ekipi i projektit* i referohet njerëzve të cilët faktikisht e bëjnë punën e zhvillimit dhe implementimit të projektit dhe i përfshinë menaxherët, palët e interesit dhe personelin kyç.

- *Palët e interesit* i referohet anëtareve të politikes ndërkombëtare dhe lokale dhe profesionistëve te komuniteteve që merren me rezultatet përfundimtare te projektit. Jo te gjitha palët e interesit janë te përfshira në përfundimin e punës aktuale te projektit.

Pyetjet në këtë seksion përqendrohen në planifikim, ekzekutim dhe menaxhim të projekteve në Kosovë. Ju lutem që të shfrytëzoni njohurinë tuaj profesionale dhe përvojën tuaj personale rreth asaj se çka faktikisht ka ndodhur e jo se si është dashur të ndodh në projektin që ju e keni implementuar në Kosovë.

No		Aspak	Pak	Deri diku	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/e pasigurte
1.0	Qëllimet dhe objektivat e projektit kanë qenë të përcaktuara qartë						
1.1	Ekipi i projektit ka ndërmjetësuar diskutimet për të ndihmuar përcaktimin e prioriteteve të përshtatshme për komunitetin						
1.2	Komuniteti ka qenë i përfshirë në zgjedhjen e projekteve						
1.3	Palët e interesit kanë qenë të zotuara për arritjen e rezultateve përfundimtare të projektit						
1.4	Anëtarët e ekipit të projektit kanë marrë pjesë aktive në vendim marrje të projektit						
1.5	Anëtarët e ekipit të projektit morën pronësi mbi projektin						
1.6	Organizata ka pasur njerëz me aftësi të planifikojnë dhe te implementojnë projektet në mënyrë realiste						
1.7	Projekti ka pasur plan të realizueshëm në forme të orarit të rrjetit						
1.8	Në planifikimin e projektit, qasjet alternative kanë qenë të përfshira për ti arritur objektivat e projektit						
1.9	Ndryshimet e projektit kanë qenë të kontrolluara me efekt përgjatë ciklit jetësor të projektit						

No		Aspak	Pak	Deri diku	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/e pasigurte
2.0	Organizata ka pasur njerëz me aftësi për t'i parashikuar shpenzimet e projektit						
2.1	Kur projekti është parashikuar, resurset kanë qenë të marra parasysh në mënyrë efektive						
2.2	Përgatitje adekuate është bërë për shpenzimet e përafërta të projektit						
2.3	Parashikimet e projektit janë zhvilluara në konsultim me palët e qëlluara te interesit, përgjegjës për detyrën						
2.4	Projekti ka pasur metodë standarde (mjetet grafike) për komunikim rreth shpenzimeve dhe mospërputhjeve të projektit						
2.5	Proceset e pajtuara të menaxhimit të financave kanë qenë të implementuara për të monitoruar shpenzimet aktuale						
2.6	Projekti ka pasur politikë mbi shpenzimet e rastit për të lejuar rreziqet dhe pasigurinë						
2.7	Analizat e shpenzimeve kanë qenë të udhëhequra dhe larshmëria ka qenë e implementuar për tu ballafaquar me rrethanat ndryshuese të ndërlikuara						
2.8	Të arriturat e projektit kanë qenë të rishikuara për të përcaktuar efektivitetin e sistemit menaxherial të shpenzimeve						
2.9	Për projektin, kontrolli i shpenzimeve ka qenë një faktor esencial për shpërndarjen e suksesshme të projektit						

No	i/e pasigurt	Aspak	Pak	Deri diku	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/e pasigurt
3.0	Palët e qëlluara te interesit i janë mbajtur orareve te caktuara gjatë implementimit te projekteve						
3.1	Me qellim te sigurimit te fondeve, organizata e ka caktuar kohën dhe i ka mbajtur shumë ulët parashikimet mbi shpenzimet						
3.2	Organizata siguroi pronësi ekipore te orarit						
3.3	Te arriturat e projektit janë rishikuar për të përcaktuar nëse të arriturat e pritshme janë kryer sipas planit						
3.4	Plani grafik i punës(Diagramet) është përdorur për te krijuar orarin e aktiviteteve te projektit						
3.5	Për çdo projekt të planifikuar dhe aprovuar secili aktivitet ka pasur kohëzgjatjen e parashikuar						
3.6	Duke e caktuar kohen për projektin tone organizata e projektit ka mundur të caktoj prioritetet për resurset në mes të projekteve						
3.7	Progresi është monitoruar përkundër orarit						
3.8	Ekipi i projektit ju ka përgjigjur ndryshimeve në orar për ti arritur objektivat e projektit përgjatë ciklit jetësor të projektit						
3.9	Koha sa ka marrë për aprovimin e fondeve të projektit ka qenë e kënaqshme						

No	i/e pasigurte	Aspak	Pak	Deri diku	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/e pasigurte
4.0	Dispozicioni i pamjaftueshëm i resurseve është marrë parasysh kur është vendosur mbi projektet						
4.1	Projekti e ka pasur grupin drejtues për ti zgjidhur çështjet						
4.2	Organizata siguron që resurset të jenë të ndara në mënyrë të duhur për menaxhim te projekteve						
4.3	Anëtarët e ekipit të projektit kanë mundur të udhëheqin, të ndikojnë dhe t'i mësojnë të tjerët për ti arritur rezultatet e dëshiruara						
4.4	Anëtarët e ekipit të projektit kanë pasur kapacitet të punojnë pavarësisht dhe të punojnë në detyra të shumta të projektit						
4.5	Njerëzit që morën pjesë në projekte ishin kompetent në fushën e tyre të ekspertizës						
4.6	Anëtarët e ekipit të projektit kishin njohuri mbi zgjidhjen e konfliktit dhe aftësi të zgjidhjes së problemeve						
4.7	Anëtarët e ekipit të projektit kishin njohuri adekuate, informata dhe i kuptonin shkathtësitë e menaxhimit të projektit						
4.8	Anëtarët e ekipit të projektit kanë qenë aktivë dhe i kanë konsultuar të tjerët për ti arritur qëllimet e projektit						
4.9	Ekipi i projektit ka mundur t'i zhvillojë dhe menaxhoi trajnimet dhe nevojat për zhvillim						

No		Aspak	Pak	Deri diku	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/e pasigurte
5.0	Ekipi i projektit i ka identifikuar cilat standarde kualitative kane qene te rëndësishme për projektin						
5.1	Projektet vazhdimisht kanë qenë në përputhje me specifikat teknike të prezantimit						
5.2	Ka pasur listë kontrolli të standardizuar për të siguruar njëtrajtshmëri të aktiviteteve më së shpeshti të paraqitura						
5.3	Ka pasur procedura për rishikime formale për të mësuar nga dështimet e projektit si dhe/apo sukseset						
5.4	Praktikat e planifikuara te projektit janë krahasuar me projektet e tjera me qëllim të prodhimit të ideve për përmirësim						
5.5	Organizata ja ka raportuar agjencioneve të tjera rezultatet e inspektimeve që kanë adresuan fushat që nuk kanë qenë në përputhshmëri						
5.6	Organizata ka pasur procedure për marrjen e veprimeve përmirësuese për problemet e shfaqura gjate ciklit jetësor te projektit						
5.7	Organizata ka pasur procedura për mirëmbajtjen e te dhënave kualitative për secilën faze te projektit						
5.8	Organizata i ka specifikuar trajnimet e shkathtësive qe inkuadronin iniciativën për zhvillim ekonomik për ekipin e projektit						
5.9	Progresi i projektit është monitoruar ndërsa procesi i ecueshmërisë dhe i të arriturave të projektit janë vlerësuar						

No		Aspak	Pak	Deri diku	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/e pasigurte
6.0	Aktivitetet e prokurimit kanë qenë të planifikuara më herët dhe të përpunuara përgjatë ciklit jetësor të projektit						
6.1	Kërkesat e prokurimit kanë qenë të identifikuara në konsultim me palët adekuate te interesit						
6.2	Seleksionimi i kritereve ka qenë i përcaktuar në konsultim me palët e interesit						
6.3	Propozimet e pajtuara u janë komunikuar kontraktuesve të ardhshëm për të siguruar qartësi të objektivave te projektit						
6.4	Kontraktuesit e preferuar janë zgjedhur në pajtueshmëri me procesin e pajtuar të seleksionimit						
6.5	Procesi i prokurimit është rishikuar për te siguruar që objektivat e projektit te jenë arritur						
6.6	Konfliktet kontraktuese janë identifikuar dhe janë implementuar veprime tjera rrugëzgjidhëse						
6.7	Shpërndarja e kontratës i ka plotësuar kërkesat e kontraktuesit dhe projektit						
6.8	Kontraktuesit i kanë vlerësuar në mënyre kritike kapacitetet e tyre për të operuar në një mjedis sfidues të post konfliktit						
6.9	Procesi i prokurimit ka qene shpesh i kritikuar si i ngadalshëm, i shtrenjtë dhe kompleks në mjedis të post konfliktit						

No		Aspak	Pak	Deri diku	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/e pasigurte
7.0	Palët kyçe të interesit kanë qenë menjëherë të identifikuara						
7.1	Ka pasur kuptim dhe marrëveshje të përbashkët të kërkesave të palëve të interesit						
7.2	Kanalet e komunikimit mbi raportimin e problemeve të projektit janë të qarta						
7.3	Kanalet e komunikimit në mes të organizatës dhe komunitetit janë të qarta						
7.4	Takimet e projektit kanë dhënë informata të dobishme dhe të sakta mbi projektin						
7.5	Projekti është i zotuar ti mbajë të informuar të gjitha palët e interesit mbi progresin e projektit						
7.6	Anëtarët e ekipit të projektit shpesh kanë diskutuar joformalisht mbi projektin						
7.7	Organizata ka pasur informata të detajizuara mbi projektin						
7.8	Palët e interesit i rishikojnë informatat e projektit dhe kërkojnë t'i adresojnë çështjet që ngritën						
7.9	Organizata mund te zgjidh konflikte kur ato paraqiten						

No		Aspak	Pak	Deri diku	Kryesisht	Mjaft	i/e pasigurte
8.0	Organizata e ka zhvilluar planin menaxhues të rrezikut për të marrë vendime të informuara						
8.1	Komunitetet kanë qenë të përfshira në menaxhimin e rrezikut përmes praktikave të identifikimit të rrezikut në fillim të jetës të projektit						
8.2	Ekipi i projektit ka ndërvepruar me organizatat e tjera të projektit me qëllim të kryerjes së analizës së rrezikut						
8.3	Raportet a auditorëve janë përdorur për te monitoruar progresin dhe vlerësuar punën						
8.4	Ekipet e projektit ishin të afta t'i monitorojnë strategjitë e përgjigjeve ndaj rrezikut dhe të merren me skenarët më të vështire të mundshëm						
8.5	Ekipi i projektit e ka adresuar vazhdimisht rrezikun potencial dhe e ka vazhduar kontrollimin e rreziqeve përgjatë ciklit jetësor të projektit						
8.6	Organizata ka pasur plan të rastit për tu rimëkëmbur nga secili rrezik i identifikuar						
8.7	Organizata është koncentruar të sigurojë që rreziqet me prioritet më të lartë të trajtohen të parat						
8.8	Përgjegjësitë për aktivitetet e rrezikut të identifikuara u janë deleguar individëve dhe grupeve përgjatë organizatës të projektit						
8.9	Organizata iu ka komunikuar agjencioneve te tjera aktivitetet mbi uljen e rrezikut						

Pyetje të përgjithshme:

1 Niveli më i lartë i arritur i edukimit:

Shkolla e mesme	
Ca vite studimi	
i/e diplomuar	
Magjistraturë	
Doktoraturë	
Tjetër	

2 Vitet e përvojës në implementimin e projekteve të rindërtimit të post konfliktit:

0 - 5 vite	
6 - 10 vite	
11- 15 vite	
16 - 20 vite	
21 - 25 vite	
26+	

3 A keni ndonjë trajnim formal mbi menaxhimin e projekteve në mjedis të post konfliktit?

Po	
Jo	

4 Për të ju ndihmuar të definoni, strukturoni dhe organizoni projektet ju lutem ti radhisni ato që vijojnë në varg sipas rëndësisë. (Ku 1 paraqet më së shumti rëndësi dhe 8 parqet më së paku rëndësi).

   Lexojeni listën para se të përgjigjeni.

Fusha e veprimit	
Koha	
Shpenzimi	
Kualiteti	
Rreziku	
Burimet njerëzore	
Komunikimet	
Prokurimi	

5 A ka organizata procese dhe standarde për implementimin e projekteve?

Po	
Jo	

Nëse ' Jo' a mendoni se organizata do te përdorë standarde dhe procese të zhvilluara për implementimin e projekteve?

6 Cila ka qenë mesatarja e zgjatjes së projekteve që i keni menaxhuar?

1- 6 muaj	
7 - 12 muaj	
13 - 18 muaj	
19 - 24 muaj	
25 - 30 muaj	
31 - 36 muaj	
37 - 42 muaj	
43 - 48 muaj	
> 4 vite	

7. Cila ka qenë vlera e menduar e projektit? (në US$)

100,000 - 250,000	
250, 000 - 500,000	
500,000 - 750,000	
750,000 - 1,000,000	
1,000,000 - 1,250,000	
1,250,000 - 1,500,000	
1,500,000 - 1,750,000	
1,750,000 - 2,000,000	
> 2,000,000	

APPENDIX 14

<u>Serbian version – Ispitivanje - 2</u>

Namera ovog ispitivanja je da bolje razumemo sadasnje prakse planiranja i implementiranja post.konfiktnih rekonstrukcijskih projekata na Kosovu. Vi ste odabrani da ucestvujete u ovom ispitivanju zbog vaseg znanja i iskukstva u implementiranju post/konfliktnih rekonstrukcijskih projekata na Kosovu. Vasi odgovori na pitanja u ovom ispitivanju bice posebno cenjeni u ovom istrazivanju. Molimo vas pazljivo procitajte svako pitanje i odaberite odgovore koji najboje odrazavaju vase misljenje tako da upisete x u odgovarajuce polje. Budite ljubazni i takode napisite svoje komente gde god je to moguce. Iznimno cenim vase vreme i trud i iskeno vrednujem vaše povratne informacije.

Kako bi analiza rezultata bila što korisnija, nužno je definisati važne termine u svrhu ove ankete. Molimo vas pročitajte ove definicije pre nego počnete i ponovo se vratite na ove definicije po potrebi kako bi vam bilo kaše odgovarati na pitanja :-

- **Konfliktne zajednice** odnosi se na zajednice zahvaćene konfliktima u njihovoj tranziciji prema održivom miru i razvoju.

- **Planiranje nepredviđenog** odnosi se na identificiranje alternativnih strategija koje bi se koristile kako bi obezbedili uspeh projekta u slučaju da dođe do nekih određenih rizičnih događaja.

- **Projekt** odnosi se na planirani pristup kako bi ostvarili određene objektive koristeći resurse i tim ljudi.

- Pos-konfliktna rekonstrukcija odnosi se na tranziciju iz konflikta u mir u pogođenim zemljama kroz ponovnu gradnju socioekonomskog okvira društva. To obuhvata socialnu reintegraciju, fizičku rekonstrukciju i izgradnju institucija.

- **Projekt životni ciklus** odnosi se na upravljanje radom potrebnim za postizanje određene objektive kroz četiri faze: inicijacija, planiranje, implementacija i faza izvršenja.

- **Uspeh projekta** u post-konfliktnom društvu zahteva postojanje značajne koristi za konfliktnu zajednicu kojoj treba da služi ovaj projekt.

- **Tim projekta** odnosi se na ljude koji zapravo rade na razvoju i implementiranju projekta i uključuje menađere, dioničare, i ključne kadrove.

- **Dioničar** odnosi se na članove međunarodne i lokalne policije i stručnjaka zajednice zainteresovani za konačne rezultate projekta. Nisu uključeni svi dioničari u završavanju aktuelnog rada projekta.

Section 1

Pitanja u ovom delu fokusirana su na planiranje, izvršenje i upravljanje projektima na Kosovu. Molimo vas koristite vaše profesionalno znanje i profesionalno iskustvo o onome što se zapravo desilo, a ne o onome što treba da se desi u projektu koji ste implementirali na Kosovu.

No			Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Uglavnom	Mnogo	Neizvesno
1.0		Ciljevi i objektive projekta jasno su definisane						
1.1		Ekipa projekta omogućila je diskusije kako bi pomogla u određivanju prioriteta koji su prilagođeni zajednici						
1.2		Kod odabira projekta bila je uključena zajednica						
1.3		Dioničari su bili predani ostvarenju rezultata projekta						
1.4		Članovi ekipe projekta aktivno su učestvovali u donošenju odluka vezano uz projekt						
1.5		Članovi ekipe projekta preuzeli su vlasništvo nad projektom						
1.6		Organizacija je angažovala ljude koji imaju sposobnosti da realno planiraju i implementiraju projekte						
1.7		Projekt je imao izvodljiv plan u obliku mrežnog plana (prekretnice)						
1.8		Kod planiranja projekta, uključeni su alternativni pristupi kako bi ostvarili objektive projekta						
1.9		Izmene u projektu efikasno su kontrolisane tokom celog životnog ciklusa projekta						

No			Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Uglavnom	Mnogo	Neizvesno
2.0		Organizacija je angažovala ljude sa sposobnosću da procene troškove projekta						
2.1		Kada je projekt procenjen resursi su bili obračunati kao efikasni						
2.2		Bila je urađena adekvatna provizija za procenjene troškove projekta						
2.3		Procene projekta bile su razvijene u dogovoru sa odgovarajućim dioničarima kojima je zadatak bio dodeljen						
2.4		Projekt je imao standardnu metodu (grafički pribor) za saopštenje troškova i varianti projekta						
2.5		Implementirani su dogovoreni procesi finansijskog upravljanja kako bi nadgledavali aktuelnu potrošnju						
2.6		Projekt je imao politiku za nepredviđene troškove do kojih može doći u slučaju rizika i neizvesnosti						
2.7		Bili su sprovedeni troškovi analize i implementirane varijacije kako bi zadovoljili kompleksne promenjive okolnosti						
2.8		Rezultati projekta bili su pregledani kako bi se utvrdila efikasnost sistema upravljanja troškovima						
2.9		Za projekt, kontrola troškova bila je esencialan faktor za uspešnu izvedbu projekta						

No		Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Uglavnom	Mnogo	Neizvesno
3.0	Odgovarajući dioničari usaglasili su se sa postavljenim vremenskim rasporedom kod implementacije projekta						
3.1	Organizacija je imala prenisko određeno vrijeme i procene troškova da bi obezbedila finansiranje projekta						
3.2	Organizacija je napravila ekipno vlasništvo rasporeda						
3.3	Rezultati projekta su pregledani kako bi odlučili da li su očekivani rezultati dosegnuti kao što je očekivano (po rasporedu)						
3.4	Tehnike organiziranja (Bar Grafikoni, Gantt Grafikoni) korištene su kako bi se postavili vremenski rasporedi za aktivnosti projekta						
3.5	Za svaki planirani i odobreni projekt, svaka aktivnost imala je procenjeno trajanje						
3.6	Određivanjem vremena za naš projekt, organizacija projekta mogla je dodeliti prioritet za resurse između projekata						
3.7	Napredak je meren prema rasporedu						
3.8	Ekipa projekta reagovala je na promene u rasporedu kako bi ostvarili objektive projekta kroz celi životni ciklus projekta						
3.9	Vreme koje je bilo potrebno za odobrenje finansiranja projekta bilo je zadovoljavajuće						

No		Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Uglavnom	Mnogo	Neizvesno
4.0	Dostupnost deficitarnih resursa uzeta je u obzir kod odlučivanja o ovom projektu						
4.1	Projekt je imao grupu za upravljanje kako bi razrešili sporna pitanja						
4.2	Organizacija obezbeđuje da su resursi smešteni na doličan način kako bi upravljali projektom						
4.3	Članovi ekipe projekta mogu voditi, uticati i trenirati ostale kako bi postigli željene rezultate						
4.4	Članovi ekipe projekta imali su kapacitet da rade nezavisno i da rukovode složenim zadacima projekta						
4.5	Osobe koje su učestvovale u projektu bile su kompetentne u njihovom relevantnom području ekspertize						
4.6	Članovi ekipe projekta imali su znanje rešavanja konflikta i sposobnosti rešavanja problema						
4.7	Članovi ekipe projekta imali su adekvatno znanje, informacije i razumevanje veština upravljanja projektom						
4.8	Članovi ekipe projekta aktiivno su u učestvovali i savetovali se sa drugima kako bi postigli ciljeve projekte						
4.9	Ekipa projekta mogla bi razviti i upravljati potrebama za obukom i razvojem						

No		Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Uglavnom	Mnogo	Neizvesno
5.0	Ekipa projekta identifikovala je koji su standardi kvalitete važni za projekt						
5.1	Projekti su konstantno ispunjavali specifikacije tehničkih performansi						
5.2	Standardni popis služio je za obezbeđivanje konzistentnosti u često izvedenim aktivnostima						
5.3	Postojali su proizvođači za formalne preglede kako bi učili na neuspesima i/ili uspesima projekta						
5.4	Planifikovane prakse projekta bile su upoređivane sa ostalim projektima kako bi generisali ideje za poboljšanje						
5.5	Organizacija je obavestila ostale agencije o rezultatima inspekcije usmerenoj prema bilo kojem području nepodobnosti						
5.6	Organizacija je imala proceduru za preduzimanje korektivnih mera za probleme susretane tokom ciklusa projekta						
5.7	Organizacija je imala procedure za održavanje Evidencije o Kvaliteti u svakoj fazi projekta						
5.8	Organizacija je specifikovala obuke veštine sa inicijativom za ekonomski razvoj ekipe projekta						
5.9	Napredak projekta bio je pod nadzorom, a proces dostave i rezultati projekta bili su procenjeni						

No		Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Uglavnom	Mnogo	Neizvesno
6.0	Aktivnosti nabavke bile su planifikovane ranije i prerađene kroz celokupni životni ciklus projekta						
6.1	Zahtevi nabavke bili su identifikovani u dogovoru sa odgovarajučim dioničarima						
6.2	Uspostavljeni kriteriji selekcije bili su određeni u dogovoru sa dioničarima						
6.3	Dogovoreni predlozi bili su saopšteni perspektivnim kontraktorima kako bi obezbedili jasnoću objektiva projekta						
6.4	Poželjni kontraktroi odabrani su u saglasnosti sa dogovorenim procesima selekcije						
6.5	Napredak nabavke bio je pregledan kako bi obezbedili ispunjenje objektiva projekta						
6.6	Ugovorni konflikti su identifikovani i popravne mere bile su implementirane						
6.7	Ugovorne isporučevine ispunile su ugovorne i projektne zahteve						
6.8	Kontraktori su kritički procenili njihov kapacitet da deluju u izazovnom post-konfliktnom okružju						
6.9	Proces nabavke često je bio kritikovan kao spor, skup i kompleksan u post-konfliktnom okružju						

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No		Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Uglavnom	Mnogo	Neizvesno
7.0	Ključni dioničari bili su pravično identifikovani						
7.1	Postojalo je zajedničko razumevanje i sporazum o zahtevima dioničara						
7.2	Komunikacijski kanali za prijavu problema projekta su otvoreni						
7.3	Komunikacijski kanali između organizacije i zajednice su otvoreni						
7.4	Sastanci projekta pružili su tačne informacije o projektu koje su bile o pomoći						
7.5	Projekt je predan tome da svi dioničari budu informisani o napredku projekta						
7.6	Članovi ekipe projekta često su neformalno diskutirali o projektu						
7.7	Organizacija je imala detaljne informacije o projektu						
7.8	Dioničari projekta pregledavaju informacije o projektu i suočavaju se sa bilo kakvim spornim pitanjima						
7.9	Organizacija može razrešiti konflikte kada do njih dođe						

No		Uopšte	Malo	Donekle	Uglavnom	Mnogo	Neizvesno
8.0	Organizacija je razvila plan upravljanja rizikom kako bi doneli informisane odluke						
8.1	Zajednice su bile uključene u upravljanju rizikom kroz praksu identifikovanja rizika u ranoj fazi projekta						
8.2	Ekipa projekta je direktno komunicirala sa ostalim projekt organizacijama kako bi sprovela analize rizika						
8.3	Izveštaji revizora bili su korišćeni za nadgledavanje napredka i procenu izvedbe						
8.4	Ekipe projekta bile su u stanju nadgledavati strategije odgovora na rizik i da se suoče sa najgorim scenariom						
8.5	Ekipa projekta neprekidno je adresirala potencijalni rizik i nastavila kontrolirati rizike kroz celokupni životni ciklus projekta						
8.6	Organizacija je imala plan za nepredviđene slučajeve kako bi se oporavila od svakog identifikovanog rizika						
8.7	Organizacija je bila koncentrisana na to da obezbedi da se rizici sa najvišim prioritetom rešavaju prvi						
8.8	Odgovornosti za identifikovane rizične aktivnost bila je delegirana kroz celokupnu organizaciju projekta pojedincima i grupama						
8.9	Organizacija je delila aktivnosti redukcije rizika sa ostalim agencijama						

Opšta pitanja:

1 Najviši stepen obrazovanja koji ste dosegli:

Srednja Škola	
Neki Fakultet	
Diplomirani Student	
Magistar	
Doktorat	
Ostalo	

2 Godine iskustva u implementiranju post-konfliktnih rekonstrukcijskih projekata:

0 - 5 Godina	
6 - 10 Godina	
11 - 15 Godina	
16 - 20 Godina	
21 - 25 Godina	
26+	

3 Da li ste prošli bilo kakvu zvaničnu obuku vezano uz upravljanje projektima u pos-konfliktnom okruženju?

Da	
Ne	

4 Molimo vas poredajte sledeće pojmove prema njihovoj važnosti kako bi vam pomogli da definišete, konstruirate i organizirate projekte. (Gde 1 pretstavlja najvažniji, a 8 najmanje važan pojam).

Pročitajte celu listu pre nego odgovorite.

Doseg	
Vreme	
Trošak	
Kvaliteta	
Rizik	
Ljudski Resurs	
Komunikacije	
Nabavka	

5 Da li organizacija ima procese i standarde za implementiranje projekta?

Da	
Ne	

Ako 'Ne' da li smatrate da će organizacija koristiti standarde i procese razvijene za implementaciju projekata?

6 Koliko su u prosjeku trajali projekti kojima ste vi upravljali?

1- 6 meseci	
7 - 12 meseci	
13 - 18 meseci	
19 - 24 meseci	
25 - 30 meseci	
31 - 36 meseci	
37 - 42 meseci	
43 - 48 meseci	
> 4 godine	

7 Koja je bila procenjena vrednost projekta? (u US$)

100,000 - 250,000	
250, 000 - 500,000	
500,000 - 750,000	
750,000 - 1,000, 000	
1,000,000 - 1,250,000	
1,250,000 - 1,500,000	
1,500,000 - 1,750,000	
1,750,000 - 2,000,000	
> 2,000,000	

APPENDIX 15

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Histogram

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Std. Dev. =0.662
N =196

Histogram

Mean =3.77
Std. Dev. =0.684
N =211

Histogram

Mean =3.73
Std. Dev. =0.59
N =208

Histogram

Mean =3.63
Std. Dev. =0.707
N =217

Histogram

Mean =3.66
Std. Dev. =0.708
N =213

Histogram

Mean =3.87
Std. Dev. =0.691
N =219

Histogram

Mean =3.59
Std. Dev. =0.837
N =217

Appendix 16

Ethics clearance

Curtin
University of Technology

Office of Research and Development

memorandum

To	Dr Victor Egan, CBS
From	A/Professor Stephan Millett, Chair, Human Research Ethics Committee
Subject	Protocol Approval **HR 74/2008**
Date	2 July 2008
Copy	James Earnest, 4 Manners Street, East Vic Park, Perth 6101
	Graduate Studies Officer, Curtin Business School

Human Research Ethics Committee

TELEPHONE   9266 2784
FACSIMILE   9266 3793
EMAIL   hrec@curtin.edu.au

Thank you for your application submitted to the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) for the project titled *"Post-conflict reconstruction: the complexity and challenges of planning and implementing infrastructure projects in Kosovo".* Your application has been reviewed by the HREC and is **approved**.

- You are authorised to commence your research as stated in your proposal.
- The approval number for your project is **HR 74/2008.** *Please quote this number in any future correspondence.*
- Approval of this project is for a period of twelve months **01-07-2008** to **01-07-2009**. To renew this approval a completed Form B (attached) must be submitted before the expiry date **01-07-2009**.
- If you are a Higher Degree by Research student, data collection must not begin before your Application for Candidacy is approved by your Divisional Graduate Studies Committee.
- The following standard statement **must be** included in the information sheet to participants:

  This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee (Approval Number HR 74/2008). The Committee is comprised of members of the public, academics, lawyers, doctors and pastoral carers. Its main role is to protect participants. If needed, verification of approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, Curtin University of Technology, GPO Box U1987, Perth, 6845 or by telephoning 9266 2784 or by emailing hrec@curtin.edu.au.

Applicants should note the following:

It is the policy of the HREC to conduct random audits on a percentage of approved projects. These audits may be conducted at any time after the project starts. In cases where the HREC considers that there may be a risk of adverse events, or where participants may be especially vulnerable, the HREC may request the chief investigator to provide an outcomes report, including information on follow-up of participants.

The attached **FORM B** should be completed and returned to the Secretary, HREC, C/- Office of Research & Development:
When the project has finished, or
- If at any time during the twelve months changes/amendments occur, or
- If a serious or unexpected adverse event occurs, or
- 14 days prior to the expiry date if renewal is required.
- An application for renewal may be made with a Form B three years running, after which a new application form (Form A), providing comprehensive details, must be submitted

Regards,

A/Professor Stephan Millett
Chair
Human Research Ethics Committee

Post-conflict reconstruction project management framework

Post-conflict Reconstruction Project Management Framework			
Initiation	**Planning**	**Controlling and Executing**	**Closing**
Project Integration Management[11]			
Detailed knowledge and understanding of project environment by stakeholders 1A	Develop procedures and activities to manage the project life cycle 3G Develop detail and realistic project plan (scope, financial, resource, communication, risk, quality, time and procurement) 1F	Control changes and monitor processes 3I Measure performance to verify success 3C	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects
Project Scope Management			
Establish community priorities and recommendations 1.1 Collaborate with community throughout the planning process 1.2 Obtain support and commitment of all stakeholders 1.3 Acquire team buy-in to the project plan 1.5	Develop clear project goals and objectives 1.0 Develop plan in consultation with the project partners 1.4 Develop alternative plans to achieve defined objectives 1.8	Control project development changes throughout the application 1.9	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects
Project Cost Management			
Develop preliminary project cost estimate 2.0 Provide adequate financial guarantees 2.2 Approve the project funding specifically for the project 3.9	Develop estimates of the projects required resources 2.1 Estimate project cost in consultation with stakeholders 2.3 Develop appropriate financial management indicators 2.5 Develop cost contingency plan 2.6 Develop cost reporting protocols 2.4	Control project budget and expenses 2.9 Conduct cost-effective analysis and implement variations 2.7 Review project outcome with cost-effectiveness 2.8	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects

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[11] The variables 1A, 3G, 1F, 3I and 3C are from Survey 1.

Post-conflict Reconstruction Project Management Framework			
Initiation	**Planning**	**Controlling and Executing**	**Closing**
Project Time Management			
	Develop an effective project schedule 3.5 Develop project schedules network diagram 3.4 Obtain team ownership and responsibility for their project schedules 3.2 Stakeholders complied with the sequence of project activities 3.0	Monitor project schedule 3.7 Respond to schedule changes 3.8 Review project outcome with schedule 3.3	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects.
Project Human Resources Management			
Establish a project steering group 4.1	Allocate resources to activities based on actual consumption 4.2 Determine resource requirement for projects in consultation with project managers 4.5 Outline measures for resources not available 4.0 Outline course of action for project conflict management 4.6 Develop procedures for inter-personal / project consultation 4.8 Develop PM training process for the organisation's project team 4.7 Develop ability to handle multiple tasks, work independently and as a team 4.4 Prepare work schedules 1.7 Prepare Resource Planning 1.6 Assign appropriate resources to projects 3.6	Provide ongoing training and development to accommodate changes 4.9 Manage, lead and coach others 4.3	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects

Post-conflict Reconstruction Project Management Framework			
Initiation	**Planning**	**Controlling and Executing**	**Closing**
Project Quality Management			
Identify and prioritise areas for skills development 5.8	Establish quality standards for the project 5.0 Develop plans for corrective actions 5.6 Determine deliverables required for a project (checklist) 5.2 Determine procedures for formal project review 5.3	Identify non-conformance and initiate continuous improvement 5.5 Meet technical quality measurement approaches 5.1 Maintain quality records 5.7 Review practices with other projects for continuous improvement 5.4 Review project outcome against standard performance criteria 5.9	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects
Project Procurement Management			
Initiate to expedite procurement early in the life cycle of the project 6.9	Plan project procurement 6.0 Emphasise the need to consult with appropriate stakeholders regarding procurement requirements 6.1 Determine selection criteria with appropriate stakeholders 6.2 Plan contractor selection management 6.4 Communicate project proposals to integrate contractor activities and schedules 6.3 Assess contractor's capacity to operate in post-conflict environment 6.8	Manage contract deliverables 6.7 Identify contractual conflicts and take remedial action 6.6 Review procurement progress to determine effectiveness of procurement process 6.5	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects
Project Risk Management			
Understand how to assess risk early in the project 8.1 Involve other organisations to analyse risk 8.2 Engage the community to identify and minimise the project risk 8.8	Identify the highest priority risk 8.7 Develop risk management plan 8.0 Develop contingency plan 8.6	Address and control project risk 8.5 Monitor risk response strategies 8.4 Communicate risk reduction activities 8.9 Use audit reports to monitor progress and evaluate the project outputs on completion 8.3	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects

Post-conflict Reconstruction Project Management Framework			
Initiation	**Planning**	**Controlling and Executing**	**Closing**
Project Communication Management			
Identify and define the characteristics of key stakeholders and develop a data base 7.0	Identify mechanism to enhance formal agreement among relevant stakeholders 7.1 Develop clear communication and reporting channels 7.2 Prepare project tracking matrix 7.7 Integrated communication plan with the implementing agency and the community 7.3	Review and identify ways to improve accountability and transparency of project information 7.8 Identify and manage to resolve conflict constructively 7.9 Provide stakeholders with updates of project progress 7.5 Review information from meetings and evaluate project progress 7.4 Work-in-progress informal interaction often discussed 7.6 Use audit reports to monitor progress and evaluate the project outputs on completion 8.3	Lessons learned from the experience to be fed back in the planning and development process for future projects