

School of Media, Creative Arts and Social Inquiry

**Constructing Counter-Narratives to Terrorism: A Comparative
Analysis of Collective Resistance in the aftermath of the terror
attacks in Bali and Norway**

Anne-Marie Balbi

**This thesis is presented for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of
Curtin University**

May 2019

Declaration

To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgment has been made.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university.

Human Ethics The research presented and reported in this thesis was conducted in accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007) – updated March 2014. The proposed research study received human research approval from the Curtin University Human Research Ethic Committee (EC00262), Approval Number #HR 117/2013.

Signature:

Date:

Abstract

As governments find themselves facing a new level of the threat posed by terrorism, witnessed particularly by the number of people being radicalised as a result of the rise of the Islamic State (IS), *counter-narratives* have emerged as the apparent panacea for countering the narratives and propaganda enticing individuals to the use of violent extremism (VE). Although extensive scholarship has been conducted to date on strategic communications to counter narratives, generating instructive guidelines for best practice in implementing counter-narratives, the state-centric assumptions upon which this body of knowledge currently relies upon means that it often fails to address the now recognised fact that governments are not the ideal *vehicles* for the messages in the first place.

This dissertation explores what government CVE policy-making could learn from exploring how counter-narratives emerge organically. By studying the symbolic meaning(s) attached to terror attack sites, the dissertation explores the trajectory of the discourses surrounding these contested spaces and how the performativity in terms of the response to the sites could inform policy about how local resilience to terrorism and counter-narratives emerge organically as part of the engagement (by local stakeholders, such as victims) with these sites. In this sense, it explores the *social production* (the functional aspect) and *social construction* (the meaning-making practice) revolving these spaces. Furthermore, using the concept of trauma, it investigates how individual trauma can be extended to the collective through representation, in this sense prompting possible collective action against terrorism and VE. Examining the cases of the Bali bombings and the Norway terror attack, it explores a) the discourses and the shared understandings of the problem in finding fruitful responses to these contested spaces and the contest between various local/national meanings attached to the terror attack sites b) the local resilience in form of trust between stakeholders/trustbased networks/the social fabric and the collective action that the performativity of these spaces has generated and how this in turn has contributed to social change, while conducting a discussion on the tangible insights and opportunities for emancipation for the field of CVE in general.

Acknowledgments

The professional and personal support I have received during my PhD experience has been overwhelming, and I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to far more people than I can mention here. The following people have been particularly influential in shaping this dissertation, though all its theoretical, empirical, and typographical shortcomings are, of course, my own.

The intellectual contribution and mentorship of my thesis committee cannot be overstated. As my main supervisor, Dr Yasuo Takao inherited and undertook the difficult task of focusing and structuring the wide range of research ideas I had amassed as my supervisory team underwent a major reshuffle. His comments and criticisms grounded my thoughts and brought much needed clarity and rigor to the project while simultaneously encouraging my intellectual freedom. I am in constant awe of his professional approach to both academic scholarship and life in general, and hope that I can one day become even half as good a scholar as him. Dr Ben Rich's sobering criticisms coupled with strong doses of encouragement struck a masterful balance for the fragile psyche of a doctoral student. I am forever indebted to these two exemplary scholars for their tireless commitment to ensure I saw this project through.

I would also like to thank the many people I have met throughout the journey of my PhD and who have offered critical insights while furthering my thinking through conversations, conferences, mentorship and other commitments, pushing me further both academically and personally. I am forever indebted to Dr Sue Boyd, Melissa Conley Tyler, Dr Daniel Baldino, Dr Orla Lynch, 'Lowy Club' contributor colleagues, AIIA & Curtin colleagues, the many people who shared their stories with me during fieldwork undertaken and the twitter community of IR/CT/CVE experts, for not only sharpening my own ideas but also keeping me abreast of other areas in the field.

Most importantly, I would like to thank my family for their steadfast love, support and encouragement. My dear brother, for always reminding me what is truly important in life, and my dear parents, for instilling the values they have in me. My dear husband and daughter, for their unconditional love while often 'miles away',

both in the physical and mental sense of the notion. Without them none of this would have been possible.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this work to my Grandfather, our dear “Taata”, and our family friend, Riitta, who both unfortunately passed away during the course of my PhD. My Grandfather, for his meticulous eye for detail and love for story telling, and Riitta, for her boundless joy for life. May their loving memory live forever in our hearts.

* As this research has been part of a larger research project, the author acknowledges the intellectual contribution of Associate Professor Anne Aly’s project “Constructions of the Bali Peace Park as Counter-terrorism”, which was funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) DECRA grant.

Table of Contents

Declaration	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgments	iv
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	ix
Chapter 1: Introduction	13
<i>The response problem.....</i>	14
Research Question and investigative task.....	16
<i>Significance.....</i>	19
<i>Research methods.....</i>	22
<i>Chapter structure.....</i>	24
Chapter 2: Literature review and conceptual framework.....	26
Terrorism Studies in National and International Security.....	27
Terrorism research to date - locating the research within the field	33
Responding to terrorism – from CT to P/CVE.....	38
<i>Counter-terrorism (CT).....</i>	38
<i>Soft counter-terrorism strategies - CVE.....</i>	42
<i>Community engagement and local resilience.....</i>	44
Terrorism as communication.....	51
<i>Terrorism and CT as communication.....</i>	53
<i>Communicative approaches to CVE.....</i>	61
<i>Narratives and counter-narratives.....</i>	64
<i>Meaning-making practice of terrorism and CT extends to the symbolism of terror attack sites.....</i>	85
Norms and norm diffusion	88

<i>CVE and norm diffusion</i>	101
<i>Performativity and the performative power of commemorialisation</i>	105
<i>The transformative power of terror attack sites – lessons for CVE</i>	114
Research gap.....	125
Conceptualising the thematic responses to the terror attack sites	128
<i>Finding meaning at terror attack sites</i>	129
<i>CT as Collective Action: Local Resistance and Social Capital</i>	136
Chapter 3: Methodology and research design	155
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS).....	157
<i>The meaning of 'critical': epistemology and ontology</i>	160
<i>Research questions</i>	162
Research Procedure and Strategy	163
<i>Case studies: case selection and comparative study</i>	166
<i>Data Collection</i>	167
<i>Methods for analysis: Discourse and Frame analysis</i>	179
Chapter 4: Finding meaning at terror attack sites – CT as ‘peace’ and ‘democracy’	183
<i>Case Study 1: Bali</i>	186
<i>Case Study 2: Norway</i>	241
<i>Conclusion</i>	272
Chapter 5: CT as collective action	281
Extending trauma from the individual to the collective through representation	281
<i>Representations of trauma around the sites in Bali and Norway</i>	286
<i>Social capital, local resistance and community engagement for CVE</i>	291

<i>Victims as norm entrepreneurs - trauma extended from the individual to the collective</i>	296
<i>Norm diffusion.....</i>	298
<i>CVE and social capital.....</i>	303
<i>Conclusion</i>	304
Chapter 6: Findings – Discussion	307
<i>The formation of counter-narratives.....</i>	307
<i>Finding meaning at terror attack sites</i>	309
<i>A contestation between various meanings – local vs national</i>	312
<i>A shared understanding of the problem key for social change.....</i>	314
Chapter 7: Conclusion.....	329
Overcoming current limitations impeding the soft CT field	330
<i>Implications for CVE policy from these findings.....</i>	341
Bibliography	346
Appendices.....	374

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AP	Arbeiderpartiet (Norwegian Labour Party)
ARC	Australian Research Council
AUF	the Workers Youth League (Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking)
BB	Bom Bali (Bali bombings)
BPP	Bali Peace Park
BPPAI	Bali Peace Park Association Inc
CCM	Collective conflict management
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CLA	Causal Layered Analysis
CONTEST	COUnter-TERRORISM STrategy
CSCC	Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications
CSEP	Civil Society Empowerment Programme
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CT	Counter-terrorism
CTS	Critical Terrorism Studies
CTSC	Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
EU	European Union
IBV	Identity-based violence
ICCT	International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague
IR	International Relations
IS / ISIS	Islamic State / Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISD	Institute for Strategic Dialogue
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
GNH	Gross National Happiness
GSN	Global Survivors Network
GWOT	Global War on Terror
NAVT	Network of Associations of Victims of Terrorism
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NSW	New South Wales
NTNU	Norwegian University of Science and Technology
OSCT	Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
PET	Preventing Extremism Together
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
RAF	Red Army Faction
RAN CoE	Radicalisation Awareness Network Centre of Excellence
RICU	Research, Information and Communications Unit
SAVE	Struggle Against Violent Extremism
TODA	Textually oriented discourse analysis
TS	Terrorism Studies
UN	United Nations
UNCTED	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

US	United States
VE	Violent Extremism
VIE	Violent Islamist Extremism
WA	Western Australia
WoT	War on Terror
WPR	What's the Problem Represented
WTC	World Trade Center

“Tragedy does not have to be personal, pervasive or permanent, but resilience can be. We can build it and carry it with us throughout our lives.”

– *Sheryl Sandberg*

“Building resilience to violent extremism has become a matter of great concern for European cities that have experienced attacks or that fear experiencing them in the future. Mayors, municipal leaders and other local authority representatives are leading efforts to empower city governments across the EU and develop pragmatic and non-ideological policies. As increasing numbers of citizens rank violent extremism as one of their top worries, urban centres have effectively become the front line of the fights against radicalisation. It is in European cities where transnational extremist threats take shape in the forms of hate speech, recruitment networks, radical cells and terrorist attacks, and it is also European cities where evidence-based plans to counter and prevent violent extremism at local level need urgently to be devised. Cities are obvious settings in which to implement the motto “think globally and act locally”.”

- CIDOB report “Resilient Cities – Countering Violent Extremism at Local Level”

For the many victims of terrorism –
in memory of Corey, Synne, Ebba and Saffie

Chapter 1: Introduction

In the current international political environment it is no understatement that the issue of terrorism has become a major driving force. With the recent surge in so called ‘lone-wolf’ and mass-casualty terror attacks, particularly in the Western part of the world, the topic of terrorism has come to permeate society to the degree where we are increasingly witnessing policy outside of the traditional counter-terrorism (CT) sphere being affected by the issue. One illustrative example is how immigration policy in light of the Syrian civil war crisis is now being conflated with the alleged threat posed by terrorism. This conflation of immigration with terrorism in turn is generating support for populist movements changing the political and social landscape of Western liberal multi-cultural societies.

The political discourse is occurring amidst relentless efforts by terrorism scholars to downplay and outright refute any such correlations.¹ In fact, so out of touch is the global political discourse on terrorism that US policy-makers are now blaming the actual bipartisan CT discourse for being part of the phenomenon that brought Donald J. Trump the US presidency:

Historians will long ponder the factors behind Mr. Trump’s unlikely rise to the presidency. Most analyses cite his advocacy for the economically disaffected, his rejection or embrace of one form of identity politics or another, or his preternatural ability to connect with “Middle America.”

But another factor deserves attention: a bipartisan approach to national security focused on terrorism that has distorted America’s understanding of its interests.²

In this sense, when considering global CT policy since 9/11, CT policy has essentially evolved from the Bush administration’s ‘hard’ Global War on Terror (GWOT) approach to a more ‘soft’ approach by the Obama administration that emphasised approaches for *countering violent extremism (CVE)* to an even ‘harder’ approach insisting on travel bans for Muslim countries most recently by Trump. This

¹ E.g. Alex P Schmid finds that “[h]istorically, the number of criminals and terrorists in mass migration

² Finer, J. & Malley, R. “How Our Strategy Against Terrorism Gave Us Trump”, *The New York Times*, March 4, 2017.

development is clearly a result of the fact that, as with most things, how we *frame* a problem defines how we in turn *approach* the problem.³

The global terrorist threat requires a serious response. But since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, sober analysis has too often fallen victim to political expediency, and fear has become divorced from facts, with profound — and largely unexamined — impact on our domestic politics.⁴

Considerations of terrorism and CT are therefore many times subject to political agendas rather than based in solid empirical research. The responses have become dependent on how one frames the issue. The question then becomes, how can we attempt to acquire a more measured and *nuanced* approach to the issue?

The response problem

As terrorism has become one of the most powerful signifiers in contemporary political and social discourse, the urgency for feasible strategies for how to best respond to the phenomenon has become imperative. Traditional ‘hard’ security-centric strategies for countering terrorism have had to give way to new ‘soft’ approaches, such as promoting social reform through community capacity building. One example of this emerged in the 2010 Australian Counter-Terrorism White Paper, largely influenced by the bombing incidents in London in 2005, where great emphasis was placed on the importance of collective resilience through the promotion of ‘social harmony’ and ‘common values’.⁵ Although designed to target the root causes of terrorism, many policymakers and scholars now question whether soft CT policies based on a strategy of integration is in fact relevant to the prevention of terror attacks.⁶

Since the notions of CVE and preventing violent extremism (PVE) have emerged to the forefront of CT strategies in the last decade or so, more specifically targeted efforts have been explored, such as *early intervention*, *local resilience* and *counter-narratives*. Particularly in light of the advance and surfacing of terror groups such as

³ Bacchi, C. 2009. *Analysing Policy: What's the problem represented to be?* Frenchs Forest, NSW: Pearson Australia, pp. 1-21.

⁴ Finer, J. & Malley, R. 2017.

⁵ ‘Counter-Terrorism White Paper’, 2010. *Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet*, chapter 7.

⁶ Aly, A., A. Balbi & C. Jacques. 2015. “Rethinking countering violent extremism: implementing the role of civil society”, *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 10(1): 3-13.

Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, with their effective use of propaganda to attract foreign fighters/inspire so called ‘lone-wolf’ attacks, as a result more funnelled CVE measures have emerged. A key contributing factor is the realisation that “countering the narrative of Al-Qaeda is at least as important as controlling and diminishing its violence, since Al-Qaeda’s narrative brings new recruits into its ranks”.⁷

In this sense, the counter-messaging of violent extremist (VE) propaganda has become one principal aspect for the holistic approach of CVE. Governments have increasingly sought different methods to construct counter-narratives aimed at refuting the narratives conveyed by violent extremists. Historically, government attempts at countering terrorist propaganda have been branded under the umbrella terms of ‘public affairs’, ‘psychological operations’ (PSYOPS) and/or ‘strategic communication’.⁸ However, in the CVE sphere of counter-messaging governments have been subject to extensive criticism for their state-centric approach. Employing the state as the *messenger* of counter-narratives becomes problematic as governments are often regarded to be lacking credibility and legitimacy amongst the target audiences.⁹ Thus, in order to overcome this predicament, counter-narratives should instead be explored in the context of grassroots-driven bottom-up efforts by civil society.

Based on the above assumptions, this dissertation attempts to explore how the current field of soft CT strategies could be developed and expanded further. It will do so by changing focus from the state as the sole CVE emancipating body, instead focussing on how CVE policy can be delivered/informed by employing counter-narratives to terrorism expressed through performative acts by civil society. In this sense, it seeks to contribute to the field by in essence providing a critique of the state-centric

⁷ “Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Frameworks for Countering Violent Extremism”, 2014, p. 10.

⁸ Schmid, A.P. 2014: 1.

⁹ “Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Frameworks for Countering Violent Extremism”, ICCT *The Hague*, 2014.

approach to CT and CVE, and instead highlight the need to apply a more “grassroots societal lens that questions the means and methods of delivering CVE”.¹⁰

One of the key premises investigated is the shift in the approach to countering terrorism from one that is mainly reactionary to one more aimed at addressing structural causes. As scholars and policy-makers have come to terms with the fact that the ‘War on Terror’ (WoT) response has not reduced the threat of terrorism, but in fact potentially increased it, there has been a realisation that a more ideational and social approach is required. Although the CT sphere has witnessed a pronounced push for shifting from traditional ‘hard’ CT to more holistic approaches such as P/CVE, there currently exists little *academic* work in the field itself. As Alex P. Schmid denotes: “[w]hile there are many good books on crime prevention as well as conflict prevention, there is, strangely enough, no really good volume on the prevention of terrorism”.¹¹

Research Question and investigative task

The investigative task for this dissertation is to examine how counter-narratives to terrorism are constructed by the social phenomena constituted by performative acts situated around terror attack sites. It will attempt to do so by exploring how victims and other key stakeholders engage with terror attack sites and how these sites have become symbolic to terrorism and CT. The principal research objective will be detailed further in the below, outlining the overall purpose of the research as well as the investigative task based on the stated objectives.

The main purpose of this research is to propose an expansion to the field of soft CT strategies by applying an innovating approach to the study. The study will be grounded on an interdisciplinary reconceptualisation of terrorism as a communicative act and, conversely, CT as collective social resistance. By researching how people engage with terror attack sites through performative acts the research will highlight how community driven responses can form a counter-narrative to terrorism and how

¹⁰ Balbi, A. 2018 “In the Aftermath of Terrorism: The Structural Challenges for incorporating victims voices”, in Lynch, O. and Argomaniz, J. (eds.) *Victims and Perpetrators of Terrorism: Exploring Identities, Roles and Narratives*, London & New York: Routledge.

¹¹ Schmid, A.P. in Bjorgo, T. 2013. *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism*, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, p. vii.

the formation of these counter-narratives organically could inform CT strategy. The main research question is therefore:

“How are counter-narratives to terrorism constructed through performative acts and how can they be integrated with other soft counter-terrorism strategies?”

The central argument put forward is that in an age where terrorism is increasingly attributed with a *transnational* character and *non-state actors*, collective efforts to counter it is required at the international level. However, just like other global challenges, this requires a *multi-level approach*. In this sense, global strategies, national mandates, and local action are converged: local actors in the local context will ultimately be part of enacting global strategies adopted by national governments. Thus, engaging those who are best equipped to solve the issues becomes key.

It therefore makes sense, particularly when it comes to counter-narratives to terrorism (which have been deemed inefficient when conveyed by government agencies), to conduct an empirical examination of how counter-narratives emerge organically on the local level. The key argument put forward is therefore that counter-narratives are most effective when emanating from the local level up, and should therefore be explored in that context.

Objective

The main objective becomes to explore how collective resistance emerges organically and what elements we can excerpt from that for CVE policy. By applying a theoretical framework defining terrorism as the ‘communication’ of a particular narrative and CT as a counter-narrative, this study will explore how the latter have been expressed through community driven acts of resistance in the specific context of Bali and Utøya¹².

Based on the above discussion, the objectives of this research are to:

- 1) Investigate current theories in the field of soft CT studies as well as the various discourses surrounding CT (both on the international and local level) in a bid to identify current theoretical structures/limitations preventing further progression of soft CT strategies.

¹² The Norway case of Utøya will be explored in combination with the attack site in Oslo.

- 2) Explore and develop the existing notion of ‘terrorism as communication’ by:
 - a) Empirically analysing the use of counter-narratives by identifying how the use of and engagement with terror attack sites can express and provide meaning to a counter-narrative to terrorism. This will be investigated by looking at how individuals and communities engage with the site of a terrorist attack; how collective resistance to terrorism is situated around the community and social functions that take place around terror attack sites; how terrorist attack sites are symbolic to terrorism and CT; and how terrorist attack sites function as communicative spaces for counter-narratives to terrorism.
 - b) Conducting a theoretical discussion identifying terrorism as a narrative and CT as a counter-narrative.
- 3) Develop a re-conceptualisation of soft CT approaches and a new way of thinking about the assumptions upon which policy responses to terrorism are based upon.

In order to achieve the above, the dissertation will firstly investigate the current state of Terrorism Studies (TS) in general, with a specific focus on the CT sub-fields of CVE and counter-narratives. It will then explore the notion of local resilience in the context of CT and conduct a discussion on how such an approach could be developed and framed within a theoretical framework based upon constructivism and terrorism as communication.

The dissertation will then explore the discourses surrounding terror attack sites, particularly in terms of how governments and communities come to view the symbolism/function of them in the wake of political violence. This is based on the assumption that these sites are symbolic to terrorism but also CT in terms of how societies chose to respond to the sites innately produces counter-narratives to terrorism. The literature review also explores key concepts such as different modes of *memorialisation*, the role of *social capital*, *perfomativity* and *trauma* in IR to enable a conceptual framework that is applicable for the analysis.

It is worthwhile stressing that the dissertation limits itself to the objective of investigating *how* counter-narratives emerge and take shape and not measuring their effectiveness as such. The decision to compare the cases of Bali and Utøya is based

on the argument that these sites provide exemplary cases for study given how the sites have become intrinsically symbolic to the acts of terrorism and are currently subject to the process of deciding/having decided what to do with the sites. They therefore provide useful case studies enabling insights into the performative acts for social change but also into the decision-making process as to what to finally make of the sites.

Based on the above objectives (emanating from an IR discipline) the research focus will be ‘glocal’ – reflecting both local and global considerations. As will be further emphasised in the sections to follow, in the age of globalisation the lines between global and local have become blurred underscoring the need for a multi-level approach.¹³ In this sense, given that narratives influence political behaviour (globally) it becomes key to explore how (counter-) narratives emerge organically. Terrorism constitutes a *global phenomenon*, which is why an IR approach becomes key to explain it: by delving into local case studies, the hope is to gain some instrumental insights into how to develop best practice for resilience against terrorism and how these insights could complement future soft CT strategies.

Significance

By analysing the symbolism of the target selection of the terrorists in conjunction with how people engage with terror attack sites, the research will highlight how community driven responses form a counter-narrative to terrorism and how the formation of these counter-narratives could inform CT strategy. Using social constructivism, the dissertation will basically explore the diffusion of norms from the local level up where victims and key stakeholders act as *norm entrepreneurs*. In this sense, the research will not only contribute to the empirical field of CVE by exploring the emergence of counter-narratives organically, but also to the theoretical field of constructivism, as the body of knowledge on norm diffusion is currently lacking in empirical research that explores norms deriving from the local level up.¹⁴ The findings from the study will be used to rethink and reconceptualise soft CT

¹³ Kurth Cronin, A. 2010, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism”, pp. 28-56.

¹⁴ Checkel, 1999; Sikkink & Finnemore, 2001.

approaches and offer a new perspective of thinking about the assumptions upon which policy responses to terrorism are based.

In their comprehensive literature review of CVE, one of the recommendations that Minerva Nasser-Eddine et al. identify is that “[r]esearch and scholarship is needed that specifically focuses on approaches and strategies for countering violent extremism”.¹⁵ The dissertation will shed light on the field of TS from an IR point of view, investigating the meaning-making process of the concepts of terrorism and CT by affected communities. In this sense the expectation is to contribute to the current sub-fields of CVE, namely *local resilience*¹⁶ and *counter-narratives* in the context of CT. Nasser-Eddine et al., in surveying research on terrorism post-2000, find following shortcomings in addition to the fact that not much has changed in the field:

A survey of the literature on terrorism generally highlights other deficiencies: first, a lack of primary source analysis; second, a continued general shortage of experienced researchers on this topic; third, the majority of authors who haven't met with terrorists or undertaken any fieldwork in the area being written about; fourth, the reliance on limited methodologies and levels of analysis; and fifth, remarkably, little academic analyses is devoted to critiquing research into VE and terrorism studies.¹⁷

In this sense, the dissertation will contribute to the field by addressing four out of the five deficiencies outlined above: i) it will use primary source analysis; ii) it will undertake fieldwork in the area; iii) it will use various levels of analysis and; iv) finally, provide a critique to current approaches. It will therefore add a scholarly contribution to the field of P/CVE at a time when the field is thriving on initiatives not generally anchored in academic research. In this sense, not only will it provide an important contribution to the field of TS as a whole, but also tangible insights for practice-led efforts within the field of CVE.

The field of CVE has basically exploded in recent years, making it hard for scholars as well as practitioners and policy-makers to simply keep track of the latest evidence-

¹⁵ Nasser-Eddine, M., Garnham, B, Agostino, K. and Caluya, G. 2011. “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review”, p. 74.

¹⁶ It may be worthwhile to mention that the terms *local resilience* and *local resistance* may appear to be used interchangeably throughout the dissertation, however the concept of *local resilience* will be discussed and assigned a more elaborate definition in the literature review while *local resistance* will be used as a specific term to depict acts of resistance discovered on the local levels.

¹⁷ Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: Executive Summary.

based best practice. In this sense, as an academic, it becomes critical to not only contribute to the field of CVE and CT by highlighting the latest research available, but to also assist in the process of translating and emancipating the findings from the research for the policy decision-makers in question.

This dissertation adds to the current field of research on counter-narratives by bypassing the state-centric approach in the counter-narrative realm. It provides insights into how counter-narratives are created/emerge *organically* as opposed to being *constructed* by governments. The ultimate objective for this research is to elucidate on counter-narratives while instigating further research, particularly on the effectiveness of named counter-narratives and on *local resilience to terrorism* more generally, while adding to the important debate on the role of *civil society resilience to terrorism*.

Conclusively, it should also be mentioned that this research initiated as part of an Australian Research Council (ARC) project at Curtin led by Dr Anne Aly investigating how individuals and communities engage with terror attack sites¹⁸, and therefore this comparative study of Bali and Norway is significant in a number of ways. First and foremost, it will contribute to the development of new empirical knowledge about the use of counter-narratives to counter terrorism, thus providing a better understanding of the use of soft CT measures in general. Second, this research will provide a significant new platform for important insights into a research field that is currently very short on reliable primary sources and empirical research;¹⁹ where primary research remains something of a taboo;²⁰ and where the study of the efficacy of CT measures is still in its infant phase.²¹ Finally, as part of the larger research project, this research will contribute towards an understanding of how governments can harness local and global initiatives to build resilience against terrorism.

¹⁸ As this research has been part of a larger research project, the author acknowledges the intellectual contribution of Associate Professor Anne Aly's project "Constructions of the Bali Peace Park as Counter-Terrorism", which was funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) DECRA grant.

¹⁹ Schuurman, B. and Eijkman, Q. "Moving Terrorism Research Forward: The Crucial Role of Primary Sources", *International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague*, published electronically 27 June 2013.

²⁰ Breen Smyth et al., 2008: 2.

²¹ Ibid, p. 3.

Research methods

Given that the exploration of counter-narratives deals with key elements such as *interpretations, language, semantics, experiences and shared meanings* the dissertation will adopt a social constructivist approach, exploring the processes of counter-narrative formation and how counter-narratives emerge as part of *performative acts* for social change, taking place in the context of how individuals and key stakeholders engage with terror attack sites. Adopting an approach that views the various meaning-making practices of terrorism and CT as *social constructions* is best positioned within the Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). The methodological approach is therefore based in ethnography, using qualitative methods for data collection and interpretation/analysis.

The research has opted to focus on two case studies – the site of the Bali bombings of 2002 in Kuta and the two locations of the 2011 Norway terror attack: the government quarter in Oslo and the island of Utøya. These two locales provide ideal case studies, since not only does the symbolism of the terror attack extend to the locations and how we respond to them, but also as the terror attack locations are contested sites in terms of the re-build, therefore providing empirical insights for comprehending and examining the social phenomenon of meaning-making practice taking place around these sites.

The dissertation applies a comparative approach to explore and compare how counter-narratives arise *organically*. It has opted for a comparative study to see how the cases differ in terms of the meaning-making process, local resilience and social capital as well as the interplay of these factors for a constructive response to the sites. Both the Bali and Norway case studies have been heavily characterised by the notion of ‘peace’ in terms of the response however constitute contrasting cases (one jihadist-inspired, one rightwing-inspired) in terms of the character of the terror attacks themselves.

Given that the research question stresses *how* counter-narratives are constructed the research is explorative in the sense that it seeks to discover how they are taking place. In this sense, exploring the Bali and the Norway case becomes exemplary given that both the sites are so intrinsic to the actual terror attacks. Investigating how victims and stakeholders engage with these sites – in their given contexts – can provide key

insights into how counter-narratives emerge organically as opposed to those currently constructed by public relations or strategic communications components of government agencies.

Furthermore, most counter-narrative research to date has focussed on the challenges posed by Islamist extremism²², and in this sense this dissertation will contribute to the body of knowledge on counter-narratives in general – while also filling the gap on knowledge on counter-narratives against right-wing extremism – as it explores cases comprising of terrorism stemming from both political extremes.

The benefits of using a comparative analysis, as opposed to an in-depth study of a single case, is that one may be able to identify common variables and discontinuities which will inform how local contexts may affect the local resilience that emerges. Also, as mentioned, the two cases provide different contexts, in which the Norway case was domestic terrorism caused by a far-right homegrown terrorist targeting the Norwegian population, while the Bali case represents a case of transnational Islamic-inspired terrorism given the multi-layered aspect of the attack, targeting Western tourists in particular. In this sense, it is interesting to explore how the counter-narratives emerge organically given the context in question as well.

Finally, the case studies provide part of a ‘Descriptive Study’, where the aim is to explore the social phenomenon of *meaning-making process around these sites*, providing insights into how counter-narratives emerge organically and in this sense can provide valuable insights for policy-makers in terms of the CVE sub-fields of local resilience and counter-narratives. However, it is worthwhile highlighting that the study is a heuristic case study, in the sense that it explores the constitution of counter-narratives in causal terms, and does not intend to examine and explain a totality of the case studies. In this sense, the use of constructivism in comparing these case studies is not meant to explain an event or episode as such but to provide a tool for comprehending the intersubjectivity – *the shared meanings* – that emerge in the aftermath of these terror attacks.

²² Ferguson, K. 2016. “Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies”, p. 9.

Chapter structure

The following chapter, Chapter 2, examines the current state of the issue of responding to terrorism in international security and terrorism studies (TS) in general to set the context and locate the research within the field, with a specific focus on the role of CVE and counter-narratives. It then explores the theoretical framework of social constructivism, particularly in the context of norm setting against terrorism and VE. The chapter will finally outline the conceptual framework derived from terrorism as communication and the meaning-making practice of terrorism/CT based in social constructivism, where the role of norm diffusion has been adopted for exploring the agency of victims and other key stakeholders as possible norm entrepreneurs. It examines some of the discourses that have emerged when responding to these sites marked by violence/terrorism; how in the process of becoming contested sites they have come to convey various meanings; and the possible ways to move on in the aftermath/rebuild of the sites.

Chapter 3 outlines the research design, discussing the chosen methodology and methods used. Given the interpretative approach best placed within the critical terrorism studies (CTS), the dissertation has opted for mainly qualitative methods.

Chapter 4 explores the meanings ascribed to and discourses surrounding the chosen (case study) sites affected by terrorism, guided by the themes that were extracted from the findings from the literature review. It therefore explores the meaning-making process of the social phenomenon of terrorism and CT around these sites.

Chapter 5 explores the notion of *CT as collective action*, using Hutchison's notion of representation to see how the individual trauma has been translated into collective trauma, providing for possible collective action and local resilience against terrorism. Victims and other stakeholders are examined as possible norm entrepreneurs for norm setting against VE and, in this sense, how they could enable norm diffusion from the local level up.

Chapter 6 conducts a discussion based on the findings from each chapter, highlighting key discoveries stressing the communicative aspects of these responses – what do they say about the involved stakeholders/communities? How has the local resilience manifested itself? What performative acts for social change and counter-narratives have emerged organically in Bali and Norway?

Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, will summarise the findings while reconnecting to the discussion set out in the introduction in terms of the limitations of current theories and how to overcome them; emphasising how the counter-narratives that have emerged organically can provide tangible insights and opportunities for emancipation for the field of CVE in general; and how the norms emanating from the local level can generate insights on the state and global level in terms of strategies for counter-messaging VE in the ongoing ‘battle for hearts and minds’.

Chapter 2: Literature review and conceptual framework

In order to answer the research question posed in the Introduction, this chapter will examine the existing body of literature and develop a conceptual framework. The chapter will achieve this by exploring the tentative answers²³ uncovered in the literature review, which will guide the design of the conceptual framework for use in the subsequent analysis chapters. The key research question is as stated earlier:

“How are counter-narratives to terrorism constructed through performative acts and how can they be integrated with other soft counter-terrorism strategies?”

The dissertation therefore examines two objects of analysis (dependent variables): *the formation of counter-narratives* and *the integration of these with soft counter-terrorism strategies*. By reviewing the literature the task becomes to identify sources of influence (independent variables) on the formation of counter-narratives, and subsequently ways to integrate these with soft counter-terrorism (CT) strategies.

The scope of the inquiry will be limited to an examination of the above variables in the particular context of the symbolic meaning attached to and discourses surrounding terror attack sites. The dissertation explores the discourses as well as the function of these contested and meaning-laden sites – places that in essence embody symbolic elements of both terrorism and CT – in order to discern possible counter-narratives to terrorism and, more importantly, how counter-narratives emerge organically.

In order to do so, the dissertation will first examine the current state of the issue of responding to terrorism in international security and terrorism studies (TS) in general to set the context and locate the research within the field. It will then explore ‘soft’ CT strategies, i.e. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), with particular focus on the role of counter-narratives; a notion that has gained a lot of traction within CVE that concerns strategies for countering the narratives and propaganda conveyed by those who incite violent extremism (VE).²⁴

²³ Possible assumptions, claims, hypotheses etc.

²⁴ Nasser-Eddine, M. et al., 2011, “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review”, p.51; Ferguson, K. 2016, “Countering violent extremism through media and communication strategies”, *Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security*; “Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Frameworks for Countering Violent Extremism”, *Hidayah and ICCT - The Hague*, 2014.

Given that the exploration of counter-narratives deals with key elements such as *interpretations, language, semantics, experiences and shared meanings* the dissertation will adopt a social constructivist approach, exploring the processes of counter-narrative formation and how counter-narratives emerge as part of performative acts for social change, taking place in the context of how individuals and key stakeholders engage with terror attack sites.

Furthermore, the dissertation explores the key constructivist element of norms – hereafter defined as “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a collectivity of actors”²⁵ – and particularly norm setting against terrorism and VE. As terrorism has become a global and *transnational issue* often involving *non-state actors* requiring a multi-level approach (including local/national/global levels), not least engaging *local actors*, the dissertation will explore possible norm diffusion from the local level up through how victims and key stakeholders engage with terror attack sites, acting in essence as possible norm entrepreneurs against VE. The sub-questions to be answered in this chapter therefore become:

- *What is the current state of CT/CVE literature, and particularly that on the use of counter-narratives? How can terror attack sites act as symbolic places for the construction of the meaning of terrorism and CT? What issues arise in responding to terror attack sites and how can this response constitute a counter-narrative? In this sense, how could victims and key stakeholders act as norm entrepreneurs against VE?*

Terrorism Studies in National and International Security

Throughout the last two decades there has been an increasing interest in terrorism studies (TS), as terrorism has become one of the most critical problems facing national and international security.²⁶ The magnitude of the unprecedented assaults on the United States (US) on September 11, 2001, has had a longlasting effect on most

²⁵ Checkel, J. 1999, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity”, p. 83.

²⁶ In the most recently released US National Defense Strategy (2018) the US recognised that terrorism has been replaced by inter-state strategic competition challenges from countries like China and Russia as the principal threat, however most national security experts agree that terrorism remains one of the biggest global security threats for the foreseeable future.

dimensions of society, resulting in a new kind of awareness of terrorism in general.²⁷ Complex issues associated with the phenomenon have resurfaced forcing policymakers and academics alike to once again contend with the many challenges presented by dealing with the issue of terrorism.

One of the key challenges for the field of TS has been the difficulty in finding a universally accepted definition of the term.²⁸ The various efforts by the United Nations (UN) to generate international consensus around a single definition have failed to find a shared perspective, as the issue of terrorism is often subject to biased interpretations, partial definitions and politicization.²⁹ In fact, there are currently over 200 definitions of terrorism in use by scholars, governments and international organisations.³⁰

Even among scholars the views often vary, given the multidisciplinary character of TS as a field of research, with scholars from disciplines varying from anthropology, criminology, history, law, political science, psychology etc., all approaching the topic from their own disciplinary practices. As Jacob L. Stump and Priya Dixit illustratively pinpoint, “[i]t has become a cliché to note that terrorism is an essentially contestable concept with no universally accepted definition”³¹

Moreover, national definitions of terrorism can vary depending on how broadly the term is defined (some definitions include terrorist motivation and aim) and whether it is referred to as an act of crime or war.³² In stable democratic societies, however, the fight against terrorism is often defined within a framework of crime prevention.³³

²⁷ Breen Smyth, Marie, Jeroen Gunning, Richard Jackson, George Kassimeris, & Piers Robinson. "Critical Terrorism Studies – an Introduction." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 1, no. 1 (2008): 1-4.

²⁸ Schmid, A. P. & Crelinsten, R. D., *Western Responses to Terrorism*, p. 2; Shimko, K. L. 2008, *International Relations – Perspectives and Controversies*, 2nd edition, pp. 318-320.

²⁹ Ganor, B. 2010, “Defining Terrorism”; Jackson, R. 2011, “In Defense of “Terrorism”: Finding a Way through the Forest of Misconceptions”.

³⁰ Jackson, R. 2011. “In Defense of “Terrorism”: Finding a Way through a Forest of Misconceptions”, *Behavioural Science of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 3(2): p. 117.

³¹ Stump, J. L. & P. Dixit, 2013, *Critical Terrorism Studies – An Introduction to Research Methods*, p. 8.

³² Shimko, K. L. 2008: 318; Bjorgo, T. 2015, *Forebyggning av Kriminalitet*, p. 207.

³³ Bjorgo, T. 2015: 207.

Such controversy prevail that some scholars have advocated for the abandonment of the term altogether, based on the argument “it lacks analytical value or because research can be conducted without employing the term”.³⁴ Yet, others have instead offered a “minimal foundationalist” reconceptualisation of the term to provide for a more nuanced understanding:

Terrorism is violence or its threat intended as a symbolically communicative act in which direct victims of the action are instrumentalized as a means to creating a psychological effect of intimidation and fear in a target audience for a political objective.³⁵

While adopting the above minimal foundationalist concept of terrorism, this dissertation also recognizes that, in a normative sense, the prevention of terrorism should be approached as a good with benefits that extend to all states, people and generations, in this sense constituting a ‘global public good’.³⁶ However, in the real world, in the absence of policy and strategy coordination at the international level, the prevention may only benefit citizens of a given country or local community.³⁷ ‘Global public goods’ should ideally meet two criteria:

The first is that their benefits have strong qualities of publicness – that is, they are marked by non-rivalry in consumption and nonexcludability. These features place them in the general category of public goods. The second criterion is that their benefits are quasi universal in terms of countries (covering more than one group of countries), people (accruing to several, preferably all, population groups), and generations (extending to both current and future generations, or at least meeting the needs of current generations without foreclosing development options for future generations). This property makes humanity as a whole the *publicum*, or beneficiary of global public goods.³⁸

Viewing the prevention of terrorism as a global public good offers benefits that are both non-excludable and non-rival. In this sense, once provided, no country can be prevented from enjoying a global public good; nor can any country’s enjoyment of the good impinge on the consumption of other countries. When prevention succeeds, i.e.

³⁴ Stump & Dixit, 2013: 8.

³⁵ Jackson, R. 2011. “In Defense of “Terrorism”, p. 123.

³⁶ Kaul, I., I. Grunberg & M. A. Stern. (eds). 1999. *Global Public Goods – International Cooperation in the 21st Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 2-3.

³⁷ Kiras, J. D. in Baylis et al. 2014, *The Globalization of World Politics – An Introduction to World Politics*, p. 360.

³⁸ Kaul, I. et al. (eds). 1999: pp. 2-3.

when a coordination mechanism between global strategies and national policy/local action is achieved, global public goods make people everywhere better off.

In an age where the issue of terrorism is increasingly attributed with a *transnational* character and *non-state actors*³⁹, aggregate efforts to counter it are required at the international level. In this contest, global strategies, national mandates, and local action are converged. To contribute to global strategies, internationally pledged national mandates will inevitably need to adapt to the locally specific environment at the community level. In this sense, the issue of terrorism is much like the issue of climate change; local actors in the local context will ultimately be part of enacting global strategies adopted by national governments.

Thus the approach can be argued to be ‘glocal’ – the various levels are inevitably converged in the fight against terrorism and VE, requiring a multi-level analysis approach to fully comprehend the issue. The nexus between the internal and external as well as the transnational character of the security threat, and the multi-level approach needed, is clearly illustrated by Bibi van Ginkel:

More than ever we see a nexus between internal and external security. Things happening abroad may have direct impact on national security and public order and vice versa. Think for instance of the Turkish referendum and the protests of diaspora communities it spurred in the Netherlands and Germany. Since the terrorist threat clearly has a transboundary character and the efforts to spread extremist ideology, as well as to incite and to recruit, have a transboundary character it makes sense to also organise the counter approaches in a multilateral manner.⁴⁰

Furthermore, in line with what has been established above, the multi-level approach needed is not only about the object of the phenomena (i.e. the impact of foreign affairs on domestic politics and vice versa), but also the subject of the phenomena (local action as part of the rule-making at the international level). In this sense, van Ginkel has made some key observations in terms of the multi-level approach for CT and CVE policy in practice, noting that while the practice of documenting how the process of “policies adopted at the international level trickle down to, ultimately,

³⁹ Kurth Cronin, A. 2010. “Behind the Curve – Globalization and International Terrorism”, in M. E Brown, O. R. Cote Jr, S. M. Lynn-Jones and S. E. Miller. *Contending with Terrorism: Roots, Strategies, and Responses*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

⁴⁰ van Ginkel, B. 2017, “Countering and Preventing the Threat of Terrorism and Violent Extremism: From the International and European to the National and Local Levels”, in D. Muero (Ed.), “Resilient Cities: Countering Violent Extremism at Local Level”, *CIDOB*, p. 29.

implementation at the local level”⁴¹ is in place, there has been less research on the bottom-up effects:

Just as interesting, but less well researched and documented, is whether the context specific policies developed and implemented at the local level yield results that would merit policy uptake to the national and possibly even the regional or international level. The work done so far, after all, is mostly limited to collecting good practices to be shared at the local level, although a thoroughly developed model for monitoring & evaluation also seems to be lacking.⁴²

In this sense, engaging those who are best equipped to solve the issues becomes key. As the threat of terrorism has gradually evolved from state-centred actors to non-state actors, it only makes sense to equally combat the issues at hand with the help of non-state actors, i.e. including the role of civil society in CVE through community engagement. In this context, P/CVE research has identified that “modern cities are best placed to meet the challenges of a globalising world and that cities alone offer real hope for a *glocal* future”⁴³ and that local governments therefore “need to map out the threats affecting their communities, identify best practices and learn from other local contexts, and must design and implement their own local action plans”⁴⁴:

If we are interested in the engagement of citizens, fostering the sense of solidarity and communal closeness typical of parochial cities, it is essential to develop a network of stakeholders with shared goals. Indeed, trust (what scholars used to call social capital) is essential to complete the paradigm shift from “countering” terrorism to “preventing” it.⁴⁵

However, due to the difficulties in reaching a shared perspective of terrorism global efforts at prevention have been limited to date. Furthermore, following the 9/11 terror attacks the UN – the key international security body – was marginalised even further as a result of America’s consequent unilateral decision for military intervention in

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 30-31.

⁴² Ibid., p. 31.

⁴³ Muro, D. 2017, “Introduction” in D. Muero (Ed.), “Resilient Cities: Countering Violent Extremism at Local Level”, *CIDOB*, p. 14.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 16.

Afghanistan and Iraq.⁴⁶ Besides, the prospect for any change on this front appears distant:

[w]hile there may be growing recognition that local, regional and global security are linked and that national security is connected to preventing or managing conflicts, the exact nature of these links remain obscure. Also obscure is the road ahead as far as reform and innovation in global institutions are concerned. There are three reasons for this: first, there are huge political hurdles to real reform, as the example of the UN Security Council makes clear; second, security has become divisive, making quest for consensus and coherence elusive; and third, many actors prefer that the current institutional endowment remains weak and imperfect.⁴⁷

The shortage of globally led guidance for CT, in turn, has meant that the ‘less experienced’ countries have sourced their CT policies from other ‘more experienced’ countries.⁴⁸ The policies and strategies that nations should pursue to deal with the issue of terrorism are some of the “enduring conceptual, empirical, theoretical, moral and political issues” that the field of TS is concerned with when it comes to understanding and responding to terrorism.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, as governments have come to realise that *reactionary* CT measures alone are insufficient and that instead more *prevention-oriented* measures need to be implemented, the issue of terrorism and CT in national and international security – particularly in the US since 2006⁵⁰ - has revolved around the matter of finding the right balance between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ CT strategies.⁵¹ These two CT strands, together with terrorism conceptualised as a form of communication or ‘communicative act’, will be examined in the coming sections on ‘responding to terrorism’. In the below section the dissertation will first review the current state of scholarly terrorism research in general to locate the dissertation within the research field.

⁴⁶ Crocker, C. A., F. O. Hampson and P. Aall. 2011. “Collective conflict management: a new formula for global peace and security cooperation”, *International Affairs*, 87(1): 39-58.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 45.

⁴⁸ For example the UK’s CT strategy of CONTEST is often used as a benchmark.

⁴⁹ Shimko, K. L. 2008: 318-319.

⁵⁰ Bjorgo, T. 2013:27.

⁵¹ Bjorgo, T. 2013: 3.

Terrorism research to date - locating the research within the field

In the aftermath of 9/11, terrorism studies (TS) have flourished without precedence and the field of terrorism research has gained increasing significance within various disciplines. Given the new urgency and importance for understanding the phenomenon more attention and funding has been provided to the topic not just in academia, but also in government and the media. The responses to the phenomenon by these social institutions, where their inherent structure and access to resources has enabled some to act more swiftly than others, has in turn given way for the shaping of the public discourse on the topic. Despite the upsurge in funding and support for terrorism-oriented Social Science, policy and public debate still remains primarily influenced by go-to experts within the spheres of media and government, rather than data-based and empirical research.

A telling account of the current state of TS and the development of the research field to date can be retrieved in the academic conversation between various prominent scholars in the field as a response to Marc Sageman's contribution "The Stagnation in Terrorism Research".⁵² Sageman argues that in the last decade the field has not progressed in terms of furthering our understanding of the reasons behind people turning to political violence. He states that one of the main reasons for the stagnation is the governments' failure to share the necessary primary source data with academia. Although extensively willing to fund research projects, the governments' shortcoming of holding back on vital data for analysis has created an "unbridgeable gap between academia and the intelligence community".⁵³

Sageman argues that the lack of intelligence sharing between the funding party – the government – and the experts with the analytical methods and tools – the academia – has led to an influx of speculations with little empirical evidence based in research. This has given way for the growth of go-to experts that are not necessarily scholarly

⁵² See *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Volume 26, Issue 4, published online 28 March 2014. The bulk of the issue is dedicated to comments and responses to Marc Sageman's article in the same issue, "The Stagnation of Terrorism Studies".

⁵³ Sageman, M. 2014. "The Stagnation of Terrorism Research", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(4): 565-580.

trained.⁵⁴ While these go-to experts may have produced great descriptive narratives about terrorists and their organisations, they have not provided analytical progress to further our understanding of terrorist attacks. Sageman makes a key observation in pointing out that some of the greatest advances in the field to date have been made by those conducting *historical archive studies* and *empirical field interviews*.⁵⁵ The vital take away from this is that there is an evident need for more scholarly research and empirical research in particular.

Sageman also highlights the fact how the field after 9/11 has been “dominated by laymen, who controlled the funding, prioritizing it according to their own questions” setting the discourse and direction of terrorism research based on particular political agendas.⁵⁶ Thus, not only have the academic scholars been withheld from vital data, they also have been focussing on conducting terrorism research based on agenda-setting by governments, i. e. the government producing the research questions, rather than the other way around (which ideally provides the ethical basis for how research should be conducted). Subsequently, the field has been deluded by speculations and political agendas and it is only in the last couple of years that this has started to become rectified as the scholarly research projects and publications have started yielding ground.

In light of the many valid arguments made by Sageman, he has also been criticised on his assumptions on the progress of TS. One of these critiques states that it is misguided to be talking about the progress of terrorism research in terms of ‘stagnation’, as the prelude to any ’stagnation’ is a bloom, and prior to 9/11 there has never been a bloom within the field, since TS first began in the 1970s.⁵⁷

Another criticism deals with the fact that Sageman likens the inability to account for terrorist radicalization with evidence of wider stagnation in the field.⁵⁸ Jessica Stern points to a few fallacies in this position: i) most scholars address risk factors on the

⁵⁴ Sageman, M. 2014; Schanzer, D. H. 2014.

⁵⁵ Sageman, M. 2014: 565.

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 566.

⁵⁷ With a few exceptions, see Schmid, A. P. in “Comments on Marc Sageman’s Polemic “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 0:1-9, 2014.

⁵⁸ Stern, J. “Response to Marc Sageman’s “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26:607-613, 2014.

societal level and not on the individual level, meaning you could not possibly achieve a “consensus answer” to Sageman’s question; ii) questions of individual decision-making tend to resist categorical classifications, as it is next to impossible to make gross generalisations about what “leads individuals to do what they do in *any* area of life”.⁵⁹ Similarly, David H. Schanzer highlights that Sageman’s search for a *universal* explanation for all forms of political violence is futile.⁶⁰ Despite such critiques, while Sageman’s basis for claims of stagnation in the field of terrorism research might be misguided, it has still drawn attention to an important issue⁶¹ and a discussion on the current field of research, which in turn has generated some guidance and consensus as to where the field of TS currently stands.

One such consensus is that if better data were available for scholars, the data would also presumably be more reliable. In this sense, Stern also highlights that one of Sageman’s greatest contributions to the field is his suggestion of more collaboration between intelligence and academia. As Sageman explains, the current “structure of the funding and exaggerated security concerns ensure that the gap between these two communities and their respective cultures is unbridgeable without any possibility of fruitful interchange.”⁶² Stern suggests that one way to overcome this is to create a ‘reserve intelligence force’.⁶³ This would enable governments to bring in specialists on a short notice, and then send them back to the private sector when their expertise is no longer required. However, this would also mean that academics would be called in for their expertise, however would not in turn entitle them to further research in the sense that they would have access to the data other than while in that temporary intelligence force.

Max Taylor points to a key distinction neglected in the debate, arguing that equating the tasks of academics and intelligence analysts is problematic⁶⁴:

It is true that both study terrorism, but you might argue to different ends. The academic is (or should be) characterised by independence and a striving for knowledge, without fear or favour,

⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 607.

⁶⁰ Schanzer, D. H. 2014: 598.

⁶¹ Stern, J. 2014: 611.

⁶² Sageman, M. 2014: 573.

⁶³ Stern, J. 2014: 611.

⁶⁴ Taylor, M. 2014: 582.

and at best guided as professionals by the principle of “*Primum non nocere*” (understanding which being a major element of evidence-led enquiry and a central element of the independence of the academic from government control)... The analyst in contrast is a government employee, tasked with certain specific, narrow, and defined advisory roles related to applying knowledge bounded by legally enforceable security clearance constraints... Put starkly, is it in fact the job of the academic to help control terrorism as Sageman suggests, or is the academics’ job the task of understanding terrorism as a social problem? If it is the former, then as noted earlier Sageman is probably right that we (collectively) haven’t achieved that objective. If the latter, however, we might have been very successful in progressing understanding, but still not have controlled terrorism.⁶⁵

Taylor further explains that control strategies – the operational task of analysts – do not automatically follow just by gaining insights into the causes of social problems. Taylor highlights how “the perspective taken by Sageman is one that privileges the intelligence community as the primary audience for knowledge generation.”⁶⁶ For Taylor it is the contrary:

[A]cademic knowledge must always be privileged over practical intervention, because innovation and effective intervention if evidenced based depends upon knowledge generation, not the other way around. And policy, national interest, and administrative convenience are characterised by an unerring quality of transience – the influence of “here today, gone tomorrow politicians”. A remedy to our problems lying in a *deus ex apparatus*, from the intelligence community or the political establishment, is unlikely.⁶⁷

Taylor concludes that Sageman’s agenda of trying to understand and prevent a person’s “turn to terrorism” is a fitting one, however, he rejects the idea of it being shaped in the context of intelligence analysis. Instead, he suggests, the focus should be on overcoming the current structural problems around how terrorism research is organised in universities, which, according to him, is inhibiting a coherent body of knowledge. Although the need for interdisciplinary research is well acknowledged it is often difficult to achieve due to organisational and discipline issues. Schanzer goes even further by suggesting that governments should pool available funds into creating one administrative structure gathering the most outstanding terrorism scholars: like a

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 583.

⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 584.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

think-tank which would pay researchers salaries for at least five years and thereby able to generate “the most robust data sets possible”.⁶⁸

In summary, Sageman’s polemic and the subsequent response it has generated, has brought to the forefront a range of issues facing the current field of TS. It has highlighted that TS originate long before the events of 9/11 but that there has been a surge in both scholarly and non-scholarly research since due to government funding for the purpose of controlling the issue; that the CT-policies since have largely failed and the threat posed by terrorism is greater than before; that academia and intelligence need to share data for furthering our understanding however under the vital understanding that these two spheres work towards different ends. One of the most important insights, provided by the discussion, is the underpinning view on who should ultimately be doing the agenda setting for terrorism research.

Based on the above observations in regards to some of the practical problems plaguing the field of TS, this dissertation will contribute to the field in a number of ways. Firstly, it will add to the debate on the issues of agenda-setting and framing of terrorism and CT. In this sense, it will delve into the meaning-making practices and shared understandings of terrorism and CT, particularly those provided by the local communities affected by terrorism, unlocking understandings of how local resilience to terrorism arises in an organic setting.

It will also add to the TS field by providing empirical research including primary sources using ethnographical methods for data collection and interviews with victims of terrorism as well as other affected communities. As identified by Taylor, victims have not figured prolifically when it comes to developing CT policy and are important for reasons based in moral and duty: victims voices hear through civil society and are necessary to counterbalance the other voices.⁶⁹

Furthermore, the dissertation will focus on how terrorism affects societies as opposed to why people become terrorists, addressing the lack identified by Tim Wilson:

⁶⁸ Schanzer, D. H. 2014: 599.

⁶⁹ Points made at a keynote by Max Taylor at the ‘Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence – The roles of Victims and Perpetrators’ conference in Cork on March 30, 2015.

“[g]enesis, and not aftermath, has tended to dominate the study of terrorism”.⁷⁰ In this sense, it will be an important contribution to the body of knowledge to further our understanding on “how both whole societies, and their individual members, cope afterwards”:

We know relatively little about the long-term social resonance of the terroristic violence that so preoccupies our governments, our media and, indeed, ourselves... For far too long the academic study of the aftermath of terrorism has been ... a subject area characterised by highly suggestive silence and evasion.⁷¹

Finally, it will contribute towards a sub-field of TS, that of the existing academic body of knowledge on CVE, as the field of CVE has been identified to be profuse in practice-led initiatives and policy programs around the globe however concurrently epitomises a field which is still very much lacking in academic scholarship.

Responding to terrorism – from CT to P/CVE

This section will explore the shift within CT from mainly reactionary responses to more preventative responses, in particular those preventative approaches that are now labelled under the umbrella terms of preventing violent extremism (PVE) and countering violent extremism (CVE). In this sense it will locate the use of counter-narratives in the CT-field in order to comprehend the bigger picture in terms of responding to the issue of terrorism.

Counter-terrorism (CT)

As a direct result of the 9/11 attacks, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006.⁷² Whereas previous UN measures had predominantly been introduced by the Security Council, fuelled by a security perspective, the 2006 Global Strategy broadened the existing definition by including issues of development and human rights, while calling for measures which focus on

⁷⁰ Wilson, T. 2018. “Preface”, in Lynch, O. & Argomaniz, J. “Victims and Perpetrators of Terrorism”, p. vii.

⁷¹ Ibid., pp. vii-viii.

⁷² ‘United Nations General Assembly Adopts Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, *United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml>

prevention and capacity building.⁷³ The aim of the strategy is to integrate different pillars of CT policies to guarantee a more comprehensive approach to terrorism. However, as van Ginkel underlines, this positive development in policymaking has been impeded in the implementation process as it only applies to UN entities – not civil society actors.⁷⁴

When investigating national responses to terrorism, Keith L. Shimko identifies two different strategies that have emerged in the post-September 11 debate: the *cosmopolitan* approach and the *statist* approach.⁷⁵ The cosmopolitan approach, which resonates with liberal, marxist/radical and feminist thought, views terrorist attacks as criminal acts against humanity as a whole, requiring a legal and international response that also addresses the root causes of terrorism. The statist approach, on the other hand, treats terrorist attacks as acts of war that might require military responses against terrorist organisations but also against the states that support them. According to this viewpoint, terrorism is rooted in a fundamental conflict of values.

The American ‘War on Terror’ (WoT) response that followed after 9/11 can largely be interpreted as a *statist approach*. This is a reflection of how variations in different nation’s professional and political cultures as well as core values determine the direction of preferred prevention strategies for CT, as illustrated by Tore Bjorgo:

The USA, which has both an enormous military capacity and a certain cultural tradition of resolving problems through the use of violence, focused in its “War on Terror” on incapacitation and deterrence through the use of military force – both to crush terror organisations physically (“kill or capture”) and to deter individuals and states from supporting terrorists. In Europe, the authorities have placed far greater importance on preventing terrorism by addressing the root causes behind the growth of terrorism and attempting to intervene in radicalisation processes. To the degree they employ incapacitation and deterrence, most European countries prefer to rely on the police and criminal justice system rather than military force.⁷⁶

⁷³ Van Ginkel, B. 2012. “Engaging Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism: Experiences with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague*, p. 1.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Shimko, K. L. 2008. *International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies*, 2nd ed., pp. 318-330.

⁷⁶ Bjorgo, T. 2013. *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism*, p. 25.

However, as it became evident that the WoT response's one-sided focus on "strategies based on the use of military force, repression and control" has been counter-productive, more comprehensive long-term strategies have been explored⁷⁷ and a marked shift in CT policy was witnessed in 2006.⁷⁸ The shift was part of a recognition that military means alone cannot win the conflict against terrorism and that other means, including diplomatic, economic and political, should be pursued in the fight against terrorism.⁷⁹ In this sense, in the post-WoT period⁸⁰, as it became obvious that a more *ideational* approach – i.e. one dealing with ideas and concepts that instigate terrorism and VE – was required, an understanding that a "balance between the short-term, repressive and controlling strategies and the more long-term, constructive strategies" is key for an effective overall strategy.⁸¹

In this context, it is vital to comprehend that the theoretical framework for conceptualising CT has its origins in the school of thought of IR and politics where CT approaches have been interpreted in terms of the notion of 'power'.⁸² In this sense, 'power' becomes the ability to "affect others to obtain the outcomes you want"⁸³, and can be achieved by using 'hard power' measures such as coercion and/or payment, or through 'soft power' measures such as attraction.⁸⁴ Subsequently, the 'soft power' side of CT has recently come to encompass various measures such as

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

⁷⁸ An endnote of Bjorgo's reads: "A marked shift in policy occurred in the Bush administration in 2006 when the limitations of a one-sided military strategy approach to the problem of terrorism were realised. A search for alternatives commenced, such as addressing the root causes of terrorism, trying to "turn" groups involved in insurgency and terrorism, and developing "counter-narratives"."

⁷⁹ Fox, R. 2005. "Gwot is history. Now for Save: After the Global War on Terror comes Struggle Againsts Violent Extremism", *New Statesman*, published August 8.

⁸⁰ The notion of 'post-WoT' is somewhat misleading given that the notion of a War on Terror is still recurrent within discourses on terrorism.

⁸¹ Bjorgo, T. 2013: 3.

⁸² Nasser-Eddine, M., B. Garnham, K. Agostino and G. Caluya. 2011. "Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review", *Defence Science and Technology Organisation*, p. 18.

⁸³ Nye, J., 2009: 160.

⁸⁴ For a more detailed discussion on the hard and soft power dimensions of CT and CVE, please see Aly, A., A. Balbi & C. Jacques, 2015, "Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism: Implementing the role of civil society", *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 10(1): 3-13.

“deradicalisation programmes, education, development programmes, conflict management, community empowerment and counter-narratives”.⁸⁵

In the last two decades or so following 9/11 governments have spent an enormous amount of money on *reacting* to terrorism.⁸⁶ These efforts have largely focussed on military operations, “including pre-emption and targeted killings or the disruption of terrorist activities by intelligence-led operations”.⁸⁷ As Schmid denotes, although these responses have at times been conducted under the umbrella of *prevention* there are clear indicators that these very same actions have motivated rather than thwarted terrorist activities.⁸⁸

Exploring the shift to more preventative CT strategies, researchers have identified a specific point in time where the language of a ‘GWOT’ was replaced by a new one.⁸⁹ Less than a month prior to the London bombings in July 2005, there was a summit at the Special Operations Command Headquarters in Florida, US, where the US along with its allies met to discuss the new anti-terror approach.⁹⁰ At this summit, US senior officials “announced that the Global War on Terror, or Gwot, was over. In its place has come Save, the Struggle Against Violent Extremism”.⁹¹ This was essentially the prelude to the shift of more comprehensive preventative strategies that currently subsist under the terminology of P/CVE.⁹²

⁸⁵ Aly et al., 2015: 5.

⁸⁶ Schmid, A. P. in Bjorgo, T. 2013: vii.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011.

⁹⁰ Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011:9.

⁹¹ Fox, R. 2005. “Gwot is history. Now for Save: After the Global War on Terror comes the Struggle Against Violent Extremism”, *New Statesman*, published 8th August.

⁹² As this dissertation is being written there currently exists definitional confusion between PVE and CVE. Bibi van Ginkel explains: “The concept of PVE was introduced to distinguish certain policies from the more repressive trend that had developed as a consequence of a certain interpretation of the countering violent extremism (CVE) policies”, in van Ginkel, B. 2018. “Countering and Preventing the Threat of Terrorism and Violent Extremism”, *CIDOB*, p. 33.

Soft counter-terrorism strategies - CVE

Following the recognition of the need for more multi-faceted approaches to CT and multi-disciplinary research into terrorism, the field of CT has evolved rapidly. While CT efforts have traditionally been concerned with the ‘how’ of terrorism, mainly focusing on policing or military strategies for neutralising the capability for terrorism and on crisis management⁹³, more recently, they have also been concerned with the ‘why’ of terrorism, introducing new ways to analyse terrorism allowing for greater emphasis on the notion of intent and motivation. This shift in focus for CT strategies has allowed governments to explore more ‘soft’ approaches incorporating measures targeting social reform such as community capacity building.⁹⁴ Soft CT approaches have yielded new ground in the field of TS by underscoring the need to address the perpetrators’ intent and deal with the actual root causes of terrorism.⁹⁵ This softer approach has resulted in a number of national programs, often under the label of *countering violent extremism* (CVE), currently present in both Muslim and non-Muslim majority states.⁹⁶

As CVE has emerged to the forefront of CT responses, illustrated by the many practice-led programs initiated, the field is still lacking in academic scholarship.⁹⁷ Defining CVE has proved difficult given that the notion developed within the policy sphere rather than academia⁹⁸, and has a tendency to stand “as a phenomenon that is both self evident and taken for granted”.⁹⁹ The notion is often used in the context of strategies that aim to either prevent or respond to violence, “with recommendations for policy rather than on understanding how ‘countering violent extremism’ is constituted and emerges in particular ways”.¹⁰⁰

⁹³ Aly, A. 2011, *Terrorism and Global Security – Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, p. 17.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 18.

⁹⁵ Ibid.; Kydd and Walter, ‘The Strategies of Terrorism’, in M.E. Brown, O.R.Jr. Cote and S. E. Miller, (eds.) *Contending with Terrorism: Roots, Strategies and Responses*, (Harvard: Mit Press, 2010), pp. 93-123.

⁹⁶ Combes, W.S. 2013.

⁹⁷ Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 9.

⁹⁸ Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 16.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

The lack of a robust theoretical anchoring in academia has resulted in CVE measures with little evidence-basis:

The first concerns the lack of empirical knowledge about the root causes and drivers of violent extremism. This lacuna has led to conceptual confusion about CVE. It is difficult to design an effective policy when there is little consensus on what it means to counter violent extremism or what actions might be taken to do so. Consequently, CVE efforts are mostly designed and funded on the basis of anecdotal evidence, with unknown results.¹⁰¹

The terms VE and CVE are mutually constitutive; i.e. the ways in which we conceptualise VE¹⁰² will inform CVE, and vice versa.¹⁰³ One of the main critiques of CVE has been that it has too often been delivered through a ‘hard power’ lens, as illustrated in the below

CVE offers a mechanism for encouraging exchange between government, academia and civil society by shifting the focus of CT on to prevention and interruption and conceptualising VE as a social issue with security implications (as opposed to a security issue with social implications). The potential for CVE to deliver effective outcomes requires that the prevailing CVE discourse be unconstrained from the currently hegemonic CT connotations. A broader more open discourse emancipates CVE from the constraints of hard-focused CT and its derivative assumptions about drivers of VE. When VE is understood as a social phenomenon, as opposed to a security issue, its response CVE is open to strategies, practices and actors that have previously been excluded or marginalised from CT.¹⁰⁴

In this sense, one may overcome the highlighted issue above by Bibi van Ginkel of UN regulation only applying to UN entities, as one of the overall key tenets of CVE strategies has been the underscoring of the role of *civil society* in combatting terrorism and VE.¹⁰⁵ As the issue of VE and terrorism has evolved into one increasingly characterised by transnational networks and non-state actors, the identified solution for targeting it has been a multi-level approach, including global, state and local actors. As a result, local communities and bottom-up approaches have been highlighted both within CT¹⁰⁶ and CVE¹⁰⁷ efforts. The result has been exploring

¹⁰¹ McKenzie, R. L. 2016.

¹⁰² For a more in-depth analysis on the role of violence in human affairs please see Hannah Arendt, 1970. *On Violence*, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

¹⁰³ Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 16.

¹⁰⁴ Aly et al. 2015: 9.

¹⁰⁵ Aly et al. 2015.

¹⁰⁶ Centre for New American Strategy called “Defeating the Islamic State – A Bottom-Up Approach”, <http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNASReport-ISIS-Final.pdf>

tangible ways in which community engagement and local resilience can support CVE efforts stemming from the local level up.

Community engagement and local resilience

Given the recent global influx of CVE strategies highlighting the role of civil society it can be difficult to discern a starting point for examining the field. However, the prevalence and prominence of the UK PREVENT program in the literature makes the UK case a useful basis. This section will explore the key elements of *community engagement* and *local resilience* in the context of CVE.

While 9/11 produced a CT response looking outwards in light of what was perceived as an international, foreign and highly coordinated threat, the London bombings of 7th July 2005, resulted in a CT response looking inwards as it turned out that the attackers were ‘home-grown’. Although the British Security Services had preempted that a home-grown threat was probable, the 9/11 attacks had swung the CT efforts to focus on threats from overseas.¹⁰⁸ This all changed in light of the 7/7 attacks and a community-based approach once again became centre stage.

A community-based approach to CT in the UK is nothing new; in fact, such an approach has provided the basis for cases such as the conflict in Northern Ireland more recently.¹⁰⁹ After the 7/7 attacks the British government – in addition to exceeding funds for intelligence and policing agencies to interdict planned attacks and intercept terrorist cells – has acknowledged “the need to work in partnership with Muslim communities to prevent young people from being radicalized in the first place, and to ensure that communities were resilient enough to respond to, and challenge, extremists from within.”¹¹⁰ In light of a more “localized and community-led approach” the Preventing Extremism Together (PET) Taskforce was established in August 2005 and provided the first manifestation of such an approach.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Aly et al, 2015.

¹⁰⁸ Briggs, R. 2010. “Community engagement for counterterrorism: lessons from the United Kingdom”, *International Affairs*, 86(2): p. 971.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 971.

¹¹¹Ibid.

Investigating the UK case Rachel Briggs concludes that much progress has been made since PET was established, particularly with the ‘Prevent’ strand of the government’s CT strategy of CONTEST, as it has advanced to be delivered by local authorities, community organisations and other groups.¹¹² The progress aside, Briggs also points to the problems with attempts to implement such an approach:

The many arms of the state continue to struggle with the principles and practicalities of partnership with non-state actors on matters relating to security and counterterrorism; mixed messages about the importance of community engagement have emerged from different government departments; local authorities on the whole have poor or non-existent relationships with Muslim communities, with an inevitable negative impact on their ability to deliver; and attempts to act on these difficult and sensitive policy priorities are being made in a hostile media and political environment.¹¹³

In terms of the rationale for community engagement in CT, Briggs highlights four ways in which communities can contribute towards an effective CT strategy.¹¹⁴ This is based on the realisation that “the terrorist threat comes from a tiny and marginal minority, but these individuals are integrated within their communities and not, on the whole, loners working on their own”.¹¹⁵ Using the case of UK, the first role has been one in which the community functions as an ‘alerting system’: “[i]f terrorists are well integrated, communities may be able to act as an early warning system for the police and intelligence services should they come across information or have concerns about particular individuals or groups.”¹¹⁶ Briggs points to the “long tradition of public involvement in crime prevention” with groups such as Crimestoppers.¹¹⁷ Similar to other crimes, specific hotlines for people to call and report potential terrorist activity have been established.

Secondly, Briggs comments how communities can act as bottom-up prevention against youth radicalization. While there are a number of possible contributing factors

¹¹² Briggs, R. 2010: 971. Briggs notes how funding for the Prevent strand of CONTEST has increased from £6 million per year in 2006 to £140 million in 2008/9.

¹¹³ Briggs, R. 2010: 972.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. For more information about Crimestoppers, see www.crimestoppers-uk.org or www.crimestoppers.com.au

for radicalization, engaging communities in the preventive work plays a crucial role in averting youth from harm. Thirdly, Briggs highlights how communities have the capacity to “tackle the grievances”, both “real and perceived”, that “allow terrorists’ messages to resonate” more broadly within the targeted audiences – both those who they hope to “commit, support or incite terrorism” but also those “in whose name terrorists purport to act”:

This is not only important for terrorists in providing justifications for their murderous acts, but also crucial if they are to drive a wedge between ordinary people and their governments and law enforcement agencies, and thus undermine counterterrorism efforts. If the government is to gain the confidence of Muslim communities, it must work hard to maintain the moral high ground and show it is committed to tackling the injustices faced by Muslims both here and abroad.¹¹⁸

Fourth, Briggs highlights the ‘principle of policing through consent’.¹¹⁹ This principle applies to CT just like any other area of law enforcement, and given that the threat from Al-Qaeda is “determined to cause maximum damage without warning” Briggs highlights how the police have to maintain trust within the communities while the threat from Al-Qaeda simultaneously presupposes intervening early, increasing the likelihood of mistakes.¹²⁰ In the UK case, this has become a precarious balancing act.

When examining the evolution of the community engagement in CT in the UK following 7/7, Briggs identifies a number of developments that have come to shape the engagement: the Preventing Extremism Together (PET) initiative¹²¹; the exit of Tony Blair from government; the roll-out of the Prevent programme; and the publication of the updated CONTEST strategy in March 2009.¹²² The PET initiative

¹¹⁸ Briggs, R. 2010: 973.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid., pp. 973-974.

¹²¹ According to Briggs, the PET initiative was established in the aftermath of 7/7 and involved ministerial visits to nine towns, including discussions with over 1000 Muslims. Various working groups were convened on a number of themes: engaging with young people; providing a full range of education services, in the UK, that meet the needs of the Muslim community; engaging with Muslim women; supporting regional and local initiatives and community actions; the training and accreditation of imams, and the role of mosques as a resource for the whole community; security – covering Islamophobia, protecting Muslims from extremism, and community confidence in policing; and tackling extremism and radicalization.

¹²² Ibid., p. 974.

was subject to criticism for being “rushed, government-led and filled with the usual suspects” while some also accused it of being lip service. Briggs denotes how the UK government has been “recovering from this ill-fated attempt at partnership ever since.”¹²³

Although the UK government recognised the need for new policy on community engagement, Briggs highlights how Tony Blair was “so personally associated with the Iraq war”, a major source of anger among the Muslim communities, foreign policy became the “elephant in the room”.¹²⁴ It was only after Tony Blair had left the office, that the new Gordon Brown government could start ‘afresh’ and successfully try a new approach. Briggs highlights another important development, the launch of the national ‘Prevent’ strategy in 2008, which enabled the embracing of the concept of “a decentralized approach”.¹²⁵ This meant that local authorities would “build on their existing work to engage communities, forge partnerships with the police, community and faith groups, and work with mosques and educational institutions”.¹²⁶ The final development was the revised CT strategy in March 2009, which effectively shifted focus from targeting *VE* to challenging *extremism* more broadly.¹²⁷

Briggs identifies a number of deficiencies that need to be addressed though: i) for communities to be able to fully realize their potential role as part of CT/CVE/PVE “they need to do so as trusted, equal and respected partners of local authorities, the police and other agencies”.¹²⁸ In this sense they also need to be provided opportunities to “share knowledge and information, and work alongside statutory bodies in making decisions about how to best respond to local needs”¹²⁹ ii) furthermore, for effective partnership the involved stakeholders need “a shared understanding of the problem and how to best respond”.¹³⁰

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid, p. 975.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Briggs, R. 2010: 976.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 977.

Additionally, iii) the local authorities ability to deliver the CVE agenda of ‘Prevent’ has been identified as an issue. Local authorities have often identified this and contracted external consultants “to conduct community mapping and community needs assessments, rather than using these opportunities to build and develop their own relationships with local communities”.¹³¹ Finally, iv) the overall negative media reporting about Muslims has affected the manner “in which Muslim communities view efforts at engagement”. However, Briggs does identify that towards this backdrop, targeted “efforts have been made to ensure government messages are inclusive rather than divisive, stressing the fact that terrorism is a criminal act rather than a religious one, and that we all need to work together to tackle it”.¹³²

One of the key final recommendations that Briggs provides is identifying that bottom-up approaches should not ‘instrumentalise’ essential partners and institutions:

Community development workers, teachers, social workers and mental health practitioners are not counterterrorism practitioners, although they undoubtedly have a contribution to make. However, in order to play their role they do not have to form part of the ‘official’ response, be recipients of government funding, or operate under the control of the state’s security architecture. Establishing a comfortable ‘arm’s length’ relationship between the state and these institutions and professionals runs counter to the top-down way that security policy has tended to be managed, but to instrumentalize their work would be to neuter their potential contribution anyway. Government needs to persuade rather than instruct, and to work in partnership rather than through control.¹³³

Briggs further concludes that communities are the “long-term solution to terrorism, but they need to grow into this role organically and in a way that does not merely serve to open up divisions and tensions elsewhere”.¹³⁴ Furthermore, the Prevent Strategy provides a crucial statement in regards to the role that the community can play in countering terrorism:

When people have a say in the design and delivery of public service, those services better meet their needs. Places where local people have the opportunities, skills and confidence to come together and address the problems they face are more likely to resolve them.¹³⁵

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 978.

¹³² Ibid., p. 979.

¹³³ Briggs, 2010: 981.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ HM Government, *The Prevent Strategy: a guide for local partners in England*, p. 2.

Therefore engaging those who are best equipped to solve the issues becomes key. Similarly, Anja Dalgaard and Patrick Schack have explored the role of *resilience* within the CVE field. As part of a more prevention oriented approach to tackling terrorism and VE governments around the world have increasingly emphasized “the need to partner with and to empower local communities and local government in efforts to prevent, limit and push back against extremism”.¹³⁶

The authors identify certain major pillars that figure across national policy initiatives for resilience: “outreach to, dialogue with, and provision of CVE knowledge to communities and community leaders”.¹³⁷ This is based on the fact that researchers have increasingly highlighted the role of civil society in CVE¹³⁸, as opposed to government-centric attempts to counter extremist propaganda, with the argument that including those on the local level will provide a more legitimate approach.¹³⁹

The pillars of outreach and educating those on the local level alone, however, is insufficient:

Researchers have generally welcomed the increased focus on communities and civil society. They argue that government-centric attempts to counter extremist propaganda lack credibility and that communities and local government have a better feel for what it takes locally to counter the attraction of extremist networks. They also caution that a commitment to outreach is not enough and point out that government authorities need to make more of an effort to get to know individual communities, to differentiate, and to build trust.¹⁴⁰

Though ‘resilience’ has gained traction in the CVE-field, the actual definition remains imprecise. In the CVE context little empirical research exists on ‘resilience’¹⁴¹, and Dalgaard-Nielsen and Schack point to the fact that if governments are to engage local resources and actors a better understanding of the phenomenon is a prerequisite.¹⁴²

Originally adopted from the field of natural sciences and systems theory, where it has been used “to denote a material or a system’s ability to regain equilibrium following a

¹³⁶ Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016, “Community Resilience to Militant Islamism”, p. 309.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Aly et al. 2015, “Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism”; Heinke, D. H. 2017, “Who leads and who does what?”.

¹³⁹ Aly et al. 2015.

¹⁴⁰ Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016, “Community Resilience to Militant Islamism”, p. 310.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

disturbance”,¹⁴³ ‘resilience’ when transferred or translated to the field of social sciences

it is in the broadest sense and with numerous variations used to capture an individual’s, an organization’s, or a society’s ability to continue to function in the face of adversity, to restore normalcy, to learn, find solutions, and move on.¹⁴⁴

Applying it to the field of CVE, Dalgaard-Nielsen and Schack provide a definition that is largely framed within a framework of radicalisation and militant Islamism,

A tentative working definition of community resilience to violent extremism might then be a community’s ability to leverage social capital understood as the existence of stable trust-based relationships and networks among the actors (civil society, local government, local businesses) to detect radicalization risks, prevent the recruitment of community members into violent extremism, and bounce back after instances of recruitment via learning and adaptability that permits the community to better limit future recruitment.¹⁴⁵

Another important key study on resilience in the CVE context identifies resilience as

a collective effort to go back to normal after a disastrous event, emergency or challenge and face the future with confidence. In the aftermath of a terrorist atrocity, resilient cities can demonstrate they constitute strong and cohesive communities which are confident of their values and lifestyle and refuse to make concessions to those using brutal methods. In short, single event disasters put to the test the defences of a city, but also its social fabric.¹⁴⁶

Yet another definition of resilience against VE states “a society capability of resistance against those extremist ideologies able to influence the behaviour of significant parts of the population in today’s cities”.¹⁴⁷

Based on the above conceptions, and particularly the focus on the communities’/cities’ ability to ‘go back to normal’; to leverage *social capital, their values and the social fabric*, as well as *refuse to make concessions to terrorists*, the

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 312.

¹⁴⁶ Muro, D. (ed.) 2017. “Resilient Cities: Countering Violent Extremism at Local Level”, *CIDOB*, p. 13.

¹⁴⁷ Heinke, D. H. 2017. “Who leads and who does what? Multi-agency coordination, community engagement, and public-private partnerships”, in Muro, D. (Ed.) “Resilient Cities: Countering Violent Extremism”, *CIDOB*, p. 81.

focus in identifying local resilience will be exploring the *social capital* and *trust-based networks* as identified by Dalgaard-Nielsen and Schack in their conclusions:

given that trust-based networks emerge as central to community resilience, local government skills in building and facilitating multicultural and cross-sector networks may be just as important as the CVE education that currently constitutes a key pillar of national strategies.¹⁴⁸

Conclusively, reviewing the key concepts/deficiencies as well as steps forward for effective *community engagement* and for building *local resilience* to VE two key concepts have emerged: *Trust/trustbased networks between key stakeholders* and *a shared understanding of the problem and how to best respond to it*. These two concepts become key for exploring the role of the affected communities in the case studies.

Therefore, in the work on CVE in general, building and facilitating multicultural and cross-sector networks is key. In this sense, the *local resilience* that takes shape through *performative acts* can provide for authentic *counter-narratives*. The two retrieved concepts and factors of *trust/trustbased networks between key stakeholders* and *a shared understanding of the problem and how to best respond to it* will be further developed and explored in the forthcoming conceptual framework section and then operationalised for analysis in Chapter 4, *Finding meaning at terror attack sites* and Chapter 5, *CT as collective action*.

Terrorism as communication

Based on the above discussion of engaging local community and local resilience in CVE, this section will localise the dissertation within the chosen framework of ‘terrorism as communication’. In order to understand the use of counter-narratives it will first explore the communicative aspects of terrorism and CT, as well as how counter-narrative efforts have evolved to date, identifying key developments plus possible flaws and areas for further study within the academic body of knowledge in CVE and particularly that on the use of counter-narratives.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 321.

Defining ‘terrorism’

As already observed, the term ‘terrorism’ is a contested concept¹⁴⁹ and requires a conceptual approach in order to be applied in empirical research. Given that the research objective revolves around terrorism in the context of *how* one should respond to it – i.e. the response problem – it will seek to explore a definition that fits in the aforementioned framework. Given the limitations of exploring the particular method of *counter-narratives* for combatting terrorist narratives, a *communicative* approach becomes valid.

Exploring Western responses to terrorism, Alex P. Schmid conducts a useful discussion around what constitutes ‘terrorism’ in the sense of ‘the response problem as a definition problem’.¹⁵⁰ He notes how the definition will vary from “society to society, from government to government” and even between academics themselves.¹⁵¹ To better understand the complexity of the term and its usage, he identifies four useful arenas of discourse on ‘terrorism’: i) the academic discourse; ii) the state’s statements; iii) the public debate on terrorism; iv) the discussion of those who oppose many of our societies’ values and support or perform acts of violence and terrorism against what they consider repressive states.¹⁵²

In order to overcome the cliché definitional dilemma of ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’,¹⁵³ Schmid outlines the four arenas of discourse

- i.) an academic one (where a consensus definition is offered)
- ii.) a state discourse (where definitions are generally wide and vague)
- iii.) a public one (as reflected in the media’s usage of the term ‘terrorism’)
- iv.) and, finally, that of the ‘terrorists’ and their sympathisers (where the focus is on political ends, while avoiding a discussion of means).

In more recent work, Schmid has provided a useful conceptual framework for terrorism which identifies five different approaches to the phenomenon: i) terrorism as/and crime; ii) terrorism as/and politics; iii) terrorism as/and warfare; iv) terrorism

¹⁴⁹ Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011:1-2.

¹⁵⁰ Schmid, A. P in Schmid & Crelinsten (eds.) 1993. *Western Responses to Terrorism*, pp. 7-13.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁵² Schmid & Crelinsten, 1993, pp. 7-8.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 7.

as/and communication; v) terrorism as/and religious fundamentalism.¹⁵⁴ Given that this dissertation will be focussing on discourses surrounding terrorism – including the meaning-making process of CT – the above four arenas together with the fourth conceptual framework for terrorism, *as/and communication*, will be used for the conceptual framework of this dissertation. In adopting the communicative approach the following is acknowledged

[t]errorism has been situated – and thereby implicitly also defined – in various contexts such as crime, politics, war, propaganda and religion. Depending on which framework one chooses, certain aspects of terrorism get exposed while others are placed ‘outside the picture’ if only one framework is utilised.¹⁵⁵

Terrorism and CT as communication

As CT efforts have gradually shifted focus to the ‘soft power’ dimensions constituting P/CVE, grappling with the actual *ideas* that instigate acts of political violence, scholars have increasingly revisited the communicative aspects of terrorism. After 9/11 there has been a different kind of awareness of terrorism, where the apparent omnipresence has been closely linked with the evolution of both traditional and social media. The disposal of media platforms and the various means by which they operate has had a substantial impact on the nature of media coverage of terrorism, not to mention the consumption of this information by the public.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, as Beatrice de Graaf observes, “[g]lobal discourse on terrorism has become much more inflammatory and militant since 9/11 as compared to previous decades”.¹⁵⁷

To this backdrop, in the age of globalisation, it has become easier to convey constructed narratives – also referred to as so called *universal truths* and *master- and metanarratives* – which are used in order to justify and attract people to the use of

¹⁵⁴ Schmid, A. P. 2004. “Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism”, *Terrorism and Political Science*, 16(2): 197-221.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 197.

¹⁵⁶ Jenkins, B. M. 2006. “The New Age of Terrorism”, in Kamien, D. (ed.) *McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook*.

¹⁵⁷ de Graaf, 2011. “Why Communication and Performance are Key in Counter Terrorism”, *ICCT The Hague*, p. 7.

VE.¹⁵⁸ As de Graaf observes in relation to the jihadist threat post-9/11, governments “face a terrorist threat that – in its narrative and its ideology at least – is more global than it ever was”.¹⁵⁹ In this sense, “foreign ‘injustice frames’ that inspire new waves of radicalisation at home are being imported from abroad by local radical movements”.¹⁶⁰

Particularly in light of the so-called Islamic State’s (IS) effective use of its propaganda tools, such as social media, to disseminate its narrative, the communicative sides of terrorism and CT have gradually shifted to the forefront of CT efforts.¹⁶¹ The body of knowledge on narratives suggests that countering the narratives of terror groups is vital as it brings new recruits.¹⁶² Ultimately, IS’ propaganda and the narrative it postulates are derivative from Al-Qaeda. The quality and quantity of IS’ propaganda have raised questions of how governments should respond, as noted by the Quilliam Foundation¹⁶³:

[i]t is in psychological terms, though, that IS has truly transformed the state of play. Its vast propaganda operation is unrivalled, involving devoted media teams from West Africa to Afghanistan who work relentlessly, day and night, in the production and dissemination of the ‘caliphate’ brand. So far, most of our attempts to meaningfully mitigate IS’s ability to globally engage have been left floundering.¹⁶⁴

In this sense, as part of a more comprehensive and prevention-oriented CT approach in the form of CVE, there has been a newfound perception of the communicative aspects, i.e. the ways in which we frame, not only terrorism but also CT. For a long period researchers and policy-makers have had a single-handed focus on the

¹⁵⁸ Schmid, A. P. 2014; Kinnvall, C. 2014: Jurgensmeyer for example speaks about “shared perceptions of oppression” in his 2003 book, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. For more on metanarratives, please see J. Lee 2012. “Metanarratives and the Perversity in the War on Terror”, *The Monitor: Journal of International Studies*, 17(2): 55-64.

¹⁵⁹ de Graaf, 2011: 6.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ “Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Framework for Countering Violent Extremism”, 2014.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 10; Williams, L. 2016. “Islamic State Propaganda and the Mainstream Media”, *Lowy Institute for International Policy*.

¹⁶³ The Quilliam Foundation is the world’s first counter-extremism organisation. Their mission is to offer a full spectrum and values-based approach to counter-terrorism which means promoting pluralism and inspiring change. For more on Quilliam, please visit <https://www.quilliaminternational.com>

¹⁶⁴ Haras Rafiq foreword in Winter, C. 2015, “Documenting the Virtual Caliphate”, p. 3.

communicative intentions of terrorists, however, more recently they have also increasingly focussed on how governments choose to respond.¹⁶⁵ Particularly in the age of the new YouTube generation, where extremist groups and networks increasingly target audiences through the use of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, “[g]overnments are interested in understanding what can be done to counter this content, both illegal and legal, which can incite or glamorise the use of violence”.¹⁶⁶

As Timothy Stanley and Alexander Lee illustratively observe, in claiming that democratic societies can no longer simply rely on taking the universal acceptance of their *liberal values* for granted, a postulation long decreed by Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’¹⁶⁷, as these no longer appear to speak for themselves and therefore argue for the need for constructive counter-narratives to become explicit:

Most of us in the West are liberals, whether we admit it or not. We want equal rights for all, reject racial differences, cherish the freedom of worship while preserving the freedom to disagree, and seek an economic order that suits the ambitions of the individual. But there’s a growing sense that liberalism isn’t delivering at home and that it’s not as popular as we think it ought to be in the developing world. The problem is that hubris has blinded its defenders to the crisis consuming liberalism’s identity, leaving them unable or unwilling, to respond to pressing challenges around the world.¹⁶⁸

Using the conceptual framework of ‘communicative action’ is nothing new within the social sciences¹⁶⁹ and, more specifically, within TS.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, more recently, as TS has attracted an influx of interest from various academic disciplines and as the conjuncture of these have yielded new insights, the previously existing theories and

¹⁶⁵ de Graaf, 2011.

¹⁶⁶ Briggs, R. & Feve, S. 2013. “Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism: What works and what are the implications for government”, *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, p. 1.

¹⁶⁷ Fukuyama, F. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Avon Books.

¹⁶⁸ Stanley, T. & A. Lee, 2014. “It’s Still Not the End of History”, *The Atlantic*.

¹⁶⁹ Habermas, J. 1984. *The Theory of Communicative Action*.

¹⁷⁰ Schmid et al., 1982; Schmid, 2011; Furthermore, Whitney Kassel provides a good exploration of the origins of the concept of the “propaganda of the deed”, which essentially gave way to the thought on terrorism as a form of communication (W. Kassel, “Terrorism and the International Anarchist Movement of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32 (3): 237-252).

approaches have been revisited, reinterpreted and developed even further.¹⁷¹ One such area in particular is the explicitly communicative aspect of terrorism and CT.

While examining terrorism as a ‘communicative act’, most of the research to date has mainly focussed on scrutinizing what message the perpetrators are trying to convey by carrying out terror attacks.¹⁷² Although this research has provided significant insights into the intent and motivation of terrorist actors, the majority of these studies have had a singular focus, i.e. that of the perpetrators.¹⁷³ Lately, however, there has been increasing interest in the actual impact the terrorists’ message might have on the target audiences, not to mention the ways in which those audiences respond, such as that carried out by social media researchers (see for example VOX-pol).¹⁷⁴

In this sense, as Joseph S. Tuman underscores, in the context of terrorism as communication: “these acts were not just ends to themselves; rather, they were and are part of a larger process of communicating a message and generating a *desired response*”.¹⁷⁵ In fact, taking the analysis one step further and also investigating the impact of the messages on the target audiences provides vital information for dealing with terrorism and for devising successful CVE measures. This approach enables governments to better understand and assess how to deal with the possible impact as well as how to make a counter move by the way they choose to communicate back.

¹⁷¹ Ferguson, 2016. “Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies”, p. 28. Ferguson gives INFOCORE as an example – INFOCORE is an international collaborative research project funded under the 7th European Framework Program of the European Commission. It comprises leading experts from all social sciences dealing, and includes nine renowned research institutions from seven countries. Its main aim is to investigate the role(s) that media play in the emergence or prevention, the escalation or de-escalation, the management, resolution, and reconciliation of violent conflict. For more information, please see www.infocore.eu

¹⁷² de Graaf, B. 2011. ‘Why Communication and Performance are Key in Counter Terrorism’, *International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague*, 12 February 2011.

¹⁷³ Argomaniz, J. & O. Lynch (eds). 2015. *International Perspectives on Terrorist Victimization*.

¹⁷⁴ On VOX-Pol’s website it reads: “The aim of the VOX-Pol Network of Excellence (NoE) is the comprehensive exploration of the many varieties of Violent Online Political Extremism, its societal impacts, and responses to it.”

¹⁷⁵ Author’s italics. Tuman, J. S. 2003, *Communicating Terror – The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism*, p. 17.

As de Graaf highlights: combating terrorism is a form of communication just like terrorism itself.¹⁷⁶

de Graaf argues further that terrorism is communication as “it aims to create fear and anxiety within a society” and that communication therefore becomes key when constructing successful CT strategies.¹⁷⁷ In this sense, both terrorists and states are essentially conducting what de Graaf refers to as ‘influence warfare’: they are both attempting to convince and persuade the different target audiences to rally with them.¹⁷⁸ By way of swaying the target audience’s perceptions the parties involved hope to influence and push them in their desired direction. Other scholars have theorised this dynamic interaction using a framework of communication as that between the *controller* and the *controlled*.¹⁷⁹

In her approach, de Graaf emphasises the importance for governments to be aware of the often implicit and unintentionally produced ‘stories’ they portray when disputing those narrated by the terrorists. In fact, there is a growing awareness among researchers and policymakers for the overall need of critical language awareness when dealing with terrorism as they have come to realise the wide-reaching social implications caused by the use of particular language in the public discourses on terrorism.¹⁸⁰

Other concepts have gradually replaced the ‘War on Terror’ language: such as ‘war on al-Qaeda’; ‘overseas contingency operations’¹⁸¹; and, more recently, PVE and CVE.¹⁸² These are conscious overall steps in a bid to avoid inflammatory and divisive language that could instigate more VE. Governments literally face a constant

¹⁷⁶ de Graaf, 2011: 1.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ See Crelinsten, R. D. 2002. “Analysing Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Communication Model”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*.

¹⁸⁰ Drake, M. 2007. “Discourse Analysis and the War on Terror” in Mullard, M., and B. A. Cole. *Globalisation, Citizenship and the War on Terror*, p. 16.

¹⁸¹ Burkeman, O. 2009. “Obama administration says goodbye to ‘war on terror’, *The Guardian*, published online

¹⁸² Stern, J. 2015. “Obama and Terrorism”, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October.

balancing act when it comes to communicating in regards to matters concerning terrorism

when the authorities are not willing or able to communicate, citizens will fill in that space themselves, possibly with all kinds of conspiracy theories, thereby again contributing to a climate of fear or even polarisation. Hence, on the one hand, authorities have to quench the population's thirst for knowledge once an incident occurs, but have to keep the level of performative power to their counter-terrorism strategies and communication as low as possible so as not to aggravate anxiety and fear on the other hand.¹⁸³

These examples highlight the intricately linked role of language, discourse and narratives when it comes to exploring the communicative aspects of terrorism and CT. In this sense, some of the most current research on CT strategic communications policy has concentrated on how to effectively “synchronise words and actions”¹⁸⁴

CT as strategic communication

As already discussed, the communication aspect of CT efforts has developed rapidly in the last few years and in May 2017 the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a resolution on strategic communication

Security Council Resolution 2354 (May 2017) urges member states to follow new guidelines on countering terrorist narratives and amplify credible and positive alternative narratives to audiences vulnerable to the messages of extremist organisations. The resolution refers to a comprehensive international framework for counter terrorist narratives prepared by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and which consists of three main elements: 1. the legal and law enforcement measures in accordance with obligations under international law, including human rights law, and relevant Security Council resolutions and in furtherance of General Assembly resolutions; 2. public-private partnerships; and 3. the development of counter-narratives.¹⁸⁵

van Ginkel observes that the UNSC stipulates more of a framework-setting role rather than implementation, and with regard to the first element the UNSC provides a legal standard “by encouraging member states to criminalise incitement to terrorism and

¹⁸³ de Graaf, B., 2011:1.

¹⁸⁴ See Ingram, H. & A. Reed, 2016. “Lessons from History for Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications”, *International Centre for Counter-terrorism – The Hague*.

¹⁸⁵ van Ginkel, B. 2017. “Countering and preventing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism”, p. 31.

take action against the glorification of terrorism”.¹⁸⁶ The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED) in turn monitors that the required resolutions are implemented by member states and keeps a record of the progress, including global survey reports.

In terms of the second element, the UNSC is very much dependent on collaboration with the private sector and merely offering “a platform for consultation between the governments that need to implement and enforce prohibitions of particular posts on social media because they qualify as incitement and the industry that needs to employ take-down policies”.¹⁸⁷ These initiatives have resulted in the major private sector providers forming the Global Forum to Counter Terrorism in June 26th 2017.¹⁸⁸

Finally, in terms of the third element, the UNSC regards that it “can best be implemented by credible messengers, such as youth organisations or religious organisations”.¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, “[t]o assist in materialising that element, UNCTED can only appeal to governments to engage with civil society organisations and to support the grassroots initiatives that support these activities”.¹⁹⁰ Beyond the ruling framework set by the UN, the EU has its own legislation when it comes to criminalising “those actions and prosecute those that post violent extremist propaganda and messages that intend to incite and recruit”.¹⁹¹

When it comes to actual CT strategic communications policy, instructive research has proposed guidelines for constructing effective communication campaigns.¹⁹² Haroro Ingram and Alastair Reed conclude, by analysing four key strategic-policy principles, that a CT “strategic communications campaign is more likely to be successful if it is based on the cumulative effects of a multidimensional messaging strategy”.¹⁹³ They

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ingram and Reed, 2016. “Lessons from History for Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications”, ICCT; see also other research conducted by ICCT, The Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications (CTSC) Project: <https://icct.nl/topic/counter-terrorism-strategic-communications-ctsc/>

¹⁹³ Ingram & Reed, 2016.

recommend the following strategic policy-principles to consider when constructing effective messaging: i) a diversity of messages that use both rational and identity-choice appeal; ii) all messaging should have a core theme or at least an overarching narrative; iii) use a variety of mediums for communication to maximise the message's reach; and iv) messaging should be synchronised with strategic-policy/military efforts.¹⁹⁴

Ingram and Reed have developed a framework of “interrelated macro-, mezzo- and micro-level considerations for maximizing the efficacy of not just a strategic communications campaign but message design”¹⁹⁵ Much in line with the literature review outlined on TS in general, Ingram and Reed note how there has been a tendency to view the propaganda used by current terrorist groups as something unique for the 21st century while ignoring the lessons learnt from the past. Similarly, J. M. Berger notes that the notion of a ‘war of ideas’ or ‘battle for hearts and minds’, a recurrent theme in the struggle against ISIS, although perceived as novel approaches, is in fact a refrain that has echoed throughout American history.¹⁹⁶

Berger argues that ISIS’ success is not due to the strength of its narrative, but rather because it can mobilize a microscopic minority:

ISIS is not succeeding because of the strength of its ideas. Instead, it exploits an increasingly networked world to sell its violent and apocalyptic ideology to a microscopic minority – people who are able to discover each other from distance and organize collective action in ways that were virtually impossible before the rise of the Internet.¹⁹⁷

Other scholars, exploring the strengths of ISIS, remark on the misguided CT communications efforts to date, as they “are mostly negative” and “lecture at young people rather than dialoguing with them.”¹⁹⁸ Furthermore, on CT strategic communication, De Graaf notes that “it is not so much the effects and outcomes of counter-terrorism policies upon which we should focus, but the practices or the

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Berger, J. M., 2015. “ISIS is Not Winning the War of Ideas”, *The Atlantic*. Berger argues that a “War of ideas” was fought in the Civil War, the World Wars, the Cold War, the Korean and Vietnam War.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Atran, S. 2015. “The Real Power of ISIS”, *The Daily Beast*, published online 25 October.

performance by the government in the process of countering terrorism.”¹⁹⁹ In this sense, even in the communicative aspects of CT, *trust* between governments and its citizens, once again becomes key:

This requires a change of mind that should not only come from politicians and officials. It also requires that the public at large will change its attitudes *vis-à-vis* the risk and threat of terrorism. This demands a completely different government policy than we have seen in some of the Western countries following 9/11 – and for that matter in countries across the globe. It implies that governments refrain from measures that only increase anxiety among their citizens and lessen their resilience. Governments should empower themselves by putting more faith in their citizens again. After all, a public that shrugs its shoulders over terrorist deeds is the best method to show terrorists that at least their means are not effective. Only when governments succeed in neutralising public fears and shatter the myths and half-truth of repression the terrorists are spreading, they will manage to take the wind out of the sails that keep them floating.²⁰⁰

Therefore, using a framework of communication enables one to explore how terrorism is best understood as a communication process between terrorist actors and audience(s), the meaning for which is *socially constructed* in the public discourse and dialogue. As Tuman observes: “[k]nowing how and why we feel threatened by what is, in the end, a communicative, rhetorical process is a starting place for considering how we should process the meaning of terrorism and, in the future, how we might respond.”²⁰¹ Most of the communicative component of TS to date has mainly focussed on the perpetrators and strategic communications approaches inherently constructed by government agencies rather than harnessing already existing initiatives on the community level. Therefore, it makes sense to explore how people and different stakeholders engage with terror attack sites as the sites are intrinsically symbolic of terrorism but also of CT in terms of how we decide to respond, construct and manage the sites and the rhetoric surrounding them.

Communicative approaches to CVE

To the backdrop of the above discussion on the communicative aspect of terrorism, particularly in creating an environment of fear and anxiety, violent extremists and terror organisations have also used the media for “critical processes such as recruiting,

¹⁹⁹ de Graaf, 2011: 8.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Tuman, J. S. 2003: 145.

training, propaganda, planning, surveillance, and coordination and communication”.²⁰² In this sense, the communicative approaches to CVE intend to

disrupt the narratives and representations generated by terrorists and promote counter-narratives and representations of the ‘west’ through public diplomacy strategies to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of real and potential constituents and sympathisers. In this ‘war of ideas’, states and violent extremists struggle over legitimacy and credibility upon a communicative terrain.²⁰³

The so-called ‘communicative terrain’ referred to above, “is situated within the context of what is understood as an ‘information society’, characterised by global communication networks and new media”.²⁰⁴ For this very reason, communicative approaches have been targeted towards “networked communication technologies such as the internet and World Wide Web”.²⁰⁵

In terms of communicative approaches to CVE, most of the literature and research to date has focussed on i) disruption, censorship and monitoring (of media content) ii) counter-narrative approaches to countering communicative aspects iii) counter-narrative considerations; and, iv) language and rhetorical strategies.²⁰⁶ The three latter ones specifically apply to this dissertation and will be considered further in the below.

The ii) *counter-narrative approaches to countering communicative aspects of VE* literature suggest deploying a range of counter-narratives²⁰⁷, such as

representing the ‘west’ as offering life whereas violent extremists champion death and destruction; emphasizing Muslim and civilian suffering caused by terrorists and violent extremists; delegitimizing terrorists by portraying them as immoral criminals who transgress Muslim principles or as destructive interlopers or the ‘puppets’ of foreign powers who lack the right to levy claims on the polity; emphasizing the non-violent nature of Islam and the rejection of violence as a strategy for addressing grievances; and, depicting life as a member of a terrorist group as difficult, financially unstable and filled with fear.²⁰⁸

²⁰² Pollard, N. A. 2007, “Competing with Terrorists in Cyberspace: Opportunities and Hurdles”, p. 236.

²⁰³ Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 49.

²⁰⁴ Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 50.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 49-53.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 51.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

Furthermore, suggestions have been made that “the counter-narrative that is formulated as a response to violent (jihadist) extremism should be a heterogeneous one. In this way, counter-narratives will express the democratic discourse”²⁰⁹ while others have argued that sometimes silence or a non-response can provide a narrative in itself.²¹⁰ Still others have suggested that “rather than countering the narratives deployed by terrorists and violent extremists, western democratic nations need to construct their own narratives”.²¹¹ In this sense – as will be investigated in this dissertation – it can serve to explore *how counter-narratives emerge organically* as opposed to being constructed per se.

In terms of iii) *counter-narrative considerations*, particularly given the amount of emphasis placed on counter-narratives within CVE efforts recently, some valid concerns have been raised

Until we can be sure what the counter-narratives should be addressing, and how we can identify the content and actors they should target, we will not be able to judge whether what we do either works, or even influences behavioural outcomes.²¹²

Moreover, other considerations include the *scale of the narrative* (global, national or local); a *definition of the recipient*; the *content of the narrative*, as well as the *author or source of the narrative* (which will be discussed more in the below).²¹³

Finally, when exploring iv) *language and rhetorical strategies*, there appears to be a clear concern with language in the literature on CVE. These concerns mainly revolve around “the insight that communicative practices of language and representation shape experience and action and have the potential to create tensions, conflict and violence”.²¹⁴ In this sense, language is a “matter of both semantics *and* some consequence”.²¹⁵ This is further illustrated in the following:

In light of the perceived importance of language, a number of governments including those in the EU, UK, US and Australia have invested in projects to develop language guidelines. These

²⁰⁹ Harchaoui, S. 2010. “Heterogeneous Counter-Narratives and the Role of Social Diplomacy”, p. 129.

²¹⁰ Kessels, E. J. A. M. 2010. “Introduction”, p. 8.

²¹¹ Kokoda foundation, 2008.

²¹² Taylor & Ramsay 2010:109, quoted in Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011: 52.

²¹³ Nasser-Eddine, 2011: 52.

²¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 52-53.

²¹⁵ Chowdhury and Krebs, 2010: 126, quoted in Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 53.

projects have recommended the adoption of the term “violent extremism” and refrain from using aggressive rhetoric such as the ‘war on terrorism’ or ‘clash of civilisations’ and reductive, misrepresentative language such as ‘Jihadist’, ‘Islamist extremism’ or ‘moderate Muslim’. Given that the media cannot be pressured into adopting an alternative lexicon for reporting on violent extremism the Research Information and Communications Unit (RICU), that delivered UK’s project on language, recommends that national leaders and governments must make the language shift and this will subsequently translate into media reporting. The effectiveness of this language based strategy for preventing violent extremism is yet to be determined but early reports from Muslim leaders in the UK indicate that the changes have been noticed and appreciated by Muslim communities.²¹⁶

Narratives and counter-narratives

As a result of globalisation and rapidly developing information technology, terrorist threats have come to appear more imminent. Whether this threat is a ’perceived’ or real threat can be contested (ultimately, the aim of terrorism is the psychological element of *creating fear and anxiety*), but the reality remains that modern communication technologies have provided terrorists with more avenues to convey and spread their narratives. Although government initiated military strategies have yielded success for securitising targets, as well as neutralising the capability of terrorism in general, the ideas and narratives that instigate terror attacks still prevail and are not likely to disappear in the near future.²¹⁷

Given the “ubiquity of these ideas and their penetration into civil society”, authorities have extensively sought alternative approaches for tackling VE, embracing more comprehensive and non-violent methods:

[to] address this possibility, a common assumption in counterterrorism discourse has been that confronting the underlying supportive narratives of terrorist groups represents a key strategic objective associated with CVE.²¹⁸

TS scholars and CT analysts have increasingly preoccupied themselves with the task of figuring out how to use counter-narratives as a non-violent measure for countering the terrorist narratives, ultimately with the objective of preventing terrorism and more

²¹⁶ Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 53.

²¹⁷ ‘Counter-Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia – Protecting our Community’, Australian Government, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, February 2010, http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/counter_terrorism/index.cfm, pp. 8-15.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

broadly, support for terrorism.²¹⁹ In terms of combatting the extremist narratives, it is not enough to simply remove or delete the content²²⁰, and at the 2015 White House Summit on CVE, “challenging extremist narratives online was one the three key programmes in defeating IS.”²²¹

Exploring the ‘narrative turn’ in social sciences, Czarniawska points out that the term ‘narrative’ is a *mode of knowing* while ‘narration’ is a *mode of communication*.²²² While social sciences, in contrast to natural sciences, may have failed to formulate laws, and therefore the failure to predict, scholars such as Alasdair McIntyre argue that this is not a shortcoming: “[e]xplanations are possible because there is a certain teleology – sense of purpose – in all lived narratives”.²²³

It is a kind of circular teleology because it is not given beforehand but is created by the narrative. A life is lived with a goal but the most important aspect of life is the formulation and re-formulation of that goal. This circular teleology is what McIntyre calls a narrative quest... A narrative view gets rid of the problem by reinstating the role of goals as both the results and the antecedents of action. Whole communities as well as individual persons are engaged in a quest for meaning in ‘their life’, which will bestow meaning on particular actions taken.²²⁴

Czarniawska therefore concludes that social sciences scholars researching social life, irrespective of the domain, need “to become interested in narrative form of social life, a form of knowledge, and a form of communication”.²²⁵ While the term ‘counter-narrative’ is dominating the current CVE literature and policy concerned with countering propaganda, little common understanding exists on the term²²⁶.

More recently, there has been growing interest in alternative approaches to the problem. One such potential solution is provided by ‘counter-narratives’; attempts to challenge extremist and violent extremist messages, whether directly or indirectly through a range of online and offline

²¹⁹ “Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Framework for Countering Violent Extremism”, 2014.

²²⁰ Bartlett, J. & Krasodomski-Jones, A. (2016). “Counter-speech on Facebook, *Demos*,

<https://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Counter-speech-on-facebook-report.pdf>

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Czarniawska, B. 2004. “Narratives in Social Science Research”, pp. 1-21.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid. pp. 17-18.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ferguson, K. 2016. “Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies”, p. 7.

means. Counter-narrative has come to be a catch-all term for a wide range of activities with different aims and tactics and understanding about what works is still poor.²²⁷

Similarly, Kurt Braddock and John Horgan have found that “[d]espite the promise of counternarratives for discouraging support for terrorism”, the field lacks “theory-based guidelines for their construction and dissemination.”²²⁸ The authors address this shortcoming by “exploring counternarratives’ potential for affecting change in beliefs and attitudes and offering recommendations for constructing counternarratives that reduce support for terrorism”.²²⁹ In order to explore counter-narratives, they first define the term ‘narrative’ in the following:

Any cohesive and coherent account of events with an identifiable beginning, middle, and end about characters engaged in actions that result in questions or conflicts for which answers or resolutions are provided.²³⁰

They provide methods for “”fighting fire with fire” by using the narrative form (i.e., the vehicle) to counter ideologies that terrorist groups disseminate via their own narratives.”²³¹ A distinction is made between ‘narrative’ and ‘ideology’, terms that may seem to be overlapping: ‘ideology’ refers to “a group of beliefs to which a terrorist group purports to adhere and attempts to instill in members to guide their actions”, whilst a ‘narrative’ refers to “a vechicle through which an ideology can be communicated”.²³²

In line with De Graaf, the scholars observe that the use of persuasion to influence is key for narratives and note that in this sense terrorists are no different to politicians:

In contexts in which influence over an audience is a strategic objective, narratives are often used to change beliefs and attitudes such that they are consistent with (or at least contribute to) the persuader’s goals. In the context of terrorism, these beliefs and attitude changes are often called “radicalization”.²³³

²²⁷ Briggs, R. & Feve, S. 2013. “Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism”, *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, p. 1.

²²⁸ Braddock, K. & Horgan, J. 2016. “Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counternarratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, p. 382.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 383.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid., p. 385.

The authors argue that, just as terrorist groups can “generate persuasive narratives that contribute to radicalization”, those who work to counter terrorism are similarly able to “develop and disseminate narratives designed to contradict potentially radicalizing themes intrinsic to terrorist narratives”.²³⁴ This is what has come to be referred to as *counter-narratives*:

[c]ounternarratives are narratives comprised of content that challenges the themes intrinsic to other narratives. In the context of CVE, counternarratives challenge themes within terrorist narratives that are consistent with the group’s ideology. For example, counternarratives designed to oppose the themes that comprise the Animal Liberation Front’s (ALF) narratives may emphasize the kindhearted nature of humans in relation to animals – a notion that contradicts many of the themes that pervade the ALF narrative.²³⁵

Braddock and Horgan finally note that no matter how a counter-narrative is comprised, “its acceptance by those at risk for radicalization will be impossible if the source of the message is immediately discounted as untrustworthy”.²³⁶ They highlight that the effectiveness of a counter-narrative is determined “not only by the content that comprises it, but also by how (and by whom) it is disseminated.”²³⁷ Following the above discussion, it makes sense to focus on the *themes* in the discourses surrounding the symbolic meaning of terror attack sites and this will be discussed and elaborated on further in the sections to follow.

Rachel Briggs and Sébastien Feve, exploring the use of counter-narratives in practice, provide a useful overall explanation:

Counter-narratives are aimed at individuals, groups and networks further along the path to radicalisation, whether they be sympathisers, passive supporters or those more active within extremist movements. These more targeted programmes explicitly deconstruct, delegitimise and de-mystify extremist propaganda in order to achieve a number of aims, from de-radicalisation of those already radicalised to sowing the seeds of doubt among ‘at-risk’ audiences potentially being exposed to or seeking out extremist content.²³⁸

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 386.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Briggs, R. & Feve, S. 2013: 16.

The following table outlines Briggs and Feve's counter-messaging spectrum²³⁹ and will be adopted for investigating the counter-narratives that have emerged in the Bali and Norway case studies. The scholars note how the term 'counter-messaging' – in both on and offline contexts – has become a notion used to describe a wide range of communications activities, "everything from public diplomacy and strategic communications by government to targeted campaigns to discredit the ideologies and actions of violent extremists".²⁴⁰ They accordingly identify three main types of counter-messaging activities: *government strategic communications*, *alternative narratives* and *counter-narratives*. The three components will be further elaborated in the below sections.

Table 1 Briggs and Feve's counter-messaging spectrum

What	Why	How	Who
Government Strategic Communications	Action to get the message out about what government is doing, including public awareness activities	Raise awareness, forge relationships with key constituencies and audiences and correct misinformation	Government
Alternative Narratives	Undercut violent extremist narratives by focusing on what we are 'for' rather than 'against'	Positive story about social values, tolerance, openness, freedom and democracy	Civil society or government
Counter-narratives	Directly deconstruct, discredit and demystify violent extremist messaging	Challenge through ideology, logic, fact or humour	Civil society

- Government strategic communications:

When investigating the key agents and objectives of counter-messaging of VE, Briggs and Feve state that "[t]he area where government has the most natural and effective

²³⁹ Table is borrowed from Briggs & Feve, 2013: 6.

²⁴⁰ Briggs & Feve, 2013: 6.

role to play in the counter-messaging spectrum lies within the development and streamlining of its own strategic communications".²⁴¹ The authors further elaborate that this includes that "government positions and policies are clearly articulated and directed to right audiences"; that government actions identified to be helpful in "building relationships with key constituencies are amplified"; and, where suitable, directly challenge misinformation about governments, "while being careful to avoid being backed into a defensive stance of rebuttals" that could serve to "reinforce the extremist discourse".²⁴²

A number of governments have in fact established specialist units "designed to oversee strategic communications activities in the context of tackling violent extremism", such as the UK and US.²⁴³ These initiatives have enabled governments to

systemise once fragmented efforts of public diplomacy, strategic communications and information operations both on and offline in a way that feeds into national counter-extremism and counter-terrorism policy objectives, and are marked by a number of characteristics.²⁴⁴

The authors list the characteristics as *cross-departmental, multi-disciplinary, monitoring capabilities, consultancy services across government, focussed on the potential of the Internet and social media, and often label government affiliation in their strategic communications.*²⁴⁵ Examples of such government bodies are the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), which was established in 2007 and based within the Office for Security and Counter-terrorism (OSCT) at the UK Home Office²⁴⁶ and the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), an interagency unit established in 2010 based in the US State Department.²⁴⁷

Both these government bodies "tend to work behind the scenes, providing a range of services, toolkits and programmes that inform, streamline and facilitate government communications to counter violent extremism".²⁴⁸ The authors note how this work

²⁴¹ Briggs & Fave, 2013: 8.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ For a more detailed discussion of the characteristics, please see Briggs & Fave, 2013: 8.

²⁴⁶ Briggs & Fave, 2013: 8.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

includes structuring research and analysis “to better understand the strategic communications of violent extremist groups and their impact on target audiences”.²⁴⁹ RICU for example has examined “the online behaviour of young Muslims, media consumption patterns, the role of blogs in radicalisation” as well as more broad efforts to comprehend “how language used by governments is received and understood by target audience groups”.²⁵⁰ Both CSCC and RICU provide communications toolkits and RICU for example has been key in aiding local Prevent delivery partners in order to “better develop, articulate and implement strategic communications”.²⁵¹

Briggs and Feve also point to the limitations of overt government communications to counter extremism. One such disadvantage is the fact that government efforts are limited in terms of resources, both financial and human. Although funding has increased significantly, governments are often “up against well-oiled communications machines of extremist networks” which are “able to commit significant amounts of time and energy in pursuit of their ideological cause”.²⁵² The bureaucratic make-up of government agencies means that governments can be slow to respond and constrained in terms of making the bold statements required to have impact for the intended audiences.

Moreover, government counter-messaging approaches are heavily ‘logic-focused’, “explaining government positions and policies, correcting facts, busting myths, and applying superior logic to refute and counter misinformation”.²⁵³ Briggs and Feve point to how governments face the challenge of balancing “the need to transmit factual information with the imperative to appeal to the emotional instincts of target audiences”.²⁵⁴ An analysis of the US State Department messaging confirmed this by finding that 93.92% of their messages used logical rhetoric.²⁵⁵ Another issue, already touched upon by Ingram and Reid, is avoiding the ‘say-do’ gap, as noted by De Graaf:

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid., pp. 9-10.

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁵⁴ Ibid

²⁵⁵ Khatib, L., W. Dutton and M. Thelwall, 2012. “Public Diplomacy 2.0: A Case Study of the US Digital Outreach Team”, *The Middle East Journal*, 66(3), p. 461.

“[v]iews of people, whether positive or negative, are, in spite of temporary successes of spin doctors, at the end of the day based upon real experiences”.²⁵⁶

In conclusion, to sum up the ideal role for governments in counter-messaging, Briggs and Fave maintain:

Aside from raising awareness of the threat of extremism, government messaging must ensure that its positions and policies are clearly articulated and directed to the right audiences; that government actions that are especially helpful in building relationships with key constituencies are amplified; and in some cases directly challenging misinformation about government. In countering extremist discourses, governments must be careful to avoid being backed into a defensive stance of rebuttals that can serve to reinforce the extremist discourse, and needs to focus its attention on undermining myths and conspiracy theories related to its activities, while making sure these do not contradict real-world actions on the ground.²⁵⁷

- Alternative Narratives

In addition to government strategic communications, Briggs and Feve identify a second type for challenging VE, defined as ‘alternative narratives’. The authors maintain that alternative narratives play a key role in countering the *appeal* of VE. Although alternative narratives “do not tend to challenge extremist messaging directly”, they instead aim to “influence those who might be sympathetic towards (but not actively supportive of) extremist causes, or help to unite the silent majority against extremism by emphasising solidarity, common causes and shared values”.²⁵⁸

The key providers of alternative narratives are *civil society* and *government*. In terms of the governments’ role, Briggs and Feve identify three roles for governments “in relation to the development and dissemination of alternative narratives”:

supporting and facilitating civil society efforts to design and deliver alternative narrative campaigns via direct funding, in-kind support, and streamlining of private sector engagement with grass-roots civil society networks; delivering alternative narratives via politicians and public statements; and ensuring that messages are reinforced by government policies and practices.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁶ De Graaf, B. 2010. “Redefining ‘Us’ and ‘Them’”, in Kessel EJAM (ed.) Counteracting Violent Extremism Narratives. *National Coordinator for Counterterrorism*. The Hague. pp. 36-45.

²⁵⁷ Briggs & Feve, 2013: 11.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

²⁵⁹ Briggs & Feve, 2013: executive summary.

The authors underscore that governments should empower the above efforts while making sure that there is consistency between their statements and the actions on the ground, i.e. avoid the ‘say-do’ gap. In the below, the first role of governments supporting and facilitating civil society efforts will be further elaborated on.

Briggs and Feve note that there are a variety of alternative narrative activities, of which government directly funds some, however many alternative narratives are community-initiated and supported at both local and national levels. The authors also point to the existence of transnational programmes. Some of the overall characteristics of these programmes include:

- They mostly focus on the promotion of moderate centre-ground alternatives that undercut, rather than directly engage, extremist messages and messengers.
- These initiatives create not only a community of interest but movements for positive change through community outreach, education and mass mobilisation.
- While government has a role to play, it has reduced credibility as enactor and it is best suited to facilitate grass-roots campaigning initiatives.
- Many existing community-led activities surveyed benefit from government support, both in terms of financial assistance, in-kind backing, convening and capacity building.
- Government institutions are playing an increasingly important role in streamlining private-sector engagement with grass-roots civil society networks, but more could be done in this regard.²⁶⁰

Briggs and Feve note how alternative narratives come in many shape and form while activated by a wide range of actors

inter-faith and inter-community networks of influential grassroots activists, opinion and community-leaders (both religious and secular), to entrepreneurs, sports personalities and even pop artists, they have provided powerful avenues through which to engineer more moderate and inclusive discourses through social action and public outreach.²⁶¹

In exploring the alternative narratives programmes, Briggs & Feve identify following efforts: i) seeding new platforms ii) galvanising the silent majority iii) capacity building. Each variety will be discussed in more detail in the below.

i) *Seeding new platforms*

The authors use the examples of the UK and US, where alternative narratives projects are supported by government in large-scale, and where projects

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

include “attempts to build online platforms through which these messages can be channelled and promoted”.²⁶² The UK’s 2013 CONTEST strategy for example stated: “We want to see more websites established to refute claims made by terrorist and extremist organisations” while recognising that these efforts are best delivered by local actors rather than government.²⁶³ Radical Middle Way is one example of such government-supported initiatives, “whose work includes the provision of faith-inspired guidance and safe spaces fostering open debate through both on and offline channels”.²⁶⁴

Briggs & Feve, however, maintain that while these kinds of ‘spaces online for debate’ are important, such platforms can have limited reach. The recommendation therefore is to try and tap into already existing platforms and social networks for disseminating good content, rather than trying to pull the audience into new locations.

ii) Galvanising the silent majority

Briggs and Feve identify that a second type of alternative narratives are efforts to try and empower those who promote alternative narratives, such as identifying emerging leaders and increasing their awareness of the challenge of tackling VE while inspiring them to play an active role. Although extremists tend to be in the minority, new communication technology and social media has provided them ways to convey their messages to a wider audience without necessarily being challenged:

While extremist voices are undoubtedly in the minority online, they are able to punch above their weight because they are determined, vociferous and dedicated to their cause. Those seeking to promote alternative narratives, in contrast, are often dogged by an ‘enthusiasm gap’; activists are dedicated but have full-time jobs to hold down and family commitments to

²⁶² Briggs & Feve, 2013: 13.

²⁶³ ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism – Annual Report’. HM Government, (2013) Available at www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/170644/28307_Cm_8583_v0_20.pdf

²⁶⁴ Briggs & Feve, 2013: 13.

honour. This has resulted in a situation where, instead of having extremist views drowned out by opposing views, the Internet has amplified extremists' voices.²⁶⁵

Briggs and Feve maintain that such awareness campaigns are very effective "when they raise awareness through target audience participation" and where they manage to encourage individuals to take part in the campaign by making a personal contribution.²⁶⁶ However, the authors do highlight that the task of galvanising 'moderates' to participate and provide trustworthy alternatives to those provided by extremists, remains a major challenge in the long-run context.

iii) Capacity building

Following on from the previous point, Briggs and Feve recognise that "[o]ne of the greatest challenges in mobilising the majority to act against the minority of extremists is one of basic skills and expertise".²⁶⁷ In this sense, the authors underscore that those who often are the most credible messengers "lack technical, communications and strategic know-how, whether in the alternative of counter-narrative domains".²⁶⁸ Briggs and Feve note that this is an area where the government plays an incremental role and can tap in to provide support. As a US State Department official noted:

"How do you empower these communities, give them the same level of passion, excitement and creativity as on the other side? How do you equip them with tools in the way that pushes the extremists back?"²⁶⁹

Examples of capacity-building projects are the 'Muslim Youth Canada' (or MY CANADA) which provides training in leadership skills and effective communication skills to empower these communities to effectively address discrimination and radicalisation; an the Viral Peace programme²⁷⁰, an offline capacity building project by the US State Department, helping activists globally to "create mobile, social and online communications tools that drive

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 13-14.

²⁶⁷ Briggs & Feve, 2013: 14.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ For more information on the programmes, please see Briggs & Feve, 2013: 14-15.

organic efforts to stand up against hate and violence".²⁷¹ Furthermore, Briggs and Feve note that both governments and the private sector²⁷² have supported several initiatives for social media and communications training for civil society groups. In this sense, the authors make an important recognition:

More broadly, it should not be forgotten that government is unique in having power to convene a wide range of actors, from civil society and academics to the private sector and international organisations. This is especially important in counter-messaging, given the need to combine a range of type of expertise that are rarely found together in one group, from technical and communication skills, to accurate messaging and authenticity of voice.²⁷³

Briggs and Feve finally pinpoint that the challenges for government, in terms of alternative narratives, is that "distrust of the government by key target audiences can limit the effectiveness of state-backed alternative narrative initiatives".²⁷⁴ Although they highlight that this challenge is even more pronounced in the counter-narrative realm, they illustrate how this has impacted on organisations such as the Radical Middle Way and the Quilliam Foundation. Both organisations have at times had their motives and impact questioned given that they have been receiving government funding. In addition to the *distrust* issue, Briggs and Feve also highlight a challenge of *scale*, given that alternative narratives is a realm where "large number of individuals and organisations have the potential to play a role".²⁷⁵ In this sense, the recommendation is for governments "to find ways to roll out training and capacity building programmes in a cascade system to produce a cadre of trained trainers who can go on to roll out the courses at a local level".²⁷⁶

- Counter-narratives

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Briggs and Feve use the example of the New America Foundation, which in the US has supported Muslim community leaders by hosting online workshops, financed by technology companies such as Microsoft, Google, Facebook and Twitter. These efforts teach participants how to use information technology more effectively, including social media.

²⁷³ Briggs & Feve, 2013: 15.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

In contrast to the above two types of counter-messaging, counter-narratives are distinguished by the fact that they are “aimed at individuals, groups or networks further along the path to radicalisation, whether they be sympathisers, passive supporters or those more active within extremist movements”.²⁷⁷ In this sense, these more *targeted programmes* “explicitly deconstruct, delegitimise and de-mystify extremist propaganda in order to achieve a number of aims”, such as de-radicalisation of those already radicalised or simply “sowing the seeds of doubt among ‘at risk’ audiences potentially being exposed to or seeking out extremist content”.²⁷⁸ Briggs and Feve identify a number of counter-narrative attributes:

- These activities deconstruct, discredit and demystify extremist messaging and tend to do so in a more head-on way than alternative narratives.
- There are many distinct target audiences for counter-narrative messaging, which require different types of campaigns, tactics and approaches.
- These activities work best when they are targeted campaigns appealing to a specific target group, which means that ‘going viral’ is not realistic or even necessary.
- Credibility of message and messenger is paramount, and while governments have conducted counter-narrative operations, they tend to be better suited to facilitating other credible messengers to do this work.
- These types of campaigns often attempt to plant seeds of doubt rather than just ‘win the argument’ because the latter can prove counter productive when the target audience is applying black and white thinking.
- Successful counter-narrative initiatives will incorporate effective branding and high-end production quality, just like some of the products and campaigns of extremist groups that are becoming more professional.

Briggs and Feve note how the notion ‘counter-narratives’ provides an umbrella term for

a broad range of strategies with different aims and messages, including picking apart violent extremist ideologies through eroding their intellectual framework; attempting to mock, ridicule, or undermine the credibility/legitimacy of violent extremist messengers; highlighting how extremist activities negatively impact on the constituencies they claim to represent; demonstrating how the means they adopt are inconsistent with their own beliefs; or questioning their overall effectiveness in achieving their stated goals.²⁷⁹

Briggs and Feve outline various approaches, including government efforts and the role of alternative messengers such as formers, survivors and other credible

²⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 16.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Briggs & Feve, 2013: 16.

messengers. The authors also explore the development and dissemination of ‘counter-narrative products’; counter-narratives aimed at deradicalisation and disengagement; counter-narratives in the realm of digital disruptions; and finally offline approaches.²⁸⁰ Each of these will be further explored in the below for a more comprehensive understanding of the different counter-narrative approaches.

- *Government counter-narratives*

Although governments have now been identified to only have a limited impact in terms of producing and disseminating counter-narratives given their credibility gap, the US and UK have tried to operate in the counter-narrative realm. Some of these efforts for example include the US State of Department seeking to tarnish the image of Al-Qaeda and its global affiliates.²⁸¹ However, due to the risk of ending up being counter-productive governments have realised their efforts are better vested in other spaces, as noted by the former UK Home Secretary, Theresa May:

Often it is more effective to be working through groups that are recognised as having a voice and having an impact with that voice, rather than it being seen to be government trying to give a message.²⁸²

- *The role of formers, survivors and other credible messengers*

Given the governments’ credibility gap identified in the above, the “identity of the counter-narrative messenger is critical”, and in this sense the target audience (at risk of radicalisation or already radicalised individuals) “will only listen to those with credibility, authority and authenticity”.²⁸³ Briggs and Feve identify a number of types of messengers “who possess these qualities due to their personal circumstances, and this makes them prime change agents in counter-narrative campaigning”.²⁸⁴

In this sense, former violent extremists (also called formers) can play an instrumental role as messengers of counter-narratives given their ‘been there done that’ qualities as well as their ability to “talk to the futility and flaws of violence and extremism, describe the grim day-to-day reality of such networks, and delegitimise violence-

²⁸⁰ Briggs & Feve, 2013: 16-24.

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 17.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

promoting narratives”.²⁸⁵ Briggs and Feve note that there are many formers already working in their local communities in order to keep young people from becoming radicalised and victims of recruiters, and in this sense “act as an embodiment of the counter-narrative message themselves”.²⁸⁶

Another type of counter-narrative messengers, and of key importance for this dissertation, is survivors of terrorism and VE. Victims and survivors of terrorism/VE can provide powerful (sources of) counter-narratives: “offering a reminder of the real impact of violence, their testimonies serve to de-glamorise and de-legitimise terrorist acts perpetrated against ordinary civilians”.²⁸⁷ Briggs and Feve ascertain how, in order to leverage on such survivor testimonies, organisations such as the Global Survivors Network (GSN) and Network of Associations of Victims of Terrorism (NAVT) have been established.²⁸⁸

Other key messengers the authors pinpoint are the voices of women and authoritative religious, political or community leaders. However, these key counter-narrative messengers are often limited in their impact, as “[t]here is often a mismatch between those who have the credibility and those with the capacity to act effectively” in the counter-narrative realm.²⁸⁹ Furthermore, the most credible messengers “tend to lack the networks, support and specialist expertise that would allow them to scale up their work and its impact”.²⁹⁰

As a direct response to the above, and of particular significance in exploring the transnational character of these specific actors, the network Against Violent Extremism (AVE) works towards helping “to plug this gap, facilitating and streamlining engagement between individuals and organisations working to counter extremist messages”.²⁹¹ The organisation also helps pairing key counter-narrative providers with professionals with specialist expertise to offer, as explained by Ross Frenett: “AVE brings together over 250 formers and survivors … Our job is to

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Briggs & Feve, 2013: 18.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

support these individuals to learn from each other, connecting them with private sector resources while advocating on their behalf to governments".²⁹²

In fact, Briggs and Feve maintain how AVE is one of the few counter-narrative initiatives to have attracted private sector assistance, from companies such as Google Ideas. This component of the project is key in relation to the credibility gap discussed above:

This allows it to stand independent of governments, avoiding the usual political sensitivities that can follow state involvement in such initiatives. It has also been successful at encouraging companies to give their time and expertise for AVE members to scale up and improve their work, helping them to widen and deepen their reach.²⁹³

Nevertheless, Briggs and Feve maintain that governments can still play an instrumental role in assisting both individuals and organisations on an *ad hoc basis*, by for example providing key contacts to expand their reach and networks, support in unlocking independent funds for projects etc. However, the authors note that this is risky business and a fine balance for the government to thread given the sensitivities and careful decision-making in terms of what groups to support as well as dealing with the associated psychological trauma experienced by the counter-narrative providers.

In this sense, when exploring counter-narratives, the actual *vehicle* for the narrative is pivotal; the *identity* of the messenger is crucial.²⁹⁴ However, as the concept of counter-narratives has emerged as a viable means of tackling sub-state terrorism and political violence it has predominantly been a tool of government agencies. Nevertheless, as Schmid points out, Western democracies have generally been reluctant to be seen to engage in what is effectively direct propaganda:

Democracies do generally not (like to) engage in direct propaganda, except in wartime when reaching out to the enemy's population in an effort to weaken a regime's control over its subjects makes it necessary. Democratic governments therefore use terms like "public affairs", "public diplomacy", "psychological operations" and "strategic communications" to describe

²⁹² Briggs & Feve, 2013: 19.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.; Ingram & Reed, 2016; "Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Frameworks", 2014.

their information-based influence operations meant to affect the attitudes and behaviours of specific audiences.²⁹⁵

- Development and dissemination of counter-narrative products

While extremist material tends to be very slick and professionally produced, counter-narratives often lack the equivalent sophistication, as noted by terror experts: counter-narrative products tend to be unappealing ‘cut-and-paste’ jobs that fail to reach what Bruce Hoffman has identified as a “computer savvy, media-saturated, video game-addicted generation”.²⁹⁶ Briggs and Feve, however, note that there have been some promising initiatives, using the example of the ‘Trojan T-Shirt’ campaign, devised by a taskforce of private sector, former neo-nazis and social media experts, which entailed a white power t-shirt being distributed at a neo-Nazi music festival which when washed “altered the logo to ‘What your T-shirt can do, so can you – we’ll help you break with the right-wing extremism’”²⁹⁷.

Another successful initiative is a collaboration between the European Commission-funded Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) and its partners the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and Google Ideas, to “connect credible messengers to private sector resources and to identify examples of good practice in counter-narratives”.²⁹⁸

This kind of private sector and credible messenger teamwork has for example resulted in “private sector in-kind support to help produce and disseminate a short animated mini counter-narrative graphic novel, Abdul X.”²⁹⁹ Other initiatives include ‘digital disruption’ and ‘offline intervention’, however these fall outside the scope of this study.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁵ Schmid, A. P., 2014: 1.

²⁹⁶ Hoffman, B. 2006. ‘The Use of the Internet by Islamist Extremists’. *RAND*. Available at www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf

²⁹⁷ For a more detailed account, please see Briggs & Feve, 2013: 20.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid. For more on Abdul X, please visit www.youtube.com/user/abduallahx

³⁰⁰ These two dimensions of counter-narratives are often delivered as part of a one-on-one setting for individuals already deemed as part of at-risk groups and as such are more specified and targeted efforts. For more on digital disruption and offline interventions please see Briggs & Feve, 2013: pp. 22-24.

Therefore, as suggested by the literature, although governments have been identified as perhaps a useful *authoritative* messenger of counter-narratives, they are not always necessarily considered credible or authentic voices.³⁰¹ In fact, studies examining government engagement in counter-narrative efforts have found that they may in fact prove counter-productive

Some governments have engaged directly in counter-narrative activities, but the emerging evidence points to the fact that governments are more effective when they play an indirect, facilitative role. In some cases, it will be appropriate for them to fund counter-narrative activities, where this does not impact on the credibility of the product, campaign or message, but there can be no general rules about when this will be the case because context is so important. There is emerging evidence to suggest that government counter-narrative campaigns can be counter-productive when poorly designed.³⁰²

Within the literature, some of the alternative messengers identified have been local communities, religious leaders, social workers³⁰³, former violent extremists³⁰⁴, young people and victims.³⁰⁵ This is based on the assumption that more localised, civil society actors – i.e. non-state actors – would provide more *legitimate* counter-narrative providers³⁰⁶, with a better chance of challenging the terrorist's metanarratives.³⁰⁷

In fact, more recently, counter-narrative initiatives have been replicated in civil society.³⁰⁸ Ferguson points to the “numerous NGOs pursuing CVE counter-narrative projects”, however, the majority of them are doing so “without research-driven

³⁰¹ “Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Framework for Countering Violent Extremism”, 2014: 4: Kessels, 2010; Braddock and Horgan, 2016.

³⁰² Briggs & Feve, 2013: 26.

³⁰³ Kessel, 2010.

³⁰⁴ For a useful example of the use of formers in counter-narratives, please see Newman, P. (2015) “Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State defectors”, *The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR)*.

³⁰⁵ “Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Framework for Countering Violent Extremism”, 2014.

³⁰⁶ Aly et al., 2015.

³⁰⁷ In this context it is important to acknowledge that these narratives do not appear in a vacuum. The current omnipresent metanarrative used by the Islamic State is a production in response to other metanarratives such as the War on Terror. For more on metanarratives, see Lee, J. (2012), “Metanarratives and the Perversity in the War on Terror”.

³⁰⁸ Ferguson, 2016: 9.

position papers, an evidence base, or even a theory of change that sets out measurable objectives”.³⁰⁹ Yet, she underlines that “most of these civil society and NGO initiatives are still in their infancy” making it “difficult to monitor their impact”.³¹⁰ Ferguson concludes further:

It is notable, for example, that the majority of commentaries supportive of counter-narrative strategies come from policy, think-tank and NGO sphere, and that academic research relating to counter-narratives in CVE appears to have emerged as a response to this trend. Further, the more influential CVE counter-narrative non-academic literature is overshadowed by the work of a few individuals, all working in the global north, and almost exclusively address the challenges posed by Islamist extremism. It is also striking that while counter-narratives can be propagated via any kind of communication media – from dropping leaflets out of a plane, to animations on YouTube – much of the CVE literature reviewed here, and the majority of practical initiatives, are focused on the online sphere and almost exclusively address VIE narratives.³¹¹

In this sense, this dissertation will further contribute to the field by examining *both* right wing and Islamist extremism, with case studies both in the global north and south. Although Fergusons’ review of counter-narratives is heavily focussed on strategic policy communication strategies and counter-propaganda techniques³¹², she highlights how the counter-narrative approach to CVE is a “relatively new endeavour and its results remain unclear” and therefore the theoretical foundations require further attention.³¹³

Furthermore, the field has been subject to criticism for not placing adequate emphasis on context and local input when developing and disseminating counter-narratives:

It remains far from clear that counter-narrative projects and programs are informed by contextual research or even designed with local input to increase the chances that content will resonate in the very communities they are meant to influence.³¹⁴

³⁰⁹ Ferguson, 2016: 9.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ferguson, K. 2016: 9.

³¹² Ferguson, K. “Countering violent extremism through media and communication strategies – A review of the evidence”, *Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research (PaCCS)*, Published 1st March 2016.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Rosand, E. & E. Winterbotham, 2019. “Do counter-narratives actually reduce violent extremism?”, *Brookings*.

This dissertation therefore provides important insights into the role of context and local input as it examines *how counter-narratives emerge organically* and may help to yield more research on the role context and local considerations should have in counter-messaging.

The case against counter-narratives

Ferguson has examined three prominent assumptions that figure in the pro-counter-narrative literature: i) violent words lead to violent deeds ii) if propaganda is crucial to VE, counter-narratives are crucial to CVE iii) the real world VE threat can be addressed, in part, by deploying counter-narratives. Some of her key findings include³¹⁵:

- There currently exists little hard evidence that actually proves that interaction with VE content leads to participation in VE activities. However, the picture is mixed: while some evidence suggest patterns of discourse and communication such as hate speech, dehumanisation, and identity-based narratives (or propaganda) can contribute to conditions where identity-based violence (IBV) or VE becomes more likely, the causal relationship remains unproven.
- The hypothesis that the messages, myths, promises, objectives, glamour and other enticements propagated via VE narratives can be replaced with, or dismantled by, an alternative set of communications is an assumption that remains unproven.
- Existing body of knowledge on propaganda, nationalism and identity shows that values identified in contemporary VE propaganda were also present in virtually every successful identity-based propaganda campaign in history.
- The assumption that responding to each set of VE narrative and its intended and/or potential audience with a specifically designed counter-narrative will be effective fails to address *why* the VE narrative may be appealing in the first place.
- Counter-narratives and CVE researchers and practitioners may wish to explore why engaging with certain VE narratives online can be so appealing from a

³¹⁵ The list has been borrowed, and slightly modified, from Ferguson, 2016: 3.

communications perspective and, therefore, consider whether there are media or communication based-solutions that can draw on these lessons.

Ferguson also discusses alternative approaches³¹⁶, however an important note in this regard is the “trust and credibility of information providers”³¹⁷, which overlaps with the notion of the authenticity of the counter-narrative providers – ‘trust’ and ‘credibility’ are important in the context of the messenger of counter-narratives.

Throughout the course of conducting research for this dissertation, as the author has presented some of the key ideas³¹⁸, the argument has been raised that we should in fact not build anything on the terror attack sites as it may reinforce *the narrative of the terrorists*. Although there currently does not exist enough evidence to prove a causal relationship between narratives and the use of VE, it has, however, been established that “discourse and communication (such as hate speech, dehumanisation, and identity-based narratives or propaganda) can contribute to conditions where IBV” and “VE becomes more likely”.³¹⁹

Scholars have similarly questioned the use of counter-narratives when targeting IS’ propaganda, based on the argument that counter-narratives may reinforce the actual message conveyed by the terrorists³²⁰:

At the heart of any comprehensive communication campaign are two types of messaging strategies, defensive and offensive – by definition, counter-narratives are inherently defensive. One lesson from history, that reflection on past communication campaigns demonstrates, is that successful campaigns combine both defensive and offensive messaging, with the latter dominating.³²¹

In this sense, given the *inherently defensive role of counter-narratives*, it may appear better to not enter the (communications) ‘game’ altogether. However, most of the research to date is affirmative on the need for counter-narratives and Reed highlights that for any successful communications campaign a multi-dimensional approach is needed:

³¹⁶ Ferguson, 2016: 17.

³¹⁷ Ibid. p. 2

³¹⁸ At various workshops, conferences and other presentations.

³¹⁹ Ferguson, 2016.

³²⁰ Reed, A. 2017, “IS Propaganda: Should We Counter the Narrative?” ICCT – The Hague.

³²¹ Ibid.

Perhaps the greatest failing that this fixation on counter-narratives highlights, is the piecemeal approach to communications and the lack of understanding of the need for a comprehensive, integrated and multi-dimensional communications campaign. Successful campaigns are a complex construction, made up of multiple different types of messaging (offensive and defensive, identity and rational-choice) dispatched through multiple mediums (online, print, tv, radio, oration), all in support of and mutually re-enforcing, a central narrative and synchronised with action on the ground. This is the reality of the propaganda campaign that we face from IS. It is naivety at best, but certainly doomed to failure, to respond with only a focus on one type of messaging in an isolated effort against an integrated campaign. The sum is certainly greater than the parts. Whilst politicians seem apt at understanding the scale and sophistication of the communication campaigns needed to get them elected, it is time that they realise that the same effort is needed to face down IS's propaganda.³²²

From the above it is clear that while a ‘shared understanding of the problem’ is instrumental, a multi-dimensional strategy is also crucial. While there have been extensive research and policy employed when it comes to strategic communications approaches for government agencies in particular³²³, there has been less instructive research conducted on how counter-narratives emerge organically on the local level.

In conclusion, the literature appears to be ambivalent towards the fact whether VE content, discourse and communication contribute to “conditions where IBV or VE becomes more likely” however the overwhelming takeaway from the body of literature is that simply removing VE content is not enough but that we also have to counter the ideas instigating and justifying violence. Hard CT approaches alone are not enough to counter terrorism and VE given that narratives are used to appeal to VE and bring new ranks into existing terrorist groups.

Meaning-making practice of terrorism and CT extends to the symbolism of terror attack sites

As the 9/11 terror attacks clearly demonstrated, the symbolism of using terrorism as a way of communicating extends to the selection of attack sites. The attack on the Twin Towers and Pentagon was essentially a symbolic attack at the heart of the economic and political system of the United States (US). In this sense, the symbolism of a terror attack site should not only extend to the message that the terrorists are trying to

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ingram, H. & Reed, A. 2016; Winter, C. 2017; Ingram, H. 2018; Ingram, H. and Whiteside, C., 2017.

convey but also to the meaning that becomes embedded in the site following a terrorist attack. The government response and how communities interact with the sites in the aftermath of the attacks, whether they rebuild and recover or memorialise and remember, essentially communicates an implicit message back to the terrorists. This message is structured around the victim audiences' own perceptions and understandings of terrorism and the performative act of terrorism.

Eric D. Miller's analysis of the 9/11 Ground Zero site and the meaning of understanding the significance of places of death, stresses the difficulty in associating the site with anything else but a cemetery.³²⁴ The meaning attributed to the sites, or these 'places of death', "is constantly being constructed and reconstructed" through the way people communicate about them and engage in the debates around the ongoing function of these sites.³²⁵ As Miller notes, this process takes place in large part "through the stories that people tell in their lives and memorial markers".³²⁶ It therefore becomes key to explore the discourses surrounding these sites and particularly *whose ideas matter*, as no matter what the actual response to the sites, it essentially communicates and entails a (counter-) narrative.

A common argument put forward is that one should simply rebuild on the sites, to avoid reinforcing the terrorist's narrative.³²⁷ However, Miller suggests otherwise:

while it is virtually inevitable that individuals will likely make sense of Ground Zero through their own personal biases, it is essential that future generations have a clear, full and accurate representation of the devastation that occurred there.³²⁸

In this sense, the prevention of terrorism (in this case responding to the sites) has a "global public goods" aspect to it by not only providing counter-narratives but by the intergenerational aspect of the response, conveying the 'story' of what happened, and, by doing so, preventing such events from happening again. Therefore, the *performativity* of not only the act of terrorism itself, but also the utterances and

³²⁴ Miller, E. D. 2011. 'Finding Meaning at Ground Zero for Future Generations: Some Reflections a Decade after 9/11', *International Social Science Review*, Vol. 86, 3/4: 113-133.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Ibid., p. 114.

³²⁷ An argument that has appeared when the author has presented the ideas proposed by this dissertation at various academic presentations.

³²⁸ Miller, E. D. 2011: 113.

actions performed around these sites in the aftermath can have an effect far beyond that of the agent. The role of *performativity* will be explored further in the below sections on *norm diffusion* in the context of victims and key stakeholders as *norm entrepreneurs*.

It therefore becomes key to examine how governments together with communities are moving away from the traditional ‘memory sites’ and instead approaching these sites as symbolical (but also functional) spaces part of some form of counter-narrative. Investigating the symbolism and functionalism (i.e. how the sites have come to function in the aftermath/for what purpose) of terror attack sites and how people are engaging with the sites provides important insights into how these sites may become more than just sites associated with death.

Given the focus on social phenomenon and the *social construction of reality*, the dissertation will be adopting a social constructivist approach. The argument for using social constructivism is derived from Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s view of constructivism as an approach that explores the role of “ideas, norms, knowledge, culture and argument in politics, stressing in particular the role of collectively held or “intersubjective” ideas and understandings on social life”.³²⁹ In this sense, constructivism allows researchers to explore how “terrorism and counter-terrorism are socially constructed in different settings, visual data as well as oral narratives and even buildings and architecture are sources of studying how different cultures make sense of terrorism as well as how counterterrorism policies are enacted”.³³⁰

This complex interplay between culture and identity becomes evident when considering the role of victims of terrorist attacks. In this sense, the (collective) trauma experienced “concerns both individuals and communities, since the boundary between the two is not always clear, particularly when considering the experience of individuals subjected to collective violence”.³³¹ Thus, the victim’s experiences in the case of the Bali bombings in 2002 and the terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011 need to

³²⁹ Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. 2001. “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, p. 392.

³³⁰ Stump, J. L. & Dixit, P. 2013. *Critical Terrorism Studies – An Introduction to Research Methods*, p. 163.

³³¹ Fassin, D. & Rechtman, R. 2009. *The Empire of Trauma – An Inquiry into the Condition of Victimhood*, p. 15.

be understood in the context of “wounds in the collective memory that contribute to the construction of identity in different social groups”.³³²

It is also this connection between the collective and the individual that allows people to relate to it and evoke empathy – making trauma universal. As Cathy Caruth points out, “[i]n a catastrophic age, trauma itself may provide the very link between cultures” as “contemporary sensitivity to the misfortunes of the world derives from this hidden wound that allows us to understand others not on the basis of their experience, but through our own”.³³³ Similarly, Emma Hutchison speaks of representation when challenging the idea that trauma is something personal that cannot be extended to the collective.³³⁴ This aspect becomes key when considering the usefulness of victim’s voices for counter-narratives and will be further elaborated in the below sections before examined in Chapter 5 on CT as collective action.

Norms and norm diffusion

Exploring the role of norms in international relations (IR), “[n]ormative and ideational concerns have always informed the study of international politics” and have, to varying degrees, been highlighted by the different IR theories.³³⁵ Even the realist school of thought, although it may have rejected idealism, nevertheless, has often been concerned with “issues of legitimacy and ideology”.³³⁶ The Cold War, for example, was not just merely a conflict between two great powers; but at the end of the day, was a war for ‘hearts and minds’.³³⁷

The study of IR therefore frequently has been concerned and coupled with the “change to attitudes, identity and affect among participants”.³³⁸ In the 1970s, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, in exploring transnational relations, underscored the

³³² Ibid.

³³³ Caruth, C. 1995. “Trauma and Experience: Introduction” in Caruth, C. (ed.) *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*.

³³⁴ Hutchison, E. 2010. “Trauma and the Politics of Emotions”.

³³⁵ Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. 1998. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, *International Organization*, p. 887.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Ibid.

role of transnational actors, “who were sometimes influenced by norms and ideas”.³³⁹ Similarly, regime theorists in the 1980s highlighted the role of norms and principles, which led the way for the “ideational turn” at the end of that same decade.³⁴⁰

However, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that rather than a ‘turn’ to norms; this highlighting of norms is actually a ‘return to norms’.³⁴¹ For the last two millennia the issues of norms and normative questions have provided key components for the study of politics in the sense that scholars have been coupled with questions of “the meaning of justice and the good society but also the influence of human behaviour of ideas about justice and good”.³⁴² In this sense, the authors maintain, “[o]ur conclusions (or our assumptions) about these issues condition every form of political analysis”.³⁴³

It is exactly for the lack of such an element of perhaps a ‘moral compass’ that E. H. Carr argued that “realism fails … precisely because it excludes essential features of politics like emotional appeal to a political goal and grounds for moral judgment”.³⁴⁴ This particular element can be discerned and reflected in the attitudes towards UN activity, which is often coupled with “establishing norms”.³⁴⁵ However, even realists like Hans Morgenthau acknowledged how “ideational and normative factors such as nationalism, morality and international law limit states’ exercise of power”.³⁴⁶

Given other schools of thoughts’ disregard for the role of *interests* and *identity formation* in the context of norms, constructivists in turn have been able to challenge the dominant way of thinking:

These arguments and assumptions have been questioned by constructivist research that seeks to explain interest and identity formation. These scholars argue that international norms carry

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 888.

³⁴¹ Ibid., p. 889.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

social content and are often independent of power distributions; they provide agents/states with understandings of interests (“constitute them”), and do not merely constrain behavior.³⁴⁷

Checkel further demonstrates how empirical work³⁴⁸, in line with the above, has convincingly illustrated how norms can entail “such constitutive effects”.³⁴⁹ However, he also highlights some shortcomings with the constructivist academic work on norms, with two weaknesses in particular: i) it has neglected to explore in a systematic manner the mechanisms through which international norms reach their domestic arena³⁵⁰ and ii) constructivism cannot account for an obvious fact: the same norm will have dramatic constitutive impact in one state, but fail to do so in others. This latter factor is linked to “inattention in theory development”, particularly on the domestic level, though Checkel underscores that a more significant factor is ontological.³⁵¹ Although constructivism relies on a “mutual constitution of agents and structure”, he highlights how empirical research within the field have used a mainly “structure-centred ontology, where structures (typically norms) provide agents (states or individual/groups within them) with new understandings of their interests”.³⁵²

He highlights how in the odd cases where, ontologically, agents have been accorded status, constructivists have tended to emphasise the role of international norm-makers (such as NGOs and international organisations) while ignoring domestic norm-takers. In this sense, in the absence of theory on domestic agency, constructivism tends to overpredict “international normative influence and cannot explain cross-national variation in the constitutive impact of systemic norms”.³⁵³ The dissertation’s intended focus on the role of domestic norm-takers is therefore an important contribution to the field of constructivist research on norms.

³⁴⁷ Checkel, J. 1999. “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe”, *International Studies Quarterly*, p. 84.

³⁴⁸ Works he refers to include for example Nadelmann, 1990; Finnemore, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996.

³⁴⁹ Checkel, 1999: 84.

³⁵⁰ In this sense, Checkel explains: “Constructivists fail to specify diffusion mechanisms and thus cannot offer a causal argument, verified through process tracing, of how norms are transmitted to states and have constitutive effects”.

³⁵¹ Checkel, 1999: 85.

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Ibid.

Checkel's research highlights the *domestic agents* by focussing on norm *diffusion*. However, while his research focusses on how global norms affect domestic agents, this dissertation will explore how the agents in question (victims and other stakeholders) can act as a source of norm diffusion, providing norms in the sense of bottom-up (civil society to state – and perhaps even global level – in the age of increasing interdependence and transnationalism).

Finnemore and Sikkink address some of the theoretical issues facing scholars who are interested in empirical research on “social construction processes and norm influences”³⁵⁴ in IR:

How do we know a norm when we see one? How do we know norms make a difference in politics? Where do norms come from? How do they change? We are particularly interested in the role norms play in political change – both in the ways in which norms, themselves, change and the ways in which they change other features of the political landscape.³⁵⁵

The scholars argue that “norms evolve in a patterned “life cycle””,³⁵⁶ and identify three stages in the life cycle of norms: i) the first phase is *norm emergence*; ii) the second one is *norm acceptance*; iii) and the third one is *norm internalization*.³⁵⁷ Below table is borrowed from the authors and demonstrates the various stages of norms, while the dissertation’s emphasis revolves around the first stage – that of norm emergence.

³⁵⁴ Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 888.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 896-909.

Table 2: Finnemore and Sikkink's table for the various 'Stages of norms'

	<i>Stage 1 Norm emergence</i>	<i>Stage 2 Norm cascade</i>	<i>Stage 3 Internalization</i>
<i>Actors</i>	Norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms	States, international organizations, networks	Law, professions, bureaucracy
<i>Motives</i>	Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
<i>Dominant mechanisms</i>	Persuasion	Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration	Habit, institutionalization

- *Stage 1: Norm emergence*

Despite a lack of robust research on the process of ‘norm-building’, most studies that explore the origin of norms stress the role of “human agency, indeterminacy, chance occurrences, and favorable events, using process tracing or genealogy as a method”.³⁵⁸ The dissertation will explore the role of the stakeholders in the case studies and their agency.

Although states have traditionally been the main actors in international politics,

[n]etworks of norm entrepreneurs and international organizations also act as agents of socialization by pressuring targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws and to ratify treaties and by monitoring compliance with international standards.³⁵⁹

Finnemore and Sikkink also underscore the role of *trust*, and how when trust becomes habitual it is subsequently internalized, and “internalized trust would, in turn, change affect among the participants”.³⁶⁰ Furthermore, the authors highlight that although the body of empirical research on norms “reveal an intimate relationship between norms and rationality”, there currently exists “little good theoretical treatment of this relationship, partly because scholars have tended to counterpose norms to rationality in IR”.³⁶¹

³⁵⁸ Ibid. 896.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

However, given the dissertation's discursive emphasis on the *process* of the emergence of counter-narratives, Krook and True's more *dynamic* approach to norms becomes more suitable. They argue that constructivist approaches to date tend to have "a relatively static depiction of norm content, juxtaposed against a comparatively dynamic account of norm creation, diffusion and socialization".³⁶² The authors contend that while norms may take different forms, commonly "their boundaries are largely understood as fixed: norms are taught, advocated and internalized".³⁶³ Although norms may be contested, the assumption is that tensions arise "from competition with other, often opposing, norms and would-be-norms" rather than "from internal contradictions or dissonance".³⁶⁴

However, more recent research "observes that the norms that spread across the international system tend to be vague, enabling their content to be filled in many ways and thereby to be appropriated for a variety of different purposes".³⁶⁵ In this sense, it challenges the more fixed notions, by viewing norms as 'processes', "as works-in-progress, rather than as finished products"³⁶⁶:

Our contention is that norms diffuse precisely because – rather than despite the fact that – they may encompass different meanings, fit in with a variety of contexts, and be subject to framing by diverse actors.³⁶⁷

Within the discipline of IR there is a tendency by those who oppose constructivism to assume and imply that "the issues constructivists study (norms, identities) are not rational and, similarly, that "rationalists" cannot or do not treat norms or identities in their research program".³⁶⁸ Yet, the authors point to the fact that "recent theoretical

³⁶² Krook, M. L. & True, J. 2010. "Rethinking the life cycles of international norms: The United Nations and global promotion of gender equality", *European Journal of International Relations*, p. 104.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Krook & True, 2010: 105.

³⁶⁸ Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 909.

work in rational choice and empirical work on norm entrepreneurs make it abundantly clear that this fault line is untenable both empirically and theoretically”.³⁶⁹

The above concepts of *norms*, *trust* and particularly *emotions* when it comes to the *trauma* related to the experiences of the victims, in the sense of conveying individual trauma to the collective, in CT will be discussed further in the below. Furthermore, for the purpose of operationalising the theoretical elements of norms and norm diffusion a discursive approach highlighting processes³⁷⁰ will be adopted and discussed further in the below.

Whose ideas matter?

Exploring norm diffusion, and how some “ideas and norms find acceptance in a particular locale and others do not”³⁷¹, Acharya points to the fact how matters of normative change in world politics “are not only about whether ideas matter, but also whose ideas matter.”³⁷² Acharya identifies ‘four waves’ that have influenced norm diffusion: “moral cosmopolitanism”, “domestic fit”, “constitutive localization” and “cognitive prior”.³⁷³

As already mentioned, given the focus on local agents, the ‘constitutive localization’ approach will be adopted. Acharya makes a key observation, in reaffirming Checkel’s assumption that norm diffusion becomes “more rapid when a cultural match exists between a systemic norm and a target country, in other words, when it resonates with historically constructed domestic norms”.³⁷⁴ This approach is very static and Acharya notes that “[p]rior action or agreement is a constraining device that conditions the reception of emerging ideas, but we know little about how local actors use prior choices to localize and reconstruct ideas in order to make them fit their circumstances and preferences.”³⁷⁵

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Krook, M. L. & J. True, 2010. “Rethinking the life cycles of international norms”.

³⁷¹ Acharya, A. 2010: 9.

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ Acharya, 2010. *Whose Ideas Matter?* pp. 9-30.

³⁷⁴ Checkel quoted in Acharya, 2010: 12.

³⁷⁵ Acharya, 2010, *Whose Ideas Matter?* pp. 12-13.

Acharya therefore recommends “framing” as a tool for analysis for a “more dynamic view of congruence between emerging and existing norms” in norm diffusion.³⁷⁶ Although framing will be discussed in more detail in the methodology section, it is worth highlighting Acharya’s distinction behind “framing” and agency of norm-takers

Through framing, norm advocates highlight and “create” issues “by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.” Audie Klotz’s study of the anti-apartheid campaign shows the critical role the framing of the global norm of racial equality and the global anti-apartheid campaign played in the context of the prevailing civil rights discourse in the United States. Framing can thus make a global norm appear local.

“Grafting” is a tactic employed by norm entrepreneurs to institutionalize a new form by associating it with an existing one, resulting in a similar prohibition or injunction. Richard Price has shown how invoking the prior norm against poison helped the campaign to develop a norm against chemical weapons. However both framing and grafting are largely acts of reinterpretation or representation rather than reconstruction. Neither is necessarily a local act; outsiders usually perform them. Moreover, framing and grafting are undertaken with a view to produce change at the “receiving end” without altering the persuader’s beliefs.³⁷⁷

the agency of norm-takers. Central to the norm dynamic is contestation between emerging norms and existing local beliefs and practices. The outcome is shaped by the ideas and initiative of local actors. This is not simply a question of the existential fit between local norms and external norms. Rather, it is a dynamic process of “constitutive localization” that enables norm-takers to build congruence between the local (including norms previously institutionalized in a region) and external norms. In this process, external norms, which may not initially cohere with existing local beliefs and practices, are incorporated after undergoing modifications to their meaning and scope. This book identifies several conditions that facilitate this process. The evidence shows that a strategy of norm diffusion that provides opportunities for localization is more likely to succeed than one that does not.³⁷⁸

Given the dissertation’s focus on *local agency*, Amitav Acharya’s research on ‘*whose ideas matter*’ provides useful direction for conceptualising the ideas that have influenced the responses to the sites. Acharya’s concept of ‘constitutional localization’ places emphasis on the role of local actors rather than external actors in producing norm diffusion.³⁷⁹ He defines the concept in the following

To localise something is to “invest [it] with the characteristics of a particular place.” I define localization as the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural

³⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 13.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 4.

³⁷⁹ Acharya, A. 2010: 14.

selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the latter developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices.³⁸⁰

Acharya notes how “[n]orm diffusion strategies that accommodate local sensitivities and contexts are more likely to succeed than those seeking to dismiss or supplant the latter”.³⁸¹ Research has demonstrated how the success of universal campaigns is contingent on whether the propagated norm by external actors encouraged or conflicted with the agenda of the local actors.³⁸² As noted by Acharya, “norm diffusion succeeds when a foreign norm seeks to replace a local norm that embodies a moral claim of function that has already been challenged from within”, however, “fails when it competes with a strong local norm.”³⁸³

Although related to the term of ‘adaptation’ and ‘socialization’, ‘localization’ should not be confused with these terms: “whereas adaptation may be tactical and to some extent forced on the target audience, localization is voluntary and the resulting change is likely to be more enduring”.³⁸⁴ Similarly, perspectives on socialization view “norm diffusion is the result of adaptive behaviour in which local practices are made consistent with an external idea” whereas localization “describes a process in which external ideas are adapted to meet local practices”.³⁸⁵ In this sense, Acharya observes how ‘constitutive’ refers to how “agents and structure mutually constitute each other”.³⁸⁶ Furthermore, localization is a dynamic and continuous process, where the “occurrence and outcome of localization is subject to shifting conditions”³⁸⁷:

Localization is progressive, not regressive or static. It reshapes both existing beliefs and practices and foreign ideas in their local context. Localization is an evolutionary or everyday form of progressive norm diffusion.³⁸⁸

Discussing localization and ‘cognitive prior’, Acharya notes how ‘[c]onstitutive localization assumes an existing normative framework’. This framework or ‘cognitive

³⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 15.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² See for example Keck and Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Borders*, p. 63.

³⁸³ Acharya, 2010: 16.

³⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 19.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 21.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

prior’, is defined as an “existing set of ideas, belief systems, and norms, which determine an individual or social group’s receptivity to new norms”.³⁸⁹ ‘Cognitive prior’³⁹⁰ is what Bourdieu would term ‘habitus’.

Norms and normative barriers in terrorism prevention

Although the terms CVE and PVE currently dominate the TS field, little research has been conducted on what role norms play in combatting terrorism. As Schmid has noted, “[w]hile there are many good books on crime prevention as well as conflict prevention, there is, strangely enough, no good volume on the prevention of terrorism”.³⁹¹ One of the few studies, Bjorgo’s crime prevention model for strategies to prevent terrorism however discusses the roles of norms in preventing terrorism.³⁹²

Bjorgo identifies nine key elements of preventative mechanisms: i) establishing and maintaining normative barriers ii) reducing recruitment iii) deterrence iv) disruption v) protecting vulnerable targets vi) reducing the harmful consequences vii) reducing the rewards viii) incapacitation and ix) desistance and rehabilitation. In this sense, the list provides a sequence of preventative barriers whereby “those not stopped by the first barrier may be stopped by the next, or the one after that”.³⁹³

Exploring the normative barrier mechanism in more detail, Bjorgo observes that “[m]ost people refrain from carrying out most types of criminal acts not out of a fear of punishment but because it is wrong, and because they usually do not perceive committing a criminal act to be an “action alternative””.³⁹⁴ He narrows this normative barrier down to the factors of self-control, conscience and the capacity of feeling

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Acharya notes that the sources of cognitive priors may be culture, or cultural norms, “the shared, sanctioned, and integrated systems of beliefs and practices that characterize a cultural group”. Acharya further notes: “such norms may reflect ethnicity, religion, group social belief systems, historical memory, and domestic political rhythms and peculiarities of societies”.

³⁹¹ Schmid, A. P. in Bjorgo, T. 2013. *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism*, pp. vii-viii.

³⁹² Bjorgo, T. 2013. *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

³⁹³ Bjorgo, 2013:12.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.

compassion for others “who could become the victims of harmful acts mean that committing such acts is beyond their action horizon”³⁹⁵:

Positive socialisation during one’s upbringing, interaction in social situations and integrating moral systems into one’s personality help to build and internalise these normative barriers to committing crime. Most of us occasionally feel our conscience fighting against our giving into temptation that could result in an offence. However, most often the notion of committing a crime is simply out of question.³⁹⁶

Bjorgo also highlights that the strength of the normative barriers relative to the type of offence in question will vary substantially “between different social environments”.³⁹⁷ In this sense, depending on the existing subcultures and communities, whereas the breaking of regulations would be considered serious breaches of the general rules that apply in one entity, in others it may be completely acceptable.

When it comes to important prevention actors for building normative barriers, he identifies parents, schools and positive role models as crucial: “providing children and young people with good role models who represent credible moral systems is a powerful means to reduce future acts of crime”.³⁹⁸ He also ascertains legislators, the criminal justice system, the media, religious authorities as well as others as having a central role in determining what is right and wrong.³⁹⁹ As an example, legislation has helped install normative barriers by making acts that used to be permitted – such as parents smacking their children, smoking in public places etc – criminalised, acts which in this way have “over time come to be considered immoral acts by most people”.⁴⁰⁰

Finally, Bjorgo establishes that “[n]ormative barriers are probably the mechanism that prevents the largest number of criminal acts”, while also recognising that these “non-acts” are difficult to calculate and measure⁴⁰¹:

However, at the same time, these are fragile barriers. Some people are more poorly equipped with normative barriers and empathy than other people, and some appear to be completely

³⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

³⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 13.

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

³⁹⁹ Bjorgo, 2013: 13.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

devoid of moral scruples and compassion for others. Even people who have normal inhibitions against inflicting harm and suffering on other people can under certain circumstances bring themselves to carry out gruesome acts.⁴⁰²

Exploring the principal actors in delivering normative barriers he identifies “the security companies, criminal justice systems, prison services, news media, various political authorities, voluntary organisations, social networks, schools, political activists or religious leaders” as possible key actors.⁴⁰³ In this sense, he highlights how it is imperative to ensure “constructive interaction between the various actors within and across different prevention strategies in which different actors understand and respect the actors’ roles and measures”.⁴⁰⁴ The Aarhus model in Denmark, for instance, has been identified as a successful CVE program as it focusses on the interaction of various actors (police, local government, social workers, religious leaders etc) in inhibiting youngsters to travel to conflict areas in Syria and Iraq and by having a program in place for those foreign fighters who return.⁴⁰⁵

Finally, in modifying his prevention model to apply to terrorism he identifies the normative barrier prevention mechanism accordingly: “[e]stablishing norms against the acceptance of violence and terrorism”⁴⁰⁶ and this definition will be utilised throughout subsequently.

Bjorgo highlights how norms are essentially internalised by “[b]asic upbringing, socialisation and education” and how “[p]arents, teachers and other moral authorities are main preventative actors”, however he also identifies other role models, and peers in particular, as possible actors that may shape and form attitudes.⁴⁰⁷ Although morality can be a fragile barrier even among “normal people”, Bjorgo nevertheless underscores that “building and maintaining such norms is one of the most important strategies for preventing terrorism”.⁴⁰⁸ In this sense, it makes sense to try and harness

⁴⁰² Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁰³ Ibid., p. 25.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ For more information on the Aarhus model, please see https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7423_en

⁴⁰⁶ Bjorgo, 2013: 27.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

the possible counter-narratives and local resilience that emerges in the aftermath of a terror attack.

Bjorgo highlights the important element of *emotions* in terms of the general idea of the use of violence and terrorism:

The idea partly goes against their conscience and moral values of right and wrong, and they partly react emotionally to the idea of inflicting pain on other people because they are capable of feeling empathy and compassion for others. For the vast majority of those who might be angry or frustrated by a political injustice, this normative barrier will be sufficient to refrain from getting involved in political violence and terrorism.⁴⁰⁹

Emotions is a concept that is often overlooked within IR scholarship due to a long tradition of relying on *rationality*.⁴¹⁰ However, more recently *emotions* have reappeared to the forefront when conceptualising culture in social movements research.⁴¹¹ Analogous to other elements of culture, such as “cognitive meanings or moral principles, emotions are shaped by social expectations as much as they are emanations from individual personalities”.⁴¹² Based on the symbolic aspect of this research, exploring the meaning-making practices of terrorism and CT, acknowledging the role of emotions becomes a key component in exploring the way in which different stakeholders engage with terror attack sites.

In this sense, emotions have been reincorporated into the field⁴¹³ where the identified empirical task forward is to explore “the interaction of emotions with other kinds of cultural dynamics but also with organizational and strategic dynamics”.⁴¹⁴ The role of *emotions* in responding to terrorism will be elaborated further by using Emma

⁴⁰⁹ Bjorgo, 2013: 32.

⁴¹⁰ The role of emotions and the nexus of emotions-rationality will be discussed further in the following sections of the dissertation.

⁴¹¹ For a long period the field has been dominated by Weber’s assumption that “rational action could not be emotional, and vice versa”.

⁴¹² Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M. & Polletta, F. (ed). 2001. *Passionate Politics – Emotions and Social Movements*, p. 9.

⁴¹³ See for example Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta (eds.) (2001) *Passionate Politics – Emotions and Social Movements*: Baumgarten, Daphi and Ullrich (2014) *Conceptualising Culture in Social Movement Research*.

⁴¹⁴ Goodwin et al., 2001: 9.

Hutchison's idea of how collective trauma is represented via emotions in the sections to follow.

Therefore, in conclusion, some important keywords he identifies in relation to normsetting against violence and terrorism are *attitudes*, *empathy*, *moral values*, *normative barriers*, *role models*, *scruples* and *socialisation*. The role of normative barriers, and how these can specifically be provided by using victim's voices and local resilience to terrorism in terms of the symbolism of terror attack sites, will be discussed further in the below sections that explores CT as collective action.

CVE and norm diffusion

Following on from the above discussion on *normative barriers* and *norm-setting against violence* in the CT and CVE context, this section will explore the notion of norm diffusion in IR. The purpose is to provide a theoretical framework for the role of victims and other key stakeholders engaging with terror attack sites for acting in essence as agents for norm-setting against VE and terrorism.

Jeffrey T. Checkel's research on norms emphasizes the domestic agents by "socializing a concept of central concern to the constructivist study of norms: diffusion".⁴¹⁵ Grouping the concept with terms such as 'spread', 'trickling down', 'translation', Checkel defines 'diffusion' accordingly

Diffusion, by a standard definition, is the "transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and information from one population or region to another"; or, as one popular text puts it, diffusion occurs when an "innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social system." Both definitions, while general, capture the central dynamic of concern to constructivists studying the spread/influence of norms.⁴¹⁶

Norm diffusion research, relatively new in the field of political science⁴¹⁷, has been identified to have certain shortcomings, which generally can be concluded to ignore agency and the social context: i) adding more emphasis on the cultural and social element – "the social construction of identity", including the degree of "cultural match" between global norms and domestic practice ii) addressing the role of agency

⁴¹⁵ Checkel, 1999: 85.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

– whereby researchers “pay greater attention to the adopter’s “experience, norms, values and intentions”⁴¹⁸:

Moreover, the adoption environment should be reconstructed within its own societal and environmental context, through an “intersubjective familiarity” of the individuals and groups under study. This is a call to reintroduce process, agency, and what Avinoam Meir has called “cultural man” to dominant structural diffusion approaches.⁴¹⁹

In this sense, given that the international community has acknowledged the important role that victims’ voices can have in countering those of terrorists, it becomes key to examine how this norm diffusion from the local level up takes shape in practice.

Victims and other stakeholders as norm entrepreneurs

Terrorism can affect anyone, anywhere ... It attacks humanity itself. And it is for the sake of humanity that we must create a global forum for your voice and listen to you, the victims. Your stories of how terrorism has affected your lives are our strongest argument why it can never be justified. By giving a human face to the painful consequences of terrorism, you help build a global culture against it. You humble the world by your strength and courage. You deserve support and solidarity. You deserve social recognition, respect and dignity. You deserve to have your human rights defended. And you deserve justice.

(Ban Ki-moon, September 2008)

As has been discussed in the above, little of the research to date has explored how counter-narratives evolve *organically* as opposed to being *constructed* by governments. To warrant more legitimacy for counter-narratives, scholars and CT-experts have argued that governments should seek to support both existing and emerging local civil society initiatives⁴²⁰, which could be argued to provide what is often considered authentic voices. In this sense, victim’s voices would be considered a civil society and grassroots initiative, “and by virtue of their victimhood have been categorised as potentially relevant for the development of ‘ethical counter-narratives’”.⁴²¹

Although a lot of research has been conducted on victims and victimhood, particularly in the disciplines of criminology and victimology, the existing body of knowledge on

⁴¹⁸ Checkel, 1999: 86.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Aly et al., 2015; Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Framework, 2014.

⁴²¹ Balbi, A. in Lynch, O. & J. Argomaniz. 2017. “Victims and Perpetrators”, p. 42.

victims of terrorism has a tendency to sit in isolation from the broader field of TS.⁴²² This could be a reflection of the fact that, as noted by Tim Wilson, genesis, and not the aftermath, has tended to be the focus of TS.⁴²³ However, aspects of the aftermath of terrorism can provide key insights, as established by research on the role of victims in the fight on terrorism and political violence

the themes of memory, remembrance and memorialisation are closely intertwined with aspects of visibility and recognition. It seems clear that offering victims the possibility of making their own experiences visible and sharing them with other people can be one way of dealing with their own personal trauma and attaining closure. Furthermore, learning about the testimony of victims can also be enriching for the entire society. The visibility and recognition of victims find public expression in commemorative acts, in the creation of monuments, museums, plaques and other markers representing social memories (memorialisation).⁴²⁴

However, the role of victims in CVE is a complex subject matter, potentially (re)-traumatising and must be handled sensitively⁴²⁵:

Although victims have been identified as potential *sources* of counter-narrative communications given their authenticity and ability to represent the human story of the suffering caused by terrorism – we cannot naively expect that the onus should be on the victims to convey them. While some individuals who have suffered a loss or violence may be willing to engage in preventative interventions, every victim experience is unique and must be understood given the context of their traumatisation.⁴²⁶

Hence why scholars speak about the victim/survivor paradigm, whereby some individuals tend to identify themselves as ‘victims’, while others as ‘survivors’.⁴²⁷

the personal response to the violence and trauma suffered can vary enormously from one individual to another. Survivor’s and victims’ family members’ reactions can range from social isolation and detachment, avoidance and/or rejection of politics to the other side of the spectrum: political awakening, community activism, media representation and advocacy work.⁴²⁸

⁴²² Argomaniz, J. & Lynch, O. 2015.

⁴²³ Wilson, T. 2018: vii.

⁴²⁴ Serrano et al. 2018: 32.

⁴²⁵ “Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Framework”, 2014.

⁴²⁶ Balbi, A. 2018. “In the aftermath of terrorism – the structural challenges for incorporating victim’s voices” in Lynch, O. & Argomaniz, J. 2018. *Victims and Perpetrators of Terrorism*, p. 42.

⁴²⁷ In conversation with Professor James M. Jasper visiting Curtin University in February 2015.

⁴²⁸ Lynch & Argomaniz, 2018, *Victims and Perpetrators of Terrorism*, p. 3.

Jasper notes how there is an inherent contradiction in terms of the compassion generated towards the affected in the passive-active role taken on by victims/survivors, as demonstrated by his table below.⁴²⁹

Table 3 – Jasper’s Passive-Active Agency paradox

	Victim	
Survivor	Good	Weak
	Strong	Bad
	Minion	
	Villain	

In this sense, when exploring the terror attack sites the dissertation will be investigating how the affected communities – identified as *victims and other key stakeholders* – engage with the terror attack sites and how their agency in terms of performative acts may provide for counter-narratives and norm diffusion from the local level up. In this sense, the victims would essentially become what the literature has identified as *norm entrepreneurs*.

One of the significant discourses that have emerged when researching the literature on victims is the associated notion of *trauma*. While most of the literature on trauma often regards the concept as something very personal, Emma Hutchison argues that *personal trauma* can in fact be extended to the *collective memory* through what she refers to as *representation*:

Focusing on the role of emotions in particular, I scrutinise how traumatic events can be represented in ways that make them meaningful to a wider community; to those who do not experience trauma directly but only bear witness, from a distance. Representations of trauma often draw attention to the harrowing nature of traumatic events: they signify shock, vulnerability and confusion. Witnesses strive to make sense of what they are seeing, being

⁴²⁹ In conversation with Professor James M. Jasper visiting Curtin University in February 2015.

affected by emotional responses and drawing upon prevailing discourses and symbols to make sense of what they see and feel. In this way, traumatic, catastrophic events can acquire shared meaning and become perceived as a collective experience.⁴³⁰

In this sense, the victims' experiences could have an impact beyond their personal spheres, extended to society through the notion of representation. This concept together with the concepts of *norm diffusion* and *norm entrepreneurs*, will be further developed in Chapter 5: *CT as collective action*.

Performativity and the performative power of commemorialisation

Another key concept that has emerged throughout the literature on terror attacks sites is the concept of 'performativity'. Performativity is here defined as "the power of language to effect change in the world: language does not simply describe the world but may instead (or also) function as a form of social action".⁴³¹ As Malin Hedlin Hayden and Märten Snickare aptly illustrate:

How does the relationship between language and the outside world look like? Is the language that we speak and write mainly a tool to describe, and therefore represent, reality? Like when we look out through the window and say "it's raining today". Such a statement can be true or false but "the rain" outside is falling independent of what we say about it. Or is it also so that our linguistic statements can *do* something with the world, change it, make things happen? That is, can words we utter be understood as actions with the trait of affecting?⁴³²

The performative power of language and the concept of performativity are often associated with John L. Austin, who specifically distinguished between two views on language:⁴³³ i) firstly, according to Austin, language serves to make statements – i.e. reporting reality⁴³⁴ ii) then, Austin argues, there are cases that go against this descriptive norm. He gives the examples of saying 'I do' when uttered as part of the marriage service: "[t]o say, in these instances, is to do: for this reason Austin christens this kind of sentence or utterance performative".⁴³⁵

⁴³⁰ Hutchison, E. 2010: 66.

⁴³¹ Cavanaugh, J. R. 2015. "Performativity", *Oxford bibliographies*.

⁴³² Hedlin Hayden, M. & M. Snickare, 2017. *Performativitet: Teoretiska tillämpningar i konstvetenskap: 1*. Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, p. xi.

⁴³³ Loxley, J. 2006. *Performativity*. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., p. 8.

Similarly, in reviewing the literature on performativity, Hedlin Hayden and Snickare state that: “it is with the help of concepts that we create – and make – meanings”.⁴³⁶ The authors maintain that when scientific practices change new questions arise which appear more relevant and urgent, while questions that used to be central are pushed to the margins. Perspectives for interpretation and theories change as well, and new concepts emerge which end up being utilized more frequently while already established perspectives are questioned and renegotiated:

Within the sciences of humanities shifts in interests and practices occur all the time. Along side studies that focus on structures, systems and positions researchers have during the last decades increasingly concerned themselves with processes, practices and changes. *Actors, agency and relations* are often recurring concepts and it appears for many researchers more important to examine what someone *does* in relation to what somebody *is*. Even texts, images and objects are these days ascribed a “social life” and therefore an ability to influence and affect those people whom meet and treat them. From such a perspective it becomes important not only to examine what we do with a picture or another object but also what the picture or object does. What is commonly referred to as the picture’s agency is just as important as what the picture is said to represent. We think, interpret and write in relation to the specific pictures and objects that we study.⁴³⁷

Similarly, in the context of terrorism, anthropologists have explored the performative power of acts of commemorialisation. For instance, Sánchez-Carretero made the following observation in exploring the response to and memorialisation of the victims of the Madrid bombings: “[t]he shrines are used as a means for performing and initiating change. They are mechanisms of agency”.⁴³⁸

The walls of the train stations were used to voice ideas or reject those expressed by others. The capacity to invite participation and interpretation is due to the polysemy inherent in these assemblages and the multivocality over time – new meanings. Interestingly, the shrines, the demonstrations, and the writings all were parts of a popular response to the bombings. They

⁴³⁶ Hedlin Hayden, M. & M. Snickare, 2017. *Performativitet: Teoretiska tillämpningar i konstvetenskap: 1.* Stockholm: Stockholm University Press.

⁴³⁷ Hayden, M. H. & Snickare, M. 2017. “Inledning”, in Hayden, M. H. and Snickare, M. (ed.) *Performativitet: Teoretiska tillämpningar i konstvetenskap: 1.* Pp. ix–xxiv. Stockholm: Stockholm University Press.

⁴³⁸ Sánchez-Carretero, C. in Santino, J. 2006. *Spontaneous Shrines and the Public Memorialization of Death*, p. 338.

registered sympathy and identification with the victims; outrage at the perpetrators; and outrage, also, at the Government, which had attempted to deceive the people.⁴³⁹

In this sense, the dissertation seeks to explore how the performativity that takes place around the sites in Bali and Norway could act as a means for delivering CVE and explores the *organically* ‘constructed’ counter-narratives in particular. It therefore becomes key to study how these performative acts on the local level could translate into policy that has a ‘trickle-up’ effect. As noted by van Ginkel: there is a need for research on whether “the context specific policies developed and implemented at the local level yield results that would merit policy uptake to the national and possibly even the regional or international level.”⁴⁴⁰

While some may argue that we should simply rebuild in order to not give the terrorists a ‘voice’ through their acts and marks of violence left behind, James E. Young reminds us of the need to in fact remember these acts of violence:

It is not enough to ask whether or not our memorials remember the Holocaust, or even how they remember it. We should also ask to what ends we have remembered. That is, how do we respond to the current moment in light of our remembered past? This is to recognize that the shape of memory cannot be divorced from the actions taken in its behalf, and that memory without consequences contains the seeds of its own destruction. For were we passively to remark only the contours of these memorials, were we to leave unexplored their genesis and remain unchanged by the recollective act, it could be said that we have not remembered at all.⁴⁴¹

Subsequently, it becomes key to explore how terror attacks are remembered through memorials and spontaneous shrines as it expresses something about us as humans while connecting us with the past. Furthermore, the manner in which we remember helps us to move on as a collective, as noted by Simon Stow: “recent work in political theory on memory, mourning, and memorialization—as well as Ancient Greek concerns about the same—point to the ways in which the manner of remembrance, grieving, and commemoration employed by a democratic polity help to shape political outcomes.”⁴⁴²

⁴³⁹ Ibid., pp. 338-339.

⁴⁴⁰ van Ginkel, B. 2017: 31.

⁴⁴¹ Young, J. E. 1993. *The Texture of Memory – Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*, p. 2.

⁴⁴² Stow, S. 2012. “From Upper Canal to Lower Manhattan: Memorialisation and the Politics of Loss”, *Perspectives on Politics*, p. 687.

Conducting a comparative study of the 9/11 and the New Orleans Katrina memorials, Stow draws upon Bodnar's distinction between national and vernacular commemoration

Drawing a distinction between "official" – here formulated as "national" – and "vernacular" modes of commemoration, he argues that the former "promotes nationalistic, patriotic culture of the whole," while the latter is "less interested ... in exerting influence or control over others, and [is] preoccupied, instead, with defending the interests and rights of ... social segments." His claims are echoed by the political theorist Jenny Edkins. "[M]any contemporary forms of memorialization" she notes, "function to reinforce the nation;" while "resistance to state narratives of commemoration ... constitutes resistance to sovereign power." Both agree that the predominant form of national memorialization frequently "constitutes a form of forgetting" that seeks to empty traumatic events of their political content and suppress oppositional narratives. In this it is, culture and communications professor Marita Sturken suggests, a manifestation of a "comfort culture" that serves "as a form of depoliticization and as a means to confront loss, grief, and fear through processes that disavow politics". This very disavowal, nevertheless, serves to promote political agendas which "tend to be politically regressive in that they are attempts to mediate loss through finding the good – a newfound patriotism, feelings of community – that has come through pain".⁴⁴³

Stow continues by noting that the above "politics of commemoration" are particularly relevant given Erika Doss's observations of how "America has recently been overcome by memorial mania".⁴⁴⁴ This mania entails an obsession with matters concerning memory and history with an urgent desire to "express and claim these issues in visibly public contexts".⁴⁴⁵ Doss has concluded that it reflects "a cultural shift toward public feeling as a source of knowledge".⁴⁴⁶ Stow further highlights that such mania, "by robbing citizens of their capacity for critical reflection", could be considered "a mental state ill-suited to productive democratic engagement". In this sense, this kind of *memorial mania* entraps *critical reflection*, which is often vital for enabling meaningful responses for social change.

⁴⁴³ Stow, S. 2012: 687-688.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 688.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶ Doss, E. 2010: 50.

Accordingly, Stow argues that the 9/11 memorial, named “Reflecting Absence” and designed by Michael Arad and Peter Walker⁴⁴⁷, embodies the type of dominant national (official) narrative mentioned above

It consists of a large tree-lined plaza whose centrepiece is the square foundational footprints of the former twin towers. Each is approximately an acre in size and features polished granite walls that descend three stories into the ground. Water cascades from all sides and collects in pools at the bottom of the footprints before draining into a further square indentation at their centers. At the plaza level, the walls around the footprints are lined with burnished bronze parapets into which the names of the dead are stencil-cut. While some have argued that the Memorial’s design is decidedly banal – “Were it not for the names … carved into the barrier surrounding the pools,” observed *New York Times* architecture critic Nicolai Ouroussoff, “you might be contemplating a pair of fountains at a corporate plaza” – others have expressed fears that the Memorial might be *too* emotive. A February 15, 2012 *New York Times* article detailed police concerns that the pools might become locations for suicides by those overcome by grief.⁴⁴⁸

Stow denotes how already back in the time of the Ancient Greeks, there was a concern with the “dangers of [private] unchecked grief to democratic politics”, often associated with women, and how it “would spill over into the public sphere where it could no longer be contained”.⁴⁴⁹ This was based on their view “that uncontained emotional responses to loss could all too easily become *álaston pénthos*: mourning without end.”⁴⁵⁰

Below is a list to illustrate some of the key elements of input for the 9/11 Memorial provided by the victims in terms of what it should and should not contain, while demonstrating how the contest between the various stakeholders over the Memorial and the role played by private grief may undermine critical thinking:

- One of the principal requests for the Memorial design was that it was to “[r]ecognize each individual who was a victim of the attacks”.⁴⁵¹ Suggestions of locating those names randomly were abandoned due to protests from the families, and a “prolonged and heated debate about how exactly the names

⁴⁴⁷ The design was chosen after an international competition that elicited some 5,201 proposals from 63 countries.

⁴⁴⁸ Stow, 2012: 688.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

would be organized followed: just one of many battles waged by the families not only against the Memorial Commission but also against one another”.⁴⁵²

Stow denotes how the process of emotionally-laden moral authority of the families of those killed in the terror attack provides a prime example of the “validity of the Greek concern about the dangers of private grief to democratic politics”.⁴⁵³

- Stow also observes how the original plans for the Memorial site contained “a number of cultural components, among them a theater and gallery spaces as well as a proposed International Freedom Center”, to reflect America’s leading role in the constantly-evolving world movement for freedom, however these plans were withdrawn due to protests from the families, on the grounds they “might include exhibits critical of America that would pain families”.⁴⁵⁴

Stow denotes how in this process one can see a manifestation of what Hannah Arendt called the rise of “the social”: “the merging of the public and private spheres in ways that undermine the possibilities for an engaged and thoughtful form of politics”.⁴⁵⁵

Stow further makes a key observation in how any narratives that included “any kind of historical or political context were suppressed by public manifestations of grief”.⁴⁵⁶

He notes how this suppression and “historical and political decontextualisation of the attacks did not serve to depoliticise the Memorial” but simply “to hide its political content”.⁴⁵⁷ Stow relates this to Marita Sturken’s concept of a manifestation of “comfort culture” which serves “as form of depoliticization and as a means to confront loss, grief, and fear through processes that disavow politics”.⁴⁵⁸ However, this disavowal can serve to promote political agendas, which “tend to be politically

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ Ibid., p. 689.

⁴⁵⁴ Murphy, 2005. “Keeping focus on the memorial”

⁴⁵⁵ Stow, 2012: 689.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 687-688.

regressive in that they are attempts to mediate loss through finding the good – a newfound patriotism, feelings of community – that has come through pain.”⁴⁵⁹

Other scholars also challenge the above disavowal of politics approach as part of the response to these sites of violence. James E. Young has conducted extensive research on the role of memory and memorials, particularly on the memory of the Holocaust, and highlights the following on the role of memory and remembrance

Memory is never shaped in a vacuum; the motives of memory are never pure. Both the reasons given for Holocaust memorials and the kinds of memory they generate are as various as the sites themselves. Some are built in response to traditional Jewish injunctions to remember, others according to a government's need to explain a nation's past to itself. Where the aim of some memorials is to educate the next generation and to inculcate in it a sense of shared experience and destiny, other memorials are conceived as expiations of guilt or as self-aggrandizement. Still others are intended to attract tourists. In addition to traditional Jewish memorial iconography, every state has its own institutional forms of remembrance. As a result, Holocaust memorials inevitably mix national and Jewish figures, political and religious imagery.⁴⁶⁰

Young, as one of the 9/11 and the Holocaust in Berlin memorial committee experts, has further established: “Where memory disables life, I think that is a failure ... in memory. But if a memory process nourishes life and enables life then we have success”.⁴⁶¹

Spontaneous memorials and resistance

The literature on memorialisation also discusses the role of *spontaneous* memorials and shrines. Jack Santino notes how shrines have emerged “as a primary way to mourn those who have died a sudden or shocking death, and to acknowledge the circumstances of the deaths”.⁴⁶² Santino underscores that given that spontaneous shrines are “a relatively recent and growing international phenomenon”, they need to be theorized for a more comprehensive understanding.

Central to all these is the conjunction of the memorializing of personal death within the framework of the social conditions that caused those deaths, the performative with the

⁴⁵⁹ Sturken, 2002: 382.

⁴⁶⁰ Young, J. E. 1993: 2.

⁴⁶¹ “Tilbake til Utøya”, videoclip, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqOPew5ZJKA>

⁴⁶² Santino, 2006: 5.

commemorative (or celebratory). To commemorate something or someone is, in a sense, to celebrate something or someone.⁴⁶³

Santino's focus is on how these spontaneous rituals can draw attention to and mobilise action regarding a social problem: "the tendency to commemorate a deceased individual in front of an undifferentiated public that can then become participatory if it so chooses".⁴⁶⁴ He speaks of concepts such as 'public display', 'public ritual', 'rites of public presentation' to emancipate the notion of enacting something in the audience, the *performative commemoration*, in order for "the audience members" to be "transformed from passive observer, as at the theatre, to active participant, as at a ritual".⁴⁶⁵

Therefore, the shrines "express an attitude toward that condition [the absence of a person or group] and the larger contexts in which it exists: support for the soldier's cause, faithfulness toward the lover, and condemnation of violence" etc.⁴⁶⁶ In this sense, "[t]he attitudes expressed" by those commemorating their loved ones etc. "are also intended to be shared by those who view the artifacts, to convince, and to have an effect on the aggregate spectatorship".⁴⁶⁷ Therefore the displays can be considered *performative* and are frequently carried out in conjunction with public events. In terms of spontaneous shrines, Santino establishes a duality expressed in "that they both commemorate deceased individuals and suggest an attitude toward a related public issue".⁴⁶⁸ He notes how ritual, "in the stricter sense of the term" is *instrumental*: "it is believed to be able to effect change".⁴⁶⁹

Compared to a traditional funeral procession, performative commemoratives (such as spontaneous shrines) invite participation. Santino furthermore underscores their role in inviting interpretation:

The question of intentionality versus spectator interpretation is important here, as observers' readings and associations will vary from those of the creators. Moreover, the relative degree of

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 11.

performativity versus commemoration varies from assemblage to assemblage and among different types of public memorializations as well...One can view these dimensions as the two ends of a continuum, along which any particular instance of public death memorialization and spontaneous shrines might be placed, according to its emphasis.⁴⁷⁰

If the role of a combatant in war is to depersonalize the enemy, the role of the spontaneous shrine is the opposite: “[t]hey insist on the personal nature of the individuals involved in these issues and the ramifications of the actions of those addressed by the shrines”.⁴⁷¹ Spontaneous shrines also act as artefacts that “construct the relationship between the deceased and those who leave the notes and memorabilia, and present that relationship to visitors”. They furthermore, very often, “challenge hegemonic claims to space and the control of discourse”, demonstrated by opposition from clerics as they exist “outside the official hierarchy of the church” and commercial interests oppose them near their property due to fear of losing business, while “city officials are constantly negotiating their validity”.⁴⁷²

Haney, Leimer and Lowery for example state that “[s]pontaneous memorialization extends the boundaries of who is allowed or expected to participate in the mourning process”.⁴⁷³ The authors “emphasize the inclusive, counter-hegemonic, personal, and eclectic nature of spontaneous memorials” which can provide an expression of resistance “to the outside management of memory”.⁴⁷⁴ For a summarised more detailed account, Goldstein and Tye provide a useful interpretation of Haney, Leimer and Lowery’s concept:

Specifically, they note that spontaneous memorialization is characterized by: not being formally organized thus allowing mourners to make individualized decisions; occurring at a site that is associated with the deceased rather than a prescribed place of mourning; creating a role for those who wish to define themselves but who may not be externally defined as mourners; are composed of eclectic combinations of traditional, religious, secular, and highly personalized objects tailored to the deceased or circumstances of the death; reflect emotions such as anger or vulnerability, which may be felt but typically are not displayed in traditional death rituals; are not constrained by culturally based norms, which prescribe the amount of

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 12.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

⁴⁷² Santino, 2011: 100-101.

⁴⁷³ Haney, Leimer & Lowery, 1997: 162.

⁴⁷⁴ Goldstein & Tye in Santino, 2006: 237.

time allotted for ritual action or appropriate periods of bereavement; and, extend the focus beyond the victim to the social and cultural implications of their death.⁴⁷⁵

The key term of ‘resistance’ in this context, can be “located in reactions to the external construction and control of discourse, meaning, and subjectivities in tragic events”.⁴⁷⁶

Resistance in this sense is the contestation of socially established meanings of dominant discourses that define the situation and how it should be managed. These small acts of defiance, nonconformity and noncompliance (“weapons of the weak” in Scott’s terms) wrestle away the practices, strategies, representations, and textual devices that are expected in response to crisis and allow participants to manage the continued identities of the tragically affected individuals and the community. The subjectivities that grievers hunger for in times of tragedy are to some extent negated by the conformity of traditional mourning practice. But the re-empowerment process, the process that makes it possible for grievers to go on living, seems to require a certain amount of resistance. While Foucault (1980) argues that where there is power there is resistance, Abu-Luhod (1990) reminds us the reverse is also true and where there is resistance there is power. Resistance reclaims agency and marks the road to recovery.⁴⁷⁷

This kind of ‘subjectification’ process permitted by the (official) responses and its consequences will be elaborated on further using Bacchi’s conceptual framework to be employed in the case studies.

The transformative power of terror attack sites – lessons for CVE

Based on the above discussion and conceptual framework, the task becomes to explore the transformative power of these sites marked by violence. Maria Tumarkin, in her research on places marked by violence – or ‘traumascapes’ – has identified that these sites “are precisely the places that remind us that the past cannot simply be erased or, for that matter, simply reconstructed”.⁴⁷⁸ Sites of violence such as Berlin, Moscow, New York, Port Arthur, Sarajevo, Shanksville, Pennsylvania (the crash site of the fourth plane in 9/11) – these places hold the key to our ability to find meaning in modern-day tragedies.

⁴⁷⁵ Goldstein & Tye in Santino, 2006: 252 (notes).

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 241.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁸ Tumarkin, 2005. *Traumascapes – The Power and Fate of Places Transformed by Tragedy*.

In this sense, in recent times, traumascapes have come to play a central part in the culture of the modern world. Tumarkin denotes how these sites of trauma are multiplying at an incredible rate and have become a vital part of

people's experiences of mourning, remembering and making sense of traumatic histories imprinted onto them. They are places that compel memories, crystallise identities and meanings, and exude power and enchantment ... At these places, neither the past nor the present is disposable or infinitely malleable.⁴⁷⁹

These terror attack sites therefore provide ideal places for exploring how people make sense of the social phenomena of terrorism and CT. By examining the intersubjectivity and shared understandings among the affected communities and stakeholders, the meanings attached could be depicted by studying how the affected communities decide to respond, construct and manage the sites and the rhetoric surrounding them. This could provide important insights into how CVE policy could be informed by the *organic* counter-narratives that emerge as part of the performative acts taking place around these sites marked by violence.

Responding to terror attack sites

When it comes to the symbolic nature of terror attack sites and matters concerned with how to respond to these sites, the 9/11-response has been instructive for scholarly research. Tumarkin, in her research on sites marked by violence, has for example observed how the real-time documentation and sheer quantity of images of the Twin Towers and Ground Zero has assured the Ground Zero site a “transcultural immortality rarely afforded even to the world’s landmarks”.⁴⁸⁰ As a terror attack site, or *traumascape*, “the World Trade Center site attracted twice as many visitors as it did before the attacks, when the Twin Towers were among the city’s main attractions”.⁴⁸¹ This illustrates the meanings imbued to sites as well as the new meanings given in the aftermath of an act of terrorism.

Exploring the discourses surrounding the rebuild process of Ground Zero, Setha M. Low notes how “sites of trauma are about the production of meaning”.⁴⁸² Studying the

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 14.

⁴⁸⁰ Tumarkin, M. 2005: 23.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

⁴⁸² Low, S. M. 2004. “The Memorialization of September 11”, *American Ethnologist*, p. 327.

meanings imbued in the sites therefore becomes key for understanding the symbolism as well as the nature of performative acts for social change. Exploring the history of territory, space and place, a lot of the scholarly work on political space is derived from Foucault⁴⁸³, who argued that “space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power”.⁴⁸⁴

These places therefore essentially embody what John A. Agnew has emphasised on the relationship of territory and politics:

...territory and related spatial terms (place, space, and territoriality) offer a profitable theoretical lens through which to analyze the workings of governance and politics. Governance, in this construction, extends beyond formal government into the realm of various forms of authority exercised by agents other than states at and across a variety of geographical scales.⁴⁸⁵

Accordingly, the symbolism of terror attack sites and the question of how to best proceed with the sites is often a contested issue due to conflicting interests and the sensitive nature of the matter. Eric D. Miller analysed the Ground Zero site in New York and the meaning of understanding the significance of places of death, stressing the difficulty in associating the site with anything else but a cemetery.⁴⁸⁶ The meanings attributed to the sites, or these ‘places of death’, is constantly being constructed and reconstructed through the way people communicate about them and engage in the debates around the ongoing function of these sites. As Low denotes:

Any site of trauma embodies the dead buried there, yet the interpretive story transcends the actual site; in the case of September 11, it extends throughout the city, the state, and even the nation. How many audiences – downtown residents, victims’ families, firefighters, volunteers, city institutions, and displaced companies, to name a few – have a vested interest in being represented?⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸³ Elden, S. 2013, “How Should We Do the History of Territory?” *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 1(1): 5-20.

⁴⁸⁴ Foucault, M. 1991, Space, knowledge and power, in Rabinow, P. (Ed.) *The Foucault Effect*, pp. 239-256.

⁴⁸⁵ Agnew, J. A. 2013, “Territory, Politics, Governance”, *Territory, Politics, Governance*, p. 1.

⁴⁸⁶ Miller, D.E. ‘Finding Meaning at Ground Zero for Future Generations: Some Reflections a Decade after 9/11’, *International Social Science Review*, pp. 113-133.

⁴⁸⁷ Low, S. M. 2004: 327.

In this context, it is important to examine how governments together with communities are moving away from the traditional ‘memory sites’ and using terror attack sites as sites that symbolically (but also functionally) counter terrorism through the stories they produce, i.e. counter-narratives. Investigating the symbolism and functionalism (i.e. how the sites have come to function in the aftermath – *for what purpose?*) of terror attack sites and how people are engaging with the sites provides important insights into how these sites may become more than just sites associated with death.

In terms of the significance of these sites marked by violence, one vital point that Miller makes is that “while it is virtually inevitable that individuals will likely make sense of Ground Zero through their own personal biases, it is essential that future generations have a clear, full and accurate representation of the devastation that occurred there”.⁴⁸⁸ In this sense, the prevention of terrorism and VE (through the responses to these particular sites) – as discussed earlier – has a “global public goods” aspect to it by not only providing counter-narratives but by the intergenerational aspect of the response, providing the ‘story’ of what happened and in this way preventing such events from happening again.

In fact, the *performativity* of utterances and actions performed around these sites can have an effect far beyond that of the agent. The role of *performativity* will be explored even further in Chapter 5 on *CT as collective action*, which explores the role of norm-setting against violence using the concept of *norm diffusion* and victims and key stakeholders as *norm entrepreneurs*.

- Social constructions of public space

Renowned anthropologist Setha M Low has explored the politics of public space and culture by focusing on the design and meaning of ‘the plaza’ in South America.⁴⁸⁹ In this sense, she explores the ethnohistorical meanings embedded in the plazas urban location and the sociocultural context of their development. Her academic works exploring *constructions of space* have highlighted the sociopolitical dimensions of

⁴⁸⁸ Miller, E. D. 2011: 113.

⁴⁸⁹ For a more detailed account of her research please see *On the Plaza: The Politics of Public Space and Culture*.

public space and communities of exclusion. In doing so, she discusses the concepts of *social production* and *social construction* of public space and underscores that it is important to distinguish between the two terms that tend to be used interchangeably:

The *social production of space* includes all those factors – social, economic, ideological, and technological – that result, or seek to result, in the physical creation of the material setting. The materialist emphasis of the term *social production* is useful in defining the historical emergence and political/economic formation of urban space. The term *social construction* may then be conveniently reserved for the phenomenological and symbolic experience of space as mediated by social processes such as exchange, conflict, and control. Thus, the *social construction* of space is the actual transformation of space – through peoples' social exchanges, memories, images, and daily use of the material setting – into scenes and actions that convey meaning. Both processes are social in that both the production and the construction of space are contested and fought over for economic and ideological reasons, and understanding them can help us see how local conflicts over space can be used to uncover and illuminate larger cultural issues.⁴⁹⁰

In her research she explores the contestation over the meaning of particular sites – the plazas – where the plaza “as a site of civic expression becomes a space of opposition and resistance in response to state and local efforts at social control”.⁴⁹¹ In this sense she goes beyond the traditional notion of the term ‘resistance’, such as that of people marching to demonstrate or obstructing tanks on Tiananmen Square, by arguing further that “the contest over public space is also about plaza meaning, which reflects differences in a war of cultural values and visions of appropriate behaviour and societal order”.⁴⁹² She adds that debates about architecture, design, and nostalgia can act as significant indicators of “local struggles for political and social control (and resistance to control) of public space”.⁴⁹³

In a similar sense, terror attack sites become contested spaces between the various affected communities and stakeholders, and in this sense become key objects for study in terms of the *meaning-making process of terrorism and CT*. This meaning-making process is in many cases a *two-way communication process* – where the meaning-making of the events requires those affected to visit the site while those who visit attach it meaning. This in the sense that right in the aftermath, in order to make

⁴⁹⁰ Low, S. M. 2000. *On the Plaza – The politics of public space and culture*, p.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid. p. 128.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

sense of such inexplicable events, people feel a need to visit these sites (related to the *trauma* associated to these sites which will be explored further in the sections below). As Tumarkin illustrates in regards to the power of these sites to attract or ‘call’ people to visit them:

I think she was protecting herself by going to Ground Zero, saving her sanity. The role of a passive onlooker, away from the immediate danger, may have been relatively comforting for a great many Americans, but for others it compounded their powerlessness and isolation. The world that people were part of only a few days ago no longer existed. As to the new world taking shape in front of their eyes, they were not part of it either. At the best, they were in the audience. Going to Ground Zero was a way of countering 9/11 being transformed into a TV spectacle, a hyper-real and addictive show. It was a way of bringing meaning to an incomprehensible and endlessly replayed sequence of events that was doggedly rewriting history.⁴⁹⁴

The above gives an illuminating insight into the significance of these sites associated with loss and violence. There appears to be an outer-body experience providing meaning for those who visit the sites. Tumarkin observes that the term ‘compulsion’ – as in “an irresistible impulse to act, regardless of the rationality of the motivation” – most accurately describes the phenomenon of people wanting to visit the World Trade Center site.⁴⁹⁵ Yet, this phenomenon is not uniquely attributable to Ground Zero. Tumarkin denotes how within two years of the United Airlines Flight 93 crashing into the rural community of Shanksville in Pennsylvania, the site had been visited by more than 200,000 people.⁴⁹⁶

In fact, when visiting the Shanksville site, also referred to as the ‘first battleground in the war on terror’⁴⁹⁷ – as the passengers on the plane, while putting their lives on the line, disrupted the plans of the terrorists onboard – Tumarkin provides some insights:

Shanksville gave relief, tangible and enduring, to a mind overdosed on headlines and to a heart shrunk by fear and hurt. As it lay at a distance, the plainest of the plain, it allowed, even prompted, visitors to place the events that September morning in the landscape, to think and feel through them at their own pace. And on that winter afternoon, Mark and I found ourselves cherishing the unexpected privacy of this public place, the space to work out what the events of September 11 actually meant to us. It occurred to me that even the most internal of our processes – thinking, grieving, remembering – needed the right kinds of spaces to unfold and

⁴⁹⁴ Tumarkin, 2005: 30.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 31.

⁴⁹⁶ Tumarkin, 2005: 31.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 34.

to come into their own. Traumascapes were often these kinds of spaces, spaces that allowed thoughts and feelings to crystallise, to find their right pitch and their singular expression.⁴⁹⁸

Therefore, in order to depict the social constructions of space and whose meaning becomes the prevalent one, as well as unravel the concept of ‘resistance’, it becomes key to explore and describe the discourses surrounding the sites. As terrorism scholars Stump and Dixit have noted:

By examining how terrorism and counterterrorism are socially constructed in different settings, visual data (comic books, art, advertising, TV shows, etc.) as well as oral narratives and even buildings and architecture (physical changes to space due to counterterrorism measures such as roadblocks and immigration stations; buildings memorializing deaths due to terrorism, such as the “ground Zero,” etc.) are sources of studying how different cultures make sense of terrorism as well as how counterterrorism policies are enacted.⁴⁹⁹

Low goes on to discuss how the contestation of space also becomes a discussion about the relationship of power. Exploring theories dealing with spatialization, she distinguishes between macrolevel theories that see a struggle where local populations have a role through social movements that “resist the control of the dominant classes and planning elite”.⁵⁰⁰ This reflects concerns with the ways in which “capital reformulates social relations and space”⁵⁰¹

In a similar sense, terror attack sites become contested spaces between the various affected communities and stakeholders, and in this sense become key objects for study in terms of the meaning-making process of terrorism and CT. This meaning-making process is in many cases a two-way communication process in the sense that right in the aftermath – in order to make sense of such inexplicable events – people feel a need to visit these sites (related to the *trauma* associated to these sites which will be explored further in the sections below). As Tumarkin illustrates in regards to the power of these sites to attract or ‘call’ people to visit them:

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 36.

⁴⁹⁹ Stump & Dixit, 2013: 163.

⁵⁰⁰ Low, 2000: 129.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

Going to Ground Zero was a way of countering 9/11 being transformed into a TV spectacle, a hyper-real and addictive show. It was a way of bringing meaning to an incomprehensible and endlessly replayed sequence of events that was doggedly rewriting history.⁵⁰²

The above provides an insight into the significance of these sites associated with loss and violence. There appears to be an outer-body experience providing meaning for those who visit the sites. Tumarkin observes that the term ‘compulsion’ – as in “an irresistible impulse to act, regardless of the rationality of the motivation” – most accurately describes the phenomenon of people wanting to visit the World Trade Center site.⁵⁰³ Yet, this phenomenon is not uniquely attributable to Ground Zero. Tumarkin denotes how within two years of the United Airlines Flight 93 crashing into the rural community of Shanksville in Pennsylvania, the site had been visited by more than 200,000 people.⁵⁰⁴

- Contested spaces

Setha M. Low has conducted research exploring the dominant and local discourses in the rebuilding process of the World Trade Center site in New York. In her research, she challenges the narratives and discourses portrayed by media by exploring the narratives of downtown residents and, in this way, seeks to “contest, expand and modify the dominant media and government representations of September 11 and its memorialization”.⁵⁰⁵

Low notes how, in terms of the rebuild of Ground Zero, the local residents, survivors and bereaved families have largely been marginalised in the decision-making process. In trying to comprehend why this has been the case, Low makes an important point:

To answer these questions, one must first acknowledge the inherent tension that exists between the meanings of the WTC site created by conflicting political and economic forces, which are projected out to national audiences through the mass media, and the significance of the space for those who actually live near it.⁵⁰⁶

Low finds that the majority of the studies and analyses of the Ground Zero site “have concerned the construction of a memorial space for an imagined national and global

⁵⁰² Tumarkin, 2005: 30.

⁵⁰³ Ibid., p. 31.

⁵⁰⁴ Tumarkin, 2005: 31.

⁵⁰⁵ Low, S. M. 2004: 326.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 327.

community of visitors who identify with its broader, state-produced meanings".⁵⁰⁷ Thus, the dominant discourses have not included the voices and meaning-making of the local residents:

But New Yorkers, in general, and downtown residents and workers, in particular, create meanings imbued with their own personal involvement in and knowledge of a situated history that has social, political, and economic significance for their everyday lives. These local meanings are multilayered, are often embedded in landscape and unarticulated, and should be as much a part of the memorialization process as the major players' political machinations and economic competition for space and status.⁵⁰⁸

Low makes a key point in stating that “[u]ncovering and eliciting local memorial discourses is part of an ethnographic project that focuses on how personalized narratives of loss emerge and are manipulated within mass-mediated representations of the WTC space”.⁵⁰⁹ In this sense, according to Low, “the official gatekeepers of what is known about the memorial process”, have been the *New York Times* and the *New Yorker*.⁵¹⁰ Hence, a large part of the ‘memorial talk’, such as “what should happen?” and “who should decide?” in terms of the site, has been channeled through these mass-media outlets in particular.⁵¹¹ However, as Low points out, “these renderings are limited and exclude local discourses that do not fit the media’s representation”.⁵¹²

This observation by Low becomes key when exploring how victim’s voices and narratives could act as ‘ethical counter-narratives’ and ‘norm-setting mechanisms against VE and terrorism’ in combination with the notion of *trauma* extended from the individual to the public through Emma Hutchison’s notion of *representation*. This key concept of representation together with norm diffusion will be further explored in the next chapter, *CT as collective action*.

Low further provides critical insights into the complexity of responding to these contested spaces:

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Ibid.

⁵¹² Ibid.

The complexity of the rebuilding and memorialization of the WTC site – its position in revitalizing downtown New York City, the enormity of the September 11 tragedy, and its national significance – provides an opportunity to rearticulate the local and dominant discourses surrounding the process. By including downtown residents' opinions and feelings, it is possible to reframe the memorial process as one in which meaning is co-constructed by individuals and the state.⁵¹³

Such analysis, Low states, enables a more nuanced take on the issues of processes of memorialization and cultural representation. It opens up for questions such as those posed by Geoffrey White and Marita Sturken, in regard to the fact that if sites “of trauma are about the production of meaning” how can such an understanding be applied in the case of a “city the size, scale, and diversity of New York, whose stories will be communicated and interpreted, and how can this be determined?”⁵¹⁴. Similarly, James Young and Kenneth Foote have argued that monuments, such as the Ground Zero one, “organize historical memory, but whose history will be recorded in such a complex setting and toward what end?”⁵¹⁵ As observed by Low:

Any site of trauma embodies the dead buried there, yet the interpretive story transcends the actual site: in the case of September 11, it extends throughout the city, the state, and even the nation. How many audiences – downtown residents, victims' families, firefighters, volunteers, city institutions, and displaced companies, to name a few – have vested interest in being represented? More marginal groups also would like to have a voice in the debate, which further complicates the situation and increases the possibility of disagreements about what should be expressed. In the WTC case, diverse personal, group, and community narratives of September 11 have been expressed in a variety of ways and locations, but their survival and continuity is limited by a dominant memorial discourse that overwhelms and obscures them. This article is one effort to rebalance this ledger of meanings by explicitly describing and analyzing the emotions, commentaries, and desires of local residents who, to date, have not been heard.⁵¹⁶

Drawing from Low's insights in regards to the WTC site above, this dissertation will explore and make visible the various discourses surrounding the Bali and Norway sites. This in an effort to discern particularly the national and local discourses, how these have taken shape and what appears to be the ‘main, dominant discourse’, and how these are possibly inhibiting each other/other discourses.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 327-328.

Stump and Dixit have noted how constructivism allows researchers to explore how “terrorism and counter-terrorism are socially constructed in different settings, visual data as well as oral narratives and even buildings and architecture are sources of studying how different cultures make sense of terrorism as well as how counterterrorism policies are enacted”.⁵¹⁷ Chapter 4 will therefore outline the response to the sites, including the discussions of the actual/desired functionality of the sites.

Terror attack sites: a foundation for knowledge creation

In theorising and conceptualising the role of terror attack sites as places that could form part of CT and CVE, the Japanese concept of ‘ba’ becomes useful.⁵¹⁸ Defined as “a shared space that serves as a foundation for knowledge creation”, ‘ba’ provides a useful conceptual tool for examining the social phenomena of *shared understandings* around the contested spaces of terror attack sites and how this *intersubjectivity* may in turn lead to norms and norm diffusion.⁵¹⁹ Nonaka and Konno apply the concept in their pursuit to understand the management of knowledge and knowledge creation⁵²⁰:

For those unfamiliar with the concept, *ba* can be thought of as a shared space for emerging relationships. This space can be physical (e.g., office, dispersed business space), virtual (e.g., e-mail, teleconference), mental (e.g., shared experiences, ideas, ideals), or any combination of them. What differentiates *ba* from ordinary human interaction is the concept of knowledge creation. *Ba* provides a platform for advancing individual and/or collective knowledge. It is from such a platform that a transcendental perspective integrates all information needed. *Ba* may also be thought of as the recognition of the self in all. According to the theory of existentialism, *ba* is a context which harbors meaning. Thus, we consider *ba* to be a shared space that serves as a foundation for knowledge creation.⁵²¹

The above becomes crucial when contemplating the symbolic meaning of terror attack sites and how these places can provide counter-narratives as well as act as sources that have a potential for constructing norms against VE. As already noted above by Bjorgo on the role of preventative strategies for normative barriers, “[s]ome mechanisms lie in the interaction between individuals and their social or physical environment” and how “some type of mechanisms can be abstract or mental, other

⁵¹⁷ Stump & Dixit, 2013: 163.

⁵¹⁸ Nonaka, L & N. Konno, 1998, “The concept of ‘Ba’”

⁵¹⁹ Nonaka, L. & N. Konno, 1998, “The concept of “Ba””, p. 40.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ Nonaka & Konno, 1998: 40.

types of mechanism can be more concrete and observable". In this sense, it becomes key to explore how terror attack sites harbor meaning and act as places that embody *tacital* knowledge which in turn may prompt performative acts for social change.

Research gap

As the literature review has demonstrated, it appears evident that within the now well-recognised subfield of CT, namely CVE, counter-narratives have become a key component for combatting terrorist propaganda. Counter-narratives have been identified as a key instrument for government strategic communication efforts given the current political and social environment where globalisation has enabled a lucrative front for the use of *disinformation, information warfare* and the promotion of *narratives and propaganda* to enhance interests that incite VE. In this sense, counter-narratives have emerged as a vital part of CVE efforts given the realisation that albeit military operations are a crucial part of CT measures, the *ideas* and *narratives* conveyed by terror organisations and violent extremists bring new recruits into their ranks.

Whilst counter-narratives have become a key stratagem within CVE, the actual devising of counter-narratives, as established in the literature, has commonly stemmed from government agencies as part of strategic communication efforts resulting in counter-narrative campaigns lacking in credibility in using governments as the *messenger or vehicle* of counter-narratives. Scholars and practitioners have instead called for more authentic counter-narratives to address the credibility gap and for governments to make efforts to engage local communities by providing support to already existing grassroots initiatives. Some of the alternative and more authentic messengers of counter-narratives identified are *youth, former violent extremists, religious leaders, victims and local actors*.

In terms of actually implementing these alternative vehicles the RAN CoE has established a program that specifically focusses on empowering civil society. However, this initiative is still novel (it was implemented in 2017) and limited to the online sphere as part of RAN CoE's EU Internet Forum "to encourage online campaigns countering extremist propaganda". Therefore, although local communities and civil society have been identified as key stakeholders in CVE and counter-

narrative efforts, the scholarly work on how to possibly implement this in practice is still very limited, offering an ideal field for further study.

While strategic communications research has enabled an understanding of best practice for how to depict terrorist narratives and construct stratcom counter-narratives⁵²², these are mainly based on theoretic assumptions. Although the research conducted to date has identified the significance of the *messenger* in counter-narratives, the empirical body of knowledge on how these counter-narratives provided by credible messengers could in fact be tasked in practice is still very scarce.⁵²³

One way of enriching the counter-narrative research field is by exploring how counter-narratives emerge *organically*. By exploring the various meanings attached to terror attack sites and how we chose to respond, construct and manage the sites and the rhetoric surrounding them, the approach may provide insights into how counter-narratives emerge organically. Exploring the shared understandings of the meaning-making process around the sites may generate knowledge that could have emancipatory potential for the CVE policy-making field.

In this sense, the dissertation follows the assumption provided by Max Taylor on the role of academia in TS, emphasising the task of comprehending social phenomena: the academic's job is not so much to control terrorism (as suggested by Sageman) but to understand terrorism as a social problem.⁵²⁴ Accordingly, the purpose of this dissertation is to elucidate on the social phenomena of how counter-narratives emerge organically, as opposed to being constructed by government agencies, and how these counter-narratives can inform current soft CT strategies.

Therefore the approach adopted for this dissertation is less of a problem-solving approach in terms of controlling (terrorists) propaganda than normative in the sense that it seeks to understand and illuminate upon the social phenomena of *authentic counter-narrative formation* while stressing what elements could inform the current body of knowledge on CVE. Worthwhile noting is that the dissertation sets out to explore *how* counter-narratives emerge, and does not intend to measure their

⁵²² See for example, Ingram, H.; Ingram & Reed, 2016; Braddock & Horgan, 2016; Winter, C., 2017.

⁵²³ Some progress in this regard has been made, such as that by Aly, Balbi & Jacques, 2015.

⁵²⁴ Please see above section 'Terrorism research to date – locating the research within the field'.

effectiveness. In this sense, the dissertation is mutually constitutive in terms of its theoretical and empirical contribution.

Most TS to date has tended to focus on *genesis*, and not the *aftermath*, of terrorism.⁵²⁵ This dissertation will therefore provide an important contribution to the field of TS as a whole, not least for adding to the understanding of the aftermath and how the affected communities cope afterwards, but also more specifically to the field of CVE and counter-narratives in terms of how counter-narratives emerge through performative acts for social change. It will do so by examining two particular terror attack sites intrinsically linked with the symbolism of the terror attack sites and their responses: the Bali bombing site of the Sari Club in Kuta and the Norway terror attack sites of Oslo/Utøya.

The dissertation will therefore tap into the *local affected communities – identified as an authentic counter-narrative messenger* - and their interpretations of the meaning of the sites. In this sense, it will delve into the *meaning-making practices* and *shared understandings* of terrorism and CT, particularly those provided by the *local actors* and in this way unlock understandings of how local resilience to terrorism arises in an organic setting, adding an important component to the debate on counter-narratives in terms of how counter-narratives emerge organically as opposed to being single-handedly constructed by government agencies.

In conclusion, based on the above observations in regards to some of the practical problems plaguing the field of TS, this dissertation will contribute to the field in a number of ways. Firstly, it will add to the debate on the issues of *agenda-setting* and *framing* of terrorism and CT. It will also add to the TS field by providing empirical research including primary sources using ethnographical methods for data collection and interviews with victims of terrorism as well as other affected communities. Victims, as identified by Taylor in the Introduction, have not figured prolifically in the development of CT policy and are important for reasons based in moral and duty: victims voices hear through civil society and are necessary to counterbalance the other voices. Finally, it will contribute towards the existing academic body of knowledge on CVE, as the field of CVE has been identified to be profuse in practice-

⁵²⁵ Wilson, T. in Lynch, O. and Argomaniz, J. (eds.) 2018, *Victims and Perpetrators of Terrorism*, p. vii.

led initiatives and policy programs around the globe however simultaneously epitomises a field which is still very much lacking in academic scholarship.

Conceptualising the thematic responses to the terror attack sites

As has been established in the literature review, the symbolism of a terror attack site should not only extend to the message that the terrorists are trying to convey by their attacks but also to the meaning(s) embedded in the sites following a terrorist attack. The government response and how communities interact with the sites in the aftermath of the attacks, whether they rebuild and recover or memorialise and remember, essentially communicates an implicit message back to the terrorists. This message is structured around the victim audiences' own perceptions and understandings of terrorism and the performative act of terrorism.

As established by de Graaf, CT and CVE is a form of communication just like terrorism itself⁵²⁶, together with the observations made by Miller: the meaning around these sites is constantly being constructed and reconstructed through the way people communicate about them and engage in the debates around the ongoing function of these sites, in essence through the stories that people tell in their lives and memorial markers.⁵²⁷

In the below, therefore, a conceptual framework will be mapped out for approaching the *intersubjectivity* of the various *symbolic meanings* attached to the sites and possible *collective action* that may emanate from the *performativity* of the responses to the sites. The first part discusses the trajectory of the discourses surrounding the sites and the *shared understandings* for how to respond to the sites, documenting the contest between various local and national meanings. The second part will discuss 'CT as Collective Action', exploring how the performativity of the sites and the agency of the stakeholders – in essence as *norm entrepreneurs* – may prompt/have prompted collective action.

In examining the counter-narratives that have emerged in the case studies more closely in the chapters to follow, the dissertation will be guided by Rachel Briggs &

⁵²⁶ De Graaf, B. 2011: 1.

⁵²⁷ Ibid., p. 114.

Sebastien Feve's conceptual framework for counter-messaging, with a specific focus on the dimensions of *alternative narratives* and *counter-narratives*.

Finding meaning at terror attack sites

While the post 9/11 terrorism debates have predominantly revolved around the narrative produced by America's 'war on terror', influencing subsequent international CT measures; the 'us and them' discourse has effectively resulted in a dichotomised worldview. Mahmood Mamdani discusses the origins of this dichotomy arguing that the use of 'senseless violence' is usually labelled in theological terms.⁵²⁸ Whilst modern history has seen political violence as necessary to historical progress, those cases that do not fit within this framework tend to be discussed in two basic ways: in cultural terms for a premodern society and theological terms for a modern society. This explains why the debate on terrorism in America has been heavily filtered by the memory of the holocaust.⁵²⁹

In her exploration of the 'Battle for Ground Zero' in New York, anthropologist Elizabeth Greenspan observes "that the identity of the country was inextricably tied to the rebuilding of the World Trade Center site" and how "[i]t was the idea that whatever we decided to build here would reveal nothing less than what makes us American".⁵³⁰ Exploring the decision-making process, Greenspan notes how

the questions that defined the battles downtown were the same ones that have triggered land conflicts everywhere. Who does it belong to? And, as importantly, how will we decide?⁵³¹

Although in legal terms the answer was straightforward – the land was owned by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey while developer Larry Silverstein owned the lease to the office space – Greenspan notes how a legal framework would appear insufficient for a site where so many lives were lost:

Nearly three thousand people were killed at the World Trade Center, in the deadliest foreign attack on American soil in the country's history. Was the land really owned by one individual

⁵²⁸ Mamdani, M. 2004. *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*, pp. 4-16.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

⁵³⁰ Greenspan, E. 2013. *Battle for Ground Zero – Inside the Political Struggle to Rebuild the World Trade Center*, pp. xi-xii.

⁵³¹ Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.

and one institution? A lot of people didn't think so, at least not in the aftermath of the attacks. Victim's families and neighborhood residents believed they had legitimate claims to the WTC site, as did many New Yorkers, as did many of the thousand and the millions of people coming to see the destruction. The question of ownership proved to be so big and open-ended it often felt rhetorical. *Everyone* owned Ground Zero – or, at the very least, they believed they owned a piece of it. So, they fought for their piece. For years. Some are still fighting.⁵³²

In exploring the Ground Zero rebuild discourse, Greenspan identifies three questions in particular: i) what should be rebuilt? ii) how should we decide? iii) what will different choices say about us, about America?⁵³³ Illustrating the various meanings that were imbued and attached to the site before and after, Greenspan provides examples of the discourse by some of the interpretations from the early days, whereby some wanted to rebuild the towers “taller, bigger, stronger” while others opposed instead wanting “something human... [n]ot a symbol, a real place: not a place to die, a place to live”.⁵³⁴

Greenspan notes how the rhetoric was near biblical, with talk about “demons” and “a human imagination dedicated to its own annihilation”, all taking place in the mainstream media. Ordinary people also contributed to the meaning-making process: calling TV-stations like CNN and sending letters to Larry Silverstein, the owner of the lease of the site, to share their visions for memorials, parks, plazas, and buildings.

It wasn't long before the list of things for Ground Zero to house reflected a host of irreconcilable desires: revenge, rebirth, peace, power, empathy, the latest in green design, a park, commercial space, and last but not least, affordable housing.⁵³⁵

Furthermore, the discourse was not just limited to Americans, as “more than two billion people watched the 9/11 attacks in real time or saw images of them that same day.”⁵³⁶ In fact, Greenspan notes that the attack – which took place just before 9 a.m. EST – occurred “precisely when the largest percentage of the earth’s people are awake”.⁵³⁷ Moreover, 329 of the victims of the attacks were determined to be foreign nationals.⁵³⁸

⁵³² Ibid., p. xiii.

⁵³³ Ibid., p. 7.

⁵³⁴ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

⁵³⁵ Greenspan, 2013: 8.

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

⁵³⁷ Ibid.

On making sense of the tragic events, Greenspan explains the New Yorkers, the locals, own way of grappling with it, a meaning-making process led by the theme ‘democracy’

Many New Yorkers had other ways of grappling with 9/11. The city’s first major exhibit after the attacks was a grassroots production titled “here is new york: A Democracy of Photographs.” Michael Shulan, a longtime New Yorker, and two colleagues retrofitted two storefronts in SoHo to artfully display and sell hundreds of original photographs of the attacks donated by amateur and professional photographers: the towers collapsing, the engulfing cloud of dust and debris, the eerie smoking rubble, the dangerous rescue and recovery work. The exhibit was located just north of Canal Street but well south of 14th Street; it brought people close to the wreckage, but not too close. And “democracy,” not “loss” or “trauma” or “new York,” was the production’s key word. There were no labels or bylines accompanying the images, which meant that no one knew if they were paying twenty-five dollars for a picture by a world-famous photographer or the consulting firm employee who happened to take a striking shot with his handheld. The line between expert and novice was erased. There was also no explanatory text, no interpretation. The crowds of people decided what it all meant.⁵³⁹

Greenspan notes how the exhibit became a “temporary community hub, open at all hours, hosting events, readings, and meetings for victim’s families”.⁵⁴⁰ This interest was attributed to “people’s desire to collectively face the violence in a space that was a bit removed and also a bit curated” but also to a desire “to be part of something social and creative, something emotional”.⁵⁴¹ Interestingly, Greenspan observes how during this time which “lacked clear explanations and understandings, art was flourishing”.⁵⁴² Greenspan notes how, the WTC site, became “a place – or *the* place, in fact – where people spoke out about post-9/11 America.”⁵⁴³ In this sense, this phenomenon could be related back to Nonnaka and Konno’s place of ‘ba’ – “a shared space for emerging relationships” and “knowledge creation”⁵⁴⁴.

In the below some of the themes that have emerged throughout the literature on these contested spaces will be discussed to enable some guiding markers for the analysis for the case studies to follow.

⁵³⁸ Ibid., p. 9.

⁵³⁹ Ibid. p. 15.

⁵⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 15-16.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid., p. 16.

⁵⁴² Ibid.

⁵⁴³ Ibid., p. 13.

⁵⁴⁴ Nonaka & Konno, 1998: 40.

Security – open vs closed spaces

Low speaks about the new kind of fear that emerged in the aftermath of 9/11 expressed through space: “concrete barriers, private guards, and police protect what were previously open plazas and buildings”.⁵⁴⁵ The WTC site has been transformed multiple times since the 9/11 attack, and as all the rubble from the explosions as well as the subsequent fires was cleaned up, New York City “also constructed walls, barriers, and temporary memorials”.⁵⁴⁶ Low notes how the process of meaning and memorialisation, demonstrated by the outpouring of emotion through spontaneous memorials (poems, flowers, pictures, drawings, etc.) were regimented by the city “by indicating appropriate locations for these testimonials to mourning and grief”, often to no avail.⁵⁴⁷

In this sense, the meaning-making process was limited by New York City in terms of the ‘where and how’, as commercial interests were given preference before personal expressions of grief. Every day city workers would remove the “informal accretions from the construction walls and fences”;

[i]t is ironic that the consumption of September 11 souvenirs – baseball caps, statues and photographs of the twin towers, and T-shirts – is encouraged and licensed by the municipality, whereas personal expressions of grief and mourning are discarded.⁵⁴⁸

A model of vernacular memorialization would instead allow for a WTC plaza as

a space of reflection and recovery as well as a place of civic action and discussion, rather than as a privatized space driven by global capital. This site of trauma could be transformed into a communal centre for people to meet, mix, mourn, and remember if the political pressures and economic interests would allow it.⁵⁴⁹

In this sense, it becomes interesting to note *the security dimension and the limitations imposed on the meaning-making process, as well as the commercial and economic interests vs the local and personal meanings.*

⁵⁴⁵ Low, S. M. 2004. “The Memorialization of September 11”, p. 328.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 329.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

An environment of fear – as opposed to trust

Linked with the above section in terms of the consequences of disruption, and particularly economic disruption, Low also identifies the environment of fear following a terror attack. Low notes how for the lowest socioeconomic dimensions of society “the concern was not memorialization but finding employment or customers”.⁵⁵⁰ Similarly, those of Muslim background experienced attacks and vilification following 9/11: “[t]o this end, many Muslim (and other “Arab-looking” immigrant) taxi drivers and businesses displayed large U.S. flags, emblematic of patriotism, on their cars and shops to “prove” their loyalty”.⁵⁵¹ Given that trust is key for community engagement in P/CVE, in this sense, *it becomes key to explore the environment of fear/trust in the aftermath of the terror attacks.*

Living next to a graveyard – the effects on the local communities

... residents recognize that they will be greatly affected by the memorial project, first by the attendant inconveniences of a nearby construction site and later by the increased tourism a finished memorial will bring...⁵⁵²

Some of the expressed concerns by the Ground Zero memorial locals were that “we don’t want to live in a memorial” nor “graveyard”.⁵⁵³ Low also points to the fact already raised above how for local communities the matter of bringing business back to the area is a higher priority than the commemoration of 9/11. However, the meaning of ‘places of death’ is juxtaposed. On the one hand, people do not want to live next to ‘graveyards’, while, on the other hand, places like Ground Zero embody a ‘sacred pilgrimage’ quality “in that many people feel spiritually drawn to it”.⁵⁵⁴

In this sense, *the attitudes towards the spaces in terms of the juxtaposed elements of graveyards constituting a constant reminder of ‘places of death’ as opposed to ‘sacred places’ attracting pilgrimage becomes a key marker for analysis.*

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 331.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵⁵² Ibid., p. 335.

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁴ Miller, E. D. 2011: 117.

Public memory – commemoration, as to what end?

In order to comprehend the process of memory, remembrance and commemoration, John Bodnar's definition of public memory earlier becomes useful for an employable conceptual framework for analysis:

"[p]ublic memory is a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future." *In this sense, it speaks primarily about the structure of power in society*".⁵⁵⁵

The dissertation will therefore investigate how the public memory in each case study takes expression helping "a public or society understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future" and what these elements in each case may reveal "about the structure of power in society". Following sub questions to be answered in this section: i) Public memory – what it says about: The past? The present? The future? ii) What does the above reveal about the structure of power in the societies in question?

Furthermore, along the line of discussion including Stow, Bodnar and Sturken above, a distinction is made between national (or official) and vernacular modes of commemoration.

National (official) – promotes a nationalistic, patriotic culture of the whole

Vernacular – less interested in exerting influence or control over others, and is preoccupied, instead with defending the interests and rights of social segments.

In this sense, the following factors/questions become critical when exploring the case studies: i) The ways in which the manner of remembrance, grieving, and commemoration employed by a democratic polity help to shape political outcomes. ii) How are the memorials and spontaneous shrines used as a means for performing and initiating change?

Places of 'ba'

Conclusively, the chapter on *Finding meaning at terror attack sites* (Chapter 4) will therefore explore the discourses surrounding the sites, in this sense elaborating on the meaning-making practice around the social phenomena of terrorism and CT, and in

⁵⁵⁵ Stow, S. 2012: 687.

particular how these can inform CVE in terms of the counter-narratives that emerge organically. Based on Acharya's work on norm diffusion it will therefore explore *whose ideas matter* when it comes to the responses to these sites marked by terrorism and VE.⁵⁵⁶

Acharya's approach may help in unravelling some of the norm diffusion processes in the case studies, as his approach

focusses on the agency of norm-takers. Central to the norm dynamic is contestation between emerging norms and existing local beliefs and practices. The outcome is shaped by the ideas and initiative of local actors. This is not simply a question of the existential fit between local norms and external norms. Rather, it is a dynamic process of "constitutive localization" that enables norm-takers to build congruence between the local (including norms previously institutionalized in a region) and external norms. In this process, external norms, which may not initially cohere with existing local beliefs and practices, are incorporated after undergoing modifications to their meaning and scope. This book identifies several conditions that facilitate this process. The evidence shows that a strategy of norm diffusion that provides opportunities for localization is more likely to succeed than one that does not.⁵⁵⁷

Following the contours of Acharya's line of thinking in terms of *whose ideas matter* in the responses to the sites, Krook and True offer the following key approach to norms, which aligns with the purposes of this dissertation:

For this reason, we argue, a discursive approach focused on norms as sense-making practices offers greater leverage for analysing patterns in their origins, adoption and implementation in diverse contexts. Discourses shape what people *do* and who they *are* by fixing meanings and by opening subject positions from which to speak and know (Epstein, 2008: 6). This perspective, in turn, highlights power as integral to the processes of social construction, determining what can and cannot be said — and, as a result, who can and cannot speak (Hansen, 2006). In contrast, most constructivist approaches either excise power from accounts of diffusion or consider power to be external to norm creation, 'treating it either as a material quantity or as located in institutions of the state' (Locher and Prugl, 2001: 113). Yet, norm internalization by its very nature requires silencing, as meaning is made precisely by demarcating that which is outside the limits of discourse.⁵⁵⁸

In this sense, the dissertation will explore which stakeholders have played a key role in being heard and which have been marginalised. In terms of depicting whose ideas matter, a discursive approach to norms does not per se open the field for any

⁵⁵⁶ Acharya, A. 2010. *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 4.

⁵⁵⁸ Krook & True, "Rethinking the life cycles of international norms", p. 108.

possibility, but “[r]ather, agents are constrained not only by relations of power, but also by the existing field of norms, cognitive frames and meaning systems already available for making sense of the world”.⁵⁵⁹

CT as Collective Action: Local Resistance and Social Capital

*Terrorism is not the act of madmen or of political and religious sociopaths but of political agents who choose covert, violent means to achieve political goals, be they ethnonational, religious, or ideological. Terrorism is explained in the same way as other forms of collective action are – be they insurgencies, social movements, dissidents, or guerrillas.*⁵⁶⁰

– Anthony Oberschall

Just as terrorism is a form of collective action, so can the resistance against acts of terrorism emanate into collective action. In the last decade there has been an increasing interest in the role that civil society can play in combating terrorism and VE. Government policies have increasingly called for strategies that target the root causes of terrorism and how to focus on the prevention of terror attacks and in this sense making use of what Robert D. Putnam distinctively has conceptualised as ‘social capital’ – i.e. developing networks of relationships that weave individuals into groups and communities – as part of their measures.⁵⁶¹ However, most of this research is still relatively novel, often lacking in tangible ways to be translated into practical measures, while referenced as ‘social mobilisation’, ‘collective resistance’ and ‘local resilience’.⁵⁶²

Chester A. Crocker et al. observe how the complex security environment in which we currently find us globally has resulted in “new patterns of international cooperation are emerging which are largely ad hoc, informal, improvised and opportunistic”.⁵⁶³

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 109.

⁵⁶⁰ Oberschall, A. 2004. “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory”, *Sociological Theory*, 22 (1): 26-37.

⁵⁶¹ Putnam, D. & Feldstein, L. M. 2004. *Better Together – Restoring the American Community*, p. 1.

⁵⁶² Dalsgaard & Schack, 2016.

⁵⁶³ Crocker et al., 2011. “Collective conflict management: a new formula for global peace and security cooperation?”, p. 39.

The authors adopt the useful term of ‘collective conflict management’ (CCM) as a mode for responding to the ever more complex security challenges the world is faced with by broadening the concept to include “a wider range of multilateral collective endeavours” including “the participation of civil society groups such as NGOs, professional bodies and task-specific international agencies, as well as regional organizations, individual states and international organizations working in dedicated coalitions to deal with non-traditional as well as traditional security threats.”⁵⁶⁴

Unlike traditional approaches to security management, such as collective defence or collective security, which involve formal obligations to undertake joint action in response to the actions of an aggressive state, today’s cooperative ventures seem to involve improvised strategies of collective action, often in response to one or more of a wide array of diverse security challenges ranging from ‘traditional’ security threats such as the outbreak of civil war or regional conflict to ‘non-traditional’ threats such as organized crime, piracy, kidnapping, arms trading, narcotics trafficking and conflict-related commodity rents, as well as protecting individuals from gross human rights abuses.

James M. Jasper has explored the role of protest in social movements, observing a clear shift from approaches that advocate explanations based on material interests to instead being centered on “collective identities, frames, and even emotions”.⁵⁶⁵ Jasper’s contribution is to find a middle-way where we can “acknowledge the felt experience of participants without losing the insights of the structural school”.⁵⁶⁶ Reluctant to use the vague term of “social movements” in the context of protest, he develops a model based on what he terms as “players and arenas”:

Once we break both the movement and its environment down into their component players and arenas, we can judge when there is enough coherence to these players to warrant the term “social movement”.⁵⁶⁷

Whose ideas matter - identifying ‘players and arenas’

Simply put, “[p]layers are those who engage in strategic action with some goal in mind”.⁵⁶⁸ Jasper makes a distinction between *simple players* (individuals) and *compound players* (ranging from loose, informal groups to formal organizations all

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 40.

⁵⁶⁵ Jasper, J. M. 2014: 10.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

⁵⁶⁸ Jasper, J.M. 2014: 10.

the way up to nations). Although both types “face many of the same challenges and dilemmas” Jasper notes how the main key distinction is that “the individuals who comprise teams may depart, defect, partly defect, or pursue their own goals at the same time that they pursue the group goals”.⁵⁶⁹ In this sense, ‘compound players’ are never quite “completely unified” – they can best be described as “necessary fictions” “that attract and inspire supporters through their promise of unity”.⁵⁷⁰

Jasper notes how the player’s goals can be “altruistic as well as selfish, ideal interests as well as material interests”.⁵⁷¹ Furthermore, he underscores how goals are dynamic and everchanging: “new ones emerge, old ones disappear, new twists and interpretations emerge”.⁵⁷² He also identifies three basic families of strategic means for pursuing goals: *paying others*, *persuading them to*, and *coercing them to*, while adding a fourth derivative capacity in the form of holding positions. He notes how this is what Bourdieu termed as various forms of ‘capital’ for mechanisms of power – cultural knowledge, social network ties, money, and reputation.

Jasper also notes how players overlap with each other: a protest group can be part of a movement coalition etc. Furthermore, compound players are constantly shifting: “appearing, merging, splitting, going through dormant periods, disappearing altogether, growing, shrinking, changing names and purposes”.⁵⁷³ In fact, perhaps the most illuminating definition, as noted by Jasper, “players redefine each other through their interactions and conflicts”.⁵⁷⁴ It therefore becomes logical, that in order to understand *collective action in the case studies*, one must attain a comprehensive understanding of the *players and arenas involved*.

An ‘arena’, on the other hand, is defined as “a bundle of rules and resources that allow or encourage certain kinds of interactions to proceed, with something at stake”⁵⁷⁵:

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid., p. 11.

⁵⁷² Ibid.

⁵⁷³ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

Some rules are formally written down, providing procedural ammunition for any player who has a stake in seeing they are enforced. Other rules are moral norms, and the cost of breaking these is usually a tarnished reputation among those who hold those norms, but here again opponents must work to tarnish that reputation.⁵⁷⁶

The boundaries between players and arenas can be blurry. Jasper notes how “[g]roups and organizations that operate as players in various external arenas can, from a different point of view, be seen as arenas themselves when we look at their internal procedures”.⁵⁷⁷ In terms of explaining the players’ actions, Jasper notes that an ‘[a]ppreciation of the meanings and emotions of players is crucial’.⁵⁷⁸ The *meanings and emotions of the affected victims and stakeholders* in the case studies therefore becomes key focus for analysis.

[t]he main constraints on what protestors can accomplish are not determined directly by economic and political structures so much as they are imposed by other players with different goals and interests.⁵⁷⁹

Social movements and collective action frames

For research exploring the “character and course of social movements”, collective action frames and framing processes have become the key dynamics studied, “alongside resource mobilization and political opportunity processes”.⁵⁸⁰ Social movement scholarship employing framing processes start by problematising (what had largely gone ignored up until the mid-1980s) *meaning work* – “the struggle over the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings”.⁵⁸¹

From this perspective, social movements are not viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies. Rather, movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers. They are deeply embroiled, along with the media, local governments, and the state, in what has been referred to as “the politics of signification”.⁵⁸²

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁹ Jasper, M. J. 2014: “Playing the Game”.

⁵⁸⁰ Benford & Snow, 2000, “Framing Processes and Social Movements”, p. 612.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid., p. 613.

⁵⁸² Ibid.

In order to capture this signifying work or meaning construction, social movement scholars use the verb “framing”, which embodies “an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction”.⁵⁸³ The phenomenon is active in the sense that “something is being done”, and “processual in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process”.⁵⁸⁴

It entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social movement organizations or movement activists. And it is contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may also challenge them. The resultant products of this framing activity are referred to as “collective action frames.”⁵⁸⁵

Most of the scholarly work on the concept of frames in this context is derived from the work of Erving Goffman. He conceptualised frames as “schemata of interpretation” which enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences both within their own lives and the world at large.⁵⁸⁶ More specifically, “[f]rames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and guide action”.⁵⁸⁷ The actual operationalising of the concept and method for exploring collective action frames will be detailed further in the methodology chapter.

Trauma – the individual extended to the collective

When exploring the role of *collective action* in the context of finding meaning at terror attack sites, the concept of *trauma* becomes key. The term is commonly perceived as ”isolating individuals and fragmenting communities”, however, Emma Hutchison observes how “practices of representation can make traumatic events meaningful in ways that give them a collective and often international dimension”.⁵⁸⁸ Key in this process is the role played by *emotions*, as noted by Hutchison:

⁵⁸³ Ibid., p. 614.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid. Goffman as quoted in Benford and Snow.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁸ Hutchison, 2010, “Trauma and the Politics of Emotions”, p. 65.

Often neglected in scholarly analysis of international relations, emotions play a crucial political role during times of crisis and can become pivotal sites for the renewal of political stability and social control.⁵⁸⁹

Depictions of trauma can provide “a sense of collective feeling that is capable of underpinning political community”, and in this sense it becomes key to explore “representations of trauma and the emotional discourses they mobilise”.⁵⁹⁰ Hutchison examined the media representations of the Bali bombings right in the aftermath of the terror attacks, noting how “[d]iscourses of commemoration and national mourning took over the space the violence opened, ascribing meaning to the potential meaninglessness of victims’ pain” and how through these representations “[t]he pain of victims was swiftly referred to as that of a nation”.⁵⁹¹

These media representations demonstrate the “collectivising potential of representing trauma” and how events of trauma “can be represented in ways that shift them from the realm of the individual to that of the collective”.⁵⁹² In this sense, Hutchison’s approach basically encapsulates a key element of Briggs identified concept for community engagement in CVE – ‘a shared understandig of the problem’, by recognising that “representations of trauma can generate *widely shared meanings*, which in turn underpin political identity and community”.⁵⁹³ Therefore, a key question to explore becomes how the *terror attack sites, traumascapes and places of ‘ba’ represent the trauma associated with the actual terror attacks.*

Similarly, Santino has spoken about the phenomena of ‘public memorialisation’ and how it relates back to the performative power of acts for social change: “public memorialization is generally located in a conceptual field that ranges between commemoration and social activism”⁵⁹⁴.

The shrines are on the ground that is itself a part of the event being referenced. By forcing attention to a place that was physically a part of the occurrence of dying, and that is often hallowed by the blood of the dead, spontaneous shrines not only commemorate the deaths of individuals but also draw attention to the reasons for those deaths and to social ills that need to

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

⁵⁹² Ibid., pp. 65-66.

⁵⁹³ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁴ Santino, J. 2011. “Between Commemoration and Social Activism”, p. 97.

be addressed. The implicit logic seems to be, had these issues been properly addressed, these deaths need not have occurred; or, alternatively, if we the people do not become aware of these issues, more such deaths will occur.⁵⁹⁵

One such initiative within the counter-narrative policy sphere is the recent launch of the *Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP)* by the RAN Centre of Excellence.⁵⁹⁶ As the RAN CSEP launch newsletter effectively outlined, on responding to terrorist propaganda and terrorists' use of social media:

... the internet has provided citizens with enormous opportunities, which should be harnessed, along with the internet's tremendous reach, to counter online threats. Countering violent extremism online is best done by civil society at local level by allowing moderate voices to be heard and providing alternative or counter narratives.

To support civil society in this important task, the European Commission, supported by partners from the internet industry, (Facebook, Twitter, Google/Youtube, Microsoft) launched the Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP) during the 2nd EU Internet Forum on 8 December 2016. The Commission will be rolling out this programme in several stages. The RAN CoE is tasked with providing support for the first phase, which will involve developing a network of civil society actors, credible voices and internet and creative companies, and providing training for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).⁵⁹⁷

The program "supports civil society, grass roots organisations and credible voices".⁵⁹⁸ As such, it has identified that "[m]any civil society organisations are already active in providing alternative narratives and sharing moderate voices" however they lack the "capacity and/or resources to produce and disseminate these messages effectively online".⁵⁹⁹ The programme is therefore dedicated to "capacity building, training, partnering civil society organisations with internet and social media companies, and supporting campaigns designed to reach vulnerable individuals and those at risk of radicalisation and recruitments by extremists".⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid. pp. 99-100.

⁵⁹⁶ "Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP)", *Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Centre of Excellence (CoE)*.

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁸ "EU Internet Forum: Civil Society Empowerment Programme", Radicalisation Awareness Network (*RAN*)

⁵⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid.

Given the focus in the above discussion on the role of community engagement and engaging grassroots initiatives as a crucial part of CVE to in turn enable *collective action* against VE, this chapter will also explore the notion of *social capital*, as outlined by Robert D. Putnam.⁶⁰¹ It will examine what instructive role social capital has in terms of the responses to the terror attack sites (and beyond). Examining the factor of social capital becomes key for comprehending the formation of *collective action* and *local resilience* in light of terrorism and VE.

- Social capital and norm diffusion

One of the key concepts identified as essential for community engagement and CVE on the local level is *trust* and *trustbased networks*. Trust, or what scholars call ‘social capital’, most prominently after Putnam for his pioneering work on the changing character of American society, as defined below:

By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital – tools and training that enhance individual productivity – the core idea of social capital theory is that social networks have value. Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) or a college education (human capital) can increase productivity (both individual and collective), so too social contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups.⁶⁰²

While “physical capital refers to physical objects” and “human capital refers to properties of the individuals”, “social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them”.⁶⁰³ Putnam notes how the term’s inventor Lyda J. Hanifan, “was self-conscious about using the term *capital* to encourage hard-nosed businessmen and economists to recognize the productive importance of social assets”.⁶⁰⁴ Social capital entails both an *individual* and *collective* element to it, which is how the concept becomes key for the context of CVE

... social capital has both an individual and a collective aspect – a private face and a public face. First, individuals form connections that benefit our own interests. One pervasive strategem of ambitious job seekers is “networking,” for most of us get our jobs because of

⁶⁰¹ Putnam, R. D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.

⁶⁰² Ibid., pp. 18-19.

⁶⁰³ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 445 (endnotes).

whom we know, not what we know – that is, our social capital, not our human capital... If individual clout and companionship were all there were to social capital, we'd expect foresighted, self-interested individuals to invest in the right amount of time and energy in creating or acquiring it. However, social capital also can have “externalities” that affect the wider community, so that not all the costs and benefits of social connections accrue to the person making the contact... a well-connected individual in a poorly connected society is not as productive as a well-connected individual in a well-connected society. And even a poorly connected individual may derive some of the spillover benefits from living in a well-connected community. If the crime rate in my neighborhood is lowered by neighbors keeping an eye on one another's homes, I benefit even if I personally spend most of my time on the road and never even nod to another resident on the street.⁶⁰⁵

In this sense, as Putnam maintains, “[a] society characterized by generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society” and “[t]rustworthiness lubricates social life... Frequent interaction among diverse set of people tends to produce a norm of generalized reciprocity”:

Civic engagement and social capital entail mutual obligation and responsibility for action. As L. J. Hanifan and his successors recognized, social networks and norms of reciprocity can facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit. When economic and political dealing is embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism and malfeasance are reduced... social capital – that is, social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity – comes in many different shapes and sizes with many different uses. Your extended family represents a form of social capital, as do your Sunday school class, the regulars who play poker on your commuter train, your college roommates, the civic organisations to which you belong, the Internet chat group in which you participate, and the network of professional acquaintances recorded in your address book.⁶⁰⁶

However, social capital should by no means be correlated as a *purely* positive thing:”[n]etworks and the associated norms of reciprocity are generally good for those inside the network, but the external effects of social capital are by no means always positive”⁶⁰⁷:

Therefore it is important to ask how the positive consequences of social capital – mutual support, cooperation, trust, institutional effectiveness – can be maximized and the negative

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 20.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 21.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid. Putnam uses as an example the Timothy McVeigh bombing in Oklahoma and urban gangs, which “often exploit social capital to achieve ends that are antisocial from a wider perspective”. In this sense, social capital “can be directed toward malevolent, antisocial purposes, just like any other form of capital”.

manifestations – sectarianism, ethnocentrism, corruption – minimized. Toward this end, scholars have begun to distinguish many different forms of social capital.⁶⁰⁸

In examining the formation of social capital, Putnam acknowledges that social capital comes in many forms (such as repeated, intensive, multistranded networks or more episodic, single stranded, and anonymous networks; some are formally organised, others more informal; some have explicit public-regarding purposes, while some exist for the private enjoyment of the members, and some both public and private ends), however, he identifies that the “most important is the distinction between bridging (or inclusive) and bonding (or exclusive)”⁶⁰⁹:

[s]ome forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups. Examples of bonding social capital include ethnic fraternal organizations, church-based women’s reading groups, and fashionable country clubs. Other networks are outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages. Examples of bridging social include the civil rights movement, many youth service groups, and ecumenical religious organizations.

Bonding social capital is good for undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity. Dense networks in ethnic enclaves, for example, provide crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate members of the community, while furnishing start-up financing, markets, and reliable labor for local entrepreneurs. Bridging networks, by contrast, are better for linkage to external assets and for information diffusion. Economic sociologist Mark Granovetter has pointed out that when seeking jobs – or political allies – the “weak” ties that link me to distant acquaintances who move in different circles from mine are actually more valuable than the “strong” ties that link me to relatives and intimate friends whose sociological niche is very like my own. Bonding social capital is, as Xavier de Souza Briggs puts it, good for “getting by,” but bridging social capital is crucial for “getting ahead”.⁶¹⁰

Putnam further highlights how bridging social capital “can generate broader identities and reciprocity”, while “bonding social capital bolsters our narrower selves”.⁶¹¹ In this sense, Putnam underscores that bonding social capital, “by creating strong in-group loyalty, may also create strong out-group antagonism” and therefore negative external effects are more common and likely compared to the former.⁶¹² However,

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 21.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 22-23.

⁶¹¹ Ibid., p. 23.

⁶¹² Ibid.

Putnam emphasises that “under many circumstances both bridging and bonding social capital can have powerfully positive social effects”⁶¹³:

Many groups simultaneously bond along some social dimensions and bridge across others. The black church, for example, brings together people of the same race and religion across class lines. The Knights of Columbus was created to bridge cleavages among different ethnic communities while bonding along religious and gender lines. Internet chat groups may bridge across geography, gender, age, and religion, while being tightly homogenous in education and ideology. In short, bonding and bridging are not “either-or” categories into which social networks can be neatly divided, but “more or less” dimensions along which we can compare different forms of social capital.⁶¹⁴

Putnam has identified particular countertrends that have affected social capital, of which for this dissertation the *succession of social movements* and the *role of the Net* are relevant factors. On the role of social movements, “[a]lthough all social movements have historical roots, and nearly all epochs witness grassroots organization for social change”, the 1960s was undoubtedly the most significant period of the twentieth century “from the perspective of grassroots social change”:⁶¹⁵

Social movements and social capital are so closely connected that it is sometimes hard to see which is chicken and which is egg. Social networks are quintessential resource of movement organizers... Precisely because social capital is essential for social movements, its erosion could shroud their prospects for the future ... Social movements also *create* social capital, by fostering new identities and extending social networks... Collective protest strengthens shared identity, certainly for the participants and sometimes for their heirs, “anchoring individuals in participatory cultures”. In short, social movements with grassroots involvement both embody and produce social capital.⁶¹⁶

Putnam discusses the materialising of social movements, stating that sociologist John McCarthy argued that “professional social movement organizations arise precisely as a response to a “social infrastructural deficit” – that is, cases in which “widespread sentiment exists favoring or opposing a social change, but the lack of available infrastructures inhibits the mobilization of the sentiment”.⁶¹⁷ Furthermore, Putnam points to a key element of social capital in this context where social and grassroots

⁶¹³ Ibid.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid., p. 152.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., p. 153.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid.

movements “can efficiently mobilize its supporters for direct action on the basis of” possible “preexisting social networks”⁶¹⁸:

To take a single example, in 1993 the National Right to Life Committee claimed 13 million members and 7,000 local chapters. By contrast, the pro-choice movement (particularly with the demise in the 1980s of the organized grassroots women’s liberation movement) lacks a preexisting social infrastructure and therefore must rely heavily on national advocacy organizations, using the technology of direct mail, telemarketing, media campaigns, and the like.⁶¹⁹

The other countertrend toward greater social connectedness that Putnam identifies is telecommunications, and perhaps most relatedly, the Internet. However, although the internet may have impacted social relations, of relevance for this dissertation is the role of the internet through ‘e-ties’ as a supplement (not an alternative) to face-to-face communications

E-ties to people you don’t know are, by definition, purely virtual, but e-ties to people whom you also know offline constitute a kind of alloy that combines the advantages of both computer-based and face-to-face connections. E-mail, instant messaging, and similar techniques join the ease, reach, and immediacy of electronic communication with the trust, sensitivity, and durability of relationships based on repeated face-to-face communication. Like the telephone, these forms of electronic communication can strengthen, broaden, and deepen existing personal ties ... Similarly, in many parts of the world Internet entrepreneurs are seeking ways to use technology to foster greater communication within a single neighborhood.

Therefore, as established in the literature review, social capital becomes a key factor in the analysis chapters. Furthermore, collective action will be analysed exploring the notion of trauma. Hutchison’s concept of representation enables an exploration of the linkages between trauma and politics – how “individually experienced trauma ... can manifest in a wider community”⁶²⁰ and how “singular events of trauma can be represented in ways that shift them from the realm of the individual to that of the collective”.⁶²¹ The chapter will therefore explore how victims’ trauma has been extended to the collective through *representation*, and how “representation of trauma

⁶¹⁸ Ibid., p. 154.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid.

⁶²⁰ Hutchison, E. 2010. “Trauma and the Politics of Emotions”, p. 67.

⁶²¹ Ibid., .p. 65.

can provide a sense of collective feeling that is capable of underpinning political community".⁶²²

Conclusively, reviewing the key concepts/deficiencies as well as steps forward for effective community engagement and for building local resilience to VE, two key concepts have emerged: *a shared understanding of the problem and how to best respond to it and trust/trustbased networks between key stakeholders*. Therefore, in Chapter 5, these two elements together with the associated notion of trauma will be explored and, in particular, how the individual trauma extends to the public. This segment of the analysis will be conducted using Emma Hutchison's conception of collective trauma, which identifies representation as the key enabler for extending trauma from the individual to the collective and in this sense facilitating collective action.

Accordingly, the dissertation will explore the discourses surrounding the sites (to depict the shared understandings of the problem and how to respond to it) and then the social capital (the trust/trustbased networks between key stakeholders to do so). In this sense, the key stakeholders (the affected communities) become the key unit of study. The victims will be studied as possible norm entrepreneurs providing for possible norm diffusion in the way they engage with the terror attack sites. The conceptual framework is operationalised and summarized in the below table:

⁶²² Ibid.

Table 4 - Conceptual framework

	<i>Approach</i>	<i>Object of analysis</i>	<i>Unit of analysis</i>	<i>Analytical tool/source of data</i>
<i>Formation of counter- narratives</i>	<i>Finding meaning at terror attack sites</i>	<i>Social phenomena: Symbolism of terror attack sites/social sites</i>	<i>Social interactions/ interpretations/ construction of public space/ transformation of space/ discourses/shared understandings</i>	<i>Ethnography/discourse analysis: Interviews/ documents/ experiences and observations</i>
	<i>CT as collective action</i>	<i>Social phenomena: local resilience/ performative acts for social change/ social capital/ norm diffusion/trauma- representation</i>	<i>Memorials/Trust- based networks/ Agency – (victims and other key stakeholders)</i>	<i>Ethnography/frame analysis: interviews/ documents/ experiences and observations</i>

Table 5 - Conceptual framework overview

<i>Theory</i>	
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Method</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">↓ Counter-narratives</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Stakeholders: government, victims, local community</p>	<p><i>Political development</i></p> <p><i>Economic development</i></p>
	<p><i>The social capital formation</i></p>
	<p><i>Social capital (e.g. social trust), social capital exist among individuals</i></p>
	<p><i>Social capital help us to associate with one another: “bond similar people” “bridge diverse people”</i></p>
	<p><i>Communication / social interaction (individual trauma extended to the collective through emotions/representation)</i></p>
	<p><i>Collective understanding / expectation (norm)</i></p>
	<p><i>Collective action</i></p>
<p><i>Mutually constitutive</i></p> <p>Practice → Theory</p> <p><i>Problem-solving approach</i></p>	

Case Studies - The significance of Attack Sites: Bali and Utøya

Below is a short summary of the two case studies, selected based on both theoretical and practical considerations: i) symbolic meaning extended to the sites: the Sari Club in Bali, Indonesia and Utøya island/the government quarters in Oslo, Norway ii) accessible given data collection in terms of cultural and linguistic considerations as well as feasibility in terms of conducting limited ethnographic field studies.

- *Bali*

The Bali bombings carried out by the South-East Asian terrorist group of Jemaah Islamiyah in October 2002, killing 202 people, targeted two nightclubs in the tourist district of Kuta. Based on both a religious and political objective,⁶²³ the attacks were not well understood by the local population while the international community had fears the Indonesian government would rely too heavily on security forces to deal with the threat from militant Islam.⁶²⁴ How to deal with the actual terror attack site has been a contested issue for many years given the international interest and multi-faceted character of the attack. The Sari Club site has been proposed to host a community driven project called the Bali Peace Park, a spiritual garden where people can reflect upon and acknowledge the terror attack of October 2002, along with all other acts of terror worldwide.⁶²⁵

- *Norway*

On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik carried out the first ever terror attacks to take place in Norway: the first one targeting a government building in the heart of Oslo killing eight people and injuring 200; the second one on the Island of Utøya, where he methodically massacred camping youths from the Norwegian Labour Party, resulting in a total of 69 casualties. These attacks were essentially politically motivated devised to target representatives for Norway's liberal multiculturalism. Although the initial national response in Norway was very un-American, calling for more democracy, more openness and greater political participation, the Norway case has eventuated in a political discourse disparaging multiculturalism while anti-Muslim racist sentiments are increasing.⁶²⁶ The question of what to do with the terror attack sites in both Oslo and Utøya remains a highly contested issue providing a useful case to study for insights into how counter-narratives to terrorism might be expressed through the way communities engage with the sites.

⁶²³ The terrorist group's long-term objective is to establish an Islamic state in the region.

⁶²⁴ Sherlock, S. 2002. 'The Bali Bombing: What it Means for Indonesia', *Parliament of Australia*, p. 7.

⁶²⁵ The Bali Peace Park Association,

http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=1

⁶²⁶ Carle, R. 2013. "Anders Breivik and the Death of Free Speech in Norway", *Society*, p. 396.

Conclusion

As established in the above, the CVE field has evolved rapidly in recent years however the academic body of knowledge in the field is still very limited. Similar to the CT period following 9/11, when funding was exceedingly funnelled to so called ‘go-to-experts’ and subject to political expediency as opposed to empirical research, in the successive CVE period, practice has often preceded empirical research, providing for many practice-led projects based in little evidence nor metrics for what CVE initiatives actually work. This in turn has generated a precarious counter-movement against CVE, often dismissing its usefulness based on its lack of evidence-based best practice.

However, most TS scholars now recognise P/CVE as a key part of CT. As the need for counter-narratives has become explicit prominent research has been produced by scholars such as Charlie Winter, Haroro Ingram, Alastair Reed, J. M. Berger and organisations such as Vox-Pol, Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), ICCT among others. Nevertheless, most of this body of research has focussed on strategic communications methods, while focussing mainly on government agencies and how to best challenge the terrorist propaganda through social media campaigns.

More recently, particularly following the London bombings, TS research has increasingly emphasised the role of community engagement. In this sense, the role of civil society in CVE has been explored further through the ideas of community engagement and local resilience. These concepts comprise key elements such as trust and trust-based networks, as well as mutual shared understandings. These elements would basically provide the key for increasing social capital in the fight against terrorism and VE, and will be further explored particularly in Chapter 5: *CT as collective action*.

Although research has identified that alternative voices and messengers are needed to complement those provided by the state, the body of knowledge for how to interpret, transform and implement such an approach into tangible measures is still in its infant stage. The RAN CoE provides a significant advancement on this front with its *Civil Society Empowerment Programme* launched in 2015, which identifies ways to support

civil society, grassroots organisations and credible voices in challenging the propaganda of terrorist and extremist groups on the Internet.⁶²⁷

Therefore examining the discourses surrounding terror attack sites offers key insights into how the meaning-making practice surrounding terrorism and CT evolves organically. Identifying and studying the performative acts surrounding these sites provides an inlet into examining how the responses to these sites could be interpreted as a form of CT and, more precisely, counter-narrative to those conveyed by the terrorists. Victims have been identified as the best positioned actors to counter VE, which is why exploring how they engage with terror attack sites together with other affected communities provides important insights not only in terms of how societies move on in the aftermath of terrorism but also preventive purposes as in providing counter-narratives and norms.

The individual trauma often associated with the terror attacks is something that has traditionally been considered as a hindrance for using victims' voices. This also brings up the question of the survivor/victim paradigm, where a 'survivor' is regarded as a more active agent whereas 'victim' is a more passive interpretation of the agent. However, Hutchison maintains that trauma, although traditionally regarded an individual experience, can in fact be translated from the individual to the collective via the concept of *representation*. This notion will be further examined in Chapter 5 as it provides for one possible way for victims to act as norm entrepreneurs in the process of setting norms against terrorism and VE.

Conclusively, reviewing the key concepts/deficiencies as well as steps forward for effective community engagement and for building local resilience to VE, two key concepts have emerged: *Trust/trustbased networks between key stakeholders* and *a shared understanding of the problem and how to best respond to it*. These two elements constitute the key enablers for the operationalising of the conceptual framework from theory to practice.

⁶²⁷ However, its training program only rolled out in 2017, and in this sense, the body of knowledge in terms of empirical research for understanding counter-narratives emerging from civil society is still very scarce.

Therefore, in Chapter 4, the dissertation will first address the discourses surrounding the terror attack sites in order to discern *the shared understandings of the problem and how to best respond to it*, and in this sense set the context for understanding the overall responses and the performative acts for social change that have emerged. Chapter 5 in turn will elaborate on the findings from Chapter 4 and explore the community engagement and collective action in terms of social capital and the associated notion of trauma based on Emma Hutchison's notion of politics of community via representation.

In this sense, exploring the performative acts taking place and how victims groups together with other affected communities and stakeholders have engaged with the sites, in essence acting as norm entrepreneurs providing for norm diffusion, allows for key insights into the role that victims' voices can play in CVE as well as in counter-balancing others in CT. This dissertation therefore becomes a key contribution to the field in terms of understanding how counter-narratives emerge organically as opposed to being constructed by government agencies.

Chapter 3: Methodology and research design

Based on the literature review and retrieved conceptual framework, this chapter sets out the structure of the methodology and research design that has instructed the data collection and the subsequent analysis. Given the conceptually analytical and interpretive nature of the research, a mainly qualitative research design was adopted. The research also employed some quantitative methods for collecting data, permitting a more comprehensive basis for the subsequent data analysis.

As the overall objective of the dissertation is to explore how meaning is attached to the social and political settings of terror attack sites, and how these sites are symbolic to terrorism and CT, the constructivist focus on intersubjectivity and shared meanings becomes the social phenomena for analysis. Studying the various meaning-making practices it will be using the qualitative methods of ethnography, phenomenology and discourse/frame analysis. In this sense, it will be investigating the local resilience to terrorism and VE by identifying the various forms of agency as this study takes an actor-specific approach to counter-narratives.

The process of gaining access to data and information relating to the social phenomena of people's experiences, interpretations and meaning-making processes is not a straightforward process given the implicit character of the unit for analysis. Tasked with the implicit aspect (or what Nonaka and Konno would refer to as *tacit knowledge*) of the social phenomena under investigation, "embedded in and made possible by everyday situated language and practices", ethnography becomes an ideal approach "to apprehend the full richness and complexity of intersubjectivity".⁶²⁸ The ethnographic methodology⁶²⁹ applied was borrowed and adapted from Jacob L. Stump and Priya Dixit, accessing data using *written sources, oral sources* and *observed and experiential sources*.⁶³⁰

⁶²⁸ Gillespie, A. & Cornish, F. 2010. "Intersubjectivity: Towards a Dialogical Analysis", *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 40(1): 19-46.

⁶²⁹ Ethnography as a methodology: an interpretive approach to the study of sociopolitical life that puts human meanings and socially constructed arrangements at the heart of their analysis (definition borrowed from Stump & Dixit, 2013: 95).

⁶³⁰ For more on the *Ethnography of the Terrorist Subject*, please see Stump and Dixit, 2013, Chapter 6.

In the quest to answer the main research question, the dissertations' first analysis section explores the various discourses surrounding the terror attack sites to set the context in understanding *the shared understandings of the problem and how to best respond to it*. This analytical segment constitutes chapter 4, *Finding meaning at terror attack sites – CT as 'peace' and 'democracy'*, and will be further operationalised based on the previous chapter in the sections below. Chapter 4, in turn, sets the foundation for Chapter 5, *CT as Collective Action*, which explores the collective action for social change that has emerged examining the factors of social capital (i.e. *trust/trustbased networks between key stakeholders*) and possible norm diffusion by the affected communities (victims and other stakeholders). Studying the agency of the victims and other affected stakeholders the objective is to uncover the *performative acts for social change* that have emanated from the engagement with the sites.

Each chapter was accomplished by using slightly different methods: chapter 4 focusses on exploring the discourses surrounding the terror attack sites and therefore used sources such as literature reviews, qualitative interviews and experience and observations through conducted fieldwork; *CT as collective action* explored the local resilience in terms of agency around the sites and how these can be understood in the context of norm-setting against violence using data from social movements.

Based on the above and the discussion in the previous chapters, the methodology is therefore grounded in the theoretical framework of *constructivism* and *terrorism as communication*, and the overall methodological research design will be further anchored in the theoretical framework while elaborated in the below discussion on *Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS)*. This is of particular significance given that the constructivist school of thought does not per se instruct any specific methodology.⁶³¹

As Finnemore and Sikkink have illustrated:

Constructivism is an approach to social analysis that deals with the role of human consciousness in social life. It asserts that human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; that the most important ideational factors are widely shared or "intersubjective" beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and that these shared beliefs construct the interests of purposive actors ... constructivism's distinctiveness lies in its theoretical arguments, not in its empirical research strategies.⁶³²

⁶³¹ Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 392.

⁶³² Ibid., p. 391.

This overall ethnographic research design draws on multiple sources of data: *documents* entailing the trajectory of the sites to date; *interviews* with the affected communities such as victims and key stakeholders that engage with the sites; and *observations and experiences* by conducting fieldwork around the sites.

Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS)

In considering suitable research methods for constructivist research, Finnemore and Sikkink conclude that, “constructivist analysis is compatible with many research methods currently used in social science and political science”.⁶³³ As the overall research objective positions itself as a *critique* of the current state of CT, i.e. highlighting the lack of preventative measures, the author has opted to seek guidance from a *Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS)* approach.⁶³⁴

A critical approach is adopted to the extent that the dissertation aims to: i) explore how soft CT approaches can be developed further ii) provide a critique toward an approach that has been too reactive (as opposed to preventative), hard power focussed and state-centric. Furthermore, CTS deals with questions such as the meaning-making process of terrorism in contrast with more orthodox TS which has a long-standing tradition of being focussed on problem-solving:

[i]ndeed, as Richard Jackson points out, the study of terrorism was part of strategic studies and based on formulating policies to deal with terrorists, not understanding them or understanding how different social actors make sense of them. R. Jackson draws attention to the origins of TS in (orthodox) security studies and strategic studies, including counterinsurgency studies (2007c). He refers to Schmid and Jongman who wrote that much of early TS was “counterinsurgency masquerading as political science” (quoted in Jackson 2007c: 245) Jackson himself adds, “as a consequence, much terrorism research adopts state-centric priorities and perspectives and tends to reproduce a limited set of assumptions and narratives about the nature, causes and responses to terrorism”.⁶³⁵

⁶³³ Ibid.

⁶³⁴ In doing so, the author acknowledges the debate of two streams of Terrorism Research/Terrorism Studies (TS) – namely traditional TS and CTS – however the aim in adopting a CTS approach does not in itself mean to exclude or dismiss traditional TS but to bring in elements from CTS which operationalise the meaning-making element of TS and in this way hopefully contribute to the field of TS as a whole.

⁶³⁵ Stump & Dixit, 2013: 15.

Another reason for opting for a CTS approach is based on the fact that this research is conducted with the expectation of affecting current policy-making in the field with an emancipatory-agenda of the findings.⁶³⁶ In this sense, it is not emanating from a problem-solving approach but rather a critique of some of the assumptions upon which current problem-solving efforts are based upon. As Stump & Dixit explain, in comparing TS and CTS

a problem-solving perspective takes existing actors and relations, such as the state (its interests and identity) and their relations of insecurity with terrorist groups, as given, objective features of world politics. It does not attempt to account for the historical emergence of the state, its interests, identity, or its relations of insecurity with terrorist groups. Rather, a problem-solving approach works to explain why present problems exist and how those problems can be overcome with specific policies the state can implement.⁶³⁷

CTS-inspired research, in contrast, could for example “explore the various ways that people make sense of terrorism and counter-terrorism”.⁶³⁸ Furthermore, Stump and Dixit state that CTS focusses more on non-state actors in contrast to much other TS literature, which, in line with the problem-solving approach, is very state-centric. In this sense, a state-centric approach relies heavily on military and police agencies for securing the state, while a CTS approach might focus on different groups in civil society.

The objective is to explore how counter-narratives emerge organically as opposed to being created to solve an issue, and although the dissertation embodies an element of problem-solving in the objective of rectifying the current approach, it’s overall approach is one of understanding and illuminating more than problem-solving.

Thus, to the extent that TS is centered on problem solving, the literature functions to reproduce the legitimacy of the state as the most important actor in world politics and functions to mask the state’s implication “in the very ‘problem’ of terrorism itself.”⁶³⁹

In line with the findings postulated by Briggs in the literature review, whereby a ‘shared understanding of the problem’ is key, the dissertation will draw from Carol Lee Bacchi’s useful insights developed in her ‘What’s the Problem Represented to be’

⁶³⁶ Ibid., p. 2. A goal that essentially lines up with the objectives of a CTS approach.

⁶³⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

⁶³⁸ Ibid.

⁶³⁹ Ibid., p. 52.

(WPR) approach. In this sense, it becomes key to explore how responding to terror attack sites is ‘problematised’ because how it is constituted as a ‘problem’ or “the way in which the ‘problem’ is represented carries all sorts of implications for how the issue is thought about and for how the people involved are treated, and are evoked to think about themselves”.⁶⁴⁰

Bacchi’s WPR approach utilises a framework, applying three interconnected and overlapping effects of the problematisation: *discursive effects*, *subjectification effects*, and *lived effects*.⁶⁴¹ These three concepts were borrowed and utilised for the analysis to determine how the “shared understandings of the problem” and the problem representation in the discourse yield: i) discursive effects: effects which follow from the limits imposed on what can be thought and said; ii) subjectification effects: the ways in which subjects and subjectivities are constituted in discourse; iii) lived effects: the impact on life and death.⁶⁴²

Furthermore, frame analysis was applied in order to excerpt how the stakeholders interpreted the ‘problem’. As identified by Bacchi, “[b]ecause problematisation, and the problem representations they contain, reduce complexity, they can be described as framing processes”.⁶⁴³ A discursive approach was therefore employed to depict the problematization

[p]roblematization doesn’t mean representation of a pre-existing object, nor the creation by discourse of an object that doesn’t exist. It is the totality of discursive or non-discursive practices that introduces something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.).⁶⁴⁴

Bacchi notes that any confusion that may appear depicting between what is ‘real’ and ‘representation’ can be overcome by what M. J. Shapiro established in the following, “representations do not imitate reality but are the practices through which things take on meaning and value”.⁶⁴⁵ This in turn relates back to the theoretical discussion

⁶⁴⁰ Bacchi, 2009. *Analysing Policy: What's the Problem Represented to be?*, p. 1.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 15-18.

⁶⁴² Ibid., p. 15.

⁶⁴³ Bacchi, C. 2009: xii.

⁶⁴⁴ Foucault, 1988: 257.

⁶⁴⁵ Shapiro, M. J. 1988: p. xi.

conducted earlier on *performativity*, and will also relate to the discussion on the role of *representation* in collective action by Hutchison.

The meaning of ‘critical’: epistemology and ontology

Stump and Dixit establish that even though Critical Theory has been on the IR scene since the 1980s, the turn to draw from Critical Theory within the field of TS occurred in the mid 2000s.⁶⁴⁶ Many scholars have since attempted to address the question of what the term ‘critical’ actually constitutes when applied to the study of terrorism, and according to Stump and Dixit, the interpretations are varied and characterised by ambiguity, often inhibiting development in the field. Below is one interpretation by Smyth et al.:

A research orientation that is willing to challenge dominant knowledge and understandings of terrorism, is sensitive to the politics of labeling in the terrorism field, is transparent about its own values and political standpoints, adheres to a set of responsible research ethics, and is committed to a broadly defined notion of emancipation.⁶⁴⁷

Stump and Dixit conclude that a philosophical ontology, i.e. “how we observers wager that we are hooked up to the world”, becomes the logical starting point for subsequent analysis.⁶⁴⁸ The authors note that “two basic wagers are at play in the philosophical ontology debate”, exemplified in the following: i) Wager 1: observer and observed, or subject and object, are distinctly separate – critical realism; ii) Wager 2: observer and observed, or subject and object, are deeply interconnected – reflexivism.⁶⁴⁹ This dissertation adopts the second wager of reflexivism, based on the arguments of emancipation provided by Stump and Dixit:

In short, we argue that the two different philosophical wagers discussed above enable two very different claims about the status and aim of knowledge generation. A CTS that draws from CT should do more than simply offer better or worse approximations of the “objective” world that may or may not intend to be emancipatory. Rather, CT-inspired knowledge should *always* aim to change the world because for a “reflexivist, knowing the world and changing the world are inseparable” (Jackson 2011:60). More specifically, a CTS that draws from CT should embrace the claim that critical theories have a unique “standing as guides for human action” because

⁶⁴⁶ Stump & Dixit, 2013: 42.

⁶⁴⁷ Smyth et al., 2008: 2.

⁶⁴⁸ Stump & Dixit, 2013: 43.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid.. p. 44.

they aim to produce reflective agents who can determine “what their true interests are” and because “they are inherently emancipatory”.⁶⁵⁰

When adopting a Critical Theory approach to anything, it entails being “involved in a struggle for social change and unification of theory and practice”.⁶⁵¹ Furthermore, a CTS approach that draws from Critical Theory “takes an explicit normative commitment … similar to that espoused by peace research and conflict resolution studies”.⁶⁵² Bacchi’s WPR approach becomes fitting as it has a normative agenda⁶⁵³, taking the side of marginal voices, particularly given the dissertation’s focus on the neglected voices of victims.

The overall objective of the dissertation is to illuminate on how counter-narratives emerge organically and in this way, entails a normative element in the form of informing government policy-making in terms of best practise towards capitalising on these performative acts for social change. Subsequently, as established by Taylor of the need of providing victims of terrorism a stronger voice within the CT realm, a CTS approach drawing from Critical Theory becomes valid as it would focus on ‘marginal voices’⁶⁵⁴:

… emancipation should be about “feasible alternatives that grow out of the here and now” (Toros and Gunning 2009: 100). Such a view of emancipation, which contains a normative vision of a better world, logically entails a particular ontological wager regarding the nature of concepts in history. In contrast to the “notion of a (broadly) immutable status quo so dominant in traditional terrorism studies” (Toros and Gunning 2009: 99), a CT-inspired CTS bets “that the actually existing empirical world is *not* simply ‘one damn thing after another’ but that instead history is, in a very real sense, going somewhere – and it is going somewhere that the researcher, through the act of producing reflexive knowledge, can contribute to” (Jackson 2011: 165).⁶⁵⁵

Emancipation therefore becomes to “induce some sort of situational progress among” victims of terrorism (but also in the sense that government policy-makers will

⁶⁵⁰ Stump & Dixit, 2013: 45. Please note that the abbreviation of CT in this context refers to Critical Theory.

⁶⁵¹ Kellner, 1990: 22.

⁶⁵² Stump & Dixit, 2013: 46.

⁶⁵³ Bacchi, C. 2009: 44.

⁶⁵⁴ Stump & Dixit, 2013: 47- 48.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 48.

emancipate the findings).⁶⁵⁶ In this sense, using Critical Theory does not in itself guarantee progress, “but is dependent on the productive and reproductive practices of historically acting subjects”.⁶⁵⁷ Furthermore, a Critical Theory approach does not envisage progress per se but should aim “to enlighten agents about how they ought rationally to act to realize their own best interests”.⁶⁵⁸ It therefore becomes key to understand and illuminate how the affected communities engage with terror attack sites to enlighten on how this engagement may yield normative practices.

Research questions

Given that the overall purpose of this dissertation is to explore the field of soft CT strategies, based on a conceptual framework of terrorism as a communicative act and CT as a counter-narrative through collective social resistance, the overall research question as already established:

“How are counter-narratives to terrorism constructed through performative acts and how can they be integrated with other soft counter-terrorism strategies?”

In order to operationalise the larger overall research question into practically investigative smaller assignments, the following questions have been devised in order to address the main over-arching research question. As already outlined in the introduction of this chapter, the chapter of *Finding meaning at terror attack sites – CT as ‘peace’ and ‘democracy’* focusses on exploring the *discourses* surrounding the terror attack sites to discern intersubjective meanings, both imbued as well as new meanings; *CT as collective action* will explore *the local resilience* in terms of *agency* around the sites and how these performative acts can be understood in the context of *norm-setting against violence*.

In order to comprehend how and why certain ideas have come to matter more than others in responding to the sites, the dissertation will use a discursive approach to norms, grounded in Krook and True’s interpretation on norms and norm diffusion:

The diffusion of international norms and their effects on policy and political behaviour are central research questions in international relations. Informed by constructivism, prevailing

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 49.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁸ Guess, 1987: 77.

models are marked by a crucial tension between a static view of norm content and a dynamic picture of norm adoption and implementation. Observing that norms continue to evolve after they emerge, we argue that a discursive approach offers a more promising way forward for theorizing and analysing the life cycles of international norms.⁶⁵⁹

Accordingly, Krook and True approach norms as *processes*, “calling attention to both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ sources of dynamism”.⁶⁶⁰ Therefore, when exploring the responses to terror attack sites it becomes crucial to explore the role of international norms, as Krook and True maintain: “their (norms) extent and variety suggest that international norms play a crucial and growing role in domestic and world politics”.⁶⁶¹ This will be explored in the context of the constitutive localization of ideas as per Acharya.

The sub-questions, in order to answer the main research question, therefore become:

R1: How have the discourses surrounding the terror attack sites evolved?

R2: What are the shared understandings of the problem and how to best respond to it?

R3: How has the local resilience taken shape, and what are the key manifestations?

R4: How has social capital played a role in the agency of the affected communities and their response(s) to the sites?

R5: What kinds of performative acts for social change have emerged? And in this sense, how could the affected communities act as norm entrepreneurs?

R1, R2 and R3 will be discussed further in Chapter 4 – *Finding meaning at terror attack sites*: ‘*CT as peace and democracy*’; R4 and R5 will be discussed in Chapter 5 – *CT as collective action*; and finally, the findings from these will be discussed in Chapter 6 – exploring the emergence of counter-narratives in an organic setting.

Research Procedure and Strategy

For an overall outline, the research design can schematically be broken down into a series of (the following) steps:

⁶⁵⁹ Krook, L. & J. True, 2010. “Rethinking the life cycles of international norms”, p. 103.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁶¹ Ibid. p. 104.

- 1.) This dissertation begins with a commitment to “a terror-free world or to a world in which conditions are such that political goals can be accomplished without a resort to terror”.⁶⁶²
- 2.) By identifying the social phenomena of terror attack sites and how to respond to them, the dissertation studies the audience of affected communities in exploring how counter-narratives emerge organically. It does so in order to offer emancipation for the affected communities (where victims are considered ‘marginal voices’) but also for government in terms of policy for best practice when considering soft CT and counter-narratives in particular.
- 3.) The research question posed: “How are counter-narratives to terrorism constructed through performative acts and how can they be integrated with other soft counter-terrorism strategies?”
- 4.) The data identified for answering the above question consists of documents, interviews and observations and experiences. Documents include anything from print, online, and digital news, policy papers, social movement websites, official speeches etc. Further sources include interviews with the affected communities to understand their meaning-making practices as well as observations and experiences of the sites conducting fieldwork in order to discern the shared understandings.
- 5.) Closely analyse the data to discern the discourses surrounding the sites, using Greenspan’s three identified questions as a guide: i) what should be built? ii) how should we decide? iii) what will different choices say about “us”? Using discourse analysis, depict key themes and elements from the literature characterising the meaning-making process of the sites, and the *shared understandings* in particular. Thereafter explore the social capital available for the affected communities to realise their shared understandings.
- 6.) Identify the political implications of the findings; especially in terms of how the findings can inform the affected communities in terms of emancipation of their role as norm entrepreneurs, but also what implications the findings have

⁶⁶² Stump & Dixit, 2013: 52.

for government policy-making in terms of counter-narratives and local resilience.

The actual methodology incorporates the following components and steps:

- 1.) A review of the existing literature on the subject to develop an understanding of the discourses surrounding the terror attack sites and the different elements in terms of how to respond to them. Using discourse analysis, depict key themes and elements from the data characterising the meaning-making practices of the sites, and the *shared understandings* in particular.
- 2.) Conduct ethnographic fieldwork of the terror attack sites, particularly around the anniversaries of the attacks, to better understand the meaning-making process of the events and the sites, the memorialisation etc. using the ethnographic methods of observations and experiences.⁶⁶³ Where possible, also visit any rebuild/reconstruction/memorials that have been constructed on the sites since.
- 3.) Conduct interviews with identified stakeholders to understand how people frame the events and the meaning-making practices in the context surrounding the sites. Using frame analysis it will probe the data gathered to depict the meaning-making process of terrorism and counter-terrorism.
- 4.) Applying a causal-layered analysis (CLA) approach it will review the ethnographic data collection to understand the various dimensions at interplay and how it can inform future soft CT policy-making.

⁶⁶³ As part of visiting the terror attacks sites, surveys were conducted to provide context to the Bali case. These surveys were carried out during the time of the anniversary of the bombings and to provide context to the meaning-making process of terrorism and CT. The surveys were conducted as part of the discourses surrounding the Bali Sari Club terror attack site, as part of a larger project, “Constructions of the Bali Peace Park as Counter-terrorism”, which this project was initially part of. The reason behind the surveys was to provide overall context to the in-depth interviews. The surveys were not conducted in the Norway case as they were not considered having the same relevance and because of pure logistical impediments.

Figure 1 - The research procedure and methodological approach

Research Phase	Methodology	Method	Method type
Data Collection	- Ethnography Triangulation, multi-faceted approach	- Literature review - Semi-structured in-depth interviews (+surveys) - Observations and Experiences	- Qualitative - Qualitative/ (quantitative)
	Discourse/Frame Analysis	- ‘What’s the Problem’ approach	- Qualitative - Qualitative
Analysis	Causal Layered Analysis (CLA)		- Qualitative

Figure 1 illustrates the research procedure in the context of the dissertation in terms of *methodology, method and method type*.

Case studies: case selection and comparative study

The significance of Attack Sites: Bali and Utøya

The case studies were selected based on both theoretical and practical considerations: i) symbolic meaning extended to the sites: the Sari Club in Bali, Indonesia and Utøya island/the government quarters in Oslo, Norway provide exemplary cases as the meaning-making practice is extended to the sites and the sites are currently under the process of deciding/having decided what to do with the sites, therefore offering rich cases to study in terms of how people engage with the sites and the intersubjectivity in terms of the meaning-making practice around the sites ii) accessible given data collection in terms of cultural and linguistic considerations as well as feasibility in terms of conducting limited ethnographic field studies.

Comparative case study: in terms of the decision of conducting a case study of two cases, Bali and Norway, the cases were selected on the basis of a ‘least similar cases’ design, in which everything between the two cases is different except for the

explanation (x = community engagement with terror attack sites) and the outcome (y = the development of counter-narratives). In this sense, it therefore will show how local resilience to terrorism takes form around terror attack sites and in this meaning-making practice process surrounding these sites will demonstrate *similarities* as well as *differences* in terms of possible norm diffusion.

Data Collection

Given the conceptually analytical and interpretive nature of the research, a mainly qualitative research design will be adopted. In this context it is important to underline that qualitative data are in essence social constructs, thus influenced by the researchers' assumptions about social reality and methodological practices.⁶⁶⁴ The research will also adopt some quantitative methods for collecting data, such as surveys, permitting a more comprehensive basis for the subsequent data analysis. The quantitative data available only apply to the Bali case, where the opportunity was given to survey people around the actual case study site area as it is more frequented by populations and still had not undergone any rebuild/reconstruction during the course of the research.

A triangulated approach of data gathering will be adopted, utilizing various methods in order to reveal multiple aspects of the research subject and therefore a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of the overall research problem. The sources for the data collection comprise of documents, direct observations and interviews, including, to some extent, surveys. During the interviews, a semi-structured interview method was applied, allowing for more open-ended discussions. The process of interviewing will be audio recorded and supported by researcher's notes.

To achieve the first research objective (investigate the existing theory of soft counter-terrorism strategies and the discourses surrounding CT) documentary study and literature reviews has been carried out. Reviewing relevant literature will provide the theoretical framework for the study and needs to be comprehensively reviewed before developing new ideas. Relevant documents, such as media reports (newspapers,

⁶⁶⁴ Miller, G. and Fox, K. in Silverman, David (ed.), *Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice*. 2nd ed. London: Sage Publications, 2004, pp. 36-37.

television and radio), research reports, government reports, NGO and international reports, as well as intelligence reports, will be used, as these will provide the context for the current discourses surrounding CT.

Based on the comprehensive data collection provided by the first objective, the second research objective will assume developing an analytical tool to be able to conduct a comparative case study of Bali and Utøya, examining counter-narratives in the context of the two terror attack sites. Using in-depth interviews and surveys as well as developing a historical timeframe of both cases will enable conducting a comparative analysis of the experiences of Bali and Norway. The empirical findings will enable a theoretical discussion developing the ideas of counter-narratives around terror attack sites.

In terms of target participants the following will apply for:

Bali: an initial series of in-depth interviews with 20 members of the target population, including direct victims of the Kuta attacks in 2002 and 2005 in Australia and Bali; family and friends of victims who are actively or passively involved in the Peace Park initiative in Australia and Bali; members of the resonant mass population in the immediate vicinity of the attacks in Kuta.

Norway: a series of 20 individual in-depth stakeholder interviews with participants drawn from government, community, organisations and key stakeholders. If possible, this group might also include victims of the actual attacks.

In addition, data collected by the ARC DECRA project on the Bali Peace Park site in Kuta will be available for interpretation and analysis to add depth to the study. This data will be in the form of survey information collected through a short time study of the site over a period of three years – 2013-2016. The surveys will be administered to tourists, locals and visitors to the Sari Club site in Kuta over two intervals annually. The data collection intervals coincide with the anniversary of the 2002 Bali bombings in October. The survey data will be collected by the ARC DECRA project and will be made available to this project for analysis. The data will allow insights into how different communities are engaging with the attack sites.

The third objective will be met by conducting a comprehensive analysis of all the gathered data throughout the research process as detailed below.

Case studies: the importance of terror attack sites

Case studies have been identified as “one useful method for situating forms of violent extremism and for developing approaches to countering violent extremism within their historical, political, and social contexts”.⁶⁶⁵ Moreover, “relational analyses within and between cases are also needed to develop knowledge in the field”⁶⁶⁶ Both the Bali bombings in 2002 and the Norway terrorist attacks in 2011 provide ideal case studies as the symbolism of the terror attacks extend to the actual sites, and therefore these sites become focal parts of a ‘narrative’ and ‘counter-narrative’ in terms of how the society and local stakeholders respond to them. This relates back to the discussion on symbolic meanings and performativity as a means for social change. The dissertation has opted for a ‘least similar cases’ design and can therefore elicit understandings for how counter-narratives emerge organically. In conducting the comparative analysis it is worthwhile mentioning that the key objective has constantly been to explore *how* the counter-narratives emerge (organically as opposed to being constructed) and not attempting to measure their effectiveness as such.⁶⁶⁷

- Bali

The Bali bombings carried out by the South-East Asian terrorist group of Jemaah Islamiyah in October 2002, killing 202 people, were targeted at nightclubs in the tourist district of Kuta. Based on both a religious and political objective⁶⁶⁸, the attacks were not well understood by the local population while the international community had fears the Indonesian government would rely too heavily on security forces to deal with the perceived threat from militant Islam.⁶⁶⁹ The attack had a big impact on Australians, “who had felt largely untouched by world conflict”, and who suddenly found “themselves being forced onto the stage of world politics as a result of the terrorist assault in Bali”.⁶⁷⁰ How to deal with the actual terror attack site has been a contested issue for many years given the international interest and multi-faceted

⁶⁶⁵ Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 73.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷ The author acknowledges that the research conducted might instigate further research including exploring the effectiveness of named counter-narratives.

⁶⁶⁸ The terrorist group’s long-term objective is to establish an Islamic state in the region.

⁶⁶⁹ Sherlock, 2002.

⁶⁷⁰ Kinnvall, C. 2004: 741.

character of the attack. The Sari club site has been proposed to host a community driven project called the Bali Peace Park, a spiritual garden where people can reflect upon and acknowledge the terror attacks of October 2002, along with all other acts of terror worldwide.⁶⁷¹

- *Norway*

On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik carried out the first ever terror attack in Norway: he first targeted a government building in the heart of Oslo with a car bomb killing eight people and injuring 200, followed by an attack on the island of Utøya, methodically killing 69 people who were partaking in the annual summer camp for the Norwegian Labour Youth Party (AUF). The attacks were politically motivated devised to target representatives for Norway's liberal multiculturalism. Although the initial national response was very unlike that of 9/11, calling for more democracy, more openness and greater political participation, the Norway case has eventuated into a political discourse witnessing multiculturalism suffering while anti-Muslim racist sentiments has increased (Carle, 2013). The question of the actual terror attack sites in Oslo and Utøya remains a highly contested issue providing a useful case to study for insights into how counter-narratives to terrorism might be expressed through the way communities engage with the sites.

Data collection and fieldwork

The data collection consists of data collected as part of a larger research project.⁶⁷² This includes qualitative interviews with various stakeholders that engage with the sites of the Bali bombings and Norway terrorist attacks, including victims⁶⁷³ of the attacks. It also includes literature reviews and analysis of material related to the case studies such as media reports, social movements websites, press releases, social media outlets, academic literature etc. The analysis of the interviews has been conducted

⁶⁷¹ The Bali Peace Park Association,

http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=1

⁶⁷² This research has been part of a larger research project and the author acknowledges the intellectual contribution of Associate Professor Anne Aly's project "Constructions of the Bali Peace Park as Counter-terrorism", which was funded by an Australian Research Council (ARC) DECRA grant.

⁶⁷³ The term 'victim' includes both individuals injured and killed and their relatives.

using frame analysis based on a theoretical framework derived from constructivism and terrorism as communication.

The fieldwork was carried out throughout a period of 2013-2016.⁶⁷⁴ A large part of the interviews were conducted as part of visiting the Bali Kuta site around the anniversary of the Bali bombings (2013 and 2014). The fieldwork for the Norway case study was carried out during the period of 2014-2016. As part of this fieldwork the author has visited both the Oslo government quarters site as well as the site of Utøya.⁶⁷⁵

Accessing data using ethnographic fieldwork

The fieldwork conducted entails an ethnographic element to it given the significance of observing displays of memorials and spontaneous shrines and the attributed functions of commemoration/performativity of these sites. As the ethnographic fieldwork of this dissertation is limited by the overall fieldwork time allocated to the case studies, the ethnographical fieldwork will be complemented with secondary source documentations of the memorials/spontaneous shrines. These different sources of information provide sources of ‘corroboratory evidence’ and the importance of ‘construct validity’ is addressed by referring to the multiple sources of evidence.

In the field of CTS, ethnography is defined as “a particular set of *methods* (participant observation and interviewing), a *methodology* that aims to make sense of how a population of people attach meanings to their social and political environment, and to the finished, written *product* of that research”⁶⁷⁶:

What do we mean by methodology and method? The two are often conflated. By methodology we mean the commitments or presuppositions that enable and support any logically consistent line of inquiry. Once a methodologically consistent stance has been taken, then the

⁶⁷⁴ Some of the Bali data collection was conducted as part of a pilot project conducted by the principal investigator of the DECRA project in 2011-2012. The pilot project explored the ways in which victim populations engaged with the site of the 2002 Bali Bombings.

⁶⁷⁵ The Utøya island visit comprised of driving along the same route from Oslo to the island as Anders Behring Breivik did on 22nd of July, 2011. It also included visits to some improvised memorial sites around the area of Utøya island.

⁶⁷⁶ Stump & Dixit, 2013: 79.

different methods of *data gathering* and *data analysis* are tactical matters that should be evaluated in terms of the skill of their application.⁶⁷⁷

As Stump and Dixit observe, “ethnographers put human meanings and socially constructed arrangements at the heart of their analysis”.⁶⁷⁸ Ethnographers seriously consider “the voices and practices of people in their everyday contexts”.⁶⁷⁹ In this sense ethnographers, unlike other traditional research practises, try to “make sense of ‘the other’”, treating them like a subject – ‘a producer of social meaning’ – rather than a research object.⁶⁸⁰ In defining *social meaning* the authors use Auge’s definition: the constellation of symbolic relations instituted among and lived by people within a given social group.⁶⁸¹

In this sense, Stump and Dixit point to the fact how the label *terrorist* has been applied by governments and neopositivist-oriented scholars “to a variety of groups over the past 40 years” and therefore argue “that it is important to study the meaning making practices (linguistic and embodied) of groups labeled terrorists”.⁶⁸² Therefore using ethnography becomes key as it aims to “more precisely describe the complex, fluid, lived symbolic relations that constitute the daily life of terrorists and to confront the abstract, removed claims about terrorists that make up the vast majority of the literature”.⁶⁸³

In describing the ethnographic methods for the study of the subject of terrorism, Stump and Dixit identify three *sources of information* to access “the meanings that some group of people attaches to events and their surroundings”: i) *written sources*; ii) *oral sources*; iii) and *observed and experiential sources*.⁶⁸⁴ In this way, as Stump and Dixit observe

The data that a researcher is accessing, in other words, is the said and done, which includes the words, artifacts, and actions made by relevant actors. Generally speaking, the ethnographer

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁸¹ Auge in Stump and Dixit, 2013: 79.

⁶⁸² Stump & Dixit, 2013: 79.

⁶⁸³ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 84.

purposefully selects, records, notes, and copies these sources of information and then sets about systematically studying them.⁶⁸⁵

Furthermore, as highlighted by Checkel in the norm diffusion section on agency and the importance of reconstructing and comprehending the “cultural man” through “intersubjective familiarity”

A second development, in research by geographers, addresses the role of agency within the adopter population. The starting point here is the obvious, but too often neglected, one that specific features of adopters crucially affect the likelihood of successful diffusion; researchers need to pay greater attention to the adopter’s “experience, norms, values and intentions” when studying diffusion. Moreover, the adoption environment should be reconstructed within its own societal and environmental context, through an “intersubjective familiarity” of the individuals and groups under study. This is a call to reintroduce process, agency, and what Avinoam Meir has called “cultural man” to dominant structural diffusion approaches.⁶⁸⁶

- *Documents*

Therefore, the data collected consists of three components: *documents, interviews* and *observations and experiences*. In this sense, the thesis has conducted a *textual ethnography* to understand the discourses surrounding the two case studies. However, for fieldworkers documents comprise only part of the data, as Stump and Dixit observe:

Documents enable researchers to identify key actors that warrant interviews, they enable researchers to refine the meaningful boundaries of the community under study, they enable researchers to corroborate or refute the researcher’s working assumptions regarding the group, and the documents enable researchers to gather background information on the topic under study.⁶⁸⁷

When reviewing documents, or text, as part of the analysis – as Bergstrom and Boreus highlight – “the amount of work spent on understanding the context is naturally dependent on the nature and scope of the task”:⁶⁸⁸

The objects of study are people or groups of people that stand in certain relations to each other. The texts are therefore from the beginning anchored in a sphere of actors and they are used to understand more about this sphere.⁶⁸⁹

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁶ Checkel, 1999: 86.

⁶⁸⁷ Stump & Dixit, 2013: 84.

⁶⁸⁸ Author’s translation. Bergström, G. & Boréus, K. 2005: 32.

To complement the documents, which when conducting fieldwork only constitute part of the data,⁶⁹⁰ particularly when attempting to “access the meanings that some community of people attaches to their surroundings and to events” they should be combined with interviews.⁶⁹¹

- *Interviews*

The opted interview strategy was a semi-structured interviewing style. Semi-structured interviews are “looser in their organization compared to surveys” and there “may be a definite set of interview questions asked by the interviewer to most all respondents”, however, answers are open-ended meaning respondents can “answer however they choose”.⁶⁹² Therefore, semi-structured interviews “open the door for the interviewee to speak at length”.⁶⁹³ Thus, the objective of semi-structured interviews for ethnographers, “is to get at the meanings people associate with particular people, organizations, events, and so forth”.⁶⁹⁴

The aim is not to get at the “real” motivations driving some group to act nor is it to get an accurate description of some event, but to prompt the interviewee to talk at length, to construct a sense-making narrative out of commonplace cultural categories that that person (as part of a interpretive community) uses in the course of their everyday lives. These narratives and cultural categories and how they are used to define particular circumstances and events are, for the ethnographer, the data that is studied.⁶⁹⁵

In terms of gaining access to a community and finding respondents for the in-depth understanding component of the dissertation, respondents were located through the established networks of the DECRA research project but also through opportunistic and snowball sampling, ranging from extreme/deviant cases within the identified community/population of ‘affected stakeholders’. These include victims and families,

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁰ Stump & Dixit, 2013: 84.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid.

⁶⁹² Ibid., p. 85.

⁶⁹³ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid.

locals, respondents and other affected people. Interviews with academic and non-academic experts also informed the author's analysis.⁶⁹⁶

Table 6 - Interviews

Interview/survey	Case study	Number of respondents
Semi-structured recorded	Bali	20
Semi-structured recorded	Norway	8
Informal ethnographic conversations	Bali	2
Informal ethnographic conversations	Norway	3
Surveys	Bali	50+
Total interviews	Bali & Norway	28

Two different questionnaires were created for the Norway in-depth interview respondents: one for *direct victims* and one for *stakeholders*, and similarly the Bali in-depth interviews were slightly amended to suit the actual respondent in question.⁶⁹⁷ All respondents have been codified for the purposes of the analysis as to maintain their anonymity where possible.

The author acknowledges that given the cultural differences in terms of language in both the Bali case (not literate in Balinese nor Indondesian) and the Norway case (understand Norwegian to some extent) some discrepancies may have occurred in the process of translation and transcription. The goal pursued for the interviews, as noted by Grenfell on Bourdieu's approach: "the need for interviews to be set up in a certain way so that the difference between the interlocutors is minimized " where "[i]n an ideal world, the questioner and the interviewee come from a similar habitus background".⁶⁹⁸

⁶⁹⁶ One of the participants – a former terrorist linked to Jemaah Islamiyah – was a respondent that the research project managed to get hold of as an unexpected outcome during fieldwork undertaken at one of the terror attack sites.

⁶⁹⁷ For a complete version of the questionnaires used for the interviews, please see Annexes.

⁶⁹⁸ Grenfell, 2011: 210.

- Observations and Experiences

The author conducted fieldwork by visiting the terror attack locations associated with the case studies. Ethnographic fieldwork involving first hand observations and experiences is pertinent to empirical research for studying the symbolic nature of terror attack sites as the practice – as noted by Setha M. Low – provides scholars with “the opportunity to examine the relationship between public space and culture.”⁶⁹⁹ Similarly Miller concludes that in order to “appreciate the true meaning of culturally or historically meaningful sites, it is critical to have experiential observations of them.”⁷⁰⁰

Furthermore, Nasser-Eddine et al. have identified the need to invest in social science and transdisciplinary research approaches stating that phenomenological and ethnographic approaches would “enable researchers to capture the complexity of these [violent extremism and CVE] phenomena”.⁷⁰¹ In this sense, understanding the symbolism of the sites for terrorism as well as CT/CVE, becomes key. However, while the element of conducting ethnographic fieldwork is pertinent for ‘immersing’ oneself in these places, and in this sense gathering a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenological aspect of the sites under exploration, it will nonetheless inevitably to a certain extent be limited as noted by Vered Amit

The notion of immersion implies that the ‘field’ which ethnographers enter exists as an independently bounded set of relationships and activities which is autonomous of the fieldwork through which it is discovered. Yet in a world of infinite interconnections and overlapping contexts, the ethnographic field cannot simply exist, awaiting discovery. It has to be laboriously constructed, prised apart from all the other possibilities for contextualization to which its constituent relationships and connections could also be referred. This process of construction is inescapably shaped by the conceptual, professional, financial and relational opportunities and resources accessible to the ethnographer.⁷⁰²

Bali: The author visited the Sari nightclub site around the time of the 12th anniversary in October 2014. This fieldwork trip included a visit to the Echo Peace Bali ceremony; various visits to the actual site of the Sari Club and the official memorial across the street from the Sari site; surveys at evening/night time conducted around

⁶⁹⁹ Miller, E. D. 2011: 113.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁰¹ Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011: 73.

⁷⁰² Amit, V. 2000: 6.

the site/memorial; as well as participation in the formal memorial service for the victims.

- Ethnographical reflections/experience: The Bali fieldwork was often intense, due to the short time frame spent on the ground as well as the emotional setting of interviewing participants around the time of the anniversary of the bombings, dealing with delicate matters including interviewing victims etc. plus conducting the surveys at night time in the busy area of Kuta around the Sari Club site frequented by tourists wanting to take pictures of us etc. Furthermore, the fieldwork required the ability to be highly pragmatic, at one point only being able to interview a participant at a ceremony gathered by media who recorded the interview, in this sense guiding the questions of the interview to become more ‘mainstream’, less candid and less detailed given the short time frame and attention from media. We had a local person employed by the project to help us in organising interviews, translating, and often acting as a gatekeeper, however given their academic background we found the collaboration very fruitful. Most interview participants were very eager to help the research project and we ended up with more data collection as a kind of ‘snowball effect’ of our fieldwork.

Norway: The author visited the Norway sites around the 3rd anniversary of the 22/7 attacks, including a visit to Utøya on 22nd of July 2014 and to the government quarters in Oslo. A second fieldwork trip was conducted to visit the 22 July Centre located at the government quarters in September 2015.


- Ethnographical reflections/experience: The Norway fieldwork was conducted only a few years after the terror attack making it harder to get hold of interview participants willing to participate. However, the fieldwork around the terror attack sites was very rewarding for the research. Experiencing the 3rd anniversary of the Utøya massacre on the actual island, guided by a local expert, was a very first-hand experience providing critical insights into how the young people on the island must have been terrified while demonstrating the tragic circumstances of being trapped on an island, at the exact time of the year as these people were, and how cold it would have been in the water for those trying to escape by swimming. These visits in person were vital for the meaning-making process and for understanding the impact the attacks had on Norway. Visiting both the island and the government quarters, including the 22 July centre, has been key for grasping the literature and has had an immense impact on

myself as the researcher. This relates back to the ability to emancipate – by immersing yourself in the local settings you become a gatekeeper for the research trying to translate it then into what it can generate for policy. Both the Bali and Norway fieldwork has been instrumental in the meaning-making process as a researcher.

Gaining access to a community for study

The dissertation will focus on **two communities affected by terrorist attacks**: the Bali bombing sites in Indonesia and the Oslo/Utoya attack sites in Norway. **Richest sources of data gathered**: documents/literature to understand the historical context surrounding the (symbolic trajectory of the) sites since the attacks; in-depth interviews with stakeholders to establish how they engage with these sites as well as how they make sense of terrorism/CT; and observation/experience to interpret the meaning of the terror sites/memorials. The analysis will consist of both thick and thin description as to identify and comprehend both the individual meanings as well as the social context in which they emerge. Using the Stump & Dixit research design strategy, the dissertation is illustrated in the following figure.

Figure 2 – Research design for the study



Methods for analysis: Discourse and Frame analysis

Given the dissertation's explicit focus on the social phenomena surrounding the meanings attached to terror attack sites, a discursive approach becomes valid: "social systems are 'discourses' and cultural artefacts are 'signs' waiting to be deciphered and interpreted".⁷⁰³ Discourse analysis is a "study of social phenomena where the language is the focus", however, "language does not directly reflect reality... but rather is conducive to shaping it".⁷⁰⁴ Although discourse analysis' multi-disciplinary character postulates ambiguity, a common denominator for the manifold of specialisations is that they all consist of "systemic studies of discourse".⁷⁰⁵ Discourse analysis is also often coupled with studying dimensions of power and power relations in a society.⁷⁰⁶

The discursive approach to understanding the meaning-making practices around the sites is mainly derived from Krook and True's reflexive approach to norm diffusion. Furthermore, Bacchi's WPR approach will be used to depict i) *discursive effects* (the limits imposed on what can be said or thought) ii) *subjectification effects* (how subjects are constituted within problem representations) and iii) finally, *lived effects* (the material impact of problem representations on bodies and lives).⁷⁰⁷

The dissertation will adopt a "critical frame analysis" as the approach involves meaning-making processes and "acknowledges that not all actors may have similar 'voice' in defining problems and solutions due to structures of social, economic and political inequality".⁷⁰⁸

[A] discursive approach focused on norms as sense-making practices offers greater leverage for analysing patterns in their origins, adoption and implementation in diverse contexts. Discourses shape what people *do* and who they *are* by fixing meanings and by opening subject positions from which to speak and know ... This perspective, in turn, highlights power as

⁷⁰³ Grenfell, M. 2011: 25-26.

⁷⁰⁴ Bergström & Boréus, 2005: 35

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 306.

⁷⁰⁶ Bergström & Boréus, 2005: 12-15.

⁷⁰⁷ For more, see Bacchi, 2009: Chapter 2.

⁷⁰⁸ Krook & True, 2010: 105.

integral to the processes of social construction, determining what can and cannot be said – and, as a result, who can and cannot speak.⁷⁰⁹

However, as the authors note, having a focus on discourses “does not mean that ‘everything is possible’”: rather, as noted by Snow and Benford, “agents are constrained not only by relations of power, but also by the existing field of norms, cognitive frames and meaning systems”.⁷¹⁰ The analysis will adopt Laclau and Mouffe’s approach given its focus on *antagonism* (in the meaning-making practice) and its view on identity as something *constructed*.

- *Identifying target themes*

Braddock and Horgan underscored the role of themes when analysing counter-narratives providing a guide for a more complex form of content analysis – namely *theme analysis* –, which can “describe higher-level concepts within narrative data that correspond to beliefs, attitudes, and values”.⁷¹¹ The authors further note that

[a]lthough researchers have used “theme analysis” as a term to identify multiple forms of qualitative investigation, all types of theme analysis entail reading (or listening to) written or spoken data and recognizing patterns within those data that shed light on the meaning behind the words. These patterns are referred to as “themes”.⁷¹²

The impetus for theme analysis is based on that “theme analysis promotes an understanding of the latent meaning of text through the identification and analysis of inherent higher-level concepts within qualitative semantic data”.⁷¹³

By facilitating inferences related to the objectives and implications of terrorist narratives, theme analysis can be used to not only evaluate what is overtly expressed within terrorist messages, but also what is meant by those messages and how the messages may be interpreted. Once the themes that comprise the meaning of the terrorist narratives have been identified, it is then possible to incorporate opposing themes into counternarratives.⁷¹⁴

Given that the objective of this dissertation is not so much to actually construct counter-narratives but to explore how they emerge organically it will follow the guide

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 108.

⁷¹⁰ Benford and Snow, 1988, quoted in Krook & True, 2010: 109.

⁷¹¹ Braddock & Horgan, 2016: 387.

⁷¹² Ibid.

⁷¹³ Ibid.

⁷¹⁴ Ibid.

by what it offers in terms of depicting themes. As noted by Braddock & Horgan on counter-narratives: “in the context of CVE, counternarratives challenge themes within terrorist narratives that are consistent with the group’s ideology.”⁷¹⁵

Therefore it becomes pertinent to explore what *themes* appear in the discourses surrounding the meaning of the terror attack sites.

- i) Depicting the discourses – content analysis – what *themes* appear in the literature on the trajectory of the sites? In finding meaning at these places – in the words of Bourdieu – what is and is not thinkable?
- ii) Frame analysis to understand how the stakeholders frame the events – depicting the meaning making processes, their idea of *terrorism*, the symbolic meaning of the sites, *the response*.
- iii) Depicting *collective action* through how *individual trauma has expanded to the collective through representation*.

Frame analysis becomes a suitable method for analysis given the focus on identifying the shared understanding of the problem of responding to terror attack sites:

Frames, then, *define problems* – determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values; *diagnose causes* – identify the forces creating the problem; *make moral judgements* – evaluate causal agents and their effects; and *suggest remedies* – offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects. A single sentence may perform more than one of these four framing functions, although many sentences in a text may perform none of them. And a frame in any particular text may not necessarily include all four functions.⁷¹⁶

Robert Entman defines ‘framing’ by highlighting how framing essentially revolves around ‘selection and salience’,⁷¹⁷:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe, a point explored most thoroughly by Gamson (1992). An example is the “cold war” frame that dominated U.S. news of foreign affairs until recently. The cold war frame highlighted certain foreign events – say, civil wars –

⁷¹⁵ Ibid., p. 386.

⁷¹⁶ Entman, R. 1993. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm”, p. 55.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid., p. 52.

as problems, identified their source (communist rebels), offered moral judgments (atheistic aggression), and commended particular solutions (U.S. support for the other side).⁷¹⁸

⁷¹⁸ Ibid.

Chapter 4: Finding meaning at terror attack sites – CT as ‘peace’ and ‘democracy’

This chapter sets out to explore the discourses surrounding the sites of the Bali and Norway case studies, examining whose ideas have come to matter in responding to these symbolic places while studying the various local/national meanings attached to the sites and the overall contest of meanings attributed to these places – or in the terminology of Low – the social construction of space. Guided by Greenspan’s typology, it will explore the factors of i) what should be built on the sites; ii) how should it be decided and; iii) what do different choices say about ‘us’ in each case study. The chapter will further identify the discursive, subjectification and lived effects of the responses to these sites and the discourses surrounding them.

Based on the conducted literature review on contested spaces and sites marked by violence, drawing particularly from the case of Ground Zero in New York, as well as Stow’s conceptual framework on public memory, the themes that emerged in Chapter 2 will help guide the analysis. This chapter will further identify the ‘shared understandings of the problem’ of how to respond to the sites while reviewing what has actually been realised to date. In this sense, the analysis comprises of studying both the imbued meanings of the sites as well as any new meanings that may have emerged in the social construction of space following the terror attacks.

As outlined in the Research Design chapter, the R1, R2 and R3 to be answered in this chapter:

R1: How have the discourses surrounding the terror attack sites evolved?

R2: What are the shared understandings of the problem and how to best respond to it?

R3: How has the local resilience taken shape, and what are the key manifestations?

Therefore, in order to answer the above questions, the sub-questions to be answered in this chapter become:

- *How are these sites symbolic of terrorism and CT? How has the trajectory of the responses to the Bali bombings and Norway terror attack sites progressed? And in this sense, how has the meaning-making process of the*

sites evolved since the attacks? What were/are some of the imbued meanings/new meanings attached to the sites? In responding to the sites, whose ideas matter? What kind of memorials and, to use the question posed by Young, ‘commemoration as to what end’? What expressions of performativity (as a means for social change) have emerged? Using Briggs and Feve’s counter-messaging typology, do these organically emerged counter-narratives fit a framework of ‘alternative narratives’ or ‘counter-narratives’?

This chapter therefore, as explained in Figure 1 (chapter 2), has as the object of analysis: the social phenomena around the symbolism of terror attack sites; the social construction of public space; the transformation of space; and the discourses and shared understandings. Meanwhile, the unit of analysis is the social interactions; interpretations; and contested spaces.⁷¹⁹

The chapter will explore the trajectory of the terror attack sites to date, with the purpose of exploring how the meaning-making process of the sites has evolved since the attacks. It will explore i) the key ‘players and arenas’ of contest and discourse ii) (what Briggs has identified as) the shared understanding of the problem and how to best respond to it iii) the local resilience that has emerged in the aftermath of the attacks. In this sense, the following definition of local resilience will be applied in the chapter when exploring how the societies have moved on:

it is in the broadest sense and with numerous variations used to capture an individual’s, an organization’s, or a society’s ability to continue to function in the face of adversity, to restore normalcy, to learn, find solutions, and move on.⁷²⁰

In her WPR approach, Bacchi uses a framework, which applies three, interconnected, and overlapping effects of the problematisation: *discursive effects*, *subjectification effects* and *lived effects*.⁷²¹ These three concepts will be borrowed and utilised for the analysis as to determine how the “shared understandings of the problem” and the problem representation in the discourse yield: i) discursive effects: effects which follow from the limits imposed on what can be thought and said; ii) subjectification

⁷¹⁹ For a more detailed overview of the conceptual framework, please see Figure 1 in Chapter 2.

⁷²⁰ Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016: 320.

⁷²¹ Bacchi, C. L. 2009. *Analysing Policy: What’s the Problem Represented to Be?* pp. 15-18.

effects: the ways in which subjects and subjectivities are constituted in discourse; iii) lived effects: the impact on life and death.⁷²²

Resistance in this sense is the contestation of socially established meanings of dominant discourses that define the situation and how it should be managed. These small acts of defiance, nonconformity and noncompliance (“weapons of the weak” in Scott’s terms) wrestle away the practices, strategies, representations, and textual devices that are expected in response to crisis and allow participants to manage the continued identities of the tragically affected individuals and the community. The subjectivities that grievers hunger for in times of tragedy are to some extent negated by the conformity of traditional mourning practice. But the re-empowerment process, the process that makes it possible for grievers to go on living, seems to require a certain amount of resistance. While Foucault (1980) argues that where there is power there is resistance, Abu-Luhod (1990) reminds us the reverse is also true and where there is resistance there is power. Resistance reclaims agency and marks the road to recovery.⁷²³

This kind of ‘subjectification’ process permitted by the (official) responses and its consequences will be elaborated on further using Bacchi’s conceptual framework employed in the case studies.

Whose ideas matter? Identifying key ‘players’ and ‘arenas’ as well as higher-order themes

The structure of the analysis to follow will firstly provide a brief summary of the case study for some essential context to then focus on identifying the key stakeholders – or in using Jasper’s typology, key *players* – and *arenas* for the meaning-making practice and discourse surrounding the sites. The analysis will then go on to discuss some of the notions that have emerged as higher order themes in the analysis of all the data, including *written, oral and observed and experienced* sources, using a mix of both thick and thin description.

⁷²² Ibid., p. 15.

⁷²³ Ibid.

Case Study 1: Bali

- Bali

The Bali bombings, carried out by the South-East Asian terrorist group of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – while orchestrated by Al-Qaeda – in October 2002, killing 202 people, were targeted at two nightclubs in the tourist district of Kuta. The terror attack received widespread international media coverage due to the large number of foreign victims from Australia, UK, US, Germany, Sweden and countless other countries.⁷²⁴ Based on both a religious and political objective⁷²⁵, the attacks were not well understood by the local population while the international community feared the Indonesian government would rely too heavily on security forces to deal with the perceived threat from militant Islam.⁷²⁶ The matter of what to do with the actual terror attack site(s) has been a contested issue for many years given the international interest and multi-faceted character of the attack. In recent years the site of the Sari Club has been proposed to host a community driven project called the Bali Peace Park, which intends to build a spiritual garden on the site where people can reflect upon and acknowledge the terror attack of October 2002, along with all other acts of terror worldwide.⁷²⁷

⁷²⁴ The number of victims in order of country mostly affected: Australia (88), Indonesia (38), UK (23), US (7), Germany (6), Sweden (5), Netherlands (4), France (4), Denmark (3), Switzerland (3), New Zealand (2), Brazil (2), Canada (2), Japan (2), South Africa (2), South Korea (2), Ecuador (1), Greece (1), Ireland (1), Italy (1), Poland (1), Portugal (1), Taiwan (1).

⁷²⁵ The terrorist group's long-term objective is to establish an Islamic state in the region. The motive is said to have been "retaliation for US' support of War on Terror and Australia's role in the liberation of East Timor".

⁷²⁶ Sherlock, S. 'The Bali Bombing: What it Means for Indonesia', *Parliament of Australia, Current Issues Brief no. 4, 2002-03,* http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/cib0203/03Cib04, p. 7.

⁷²⁷ The Bali Peace Park Association, http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=1 (accessed 6 February 2013)

The Terrorist Narrative

The Bali bombings were conducted as part of JI's narrative of the American-led 'War on Terror' being a 'war on Islam', and therefore targeted Western tourist clubs in cosmopolitan Bali. JI attacked the Bali tourist areas "in order to demonstrate their disdain for "the West", to disrupt the tourist economy, and inflict fear on the peoples and governments within the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing".⁷²⁸ From the perpetrators' perspective, the US and its allies were perceived as "moral contaminants and infidels, whose cultural values and practices were deeply offensive to the purity of the Muslim faith".⁷²⁹ In this context, the Balinese were viewed as "collusive and treacherous allies of the West and its imperial disposition".⁷³⁰

The Bali bombings occurred as the US, UK, and Australia "were preparing to invade Iraq" and "were designed to instill fear in the coalition governments and their citizens, creating a mood of insecurity which would ultimately shatter the nexus that had formed between Bali and the "West" within the broader economy of pleasure".⁷³¹ The attack was also purported to be targeting Australians in particular for the country's role in the liberation of East Timor. Nevertheless, "[i]n the broadest sense ... the attacks were designed to persuade these governments to cancel the war on terror and expel themselves from all the holy Muslim lands, including Indonesia".⁷³²

The Bali bombings also have to be understood in the context of Indonesia's history of sectarian violence going back to 1949.⁷³³ The relationship between Bali and Java represents the complex modernization of Indonesia and the "constitutional fabric of Indonesia's democratic statehood", and in this sense, the Islamic militant terror attacks were also an assault on the "very essence of the Indonesian state and its politico-cultural integrity".⁷³⁴ Furthermore, on a more local level, it was an attack on

⁷²⁸ Lewis, J. & Lewis, B. 2009. *Bali's Silent Crisis – Desire, Tragedy, and Transition*, p. 187.

⁷²⁹ Lewis et al., 2013. "The Bali Bombings Monument", p. 25.

⁷³⁰ Ibid.

⁷³¹ Lewis & Lewis, 2009: 186.

⁷³² Ibid., p. 187.

⁷³³ Lewis et al note how Islamist groups like JI view Bali's cosmopolitanization as part of a historical betrayal that started in 1949 with Sukarno's rejection of the Jakarta Charter, the precept of Sharia law, and Islam as the official national religion.

⁷³⁴ Lewis & Lewis, 2009: 188.

Balinese secularism. Although Indonesia is a muslim-majority country, Indonesia's jihadists constitute a very small minority and may number approximately 1,000 individuals.⁷³⁵

Finding meaning at the Sari Club site: ‘Social production’ and ‘social construction’ of space

Contested space - whose ideas matter?

The 2002 Bali bombings targeted two night clubs on the street of Jalan Legian in Kuta's commercial hub which attracts a lot of tourists: the Sari Club and Paddy's Bar. Early on the Indonesian government banned any rebuilding on the sites and many Balinese simply referred to the sites as 'Ground Zero', however a new Paddy's Bar (named Paddy's Bar Reloaded) was rebuilt just down the road about six months after the blasts.⁷³⁶ Later on, another bar was actually built on the Paddy's Bar site, called VIP.⁷³⁷

Tumarkin's ethnographical fieldwork documenting the initial response to the sites observed how right in the aftermath "the bomb sites were covered in offerings left by the Balinese, surrounded by flowers, photographs and candles brought by the visitors".⁷³⁸ Similar to other places marked by violence, such as Shanksville and New York, she notes how these sites "figured as revered spontaneous shrines and memorial spaces".⁷³⁹ A year and half later, however, the two sites were "marked by a sense of abandonment":

Banana trees, traditionally planted by the Balinese to ward off the evil spirits, grow on the site of Paddy's Bar. It feels strange to stand in front of these two places. I understand how it could really hurt if someone I loved died here. How the monument erected nearby would be of little consolation.⁷⁴⁰

The official Bali bombing monument was unveiled for the first anniversary of the attacks, and is located across the street from the Sari Club site. The memorial consists

⁷³⁵ Chalmers, I. 2017. "Countering violent extremism in Indonesia", p. 332.

⁷³⁶ Information gathered from interviews; Tumarkin, M. 2005: 59.

⁷³⁷ Information gathered from data collection.

⁷³⁸ Tumarkin, M. 2005: 60.

⁷³⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid.

of a monument listing the names of the 202 victims, a ring of flags representing the nationalities of the victims as well as a water fountain.⁷⁴¹ The many tourists in the area frequent the monument however few are aware that the makeshift car park lot across the street is the actual Sari Club site where the main bomb blast went off.⁷⁴²

Over a decade later, the memorial keeps attracting controversy as the sole marker of the violence to date, with concerns particularly from local Australians over the negligence and deteriorating state of it.⁷⁴³ The neglect and controversy over the memorial is further exacerbated by the impertinent way in which the actual Sari Club site has fared following the bomb blasts, particularly as perceived by those affected by the attacks.⁷⁴⁴

Yet, the actual significance attached to the sites has varied amongst the affected communities. Though the sites became the foci right in the aftermath of the Bali bombings, particularly for the local community, the spiritual significance that the Balinese assigned to the sites soon dissipated.⁷⁴⁵ More than 15 years later, while the Balinese victims and affected communities appear to some level have attained ‘closure’ and ‘moved on’, particularly since the official cleansing ritual, *Pemarisudha Karipubhaya*, which took place on November 15, 2002, many of the Australian victims remain unsettled:

During this elaborate ceremony secured by five thousand police and soldiers, holy water carried from temples was sprinkled on the bomb sites and on the thousands of mourners to bring blessing and purification. The island’s highest-level priests led the rituals of cleansing, releasing the souls of the dead and purifying the soil of the evil and of the blood shed by the victims. Special offerings to God were made on the sites and thousands of Balinese engaged in a collective, cathartic prayer. The biggest ceremony of its kind in Bali, it worked to restore a sense of balance and harmony to the island’s community, marking the end of its dark period. With the ceremonies complete, there was, I was told, a general sense of relief. The two places struck by evil and darkness were now cleansed and, while the authorities turned their attention to the perpetrators, the community’s spiritual focus shifted to temples. People no longer needed to come to the bomb sites to pray. ‘Balinese people,’ says Haji Agus Bambang, ‘might go to the bomb sites out of respect for international victims, but they will no longer go there for

⁷⁴¹ See Figures 12-15 in annexes.

⁷⁴² Information gathered from data collection.

⁷⁴³ “Fight for Peace Park Continues”, *The Sydney Morning Herald*.

⁷⁴⁴ Information gathered from interviews.

⁷⁴⁵ Information gathered from interviews; Tumarkin, 2005: 61.

spiritual purposes.' The sites stopped being important... For Australians, however, the sight of two vacant and neglected bomb sites has been profoundly unsettling.⁷⁴⁶

In this sense, although the right aftermath of the attacks witnessed dynamic cooperation between the locals and the Australians in the rescue and police operations, the attitudes towards the site of the Sari Club has become a division between the two communities. This difference in turn has become an obstacle for progress in reaching a 'shared understanding of the problem' in terms of responding to the site.

What should be built and how should we decide?

While using Greenspan's terminology, the questions of *what should be built and how should we decide* on the Sari Club site have become long-drawn-out issues. As already noted, early on the government prohibited any rebuilding on the site, in this sense transforming the block of land commercially unviable for the landowner. Around the first anniversary of the terror attack, the idea of using the land for some kind of peace garden to commemorate the many victims had started to officially take shape, and the lengthy battle to establish whom the owner of the land was began followed by the process of persuading them to give it up for sale.⁷⁴⁷ However, the debate around what should be built as well as the decision-making process around the issue has proved rather difficult given the multi-layered aspect of the terror attack, involving various affected communities with different meaning-making practices.

The origins of the idea of a Peace Park

When exploring the origins of the actual idea of a 'peace park' the idea first appears to have surfaced around the first anniversary of the Bali bombings when victims and local community had gathered in Bali to commemorate their loved ones.⁷⁴⁸

"the first anniversary... I met X, and then she said we are going to this office which was right next to the peace park or next to the site and we are having a meeting with a lady Y, who was quite a high profile ... in Bali, I met Y that night, we ended up doing well we shot a TV story and we ran that story as a

⁷⁴⁶ Tumarkin, M. 2005: 62-63.

⁷⁴⁷ Information gathered from data collection.

⁷⁴⁸ Information gathered from interviews.

*bit of an exclusive and it was a really gut wrenching story and it was about the dream to secure this land, which was these two women's dream. So you had an Indonesian woman who was very articulate and these two Australian women both lost their sons and they came together and they said we want to do this.*⁷⁴⁹

Many ideas appear to have been thrown around, and similar to the Ground Zero site, exhibitions were held near the Sari Club site engaging the many local widows into workshops, exhibiting photos etc.⁷⁵⁰ Respondents framed how in the early stages the idea was for the project to be a *participatory process*: “by the community for the community to the community” and that government should eventually be made involved to make the process legitimate.⁷⁵¹ Some of the initial ideas in terms of the *social production* of the peace park proposal included calls for Banyan trees

*“The locals ‘cause basically what it is, ‘cause they believed that was still, there were spirits on the site so and the spirits hide in the banyan tree... They’re massive, massive, especially up in Ubud, on the way to Ubud there’s, yeah they’ve got, usually temples are located very close to them and stuff so.*⁷⁵²

However, the actual idea of setting up a charity and foundation for a Peace Park appears to have come to a halt when some of the original people behind the idea in Bali thought it would be “too political”.⁷⁵³ Early on there were concerns among the initiative-takers that the idea of a Peace Park was coming from the ‘outside’, i.e. would be perceived as an Australian idea, and key individuals involved in the early stages tried to engage the local communities with various grassroots driven initiatives, such as t-shirts printed with messages of unity between Bali and Australians.⁷⁵⁴

“No the memorial was built, but it wasn’t built to what it is now. They partly built it and then a year later they finished it off. So what we did was we took

⁷⁴⁹ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁷⁵⁰ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁷⁵¹ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁷⁵² Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁷⁵³ Information gathered from interviews.

⁷⁵⁴ Information gathered from interviews.

down all the t-shirts, I went and got some rope and we found some wooden pegs because a lot of people just stopped at the fence and a lot of Balinese wouldn't go onto the site because it had bad spirits. So basically what we did was, try to engage the community and people to walk onto the site, I hung the rope, hung all the t-shirts on the rope about 5 metres in and so what I did then for the next few days I just watched and observed and I was hanging around there listening to what people were saying and all that stuff... So what happened then, a few days after that I went and got, borrowed a truck and then I pulled guys off the street ... So we got a truck and we started cleaning up the site and then I got them to move the t-shirts right back on the site so you literally had to walk right onto the site. So see how they're like basically, people started walking onto the site. ⁷⁵⁵

These t-shirts went from having messages such as “Fuck terrorism” (reflecting the anger felt at first) to more simple uniting messages, such as “Bali has a soul Australia has a heart”.⁷⁵⁶ It was also a matter of the Australians behind the initiative trying to understand the Balinese system for something like setting up a charity foundation:

*“We were meeting people and we’re getting told one thing and then next minute we’re getting told another thing and all that stuff. And there was one meeting after the other and we were just getting thrown around and I said ok well I need letters of support now from various organisations up here to say that you know that you support me and you support the idea of the peace park. So we started getting all that up and that takes time and a lot of people don’t realise that it’s not like in the west, anything here ...”*⁷⁵⁷

On the origins of the concept of a Peace Park:

“The actual concept for the peace park was, I got was watching how people were identifying with the site, both Balinese and westerners and what I noticed with the Australians was that they were coming on with an actual map of the Sari Club site. And I saw a guy there one day and I was watching him and his girlfriend at the time, so I walked up and I said what are you actually doing.

⁷⁵⁵ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁷⁵⁶ Information gathered from interviews.

⁷⁵⁷ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

He goes I'm trying to locate where my dad died in the club... And I went oh, I just said can I have a look at it and I just looked at it and I thought that's a park, let's rebuild the Sari Club as a park. So where the dance floor was a pond, you know so people can identify that's where the dance floor is, where the bar was or whatever, you know like it was very asymmetrical the actual like the map that he had and if you look at the gardens here it's pretty you know. So yeah and so I put that up on the website and a lot of, I actually had a lot of compliments from people saying wow that's and actually how did you come about that and it's like just observing and watching people. So anyway I was to-ing and fro-ing back to Australia and I was trying to get people onboard in Australia... ”⁷⁵⁸

Although the decision to rebuild a bar on the Paddy's bar site was perceived as 'shocking' by many⁷⁵⁹, the reason for the greater emphasis on the Sari Club site (and why rebuilding a bar would not be acceptable) that has surfaced from the data is that "more Australians were killed on the Sari Club site" creating a stronger identification with the Sari site.⁷⁶⁰

From the data gathered it becomes evident that the original contours and stages of the Bali Peace Park Association Inc. (BPPAI), which was not officially founded until 2008, was very much an '*arena of players*', to use Jasper's terminology, more than one coherent '*player*', given the various objectives and motives of the numerous stakeholders involved. There were some feuds amongst the various key '*players*' involved in the process due to vested interests, egos and self-promotion.⁷⁶¹ While the initiative-takers were working hard to gain credibility, such as approaching influential individuals as patrons for the project, internal infighting was simultaneously taking place between those who were considered 'legitimate' and 'non-legitimate' as part of the project.⁷⁶² An association for building a peace garden on the Sari Club site was

⁷⁵⁸ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁷⁵⁹ Information gathered from data collection.

⁷⁶⁰ Information gathered from interviews.

⁷⁶¹ Information gathered from interviews.

⁷⁶² Thomson, C. 2010. "Bali Peace Park founder quits Perth in disgust"

www.watoday.com.au/national/western-australia/bali-peace-park-founder-quits-perth-in-disgust-20100201-n8ly.html

established in New South Wales (NSW, Australia) before it became entangled in bureaucracy and eventually replaced by the current one set up in Western Australia (WA).⁷⁶³ The above explains why the initiative for a peace park fell apart several times and why the actual BPPAI was not officially founded until 6 years after the bombings.⁷⁶⁴

“... we formed this association in August, we basically had people in positions of power that could be helpful and I also believe that some of the conflicts, some of the emotional conflicts had settled down over the years. In other words I think if this had happened in Norway for instance with that other tragedy on the island, I’m sure the Norwegian government will just make this happen whereas we were dealing with a third world country where there was a lot of passion to do this but there was no money, they were coming out of you know they were only just getting the democratic judicial system in place after the change of government, there were still messages of corruption and bureaucracy and there was a lot of emotion there, I think really the later timing was a time when it could really happen rather than earlier it was very hard early, we didn’t even have universal support from Australia because some of the survivors just really wanted that area to built up again, some of them yeah... [wanted another bar there] Well it was more or less let’s go on as business as usual let’s stick it up the terrorists we are actually going to put another bar there, that is a minority I must admit”⁷⁶⁵

Once the infighting between the stakeholders within the would-be-foundation was resolved, the focus proceeded to securing the funds needed to buy the land of the Sari Club site, whilst also gaining support for the Peace Park project from key influential patrons. This process has involved everything from victims, local expats, local Balinese people, journalists and media, tourism industry, medical industry, architects, academics, police, government etc.⁷⁶⁶ A lot of time was also exhausted on trying to localise the actual landowner, a not very straightforward process in Indonesia where you often have third-party representatives to attain discretion. The initial negotiations

⁷⁶³ Information gathered from data collection.

⁷⁶⁴ Information gathered from interviews.

⁷⁶⁵ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁷⁶⁶ Information gathered from data collection.

with the owner of the land appear to have started in 2005.⁷⁶⁷ The various stakeholders involved, both informally before BPPAI and formally after the establishment of BPPAI, have trialled everything from land swaps to persuading the landowner to give up the land for a reasonable market price without success⁷⁶⁸:

“They had a meeting and then they were asking for like \$20,000, er \$20 million to buy the land and then after that you know they went down to \$10,000, \$10 million, then they went down to \$7 million dollars. So they’re just playing around. Yeah they just playing around it’s as simple as that because they’re not interested yeah”⁷⁶⁹

The respondents framed the progress and backlashes to date in trying to realise a peace park in the following: a failure in getting the message out into the community (as everyone was sceptical); Indonesian people were perceived to think the project would “wither”; the project “looking like a dream”; for the project to be successful one must “embrace all the differences”; however, the main obstacle has been the issue of the land.

“Yeah that’s, that is the problem you know in our democracy, here in Indonesia now especially after the reformation. It’s not easy to force other people do what we want to do, that is the problem, even the government. We don’t have the right to force people, to give up their land.”⁷⁷⁰

Respondents framing the BPPAI process to date: “meant to be as everytime we get to a breaking point we have had a breakthrough”; about “never giving up”; about “being tested”; “it’s got a bigger purpose”; “it’s a perfect example of terror uniting people”; “we all felt different things at different times yet we are all like family now”; “the Australian spirit or human nature is to push forward and reunite, reconnect and help motivate each other”.⁷⁷¹

The above demonstrates the *resilience* of the affected communities, and how there appears to have been a lot of ‘bonding social capital’ around the actual materialisation

⁷⁶⁷ Information gathered from interviews.

⁷⁶⁸ Information gathered from interviews.

⁷⁶⁹ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁷⁷⁰ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁷⁷¹ Information gathered from interviews.

of the association, while initially perhaps lacking the ‘bridging social capital’. The ‘bonding social capital’ element could be interpreted as a necessary process for the formation of the actual association – *bonding over a cause for initiating change* – which, however, consequently appears to have attempted to pursue ‘bridging social capital’ once actually formally established as an entity.

Some of the respondents, when discussing the likelihood of the park being realised, framed the success in terms of ‘political will’. That, in the end, it would all be down to ‘political will’⁷⁷²:

“It is, it’s the lack of political will... It’s a lack of competency also you see. If there is a competency then it’s going to be, it’s going to be politically driven right.”⁷⁷³

“I think now what is left is only political will. Yeah total political will and the community understanding about what is the idea of this peace park, which has already been, which already subsides with time. Yeah the first 5 years until 7 years they are still, they are still full of energy. The community said oh yeah if we can do that that would be good yeah... I would say that it’ll come with time and also not, and also the access, the, the, how do you call it, it is not about the commemoration only but it also about the environment, it’s also about the livelihood you know what I mean yeah. That is what I have in mind and this is what I said to the community. But then it’s all subsided, just with time everybody is have their own things to do yeah, while the Australian of course I understand the way you think about the death about this, about it’s a completely different in the Balinese.”⁷⁷⁴

Although the original BPPAI was established in 2008, it mainly consisted of an Australian-backed initiative; however, in 2012, the foundation methodically pursued the local community to gain their support for a Bali Peace Park.⁷⁷⁵ A feasibility plan,

⁷⁷² Information gathered from interviews.

⁷⁷³ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁷⁷⁴ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁷⁷⁵ Information gathered from interviews.

which included the various stakeholders, was conducted to investigate how the park initiative could sustain the local community.⁷⁷⁶

“Yeah we opened an exhibition to everybody who wants to put their ideas into what should we do in that piece of paper you know... Oh yeah it was a discussion and it’s an open discussion, stakeholder discussion but of course you know our government have their own different path.”⁷⁷⁷

Constitutive localization – the difficulties of capitalising on ‘peace’ while reimagining the concept

Using Laclau and Mouffe’s approach where discourse entails *antagonism*, (whereby antagonism refers to a conflict in terms of the meaning-making practice on a linguistic level)⁷⁷⁸, from the data it became evident that Bali’s inherent feature of ‘peace’ has become a key theme for the response to the site. However, even though Bali is often identified as a “safe, peaceful and harmonious”⁷⁷⁹ place with a mantra of “Bali harmony/Bali paradise”⁷⁸⁰, capitalising on these inherent features in the response to the site has not been a straightforward process. Whilst the idea of a ‘Peace Park’ in midst one of Bali’s most popular tourist areas may appear like a forthright idea given that Bali is inherently “welcoming, peaceful and friendly”⁷⁸¹, the diversity of the *players* involved in the response to the site has made the process more convoluted.

The data analysis suggests that the actual idea of a ‘Peace Park’ on the Sari Club site was first conceived by external actors (what was to become the BPPAI) and has therefore not necessarily engaged local actors in the initial stages of the proposal. In fact, the data demonstrated that the original idea of the ‘Peace Park’ has been altered many times in order to *engage the local actors*.⁷⁸² In this sense, when exploring the

⁷⁷⁶ Information gathered from interviews.

⁷⁷⁷ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁷⁷⁸ Bergström & Boréus, 2005: 319.

⁷⁷⁹ Lewis et al. 2013: 21.

⁷⁸⁰ Lewis & Lewis, 2009: 185.

⁷⁸¹ Ibid.

⁷⁸² One example is how the wording of the ‘Peace Park’ idea has changed on the BPPAI website during the course of conducting research for this dissertation. Data gathered from the interviews also point to how the plans have changed in order for the proposal to be perceived as legitimate amongst the local actors.

localization of the idea, the ‘Peace Park’ mission could be interpreted as an outcome of a localization process that was initiated as one of norm entrepreneurship from “*outsider proponents*” (the Australian victims) *committed to a transnational or universal moral agenda*, but which has since transformed into a process now also being driven by the local actors (such as the Mayor of Bali) based on their localized normative order. However, even though the idea of a Peace Park is now more widely accepted among the various ‘players’, one of the biggest hurdles has been the dispute with the actual landowner.

In this sense, the constitutive localization process of the proposed Peace Park idea has been one of “framing” and “grafting”, to use Acharya’s terminology, to gain congruence between the idea of a Peace Park that dynamically capitalises on the existing framework of ‘peace’ while also satisfying the needs not only of the many overseas victims and their families but also the needs of the local community. As Acharya noted,

both framing and grafting are largely acts of reinterpretation or representation rather than reconstruction. Neither is necessarily a local act; outsiders usually perform them. Moreover, framing and grafting are undertaken with a view to produce change at the “receiving end” without altering the persuader’s beliefs.⁷⁸³

When exploring how the BPPAI ‘frames’ the idea of the ‘Peace Park’, the current ‘shared understanding’ of the proposed ‘Peace Park’ on the website reads:

Overview

Founded in Perth in 2008 and registered as a charity, the Association has supporters in Indonesia, Great Britain, New Zealand, Japan, the United States and Australia, united in their commitment to make a difference and to give lasting peace to victims of terrorism worldwide and their families and friends.

An independent study by Bali’s Udayana University shows the planned park and museum will be self-sustaining and create numerous jobs, while serving as an icon for world peace, attracting tens of thousands of visitors each year.

A suggested park concept has been completed by renowned Bali landscape artists Wijaya Tribwana International but the final design will be conceived and approved by the community of Bali. It will include a green space of tranquillity in the middle of one of the world’s most popular tourist centres, providing value far beyond the initial investment of time and funds.

⁷⁸³ Acharya, A. 2010: 13.

The Association is liaising with the Bupati of the Badung Regency, the Camat of Kuta, senior Indonesian political figures and numerous Bali community groups.

The Australian Commonwealth and all Australian State and Territory governments have also pledged financial support, once the land tenure has been negotiated.

The Peace Park Association works closely with registered Indonesian charity Yayasan Isana Dewata. This Bali-based organisation supports more than 50 local widows and their families who were devastated by the 2002 and 2005 bombings.

Please help us achieve our goal please by clicking on the Donate or Become a Friend of the Bali Peace Park buttons now.

This ‘framing’ finds its basis and legitimacy in the *many victims of the attacks* – note not only Australian victims but also highlights supporters in Indonesia, Great Britain, New Zealand, the United States – and in providing, not only *those affected* by the Bali bombings but victims *worldwide*, ‘lasting peace’, therefore framing ‘peace’ as something universal – the peace park as an “icon for world peace”. The framing of the park is also *action-oriented* (in terms of its performativity) in the sense of its “commitment to make a difference”. Conclusively, as noted by Acharya in terms of ‘constitutive localization’ of the peace park idea, “[t]he outcome is shaped by the ideas and initiative of local actors”.⁷⁸⁴

Arenas of discourse: The Sari club site – “an open wound” in memory

While the local Balinese community appears to have attained some kind of ‘closure’ following the official cleansing ritual, whereby the actual site of the Sari club was no longer the place where ‘to find meaning’, the Australian victims on the other hand have been unwavering in their position that the only way to truly honour the memory of the vicims is by developing the site into *something meaningful*. This search for meaning harboured in the sites – or ‘social construction’ (of space) – eventually materialised in the non-profit organisation The Bali Peace Park Association Inc (BPPAI).⁷⁸⁵

Tumarkin explains that this need to be close to the sites has to do with our attachment revolving around the human body:

In most cultures, rituals of mourning and commemoration revolve around the body, which is identified, cleansed, honoured, visited for years or lifetimes to come. The absense of the body

⁷⁸⁴ Acharya, A. 2010: 4.

⁷⁸⁵ “Bali Peace Park Association Inc”, www.balipeacepark.com.au

creates a profound crisis for mourners. For one, it makes it difficult to let go of the possibility that the person presumed dead is wandering somewhere, having miraculously walked out from the inferno at last moment, or having missed his flight, or (the mind never tires of thinking up the possibilities) maybe having succumbed to a temporary amnesia as a result of the shock. Psychologists call it ‘searching behaviour’, the determination to keep looking, which at times can last years.⁷⁸⁶

This attachment with the body applies to both the West and Hindu Balinese⁷⁸⁷:

The need to be close to the site of your loved one’s death in the absence of their body could explain the attachment many Australians felt toward the blast sites at Kuta. In the aftermath of the bombings, families of many local and overseas victims had to come face to face with the catastrophe of having no human remains to bury. Others had to be content with receiving belatedly, sometimes months later, fragments of the body of their loved ones. To the Hindu Balinese, funeral rituals and the eventual cremation are of paramount importance...

[i]t is very difficult, both spiritually and psychologically, for the Hindu people to accept no body. I don’t think ... there has been another tragedy in Bali’s recent history where there have been no bodies left to attend. The absence of the bodies often leaves a vacuum, which families try desperately to fill.⁷⁸⁸

The site becomes key “because it is the last place the deceased was alive on this earth”.⁷⁸⁹ Another victim’s family, an Australian father who had never been overseas, however when his son died in the bombings felt that “[g]oing to Bali was the only way of properly saying goodbye to Josh. It was the least and the most he could do for his own dignity and his son’s and for the peace of their grieving family”⁷⁹⁰.

In the absence of bodies, sites of death could become substitutes for graves, the centrepieces of the rituals families and loved ones need to carry out to honour their dead. After all, where else could we possibly go to grieve? At churches, temples, synagogues, mosques we speak with our gods, not with those we have lost. At memorial services we get close to other mourners, but not really to those we ache and mourn for. At places of daily life we have once shared, we meet the reality of a life cut short, not the finality of death. So we end up going to places, where they, who are not coming back, have died, to their final destination. ‘Death,’ wrote Czech author Milan Kundera, ‘has two faces. One is nonbeing: the other is the terrifying material being that

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁹ Santino, J. 2011: 99.

⁷⁹⁰ Tumarkin, 2005: 76.

is the corpse.' In the absence of 'the terrifying material being', a site of trauma can become a face of death that many mourners will need to see to endure the agony and paralysis of loss.⁷⁹¹

In the case of Flight 93, where victim's families were in a similar case of that in Bali, the victim's families expressed a special connection to the site of the crash – and felt the need "to be close to the final resting place of the people they loved and lost", whereby Shanksville became "the right place to grieve".⁷⁹² Similarly, the data collected for Bali has largely supported the above observation.

One of the respondents noted how his wife, following the death of a family member in the Bali attacks, "had not been able to visit the site as it currently stands".⁷⁹³ He himself would come back to the Sari Club site every year around the anniversary of the bombings to be at the place where his loved one was lost. He did believe his wife would possibly one day visit, once the Peace Park was finally realised, highlighting the lack of 'closure' experienced by the victims. Similarly, another victim stated that – 12 years after the attacks – he could "still sense his loved ones presence at the site", while feeling guilt over the fact that he had been spared from the attacks.⁷⁹⁴

This special connection to the site is nothing unique for the Sari Club site – as mentioned, similar stories have been identified in relation to Shanksville, New York, the Pentagon and Moscow where victims' bodies were "ripped to shreds, made impossible to identify or simply pulverised into dust".⁷⁹⁵ Tumarkin exhibits stories by people who visited the site and one of those belongs to Gloria Goodwin who went to visit the site of the Sari Club to pray at 6am in the morning a few days after the blasts:

... everything was completely coated in dust like talcum powder, grey dust ... and I knelt down at the site and after I had prayed because I am Hindu I gave an offering ... I put my hands down to get myself up and I had all of it on my hands – all this grey dust, 'Oh my God, it's people ... That dust is people.'

Then it started to rain. Rain made little trickles in the dust. And soon the trickles were making their way to the gutter and one by one they flowed along a slope, towards the Kuta beach. It's a Hindu Balinese tradition for ashes to be taken to sea after cremation, so it made Gloria feel like God was taking the souls of the dead to sea, where they belonged. She felt that she was

⁷⁹¹ Ibid.

⁷⁹² Ibid., p. 76.

⁷⁹³ Interviewee – Victim (Australia).

⁷⁹⁴ Interviewee – Victim (Australia).

⁷⁹⁵ Tumarkin, 2005: 73.

witnessing a very special moment. The thought of human remains staying in the ground of the bomb sites, she said, was very hard to take. ‘I didn’t like the thought of them just staying there, nobody being able to take them home or nobody being able to complete the ceremony for them to go on to God.’⁷⁹⁶

Therefore for the locals, it has been more a matter of ‘cleansing’ the site to remove the entrapped ‘bad spirits’

“that’s why I think Balinese people after the bombing they have meeting, especially the local, the ground zero where the bombing happened, they have meeting, the leaders of that village meeting. How to clean that place so will we make it, back to normal I mean because for Balinese is very bad you know. We believe the spirit who died on the bombing still there and need help”⁷⁹⁷

In this sense, there has been a clash in the response to the Bali bombings in terms of cultural approaches to the role acknowledged to *sudden death, mourning and public memory*. Reflecting over the Western responses in comparison with the Balinese, Tumarkin makes a couple of key observations:

Bali sheds light on the values of the Western cultures, on their attitudes to human suffering and to places marred by blood. In Bali there are powerful, clearly articulated rituals to deal with public places of traumatic death. These places are commonly understood to be contaminated by evil. Souls of the deceased are trapped in them, unable to move on to God. Through prayer, offerings and purification rituals, people work to cleanse such places of evil and to release the souls of the dead. Once the work of purification is complete, the sites are no longer considered contaminated and can acquire a new purpose, a new lease of life.⁷⁹⁸

At the same time, in the largely secularised societies of Europe, America and Australia, people have come increasingly to regard sites marked by loss and death as critically important, both spiritually and culturally. Yet beyond commonplaces and slogans, it seems to me that we are still struggling to articulate the nature and the roots of the significance of traumascapes. In America, Australia and Europe there is now a spontaneous process taking place, whereby rituals and styles of behaviour towards physical sites of trauma are being gradually chiselled out and polished. Common idioms such as spontaneous shrines are becoming more and more clearly defined. In a sense, though, our stage of development is very different from that of the people of Bali. We are only starting out. Yet I believe that the light Bali sheds on Western attitudes to traumascapes, and on the often unarticulated values that underpin these attitudes, is, as Ryszard Kapuscinski would say, the most penetrating and the best. This light illuminates a need, which seems to me more and more urgent, for a much deeper understanding of the

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁷ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 70.

cultural and spiritual work performed by traumascapes. When I say deeper, I don't mean more convoluted. The question is really basic. It is not about what traumascapes stand for symbolically or otherwise, but about what it is that we want or need from these places.⁷⁹⁹

In utilising Tumarkin's notion of, "what is it that we need from these places", it appears clear that 'closure' is one important dimension. Until the Sari Club site, which currently (in terms of Low's terminology of *social production*) acts as a makeshift carpark, in fact harbors *something meaningful*, the Australian victims are highly unlikely to ever find 'closure'.

In this sense, the discourse can be related back to Stow's discussion on the concept of *álaston pénthos* of the Ancient Greek, "the dangers of [private] unchecked grief to democratic politics", and how it "would spill over into the public sphere where it could no longer be contained".⁸⁰⁰ This was based on their view "that uncontained emotional responses to loss could all too easily become *álaston pénthos*: mourning without end."⁸⁰¹ As one advocate of the Bali Peace Park expressed it:

*The bombing in Bali was a terrible injustice and I believe a peace park can go a long way in rectifying that injustice.*⁸⁰²

Therefore it appears clear that a Peace Park would provide 'closure'; whether that comprises addressing personal requests for honoring the memory of the death of their loved ones, rectifying injustices and/or ultimately providing for a respectful manner in which to approach the public memory and meaning of the site in general. A key part of the discourse and meaning-making practice around the sites therefore becomes, as noted by Tumarkin, what is it that we – collectively – need from the site? In framing what a peace park would mean, below is a list of themes based on how it was articulated amongst the respondents.

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁰ Stow, 2012: 688.

⁸⁰¹ Ibid.

⁸⁰² "The Bali Peace Park Association", <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au>

Social production of the Sari Club site

Agency

Some of the respondents spoke about their attempts to get the local community and visitors to engage with the site. Once the site was cleaned from all the rubble following the terror attack, most people who visited the site would stop at the fence. One example of agency to get people to engage with the site was hanging up t-shirts with messages on the site, which made people actually physically enter the site

“No they’d just walked onto the site to read the t-shirts. ‘Cause that’s what it was, it was getting people engaging onto the site because everyone stopped at the fence. There was a little gap, yeah look at the t-shirts and walk off. I wanted people to actually go on there and actually you know.”⁸⁰³

Other elements of agency included throwing t-shirts with the Peace Park message at nightclubs to get people involved, or as a stakeholder put it, “throw them out and as I said empowering the crowd”.⁸⁰⁴ This clearly demonstrates a need for engaging people with the site, perhaps foremost in order to create awareness and performative acts for social change.

This relates back to Nonaka and Konno’s concept of ‘ba’ (discussed in the literature review), whereby the site of the Sari Club can basically be interpreted to act as a ‘foundation of knowledge creation’, including, as noted above, as ‘empowerment’. The site is assigned a multitude of meanings, of which ‘respect’ appears to be an overriding theme. In this sense, the element of ‘respect’ has played a role both as an impediment for the site to be turned into commercial property while also constraining its empowering capabilities as people respect it enough to not enter the site. This is where the agency of the stakeholders has become key, in their attempts to transform the site into something that will truly ‘empower’ those who enter it.

In this context it becomes important to note that respondents spoke about the ability of the Sari Club site to evoke ‘emotions’ and act as ‘education’

“The emotion, the part of the emotion visit the sign it again, the memory of it. This is important signing for, for not Balinese people more of them is the

⁸⁰³ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁸⁰⁴ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

whole of the world people because I think the universal [36.48] who didn't want peace, who didn't want to love something like that. I think this is beneficial value you must be protect from the bomb tragedy, something like that. The beyond, the beyond is education, to educate the people how it is important after the bomb... „⁸⁰⁵

Agency by the affected stakeholders has played a big part in the response to the site. In 2007-2008 there were in fact attempts by the actual owner to build on the land

"They started to build and then I called everybody because you know I said what's going on and they said oooh, what, what, what, and all the leaders of all the banjars you know they went there and they stop it and then they said to the government look you know we've got to stop it. So actually there was a community driven stating that, I called the government I said look, look you know we don't know what happened yet but there's no way that you can build this. Then the government clicked and said ok no permit can be given to anybody yeah. „⁸⁰⁶

The role of Education

Other 'needs' pertaining from the site, is the role of education, as noted by respondents in the below

"You know, you know this is about, sometimes this is most about the, ideal. So the education is the dominant, is very vital. So we have to start from the very beginning to our kids to tell them about the tolerance, about the peace, about the democracy, about the justice. Not greedy, not keeping anger and hatred in our heart and minds. That is what we have to start from the school, from the small kids, then they will love each other. That is the real counter-terrorism. „⁸⁰⁷

"Yes because to make sure people knowing what the effect from the bombing. So people knowing how to care about their, about their area like that and then

⁸⁰⁵ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁰⁶ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁰⁷ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

*they, they can, they knowing about how to care one and each other like that.*⁸⁰⁸

National vs local meanings

Whereas the official memorial has been created, much similar to the Ground Zero site in NY, as “a memorial space for an imagined national and local community of visitors”⁸⁰⁹, it is less about ‘remembering’ than ‘forgetting’. In fact, as noted by Young, some memorials are created to *attract tourists*, which appears to be the identified main purpose for the Bali memorial. Revisiting his concept about constructive memory and memorials, “where memory disables life, I think that is a failure … in memory. But if a memory process nourishes life and enables life then we have success”.⁸¹⁰ Clearly the official Bali memorial in Kuta has been identified to be insufficient in terms of respectfully preserving the memory of the many victims, disrupting lives still today.

- The memorial

On whether the current social production of a memorial is enough the respondents had conflicting views, some stating that Indonesian people are not as “sensitive with monument” as Westerners and that it might in fact instigate further attacks⁸¹¹:

*“I think the memorial is enough ok. I think the memorial is enough yeah. Bali has their own culture ok.”*⁸¹²

*“Some Balinese think because their names are on the wall the spirits are still there.”*⁸¹³

“For them it is even better if there is no memory. It is different for me, there is something bad happening so why should we always remember you see and that’s, however because we have that monument, we have a new icon on that area you see, and also because we have that monument and there is new

⁸⁰⁸ Interviewee – victim (Bali).

⁸⁰⁹ Low, 2004: 327.

⁸¹⁰ “Tilbake till Utøya”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqOPew5ZJKA>

⁸¹¹ Data gathered from interviews.

⁸¹² Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸¹³ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

*attraction that let the people come because of it. I feel very sorry to all my friends that's from Australia, very unfortunate that it's happen like that and so for me personally, literally that kind of monument is enough like that.*⁸¹⁴

*"When I been approached by the Foundation if I can help it's really an easy one you know because I think if we have a corner, even a small one, a family of the victims could do I don't know just short meditation or something like that we should appreciate to the person who own the land. But if we would like to have something oh I said that the big monument or something that always to remember, I'm not sure whether it's good for the family here in Bali.*⁸¹⁵

For others the monument with the names of the victims appeared sufficient

*"Are the heroes of peace, all of them, all of them. So the message is you did not, you know, you tried to make Bali disharmonious, disharmony right, so it didn't work man... It can be a message of a peaceful to all over the world. So it is for us to respect that they are the heroes of the peace too. Could be a lot of things and not only one... the memorial built is for you know for us to remember that somethings, something bad happened there and we all of the, all of us committed that it won't happen again you know.*⁸¹⁶

In terms of what the memorial has to offer visitors one respondent stressed its emotional dimension:

*"Every time I visit the memorial, every time it touch my heart and every time it not only touch my heart to give a simple no, no. Maybe people with [40.11] tears ok, because of sympathy with what happened. But it's different for me when I tell it touch my heart, it touch my heart not because of, not only the sympathy but it give me a burden in my [40.31] you know."*⁸¹⁷

Although the national and local meanings towards the Sari site converge in terms of the fact that their main concern has been resuming the tourism industry, there is still

⁸¹⁴ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸¹⁵ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸¹⁶ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸¹⁷ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

inconsistency in their outlooks on ‘forgetting’. The local response has very much been characterised by introspection, and an important part of this ‘finding peace from within by forgiveness’ is that forgiving in itself does not mean forgetting. The respondents speaking of forgiving also highlighted the need for remembrance; the reason for remembering is to remind people “that all violence is useless”.⁸¹⁸

The importance of downplaying political messages and finding common ground

Many respondents spoke about the need to keep the peace park apolitical.

*“Everyone’s talking about it. And I also said in an email about, harking back to the flags, I actually wrote to them and told them about the flags, not to put the flags on there. I said the reason that you don’t see the flags, you don’t see the flags, they’re only there at the anniversary, they’re only ever hung at the anniversary.”*⁸¹⁹

Respondents also spoke about not having the flags on the Peace Park website to keep the project apolitical. However, in this context it is worthwhile highlighting the perils of an apolitical approach, as discussed by Stow and Sturken, whereby a “comfort culture” may replace critical thinking. Similar to the 9/11 Ground Zero response, where “any kind of historical or political context were suppressed by public manifestations of grief”, the same kind of approach appears to have characterised the Sari Club site response.

Respondents stressed the role of language, framing that the park is called a ‘peace park’ because it provides counter-terrorism

*“Yeah, yeah. So that’s why the title of that idea is the Peace Park. We are talking about peace, we are not talking about the terrorism whatever, we are talking about peace ...”*⁸²⁰

The Peace Park was also framed to be ‘a peace park for everybody’, not just the victims:

⁸¹⁸ Information gathered from data collection.

⁸¹⁹ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁸²⁰ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

“For everybody that would be good. We declare already, we ourself declare and we wish that Bali is a centre of peace and democracy, of the world...”

All brothers and sisters, we are talking the co-operation among humanity, our civilisation. A few months ago we had what we call the UNAOC here, United Nation Association of Civilisation, here in Bali. We are talking about civilisation, all human beings I think want the peace..

And harmony. So that’s why what yesterday we did, every year, everybody come pray for peace and harmony. That’s our wish.”⁸²¹

The feasibility plan that was carried out with various stakeholders framed the park as something for both the international community as well as the Balinese.⁸²² This was one of the tasks for the designer as well as the stakeholders evaluating the social and economic impact of the park. According to the feasibility plan, the social benefits for the locals would be “to make a more strong Balinese people”, and to highlight solidarity, which ties in to the local resilience and social capital element.

Engaging the local community is also very much interlinked with the tourism industry. The Peace Park was to include ‘reflection corners’ as a symbol of interfaith and unison⁸²³

“Because they actually said [1.03.02], the Balinese didn’t want any religious paraphernalia you know what I mean, all they wanted was a temple and they wanted it discretely on the site you know what I mean. X [1.03.16] actually got the design wrong, the design is actually wrong, the temple’s in the wrong position on the site and also there’s five main religions in the world not four, but they can’t have Judaism here, Jewish people aren’t allowed here... And, Israeli I should say, Israeli’s aren’t allowed here so but yeah so they became reflection corners... ”⁸²⁴

Others framed the purpose of the park in terms of ‘taking control’ and ‘empowerment’:

⁸²¹ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali.)

⁸²² Information gathered from data collection.

⁸²³ Data gathered from interviews.

⁸²⁴ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

“It, it’s empowering the community and it’s basically taking control of a situation that no one had control of. Do you know what I mean, like no one had control over what happened that night you know. Whereas with a peace park and the communities coming together and building it you know, it’s taking control of a situation, it’s not letting go of it you know it’s, it’s the empowerment of communities. And that was a hard thing trying to, ‘cause I’m having the Australians in one ear and I’ve got the Balinese here and I could see sometimes, I could see their point of view and I could see their point of view but at the end of the day it’s their land, what they choose to do with it, whether they build a nightclub or not it’s up to them. It’s not Australia telling them, and that’s what’s happening now, Australia’s telling them what to do with the land you know...”⁸²⁵

In terms of who the peace park was for, it was often framed as ‘universal’: “[i]t’s for the world it’s a peace park”.⁸²⁶ Some respondents also noted that perhaps it was inevitable for Australians to view the park as a memorial as that is our way of approaching death

“I think it’s our way, I think it’s a western way of looking at death and how we approach death whereas the Balinese celebrate it. Although it’s something tragic they celebrate it ...”⁸²⁷

Whereas the respondents framed that the Balinese would use the garden if it included ‘a temple’, where they could pray and give offerings at shrines.

The Bali Peace Park – “A landmark for peace”

An overriding theme in terms of the meaning-making practice of the peace park has been that of ‘not forgetting what happened’. As one of the respondents noted, “if they had built another bar there then in 20 years time no one would have known what had happened there”.⁸²⁸ The respondents also noted that a ‘peace garden’ was more respectful for the victims than rebuilding a bar or restaurant. For many of the

⁸²⁵ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁸²⁶ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁸²⁷ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁸²⁸ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

respondents the Peace Park embodied a place for reflection and a green space in midst of Bali. These expressions relate back to Tumarkin's notion of what is it that we need from the site, where respondents spoke about Kuta needing a green space in "a sea of concrete" that would represent a place of 'solace' and 'quiet'.⁸²⁹ Yet others spoke about the garden being 'a green public space',

*"somewhere where people can have a nice place to sit, think about the people they love, you know, how close they came to losing somebody and it doesn't have to be just about Bali, it can be any country in the world, a car accident just anything, it's just a place where people can go and be at peace."*⁸³⁰

For others the 'peace park' symbolised the *local resistance* and *collective action* that often emanates right in the aftermath of a terror attack

"... so for me the peace park after Bali there was so much hatred and hurt that came out of people, especially in my generation people got so angry and they didn't know who to blame so they just blamed everyone, everyone who was different and when X took part in projects like a documentary where they interviewed different people of different faiths, you know they interviewed Hagi bun bun and other people, a Muslim leader in Bali, and that was one point that changed X's perspective at that time and I remember that, and so for me the peace park was something to remember all the good that that brought out in people as well even though it brought out a lot of hurt and hatred it also brought out a lot of compassion and you turned to the person next to you give them a hug even if you didn't know them it really opened people up and it made you go and tell our loved that you loved them, our generation didn't have any of that, we didn't have any wars or anything so to have an event that really brought people together and challenged what you believed in and then to overcome the negatives and joined together with people who are different to us and strange to us to create something really special, that is what the peace park is to me, it's to basically show people who are trying to keep us all separate that no matter what happens each generation will have something

⁸²⁹ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁸³⁰ Interviewee – victim (Australia).

that brings us together and it will bring us together we won't be torn apart, that is what the peace park means to me. ^{”831}

“It is definitely making a statement that life is going on and here is somewhere where people can walk in there and be, live, breath, remember, be safe actually enjoy our beautiful place but it is definitely more than just life going on, it's actually as life progresses this is... Something good and something that is actually being created, it's actually a big step it's like a landing in a stairway up to heaven, it's a like a big landing where you say right this happened here but we are beyond that, everyone, we really are beyond that. ^{”832}

“Yeah so that's the culture, so that's why, that's what we want here from Bali. Even Bali a small island but everybody love one. That's the capital of us, so we can speak about peace, we can speak about tolerance, we can speak about democracy, we can speak about justice, that's what we want... Dialogue yeah, because dialogue makes us understand each other... Dialogue is very important, communication is very important. ^{”833}

The discourse also manifested the *antagonism* between a project that is *self-sustained* versus *commercial*

“With all this profit going, so many people are paying so much donation. I said we don't talk about that, I said you know. Yeah but we need the, no I said if you are talking about how much money you need to build the peace park that is a completely different thing, it's a proposal. But if you already said that how much money want to build something and how much money you are going to get for all this thing, where are you going, well that is a business, that's a total you know business way of operating I said you know, and I do not want to have anything to do with it ... Because business is always profit and lose and lost and also sometimes you know when the business doesn't run well it collapse ... We are not talking about peace park collapsing. ^{”834}

⁸³¹ Interviewee – victim (Australia).

⁸³² Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁸³³ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸³⁴ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

- Framing ‘Peace’: Finding peace from within, from the outside

“So that is the root of all violence, all misery in this world, all war because some people, some group, some nations lost faith. They want to monopoly the truth and also the resources. That’s the rule. So as long as we understand that and we have to stay out with all those greedy and anger and hatred the peace will come... So it must be started from our own selves.”⁸³⁵

As part of the framing of the ‘peace park’, respondents spoke about how the park would also symbolise *no judgement*: “Well I think the word peace is the key to it. It’s peace you know. It’s a, you can walk in there and there’s no judgement of who you are I guess you know in some ways”.⁸³⁶

Democracy and economic development

Some other themes that emerged as part of the data analysis were ‘democracy’ and ‘economic development’. In this sense, peace is also framed in the context of ‘democracy’ – in Bali the two terms appear intricately linked. The emphasis on ‘democracy’ is also one of the reasons for why the local government cannot confiscate the land and simply provide it for the peace park – they want the land acquisition process to be viewed as legitimate, according to democratic principles. As noted by Governor Pastika on the Bali Peace Park

“Yeah that’s, that is the problem you know in our democracy, here in Indonesia now especially after the reformation. It’s not easy to force other people do what we want to do, that is the problem, even the government. We don’t have the right to force people, to give up their land.”⁸³⁷

‘Peace’ can only be achieved through ‘democracy’, or as one respondent put it, “democracy is the road of peace”.⁸³⁸ Pastika goes on to reaffirm that a Peace Park would be good for all parties

“For everybody that would be good. We declare already, we ourself declare and we wish that Bali is a center of peace and democracy of the world.”⁸³⁹

⁸³⁵ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸³⁶ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸³⁷ Information gathered from interviews.

⁸³⁸ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

Therefore for the local or national government to intervene in the process would in essence comprise over-riding the principles of democracy and therefore ‘peace’. The above extract also reflects how the local politician frames the global identity of Bali – as “a center of peace and democracy of the world”.

The framing of ‘peace’ also entails an economic aspect to it, whereby peace to Bali equals the tourism business blossoming. In this sense, the Bali bombings did not only affect the Balinese, but also the economy of Indonesia at large, as many people from West of Java, all east of Bali, Lombok etc. were working in Bali, sending money back to their families.⁸⁴⁰ One respondent spoke about how the bombings impacted thinking about the Bali economy, where it had jumped from an economy based on agriculture straight to a services economy, circumventing the industrialised economy, and how a reorientation was necessary to be better equipped for a disruption in the future.

Communication

In terms of the communicative aspects of the park, and the kind of message a park could convey, respondents spoke about ‘unison’. Here the social production, as well as social construction, of the park should entail ‘symbols’ that *unite* (particularly from a religious point of view)

“All this religion I know they respect symbol, symbol. So if the symbol will be good they respect it, if they break the symbol they can fight each other. Even for the same religion they fight ... But one way like that way, so because sometime people respect with the symbol, symbol of [32.39] as long as that symbol is right symbol, the good symbol and then very communicative to the people so that is, that’s what, we can, teach of people understand it of that.”⁸⁴¹

“I think it sends a pretty strong message to terrorists because you’re, you’re, you might have knocked us down but look what we’ve achieved in that way as well you know, we’ve achieved something you know.”⁸⁴²

⁸³⁹ Information gathered from interviews.

⁸⁴⁰ Information gathered from data collection.

⁸⁴¹ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁴² Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

There were also some functional aspects for the argument of having a park, such as for a park “to keep the good circulation of the wind.”⁸⁴³ Others thought it would be good with a place for ‘relaxing’, to escape the busyness of the area. In terms of the **social production** of the proposed park, many respondents suggested for the garden to entail a *temple* (other suggestions included a *pond*)

*“If they make like a little temple there maybe Balinese make a ceremony for every year of we have like the special day they make a ceremony like a Galungan...Because Bali culture they believe the old long long time ago dead people so they still like a spirit when they have a problem they can pray to the ancestors. In hindu we call La lahu.”*⁸⁴⁴

Another important theme is *honoring the memory of the victims*, whereby building another bar (where people would be dancing, drinking etc) or leaving it as it is (a makeshift carpark) would be perceived as disrespectful. There is a clear *need* to showcase *respect*, and the respondents spoke about *respect superseding all else*

*“... and seeing the site the way it was just didn’t feel right I suppose you can put it like any race of people getting slaughtered on an area of ground I don’t think you should build on it in that sense. So I wasn’t happy with so many lives lost in that area and then just having a night club being built a lot of people dancing, spilling alcohol on where people have died, it just wasn’t the right thing to do, so initially that was my heart talking I suppose going from there and then it progressed I suppose of being a place that people can go to, doesn’t matter who you are, where you’re from, what religion you are, or what incident you came from, it doesn’t matter, it is a place that Bali doesn’t have and a lot of places don’t have and we want to work together to provide that for the area I suppose for Bali itself and being that it is virtually in Australia’s back yard I can see a lot of people getting benefit from that.”*⁸⁴⁵

“I mean it is just very clear as far as I’m concerned. If that place is not done, I mean the government couldn’t even do anything to that place, then just plant a tree. I mean 12 years the tree must have grown, yeah the tree would be as

⁸⁴³ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁴⁴ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁴⁵ Interviewee – victim (Australia).

big as that, just as nice. Just a tree, just a token of peace, you know what I mean. But then now it's dirty, it's a parking space, you know, there is a total lack of, lack of respect... That is what I think. It's a total lack of respect. I mean I'm talking, now I'm not talking that we have differences in beliefs and everything here I'm just talking about respect and respect would then supersede as yeah, supersede all this you know beliefs and everything... Because I think respect is global, respect is universal, for me yeah. And the only thing that I would say to everybody, to even X, to even Y, Australians, Indonesians whoever it is, there is a lack of respect. I mean overall yeah. I would forget about this idea about this, this idea about that. Well we do have different belief, we do have different habits, characteristics and everything but one thing is universal for me is respect and this is lacking of respect. ⁸⁴⁶

"... it has a wider range of affect on the community it is not just the people that were there, obviously for them it is very important but it is in an area where it is one of the busiest intersections in Legian, busy intersections in Bali and there is no green space and it shouldn't be the sort of place forpeople coming from Christian background, for me you don't go and built over the top of the site where so many people died especially in that way they weren't hurting anybody with what they were doing they were just having fun" ⁸⁴⁷

"And after that 2002 I was just thinking you know there was the Marriott Jakarta and then there was another one and there was another one and there's other ones there is no real, its all of those things as well in terms of just Indonesians, there is no parks being built in Jakarta or anything like that, not that it's a criticism of it but that is representative of making a stand against all those atrocities and there is no doubt that the government in Bali understands that and has understood it for several years, that basically that area you can't pour concrete over those lives." ⁸⁴⁸

⁸⁴⁶ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁴⁷ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁸⁴⁸ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

One of the respondents spoke about how in terms of social production the sites were desensitised, to lose the memory of them

“Anyway I was flying back up and I’m riding along past Sari Club site and I’ve gone holy fuck they’re about to start building on this. ‘Cause I knew exactly how they did it with the Paddy site. They desensitised the area by turning it into a car park ... Yeah it was turned into a car park and then slowly over time, people get desensitised round the area, you know what I mean like. They lose the memory of what it is. How many times have you gone past and go what was there before.”⁸⁴⁹

In this sense giving the place a ‘neutral function’, before possibly turning it into something else. Furthermore, in terms of social production, some of the respondents spoke about the importance of keeping it non-political.

A Place of ‘ba’

In terms of why the current memorial is not enough, some of the respondents framed it in the following

“And he need not only just sign it as a memorial or something and then he bring the park emotion maybe to show the, not only Balinese people but all the [8.31] came to Bali to knowing more, more deeply about the tragedy and he want to build park and [8.38] and that’s way the park.”⁸⁵⁰

Cleansing

Some respondents framed the cleansing ceremony as a politically driven process to show the outside of Bali the government was doing something. They assert the cleansing ceremony was not citizen-driven, whereas the peace park has been

“I mean a citizen driven, in fact that we have, I sent you here, of course I scan you. This is a report, a complete report what we’ve done. You know that I’m a member of [04.06], at that time I’m the voice of the people and this is what I did you know. I propose this kind of program to USAID and then we were funded by USAID. This is the [04.17] participatory planning for the

⁸⁴⁹ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁵⁰ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

development of ground zero. So everybody, all the stakeholders, all the you know the pictures, the process of this you know this is two and a half months, it takes two and a half months you know.”

Peace Garden – a place for bringing people together

In framing the motives behind the terrorist attack, themes such as jealousy, frustration, to make people scared (not trust in each other), hatred towards Americans, an attack on the Balinese tolerance, breaking the Bali tourism surfaced.

“Because I think, in my mind yeah, in my mind because Bali is the famous country, the famous island, many people from abroad, the foreign country, they come to Bali, they spend money here, make it Bali improve their life. Improving their life because lots of people bring money to Bali and because of that maybe who the bomb, the suspect bomb who did it the bombing they jealous of Bali see.”⁸⁵¹

“Number one there would, ... think that they would like to tell the world that hate America and its alliance like UK or Australia. Friends. Friends etc. Yeah the NATO.”⁸⁵²

“Yes, yes conflict in Bali. So that’s their ... so they would like to do this bomb Bali and then no more tourist come to Bali right and then Balinese society starting hard to find food, you know and then start conflict with Muslim, they burn, burn the mosque and then the terrorist come and put the Jihad on.”⁸⁵³

Other respondents mentioned how terrorism in Bali is very political.⁸⁵⁴ The respondents framed it as though the terrorists wanted to create disharmony, and that therefore what was needed was to restore the harmony. One respondent also framed it as troublesome to view the aftermath of the tragedy in simply Western terms, and highlighted how we forget that “the Balinese are still a primitive small, little cluster of indigenous people”:

⁸⁵¹ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁵² Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁵³ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁵⁴ Information gathered from interviews.

“The Hindu religion, we are one of the most tolerant people. Ok. And the second tolerast is New York and that’s why I say the bomb, what happened, the tragedy is different here. It’s just the same like because they attacked the two tolerast people, yeah a group of people. New York you can be anybody you go to New York. Yeah I lived in New York for seven years ok, and then here in Bali you can be just anybody you can come here, you don’t receive any resistance, nothing and that’s it. That’s the core of the human tolerant that they impact also yeah. So the Balinese people do not understand all this, this, all this, the life of the Balinese are driven by their, by their [30.11] either it’s traditional chief, chief they’re all their life it’s being driven by their chiefs. Ok so if you can get a good chief then you get a good life.”⁸⁵⁵

Some of the respondents also framed the event as ‘their fault’ for not picking up on suspicious activity in their communities, or ‘banjar’

“For us, for Hindu I think that is my fault … Not the bomb before because we not, we not make sure what do you call, look after the area as good as possible so they make fault but my fault [27.40] why we not look after really detail, we have system, like community system like banjar.”⁸⁵⁶

A lot of the framing of the park also articulates the need for a ‘meeting place’, a space where people can meet other people (of other religions) and in this way build trust in each other. This kind of framing echoes as a direct response to that of the actions of the terrorists, which is to create fear, as discussed in the literature review: “an environment of fear” is often a consequence following terrorism. In this sense, it becomes clear that the Bali bombings have set a mark in the consciousness of both tourists and the local community of Bali. One respondent states, on the matter whether the Bali bombers succeeded in making people scared

“Yes, yes people, 100 percent.”⁸⁵⁷

Even twelve years after the bombings, respondents would speak of an environment of fear and how the security measures around Bali are ramped up around public holidays

⁸⁵⁵ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁵⁶ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁵⁷ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

over Christmas and New Years, when more tourists frequent Bali.⁸⁵⁸ Others expressed that after some of the terrorists were killed, such as Dr Azahari, the situation changed a bit.⁸⁵⁹ Other respondents on the impact of the Bali bombings

“the difference that you feel from when you used to walk around there you cannot return without that in the back of your mind, there is always that presence in the back of your mind of what went on and its changed, it’s actually changed the feel of the place and whether that is me internally but when you discuss things with people they speak of the time there is always before the bomb and after the bomb, for the people that lived and worked there the Balinese that bomb event has gone into their understanding of time and event.”⁸⁶⁰

“Bali was a safe place, there was no conflict, Bali was not at war with anyone, Bali had no conflict there, Bali it showed for me that it didn’t matter what country you were in or where you were it was now borderless, because before then it was like ok you don’t go to Ireland, you might avoid America if there is some kind of conflict going on or Pakistan or something like that but to go to Bali an island where there is nothing going on it was inconceivable.”⁸⁶¹

“And now depend like back but not normal like before not like before normal. You know the old price getting up and maybe nearly the same with the other country so the tourists maybe they can buy in their country because nearly the same, same price and the same thing. BB changed the tourists. Somebody scared come to Bali but some tourists think that any where can happen every where around the world.”⁸⁶²

“Yes, yes, yes, yes I think it’s more different. More, more careful I think, they careful especially with the visitor, not tourist visitor foreign but domestic

⁸⁵⁸ Information gathered from interviews.

⁸⁵⁹ Information gathered from interviews.

⁸⁶⁰ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁸⁶¹ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

⁸⁶² Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

*visitor I mean, we call domestic tourist, as tourist or something else come to here*⁸⁶³

*"After BB all people will be open eyes because before they feeling Bali is safe but after BB all people think about safe - like security and how people have accommodation like cos we call cos and then every month they have to report. Not only police all Bali people have to be responsible like that."*⁸⁶⁴

In response to this new environment, many of the local Balinese respondents suggested that people have to be more alert.⁸⁶⁵ According to them, it was the responsibility of the people to become more aware, to give another example: "so we are all the security of Bali, whatever it takes. Like I said each person is a police so must alert if something's wrong."⁸⁶⁶ A lot of the onus of preventing terrorism is already placed on the community themselves:

*"We have to watching them who the one is very strange person to come our place and we have to know who they are and what they want and we have to know that so if they make something strange and then we have to call the police we tell them there are some people doing not good can you please check"*⁸⁶⁷

*"because you know after the bombings they were going, when they saw an Australian in the street all they were saying was sorry, sorry, sorry."*⁸⁶⁸

The respondents spoke about the Banjar system, which includes ID checks on a regular basis, a procedure set in motion following the Bali bombings.

"The banjar system or the community system I mean, they have quite strong control about this. For example I used to be lived in Kuta but now a few months ago I lived in Denpasar. I used to be lived in Kuta, every, one time a month the community at 4 o'clock, 3 o'clock in the morning, early, they come to the house, the rental houses people, they wake them up, make sure what

⁸⁶³ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁶⁴ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁶⁵ Information gathered from data collection.

⁸⁶⁶ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁶⁷ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁶⁸ Interviewee – stakeholder (Australia).

*they're doing... They do it like that. But some of us because some really nice [05.23] but that is very good I think for security system to make sure like keeping peace of the people, to make sure what the people are doing, is they do the right thing or the wrong thing. So if they don't have ID, because when they check they check ID, everything, they ask question, a few questions, what [05.40] if they don't have ID they bring to the community hall and they have to [05.52] they make the ID, temporary ID there, so we have temporary ID to do that.*⁸⁶⁹

Respondents also spoke about how the current memorial was *too static*, how the peace park would represent something more organic.⁸⁷⁰ The respondents also spoke about how Australians kind of adopted the attack as an attack on Australia, causing a rift between Bali and Australia, whereby the locals in Bali felt circumnavigated.

The Bali Peace Park – a place for closure, reflection and prevention

If one element of Tumarkin's notion of "*what is it that we need from these places?*" has been established to be 'closure', then another one appears to be a 'place for reflection'. This is clearly illustrated by the data gathered around the annual rituals and memorials that take place around the anniversary of the attacks. Both the Sari Club site and the official memorial across the street become adorned with spontaneous shrines starting about a week before in the lead up to the actual anniversary.⁸⁷¹ The sites were decorated with Australian flags, photos of the victims, and personalised messages all posted along the fencing of the sites.⁸⁷² Besides, this is further corroborated by the actual BBPAI's mission statement:

To create a memorial garden on the Sari Club site to enable people to reflect upon the terrorist attack of October 12th 2002, and to help build a future without fear by promoting peace, tolerance, understanding and freedom for generations to come, irrespective of nationality, culture, religious belief or race.

⁸⁶⁹ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁷⁰ Information gathered from interviews.

⁸⁷¹ Information gathered from data collection.

⁸⁷² Please see Figures 10-11 in appendices.

As one survivor expressed it, on the meaning of attending the annual memorials in Bali: “[i]t also give me a big chance to reflect on what happened, especially to think about those that never made it home, and it’s a way of showing respect for them and keeping in mind the tragedy that happened”.⁸⁷³

While attending the 12th anniversary of the Bali bombings, below is an extract from field notes carried out by the author illustrating the need for reflection and the significance of being close to the site:

“We conducted surveys again for a few hours around the site while awaiting the night-time anniversary ritual of lighting the candles at the site in memory of the 88 Australian victims, at the exact time of the blasts... When we got to the Sari Club site the nightlife was in full swing in Kuta and cars kept dropping in to the makeshift parking lot guided into allocated spots by Balinese ‘parking lot bouncers’. X (one of the victims) – was already there preparing for the set up of the candles to form the shape of 88, together with a film crew doing a documentary about the Bali bombings, following the story of a former perpetrator, Z. X seemed a bit confused as X approached the bouncers to pay them for “lending a bit of land” for conducting the 88 candles ceremony. I thought for myself it would be self-explanatory that you wouldn’t have to pay for that, but X seemed to be insisting on doing it. Once X had sorted the payment X returned to start setting up the tealights into plastic cups (please see Figure 18 in Annexes) and we helped X lit them all up while making the formation of “88”. By this time there was a group of us, perhaps 10 people, and people kept coming and going. Y (another victim) came by as well and as Z, the former perpetrator, who was helping with the tealights, wanted to shake his hand, Y refused, albeit very politely. Y had come to remember and honor Y’s loved one, nothing else. It was a little awkward, all these emotions mixed with good-will that perhaps did not quite suit the occasion, it felt a bit ‘pushed’ and ‘unnatural’ – I kept thinking Z may have crossed the line by being a bit too engaging, however the reason Z ultimately

⁸⁷³ Ducey, L. 2014, “After 12 years, Bali Peace Park possible in six months”

was there was as part of the documentary and by invitation and acceptance by X,⁸⁷⁴

It was a surreal experience to participate in the candle ceremony while the locals were engaged in ‘business-as-usual’. All meanwhile, tourists and other locals kept passing the site seemingly unaware of what was taking place – nor what *had taken place* - at the site. This fieldwork undertaking of *observations and experiences* clearly illustrated how the locals have indeed moved on, while the Australian victims are still very much caught in a process of attaining ‘closure’. Furthermore, the memorial across the street is often neglected and was only attended to after a local Australian in Bali wrote to 50 Australian MPs expressing her concerns over the decay.⁸⁷⁵

When exploring the process of the Bali Peace Park to date while taking into consideration Tumarkin’s earlier observation that in the West we tend to have difficulties in *articulating* the nature and roots of the significance of these places, perhaps it is no wonder that the ‘shared understanding’ of what the site in the form of a Peace Park should in fact entail has been a convoluted process, pushing the actual realisation of the project back. While ‘peace’ as an idea, or a norm, is an epitome ‘cultural match’ in Bali, the various players involved in the discursive arena differ in how they frame the notion.

The Balinese people also spoke about the *ceremony* being more important than *monuments*.⁸⁷⁶ This explains why the Balinese do not place same emphasis on the place where their loved ones perished. The existing memorial was framed as something not part of Bali culture, mainly produced for the ‘government’ and ‘international audience’

“No. memorial for Bali I think that is not culture for real bali but it is for our government. They will be make memorial that is to be remember we have something in that place. For example we have independence day we have a monument. The biggest we call That is 1946 lot of people dead there. Every small place that is for our independence they make small memorial in Nusa Duah you can find that too. Here in Kuta beach you can see that but

⁸⁷⁴ Field notes from Bali, 12th October 2014.

⁸⁷⁵ Topsfield, J. 2016. “Fight for Peace Park continues”

⁸⁷⁶ Information gathered from data collection.

*memorial for BB that is bit special why? Because all the world here so they make it a bit special. They make special who information like electronic information or letter something like that. Before ewe have from our gov we have memorial but not popular like BB memorial.*⁸⁷⁷

The monuments appear to be legitimate for ‘good’ stories only, such as the Independence of Bali, but not for the Bali bombings:

*“There are two ways about that one. Probably we have to make a memorial if it was something good - story. But this happened is not a good story because killed lots of people like that. But the people was killed over there ... Independence memorial... that’s good for the regeneration for we know about how is people long time ago is struggle for the independence from the colonise we need for that one ... Yeah I think is a bad story if you make something memorial about that probably the terrorists will make something another again.*⁸⁷⁸

In this context, respondents also raised concern that memorials would bring the terrorists more fame.⁸⁷⁹ While others thought the memorial was a good initiative

“Yes I think that one is good because of course a lot of people died there so they will know ok so the other guy maybe they don’t know is happening there so they will see oh so many dead people here so they will think how we can save together how we work together again so they will think about that”⁸⁸⁰

Yet others expressed concerns over the current memorial being too small, and therefore thought it more appropriate to build one on the Sari Club site.⁸⁸¹ Respondents spoke about the memorial near the airport with a horse and how it was easily accessible for people to visit and how the memorial of Bom Bali should be equally accessible. On the importance of remembering Bali bombings for Bali culture:

⁸⁷⁷ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁷⁸ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁷⁹ Information gathered from data collection.

⁸⁸⁰ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁸¹ Information gathered from interviews.

“According our culture so yes that’s very important ‘cause everything like we have, in our country we have heroes, we have hero and we have to build statue of them or memory of our hero so that’s very, very important to remember because we can learn from that happened, we can learn from what happened to next generation so to make sure if they have bomb like that so what we have to do so anticipation for next future time we be a little bit careful or maybe like this time they check more detail about the people who especial foreign people who want to come to Bali so be like.”⁸⁸²

The Balinese also raised concerns about the makeshift carpark, the place ‘not honoring the memory of the victims’ and because the empty lot reminded them about the bombings. On the idea whether a Peace Park would be an appropriate response

“In connection with respect? Yes. Very much yes because it’s hope. And you know the world we talk about terrorism, we talk about all these differences of the development of peoples’ mind, the open media etc. I think we cannot, we cannot lose our hope huh. And then I think you know just to think about the, the idea of a peace park I think you know it’s already a big, should be immortal idea I think so.”⁸⁸³

While some respondents thought it better to just rebuild a bar on the site others expressed that another bar or restaurant would remind of the Bali bombings. While a garden, it was suggested, would help to forget.

“If we build the garden to so people can go there and then like a refresh the mind and that if they make something like a restaurant again so maybe people will think again about the bomb before”⁸⁸⁴

The actual site in itself is not so important in terms of the fact that these people physically perished there, but more so for the purpose of memory:

“That’s important only for to keep the story but for Bali religion, for Hindu whenever we have people die up there we need to cremated them.”⁸⁸⁵

⁸⁸² Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁸³ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁸⁴ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁸⁵ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

“So that’s main, that place back like normal... So not any negative, or bad spirits there because we making proper ceremony for the spirit before they die, that’s the meaning... so like the ground zero now, so for Hindu people we believe they clean already because the spirit, the bad spirit they become already on paradise. We making proper ceremony to keep them from the bad spirit become happiness spirit in paradise like that.”⁸⁸⁶

The purpose of having a memorial on the site then – after it being cleansed from bad spirits – becomes “to remember the history”.⁸⁸⁷ The importance of remembering is for it to not happen again.⁸⁸⁸

When conducting an interview with the Governor of Bali, Pastika, he framed ‘peace’ as ‘the resistance/rejection of greed and anger’

*So that is the root of all violence, all misery in this world, all war because some people, some group, some nations lost faith. They want monopoly the truth and also the resources. That’s the rule. So as long as we understand that and we have to stay out with all those greedy and anger and hatred peace will come.*⁸⁸⁹

For Governor Pastika, and the many Balinese he represents, peace is therefore only communicable through an inward journey – *inner peace* – that starts with looking into our own selves.

We have to make a peaceful mind in our own selves, then we talk about peace to other people.

We must forgive, otherwise all this anger and hatred are still in our own selves and that’s not good. There is a disease, that is a fatal disease. So that’s why we have to forgive, but however it is not easy to forget, yeah. We have to remember all these things, and also remind all people in the world, that all violence is useless. There is only hurting our own selves actually, and we hurt

⁸⁸⁶ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁸⁷ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁸⁸ Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

⁸⁸⁹ Interview with Governor of Bali, Pastika.

other people that means actually hurting our own selves. That is what we call the (paptwam ashi] ... I am you, you are me, as a creature secret of hope.

In this sense, although Governor Pastika underscores the role of forgiveness, he also highlights the role of *public memory* and *remembrance*. Although forgiving may include forgetting to some extent, we also have to “remind all people in the world, that all violence is useless”. How do you remind people? How does the memory of the atrocity live on? In the words of James E Young, how can the way in which we remember this atrocity help us in the future?

It is clear that the idea and the function of the Peace Park as a ‘vehicle for peace’ is intended on a *global level* and directed as an *expression against all violence*. This is not a counter-narrative conceived to be limited to the Bali Bombings but one that highlights the pointlessness of violence globally. This mission is made possible by the inherited elements of Bali as a symbol for peace and should be capitalised on, as noted by Governor Pastika

We have here, what we call the Institute of Peace and Democracy and Udayana University we are talking about democracy, we are talking about justice. You know injustice not democratic, that is the root also of the violence, yeah because democracy is the road of peace, justice, that is very good.

In terms of the objective and goals of the organisation, the BPPAI website reads:

The main focus of the BPPAI has been firstly to secure the site and then undertake a fundraising campaign to assist meeting the cost of the land purchase and the construction of the Peace Park and Museum development.

While major private and public funding is being actively pursued, as mentioned above the Association’s priority at this point is securing the former Sari Club site. To this end, a landmark meeting was held on 25 February 2010, attended by two Association negotiators, two representatives of the landowner and two mediators/observers from the Governor’s office. Negotiations were extremely positive although in the interests of all parties and at the request of the land owner remain confidential at this time.

Although the initiative has mainly been an Australian one, the BBPAI underscores that the Peace Park is for all the people of Bali along with all the victims of the terror attack

The Bali Peace Park and Museum project is being driven by the BPPAI but is not just for Australians.

It is also for the Balinese victims, their families, and the people of Bali.

It is for the 22 nations of other victims.

It will be available for people of all nations, to honour not only victims of the Bali bombings, but victims of any event, or occurrence that obstructs world peace and the right to live our lives without threat.

It is simply a place to reflect on what may have been, and what could be.

Total deaths from both Bali bombings is 202 which includes 88 Australians with hundreds more injured.

To put this into perspective, considering the death toll and injury toll, hundreds of families have been affected directly.

Add to this number the relatives of the victims, add further to the number, their network of friends, their sporting clubs, their team mates, then there are the communities that these victims came from and surviving victims are apart of, and the number of Australians affected by these events could conceivably run into the millions.

This figure can be multiplied many times over taking into account the other 21 nations involved.

The Bali Peace Park Association Inc remains committed to this project and looks forward to achieving the desired outcome in the near future.

Other themes uncovered in Bali:

The respondents suggested that building another bar would invite more terrorism, because by bombing the Sari Club the terroristst wanted to create ‘fear’ and by building another bar the message would be ‘we are not scared’, therefore enticing another possible attack. While a Peace Garden instead would send the message of “make a good relationship”.⁸⁹⁰

Right in the aftermath of the terror attack, the most affected communities, consisting of Australians and Balinese, worked together closely in responding to the tragedy.⁸⁹¹

Furthermore, the Australian Federal Police worked closely with Balinese officials in the hunt that ensued for the Bali bombing perpetrators. In this sense, the response to the terror attack sites became a marker of disunion between the two previously amicable nations:

After all, for a long time before the attacks, there had existed a genuine connection between the two nations and an abundance of warmth. Those Australians who cared about Bali as more than just an exotic backdrop to their vacations were always treated with affection and respect. Gloria Goodwin, a British-born health professional, who lived in Australia for many years before settling in Bali, says that the Balinese people are very close to Australians. ‘They love not just the money-spending but they love the comfortable feeling they have with Australian

⁸⁹⁰ Information gathered from interviews.

⁸⁹¹ Tumarkin, 2005: 63-64.

tourists.’ Many Australians too love ‘the comfortable feeling’ they have with the Balinese – their legendary hospitality, the beauty of their island, the strength of their spiritual beliefs. The difference of attitudes towards the sites of the bombings was one of those rare moments when this comfortable feeling seemed to be disturbed.⁸⁹²

However, Tumarkin underscores the fact that regardless of this self-exploration and introspection following the blasts, it did not “turn into alienation or aggression towards the foreigners”.⁸⁹³ She denotes how there were people in the aftermath of the blasts that did voice sentiments about the bombs being a good thing as they occurred to “cleanse Bali of the foreign evils brought by tourists”, meaning Australians would no longer come to Bali.⁸⁹⁴ Yet, as Tumarkin observes, these opinions came from outside Bali (Malaysia, mainland Indonesia and the region) while inside Bali, “the majority of people did not appear to blame tourists”⁸⁹⁵:

They blamed themselves. There was a clear sense of responsibility that most Balinese seemed to feel for the fact that the tragedy happened on their soil. And so they apologised to visitors. ‘People came to our home for a holiday and they got killed. This is wrong. This is terrible. We are really sorry.’ I try to imagine the United States apologising to international victims of September 11 – Mexicans, Indians, Brits, all the other foreign nationals murdered on the day; or Australia apologising to Malaysia for the fact that its citizens were killed at the Port Arthur massacre in 1996. Even to think of this seems preposterous but why?⁸⁹⁶

Tumarkin’s research explains this with the fact that in Bali there is a strong “principle of life”.⁸⁹⁷ One of her interview participants explains: “We are all the same. If I hurt you, I hurt myself”⁸⁹⁸, while Tumarkin further elaborates:

The principle says that the good exists with the bad. The two go together. Like life and death. Introspection is the good that comes from the bombs. It is the learning and the renewed awareness. It seems so obvious, but it takes such humility to learn from pain and injustice, such moral courage. I am overwhelmed by the gratitude I feel that the Balinese had the ability not to fight the wounds inflicted on their land and their souls with the wounds that they could so

⁸⁹² Ibid., p. 64.

⁸⁹³ Ibid., p. 66.

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 67

⁸⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁸ Ibid.

easily inflict on others. The ‘eye for an eye’ model has become so standard in our world that it seems almost involuntary.⁸⁹⁹

- Nationalism

On analysing the response and the cultural differences in this response to the Bali bombings, Jeff Lewis observes how “while for the Hindu communities in Bali this cultural expressivity is located in Vedic mythology, rituals and principles, for many Australians it appears to be associated with various forms of political ideology and ‘nationalism’.”⁹⁰⁰ Therefore, similarly to 9/11 in the US, in Australia the discourse on the Bali bombings and the tragedy has very much been filtered through ‘nationalism’. Jeff Lewis draws parallels to the ‘political victim’ mentality of the role Gallipoli plays in Australian historical and cultural memory

The invocation of Gallipoli during the Bali bombing and commemorations resonates with a similar ideological motive, a desire to transform the hideousness of the event into a discursive unity, a triumph of national valour. For the official discourses of the state, the Gallipoli–Bali analogue galvanizes the popular imagining against a common enemy: the disparate sensibilities, practices, ethics and ideas that constitute a social assembly are drawn together through an overarching political postulate, one that affirms the ultimate authority and validity of the state itself.⁹⁰¹

Lewis illustrates how the atrocity of the Bali terror attack once again opened the connection between Gallipoli and the Australian ‘national psyche’, meaning that was the *habitus* through which the meaning-making process evolved. In the right aftermath of the Bali bombings in particular the response was very much based in nationalism made evident by the often angry posters and Australian national flags surrounding the site, something that has since been watered down with time. However Australian flags are still a common feature of the spontaneous shrines that appear around the anniversary.⁹⁰²

- Memory: grappling through a clash of culture

Memory, as discussed in the literature review, is a complex theme that permeates most research on terror attacks and the sudden loss of lives and has likewise been a

⁸⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁰ Lewis, J. 2006: “Paradise defiled: The Bali bombings and the terror of national identity”, p. 224.

⁹⁰¹ Lewis, J. 2006: 226.

⁹⁰² Please see images in appendices.

recurrent theme in the Bali case. To apply an employable concept of *memory*, as noted by Serrano et al in the literature review,

[i]t must be pointed out that *memory*, *truth* and *justice* are also located simultaneously in the public and private spheres of victim's experiences. For instance, *memory*, on the one hand, can be instrumental for victims to attain some measure of personal resolution, often termed "closure"; on the other, memory is constructed as a public moral duty, an obligation on society to remember the crimes committed. Moreover, *memory* can also be considered a tool for preventing future atrocities through the recognition of the tragedy of loss suffered by the victims and their families.⁹⁰³

In this sense, memory has three objectives: closure, public moral duty and prevention. Starting with *closure*, the multifaceted term has emerged throughout the literature review and is often interlinked with other terms, such as *trauma* and *performativity*. This dissertation will be applying the definition provided by Agata Serrano et al., whereby *memory* constitutes "both the personal and collective recollections of individuals killed by terrorism and political violence, including their place in historic constructions of the violence".⁹⁰⁴ Serrano et al further link the term with two other related concepts, that of *remembrance* and *memorialisation*

Remembrance can be defined as the act of remembering victims of terrorism and political violence and relatedly *memorialisation* is the way they are honoured and commemorated in the public sphere.⁹⁰⁵

Public memory: the public moral duty to remember the crimes

If public memory constitutes, as noted by Bodnar, "a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society understand both its past, present and by implication, its future", it becomes evident that there is an inherent clash between the processes of public memory in Australia and Bali. Public memory also reveals something about the power structures in a society. While the official (or national) mode of commemoration "promotes a nationalistic, patriotic culture of the whole", vernacular modes of commemoration are "less interested in exerting influence or control others, and is preoccupied, instead, with defending the interests and rights of social segments". Bodnar's remarks are reinforced by Edkins, who states that "many contemporary forms of memorialization function to reinforce the nation", whereas

⁹⁰³ Serrano et al. 2018, "Memory, truth and justice", pp. 18-19.

⁹⁰⁴ Serrano et al. 2018: 19.

⁹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 20.

“resistance to state narratives of commemoration …constitutes resistance to sovereign power”.⁹⁰⁶

One of the local Balinese respondents expressed how the Bali Peace Park idea was not so much necessarily about remembrance on behalf of the local community but rather about ‘respect’ and ‘care’.⁹⁰⁷

- *Memory for prevention*

Significance of the site: One vital point that Miller makes is that “while it is virtually inevitable that individuals will likely make sense of Ground Zero through their own personal biases, it is essential that future generations have a clear, full and accurate representation of the devastation that occurred there”.⁹⁰⁸ In this sense, many respondents, both Australian and Balinese, expressed the need for commemoration in order to not forget what happened on the site.

Tourism

One recurrent theme that emerged in the Bali case is the complex role played by *tourism*. Inherently part of what constitutes Bali, it makes it practically impossible to analyse the Bali bombings without examining the subject through the lens of tourism. In essence, tourism encompasses two sides of the story; it was in part the ‘reason’ for the terror attack, while, inherently juxtaposed, it is also part of the answer for bringing ‘peace’ to Bali.

As noted by Tumarkin, while the sentiment that the attacks may have been ‘a good thing for Bali, as tourists would no longer come to Bali’ mainly manifested itself outside of Bali, such as Malaysia, mainland Indonesia and other parts of the region, Bali itself did not blame the tourists.⁹⁰⁹ They blamed themselves instead, and apologised to visitors. In the aftermath of the Bali bombings, as the tourism industry was taking a hit, there were also fears that criminality would increase.⁹¹⁰

⁹⁰⁶ Edkins, J. 2003:xiii, xv.

⁹⁰⁷ Information gathered from interviews.

⁹⁰⁸ Miller, E. D. 2011: 113.

⁹⁰⁹ Tumarkin, 2005.

⁹¹⁰ Data gathered from interviews.

As part of the response to the Bali attacks, the Indonesian government and Bali Tourism Authority had invested heavily in Bali's recovery.⁹¹¹ The focus on tourism also highlights some of the national vs local meanings:

Thus, while the Indonesian government and the IMF focused on the social and economic conditions of recovery after the bombings (UNDP 2003), Balinese community leaders sought to restore harmony through the rebalancing of the *rwa bhineda*.⁹¹²

Therefore, following the Bali Bombings, while the Indonesian government, together with the IMF, was focussed on “the social and economic conditions of recovery”, the Balinese were concerned “about the outbreak of evil that rapid development and cosmic imbalance had generated”.⁹¹³ Although many Balinese viewed the attacks as primarily an assault on “Westerners”, “there was also an uneasy and persistent sense that the Islamists were attacking the Balinese lifestyle that had been created through their interaction with the West”⁹¹⁴.

In thus way, Western fears over growing Islamism in Indonesia were conflated through the Balinese’s own sense of threat both for their religious integrity and their more secular aspirations – economic security, sustainable livelihoods, and new forms of consumer-based pleasures.⁹¹⁵

A key share of the counter-narrative and local resistance to the terror attack therefore understandably has entailed the road to recovery in terms of the tourism industry in Bali, however for the Balinese it has been a journey for *introspection*. However, it is worthwhile noting that some respondents discussed the idea of bringing a quota to the number of tourists, as to preserve Bali’s Gross National Happiness (GNH).

- Memorials, spontaneous shrines and performativity

In this sense, as John Bodnar argued, “public memory is a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future” and it speaks, he suggests, “primarily about the structure of power in society”.⁹¹⁶ Bodnar draws a distinction between “official” (by Stow

⁹¹¹ Lewis & Lewis, 2009: 185.

⁹¹² Lewis et al., 2013: 28.

⁹¹³ Ibid.

⁹¹⁴ Lewis & Lewis, 2009: 189.

⁹¹⁵ Ibid.

⁹¹⁶ Bodnar, 1992: 15.

reformulated as “national”⁹¹⁷) – and “vernacular” modes of commemoration, and argues that the former “promotes a nationalistic, patriotic culture of the whole”, while the latter is “less interested... in exerting influence or control over others, and [is] preoccupied, instead, with defending the interests and right of ...social segments.”

In fact, Jeff Lewis and Belinda Lewis noted already in 2009 how the memorial replicated the response to the Bali bombings overall:

while it seemed that Jemaah Islamiyah had refocused their interests on Jakarta, with attacks on the Marriot Hotel and the Australian embassy, Bali remained a potential target. This view was certainly confirmed by government travel warnings in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. International tourists, however, subsumed these warnings within the more familiar and sensory mantra of Bali harmony/Bali paradise. Tourists, it seemed, had become so engaged in the Bali harmony discourse that the violence and horror of the 2002 attacks was best understood as historical aberration, an event that could be transformed and closed within the frieze of an historical relic and glorified remembrance. The Legian monument performed this role, as it collapsed the complex meanings of the bombings into a cool, fixed, and extemporized inscription which glorified the dead, their deaths, and the underlying ideology of nation and nationhood. The monument, that is, removed the event from history, inasmuch as it cleansed the details in favor of a polemical motif in which the dead were victims and heroes. In this way, the remembrance, which draws the tourists to the site, is equally a monument to historical forgetfulness.⁹¹⁸

As noted by Edkins: “Many contemporary forms of memorialization function to reinforce the nation; while resistance to state narratives of commemoration...constitutes resistance to sovereign power.”⁹¹⁹ In its current form, the only marker of violence – the official memorial – comes across as more of a tourism attraction than a “place of ‘ba’”. In this sense there are parallels to be drawn to the National September 11 Memorial in Lower Manhattan, which in less than four months since opening (on the 12 September 2011), drew more than 1 million visitors.⁹²⁰ Low demonstrated how the ‘dedicated spaces’ for memorials do not always necessarily act as the appropriate spaces for healing:

These were not the places to heal and reconcile New Yorkers’ hopes and dreams after the WTC attack. Instead, it was the less-structured and less-regulated spaces to which people turned (Rivel 2001). Union Square, with its green trees, benches, and circular walkways,

⁹¹⁷ Stow, 2012: 687.

⁹¹⁸ Lewis & Lewis, 2009: 185.

⁹¹⁹ Quoted in Stow, S. 2012: 687-688.

⁹²⁰ Muskal, M. 2011.

became a sacred space through the creation of spontaneous memorials – written messages, flowers, candles, photographs, and other objects commemorating the victims of September 11.⁹²¹

As Low points out, the most shocking element the local residents have been left out is that “along with the victims’ families, they will be affected the most by what is built on the site”.⁹²²

Spontaneous rituals of mourning often revolve around this need to mark the exact physical location of death. In many countries across the world, roadside memorials are placed as near as possible to the spot of the collision. Does it really matter where it happened, now that parents will get to outlive their children? Yet everywhere you go, it seems, there are memorials hiding in the crevices of the roads, attached to poles and trees, a whole separate landscape of flowers, photographs, crosses battered by winds and rain. Years may pass, but relatives and friends of those killed still turn to them, continuing to mourn. In most countries, the roadside shrines are officially illegal, a road hazard itself linked to the rise in road fatalities. Yet they are, as a rule, tolerated by local authorities and treated by many in the general community as sacred sites.⁹²³

In terms of the symbolic meaning and performativity of these places, the above is key in terms of how they can enact and inform preventative strategies for CVE.

- Identity and culture

One of the key themes, or prisms through which the events have been understood, that has emerged in the discourses is the role of *identity* and *culture*. In order to understand whose ideas matter, one has to capture the role of identity and culture in responding to the attacks/attack sites. As Kratochwil noted, when exploring the return of culture and identity to the field of IR: “[r]ather than the individual’s motives or learned behaviour, it is the productive capacity of individuals to use moral codes in an intersubjectively justifiable fashion that has become one of the main research foci”.⁹²⁴ In this sense, culture has become to be understood as a “symbolic and historically transmitted system of shared meanings”.⁹²⁵

This theme also highlights the role of the other, as noted by Kratochwil:

⁹²¹ Low, S. M. 2004: 329.

⁹²² Ibid., p. 335.

⁹²³ Tumarkin, 2005: 78.

⁹²⁴ Kratochwil in Y. Lapid & F. Kratochwil, 1996. *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, p. 209.

⁹²⁵ Ibid.

If the self is dependent on the other in its constitution, and if stereotyping occurs in this process, then the more important aspect of this dynamic is less connected with the individual level of cognition and more with the role the other plays in discourse and the practices of a given society.⁹²⁶

The Bali case has clearly illustrated how identity and culture has played a crucial role in the response to the Sari Club site, particularly in terms of the diverse meaning-making practices.

Peace Park – a place of ‘ba’?

As this dissertation is nearing completion, on April 24th 2019 a building permit sign for a 700-sqm building on the 800-sqm Sari site appeared in front of the site, above “fading photos of the bombing victims”.⁹²⁷ Apparently a building permit was signed in December 2018.⁹²⁸ As voiced by one of the BPPAI members:

“That’s an insult to everybody. Not only the Australians who were killed there but everybody … all the other nations who had people killed there … that land should be sacred, it should be kept apart”⁹²⁹

Australian media outlined how “[m]ultiple attempts by survivors and other interested parties to secure the site to create a place of reflection amid the throng of Kuta’s main strip have been thwarted” and how the Peace Park process to date was framed by key stakeholders: “there’s [been] a degree of deception, confusion and the ground kept shifting all the way through the process”.⁹³⁰ According to the victims representatives the most upsetting element was that there had been “ongoing assurances that the site would be reserved as a place to remember the victims”, including by the previous Bali governor.⁹³¹

⁹²⁶ Ibid.

⁹²⁷ Massola et al. ‘Staggering’: Bali bombing survivors lash nightclub proposal for Sari Club site”, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, published online 25 April, <https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/staggering-bali-bombing-survivors-lash-nightclub-proposal-for-sari-club-site-20190425-p51h6b.html>

⁹²⁸ Lipson, D. 2019. “Bali bombing blast site to be developed into five-storey commercial complex, outraging survivors”, *ABC News*, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-04-25/bali-bombings-site-to-be-transformed-into-commercial-development/11042234>

⁹²⁹ Ibid.

⁹³⁰ Ibid.

⁹³¹ Ibid.

*"They were actually very clear for many, many years in stating that no commercial building would be put on that property. It was reserved for a peace park or a memorial park"*⁹³²

Apparently the local government sign erected at the site describes the building project as "Restaurant and Monument", with plans to include a monument on the fifth level of the building. As the chair of the BPPAI framed it: "[i]t's the owner's way of making provision for a peace park, but it is totally unsatisfactory and defeats the purpose".⁹³³ The lack of transparency has concerned both the BPPAI and Bali locals, such as the head of Kuta's Institute for Community Empowerment: "[t]he [construction of a] monument is very important for us so that the world can remember with us".⁹³⁴

*"It was an historic event that occurred there and it hurt us, both as Balinese and Indonesians. And we can't just forget that."*⁹³⁵

When revisiting the question posed by Young (*memorialisation, as to what end?*) a striking feature of memorialisation appears to be remembering in order for such events to not be repeated. In this sense, in the *social construction of space*, these places harbor meaning which is impossible to recreate and experience, as noted by Miller, without actually *physically visiting the sites*.

Using Nonaka and Konno's concept of 'ba', these places marked by violence provide "a shared space for emerging relationships".⁹³⁶ As noted by the authors, the difference between 'ba' and ordinary human interaction is "the concept of knowledge creation ...[b]a provides a platform for advancing individual and/or collective knowledge".⁹³⁷ In the context of the Sari Club site, 'ba' therefore becomes useful in explaining how the site can be considered "a shared space that serves as a foundation for knowledge creation".⁹³⁸ The rational for the physical presence is based in the phenomenology of

⁹³² Ibid.

⁹³³ Ibid.

⁹³⁴ Ibid.

⁹³⁵ Ibid.

⁹³⁶ Nonaka & Konno, 1998: 40.

⁹³⁷ Ibid.

⁹³⁸ Ibid.

these sites: “[k]nowledge is embedded in ba (in these shared spaces), where it is then acquired through one’s own experience or reflections on the experiences of others”.⁹³⁹

As noted in the literature review, ‘ba’ can be *physical* (e.g. office), *virtual* (e.g. teleconference), *mental* (shared experiences, ideas, ideals) or any combination of them: “[t]he concept of *ba* unifies the physical space, the virtual space, and the mental spaces”.⁹⁴⁰ In this sense the proposed Bali Peace Park would provide a place of ‘ba’, furthering knowledge both in the *physical* sense of a ‘space for emerging relationships’ but also in the *mental* sense of providing a space for shared experiences, ideas and ideals, as per the mission statement on the BPPAI website:

To create a memorial garden on the Sari Club site to enable people to reflect upon the terrorist attack of October 12th 2002, and to help build a future without fear by promoting peace, tolerance, understanding and freedom for generations to come, irrespective of nationality, culture, religious belief or race.⁹⁴¹

Furthermore, in relation to the *social production* and *social construction* of space as outlined by Low, the BPPAI provides the following overview

Founded in Perth in 2008 and registered as a charity, the Association has supporters in Indonesia, Great Britain, New Zealand, Japan, the United States and Australia, united in their commitment to make a difference and to give lasting peace to victims of terrorism worldwide and their families and friends.

An independent study by Bali’s Udayana University shows the planned park and museum will be self-sustaining and create numerous jobs, while serving as an icon for world peace, attracting tens of thousands of visitors each year.

A suggested park concept has been completed by renowned Bali landscape artists Wijaya Tribwana International but the final design will be conceived and approved by the community of Bali. It will include a green space of tranquillity in the middle of one of the world’s most popular tourist centres, providing value far beyond the initial investment of time and funds.

The Association is liaising with the Bupati of the Badung Regency, the Camat of Kuta, senior Indonesian political figures and numerous Bali community groups.

The Australian Commonwealth and all Australian State and Territory governments have also pledged financial support, once the land tenure has been negotiated.

The Peace Park Association works closely with registered Indonesian charity Yayasan Isana Dewata. This Bali-based organisation supports more than 50 local widows and their families who were devastated by the 2002 and 2005 bombings.⁹⁴²

⁹³⁹ Ibid., pp. 40-41.

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 41.

⁹⁴¹ The Bali Peace Park Association Inc, ‘Mission Statement’, <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au>

⁹⁴² Ibid.

The function of the proposed Peace Park therefore is envisaged to “make a difference and to give lasting peace to victims of terrorism worldwide and their families and friends”; offer a “park and museum” which “will be self-sustaining and create numerous jobs, while serving as an icon for world peace, attracting tens of thousands of visitors each year”; provide “a green space of tranquillity in the middle of one of the world’s most popular tourist centres, providing value far beyond the initial investment of time and funds”.

Case Study 2: Norway

- *Norway*

On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik carried out the first ever terror attack to occur in Norway: a car bomb targeting the government quarters in Oslo killing eight people while injuring 200; followed by an attack on the island of Utøya, methodically massacring 69 people at the Norwegian Labour Party youth wing (AUF) summer camp, killing a total of 77 people in the attacks. Breivik's attack was essentially politically motivated devised to target representatives for Norway's liberal multiculturalism. Although the initial national response to 22/7 was very different to that in America after 9/11, calling for more democracy, more openness and greater political participation, the Norway case has eventuated in a political discourse disparaging multiculturalism while racist anti-Islamic and anti-immigration sentiment is increasing.⁹⁴³ The question of what to do with the terror attack sites in both Oslo and Utøya has proved a highly contested issue providing a useful case study for insights into how counter-narratives to terrorism might be expressed through the way communities engage with the sites.

The Terrorist Narrative

To provide some background in order to comprehend the reasons for the terror attack conducted by Anders Behring Breivik, Aage Borchgrevink offers a description of a complex being whose 'narrative' is as much about political objectives as a kind of need for self-expression. While the first part of his 'narrative' is about political change as he views Norway (and Europe) threatened by an Islamic invasion⁹⁴⁴, therefore attacking those who represent the political course in Norway, the second part of self-expression is what psychiatrists heard in his court case depicted as "a confused identity perception".⁹⁴⁵

⁹⁴³ Carle, R. 2013. 'Anders Breivik and the Death of Free Speech in Norway', *Society*, 50(4): p. 396.

⁹⁴⁴ For more detailed information please see Breivik's manifesto, "2083 – A European Declaration of Independence", under the pseudonym of Andrew Berwick.

⁹⁴⁵ Borchgrevink, A. 2013: 16.

Borchgrevink links Breivik with ‘herostratic terrorism’, a term originating from the expression *Herostratic fame*, which he describes as “the criminals’ desire to be seen, remembered and forever feared”.⁹⁴⁶ As Borchgrevink notes on Herostratic terrorists

The fact that they were nevertheless found legally sane and put in prison says something about the frequent place of Herostratic terrorists somewhere on a continuum between mental illness and religious or political extremism. The desire of narcissists to be seen as the special and exceptional people they are gives them a mandate to destroy and kill. Other people and the rest of society have a merely instrumental role. They are tools that can confirm their grandiose self-image and exist solely in that function. From this perspective, the narcissist is in the right.⁹⁴⁷

Borchgrevink notes that “[w]hile terrorism as a political tool is often imprecise”, with the outcomes of acts of terrorism often turning to be the opposite to their intentions, “the success of Herostratic terrorism is independent of the crime’s political consequences”.⁹⁴⁸

Notoriety is achieved, even if the terrorist and his ideology are largely neither accepted nor respected. The ideology often seems a mere pretext. Whether or not the terrorist is liked is less important than being known.⁹⁴⁹

This ‘confused identity perception’ has been traced back to Breivik’s troubled upbringing, and particularly the emotional abuse he suffered from his relationship with his mother, who was his principal caregiver.⁹⁵⁰ As for the reasons for carrying out the terror attack, “[v]iolence is the mother of change”, wrote Breivik in his manifesto.⁹⁵¹

Two particular *themes* therefore emerge as part of Breivik’s narrative: that of *right-wing extremism fighting Islam in Europe* and that of *obtaining fame and notoriety*.

⁹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 18.

⁹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 21.

⁹⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 21-22.

⁹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

⁹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 31.

⁹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 16.

Finding meaning at Utøya and the Oslo Government Quarters

A reaction to 9/11

Using Laclau and Mouffe's discursive term *antagonism*, the analysis manifested how the 22/7 responses in essence constituted a reaction against that which followed after 9/11. In this sense, the discourse on the Norwegian response to the 22/7 attacks has very much been filtered through 9/11, both by bystanders and those actually affected by the terror attack in Norway. The response has effectively been a direct counter-response to 9/11 – where the lessons learnt from the 9/11 response have largely influenced the Norwegian response:

*“one of the most remarkable developments has been the way the Norwegians have managed to avoid the bloodlust and vengeance that swept over the U.S. in the wake of terrorist attacks like 9/11 and the Oklahoma City bombing”.*⁹⁵²

*“Norwegians would combat the terror inflicted by anti-Islam extremist Anders Behring Breivik with more democracy, greater political engagement, and a commitment to freedom of thought, so long as extreme views don’t spill over into violence”*⁹⁵³

*“We also experienced something good in midst of all that evil. Because Norway’s response was entirely unique. We responded with roses, not bullets. We responded with love, not hate. We stood together, we did not look for scapegoats... Many other terror troubled countries have ended up curtailing people’s rights and built a rhetoric that has created division between people ... we could have chosen that as well, but we chose the message of love and unity.”*⁹⁵⁴

In fact, ‘love’ and ‘unity’ are themes that have appeared throughout the discourse of the Norwegian response, where the *solidarity* with the many victims has stood at the heart of the response.⁹⁵⁵ To understand the scale of the impact the 22/7 attacks had on

⁹⁵² Friedman, U. 2011. “Comparing How Norway and the U.S. Respond to Terror”

⁹⁵³ Ibid.

⁹⁵⁴ Eskil Pedersen, 2012. “Sommar och Vinter i P1”, Sveriges Radio, podcast, <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/116694?programid=2071>

⁹⁵⁵ See Figures 41, 46, 53-55 in Appendices.

Norway, one in every four Norwegians were affected by the terror attacks through connections with family, friends and acquaintances of the victims.⁹⁵⁶ In this sense, the attacks had “an enormous impact on a country with only 5 million inhabitants”⁹⁵⁷:

Most of the victims were young Labor Party (Arbeiderpartiet, AP) activists and youth politicians who were gathered at Utøya for their annual summer camp. The tragedy left a massive gap not only for their families, but also local communities and Norwegian politics.⁹⁵⁸

This is why there have been so many local memorials built around the country, as the summer camp on Utøya gathered AUF representatives from around the country – essentially training the future leaders of Norway.

Several studies have in fact examined the Norwegian response in comparison to the American response⁹⁵⁹, however, in terms of trust, Wollebæk et al. comparative study of the two countries before and after the attack corroborates Putnam’s findings about social capital, “indicating increased post-terror levels of civic engagement and trust” in Norway.⁹⁶⁰ As Kolås observes:

The main difference between the United States and Norway is found in the reported experience of fear, in which there was little increase in Norway post-22 July.⁹⁶¹

Constituting identity – the battle for ‘Norwegian identity’

Using the discursive analytical tool of *antagonism*, the data revealed how in the inherent search for ‘the other’ behind this tragedy affecting Norway, the discourse around the ‘perpetrator’ progressed along a conceptual trajectory of being framed as ‘an immigrant, ‘a Muslim’, ‘ethnic Norwegian raised in better parts of Oslo’, ‘one of us’, ‘mentally ill’ to ‘terrorist’.⁹⁶² Initially many people in Norway thought that it was

⁹⁵⁶ Balbi, A. 2018. “In the aftermath of terrorism”.

⁹⁵⁷ Wiggen, M. 2018. “Norway has failed to combat a climate of hate”, *Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right*.

⁹⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁵⁹ See for example Andersson, M. 2012; Ezzati & Erdal, 2017; Rykkja, Lægreid, & Fimreite, 2011.

⁹⁶⁰ Wollebæk et al. 2012 in Kolas, A. 2017.

⁹⁶¹ Kolås, A. 2017. “How critical is the event? Multicultural Norway after 22 July 2011”, *Social Identities*, 23(5): p. 519.

⁹⁶² Information gathered from data collection.

a jihadist inspired attack, and the framing by the respondents indicated that the response had been much worse had that been the case.⁹⁶³

Furthermore, in this search for identity in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the role assigned to ‘Norwegian identity’ has become imperative. Whereas Breivik evidently framed his attack as ‘for the sake of preserving Norway’, the people of Norway were equally quick to assign meaning to what it means to be ‘Norwegian’, in this sense countering the narrative conveyed by Breivik:

I've lived in Oslo for fifteen years, and I've never seen my city like this. An ocean of roses is now covering the streets of Oslo and the shores close to Utøya, thirty minutes away, to honor the dead and wounded. These hundreds of thousands of flowers have been brought by a never-ending flow of silent people, young and old. Never before has Norway seen so many people muted for such a long time.

They are also carrying Norwegian flags. We don't wave our flag all the time the way Americans do, except on May 17th, our national holiday, celebrating the anniversary of the signing our constitution in 1814. In fact, carrying the national flag the rest of the year has been seen as a sign of overwrought patriotism.

*Not any longer. Now the flag is again a source of pride, a silent celebration of the joy of being alive and of living in a privileged society. A society where it has long been a virtue to keep a cool head, but not necessarily a warm heart, as the Norwegian author Jo Nesbo noted in the New York Times this week.*⁹⁶⁴

In this sense, the Norwegian people, by taking to the streets participating in the *rose ceremony* that followed the attacks to express solidarity with the many victims, have essentially produced a counter-narrative to the narrative conveyed by Breivik by reinforcing that ‘Norway’ represents a country of ‘tolerance, democracy and multiculturalism’. Most of the national response was focussed on the trauma, as noted by Kolås:

⁹⁶³ Information gathered from data collection.

⁹⁶⁴ Amas, K. O. “Seven Days in Oslo: Flowers, Flags, Silence”, *The New Yorker*, published online July 29, 2011, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/seven-days-in-oslo-flowers-flags-silence>

... one could easily see 22 July as a potential source of new ‘foundational fictions’ of nationhood, where the ‘national text’ is interrupted and the nation must be re-contextualized, and reconfigured as a cultural and political space. As argued here, however, the national text of Norway was left uninterrupted by the 22 July tragedy. Nor were traditional categories, codes or meanings reworked. Rather, there was an overwhelming social mobilization in response to the trauma of the violence itself, followed by a stifling political silence and inertia. Initially, there was a consensus among all political parties to postpone their campaigning for the 2011 local elections, scheduled to take place in mid-September. After the elections, the parties seemed to agree to remain silent on Breivik’s anti-immigration agenda. Silence soon engulfed other sensitive topics as well, including the police response to the shootings.⁹⁶⁵

- *Rose ceremony*

The rose ceremony, or ‘rose march’, that followed only days after the terror attack, on 25 July 2011, has come to represent the *solidarity with the victims*, who in essence represented ‘a multicultural Norway’. The rose ceremony was initiated by prompts on facebook and twitter to take to the streets⁹⁶⁶ and included a concert, where a song called “Children of the Rainbow” was performed, a song which Breivik is said to have “hated” as it represents the very things he tried to wipe out: friendship and solidarity across ethnic and religious delimitations.⁹⁶⁷ The rose ceremony gathered up to 200,000 people in Oslo, more than a third of the capital’s population⁹⁶⁸, and similar gatherings took place in other parts around the country, with the Prime Minister and Royal Family of Norway all participating.

As framed by the then Norwegian PM Jens Stoltenberg at the ‘rose march’: “[b]y taking part you are saying a resounding “yes” to democracy”, while calling “the Rose March a ‘march for *democracy*, a march for *tolerance*, a march for *unity*’.”⁹⁶⁹

The rose ceremony has come to represent the solidarity with the victims and *the rose* now a symbol of what day meant and embodied. Inspired by a facebook-organised protest, people once again took to the streets around the days of the court case against Breivik. In his testimony, referring to the ‘Children of the Rainbow song’, Breivik

⁹⁶⁵ Kolås, A. 2017: 520.

⁹⁶⁶ Information gathered from data collection.

⁹⁶⁷ Information gathered from data collection.

⁹⁶⁸ Kolås, A. 2017.

⁹⁶⁹ “Tonight the streets are filled with love”, 2011, *Daily Mail*,

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2018368/Norway-massacre-150k-gather-Oslo-rose-march-tribute.html>

“mentioned the tune as an example of how he believes "cultural Marxists" have infiltrated Norwegian schools and weakened its society”.⁹⁷⁰ As one respondent recalls:

“another thing is the response after you know that court case, the attacker said, talked down one of our children’s songs, the song The Child of the Rainbow.... a multicultural one .. and the response came immediately. People got out again with the roses in the, it was raining like and I remembered because I came out of the court room and opened the door and suddenly you just heard all this beautiful singing and roses... it was really really moving”⁹⁷¹

Given the enormous response of the ‘rose march’ where the red rose became a symbol identified with the resistance against the horrific attacks and violence, there has been suggestions for a memorial to embody this ‘rose ceremony response’ somewhere in the heart of Oslo. In fact, such a response followed the rose ceremony that people would send *iron roses* (some of which have been sent to Norway by ironsmiths around the world) and these were waiting to be assembled, as part of the proposed memorial, in a smithy in the village of Baerum, right outside of Oslo.⁹⁷² Still today around the anniversaries of the attacks roses are placed around the memorials and terror attack sites in memory of the victims.⁹⁷³

Considering Breivik’s objectives, Norway has responded with resolve to maintain its multicultural feature. As one respondent framed it, in terms of whether Breivik achieved what he set out to achieve:

“No. I don’t know about his own personal need, obviously, he’s been noticed for sure, and if that is what he needs, then, he, that may... satisfaction may have come, I have no idea, but in terms of the multiculturalism attack I don’t

⁹⁷⁰ Gronnevet, J. 2012. “Thousands defy Anders Breivik with children’s song in Norway”, *Independent*, published online 26 April, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/thousands-defy-anders-breivik-with-childrens-song-in-norway-7681732.html>

⁹⁷¹ Interviewee – victim (Norway).

⁹⁷² Hellem Anstaad, K. 2017. “Domprosten om jernrosen utenfor domkirken: - En spennende og positiv tanke”, *Aftenposten*, published online 18th July, <https://www.aftenposten.no/kultur/i/EVEEG/Domprosten-om-jernrosene-utenfor-domkirken--En-spennende-og-positiv-tanke>

⁹⁷³ Please see Figures 19-29 and 53-55 in Appendices.

*think this works because I think people at large, the public, they understand that we have come, we have come to a development in this world where we live together [x] with each other, we have to live with differences... and that to build the walls and the borders everywhere is not going to work, and I'm an optimist, in a way, I don't believe in the 'clash of civilizations', I believe in formation of mindsets that ... through education ... and education is not only formal school, it is also family, good community, and it is a non-formal system where you have massmedia that are informative, that you have a religion that hopefully, will stop preaching ideologies, that may be a ground for people to do these kinds of things, so within all religions we have more soft ways of understanding religion, and I believe that what we need to do in the future is to support and reinforce those interpretations of religions that lead to an inter-faith confidence. So we become more accepting, of each other.*⁹⁷⁴

Nevertheless, some of the concerns raised by the national victim's support group in particular have been the mounting hatred experienced from right-wing extremists in online platforms.⁹⁷⁵ With the anonymity of the Internet, and particularly in the aftermath of Breivik's attacks, the public debate has witnessed far-right sentiments become more normalised in Norway.⁹⁷⁶ As observed by Kolås, on the replacement of the Labour Party-led government by a right-wing coalition in 2013:

Some have interpreted the historical breakthrough of the Progress Party in the 2013 parliamentary election as a sign of growing xenophobia in Norwegian society post-22 July.⁹⁷⁷

Mette Wiggen further corroborates the above victim's experience:

In the seven years since the massacre, much has moved in a negative direction. AP politicians, despite being the target of hatred, need to share responsibility with other political parties. Despite the promises made by the prime minister in 2011, there has never been a collective political strategy to come to terms with the fact that Norwegian society had produced the killer. The ideology he promoted was and is now even more accepted and promoted, especially on social media, by radical-right activists, including ministers of the current government.⁹⁷⁸

⁹⁷⁴ Interviewee – stakeholder (Norway).

⁹⁷⁵ Information gathered from data collection.

⁹⁷⁶ Information gathered from data collection.

⁹⁷⁷ Kolås, A. 2017: 519.

⁹⁷⁸ Wiggen, M. 2018. "Norway has failed to combat a climate of hatred"

She points to a generational departure within Norwegian politics, and especially within the Norwegian Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet, AP)

We will never find out what would have happened if those killed at Utøya had lived and been able to pursue their careers and make their mark on Norway's political scene. It is possible that they might have been able to steer the AP onto a different path, away from a right-wing, anti-immigrant neoliberalism that has marked the party's recent history. As I have previously argued, the AP has done its best to keep up with the radical right, making it difficult for the electorate to see the difference between itself and established right-wing parties.⁹⁷⁹

This indicates that there may have been underlying issues that were brought to the surface by Breivik's attack, and why the response has mainly been focussed on the trauma while simultaneously characterised by political "inertia". Meanwhile, the victims' subjectification position in the discourse appears to have been pushed outside what is considered the acceptable norm and the realm of this trauma, merely constituting pawns as part of the process

Indeed, every year, survivors and the victims' families continue to receive death threats and hate mail from individuals and extremist groups, with the main message being that it was a pity that the killer had missed them or that they got what they deserved. Tarjei Jensen Bech, a survivor and the deputy mayor of Finnmark, is living with threats, such as "I think it would have been best for all of us if you had stayed at Utøya and not survived."⁹⁸⁰

Democracy

If Breivik's attack constituted 'an attack on democracy', then the response to the terror attack sites has very much revolved around the *antagonism* to his message: the reinforcement of *democratic* processes. One of the key themes throughout the discourse analysis of the meaning around the terror attack sites is how these sites have come to represent places of 'democracy'. This essentially constitutes the 'master' counter-narrative theme as Breivik in essence attacked the 'Norwegian democratic political system'. As one respondent framed it: "he wanted to bring Norway down with him".⁹⁸¹ One of the richest examples is the discourse revolving the site of Utøya.

⁹⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁸¹ Interviewee – stakeholder (Norway).

- Utøya:

“Utøya er et av de viktigste stedene i norsk politikk, og et av stedene som har preget norsk politikk mest de siste årene. Om sommeren er Utøya Norges viktigste talerstol.”

“Utøya is one of the most important places in Norwegian politics, and one of the places that has embodied Norwegian politics most in recent years. In summer Utøya becomes Norway's key lectern.”

- Jens Stoltenberg, June 2010

The above is a quote by the then Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, on the 12th of June 2010 at the 60th anniversary to mark when Utøya was given as a gift to the AUF by LO, the Norwegian union. In order to understand how Utøya has become such a symbolic part of Norwegian politics, one has to familiarise oneself with a few historical lineages leading up to the moment in time Utøya became appropriated by the AUF. Below is an extract from Utøya's official website outlining the history of the island:

For some time, Utøya was owned by Jens Kristian Meinrich Bratlie. Bratlie had an impressive military and political career. In 1898 he was elected General War Commissioner, he was a member of parliament for Høyre from 1900 to 1912, and the leader of the military committee in parliament. In 1906 Bratlie became president of the commons, and later parliamentary president in 1912. After the resignation of Prime Minister Konow in February 1912, Bratlie became Prime Minister, while at the same time serving as Minister of Defence. During the 1930s, he became part of the circle surrounding Vidkun Quisling. Bratlie would use Utøya as his personal summer residence during the time. He had bought it in 1898 as a holiday location, and created several gardens across the island. Servants and staff lived year round on the island to maintain and manage the property.

In 1932 the Norwegian labour and trade union movement took over Utøya. With the extreme right tendencies displayed by Bratlie, it is curious that he chose to sell the island to the labour movement, in a time of class war and sharp conflict between the political right and left. Under ownership of the labour movement, in the following years Utøya was used as a holiday camp for children of the working classes. It became a popular summer destination, used by a number of organisations connected to the labour movement. As well as holiday camps for the trade unions, Utøya soon also became a gathering place for other parts of the labour organisations. The first national conference of Framfylkingen, an organisation for children and families, happened at Utøya in 1935. The Worker's Sport Organisation, Arbeidernes Idrettsforbund (AIF), was early in adopting the island as their main location for courses and training, with political education, public health training and recreational sports for all as central topics on the agenda.

During this period, the café building Kafébygget was built, and the oldest outdoor toilets were constructed. In 1936, Utøya was visited by a world famous revolutionary. After Stalin had won the internal power struggle in the soviet communist party, Leo Trotsky was excluded, considered a traitor and exiled from the Soviet Union. In 1935, the Norwegian government granted him asylum. At the time, Trotsky stayed in Ringerike and was a frequent visitor to Utøya. While in Norway, Trotsky was working on one of his most important book projects, the big confrontation with Joseph Stalin. It is not unlikely that the last details in his legendary book *The Revolution Betrayed* was written in Hovedhuset at Utøya.⁹⁸²

In this sense, there is an imbued meaning-making component embodying Utøya of historical ‘ownership’ between the left and the right in Norway, and in this context Breivik’s attack can be interpreted to inflict havoc (not only in terms of the social production of the island and the actual tragedy of lives lost but) in the symbolical sense of the ‘social construction of the island’.

In fact, this contest of ‘symbolical ownership’ of the island became evident in the discourse of responding to the terror attack site of Utøya. Early on representatives from the Worker’s Youth League – AUF – made clear that they intended to resume the summer camps.⁹⁸³ The AUF leader at the time, Eskil Pedersen, a strong advocate for the return of the summer camps framed it in the following: “we cannot let the terror win”. Many of the victims’ families objected to the idea, as they could not bear the thought of having young people party etc. on the very same location where their children lost their lives.⁹⁸⁴ However, when a petition to leave the island alone was supported by right-wing supporters sympathising with Breivik, a lot of the parents changed their minds.⁹⁸⁵ Most of the parents, however, had supported the idea of resuming the camps, as exemplified by this respondent: “[a]nd that youth are able to go out there again, yeah because I’ve been to the island several times and I know, it’s a pretty island. And my daughter she had a good time there.”⁹⁸⁶

Despite many difficult debates as to what should happen to the island – where many voices such as Pedersen supporting the decision of a quick return have been conflicting with those survivors who thought more time was needed before the camps

⁹⁸² www.utoya.no

⁹⁸³ The AUF owns the land of Utøya.

⁹⁸⁴ Information gathered from data collection.

⁹⁸⁵ Information gathered from data collection.

⁹⁸⁶ Interviewee – victim (Norway).

return – the first summer camp resumed in August 2015, four years after the massacre. As a lead up to the return of the summer camp the buildings on the island were refurbished and a memorial was built in a peaceful spot in accordance with the wishes of the AUF and the national victims support group for 22/7. In fact, in 2012 the national victims group – Nasjonal støttegruppe etter 22.juli hendelsene – held a hearing in which all counties could voice their concerns and wishes in regards to the future of the island of Utøya.⁹⁸⁷ In this sense, there has been an important element of the role of the civil society in the decision-making process.

Reflecting on the decision-making process around Utøya, James E. Young – one of the experts in the committee advising on the rebuild of Utøya – observed:

“To say, immediately, we – the AUF – are going back, no matter what, is great. But then they had to decide what does going back mean?”⁹⁸⁸

Given that the AUF were the owners of the land of Utøya, they have had the ultimate decision-making authority in terms of the response following 22/7. In the decision-making process AUF invited experts from the US with experience from the 9/11 rebuild and from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU).⁹⁸⁹ The chair of the victims support group, Lisbeth Royneland, says that the AUF were perceptive to the ideas and advice given by the experts and grew very much on that task.⁹⁹⁰ As Alice Greenwald, the director for the 9/11 museum in New York, observed in regards to the rebuilding process of Utøya:

“In situations of historic loss due to traumatic historical events, there will inevitably be a tension between the impulse to commemorate – to remember those who were killed – to honour them – but also to rebuild, to revitalise – and of course these were the very same tensions that the planners faced at Utøya island.”⁹⁹¹

As Tor Einar Fagerland, a historian at NTNU and expert on the advisory committee for the rebuild of Utøya, framed it in terms of the pathway back after Utøya:

⁹⁸⁷ “Støttegruppens behandling av Utøya-saken”, *Støttegruppen 22. Juli*,

<http://22juli.info/Lists/Informasjon/Form.aspx?ID=25>

⁹⁸⁸ “Tilbake till Utøya”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqOPew5ZJKA>

⁹⁸⁹ “Tilbake till Utøya”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqOPew5ZJKA>

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁹¹ Ibid.

In social sciences we often talk about a society's resistance, or 'resilience'. And that is about what happens when you are put under a lot of pressure. What happens when you are hit down? Do you then in fact get knocked out? Or do you get up? Utøya got up.⁹⁹²

Fagerland states that for the AUF, Utøya has become more important after 22 July than before.⁹⁹³ One of the key issues in the response to Utøya was what to do with the café building where many of the Utøya massacre victims lost their lives. Fagerlund notes how it was an incredibly challenging task to go back when the assumption was that a prerequisite for new life on Utøya was that all the evil that was in the café building must go. Greenwald on the decision to preserve it:

*"I remember thinking if this can be realised it will be very, very powerful. Because the house that embraces it suggests a physical place that protects and that preserves a memory. And that is exactly what it intended to do."*⁹⁹⁴

On the decision-making process, Fagerlund notes how, "gradually, there was this trust created amongst all involved parties, which was almost unbreakable".⁹⁹⁵ This, he suggests, was the reason for why they dared to think the challenging thoughts needed: e.g. "can we really display text messages from that day inside the building?"

The end result from the conferring with the expert committee became what is called the "Hegnhuset", a building that surrounds the original refurbished café building. It contains 69 poles representing the 69 victims that died on the island. It acts as a learning centre for students and youth organisations that visit the island. Greenwald notes on Utøya, in addition to the "Hegnhuset": "and you have a new campsite, new buildings, new areas for gathering that allows the life of the island to resume. But always with the memory of what was lost".⁹⁹⁶

Concept of 'ba': Utøya – a place for 'democracy learning'

When visiting the official website for Utøya⁹⁹⁷, the website frames the place as "a place for engagement", "a place for learning" and "a place for remembering":

⁹⁹² "Tilbake till Utøya", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqOPew5ZJKA>

⁹⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁷ www.utoya.no

Utøya has a long history as an arena for learning democracy, freedom of expression, tolerance and diversity. At the same time Utøya is a strong witness to why these values cannot be taken for granted. The learning centre on Utøya is developed so that youth itself should reflect over what democracy means for them, what challenges democracy and what they themselves can do to protect democracy.⁹⁹⁸

In this sense, Utøya has been a symbolic place for democracy throughout hundreds of years.⁹⁹⁹ In fact, Utøya has become more significant for the AUF after 22 July than it was before.¹⁰⁰⁰ If it previously represented *a place for democratic process*, it not only symbolises but also truly *embodies ‘democracy’* now even more after 22 July. As Fagerlund notes, AUF uses the term ‘democracy workshop’ which is fitting since “in a workshop you create something, meaning, you don’t get a premade package, but in a workshop you make something, and democracy is more like an activity”¹⁰⁰¹.

Today, since having the buildings on the island refurbished, Utøya provides a place not only for the annual AUF summer camps, but also hosts various kinds of workshops for ‘democracy learning’ and students learn about the processes and prevention of radicalisation.¹⁰⁰² The potential for such workshops at a place like Utøya relates back to the concept of ‘ba’, whereby Utøya now possesses such tacital knowledge, it would literally be impossible to replicate simply by construct. Youth attend the island for school as well as confirmation camps, and companies are offered to host their ‘team building’ meetings on the island.

There have also been plans for a national memorial on the mainland across from Utøya in which the Norwegian government announced the Swedish artist Jonas Dahlberg’s proposal, “Memory wound” as the winner of the contest to find a fitting memorial. The national memorial is planned to be located at a headland on the mainland overlooking Utøya. The original plan was that part of the headland, the landmass slice to create the void, was to be moved to a second memorial site at the government quarters in Oslo, linking the two attack sites.¹⁰⁰³ In this sense, it was a

⁹⁹⁸ ‘Velkommen til Utøya’, www.utoya.no

⁹⁹⁹ For a more detailed account of the history of Utøya (including english version at the bottom of the page) please visit <http://www.utoya.no/historien>

¹⁰⁰⁰ “Tilbake till Utøya”, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqOPew5ZJKA>

¹⁰⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰⁰³ Information gathered from data collection.

symbolic gesture to highlight the significance of both sites and a way to reinforce the remembrance of these horrific events for future generations, even after the government quarters was fully refurbished. How some of the respondent framed the sites:

It would have to be a site where ... which would invite the victims and relatives, neighbors, public at large, to reflect on, not only the harders, not to forget the enormous suffering that was given to so many people, but also a site that made it possible to reflect upon the causes, the root causes of violence. The root causes of this specific act, but also the root causes of violence in general. And, more than that, how to find non-violent ways of solving conflict. How, what could have been done in the time 1979 to this day when it happened for this person not have this kind of formation of a mindset that led to this.¹⁰⁰⁴

Similarly the ‘22 July Centre’, that was opened in September 2015 at the government quarters in Oslo, invites school classes to visit the exhibition about the Norway terror attacks to discuss what the events mean for Norway and will be discussed further in Chapter 5, on *Collective Action*.

- The memorial on Utøya

The memorial on the island consists of a sculpture and landscaped garden known as ‘The Clearing’ and was opened around the fourth anniversary of the attacks. ‘The Clearing’ consists of a 12-metre-wide circular clearing overlooking the water among the island’s pine trees, where a steel ring measuring four metres in diameter is installed.¹⁰⁰⁵ The names in the hang-up metal circle lets the light fall through the metal and can be read when walking around the ring. No name comes first or last.¹⁰⁰⁶

The thought behind the name of the sculpture, as explained by the architects:

When a big tree in the forest dies, an organic process that creates what we know as a clearing begins – open room in the otherwise dense forest. We wanted to develop the memorial on

¹⁰⁰⁴ Interviewee – stakeholder (Norway).

¹⁰⁰⁵ For more information and images of the sculpture, please visit www.dezeen.com/2015/07/22/the-clearing-memorial-utoya-massacre-norway-3rw/.

¹⁰⁰⁶ ‘Minnested’, <http://www.utoya.no/minnested>

Utøya as such a clearing; forming a clear spot and highlighting all the beautiful landscape qualities that are already in place and in contact with the surrounding environment.¹⁰⁰⁷

When trying to depict the right place for the memorial on the island the decision was based on the fact that it should be in a spot where none of the already ‘marked’ places on the island would take away from the experience.¹⁰⁰⁸ Or as one of the respondents explained: “nobody was killed there”.¹⁰⁰⁹ They wanted a spot in nature, where one could have piece and quiet. This also reflects the thought behind The Clearing – ‘a place for contemplation’. The memorial has been built with the serene natural environment in mind: “[p]lanted areas between pathways within the space are populated with flowers that will encourage native butterflies.”¹⁰¹⁰

Hope, trust and community

The landscape of Utøya has played a key role in the meaning-making process of the response to the island. The meaning of the memorial on the island brings its inspiration from the dualistic view of the island, as portrayed by the architects:

Utøya is both a unique piece of nature, and the scene of one of the most horrific crimes in Norway’s history. Sixty-nine people, most of them children and youth, were brutally murdered here on the 22nd July 2011. Within this duality, nature represents hope. In this nature, we as humans have cleared space to establish social communities and have made shelter to protect us from the weather. This cultural landscape is telling a story about how people and society have changed nature, and adapted to it through generations.

In the period after the 22nd July 2011, there were big questions from a shocked world about the way in which this event would change Norwegian society. The high level of social trust and sense of community was challenged and even met with criticism. In light of this, we propose a landscape-friendly memorial, built through volunteer work and community – the true spirit of the Norwegian society.¹⁰¹¹

In considering Greenspan’s typology, the third element of what we decide to build says about ‘us’, the above is very revealing. The official Utøya website describes the

¹⁰⁰⁷ Howarth, D. 2015. “3RW’s memorial for victims of Norwegian massacre opens on Utøya island”, *Dezeen*.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Information gathered from data collection.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Information gathered from interviews.

¹⁰¹⁰ Howarth, D. 2015. “3RW’s memorial for victims”, *Dezeen*.

¹⁰¹¹ <https://3rw.no/3rw-wins-the-competition-to-propose-memorial-on-utoya/>

memorial accordingly: “The memorial on Utøya is a worthy, fun and lasting place for belonging and reflection. It is a beautiful place for remembering”.¹⁰¹²

A ‘place for contemplation’

The approach to the memorials has always been *holistic*, as noted by the thought behind the memorial on Utøya

She was responsible for working directly with the AUF party to select and manage a winning project from an architectural team. Heier stated that “The Clearing,” located at the scene of the crime, was never intended as an artwork but rather as a space of contemplation. “It is obviously a very different task to build a memorial on Utøya than to build one on land at Sørbråten, like the national memorial close by,” she said. “We saw these two memorials as fulfilling each other, covering different functions and needs in the aftermath of the terrorist attack of July 22.” As opposed to Dahlberg’s state-sponsored piece, “The Clearing” was considered apolitical, “placed where the attack happened, accessible to everyone but built on private land on the island.”¹⁰¹³

In this sense, the memorial on Utøya has a social construction and production of ‘a place for contemplation’, more on a ‘personal level’, a place where politics has no place, yet also on a ‘global level’ – or ‘glocal’ – in the sense that this trauma *unites us all as humans amongst mother nature*. This phenomenon of disavowing politics is a common feature, as noted by Stow in the literature review: for the 9/11 memorial any narratives that included “any kind of historical or political context were suppressed by public manifestations of grief”.¹⁰¹⁴ This is what Sturken termed a manifestation of “comfort culture” which serves “as a form of depoliticization and a as a means to confront loss, grief, and fear through processes that disavow politics”.¹⁰¹⁵

However, this process of disavowal can serve to promote political agendas, which “tend to be politically regressive in that they are attempts to mediate loss through finding the good – a newfound patriotism, feelings of community – that has come through pain”.¹⁰¹⁶ Interestingly, the latter would provide explanatory power to the fact that despite the massive outpouring of messages of *love, tolerance and unity* in the

¹⁰¹² ‘Velkommen til Utøya’, www.utoya.no

¹⁰¹³ Vogel, W. 2016. “The Story of Norway’s Multiple July 22 Memorials”, *Hyperallergic*.

¹⁰¹⁴ Stow, 2012: 689.

¹⁰¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 687-688.

¹⁰¹⁶ Sturken, 2002: 382.

response to Breivik's terror attacks the country chose a more conservative government in the 2013 election.

Open versus closed society

Some other key themes as part of the discourse following 22/7 attacks have been *security* and *trust/social capital*. This discourse included various elements and levels of analysis:

- Trust between citizens and government

In the immediate aftermath of the terror attack, many of the Norwegian police and security services were called back to Oslo as the attack occurred at peak holiday season in Norway.¹⁰¹⁷ Respondents framed the public response as positive at first when the police took to the streets to secure areas of Oslo that had been severely damaged, with the public showering them with thanks and their appreciation however, this sentiment changed once the Norwegian media started unravelling the mistakes made by the police force that led to the delay in the rescue operation.¹⁰¹⁸

In this sense, the miscommunication in terms of the First Responders has become a major part of the overall discourse and response to the attacks.¹⁰¹⁹ As summarised by the below excerpt:

With the August 2012 release of the Report from the 22 July Commission (NOU, 2012) it became evident that the police had failed miserably in their response to the mass shooting. They had no helicopter in the air until an hour after Breivik's arrest, whereas the media's helicopters had hovered over the island catching images of the gunman. Nor did the police arrive in time to rescue the hundreds of victims trapped on the island after the only ferry had left, commandeered by the leader of the Labour Party youth wing and carrying only eight passengers. While the police barely managed to find their way to the scene, local boat-owners rescued desperate people from the cold waters of the lake, and even picked up people calling for help from the shore. The volunteer rescuers also had to help the police SWAT team out of their sinking rubber dingy. The emergency call facility failed as well. Police officers were unaware that the perpetrator had called the emergency line twice to surrender, as early as 30 minutes before the SWAT team reached the island.¹⁰²⁰

¹⁰¹⁷ Information gathered from data collection.

¹⁰¹⁸ Information gathered from data collection.

¹⁰¹⁹ Hutchison, P. 2011. "Norway shooting: police response criticised", *The Telegraph*.

¹⁰²⁰ Kolås, A. 2017.

Many respondents spoke about how the terror attack had affected how Norway thinks about security and safety. The authorities themselves expressed that there is a different awareness, that for those who work in the authorities and security branch “everything has changed” and that they are “just waiting for the next attack”.¹⁰²¹ However, this threat is coming from both Islamic inspired terrorism and right-wing terrorism, “looking for terrorists in every day”¹⁰²²:

“... it’s another mindset and for us and for me the big question is will this affect my contact with people. Now we are armed. Before this happened we were not armed.”¹⁰²³

This last statement also contradicts the notion of thriving for a society of more openness, as the political and security climate has obviously become hardened. This change in mindset applies perhaps more to those who were affected, such as authorities. Other respondents framed the prerequisite for a successful open society as making the public more engaged and “make them more responsible” in terms of general awareness. The undesirable option, they noted, is an Orwellian society “where we [the authorities] can see everything”.¹⁰²⁴

“People were contacting us when we are on duty out in the streets and they were thanking and we did a good job and they wanted to, they told that they were appreciating that the police is working out in the streets outside and, but it was a kind of different phases after the bomb was very quiet, it was very strange situation downtown Oslo and afterwards when there was writings in the newspapers and on TV all the time, day after day and there was criticism to the police and we got a Gjørv Commission but that was investigating the police and

¹⁰²¹ Information gathered from data collection.

¹⁰²² Interviewee – stakeholder (Norway).

¹⁰²³ The respondent did underscore that the Breivik attack in itself was not the reason Norwegian police are now armed, but that the threat from an intercepted IS plot in Oslo in July 2014 was the onset for the arming of Norwegian police. For more on the terror plot, please see <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/norway-warns-of-imminent-concrete-terror-threat-9626465.html>

¹⁰²⁴ Interviewee – stakeholder (Norway).

it was a very big investigation. Not only during the, to [5.34] Breivik but also they are, were investigation all of the Norwegian police. ”¹⁰²⁵

There also appears to be an ambiguity within the security forces whether the main threat is coming from right-wing groups or Islamic groups

“Yes it has and there’s also a, well it’s a big political discussion and also a discussion inside the police force in who are we going to surveillance right wing people, are the right wings a threat or is the bigger threat the Islamic threat. ”¹⁰²⁶

The emphasis on the change in the political climate in terms of security was not just highlighted by respondents belonging to the stakeholder group of *first respondents*, but was also highlighted by *victims*. As one victim observed: the political climate has changed however to what degree it can be connected to the Breivik attack is unclear. In 2013 Norway had an election, which turned out to be a victory for the Conservatives and their populist right-wing allies. On the change in political climate right after 22/7:

“Ahhh ... initially there was like a little difference but I think Norway kind of got back to normal pretty quickly...”

*In the immediate aftermath there was like these rose parades and stuff like that going on right, and we were all supposed to be super united ... then like combatting violence and things like that and I, it was nice speeches and all but... whenever it got down to business and actually doing it ... ehh so yeah... that was my experience obviously.”*¹⁰²⁷

The victim’s experience was that one of the reasons for the labour party losing the election to the conservatives in 2013 was that they very strongly took on the role of ‘being a victim’ following 22/7:

“First of all the Labour party kind of very strongly took the role of victim, because it was kind of people from their party that were attacked. And that

¹⁰²⁵ Interviewee – stakeholder (Norway).

¹⁰²⁶ Interviewee – stakeholder (Norway).

¹⁰²⁷ Interviewee – victim (Norway).

might sort of make sense but at the same time it, it was eehh an attack on Norway and ...like the Labour party, people from the labour party who were kinda under attack ...teenagers...and still like not high up in the party and was not ...directed at the partywas also like the government head quarters was a pretty big bomb blast...

Hard to distinguish between labour party and norweigan political culture ... so a lot of people ...the other parties felt that the labour party used it unfairly and a lot of people who – in the general public who are not member of the party also felt that the Labour party was kind of pushing this victimhood agenda... „¹⁰²⁸

There were conflicting views in terms of the role played by politicians in the response:

“[t]here has been too little discussion around it [terrorism] I think ... I had expected the Labour Party would have been more angry, they were attacked. I think they were so afraid of being accused of using the things of 22nd July and the politics so they were silent”¹⁰²⁹

“... there has certainly been more focus on security and I think one of the reasons is when Norway has right-wingish government now is because of mistakes that were made by the Labour government and how they handled the terrorist attack and how they handled the kind of security aspects of it but also how they tried to politicise it in ways that the public may not have seen as that skewed if you know what I mean. „¹⁰³⁰

One respondent spoke about how the politicians, in the aftermath realising the mistakes of the police force response, failed to take responsibility

“the minister of justice who was in charge of the police left the office in the fall of 2011 ...for what he claimed was personal reasons... admittance of that might have been a better way. Admittance had been a better way to do it. ”¹⁰³¹

¹⁰²⁸ Interviewee – victim (Norway).

¹⁰²⁹ Interviewee – victim (Norway).

¹⁰³⁰ Interviewee – victim (Norway).

¹⁰³¹ Interviewee – victim (Norway).

But the respondents highlighted that the AUF had been more outspoken while highlighting the need for debate on terrorism, and particularly right-wing terrorism.¹⁰³² Other reflections on the discourse in Norway after 22/7:

“Immediately after the incident, one year after the incidents when all the investigation were, we were going through and the police was heavily criticised because of lack of capacity to stop him earlier. So it was quite a lot of investigations going on and then we had the focus on the police and the society and the politicians, their capacity to make changes, be talking about changes but we hadn’t been able to make the changes. So then I think that the discussion was quite, it was quite good discussion, we had all the problems up on the table and but then after 1 year, 2 years it just began to be a lot of politics. How to do it, how to organise the police, how to organise the society against terrorism, it just became into the politicians again and then the focus to do the main thing, to prepare the society for these things, to think about security, to think about, to accept that terrorism is a part of every country’s future. Because in Norway ... in Norway there’s been ... naïvety.”¹⁰³³

Respondents spoke about how “the politicians right afterwards they said we will not, we will not do things in another way after this” and how “[l]ife will go on and we will not let us be dictated from terrorists and how those promises failed. We have changed”.¹⁰³⁴ Respondents also framed it as that the migration crisis in Europe in general might have affected politics in Norway.

“Comfort culture” and disavowing politics

One of the striking features of the 22/7 terror attack is the attack on the Norwegian democracy itself. The fact that the government quarters and the future leaders of the labor party were targeted in particular has resulted in confusion as to distinguish between the attack being on Norway’s democracy or the governing party of the Labour Party and what the party stands for.

¹⁰³² Information gathered from data collection.

¹⁰³³ Interviewee – stakeholder (Norway).

¹⁰³⁴ Interviewee – stakeholder (Norway).

“Noone in Norway saw this coming ... and I think Norway was extremely unprepared for something like this happening.

The initial response was one of shock and of kind of unity against this extreme violence and that was very good ... but then, very quickly, it’s kind of dissolved into ehh a matter of responsibility and who didn’t take responsibility of security and how to better secure our societies and then eventually kind of Norway jumped back to “all terrorists are muslims” ... very quickly.”¹⁰³⁵

“The initial unity against violence quickly kind of became something else in terms of how to respond to terrorism ... and in many ways responses to terrorism classically in especially in kind of the Western Europe is to use violence against violence and I don’t think that is particularly helpful so I kind of stood on the lets try to find peaceful ways of making our societies more resilient to violent extremism and acknowledge the fact this is something that comes from our own societies and problems in our own societies that we need to deal with, rather than, kind of, externalising it and saying this is resolved of something foreign or people being mentally ill or you know, all these things that we have tendency to blame rather than looking at our own faults.”¹⁰³⁶

The above demonstrates how the victim frames the events as very quickly becoming politicised, which relates back to Sturken’s concept of “comfort culture”, a notion that serves as a “form of depoliticization and as a means to confront loss, grief, and fear through processes that disavow politics”.¹⁰³⁷ The victim notes how the Norwegian public punished the Labour party for politicising the 22/7 and for pushing a victimhood agenda. However, as Sturken has noted, this disavowal can serve to promote political agendas, which “tend to be politically regressive in that they are attempts to mediate loss through finding the good – a newfound patriotism, feelings of community – that has come through pain.”¹⁰³⁸

¹⁰³⁵ Interviewee – victim (Norway).

¹⁰³⁶ Interviewee – victim (Norway).

¹⁰³⁷ Ibid., pp. 687-688.

¹⁰³⁸ Sturken, 2002: 382.

One of the participants interviewed noted the below about how the terror attack forced the Norwegian society's attention inward questioning how the society could have produced such evil:

First of all, I'm ...when this happened, ummm...you know... ideas the first thing you thought about was that this was ... ehh... not done by a Norwegian, it was done by an immigrant, it was done by probably a muslim, so it was almost good to hear that it was not done by a muslim ... that it was one of us. Because if it had been a Muslim that had done this it would have much more changes in the political climate than it had when it was one of us. I think the political climate now would have to turn the attention inward to our society that has managed to produce such an evil ... evildoer... who could do such a thing.

Multi-culturalism, of course, which he attacked ... and the idea of Eurabia ... we see now when the Syrians are coming to Europe that ehmm ...the political climate is not affected by this terrorist attack. On the contrary, it almost seems like the political climate is more accepting and multi-culturalism now than it was before... Fortunately, I would say...¹⁰³⁹

So while some have perceived the political climate to have been hardened, made evident by frequent hatespeech, the above illustrates another development whereby multiculturalism has been emphasised since the attack. In reflecting over Breivik's purpose with the attack, one respondent points to a key factor in terms of how 'he wanted to bring Norway down with him', illuminating why the response has been focussing on 'democracy', 'democracy learning' and 'democracy workshops' ...

Well, I mean, obviously, it was ehm... a psychological need. He needed to become 'somebody', and he was nobody. So, obviously, he found his own helplessness, as Seierstad also says ... 'to be helped out by committing this kind of act', you know, he, he wanted to bring Norway down with him, so to speak, and especially that socialdemocratic party and the young people in the sociademocratic party that he felt was more responsible for the multiculturalism that he hated ...and the, this, this ehm ... future that he had predicted as being Eurabia – that Europe would be taken over by Islam – so

¹⁰³⁹ Interviewee – Norway (stakeholder)

*that's what he wanted to achieve, wasn't it. But I think it's a combination of a personal need, and that he has coupled up with some kind of political ideas.*¹⁰⁴⁰

Some of the victims also expressed that they thought the debate on the terror attack had been ‘muted’: “[t]here has been too little discussions around it I think”¹⁰⁴¹. Respondents expressed that they thought the Labour Party were afraid of “being accused on using the things of 22nd July and the politics” which is why they remained silent.¹⁰⁴²

Memorials

In the aftermath of the 22/7 attacks, the actual physical terrorist attack sites emerged as a contentious issue. The symbolic character of the target sites was particularly challenging: the government quarters (representing the highest powers of Norway) together with the Utøya youth league summer camp (fostering the development of potential future leaders of Norway). Given that the Norway terror attacks affected one in every four Norwegians, the matter of memorials has become a large part of the response to the terror attacks, with many local memorials around Norway. As noted by Wendy Vogel, in exploring the meaning of memorials in Norway: “In this context, art was viewed as one method of speaking truth to power”.¹⁰⁴³

The below will outline some of the key features of the memorials (including the spontaneous, national and local memorials) while depicting Young’s communicative aspect of memorials: ‘commemorialisation as to what end?’

- Spontaneous memorials and shrines

Spontaneous memorial sites and monuments appeared during the period following the attacks. One was the sea of flowers outside Oslo Cathedral, where eventually the loveheart-shaped sculpture by Espen Hilde was set up¹⁰⁴⁴, and the other was ‘The

¹⁰⁴⁰ Interviewee – Norway (stakeholder).

¹⁰⁴¹ Interviewee – victim (Norway).

¹⁰⁴² Information gathered from interviews.

¹⁰⁴³ Vogel, W. 2016. “The Story of Norway’s Multiple July 22 Memorials”, *Hyperallergic*, published online 21 November.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Please see Figures 53-55 in Appendices.

'Altar', an informal memorial at Utvika in Hole municipality, where people laid flowers, photographs and small objects in memory of those who had died.

The actual fate of the spontaneous memorials at Utøya has become an expression for the local resistance and conflict of interests amongst the affected communities and stakeholders. On the mainland, overlooking Utøya Island, there was a large stone called "The Altar" that acted as a key spot for spontaneous shrines for many of the victims' families. That same stone was physically relocated from its original spot near the waterfront, to a highway (E16) closeby, as the frequent visits to the stone frustrated the locals living in the area.¹⁰⁴⁵ A lot of the victims were very upset and since "very few people use it and it was destroyed the minute they moved it."¹⁰⁴⁶

- *National memorial: "Memory Wound" – a clash between local vs national meanings*

Much similar to the 9/11-memorial process, in 2012 the Norwegian government decided to establish official memorial sites to "honour the victims, the survivors, the emergency services, and the many members of the public who assisted both during and after the attacks", by seeking proposals for the memorial.¹⁰⁴⁷ This government plan included two memorials: one permanent memorial in Hole municipality; and a temporary memorial in the government quarters.¹⁰⁴⁸ Proposals for the memorial were sought internationally with a jury consisting of representatives from the national support group for victims of the attacks, the AUF, the government as well as artists and art experts. In February 2014 the Swedish artist Jonas Dahlberg's proposal "Memory wound" was announced as the winner,

Dahlberg's proposal for the Sørbråten memorial involves physically slicing through the peninsula. The slice will create a "wound" in nature that will evoke in a concrete and brutal manner the loss of the young people killed at Utøya. The names of those who died will be engraved on one of the stone walls opened up by the "slice" through the rock.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Information gathered from interviews/fieldwork. Please see appendices, Figures 27-28.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Information gathered from interviews.

¹⁰⁴⁷ <https://publicartnorway.org/prosjekter/memorial-sites-after-22-july/>

¹⁰⁴⁸ The temporary memorial will be replaced by a permanent one once the reconstruction of the government quarters is completed.

Jonas Dahlberg's proposal for the memorial site on the Sørbråten peninsula in Hole municipality evokes the physical feeling of loss, symbolizing the wound inflicted on the victims, their families, and the whole of Norway by the Utøya massacre on 22 July 2011.

The memorials will be open to many different interpretations, both by people today and by future generations.

Dahlberg has said that the Oslo memorial should be "a place for the ongoing dialogue that forms the basis of tolerance – precisely what so many of those who were directly affected by the attacks were so passionately engaged in."

While the out-of-the-way location of the Sørbråten memorial will encourage peaceful contemplation, the memorial in Oslo will be much more readily accessible and will probably become the site of official commemorations.¹⁰⁴⁹

The plan was therefore to have the sliced piece from Sørbråten peninsula transferred to the government quarters to connect the two memorial sites. However, the plans for the original memorial have since been cancelled as it was perceived too controversial, gathering resistance from both the locals and some of the victims, with experts maintaining the rock was too soft for the actual design to work in practice.¹⁰⁵⁰ This highlights Low's discussion on *social production/social construction* of space, and how the symbolic ideas (social construction) may not translate into materialisation (social production).

The "Memory Wound" proposal has become a key case of how national and local meanings clash and provides an illustrative *field* or *arena* of the meaning-making process around the 22/7-terror attack. The controversy and discourse surrounding the 'Memory Wound' exposes the limitations of how much 'meaning' and 'performative change' that memorials are allowed to affect. As one art critic commentator put it:

*"Dahlberg's proposal ... risked being coercive; its conceptual complexity had an effect of exalting the artist as a maestro of mourning. Its cancellation leaves an object lesson. By crossing lines of propriety, "Memory Wound" scouted where and what the lines may be."*¹⁰⁵¹

¹⁰⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁰ "Norway PM rings Utøya mum over national memorial"; "The Story of Norway's Multiple July 22 Memorials"

¹⁰⁵¹ Ibid.

Oslo government quarters

The same architect firm that developed the idea for the memorial on Utøya has been engaged to give form to the temporary memorial at the Government quarters in Oslo.¹⁰⁵² The final location of the memorial will be affected by the actual rebuild of the new government quarters however proximity to the scene has been an important factor for the actors involved. The national victims support group after 22 July together with AUF have been, and intend to continue so, instrumental in the decision-making process to date. Given the damage caused on the government buildings after the bomb, the area has been closed for renovation. However, during the decision-making process of what the new government quarters would look like, a temporary exhibition called the ‘22 July Centre’ was opened in September 2015.

- Temporary memorial at Johan Nygaardsvolds plass

On the seventh anniversary of 22/7, in July 2018, a memorial was unveiled at the government quarters in Oslo, in Johan Nygaardsvolds plass.¹⁰⁵³ The memorial is officially ‘temporary’ given that when the actual rebuild and renovation of the government quarters (which were badly damaged in the terror attack¹⁰⁵⁴) eventually begins it will have to be relocated. The memorial “resembles broken glass as a symbol of the damage caused by the bomb” and has all the names and ages of the victims inscribed. Many have stressed the importance of a memorial in Oslo’s Regjeringskvarteret (Government quarters), which is home to many official buildings:

“It is like a gravestone and a collective memorial for those who lost loved ones. It is also a part of Norway’s history”¹⁰⁵⁵

¹⁰⁵² “Midlertidig minnestad i regjeringskvarteret”, <http://www.statsbygg.no/Nytt-fra-Statsbygg/Nyheter/2017/Midlertidig-minnested-i-regjeringskvarteret/>

¹⁰⁵³ “Norway unveils Utøya memorial on day of remembrance”, *The Local*, published online 23 July 2018, <https://www.thelocal.no/20180723/norway-unveils-utøya-monument-on-day-of-remembrance>

¹⁰⁵⁴ Please see Figures 19-23, 31-32, 37-40 and 48-52 in Appendices.

¹⁰⁵⁵ A quote by Jonas Gahr Støre, the Leader of the Labour Party in Norway, at the unveiling of the memorial.

- *Newspaper panel – “Relocating the Past: Ruins for the Future”*

On the meaning of the newspaper panel that was preserved from the day of the attacks, and transformed into an artwork as part of the project “Relocating the Past: Ruins for the Future” initiated by Ahmad Ghossein¹⁰⁵⁶:

The newspaper edition in question reads a date that could be as prosaic and unremarkable as the display case itself: 22nd of July 2011. This is all that is needed to completely shift our perception of what we are dealing with, because the glass is broken. It was broken by an act of terror that left its signature in the midst of everyday life, thereby changing it irreversibly.

When we say, write, or read this it is from a specific perspective, a place in time: *after* the terrorist attack. What this partially destroyed panel and its newspaper edition does is to mark a *before* – in a sense a *last* before: the last newspaper a VG worker had time to put up before Norway was struck by the worst act of terror in the nations peace-time history.

To regard this panel today, in its ruined and therefore authentic condition, as damaged rather than intact, to regard it as attacked, just as so many others that afternoon – is to stand in *a here and now*, a retrospective one, and maintain a contact – confrontation – with a *here and then*. That contact is so direct since the two different moments in time share an actual place: it happened precisely here. I have a part in, an access to, the moment it happened because my placement on the world, in the world, is precisely where it happened. That access is not abstract, not fictional or of the imagination but concrete, physical: here.¹⁰⁵⁷

Exploring the meaning of the “Relocating the Past” newspaper panel, Thomas Hylland Eriksen relates it to Benedict Anderson’s concept of ‘Imagined Community’ and the central symbol of the memorial to an Unknown Soldier. The role of nationalism therefore becomes about the ability to imagine a community, “[m]etaphorically we are one big family, you and the millions of people you will never know.”¹⁰⁵⁸

In nations like Norway, the battle is not about whether nationalism has a right to life in our century, but about what kind of nationalism should be encouraged – an ethno-cultural version where only the descendants of Vikings or someone resembling Vikings are true members of the nation (think of the statements that claim Oslo will have a majority of foreign citizens by 2040) or a republican version where place, not blood, creates community.¹⁰⁵⁹

¹⁰⁵⁶ For more about the project, please see <https://koro.no/prosjekter/relocating-the-past-ruins-for-the-future/>

¹⁰⁵⁷ “Relocating the Past: Ruins for the Future”, <https://koro.no/content/uploads/2015/01/Publikasjon-Ruins-for-the-future-eng.pdf>

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ibid.

In this context, the Unknown Soldier “is the anonymous young man who bravely gave his life defending the nations borders. No one knows who he was, or rather: He was everybody and nobody’s son, brother and lover”.¹⁰⁶⁰ Hylland Eriksen notes how Anderson saw these monuments to the Unknown Soldier “as a highlight of abstract identification”: “[y]ou can visit them, lay down your flowers and cry sad tears over the loss of an abstract person who fills you with emotion since he incarnates the nation, your metaphorical family”.¹⁰⁶¹ However, no such monuments exist in Norway:

It must be coincidence that Norway is one of the few countries missing a memorial to an Unknown Soldier. A simple explanation could be Norway’s absence from the First World War. The country does have its share of World War II Memorials, but these are usually monuments with names that give them local significance, thereby losing some of their universal message.¹⁰⁶²

Hylland Eriksen suggests that the ‘Relocating the Past’ newspaper panel could embody the same function as the more antiquated memorials around the world commemorating the Unknown Soldier. This is subject to its possible future significance – “in itself, of course, it means nothing. No object has any other meaning than what man projects upon it. But people are different. An ambiguous symbol like this VG newspaper panel will undoubtedly come to mean many things”.¹⁰⁶³

Something got broken for most of us when the first images of dead victims from Utøya and the government buildings were published. These dead were unknown soldiers, anonymous, but more real than the abstract soldier at Champs-Élysées. All though most of us who saw these images didn’t know the victims, we still felt like we knew them all. Among both dead and survivors there were youth from all across the country, with both minority and majority backgrounds. This diversity becoming a grotesque but especially pertinent comment to those who inspired the terrorist, meaning those who regard Muslim immigration as a betrayal of the national concept, of democracy and freedom.

The VG panel in Akersgata is a self-made monument. There are subtle associations to the shot-out walls of Sarajevo, the NATO bombed buildings in central Beograd (which until recently were left unchanged as memorials), damaged bridges and burnt-out tanks, all of which could be infused with meaning as ‘readymade’ artworks. But this newspaper panel is fundamentally different than all of those. It is no relic of war; on the contrary it is an afterthought, a side effect

¹⁰⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶² Ibid.

¹⁰⁶³ Ibid.

and a contradictory reminder of the shock that struck the country on that dark and rainy day in July 2011.¹⁰⁶⁴

When foreign colleagues or journalists come visit me and we stroll through the parts of central Oslo that were damaged by the terrorist attack, we always stop in front of the VG panel. I translate some headlines and explain the context; Yes, July is the primary holiday month above all others for Norwegians and the whole country is practically closed down during the last two to three weeks of this month. The newspapers are barely published. And sure, we call this period in the press *cucumber time* because the annual cucumber harvest is the most exciting thing they can find to write about. And absolutely, the police were completely unprepared for the terrorist attack and acted accordingly. Typically, I add, the debate post 22nd of July was more about police mistakes and the terrorists traumatic childhood than about the political hatred that motivated him and where he may have cultivated it.¹⁰⁶⁵

This panel is perhaps most precisely read as a monument to the element of chance that shapes our lives and to the fundamental unpredictability of existence. From one day to the next we went from being annoyed at a terrible summer to wondering if democracy had any future at all. We had met absolute evil in a country that had long marketed itself as a gross exporter of goodness and when the dust settled, we were left knowing that, when we least expect it, something similar could happen again. The VG panel from July 22nd 2011 says nothing about the Unknown Soldier, he who gave his life to protect the nations borders against foreign enemies. Instead it tells the story of an inner enemy who broke our idyllic existence with the blood of others, the monster that could emerge at any time, anywhere. A monster that is harder to talk about than both the Unknown Soldier and an external enemy, because we created it ourselves.

1066

¹⁰⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Ibid.

Conclusion

Revisiting the research questions R1, R2 and R3 posed in the beginning of the chapter, i.e. *how have the discourses surrounding the terror attack sites evolved? What are the shared understandings of the problem and how to best respond to it? How has the local resilience taken shape, and what are the key manifestations?* a few key observations became salient and will be discussed in more detail in the below. In conclusion, this section will discuss the findings in terms of the local resilience that has emerged and key manifestations in each case study.

How have the discourses surrounding the terror attack sites evolved?

As already established and noted by Stow, recent work in political theory on memory, mourning, and memorialisation, demonstrate that “the manner of remembrance, grieving, and commemoration employed by a democratic polity help to shape political outcomes”.¹⁰⁶⁷ It therefore becomes key to explore how the discourses surrounding the meaning-making practice around the terror attack sites have evolved to elicit how the response may prompt or inhibit effective platforms for norm diffusion against VE from a CVE aspect.

In this sense, the *social production* and *social construction* of the sites becomes key, and what Tumarkin identified as our specific *needs* from these sites. These discourses entail numerous players and arenas, and the sites have in essence become subject to *a contestation of meaning-making practices*. Key in this context, as stressed by Low, is that given the “memorial talk” gatekeepers in the form of media and their representation of it – certain meanings are often given more leverage than others.

The meaning-making practice around these sites therefore has very much to do with the fact of whose voices are being heard. In order to break down and grasp the discourses surrounding the sites some key discursive instruments were identified. Greenspan’s typology of *what should be built? How should we decide? And what do different choices say about us?* These questions acted as guiding principles to grasp the meaning-making practices around the sites, together with Laclau and Mouffe’s antagonism oriented discourse analysis to identify the contestation of meanings, and the frame analysis employed for the interviews.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Stow, S. 2012: 687.

Bali

The overriding theme in the Bali case has been that of ‘peace’. The analysis identified how the responses and the discourse following the terror attack has revolved around the Bali ‘peace’ notion: ‘the echoe peace’ festivals around the anniversary to advocate for interfaith, multiculturalism and tolerance; ‘the peace park’ proposal; ‘the internal peace process’ of the Balinese etc. – ‘peace’ has come to embody most elements of the response to date. Simultaneously, ‘peace’ translates into different things for different people, and the obvious lack of ‘a shared understanding’ of what a ‘peace park’ would entail, has turned out to be an obstacle for a constructive response.

In this sense, the discourse surrounding the Bali site has evolved as a three-fold process including the national, international and local dimensions and imbued meanings. These three levels each in turn involve various “players and arenas”. One of the most striking elements about the Bali case is how the response to the site reflects a total disconnection between these three discourses, where the commemoration, using Bodnar’s terminology, has mainly been dominated by what he refers to as the *national memorialisation*.

Whereas the national meanings have set the tone as evidenced by the stature of the Kuta memorial, perhaps also to some degree brokered by international pressure to commemorate the many international victims, it is evident that the Bali case fits the description of *national memorialization*, which essentially “constitutes a form of forgetting”.¹⁰⁶⁸ In order to resume the Bali tourism industry, ‘forgetting’ becomes key.

Meanwhile, the local Balinese community speak of ‘forgiving, but not forgetting’ and have a mixed approach to the site of the Sari Club. Much similar to the findings of Low exploring the local communities of New York post-9/11, the local Balinese community has – particularly following the cleansing of the Sari Club site – been more preoccupied with providing for their livelihood, i.e. bringing business back, than concerned with the form of commemoration of the victims. However, in this context it is important to note that most of the stakeholders framed a concern how *the site must be respected* and that a Peace Park would constitute the most appropriate approach to the site.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Edkins in Stow, *ibid.*

The Australian stakeholders constitute the actors most preoccupied to preserve the memory of the victims by building a Peace Park. This preoccupation with the Sari Club site relates back to Tumarkin's notion of 'what is it that we need from these sites' and how the Western culture, in the absence of physical remains of the bodies of loved ones, cultivates an inexplicable bond to these 'traumascapes' – "in the absence of bodies, sites of death become substitutes for graves, the centrepieces of the rituals families and loved ones need to carry out to honour their dead".¹⁰⁶⁹

The Bali case involves three main competing discourses based on Tumarkin's concept of 'what is it that we need from these sites': i) a *national* one of 'forgetting', ii) a *local* one of 'forgiving, but not forgetting' iii) and finally, an *international* one of 'honouring the memory of loved ones fixated on the Sari Club site'. However, some common 'shared understandings' appears to have materialised along the trajectory of the response to the site to date.

- Norway

One of the key manifestations of the intersubjectivity or shared understandings of the problem has been how the response has very much been understood as a reaction to 9/11. Early on, it became evident that the Norwegian people had a clear 'shared understanding' of what they *didn't* want the response to be – based on the insights from the failures of US policy following 9/11.

Instead, there was a shared understanding that rather than fuelling further hatred and division within the Norwegian society, the response should be one of spreading more love and unity. This was clearly demonstrated by the rose ceremony which gathered hundred thousands of people to the streets in order to display their solidarity with the victims of the attacks.

The Norway case discourse has very much revolved around the concepts of "one of us", "Norwegian identity" and "democracy-learning". The commemoration mode matches that of *vernacular mode of memorialisation*, where the local meanings are embedded, evident throughout the many memorials built since the attacks.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Tumarkin, 2005:72.

Problematisation: Discursive, subjectification and lived effects

Following from the discussion above in regards to the ‘*shared understandings of the problem*’ in responding to the sites, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, Bacchi’s typology becomes useful in order to comprehend the effects produced by certain problem representations. Bacchi distinguished between i) *discursive effects*: effects which follow from the limits imposed on what can be thought or said; ii) *subjectification effects*: the ways in which subjects and subjectivities are constituted in discourse; iii) *lived effects*: the impact on life and death. Each of the three discursive components will be discussed exploring how the problem representations in each case study discourse may have effects beyond the discourse.

- Discursive effects

As has become evident throughout the analysis above, the fact that the Peace Park is yet to be realised has resulted in large part of the discourse on the response has been channelled on the Bali Peace Park and the efforts required to materialise it. Subsequently, the *discourse* has been centred on the BPPAI securing the funds needed to be able to purchase the land of the Sari Club site. In this sense, the Sari Club site could be argued to be dominated by the official narrative and meanings attributed – consisting of the official memorial across the street – while the local meanings attributed (what Stow terms the vernacular meanings) are still locked in the battles over the land dispute. One illustrative example is how during some of the interviews conducted (in 2014) the local victim’s groups did not appear to be aware of the Peace Park project, however since then they have been incorporated on the BPPAI website.¹⁰⁷⁰

How we remember says something about our present, past and future. If the memory (and thereby the discourse) does not entail anything about the terror attack, will it in turn prevent these incidents from taking place in the future? How do we learn from the past if the present discourse is concealed from the negative aspects of the past in order to ensure a peaceful future? The actual *functional form* of the Peace Park will be key for the discursive effects it will generate in the future. The current form of

¹⁰⁷⁰ The researcher noted how the BBPAI now sells a book written by one of the local Balinese victim’s groups.

memorialisation provided by the official, national memorial fit with the purpose of what Young identified as *attracting tourists* and '*forgetting*'.

Meanwhile, in the Norway case, as part of the overall response, which has been characterised by emphasising more openness, democracy and transparency, the actual meaning-making practice of 22/7 has become a process of *engaging the public into the meaning-making process*. This is evident for example in the data gathered from the social media posts by the 22 July centre and the workshops they organise to discuss what the incident means, keeping the meaning-making *open-ended*. Both the 22/7 centre and the democracy workshops delivered on Utøya provide, what Nonaka and Konno identified as places of 'ba': "a shared space that serves as a foundation for knowledge creation".¹⁰⁷¹

In this sense, the Norway case fits the framework of what Stow defines as vernacular memorialisation, whereby the local meanings are attributed. It has also enabled a sense of closure for victims and other stakeholders that were worst affected by the terror attack.

However, it is worthwhile noting that concurrently, the experience of particularly some of the victims, was that Breivik's attack had in fact 'opened Pandora's box' for right-wing extremist views and that hate speech had in fact become more common particularly in social media forums on the Internet.

- Subjectification effects

The official response that followed the Bali bombings has very much set the tone for the overall (dis)course in terms of the rebuild and response to the actual site(s). The official memorial built in memory of the 202 victims has widely been interpreted as 'lip service' by the Indonesian government given the international character of the tragedy. It appears that the victims in the Bali case have been subjectified to the margins by the discourse of the rebuild of the Bali bombing site(s).

Similarly, in the Norway case, such a climate has ensued that the victims of the 22 July terror attacks are continually abused on social media.¹⁰⁷² Thus, while the public response and discourse following the attack was very much focused on emphasising a

¹⁰⁷¹ Nonaka & Konno, 1998: 40.

¹⁰⁷² Information gathered from data collection.

reaction which contrasted that in America after 9/11, highlighting messages of ‘tolerance’, ‘love’ and ‘unity’, it has simultaneously witnessed the victims’ subjectification position gradually move outside the realm of respectful discourse.

Another subjectification effect has been the level of attention provided for Breivik. This becomes key given that Herostratic terrorism is all about notoriety. There have been explicit concerns over the publicity and attention provided for the perpetrator, raised by the victims in particular, such as when Breivik was suing the Norwegian state for inhumane treatment in prison.

The key shared understanding that the first respondents, particularly the police, failed in their task of responding to the terror attacks has meant that the discourse surrounding the response to 22/7 has very much centred around the subsequent police force reform. This is why some of the interview participants mentioned the trust issue between people in terms of security following the attacks, whereby Norwegian police were issued with weapons complicating human communication.

The Norway case also illustrates the dilemma of ‘disavowing politics’ and ‘comfort culture’ following a terror attack. Although the efforts particularly by the 22/7 centre has been focussed on *inclusion* in terms of the *meaning-making practice* around 22/7, by explicitly inviting the Norwegians to engage in the meaning-making process, the actual focus on the trauma has led to political inertia.

- Lived effects

The very unsatisfactory accomplishments to date in terms of materialising the ‘shared understanding of the problem’ and, in turn, what should in fact be done about it, has affected the lives of the many victims affected by the Bali bombings. As became evident by the data, many of the victims have expressed how the realisation of a Pecae Park would be a big step towards rectifying the injustice caused by the Bali bombings.

It is quite clear that in the Norway case, when exploring the lived effects of the problem representation, the victims have in many ways already achieved a high degree of closure. The fact that the response to the sites has evolved as much as it has since 2011 makes the lived effects of the victims a positive experience where possible. However, the political inertia that has followed in terms of inaction against

the extremist views that gave way for Breivik have also led to the victims becoming pawns of the (right-wing) discourse experiencing death threats and abuse.

How has the local resilience taken shape? What are the key manifestations?

Given that the ultimate objective of terrorism is in essence the psychological impact that it conveys on a society, local resilience becomes key. The destruction of buildings and infrastructure can be remedied, but the experience, terror and trauma of the attack lives on in the minds of the affected people, which is essentially why terrorism constitutes “a battle for hearts and minds” and why the meanings attached become(s) key. The battle against terrorism and VE can therefore be argued to be fought in the minds of the people, meaning that intersubjectivity, the shared understandings, becomes central.

- Bali: Resilience – introspection and bringing back tourism

When exploring the resilience that has taken place as a response to the attacks, it is clear how a multi-level analysis is required to identify the various aspects of resilience that has materialised. The form of the resilience is subject to the social fabric and social capital pertinent to the communities in question. Revisiting the definition of resilience,

it is in the broadest sense and with numerous variations used to capture an individual’s, an organization’s, or a society’s ability to continue to function in the face of adversity, to restore normalcy, to learn, find solutions, and move on¹⁰⁷³

it becomes obvious that in the Bali case the resilience has taken various forms. When considering the narrative of the terrorists and their intention of disrupting the tourist economy, the overall focus on recovering the Bali tourism becomes a key part of the counter-narrative and local resistance. A lot of the local resilience in Bali has consisted of a introspective process, as part of the cultural traditions of the region. It therefore has not focussed as much on the Sari Club site as the Australian victims, for whom resilience becomes an ‘outward-looking’ process.

Meanwhile, the Norway response has in large been filtered through the notion of *democracy*, where the terror attack has been very much interpreted as an attack on Norwegian democracy, given the symbolic targeting of the government quarters and

¹⁰⁷³ Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016: 320.

the future political leaders. Therefore the response to the attacks, both in the government quarter and Utøya sites, has revolved around the notion of ‘democracy’ and how to proceed in responding to the sites in a way that best preserves the Norwegian notion of democracy.

As has become manifest throughout the analysis, the symbolic meaning-making practice around Utøya goes beyond that of targeting the AUF given the historical symbolism of the island. Returning the camps to the island and it becoming a hub for ‘democracy learning’ provides a strong counter-narrative and example of local resilience. As framed by Fagerland, “Utøya got up”. This response is reflected in the functions of both the 22 July centre in Oslo and the functions of some of the refurbished buildings, such as the café building, on Utøya. Both venues act, as Fagerland observed, as ‘verkstad’ – workshops – which he identifies as the ultimate *concept of democracy* and finally, for future generations to reflect upon the events.

Whose ideas matter?

The theme ‘democracy’ has also had a role in the Bali case in the sense that the local government has a sensitive balancing act role in, on one hand, respectfully listening to the wishes of the victims, and on the other, not interfering but let the democratic process take its natural course, i.e. not to be seen as forcing its power on to the landowner.

Furthermore, on the role of *whose ideas matter*, in the words of Turmarkin, on the purpose of these sites: “[t]raumascapes were often these kinds of spaces, spaces that allowed thoughts and feelings to crystallise, to find their right pitch and their singular expression” it appears clear that in the Bali case this “singular expression” or “shared understanding” has become a struggle.

However, while ‘peace’ has clearly emerged as a higher order theme, encapsulating the key concept guiding the response to the site, it is less obvious what is actually meant by ‘peace’ when referred to the “Peace Park”. Therefore, while most affected communities and stakeholders now agree upon the idea of a Peace Park on the site, the lack of a ‘*shared understanding*’ (or what Turmakin calls a *singular expression*) has been one of the key reasons impeding the fulfilment. In this sense, ideas of ‘peace’ and the Peace Park has in fact given way for discord instead of perhaps the originally desired goal of more unanimity.

Conclusively, if one explores the ideas and shared understandings revolving the sites it becomes clear that the *narratives* and *themes* that have emerged appear to constitute a better fit with Briggs and Feve's 'alternative narratives' (positive stories about social values, tolerance, openness, freedom and democracy) rather than 'counter-narratives' (which tend to challenge through ideology, logic, fact or humour). Further discussion on this element of the research will be found in Chapter 6 and 7.

Commemorialisation – as to what end?

Revisiting Young's key question on the purpose of remembering – to what end? – the question relates back to Greenspan's third point: *what we decide to build says about 'us'*. Given the most recent development in the Bali case, with impending construction of a five storey building on the site, it appears that the *national* mode of memorialisation, i.e. 'forgetting', has superseded the local and international modes of memorialisation. As recognised by Young, simply *remembering* the Bali Bombings is not enough, the question to ask is to what end have we remembered?: "[t]his is to recognize that the shape of memory cannot be divorced from the actions taken in its behalf, and that memory without consequences contains the seeds of its own destruction."¹⁰⁷⁴

For were we passively to remark only the contours of these memorials, were we to leave unexplored their genesis and remain unchanged by the recollective act, it could be said that we have not remembered at all.¹⁰⁷⁵

The above quote, together with Stow's concept of how we memorialise will ultimately help shape political outcomes, indicates that there is great potential for P/CVE purposes in terms of how we chose to respond to these sites. The Norway case is a very illustrative example of this, where the memorials have been incorporated with local meanings and the tacit knowledge provided by these "places of 'ba'" have been utilised to not only educate future generations, but also engage people in 'democracy'. As Young illustratively recognised, "memory that disables life has failed, but memory that enables life ... then we have success".¹⁰⁷⁶

¹⁰⁷⁴ Young, J. E. *The Texture of Memory*

¹⁰⁷⁵ Young, J. E. *The Texture of Memory*

¹⁰⁷⁶ "Tilbake till Utøya", <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqOPew5ZJKA>

Chapter 5: CT as collective action

Based on the findings from the previous chapter on finding meaning at terror attack sites, this chapter explores how performative acts for social change may develop into collective action. Utilising Hutchison's notion of trauma extended from the individual to the collective together with Putnam's concepts of bonding and bridging social capital, the chapter will explore how the stakeholders have acted as norm entrepreneurs for norm diffusion. As outlined in the Research Design chapter, the R4 and R5 to be addressed in this chapter:

R4: How has social capital played a role in the agency of the affected communities and their response(s) to the sites?

R5: What performative acts for social change have emerged? And in this sense, how could the affected communities act as norm entrepreneurs?

The sub-questions to be answered in this chapter therefore become:

- *How has the community engagement, as identified by Briggs, taken shape in the case studies? What kind of collective action for social change has emerged? What role does social capital have in the responses to the terror attack sites? How can/does the responses to the terror attack sites provide norm setting against VE/terrorism? How can/does the victims act as norm entrepreneurs?*

Extending trauma from the individual to the collective through representation

Discussing the importance of spontaneous shrines, Tumarkin observes how “the need to mark places of trauma and death is so strong in part because trauma often cannot be marked in time”.¹⁰⁷⁷ Research studying the aftermath of traumatic events has found that “more than anything, such events tend to change dramatically the way in which people experience time”.¹⁰⁷⁸ Rather than a straight linear time-line, the “post-

¹⁰⁷⁷ Tumarkin, 2005, *Traumascapes*, p. 79

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid.

traumatic time flows from the past to the present” in a non-linear and volatile way.¹⁰⁷⁹

In fact, the most commonly diagnosed condition in survivors of trauma – post-traumatic stress disorder (PSTD) – is in essence a disorder of time, defined “by the way people’s past invades their present through flashbacks, intrusive thoughts and compulsive re-enactments”.¹⁰⁸⁰

Therefore, time becomes replaced by space: “[t]raumatic experiences, it seems, rupture time – make time stop, go backwards or lose any meaning”.¹⁰⁸¹ In this sense, as Tumarkin notes, “events that cannot be fixed in time are often fixed in space”¹⁰⁸²:

When it comes to traumatic events, to the loss that eschews time, in Shanksville, in New York, in Port Arthur, in Bali, on the roads and highways of many nations, the time and reality of death becomes embedded in traumascapes. The world may have moved on, the deaths may have been forgotten, the memories may have become slippery or faint, but at those places, the presence of loss is solid, permanent, everlasting.¹⁰⁸³

Therefore, Tumarkin’s notion of trauma is not as a medical condition or a pathological state but as “an individual and collective response to loss and suffering – an ongoing response that affects people at their very core”.¹⁰⁸⁴

As discussed in Chapter 2, trauma is an inherent dimension of any response to terror attack sites. The conventional perception of trauma tends to be as a phenomenon best described as something ‘individual’ and ‘incommunicable’, however, Hutchison argues that individual trauma can be extended to the collective through representation:

[p]opular representations can mediate and attribute trauma with emotional meanings that are instrumental to the construction or consolidation of wider political communities... Focusing on the role of emotions in particular, I scrutinize how traumatic events can be represented in ways that make them meaningful to a wider community: to those who do not experience trauma directly but only bear witness, from a distance.¹⁰⁸⁵

The key therefore becomes *representations of trauma*, which often “draw attention to the harrowing nature of traumatic events: they signify shock, vulnerability and

¹⁰⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸² Ibid.

¹⁰⁸³ Ibid., p. 79.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Hutchison, 2010, “Trauma and the Politics of Emotions”, *International Relations*, 24(1): p. 66.

confusion”.¹⁰⁸⁶ In this sense, Hutchison explains how witnesses try to make sense of what they are seeing, while “being affected by emotional responses and drawing upon prevailing discourses and symbols to make sense of what they see and feel”.¹⁰⁸⁷ Subsequently, traumatic events, such as the Bali bombings and the Norway terror attack, “can acquire shared meaning and become perceived as a collective experience”.¹⁰⁸⁸

In this sense, scholars have established that trauma constitutes “a powerful social and political phenomenon, one that influences various aspects of both domestic and international politics”.¹⁰⁸⁹ These experiences of widespread or publicly visible trauma “produce discourses that shape not only how individuals are connected to the world, but also how such connections influence the way one responds to the needs of suffering”.¹⁰⁹⁰ This again links back to Tumarkin’s concept of what is it that we ‘need’ from these sites.

Interestingly, Hutchison pinpoints how these discourses “generally commemorate trauma in ways that foster the reification of existing forms of political sovereignty”.¹⁰⁹¹ Similar to Bodnar’s line of thinking, Hutchison states:

How individuals, and in turn societies, come to remember past traumas and mourn lives lost to events such as war is intimately connected to discourses that reinstate modes of political power and social control. Remnants of such acts linger, shaping social and political landscapes often for generations to come.¹⁰⁹²

Hutchison notes how, for example, the terrorist attacks of September 11 have left the legacy of the ‘War on Terror’. The key in this process is uncovering “how trauma intrudes into public awareness and in turn, into politics”.¹⁰⁹³

¹⁰⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 68. Please also see Bell, D. *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*; Edkins, J. *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*; and Fierke, K. M. ‘Bewitched by the Past: Social Memory, Trauma and International Relations’, in Bell, *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Hutchison, 2010: 68-69.

¹⁰⁹¹ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁰⁹² Ibid.

¹⁰⁹³ Ibid.

At the social level trauma often unknowingly helps to constitute the present; it manifests in social discourses and wider cultural dispositions that play a critical though subliminal role in configuring politics.¹⁰⁹⁴

Hutchison notes how it becomes key to unlock “the politics that are at play in the narration of trauma”.¹⁰⁹⁵ Implicated in this process are not only the “communicative practices utilised in the giving of individual testimony” but also “the practices employed by the media and in politics”.¹⁰⁹⁶ In this process the key to how individual trauma can become a collective phenomenon is *representation*: “[r]epresentational practices provide for the expression of trauma, and in doing so shift it from the realm of the individual to that of a collective or community”.¹⁰⁹⁷

Holocaust scholars for example have noted how the stories told by survivors and witnesses “is inevitably constrained by the impossibility of ever adequately representing trauma”.¹⁰⁹⁸ Hutchison notes how even though trauma may be without a ‘voice’, it often ends up finding “some form of expression, regardless of how inadequate”¹⁰⁹⁹:

Various representational practices narrate trauma, somehow telling of its terror and its pain, and in doing so weave it into the fabric of both individual and collective conceptions of being and knowing. Speaking of trauma – either by victims or witnesses – is a search to find the expressions considered to be the most appropriate measures of trauma and its pain. This is how trauma gathers meaning, socially, by being encoded within social symbols and linguistic patterns that are specific in time and place.¹¹⁰⁰

Hutchison notes that these ‘practices of representation’ can take on many forms, such as “speech, text, photographs, film and bodily gestures”.¹¹⁰¹ The task of representing trauma is not solely a mission of “trying to find expressions that adequately represent one’s feelings”, but also ”translate trauma into something that can be meaningful to many”.¹¹⁰² Whether the trauma is relatable has “therefore much to do with the way it

¹⁰⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰² Ibid., p. 71.

is presented”: “[t]rauma gets its shape, its more public meaning, from the way it is represented and the messages such representations are perceived to convey”.¹¹⁰³ In this sense, it becomes key to explore *how trauma is represented in the case studies*, as this process is imperative for it to become meaningful for many, and therefore, in turn, collective action.

This is where emotions become key. By unravelling how individual emotions are “intervowen with social structures of knowledge and belief may facilitate a deeper understanding of how identities and collectives can be constructed”¹¹⁰⁴:

Examining trauma through an emotionally sensitive lens is thus crucial to considering the cultural (and collectivising) dynamics of trauma’s various representations. Important here is an understanding of how emotions help to shape the interpretative processes through which trauma gains social meaning, and, in some cases, influences boundaries of identity and community. A wider community is often depicted as feeling the disorientating effects of those who witness – and suffer from – a trauma directly. Trauma thus touches not simply direct victims but also those witnessing it at ‘home’, in a far off and safe place. Claudia Aradau comments that it is in this way that individuals may be ‘emotionally affected and experience solidarity with victims’. A kind of social connection between victim and witness can be summoned. Feelings of sympathy, or even shared shock and fear, may emerge between witness and victim, and processes of reckoning with and mourning trauma can foster solidarity and solidify communal connections.¹¹⁰⁵

Hutchison explored these communal expressions of trauma in the aftermath of the Bali bombings exploring Australian media representations. She discovered that a “shared meaning, purpose and identity was articulated in what became ‘us’/‘them’ type of rhetoric”.¹¹⁰⁶

Outwardly reflective of this were both the publicly respected calls for collective remembrance and commemoration, and the discourses of retributive justice that subsequently emerged.

Underpinning the various representations and subsequent discourses that surrounded the tragedy was, I argue, the interweaving of individual and collective emotion. How the media and other representational outlets captured the crisis not only told a story about what happened, but also made one feel. This was accomplished in a way that sought to align individual

¹¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 73.

¹¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 74.

emotions with the wider emotionally charged social discourses that ultimately narrated and gave meaning to the catastrophe.¹¹⁰⁷

In the below, the chapter will build on Hutchison's conception by exploring *how the trauma has gathered meaning*, socially, by being encoded within 'social symbolic and linguistics patterns' specific in time and place in terms of the *response to the actual terror attack sites* in the case studies.

Representations of trauma around the sites in Bali and Norway

- Bali

Given that the Sari Club site still today operates as a makeshift carpark, the only representations of trauma has been the spontaneous shrines around the site. However, these spontaneous shrines mainly frequent the site around the time of the anniversary of the Bali bombings.¹¹⁰⁸

Expressions of trauma on the site around the Anniversary: On the day of the Bali bombing anniversary, some of the victims are commemorated, through a process of lighting candles in the shape of the numbers '88' on the site, around the exact time of the bomb blasts.¹¹⁰⁹ The spontaneous shrines displayed around the site consisted of homemade posters with messages, photographs, national flags, various items and traditional Balinese offerings.¹¹¹⁰ These were placed both at the actual Sari Club site as well as the official memorial across the street.

Although the above spontaneous shrines may act as "means for performing and initiating change" by constituting what Sánchez-Carretero termed 'mechanisms of agency', they only constitute a fraction of what could be possible in terms of *collective action* by transforming the site into a peace park.¹¹¹¹ Using Santino's spontaneous shrines continuum of 'performativity versus commemoration', these spontaneous shrines placed at the sites around the anniversaries would fall in the latter end of the spectrum. Some of the initial examples of agency around the site, such as

¹¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁸ See Figures 10-18 in Appendices.

¹¹⁰⁹ See Figure 18. Data gathered from fieldwork.

¹¹¹⁰ Please see Figures 10-18 in annexes.

¹¹¹¹ Sánchez-Carretero, C. in Santino, J. 2006: 338.

the T-shirts with messages and placing them on the site to attract people onto the site, would fall within the ‘performativity/social activism’ end of the spectrum.

When (and if) the Bali Peace Park is eventually realised, the Sari club site would offer an ideal site for expressions of trauma that could become meaningful for many (and thereby possible collective action) given that it constitutes a place of ‘ba’ with its inherent possibilities for enacting ‘tacit knowledge’. These potential channels for collective action are currently locked in the stalemate over the acquisition process of the land of the Sari club site, as the actual official memorial (deemed by many of the stakeholders as insufficient) across the street acts as the only marker of the violence to date.

- *Norway*

The Norway case has been more successful in terms of the responses to the terror attack sites of the island of Utøya and the Oslo government quarters, and therefore also in terms of the various expressions of trauma to make these events meaningful for many. Since September 2015 the government quarters has hosted the ‘22 July Centre’ and in July 2015 the AUF summer camps resumed on Utøya for the first time since the 2011 terror attacks. Below is a more detailed account of the various expressions of trauma that can make these events meaningful for many at each of the sites.

- *Government Quarters*

- *The 22 July Centre:*

Located in the midst of the Oslo government quarters, the centre hosts an exhibition of the 22 July terror attacks.¹¹¹² The exhibition consists of six sections, all embodying different depictions for providing meaning to the trauma of 22/7.

- *Section 1: ‘Room of remembrance’*

Upon entering this section of the exhibition, you find yourself in a rectangle-shaped room with white walls covered with photographs aligned along the middle of the four walls. These represent the faces of the 77 victims that lost their lives on 22/7. At the time of visiting, I noticed how seven of the allocated spots for photographs were

¹¹¹² See Figures 31-52 in annexes.

empty, meaning the families of the victims had not approved of having their photographs represented on the walls. This was also the only part of the exhibition where you were not allowed to take photographs.¹¹¹³

- *Section 2: Video footage of the bomb blast*

This section of the exhibition contains a dark room with a large screen displaying the actual security camera footage from the time of the car bomb at the government quarters.¹¹¹⁴ With the exact time ticking on the screen it shows how Breivik parks the car at the government quarters and walks off before the bomb blast. There is no actual footage of the bomb blast (out of respect for the victims) however the footage is resumed some time after the blast displaying how the screen is covered in white dust, flying pieces of paper and rubble for several minutes before one can actually distinguish the surroundings again of where the bomb went off. Although the actual section with the bomb going off is cut out of the clip, watching the video makes you realise the impact of the bomb blast and particularly the impact it would have had on those in the vicinity at the time of the blast.¹¹¹⁵

- *Section 3: Timeline of the tragedy*

This section of the exhibition consists of a massive room in which exhibits document the timeline of the events on the day of the terror attacks and the aftermath, such as images of twitter communications, as well as items collected from the debris field (such as the remnants of the car bomb and the cameras used by the victims on Utøya).¹¹¹⁶

- *Section 4: Witness stories*

The fourth room at the exhibition takes the visitor into a room with videos displaying witness accounts, including by victims of the attack.

¹¹¹³ Data gathered from fieldwork in September 2015.

¹¹¹⁴ Please see imagery of the video footage in appendices, Figures 31-32.

¹¹¹⁵ Ibid. 8 people lost their lives by the impact of the bomb blast in the government quarters.

¹¹¹⁶ Please see Appendices, Figures 33-43.

- *Section 5: The response to the terror attacks*

The fifth section of the centre consists of a large room with displays of the aftermath and the response to the terror attacks, including by the public, the emergency services and the criminal justice process.¹¹¹⁷ It also includes a section with books and a seat where one can read about the 22 July.¹¹¹⁸

- *Section 6: Proposals for the rebuild*

The final section of the centre consists of a large room with proposals from various architect firms with different concepts for the rebuild of the government quarters.

As the rebuild of the government quarters is planned to start shortly there have been plans to move the 22 July Centre to another location. Concerns have been raised that by moving the centre an important “knowledge pillar” for understanding what happened on 22/7 becomes lost.¹¹¹⁹ Although conspiracy theories around 22/7 is very rare, they exist: “the greater the ambiguity around a dramatic event, the stronger the rumours and speculation will be, as a collective attempt to understand what really happened”.¹¹²⁰ Therefore, it naturally follows that “the greater the clarity and insight the public has, the less fertile it is for speculation”.¹¹²¹

And in the center of it all, as a living, daily reminder of what happened, how it happened and who we lost that dark July day almost eight years ago, is the Centre on the place where the culprit parked his deadly load at 15:16 July 22, 2011.¹¹²²

- *Memorial at Johan Nygaardsvolds plass*

Another example of extending the trauma is the temporary memorial at Johan Nygaardsvolds plass in Oslo government quarters. The trauma of the massacre is extended from the individual to the collective by the memorial composition with the names and the added detail of the very young ages of each of the victims inscribed on the memorial, resembling “broken glass as a symbol of the damage caused by the

¹¹¹⁷ Please see Figures 44-47 in Appendices.

¹¹¹⁸ Please see Figure 46 in Appendices.

¹¹¹⁹ Giæver, A. 2019. “Hukommelses-senteret”, VG, published online 27 April, <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/meninger/i/lAKrxh/hukommelses-senteret>

¹¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹¹²¹ Ibid.

¹¹²² Ibid.

bomb in the Norwegian capital".¹¹²³ In this sense, the two sites of Utøya and the Oslo government quarters have also been interlinked, extending the collective trauma of that day beyond the incidents of each location. It is evident that a lot of thought has gone behind the memorials in Norway, to make them expressive beyond traditional memorials, reflecting the potential for *representing trauma* but also the *vernacular modes of commemorialisation* in form of the local meanings acknowledged.

Another example of representing the trauma is the "Relocating the Past" newspaper panel. By showcasing the actual impact of the attacks – the impact it had on the newspaper panel – and preserving the actual headlines, it represents the idyllic summertime lightedness of the issues on the headlines and how democracy was disrupted in an instant. The authenticity of the partially destroyed panel and its newspaper edition has symbolically been paralleled to that of the 'Unknown soldier'. As noted by Hylland Eriksen: "it is an afterthought, a side effect and a contradictory reminder of the shock that struck the country on that dark and rainy day in July 2011."¹¹²⁴ As noted by the artist on what he hopes the reaction will be:

That is what I am looking forward to. How the work will be received. Its actual use is not for me to define. Be that as it may, it is, however, hard not to notice the lack of a thorough public debate about Breivik and what he represents after 22/7. A natural consequence of an act like this would, from my point of view, be to unearth the roots of what happened. But a discussion like this only took place to a limited extent. Today people walk by this place as if nothing has happened.¹¹²⁵

Interestingly, the 22/7 response's overriding theme of 'democracy' is employed into this *representation of trauma* as well, as noted by the artist

it is also a democratic work because it addresses the collective, the people. It's a call to intellectual labor, a mutual effort which does not exist yet, at least not sufficiently so. It's not, as I said, a monument, since monument freeze moments in time. In addition, the real monuments of the past are in people's heads, not in public space... It is the life of the object which interest me here, people's reactions, not it's status as a piece of art.¹¹²⁶

Clearly there is an intention to *enact agency* by the piece of work, as conveyed by the artist in the above.

¹¹²³ "Norway unveils Utøya monument"

¹¹²⁴ "Relocating the Past: Ruins for the Future", *KORO*

¹¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹¹²⁶ Ibid.

Utøya

As already discussed in Chapter 4, in relation to the difficult decision-making around what to do with the café building, one example of how the individual trauma of the victims of the massacre on Utøya is extended to the collective is by exhibiting the twitter communications of those affected on the day of the massacre inside the café building which is now protected by the 69 timber poles (representing the victims) that constitute the ‘Hegnhuset’. Displays of the twitter communications, representing the trauma of that day, can be found both at the 22 July Centre in Oslo as well as the café building on Utøya, in this sense capitalising on the ‘tacital knowledge’ of engaging people with these ‘places of ba’ together with factual knowledge.¹¹²⁷

Social capital, local resistance and community engagement for CVE

- Norway

One of the key factors for the formalisation of community engagement in Norway is the pre-existing trust and social capital between key stakeholders. As noted in the previous chapter, the 22/7 attacks had a vast impact on a population of five million people affecting one in every four Norwegians. However, such abundance of social capital prevails that even after the 22/7 attacks the level of fear has been very low compared to for example the US post 9/11.

Furthermore, the Norway case is special in the sense that many of the key actors have to some extent been ‘overlapping’, such as the government at the time of the attacks, the youth representatives of AUF and the National Support Group having a shared identity of belonging to the Labour Party. In the words of Putnam, there has been ‘bonding’ social capital in the sense that they were all in a sense ‘victims’ by being the target of Breivik’s attack.

Yet, the attack was also perceived as an assault on *Norway as a whole*, whereby the *trauma* experienced has acted as a unifying factor in Norway, providing ‘bridging social capital’ across the political spectrum. This trauma was most illustratively represented by the rose ceremony, which gathered over 200,000 in Oslo alone. This trauma that united Norway, together with the existing social capital in the Norwegian

¹¹²⁷ Data collected from fieldwork, please see Figures 41-42 in appendices.

society, has been a key factor in giving way for the trust required for a ‘shared understanding’ of how to respond to these “places of ‘ba’”.

The Utøya case has particularly illustrated the social capital available and the ‘unbreakable trust’ between the stakeholders involved with the many hard decisions regarding what to do with the buildings marked by violence and sudden death. The local resilience demonstrated in the aftermath has proved the island more important post 22/7 than what it already represented before the attack. While the 22 July centre has been a joint project between the Norwegian government and the victim’s support group, the response to Utøya has been shaped more by the AUF, who owns the land.

However, the 22 July centre equally demonstrates the role of *social capital* and *trust* in materialising as a project. The exhibition showcases items such as Breivik’s fake police ID and the remains of the car bomb¹¹²⁸, initially raising concerns that such an initiative would in essence constitute a ‘Breivik Museum’, in this sense providing the perpetrator further attention.¹¹²⁹ However, the educational purposes of such an exhibition have outweighed these concerns

The far-Right extremist used the ID to convince staff running a Labour party youth camp on the island of Utøya that he had come to help them. Minutes later he shot them dead at point blank range.

“Together with his fake ID, we also show some of these fake police badges,” said Tor Einar Fagerland, the history professor who has curating the exhibition.

“It’s physical and concrete evidence. We are not putting it on display in order to dramatise the events, but just to show that it actually happened.”¹¹³⁰

The centre is not a museum. Nor is it a memorial. It is a sober, simple and brutal documentation of the 188 minutes that passed from the car was parked and to the mass murderer surrendered to the emergency response force on Utøya.¹¹³¹

The centre is an instrumental part of the potential for *collective action* for CVE as it invites students and others to engage in a debate on the meaning-making process of

¹¹²⁸ Please see Figures 36, 42 and 44-45 in Appendices.

¹¹²⁹ “Outrage as Anders Breivik items go on display in Norway museum”, *The Telegraph*, published online 14 July 2015, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/11738110/Outrage-as-Anders-Breivik-items-go-on-display-in-Norway-museum.html>

¹¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹¹³¹ Giæver, A. 2019. “Hukommelses-senteret”

22 July. One of the very interesting features is how the centre does not promote ‘a fixed meaning’ but invites people to *take part in this meaning-making process*.

It is documentation that you cannot sit back and study, but which you wander through and are in the middle of it. On the sparse square meters of concrete that has been untreated since the day of terror, you will find a timeline. Some video recordings. Some pictures. A series of silent evidence that testifies to the terror: The distorted remains of the car bomb. The dial from the building next door has lost the times between 15:00 and 19:00. A selection of mobile phones that rang all night at Utøya.

And the portraits of the dead.

It is a place that gives more than clarity and ice-cold recognition of what happened. Within these walls it will always be July 22, 2011.¹¹³²

In this sense the 22/7 Centre in Oslo encourages *collective action* by inviting the Norwegian people to the centre and for them to engage in a discussion on what the 22/7 means for Norway. In 2017 the center started developing programs also for children under 14, inviting families to visit the center.¹¹³³ Below is an extract about the children’s program posted on their facebook page¹¹³⁴:

22. July characterized the whole of Norway. All generations participated in the commemoration, and children were not an exception.

Through letters and drawings on spontaneous memorials around the country children promoted messages of hope and faith, expressed grief and feelings of unreality.

For our youngest visitors the need for expression continues being important. The center’s “children’s corner” frequently gets new drawings, and the message is the same: We care about each other.

In the 22 July center’s pavilion you can see these, and other children’s drawings, for inspiration and reflection. Please stop by – maybe you would like to leave behind a contribution yourself!¹¹³⁵

By hosting the discussion at the premises where the terror attack took place these “places of ‘ba’” will not only tap into the meaning of the attacks but also internalise the trauma into a ‘shared experience’. In combination with the upcoming planned renovation of the government quarters the debate around what to do with the centre has become a contentious issue between security experts who think that the centre

¹¹³² Ibid.

¹¹³³ <https://22julisenteret.no/familier-med-barn/>

¹¹³⁴ Please see Figure 56 in Appendices for the original post.

¹¹³⁵ The post is derived from www.facebook.com

built into the new government buildings is not feasible from a security point of view, whereas the AUF and national victims support group have objected to moving it from the actual site. As one commentator observed, moving the centre would transform the items into “museum objects”.¹¹³⁶

In this sense, the Norway case becomes rather exceptional when considering that reactions to these sites often “downplay the sheer trauma of the event”.¹¹³⁷ Paradoxically, those who have not experienced it, as their only means of making sense of the unexplicable is by access to those who have experienced it and the space where it happened

The late clinical psychologist, Thomas Conran, argued that it is difficult to experience Ground Zero as a space without actually visiting it. Such a visit, he believed, represents a personal pilgrimage that intersects personal and public tragedy. Setha M. Low, an environmental psychologist and anthropologist at The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, asserts that Ground Zero provides all of us, particularly scholars, with the opportunity to examine what is – or should be – the relationship between public space and culture. These observations underscore the point that in order to appreciate the true meaning of culturally or historically important sites, it is critical to have experiential observations of them.¹¹³⁸

- Bali: lack of bridging social capital

The potential for the Sari Club site to enact CVE is yet to be determined, however according to the latest reports the pleas by the BPPAI to the Indonesian Consul General appear to have atleast temporarily thwarted the recently provided construction permit and plans for a five-storey commercial building on the site. However, the fact that the BPPAI still have not even had a face-to-face meeting with the owner of the land is just another example of the lack of ‘bridging’ social capital in the Bali case.¹¹³⁹ Yet, there appears to have been enough social capital to once again

¹¹³⁶ Giæver, A. 2019. “Hukommelses-senteret”

¹¹³⁷ Miller, E. D. 2011, “Finding Meaning at Ground Zero For Future Generations”, p. 113.

¹¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹¹³⁹ “Bali bombing blast site to developed into five-storey commercial complex, outraging survivors”, ABC News, published online 25 April 2019, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-04-25/bali-bombings-site-to-be-transformed-into-commercial-development/11042234>

halt the commercial building project, whereby according to latest reports the new Bali Governor, Wayan Koster, was trying to once again attempt landswap negotiations.¹¹⁴⁰

Furthermore, in terms of social capital and the lack thereof, Tumarkin has explored the controversy surrounding the fact “why the fate of the bomb sites proved so contentious”.¹¹⁴¹ She raises the issue of a ‘sense of entitlement’ that she identifies among the Australian’s relationship to the Kuta bomb sites:

Don’t these places belong first and foremost to the Balinese? If something like the blasts happened in a different country, say in Malaysia, would my fellow Australians feel equally proprietorial? Is this sense of ownership a dangerous extension of the view of Bali as Australia’s backyard? Could this perhaps be a reflection of the way in which the attacks in Kuta were appropriated by the Australian media as the Australian tragedy, with Indonesia’s known and hidden victims as an afterthought? In the end, despite the sheer quantity of reports on the blasts, the international media coverage of the bombings was peculiarly one-sided. It focussed predominantly on tourists and gave little sense of what the 12 October tragedy meant for the Balinese, beyond the scant reports of the island’s dire economic crisis.¹¹⁴²

Tumarkin states that the unanswered question of what the tragedy meant for the local communities is key for comprehending “the differences in attitudes towards the blast sites and the ways in which this difference can be reconciled”.¹¹⁴³ Speaking to some of the locals, and an academic by the name of Darma Putra in particular, Tumarkin explores the meaning of the tragedy for the locals:

When the bombs came, says Darma Putra, most Balinese – including Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists – knew they were a punishment from God. For too long Bali tolerated drugs, prostitution, gambling = all the things brought to the island by mass tourism. People no longer had the right kind of consciousness. So God allowed the evil spirit to come to Bali, to bring the bombs to the island. After all, Bali was marked by a singular devotion to religious values and rituals. For the Hindu majority, their religious principles and obligations were an integral part of their life, affecting its every aspect and shaping all the public and private spaces across the island.¹¹⁴⁴

¹¹⁴⁰ “Bali governor offers landswap to allow Sari Club site to become peace park”, *ABC News*, published online 3 May 2019, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-03/bali-governor-offer-landswap-away-from-sari-club-for-peace-park/11075588>

¹¹⁴¹ Tumarkin, 2005: 65.

¹¹⁴² Ibid.

¹¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

In this sense, the blasts resulted in the people of Bali searching for answers through self-examination and soul-searching, an introspective process rather than outward oriented.

One important initiative of *collective action* that has emerged in Bali is the ‘Echoe of Peace’ (*Gema Perdamaian*) festival held every year around the anniversary of the Bali bombings.¹¹⁴⁵ This is an interfaith initiative to promote tolerance between various religious and spiritual groups in Bali and offers people the chance to experience spiritual performances, such as ‘laughing yoga’ etc. The festival forms a response to and reflects *the religious aspect of the terror attack* and therefore provides an important initiative for capacity building in terms of interfaith tolerance in Bali, in this sense enacting P/CVE.

Victims as norm entrepreneurs - trauma extended from the individual to the collective

Compared to government agencies, which generally have been the main counter-narrative providers to date, victims of terror attacks have been identified as more authentic and legitimate messengers. Victims’ voices provide what has essentially been identified as ‘ethical counter-narratives’,¹¹⁴⁶ and have the potential to “offer counter-narratives that are explicit and universal”.¹¹⁴⁷ Argomaniz and Lynch find that overall victim’s experiences in the field of TS is under-researched, however, more recently there has been significant work conducted with this population.¹¹⁴⁸ Although our understanding of the experiences of victims, and particularly their role as *public victims*, has progressed, and victims are now recognised as “one of the best-positioned actors to counter violent extremism”¹¹⁴⁹, the role of victims in CVE is fraught with complications.¹¹⁵⁰

¹¹⁴⁵ Please see Figures 3-9 in Appendices.

¹¹⁴⁶ “Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Frameworks”, 2014.

¹¹⁴⁷ Balbi, A. 2018. “In the aftermath of terrorism”, p. 39.

¹¹⁴⁸ Argomaniz and Lynch, 2015, *International Perspectives on Terrorist Victimisation*.

¹¹⁴⁹ Schmid, 2012. Strengthening the Role of Victims and

¹¹⁵⁰ Schmid, A. P. 2012; “Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Frameworks”, 2014; Argomaniz, J. and O. Lynch, 2015; Balbi, A, 2018.

Utilising victim's voices in CVE is a delicate matter given "the sensitive nature and potential detrimental effect of such initiatives on victim's physical and emotional well-being".¹¹⁵¹ It is therefore vital that such activities are guided by basic concerns such as "a mindfullness of the needs of victims, the need to protect victims from politicisation, avoiding traumatisation and ensuring a victim-centric approach".¹¹⁵²

Nevertheless, as recognised by Jasper, there are victims who view themselves as 'survivors' as opposed to 'victims', and who are indeed willing to be agents for norm setting against VE. Both the 22 July National victims support group and the BPPAI have taken on roles in this capacity, and have members who actively engage with the public to create awareness. However, it is important to note that "the public treatment of victims is mediated by the context and climate in which the violence takes place".¹¹⁵³

The task of representing trauma therefore becomes, "not solely ... of trying to find expressions that adequately represent one's feelings" but representations that "translate trauma into something that can be meaningful to many".¹¹⁵⁴ This is where the role of *emotions* enters the equation, a dimension largely neglected in the scholarly body of knowledge in IR¹¹⁵⁵ and social movements¹¹⁵⁶. "While emotions were traditionally considered irrational and capricious individual phenomena that ran counter to effective reasoning, research now convincingly shows that this is not the case".¹¹⁵⁷

One of the key final recommendations that Briggs provides is identifying that bottom-up approaches should not 'instrumentalise' essential partners and institutions:

Community development workers, teachers, social workers and mental health practitioners are not counterterrorism practitioners, although they undoubtedly have a contribution to make. However, in order to play their role they do not have to form part of the 'official' response, be recipients of government funding, or operate under the control of the state's security architecture. Establishing a comfortable 'arm's length' relationship between the state and these

¹¹⁵¹ "Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Frameworks", 2014.

¹¹⁵² Balbi, A. 2018. "In the aftermath of terrorism", p. 39.

¹¹⁵³ Lynch and Argomaniz, 2018, "Victims and Perpetrators of Terrorism", p. 3.

¹¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 71.

¹¹⁵⁵ Hutchison, E. 2010. "Trauma and the Politics of Emotion".

¹¹⁵⁶ Jasper, J.

¹¹⁵⁷ Hutchison, E. 2018, "Affective Communities and World Politics".

institutions and professionals runs counter to the top-down way that security policy has tended to be managed, but to instrumentalize their work would be to neuter their potential contribution anyway. Government needs to persuade rather than instruct, and to work in partnership rather than through control.¹¹⁵⁸

It is evident that in the Norway case the government has indeed worked in partnership with the stakeholders, whereas in the Bali case these kinds of ‘partnerships’ appear very adhoc and unpredictable.

Briggs further concludes that communities are the “long-term solution to terrorism, but they need to grow into this role organically and in a way that does not merely serve to open up divisions and tensions elsewhere”.¹¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, the Prevent Strategy offers a key insight into the role that community can play in CT:

When people have a say in the design and delivery of public service, those services better meet their needs. Places where local people have the opportunities, skills and confidence to come together and address the problems they face are more likely to resolve them.¹¹⁶⁰

As noted in the previous chapter, the victims in the Norway case have become victims of a polarised society that has allowed for hate speech to thrive in online forums, including death threats and severe verbal abuse.

Norm diffusion

- Bali

When exploring the Bali case it becomes evident that although there is a *shared understanding* of the potential for Bali as a ‘vehicle for peace’ worldwide, i.e. the Sari Club site as a vehicle for a counter-narrative against VE, there is a long way to go for the peace park project to enact *norm diffusion*. In utilising Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm typology, the Bali case would at best constitute an example of a norm in its initial stages – *norm emergence* – whereby the conceived idea (or *the shared understanding*) of a Peace Park is evidently there, however, due to myriad factors, such as cultural understandings of how to commemorate the victims, the *norm cascade* and *collective action* component of the response to the site has not yet been

¹¹⁵⁸ Briggs, 2010: 981.

¹¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁶⁰ HM Government, *The Prevent Strategy: a guide for local partners in England*, p. 2.

commenced to its full potential. The BPPAI has however acted as a norm entrepreneur in other aspects:

- *Beyond Bali*

While the BPPAI has been the key actor in driving the groundwork to date for the construction of a Peace Park and Museum development on the Sari nightclub site, it has also been instrumental in other performative acts for social change, both in Bali as well as in Australia. While the work in Bali has mainly centred on the Peace Park, in Australia the Beyond Bali Education Package is an example of *collective action* for social change.¹¹⁶¹

The Beyond Bali Project, funded by an Australian government grants program called Building Community Resilience (BCR), is aimed to develop and produce an education resource for secondary school students (years 8/9) to create awareness about the Bali bombings and the Bali Peace Park. The resource is designed to build social resilience to VE by:

- i) providing students with the skills and tools to critically analyse and challenge violent extremism, its causes and consequences
- ii) raising awareness and education on the social impacts of violent extremism
- iii) encouraging students to think about how societies can resist the influence of violent extremism
- iv) engaging students through activities and discussion about the Bali Peace Park as social resistance to terrorism.

In an April 2017 BPPAI newsletter it was announced that the Beyond Bali Education Package would be included in Australia's new national Student Wellbeing Hub, reaching across Australia¹¹⁶²:

The hub is being developed by the Government backed Education Services Australia, to provide a onestop shop for information and resources on strategies to build and sustain the wellbeing of the whole school community.

Development of the Beyond Bali Education Package by WA's Curtin University was funded by the Peace Park Association, through a Commonwealth grant. It was finalised in 2012, after

¹¹⁶¹ For more information about the Beyond Bali Education package, please see <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>

¹¹⁶² "April 2017 Newsletter", *Bali Peace Park Association Inc. (BPPAI)*, <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/images/April-2017-Newsletter.pdf>

trials at two major Perth high schools, with each of the five modules linked to the Australian Curriculum.

With the Bali Peace Park as a focus and designed for use with Years 8 and 9, the package systematically works through a series of activities to engage students with the social impacts of the Bali terrorist attacks and guide them through peaceful alternatives to violence.

“This is just another way that the Peace Park Association is helping kick goals in our communities,” said association communications manager Antony Svilicich. “I am very proud of this resource and am especially heartened that it will now be used across Australia to help ensure a more secure future for our nation and the world.”¹¹⁶³

Given the generational aspect of providing knowledge about these terror attacks as part of building resilience, as discussed by Miller and Young, the fact that the Beyond Bali Education Package has gone from being a local resource developed and utilised in parts of WA, to be included as part of the government-backed national Student Wellbeing Hub is a great example of a performative act for social change. However, at the time of this dissertation the educational toolkit appeared to be an *optional* tool rather than compulsory, meaning it would only be utilised if the teacher in question were to choose to do so.

- Norway

The attainment of *a shared understanding of the problem*, and an aligned response, has resulted in comprehensive collective action in Norway, which in turn has developed into norm diffusion against VE. As noted by Checkel, norms are essentially “shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a collectivity of actors”.¹¹⁶⁴ In the Norway case the response has therefore been built around the notion of ‘democracy’, thereby intrinsically deeming terrorism and VE as illegitimate.

“Utøya – a place that engages”: a place of ‘ba’

On a regular basis, students and teachers from lower secondary schools in Norway participate in “Democracy learning on Utøya”.¹¹⁶⁵ As part of this workshop the participants learn to explore engagement, discuss hate speech and human rights, while

¹¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹¹⁶⁴ Checkel, J. T. 1999: 83.

¹¹⁶⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/theewc.org/>

exchanging experiences. The actual workshops are then followed up with activities in school and local community after the training course at Utøya.

As noted by Fagerlund in discussing the response to the Utøya site

“AUF uses the term ‘democracy workshop’, and that I think is very fitting... in a workshop you create something, meaning you don’t get a premade package, but in a workshop you make something. And democracy is, more than anything, an activity.”¹¹⁶⁶

Both places of Utøya and the 22 July centre essentially constitute ‘democracy workshops’. These places have become learning centres for students to learn about radicalisation, hate speech and democracy.¹¹⁶⁷

As the leader of the national victims support group stated: “I think Utøya wants to have a meaningful place in society. It wants to teach future generations what happened in 2011. It wants to teach about democracy, it wants to teach about how to prevent radicalisation and that is a very important thing in the current political landscape.”¹¹⁶⁸

The 22 July centre also encourages discussion both at their premises and on their social media outlets. Around the anniversary of the terror attack the 22 July Centre facebook page posted stories by victims and other eyewitnesses on a daily basis. The 22 July centre also has a wide range of education tools linked to 22/7, one of which is titled “My Story – personal accounts from and about 22 July”.¹¹⁶⁹

One of the key findings in the Norway case is how the norm diffusion is best described as what Krook and True identified as ‘processes’ and “as works-in-progress, rather than as finished products”¹¹⁷⁰.

Our contention is that norms diffuse precisely because – rather than despite the fact that – they may encompass different meanings, fit in with a variety of contexts, and be subject to framing by diverse actors.¹¹⁷¹

¹¹⁶⁶ “Tillbake till Utøya” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqOPew5ZJKA>

¹¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁶⁹ <https://22julisenteret.no/min-historie-personlige-fortellinger-fra-og-om-22-juli/>

¹¹⁷⁰ Krook & True, 2010: 104.

¹¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 105.

In this sense, both Utøya and the 22 July Centre are more centred around the process of engaging people in the process of democracy (as noted by Fagerland, ‘democracy as a workshop’) and the meaning-making process of 22/7 for Norway. Krook and True observed how “the norms that spread across the international system tend to be vague, enabling their content to be filled in many ways and thereby be appropriated for a variety of different purposes”.¹¹⁷²

- *Rose ceremony*

One example of collective action that has emanated as part of the resistance against VE more broadly, is how the rose ceremony that followed in the days after the atrocity in July 2011, has become a symbol of solidarity with the victims and has since turned into the project ‘iron rose’:

It was the sea of roses that inspired smiths Tone Mörk Karlsrud and Tobbe Malm to start the project IRON ROSE. Via their international network, they invited all the world’s smiths to attend. The response was immediate. Up to date, ca. 850 blacksmiths (from 24 countries outside Norway) contributed with iron roses. Survivors has been in the forge and got help to forge their praises to those killed in the terrorist act. 90 roses are made by them. The roses will be integrated into a monument and a final proposal for the design will be presented in December 2014.¹¹⁷³

Some of the victims have been instructive behind the initiative to have the now about 900 iron roses contributed from around the world in a memorial.

It is also worthwhile noting that some top-down mechanisms for norm diffusion have also been put in place by measures such as the government providing grants for scholarly research into the issues of VE/CVE in Norway. The Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), a cross-disciplinary center for the study of right-wing extremism, hate crime and political violence, is the result of one of the measures taken by the Norwegian government following 22/7.¹¹⁷⁴

¹¹⁷² Ibid., p. 104.

¹¹⁷³ “Iron Rose”, <https://nww.no/iron-rose/>

¹¹⁷⁴ C-REX is a joint collaboration with five of the leading Norwegian institutions on extremism research. For more information, please visit <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/>

CVE and social capital

In terms of the correlation between CVE and *social capital*, the following extract by Putnam explaining the key principle behind the concept itself, is a key point worth highlighting:

If we are to believe that social capital benefits individuals and communities, we must first understand how social capital works its magic. High levels of trust and citizen participation operate through a variety of mechanisms to produce socially desirable outcomes. Obviously the mechanism(s) at work will vary by the circumstance and outcome in question. But in general social capital has many features that help people translate aspirations into realities.¹¹⁷⁵

Putnam goes on to describe three ways in which social capital enables the above: i) firstly, “it allows citizens to resolve collective problems more easily”; ii) secondly, “social capital greases the wheels that allow communities to advance smoothly”; iii) and finally, social capital improves communities “by widening our awareness of the many ways in which our fates are linked”.¹¹⁷⁶

As noted by Putnam: *communities that lack civic interconnections find it harder to share information and thus mobilize to achieve opportunities or resist threats*. This clearly links back to Dalsgaard-Nielsen & Schack’s discussion on local resilience against VE and the role of trust-based networks for CVE.

Also, when applying the definition of resilience as that of “a collective effort to go back to normal after a disastrous event, emergency or challenge and face the future with confidence” it is clear that the environment of fear and apprehension that still reigns in Bali, demonstrates a lack in basic trust i.e. social capital. While ‘going back to normal’ has principally entailed an *economic aspect* in Bali – that is, ensuring the return of the tourism industry – even so a lot of the shops were now closing earlier in the evenings than they used to before Bom Bali.¹¹⁷⁷ Most of the respondents speak of a new awareness and environment of apprehension, which has changed their behaviour.

There appears to be bonding social capital, i.e. the local Balinese widows group etc. however bridging social capital, that between various communities affected by the

¹¹⁷⁵ Putnam, R., 2000: 288.

¹¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷⁷ Information gathered from the interviews.

Bali bombings, is less abundant. In fact, when visiting and interviewing respondents in 2014 it became evident that the local victim's groups were not aware of the Bali Peace Park proposal.

Conclusion

Therefore, one of the arguments put forward is that these terror attack sites, traumascapes and places of 'ba', have the capacity for *collective action* as they not only provide people a place for meeting others (building trust - social capital), they entail a *phenomenological aspect* of making the events real (as Miller noted, you can only completely understand the events by physically visiting the site) as well as an educational aspect for future generations to come.

It is evident that the Bali case was never going to be a straightforward process, particularly given the complex social fabric of the various communities affected. The historical aspects of the relations between the various countries and hierarchies involved have meant that there has been manifold of sensitivities to take into account. This has been witnessed in the Australian victims groups' approach of trying to include the local communities in an effort to rally support for their Peace Park idea.

As already discussed in Chapter 4, compared to the Bali case study, the Norway case has been a lot more successful in terms of giving 'voice' or expressions to the shared meanings attributed to the sites. In this sense, giving expressions to meanings becomes key when exploring the *performativity* of the actual sites. The more meanings that get an outlet for expression, the more collective action you can expect in terms of social change. However, as noted by Tumarkin, while visiting these sites is essential as it gives meaning to our feelings, yet 'the shared understanding' requires a *singular expression*. Still, as demonstrated by the discussion on the Unknown Soldier like monuments, this 'singular expression' should not be allocated too much local significance if one wishes to convey universal messages.

Stow and Doss discussed how 'memorial mania' was becoming a common phenomenon in the US, reflecting a "cultural shift toward public feeling as a source of knowledge".¹¹⁷⁸ 'Memorial mania' in turn entraps *critical reflection*, hindering meaningful responses for social change. Neither Bali nor Norway can be argued to fit

¹¹⁷⁸ Doss, E. 2010: 50.

this description, as Bali represents a case where memorials are rather unusual outside the context of independence, and Norway has found a balance between *many* memorials and constructive memorial creations extending beyond simply national modes of commemoration.

Examining the collective trauma and its uniting element from the lens provided by Hutchison's notion, whereby the (terror attack) incidents could be interpreted as traumatic events that have acquired shared meaning and become perceived as a collective experience, it becomes clear that this has indisputably been the case in both the Bali and Norway case study. However, in the Bali case the cultural differences in terms of commemoration and public memory, together with the land ownership issues, have hindered the Peace Park from developing from an idea to actually being materialised. As Briggs has noted, without a 'shared understanding of the problem' there is unlikely to be a unifying response.

In terms of the 'social capital' aspect, it appears that the Bali case has also been affected by the inherently characterised version of social capital existent in Bali. As noted by Putnam, social capital is by no means correlated as a purely *positive* thing – it also contains *negative* manifestations: such as sectarianism, ethnocentrism and corruption. Given the absence of more formal channels for social capital, such as in the Norway case, it becomes comprehensible the Bali case has been characterised by some of the negative manifestations, particularly that of corruption. This is one of the reasons for the sensitivity around the land ownership of the Sari club site – the local government does not want to be perceived as overruling the land acquisition process but wants the process to be perceived to be handled according to democratic principles.

As noted in the previous chapter, there has been an abundance of 'bonding social capital' around the issue of honoring the many victims of the Bali bombings and fighting for the cause of a Peace Park, however the BPPAI appears to have failed in capitalising on the various forms of 'bridging social capital' to ensure such an idea 'embraces all the differences' as put by the stakeholders. Furthermore, both the stakeholders themselves and the data collection indicated a failure in getting the message across to the local community. One way of overcoming the lack of 'bridging social capital' would be the use of *representations of trauma*, that can become

meaningful for many, particularly given that the data indicated the mutual understanding of *respect* for the victims across the range of various stakeholders.

Chapter 6: Findings – Discussion

As established in the literature review, adopting a framework of communication enables one to explore how terrorism is best understood as a communicative process between terrorist actors and audience(s), the meaning for which is *socially constructed* in the public discourse and dialogue. Therefore, as observed by Tuman, exploring “how and why we feel threatened by what is, in the end, a communicative, rhetorical process” provides a basis for understanding how to process the meaning of terrorism as well as how to respond to it.¹¹⁷⁹

Given that the body of knowledge on VE and CVE now recognises that narratives irrefutably affect political behaviour, counter-narratives have emerged as the ostensible panacea to counter terrorist propaganda. Some of the most pertinent critiques of the counter-narrative research area to date has been the lack of credibility of governments as the vehicles for counter-narratives as well as the lack of counter-narrative projects and programs that are “informed by contextual research or even designed with local input to increase the chance that content will resonate in the very communities they are meant to influence”.¹¹⁸⁰

In an attempt to address the above critiques, this dissertation conducted a distinctive case study to explore how counter-narratives *emerge organically* by exploring the meaning making practices surrounding terror attack sites and how key stakeholders engage with these sites. Based on the analysis by previous chapters, this chapter will discuss some of the key findings obtained.

The formation of counter-narratives

As recognised by de Graaf in the literature review, how we chose to respond to terrorism innately produces ‘stories’.¹¹⁸¹ Based on this assumption it therefore follows that how the affected communities respond to terrorism constitutes a narrative back to

¹¹⁷⁹ Tuman, J. S. 2003: 145.

¹¹⁸⁰ Rosand, E. & E. Winterbotham, 2019. “Do counter-narratives actually reduce violent extremism?”, *Brookings*.

¹¹⁸¹ De Graaf, 2011.

the terrorists. A setting where this phenomenon becomes explicit and tangible is in the context of the symbolic meanings attached to terror attack sites and how societies chose to *respond, construct and manage the sites and the rhetoric surrounding them*.¹¹⁸²

In this sense, as observed by Low together with Stump and Dixit, the *social production* and *social construction* of these sites offers meaning-making practices that entail ‘shared understandings’ that in turn holds the potential for enacting P/CVE. Similarly, as discussed by Stow and Young, the interrelated discourse on the way in which we commemorate (victims of terrorism) has different political outcomes for society. Exploring the factors of *national versus vernacular modes of memorialisation* together with the aspect of *commemoration as to what end*, provide key insights into how societies cope with these incidents and the communicative aspects they inherently embody.

Furthermore, the different manifestations of *local resilience* and how the resilience in turn has transformed into *performative acts for social change* may offer significant insights for understanding the formation of counter-narratives. Exploring and identifying these elements offers important insights into how counter-narratives emerge organically while providing significant tangible insights for the field of P/CVE in general.

The Norway case constitutes an illustrative paradigm for the various expressions of *local resilience* and *agency* to suppress Breivik’s narrative: the *rose ceremony* which gathered hundreds of thousands of people on the streets of Oslo (and elsewhere in Norway) to express solidarity with the victims; *performing music*, “Children of the Rainbow”, which Breivik hated; responding to the island of Utøya by resuming the summer camps and with boosted initiatives to *engage people in ‘democracy learning’*; display *representations of trauma* to *engage people in the meaning-making process of 22/7*; all these performative acts constitute ‘stories’ or ‘narratives’ to resist those represented by Breivik with his acts of terrorism and VE.

Similarly, the discourse surrounding the terror attack sites of Utøya and Oslo government quarters reveals the contestation of the meaning-making practice of 22/7, whereby the national and local meanings have converged. These sites therefore

¹¹⁸² Balbi, A. 2018. “In the aftermath of terrorism”

provide instructive arenas for understanding how counter-narratives may emerge organically, as opposed to being constructed by government agencies, and how they come to embody meanings that supersede traditional commemoration modes of simply ‘forgetting’, while still embodying meaning for many.

In this context it is key to stress that the formation of counter-narratives does not just apply to the *discursive* realm. Stump and Dixit observed how “terrorism and counterterrorism are socially constructed in different settings, visual data … as well as oral narratives and even buildings and architecture … are sources of studying how different cultures make sense of terrorism as well as how counterterrorism policies are enacted”.¹¹⁸³ It therefore becomes key to explore the response to the sites in terms of the *social production* (to use Low’s terminology) as well.

Finding meaning at terror attack sites

How have the discourses surrounding the terror attack sites evolved?

In order to answer the above question, Greenspan’s three questions provided useful guidance as to break down the discourses surrounding the sites: *What should be built? How should we decide? What does it say about us?* Furthermore, Tumarkin’s concept of ‘what is it that we need from these sites’ was used to depict the meaning-making practice. Both the Bali and Norway case studies have demonstrated how the response is framed as a paradigm for something more than simply rebuilding, as will be demonstrated in the below.

Whose ideas matter? Key ‘players and arenas’

As established in the analysis chapters, a large part of the discursive response to the terror attacks, and the actual physical attack sites, in both Bali and Norway have been understood through the lens of the 9/11 response. The Bali bombings was in essence a response to the “War on Terror”, and the Bali response largely provided a continuation of the WoT, whereas the failures of the “War on Terror” response, in turn, has shaped the Norway response. In terms of the rebuild and public memory process, the Ground Zero in NY has again acted as a significant reference point, both in terms of the discourse in Bali (referring to the Sari site as ‘Ground Zero’) and

¹¹⁸³ Stump & Dixit, 2013: 163.

constructive guidance for modes of commemoration. Yet, both case studies have progressively come to opt for an explicitly peaceful response, emphasising notions such as ‘tolerance’, ‘multi-culturalism’, ‘inter-faith’, ‘democracy’ and ‘openness’.

The Bali case provides a prime example of where the *lack of a shared understanding* amongst the stakeholders has crippled the progress to date. 17 years later, there now appears to be a shared understanding that a Peace Park should be built with the main obstacle consisting of the actual land dispute. Part of the reason for the obstacles of realising the Peace Park can be derived from Greenspan’s second question (*how should we decide?*) as the original Peace Park initiative originated from the community of Australian victims and not from the local Balinese.

Yet, the data collection indicated that some of the BPPAI stakeholders early on identified that the local Balinese community had to be involved for the success of any such initiative however due to internal disputes such initiatives appears to have been stalled. The BPPAI only became a formal body in 2008. In this sense, the lack of ‘bridging’ social capital between the various stakeholders has been a significant factor for the delay of the Peace Park. The contest between various meanings attributed to the site becomes evident in the constant postponement of *realising* the proposed park. Using Acharya’s concept of whose ideas matter, the ‘constitutive localization’ is dependant on the *agency of norm-takers*. In the case of the ‘Peace Park’ project, the actual concept of ‘peace’ has gradually been altered in order for it to be adopted by the norm-takers.

While the fact that the local victim’s groups were unaware of the peace park proposal illustrates the lack of ‘bridging social capital’ between the Australian and local victims, it also highlights the question of who are the ‘norm entrepreneurs’? What type of norms are we talking about? Whose ideas/stories are centered? If we are to look to the global message that a peace park has the prospect of conveying, perhaps the local people become norm-takers, however, equally valid is the question whether some of the Australian victims could become norm-takers learning from the Balinese in how they deal with the death of their loved ones, where the meaning-making practise appears to constitute more of an internal process. These are some of the antagonisms that have arised in analysing the possible norm entrepreneur role for the victims.

An illustrative example is the fine balancing act of the Peace Park comprising elements such as *participatory process*, *community-based* and possible ‘commercial’ connotations that such a *self-sustained* project would entail. As one respondent framed it: “[b]ecause business is always profit and lose and lost and also sometimes you know when the business doesn’t run well it collapse … We are not talking about peace park collapsing”. This reflects the myriad of meanings and sensitivities when various cultures are involved in order to realise a peace park that can bring meaning to many, while also accomplishing the necessary steps required for it to be a self-sustained, community-based initiative.

Whereas the key stakeholders in the Sari Club site has been the BPPAI, the local government in Bali, the local activists and the landowner, there appears to have been limited ‘bridging’ social capital given the cultural barriers involved. Many of the respondents spoke about the need to “embrace all differences” as well as the failure to get the message across to the local community. However, evidently the largest hurdle to date has been securing the site from the landowner, a process that is still ongoing. Another example of the lack of ‘bridging’ social capital is the failure of the BPPAI to secure a face-to-face meeting with the owner of the land.

The key ‘players’ in the Norway case in terms of finding meaning at the terror attack sites has been the AUF, the 22/7 National victims support group, the Labor government (2011-2013), the Coalition government (2013-), the local community in Utøya. In comparison to the Bali case, the Norway case has manifested an abundance of social capital, which has been crucial in addressing some of the very difficult decisions surrounding the response and rebuild of the two sites. Although the overall Norway response may have been characterised by ‘political inertia’, the sites have become instructive cases of a constructive response to terrorism and VE.

In terms of *what will the different choices say about us*, it is clear how the decision-making process around the terror attack sites has engaged reflection in terms of the various choices along the meaning-making trajectory. In this sense, the meaning-making process around 22/7 has very much been characterised by being a *progressive conversation* in the Norway case. An illustrative example is how although many of the victims’ parents initially opposed the idea of resuming the summer camps on Utøya, however when the *social construction* of the island was hijacked by right-wing extremists in support of Utøya becoming a symbol for Breivik, the parents changed

their minds in favor of resuming the camps, in essence providing a counter-narrative to the right-wing narrative.

The Utøya and Oslo sites demonstrate how you can use both the *social production* (such as the Hegnhuset) and social construction (*shared understandings* of democracy) to enact measures of P/CVE. The sites also reflect how the abundance of social capital has empowered responses which honour both local as well as national meanings, while, in the words of Young, *enabling new life*, whilst permitting representations of trauma that may have meaning for many. The trickle down effects of this norm diffusion becomes irrefutable by the empowering use of these ‘places of ba’ enabling a discourse on (while internalising) the elements of ‘democracy’ as well as the trauma of 22/7.

A contestation between various meanings – local vs national

As established by recent counter-narrative literature, with special focus on deconstructing the narratives conveyed by terrorists and violent extremists, the key component is the meanings attached “designed to shape audience perceptions and polarize their support”¹¹⁸⁴ Ingram and Reed have demonstrated how the strategic logic of for example IS propaganda is to provide its audiences with a “competitive system of meaning”. This is in essence why the overall discourse on CVE revolves around the concept of “a battle for hearts and minds” and why counter-narratives become key.

The Norway case provides an illustrative example of how the various stakeholders have been included in the decision-making process. The national memorial discourse provides an arena that reflects how the local and national meanings of 22/7 have collided, particularly in the sense of the functional and symbolic meanings attached to the sites, whereby the locals have opposed their peaceful community of becoming the centre of a *tourist attraction*. This highlights Young’s remark about offering memory that “enables life”: the locals perceive a memorial at Sørbråten peninsula to ‘disable life’ by becoming a constant reminder of that day in July while losing the quaintness character of their neighborhood. In this sense, the national meanings have had to succumb to demands made particularly from the locals, in essence reflecting an

¹¹⁸⁴ Ingram & Reed, 2018, “Reverse-engineering the ISIS playbook”.

inclusive decision-making process. This relates back to Stow's discussion about how we remember can provide for political outcomes, and the Norway case illustrates how grievances are worked through even by the way we remember.

In the Bali case it has been evident since the BPPAI was established that no matter what was built on the Sari Club site, in the form of a 'Peace Park', the response should capitalise on Bali's pre-existing 'soft power' of constituting a symbol for 'peace'. In this sense, the Peace Park mission extends beyond the locale ultimately intended as a *global vehicle for peace*, made possible by the inherited elements of Bali as a symbol for peace, to be capitalised on – therefore the use of the 'lens' or 'frame' of '*peace*' in particular. In this sense, what *should* be built should be *something that inherently represents Bali, the Balinese 'peace'*. The foci on a discourse of 'peace' therefore becomes valid, given that that particular 'framework' was there even before the Bali bombings, while avoiding any divisive language that explicitly speaks about countering terrorism as such.

However, while the idea of a 'Peace Park' has a strong 'cultural match', to use the terminology of Checkel on norm diffusion, the actual process of *constructing a peace park* has been less successful. This is where the second question, the manner of the *decision-making process*, comes in. Part of the controversy surrounding the Bali Peace Park has been due to this second element of Greenspan's typology: The Bali Peace Park has been a heavily reliant initiative on behalf of the Australian victim's group. In this context it is important to stress how the local government has been reluctant to intervene in the land acquisition process, on the basis of not wanting to be perceived to be using undemocratic measures for securing the land, which essentially could risk delegitimising and tarnishing the Peace Park project.

One example of *how the formation of counter-narratives to terrorism has played a critical role for political behaviour* is how the Utøya aftermath debate became a delicate decision-making process with many vested interests. While the AUF stood firm on their objective of resuming the summer camps on the island, many of the victim's families strongly opposed the idea of having youth partying etc. in the very same place where their children had died at the hands of a terrorist. A petition was initiated for the island to be left alone, however, the unearthing that right-wing extremists who sympathised with Breivik were also signing the petition as a symbol of Breivik made victims families change their minds in favor of the summer camps. In

this sense, given that one of the key issues for the victims support group in Norway has been to minimise the public attention provided for Breivik (given the Herostratic fame aspect of his narrative) the resuming of the summer camps becomes a key counter-narrative and manifestation of resilience.

A shared understanding of the problem key for social change

One of the key premises upon which this dissertation set out was the proposition that counter-narratives are more effective when they emanate from legitimate messengers and from the local communities affected by terrorism and VE. As established in the literature, engaging local communities in P/CVE necessitates *a shared understanding of the problem* and how to respond to it. Having explored the case studies, it is evident that this premise has played a vital role in terms of the progress in responding to the terror attack sites.

In the Norway case the *performative acts for social change* have come a long way since 22/7. This is largely due to the fact that there has been a shared understanding of the problem and how to respond to it. This shared understanding has partly been shaped by past experience – as in a shared understanding the 9/11 response being a failure not to be repeated in Norway – which therefore prompted the opposite – a response based on the notions of *unity, openness and tolerance*. The spontaneous *rose ceremony* demonstrations that followed in the days after the tragedy after a campaign via Facebook and Twitter encouraging people to take to streets in honour of the victims has become an integral part of the response to the 22/7 attack, and *the rose now a symbol representing that trauma*.

However, there are limitations to the extent of such solidarity, as noted by Stow and Sturken, in highlighting the tendency of trauma suppressing narratives of historical and political context and the manifestations of ‘comfort culture’, which serves “as a form of depoliticization and as a means to confront loss, grief, and fear through processes that disavow politics”.¹¹⁸⁵ This kind of ‘disavowing of politics’ in turn often hinders critical reflection. This may explain why the Norwegian Labour Party was in fact defeated in the 2013 election, despite the overall trauma that gripped Norway.

¹¹⁸⁵ Stow, 2012: 687-689.

The fact that the party constituted the victims of the attacks appears to have been overlooked by the scandal surrounding the police response to the terror attacks.

In this sense, as observed by Sturken in the literature, this kind of disavowal can serve to promote political agendas, which “tend to be politically regressive in that they are attempts to mediate loss through finding the good – a newfound patriotism, feelings of community – that has come through pain”.¹¹⁸⁶ As noted by Arendt, this could be interpreted as the rise of “the social” – i.e. “the merging of the public and the private spheres“ in ways that may inhibit “the possibilities for an engaged and thoughtful form of politics”.¹¹⁸⁷ In this sense, critical thinking could be hindered by the feelings of community that has come through loss and pain. The narrative of the Labor party’s failures in responding to the attacks has overshadowed the larger overarching narrative of the party in essence being a victim of the attacks.

What is interesting in the Norway case is how, although the sites have entailed a contest between various meanings attributed to the sites – not least due to its imbued historical meanings – the actual meaning-making process of 22/7 in essence has been a *dynamic* and *open* process. This brings us back to the second question posed by Greenspan in relation to responding to the sites, *how should we decide*, and the Norway case illustrates how *democracy* extends not only to the message or counter-narrative provided to Breivik, but also in terms of the process of decision-making around the sites and the meaning-making of the symbolism of 22/7 for Norway as a whole.

Furthermore, this counter-narrative of ‘democracy’ extends to the function of the sites, as both the 22/7 centre and Utøya have become places of ‘ba’. The 22/7 Centre now functions as a place where school children and teenagers meet to discuss and contribute towards the meaning of 22/7 for Norway, while Utøya hosts workshops for both schools as well as private companies to learn about democracy in a place, or setting, which has come to epitomise the term even more after the 22/7. As Fagerland observed, democracy is fittingly defined as a ‘workshop’, where you engage in the meaning-making practise and thereby internalise it.

¹¹⁸⁶ Sturken, 2002: 382.

¹¹⁸⁷ Arendt quoted in Stow, 2012: 689.

The shared understanding of the problem and how to respond to it, particularly in terms of the 9/11 experience together with the existence of both bonding and bridging capital, has meant that Norway has come a long way in its response to the sites of the 22/7 terror attacks. Meanwhile, in the Bali case, the lack of a shared understanding has probably been one of the main obstacles for the fulfillment of a Peace Park on the Sari Club site, despite the potential of Bali's inherent connotations.

Social capital and Norm Diffusion

In applying the norm diffusion approach adopted by Krook and True, whereby norm diffusion occurs due to 'external' as well as 'internal' factors, some interesting findings were uncovered. In both the Bali and Norway case, the response to the sites and the meaning-making process behind them, has been influenced by the American response to 9/11. The divisive WOT discourse and all its negative consequences has acted as an 'external' factor of influence not to be repeated. Both the Bali and Norway responses have therefore been characterized by instead highlighting expressions of love, peace, compassion, tolerance, democracy, multiculturalism and inter-faith.

As an example, this is reflected by how in the Norway case the "Hegnhuset" constitutes CT in the sense that the 69 timber poles surrounding it represent the 69 victims that died on the island. The case of Norway has very much encapsulated Hutchison's concept where trauma is represented in such a way that it becomes collective, in turn, prompting *collective action*. Both the 69 poles surrounding and 'protecting' the café building and the timeline of text messages inside displaying the youngsters in distress represents this trauma that becomes universal by visiting these places of tacit knowledge, what Nonaka and Konno described as places of 'ba'.

The initial responses to the terror attacks differed a lot in the case studies, shaping the role of social capital in the response to the sites. While the Norwegian response was very much a message of love and unity from the very beginning, the Bali response was characterised by the 'us and them' discourse that arose in the aftermath. As observed by Lewis and Lewis, the Australian response was very much affected by nationalism and a 'victim' mentality of the scale of Gallipoli, in this sense creating more 'bonding' social capital while omitting 'bridging' social capital.

In Bali the terrorists were framed to have conducted the attack due to *jealousness, frustration, to make people scared (not trust in each other), hatred towards Americans, an attack on the Balinese tolerance, breaking the Bali tourism.*

Whereas in the Norway case, the perception among the interview participants is that he largely failed to divide the Norwegian society. However, while the perception in Norway is that he largely failed, some data in regards to social capital indicate otherwise. One of the participants spoke about how there is now a gap in trust between government officials and the public, such as that between the police and the public. The police force has at times been armed, which they were not prior to the 22 July attacks. There were also other factors contributing to the lack of trust between the police and the public, such as the actual police rescue operation for Utøya Island. This includes the subsequent handling of the issue by politicians who were in charge for the police forces at the time being in terms of taking on versus avoiding responsibility.

Manifestations of local resistance

In the Bali case, the national mode of memorialisation has formed part of the local resistance discourse. In order to move on, and reinstate Bali harmony through recovering the tourism industry, part of the local resistance would entail forgetting. However, instead of making something constructive – or vernacular – of the memorialisation process the historical abberation narrative has trapped the CVE potential for norm diffusion.

- Commercial, economic interests vs local, personal interests

The Bali example represents a case where the commercial interests have played a key role. Much like Ground Zero in New York, the Bali bombings occurred in a commercial hub of Kuta on the island of Bali, where the tourism industry is thriving. However, when considering the reflections of Low in the literature review, the Sari Club site is currently inside a juxtaposed mode, where the shared understanding of the problem is a vernacular one, however the commercial interests and global capital stand in the way of realising it: “as a space of reflection and recovery as well as a place of civic action and discussion, rather than as a privatized space driven by global

capital”.¹¹⁸⁸ Low’s reflections could be applied to Bali: “[t]his site of trauma could be transformed into a communal center for people to meet, mix, mourn, and remember if the political pressures and economic interests would allow it”.¹¹⁸⁹

Memorials and spontaneous shrines – “mechanisms of agency”

In the words of Low, *how have these spaces become expressions for opposition and resistance?*, it appears that in the Bali case the official memorial itself is perceived as an unsatisfactory marker of the violence that took place. Particularly for the international victims, but also the locals, the fact that there were no bodies to be recovered from the site, has resulted in a strong attachment and bond with the Sari Club site. As noted by Tumarkin, in the absence of the bodies, the site acts as a graveyard and marker of the trauma.

There is clearly *a vision* of the potential for resistance against violence in the form of a Peace Park, which in essence provides a space for people to visit and to reflect upon all terror attacks around the world. In the current shape of the site though, consisting of a makeshift parking place, it is as though this space has been locked in a ‘phase’ that is not only hindering closure for the many of the victims, but also causing them even more harm due to the disrespectful manner in which the site is managed.

As Stow denotes in the words of the Ancient Greek, in speaking about *álaston pénthos*, it appears that for many of the Australian victims in particular, the unresolved mode of the Sari nightclub site is enabling an open wound in essence allowing for *mourning without end*. Only by the realisation of the Peace Park will those affected finally find closure and ‘peace’ of mind.

Much of the above relates back to the discussion on *memory*.¹¹⁹⁰ Memory, as understood in the context of the dissertation, is closely interlinked with the concepts

¹¹⁸⁸ See Low, in Chapter 2.

¹¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁹⁰ Memory, as already mentioned, is here understood as both the personal and collective recollections of individuals killed by terrorism and political violence, including their place in historic constructions of the violence.

of *remembrance* and *memorialisation*.¹¹⁹¹ As the Bali case currently stands, the public expression of memory is very much similar to that of the 9/11 case, whereby the discourse and narratives on memory are currently only expressed through the official memorial. Parallels can be drawn, when considering this observation by Low, on the WTC case: “diverse personal, group, and community narratives of September 11 have been expressed in a variety of ways and locations”, however, “their survival and continuity is limited by a dominant memorial discourse that overwhelms and obscures them”.¹¹⁹²

As James E. Young stated, “[w]here memory disables life, I think that is a failure ... in memory. But if a memory process nourishes life and enables life then we have success”. Based on the above, the realisation of a Peace Park will not only serve to satisfy the individual needs of the victims, but from a collective action point of view, will serve to nourish and enable life as a whole, as opposed to the symbolic meaning of death associated with the site following the terror attack. By building a Peace Park the narrative of nourishing life and enabling life will prevail above any other competing narratives.

In the language of Bodnar, “[p]ublic memory is a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future.” In this sense, it speaks “primarily about the structure of power in society”. When employing this definition of *public memory* to the case studies some interesting observations can be made:

Bali

Given the current concentration of public memory to the official memorial situated across the street from the site¹¹⁹³, it is a very formal “space” for public memory. Going by the above definition and the existing memorial, it does not allow for much more than a very *static* composition of both *social production* and *social construction*. A Peace Park, on the other hand, could provide for a

¹¹⁹¹ As mentioned earlier, *remembrance* is understood as the act of remembering victims of terrorism and political violence and relatedly *memorialisation* is the way they are honoured and commemorated in the public sphere.

¹¹⁹² Low, 2004: 327-328.

¹¹⁹³ Please see images in annexes.

more *organic* and *dynamic* manner of public memory, making the past into something preventable in the future.

Norway

Given the various local and national memorials around the country, the public memory has taken many shapes, not least in the form of actual memorials but also the architectural construction of buildings (“Hegnhuset”), which now, as noted by Stump and Dixit, embody CT; as well as spontaneous shrines that have turned into actual memorials (the rose ceremony); and other *representations of trauma* such as the 22 July Centre exhibition as well as artwork (the newspaper panel). These are illustrative examples of *dynamic* and *organic* expressions of public memory that help the Norwegian society understand its past, present and future.

Based on the surveys conducted as part of the research, an overwhelming majority of the respondents in Bali thought that the site should be turned into a ‘green space’ such as a Peace Park. Conclusively, in the Bali case, the *shared understanding* appears to be that the response should indeed capitalise on the pre-existing symbolic power and state/values of peace that Bali entails.

Part of this dilemma can be attributed to the transnational dimension as well as the social fabric, whereby the Indonesian government represents the majority Muslim population, the local victims the Balinese community and the majority of the victims being foreigners, with the strongest victims groups advocates in Australia.

The role of the sites involves a two-way process – in order to make sense of the events, many have felt the need to visit the sites (not least in the case of the Bali bombings where many victims bodies were never retrieved). In this sense, as noted by Tumarkin, traumascape offer spaces “that allowed thoughts and feelings to crystallize, to find their pitch and their singular expression”. This process of visiting the sites to make sense of the events in turn *gives* the place meaning. As noted by Shapiro, “representations do not imitate reality but are the practices through which things take on meaning and value”.¹¹⁹⁴

¹¹⁹⁴ Shapiro, M. J. 1988: p. xi.

- *Commemoration – as to what end?*

As noted earlier in the literature, the Prevent Strategy states in regards to the role that the community can play in countering terrorism: “[w]hen people have a say in the design and delivery of public service, those services better meet their needs. Places where local people have the opportunities, skills and confidence to come together and address the problems they face are more likely to resolve them.”¹¹⁹⁵

In this sense, the Norway case has been very successful, particularly in terms of the government not setting the tone of the narrative surrounding 22/7 but instead being an active stakeholder in making sure the narrative of 22/7 is an open-ended discussion where everyone is invited to have their say. In other words, the meaning-making practice surrounding 22/7 has been dynamic and open for discussion, and therefore as a whole, what Stow would denote ‘vernacular’ memorialisation.

“By an invitation to an open dialogue about the meaning of the terror attacks of 22 July, in a contemporary and historical perspective, the 22 Centre wants to contribute towards giving students ownership to history.

Every Friday the 22 centre presents a student voice. The students in the clips you see have participated in the educational offer “What should we teach about 22 July?”¹¹⁹⁶

CVE and collective action – educational components key success

The analysis of the collective action element above demonstrates how in both the Bali and the Norway case studies the actual expressions of *collective action* that has in fact emanated into tangible outcomes are those that focus on the *educational* components. Although the Bali Sari Club site does not offer any particular premises to visit per se as it stands, the BPPAI initiated project “Beyond Bali” is now a recognised educational tool kit to be available nationally in Australia. Although the program has not been incorporated as an obligatory part of the curriculum, the fact that it is as part of the Student Wellbeing Hub means the norm of preventing future incidents through education (PVE) has been internalised by the school curriculums and ‘institutionalised’.

¹¹⁹⁵ HM Government, *The Prevent Strategy: a guide for local partners in England*, p. 2.

¹¹⁹⁶ http://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1878886855722068&id=1643699219240834

One vital point that Miller makes is that “while it is virtually inevitable that individuals will likely make sense of Ground Zero through their own personal biases, it is essential that future generations have a clear, full and accurate representation of the devastation that occurred there”.¹¹⁹⁷ This feature provides an important research question for the case studies: how do the responses to the attacks provide for the future generations.

Meanwhile, in the Bali case, given the transnational character of the attack and the many layers of ‘players in the arena’ to use Jasper’s terminology, the dominant way of remembering currently represented by the social production on the site has mostly resembled what Stow referred to as that of ‘forgetting’. Although the initial solidarity felt with the victims and demonstrated by the impromptu teamwork between those Balinese and Australians at the site at the time of the attack and the right aftermath, this solidarity has unfortunately not translated into immediate ‘bridging capital’ in the response process to the site.

Low notes how, in terms of the rebuild of Ground Zero, the local residents, survivors and bereaved families have largely been marginalised in the decision-making process. In trying to comprehend why this has been the case, Low makes an important point:

To answer these questions, one must first acknowledge the inherent tension that exists between the meanings of the WTC site created by conflicting political and economic forces, which are projected out to national audiences through the mass media, and the significance of the space for those who actually live near it.¹¹⁹⁸

Low finds that the majority of the studies and analysis of the Ground Zero site “have concerned the construction of a memorial space for an imagined national and global community of visitors who identify with its broader, state-produced meanings”.¹¹⁹⁹ Thus, the dominant discourses have not included the voices and meaning-making of the local residents:

But New Yorkers, in general, and downtown residents and workers, in particular, create meanings imbued with their own personal involvement in and knowledge of a situated history that has social, political, and economic significance for their everyday lives. These local meanings are multilayered, are often embedded in landscape and unarticulated, and should be

¹¹⁹⁷ Miller, E. D. 2011: 113.

¹¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 327.

¹¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 327.

as much a part of the memorialization process as the major players' political machinations and economic competition for space and status.¹²⁰⁰

The concept of 'Ba' – Bali and Norway

Based on the discussion conducted in the literature review on intersubjectivity and 'knowledge creation', and *places* of knowledge creation in particular using the framework of the concept of 'ba' as interpreted by Nonaka and Konno, it is clear that the Norway case provides for a 'richer' case in terms of findings given the progress to date in terms of the 'rebuild' of both the Utøya island and the government quarters in Oslo.

As the local resilience against the violence carried out by Breivik has very much been filtered and interpreted through a lens or discourse based on democracy – whereby the attacks have in effect been understood as an attack on Norwegian democracy – many of the responses to the attacks have similarly been sketched and (re)solved in the spirit of advocating for democracy. Therefore, in terms of the social function and symbolic meaning of the island as well as the government quarters, these have been remodified and restructured by the key element of supporting democracy and democratic functions.

In this way, as Tor Einar Fagerland from NTNU observed, democracy is very much interpreted as a "workshop", and the café building on Utøya has almost become like an optimal example of a place of knowledge creation. Firstly, in terms of its social function, it has become a *place where people meet and discuss* topics such as the events of 22 July, what Utøya means for democracy, radicalisation etc. The premises are used for workshops organised for both school children and youth; for those working with non-profit organisations promoting democracy as well as for company employees. This workshop element to Utøya is perhaps most illustrative by the facebook page created under the name "Utøya – Et sted som engasjerer" – translated into English: "Utøya – A place that engages".¹²⁰¹

In terms of CVE, this is crucial from several points. If there is one lesson to be drawn from the 9/11 events except for the futility of the GWoT response, it is in essence

¹²⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹²⁰¹ www.facebook.com/utoya.no

that the taboo associated with the events, gave way for generations that did not fully comprehend the events. In this sense, when dealing with shared understandings and how these intersubjective meanings may lead to norms and norm diffusion, the notion of ‘ba’ becomes central. Places where shared understandings develop however once they leave the ‘place’ become information.

What are the shared understandings of the problem and how to best respond to it?

In conclusion, the themes that have emerged in terms of ‘a shared understanding of the problem of the sites and how to respond to them’, some of the *universal themes* that have emerged: *education, solidarity, respect, hope*.

- *Dialogue, communication (“makes us understand each other -> “shared understanding”)*
- *Peace Park: immortal, universal and cosmopolitan idea*
- *Sacred space: paying/showing respect*

One of the most salient findings from the data is how most of the respondents agreed that the site of the Sari Club should be respected. Even though many of the local respondents had never heard of the idea of a Peace Park before, they still had the view that to preserve the memory a peace park/garden on the site was the best option available. Therefore, in terms of *respect*, a peace park was deemed an appropriate response, as noted by one respondent, as together with respect it provides ‘hope’.

It appears obvious that in the Bali case there is a *shared understanding* that the current form and function of the Sari nightclub site – as a makeshift carpark with an official memorial across the street - is evidently not sufficient as a marker of the violence that took place on October 12, 2002. The Bali bombings terror attack evidently still affects lives today (mourning without end – *álaston pénthos*) and the way in which people commemorate provides meaning to the site where their loved ones spent their last moments.

- Static vs organic memorialisation

A key finding from the data was how most respondents framed the current memorial, although believed to fulfill a function, as “insufficient”, “too small”, and/or “too static”:

“The memorial is not strong enough to represent what happened.”¹²⁰²

For the local community, ceremony was more important than monuments. The memorial was not framed as part of Balinese culture but more as something done by the government, mostly for the international audience, particularly given the scale on which international tourists frequent Bali. In fact, given the importance the Balinese assign to (bad) spirits, some of the respondents believed that having the names of the victims on the monument meant the spirits were trapped in there.

However, the cultural differences aside, most respondents framed the monument as too static, and believed that a Peace Park could fulfill a more useful function. In this context, some respondents spoke about the need for motion, and a museum on the site, an interactive museum, while others, especially the victims found the idea of a museum too confronting however could still see the usefulness of having one, however expressed that they would not be visiting that function of the park.

As noted by Lewis and Lewis, the complex meanings associated with the Bali bombings are currently locked inside the Legian monument, which in turn channels the focus instead on remembrance of the dead as victims and heroes. This national mode of remembrance inhibits a closure for the affected stakeholders, further reinforcing their state of mourning without end, *álaston pénthos*.

- Memory and culture – past, present and the future

The analytical approaches together demonstrate how, in the aftermath of the terror attack, the Balinese people appear to have moved on while the Western victims, particularly the large amount of Australian victims involved, have an attachment with the actual site of the Sari Club site. In employing James E Young’s useful conceptual framework on how the way we remember the events in essence provides for the future

¹²⁰² Interviewee – stakeholder (Bali).

[i]t is not enough to ask whether or not our memorials remember the Holocaust, or even how they remember it. We should also ask to what ends we have remembered. That is, how do we respond to the current moment in light of our remembered past? This is to recognize that the shape of memory cannot be divorced from the actions taken in its behalf, and that memory without consequences contains the seeds of its own destruction. For were we passively to remark only the contours of these memorials, were we to leave unexplored their genesis and remain unchanged by the recollective act, it could be said that we have not remembered at all.¹²⁰³

The Bali case also reflects what Stow and Doss touch on in terms of *memorial mania*, which entraps critical reflection. So far, the response to the Bali bombings (15 years later) has only resulted in an official memorial.¹²⁰⁴ As stated earlier, “many contemporary forms of memorialization function to reinforce the nation”. In this sense, in a complex situation such as that of the multi-layered case of the Bali bombings, the Indonesian government has been described to pay lip-service to all the international stakeholders (and their victims) by instating the official memorial.

What are the key manifestations of local resilience?

In order to comprehend the impact of the terror attacks and the resilience manifested, it becomes key to first understand how the affected stakeholders perceived the terror attack. As demonstrated by the data in the Bali case, the respondents framed the attack in terms of *jealousness, frustration, to make people scared (not trust each other), hatred towards Americans, an attack on Balinese tolerance, breaking/disrupting the Bali tourism/economy*.

Subsequently, a lot of the resilience manifested has centred on the elements necessary for reinstalling the *Bali harmony*, a *response process* largely dominated by focussing on *economic development* and *introspective reflection*. The resilience manifested also exposes the main dissonance between the Australian victims and the local stakeholders, where bringing back the tourism industry has been the main concern for the locals while for the Australian community it has been more about the victims and the respectfully commemorating the sacred space where they perished.

This dissonance in local resistance can best be explained by relating back to the discussion on meaning-making practices and ‘the politics of signification’ discussed

¹²⁰³ Young, J. E. The Texture of Memory -

¹²⁰⁴ For images, please refer to annexes.

in the literature. The various victims groups and stakeholders differ in the way they *frame* events, where frames (schemata of interpretation which enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences both within their own lives and the world at large¹²⁰⁵) thereby “render events or occurrences meaningful and … function to organize experience and guide action”.¹²⁰⁶

In interpreting the data gathered, it is worthwhile revisiting the definition provided by Dalgaard-Nielsen and Schack, whereby local resilience is basically “used to capture an individual’s, an organization’s, or a society’s ability to continue to function in the face of adversity, to restore normalcy, to learn, find solutions, and move on.”¹²⁰⁷ Although the Peace Park is yet to be realised, there has been an abundance of resilience. The analysis demonstrated profuse local resistance however the absence of a ‘shared understanding’ has hindered this to be channelled into something perhaps more ‘universal’.

Rather, the local resilience manifested has taken different forms. In this sense, it has manifested itself as *continuing in the face of adversity, restoring normalcy, and moving on* but perhaps to a lesser degree on *learning and finding solutions*. This last element appears to have been conducted in the private realm, rather than the public. Meanwhile, the Australian victim’s group has shown resilience in being resolute in their mission to make sure the Sari club site is treated with respect to all the victims that were perished in the blasts, both in terms of the symbolic as well as its functional aspect, and to ensure that future generations will learn from the tragedy.

Therefore, while both communities have been identified to have demonstrated local resilience, in the local Balinese community it has been more of an internal process while the Australian victim’s community has very much stressed an external process in order to prevent such tragedies from happening again. The Balinese community also appears to have moved on, while the Australian victims community still has steps of local resilience to fulfill before being able to attain the final closure component.

This is also evident in the responses it has given way to such as the *Echo for Peace* initiative, which has since become an annual event to promote a society based on

¹²⁰⁵ Goffman quoted in Benford and Snow, 2000: 614.

¹²⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁰⁷ Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack, 2016: 320.

multi-faith and tolerance. In the process of ‘finding peace’ in the aftermath of the Bali attacks this development, in terms of the local Balinese population, has very much consisted of an *introspective* approach. Interpreting the events through a prism embedded within cultural traditions has meant that the local Balinese have sought comprehension and performative action through self-reflection (i.e. internal as opposed to external) rather than social change demanded by the government in question.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The investigative task for this dissertation was to examine how counter-narratives to terrorism are constructed by the social phenomena constituted by performative acts situated around terror attack sites. It set out to do so by exploring how victims and other key stakeholders engage with terror attack sites and how these sites have become symbolic to terrorism and CT. Accordingly, contextualising these terror attack experiences in line with Fassin and Rechtman's idea of "wounds in the collective memory that contribute to the construction of identity in different social groups" offers an organic setting for examining the emergence of counter-narratives.¹²⁰⁸

In this sense, the main purpose of this research was to propose an expansion to the field of soft CT strategies by applying an innovating approach to the study, grounded on an interdisciplinary reconceptualisation of terrorism as a communicative act and, conversely, CT as collective social resistance. By researching how people engage with terror attack sites through performative acts the research highlighted how community driven responses can form a counter-narrative to terrorism and how the formation of these counter-narratives organically could inform CT strategy. The main research question posed:

"How are counter-narratives to terrorism constructed through performative acts and how can they be integrated with other soft counter-terrorism strategies?"

The central argument put forward was that in an age where terrorism is increasingly attributed with a *transnational* character and *non-state actors*, collective efforts to counter it is required at the international level. However, just like other global challenges, this requires a *multi-level approach*. In this sense, global strategies, national mandates, and local action are converged: local actors in the local context will ultimately be part of enacting global strategies adopted by national governments. Thus, engaging those who are best equipped to solve the issues becomes key. The key

¹²⁰⁸ Fassin & Rechtman, 2009: 15.

argument put forward was therefore that counter-narratives are most effective when emanating from the local level up, and should therefore be explored in that context.

Examining the key findings, this chapter will conclude the dissertation by revisiting the investigative task posed in the introduction and assessing the findings. Based on the results obtained from the previous literature and analysis chapters, this chapter revisits the three main objectives set out in the Introduction chapter to guide the findings discussion: i) investigate current theories in the field of soft CT studies to identify theoretical structures/limitations ii) explore and develop the existing notion of ‘terrorism as communication’ through empirical analysis and, iii) develop a reconceptualisation of soft CT approaches. Following a discussion covering all three objectives in terms of what the findings from the literature and empirical analysis has generated, it will conclude by offering some insights in terms of how the research field could move forward.

Finally, this chapter will also review the dissertation’s original contribution to knowledge in the field of CVE and counter-narratives, discuss any problems or flaws in the study as well as identify future avenues of scholarship that could build on the findings from this dissertation.

Overcoming current limitations impeding the soft CT field

The literature review discussed the current research in the CT/CVE field to locate this dissertation within the field. Although most scholars now agree that effective CVE requires more funnelled measures than just ‘collective resilience’ to VE through ‘social harmony’ and ‘common values’, the literature simultaneously indicated that the role performed by trust and social capital should not be underestimated. As noted by Muro, “trust (what scholars used to call social capital) is essential to complete the paradigm shift from “countering” terrorism to “preventing” it”.¹²⁰⁹ By boosting and harnessing social capital in general, governments can in fact limit the CVE efforts required if there are productive PVE measures in effect in the first place.

The above was also corroborated by the empirical research, which demonstrated how the level of pre-existing social capital and trust in the Norwegian society has resulted in the response to the attacks being much more productive than the response to the

¹²⁰⁹ Muro, D. 2017: 14.

sites in Bali. Dalgaard-Nielsen and Schack, in their exploration of the body of knowledge on ‘local resilience’ to VE and terrorism, concluded that governments need a better understanding of the phenomenon in order to efficiently engage local resources and actors. Furthermore, although both case studies demonstrated that ‘local resilience’ clearly was established in the responses to the attacks, the factor of “an individual’s, an organization’s, or a society’s ability to continue to function in the face of adversity, to restore normalcy, to learn, find solutions, and move on” was more convoluted in the responses.

When exploring ‘local resilience’ by using the notion of “communities’ ability to go back to normal” as identified in the literature, the Balinese local community appears to have moved on, showcasing that the *local* social capital and resilience, is indeed in effect. In this sense, the empirical analysis has demonstrated how local resilience takes *many shapes*; some expressed through more *externally* projected outcomes, while others more through *internally* reflecting processes. However, by adding the elements of memorialisation and performative acts for social change, it becomes clear how the responses can be interpreted to entail various layers that alleviate this ‘local resilience’ process. Taking these elements into account it becomes clear that in terms of “learning and finding solutions” – a key part of ‘local resilience’ according to Dalsgaard-Nielsen and Schack – these factors may have been less elaborate in the Bali case than the factors of “to restore normalcy” and “move on”.

The above also reflects the ‘social responsibility’ question that is often an afterthought in light of terror attacks. As demonstrated by the empirical analysis, clearly the Balinese felt that the attack was somehow *their* fault, causing them to apologize to tourists and embark on an inner journey to find peace. Whereas in the Norway case, some case expert authors (Seierstad) and interview participants have highlighted how there was no ‘social responsibility’ looking inwards as to where the Norwegian society had failed in producing a terrorist such as Breivik. This is an interesting outcome of the research. In this sense, the dissertation has raised and reflected over some key questions in regards to *social capital*, *local resilience* and *social responsibility* providing insights that are key for understanding CVE.

Furthermore, the literature review found that for effective community engagement and local resilience a ‘shared understanding of the problem’ is key, which was subsequently corroborated by the empirical analysis. One of the key reasons for the

productive response in the Norway case has been ‘a shared understanding of the problem and how to respond to it’. However, while a ‘shared understanding’ is vital, a multi-dimensional strategy is also crucial, as highlighted by Reed in the literature review. These are two dynamic elements for the literature on counter-narratives to keep in mind when factoring successful counter-narratives.

Furthermore, the analysis and subsequent discussion around the findings, revealed the implications from this dissertation’s case studies. Both case studies have demonstrated significant data and findings for how the local considerations and input inform counter-narratives. In this sense, it has demonstrated how local resilience acts as a key factor for performative acts for social change and how the counter-narrative research field may yield progress from addressing the identified critique of being more ”informed by contextual research” and “designed with local input to increase the chance that content will resonate in the very communities they are meant to influence”.¹²¹⁰

The literature review also suggested that although the CVE field has identified that alternative voices and messengers are needed to complement those provided by the state, the body of knowledge for how to interpret, transform and implement such an approach into tangible measures is still in its infant stage. The RAN CoE provides a significant advancement on this front with its *Civil Society Empowerment Programme* launched in 2015, which identifies ways to support *civil society, grassroots organisations and credible voices* in challenging the propaganda of terrorist and extremist groups on the Internet.¹²¹¹

Therefore examining the discourses surrounding terror attack sites offers key insights into how the meaning-making practice surrounding terrorism and CT evolves organically. Identifying and studying the performative acts surrounding these sites provides an inlet into examining how the responses to these sites could be interpreted as a form of CT and, more precisely, counter-narrative to those conveyed by the

¹²¹⁰ Rosand & Winterbotham, 2019. “Do counter-narratives actually reduce violent extremism?”.

¹²¹¹ However, its training program only rolled out in 2017, and in this sense, the body of knowledge in terms of empirical research for understanding counter-narratives emerging from civil society is still very scarce.

terrorists. Victims have been identified as the best positioned actors to counter VE, which is why exploring how they engage with terror attack sites together with other affected communities provides important insights not only in terms of how societies move on in the aftermath of terrorism but also preventive purposes as in providing counter-narratives and norms.

The individual trauma often associated with the terror attacks is something that has traditionally been considered as a hindrance for using victims' voices. However, the research has clearly demonstrated how many of the victims have been the driving forces behind the initiatives in terms of responding to these sites and often take on an active rather than passive role. Furthermore, Hutchison has demonstrated how trauma, although traditionally regarded an individual experience, can in fact be translated from the individual to the collective via the concept of *representation*. The analysis chapter clearly demonstrated how the Norway case has been successful in representing individual trauma to extend it to the collective realm. In this sense, exploring the performative acts taking place and how victims groups together with other affected communities and stakeholders have engaged with the sites, in essence acting as norm entrepreneurs providing for norm diffusion, has provided key insights into the role that victims' voices can play in CVE as well as in counter-balancing others in CT.

The literature also underscored how the work on counter-narratives has been very much absorbed by strategic communications, focussing on the *means* instead of harnessing the meaning-making processes that *emerge organically*. Similarly, the existing literature on counter-narratives (focussed on strategic communication) appears to be disjointed from the research on community engagement and local resilience. Approaching the issue instead from the perspective of how counter-narratives emerge organically, *local resilience* and *counter-narratives* become interwoven factors. The interplay between these two factors is something that provides for an avenue for further research and could, in turn, also inform policy.

In short, the key contributions from this dissertation to the CVE literature are that it highlights how counter-narratives take shape organically; in this sense it uses a definition of counter-narratives that is closely intertwined with the concept of 'local resilience'; it highlights how the responses to the terror attacks has constituted more of 'alternative narratives' than 'counter-narratives' using Briggs & Feve's framework;

it showcases how local resilience based on social capital takes different forms; and it adds an important contribution to the literature on norm diffusion demonstrating how norms may emerge from the bottom-up while corroborating how a discursive approach to norms appears to be the most efficient for norm diffusion in the counter-narratives realm.

In the literature Taylor emphasised how the focus for the field of terrorism research should be overcoming the current structural problems around how terrorism is organised in universities, which is inhibiting a coherent body of knowledge. This issue relates back to the multidisciplinary character of the topic of terrorism research. From this point of view, this dissertation has been a significant contribution to the current body of knowledge, offering an interdisciplinary approach to the topic drawing from International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Terrorism Studies and Political Theory, in this sense providing an important step towards making the body of knowledge more coherent while hopefully instigating others to do the same.

Counter-narratives have become the professed panacea to the problem posed by the propaganda (*ideas and narratives*) utilised by terrorist groups to entice supporters and radicalise individuals to their cause.¹²¹² Yet, though counter-narratives appear as an “inherently intuitive response to neutralise the opposition’s radicalising narrative”, there still remain many “unaddressed assumptions” in the process of designing counter-narratives.¹²¹³ An important criticism is how the entire practice of *countering narratives* inherently appears from a position of being *defensive*, in this sense reinforcing *the narrative of the terrorists in the first place*.

However, as demonstrated by the literature, the consensus among scholars and practitioners is that counter-narratives now constitute a key part of P/CVE. *Why do narratives matter?* The answer, as argued by McIntyre, is because “there is a sense of purpose – in all lived narratives”¹²¹⁴ and ultimately, *narratives affect political behaviour*. The global decay of democracy and norms requires more funnelled CVE measures. In order to address the global transnational phenomenon of terrorism, counter-narratives become a key part of targeting the global propaganda conveyed by

¹²¹² Reed, A. 2017. “IS Propaganda: Should We Counter the Narrative?”

¹²¹³ Ibid.

¹²¹⁴ Czarniawska, B. 2004. “Narratives in Social Science Research”.

non-state actors. In this sense, just like terrorism and the propaganda it spreads, counter-narratives constitute a ‘glocal’ issue, and should be informed by a multi-level approach, including the role of civil society.

As established by recent counter-narrative literature, with special focus on deconstructing the narratives conveyed by terrorists and violent extremists, the key component is the meanings attached “designed to shape audience perceptions and polarize their support”.¹²¹⁵ Ingram and Reed have demonstrated how the strategic logic of for example IS propaganda is to provide its audiences with a “competitive system of meaning”. This constitutes the reason for the overall discourse on how CVE revolves around the concept of “a battle for hearts and minds” and why counter-narratives become key.

Yet, the body of knowledge on counter-messaging suggests that counter-narratives are not “informed by contextual research and local input”¹²¹⁶ and that most counter-narratives are designed and conveyed by government strategic communications agencies. The purpose of this dissertation has been to address this issue and how this missing element can inform the current CVE field in terms of how counter-narratives emerge organically.

‘Counter-narratives’ or ‘alternative narratives’?

Revisiting Briggs and Feve’s counter-messaging spectrum of *government strategic communications*, *alternative narratives* and *counter-narratives*, the two latter have comprised the emphasis for this dissertation. Based on the findings in the case studies, of the two counter-narrative (formation) categories they would best fit the description of constituting ‘alternative narratives’. In both case studies the counter-narrative formation process has focused around what the communities are ‘for’ – such as ‘inter-faith’, ‘multi-culturalism’, ‘unity’, ‘tolerance’ etc. – with the principal master-narratives of ‘democracy’ in Norway and ‘peace’ in Bali, often unequivocally underscoring *positive language* rather than explicit terms such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘counter-terrorism’. In this sense they constitute what Briggs and Feve termed

¹²¹⁵ Ingram & Reed, 2018, “Reverse-engineering the ISIS playbook”.

¹²¹⁶ Rosand, E. & Winterbotham, E. 2019. “Do counter-narratives actually reduce violent extremism?”

‘positive stories about social values, tolerance, openness, freedom and democracy’.¹²¹⁷

The ‘Echoe of Peace’ festival provides one example of an ‘alternative narrative’, highlighting inter-faith initiatives by gathering all the religious and spiritual groups of Bali together. Similarly, the *rose ceremony* constituted an ‘alternative narrative’ highlighting what Norway stands for. In this sense, these initiatives were in essence aimed to “influence those who might be sympathetic towards (but not actively supportive of) extremist causes, or help to unite the silent majority against extremism by emphasising solidarity, common causes and shared values”¹²¹⁸.

However, there are components of the response to the sites that could be interpreted to constitute elements of ‘counter-narratives’ as well, such as the 22/7 exhibition in Oslo. In this context, the 22 July centre is a prime example of an effort to “[d]irectly deconstruct, discredit and demystify violent extremist messaging” through efforts that “[c]hallenge through ideology, logic, fact or humor”.¹²¹⁹ In this sense, using *representations of trauma* (together with the tacital knowledge provided by ‘places of ba’) such as the remembrance room with the images of the many victims, concretely demonstrates the cost of violence to human life, demystifying any Herostratic narratives conveyed by Breivik.

However, overall the counter-narrative formation in the case studies would fall in the ‘alternative narrative’ category as they are less about *targeted measures* directed at individuals already along the path of radicalisation, and more about emphasising ‘shared values’ that the communities and societies stand for. In this sense, both the Norway and Bali responses have to varying degrees constituted constructive implementations of P/CVE for ‘solidarity, common causes and shared values’.

Conclusively, both Bali and Norway indicate that the organically emerging (counter-) narratives that have appeared as part of the discourses surrounding the sites in the case studies would fit Briggs & Feve’s framework of ‘alternative narratives’. It is not so much about directly “deconstructing, discrediting and demystifying violent extremist messaging” – as scripted by the term ‘counter-narratives’ – as it is about

¹²¹⁷ Briggs & Feve, 2013: 6.

¹²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

¹²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

“undercut[ting] violent extremist narratives by focusing on what we are ‘for’ rather than ‘against’”.¹²²⁰ Briggs and Feve note that the vehicle for *how* to accomplish alternative narratives is through the means of providing a “[p]ositive story about social values, tolerance, openness, freedom and democracy”, whereas ‘counter-narratives’ are achieved through “challeng[ing] through ideology, logic, fact or humour.”

Briggs and Feve have pinpointed that the messenger of ‘alternative narratives’ tends to be *civil society* or *government*, which in essence have been identified as the key (affected) stakeholders in both case studies, where the role of civil society and social movements are fundamental whereas the three identified roles for governments are:

supporting and facilitating civil society efforts to design and deliver alternative narrative campaigns via direct funding, in-kind support, and streamlining of private sector engagement with grass-roots civil society networks; delivering alternative narratives via politicians and public statements; and ensuring that messages are reinforced by government policies and practices.¹²²¹

The role of civil society, as identified by the authors, is to “influence those who might be sympathetic towards (but not actively supportive of) extremist causes, or help to unite the silent majority against extremism by emphasising solidarity, common causes and shared values”. The notions of *solidarity*, *common causes* and *shared values* have indeed emerged as key themes throughout the discourse and theme analysis. The above findings provide significant tangible insights, which can be emancipated by governments in their P/CVE counter-narrative policy-making.

- *Counter-narratives that emerge organically*

Both the Beyond Bali Education Package and the various projects as part of Utøya’s activities, provide *counter-narratives* that in effect *keep on giving*. Through representation, such as that by a survivor visiting schools either in person or as part of a video tutorial, counter-narratives are provided which in turn may prompt further collective action by the recipients (the school children). This kind of CVE community engagement also enables a shared understanding of the problem in young people as they can discuss the matter in a trust-based environment with their peers.

¹²²⁰ Please see Briggs and Feve’s counter-messaging spectrum table in literature review.

¹²²¹ Briggs & Feve, 2013: executive summary.

While in the Bali case the meanings and narratives are currently ‘artificially’ locked in the official memorial, the Norway case provides an example of how the various meanings have been included not only by making the process “democratic”, but also by explicitly encouraging people to be agents of the meaning (as witnessed by the various social media prompts of 22 July centre). In this sense, the meaning of 22 July is a “work in progress”, meaning the discourse and signifiers are essentially inclusive rather than exclusive. Similarly, once the Bali Peace Park becomes materialised, one should avoid to give the concept too much local significance, as noted in the discussion on the Unknown Soldier monuments in the context of Norway, as it thereby loses some of its intended universal message.

One of the key findings has been how the norm diffusion in the Norway case is not ‘fixed’ but rather the ‘norm’ is open-ended and dynamic, meaning that it is limited enough to constitute a ‘shared understanding’ of a norm, (i.e. a “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a collectivity of actors”¹²²²) however open-ended enough for it to include many meanings in the meaning-making practice – enabling the norm to become meaningful for many. This key insight of how public commemoration that is *organic* and *dynamic* – as opposed to *static* – can generate meaning for many, and thus norm diffusion, is a significant finding contributing to the research on meaning-making systems as part of counter-narratives and the field of P/CVE.

The Norway case has been more successful in terms of giving ‘voice’ or expressions to the shared meanings attributed to the sites. In this sense, giving expressions to meanings becomes key when exploring the *performativity* of the actual sites. The more meanings that get an outlet for expression, the more collective action you can expect in terms of social change. However, as noted by Tumarkin, while visiting these sites is essential as it gives meaning to our feelings, ‘the shared understanding’ requires a *singular expression*.

In terms of memorials and performativity, Stow and Doss discussed how ‘memorial mania’ was becoming a common phenomenon in the US, reflecting a “cultural shift toward public feeling as a source of knowledge”.¹²²³ ‘Memorial mania’ in turn entraps

¹²²² Checkel, J. 1999, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity”, p. 83.

¹²²³ Doss, E. 2010: 50.

critical reflection, hindering meaningful responses for social change. Neither Bali nor Norway can be argued to fit this description, as Bali represents a case where memorials are rather unusual outside the context of independence, and Norway has found a balance between *many* memorials and constructive memorial creations extending beyond simply national modes of commemoration.

Examining the collective trauma and its uniting element from the lens provided by Hutchison's notion, whereby the (terror attack) incidents could be interpreted as traumatic events that have acquired shared meaning and become perceived as a collective experience, it becomes clear that this has indisputably been the case in both the Bali and Norway case study. However, in the Bali case the cultural differences in terms of commemoration and public memory, together with the land ownership issues, have hindered the Peace Park from developing from an idea to actually being materialised. As Briggs noted, without a 'shared understanding of the problem', or in the words of Turmakin – *a singular expression* – there is unlikely to be a unifying response.

Furthermore, the dissertation demonstrated how memory could be interpreted to constitute three different albeit interwoven elements: closure, public moral duty and prevention. All these elements were identified in the empirical analysis highlighting that memory is a large part of the meaning-making practice in terms of organically emerging counter-narratives and should therefore be harnessed upon in the research. In this context, the dissertation also demonstrated how this memory discourse is closely intertwined with the discourse on power in society.

In terms of the 'social capital' aspect, it appears that the Bali case has also been affected by the inherently characterised version of social capital existent in Bali. As noted by Putnam, social capital is by no means correlated as a purely *positive* thing – it also contains *negative* manifestations: such as sectarianism, ethnocentrism and corruption. Given the absence of more formal channels for social capital, such as in the Norway case, it becomes comprehensible the Bali case has been characterised by some of the negative manifestations, particularly that of corruption. This is one of the reasons for the sensitivity around the land ownership of the Sari club site – the local government does not want to be seen as overruling the land acquisition process but wants the process to be perceived to be handling it according to democratic principles.

There has been an abundance of ‘bonding social capital’ around the issue of honoring the many victims of the Bali bombings and fighting for the cause of a Peace Park, however the BPPAI appears to have failed in capitalising on the various forms of ‘bridging social capital’ to ensure such an idea ‘embraces all the differences’ as put by the stakeholders. Furthermore, both the stakeholders themselves and the data collection indicated a failure in getting the message across to the local community. One way of overcoming the lack of ‘bridging social capital’ would be the use of *representations of trauma*, that can become *meaningful for many*, particularly given that the data indicated the mutual understanding of *respect* for the victims across the range of various stakeholders.

Incorporating these organic narratives with a CVE approach

Drawing from the above theoretical framework, and having explored how counter-narratives emerge *organically* as opposed to being *constructed* by government agencies, it is evident that governments should “play an indirect, facilitative role”.¹²²⁴

This becomes very explicit in the Bali case, where perhaps the governments of Australia and Bali could have played a more instrumental role, however, have abstained out of fear of being perceived to override the local customs and democratic processes. However, in stating this, they have often had a lasting final say when the victims support groups have made critical pleas, demonstrating the fine balancing acts of the government stakeholders in the processes.

The case studies have illustrated how Rosand and Winterbotham’s concerns about the lack of local input and contextual research are valid, and how the CVE counter-messaging field may yield fruitful research by placing more emphasis on the local context. Some of the overriding themes that emerged for both case studies were the focus on positive themes such as ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’, while within these frameworks searching for *universal* themes that can become meaningful for many. One method of doing so is Huthcison’s concept of *representations of trauma*, which has proved very constructive in the Norway case.

Another key finding is how even though both case studies demonstrated the need for a ‘shared understanding of the problem’ in order to yield a constructive response, this

¹²²⁴ Ibid., p. 26.

‘shared understanding’ should not comprise of a ‘fixed meaning’ in the sense of enacting constructive *norm diffusion*. The Norway case illustrates how Krook and True’s concept of a more *dynamic meaning-making process* opens up the discussion around 22/7 providing meaning for many while engaging people and internalising elements of both democracy and CVE. Keeping the meaning *open-ended* engages people making them feel part of the discourse while also simultaneously enacting possible norm diffusion.

Implications for CVE policy from these findings

- A shared understanding of the problem is key

One of the key findings from the dissertation has been the insight that both the literature as well as the analysis indicated that ‘a shared understanding of the problem and how to best respond to it’ is key for any fruitful action involving the local level. Without a ‘shared understanding’ of the problem, as well as *how to respond to it*, efforts easily become confounded while inhibiting multi-level and coordinated efforts. The deeper the understanding of the elements of a ‘shared understanding of the problem’ the more comprehensive response is to be anticipated. However, as illustrated by the empirical analysis, when the ‘community’ consists of stakeholders from various cultural backgrounds, such as in the Bali case, reaching ‘a shared understanding’ becomes a more complex process.

While a *shared understanding* of the problem is key for a constructive response to the sites this shared understanding also requires some dynamic ‘leverage room’ in terms of the meaning-making process. As noted by Krook and True in terms of a discursive approach to norm diffusion – norms diffuse precisely because they may encompass different meanings, fit in with a variety of contexts, and be subject to framing by diverse actors.¹²²⁵ In this sense, the Norway example has been very successful – the 22/7 Centre in Oslo invites the Norwegians to reflect over what 22/7 means for them – the debate over the meaning of 22/7 is open-ended rather than fixed. The above findings are key elements that governments and policy-makers should emancipate from the research and build further on in terms of the development of efficient CVE frameworks.

¹²²⁵ Krook & True, 2010: 105.

As identified in the Norway case, it appears that the bonding and bridging capital available, has enabled a shared understanding of the problem resulting in a unified response, which includes more dialogue and more ‘democracy’. However, in saying this, the meaning attached should not be fixed. One of the key factors behind the reason the Norway case has been so successful is the fact that, as witnessed in the case of the 22 July Centre, they explicitly invite people to engage in the meaning-making process. This demonstrates the fluid and dynamic approach to the meaning-making practice of 22 July in Norway.

In examining counter-narratives that emerge organically and the meaning-making practices surrounding these organic settings of symbolically-laden terror attack sites, the research has touched on concepts such as local resilience, social capital, memory and representations of trauma. This highlights the complex meaning-making practices at play and how it is vital to have a thorough understanding of the local context in terms of intersubjectivity and shared understandings before even considering embarking on devising constructive counter-narratives.

Future areas of study

While victims’ voices have been identified as possible powerful counter-narratives and as authentic messengers of counter-narratives, there is still a lack in the body of knowledge as to the extent to which such initiatives prevent people from joining violent extremist organisations and steer them away from political violence in general. Nevertheless, both within academia and policy the need for counter-narratives in order to effectively combat terrorism and VE is now practically undisputed. In order to comprehend the possible impact of organically emerging counter-narratives, any obstacles hindering the complete impact of these powerful stories must first be identified and overcome.

This dissertation conducted instructive data collection, however due to the timeline of events and the Norway case being a rather recent incident in time at the time of the data collection, it had to rely less on primary sources in terms of victim’s experiences and more on secondary sources. Future studies could delve even deeper into understanding the meaning-making practice around the sites and particularly the ‘survivor’ experiences in terms of the role of victims to take on agency. The hope is that this research will encourage further research focussed on *understanding the*

meaning-making processes, as noted by both Max Taylor and Richard Jackson in the literature, as opposed to simply focussing on finding solutions formulating policies without a comprehensive view of the problem.¹²²⁶

One constructive area of study, based on the findings from this dissertation, would be to examine the actual *effectiveness* of the above-mentioned counter-narratives. The manifest objective of the dissertation was to demonstrate *how counter-narratives emerge organically*, as opposed to strategies being constructed by government agencies, and how these could be implemented with other soft CT strategies. Given the insights provided by the instructive cases of Bali and Norway, particularly in terms of demonstrating the *capability* and *legitimacy* of the voices of the affected communities in combatting terrorism and VE, more research into the field would be instructive in order for CT policy-making to capitalise on these already existing grassroots efforts.

Another key area for further study is to build on the findings around norm diffusion. Firstly, as noted by Checkel in the literature, there has been an over-reliance on norm-makers while ignoring norm-takers in constructivist research. In this sense, this study has provided one key study on the role of agency from the bottom-up, hopefully instigating further research to balance out the role of norm-makers/norm-takers. Secondly, that the Norway case corroborates Krook and True's discursive approach to norms is one very interesting research realm to delve into further. The fact that "norms diffuse precisely because – rather than despite the fact that – they may encompass different meanings, fit with a variety of contexts, and be subject to framing by diverse actors" has been successfully demonstrated in the Norway case and could become the leadword for moving forward in the Bali Peace Park process.¹²²⁷

In the Bali case, it is also – in the words of Acharya – a matter of 'localising' the idea to "invest [it] with the characteristics of a particular place".¹²²⁸ This element has been a vital part of the Bali Peace Park project early on – to embrace and harness the inherent characteristics of Bali 'peace'. Furthermore, Acharya insightfully noted how

¹²²⁶ Please see earlier discussion by Max Taylor on pages 27-28 and Richard Jackson on page 109 of the dissertation.

¹²²⁷ Krook & True, 2010: 105.

¹²²⁸ Acharya, 2010: 15.

“[n]orm diffusion strategies that accommodate local sensitivities and contexts are more likely to succeed than those seeking to dismiss or supplant the latter”.¹²²⁹ This, in turn, has proved correct in the Bali case, as the BPPAI project has become more successful since engaging local considerations and contexts. At the end of the day, ‘localization’ “describes a process in which external ideas are adapted to meet local practices”.¹²³⁰ Therefore, in order for the Bali Peace Park to ultimately become a vehicle for global peace – enacting norm diffusion – the above insights and factors need to be considered and realised.

These key insights around norm diffusion could provide crucial and more detailed understanding of the complex meaning-making practices that play such an instructive role in the narratives and counter-narrative research field. Hopefully, as stated in the above, this dissertation will act as an important contribution in drawing more attention to the local input and contextual research in terms of Rosand and Winterbotham’s important critique to the field, in this sense enabling more constructive P/CVE measures which are informed by the complexity of meaning-making practices surrounding the counter-messaging realm.

¹²²⁹ Ibid., p. 14.

¹²³⁰ Ibid., p. 19.

Bibliography

- “Aarhus model: Prevention of Radicalisation and Discrimination in Aarhus”,
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) - European Commission,
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7423_en [accessed 18 May 2017]
- Abir, M. & C. Nelson (2017). “Lessons for First Responders on the Front Lines of Terrorism’, *The RAND Blog*, published online July 10,
<https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/07/lessons-for-first-responders-on-the-front-lines-of.html>
- Acharya, Amitav (2004). “How ideas spread: whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism”, *International Organisation*, 58(2): 239:275.
- Acharya, Amitav (2010). *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.
- Agnew, John. A. (2013). “Territory, Politics, Governance”, *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 1(1): 1-4.
- Aly, Anne (2011). *Terrorism and Global Security: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. (First ed.) South Yarra, Vic.: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Aly, Anne (2013). “CVE 2013: Report on Countering Violent Extremism Symposium 2013”. Curtin University, Department of Social Science and International Studies.
http://espace.library.curtin.edu.au/cgi-bin/espace.pdf?file=/2014/03/31/file_2/197148 [accessed 29 September 2016]
- Aly, Anne, Anne-Marie Balbi and Carmen Jacques (2015). “Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism – implementing the role of civil society”, *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism*, Vol. 10:1, published online 3 July 2015,
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2015.1028772>
[accessed online 3 August 2015]

- Amas, Knut O. (2011). "Seven Days in Oslo: Flowers, Flags, Silence", *The New Yorker*, published online July 29, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/seven-days-in-oslo-flowers-flags-silence> [accessed 10 September 2017]
- Amit, Vered (ed.) (2000). *Constructing the Field – Ethnographic Fieldwork in the Contemporary World*, London/New York: Routledge.
- "Anmälningar om hatbrott skjuter i höjden efter brexit", *Svenska Dagbladet*, 23 September 2016, <http://www.svd.se/anmalningar-om-hatbrott-skjuter-i-hojden-efter-brexit>
- "April 2017 Newsletter", *Bali Peace Park Association Inc. (BPPAI)*, <http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/images/April-2017-Newsletter.pdf> [accessed 2 August 2017]
- Arendt, Hanna (1970). *On Violence*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Argomaniz, Javier and Orla Lynch (Eds.) (2015). *International Perspectives on Terrorist Victimisation*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Atran, Scott (2015). "The Real Power of ISIS", *The Daily Beast*, published online 25th October, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-real-power-of-isis> [accessed 20 November 2016]
- Bacchi, Carol L. (2009). *Analysing Policy: What's the Problem Represented to Be?* 1st ed. Frenchs Forest, N.S.W.: Pearson Education.
- Baines, P. B., N. J. O'Shaughnessy, K. Moloney, B. Richards, S. Butler and M. Gill (2010). "The dark side of Political Marketing: Islamist Propaganda, Reversal Theory and British Muslims", *European Journal of Marketing*, 44(3-4): 478-495.
- Baker-Beall, C. 'The Discursive Construction of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Writing the 'Migrant Other', Securitisation and Control', *Journal of Contemporary European Research*. 5 (2) (2009): 188-206.
- Balbi, Anne-Marie (2015). "The Paris Attacks: Why it's time we saved generation K from living in the hunger games", *New Matilda*, <https://newmatilda.com/2015/11/18/the-paris-attacks-why-its-time-we-saved-generation-k-from-living-in-the-hunger-games/> [accessed 21 January 2016]

- Balbi, Anne-Marie (2016). “The influence of non-state actors on global politics”, *Australian Outlook*, Australian Institute of International Affairs, published online 26 August 2016,
http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian_outlook/the-influence-of-non-state-actors-on-global-politics/ [accessed 3 October 2016]
- Balbi, Anne-Marie (2018). “In the aftermath of terrorism – the structural challenges for incorporating victims’ voices” in Lynch, O. & Argomaniz, J. (eds.) *Victims and Perpetrators of Terrorism – Exploring Identities, Roles and Narratives*, London & New York: Routledge.
- Bali Peace Park Association Inc, ‘Mission statement’,
<http://www.balipeacepark.com.au> [accessed 6 February 2013]
- Bali Peace Park Association Inc, ‘University Study Shows Bom Bali Site Peace Park and Museum Project will make the island a “world leader”’, 11 October 2010.
http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/images/Media_Release_Website.pdf
[accessed 6 February 2013]
- Bartlett, Jamie & Alex Krasodomski-Jones (2016). “Counter-speech on Facebook”, *Demos*, published online 7 September, <https://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Counter-speech-on-facebook-report.pdf> [accessed 17 September 2017]
- Basra, Rajan, Peter Neumann and Claudia Brunner (2016) “Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus”, *The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence* (ICSR) <http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures.pdf>
- Baylis, John, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (2014). *The Globalization of World Politics – An introduction to international relations*, 6th edition, Oxford (UK): Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Bell, Duncan (Ed.) (2006). *Memory, Trauma and World Politics*, London: Palgrave Mcmillan.

- Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow (2000). "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment", *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 26, pp. 611-639.
- Berger, J. M. (2015) "ISIS is Not Winning the War of Ideas", *The Atlantic*, November 11, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/isis-war-of-ideas-propaganda/415335/> [accessed 12th Nov 2015]
- Bergin, Anthony and Carl Ungerer (2010). 'Homeward bound: Australia's new Counter-Terrorism White Paper', *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, 18 March,
http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=246&pubtype=9 [accessed 12 July 2013]
- Bergström, Göran and Kristina Boréus (eds.) (2005). *Textens mening och makt: Metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig text- och diskursanalys*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Berwick, Andrew (2011). "2083 – A European Declaration of Independence", Breivik manifesto, [accessed January 12th 2018]
<https://publicintelligence.net/anders-behring-breiviks-complete-manifesto-2083-a-european-declaration-of-independence/>
- "Beyond Bali Education Package", *Bali Peace Park Association Inc (BPPAI)*,
<http://www.balipeacepark.com.au/beyond-bali-education-package.html>
[accessed 17 November 2017]
- Bjørgo, Tore (2013). *Strategies for Preventing Terrorism*, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bjørgo, Tore (2015). *Forebyggning av Kriminalitet*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Blanchot, Maurice (1995). *The Writing of Disaster*, trans. Ann Smock, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Bodnar, John (1992). *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1991). *Language and Symbolic Power*, Cambridge (UK): Polity Press.

- Braddock, Kurt and John Horgan (2016). "Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counternarratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39:5, 381-404, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1116277
- Briggs, Rachel (2010). "Community engagement for counterterrorism: lessons from the United Kingdom", *International Affairs*, 86(4): 971-981.
- Briggs, Rachel & Sebastien Feve (2013). "Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism – What works and what are the implications for government?" *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, [Retrieved from Analysis and Policy Observatory Website: <https://apo.org.au/node/37101>]
- Brooking, Emerson and Peter W. Singer, "War goes Viral: How Social Media is being Weaponized Around the World", *The Atlantic*, November issue, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/war-goes-viral/501125/?utm_source=atltw
- Brown, Michael E., Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.) (2010). *Contending with Terrorism – Roots, Strategies, and Responses*, Cambridge MA: The Mit Press.
- Brown, Gillian and George Yule (1983). *Discourse Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Breen Smyth, Marie, Jeroen Gunning, Richard Jackson, George Kassimeris, and Piers Robinson (2008). "Critical Terrorism Studies – an Introduction", *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1(1): 1-4.
- Burkeman, Oliver (2009). "Obama administration says goodbye to 'war on terror'", *The Guardian*, published online 26 March, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/25/obama-war-terror-overseas-contingency-operations> [accessed 17 May 2015]
- Carle, Robert (2013). "Anders Breivik and the Death of Free Speech in Norway", *Society*, August, 50(4): 395-401.
- Caruth, Cathy (1995). "Trauma and Experience: Introduction", in Caruth, C. (ed.) *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-12.

- Cavanaugh, Jillian R. (2015). “Performativity”, Oxford bibliographies, DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780199766567-0114.
- Chakrabortty, Aditya (2016). “After a Campaign scarred by bigotry, it has become OK to be racist in UK”, published online 29 June, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/28/campaign-bigotry-racist-britain-leave-brexit>
- Chalmers, Ian (2017). “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Bringing Back the Jihadists”, *Asian Studies Review*, 41 (3): 331-351.
- Chaskin, R., Brown, P., Venkatesh, S., and Vidal, A. *Building Community Capacity*, New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 2001.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1998). “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, *World Politics*, 50(2): 324-348.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999). “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 43: 83-114.
- Cheong, P. H. and Lundry, C. (2012). “Prosumption, Transmediation and Resistance: Terrorism and Man-Hunting in South East Asia”, *American Behavioural Scientist*, 56(4): 488-510.
- “Civil Society Empowerment Programme”, *RAN CoE*, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/radicalisation_awareness_network/rancsep/docs/csep_newsletter_1_en.pdf
- Combes, William S. (2013). ‘Assessing Two Countering Violent Extremism Programs: Saudi Arabia’s PRAC and United Kingdom’s Prevent Strategy’, *Small Wars Journal*, July 9, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/assessing-two-countering-violent-extremism-programs-saudi-arabia’s-prac-and-the-united-king> [accessed 15 July 2013]
- ‘CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism – Annual Report’. HM Government, (2013) Available at www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/170644/28307_Cm_8583_v0_20.pdf

‘Counter-Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia – Protecting our Community’, Australian Government, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, February 2010, http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/counter_terrorism/index.cfm [accessed 10 June 2013]

Crelinsten, Ronald D. (2002). “Analysing Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Communication Model”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14(2): 77-122.

Crocker, Chester, Hampson, Fen Osler and Pamela Aall (2011). ‘Collective conflict management: a new formula for global peace and security cooperation?’, *International Affairs*, 87(1): 39-58.

Czarniawska, B. (2004). “Narratives in Social Science Research – The ‘Narrative Turn’ in Social Studies”, *SAGE Research Methods*,

DOI: 10.4135/9781849209502

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja & Patrick Schack (2016). “Community Resilience to Militant Islamism: Who and What? An Explorative Study of Resilience in Three Danish Communities”, *Democracy and Security*, 12 (4): 309-327,

DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2016.1236691

Dearden, L. 2017. “Parsons Green Attack: No evidence Isis is systematically using refugees for terror plots, research finds”, *The Independent*, September 19, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/parsons-green-attack-isis-evidence-refugees-terror-plots-jihadis-terrorist-islamic-state-paris-a7955026.html>

De Graaf, Beatrice (2010). “Counter-narratives and the Unintentional Messages Counterterrorism Policies Unwittingly Produce: The Case of West-Germany”, in ‘Countering Violent Extremist Narratives’, *National Coordinator for Counterterrorism* in the Netherlands, July.

https://www.ris.uu.nl/ws/files/20779441/Countering_Violent_Exremist_Narratives_2_tcm126_444038_2_.pdf [accessed 15 July 2016]

De Graaf, Beatrice (2010). “Redefining ‘Us’ and ‘Them’”, in Kessel EJAM (ed.) Countering Violent Extremism Narratives. *National Coordinator for Counterterrorism*. The Hague. pp. 36-45.

De Graaf, Beatrice (2011). ‘Why Communication and Performance are Key in Counter Terrorism’, *International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague*, 12 February, <http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-de-Graaf-Communication-and- Performance-Key-to-CT-February.pdf> [accessed 23 July 2013]

“Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Frameworks for Countering Violent Extremism”, *International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT) The Hague*, 2014,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Developing%20Effective%20Frameworks%20for%20CVE-Hidayah_ICCT%20Report.pdf

Doss, Erika (2010). *Memorial Mania. Public Feeling in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Ducey, Liam (2014). “After 12 years, Bali Peace Park possible in six month”, *WAtoday*, www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/after-12-years-bali-peace-park-possible-in-six-months-20141011-114iac.html

Edkins, Jenny (2003). *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elden, Stuart (2013). “How Should We Do the History of Territory?” *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 1(1): 5-20,
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2012.733317>

Entman, Robert M. (1993). “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm”, *Journal of Communication*, 43 (4): 51-58.

“EU Internet Forum: Civil Society Empowerment Programme”, *Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)*, http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/civil-society-empowerment-programme_en [accessed 16 March 2017]

Fairclough, Norman (1992), *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Fairclough, Norman & Ruth Wodak (1997). “Critical Discourse Analysis”, in van Djik, Teun A. (ed.), *Discourse as Social Action. Discourse Studies 2. A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, London: Sage.

- Fassin, Didier and Richard Rechtman (2009). *The Empire of Trauma – An Inquiry into the Condition of Victimhood*, Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Ferguson, Kate (2016). “Countering Violent Extremism through Media and Communication Strategies – A Review of the Evidence”, *Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research*, 1st March, <http://www.paccsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Countering-Violent-Extremism-Through-Media-and-Communication-Strategies-.pdf> [accessed 2 March 2016]
- “Fight for Peace Park Continues 14 years After Bali Bombings”, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, published online 11 October 2016. Available at:
- Finer, Jon and Robert Malley (2017). “How Our Strategy Against Terrorism Gave Us Trump”, *The New York Times*, published online 4 March 2017
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/opinion/sunday/how-our-strategy-against-terrorism-gave-us-trump.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0&referer=https://t.co/5Z0OLy9FJ6?amp=1 [accessed 20 March 2017]
- Finnemore, Martha (1996). “Norms, Culture and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism”, *International Organisation*, 50(2): 325-347.
- Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, *International Organization*, 52:4, pp. 887-917.
<https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789>
- Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (2001). “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 391-416.
- DOI: 10.1146/annurev/polisci.4.1.391.
- Foucault, Michel (1988) [1984]. ‘The Concern for Truth’, in *Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture. Interviews and Other Writings*, 1977-1984, ed. L. D. Kritzman, Trans. A. Sheridan & others, New York: Routledge.
- Foucault, M. (1991) “Space, knowledge and power”, in Rabinow P. (Ed.) *The Foucault Effect*, pp. 239-256, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

- Foucault, M. 1994 [1981], ‘So it is important to Think?’, in Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol. 3, ed. J. D. Faubion, Trans. R. Hurley & others, London: Penguin.
- Fox, Robert (2005). “Gwot is history. Now for Save: After the Global War on Terror comes the Struggle Against Violent Extremism”, *New Statesman*, 8th August, <http://www.newstatesman.com/node/195357> [accessed 19th Jan 2016]
- Friedman, Uri (2011). “Comparing How Norway and the US Respond to Terror”, *The Atlantic*, published July 27, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/comparing-how-norway-and-us-respond-terror/353336/>
- Fukuyama, Francis (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Avon Books.
- Ganor, Boaz (2010). “Defining Terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?”, *Police Practice and Research*, 3 (4): 287-304.
- Gamson, W. A. & Modigliani, A. “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach”, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 95:1 (Jul 1989), pp. 1-37 [accessed 4 March 2015]
- Giæver, Anders (2019). “Hukommelses-senteret”, *VG*, published online 27 April, <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/meninger/i/lAKrx/e/hukommelses-senteret>
- Gillespie, Alex & Cornish, Flora (2010). “Intersubjectivity: Towards a Dialogical Analysis”, *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 40(1): 19-46.
- Goffman, Erving (1974). *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Goldenberg, I., Heras, N. A., and Paul Scharre, “Defeating the Islamic State – A Bottom-Up Approach”, *Center for a New American Security*, <http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNASReport-ISIS-Final.pdf> [accessed 20th June 2016]
- Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper & Francesca Polletta (ed). (2001). *Passionate Politics – Emotions and Social Movements*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Guess, R. 1987. *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grant Geary, Belinda (2016). “Lest we forget... but Bali did: Bali bombing memorial in Kuta lies in ruins with no flags and a water features covered in slime weeks before the anniversary of terror attack that killed 88 Australians”, *Daily Mail*, 15 September, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3790285/Bali-Bombings-memorial-Kuta-left-ruin-weeks-anniversary-attack-killed-88-Australians.html>

Greenspan, Elizabeth (2013). *Battle for Ground Zero – Inside the Political Struggle to Rebuild the World Trade Center*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Grenfell, Michael (2011). *Bourdieu, Language and Linguistics*. London & New York: Continuum.

Gronnevet, J. 2012. “Thousands defy Anders Breivik with children’s song in Norway”, *Independent*, published online 26 April, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/thousands-defy-anders-breivik-with-childrens-song-in-norway-7681732.html>

Habermas, J. (1987) *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1987.

Habermas, J. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. 2 vols. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1984.

Haney, C. Allen, Christina Leimer, and Juliann Lowery. (1997). “Spontaneous Memorialiation: Violent Death and Emerging Mourning Ritual.” *Omega*, 35(2): 159-171.

Harchaoui, Sadik (2010). “Heterogeneous Counter-Narratives and the Role of Social Diplomacy” *Countering Violent Extremist Narratives*, pp. 124-131. The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism. https://www.ris.uu.nl/ws/files/20779441/Countering_Violent_Extremist_Narratives_2_tcm126_444038_2_.pdf

Hedlin Hayden, Malin & Snickare, Mårten. 2017. *Performativitet: Teoretiska tillämpningar i konstvetenskap*: 1. Stockholm: Stockholm University Press.

Heinke, Daniel H. 2017. "Who leads and who does what? Multi-agency coordination, community engagement, and public-private partnerships", in Muro, D. (Ed) Resilient Cities – Countering Violent Extremism at Local Level, *CIDOB*, https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/monographs/monographs/resilient_cities_countering_violent_extremism_at_local_level [accessed 18 August 2018]

Hellem Anstaad, K. 2017. "Domprosten om jernrosen utenfor domkirken: - En spennende og positiv tanke", *Aftenposten*, published online 18th July, <https://www.aftenposten.no/kultur/i/EVEEG/Domprosten-om-jernrosene-utenfor-domkirken--En-spennende-og-positiv-tanke>

HM Government (2009). Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Home Department, March 2009, chapter 9).

HM Government (2011). Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, July 2011. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest> [accessed 11 April 2016].

Hoffman, Bruce (2006). 'The Use of the Internet by Islamist Extremists'. *RAND*. www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf

Hopf, Ted (2013). "Common-sense Constructivism and Hegemony in World Politics", *International Organization*, 67, Spring, pp. 317-354.

Howarth, Don. (2015). "3RW's memorial for victims of Norwegian massacre opens on Utøya island", *Dezeen*, published online 22 July, <https://www.dezeen.com/2015/07/22/the-clearing-memorial-utoya-massacre-norway-3rw/>

Hutchison, Emma (2010). "Trauma and the Politics of Emotions: Constituting Identity, Security and Community after the Bali Bombing", *International Relations*, 24(1): 65-86.

- Hutchison, Emma (2018). “Affective Communities and World Politics”, *E-International Relations*, [accessed 9 March 2018] www.e-internationalrelations.com/2018/03/08/affective-communities-and-world-politics/
- Hutchison, Peter (2011). “Norway shooting: police response criticised”, *The Telegraph*, published online 24 July 2011, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/8658569/Norway-shooting-police-response-criticised.html>
- Huisse, Camilla (2016). “Fem år etter 22.juli: Minnes dotteren Synne (18) med rosehav fra hele verden – nå skal <<Jernrosen>> skulpturen opp”, *Verdens Gang*, published online 12 July, <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/MyQ9K/fem-aar-etter-22-juli-minnes-datteren-synne-18-med-rosehav-fra-hele-verden-naa-skal-jernrosen-skulpturen-opp>
- “Hvorfor vi bør lære om 22. juli i skolen”, *Verdens Gang*, 22nd July 2016, [accessed 26 July 2016] <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/meninger/terrorangrepet-22-juli-femaarsdagen/hvorfor-vi-boer-laere-om-22-juli-i-skolen/a/23746679/>
- Ingebritsen, C. (2002), “Norm entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37:1,
- Ingram, Haroro J. (2016). “An Analysis of *Inspire* & *Dabiq*: Lessons from Aqap and Islamic State’s Propaganda War”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, published online 13 July.
- Ingram, Haroro. J. and Alastair Reed (2016). “Lessons from History for Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications”, *The International Centre for Counter-terrorism – The Hague* 7, no. 4.
- Ingram, Haroro. J. and Craig Whiteside (2017). “In Search of the Virtual Caliphate: Convenient Fallacy, Dangerous Distraction”, *War on the Rocks*, published online September 17, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/in-search-of-the-virtual-caliphate-convenient-fallacy-dangerous-distraction/> [accessed 12 November 2018]
- Ingram, Haroro. J. and Alastair Reed (2018). “Reverse-engineering the ISIS playbook, part I: CT-CVE messaging lessons from ISIS’s English- language

magazines”, *Vox-Pol*, published online 13 April,
<http://www.voxpol.eu/reverse-engineering-the-isis-playbook-part-i-ct-cve-messaging-lessons-from-isiss-english-language-magazines/> [accessed 13 April 2018]

Ingram, Haroro. J. (2018). “Islamic State’s English-language magazines, 2014-2017: Trends & Implications for CT-CVE Strategic Communications.” *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* 8, no. 15

“Islamic State looking for spectacular attacks: UK Police”, *Reuters*, published online 07-03- 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-security-spectacular-idUSKCN0W91MN> [accessed 9 March 2016]

Iversen, B. “Innfører ny felles terrorøvelse for politiet og Forsvaret kalt «Nordlys»”, *iFinnmark*, published online 11 October 2016,
http://www.ifinnmark.no/nyheter/forsvaret/politi/innforer-ny-felles-terrorovelse-for-politiet-og-forsvaret-kalt-nordlys/s/5-81-350851?ns_campaign=editorial.article&%3Bns_mchannel=editorial.facebook&%3Bns_source=editorial.facebook&%3Bns_linkname=editorial.share.article&%3Bns_fee=0 [accessed 12 October 2016]

Jackson, Richard 2011. “In Defense of “Terrorism”: Finding a Way through a Forest of Misconceptions”, *Behavioural Science of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 3(2): 116-130. www.tandfonline.com

DOI: 10.1080/19434472.2010.512148

Jasper, James M. (2014). “Playing the Game” in Jasper, J. M & Duyvendak, J. W. (eds.) *Players and Arenas – The Interactive Dynamics of Protest*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Jenkins, Brian. M. (1986). “Defense against Terrorism”, *Political Science Quarterly*, 101(5): 777-786.

Jenkins, Brian M. (2006). “The New Age of Terrorism”, in Kamien, D. (ed). McGraw-Hill Homeland Security, accessed through RAND. Available at:
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1215.html>

- Kassel, W. 2009. "Terrorism and the International Anarchist Movement of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 32(3): 237-252.
- Keck, Margaret E. & Sikkink, Kathryn. (1998) *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Kellner, D. 1990. "Critical Theory and the Crisis of Social Theory", *Sociological Perspectives*, 33 (1): 11-33.
- Kessels, E. J. A. M. 2010. "Introduction", *Countering Violent Extremist Narratives*, pp. 6-11. The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism.
- Khatib, L., W. Dutton and M. Thelwall, 2012. "Public Diplomacy 2.0: A Case Study of the US Digital Outreach Team", *The Middle East Journal*, 66(3): 453-472.
- Kinnvall, Catarina (2004). "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity and the Search for Ontological Security", *Political Psychology*, 25 (5): 741-767.
- Kokoda Foundation (2008). Kokoda Trilogy Proceedings: Towards an Effective Strategy for Countering Islamist Terror. *Security Challenges*, 4(2), 165-179.
- Kolås, Åshild (2017). "How critical is the event? Multicultural Norway after 22 July 2011", *Social Identities*, 23:5, 518-532,
DOI: 10.1080/13504630.2016.1271740
- Kugler, R. L. and Frost, E. (eds.) *Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, Vol. 2, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2001.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich. V. (1989). *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Krook, Mona L. and Jacqui True (2010). "Rethinking the life cycles of international norms: The United Nations and the global promotion of gender equality", *European Journal of International Relations*, 18 (1): 103-127.
- Kurlansky, M. (2007). *Non-Violence – The History of a Dangerous Idea*, London: Vintage Books.

- Kurth Cronin, A. (2010). "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism" in *Contending with Terrorism: Roots, Strategies, and Responses*, edited by Brown, E., O. R. Cote Jr., S. M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, 28-56. Cambridge, Massachusetts;
- Lapid, Yosef and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds) (1996). *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Lewis, Jeff (2006). "Paradise defiled – The Bali bombings and the terror of national identity", *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 9 (2): 223-242.
DOI: 10.1177/1367549406063165
- Lewis, Jeff and Belinda Lewis (2009). *Bali's Silent Crisis – Desire, Tragedy, and Transition*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Lewis, Jeff, Belinda Lewis and I Nyoman Darma Putra (2013). "The Bali Bombings Monument: Ceremonial Cosmopolis", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 72(1): 21-43, DOI: 10.1017/S0021911812001799
- Lindgren, F. and Odlund, A. "Utmänningar i ateruppbyggnaden av Sveriges civila försvar", FOI, <http://www.foi.se/rapport?rNo=FOI-R--4194--SE> [accessed 3 March 2016]
- Lipson, David. (2019). "Bali bombing blast site to be developed into five-storey commercial complex, outraging survivors", *ABC News*, published online 24 April <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-04-25/bali-bombings-site-to-be-transformed-into-commercial-development/11042234> [accessed 26 April 2019]
- Lord Carlile, "Report to the Home Secretary of Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy", *U.K. Home Office*, May 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97977/lord-carlile-report.pdf [accessed 17 July 2013]
- Low, Setha M. (2000). *On the Plaza – The Politics of Public Space and Culture*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Low, Setha M. (2004). "The memorialization of September 11: Dominant and local discourses on the rebuilding of the World Trade Center site", *American Ethnologist*, 31(3): 326-339. DOI: 10.1525/ae.2004.31.3.326

- Loxley, James (2006). *Performativity*, Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.
- Mac Ginty, R. *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- Mamdani, Mahmood (2004). *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. 1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Margry, P. J. and Sanchez-Carretero, C. (2011) *Grassroots Memorials: The Politics of Memorializing Traumatic Death*, New York: Berghahn Books.
- McKenzie, R. L. (18th October 2016). "Countering violent extremism in America: Policy recommendations for the next president", *Brookings Big Ideas For America*, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/countering-violent-extremism-in-america-policy-recommendations-for-the-next-president/>
- Meyer, J. and D. Strang. "Institutional Conditions for Diffusion". *Theory and Society* 22 (August) 1993: 487-511.
- "Memorial sites after 22 July", *Koro – Public Art Norway*, <https://publicartnorway.org/prosjekter/memorial-sites-after-22-july/> [accessed 22nd July 2017]
- "Midlertidig minnestad i regjeringskvarteralet", *Statsbygg*, published 03 November 2017, <http://www.statsbygg.no/Nytt-fra-Statsbygg/Nyheter/2017/Midlertidig-minnested-i-regjeringskvarteralet/>
- Miller, Eric D. (2011). "Finding Meaning at Ground Zero for Future Generations: Some Reflections a Decade after 9/11", *International Social Science Review*, Vol. 86, no. 3/4, pp. 113-133.
- 'Minnested', <http://www.utoya.no/minnested> [accessed 24 July 2017]
- Morgan, J. "The Radical Right and the Threat of Violence", *Medium*, published online 8 September 2016, <https://medium.com/@jonathonmorgan/the-radical-right-and-the-threat-of-violence-f66288ac8c4#.wgkvu3b8a> [accessed 12 October 2016]
- Mullard, Maurice and Bankole A. Cole. (Ed.) (2007). *Globalisation, Citizenship and the War on Terror*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Muro, Diego (ed.) (2017). “Resilient Cities – Countering Violent Extremism at Local Level”, *CIDOB Barcelona Centre for International Affairs*, https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/monographs/monographs/resilient_cities_countering_violent_extremism_at_local_level,

DOI: <http://doi.org/10.24241/ResilientCities>

Murphy, William (2005). “Keeping focus on memorial; NY Representatives say Congress will act if Ground Zero project will include exhibits not related to 9/11.” *Newsday* (July 2). <http://www.newsday.com/news/keeping-focus-on-memorial-1.623948> [accessed 17 Sep 2017]

Muskal, Michael. 2011. “Tragedy and tourism: 9/11 memorial draws its millionth visitor.” *Los Angeles Times* (December 30). <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2011/12/911-site-in-nyc-draws-one-millionth-visitor.html>, [accessed 25 July 2017]

Nasser-Eddine, Minerva, Garnham, B., Agostino, K. and G. Caluya, (2011). “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review”, *Australian Government Department of Defence*, https://publicaccess.dtic.mil/psm/api/service/search/search?site=default_collection&q=CVE+literature+review [accessed 5 Feb 2015]

Nonaka, Ikujiro and Noburo Konno (1998). “The Concept of “Ba”: Building a Foundation for Knowledge Creation, *California Management Review*”, 40(3): 40-54, <http://home.business.utah.edu/actme/7410/Nonaka%201998.pdf> [accessed 21 January 2016]

“Norway PM rings Utøya mum over memorial”, *The Local*, published online 4 April 2014, www.thelocal.no/20140404/norway-pm-rings-utya-mother-on-memorial [accessed 27 Jul 2017]

“Norway unveils Utøya memorial on day of remembrance”, *The Local*, published online 23 July 2018, <https://www.thelocal.no/20180723/norway-unveils-utya-monument-on-day-of-remembrance> [accessed 25 October 2018]

“Norway's Society Polarises as Anniversary of Terrorist Attacks is Commemorated” *Jane's Intelligence Review*, (2012): 3. Published electronically 23-Jul-2012.

- Nye, Joseph. S. Jr. (2009). "Combining hard and soft power", *Foreign Affairs*, 88(4), pp. 160-163.
- Nye, Joseph. S. Jr. (2016). "Putting the populist revolt in its place", *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, published online 10 October, <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/putting-populist-revolt-place/> [accessed 10 October 2016]
- Oberschall, Anthony (2004). "Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory", *Sociological Theory*, 22 (1): 26-37.
- "Oslo church wants to remove 22 July memorial" (2015). *The Local*, published online 1 September, <https://www.thelocal.no/20150901/oslo-church-want-to-remove-22-july-memorial>
- Pedersen, Eskil (2012). Sommar och Vinter i P1, *Sveriges Radio*, podcast, published online 22 July, <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/avsnitt/116694?programid=2071> [accessed 17 Jan 2015]
- Pelletier, I., Lundmark, L., Gardner, R., Scott Ligon, G. and Ramazan Kilinc, "Why ISIS's Message Resonates: Leveraging Islam, Sociopolitical Catalysts, and Adapting Messaging", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39:10, 2016, pp.871-899.
- Philpott, D. and G. Powers (eds.) (2010). *Strategies of Peace – Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pollard, N. A. (2007). "Competing with Terrorists in Cyberspace: Opportunities and Hurdles", in M. Ranstorp (Ed.), *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction* (pp.236-251). Oxon: Routledge.
- "Prevent Strategy", *UK Home Office*, June 2011, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011> [accessed 17 July 2013]
- "Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: the United Kingdom's strategy for countering international terrorism", March 2009, <http://www.officialdocuments.gov.uk/document/cm78/7833/7833.pdf> [accessed 17 July 2013]

- Putnam, Robert D. (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games". *International Organization*. 42: 427-460.
- Putnam, Robert D. (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Putnam, R. D. & Lewis M. Feldstein (2004). *Better Together: Restoring the American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.
- Rao, Ankita. "French Media Stopped Publishing Terrorists' Photos. Research Says They're Right", *Motherboard*, August 16, 2016,
<http://motherboard.vice.com/read/french-media-stopped-publishing-terrorists-photos-science-says-theyre-right> [accessed 17 August 2016]
- Reckwitz, (2002). "Toward a Theory of Social Practices – A Development in Culturalist Theorizing", *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5(2): 243-263, [accessed through Curtin 21st July 2015]
<http://est.sagepub.com.dbgw.lis.curtin.edu.au/content/5/2/243.full.pdf+html>
- Reed, Alistair (2017). "IS Propaganda: Should We Counter the Narrative?", *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. The Hague*, 17 March,
<https://icct.nl/publication/is-propaganda-should-we-counter-the-narrative/>
[accessed 19 March 2017]
- "Relocating the Past: Ruins for the future", *KORO*,
<https://koro.no/content/uploads/2015/01/Publikasjon-Ruins-for-the-future-eng.pdf>
- Richards, A. "The Problem with 'Radicalization': The Remit of 'Prevent' and the Need to Refocus on Terrorism in the UK." *International Affairs* 87, no. 1 (2011): 143-52.
- Richmond, Oliver P. and Tellidis, I. "The Complex Relationship Between Peacebuilding and Terrorism Approaches: Towards Post-Terrorism and a Post-Liberal Peace?", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(1): 120-143

- Rosand, Eric & Emily Winterbotham (2019). “*Do counter-narratives actually reduce violent extremism?*”, *Brookings*, published online 20 March, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/20/do-counter-narratives-actually-reduce-violent-extremism/> [accessed 22 March 2019]
- Ruggie, J. G. “What makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”, *International Organization*, 52, pp. 855-885. DOI: 10.1162/002081898550770
- Sageman, M. (2014). “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(4): 565-580.
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649>
[accessed 14th August 2015]
- Santino, Jack (2004). “Performative Commemoratives, the Personal, and the Public: Spontaneous Shrines, Emergent Ritual, and the Field of Folklore”, *The Journal of American Folklore*, 117(266): 363-372.
- Santino, Jack (2006). *Spontaneous Shrines and the Public Memorialization of Death* (ed.), New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Santino, Jack (2011). “Between Commemoration and Social Activism” in *Grassroots Memorials*, edited by Peter Jan Margry & Christina Sánchez-Carretero, New York: Berghahn Books, pp. 97-107.
- Schanzer, David H. 2014. “No Easy Day: Government Roadblocks and the Unsolvable Problem of Political Violence: A Reponse to Marc Sageman’s “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26:4, 596-600.
- Schjeldahl, Peter (2017). “Did a Cancelled Memorial to Norway’s Utøya Massacre Go Too Far?”, *The New Yorker*, published online 25 July, <https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/did-a-cancelled-memorial-to-norways-utoya-massacre-go-too-far> [accessed 15 September 2017]
- Schmid, Alex P. and J.F.A. de Graaf. (1982) Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media. London: Sage.

- Schmid, Alex P. & Crelinsten, R. D. (eds.) (1993) *Western responses to terrorism*, London: Frank Cass.
- Schmid, Alex P. (2004). “Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(2): 197-221. DOI: 10.1080/09546550490483134
- Schmid, Alex P. (ed.) (2011). *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, London: Routledge.
- Schmid, Alex P. (2012). “Strengthening the Role of Victims and Incorporating Victims in Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism and Terrorism”, *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague*, <https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Strengthening-the-Role-of-Victims-August-2012.pdf>
- Schmid, Alex P. (2014). “Comments on Marc Sageman’s Polemic “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26: 4, 587-595.
- Schmid, Alex P. (2014). “Al Qaeda’s “Single Narrative” and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives”, *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague* 5, no. 1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.19165/2014.1.01>
- Schmid, Alex P. (2016). “Links between Terrorism and Migration”, *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)*, DOI: 10.19165/2016.1.04.
- Schuurman, Bart and Quirine Eijkman (2013). “Moving Terrorism Research Forward: The Crucial Role of Primary Sources”, *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague*, 27 June, <http://www.icct.nl/download/file/Schuurman-and-Eijkman-Moving-Terrorism-Research-Forward-June-2013.pdf> [accessed 12 July 2013]
- Schutz, A. and M. G. Sandy (2011). *Collective Action for Social Change – An Introduction to Community Organizing*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Serrano, Agata, Orla Lynch, Javier Argomaniz and Cheryl Lawther (2018). “Memory, truth and justice – understanding the experience of victims of terrorism and political violence: the cases of the United Kingdom and Spain”, in Lynch, O. & Argomaniz, J. (eds.) *Victims and Perpetrators of Terrorism – Exploring Identities, Roles and Narratives*, London & New York: Routledge.

- Scott, Claudia and Karen Baehler (2010). *Adding value to Policy Analysis and Advice*, Sydney: UNSW Press.
- Seierstad, Åsne (2013). *One of Us – The Story of Anders Breivik and the Massacre in Norway*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Seierstad, Åsne (2015). “Islamofoberna och IS drivs av samma hat”, *Dagens Nyheter*, <http://www.dn.se/kultur-noje/seierstad-islamofoberna-och-is-drivs-av-samma-hat/> [accessed 17 November 2015]
- Shapiro, Michael J. (1988). *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography and Policy Analysis*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Shephard, Michelle (2016). “How can we end terrorism without feeding it?”, *The Star*, published online 28 May, <https://www.thestar.com/news/atkinsonseries/generation911/2016/05/28/how-can-we-end-terrorism-without-feeding-it.html> [accessed 17 June 2016]
- Sherlock, S. “The Bali Bombing: What it Means for Indonesia”, *Parliament of Australia*, Current Issues Brief no. 4, 2002-03, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/cib0203/03Cib04 [accessed 29 July 2013]
- Shevellar, L. (2011) “We have to go back to stories”: Causal Layered Analysis and the community development gateaux, *Community Development*, 42:1: 3-15.
- Shimko, Keith L. (2008). *International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies*. 2nd ed. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin.
- Silverman, David (ed.) (2004). *Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice*. 2nd ed. London: Sage Publications.
- Smyth, M. B., Gunning, J., Jackson, R., Kassimeris, G., and Robinson, P. (2008), “Symposium: Critical Terrorism Studies – an Introduction,” *Critical Terrorism Studies*, 1 (1): 1-4.
- Stanley, Timothy and Alexander Lee (2014). “It’s Still Not the End of History”, *The Atlantic*, Published online 1 September,

<https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/its-still-not-the-end-of-history-francis-fukuyama/379394/> [accessed 26 September 2016]

Stern, Jessica (2014). “Response to Marc Sageman’s “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(4): 607-613.

Stern, Jessica (2015). “Obama and Terrorism”, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/obama-and-terrorism> [accessed 25 March 2017]

Stow, Simon (2012). “From Upper Canal to Lower Manhattan: Memorialisation and the Politics of Loss”, *Perspectives on Politics*, 10 (3): 687-700.
doi:10.1017/S1537592712001703

“Struggle continues for Bali Peace Park”, (2014). *Yahoo 7 News*, published online 1 February, <https://au.news.yahoo.com/struggle-continues-for-bali-peace-park-21212215.html>

Stump, Jacob. L. and Priya Dixit (2013). *Critical Terrorism Studies: An Introduction to Research Methods*. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge.

Sturken, Marita (2002). “Memorializing Absence” in *Understanding September 11*, eds. Craig Calhoun, Paul Price and Ashley Timmer. New York: W.W. Norton, 374-384.

“The 9/11 children: what can they teach us?” *CNN*, published online September 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2016/09/us/911-children-age-of-terror/> [accessed 7 September 2016]

Talsnes, Anne (2016). “Hva skal vi lære bort om 22. juli?”, *Dagsavisen*, published 13 September,
<http://www.dagsavisen.no/nyemeninger/hva-skal-vi-lære-bort-om-22-juli-1.777417> [accessed 14 September 2016]

Taylor, Max (2014). “If I Were You, I Wouldn’t Start From Here: Response to Marc Sageman’s “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26(4): 581-586.
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649>
[accessed 14th August 2015]

The National September 11 Memorial, ‘FAQ about 9/11’,

<http://www.911memorial.org/faq-about-911> [accessed 17 April 2013]

The National September 11 Memorial, ‘Design Overview’,

<http://www.911memorial.org/design-overview> [accessed 17 April 2013]

Thomson, Chris (2010). “Bali Peace Park founder quits Perth in disgust”, *WAtoday*, published online February 2,

<https://www.watoday.com.au/national/western-australia/bali-peace-park-founder-quits-perth-in-disgust-20100201-n8ly.html> [accessed 5 April 2016]

“Tilbake till Utoya”, *YouTube*, videoclip,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqOPew5ZJKA> [accessed 21 July 2017]

“Tonight the streets are filled with love”, (2011), *Daily Mail*, published online 26 July, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2018368/Norway-massacre-150k-gather-Oslo-rose-march-tribute.html> [accessed 25 November 2017]

Topsfield, Jewel (2016). “Fight for Peace Park continues 14 years after the Bali bombings”, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 11th October, <https://www.smh.com.au/world/fight-for-peace-park-continues-14-years-after-bali-bombings-20161011-grzopi.html> [accessed 17 October 2017]

Tolgfors, Sten (2017). “Underskatta inte populismens ideologiska grund”, *Mänsklig Säkerhet*, <http://manskligsakerhet.se/2017/02/24/underskatta-inte-populismens-ideologiska-grund/> [accessed 24 Feb 2017]

Tuman, Joseph S. (2003). *Communicating Terror – The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Tumarkin, Maria (2005). *Traumascapes – The Power and Fate of Places Transformed by Tragedy*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

‘United Nations General Assembly Adopts Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, *United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml> [accessed 23 July 2013]

Urrestarazu, Ursula S. (2015). “‘Identity’ in International Relations and Foreign Policy Theory” in *Theorizing Foreign Policy in a Globalized World*, edited by

Jørgensen, K. E., Werner Link & Gunther Hellman, 126-149. Palgrave
McMillan UK.

‘Utoyas historie’, <http://www.utoya.no/historien> [accessed 24 July 2017]

Van Ginkel, Bibi (2012). “Engaging Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism: Experiences with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague*, <http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-van-Ginkel-Civil-Society-in-CVE-August-2012.pdf> [accessed 23 July 2013]

Van Ginkel, Bibi (2017). “Countering and preventing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism: From the international and European to the national and local levels” in Muro, Diego (ed.) “Resilient Cities: Countering Violent Extremism at Local Level”, *CIDOB*, [accessed 7 May 2018] https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/monographs/monographs/resilient_cities_countering_violent_extremism_at_local_level,
DOI: <http://doi.org/10.24241/ResilientCities>

‘Velkommen til Utoya’, www.utoya.no [accessed 24 July 2017]

“Verdig minnested og vakker park”,
<http://adressa.alda.no/bestillpluss2?9&artRefId=13658064&aviskode=ADR&targetUrl=http://www.adressa.no/%3Fservice%3DpaywallRedirect%26articleUrl%3Dhttp://www.adressa.no/pluss/meninger/article13658064.ece>

Vogel, Wendy (2016). “The Story of Norway’s Multiple July 22 Memorials”, *Hyperallergic*, <https://hyperallergic.com/339320/the-story-of-norways-multiple-july-22-memorials/>

Wendt, Alexander (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Weimann, G. and K. Von Knop (2008). “Applying the Notion of Noise to Countering Online Terrorism”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 31(10): 883-902.

West, Brad (2008). “Collective memory and crisis – The 2002 Bali bombing, national heroic archetypes and the counter-narrative of cosmopolitan nationalism”, *Journal of Sociology*, The Australian Sociological Association, 44(4): 337-353.

“Who Owns the Sari Club?” *Bali Discovery*, published 24 January 2015,
<https://www.balidiscovery.com/news/who-owns-the-sari-club-11479>
[accessed 17 March 2017]

Wiggen, Mette (2018). “Norway has failed to combat a climate of hate”, *Centre for Analysis of Radical Right*, published online 2 August,
<https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2018/08/02/norway-has FAILED-to-combat-a-climate-of-hate/> [accessed 4 August 2018]

Williams, L. (2016). “Islamic State propaganda and the mainstream media”, *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, published online 29th February,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0_0.pdf

Wilson, Tim (2017). “Terrorism and resilience: An historical perspective” in D. Muro (ed.) “Resilient Cities – Countering Violent Extremism at Local Level”, *Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)*,
https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/monographs/monographs/resilient_cities_countering_violent_extremism_at_local_level [accessed 11 Nov 2017]

Wilson, Tim (2018). “Preface” in *Victims and Perpetrators of Terrorism: Exploring identities, roles and narratives*, edited by Orla Lynch and Javier Argomaniz, London & New York: Routledge.

Winter, Charlie (2015). “Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’”, *Quilliam*,
<http://www.quilliaminternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf>

Winter, Charlie (2017). “Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare”, *The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence*, http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Media-jihad_web.pdf

Young, James E. (1993). *The Texture of Memory – Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Zalman, A. and J. Clarke (2009). “The Global War on Terror: A Narrative in need of a rewrite”, *Ethics & International Affairs*, 23(2),

http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/23_2/essays/002

[accessed 23 September 2016]

22.juli-senteret – Official facebook page, <https://www.facebook.com/22julisenteret/>

Every reasonable effort has been made to acknowledge the owners of copyright material. I would be pleased to hear from any copyright owner who has been omitted or incorrectly acknowledged.

Appendices

Questionnaire for Norway (Utoya/Oslo) – direct victims/resonant mass

Code _____

Age:

Gender:

Introduction

- Greet and introduce self
- Purpose of the interview
- Recording and transcripts
- Contact people
- Counselling services

Guided questions

1. How were you affected by the Norway attacks?
2. Would you describe it as terrorism? Why?
3. Would you say there has been a difference in Norway since the attacks? In what ways?
4. Have there been any noticeable changes in the current political climate in regards to specific issues following Breivik's attacks? (immigration, multiculturalism, right-wing groups)
5. How would you describe the public response to the attacks?
6. What do you know about what is going to happen with the site of Utoya island and the site of the bomb explosion at the Government House in Oslo?
7. What do you personally consider should happen with these sites?

- i) Utoya?
 - ii) Government House in Oslo?
8. Are you aware of the proposed memorials on the sites? (the one on Utoya island; the official national one – “the human scar” - on the mainland across from Utoya as well as in Oslo; the natural memorial stone).
 9. What role do you think the memorials have at the site/s? Any disputes?
 10. What do you think is the best response to Breivik’s attacks?
 11. What role do you have in this response?
 12. Do you feel that your voice has been heard? Challenges?

Questionnaire for Norway (Utoya/Oslo) – stakeholder questions

Code _____

Age:

Gender:

Introduction

- Greet and introduce self
- Purpose of the interview
- Recording and transcripts
- Contact people
- Counselling services

Guided questions

1. How were you affected by the Norway attacks?
2. Would you describe the attacks as terrorism? Why?
3. Would you say there has been a difference in Norway since the attacks? In what ways?
4. Have there been any noticeable changes in the current political climate in regards to specific issues following Breivik's attacks? (examples: immigration, multiculturalism, right-wing groups)
5. How would you describe the official response to the attacks?
6. What do you know about what is going to happen with the site of Utoya island and the site of the bomb explosion at the Government House in Oslo?
7. What do you personally consider should happen with these sites?
 - i) Utoya?
 - ii) Government House in Oslo?

8. What was Breivik trying to achieve by carrying out the attacks?
9. Do you think he achieved it?
10. What do you think is the best response? What are some of the challenges?

Direct victims/resonant mass- Bali

Code _____

Age:

Gender:

Introduction

- Greet and introduce self
- Purpose of the interview
- Recording and transcripts
- Contact people
- Counselling services

Guided questions

1. Is there a difference before and after Bom Bali? How is Bali/ Kuta different?
2. What do you think of the Bom Bali memorial?
3. Is the memorial part of Balinese culture?
4. Is the memorial more for the local people or for the tourists?
5. When somebody dies how do you remember them in your culture?
6. How do you remember Bom Bali in Balinese culture?
7. Do you think the site of the Sari Club is a special place? Why?
8. Do you know about the plans to build a park (peace park, garden, peace garden) on the site of the Sari Club? Do you think this is a good idea or not? Why?
9. Is it better to build a park or another night club on the site of the Sari Club? Why?
10. How would Bali people use the park/ garden? What would they do in the park/garden?
11. Do you do any activities in the site? What kinds of activities?
12. How would you describe terrorism?
13. Thinking about the terrorists who did Bom Bali, why do you think they did this?
14. Is there anything we can do to stop another terrorist attack? What can we do?

15. What message do you think terrorists are sending?
16. What message is a Peace Park sending?
17. Can Peace Park help Bali to deal with the attacks? In what ways?

Closing

- Any additional comments
- Thank participant

Visitor survey

Introduction

- Greet and introduce self
- Purpose of the survey
- Contact people

Survey period: may_year/ oct_year

Country of origin:

Age range: 18- 29; 30- 44; 45-60; > 60

Gender: m/f

Regular visitor to Bali: y/n

How many times visited:

Do you have a specific religion that you identify with?

Did you know anyone who was a victim? y/n

Have you visited the site before? y/n

Have you visited the memorial? y/n

1. Why have you come to this site today?
2. Are you surprised by the site and how it looks?
3. What do you think should be done with the site? Why?
4. In terms of responding to the terrorist attacks here and in general, do you think it is better to rebuild on the site, or to keep the site as it is? **rebuild/ keep as is/ unsure/ other.** Why?
5. Are you aware of plans to turn the site into a (peace) park? **y/ n**
6. Compared to another night club or restaurant, do you think a park is a more appropriate or less appropriate use of the site? **more/ less/ unsure.** Why?
7. If there was a (peace) park built on the site, do you think you would visit? **y/n/ unsure.**
8. What would you do there?
9. Who do you think a park would serve/ attract? (locals, tourists, victim's families, survivors)
10. How would a (peace) park work with the existing memorial?
11. What message would a peace park on this site (as opposed to another nightclub) send about terrorism?

Closing

- Any additional comments
- Thank participant

This study has been approved by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee (Approval Number #HR117/2013). The Committee is comprised of members of the public, academics, lawyers, doctors and pastoral carers. If needed, verification of approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, Curtin University, GPO Box U1987, Perth 6845 or by telephoning 9266 9223 or by emailing hrec@curtin.edu.au.

Appendix - Images

Figure 3



The author and co-investigator attending the 'Echo of Peace', *Gema Perdamaian*, event 11th October 2014 dressed for the occasion in traditional Balinese attire.

Figure 4



The ‘Echo of Peace’ event in Bali, Denpasar, 11 October 2014. The event gathers various religious groups and different expressions of culture (including ‘laughing yoga’ etc.) in an effort to promote peace, democracy and inter-faith dialogue.

Figure 5



The ‘Echo of Peace’ event, *Gema Perdamaian XII*, around the 12th anniversary of the Bali bombings.

Figure 6



Pictured are some of the religious leaders gathered at the 'Echo of Peace' event, October 2014.

Figure 7



The religious leaders gathered together on stage.

Figure 8



Various religious and spiritual leaders taking part in the interfaith “hymn” at the ‘Echo of Peace’ event in October 2014.

Figure 9



The various religious leaders gathered together setting off balloons into the sky.

Figure 10



Every year, around the anniversary, spontaneous shrines are placed around the site of the Sari Club in Kuta, Bali, to remember the victims of the terror attack. Pictured are flags, posters and pictures of the victims along the fencing at the Sari nightclub site (picture taken around the 12th anniversary of the Bali bombings, 11 October 2014).

Figure 11



Figure 12



The official memorial in Kuta in honour of the 202 victims that died in the Bali bombings (picture taken in October 2014, around the 12th anniversary of the bombings).

Figure 13



Figure 14



The official memorial, situated across the street from the Sari Club site, with the names of the 202 victims engraved and flags representing the countries of the various nationalities of the victims.

Figure 15



The names of the 202 victims (that perished in the Bali bombings) engraved in the memorial.

Figure 16



Local activists gathered at the 12th anniversary memorial service in Kuta in 2014.

Figure 17



The 12th anniversary memorial service with Governor of Bali, Made Pastika, and the Australian Consul-General to Bali, Majell Hind.

Figure 18



The 88 candles lit up at the exact time of the bombings on the night of the 12th anniversary, 12 October 2014.

Figure 19



The government quarters where the car bomb exploded – the area was still blocked off and under renovation/restoration when visited around the 3rd anniversary of the attacks (picture taken 22 July 2014).

Figure 20



Roses placed around the area at the government quarters where the bomb blast took place (picture taken 22 July 2014).

Figure 21



Government quarters in Oslo, on the 3rd anniversary of the 22 July attacks.

Figure 22



Government quarters in Oslo, on the 3rd anniversary of the 22 July attacks

Figure 23



Government quarters in Oslo, on the 3rd anniversary of the 22 July attacks.

Figure 24



Visiting Utøya on the 3rd anniversary of the 22 July terror attacks. Image taken on the ferry (that travels from the mainland to Utøya) approaching the island. This is where the first of Breivik's victims on the island were killed, including the security guard.

Figure 25



Pictured is one of the spots around the island where many of the youngsters were hiding, and where a lot of bodies were found following Breivik's massacre. Marked with roses for the location where victims died. (Picture taken 22 July 2014)

Figure 26



Figure 27



The spontaneous memorial overlooking Utøya, situated near the freeway after being relocated by the locals – photo taken on the third anniversary of the terror attacks (22 July 2014).

Figure 28



Where the spontaneous memorial was originally located – a natural stone which families visited to place memorials.

Figure 29



The café building (where most of the victims were killed). Pictured: memorials placed around the 3rd anniversary of the attacks, including pictures of the victims as well as roses marking where their bodies were found.

Figure 30



Bullet holes in wall of the café building where most of the youngsters were killed. (Picture taken on the 3rd anniversary of the attacks, 22 July 2014). The buildings have since been restored and the summer camps resumed in July 2015.

Figure 31



Image taken of the security camera footage displayed at the 22 July Centre, with the white van containing the car bomb parked at the government quarters. The actual bomb blast occurred minutes later, at exactly 15:25:22.

Figure 32





Image taken of the security camera footage displayed at the 22 July Centre, exhibiting the view almost a minute after the blast.

Figure 33



Upon entering the room exhibiting the ‘Timeline of 22 July’ is a large board that sums up the terror attacks of 22 July 2011 in both Norwegian and English.

Figure 34



Figure 35



Figure 36



Pictured the car bomb remnants to the backdrop of an image of Utøya island.

Figure 37




The timeline displays images of the destruction after the bomb blast at Oslo government quarters.

Figure 38




Figure 39




The timeline includes detailed portrayals of the line of events on 22 July 2011.

Figure 40



A detailed timeline of events describes the tragic events of that day, and through these portrayals and *representations of trauma* extending the trauma to the collective, thereby possible collective action.

Figure 41




som såvidt unnslapp
 ødstallet skal kraftig

The timeline includes twitter messages posted around the time of the tragedy, both by the victims in distress on the island and people in general. The above tweet, reflecting the overall response to the attacks, reads (in Norwegian): "When one man can cause so much evil – think how much love we can create together".

Figure 42



Figure 43



The centre displays the cameras used by the victims attending the summer camp on Utøya.

Figure 44





Figure 45



The display cabinet reads: "Evidence confiscated on Utøya. Fake police badges and ID. Flags and crusader symbols. Worn by the perpetrator."

Figure 46





Figure 47



The exhibition contains displays of the judgment in Oslo District Court, 24 August 2012.

Figure 48



The 22 July Centre at Oslo government quarters, visited in September 2015.

Figure 49



Figure 50



Figure 51



Figure 52



Figure 53



The spontaneous memorial in a park outside Oslo cathedral, made by artist Espen Hilde shortly after the 22 July attacks, which has since created controversy, as the Church wants it removed. This, in turn, has caused protests as it provides a place of remembrance for many who were affected by the attacks.

Figure 54



“... greatest of all is love”

Figure 55



The spontaneous memorial that has caused controversy as the church wanted to move it from its premises.

Figure 56

 22. juli-senteret · Yesterday at 11:30 pm · 

...
22. juli preget hele Norge. Alle generasjoner deltok i minnemarkeringene, og barna var ikke et unntak. Gjennom brev og tegninger på spontane minnesteder rundt om i landet fremmet barn budskap om håp og trøst, uttrykte sorg og følelse av uvirkelighet.

For våre yngste besökende er behovet for å uttrykke seg fortsatt viktig. Senterets "barnehjørne" får stadig nye tegninger, og budskapet et det samme: Vi bryr oss om hverandre.

I 22. juli-senterets paviljong kan du se disse, og mange andre barnetegninger, til inspirasjon og ettertanke. Kom gjerne innom - kanskje vil du legge igjen et bidrag selv?

[See Translation](#)



Appendix – copyright/licenses

- 22 July Centre:

Fahre Lena
To: Anne-Marie Balbi
Re: Enquiry about copyright for material for doctoral thesis

Yesterday 6:18 pm

FL

Dear Anne-Mari Balbi

Thank you for your mail. You are more than welcome to use the images. I am also very interested in your thesis, so I will write back to you as soon as possible.

Best regards
Lena Fahre
Director

- Bjorgo, T.:

Licence Terms

Licence Date: 24/02/2020
PLSclear Ref No: 34115

The Lensor

Company name: Springer Nature BV
Address: Van Godewijkstraat 30
PO Box 17
Dordrecht
3300 AA
Netherlands
NL

The Licensee

Licensee Contact Name: Anne-Marie Balbi
Licensee Address: 2/10 Harrison Crescent
VIC
Hawthorn
3122
Australia

Licensed Material

title: Strategies for Preventing Terrorism
ISBN/ISSN: 9781137355072
publisher: Springer Nature BV

Number of words	110
Page numbers	25
Number of pages	1
Identifier / First few words	The USA, which has both an enormous ...
Are you reusing the full article or chapter?	No
Author of original work	Tore Bjorgo
Are you requesting permission to reuse your own work?	No
Additional Information	For republication in doctoral thesis
Number of words	60
Page numbers	13
Number of pages	1
Identifier / First few words	Positive socialisation during one's upbringing...
Are you reusing the full article or chapter?	No

- Braddock & Horgan:

From: US Journal Permissions USJournalPermissions@taylorandfrancis.com
Subject: RE: ute20:Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counternarratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism
Date: 24 February 2020 7:55 am
To: Anne-Marie Balbi anne-marie847@hotmail.com

UJ

Dear Ms. Balbi,
Thank you for your permission request.

Your use is considered Fair Use and you are free to quote excerpts of our article in your thesis.

We appreciate you contacting us.
Best wishes,

Mary Ann Muller – Permissions Coordinator, US Journals Division

- CIDOB:

Bet Mañé ☺

18 December 2019 9:19 pm

To: Anne-Marie Balbi

BM

RE: Copyright enquiry for PhD Dissertation quoting CIDOB 'Resilient Cities' report

Dear Anne-Marie,

In response to your request, we give you our permission to reproduce some of the CIDOB published material in your thesis, considering that our publications on the internet are in open access (under ) and, furthermore, your thesis is an academic project.

So, feel free to use/reproduce them and good luck with your research.

Best wishes,

Elisabet Mañé

Responsable de Publicacions /Publications Officer
Editora de Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals y
Anuario CIDOB de la Inmigración
CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs)
Elisabets 12
08001 Barcelona
+34 93 302 64 95
bmane@cidob.org
www.cidob.org

Websites:

<https://raco.cat/index.php/RevistaCIDOB/index>
<https://www.raco.cat/index.php/AnuarioCIDOBInmigracion/index>

Academia.edu profiles:

<https://cidob.academia.edu/RevistaCIDOBdAfersInternacionals>
<https://cidob.academia.edu/AnuarioCIDOBdelalInmigraci%C3%B3n>

- Crocker et al.:

 **RightsLink®**

My Orders My Library My Profile

Welcome anne-marie847@hotmail.com Log out | Help

My Orders > Orders > All Orders

License Details

This Agreement between Anne-Marie Balbi ("You") and Oxford University Press ("Oxford University Press") consists of your license details and the terms and conditions provided by Oxford University Press and Copyright Clearance Center.

Print Copy

License Number	4765071072871
License date	Feb 09, 2020
Licensed Content Publisher	Oxford University Press
Licensed Content Publication	International Affairs
Licensed Content Title	Collective conflict management: a new formula for global peace and security cooperation?
Licensed Content Author	CROCKER, CHESTER A.; HAMPSON, FEN OSLER
Licensed Content Date	Jan 19, 2011
Licensed Content Volume	87
Licensed Content Issue	1
Type of Use	Thesis/Dissertation
Requestor type	Educational Institution/Non-commercial/ Not for-profit
Format	Print and electronic
Portion	Text Extract
Number of pages requested	45
Will you be translating?	No
Title	Constructing counter-narratives to terrorism: a comparative analysis of collective resistance in the aftermath of the terror attacks in Bali and Norway
Institution name	Curtin University
Expected presentation date	Feb 2020
Order reference number	200210045
Portions	extract on p. 45 "while there may be growing recognition remains weak and imperfect"
Requestor Location	Anne-Marie Balbi

- Dalgaard-Nielsen & Schack:

From: US Journal Permissions USJournalPermissions@taylorandfrancis.com 
Subject: RE: fdas20:Community Resilience to Militant Islamism: Who and What?: An Explorative Study of Resilience in Three Danish Communities
Date: 24 February 2020 7:56 am
To: Anne-Marie Balbi anne-marie847@hotmail.com

UJ

Dear Ms. Balbi,
Thank you for your permission request.

You use is considered Fair Use as it is less than 400 words.
You are free to use the excerpts of our work in your thesis.

We appreciate you contacting us.
Best wishes,

Mary Ann Muller – Permissions Coordinator, US Journals Division

My Work Schedule is Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday.

- Jackson, Richard:

★ Academic UK Non Rightslink 10 February 2020 9:56 pm AU

To: Anne-Marie Balbi ▾ RE: rirt20:In defence of 'terrorism': finding a way through a forest of misconceptions
anne-marie847@hotmail.com

trash back forward

Dear Anne-Marie

Apologies for the confusion.

41 words from Richard Jackson (2011) In defence of 'terrorism': finding a way through a forest of misconceptions, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 3:2, 116-130, DOI: [10.1080/19434472.2010.512148](https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2010.512148)

Thank you for your correspondence requesting permission to reproduce the above material from our Journal in your printed thesis and to be posted in your university's repository - Curtin University.

We will be pleased to grant entirely free permission on the condition that you acknowledge the original source of publication and insert a reference to the Journal's web site: www.tandfonline.com

Please note that this licence does not allow you to post our content on any third party websites or repositories.

Thank you for your interest in our Journal.

Best wishes

Karin Beesley - Permissions Administrator, Journals
Taylor & Francis Group
3 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN, UK
Permissions Tel: +44 (0)20 7017 7617
Permissions e-mail: permissionrequest@tandf.co.uk

Taylor & Francis Group is a trading name of Informa UK Limited, registered in England under no. 1072954

P

Please don't print this e-mail unless you really need to.

- Hedlin Hayden & Snickare:

<https://www.stockholmuniversitypress.se/site/books/10.16993/bal/>

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/> (licence URL)

- Kaul, I. et al.:

Oxford University Press - Books (US & UK) - License Terms and Conditions

Order Date	09-Feb-2020
Order license ID	1017280-1
ISBN-13	9780195130522
Type of Use	Republish in a thesis/dissertation
Publisher	OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, INCORPORATED
Portion	Excerpt (up to 400 words)

LICENSED CONTENT

Publication Title	Global Public Goods : International Cooperation in the 21st Century	Country	United States of America
Author/Editor	Grunberg, Isabelle., Stern, Marc A., Kaul, Inge., United Nations Development Programme.	Rightsholder	Oxford University Press - Books (US & UK)
Date	06/03/1999	Publication Type	Book
Language	English		

REQUEST DETAILS

Portion Type	Excerpt (up to 400 words)	Distribution	Worldwide
Number of excerpts	1	Translation	Original language of publication
Format (select all that apply)	Print, Electronic	Copies for the disabled?	No
Who will republish the content?	Academic institution	Minor editing privileges?	No
Duration of Use	Life of current edition	Incidental promotional use?	No
Lifetime Unit Quantity	Up to 499	Currency	AUD
Rights Requested	Main product		

NEW WORK DETAILS

Title	Constructing counter-narratives to terrorism: a comparative analysis of collective resistance in the aftermath of the terror attacks in Bali and Norway	Institution name	Curtin University
Instructor name	Dr Yasuo Takao	Expected presentation date	2020-02-14

- Lynch, O. & Argomaniz, J. (Balbi, A. & Wilson, T.):



Taylor & Francis Informa UK Ltd - Books - License Terms and Conditions

Order Date	09-Feb-2020
Order license ID	1017288-1
ISBN-13	9781138739550
Type of Use	Republish in a thesis/dissertation
Publisher	Taylor and Francis (Books) Limited UK
Portion	Excerpt (up to 400 words)

LICENSED CONTENT

Publication Title	Victims and Perpetrators of Terrorism : Exploring Identities, Roles and Narratives	Rightsholder	Taylor & Francis Informa UK Ltd - Books
Date	11/07/2017	Publication Type	Book
Language	English		

REQUEST DETAILS

Portion Type	Excerpt (up to 400 words)	Distribution	Worldwide
Number of excerpts	3	Translation	Original language of publication
Format (select all that apply)	Print, Electronic	Copies for the disabled?	No
Who will republish the content?	Academic institution	Minor editing privileges?	No
Duration of Use	Life of current edition	Incidental promotional use?	No
Lifetime Unit Quantity	Up to 499	Currency	AUD
Rights Requested	Main product		

NEW WORK DETAILS

Title	Constructing counter-narratives to terrorism: a comparative analysis of collective resistance in the aftermath of the terror attacks in Bali and Norway	Institution name	Curtin University
Expected presentation date	2020-02-14		
Instructor name			Dr Yasuo Takao

- Stump, P. & Dixit, J.:



Marketplace

Taylor & Francis Informa UK Ltd - Books - License Terms and Conditions

Order Date	05-Feb-2020
Order license ID	1016790-1
ISBN-13	9780415620475
Type of Use	Republish in a thesis/dissertation
Publisher	Routledge
Portion	Excerpt (up to 400 words)

LICENSED CONTENT

Publication Title	Critical terrorism studies : an introduction to research methods	Country	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Author/Editor	Stump, Jacob L., Dixit, Priya.	Rightsholder	Taylor & Francis Informa UK Ltd - Books
Date	01/01/2013	Publication Type	Book
Language	English		

REQUEST DETAILS

Portion Type	Excerpt (up to 400 words)	Distribution	Worldwide
Number of excerpts	12	Translation	Original language of publication
Format (select all that apply)	Print, Electronic	Copies for the disabled?	No
Who will republish the content?	Academic institution	Minor editing privileges?	No
Duration of Use	Life of current edition	Incidental promotional use?	No
Lifetime Unit Quantity	Up to 499	Currency	AUD
Rights Requested	Main product		

- Taylor, Max:

☆ **US Journal Permissions** ☺ 12 February 2020 6:21 am

To: Anne-Marie Balbi
RE: ftpv20:If I Were You, I Wouldn't Start From Here: Response to Marc Sageman's "The Stagnation in Terrorism Research"

UJ

Dear Ms. Balbi,
Your permission request is considered Fair Use.

You are free to quote our content, providing full acknowledgment in your work.

Thank you for contacting us.

Mary Ann Muller — Permissions Coordinator, US Journals Division

My Work Schedule is Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday.

Please note the current processing time is 6 weeks for all permission requests received in-house by the Journal permissions team.

Find digital versions of our articles on: www.tandfonline.com to use RightsLink, our online permissions web page, for immediate processing of your permission request.

Instructions on the use of RightsLink is provided below:
[\(https://taylorandfrancis.my.salesforce.com/sfc/p/ \)](https://taylorandfrancis.my.salesforce.com/sfc/p/)

Do you need corporate or book permission? **Please contact our dedicated Corporate Permission TFCorporatepermissions@informa.com or Book Permission mpkbookspermissions@tandf.co.uk teams.**



Taylor & Francis Group
an informa business