
**BORDERLINE ANXIETIES: WHAT WHITENING THE IRISH HAS TO DO WITH KEEPING OUT ASYLUM SEEKERS**

‘When you reach the broken promised land
And every dream slips through your hands
Then you’ll know that it’s too late to change your mind
’Cause you’ve paid the price to come so far
Just to wind up where you are
And you’re still just across the borderline’

(Ry Cooder/John Hiatt/James Dickinson ‘Across the Borderline’)

*Asylum Seekers and Zimbabwean Farmers*

It has become practically a cliché that Australia has the most penalising regulations for those now described as ‘asylum seekers’ of any first or second world country. The Department of Immigration’s Fact Sheet on ‘Border Control’ tells us in stern rhetoric that: ‘The Australian Government is firmly committed to ensuring the integrity of Australia’s borders and to the effective control and management of the movement of people to and from Australia’. The origins of the present bipartisan policy of detention of asylum seekers go back to 1992. Among the reasons given for the implementation of this policy, the Department of Immigration’s Fact Sheet on ‘Immigration Detention’ tells us that it ensures ‘unauthorised arrivals do not enter the Australian community until their identity and status has been properly assessed and they have been granted a visa’. Here we find clearly illustrated the Australian government, in its role as executive of the Australian state, concerned with regulating as tightly as possible all access to the Australian national community.

The option of mandatory detention is not new, it comes from an interpretation of the Migration Act 1958 which, the same Fact Sheet explains right at the beginning, ‘requires that all non-Australians who are unlawfully in mainland Australia must be
detained and that unless they are granted permission to remain in Australia, they must be removed as soon as practical’. Don McMaster tells us with more detail that the Act, presuming that such people would come as stowaways, ‘made provision for illegal entrants to be detained until the return of the vessel upon which they arrived.’ McMaster goes on to describe how this Act has been opportunistically interpreted in regard to boat people:

‘The boat people presented a new challenge. The boats they had arrived on were mainly fishing trawlers, small wooden boats that were classified as a quarantine risk by the authorities and subsequently burnt. Legislation decreed that the boat people, as illegal entrants without authorised visas or entry permits, could be detained until their boat could be turned around. With their boats destroyed, boat people could be detained indefinitely.’

The 1958 Migration Act was passed ten years after the creation of the category of ‘Australian citizen’ by the passing of the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948. While, of course, entry into the Australian community does not make one a citizen, the Australian state has always been deeply preoccupied with who might have that entry and, necessarily, from 1948 this has been thought about in terms of the exclusion of non-citizens. The concern over access to the Australian community only increased when the formal definition of an Australian was distinguished from being British. Consolidating and replacing previous legislation, the object of the Migration Act 1958, as lain out in Section 4, was ‘to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens.’

What, then, was the context for the introduction of mandatory detention for asylum seekers by the Labor government in 1992? For this, we need to go back to the FitzGerald Report of 1988, *Immigration: A Commitment to Australia*. This report brought together the so-called immigration debate over peoples from which countries, and how many, should be allowed into Australia with concerns among certain, especially conservative, groups about the functioning of multiculturalism as a policy and anxiety over the commitment of migrants to Australia. The report sought ways that the state could intervene and manage the relation between migration and multiculturalism so as to increase commitment to Australia as a state, and aid in the production of a unitary, shared national identity.
As I have remarked elsewhere, central to the FitzGerald Report was ‘the new idea, especially in Australia, that the state, to some extent, consciously manages the national culture’. This idea was fundamental to the government’s blueprint for the future of multiculturalism, published in 1989, called \textit{National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia}. From this point of view, the introduction of mandatory detention in 1992 was an extension of the state’s recognition of the connections between immigration, population management and national identity. Mandatory detention secured the border so that nobody who did not have proper approval from the state could enter the national community. Such thinking understands the national polity as requiring the strictest policing by the state. So great is this concern that, in 2001, the government passed legislation actually excising parts of the Australian territory from what is known as the migration zone, Ashmore and Cartier reefs, Christmas and Cocos Islands, thus ensuring that asylum seekers landing at these places could not apply for visas to enter Australia. Instead they were funnelled into the so-called ‘Pacific Solution’.

We can very briefly compare these practices with those of Britain, the colonial power and reference point for Australian understandings of whiteness. There, the Immigration Act of 1971 gave the state the possibility of detention for aspiring migrants who, it was considered, might pose some, unspecified threat. In Britain, the vast majority of asylum seekers are given ‘temporary admission’ pending a Home Office decision on their claim. Those detained are, in the main, those whose applications have been turned down. Campaigns in Britain tend to focus on the, relatively few, asylum seekers who are detained without explanation.

Unlike Britain, in Australia, it would seem that asylum seekers, in attempting to breach the border of the state, are automatically perceived to pose a threat. Recently, this has been most clearly illustrated in the so-called \textit{Tampa} affair of 2001 where the government struggled to ensure that four hundred and thirty-three asylum seekers, picked up by the Norwegian container ship \textit{Tampa}, were kept from being landed on Australian territory. As Anthony Burke writes in \textit{In Fear of Security}: ‘the \textit{Tampa} affair was the culmination of a policy approach to refugees which had become increasingly securitised and repressive—indeed with the use of the SAS and the stationing of the Australian navy in the seas off Indonesia, it had become thoroughly militarised.’.
Another example of the Australian preoccupation with the border is found in the different treatment meted out to those people who enter Australia lawfully before asking for asylum. Peter Mares writes that:

Those who enter lawfully (for example, on a tourist or student visa) are usually not detained and can live freely in the community. Provided that they apply for refugee status within forty-five days of arrival, such ‘lawful’ asylum seekers can also obtain a work permit.10

Here we can see well what a difference how one crosses the border makes. As with these legal asylum seekers, so-called ‘overstayers,’ that is, people who enter Australia on properly issued visas and who then simply do not leave when their visas run out, are also treated differently from ‘illegal’ asylum seekers. Senator Christabel Chamarette was on the Joint Standing Committee on Migration in 1994 when it was asked to inquire into immigration detention practices in Australia. As McMaster writes, what was of major concern to Chamarette, in her dissenting report, ‘was the practice of detaining illegal arrivals but not detaining illegal overstayers, highlighting the discriminatory practice by which detention depended on mode of entry into Australia.’11 It is also the case that, in both 1999 and 2000, over eighteen percent of each year’s overstayers came from the United Kingdom and the United States.12 Citizens of these countries comprised the two largest groups of overstayers. In June 2000 there were estimated to be 58,748 overstayers in Australia. Given that the United Kingdom and the United States are still ideologically constructed as, in the main, white countries, most of that eighteen percent will be ‘white’ within the definition that Australia uses. White people, as we will see, are also those for whom the Australian border is more likely to be permeable.

In order to begin to understand what underlies this Australian anxiety over the crossing of the border I want to turn to an analogy which has much currency among those speaking in favour of the asylum seekers. I most recently heard it used at a public seminar in Perth early in 2002 by Andrew Markus, the eminent commentator on race issues in Australia. The analogy asks, if the asylum seekers who fill the leaky boats attempting to reach the Australian migration zone were white Zimbabwean farmers forced to leave Zimbabwe, would the Howard government—or, we might add a Labor government given that mandatory detention is a bipartisan policy—treat them in the same way that it is treating the Kurds, Iraqis, Afghans who, at present, make up the majority of
the asylum seekers. The implicit expectation in this hypothetical question is that white Zimbabwean farmers would be treated differently.

The source for this story, and the expectation, goes back to 2000 when, in the wake of attacks on white farmers by self-styled veterans of the 1970s Zimbabwean liberation war, both John Howard, in his capacity as Prime Minister, and Philip Ruddock as Minister for Immigration, spoke of the possibility of offering white Zimbabwean farmers some kind of refuge in Australia. The implication here is that white asylum seekers would be treated differently from coloured asylum seekers. I use the word ‘coloured’ here deliberately because it is a term from Australia’s past, from the long period before the policy of multiculturalism. In Elazar Barkan’s book entitled The Retreat of Scientific Racism, he writes that:

‘The British attitudes to racial questions before World War II were based in part on the imperial experience, but mainly on ignorance. Thus, colored people lacked any specific identity and were all simply characterized as “natives”’.

Australia inherited the term ‘coloured’ from Britain, and used it similarly.

We are, though, not just talking about any white people. Like Australia, Rhodesia was a settler colony. Also like Australia, the land of the indigenous people was expropriated for the use of white settlers. More, in both cases the land was settled as colonies under British auspices. From an Australian perspective the ‘whiteness’ of these white Zimbabwean farmers derives from their sharing a common stock with those who still occupy the site of the Australian national myth, the white English who, so the story goes, settled Australia. What we have here, then, is a (post)colonial saga. An anxiety not about those entering the country but about the unsettling of one’s colonial presence within the country. Underneath the concern for the white Zimbabwean farmers by the Australian government lurks another, more generalised, anxiety. Could the indigenous people of Australia at some point have the power to begin a land redistribution? Such an anxiety underlay much of the reaction through the 1990s to the Mabo decision handed down by the High Court in June, 1992, and what this might mean for Land Rights claims across Australia. In this instance the assumption of a common whiteness is based on a claim to a common colonial heritage.
In these two examples, asylum seekers and white Zimbabwean farmers, we find a common concern—who should not be allowed into Australia, and who should. For whom should the border be impenetrable, solid, and for whom should it, at best, appear to not exist. In a spirit of even-handed morality, the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s editorial for 26 April 2000, comments:

‘It is not that [the Australian government] should not respond generously, as Australia has over the years to various humanitarian crises. But it also needs to be aware that any appearance of especially favoured treatment for people from Zimbabwe because they are white, English-speaking and predominantly Anglo-Saxon would smack of double standards—all the more so in view of the Government’s hard-nosed approach to boat people and its insistence on repatriating Kosovars and East Timorese to their ravaged countries when their temporary “safe haven” terms expired.’

The editorial’s position is that there should be one rule for everybody. At the same time, it suggests that these white farmers could likely be accommodated by way of refugee status, family or special skills categories. In other words, the system as it stands could be made to work to their advantage, unlike other groups such as boat people or the Timorese.

Even in its criticism of the position adumbrated by the Australian government, this editorial delineates for us the whiteness which continues to underlie Australia’s border practices, a whiteness much more obvious in the moments when the formal system of immigration regulation is challenged from the outside, or potentially simply disregarded from within. White Zimbabwean farmers are ‘white’, as we have seen, by virtue of their British, read Anglo-Saxon—another old term resurrected here—heritage and their shared positioning in the (post)colonial problematic. However, Kosovars, in spite of coming ambiguously from within the space of ‘Europe’ are not white—being Muslim or of any other non-Christian faith has always counted heavily against being considered ‘white’ in Australia; boat people, mostly Muslims from central and western Asia, so neither European nor Christian, are certainly not white; and East Timorese who, while being Christian are, to use the term Barkan identifies, a ‘native’ people Christianised by their Portuguese colonizers (and inducted into Roman Catholicism at that!), are also not white.

*Borders; Keeping Coloured People Out*
Borders are one of the key characteristics of the modern nation-state. Anthony Giddens has offered this definition: ‘The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of internal and external violence’.\(^{20}\) A border marks the limit of a particular state’s region of control. Giddens distinguishes between frontiers and borders.

‘In all cases, ‘frontier’ refers to an area on the peripheral regions of a state (not necessarily adjoining another state) in which the political authority of the centre is diffuse or thinly spread. A ‘border’, on the other hand, is a known and geographically drawn line separating and joining two or more states’.\(^{21}\)

The border, as opposed to the frontier, is a defining characteristic of the modern state. In such states with centralised power, the power at the border is as strong as at the centre. This power is most usually exercised to allow in, or keep out, goods, for example drugs, food, imports generally, and human beings. Sometimes, rarely, a state patrols its border to keep goods or people, not necessarily members of the state, citizens, in. The German Democratic Republic, East Germany, was an example of such a state.

In nineteenth and twentieth century Europe, the legitimating myth was of a national entity, its origin lost in the mists of time, whose existence was guaranteed and protected by a state structure which grew up through it, positioning the nation on a particular territory.\(^{22}\) The purpose of patrolling the border of this state was to keep out those who might try to enter, or to ensure that those allowed in had legitimate business. In settler nation-states the situation was very different. There was no pre-existing nation, the nation had to be produced, and its composition was an effect of decisions made by the state, in the form of the government. Thus, since Federation in 1901, the Australian border has always been the site of state decisions about whom to allow in and whom to bar, and these decisions have always been closely related to debates over the formation of the national population.

The border functions as a marker of decisive fracture producing ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘self’ and ‘Other’ and, in that process, legitimating the distinctions which are claimed to inhere in ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘self’ and ‘Other’. It is, then, the radical, apparently onto-social
break, foundational to the modern experience, which the modern world constituted as the border, a break which articulates the limits of power, which enables the production of people as members of diverse categories: asylum-seeker, refugee, migrant, tourist, citizen. The requirement of the border as onto-social break is that it should resolve ambiguity. However, at the limits of power where ‘outside’ is constituted and distinguished from ‘inside’, the border proliferates ambiguity while making plain the working assumptions on which it operates as a discursive practice.

In *Local Histories/Global Designs*, Walter Mignolo describes the guiding premise of his argument like this:

‘Following the previous configurations of the field of knowledge in Western memory, I will use gnoseology as the discourse about gnosis and I will understand by gnosis knowledge in general, including doxa and episteme. Border gnosis as knowledge from a subaltern, perspective is knowledge conceived from the exterior borders of the modern/colonial world system, and border gnoseology as a discourse about colonial knowledge is conceived at the conflictive intersection of the knowledge produced from the perspective of modern colonialisms (rhetoric, philosophy, science) and knowledge produced from the perspective of colonial modernities in Asia, Africa, and the Americas/Caribbean.’

Mignolo is not much interested in the borders between states. Rather his starting point is the historical production of the border that produced ‘Europe’ and its ‘Others’, the historical border which, in its geographical transposition signified the distinction between the modern world and its *alter*. This world has its beginnings in the sixteenth century—the benchmark date here is 1492, the year of the ‘discovery’/invention of the American New World and also the year of the expulsion of those uncomfortably ambiguously-positioned strangers-who-came-and-stayed, the Jews, from Spain. Mignolo, though, is not here interested in the production of colonial knowledges. His concern is with an already colonised world, a world system in which the coloniser, let us say Europe and its settler outposts, polices a more fundamental border between itself and the colonial modernities beyond ‘itself,’ those, as Mignolo writes, of Asia, Africa and the Americas/Caribbean.
At this point I may appear to have moved a long way from the problem of Australia, its construction of whiteness, and asylum seekers. I have not. Where Mignolo writes in rather abstract terms about a conflictive intersection of, we might way, inner and outer knowledges, we can identify the construction of a border in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the purpose of which was to stop population flow from the sites of colonial modernities to Europe and its settler outposts. The purpose of this paper is to describe the effects of the integration of the Australian border, the literal border of the new Australian state which was a consequence of Federation in 1901, into this more general border.

One, crucially important, way of thinking about this other border is that it had, as its primary feature, a preoccupation with whiteness. Charles Price has discussed the history of this border in an important but unfortunately now rather neglected book entitled *The Great White Walls Are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North America and Australasia 1836-1888*.26 Published in 1974, Price’s book focuses on relations between the incipient Anglo, ‘white’, settler states of the Pacific rim and the Chinese, and to some extent Japanese, who attempted for various reasons, to enter these colonies and states. Price notes the small amount of Chinese migration during the 1830s and 1840s, as he writes, ‘not enough to produce restrictions on immigration but enough to raise worries about a new kind of semi-slavery and about relationships between industrially advanced European peoples in the Pacific borderlands and immigrants from industrially backward and ‘inferior’ societies’.27 He goes on to write:

Then in the 1850s came the great waves of Cantonese gold-diggers, flooding into California, then Eastern Australia, then New Zealand and finally British Columbia: these waves did arouse strong fears and antipathies amongst the white colonists, leading to restrictions on entry and discriminatory measures to keep Chinese out of certain areas, occupations and civil liberties’.28

This is not the place to discuss the restrictive immigrations Acts passed by the various Australian colonies in the second half of the nineteenth century. Suffice it to say that there were many of them and that a number specifically identified the Chinese. The Chinese were generally regarded as a grossly inferior race, often thought to be barely human at all. The white Californian, Frank Pixley, stated to the 1876 Congressional Committee: ‘The Chinese are inferior to any race God ever made. . .I think there are none
so low... I believe that the Chinese have no souls to save, and if they have, they are not worth the saving'.29 In Australia, the Shearer’s Record, 15th August 1888, carried a report that, ‘a congregation of Europeans numbering a thousand persons and embracing representatives of every class and creed, assembled on one of the Hobson Bay piers, and looking at the cargo of immigrants from the “Flowery Isles”, would regard their appearance on deck much in the same light as they would a similar detachment of a certain kind of animal which youngsters exhibit a partiality for in the Zoological Gardens’.30

While it was the Chinese who were often singled out because of the numbers which had begun arriving in the Pacific, white settler territories in latter half of the nineteenth century, the concern was spread more widely. To focus on Australia, Myra Willard, in her account of the inception of the White Australia Policy, writes that: ‘The desire to guard themselves effectively against the dangers of Asiatic immigration was one of the most powerful influences which drew the Colonies together’.31 She notes that before Federation, the Colonies had met three times at Intercolonial Conferences, 1880, 1888, 1890, to discuss the issue of uniform legislation. The anxiety in the Australian Colonies over ‘Asiatic’ immigration sat side by side with fears of invasion. In his, more recent, discussion of the importance of this element in the move to federation, Burke notes, for example, that in Henry Parkes’ speeches ‘it became clear that he sought to found the new Australian political identity upon a symbiotic relation to an inferior, threatening and barbarous Other.’32

In the years up to and following Federation, as the idea of Australia as a unified nation administered by a single, federal, Australian state, was clarified and accepted so we find a shift of rhetoric from simply keeping out the undesirable Chinese to making a distinction between ‘white’ Australia and the ‘coloured races’ who should be excluded from this new nation. Thus, in discussions of the 1901 Immigration Restriction Bill, Senators Sargood and Pearce could have an exchange specifically related to whether Pearce was urging this measure not ‘on the ground of the competition with the labour of these people, [the Chinese], but on the higher moral ground’. Pearce replied to this query: ‘On both grounds, the racial is the primary ground’.33 Here, the Chinese were still being specifically singled out. In addition, we should note here that race exclusion is identified as a moral good.
J.C. Watson, the leader of the Labor party saw the bigger picture. He asserted that:

‘the objection I have to the mixing of the coloured people with the white people of Australia—although I admit it is to a large extent tinged with the considerations of an industrial nature—lies in the main in the possibility and probability of racial contamination’.

As ‘Australia’ began to be thought of as a nation, and a nation defined by its Anglo white origins in England, so the binary divide, inscribed at the border, became ‘white’ versus ‘coloured’. The Bulletin on 22nd June 1901, made the point with its usual bluntness, inveighing here against the British Secretary of State, Joseph Chamberlain:

‘If Judas Chamberlain can find a black, or brown, or yellow race in Asia or Africa that has as high a standard of civilisation and intelligence as the whites, that is so progressive as the whites, as brave, as sturdy, as good nation building material and that can intermarry with the white without the mixed progeny showing signs of deterioration—that race is welcome in Australia regardless of colour’.

By 1908, the nation-state of Australia having been in existence for seven years, the white/coloured binary had become naturalised. T.A. Coghlan in a Times Special Article could write that: ‘The most serious objection to the coloured races is, of course, the ethnical’.

As is well-known, the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, passed in the first sitting of the new federal Australian parliament, did not identify any specific races to be excluded in the pursuit of white Australia. This was in part due to pressure from Britain who, for trade reasons, did not want any particular groups, especially the Japanese, offended. The Immigration Restriction Act was disguised as being concerned with education. The potential migrant had to take a fifty word dictation test. However, the draft of the notes to be sent to the Customs officers who were to administer the test included the sentence ‘All aboriginal inhabitants of Africa, Asia and Polynesia should be subjected to the test unless otherwise exempted.’ Through the 1960s the administration of the Act was allowed to become increasingly lax as Australia began to move towards a non-racially discriminatory immigration policy. Something formally achieved by the Whitlam Labor government in 1974. Nevertheless, and this is my most important point
here, the continuing and current anxiety surrounding the administering of Australia’s immigration laws against ‘unlawful entrants’ are the effect of the Australian border doing double service, first to ‘protect’ the Australian nation and, second, as part of the Great White Wall protecting Europe and its outposts, including the United States, from population movements coming from those places that have been subject to the despoliation on which has been built European modernity with all its material wealth.

In his book on the history of the Great White Wall in the twentieth century, *The White Peril*, Sean Brawley argues for its end in the late 1970s. He writes:

‘The influx of Indo-Chinese refugees in the 1970s and the relative ease with which they were admitted to North America and Australiasia was testament to how firmly committed these governments finally were to their immigration reforms. These arrivals clearly indicated a major ideological shift in the white settler societies of the Pacific. The White Peril was no more. For the moment, anyway.’

As should be clear, I think Brawley is mistaken. The Great White Wall continues to exist, though in rather more subtle ways than previously. At the least, it serves to control population movements from the impoverished postcolonial periphery to the still predominantly white, wealthy, (post)modern Euro-American heartland and its outposts.

*Inside the Border; Whitening the Irish*

So far I have discussed the production of the exterior of the doubled border, the border of the new Australian state which functioned also as a brick in the Great White Wall protecting Europe and its settler outposts from ‘coloured’ incursion. Now I want to turn to the other side of that border, the inside that was the new Australian nation. That the majority of the inhabitants of this new state were, we could say without exaggeration, obsessed with making it white, with forming a white nation, is a consequence of English settler colonialism but also an effect of what I have identified as the secondary function of the Australian border.

From around the middle of the nineteenth century, as the idea of the nation became the taken-for-granted way of thinking about the diversity of population groups within the newly developing state system of Europe, so nations were often equated with races. The consequence was that people sometimes spoke of white races rather than of a
single white race. Thus, for example, T.A. Coghlan could not only pronounce an objection to the ‘coloured’ races being allowed into Australia, as quoted above, but could go on to write that: ‘In all Australian cities there are large communities of non-British Europeans who are greatly objected to on economic grounds, but whose presence is tolerated because they belong to the races with whom Australians may intermarry, and who may thus ultimately become absorbed in the general population’. It was the whiteness of these other European races that made them tolerable, and therefore marriageable.

However, there was one white race which, in England, and in the first half of the nineteenth century in Australia, was considered so very different, and so inferior, that it was often not thought of as white at all. The Catholic Irish were considered to be so un-white that, using marriageability as our scale here, John Beddoe, the English proto-social anthropologist, could write in *The Races of Britain* (1885) that, ‘Englishwomen very rarely marry Irish, or at least Catholic Irish, men’. What we will find is that, as the notion of an Australian nation takes hold towards the end of the nineteenth century, so the Irish, previously racialised and, to all intents and purposes, excluded from whiteness both in England and Australia, become reconstituted within Australia as acceptably white, helping to produce a claimed homogeneous white nation. We must understand here that, as cultural differences were considered to be a consequence of racial differences, racial homogeneity was considered to be a prerequisite for the construction of the new, culturally homogeneous white nation. Thus, for example, as A.T. Yarwood writes: ‘Australian daily newspapers gave overwhelming support to the principle of absolutely excluding coloured immigrants, and accepted the aim of racial homogeneity as having primary importance’.

From round about the latter part of the eighteenth century, in the context of Anglo-Irish colonialism, the task of constructing Irish difference shifted from the discourse of religion to that of race. Irish racial difference was construed in terms of physiognomy rather than colour. In Europe, through the eighteenth century, the study of facial features as the way to understand character was gradually raised to the status of a science. In his discussion of physiognomy, L. Perry Curtis identifies Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741-1801), Pieter Camper (1722-1789), Johann Friedrich Blumenback (1752-184), Sir Charles Bell (1774-1842) and James C. Prichard (1786-1848) as the key figures in this development. According to Curtis, from the time of the 1798 Irish uprising there
was a tendency to associate certain physical features with the Catholic Irish type. Perhaps the most important of these was the prognathous (large and protruding) jaw which, Curtis tells us, ‘any student of Lavater would associate with brutal and vicious behaviour’.46

As the nineteenth century wore on, physiognomical beliefs, which had helped contribute to a ranking of races, became harnessed to evolutionary theory. This was given a scientific form in Charles Darwin’s *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*, published in 1859. The consequence was that cartoons began to express what was a more general discursive understanding of the Irish as looking like ‘Negroes’ who were positioned near the bottom of the evolutionary tree of races and also, and increasingly, gorillas. Curtis traces this latter development to the cartoonist for *Punch*, John Tenniel, who, in a reaction to Fenianism in the 1860s, started drawing simianized Irish. The connection was widespread. Curtis sums up these transformations:

‘If educated Victorians—and by Victorians we do not mean just the English upper middle classes—had done no more than construct mutually derogatory comparisons between Irishmen and the Chinese, Hottentots, Maoris, Aborigines, Sudanese, and other “barbarians”, life might have been a shade less harsh for the vast majority of Irish Catholics. But some Victorians on both sides of the Atlantic went further by discovering features in Irish character which they took to be completely simian or anthropoid. In cartoons and caricatures as well as in prose, Paddy began to resemble increasingly the chimpanzee, the orangutan, and, finally, the gorilla’.47

In a letter to his wife, written in 1861, the English novelist and liberal reformer Charles Kingsley, travelling in Ireland a decade after the Great Famine, wrote:

‘But I am haunted by the human chimpanzees I saw along that 100 miles of horrible country. I don’t believe they are our fault. I believe there are not only more of them than of old, but that they are happier, better, more comfortably fed and lodged under our rule than they ever were. But to see white chimpanzees is dreadful; if they were black, one would not feel it so much, but their skins, except where tanned by exposure, are as white as ours’.48
Here, we can see how naturalised in England already, by the early 1860s, was the idea of
the Catholic Irish as being human simians. Tenniel was working within a rapidly
established discourse. In 1880 the Belgian political economist and essayist Gustave de
Molinari commented that England’s largest newspapers ‘allow no occasion to escape
them of treating the Irish as an inferior race—as a kind of white Negroses [sic]’.49
Beddoe, who we have already met, argued that the Irish type typified by prognathism and
associated features accounted for roughly twenty per cent of the Irish: ‘While Ireland is
apparently [this type’s] present centre, most of its lineaments are such as lead us to think
of Africa as its possible birthplace, and it may be well, provisionally, to call it
Africanoid.’50

If in England the nineteenth century saw the Catholic Irish racialised as the very
lowest possible race, and their whiteness acknowledged only as a kind of freak of nature,
what happened to the Catholic Irish in the Australian Colonies? In the nineteenth century
those of Irish Catholic background made up a considerable proportion of the non-
Aboriginal population of the Colonies. Chris McConville writes that Irish courts sent
over 30,000 men and women to New South Wales and lesser numbers to the other convict
colonies. ‘Overall’, he tells us, ‘one in four convicts sent to the colonies was Irish’.51
Edmund Campion writes that, ‘by the time an accurate count was made, in 1828,
Catholics numbered one-quarter of the colony’s population’.52 Almost all of these will
have been Irish. Unlike the United States to which Irish migration peaked in the
aftermath of the Great Famine, Australia attracted most free Irish migrants a decade later,
during the Victorian gold rushes.

The English in the Australian Colonies brought their prejudices with them. The
notorious Samuel Marsden, who became known as ‘the Flogging Parson,’ arrived in New
South Wales in 1793. He rapidly became the chief Anglican clergyman. In 1800 in a
paper on the toleration of Catholicism in New South Wales, he wrote: ‘The number of
Catholic Convicts is very great. . .and these in general composed of the lowest class of the
Irish nation; who are the most wild, ignorant and savage Race that were ever favoured
with the light of Civilisation’.53 In the Colonies the assumption that the Catholic Irish
were a different, and inferior, race to the English was pervasive. In his foundational book
on The Irish in Australia, Patrick O’Farrell looks for empirical reasons for this. He notes
how foreign the Irish must have seemed with their different, albeit Christian, religion—
practicing Catholicism was not legally allowed until Catholic emancipation in 1829.
Then, large numbers of the Irish, convicts and migrants, spoke Gaelic and then there was ‘often distinctive dress, clay pipes, odd hats, to say nothing of other characteristics, real or alleged; poverty, absence of skills, dirt’. However, we should understand that this image of foreignness only confirmed the racial difference, and inferiority, of the Irish in the perception of the Colonies’ Anglo population. The *Australian*, 13th April 1846, offered this racial comparison in terms of work capacity: ‘We rate these three races as follows:—Three first rate lowland Scotch or English labourers or shepherds. . .to seven west and mountain Irish or highlanders, and to ten coolies. . . We mean no offence in this to the Irish as a nation. . .’. In this grading the Irish race comes out closer to the Chinese race than to the English. This gives some idea of the gulf that was assumed to exist between the English and Irish.

Indeed, so inferior was the Irish race considered to be that the standard racial comparison was with the Aborigines. In British racial thinking, given a scientific basis with the advent of Social Darwinism in the 1860s, Australian Aborigines were considered as being about the most primitive of races. David Pearson writes that:

‘The British state had always believed that acknowledgment of sovereignty in the far corners of its Empire depended on notions of agriculture, property ownership (preferably private) and architecture as measures of civilisation. Land had to be used and altered in order for its occupants to be accorded political recognition. Few, if any, of the aboriginal peoples in North America met these criteria in full, hence the need for tutelage, but in Australia the indigenes and their life-style were often viewed as irreremediably primitive’.

The general acceptance of the extreme racial inferiority of Aborigines is illustrated by Emile Durkheim’s use of Aboriginal material in his classic sociological text, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, first published in 1912. This work claims to study ‘the most primitive and simple religion which is actually known’. In the same year Sigmund Freud wrote in *Totem and Taboo*, referring to the accepted anthropological view, that he will be using as his point of comparison with neurotics, ‘the tribes which have been described as the most backward and miserable of savages, the aborigines of Australia.’
As Richard Broome points out, the setting of this understanding of Aborigines as one of, if not the, most inferior, most primitive race within a Social Darwinist framework, also justified the claim that Aborigines were dying out. Broome quotes the *Age* from January 1888: ‘It seems a law of nature that where two races whose stages of progression differ greatly are brought into contact, the inferior race is doomed to wither and disappear’. 59 In 1901, Broome writes, ‘Vincent Lesina told the Queensland parliament … ‘that the law of evolution says that the nigger shall disappear in the onward progress of the white man. There is really no hope at all.’ 60 The use of generalising terms for the indigenous people of Australia such as ‘niggers,’ or, for that matter, ‘a/Aborigines,’ is an example of Barkan’s point that English simply characterised all non-white peoples similarly.

In 1843, O’Farrell writes, ‘Dr Alexander Thompson claimed that the Irish were intellectually inferior to Aborigines, “utterly useless”’. 61 In the 1870s a Mrs Baxter, an English traveller, ‘deemed native huts a distinct improvement on those she had seen in Ireland’. 62 We have already noted that, with advent of scientific racism, the Irish were claimed to be derived from ‘Africanoid’ stock. The same was commonly thought of Aborigines. T. H. Huxley, for one, asserted in 1870 that the Tasmanian indigenes were Negritos, ‘men with dark skins and woolly hair who constitute a special modification of the Negro type.’ 63 The Tasmanians, though, were sometimes thought to be a distinct race, displaced on the mainland by more recent arrivals. Edward Curt, author of the four volume *The Australian Race*, published in 1886, thought that ‘the Australian is, by descent, a Negro, crossed by some other race.’ 64 O’Farrell elaborates on the perceived similarities that the English in the Australian Colonies found between the Irish and the Aborigines, both were understood as, ‘primitive, backward, outmoded, the butt of impatience and contempt’. 65 Both were, as O’Farrell notes, pre-modern.

There were certain actual similarities in the colonial situations of Aborigines and Irish, and in the ways they were racialised, similarities which could lead to a certain empathy. O’Farrell refers to the memories of Aboriginal activist Faith Bandler who recalls that in northern New South Wales: ‘In contrast to Protestant paternalist or exploitative whites, Irish Catholics treated the Aborigines as human beings, as equals, an equality extending to marriage’. 66 Bob Reece makes a similar argument for empathy between two colonised peoples while commenting on the large number of Aboriginal activists with Irish family names. 67 While such empathy may be part of the answer, the
The most important context was the similar racial inferiority ascribed to both groups which, as a consequence, threw them together at the bottom of the social order in the Australian Colonies during the nineteenth century. Indeed, not just racial inferiority, in the guise of the Irish as the Celtic race Murray Pittock notes that Celts were also thought of as a race in decline.68

The white British-Australian view of the Catholic Irish as a grossly inferior race was the dominant understanding of the Irish in the Australian Colonies until around the beginning of the 1880s. At this time things began to change. O’Farrell writes that:

‘A.M. Topp’s series of articles in the Melbourne Review of 1881 mark a convenient point to mark the end of the phase of virtually unhindered denigration, though its themes, of course, continue—essentially that the Catholic Irish were of vastly inferior stock, that they had all the vices of their servile position (moral and intellectual deficiencies of all kinds), and that they needed strong English government for their own good’.69

O’Farrell’s point is that, from around this period, Irish-Australians begin to appear in print rebutting such slurs by demonstrating how successful the Irish had been in Australia. However, this is only a small part of the answer as to why such negative racial constructions started to die out.

The most important reason lies in the beginnings of the movement to transform the various Colonies into a single state of Australia. We have already seen that this move was, to a significant extent, driven by a concern to put in place a unified protection against the incursions of Chinese, and ‘Asiatics’ generally; that in producing a single border there was also a preoccupation with the establishment of a racially homogeneous, white population within this new Australian state. To take another example of this, Willard quotes Alfred Deakin, at this time Attorney-General in the first federal government, reminiscing:

‘No motive power operated more universally on this Continent, or in the beautiful island of Tasmania, and certainly no motive power operated more powerfully in dissolving the technical and arbitrary political divisions which previously separated us than the desire that we should be one people, and remain one people without the admixture of other races’.70
Obviously Deakin is here disregarding the indigenous population, as well as all those other groups considered coloured.

What about the Catholic Irish, then, this large racialised minority, around a quarter of the population before the gold rush migration of the 1860s and 1870s? Deakin is constructing a history in which the Irish were always white, always a part of a single people. From around the 1880s the imperative to create a national, white population overtakes other racial attitudes. Where the ‘whiteness’ of the Irish had been subsumed under a preoccupation with their physiognomy which, like their religion, so well demonstrated this racial inferiority, now the concern with racial homogeneity within the new Australian state shifted the emphasis from the physiognomy of the Irish to their ‘whiteness’. At the same time, Catholicism shifted from being an unacceptable heresy to being a lesser version of Christianity than that of the Church of England and Protestant sects but nevertheless acceptable. The white, Anglo population transformed the Catholic Irish into a part of the white race(s) and assimilated them. At the same time, the dominant racial rhetoric for the new nation shifted from its being composed of the ‘British race’ to a claim about its whiteness per se. While, as John Docker suggests,71 Anglo-conformity was not pervasive until after World War I, by the end of the nineteenth century the Irish were moving from speaking Gaelic to English and many of the other signifiers of their ‘foreignness’, though not their religion, were being lost. As a consequence the Irish were well-placed to be assimilated when the need arose.

As we have seen, the ideological need to claim the new Australian nation as having a homogeneous ‘white’ population was overwhelming because, from the start, the border of the Australian state, initiated at Federation, served a double purpose, to define that state, and the white, modern nation within it, and to function as a part of a larger wall keeping out unwanted ‘coloured’ peoples, the colonised of Asia and of Africa and the Americas/Caribbean from Europe and its outposts. Hence the whitening of the Catholic Irish—and, we can add, the convenient ‘forgetting’ of the much smaller populations of Afghans 72, Indians 73, people of African descent 74 and other non-white groups—went along with a shift in discourse from ‘British’ to ‘white’ and from talking about specific groups to be kept out, most importantly the Chinese, who had been the largest non-white group after the Catholic Irish in the Colonies, to the generalising ‘coloured’ people. The border was central in this new binary, as it still is.
While the rhetorical construction ‘asylum seekers’ is current right along the Great White Wall, and I am now including here the borders of the European Union, the term ‘boat people’ has a particular resonance in Australia. McMaster tells us that: ‘Boat people are predominantly South-East Asian asylum seekers who come to Australia by sea without authority’. While this works as a thumb-nail empirical definition, it is only half the story. The idea of boat people travelling to Australia utilises the fact that most of Australia is a single island to materialise the abstract concept of the Australian border as an overdetermined site the purpose of which is to keep people out. As a physical site, the border is thought of as extremely difficult to penetrate, requiring, at the least, boats. Thus, the connotation of boat people is one of threat, of invasion. It is not surprising that the fear of invasion, usually by some ‘Asiatic’ race, has a history in Australia dating to around Federation. This invasion fear sits comfortably with the recognition that boat people are ‘coloured’, predominantly South-East Asian, in McMaster’s words, though his definition is now out of date. Now we should say ‘western and central Asian,’ a term that preserves the linguistic identifier ‘Asian’ that has always sourced Australia’s fears of being over-run, whether through immigration or invasion—indeed, in the Australian imaginary as the Tampa crisis so well demonstrates these two are fundamentally blurred.

It is the relationship of ‘boat people’ to the idea of the Australian border as impermeable which has given rise to the left-liberal attempt to undermine this demonisation of ‘unlawful entrants’ in the phrase ‘We are all boat people’. This phrase seeks to recognise that the white invaders/settlers of this land also came by boat. However, similar to the white Zimbabwean farmers narrative, this one also betrays a colonial anxiety. In his discussion of boat people, Brett Nielson refers to a suggestion made by Christabel Chamarette at a symposium on boat people in 1995 that: ‘the aggression directed towards “boat people” in Australia perhaps reflects the fact that the country is a nation of “boat people”—i.e. the initial “white” settlers, who “stole” the land from its inhabitants and left behind a trail of genocidal carnage’. More fundamentally, the phrase puts the very status of the indigenous inhabitants in question by acknowledging that they, too, arrived by boat.

We must, though, not forget the double service of the Australian border. As a part of the Great White Wall it stands as an aspect of modernity. The Wall, and the racialised division it expresses, continues, in this era of globalisation, to mark an economic division
expressed both in capital wealth and in global flows of goods, finance and, now, in people. Increasing numbers of people, those constructed as ‘coloured’, from those countries historically exploited by the modern, European order, are now following the flows of wealth and attempting to breach the Great White Wall. The ethical problem posed here is not so much how to give access to the territory of the ‘West’ to more people, and how to dispense with the racialised distinction between ‘white’ and ‘non-white,’ but how to equalise the global flows to give people across the world greater access to the wealth that has flowed out of those countries outside of the Wall and into what we can think of as the territories of the Euro-American (post)modern order.

In practical and local terms, the Australian anxiety about protecting the border of Australia is actually an anxiety about preserving the claim to the legitimacy of the border as an onto-social break, a binarising site which, in Australia, in spite of the present officially non-racially discriminatory immigration policy, continues to produce ‘coloured’ people outside trying to get in and the predominantly ‘white’ people inside who still make up what, in its imaginary, is the white Australian nation. In The Gauche Intruder, Jennifer Rutherford utilises a Lacanian analysis to think through what she calls ‘the Australian Good’ and, she goes on, ‘to bring into focus its incumbent aggression.’ As she writes, she has ‘tried to seize hold of the repetition of a fantasy space in which the white Australian community organises its enjoyment.’ Rutherford recognises the connection between whiteness and a moral claim to ‘the Good’ in Australia. I have already noted, commenting on the interchange between Senators Sargood and Pearce over the Immigration Restriction Bill 1901, that race exclusion was viewed as a moral good. As Rutherford indicates, this understanding has not dissipated. The border functions as a moral site, distinguishing not only white from coloured but protecting the white Australian Good from racial pollution.

In his important discussion of detention, Ghassan Hage has argued that the ‘Port Headland [detention facility] works as a psychoanalytic symptom: What are these pictures of ethnic caging being offered to us but images of ourselves as domesticated Third World-looking ethnics that constitute the very support for the reproduction of the White national fantasy of a multicultural Australia?’ Hage’s discussion is poised on a critique of the acceptability of the idea of toleration; that toleration functions on the terms of the powerful which, in Australia, continues to mean the so-called Anglo-Celtic, white, dominant. We should note here that, while the post-1980s usage of ‘Anglo-Celtic’
signals the hegemonic core in Australian multiculturalism, it also acknowledges the perpetuation of a differentiation between Anglos and Irish-background people, a suggestion that the Irish are still, perhaps, not-quite-totally white.

Discussing Canada in *A Border Within*, Ian Angus writes that: ‘The core of the argument is that respect for the Other can only be established through an ethical practice that maintains a border which refuses to cannibalize the other by the self’.82 I understand this to mean the maintenance of a border which preserves the integrity of the Other and does not try to exclude it because of its Otherness, or attempt to include it, make it a part of the nation-state, by a process of destruction and reconstruction. This is how the cultural pluralist understanding of multiculturalism works in Australia, as a weak form of assimilation. Hage’s point is that detention acts out this process of making the coloured Other safe. Needless to say, this is not a practice which respects the integrity of the Other—the Other which, as we have seen, in a general sense has been produced as Other through the very existence of the border as a characteristic feature of modernity.

The modern border strives for an absoluteness of interior and exterior categories. As we have seen, the most fundamental of these in Australia’s case, as a settler outpost of the modern, white world, has been ‘white’ and ‘coloured’. The more there is an attempt to establish such clear categories, the more the border becomes mired in ambiguity. What exactly are the limits of whiteness; how should coloured be defined? We might begin to rethink the possibilities of the border by coupling Angus’ idea of ethical practice of the border with Scott Michaelsen and David Johnson’s profoundly postmodern retheorisation of borders from the point of view of an unsettled identity, ‘comprehending the cultural and linguistic self as necessarily incomplete, coming to be, held open to “outside” cultures, while at the same time, as having always already enfolded the other within itself, with the border between the inside and outside, in principle, uncloseable’.83 Rethinking the possible practice of the Australian border in this way would, at the very least, offer an ethical template for understanding how the border at present works to confine the horizon of possibilities for life on both the inside and the outside of Australia and, indeed, for the ‘white’ ‘west’ and the ‘coloured’ Rest more generally.
References


http://www.people.virginia.edu/~dnp5c/Victorian/racesbrit.html


Markus, Andrew. 1994 Australian Race Relations, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards.


Migration Act 1958.


O’Farrell, Patrick. 1987 The Irish in Australia, NSW UP, Kensington.


These lyrics refer to the border between the United States and Mexico and, in particular, to those people attempting to enter the United States from Mexico. There is now a deal of writing about this border, and inspired by this border. A good place to start is Gloria Anzaldua *Borderlands/La frontera* San Francisco 1987, see also Michael Kerney ‘Transnationalism in California and Mexico at the End of Empire’ in Thomas Wilson and Hastings Donnan eds. *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers* Cambridge, 1998, pp. 117-116, and Hector Calderon and Jose David Saldivar *Criticism in the Borderlands: Studies in Chicano Literature, Culture, and Ideology* Durham, N.C., 1991. Unlike the border between the United States and Canada, that between the United States and Mexico is a part of what, later in this article, I shall refer to as the Great White Wall.


McMaster *Asylum Seekers*, p. 74.


Initiated in 2001, the so-called Pacific Solution involves the Australian government coming to agreements with various small Pacific countries such as Nauru for the placing of internment camps on their territory to hold asylum seekers. These people can then be processed outside of Australian territory and will therefore not have available to them the rights which would accrue should they have reached Australian landfall—more specifically, should they have reached the Australian migration zone.

McMaster offers a brief outline of British policy on asylum seekers in *Asylum Seekers*, pp. 99-102.

Anthony Burke *In Fear Of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety* Sydney, 2001, p. 324. Burke goes on to quote the Australian Prime Minister in 1913, as the first of Australia’s naval vessels arrived from British shipyards, saying that, ‘this fleet will defend White Australia from less advanced but aggressive nations all around us with lower standards.’
10 Peter Mares Borderline: Australia’s Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers Sydney, 2001, p. 6.

11 McMaster Asylum Seekers, p. 85.


13 See, for example, the editorial in the Sydney Morning Herald for 26th April 2000, ‘Out of Africa, an exodus’.


15 See Miriam Dixson The Imaginary Australian: Anglo-Celts and Identity, 1788 to the Present Sydney, 1999.

16 For a discussion of this reaction see Andrew Markus Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia Sydney, 2001, pp. 72-79.

17 Sydney Morning Herald, 26th April 2000.

18 I have discussed the use of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ in Australia in ‘Not Just Another Multicultural Story: English Migrants and the Ideology of ‘Fitting In’ to Australia,’ Journal of Australian Studies, no 66, 2000, section ‘Anglo-Saxonism and the English.’

19 See Jon Stratton ‘Multiculturalism and the Whitening Machine, or How Australians Become White’ in Ghassan Hage and Rowanne Couch The Future of Australian Multiculturalism: Reflections on the Twentieth Anniversary of Jeannie Martin’s The Migrant Presence Sydney, 1999, pp. 163-188. In Asylum Seekers, p. 191, McMaster notes the difference between the way the Kosovars were treated and way Asian boat people are treated. He implies that the Kosovars were treated better because they were understood to be ‘white.’ As I have suggested, the Kosovars were only thought of as ambiguously white. They were, for example, not as white as the Zimbabwean farmers to whom Howard and Ruddock wanted to give asylum.


21 Giddens The Nation-State and Violence, p. 50.

22 On this history see Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger eds. The Invention of Tradition Cambridge, 1983; Ernest Gellner Nations and Nationalism Oxford, 1983; Benedict Anderson Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and


24 For the role of the idea of the stranger in modernity see Zygmunt Bauman Modernity and Ambivalence Cambridge, 1991.


27 Price The Great White Walls, p. 23.

28 Price The Great White Walls, p. 23.

29 Quoted in Price The Great White Walls, pp. 246-247.

30 Quoted in Price The Great White Walls, p. 247.


33 Quoted in A.T. Yarwood Asian Migration to Australia: The Background to Exclusion 1896-1923 Melbourne, 1964, p. 25.

34 Quoted in Yarwood Asian Migration to Australia, p. 25.

35 Quoted in Yarwood Asian Migration to Australia, p. 34.

36 Quoted in Yarwood Asian Migration to Australia, p. 26.

37 See Willard History, p. 112.

38 Quoted in Yarwood Asian Migration to Australia, p. 46.


40 Quoted in Yarwood Asian Migration to Australia, p. 26.

41 John Beddoe The Races of Britain, chapter XIII at: http://www.people.virginia.edu/~dnp5c/Victorian/racesbrit.html
In the United States the whitening of the Irish took place quite differently and for different reasons, see Noel Ignatiev *How the Irish Became White* New York, 1995.

Yarwood *Asian Migration to Australia*, p. 32.

This section, on the racial construction of the Irish, has benefited from discussions with Amanda Third. Hopefully, her article ‘Does the Rug Match the Carpet?: Race, Gender and Red-Headedness’ will soon be published.


Curtis *Apes and Angels*, p. 30.


Quoted here from Curtis *Apes and Angels*, p. 1.

Beddoe *The Races of Britain*, Chapter II.

Chris McConville *Croppies, Celts and Catholics: The Irish in Australia* Caulfield East, 1987, p. 22.

Edmund Campion *Rockchoppers: Growing Up Catholic in Australia* Ringwood, 1982, p. 44.


Quoted in O’Farrell *The Irish in Australia*, p. 72.


For a brief discussion of Durkheim’s *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* in the context of the claimed ‘primitiveness’ of Aborigines, see Toby Miller ‘Exporting Truth from Aboriginal Australia’ in *Media International Australia*, no 76, 1995, pp. 7-


Broome *Aboriginal Australians*, p. 92.

O’Farrell *The Irish in Australia*, p. 72.

O’Farrell *The Irish in Australia*, p. 72.


Quoted in Anderson *The Cultivation of Whiteness*, p. 189. However, as Anderson discusses, by the late 1890s, scientific thought was beginning to place Aborigines as archaic Caucasians. This new understanding would make ‘half-castes’ absorbable into the new Australian, national population through their interbreeding with ‘white’ Caucasians thus helping to consolidate a racially homogenous population.

O’Farrell *The Irish in Australia*, p. 72.

O’Farrell *The Irish in Australia*, p. 72.


O’Farrell *The Irish in Australia*, p. 247.


There is certain irony in the present attempts to keep out Afghan asylum seekers in that, from 1838 on, up to 3000 Afghans were brought to Australia as camel drivers to help open up the arid inland. On the Afghan presence see Christine Stevens *Tin Mosques and Ghantowns: A History of Afghan Camel Drivers in Australia* Melbourne 1989. Stevens writes that ‘[m]any of the men who came to Australia as cameleers are documented as originating from ‘near Kabul’ or ‘near Kandahar’, both major cities in Afghanistan, or from ‘near Peshawar’, a city which, until the creation of the Durand Line in 1893, was a part of Afghanistan, or from ‘near Karachi’, Afghanistan’s port until the creation of the Durand Line and a city from which many Pathans travelled looking for work..’ (p. 2.)

In *Australian Race Relations* (p. 56.), Markus estimates that, in 1850, there were ‘less than 5000 [Asian indentured labourers], between 1 and 2 percent of [New South Wales’] non-Aboriginal population.’
There is a brief discussion, including relevant references, of the Afro-Black presence in the pre-Federation Australian Colonies in my *Race Daze*, p. 91-92. The most important reference is Ian Duffield ‘Martin Beck and Afro-Blacks in Colonial Australia’ in *Journal of Australian Studies*, no 16, 1985. Duffield estimates that up to one percent of transportees were Afro-Black.

Don McMaster *Asylum Seekers*, p. 2.

See Burke *In Fear of Security*.


The literature on globalisation is now vast. Here, I am, in particular, thinking of the work of thinkers such as Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin. In 2001 *The Economist* published an article called ‘Winners and Losers.’ This argued that, measuring countries in terms of purchasing-power parity: ‘The distribution has two poles. One, at the bottom end, is at an average income of less than $1,500 a year. It contains the populations of most of Africa, India, Indonesia and rural China. At the other pole, with average PPP incomes of more than $11,500, are the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain and Italy.’ Found at: http://www2.gol.com/users/coynerhm/winners_and_losers_of_rich_and_poor.htm. In other words, with the exception of Japan, the (‘white’) countries of European modernity and its outposts.

On population flows see, among others, the work of Stephen Castles. In 1997 around 90 million people, one in seventy of the world’s population, were living outside their country of birth as either migrants or refugees. In 1996 there were around 13 million refugees in the world (figures from Peter Stalker *Refugees and Migration* at: http://www.oneworld.org/guides/migration/). Most of these came from the poorest countries in the world and many were attempting to enter the richest.


