School of Media, Creative Arts and Social Inquiry

A Rubik's Cube®, the Copenhagen School and Israel

A Re-conceptualisation of Security 1947–1967

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This thesis is presented for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
of
Curtin University

October 2020

Declaration

To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgment has been made.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university.

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Tara Felton

12 October 2020

Abstract

What are you afraid of? And what will you do to protect yourself from this threat?

This dissertation seeks to ascertain whether Buzan, Wæver, and deWilde's (1998) securitization[1] theory and methodology can be used longitudinally to plot the securitization of the State of Israel between 1947 – 1967. On a secondary level what does a corpus of legislative language used to support securitization tell us about the construction of the speech act in defining and then embedding the Israel vs other[2] within the wider context of the 'we' and 'other' discourse.

The interconnectivity and interdependence of sectoral securitization within the State of Israel and its first 20 years allows for consideration of the dynamic elements surrounding securitization and the use of legislative language to support securitization. Israel was chosen specifically because its passage to statehood was not simple or easy, beset by challenges internally and externally. Survival would ultimately be reflected in its response to those challenges.

This dissertation, in considering the State of Israel in discrete time periods, seeks to understand what was threatened, the impacts of previous actions and the conflicting choices of the state to ensure survival. Offering 43 quintillion options, my use of a Rubik's Cube® analogy assists in depicting and supporting a holistic assessment of the choices and possible outcomes available through the use of Buzan et al.'s (1998) theory and methodology. The integration of the wider security and international paradigm espoused by Buzan et al. into a highly securitized environment allows greater consideration as to the utility or otherwise of a number of theoretical elements, including a speech act, an audience, and the impact of considering the elements in isolation. The use of legislation as a vehicle for considering speech acts over this time period actively defines and reinforces understanding the considerations of 'we' and 'other' by the state.

This dissertation does not seek to argue the legitimacy or otherwise of the creation or actions of the State of Israel. It seeks to consider what occurred and the legislation utilised by Israel to support its securitization. Ultimately, I sought to ascertain if the use

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[1] The dominant spelling of securitization is used here to ensure discipline consistency.

[2] Including Arab states or any other non-Jew's

of Buzan et al.'s theory and methodology allows a state-wide securitized environment to be considered longitudinally and if legislative language used as a speech act to support securitization could be used as a vehicle to define and then embed the dominant discourses.

This research enhances the understanding of longitudinal securitization and illustrates the additional nuance that can be gained in the consideration legislation as a speech act to define and then embed 'we' and 'other'. The linkage of these concepts in analysing Israel's securitization between 1947-1967 chronicles the changing nature of threats and what must be given up to mitigate those threats. The re-conceptualisation of a wider security definition adds to the theory and our understanding of the International Relations (IR) discipline.

Limitations

The State of Israel is hotly contested and a significant number of people have polar opposite views as to its creation and actions. I am not seeking to provide a view as to the legitimacy or otherwise of the state, its legislation, the land it controls or its actions. This dissertation seeks to consider securitization longitudinally and how legislation written at the relevant time period constructed the 'we' and 'other' discourse. The neutrality of the position that I am seeking to take recognises that there are counter-narratives to each issue included within this dissertation.

The use of legislation by the State of Israel to achieve particular national goals may seem to some to be immoral and unethical. Legislation is used within this dissertation to illustrate an Executive Order speech act (or acts) within the context of securitization. In doing so, the dissertation also analyses how this impacted on defining and then embedding an enduring discourse within the state of 'we' and 'other'.

A wide range of eminent scholars have written, and continue to write, on this subject, espousing either pro-Palestinian (e.g. Abu Sitta; Morris & Black; Pappé) or pro-Israel (Sharon, Raviv; Teveth; Dershowitz) views, examining the history of the area, the respective national and religious narratives and the actions of parties based on their particular view. Additionally, I also acknowledge that whilst most of the narratives of the time and later predominantly consider the Jewish and Islamic faiths, there were and remain many other religions present on the land that was claimed by the State of Israel; however, these are not extensively discussed within this work.

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Acknowledgements

Alexander my son, you are my miracle and ultimate motivation. I hope that the world you inhabit will be a more peaceful one.

To my father who told me from the beginning girls could do anything and that nothing was impossible if you really wanted to make a change.

Dr Chris Hubbard, that this was finished is in no small part due to you. My thanks will never be enough.

Professor Linley Lord, who stepped up when others fell away, and Dr Amma Buckley who came in at the end to support, I-dot and T-cross to the finish line – thank you.

Introduction

Security has as its basis the concept of fear – what are you afraid of? And what will you do to respond to that fear? This dissertation engages with current and ongoing scholarship within the literature of Critical Security Studies (CSS) in international relations. It articulates and critiques key concepts in relation to power, sovereignty and security using the emergence of the State of Israel from 1947 to 1967 as its case study. It defines key elements of the Copenhagen School critical approach to sectoral security research, and generates contextual analysis providing a theoretical structure for mapping the tenets of CSS onto the history of the Jewish diaspora, and the first twenty years of the State of Israel addressing this from a 'executive order' speech act lens through the use of legislation to support securitization efforts. The emergence of the State of Israel has been written about extensively, addressing diverse elements from territory and politics through to military actions. None of this literature, however, has considered the first twenty years longitudinally through the Copenhagen School's sectoral lens and Israel's legislation as an exemplar of the speech act to define and embed the concept of 'we' and 'other'.

Literature reviews uncover no previous usages of Buzan, Wæver, and deWilde's (1998) theory or methodology to map the securitization of a state longitudinally and Lupovici (2014) observes an absence of a detailed securitization critique of any sectoral elements within Israel, referencing only limited attempts on single elements. Extensive literature searches show its use from a single sectoral perspective in an established state environment (Bilgin, 2011; Heeg, 2010) or for particular issues such as the construction of a specific element (Hansen, 2012; Langenohl, 2017; McDonald, 2008; Wilkinson, 2007). This dissertation therefore enables a wider consideration of Buzan et al.'s theory and also supports further consideration of legislation within the speech act discourse.

The concept of securitization is based on power politics seeking to understand "who can securitise issues, for whom, why, with what kind of effects and what conditions" (Vuori 2010 p. 257). Yet Buzan et al.'s theory has been challenged in the literature from a number of directions, and by scholars across the IR spectrum. In considering the theory and methodology what actually creates a securitized environment? Is it speaking 'security'? Acceptance by the audience? Or is it the practice of security? The establishment and first twenty years of the state of Israel is a large and complex topic,

able to be viewed from a myriad of angles and theoretical viewpoints. I argue a longitudinal consideration of securitization and the construction of Israeli state legislation leverages a mnemonic (or remembering) articulation of threats (Donnelly & Steel, 2019) and supports Austin (1962) executive order analysis of speech acts.

The question of a Jewish homeland and/or a Jewish state has raged for centuries, with countless individuals having argued for and against its creation. Just over one hundred years ago, a statement by Great Britain, known as the Balfour Declaration, announced support for the establishment of a national home for Jews in Palestine, simultaneously paving the way for the start of one of the biggest threats to peace in the Middle East, and the creation of a Jewish homeland. Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention (p.25) articulates the four conditions for a state: "(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states." Cosgrove (1988, pp. 13–14) asserts that control over territory has been a source of conflict for centuries. Moreover, the geographic boundaries encasing a sovereign state, have additional attributes. Territorial boundaries are often viewed with historic and symbolic significance. Legally, the precedents around the globe determining who owns or controls land are varied and generally link to colonialising history (Ottoman Empire, the British Empire, etc.) interpretations and to more recent events. Faith is a key concept to territory, with multiple faiths placing particular relevance on specific pieces of land. None arguably is more contested than Jerusalem.

Perlmutter (1985) argued that the nascent State of Israel knew that the security of all aspects of the state was critical to its survival. Centuries of preparation enabled rapid response to the opportunity offered to the Jewish people, some of these responses could be and were addressed in the pre-state years, others required the creation of the state. On 29 November 1947, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) paved the way for the creation of the State of Israel. The attainment of the four elements of statehood as articulated in the 1933 Montevideo Convention (p. 25) above had a strong and compelling impact both on the nascent State of Israel's internal development and the external relationship with regional and major global powers. Beginning with the battle for independence, coupled with a dialogue of real or perceived threat both internally and externally, I posit in this dissertation that increased consideration of all sectoral elements will enhance the understanding of securitization longitudinally examining the changing

nature of threats and what must be given up to mitigate those threats, and how legislation was used by the state as a speech act to define and embed 'we' and 'other'.

Utilisation of Buzan et al.'s (1998) analysis incorporating environmental, political, military, economic and societal sectoral securitization, allows when considering the State of Israel as the case study to address wider internal and external implications and their subsequent impact both on and in response to regional and global factors. In the early 1970s the Rubik's Cube® was created by an academic as an attempt to explain spatial geometry (About Rubik's, n.d.). Able to be rearranged 43 quintillion different ways, it therefore provides

"Rubik's Cube®." Used by permission Rubik's Brand Ltd. (www.rubiks.com)

a useful analogy for sectoral securitization. In seeking to solve each side of the puzzle or address a particular sectoral threat there are simultaneous impacts of that choice elsewhere. Conceptually viewing the Copenhagen School's theory and methodology in this manner reinforces the sheer complexities of multi-layered securitization analyses.

Buzan et al.'s (1998) work articulates that the threat needs to be existential to warrant the setting aside of usual practice, thereby allowing an issue to be securitized. I argue, that mnemonic memory has an enduring impact on threat construction by the State of Israel. As such it is through the lens espoused by Hirschberger, Ein-Dor, Leidner, and Saguy (2016) that I consider the concept of existential threat: "personal death, physical collective annihilation, symbolic collective annihilation and past victimisation" (p. 1). The use of legislation as a speech act defining 'we' and 'other' within the context of responding to or pre-empting threats is a critical component to both securitization and de-securitization. The stimulus for both violence and reconciliation are derived in reaction to an existential fear. Perception is a critical component here; the threats do not need to be real to trigger a belief of an imminent existential threat. History, and in the case of Israel both recent events and events over the previous centuries, have a strong relationship to what is considered a threat, and what is acceptable to ensure the threat does not occur again. The integration of the wider security and international paradigm espoused by Buzan et al., and particularly the social/historical context of the Holocaust survivors, allow a greater understanding of why a nation would choose to defy not only

the nations surrounding it, but the superpowers of the time. The re-conceptualisation of a wider security definition adds to international relations theory and our understanding of the international relations discipline.

In reviewing those actions taken over the period 1947–1967, I am not seeking to apply knowledge that was unavailable at the time to the general populace within the State of Israel, but consider the context of the actions taken, based on a belief of what could reasonably be known or inferred at the time. Perception was, and remains, crucial as we are all impacted on and by our own histories. New information, hindsight and differing lenses may change the way particular issue(s) could have been responded to, however this is not a luxury we have. The ability to 'start over', whilst available within the Rubik's Cube®, does not exist in life.

This dissertation's analytical structure is divided into seven chapters. The first two chapters serve to set the scene for what is to unfold. Chapter 1 introduces the main security theories and how they will be utilised analytically within the case study that follows. It places Buzan et al.'s (1998) Copenhagen School within this wider security framework. The use of this theoretical framework allows for a more effective analysis of how securitization fits with major theories, and simultaneously allows for the inclusion of competing theoretical arguments. It sets up the analysis and critique methodology for considering the first 20 years of the State of Israel longitudinally. Chapter 2 will serve as an introduction to key participants, both inside and outside Israel. The differing facets of the cube will be addressed by a wide group of actors. Additionally, this chapter provides a timeline of events to enable the reader to have a chronological baseline for activities and will also articulate the limits of the study.

Chapter 3 addresses the seminal period of 1947 through to April 1949. Each of the sectoral threats (or divergent facets of the cube) will be addressed individually, with the functional actors responding to their concerns. This will enable an extrapolation of the threats but also show the challenges of considering the threat within a single sectoral context. This short but eventful time period saw military and political securitization threats as well as the actions of the nascent state to achieve legitimacy. The chapter examines the use of multiple securitization strategies by Israel and an analysis of what the state was willing to sacrifice to attain particular goals. In doing so, the legislative language of Israel is reviewed in the terms of supporting securitization aims and defining

and then embedding the 'we' and 'other' discourse. Additionally, the chapter addresses the success or failure of other key participants, including regional and other national powers, to provide effective counter strategies to that securitization.

Chapter 4 considers the period between May 1949 and 1955, continuing to analyse each of the sectoral threats individually as well as the legislation that assisted in securing particular sectors. Comparatively, this was a period of calm militarily, but a period of intense activity in all other sectors. Israel used a number of internal securitization methodologies to transform both the demographic and territorial construct of the state. The chapter also shows the reassessment undertaken by regional and superpowers as part of their force projection efforts.

Chapter 5 assesses the period 1956–1962 with individual sectoral analysis continuing and identifying that the major issues revolved around water, and the defence/nuclear position taken by Israel. Each was addressed by its functional actor through a single sectoral lens however the interdependent linkages required a state response. Water was a catalyst for a changing dynamic between Israel and its regional adversaries and the major powers, including the two superpowers. The legislative agenda over this period was further clarified to embed securitization and further reinforce the considerations of 'we' and 'other'.

Chapter 6 analyses the period 1962–1967 and represents the final period within the ambit of the case study. This chapter identifies significant impacts across all the individual sectors and ends with the cessation of hostilities in the 1967 war. The previous choices in relation to threats and how to mitigate them continued to play out, both internally and externally. However, it is the choices made by the State of Israel and discussed at the end of this chapter that still resonate with the global community now.

Chapter 7 reviews Buzan et al.'s work longitudinally and the use of legislation as a speech act to define 'we' and 'other'. It particularly addresses what lessons can be learned from the re-conceptualisation process Ultimately, it shows that individuals, groups and nations attach a value to items that they treasure and make choices to keep safe that which is most important to them, accepting the consequences that those choices entail.

Chapter 1   Theoretical Review and Methodology

"All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing."

Edmund Burke, (1770, pp. 82–83)

This chapter will introduce the social science discipline of international relations and the major security theories which impact upon it. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaan de Wilde's (1998) work will be used to provide the conceptual framework through which the central research question of this thesis: how the emergent State of Israel securitized particular issues and used legislation to support securitization efforts as a speech act to define and then embed 'we' and 'other'. This will be undertaken through a longitudinal review of actions undertaken by Speech Actors (hereafter referred to as speech actors) and Functional Actors (hereafter referred to as functional actors) from immediately prior to Israel's declaration of statehood in 1947, through to the end of the Six Day War in 1967.

Buzan and Little (2000) posit international relationships as a component of politics originating in the relationships between Sumerian states in 3500 BC. It was not however until the early 20th century when international relations (IR) emerged as a field of study.[3] The cessation of World War One (WWI) saw its academic evolution in 1919 initially at the University of Aberystwyth in Wales, as well as the US and London. The discipline grew from the study and analysis of formal inter-state relations, to now encompass the interactions between people, societies, non-government and global organisations beyond the concept of state relationships.

Discussions in IR generally link sovereignty with territory. Modern society is based on territory and hinges on two central concepts: territorial integrity (the non-intervention by other states linked to the legal equality of states); and territorial inviolability (borders providing limits to the ability of the state to exercise exclusive jurisdiction).[4] Though

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[3] No. 5901 in the 4-digit UNESCO Nomenclature – Political Science.

[4] Within contemporary international law (not in existence at the creation of the state of Israel) territorial integrity requires both territorial inviolability and territorial sovereignty. This becomes a larger issue in the context of weak states, which will be examined in the context of Palestine in Chapter 3 onwards.

interrelated they are not the same concept. The integrity of a nation's or state's territory has been expressed in a number of crucial documents within the 20th century, including the League of Nations Charter, the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact (outlawing war as a method of diplomacy) and importantly in the first chapter of the UN Charter (1945) at Article Two, paragraph four declaring: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." When linked with the equality of membership and further paragraphs in relation to domestic jurisdiction,[5] this provided the starting point for a spatial concept of contemporary sovereignty.

Li (2002) argues that it is territorial integrity, rather than organisational stability, that articulates the power of the state. Sovereignty is being increasingly viewed as an assertion about a state's political responsibility for governance, defence and promotion of the welfare of its citizens.[6] Bull (1977) argues that a state needs to respect another nation-state's claims of independence and honour the agreements they enter into, and that there are limitations when using force against others. The possession of territory by a state confers upon it both rights and responsibilities internally and externally. The international rights include diverse areas ranging from the negotiation of treaties and agreements and the recognition of other states through to the ability to declare war and conclude peace.

The willingness to allow external pressure, through entities such as the United Nations (UN) or the International Criminal Court (ICC), are choices that a state makes, they are not prerequisites. Modern usage suggests that this is also linked to a lack of defensive depth. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (1996) argue that sovereignty is fundamental to the construct of identity and also fundamental within the international community. They also identify differences between nationhood and statehood, with nationhood

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[5] This is currently being challenged by some nations within the United Nations (UN) and through discussion at the International Criminal Court (ICC), arguing there is an additional element as to internal competence within domestic jurisdictions. The deliberate determination not to protect an element of the population within its territory from others increases the threat of genocide, and calls into question the moral integrity of the state. The issues of Rwanda and Kosovo provided a challenge to the UN, and its response to these two crises varied dramatically based on a number of factors, including acceptance of the concept of internal competence. Additionally the US used this argument on the commencement of the war on terror.

[6] This is being done through a variety of mechanisms which include non-state actors such as the United Nation. The remit of the state includes the protection of individuals or groups from war crimes. (UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, n.d.).

representing a unique ideology for a constituency while statehood is a component of sovereignty endorsed internally and communicated externally. Sovereignty confers an element of legitimacy and is associated with critical rights and duties. Those who lack land are very aware of the rights and benefits that they are able to accrue from its attainment and the subsequent recognition of their sovereignty over it.

1.1   Power

Power represents the capacity of an individual, community or state to influence the outcome of events. There are many types of power and multiple ways in which their utility may be asserted. Lukes (2005), for instance, differentiates three types of power: the first centres upon winning conflicts and influencing decision making; the second limits alternatives and sets agendas; and the third shapes the preferences and behaviour of others. These differing types of power move on a spectrum between hard and soft. Bull (1966, pp. 9–10) argues a system is established "when the behaviour of each unit is a necessary element in the calculations of the other," and repetition reinforces this behaviour (Oren & Solomon, 2015). Given the predominance and power of the state, the behaviour of states toward one another and in relation to threat analysis is a critical component in the calculations of these actors. The power wielded by a state is not always dependent upon the size of its land holding. Hard power, Nye (2009) posits, is coercive, utilising threats or incentives, with implementation methodologies that traditionally consist of military intervention or economic sanctions.[7] Structural power, Barnett and Duvall (2005) contend, "concerns the determination of social capacities and interests" (p. 53). Conceptually, Manners (2009) asserts, purist normative power "is ideational rather than material or physical" (p. 2), revolving around normative reasoning not "material incentives or physical force" (p. 2). This type of power relies on the legitimacy of the principles and consistent promotion. In referring to this as soft power, Nye (2009) explains it is intangible, and based on aspects of the construct of community, such as culture and belief. Eagleton-Pierce (2013) extends this analysis, asserting that soft power is used via diplomacy. It is about the ability to influence others, not through an overt or even implied threat but on the basis of being part of a community. The Vatican See holds a very small land mass; however, it wields substantial power over Catholics across the

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[7] The pressure exerted on North Korea is such an example.

globe. This impacts the domestic and international choices made by a number of nations' elected representatives. Symbolic power, Vangeli (2018, p. 676) argues, is evidenced in practice through "setting the terms and conditions of relationships, providing the official terminology, and other key symbolic forms." Within the context of this dissertation the ability of symbolic power to impact an individual or group through legislative language, without overt linkage to the inequitable power relationship, is considered within the context of speech acts in the definition of 'we' and 'other'. The discussion of power is impacted by the context within which power is used. The dissertation discusses power in a number of ways and this is addressed in the chapters to follow.

Given the case study used within this dissertation, consideration must also be given to secularism, which Pfeifer (2019, p. 478) describes as "a form of (state) power to politically draw the line between politics and religion … found in both discursive structures and state practice." In this dissertation, state practice will be explored through the consideration of the legislative instruments Israel used to define 'we' and 'other'. However, I contend that within Israel between 1947 and 1967 the line between politics and religion was significantly blurred, and as a result this blurring challenges Hurd's (2012) definition of secularism as "a practice of state sovereignty that claims to be universal by defining the limits of state-centered politics *with something called religion on the outside*" (p. 47, emphasis added).

Hegemonic power is present when one state is dominant within a regional or global system, allowing for quasi-stability.[8] The practice of security, through its ability to retain sovereignty over all elements, reflects the strength or otherwise of the state. Lukes (2005) discusses the visibility of power, arguing that where you identify it is contingent upon your conception of power. The case study analysed in this dissertation will clearly show the relevance of Wendt's (1999) argument that perception impacts our understanding of the 'other's intent. Like Bull (1966), Wendt limits his analysis to states, and argues that recognition of the right of the other to exist – or in the case of the Arab states around Israel, non-recognition of that right – and the control of violence between states is informed by the perception of the 'others' intent.

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[8] I note that some scholars, for example Waltz (1964) and Walt (1987), would argue that the bipolar system is the most stable, as both major states act as a check on one another. In a uni-polar world, states can behave relatively unfettered by the restrictions of their peers, allowing for poor unilateral policy-making, e.g. the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

1.2   Security

Security is contextual and most post-World War Two (WWII) IR theories reflect the Western security concerns arising out of the Cold War. Zartman (2004) and Rotberg (1995) assert a state is required to provide security as this is a pre-condition to the provision of any other services a state may then choose to provide its people. Tilly (1975, 1992) and Mann (1993, 2006) also link this to a hierarchical formation which then includes "taxation, policing, the control of food supply, and the formation of technical personnel," (Tilly, 1975, p. 6) According to Wæver (1995), the strong cohesion and internal legitimacy of Western states made them less likely to be destabilised from within, which resulted in the military security focus becoming linked to external political engagement. "Security is a specific move that entails consequences which involve risking oneself and offering a specific issue as a test case. Doing this may have a price" (Wæver, 1995, p. 75). This belief would form the basis of many of the assumptions that would come to make up modern realist theory. The cessation of hostilities at the end of WWII saw the emergence of International Security Studies (ISS) within the context of IR studies. As a subfield of IR, ISS dealt with the military aspects of security including treaties and alliances, and although this has now expanded slightly to include a version of sectoral analysis, military security is a core tenet. Buzan and Hansen (2009) contend the Cold War and the realist school provided a clear fit, with tangible links to a state-centric, politico-military understanding of security. Security in this form meant the safety of the state, and its implementation through the usage or threat of military options. Securitization theory at its most basic, is the result of an issue articulated as creating an existential threat to an identified referent object.

Wolfers (1952) argues that measuring security is both subjective (a belief that something is safe) and/or objective (a structured threat assessment). This could cover a diversity of areas including nations, social groups, or the individual. Waltz (1986) believed that structural changes in the state system are brought about by changes in the distribution of power among sovereign states, as shown by the gradual dissolution of the British Empire. It is the perception that impacts on both of these elements as objectivity is relative, based on an individual or organisation's history and drivers. These perceptions of threat do not have to eventuate to still force action by Speech Actors (hereafter speech actors).

A number of theorists' critique of security/securitization references a Schmittian position on decisionism/exclusionary practice and the use of emergency powers and sovereignty unhindered by legal constraints (Aradau, 2004; Booth, 2005, 2007; McDonald, 2008; McSweeney, 1999). Aradau clearly articulates this position as "we cannot all be equal sharers of security" (2004, p.73) noting this creates within the process a 'we' and 'other'. Constructivists argue that security is a social construction, how we give meaning to security and how this meaning "impacts on political practice" (McDonald in Williams, 2012, p.64). Lester, Wong, O'Reilly & Kyimba (2018) consider this within discursive psychology not only in relation to intent but also emotion and agency within both text and talk. As such there is the possibility of inherent conflict between speech actors over a particular position and between the actor and the audience.

1.3   Sovereignty and the State

Western concepts and traditions of sovereignty have been indelibly linked since the Treaty of Westphalia was enacted in 1648 as part of a wider response, commonly referred to as the Peace of Westphalia that signified the ending of the Thirty Years War. Regpen (1998) notes that representational delegations were sent by a total of 82 states (16 European, 66 Imperial) and 27 interest groups. The outcome was a number of agreed basic principles relating to the conduct of activities between states. The treaty expressed the transition from feudalism to monarchical absolutism. It can be argued that the modern idea of human sovereignty originated from this period, coming to be seen as a fundamental attribute of all states (Bull, 1966; Jackson, 1991). One of the major concepts to emerge from the treaty was the exclusive sovereignty of each ruler over a land and its inhabitants. Limits to the jurisdiction of violence by a ruler then informed the political, cultural, economic and military defence of a particular territory. External agents had no place within the domestic apparatus. Foucault (2000) concluded state sovereignty was linked to its externality and transcendence.

The Eastern concept of sovereignty is more challenging to define. Ethnic nationalism was an alien concept within a Middle Eastern context. The Western theoretical concept of society mapping onto the state failed to consider the importance within Eastern culture of clans, tribes, families and ethnic groups. The Ottoman patrimonial system was led by a sultan or caliph whose rule was underpinned by Islamic law, the external manifestation

of the supra-national Islamic Umma.[9] Devout Muslims considered religion and politics intertwined, a government based upon the Qur'an and Hadith,[10] legislated by God, unable to be nullified by humans. In the Arab world the territorial state was based on occupancy of a shared area, with boundaries correlating to historical memory[11]. Alternatively, identity could be articulated through citizenship under a common government. Lampton (1981) argues this differs from an Islamic State, as it was not based on politics or territory but on ideology, with a governing structure to protect the faith. Hinnebusch (2015) contends the Ottoman supra-state identity incorporated indigenous societies and a myriad of identity groups around an imperial core. Whilst centuries ago this was an extremely strong bond, Ottoman claims in relation to leading the Umma had weakened significantly, as WWI showed, yet the basic cultural premise remained.

State formation is articulated in two primary international law theories[12] (Grant, 1999; Hillier, 1998; Hobach, Lefeber & Ribbelink, 2007; Ioannidis, 2014; Murphy & Stancescu, 2017; Oppenheim, 1955; Talmon, 2004). Constitutive theory[13] outlines that a state's legal existence (thereby making it subject to international law) is contingent upon recognition by other states (Bull, 1977) making a nascent state beholden to other states for its "personality in international law" (Ioannidis, 2014, p.975). Declarative theory rejects the flexible nature of constitutive theory and sets out the legal requirements for statehood, embedding the criteria articulated in the Montevideo Convention[14]. This therefore moves the process of recognition by other states to something that "merely establishes, confirms or provides evidence of the objective legal situation, that is, the existence of a State" (Hobach et al., 2007, p. 170). In the contemporary political environment, states can make choices about who they recognise either explicitly or implicitly (Murphy & Stancescu, 2017) which results in both theories being used;

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[9] An administrative division of Turkey (American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 2011).

[10] Hadith is defined as the "body of tradition and legend about Mohammed and his followers, used as a basis of Islamic law" (Collins English Dictionary, 2014).

[11] As Hall (1990, p. 226 in Alexander, 2013, p. 595) outlines: "Identity is always constructed through memory, fantasy, narrative and myth."

[12] Ioannidis (2014) argues for the inclusion of another element – popular sovereignty. See also Pribán (2015) and Bellamy (2007).

[13] This theory emerged in 1815 from the Peace Congress of Vienna, with the recognition of 39 sovereign states in Europe; it established that recognition of future states was contingent upon acceptance by prior existing states.

[14] See also Pellet (1992).

however, the declarative method is the most common.[15] Foucault (2003) argues the transition from the medieval war-like state to the current state construct is simply "wars by other means" (p. 28). The conceptual framework of Montevideo was restated in 1991 by the Badinter Commission as: "that the state is commonly defined as a community which consists of a territory and a population subject to an organized political authority; that such a state is characterized by sovereignty" (Pellet, 1992, p. 220). Within this dissertation the conceptual framework of the Montevideo Convention will be used as it is relevant to the period being examined.

State formation needs to also be considered from other viewpoints. Nugent and Suhail (2018) posit that, anthropologically, state formation is the culmination of organisational or cultural processes.[16] Jackson (2003), in considering sovereignty and state formation, argues a nexus exists in attempting "to legitimise political commands, obedience, and civic bonds between the governed and those who govern them" (p. 801). Clark (2005, p. 5) notes that society conceptualises legitimacy and that "more controversially, legitimacy lies at the very heart of what is meant by an international society." Anderson (2006) aligns the progression of ethnic and national identity development through political, economic and social structures. This is supported by Skocpol (in Evans, Reuschemeyer & Skocpol, 1985, p. 3) who illustrates states "shape social and political processes" occasionally in direct opposition to some within their community. Within the context of this dissertation, primacy in relation to attainment of statehood will be given to international law as there is widespread acceptance of statehood's inherent requirements in this context. From 1916 through to 1923, the Allied Powers carved up the former Ottoman Empire[17] into parcels of territories that would constitute the territorial framework of artificially bounded states of the Middle East into a host of arbitrarily imposed and rival state units. Ayoob (1995, p. 33) argues this action was

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[15] Relevant to the work of this dissertation, Murphy & Statcescu (2017) also note that governments-in-exile, such as Palestine, are only offered de jure recognition.

[16] This work draws on Wendt (1994).

[17] As Fromkin (1989) observed "Middle Eastern countries and frontiers were fabricated in Europe. Iraq and what we now call Jordan, for example, were British inventions, lines drawn on an empty map by British politicians after/during the First World War; while the boundaries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq were established by a British civil servant in 1922, and the frontiers between Moslems and Christians were drawn by France in Syria-Lebanon and by Russia on the borders of Armenia and Soviet Azerbaijan" (p. 17). This was done through a variety of treaties planned in the early stages of WWI. Whilst the most notable was the Sykes-Picot agreement, 1916, others such as the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and the nascent League of Nations all played a part.

"according to their own needs, not indigenous wishes".[18] In a global environment where sovereignty had generally aligned with either historic or cultural norms, the colonial legacy dictated not only land allocations to new states and their subsequent populations but also, in many cases, their forms of government, with Britain generally opting for monarchical rule and France supporting republican authoritarianism. Each state's system was therefore superficially grafted into a Middle East re-envisaged in the Westphalian image which Binder (1964, p. 264) contends was "then presumed to acquire a national culture". This has had a long-term effect on the region, where the loyalty of those within the borders of some states was and remains contested by a variety of sub-state identities upon which the state boundaries were indiscriminately enforced along with a supra-state identity.[19] Binder (1964) argued forcefully that these territorial boundaries had limited historic importance and even little validity when combined with the ethnicity of those inhabiting them. This built irredentism into the system with legitimacy hard to establish, enabling inter-state or state/sub-state conflict resulting from the trans-state connections of sub-state groups.[20] It is within this context that the case study is situated – an arbitrary border granted by a third party creating a country with no linkage to the cultures, mores or structures within the region in which it is situated. Chapters 3 to 6 will explore active responses to this very challenge.

Weber's (1964) initial description of the state required a human community with the ability to effectively claim a legitimate monopoly over the use of force to protect a given location. As noted earlier, Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention (p. 25) articulates the four conditions that "a state as a person of international law should possess. Risse (2000) contends the norm of sovereignty, whilst becoming more restricted, remains linked to that of a state, "insofar as we cannot define what a state is without reference to the notion of sovereignty" (p.5). Territory defines the physical extent of the sovereignty of the state, and the place where societies and individuals intersect. The case study will show how the acquisition of territory resulted in changes to the sovereignty of those within it. The convention has a crucial place within the nexus of statehood and its role in the international community. As new states seek to emerge, they pursue land in

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[18] Carroll (2009) notes that within state theory there are centres of gravity which can be readily identified: the military-fiscal, the autonomous state, and the cultural.

[19] Examples include Turkey, Syria and Jordan.

[20] The Kurds in Turkey remain an example of this.

which to define themselves and their people and then once that is achieved, to define their territorial sovereignty.

1.4   Realist Theory

While essential IR theory remains contested, the realist tradition of IR is steeped in the customary military–political concept of security. Realism views the relationship between states in terms of power. Wendt (1999) argues the requirement to defend its own interests is a cornerstone of a state's engagement in international politics from the realist perspective, particularly at the great power level. Security through the protection of territory and sovereignty represents a defining outcome for states or actors utilising military methodologies. Realists trace their theoretical heritage back to Sun Tzu and Thucydides, who maintained that power was crucial when challenged by an armed and dangerous opposition. Chairman Mao Zedong of China (1938, p. 224) stated "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". The major outcome of the use of power was to ensure the state's survival and the defence of national interests. Wæver (1995, 2011) explains the securitization framework as being informed by theoretical traditions of realism and post-structuralism. McDonald (in Williams, 2012) as well as other theorists have made a number of arguments that consider it's positioning in this manner. This will be further explored in the section on the Copenhagen School.

Morgenthau (1960, p. 28) argued that "international politics is power by a set of international laws and norms that were defined by national interest". Realist theories also acknowledge to a greater or lesser extent the causal relationship between uncertainty and conflict, commonly known as the security dilemma.[21] Morgenthau (1960) suggests traditional realists postulate that all states seek security, arguing that this obdurate concern has a primary systemic-level cause – anarchy. This is as a result of the lack of an absolute central government to enforce norms and rules and ensure the autonomy of states. It also enables the state to undertake action within its own borders without legal international accountability. However, this can be limited by individual nations who choose to be part of international organisations such as the United Nations

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[21] Classical realists, such as Morgenthau (1960), viewed international conflict as the outcome of evil, corrupt or greedy statesmen in an argument about human nature. It was only later that the uncertainty/conflict relationship came to the fore with scholars like Waltz (1964) and Walt (1987) under neo-realism and defensive realism.

(UN) or more recently the International Criminal Court (ICC).[22] Defensive realists such as Walt (1987) go further, focusing on threat assessment and establishing that while not characteristically antagonistic, states are intrinsically searching for security which requires the continual evaluation of potential threats to their existence to provide the best defence. War, and protection from military threats, Tilly (1992) argues, is a key to state building, ensuring a state's security through territorial inviolability and sovereignty.

At its heart, realism conceptually relies on the autonomy of the state, with the ability to make or break alliances based on individual self-interest. Whilst security theory has evolved, some IR practitioners (Bull, 1966; Morgenthau, 1960) seek the retention of the state as the referent object as well as the primary security provider. The premise of the argument is that as a result of the social contract between the individual and the state, this remains the most effective tool for ensuring safety. Individual security is contingent upon citizenship of a state provided that state is willing and able to provide security. Evidence shown in the case study will prove that this is not universal. Such implied guarantees must be bounded by inclusiveness and the rule of law which, while supposedly included within the social contract between a state and its populace, is not guaranteed. A state's main threats are shaped by the tactical and strategic significance or vulnerability of its location, combined with its goals and the capability or otherwise to realise them.

1.4.1   Neo-realist Theory

Neo-realism stresses that the state system is made up of autonomous states seeking security/survival,[23] arguing that international politics is primarily determined by an international system which is anarchic. Neo-realists argue anarchy requires states to act in particular ways, based on a concept of self-reliance in terms of security (Elman, 2008). Neo-realists align with the traditional military–security viewpoint, Ayoob (1995) arguing this is founded on two elements: an external threat (predominantly military); and the requirements of a military response.

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[22] The development and ratification of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 was in response to international concerns, and it is limited in its ability to prosecute to crimes which are "of concern to the international community as a whole" namely: genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes and crimes of aggression. It is a treaty-based organisation which 62 per cent of nations have agreed to support. However, contemporary political philosophy and the expanded approach to security studies have irreversibly introduced and emphasised the importance of human security.

[23] Offensive realism argues that states compete to maximise their power.

Neo-realists argue that international relations are interpreted as an alternation among three structural modes: uni-polarity, bi-polarity and multi-polarity,[24] which define power distribution internationally. Within this context the premise of centrality by a range of 'autonomous' actors defining what the international system structurally entails is critical. Uni-polarity occurs when there is a single state exercising hegemonic power. Whilst it may refer to empire, it can equally refer to the inter-state system. Jervis (2009, p. 190) states that "uni-polarity implies the existence of many jurisdictionally equal non-states, something that an empire denies." Waltz (1964) contends it remains anarchical, as the uni-polar entity cannot exert control everywhere as a result of limitations on power projection. This leaves generally weaker nations able to exercise sovereignty with undue influence from the uni-pole. Bi-polarity (Waltz 1964) moves the distribution of power from a single state to one in which two states have the majority of influence internationally or regionally. The Cold War saw a bipolar system between the USSR and the United States (US). The case study will show that bi-polarity can exist at a regional level, with Israel and Egypt holding two of the main positions within the Middle East.[25] Neighbouring weak states faced an increased risk of destabilisation as a result of the movement of refugees and the supports this required them to provide. A multi-polar environment is present when there are more than two states with similar amounts of influence through a mix of military, economic or cultural power.[26] Under the neo-realist paradigm, power is articulated in quantifiable terms, and, as Stein (2012, p. 888) states, "with the 'balance' of power constituting the underlying dynamic of international relations."

Neo-realism is limited in two key areas when undertaking a longitudinal security assessment of a nation-state. Firstly, neo-realism assumes that international politics is determined by the logic of anarchy. Any changes beyond the level of the state system, such as changes in national institutions or moral values, are omitted from the examination. Secondly, Waltz (1986) asserts neo-realism presumes that the states as the units of the system are functionally homogenous; all states throughout history have only

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[24] Referring to Waltz (1979), Teschke counts two neo-realist structural principles: hierarchy and anarchy (Teschke, 2003, p. 14). It can be argued that bi-polarity constitutes another structural mode besides uni-polar and multi-polar international systems. For neo-realism the important premise is the central position of the number of 'autonomous' actors for defining structural characteristics of an international system.

[25] There are other regional examples, such as Turkey, Iran, etc. However given the case study for this dissertation is Israel, the relationship between these two countries has been examined.

[26] An example of this could be an early version of the current European Union: the European Economic Community of 1957.

one function with regard to the state system – the pursuit of power. According to neo-realism, within the state system power distribution is the key element of the behaviour of its constituent states. However, in the Middle East the Western concept of the state system is progressing towards consolidation, therefore the subtleties of the 'system level' have a diminished impact on the behaviour of states.

1.5   Liberalism and Idealism

Idealism is the opposite of realism. It follows the liberal traditions within IR and supports the notion that people are 'inherently good'. Expanded globally, and particularly through economic cooperation and the construction of international institutions and normative regimes, this can lead to peaceful and cooperative relationships. Individuals form groups and later states. In distinguishing between liberalism and realism an assessment in relation to absolute versus relative gains is critical. Although both reference the preferences or behaviour of states, the former emphasises cooperation, whilst the latter in emphasising conflict acknowledges tacitly that gains will be relative. Kant (1795) posits individual self-interest can be channelled by society to stimulate collective social welfare. In retaining an anarchical system theory, as there is no single overarching authority, states, multinational corporations and non-governmental (international) organisations are seen as the key interdependent actors within liberalist international relations theory, acting in their own self-interest. These groups, according to Bull (1977) communicate and are recognised across the spectrum. As central tenets they hold morality, international law and international organisations as key influences on power.

1.6   Constructivism

Constructivism is a meta-theory that seeks to understand the system as an outcome of the social construction between participating parties. The theory enables a more sophisticated and broad understanding of security, as it is able to consider the actions of strategic actors more holistically across periods of structural change. It concentrates on the role that culture or identity plays in international politics, allows states and other actors, including institutions and various national, regional or ethnic groups or individuals to elevate a concern as an issue that needs to be securitized through a variety of methods. As such constructivism allows consideration of the values, threats, norms of conditioning,

challenges and opportunities to the party seeking to elevate a problem for consideration as a security issue. Securitization within this context allows the consideration of the role and use of language, power both linguistically and through its ability to enable or constrain practice and the status of practice. Risse (2000) argues constructivism shows the role of ideational factors to both regulate behaviour and construct the identity of actors through a particular historic, cultural and social lens by social interaction and discursive practice. It is the ability to galvanise public support to force change that is the key. McDonald (in Williams, 2012) argues that securitization can be located within constructivism. Wendt (1999) and Katzenstein (1996) argues that individuals do not exist independent of their social environment (including its norms and beliefs) and human agency results in changes to that culture as a result of practice.[27] Within the context of this dissertation, the active usage of ethnic and religious narratives by groups as key securitizing agents inside and outside of Israel will be tracked and analysed. Within the context of this dissertation, Jewish identity is stable, allowing a clear definition of 'we'. The impact of a functional actor to drive behaviour both internally and externally, which is then responded to by the relevant speech actor, is a critical part of the escalation process. These groups and individuals are especially attentive to changes in society, because social reality is never clearly defined. The narrative of privileging of one group over another is examined within this dissertation through the construction of legislation. Social constructivism recognises that reality changes constantly through the actions of others.

Constructivists maintain inter-state relationships are dependent on how identity is constructed, thereby determining the parameters of state interaction. Identity refers to equally created and emergent imaginings of 'we' and 'other' where the 'self' can be the state (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996). Norms, which establish expectations of the state, and identity which influences state policies, are equally constitutive. In the Middle East, Hinnebusch (2015) argues that "sub- and supra-state identities compete with state identity, inspire trans-state movements, and constrain purely state-centric behaviour" (p. 2). Power accumulation and balancing are currently being used as a means of countering threats.[28] These perceptions influence behaviours both internally and externally, and when tied to state security carry an even greater weight. Only by

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[27] See also Hopf (1998).

[28] An example of this would be the acquisition of nuclear technology within the Middle East.

understanding why others find a particular action threatening, can it be assessed clearly and dispassionately. It is not a question of right or wrong, but whether that threat can be mitigated or marginalised.

1.7   The Changing IR Landscape

The end of the Cold War[29] saw a change in how security was theorised. These changes were brought about by new concepts, challenging the notions of what could be considered a security issue. Buzan (1991) states these changes challenge the concept of security. Cold War threats and security conceptions no longer seemed to hold true. As a result of this there has been what Krause and Williams (1996, p. 229) term a "broadening and deepening" of security.

'Broadening' added a diverse range of potential security threats including environmental degradation and human security, whilst acknowledging that there were options available to nation-states other than purely military ones. The broadening scope of IR required changes to threat responses, including non-military options and those needing international co-operation and new referent security objects identified. The unique challenges that these threats pose highlight or accentuate the inability of states to handle the existing difficulties and render the threatened element worthy of securitization. 'Deepening' moves reference levels from a state-centric focus "either down, to include the individual, or upward on a regional and ultimately global level" (Krause and Williams 1996, p. 230). Thus, much of the debate has been focused on the referent object of security and appropriate security subjects. Barnett, Matthew, and O'Brien (as cited in McDonald, 2013) caution that failure to explicitly identify non-state referent objects, generally results in state monopolisation of new security challenges.

Within that context, primacy within the Frankfurt School[30] is not granted to either materialism or idealism as the reality of both, is distorted by individual epistemology (Geuss, 1981). Utilising Marxist investigative methods through an open-ended and self-critical lens, the Frankfurt School seeks to understand how the dominant ideology misrepresents the construct of human relationships, therefore perpetuating the cycle.

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[29] Late 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR.

[30] Commencing in 1923 in Frankfurt, moving to the US as a result of Nazi German opposition prior to its return to Germany in 1953.

Power, when viewed through this lens refers to psychological consent to either the whole or parts of the socio-political order. Lukes (2005) and Przeworski (1985) argue consent requires behavioural and cognitive acquiescence which links more cleanly with the position of Buzan et al. outlined later in this chapter. Within the case study, Chapter 2 discusses the impact of cultural hegemony through the sale of land by Palestinian Arabs to Jews. The narrative at the time was that 'we [Palestinian Arabs] don't do this'; the reality was that it occurred, and retribution was swift by Palestinian Arabs against those who subverted this hegemonic position. Later work from Adorno (2002) argued that state involvement in the economy removed capitalist tension and also was increasingly ambivalent to the construct of social domination. In the case of limiting state involvement in economic matters, the small element described above shows this did not apply to the nascent state of Palestine.

The environment for vibrant and polycentric IR now emerged. The intricacies and uncertainties of a post-bipolar world, particularly in the Middle East, were now more clearly articulated as a result of understanding the relevant norms, perceptions, and identity. Price and Reus-Smith (1998) assert the constructivist approach, which has embraced many of the insights of critical studies, sought to provide guidance on many of these contested points and has made a number of significant impacts in the study and understanding of security.

1.8   Critical Security History

As a secondary element, this dissertation considers how conceptually 'we' and 'other' were embedded within the legislative agenda of the State of Israel. Donnelly and Steele (2019) in advocating for Critical Security History (CSH) argue that historic and current actions not only change how issues are perceived, but how they will be remembered. The tension over the land Israel was granted and its subsequent actions brings with it a discursive narrative of distrust and enmity not only within Israel but in the surrounding states and wider global environment. The impact of this 'remembering' impacts not only on the process of securitization and de-securitization, but I argue within the construction of legislative language. Balzacq (2011, p. 14) proposes that "every securitization is a historic process" influenced by prior events and interactions which either reinforce or challenge the current scenario.

1.9 The Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School emerged in the 1990s and brought the process of securitization into international relations as a knowledge discipline within the paradigm of social constructivism, with the inclusion of non-military security sectors within its matrix. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaan de Wilde are three main theorists from this school. As a subset of constructivism, the Copenhagen School brings two key concepts to this dissertation: securitization and security sectors that are not ontologically driven. This school posits that security is inter-subjectively constructed. It represents the struggle for sovereignty for states, societies and individuals. Arendt (as cited in Buzan 1998), theorises that "security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects" (p. 31). The changing nature of threat response across time is an example of this. Katzenstein (2003) examines this looking at national responses to terrorism from a Japanese position (generally a policing action) to a US response (military action).

In utilising this sectoral approach, securitization therefore becomes a multi-focal lens through which the security dynamic can be analysed. Each sector looks at an individual security element, its threats, vulnerabilities, actors and referent objects. Holistically, it allows the conflicting challenges facing a state to be assessed and viewed in relation to the wider internal and external environment.

In contrast, the Welsh School draws upon the work of Booth (1991a, 1991b, 2005) and Wyn Jones (1995, 1999, 2005), who merged IR theory and critical theory to formulate Critical Security Studies (CSS) which seeks to raise concerns for referents other than states and to consider a diverse range of uncertainties that may affect them. As such it discards the centrality of the state, seeking to limit the power of military and state-focused threats which dominate the realist security agenda. This work incorporates the Frankfurt School and Gramscian traditions within its framework (Bilgin, 2008) and also leverages Booth's (1991) work in relation to emancipation. Security is espoused by Booth (2005) as a derivative concept influenced by an individual's political and world view. This position can be seen within the case study between those willing to give back land to secure peace, and those who wish to retain it as a buffer or to provide strategic depth. This case study challenges Booth (2007) in relation to exclusionary practice and his contention that within an emancipatory community "a person's identity cannot be

satisfactorily defined by any single attribution" (p. 138). 'We' and 'other' is defined by the State of Israel on a single identity marker – faith.

Unlike the Welsh and Copenhagen schools, the Paris School "has its roots in political theory and the sociology of migration and policing in Europe" (Collective C.A.S.E., 2006, p. 446), not in international relations. In light of this, it leverages differing conceptualisations of how truth is produced and how that impacts on the construct of threats outside a securitized environment. Bigo (2000) explains that the Paris School combines Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 1991, 1998) and Foucault (1997a) in the mapping of security. While most analyses of securitization focus on securitizing moves (speech acts), I support the position of the Paris School that securitization can also be performed through, or evidenced by, practice (Aradau, 2004, 2008; Balzacq, 2005; Bigo, 2000; Guillaume, 2018; Huysmans, 2011; Mälksoo, 2014). Huymans (2011) argues that securitization is "less an actualization of a critical decision and more a continuous process of assembling objects, subjects and practices" (p. 377). Within Israel, utilisation of this method has enabled securitization to be tracked not only by words or pictures but by actions, which taken in isolation do not meet the criteria of exceptional. These individual actions invest insecurity within the state, entrenching the 'we' and 'other' discourse into the everyday. Once embedded in the community through culture and practice, the process of dispersed securitization therefore makes the process of de-securitization infinitely more difficult.

Wæver (1995, 2010) notes that for a theory to be useful it should be limited and parsimonious. This should provide opportunities for future learning and critique as well as modifications to theoretical elements. Biersteker (2010) extends this further, suggesting that 'no analytical framework is ever complete or entirely adequate for all situations or phenomena" (p. 604). The overarching conceptualisation of securitization has been challenged by a number of schools and individual theorists arguing against particular positions; this will be discussed further in this chapter.

1.9.1   Existential Threats

The securitization process as described by Buzan et al. (1998) has three major elements: Referent Objects (hereafter referent objects), securitizing actors and functional actors, which are linked to the concept of an existential threat. The linguistic narrative of threats

provides definition and context to the issue in need of security. An existential threat could be argued to be either a threat to survival or a threat to existence, depending on the epidemiology used. Buzan et al.'s argument is that "an existential threat needs to be contextualised in terms of its referent object" (p. 21). In defining the 'other', speech and functional actors have sought to characterise the 'other' as anyone (individual, community or state) who represented an existential threat to the Jewish people, thereby producing in-group defensive behaviours. This is supported by Wohl, Branscombe, and Reysen (2010), who argue that collective fear for group survival represents an existential threat. Given that threats can be real or perceived, from a psychological perspective Hirschberger et al. (2016) argue that there are four types of existential threat: "personal death, physical collective annihilation, symbolic collective annihilation and past victimisation" (p. 1). Historic victimisation is a pre-condition to a history of collective trauma, which Hirschberger et al. (2016) assert conflates current conflicts. The application of a collective system of understanding to victimhood within the existential threat discourse allows greater appreciation of both its use and impact.

In defining the 'other' speech and functional actors sought to characterize the 'other' as anyone (individual, community or state) who an represented an existential threat to the Jewish people thereby producing in-group defensive behaviours. This is supported by Wohl et al. (2010) who argue that collective fear for group survival represents an existential threat. Given that threats can be real or perceived from a psychological perspective Hirschberger et al. (2016) argue that there are four types of existential threat: "personal death, physical collective annihilation, symbolic collective annihilation and past victimisation" (p. 1).

1.9.2   Referent Objects

Buzan et al. (1998) assert referent objects are "things that are seen to be existentially threatened" (p. 36) that also have a genuine right to survive. This varies depending upon which sector is being analysed, but the state is generally, though not always as the case study will clearly show, the object that is deemed to be threatened. In other historical periods, it was one of many – including religion, city, region, and language group. Essentially the ability to become a referent object hinges on the legitimacy of the threat, who is appealed to and the amount of support both garnered and actively utilised.

Security, Booth (1991) argues, sees the individual as the definitive referent object, as it relies "on groupings of humans as important to understanding security" (p. 315). This is challenged by Buzan (2001), who argues that it is easier to securitise groups (i.e. ethnic or states) as opposed to those that are not too narrow (individuals) or too broad (humanity). Buzan et al. (1998) claim this results from social communities eliciting 'we' feelings and permitting an easily identified 'other'. Therefore these social communities are more easily constructed as referent objects, which will be demonstrated in the case study. Weldes (1996) supports such a view of securitization stating: "national security is not rejected as either outmoded or in need of transcendence; instead it is taken seriously as an important historical resolution to central problems of political life" (p. 279). It could be argued that with increased globalisation we may see a transition from state security to societal security.[31][32]

Jews, Palestinians and countless other societal groups at the commencement of the 20th century had restrictions placed upon their communities. To make a claim under the securitization paradigm, Mutimer (1999) argues groups or individuals must identify how they are constrained or threatened. Therefore, securitization considers the constructed threats to individuals groups and communities (including states). The broader theory of securitization as developed by the Copenhagen School allows transition from the state as the primary referent object through to other potential referent objects, including possible socially constructed referents (societies, values, culture) and individuals.

1.9.3   Speech Acts and Securitizing Actors

One of the enduring legacies of the ordinary language movement is the notion of a speech act. Austin (1962), as one of the movement's chief proponents, argued that an expression's meaning should be equated with its use, and not limited to a depiction of preference or view of reality. He famously illustrated the "distinction between performative and constative utterances: performatives change or create a state of

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[31]The increasing issues with the creation of societal or ethnically based states, the Kurds in Turkey who have been relatively autonomous within their territory, the Islamic State and what they seek to create, along with other societal based national causes in the early 21st century would lead this observer to believe that societal security is already becoming an issue.

[32] Modern methods of communication provide referent objects, functional and speech actor's greater reach, with the ability to communicate with an individual or large portions of the global community with ease, see Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009).

affairs, constatives merely describe them" (as cited in Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, p.10). Buzan et al. (1998, p. 5) propose that "securitization operates on a global, subsystem and local dynamic level" and its enactment is normally accomplished by a securitizing "speech act." Wæver (1995, p.46) explains his position on security, stating that security is "a speech act" which occurs when an individual or collective claims that a specific issue threatens the survival of the referent object and appeals to a security provider to implement extraordinary means for its protection.[33]

1.9.3.1   Illocutionary vs Performative Images of the Speech Act

Austin (1962) examined the use of language in making statements about the world and how words may support actions.[34] Searle (1969) considered this through three lenses: locution, considering what was spoken and its meaning; illocution, referring to what was done; and perlocution, referring to the outcome. Illocutionary force refers to the intent to perform an act, not the actual occurrence. Performative acts could be used interchangeably with contractual speech acts, as both require a collective agreement and the words' ability to 'do' something (Austin, 1962). Buzan et al. (1998), in discussing speech acts, argued "that the utterance is itself an act" (p. 26), which is consistent with Austin's (1962) position of a performative speech act. Serle (1975) would consider speech acts as falling within the context of either a directive illocutionary act (causing the audience to take a specific action) or a commissive illocutionary act (committing the speaker to a future action).[35] In the case of the Israeli legislative language, it is empowered in parliament (Knesset) by members elected by and for the people and as such has the power to enforce or validate particular actions of the state.

Of particular relevance to this dissertation is the concept of illocutionary silencing, through which patterns of discrimination can deprive specified groups of the ability to perform a speech act (Guillaume, 2018; Hansen, 2011). Given the heightened security posture within the State of Israel, there were and remain limits on what can be reported. It is the usage of legislation supporting the silencing of dissent that enables the speech

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[33] For a discussion surrounding the role of science and the benefit this approach may bring to arguments surrounding 'facts' and the ability to influence the authority of the speaker in international relations see Jackson (2011); or in relation to securitization see Villumsen Berling (2011).

[34] See McGowan (2009).

[35] Searle (1975, 1999) argued there are five variations of illocutionary speech acts: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations.

act to become performative, linking a discursive narrative through the granting or denial of legislative protections and embedding of 'we' and 'other'. As such, performative utterance embedded these concepts within the population of Israel as lived experience.

1.9.3.2   When can we actually say that Securitization has happened?

One of the common criticisms of the Copenhagen School is that it fails to clearly articulate when securitization has occurred. There are three common arguments put forward in relation to this: speech, audience acceptance or emergency measures. Recognition of successful securitization will always be partially or wholly subjective and often intrinsically difficult to recognize, especially during early stages, however Salter (2008) explains that "we must gain a tactical knowledge of the conditions for success and failure" (p. 343) of both securitization and de-securitization.

Expanding on the speech acts discussed earlier, Côté (2016) notes that this infers mutual identification in relation to a community's survival and persona. Critically, the issue becomes a social and intra-subjective construct if its participants can persuade others that the topic is urgent and deemed an existential threat (and subsequent acknowledgement of the plausibility of the threat by a significant audience), which engenders emergency action. Balzacq (2005) argues this high degree of formality renders securitization a 'conventional procedure' in which all parts must be met to ensure success. McDonald (2008) further notes that language is only a component of the discourse. Wilkinson (2007) argues that securitization does not require the word 'security' to be included within the speech act. Arguments in the literature by a number of theorists (Guillaume, 2018; Hansen, 2000; Huymans, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007; Williams, 2003) challenge whether a 'speech act' actually has to be spoken, and the almost exclusive emphasis on a discursive practice is inconsistent with the lived experience. Those contesting the Copenhagen School's requirement for a speech act as part of its securitization process seek to unpack both the language and practice of the speech act.[36] Huysmans (2011, p. 374) articulates some of the major concerns as "the meaning of security that was 'activated' in the speech act, the exclusion of silence, the relevance of images and the conditions of felicity of a speech act." Green (2017) proposes that by "a

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[36] Stritzel (2011a) seeks to extend this position further by including translation as a way of collectively understanding threats.

pattern of abuses of speech act, institutions might deprive a person of an ability to perform speech acts". This dissertation, supporting the position of (Guillaume, 2018; Hansen, 2000, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007; Williams, 2003) will seek to further explore this element considering how legislation can generate unequal privilege (including silencing) and differential advantage, and shapes an individual or communities self-understanding and subjective interest.

Buzan et al. (1998) asserts that an issue is only securitised "if and when the audience accepts it as such" (p.25) based on a set of conditions. McDonald (in Williams, 2012) suggest that constructivists place significance upon approval of the speech act, which Côté, citing both Williams (2011) and Salter (2008), posits that the audience and how it accepts these speech acts has been under-defined in the literature and argues that securitization theory "characterises the audience as agents without agency" (Côté, 2016, p. 543). Legislative language derives its power from collective acceptance and implementation with actions driving legislation and legislation as a precursor to particular actions. Petrey (2016) argues that successful communication is the key to performative speech acts. Balzacq (2005) argues for a more pragmatic approach when considering the role of the audience, in that the process of acceptance of the threat and the requirement for immediate action is contingent upon the target audience understanding a particular claim within the context of their understanding of the world. Balzacq (2005) further contends that the process utilised by the Copenhagen School negates the audience entirely.

The entity or person that is appealed to is deemed to be a securitizing actor. Bourdieu (2004, p.34) proposes "authority is produced in fields structured by different types of field-specific, valued capital – military capital, social capital (networks), economic capital, scientific capital, etc." This results in actors possessing differential value capital impacting upon their ability to speak with authority (Leander, 2005). In the case of nations this is normally the head of government or an elected official, however the Copenhagen School's widening of the definition and sectoral base shows that within some sectors (e.g. the environmental sector), individuals, community and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) are becoming key securitizing agents.[37] Functional actors are people or

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[37] The case study will evidence the impact of Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion in relation to Israel, but it could equally refer to the scientific community and climate change.

organisations advocating for a particular sector, but are neither the speech actor nor the referent object. In the articulation of the speech act, representatives when responding to the threat make a choice in presenting a "specific issue as a test case" (Buzan et al, 1998, p.x) by the state's actions. The action creates a condition of answerability to the wider publics (both internal and external). Huymans (2011) and Isin (2008) however argue that acceptance by the audience is immaterial. "To act, then, is neither arriving at a scene nor fleeing from it, but actually engaging in its creation" (Isin, 2008, p. 27). Whilst this contention may be valid, in the application of legislation as a performative speech act this can only occur at the site constituted for that process, i.e. where the legal and political conditions merge. The critical factor is the linkage of "acts, actions and actors in a historically and geographically concrete situation" (Isin, 2008, p. 24) who remain in that location, rather than remove themselves from the threatened environment.   I contend that the presentation of a 'test case' may not always result in the use of legislation but may take the form of a policy position (location of new migrants) or operational process. Whilst Isin (2008) may deem a test case to be the 'gold standard' for embedding a security issue/dilemma within a state, etc., as evidenced through this dissertation there are other non-legislative options available to the state dependent upon the securitized issue. These alternatives may be equally effective in their application, especially for decision makers within the context of a tumultuous nascent state.

In arguing that emergency measures identify that securitization has occurred, this element may be contingent upon both the speech act and/or audience acceptance. Buzan et al. (1998 p.28) explain that there needs to be enough momentum to "legitimize emergency measures . . . that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats." This Roe (2008) argues invalidates emergency measures from being considered, and Sarat (2010) identifies that within states how emergency measures are implemented is legislated and use of power by a single individual in this format now is rare. Jackson further challenges this position arguing legislatively this impacts upon policy development "Otherwise the activities have only been rhetorically securitized with no practical result" (Jackson, 2006, p.313).

The case study will show the diversity of these claims in a number of ways, with multiple securitizing actors. Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann (1983) and head of the Jewish Agency David Ben-Gurion were not part of a state; they represented a displaced society,

who sought to create a safe territory for Jewish members of that society to exist. Additionally, while Great Britain had primacy as the security provider in the pre-state years, ultimately the UN after its inception in 1945 held the role as arbitrator prior to the 1948 uprising. The Copenhagen School essentially adopts Weber's depiction of the modern state of collective action, law and administration. In doing so there is an acceptance within Western liberal states[38] that the state holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Consequently, the state is accepted as the only security provider. Wæver (1995) argues enacting emergency action requires the security provider to have an adequate military or paramilitary organisation coupled with a legitimised cohesive ideological will enabling its use and avoiding the increase of public dissent. When the state is appealed to as the security provider, the emergency measures typically are use of military or police forces or engagement in coercive politico-economic measures toward other states, such as sanctions.

Essentially, what we define as a security issue varies not only between states, but between societies and individuals as well. Wæver (1995) asserts that by invoking 'security', a representative of the referent object[39] declares an emergency situation and claims the right to use whatever means are necessary to counteract the threat. There is no international standard as to what constitutes a threat, which varies by state, society and individual. As a result, what is required for survival of that threat by each group similarly changes. The speed with which an issue is securitized is also variable. As will be discussed in this dissertation, some issues move through this process very quickly as they have key people or organisations advocating for them while others of equal or even more pressing value suffer for want of a more able functional actor, or because there are other challenges for the security provider to address. Additionally, the extraordinary means implemented to counteract the threat depends on the security provider appealed to by the representative of the referent object. The open-ended nature of this definition of security allows a multidimensional approach to a wide range of issues, referent objects and security providers.

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[38] See Hobson & Sajed (2017) for a discussion on the impact of eurocentrism on the critical IR theory and non-western agency.

[39] Traditionally a state but not always; the UN has functioned in this format recently in relation to humanitarian crises in Africa and elsewhere.

Understanding what constitutes the 'normal' political rules governing the behaviour of the security provider is key to determining if an action needs or does move outside of it. The definition will change dependent on the state, its political environment, history and infrastructure. Fundamentally, this assessment of what constitutes 'normal' looks at the relationships between entities (e.g. political parties, activist groups, non-state actors) and how they have altered, and the norms and/or rules that govern both the relationships and their interactions. In many cases, securitizing actors appeal to foreign governments, the international community or some conglomeration of states to provide security for a threatened referent object. The Jews approached all these entities, asserting their claim as the threatened referent object. The Arabs in Palestine[40] did not utilised this method as effectively in the early 20th century, however since the late 1960s have utilised this method of securitization to gain international support for their cause. This dissertation seeks to ascertain if Buzan et al.'s securitization theory and methodology can be used longitudinally to plot the securitization of the State of Israel between 1947 – 1967 and on a secondary level what does the legislative language used to support securitization tell us about the construction of speech act in defining and then embedding the 'we' and 'other' discourse.

Wæver and Buzan's (2003) securitization approach links with the 'broadening' and 'deepening' of security agendas espoused by Krause and Williams (1996), arguing security threats are constructed by securitizing actors addressing a particular audience. The Copenhagen School explains how issues are created as threats moving away from the normative discussion as to the inclusion or otherwise of specific subjects in security.

The Copenhagen School threat assessment methodology divides security into individual sectors – military, political, economic, societal and environmental (Buzan et al., 1998). In each of the sectors it identifies objects that, if threatened existentially, may legitimately claim the right to survive through its representatives. In doing so, this approach challenges realists who maintain a purely military view of security, and neo-realists attempting to widen the conceptualisation of security without changing the existing pool of referent objects. It allows movement outside the usual processes including non-state referent objects (e.g. biosphere) and even non-state security providers. The non-state

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[40] And after the creation of the State of Israel, the refugees in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and surrounding nations.

security provider will be shown as a key component in the creation of the State of Israel, and in providing elements of protection to it. This sectoral method further defines the major existential threats within the sector. If a major existential threat exists to the referent object, securitizing actors galvanise support to respond to that threat. The sectors, Buzan et al. assert, "are not ontologically separate, but instead they are analytical devices or lenses" (p. 168) through which it is possible to analyse an issue. Therefore these sectors provide the dissertation with a robust structure with identified referent objects, threats and actors in which to analyse and assess the creation of the State of Israel. Each sector will now be unpacked, and key elements identified in terms of threats, actors and referent objects. Contextually, small elements of the case study will be included, however the following chapters will be where the detailed use of the sectoral elements will be utilised in assessing threats to the State of Israel from 1947 to the end of the Six Day War in 1967.

1.9.4   Deconstruction of Securitization

The process of deconstructing a securitized issue is not fulsomely addressed by Buzan et al. (1998) which is articulated by numerous theorists (Aradau, 2004; Donnelly, 2015; Huysmans, 1998; Knudsen, 2001; Salter, 2008; Williams, 2003) and represents a challenge to both theory and methodology. In acknowledging that this is a political process and there are no set formulae, Wæver (2000, p. 253) articulates three methods for how de-securitization can occur. The first two are "do not initially securitize an issue" and "do not create a security dilemma" and the third is to move security issues back within the realm of normative politics or, as Hansen (2012) suggests, normalising or moving an issue out of "the sphere of security" (p. 525), a process that is assisted through the framing of the speech act. Aradau (2004, 2008) outlines securitization/de-securitization conceptually as negative/positive, arguing that extraordinary politics necessitates fast process and the creation of the 'other'. The Paris School explains de-securitization through a changed narrative or the utilisation of alternative security actions that may not achieve the desired outcome (Collective C.A.S.E., 2006). Whilst recognising that democratic politics and institutional processes and procedures are inherently slow, the 'act' is then is able to be considered in the context of "normative and political orders," assessing the acceptability of the deviation from 'normal' based upon the consequences of the action and the responsibility of the actor. Pram Gad and Lund Petersen (2011, p. 316) also identify

theorists' concerns that deconstruction of securitization allegedly "reproduces the existing liberal order." Whilst a state's response to a threat may require immediate action, the process of de-escalation is also slow. Roe (2004) extends this position further, arguing that de-securitization may be "logically impossible" (p. 208). Whilst de-securitization by demilitarisation may be the desired state, this is contingent upon numerous contributory factors, including trust.[41] This dissertation argues that whilst the reframing of the speech act may assist in the transition, an embedded narrative of 'we' and 'other' that is inculcated within the psyche of a state, its people and its legislative instruments will take significant time and effort to change.

1.10 Methodology

This thesis maps longitudinally the first 20 years of the State of Israel, to consider the choices made within the context of the Copenhagen School's securitization theory and methodology. Additionally, the actions of Israel are contextually analysed considering the speech act enabling practice (physical actions) and the discursive construction of legislative language, noting that Austin (1964) and Searle (1994) identify this construction as a political act.

The research question suggests two distinct approaches and two distinct frameworks of analysis. One approach maps the securitization within the State of Israel longitudinally through events, while the second approach applies a discourse analysis to interpret the legislative corpus to identify the 'we' and 'other' within the text. This, then, will allow the consideration of how securitization discourse was utilised within legislation to define and then embed a discourse of 'we' and 'other' to support the State of Israel. Whilst I acknowledge that the Copenhagen School places primacy on the 'act' of speaking, it is my contention that this can also be considered through both the written word and how language structure or construction can enable or constrain practice (Table 1.1). This suggests a central role for both discourse analysis, in that it seeks to illustrate as a result of the power-knowledge nexus how specific contexts inform the ways we respond to security in the wider world (Foucault, 1997a, 2000; George, 1995; Milliken, 1999; Wæver, 1995), and the impact of history on threat construction and perception.

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[41] For consideration of this in a Norwegian context see Jensen (2012).

Table 1.1   Discourse and Practice Elements

Tool	Analysis	Source	Corpus / Referred to
Written Word	Terms that articulate the we (Jew) and other	Legislation that supports practice	8/43
Spoken word (converted to text)		Speeches	3/10
Practice (Material)	Measures by the state to prioritise Jewish Israeli interests	Securitised issues	Not quantifiable

1.10.1   Sectoral Securitisation

The first approach (mapping) seeks to consider a sample of major events between 1947 and 1967, in discrete periods. This enables events within each chapter to be examined within each securitization sector (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 49 – 162), but also holistically across the period, consistent with the Rubik's Cube® thought experiment. In doing so, it reflects on the interconnected nature of the challenges to the state to enable or constrain practice. The rationale for this 20-year period was that it encompasses the creation of the state, and the flow-on impacts to the formation and implementation of critical infrastructure and legislation in response to threats to all sectors. This allows the dissertation to consider whether speech acts support the definition and embedding of 'we' and 'other', and the possible impacts of illocutionary silencing.

For inclusion securitised events were required to satisfy the following criteria:

➢ the securitized event occurred during the time period under consideration;

➢ securitization was initiated by the State of Israel (or its antecedents); and

➢ legislation was to be either a pre-curser or product of the event.

It was not a requirement that there be an overt speech act that was articulated to the people residing in Palestine/Israel, nor was there a requirement for audience acceptance of the speech act.

This allows the Copenhagen School's theory and methodology to provide an analytical tool to consider securitisation, threats (mnemonic and present), identity, speech acts and the audience.

1.10.1.1   Political Securitisation

Political securitization addresses the legitimacy of the state internally and externally and its capacity to provide organisation and stability through governance structures. Buzan et al. (1998) opine this is arguably the widest field, and prey to becoming the 'bucket' in which all other elements are linked or quantified as "all threats and defences are constituted and defined politically" (p. 141). The existential threats to the legitimacy and national identity of the state, both internal and external, are key elements which will be evidenced within the case study. Implied within this paradigm is the power of a group of individuals to exert pressure, which Buzan et al. (1998) claim have priority over all others. Within the case study, Chapter 3 deals with this specifically in relation to the ultra-orthodox Jews who were exempted from military service when the rest of the nation went to war. Andrews (2007, pp. 208-209) argues "it is ultimately the dynamic tension between biography and history which stimulates the heartbeat of political narratives."

The securitizing actor is generally the state; however the UN or transnational movements are other possible alternatives.[42] The strength or otherwise of the state also has an impact on who would be appealed to as a securitizing actor. Strong states generally utilise the state as the securitizing actor, having legitimacy both internally and externally. Weaker states have more challenges as the legitimacy of the speech actor may be fraught due to multiple claimants, or a lack of territorial inviolability. The choice of speech actor is also linked to the ability of that entity to undertake two elements: to articulate the perceived threat and to facilitate breaking the rules of normative behaviour to mitigate the threat.

The Jews advocating for a homeland sought an area in which they could establish a state, for the protection of their people and culture. The territorial manifestation of that political ideal was a democratic state protecting the Jewish people, and those who remained within the physical borders of the state in line with the overarching premise of a homeland and place of safety for Jews.

1.10.1.2   Environmental Securitisation

Environmental securitization has been viewed by scholars on a spectrum from the "ultimate security" (Myers as cited in Buzan et al., 1998, p. 71) to a contamination of the

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[42] Intergovernmental organisations such as the Group of 20 (G20), World Trade Organisation (WTO), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are others.

security discourse (Deudney as cited in Buzan et al., 1998, p. 71). This sector's evolution commenced, Buzan et al. (1998) argue, with the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment, looking at the relationships between the action of people and the planetary biosphere and how the use of the environment could or has led to conflict, but not necessarily military conflict. There are two differing means of assessing environmental securitization – scientific or political – which change securitizing and functional actors (ranging from industry groups, research conglomerates, and government departments through to downstream users) and referent objects. The differences between the approaches revolve around the location and the structure of the argument. Scientific environmental securitization is outside of the political sphere, leveraging academic rigour and non-government activity to ascertain threats to the environment. Political environmental securitization is a government decision-making process as a result of either a real or perceived threat to the environment predicated on public awareness, responsibility for addressing the threat and global collaboration and institutionalisation (Buzan et al., 1998).

Existential threats within this context can be diverse. Land is a physical entity; cartographically it is represented by lines on a map, however the lines have an unlimited height and depth when translated to the ground, and as such it exemplifies how a range of environmental issues can be securitized. These can include air quality as well as topographical features such as the impact of erosion, rainfall, and population density through to soil degradation and water rights. Riparian rights bring with them a large amount of security interdependence, and the issues continue to play out in the Middle East today. Wæver (1995) often references the Netherlands where flooding is perceived as an existential threat and the state's response is the maintenance and use of dykes.

Palestine, and the nascent state of Israel, therefore brought with it particular challenges. The second report to the 1947 United Nations Special Commission on Palestine stated, "Palestine is not very bountifully supplied with water and … its continued development depends on making the most of what water there is (General Assembly, 1947, Chapter II, paragraph 9)." The case study will focus primarily upon the political assessment of environmental security, as evidence of scientific environmental securitization was limited over the period covered by the dissertation. Chapters 2–6 will include a rationale

for the acquisition and retention of both land and water resources as a result of battles between 1948 and 1967.

1.10.1.3   Societal Securitization

Societal securitization refers to identity; Buzan et al. (1998) assert it relates to how an individual or group identify themselves as a member of a particular community. Identity is linked to a master narrative which is socially entrenched and shares a common framework of history, experience or knowledge (Hammack, 2011). Thus, the four main threats to identity arise from challenges to the existing identity of the society. These include migration, as one of the most commonly viewed threats to societal security, along with "horizontal competition, vertical competition and depopulation" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 121).

As the case study will show, migration was viewed as a serious issue by all parties; both as a threat to, and a critical component of their survival resulting from the arrival of a foreign population. This caused a change in the ethnic, religious and linguistic construct of the society. Buzan and Wæver (2003) observe that whether immigrants or opposing identities are securitized is contingent upon whether the owners of the group identity take a closed or open-minded view on the constitution and maintenance of their identity. Increased migration by Jews from 1917 onwards into Palestine was extremely threatening to Arabs in Palestine. In 1946 there were approximately 1.2 million Arabs, 600,000 Jews and 35,000 people from other groups, with a total population of 1,846,000. The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) (1948) report identified a 20 per cent increase in the Jewish population since 1922.[43] The Muslim population (almost entirely Arab) decreased by 15 per cent and the Christian (largely Arab) population by three per cent over the same period. Jews had therefore come to represent one third of the population of Palestine, and as such were a clear and distinct 'other.'

Initially the construction of the Jewish refugee was founded on a humanitarian securitization of the individual, on their membership and experiences in or as a particular

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[43] In 1922, the Jewish population represented 12.91 per cent of the total population compared with 32.96 per cent in 1946.

group.[44] The case study will show how significant the increase in Jewish settlers was, either through legal or illegal migration, between 1947 and 1967. The challenge however is that land is a key component of identity and impacts on the concept of society and the cultural components of religion. Horizontal competition addresses the fears of the original inhabitants about their society changing as a result of migrant influx whilst vertical competition addresses people identifying themselves as something different, as part of an integration scheme or exclusionary practice. A very significant impact of the Israeli Law of Return (1950)[45] was the ingathering of exiles, drawing a wide cohort of people into a narrow Israeli national identity. The case study will show ample evidence of all three of these elements (migration, horizontal competition and vertical competition). The fourth pillar of this sector, depopulation, is rarely used as it is about the elimination of identity from an area. The case study does provide some initial discussion of this, including how Plan Delat (Khalidi, 1999) was used and its impact on the depopulation of areas to enhance the land holding of the nascent state. Other examples are also included in later chapters.[46] Strategically, societal securitization was linked with a number of political and military securitization factors, which will be addressed from Chapter 3 onwards.

1.10.1.4   Military Securitization

Military securitization addresses the relationships and the use, or the ability to threaten to use, forceful coercion to ensure the security of the state, but also the ability to request or respond to requests for aid from allies. As a result, the consequences of either use or the threat of use are easily visible, and implementation is generally swift. Within the context of the case study both self-reliance and the utilisation of superpower and great power relationships by Israel in response to threats and military action is demonstrated. Expressed through Israel's most important military–strategic relationships with the US,

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[44] The refugee is identified as both victim and referent object, which the host state (as the actor responsible for the refugee), implicitly bestows legitimacy upon the group they belong to. Permanent migration is essential to the long-term survival of settler states. Whilst the Arabs in Palestine and more broadly the Middle East did not deny that European Jewry were refugees from the Holocaust, they did contest that those within Palestine did not meet that criteria. For Palestinian Arabs, this influx represented an existential threat in terms of both migration and then going forward in terms of horizontal competition. See Bateman and Pilkington, 2011.

[45] This will be discussed in Chapter 4.

[46] Nesbitt-Larkin (2017, p. 573) supports the contention of Taylor (2015) that "enforced displacement and exile problematizes questions of home, notably as diasporic generations become post diasporic"

France and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom and Germany, the alliances assisted not only in force projection but also in access to weapons and technology.

The use of a nation's military is generally with the approval of the state as the primary referent object. The existential threat is in this context the easiest to quantify as it fits the traditional model of state-centric security concerns. The securitizing actor is most often the head of state, and functional actors include government departments, the military-industrial complex and others. It can be viewed as the most obvious securitization of the state, however the role of the military may not be purely one of the military defence of the state. In almost all nations, the role also supports the government across sectoral elements through international peacekeeping (political) or domestically disaster assistance (societal). Ullman (2008) argues within this context that the ability for normal practice to be set aside is easier to establish; a national response is more readily achieved. This can be traced back through both Eastern and Western concepts of sovereignty, with kings, queens, sultans and caliphates using military power to establish or retain their rule over territory and the people that reside on that land. Outcomes of conventional wars were easily measured in terms of longitude and latitude through control, either formal or informal, over land or a people.[47] This feudal system allowed the use of force by additional layers of society, having sworn allegiance to the ruler. The state is not the only referent object, as coups, separatist uprisings and other uses of the military have shown.

In mapping military securitization onto the creation of the State of Israel, the case study will show clearly how non-state entities in Great Britain's Mandated Palestine created, supplied, trained and used military force, with varying success. The Jews in Palestine created early military forces, which joined the British in WWII and then in some cases, used the skills they had learnt against both British and Arab forces between 1947–48, at the end of the Mandatory Period. As such, Ayoob (1995) contends these actions could be seen as a clear challenge of state sovereignty by its citizens. The 1948 War of Independence, and to a lesser extent the wars or battles that followed, will clearly show the impact of perceived external threats in relation to the obliteration of society, culture and people. The 1956 Suez Canal conflict and the building of Israel's nuclear capability

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[47] The writer acknowledges that the rationale for going to war may have diverse iterations: religion; alliances; responses to threats. The outcomes of these are generally reflected in connection to territorial sovereignty.

will illustrate both sides of the use of military threat deterrence. Functional actors within the case study period are diverse, but foremost amongst them are those who did not enter Palestine, the Holocaust victims. The memory or legacy of this group of actors has driven and continues to drive a large component of the military security position of Israel. In considering securitization from a performance or evidentiary practice basis, within the Israeli military community, the Mossad and Shin Bet[48] have a significant public relations function beyond pure military action. The case of Israel will clearly articulate the challenges that the acquisition of land can have on the methods of defence and therefore the protection of the state.

1.10.1.5   Economic Securitization

Economic securitization is concerned with the relationships between the four factors of production: land, labour, capital and enterprise, and the perceived or real threats to these domestically and/or internationally. Gill and Law (1989) in supporting Lukes and Gramaci, contend that whilst power exists through institutional practice and pressure, the global capitalist economy is contingent upon acknowledgement of the constitutive structure of global production. This sector of securitization is highly contentious with competing claims about primacy between various actors dealing with the issues of the international political economy (IPE) and its relationship to domestic systems which may be politically anarchic. The State of Israel, with its strict controls over land, industry and labour, has an economic nationalistic approach to economic security coupled with a tendency towards protectionist policy approaches to foster self-sufficiency. This process is replicated in its defence industries and environmental security.

Within the case study period, geopolitics can be assumed to be a means of attaining land/territory with the objective of accumulating wealth and physical security. Territorial acquisition, preservation and control is linked with stability and successful trade relationships within the global market. The Jewish acquisition of land in Palestine in the late 1800s and the early 1900s was not only for housing, but also economic gain. The land acquired in the pre-state period was diverse, from agricultural land (olive and citrus groves) to urban land and swamps. The UNSCOP (1948) report advised that the contested

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[48] The Mossad is currently the national intelligence agency and Shin Bet is the internal security service for the State of Israel.

land as defined in UN Resolution 181 (II) "had neither coal, iron, nor any other important mineral deposit, deeming it deficient in those components required in a modern, industrial state" (Chapter II, paragraph nine). The requirement therefore was to acquire land and other resources (i.e. water) that would allow the creation, security and power of a modern state. This dynamic would continue over the dissertation period, during which all land that was able to be acquired was subsumed into the State of Israel.

The choice of, access to and volume of available labour has significant impacts upon economic securitization. The choices made within this context not only impact individuals and the companies but also the cost of goods and services, thereby affecting sale prices domestically and internationally. Within the context of this dissertation, the choices made in relation to access to land and who could use it will be shown to have a significant impact on the cost of production. The most common threat in this element is insufficient supply and/or the lack of knowledge to undertake the role. The ability of a state to care for the most vulnerable members of its community is part of the social contract with the state. Displaced people, refugees and restrictions placed on the labour market all fall with the aegis of national economic securitization. When viewed through the lens of the dissolution of the State of Palestine (1947–67) and the creation of two new entities, this needs to be addressed holistically by all parties concerned.

Within the context of the liberal economy, the argument for economic securitization of a company or companies is strong when the state has reason to believe that a war is probable, and that it may have few or no allies to support it. The ability of a state to retain its military security independent of other states was acknowledged clearly in the pre-state period. The perceived threat of being unable to mobilise and equip a fighting force for the defence of the state was addressed through the creation of defence industries, which would provide both military security but also external funding through weapons sales at a later period. This will be discussed across the dissertation period.

The relatively unrestricted global nature of the funding of both the nascent and established State of Israel was testament to the liberal ideal of the ability to move funds in an unobstructed way. The Jewish development drive was initially financed by the Jewish diaspora. Later grants or reparations[49] would come to impact both the perception

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[49] Major grants will be discussed in the chapters representing the respective periods in which they were given. Reparations with Germany will be discussed in Chapter 4.

of security and dependence as well as the threats of reliance on those sources without sufficient internal economic depth.

In the early 1900s Palestine was dependent upon foreign trade for key development items, including food for consumption by people and livestock, raw materials and machinery (Bialer, 1999). For a number of industries in pre-state Israel, while they were technically independent, external market factors showed the depth of interconnectedness within both the region and the wider global community. The threats, both real and perceived, for those actors to impact the flow on the ability to acquire resources for the state was high. The legacy provisions of colonial rule will be explored in Chapter 2 in relation to oil and the damaging terms of trade that the Palestinians in Mandatory Palestine and then the State of Israel were forced to initially accept. Security of supply, both of the raw product to refine and also of the finished products, was exploited by a variety of external actors to assist in the attainment of a third party's political and economic goals (Loftus, 1948) and will be discussed in Chapter 2. The state remains the primary referent object, however across this period individuals, groups (e.g. unions) and companies would be securitized, and as a result of the interconnectivity of the sectors the decisions of the state would be balanced with consideration of the whole. The driver of that referent actor in terms of existential threat would therefore change. The needs of an individual, as highlighted by Maslow (1943), can be extrapolated when the individual is part of a wider community. This then impacts on the services that groups and companies provide to support the safety and welfare of both individuals and groups. Within this context, functional actors are varied and include unions, companies, or social groups who believe the welfare of those they represent is threatened unless an economic remedy is forthcoming. This may be in the context of a living wage, working hours or work conditions. The ability of a state to create or take part in international protection mechanisms or utilise system level referent objects such as the World Bank or the nascent European Economic Community has impacts both internally and externally, and the choices made, whilst not always driven by securitization pressures, may be in response to them. Economic power and its responses to existential threats is a fundamental driver of global, regional and national political outcomes. The ability to effectively securitize this element is critical to the attainment of statehood. Without funding, everything stops.

1.10.2 Discourse and Practice

The second approach considers the framing of the speech act through a number of lenses. Consistent with a number of theorists (Balzacq, 2005; McDonald, 2008; Sjöstedt, 2013), my research approach is informed by two differing elements: discourse and practice. The differing types of securitized issues encountered or created by the State of Israel encouraged the selection of a number of pieces of legislation that were either precursors to issues, or were developed in response to the challenges that Israel was seeking to overcome. Legislation acts to support the ruling elite in managing both territory, population and resources. Legislation may be considered as illocutionary, and it is also a vehicle that enables and constrains practice. As such, it provides a method to consider the "analytics of government" (Balzacq, Leonard & Ruzicka, 2016, p. 494) not only from a discursive position of intent (Lester et al., 2018) but also through the consideration of practice. I chose to consider a cross-section of responses to securitized issues, showing how legislation contextually defined and then embedded the 'we' and 'other' discourse whilst supporting various securitization efforts. The primary source documentation cited within this dissertation is limited to what was available to the general public (regardless of affiliation) within Israel for each of the respective time periods. The one exception to this is Plan Delat.[50] Given the impact of this document on the creation and consolidation of the state and many of the subsequent actions by a range of actors, it has been included.

1.10.2.1 Discourse

Post-structuralism considers language from the perspective of literary theory, critical theory and philosophy. It proposes language as the key to explaining the world and how we perceive it; in essence the production of an individual or community's truth through discourse, supporting the group's identity and values (Abrams & Hogg, 1987). Nietzsche (cited in Blieker & Chou, 2010, p. 9) explains this as "assumptions and conventions of knowing that we have acquired over time and that have become codified in language."[51] It is drawing on this knowledge through a lens coloured by an individual or community's history that frames and contextualises what they have seen, heard or written and the

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[50] De-classified by Israel in 1972.

[51] See also Pervis and Hunt (1993).

use of language to convey that to others. Within the genre of discourse, political discourse provides significant latitude as to the type of documentation that is considered and the methodologies used to communicate intent. Buzan et al. (1998) assert that securitization should be considered through "discourse and political constellations" (p. 25). This dissertation identifies the 'we' as the Jewish people and considers who the 'other' is. Van Dijk (1997) defines political discourse as articulating desired decisions requiring cooperative action (i.e. from a governing body) which may include distribution of social resources contextually occurring within an event (i.e. speech, hearing, demonstration). The setting is important in terms of context, legitimacy and rhetorical schema, and the ability to engage with the audience in an authoritative manner or with societal implications (Partington & Taylor, 2017). The role of speech actor is not limited to politicians; whilst politicians may primarily undertake this action, consistent with the approach of constructivism these acts can also be undertaken by individuals, communities and organisations (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012).

1.10.2.2   Data Selection

This thesis considers a corpus of legislative instruments for analysis. Foucauldian investigation, in its purist form, considers the entirety of discursive practice (e.g. lists of legislation and political contexts, including the speech acts that may have surrounded the drafting process and historic and contemporary factors). Contextually within this dissertation it is neither appropriate nor practicable to undertake an analysis that encapsulates the total range of discursive practice which surrounds and may pre-date the creation of the State of Israel. The data utilised represents a "snapshot of the web of discourse" (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 35).

Prior to compiling the corpus, this element of the research problem was provisionally articulated as the need to investigate the construct of legislation to consider whether a defined 'other' was included within the text and whether legislation was linked to securitization efforts. Preliminary research involved investigating prospective sources of legislative instruments across the identified time period while considering the research problem, and the uniformity of the sample (Williams, 1999). Whilst not an overt physical act, legislative discourse may operate as a line between the cognitive formation of

'othering' and practice (Van Dijk, 2000). What a state chooses to legislate has the ability to convey a significant amount of covert or overt meaning to the audience.

For inclusion within the corpus, legislative instrument texts were required to satisfy the following criteria:

- ➢ the legislation was initiated in the State of Israel (or its antecedents);
- ➢ the legislation was created, used or resulted from a securitised event; and
- ➢ the legislation was promulgated and incepted or authorised for use within the period (i.e. Ottoman land legislation and Ordinances articulated during the Palestinian mandatory period).

As such, the corpus acts as an illustrative discourse record, where language variation and accompanied meaning(s) link to variations in situational context (Halliday, 1985). In other words, Israeli legislation contextually realises a certain usage of language, and therefore meaning, when considered within Israel's securitization response. The corpus of legislation selected may offer insight into the discursive intent to support securitization efforts, allowing a focus on intent linked to practice, rather than a search for veiled illocution.

1.10.2.3   Discourse analysis

Foucault (1997a, p. 35) suggests that discourse theory forms "the set of rules enabling one to establish which statements in a given discourse can be described as true or false." Discourse theory provides significant latitude in considering political discourse, including, as Van Dijk (1997, 2015) notes, contextually (by who, to whom) and what they are seeking to achieve.

Discourse analysis assists in the exploration of discursive practices between language and a variety of factors (e.g. power, ideology, discrimination) through which the linguistic creation of national identity and the practice of 'othering' is identifiable. The period 1947–1967 corresponds with the creation of the new State of Israel and the securitization moves, supported by a legislative discourse about the 'other', which supported or enabled the actions of the State. Reyes (2011) asserts that for political actors legitimisation provides a dyad between causation and result around shared beliefs within a cultural group. The construction of the 'other' is habitually grounded in personal

experiences, and supported by a pervasive rhetoric which a variety of functional and speech actors actively reproduce through public discourse (Van Dijk, 1992).

Legitimisation or de-legitimisation by fear of the 'other' is an emotive methodology, implying truth (Foucault, 2004) and linking to past behaviours and actions; and within the context of this dissertation linking to a faith-based mnemonic of existential threats which may have impacted on the construction of legislative intent (Hart & Sparrow, 2001; Hart, Jarvis, Jennings, & Smith-Howell, 2005). Legitimisation can also occur through a timeline linking past issues to current reality and predicting a future based on 'if we do x or don't do y' which require immediate state action. Contextually this may be in support of what Buzan et al. (1998) describe as exceptional circumstances or may also be part of normal political discourse. There are a wide variety of approaches to discourse analysis across the multiple disciplines, considering a range of views from general inference of meaning to a more explicit analysis of term usage from the view the sentence or the word (Austin, 1962; Bourdieu, 1977; Foucault, 1997b; Hansen, 2012; Milliken, 1999). Milliken (1999) argues that as a result of these multiple forms of analysis, "there is no common understanding ... in International Relations about the best way to study discourse" (p. 226). Fairclough's (1992, 2000) approach to discourse is more distanced than Foucault's, linking it more closely to performative conceptions that consider it as practice, and which support a complex array of discursive research considerations linking micro (written and verbal texts) and macro considerations (i.e. legislation, state process) in understanding, critiquing and ideally de-securitizing macro considerations (i.e. legislation, state process). This research will undertake analysis by considering specific pieces of legislation used to support securitization efforts and whether they enabled or constrained practice. This is not a linguistic analysis at the level of the word, except for consideration of 'we' and/or 'other.'

1.10.2.4   Genre

Genre refers to "orienting frameworks, interpretive procedures, and sets of expectations" (Bauman, 2004, p. 5). It represents a complex relationship between literary systems and categories of text applicable to social practices, which frame the discourse guiding how they may be interpreted (Goffman, 1974). Within the context of this dissertation narrative and augmentation are both present in the implicit and explicit

articulation of speech acts. Narrative genre includes media accounts or informal historic mnemonic discourse, including accounts that members of the Jewish community tell about recent and distant past atrocities. For Wodak (2002) the argumentation method considers through what "linguistic structures and rhetorical devices do these leaders try to justify, legitimize and naturalize the exclusion, discrimination or demonization of others" (pp. 40–41).[52] Government reporting and compensation assessments, both part of the operationalisation of government legislation, are also both genres, though less conceptualised (Van Dijk, 1992). Williams (2003, p. 512) argues the placement of securitization in a "political argument and discursive legitimisation" results in a practice that is both susceptible to criticism and able to be transformed as it emphasises the "role of political elites and key political institutions like parliaments and diplomacy".

Actively linked with this is the recognition that hegemony, power, identity and ideology, which are cornerstones of Fairclough's (1992) methodology, are seen in the case study and in the construction of threats using Critical Security History. Speech acts (discursive and/or practice) conform to a varied or hybridised genre, as opposed to a single iteration (Fairclough, 2003). Genres not only silence but censor (Cameron, 1998; Guillaume, 2018; Hansen, 2011), and are impacted upon by secure and undeniable constructions of ritual linked to socio-cultural institutions (government, religion, jurisprudence) which support the maintenance of ethnic and national hierarchies (Threadgold, 1993; Scheeres & Solomon, 2000).

1.10.2.5   Representation in Discourse

Through the lens of anthropological linguistics a process of 'recontextualisation' and 'interdiscursivity' (Blackedge, 2005; Fairclough, 2003; Womack, 2008, 2009) through an emotive narrative (Hardy et al., 2019; Medveschi, 2019) creates two opposing sides, supporting a Foucault model of 'division' and 'rejection' (Foucault, 1997a). In doing this Rojo (1995) suggests a dyad exits which invokes an included 'we' and an excluded 'other'. Rejection from the 'we' may enable a process of prejudice or discrimination (Uzarevic et al., 2020). The process of rejection enables a variety of covert and explicit practices. Legislation in the legitimisation of discourse impacts upon the securitization process, and the construction of 'we' and 'other'.

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[52] See also Chilton (2004) and Short & Magaña (2002).

Rhetoric as a component of the speech act (including text, speech and images) is a method used to engage and potentially activate the audience. A component of this includes the recitation of particular phrases, which is consistent with Wæver's (1995) position that "the utterance itself is the act" (p. 55, emphasis in original). Oren and Solomon (2015) note that the repetition of phrases such as "Iraq has weapons of mass destruction" provides the audience a frame through which to view the emotive threat narrative, linking them with the 'we' and isolating Iraq as the 'other'.

1.10.2.6   Intertexuality in Discourse

Hodges (cited in Tannen, Hamilton, & Schiffrin, 2015, p. 44) explains that discourse is located contextually within "a world filled with prior utterances" and as such it is impacted by a myriad of factors before the discourse is created. Bakhtin suggests that, for individuals and communities, language as a social phenomenon results in a requirement to "assimilate, rework, and re-accentuate" what has preceded us (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 89), and how that may impact on the future. As a persuasive speech act legislation may legitimise political goals (Cap, 2008) and within the context of this dissertation support securitization efforts or a process of 'othering'. Voloshinov (1973) in supporting this position notes: "The organizing center of any utterance, of any experience, is not within but outside – in the social milieu surrounding the individual being" (p. 93, emphasis in original).

Intertextuality is not limited to a particular text (termed horizontal intertextuality) (Fairclough, 1992), but builds upon prior utterances to reinforce or create a new discursive act, leveraging a chronological relationship between texts (Johnstone, 2008) across multiple settings. Within the context of this dissertation, it may be seen across sectors and across multiple renderings of securitized events. Migration, both legal and illegal, will be shown to impact multiple securitized events, both enabling and constraining the State of Israel, and the corpus will articulate how the state utilised legislation to respond to this issue. This process will also provide evidence in support of Oddo (2013), who posited that pre-contextualisation allows the anticipation and analysis of a forthcoming rhetorical event. The use of the built environment to construct Kibbutzim via the use of Homa Umigdal started a panopticon discourse that impacted both Jews and those in the surrounding areas. More controversially, in considering the flight of the Palestinians prior

to Plan Delat, they were advised to leave the area[53] but then legislation was used to ensure that their compliance with this advice resulted in their land and built environment becoming a possession of the state.

1.10.2.7   Textual Analysis

In considering legislation and the clarity that it provides in terms of the 'other' in the legislative discourse, this approach also allows the significant knowledge/power (Foucault, 2000) dynamic within Israel to be contextualised (Partington & Taylor, 2017). The impact on the passage of legislation enabling a process of illocutionary silencing also needed to be considered not only within the 'we' and 'other' discourse but also from the long-term perspective of the de-construction of securitization.

Legislation is an articulation of government intent, provides legitimisation internally in relation to actions, and is considered externally within the context of Montevideo as proof of government. The legalistic formats of legislation offer a particular reading position, and the discursive content of these formats broadly consists of codification and declaration. The legislative framework is positioned at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of knowledge within discourse. The articulation of its form and structure undergoes significant change over the dissertation period. It may be argued that this is consistent with the incremental learning of the state, and the rapidity with which legislation was initially required to address securitization issues. The nascent State of Israel made an informed choice upon its declaration of statehood in relation to the retention and integration of a number of pre-state legislative elements.[54] All the legislation within the corpus (see Table 1.2) identifies an explicit 'other' whilst the 'we' was not as clearly articulated in all texts. It may be implied based on the rhetoric, the framing of the other or the intent of the legislation. Only one component of the corpus identifies and names a possible Jewish 'other'.

In the following chapters, I will apply discourse analysis as defined above to eight pieces of legislation which are representative of the legislative instruments enacted by Israel between 1947 and 1967. Each of the eight pieces of legislation was discursively examined

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[53] Overtly through pamphlets and flyers, and more covertly by considering the previous actions of the nascent state in earlier clearing events which resulted in significant deaths and casualties.

[54] Ottoman (Otto) land laws and Ordinance's from Great Britain's administration of Mandatory Palestine

both individually and comparatively in order to identify the articulation of the 'other' by either explicit or implicit methods (Partington & Taylor, 2017; Van Dijk, 1995). This enables an assessment of the legislative instruments utilised to support the securitization efforts of the State of Israel to define and then embed a 'we' or 'other' discourse.

Furthermore, the formation of language moves across a spectrum from post-structuralism (performative) to a more constructivist position designed to constrain or enable practice. Contextually, Foucault (1997a, 2000)[55] would argue that this creates a nexus between knowledge and power which is intertwined, implicit and "mutually supportive" (Devetak, 2013, p. 188). This dissertation will follow the softer form of analysis, considering whether discursive action may enable or constrain practice specifically as it pertains to the legislative environment.

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[55] Foucault's work is highly contested (see Newton, Deetz, & Reed, 2011 and Al-Amoudi and Willmott, 2011). The dissonance primarily revolves around critical realists criticising Foucault over inadequacies in providing detailed explanations about 'structure and agency' in institutions or organisations whilst critics of critical realism argue his approach is flawed by not considering partiality and contingency within critical realism.

Table 1.2 Legislative Instruments

Year	Legislation	Linked Securitisation Sector	Defined or implied 'other'
1948	Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel	Political; Military; Societal;	"open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew." Implied anyone who is not a Jew
1945 (Great Britain) 1948 (Israeli continuance)	1945 Defence Emergency Powers Ordnance	Political; Military; Societal; Economic	Anyone deemed to act in a manner not conducive to good order and discipline.
1948	Abandoned Areas Ordinance	Military, Economic; Environmental	Any area or place conquered by or surrendered to armed forces or deserted by all or part of its inhabitants,
1949-1950	Absentee Property Law	Societal; Economic; Environmental	A national or citizen of the Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan, Iraq or the Yemen, (in those countries or Palestine) or Palestinian and left their ordinary place of residence in Palestine to leave Palestine or to support anti-Israel action (passive or active) A body of persons who owned property in Israel where the partners, shareholders, directors or managers meet the definition above, or the property is managed by them, or the capital is held by them.
1949	Defence Service Law	Military; Societal	A person whose ordinary place of residence is not within the territory in which the law of the State of Israel apply
1950	Law of Return	Societal	Any Jew who: − is engaged in an activity directed against the Jewish people; or − is likely to endanger public health or the security of the State.
1952	Nationality Law	Political; Societal; Military,	Any individual who cannot meet one of the following criteria: by return; by residence in Israel; by birth; by birth and residence in Israel; by naturalization or by grant.
1950	Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law (Punishment)	Political, Societal, Military, Economic	A person who has committed: − crime against the Jewish people; − an act constituting a crime against humanity; − an act constituting a war crime − an act if committed in Israel would be an offence against specified elements of the Israeli Criminal Code − was a member of the Nazi Party, or held any post or exercised any function in that party., received or demanded a benefit from a Jew by threatening them.

1.10.2.8   Practice

Buzan et al. (1998) are unequivocal in the articulation of a link between theory and practice. They state "the meaning of a concept lies in its usage and not something we can define analytically" (p. 24). Oren and Solomon (2015) clarify that tension exists "between securitization understood as a linguistic event and securitization qua social process" (p. 314). Conceptually, practice theory (Bourdieu, 1979, 1990; Foucault, 1997b, 2004; Giddens, 1977; Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki et al., 2001) draws upon different traditions and alternate evidentiary requirements. The question as to whether the act performs or enables action is contested, linking to debates within securitization literature around illocutionary versus performative images of the speech act discussed earlier. The distinction often made is between securitization and securitizing moves, and the broader question as to whether it is the speech act that does the work or the speech act plus audience acceptance plus emergency measures. Buzan and Wæver (2003) note that a securitizing process produces insecurities primarily by scattering the speech act through a variety of mediums which modify and test with actions, regulations, and so on. Pouliot and Cornut (2015) note this then creates a linkage between the alteration and reproduction, "rationality and know-how, and the technical vs. social dimensions of practices" (p. 297). Securitization becomes therefore not the disruption of a given order, but contextualises the speech act into "creating things, meanings, subjects in habitual, everyday innovation in meetings, discussions, regulations, programming, etc." (Huysmans, 2011, p.375).

This examination of the speech act does not resolve the question of what is invested in the notion of 'act'. Pouliot (2008) argues that "intersubjective representations of reality, morality, or individuality determine socially embedded cognition" (p. 257). It is argued by a growing number of theorists that securitization has moved beyond the Copenhagen School's focus on the 'act' of speaking security (Balzacq, 2011; Hansen, 2006, 2011, 2012; Leonard, & Ruzicka, 2016; Neumann, 2002). Pouliot (2008) contends practice is as a "result of inarticulate know-how that makes what is to be done self-evident or commonsensical" (p. 257). Securitization incorporates the act into the ideas of practice on a spectrum from Balzacq's (2005) pragmatist to Salter's (2008) dramaturgical. Huymans (2011) contends that "politically salient speech acts are heavily displaced by securitizing practices and devices that appear as banal" (p. 374). The methodology put

forward by Buzan et al. (1998, p. 28) requires the utterance of security and linkage of this to a threatened referent object. This process follows a post-structuralist position and is therefore performative, suggesting discourse as methodology requiring the speech act + a particular structure to occur. Wæver (1995, p. 57) goes further, suggesting threat articulation is limited to coming "only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites", without which success is not assured.

The capacity of an audience to either comprehend intent or have the means to put the understood intent into action requires the speech actors to speak predominantly to 'we' and 'other' everyone else. As noted earlier in this chapter, there is significant contention in relation to the requirement to speak and for the audience to accept. The highly securitized nature of the State of Israel, the continual leveraging of mnemonic threat, and the requirement for rapid action all speak to the argument against audience acceptance. One exception to this is discussed in Chapter 4, related to an incident where Ben-Gurion acknowledged that he would have to actively engage with the public. Huymans (2011, p. 374) illustrates that the outcome of the act "brings practice more explicitly into the picture." Schatzki (2001) in examining practice theory as the nexus of interrelated human customs notes it can be utilised to "study the nature and transformation of the subject matter" (p. 12). It is through this lens that this dissertation considers the use of legislation. Bigo (2002, p. 65) suggests securitization is constructed through institutional and related acts that embed securitization. Pouliot and Thérien (2018) assert that practice supports the creation of inclusionary and exclusionary results via informal modes of action. Austin (1962) in defining an executive speech act viewed it as "an assertion of influence or exercising of power" (p. 163). The enactment of legislation underlines the discursive character of modern power (Fairclough, 2001), identifying what is legally permissible as defined by those with the power to enforce action.

Key theorists, Pouliot (2008, 2016), Neumann (2002, 2007) and Hopf (2002, 2010), challenge the assumptions of both linguistic theory and IR theory, asserting that consideration of the world from a practice perspective allows consideration of the hidden world of knowledge impacted upon by habitual logic. Watson (2012) extends this further, arguing that the challenges to Buzan et al.'s (1998) work has resulted in a "move towards a more processual understanding of security … as well as [towards] non-linguistic approaches" (p. 19). Diplomacy, intelligence and threat assessments are all part of the

fundamental practice of states within the international political arena. Whilst they are generally undertaken from a basis of rationality and calculation, practitioners argue that it "remains a matter of human skills and judgments" (Watson, 1991, p. 52) which Fairclough (1992) attributes to the "discursive nature of social and political change" (pp. 55–6). Luntz (2007) posits that consistent messaging takes discipline but has high rewards. The Jewish narrative of existential threat and dispossession existed for centuries prior to the creation of the State of Israel. The narrative of long-term existential threat is used throughout the dissertation period, both internally and externally. The mnemonic impacts of this suggests a challenge to the requirement for audience acceptance and the ability to de-securitize an event. Pouliot (2008) argues background knowledge represents implicit words and thoughts which are rarely explicitly mentioned in speech acts although part of each and every practice. Water, for example, is an acknowledged requirement of human life. It is also a hidden component to the element of practice within Israel's securitization efforts, which will be discussed in forthcoming chapters.

The second half of this chapter has established the parameters for the remainder of the thesis, the longitudinal analysis of securitization acts by the State of Israel, and the use of legislation in support of those securitization issues. It provides background to alternative methods of analysis (discourse and practice), explains how data was selected and specifies the forms of qualitative analysis. Employing a mixture of post-structuralist, discourse and practice methods, this chapter sets out the tools proposed for a closer study of longitudinal securitization and how both discourse and language use the constructs of knowledge and power to define and then embed a 'we' and 'other' discursive narrative. In using both fine-grained technical tools and broader frameworks of interpretation, the proposed approach proceeds from the understanding that processes internal and external to the text will produce insight into patterns of use which would otherwise have been unavailable.

The format of each chapter is consistent in that it maps the actions of the state longitudinally through the lens of each sectoral element, considering the key threats to the state within that sector and what was undertaken to address them. As such, it considers the construction of securitization by the State of Israel and whether a particular discourse was utilised to securitize or de-securitize an issue. The Rubik's Cube® analogy

allows the multi-faceted nature of sectoral analysis to explain the impacts that choices in one sector have upon another.

1.11 Concluding Comments

This chapter has provided a theoretical and conceptual basis, establishing where this dissertation fits within IR and within the continuing debate in the field of security studies. Secondly, it has articulated key concepts in relation to power, sovereignty and security which are central to the dissertation. The articulation of security issues through both discourse and practice is based on what a particular community views as a threat, and what enables or constrains the responses of actors seeking to respond to those threats. Contextually, the performative function of security within the context of this dissertation will be considered through discourse and practice in and through a legislative lens. This not only provides a legitimising function but has the ability to enable or constrain practice, representing a lens through which to consider privilege and the ability to identify 'we' and 'other' within the state. Thirdly, it has defined the key elements of the Copenhagen School approach to sectoral analysis, the major challenges to the theory and methodology, and identified the role that identity (individual, community, and state) has in the construction of security issues. This provides the context through which this dissertation will consider whether Buzan et al.'s (1998) securitization theory and methodology can be used longitudinally to plot the securitization of the State of Israel between 1947 – 1967. On a secondary level what does a corpus of legislative language used to support securitization tell us about the construction of the speech act in defining and then embedding the Israel vs other[56] within the wider context of the 'we' and 'other' discourse.

The utilisation of Buzan et al.'s (1998) theory and methodology enables a more accurate portrayal and evaluation of existential threats, the relevant actors and the actions taken to address the threats. In acknowledging that threats are constructed and impacted by both memory and identity, the management of sectoral issues needs to be considered holistically. This 20-year period has been assessed by many others looking at individual components (e.g. military or political drivers), but never over this entire period and in this

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[56] Including Arab states or any other non-Jews

format. The use of legislative language to enable or constrain practice and to identify 'we' and 'other' over the time period similarly has not been used previously within this context.

The ideation of the Jewish people for a national home allowing for security and self-determination hinged on a number of factors. The following chapter will set the scene for the pre-state period, identifying major players and actions internally within Palestine, in the region, and on the wider global stage.

Chapter 2   The Nascent State

The Middle East, as we know it from today's headlines, emerged from decisions made by the Allies during and after the First World War ... they [the Allies] saw no need to follow the lines of existing political subdivisions of the empire, the vilayets[57], and felt free to remake the face of the Middle East as they saw fit.

David Fromkin (2009, p. 7)

The previous chapter outlined the key theoretical considerations and challenges in relation to the Copenhagen School's theory and methodology and has introduced the speech act within the context of both discursive and practice theories. This identified the grounding of the dissertation, established its place within the securitization narrative and outlined the method to be used going forward.

The dissertation seeks to apply Buzan et al.'s securitization theory and methodology longitudinally to the State of Israel over a 20 year period (1947-67). This longitudinal approach within the sectoral context articulated by Buzan et al. (1998), allows the articulation of individual threats, referent objects and function or speech actors. In doing so the construction of the speech act through legislation can be considered through both a discursive and practice lens to define and embed the discursive narrative surrounding Jews and 'others'. Securitization as outlined in the previous chapter, represents a practice enabling a particular course of action through the articulation of emergency measures which break the normal rules governing the relationship between groups.

This chapter provides a brief historiography of the State of Palestine in the context of the nascent State of Israel. There will be a general overview of the surrounding region from the perspective of its interaction with the dissertation's aims and explores key historic elements and identities on which the remaining analysis of the chapter will be based. This chapter will consider the nascent state from a sectoral standpoint, articulating threats and opportunities contextually predominantly from the Jewish perspective, but also

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[57] An administrative division of Turkey. (American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 2011).

considering the British and Arab positions. The State of Israel[58] presents a security challenge both to the states surrounding it as well as to itself. The threat, internally and externally, is both a physical and existential one which is linked conceptually by Jews to remembered and mnemonic threats. Buzan et al.'s (1998) theory allows for a more holistic assessment of threats, choices and underlying rationale for a call to action, which is incongruent with realist theory. Realism places primacy in the state, making it the only referent object; and in doing so it fails to consider the relationships between the individual, communities and groups. The mutuality of the relationship between the securitization of the individual and the creation and continuation of the state are key concepts, particularly in the context of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and will be explored there. As will be shown, the securitization of conflicting issues exposed to existential threats needs to be actively managed. Some sectors through this dissertation will show lower comparative securitization to others, however all have an impact on the creation and consolidation of the State of Israel. Contrary to the liberal ideal, the state, especially one located in the Middle East, has never been completely secular (Cesari 2014). Whilst Palestine and the State of Israel included a wide array of faiths, this dissertation will deal with the two major faith-based groups across the period of 1947–1967: Jews and Muslims.

Power, both hard and soft as discussed in Chapter 1, and its ability to provide security to either an individual or a state, is fundamental to security. Wolfers (1952) argues that objectively security assesses the "absence of threats to acquired values" whilst the subjective threat assessment considers "the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (p. 485). Security is concerned with an object that needs to be secured, whether that is the nation, the individual or culture. The case study will show how the active use of 'we' and 'other' drove behaviours. State, individual and communal rights (both ethical and epistemic) coupled with legality, custom and more recent endorsement of government and wider non-government entities such as the United Nations (UN) all played an intrinsic role.

Israel was unique in the modern Middle East in that it commenced statehood as a nationally determined democracy created by the UN. The nations surrounding it were either carved or created from the Ottoman Empire by European colonial powers and had

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[58] The author acknowledges Eretz Yisrael is the Jewish phrase for their homeland and Israel the name designated by the UN and ratified by the State in its Declaration of Independence. For ease of use this dissertation will utilise the term Israel to cover both, except where explicitly stated otherwise.

an aristocracy or government forced upon them. As a result there was little shared understanding of hegemonic norms, recognition of the 'other' was fraught, having an impact both in terms of its legitimacy internally and externally and on governance structures to support the respective nascent states (Figure 2.1[59]).

Figure 2.1   Division of British and French areas of interest (1916)

The Hashemite dynasty, whose functional hegemony was relatively new,[60] failed to acknowledge Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia's sovereignty and similar scenarios played out between Iraq, Kuwait, Syria and Lebanon. The epistemology of democracy in its widest possible determination and its translation into the Middle East is drawn from numerous sources. The Treaties of Westphalia have been argued to be the premise underlying what the Western world accepts as territorial sovereignty. They reinforced the connection between feudalism and militarism and would have been firmly aligned with the realist school.

2.1   Regional History

The Holy Land, as a component of the Middle East as we now know it, was a key cornerstone in policy discussions within Europe from the 12th to the 15th centuries for religious and cultural reasons. The crusades and the dominant position held by Sultan

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[59] 2014 https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/sites/default/files/images/2014/10/grossman-map.gif

[60] The Kingdom of Transjordan declared independence on 25 May 1946. (The History Files, n.d.)

Saladin[61] transformed the region into a strategic target for European powers. Later the tactical implications of this land, in terms of trade for access to Ottoman or Asian goods and military defence in terms of protecting the caliphate, would become more evident. It would be centuries before the true economic impact of oil and other natural resources in the region would be felt.

2.1.1   Ottoman Empire

The 1800s were a key period of change in the region politically, culturally, socially and economically. Krämer (2011) estimates the population of Palestine by 1880 was 340,000. While the Ottoman regime retained power it used this to protect its population from the world, particularly the manoeuvrings of the Western (predominantly Christian) nations seeking to expand their influence beyond their borders. The impact of the embryonic modern concept of international law, however, contributed to the undermining of the Ottoman Empire's ability to effectively safeguard its populace from the wider international community.[62] Agnell (1901, p. 257) declares the Capitulation system was a treaty arrangement that enabled one state to permit "another to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over its own nationals within the former state's boundaries". One of the early contractual arrangements related to the application of justice to foreign merchants, in which the Ottoman Empire ceded this power to European nations.[63] The great powers of Europe established a consular presence in the region to protect their nationals, who increasingly included missionaries and church leaders. A variety of faiths, including Greek and Latin Orthodox and the Anglican Church, were formally recognised in Jerusalem from 1845–47. The 1888 Convention of Constantinople respecting free navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal affirmed the Suez Canal as a neutral zone operating under British protection for a period of 100 years. Ratification by the Ottoman Empire permitted international shipping passage through the Suez Canal from 1904, during both war and

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[61] A significant 11th century ruler over the areas of Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine, who was the founder of the Ayyūbid dynasty and victor against European powers in the crusades.

[62] International law was conceived in strictly consensual terms during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Countries were only bound to rules that they explicitly agreed to, either through treaty or mode of behaviour that gave rise to 'customary international law'.

[63] The challenge was, however, that increasing trade with Europe caused pressure on primary local producers, who had not been the recipients of significant investment in either infrastructure or production methods. Their ability to compete with wider Asia or Europe and therefore bring money into the empire was reduced, perpetuating a circular argument about funding to which the Ottoman Empire was fiscally not in a position to respond. Agreements of trade and the capitulations hastened an economic collapse that had its genesis centuries or decades before.

peace. Its impact was felt in a variety of ways both positively (through increase of trade) and negatively (chiefly arising from the exemption from Ottoman law whereby there were essentially different sets of rules dependent upon nationality).

Regionally it became impossible to ignore the way external forces, in particular Great Britain, France, and Russia, were impacting on the Ottoman Empire, particularly in relation to access to and control of land and resources. Added to this environment in the early 1900s were the first accepted claims by a Great Power for a Jewish homeland through the Balfour Declaration.

2.2   Security Sectors, Key Personnel and the Embryonic State of Israel

Securitization, according to Buzan et al. (1998) as discussed in Chapter 1, is present when an issue occurs which threatens existence and requires emergency action to ensure its survival. These actions Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 23–24) argue, occur "outside the normal bounds governed by defined political procedure." Nations have differing methodologies to assess what is a threat to their existence, including threats that fall outside the normal military parameters. The widening of the security parameters by the application of Buzan et al.'s theory allows for a more complete understanding of state motivations and the success or failure of the securitizing alternative used in obtaining the objective. By understanding what drives a state to choose certain actions, and the opportunities or limits that this then places upon the sub-units it employs, we can see how securitization radiates across sectors.

The State of Israel was formally declared at 4pm on 14 May 1948 in a speech act by David Ben-Gurion and was preceded by years of negotiation and conflicting agendas, which had a profound effect on its development. Religion and land were key components of Israel's identity. The theoretical argument, as articulated by Buzan et al. (1998), devolves into five key sectors – military, political, societal, economic and environmental. This argument seeks to move the premise of securitization beyond a military or paramilitary perspective. Buzan et al. (1998) argue that securitization operates on a global, international subsystem, unit, sub-unit and individual level. As such they portray security as an extension of politics, adaptable to additional areas with clear definitions in relation to whom, to what and when a securitization act can occur. Very few of the issues addressed in this dissertation fall cleanly into one discrete area. In this and future

chapters issues will be articulated in the area of best fit, and the subsequent considerations addressed as they eventuate across the period under discussion.

Threats are drivers of both politics and policies, internally and externally. Both international relations and security theorists in seeking to develop predictive behavioural models have studied threats. Walt (1987) argued that inter-Arab politics was not troubled by identity and religious politics but that it was like any other inter-state politics because the underlying power-based systems extended across the region. However, Arabs within the Ottoman Empire were highly aware of the importance and value of identity. Linking to the Eastern concept of sovereignty discussed in Chapter 1, in the fourteenth-century Abd al-Raman Ibn Khaldun an Arab philosopher, advanced the concept of 'Asabiyya', articulated by Rosenthal (1958) as interpreting Arab culture as a group whose identity is contingent upon real or imagined blood or ancient ties, supported by a common ancestry that may also be actual or perceived. The historic linkage between Islam and politics in the Middle East has been a key component of empire building since the Middle Ages. Saudi Professor Ahmad Muhammad Jamal asserts in Tibi (1990, p. 6) that "Arab familiarity with 'Asabiyya', was an authentic pattern of nationalism long before the historical phenomenon related to this ideology took place in Europe or the Americas." This concept has also been stressed by a number of Jewish historians including Smith (as cited in Katz, 1983) who refers to the virtual overlay between ethnie (ethnic nationalism) and religion within Judaism. The common ground between religion and ethnie is not new but it was highly developed within what was the Ottoman Empire.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the threat to the referent object can be real or perceived. Security paradigms of the 1940s largely limited security to the state/nation and military security. The Copenhagen Schools' constructivist theory and methodology (1998) broadens and widens these parameters. As such it allows those seeking statehood to address more accurately the potential threats, thereby reducing the levels of instability to the state.

2.3 Pre-State Political Securitization

Political securitization hinges on the threats to the sovereignty of the state. Within this chapter this will be discussed in terms of the pre-state manoeuvrings and the creation of

Figure 2.2 **Arab towns and Jewish settlements 1881–1914.**

the Jewish state. The referent object here is the state and territory granted to or acquired by the Jewish population in Palestine (Figure 2.2[64]). As noted, these threats can be both external and internal, and the period under discussion provides ample evidence of both. The political securitization and its evolution were crucial not only to the State of Israel's initial creation but also to its survival up to the present day. As discussed, other sectors within the security arena are frequently harnessed to achieve a political security goal.

Theodore Herzel called the first major gathering of influential Jewish leaders regarding a Jewish state in Basel, Switzerland on 29 August 1897 ("Zionist Congress: First Zionist Congress", n.d.). The gathering was referred to as the first Zionist Congress. The major outcomes were an agreement to formally investigate options for settlement, and the creation of the Zionist Organisation (ZO). Within Israel, Zionism is understood to be the national liberation of the Jews and was used to describe or be representative of an ethnic group, not as a religious one. Zionism was conceived in the late 19th century as an entirely secular project, focused on a pragmatic goal: the establishment of a safe haven for persecuted Jews. The immigration of Jews from the diaspora to Israel was and remains one of the most basic tenets of Zionist ideology. In 1908 the ZO founded an office in Palestine to support the purchasing of land, for initially agricultural settlement but moving toward more urban requirements. Land purchases by Jews occurred rapidly

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[64] From "Palestine," by Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), n.d. http://www.passia.org/media/filer_public/05/41/05410953-b034-4c36-96b2-3cc4bf4c8e6e/pdfresizercom-pdf-crop_2-page-001.jpg

between 1900 and 1920, from "approximately 218,000 dunum (about 218 km2) to approximately 557,000 dunum (about 557 km2)" as articulated in the 1945–46 Survey of Palestine (Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1946, p. 244). Whilst the state was conceived for the Jewish people, the potential "danger of the idea of the religious state to both religion and the state" (Boubekeur & Roy, 2012, p. 5, emphasis added) was recognized and structures created to respond to this.

In the 1880s the Hebrew term Yishuv[65] was coined to denote Jews living in pre-state Palestine. The Yishuv sought to represent a republican community, following the principles of democracy-seeking and prioritising the Jewish people and their longstanding relationship with Eretz Yisrael. The funds for land purchase were provided by the group both in Palestine and the diaspora. With agricultural settlement driving the Yishuv, an element evident early in the development of the fledgling state was the kibbutz,[66] first implemented in 1909 and named Degania Alef. To be deemed a success the nascent state was required to be constituted as a Jewish ethno-republican community. The position of the settlers was articulated by Rayman (1981) thus: "the question was not whether group settlement was preferable to individual settlement; it was rather one of either group settlement or no settlement at all" (p. 12). This collective approach was based on both economic and physical security whilst balancing individual rights within the collective.

Land was used as a bargaining tool by Great Britain to consolidate alliances prior to WWI. To ensure Arab support in the war, in 1915 the British promised a majority of Arab provinces within the Turkish Empire independence including Palestine, to the Sharif of Mecca upon an Allied victory, as discussed in the Palestine Royal Commission Report (Peel, 1937).[67] This was the same area of land that would ultimately be allocated to the Jewish people as their homeland. Ikenberry (2004, p. 166) and Samimian-Darash and Stalcup (2016) argue that "borders are a human institution" through which security and

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[65]Yishuv refers to Jews residing in "Ottoman Syria until 1917, OETA South 1917–1920 and later Mandatory Palestine 1920–1948) prior to the establishment of the State of Israel" (American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 2011).

[66] This term refers to the Hebrew word for 'communal settlement.' "It is a unique rural community; a society dedicated to mutual aid and social justice; a socioeconomic system based on the principle of joint ownership of property, equality and cooperation of production, consumption and education; the fulfilment of the idea 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs'; a home for those who have chosen it" (The Kibbutz and Moshav History and overview, n.d.).

[67] For discussions surrounding Palestinian citzenship under the British mandatory period see Banko, L. (2012).

insecurity is understood, created and evidenced. Simmons (2005) further expands on this explaining that borders assist in the understanding the territorial jurisdiction of the state. In 1917 Chaim Weizmann, the primary securitizing actor in the UK and head of the worldwide Zionist movement (A Brief History: The World Zionist Organisation, n.d.), persuaded the British government to put forth a statement in favour of a Jewish homeland. This led to the Balfour Declaration on 2 November 1917, which could be viewed as the start of one of the largest and longest security dilemmas for the region. It was, however, hailed by Zionists as the inception of the contemporary state of Israel. As discussed in the previous chapter, a defined territory was a pre-condition for statehood. Irrespective of either the Arab or Jewish perspective, Great Britain was promising the same land to both sides, thus setting the scene for possible conflict. The conflicting claims to land are addressed in the British White Papers of 1922, 1930, 1937 and 1939 (Churchill, 1922; Hope Simpson, 1930; Peel, 1937; MacDonald, 1939) written in response to the escalating issues in Mandatory Palestine in relation to land and immigration.

With the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the cessation of WWI the victors divided the lands and territories the empire once held. Great Britain and France were the primary recipients. Great Britain took Palestine as a part of 'the spoils of war'[68]. It appointed a Civil Administration in 1920 to deal with the mandate area. The Peel and Hope Simpson reports (Hope Simpson, 1930; Peel, 1937) identified two main areas of focus. The first was delivery of public services, which primarily impacted the Arab population. The second was the establishment of an Arab and Jewish national home. At this time Jews controlled between 2 per cent and 2.8 per cent of the total land area of Palestine. This amounted to 741,833 dunam[69] (about 741.8 km2). The political climate of Europe in the 1930s saw an immediate increase in immigration by Jews to British-controlled Palestine. Tensions between Arab Palestinians and Jewish Palestinians as a result of migration continued to rise. Arab Palestinians instigated a six-month general strike and between 1936 and 1939 there was a string of riots by Palestinian Arabs seeking an end to the mandate and the cessation of Jewish migration. The British government in 1937 proposed partitioning Palestine, allocating the Jews an area along the coast. The 1939

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[68] See also Mulder (2020).

[69] Dunam was an Ottoman Empire measurement of land representing the daily amount of land which could be ploughed. Whilst it was legal defined to be "forty standard paces in length and breadth", its actual area varied across the Empire, from 900–2500 m²: in Iraq, to 919.3 m² in Palestine. (Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 1994. p. 351).

White Paper (MacDonald, 1939) also limited immigration to 75,000 people for a five-year period and then nothing further without the approval of the Arab majority within Palestine. More significantly, it undertook to provide for an independent Jewish state by 1949. The reality of exponentially increasing population as a result of cessation of hostilities in Europe and elsewhere came at a time of disputes within the British Mandate territory as to the level of sanctioned immigration. The land allocated to the Jews under the mandate did not align with long-term national goals of the nascent State of Israel. Simultaneously, tensions between rival countries (e.g. Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan) combined with land divisions at the end of WWI resulting from the final collapse of Ottoman Empire in the Middle East saw a number of interested parties, including Hussein bin Ali (Sharif of Mecca) and Ibn Saud, seeking leadership and/or power within the Arab world. In that environment Beilin (1998) asserts, Arab opposition to proposed Israeli settlement became a central platform.

The Balfour Declaration viewed broadly as a speech act promised, as Brogan, (1998, p. 306) posits, "a national home in Palestine" the borders of which were not initially defined. In 1929 the Jewish Agency was founded, acting as a shadow government to the British administration.[70] David Ben-Gurion, who went on to become the first Prime Minister of Israel (discussed further in Chapter 3), was elected as its head in 1939. The creation of distinct and corresponding political organisations and leadership in expectation of the transfer of power actively provided knowledge, quasi-legitimacy and governance structures which supported the survival of the state. As such this could be argued to be the formal commencement of legitimacy within the context of the Montevideo Convention (1933, Article 1). Whilst not having formal legitimacy, the actions of key functional actors were acknowledged by those whom they were dealing with as being on behalf of the nascent state. Horowitz and Lissak (1978) note this was voluntary, and supported by a moderately organised diaspora. This use of the diaspora on an international scale would be a key factor which the state would turn to continually through its initial development and beyond.

The organisation of action by Jews across the nascent state's embryonic governing bodies, organisations and individuals played a central part in the strengthening securitization of the emerging state. The British government, concerned about the

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[70] This was in adherence to Article 4 of the Mandate for Palestine (The Palestine Order in Council, 1922).

escalating tensions, commissioned Lord Peel in 1936 to report on the issue. The Peel Commission published its recommendations a year later. The key components of the report were the removal of the mandate, the partitioning of Palestine, and a two state strategy. The Palestine Royal Commission Report (Peel, 1937a) provided a number of recommendations in relation to land, and particularly concerning the population. It recommended that "the Jewish state include the coastal plain, the valleys and Galilee, while the Arab state include Transjordan and parts of Palestine in the Judean Hills, Samaria, the south and the Negev"(pp. 383-384). The pre-planning by the Yishuv in the early 1920s in relation to the position of the kibbutzim had been successful. Understanding that partition would not create an unqualified separation between Arabs and Jews, the Palestine Royal Commission Report noted the possibility of "a transfer of population and lands, to take place, if necessary, by force" (p. 391), as had occurred between Greece and Turkey in 1923. The Commission's concern as to the hostilities between the groups is particularly evident, noting that a minority portion of cultural subgroups would remain in each state, the report stipulated that both states were required to ensure their protection.

Within Jewish society the needs of the community and the individual in terms of laying down a foundation for the state and the means to protect that foundation were key identifiers of success. Merton (1938) posited that deviance was dependent upon how a society identified success. Linking to this, Hagan and McCarthy (1997) argue criminality becomes appealing when these goals cannot be achieved legitimately. As immigration was limited by Great Britain, and in the face of growing threats to European Jewry, criminality (smuggling) was the most expedient option available to ensure the nascent state's survival. Powell (1966, p. 2) claims that "if crime is seen as a function of anomie, organised behaviour produces stability, increases protection or security" and this is contingent upon either the approach adopted or market forces. Baumer and Gustafson (2007) suggest that when the legitimate avenues to attain societal goals are removed, preventing an individual or group (due to their position in society) from acquiring them, the individual or group will seek alternative methods. The Jews in both Palestine and the diaspora recognised this and acted accordingly.

Sovereign states will use a variety of strategies to address the threats before them, and depending upon the threat, those options may be legal or illegal. Smith (1974) argues that

organised crime can be characterized as 'business as usual' within the realm of proscribed markets. Smith maintains organised crime and entrepreneurship are based on the same central assumptions that govern the marketplace. The British government mandate in Palestine prevented increases in population and the acquisition of land, however the success parameters used by the Yishuv were dependent upon both. In the case of Israel, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the State of Israel retrospectively legalised those actions undertaken in the pre-state years which could have been deemed illegal.

The Zionist land purchases continued, although at a reduced rate as a result of British legislation and Arab hostility. Despite verbal protests, there was little direct opposition to the waves of migration in the early 1930s after Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. In 1935, 62,000 Jews entered Palestine, the largest number since 1920. As a result, by 1936 Jews represented over one third of the population of Palestine, approximately 40 per cent having taken up residence within the country within the previous five years (Forum on Religion and Ecology, n.d.). Arab and Jewish Palestinian groups were disgruntled with the outcomes of the Peel Report for various reasons. In seeking to address the issues raised, the British government commissioned the 1939 MacDonald White Paper (CMD 6019) seeking to ascertain a policy position in relation to Palestine. The paper acted as a governance document from that period until the withdrawal by Great Britain in 1948. The report highlighted the increasing sale of land by Palestinian Arabs to Jews[71] in contrast to the Peel Report recommendations. The actions in relation to people and commodity smuggling and the acquisition of land from Arab purchasers were, therefore, technically in contravention of the ordinances of British Mandated Palestine. The purchase of land by the Jewish National Fund (JNF) or by individuals from Arabs occurred often, in spite of both British Mandate policy and Arab religious and cultural stipulations. Ianni (1972) in suggesting a theory of ethnic succession, argued that impediments to their progression within the new community including diminished economic prospects, discrimination and lack of agency are common. He believed with

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[71] "The Reports of several expert Commissions have indicated that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land" MacDonald White Paper (1939 p.11).

every successive wave of migrants (Aliyah in the Jewish context) the nature of organised crime altered as a reflection of the group's approach.

Political security, however, was where the Yishuv and the diaspora were most effective, both internally and externally. A number of Jewish political parties and Zionist youth movements existed prior to the official founding of the state. The Workers Party of the Land of Israel (MAPAI) represented the largest political constituency, establishing political, health, welfare and economic organisations prior to the formal articulation of statehood. Horowitz and Lissak (1973), in discussing the depth of MAPAI's involvement, asserted it supervised the running of the Palestinian Jewish community (including banking and welfare services), and either appointed, or influenced through alliances the appointment of, those placed in positions of power. Most of the Jewish political, socio-cultural and economic hierarchy were allied to this party.

In relation to political security, the scenario prior to 1947 was fraught with challenges. The Zionists knew the implementation of Western democratic principles, including an elected government, upon declaration of statehood would allow the inclusion of a significant Arab representation, as Arabs represented almost 50 per cent of the population. This would impact on the real and perceived nature of the Jewishness of the state. Existential threats as defined by Hirschberger et al. (2016) also include "when its [a community's] culture symbols and beliefs are threatened to the point that the group may transform" (p. 3). The Protocols for the Jewish Agency Executive (Central Zionist Agency, 1938) note Ben-Gurion's (1938) belief that the state would require a strong defence, which resulted in him placing limitations on civil liberties including the "universal right of all adult citizens without distinction of religion, races or class to elect parliamentary representation and a government accountable to the elected representatives" (p. 33). Until peace was declared government functions would be undertaken by representatives of the Jewish Agency.

As discussed in Chapter 1 symbolic power is facilitated through language which obfuscates reality. This statement effectively meant that Zionists would themselves define what constituted peace and therefore when to allow minorities within the state's borders any rights. Sharret, the de facto foreign minister of the nascent state, whilst agreeing with the concept opted for less obvious tactics and phraseology when dealing with the international community. Conscious that failure to provide basic rights to its

minorities would leave Israel open to claims of hypocrisy, he suggested a 'provisional government' during the transition period. That government, as suggested by Ben-Gurion, would also have the added responsibility of increasing immigration, thereby mitigating the perceived or actual threat of the number of Arabs within the borders of the state diluting the 'Jewishness' of the enterprise. The outcomes of this will be discussed in the following chapter.

The political climate in both the nascent state and during its formative years meant that the political security issues impacted on almost all components of the state, including in areas such as education, architecture and art. Rotbard (as cited in Segal & Weizman, 2002, p. 40) argues "in Israel, architecture, just like war, is a continuation of politics by other means" and the built environment would feature heavily, not only in the structure of housing, but in the strength/vulnerability mindset of the populace as outlined across this dissertation. In considering whether securitization is performed through or evidenced by practice the use of the built environment[72] in this manner could be argued to support this contention. Whilst initially it may have been utilised as exceptional practice, its use became habitual. This process arguably commences embedding a construction of security into the psyche of the populace which would pose significant challenges to deconstruct. The physical construction of the state was clearly defined politically in terms of the need for and access to land and other resources. In the pre-state period this was a crucial aspect of both land acquisition and management.

Securitization could be viewed as both an escalation of the political agenda as well as opposition to it. On a domestic level, the politicisation of an idea makes it more prone to haggling, discussion and debate. In the case of the nascent State of Israel, land and migration were key early examples of this. On an international level, however, the securitization shown by Israel in relation to the Holocaust and Israel's provision of a 'safe' homeland, were presented as urgent and existential. Clark (2007) notes that the international society does not operate as a discrete political system and relies "upon the legitimacy practices of international society." (p. 194) Bull (1962) argues this system is built from common interests which then leverage rules of behaviour between participants. The shaping of this discourse will be examined in Chapter 3. This will be

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[72] For information on the use of legal means to mould human geography see Blomeley et al (2001) Harrison and Holder (2003)

discussed in forthcoming chapters as a component of societal securitization, but Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 also show the interconnectedness of this element through its clear impact in the economic securitization sector.

2.4   Pre-State Environmental Securitization

The Balfour Declaration elicited an immediate response from the emergent nation in relation to its economic and environmental future. In a clear speech act by a securitizing actor, Weizmann wrote to then British Prime Minister David Lloyd George arguing that:

> The whole economic future of Palestine is dependent upon its water supply for irrigation and for electric power, and the water supply must mainly be derived from the slopes of Mount Hermon, from the headwaters of the Jordan and from the Litani river … [We] consider it essential that the northern frontier of Palestine should include the valley of the Litani, for a distance of about 25 miles above the bend, and the western and southern slopes of Mount Hermon. *(Water Resources of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 1992, Part V, paragraph 5)*

This early acceptance of the need to secure resources (especially water) necessary to its long-term security, and attempts to do so, were essential to the survival of the state. The nature of this speech act also clearly shows that military securitization was not the first articulated existential threat. As such, whilst military securitization is the most obvious in its usage, it is not necessarily the primary determining factor; indeed the attainment of the above resources caused additional challenges to military security. Chapter 3 will show how the requirement to achieve environmental security would diminish the optimal military security environment and highlight the interaction between individual sectoral securitization.

The proponents of the new state understood inherently that the ability to provide for the welfare of the citizens of the state was part of the social contract of a democracy. The government had to have, and be seen to have, the ability to care for not only its current citizens, but those that they hoped would join the state after its formal creation. Erosion of water security internally and within the region represents an irreversible shortage. Groundwater is a finite resource. Failure to attain access to it prior to statehood would result in either out-migration or unsupportable long-term costs to supply it. The flow-on effect of an inability to provide this basic requirement of human life would mean that the

state had failed in its most critical component. This would then leave both the current and hoped-for future citizens in serious doubt about the ability of the state to protect them. While desalination would become a viable option for the acquisition of water, this occurs outside the period of the dissertation focus.

The operational components of Jewish statehood, including political, economic and administrative infrastructure, already informally existed as a result of the Yishuv (Amos, 1971). The procurement of land ensured settlement along the coast, enclaves within established cities and the creation of the new city of Tel Aviv. By the late 1930s kibbutzim assumed a more political, economic and military strategic position and their locations were predicated on maximum defence and agricultural advantage. After the intent to partition became evident, kibbutzim were established in outlying areas, including 11 in the Negev, staking a claim for inclusion into the State of Israel. The Negev kibbutzim required supplies transported to them on a regular basis to ensure a claim for continued and active habitation of the land could be maintained (Segev, 1998). Societal, military and political securitization was deemed more important than the economic impact of this action.

Environmental security aspects were also raised in the Palestine Royal Commission Report (Peel, 1937a), where Peel argued that "legislation vesting surface water in the High Commissioner is essential" (p. 252). Environmental securitization theory, as discussed in Chapter 1, shows a range of arguments when dealing with scarcity. Ullman's (1983) argument that "at the root of most of the violent conflicts in history has been competition for territory and resources" (p. 139) was clearly accepted by the nascent state. Given the land identified, both through the Balfour Declaration and UN Resolution 181 (II), there was a strong belief that clashes over resources (including water) were expected to escalate as demand for commodities increased and/or because there was a finite supply of a scarce resource. Gleick and Heberger (2013) have identified that intrastate conflicts utilise water resources as a tool of warfare more frequently than interstate conflict. Behind Israel's expanding demands lay the continuing rapid growth from the waves of current and expected migration, which the Jewish political elite believed provided a justification of the state's actions across the period of this dissertation.

Water remains a primary consideration within the region. In excess of 90 per cent of water for the River Jordan system originates from Mount Hermon. The River Jordan therefore was shared by four countries: Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Palestine

Figure 2.3   Shared waters of Israel, Palestine and Jordan.

(Figure 2.3[73]). The Anglo-French agreement in 1923 drew up the Syrian–Palestinian border, placing the River Jordan and Lake Tiberias in Palestine, however two of the three feeder tributaries[74] originated from then French-held Lebanon and Syria. Bialer (1999) notes that the first hydro-electric plant was also located here, at the intersection of the Yarmuk and the River Jordan.

Contested riparian rights to water in or around Palestine are not new. The Coastal Aquifer and the western sub-unit of the Mountain Aquifer are shared between Israel and Gaza. The eastern sub-unit of the Mountain Aquifer contributes to the River Jordan.

From the 1930s through to the 1950s regional analysis, according to Frederiksen (2003), showed that without regional population control there would be significant water shortages. In 1944, Lowdermilk proposed the idea of a National Water Carrier, allowing for the movement of water from Lake Tiberias to support the southern Negev region (Amos, 1971). The pre-state leadership commissioned James Hays to devise a plan utilising the Jordan, Litani, and Yarmouk Rivers to support a future Negev population. It is of note that the nascent State of Israel did not at the time have riparian rights to all of these water sources. This will be explored through the remainder of the dissertation. Water rights are connected to land ownership and impact a nation's viability, with flow-on effects to societal and economic securitization.

Buzan et al. (1998), as mentioned in the previous chapter, note that disruption of ecosystems and the food problems that result from the loss of fertile soil would be deemed

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[73] From "Why Cooperate Over Water? Shared Waters of Palestine, Israel and Jordan: Cross-border crises and the need for trans-national solutions," by Friends of the Earth Middle Ease (FoEME), 2010, p. 2. http://foeme.org/uploads/12893974031~%5E$%5E~Why_Cooperate_Over_Water.pdf

[74] The Hatzbani and the Banias.

as a threat within the environmental sector. The use of arable land for the support of the community was also an environmental threat consideration (O'Balance, 1972). The JNF articulated four environmental concerns as part of its key tasks: forestry, ecology, water and recreation. Reclamation of land through afforestation was a prime example of this; by 1935, over 1.7 million trees had been planted across 7.08 km², whilst simultaneously draining swamps, creating and implementing irrigation infrastructure to ensure the longevity of the soil and ultimately use by the state (Fromkin, 2009). Given the land acquired in the pre-state period, this was a precursor of significant future development and an active response to the disruption of ecosystems and to deforestation.

Environmental factors, including the need for oil and water as well as the development and use of uranium, have been downplayed in the current environmental debate. Bialer (1999, p. 1) posits that "oil was as vital to Israel as were sources of finance, immigration and arms." In effect, the access to water and oil became a weapon. To be able to utilise these resources the state had to control not only the land the resource was located on, but also to ensure that the pipeline to deliver the goods was secure from those who would seek to interdict its use.

2.5   Pre-State Military Securitization

The position of the state in the field of military security will always be a priority. A state will always attempt to maintain the security of the elements that define it: its citizens, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. Within the military schema, the role of the infantry has always been to seize and hold ground. Land in both a physical and environmental sense is a key component in the role of the military. It provides a military commander with both offensive and defensive options in tactical scenarios, and also shows threats to the retention of objectives. Regardless of which service obtains the objective, the ability to have personnel in a protective position on the ground ultimately determines control.

Military securitization additionally relies on larger states[75] and the power potential of the individual state and its relationship to both regional powers and superpowers. This will be discussed through Israel's most important military–strategic relationships with the United States of America (US), France and to a lesser extent Great Britain and Germany

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[75] Unless the state was one of the two superpowers of the era.

across the case study period (Caplan, 2020). These will be explored in the following chapters, including the changing alliances and sharing of resources, both in terms of military knowledge and hardware, but also in the context of Israel's nuclear ambitions. These relationships were and are used not only in force projection but also in access to weapons and technology.

Goldstein (2003, p. 204) argues that "the development and deployment of military capabilities ... continues to hold a central position in the field." Other theorists, such as Smith (2005), in arguing for the widening of the security paradigm hold concerns that Goldstein and others following realist theory have "a very limited range of responses to contemporary threats precisely because it defines security so narrowly" (p. 43). The realist theorists in conceptualising security remain focused on the state as the main actor or referent object, with military security dominant. When seeking to provide an impetus for a national response, a threat, particularly a military one, is extremely effective. Ullman (1983) argues that:

> the 'public good' is much more easily defined; sacrifice can not only be asked but expected; particular interests are more easily co-opted or, failing that, over-ridden; it is easier to demonstrate that 'business as usual' must give way to extraordinary measures; dissent is more readily swept aside in the name of forging a national consensus. *(Ullman, 1983, p. 135)*

The consequences of military threats are generally readily apparent and, if implemented, the result is swift. They are therefore relatively non-controversial.

2.5.1 Protection of the Nascent State

Hashomer was created in 1909 as a defence force to protect the Jewish settlements. It ceased operation in 1920 when the Haganah was founded. Haganah differed from its predecessor in that while it retained a role in protecting farms and kibbutzim, it also expanded to include warning Jewish settlers about the potential for attacks (Miller, 2009). As such, it was the unofficial start of military strategic intelligence gathering by the Jewish population about the potential quasi-military responses by Arabs. Haganah, aligned politically to the Histadrut labour federation,[76] operated in a semi-clandestine

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[76] Founded in 1920 and continuing to the present day the Histadrut labour federation is a trade union representing all Jewish workers initially in Palestine but now the State of Israel. By 1927 it represented 75 per cent of the Jewish workers and would play a significant role in the economic survival of the state. (Histadrut Labour Federation, n.d.)

way across the country (Schindler, 2008). It exploited the rifts between the Arab populations as a result of land sales. As Black and Morris (1991) contend, payments for information were "rarely money … almost all of them were persecuted by their brothers because of ties of commerce or land dealings with Jews" (p. 8). Haganah formally created the first Jewish intelligence community in Palestine in 1930, as a response to the 1929 riots in Jerusalem and Jaffa over access to the Wailing Wall. Around the same time, a small number of its members splintered off to create Igrun, another paramilitary organisation, arguing for more extreme responses to Arab threats (Pasachoff & Littleman, 2005). The nature of its actions saw Igrun being called a terrorist organisation by Jews, the UN, Great Britain and the US.

Between 1936 and 1939 there was an escalation in the violence in Palestine. Structured and sustained politico-military violence across this period was impacted by, the availability of resources (military and economic) and the support offered by functional actors who had the ability to galvanise the populace (Hinnebusch, 2015). Supporting Buzan et al.'s (1998) argument in relation to the importance of functional acts, Jackson and Dexter state that human agency is required to "to trigger or unlock their violence-generating potential" (2014, p. 2). The long prehistory of the state (including the more recent Holocaust) had shown the Jewish people that they could not depend upon others to ensure their safety. Palestinian Arabs, supported by surrounding states and the Palestinian Arab political elite, commenced structured paramilitary action against both Jews and British forces. The uprising produced both positive and negative side effects for all three combatants. Great Britain's forces were unable to completely contain the action, and as a method of appeasement placed severe restrictions on the migration of Jews into Palestine, as previously noted (Ben-Ami, 2005). These restrictions were articulated in the 1939 MacDonald White Paper[77] and resulted in the paramilitary elements within the Yishuv (Haganah, the right-wing Igrun and Lehi[78]) being further reinforced. Mohammad Amin al-Husayni, leader of the Arab Higher Committee, and a majority of the Palestinian Arab political elite chose voluntary exile (Azoulay & Ophir, 2013). In addition uprisings signalled the commencement of Zionist irregular military

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[77] It was approved by the House of Commons on 23 May 1939 and accepted the next day by the House of Lords. It was not approved by either the League of Nations, or by the Jews or Arabs within Palestine.

[78] Lehi was created in August 1940 as an offshoot of Igrun. It was commonly referred to as the Stern Gang, after its founder Avraham Stern.

actions against the British. Between 1945 and June 1947, as Khalidi (1988) reports, 103 members of British law enforcement died and 391 sustained wounds from Jewish militants. On 22 July 1946 one of the most lethal of Igrun's operations occurred with the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing over 90 people. The ultimate outcome would be condemnation from all sides including the ZO (Schindler, 2008). The UN Commission's first monthly report into Palestine in January 1948 includes the comment "elements on each side [Arab and Jew] are thus engaged in attacking or in taking reprisals indistinguishable from attacks" (Point 7, c.) with the British mandatory forces trying to simultaneously protect themselves and maintain the peace.

As demonstrated in Figure 2.4[79] and Figure 2.5[80] below, the tactical challenges for a military defensive position in the new state were manifold. The opportunities for blockades, encirclement, sieges and penetration across the entire border were substantial risks. However the environmental security issues were deemed far more vital. Weizmann's successful appeal combined with the usage of strategic kibbutzim placement created a more sustainable state.

Figure 2.4   Palestine: British Mandate 1920–1948

Figure 2.5   UN Partition Plan 1947

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
[79] From "Israel in Biblical Times." 1973 https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/israel_hist_1973.jpg
[80] From "Israel in Biblical Times." 1973 https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/israel_hist_1973.jpg

2.5.2   Nuclear Power

Israel's involvement with nuclear technology also started in this period. The nuclear option represented a new source of power, not only militarily but also with benefits to the nation as an energy source (Hersh, 1991). The mid to late 1930s and 1940s saw an increased migration of Jewish scientists, including Ernst David Bergmann. Bergmann, hailed as the father of Israeli nuclear weapons technology, became both the head of the Weizmann Institute of Science's chemistry division and Israel's first Atomic Energy Commission director. He was both advisor and friend of Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. Nuclear energy was viewed as a method to ameliorate the lack of natural resources and as mitigation for the lack of military personnel. Cohen (1998) notes that Bergmann pointed out "there was just one nuclear energy, not two, suggesting nuclear weapons were part of the plan" (p. 16). Whilst nuclear power could fit under military, political or environmental sectors, its use, or more accurately the threat of its use, as a military tool will see it predominantly addressed under military security where its development, growth and impact will be tracked in each chapter through the dissertation period.

As has been shown in the previous chapter, the military integrity of the state is a key requirement of territorial control. Individually, Zionists, Arabs and the British all understood the importance of obtaining and maintaining control over territory, however the Zionists were more successful in this endeavour than the Arabs, approaching the issue in a coordinated and systematic way, using legal and illegal means.

2.6   Pre-State Economic Securitization

The key fundamentals of the economic security sector are in the ability of the state to regulate a framework of social politics impacting on both macro and micro economic issues, including the poverty or otherwise of those within the boundaries of the state. The four pillars of economics – land, labour, capital and enterprise – discussed in Chapter 1 will be assessed over this period in the context of pre-state manoeuvring and the existential threats, either real or imagined, that would impact on this sector.

2.6.1 Land

The Ottoman Land Code commencing in 1858 had five main categories (Miri, Mawat, Milk, Waqf, Matrūk) and covered not only acquisition but also registration, taxation, use and sale of land (Amos, 1971). This code would endure through the British Mandate period and the initial creation of the State of Israel.[81] Under the Ottoman Land Code and Registration Laws of 1858 and 1859 an element of taxation was based upon land holdings through the Miri and Mawat categories.

The creation of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) in 1901 at the 5th Zionist Congress helped fund land acquisition in Judea and the Lower Galilee. The position of the JNF was not to sell land, but to provide long-term leases. In its charter, the JNF articulates its role as a "trustee of land" and to support the development work of the state. Prior to WWII, the Arab inhabitants were increasingly concerned over the physical and economic growth (especially in relation to land acquisition) of the Jewish population (Barkai, 1983). The Arab population also increased after the British Mandate. Others within the Arab community gained through the sale of goods and services to the new migrants. Landowners were the first to gain through the sale of land to the JNF, though this was curtailed in the late 1930s by Islamic religious guidance and nationalistic feeling (Gross, 1990).

During the period of the Arab revolt in the 1930s and early 1940s,[82] the Yishuv adapted the pattern of its land acquisition process. This was to leave an enduring mark, not only on the land that the Yishuv occupied, but also on the architectural development of the nation. The process was referred to as the Homa Umigdal project, which Segal and Weizman (2002) identify consisted of three basic elements: a settlement, a wall, and a guard tower. The structures and formation of the Homa Umigdal provided both an offensive and defensive system designed to support the purchased land and then to assist in the acquisition of land in remote parts of the country, which were difficult to

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[81] Forman and Kedar (2003) argue that British mandatory legislation removed indigenous land rights in a number of areas that would be further impacted by the creation of the State of Israel.

[82] Seven key emergency orders or regulations were articualated at this time: Palestine (Defence) Order in Council 1931. (Revised Laws of Palestine, Vol. III, p. 2619); Palestine Martial Law (Defence) Order in Council, 1936. (Official Gazette, September 30, 1936, p. 1070 [Long Gazette]); Palestine (Defence) Order in Council, 1937. (Official Gazette, March 24, 1937, p. 267); Emergency Regulations, 1936. (Official Gazette, April 19, 1936, p. 250).; Defence (Military Courts) Regulation, 1937. (Official Gazette, No vember 11, 1937, p. 1138).; Defence (Military Commanders) Regulations, 1938. (Official Ga zette, October 18, 1938, p. 1361) and Defence Regulations, 1939. (Official Gazette, August 26, 1939, p. 659) by the British mandatory powers which acted to restrict the local population, and would ultimately serve as a precursor to the Defence Emergency Regulations 1945.

colonise through the use of intimidation or force. These structures denote symbolic power, as the presence on the landscape has a visual form and became synonymous with the acquisition of land by Israel. Supporting Hansen's (2006, 2012) contention that securitization does not need to be verbalised the threat and security that they provided links with Taylor's (2015, p. 3) assertion that "Home is an intersection of space, time and social relations."

The regions in which the linked kibbutzim and the Homa Umigdal land acquisition were traditionally employed were in non-urban areas, where the JNF had only a minor holdings and/or there was moderate or major opposition to the acquisition. Olesker (2011) notes that self-reliance and the need to ensure its own safety was embedded in the physical and psychological structure of the state. The 'claiming' of the land involved a group of up to 40 individuals that would arrive under the cover of darkness and by first light have completed the construction of the outer walls, providing an internal safe area and perimeter security. The secondary action, Segal and Weizman (2002) contend, would provide a guard tower for overwatch of surrounding areas which might be hostile. The idea mirrored signal fires in feudal periods, creating a chain of new settlements providing all-round defence and highlighting Jewish overt possession of the land evident in Figure 2.4 above. Over the period 1936 to 1947, Waterman (2013) asserts that approximately 118 Homa Umigdal were created in Palestine. This amounted to a civilian occupation that showed to the region and the superpowers outside of it that the land was now either Jewish, or subject to Jewish oversight. As such it provided a recognisable architectural landmark, a claim to the land physically, culturally and politically.

2.6.2 Labour

Structures and deliberate approaches to the attainment of land were driven by long-term planning processes and continual review and re-evaluation. This was further enhanced by a study of Jewish economics in Palestine commissioned by the Jewish Agency. According primacy to agricultural development, Tessler (1994) noted the report provided scant information on industry and oil. In the case of the latter, the stranglehold on the industry by the British government meant that the development of skills in this industry was difficult to address.

The causal effect of land and employment outcomes was articulated in the Hope Simpson Report (1930) established after the 1929 riots over access to Jerusalem's Western Wall, which noted that when the JNF purchased land it was more than just territory. Lehn and Davis (1988) noted that as a result of JNF's leasing conditions, non-Jews would cease to gain any further advantage from the land. The limitations on who could be employed on JNF land (excluding experts in particular fields or seasonal labour) applied to all but two areas, the potash company and the oil refinery in Haifa, which were owned by the government. Article 23 of a JNF land or property lease ensures that the lessor must pay compensation to the JNF if the condition articulating the employment of Jews only on JNF land is infringed. The Hope Simpson Report noted that conditions went so far as to include provisions to ensure that "[An Arab] is deprived forever from employment on the land." This restriction on the ability to derive an income would have a serious impact on the Arab population, and was a leading cause in the upheavals that culminated in the 1929 riots and the mid-1930s hostilities against both the Jews and British forces by the Arabs. The impact of this choice will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

The emergent state of Israel had a number of internal and external positive starting points. The Yishuv from the early 1900s had a strong societal system of support under the political parties, especially the MAPAI. This provided a socio-economic background from which the state could leverage operationally. Externally, it is where political and societal securitization through the use of the diaspora became a strong and continual model for economic security.

Given that economic growth plays an integral part in the power of the state, Jewish agriculture was 75 per cent marketed, intensive, cash-crop production, (including citrus).[83] The kibbutzim or communal process embraced by the Jews had, by the middle of 1947, 150,000 people employed in agriculture, changing not only the land, but methods of agriculture.

2.6.3   Capital

Supporting the JNF's activities through the Blue Box – essentially a money box (generally but not necessarily blue) found in Jewish homes and institutions globally – has

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[83] Arabic farming was general subsistence cereal crops with only 20– 25% being marketed.

symbolised the partnership between Israel and the diaspora since the inception of this funding approach. The JNF argued that the purpose of the Blue Box was twofold; first the collection of funds, but the second, equally as important, "as an educational vehicle spreading the Zionist word and forging the bond between the Jewish People and their ancient homeland" ("The Blue Box", n.d.) Approximately one million blue boxes could be found in Jewish homes globally from 1920 to 1940. Additionally, between 1902 until the late 1940s, the JNF also sold fund stamps to raise money, for the same purpose. Across the period covered by this dissertation and up until the present, the JNF remains a strong organisation within the context of the Jewish state.

The New York Times reported the growth of the Jewish investment in Mandated Palestine: "in 1921, JNF land holdings reached 25,000 acres (100 km²), rising to 50,000 acres (200 km²) by 1927" (Arabs create organization for recovery of Palestine, 1964). An additional report in The New York Times in April 1936 (100 colonies founded, 1936) reported on the continued growth of Jewish settlements noting "at the end of 1935, JNF held 89,500 acres (362 km²) of land housing 108 Jewish communities." Barkat (2005) notes that in 1939, 10 per cent of the Jewish population of the Mandated Palestine lived on JNF land, amounting to 936 km². Raider (1995) identifies that 24,105 Jewish Palestinians were living on 79 kibbutzim which comprised 5 per cent of the Jewish population of Mandate Palestine. Benvenisti (2007), in discussing the impact of the Blue Boxes, notes by 1948 the JNF owned 54 per cent of the land held by Jews in the region, or slightly less than 4 per cent of Palestine. Kretzmer (1990) additionally observes that another 800,000 dunums had been acquired by other Jewish organisations or individuals.

Palestine depended on foreign trade for machinery, raw materials, and food. Funding for the first two of these was mainly as a result of diaspora investment, and funds as a result of migration. The UNSCOP report (1947) noted the industrialised systems and new export-focused industries created as a result of Jewish investment. Palestine immediately prior to UN Resolution 181 (II) was in a difficult position, and the UNSCOP report (1947) particularly articulates concerns relating to "the excess of imports over exports in 1936 being over 45 million pounds" (Part II Section B).

2.6.4   Enterprise

The economic security of the embryonic state was addressed in a number of ways, representing a unique hybrid of mercantilist and liberal views. The second Zionist Congress in 1898 (Centre for Israel Education, 2018) commenced the process with the creation of the Jewish Colonial Trust (now Bank Leumi) incorporated in London to support the purchase of land and resources. In 1902 it created a subsidiary, the Anglo-Palestine Bank, to operate in Palestine. The Anglo-Palestine Bank operated successfully both retaining its funds during WWI and expanding its enterprise across Mandated Palestine. In WWII the bank utilised its reserve, financing the development of industries "which supplied provisions to the British army."[84][85]   These industries also included the making of munitions and weaponry. This groundwork was therefore aligned with liberal economic theory in allowing the market to operate as freely as possible without influence of the state, because in this case the state did not exist. However it simultaneously aligned with mercantilists and neo-mercantilists in that the driving factor behind its existence was security of the nascent state.

Yishuv members had established an economic foothold including industrial (e.g. machinery and munitions) and agricultural (e.g. vineyards and orchards) ventures. In 1903, 200 dunams (0.20 km2) east of Hadera was the first purchase with funding supplied by Russian Zionist leader Isaac Goldberg. Orni (1981) notes that the purchase allowed the creation of an olive grove. Shilony (1998) states that over the next couple of years similar purchases were made near Lake Kinneret and Ben Shemen. The UNSCOP Report (1947) noted that in the preceding year exports to Arab countries were negatively impacted by the boycott of Jewish products, and if this continued in the long term, it could affect the industrial development in Palestine. Israel's nascent defence industries, Cohen, Eisenstadt, and Bacevich (1998a) assert, also commenced in this period, "with clandestine arms manufacturing workshops" (p. 42) supporting both the defence of the kibbutzim and Haganah.

The growth in Mandated Palestine saw a large increase in the use of materials as technology grew and shaped the emergent state, which resulted in dependencies linked to oil, benzene and kerosene. Their use coincided not only with increased infrastructure

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[84] Paragraph 6, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jewish-colonial-trust

[85] Only £395, 000 was raised.

(roads, vehicles) but also industry, housing and support to the military. The situation was exploited by Great Britain, both in terms of supply (coal sales to Palestine) and by having a significant share in the ownership of the companies that imported and used Mandated Palestine land or sea lanes to move the products.

The impact of Jewish financial investment in Palestine was recognised by the UNSCOP report (1947, chapter II, paragraph 54) which stated that "the balance of imports over exports is financed by import of capital consisting mainly of funds – or gift capital – coming from world Jewry." This economic support was critical in creating the conditions that drove determinations as to what lands were to be ceded to the State of Israel when partition occurred.

In responding to the argument by Arabs that the distribution of land was inequitable, the Palestine Royal Commission Report (Peel, 1937) commissioned by the British Government to support the management of Mandated Palestine argued that the Arab claim of advantageous apportionment of good land to Jews was not sustainable, as the development occurred after Jewish purchase. Additionally the Arabs were seen as having also gained from the Jewish immigration, with Peel (1937) stating they "… benefited from social services which could not have been provided on the existing scale without the revenue obtained from the Jews" (p. 386). The ability of the nascent state to acquire land and provide for its current and future population was a crucial factor in the determination that a Jewish state could survive. This component, more than almost all others, ensured the creation of the state.

2.7   Pre-State Societal Securitization

Societal security aspects have a strong impact upon the internal drivers of those in power both theoretically and within the context of the case study, as well as those who would follow and the emerging national Israeli psyche. The clear clash of civilizations and cultural/belief structures within the region demonstrates the importance of societal securitization. Kershaw (2005, p. 115) contends that an "integral-organic ideology of nationalism which gained definition by exclusion of ethnic minorities, often sharing the same territory" increases the chance of violent conflict. Members of social groups identify as part of that group either in response to differences with other cultures, or because of shared values, norms or behaviours. This societal cohesion Merom (1999)

stresses, serves "as the foundation … which is pivotal in the formation and moulding of religious, ethnic and national communities" (p. 204). The management of a public sense of insecurity or fear in support of the state and as a call to action is effectively the public relations (PR) component of security. To be successful it requires the effective control of speech acts by functional actors. The active utilisation of a PR strategy was central to how Israel conducted the securitization of the nascent state and embedded the sense of insecurity within the psyche of the government.

Palestine was, in the late 1800s a melting pot of religions and cultures as part of the Ottoman Empire. Culturally the phrase 'next year in Jerusalem' had symbolised a return to the Jewish biblical and spiritual home and had been in use since the Jews had been evicted from it centuries earlier (Krämer, 2011). It had embedded within it a clear societal sector security paradigm whereby nation-states which represented the traditions and cultures of the overwhelming majority are the preferred form of any social organisation. In 1896, Theodore Herzl wrote of the need for a 'The Jewish State' calling for its establishment in some neutral territory. The climate across Europe and Russia was becoming increasingly hostile to Jews. As such Buzan's et al.'s (1998) concept of both 'we' and 'other' is clearly identifiable – 'we' the Jewish people and 'other' to nations across the globe. Hence it was argued there was a requirement for a completely separate state in a neutral territory to ensure their survival. Pappé (2008) notes that a key figure in the early Zionist movement, Israel Zangwill, articulated this as "Palestine is a land without a people for a people without a land" (p. 2). This statement suggests the view that Palestine was effectively terra nullius and thus acquisition of new territory was a justifiable action.[86] From an international law perspective,[87] Zangwill sought to argue that with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain only acknowledging a mandate but not sovereignty over Palestine, it could be acquired through occupation (O'Balance, 1972).

A number of small groups, all seeking the same goal – a Jewish homeland – had been, or were already, investigating options. These groups looked at several different countries in

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[86] The same strategy was used by the British in the colonisation of Australia in 1788.

[87] A legal definition of terra nullius is "in international law, a territory which has never been subject to the sovereignty of any state, or over which any prior sovereign has expressly or implicitly relinquished sovereignty is terra nullius. Sovereignty over territory which is terra nullius may be acquired through occupation. International sea, and celestial bodies would come under the term terra nullius." (US Legal, n.d.).

which to settle, from areas as diverse as the north-west of Western Australia to Alaska (Hughes, 1998). There were two critical factors in the decision-making process. The first was that they could not be a 'settlement' in another state's territory – the land had to be given to the people of Israel as sovereign territory. The second factor was its location. The land of their fathers was the cultural and spiritual critical determinant.

Proactive Jews seeking a foothold in Palestine sought out the large absentee Arab landholders who held title to lands in Palestine (Krämer, 2011). Funded by Jewish patrons globally, they bought as much land as possible.[88] They also sought to purchase land direct from the Ottoman government. In both scenarios they were successful in creating a foothold in key areas across Palestine. The Arabs within Palestine were aware of the threat posed by increased migration. The threat relating to the negative impacts of migration and the lack of integration was communicated to both domestic and regional constituents by the Mufti of Jerusalem in a functional actor role in the early 1890s, who started campaigning against both Jewish migration and the sale of land to Jews (Fromkin, 2009). The concept of 'us' and 'them' was clearly identified in public fora by both sides. Given that more than 75 per cent of the population of Palestine was Muslim, the threat was evident at this early stage in relation to dilution of majority ethnic groups.

The desire of Israelis for their own national community identity resulted from many drivers including centuries of the inability to control any aspect of their community except their faith. Religion was and remains a shared belief, and a clearly visible part of the Israeli value system. The referent object following Buzan et al.'s (1998) theory therefore became 'we' the Jewish people regardless of physical location. Its impact on the Israeli government ranged from the prosecution of national defence to the smallest portion of regulated daily life – births, deaths and marriages, or driving vehicles on the Sabbath. Religion, Goldstein (2003, p. 204) contends "when overlaid on ethnic and territorial conflicts … surfaces as the central and most visible distinction between groups." As such it was, and remains, a key component of identity both internally and externally within Israel.

The effective use of smuggling by the Yishuv in the pre-independence years, whilst being blockaded by the British and the other countries of the Middle East, could align with

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[88] Isaac Goldberg, as a Russian example, funded the first large purchase. This methodology became a forerunner for the activation of the diaspora.

Alexander's (2008) argument as a Durkheimian social construct whereby the society as a whole needed this action to survive. Access to weapons, and indeed personnel, was a structural issue in terms of society and not a process of the collective deviance of the individual. Black and Morris (1991, p. 23) suggest that Haganah's intelligence arm encouraged disaffected Arabs to purchase captured Axis weapons which were then "smuggled into Israel by Australian troops".[89] Humanitarian migrants refers to individuals seeking refuge in a state on the basis that refusal would contravene a perceived collective humanity. The creation of a Jewish homeland was a confident use of political securitization, effectively conveying the idea that this was the right or just thing to do. After WWII, in spite of British regulations, Brogan (1998, p. 309) asserts that "about 200,000 Jews reached Palestine between 1944 and 1948," through the underground networks, or as refugees who had made their own way.

Through the mandate period Great Britain created more favourable conditions first for immigration to the country and second for land acquisition, which had both been severely restricted during the Ottoman period (Caplan, 2020). However as a result of the changing international environment and the increased migration of European Jewry prior to WWII, the immigration and land policies became a basis of unease for both Arabs and Jews (Ben-Ami, 2005). In the context of both social and cultural conflict, the divisions between the two populations were increasingly evident. Social conflict refers to irreconcilable needs or desires of dissimilar groups. Cultural conflict looks at the customs and ideals that each group uses to identify right and wrong. Two populations claiming the right to one land, both supported by the same superpower (Britain), was always going to lead to dissension.

The traditional or long-lasting social antipathies of the Jewish/Palestinian dyad were now provided with an ideological rationale for violence as a result of the proposed partition plan, which escalated wildly (Segev, 1998). What counted as a crime depended upon ever-changing cultural values and access to stable judicial processes. In September 1938, Black and Morris (1991) note that British military commander General Haining reported "the situation was such that civil administration and control of the country was, to all practical purposes non-existent" (p. 14).

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[89] The Australian troops had served during WWI in the Egyptian Western Desert.

The Zionist settlement in Palestine from 1882 to 1914 resembled that of European colonial societies. Both the positive and negative aspects of colonisation therefore shaped the land and its inhabitants. Gershom (1996) posits placing a new distinct community in an already settled landmass caused conflict generated by both parties (Jews and Arabs) over land and labour. The potential displacement of the Arab minorities within its borders on attainment of statehood was seen as the inevitable consequence of Zionism's goals. The most concise definition of this process is ethnocracy which Yiftachel (2006, p. 3) defines as "a regime promoting the expansion of the dominant group in contested territory while maintaining a democratic facade." This implies within it the exclusion of the minority that remains within its borders and therefore under the control of the state. This struggle would be played out in both the domestic and international arena for decades to come.

Buzan et al. (1998) argue that securitization on the international level (although not necessarily domestically) seeks to pose an issue as so pressing and existential that it becomes exempt from customary political wrangling and escalated to senior leaders above all other issues. Weizmann and Ben-Gurion were viewed as the key actors in the creation of the emerging state of Israel. The end of WWII saw an influx of survivors and refugees from Europe and elsewhere (Fromkin, 2009). The atrocities against the Jewish people were uppermost in the minds of the Jewish people and the international community. Most of the Jewish adults in Palestine or those who migrated there had relatives or friends who were killed in the Holocaust.

Collective identity operates as a prerequisite for the creation of a 'national identity', which assists groups (both large and small) progress growth, maintenance and modifications in different levels of social order. The case study includes within this perspective transnational entities such as the Jewish diaspora. The collective identity allows individual members to gain a sense of belonging and the creation of societal boundaries. For larger collectives, such as the ethnic and religious entity envisioned by the proponents of the State of Israel, the collective identities would also provide physical and social boundaries, and accepted social mores governing the collective. As Kimmerling (2000) asserts, a distinct unopposed collective identity, with a robust political structures and communities, supports hegemonic socio-political orders. This enabled the creation of a coherent Israeli historiography, not based purely on a 'home' given to Eretz Yisrael.

The Yishuv would serve as the foundation for the Israeli state. The issues that they encountered personally and collectively would shape them (Amos, 1971). With a clear understanding that Zionism was the survival of the Jewish people, the new society had a common goal. The legitimisation of that goal was historic rights in Palestine through the emancipating actions of the settlers, including agricultural settlement; physical labour; and military defence. This framework would separate not only Jews and Arabs, but also various groups within the Jewish community (Tessler, 1994). They would similarly view those who had not been present for the struggle as part of the community but a subset ethnographically. Each Aliyah or immigration wave would see additional subsets.

The national and international acknowledgement of the trauma of the Jewish people also saw the unwitting commencement of a rhetoric which would cause long-lasting internal and external conflict (Pasachoff & Litteman, 2005). In a conflict, the ability to use and be recognised by state or non-state actors as the 'victim' facilitates the provision of political and material support. If the level of suffering or threat become existential, as articulated in Hirschberger et al.'s (2016) existential threat model then this adds further weight. The Zionists were very effective in using this. The embedding of victimhood has created a long-term strength /vulnerability paradox which will be evidenced in the case study. The Arab nations of the Middle East did not deny the torture and trauma suffered by the Jewish people during the war. They did, however, refuse to acknowledge that the Jews in Palestine were victims, seeing the Arabs in Palestine as the 'victim' (Hinnebusch, 2015). The proposed Jewish state would consist of an Arab minority representing almost 50 per cent of the population. The coming declaration of statehood would exacerbate this distinction even further.

Within the Jewish community there were a variety of educational services, addressing ultra-orthodox, orthodox and moderate Jewish beliefs. The concessions given within this period would have long-term effects not only on the social construct of the society, but on the military, economic and political securitization (Miller, 2009). These education systems co-existed with a national culture and clear religious affiliation, thereby supplying legitimacy to the socio-political order. The Yishuv further enhanced this by revival of Hebrew as the national language, which was supported by newspapers, publishing houses and theatres. It would become the national language and a source of unification for the migrant population. The Yishuv and the nascent state carried forward the legal process

established or used by the British in the mandate period (Caplan, 2020). Labour unions were formed; and social welfare services (including health, education and culture) were organised which would become administered by the Jewish National Council (JNC). This added definition to the Yishuv's planning in relation to infrastructure and socio-political support, which had been underway (Segev, 1998). The most far reaching of these were the British Mandate's Land Acquisition for Public Purpose Ordnance enacted in 1943 in terms of land acquisition and the 1945 Defence Emergency Powers Ordnance[90] both of which are still used in Israel today. The discursive power to make and determine the 'other' and identify and implement required actions organically, without either explicit or implicit prior notice, provides the clearest declarative statement of the power of the text. The 1945 Defence Emergence Ordinance provides for:

> (4) Without prejudice to the preceding provisions of this regulation, any order, direction, requirement, notice or appointment under any Regulations (including these Regulations) made under the Order in Council, may, if the authority making or issuing the same thinks fit, but subject to the provisions of any such Regulations, be made or issued orally.
>
> (5) The authority making or issuing any such order, direction, requirement, notice or appointment as is referred to in sub-regulation (4) shall cause information of the effect thereof to be given as soon as may be in such manner as he thinks necessary for bringing it to the attention of all persons who in his opinion ought to have such information, but no such order, direction, requirement, notice or appointment shall be, or be rendered, invalid as regards any person affected thereby by the fact that the order, direction, requirement, notice or appointment has not been brought to his attention.

This document, which was retained by Israel upon its declaration of statehood allows for unilateral action by representatives of the state to be undertaken punishing individuals, groups or communities for activities that had not been articulated as illegal, and that they may not have known were going to be considered as such. This is consistent with the approach of Hansen (2006, p.55) who argues "the meaning of a text… never fully given by the text itself but is always the product of other readings and interpretations." This legislation remains on the Israeli statute books, being extended every three years.

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[90] See Emergency Regulations regarding Absentee Property, and the Abandoned Area Ordinance, and as an illustration of deliberations MAPC, 1948a; 1948b; 1948c; 1948d.

2.8   Concluding Comments about the Pre-State Years

The events described in this chapter represented major milestones not only for the nascent State of Israel's security paradigms but also within the Middle East, with ramifications for the wider global community. As such these aspects provide an insight into the relevant historical elements that need to be considered in the context of the case study of the State of Israel from 1947 to 1967. The Rubik's Cube® analogy allows the state to consider each threat separately, but also the interconnectedness of each sector to the position and choices made by the state. The long-running discursive repetition of existential threat to the Jewish people internally and externally was finally enabling a change in global positioning. The Jewish community understood the mnemonic threat articulation, and as a result did not need to verbalise their agreement with the premise. Audience acceptance was evidenced through action, the pledging of money and other resources, buying land and/or moving to Palestine when the actions of Arabs internally and in surrounding nations indicated the possibility of imminent hostile action. Legislatively Great Britain used its power to disenfranchise both Jews and Arabs at various points in the lead up to the end of the Mandatory period. The discursive narratives of both Arabs and Jews were clearly articulated, not only within Palestine, but to their supporters in the region and more globally.

The following four chapters will provide a longitudinal critical review of Buzan et al.'s (1998) theory in the context of Israel's responses to the sectoral securitization elements, their respective existential threats and the impact that this has had on the survival and development of the state. As the Collective C.A.S.E. (2006, p.446) assert "personal encounters, material conditions or the very contingency of life itself … play an important role in the emergence of certain ideas and approaches". Constructivism applied to IR theory looks at the role that culture or identity plays in international politics. The identity of Israel clearly does matter, for its people and the nations that surround it. These perceptions influence behaviours both internally and externally, and when tied to its security carry an even greater weight. Only by understanding why others find a particular action threatening, can it be assessed clearly and dispassionately. It is not a question of right or wrong, but whether that threat can be mitigated or marginalised.

This chapter has provided a brief overview of Palestine immediately prior to the beginning of WWI through to 1946. In doing so it sets the scene for the dissertation and identifies the major elements considered under each of the securitization sectors. Even at this early stage the utility of Buzan et al.'s (1998) security definition allows for a nuanced portrayal of the issues in the lead up to the declaration of statehood.

2.9   Time Line

Table 2.1   Time Line of Key Events (1517 – present)[91]

Date	Event
1517 – 1917	Ottoman Rule
1888	Convention of Constantinople
1896, 1897	Theodore Herzl publishes 'The Jewish State'
1909	First kibbutz, Degania. Moshe Dyan traces his lineage back to here. First modern all-Jewish city, Tel Aviv, founded.
1917	2 November: The Balfour Declaration
1919 – 1923	Provisional Jewish state-building commences, through the creation or formalisation of Vaad Leumi, the Jewish Agency, Histadrut and paramilitary forces.
1922–1948	British Mandate over Palestine
1931	Haganah in-fighting leads to the creation of a splinter group – Igrun.
1932 – 1939	Aliyah of Western European Jewry (mainly from Germany).
1936 – 1939	Riots by Arab and Jewish forces against each other and the British.
1937	Peel Commission
1939	British White Paper limits the immigration of Jews.
1939 – 1945	World War II; Holocaust in Europe.
Late 1930's	Arrival of Ernst David Bergman – father of Israeli nuclear weapons technology, into Palestine.
1940	Lehi founded as a new paramilitary organisation.
1946	11 Tower and Stockade kibbutzim created in northern Negev.
1947	UN Resolution 181 (II) proposes the establishment of an Arab and Jewish state. 29 November: two-thirds majority of the UN vote proposal passes. Arabs reject proposal.
1948	*14 May* End of British Mandate State of Israel proclaimed: 600,000 Jews occupy the land
	June Haganah acknowledged as the military force of the state; Igrun is dismantled; and all other Jewish paramilitary organisations are merged into Haganah.

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[91] References for each individual element are identified within the respective chapter.

Date	Event	
15 May 1948 – July 1949	War of Independence.	
	Armistice agreements signed with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.	
	Israel and Jordan apportion Jerusalem.	
1949	First Knesset (parliament) elected	
	Israel admitted to United Nations as 59th member.	
1948 – 1952	Mass immigration from Europe and Arab countries.	
1953	Repatriations from West Germany commence	
1956	Sinai Campaign.	
	Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba.	
1956	*26 July*	Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company, and closed the canal.
	29 October	Israel invaded Egypt with British and French support, capturing the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip.
		US, USSR and the UN soon pressure the nations into a ceasefire, and a return to the status quo.
		UN Emergency Force (UNEF) formed and deployed into Egyptian territory to ensure demilitarisation.
1961	Mossad capture Adolf Eichmann in Argentina.	
1962	Adolf Eichmann tried and executed in Israel for his key part in the Holocaust	
1964	National Water Carrier completed.	
1967	*May*	USSR Report
	May	Blockage of the Straits of Tiran.
	5–10 June	Six-Day War
	June	Offer to return land to Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

Chapter 3   The State of Israel (1947 – June 1949)

"The land is the only thing in the world worth working for, worth fighting for, worth dying for, because it's the only thing that lasts"

Margaret Mitchell (*Gone With the Wind*, 1936, vol. 1, pt. 1, Ch. 2)

The situation within Palestine in the previous chapter was one of increasing tension. Manoeuvring internally and externally by Great Britain, Jews and Arabs in relation to Mandatory Palestine resulted in uncertainty and instability. Discursive speech acts were evident on the global stage and within Mandatory Palestine by both state and non-state actors in support of various parties. Practice based articulations of speech acts through the physical and psychological claiming of the land using Homa Umigdal were also clearly apparent. Additionally over this period Great Britain provided ample examples of legislation to identify 'we' and 'other' as they sought to enable or constrain those dwelling in Palestine. The evolutionary practice in relation to the usage of legislative instruments and their impact would become more evident as Israeli statehood approached.

This dissertation studies the utility of Buzan et al.'s securitization theory and methodology to longitudinally the focus of this chapter will be the period from 1947 to June 1949, immediately prior to and after the Israeli Declaration of Independence, from a sectoral perspective. It undertakes this analysis by identifying the existential threats (including the impact of mnemonic narratives) within each sector and reflects the actions of the state to address them, and from the Rubik's Cube® perspective the intersection of those choices with other sectoral considerations. On a secondary level the legislative language used to support securitization of the State of Israel is considered both in the context of the construction of speech act but also in how it assists in defining and then embedding the 'we' and 'other' discourse within Israel.

The land proposed for the State of Israel was not 'terra nullius' nor did it exist in isolation from surrounding states. As such, it presented significant challenges across the international relations (IR) spectrum to all nations, non-government organisations (NGOs), communities and individuals involved. Securitization theory argues that for an issue to become securitized, it must be constructed as such by a securitizing agent, who

makes a security argument or speech act to a targeted audience. Buzan et al.(1998) argue that this move has two critical components – the claim of an existential threat to a specific object and the acceptance of that claim by a securitizing actor whose action to mitigate the threat requires the breaking of normal rules. For a specific combination of people, for example, to claim to be threatened under this description, Mutimer (1999) asserts that they must be categorised in a way that identifies how they are constrained or threatened. The unique normative and structural nature of democracy means that, for the majority of security issues (e.g. war), political leaders must make their securitization move to the general public. Strong, articulate individuals capable of individual-level decision-making are critically important in times of crisis.

On 25 April 1920, the Mandate for Palestine was created and the Allied Powers assigned this responsibility to Great Britain, including the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. It could be argued that this was, for Palestine, the true commencement of the security complex, the dynamics of which would drive behaviour, perceptions and actions going forward. The Mandate over Palestine was confirmed by the League of Nations and commenced on 29 September 1923. The previous chapter argues that both Jews and Arabs within Mandated Palestine felt threatened by the 'other'. Land or the lack thereof was a key contributing factor both in regards to the threat, and the methods by which each party, including Great Britain, sought to counteract that threat.

Without the right of land ownership, Palestine will never be Jewish regardless of the number of Jews in it … But how is land ownership customarily achieved? Only in the following three ways: by force – that is, through conquest of war; by compulsion – that is through government expropriation of land; and by voluntary sale on the part of the owners. (Menachem Ussishkin, as cited in Kimmerling, 1983, p. 14)

Title to land, as discussed in the last chapter, could lawfully be acquired by the use of force prior to 1928. The Kellogg–Briand Pact sought to prevent tit use of war as an instrument of national policy, and through that agreement to limit the acquisition of land through war. The British White Papers discussed in Chapter 2 ascertained that Palestine covered about 26,000 square kilometres. The issue of how the allotment of land was to be managed to attain statehood for both the Jews and Palestinians brought to the fore two diametrically opposing claims, both supported by robust arguments. The ability to

use force, purchase or compel access to land was always going to create challenges not only to those within the immediate area, but regionally, and to a lesser extent globally.

By 1947 Palestine was a serious concern for Great Britain, requiring 100,000 troops, a huge maintenance budget and also representing a longer term economic threat to the British oil supply (Bialer, 1999). This period effectively was one of civil war in the British mandated territory between the Yishuv and the Arab Palestinians and their respective supporters. There were also occasional attacks made separately by both parties against Great Britain. As stated in the Palestine Royal Commission Report (Peel 1937a), administrators of Mandatory Palestine concluded that the conflict was irreconcilable. On 2 April 1947, Great Britain requested that the question of Palestine be placed before the United Nations (UN) next General Assembly to determine its future seeking to move it from a normative to securitized environment.[92] The UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was created on 15 May 1947 to determine the viability and extent of support for either a single state option or a two state option for the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The committee had three months in which to create a report responding to Great Britain's request for arbitration on the issue of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The committee's deliberations and report would then have flow-on effects in determining the next possible stages for actions in the land of Palestine. In terms of power dynamics, including perceived threats from emerging Cold War entities, it is germane to note that this committee did not have any direct superpower involvement. However, satellite power control could be imputed through other members of the committee such as Australia, Canada and Czechoslovakia.

All nations have differing opinions on what is deemed by their state as a threat to their existence. Securitization theory argues that security is not a natural state of affairs, but a social construct (Buzan et al., 1998). This deals with the relationship by which states view their vulnerabilities and threats. Securitizing actors, David Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann on behalf of the Jewish people, and the Arab Higher Commission and Arab League[93] on behalf of Arabs in Palestine, argued that the allocation of land,

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[92] This position was enhanced when the UN Special Committee Report on Palestine (UNSCOP) stated "it is not without significance that only since the rise of Nazism to power in Germany, with the resultant mass movement of Jews to Palestine, has the Palestine question become sufficiently acute to require the devising of solutions outside the framework of the normal evolution of an "A" Mandate" (1947, Chapter IV, Paragraph 15).
[93] This ogansation is also referred to as the League of Arab States.

mass migration and the presence of the 'other' posed an existential threat. This threat was to the internal stability of Palestine and externally to the region and the wider global environment.

The tracking of sustained and robust military, political, environmental, economic and societal securitization of the new state can be seen to have started in earnest from the end of WWII onwards. David Ben-Gurion (n.d.), head of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, the second major securitizing agent,[94] pointedly increased his advocacy on behalf of nationless and displaced Jewish people around the globe seeking the promised Jewish home.

Ben-Gurion's reliance on political, social, economic and cultural factors within Europe to support him will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. WWII had ended and the conditions of the concentration camps were coming into public awareness. Simultaneously, Bialer (1999) asserts, the Israeli Zionist leadership commenced negotiations with the US, which was looking at oil and other strategic implications, including access routes, and seeking to reduce the impact of the USSR in the region, as well as to limit the ability of France to regain a foothold in the area (Shalaim, 2010). This re-evaluation of the US strategic position, wider geopolitical interests and the Jewish request provided the US with opportunities in power projection in the earliest stages of the Cold War.

UNSCOP sought comment from interested parties and accepted for face-to-face meetings representatives of selected groups and significant individuals including Chaim Weizmann (Caplan, 2020). Jewish organisations within and outside Palestine provided written or oral testimony to the Special Committee, the narrative[95] concurred with the view expressed by the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi in requiring the creation of a Jewish State. Differences existed between those advocating for the entirety of Palestine becoming a Jewish State and those acquiescing to partition, conditional upon the ability to settle a significant number of new immigrants (Dershowitz, 2003). A minority (including the American Council for Judaism) also sent submissions opposing the

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[94] The first was Chaim Weizmann who secured the Balfour Declaration and would continue to exert influence internally within Palestine and externally until his death in 1952.

[95] Nesbitt-Larking (2017) proposes that meta-narrative is socially embedded and is linked to a broad framework of knowledge or experience that are communicated through stories. Schiff (2014 p. 48) extends this fruther arguing that a groups' social history enables it to empathise with others or "further essentialise us and close down our perceptual worlds."

creation of a state. They viewed it as a threat internally and externally to Jewish interests and also to Palestine.

The proximity of the threat and the immediacy of the societal securitization that the Jewish position was seeking to reinforce was achieved (Ben-Ami, 2005). The committee visited Palestine and also a number of concentration camps in Germany and Austria. The psychological impact of the concentration camps and meeting survivors who argued for a Jewish homeland as the final stop for the UNSCOP committee before the deliberations in Palestine cannot be understated. In contrast, the Arab Higher Committee[96] initially failed to grasp the political and societal securitization opportunities and did not actively engage with the delegation (Bregman, 2000). The UN telegraphed its members in Palestine advising that the Arab Higher Committee had chosen to refrain from cooperation with the Special Committee. The Arab Higher Committee, realising its tactical error, successfully sought a meeting with delegates in Geneva. During their time in the Middle East, the UNSCOP committee did meet in Beirut to determine the position of regional governments (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen) on the issue of Palestine (Caplan, 2020).

Figure 3.1   Proposed States of Israel and Palestine.

On 27 November 1947 the UN partitioned Palestine. UN Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine was announced, dividing the land into three areas: an Arab state, a Jewish state and an international zone around Jerusalem (Figure 3.1[97]).[98] If agreed to, it was envisaged that the

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[96] This committee consisted of the heads of five differing Arab political parties joined together under the guidance and leadership of the Mufti of Jerusalem.
[97] From "Israel in Biblical Times." 1973 https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/israel_hist_1973.jpg
[98] The division of land provided for the territory of the nascent State of Israel to include the Beersheba sub-district (including the Negev), Eastern Galilee, and the majority of the coastal and Esdraelon plain. Arab State territory comprised Samaria and Judea (excluding Jerusalem), Western Galilee, and the remainder of the coastal plain from Isdud to the Egyptian border.

separation would meet the desire of each group for statehood. There were also expectations that the groups would be able to provide effective governance and that the drawing of these borders would provide a clearly defined limit to the spatial extent of their sovereignty, thereby defining the authority of each group (Miller 2009). Each state was to maintain authority over their allocated land, thereby enabling the integrity of social organisations to be preserved. These borders would consequently render the use of violence by non-state actors within those sectors illegitimate. More importantly it would allow the use of force by the state in defence of its borders and for the protection of its community.

The Jewish leadership agreed to the United Nations partition scheme, which gave them 5,500 square miles, chiefly in the Negev desert, which would be home to 538,000 Jews and 397,000 Arabs (Bregman, 2000). In doing so, they had obtained a defined territory, thereby meeting the threshold standard of part b) within the Montevideo Convention (1933, Article 1). As the case study will show, the defined boundaries and distinct national identity, combined with a significant amount of pre-planning, enabled the State of Israel to be declared a short time later. The allocation of land posed obvious threats in both the short and the long term, however the Jewish leadership believed they could be resolved. The leaders thus began the process of positioning for the aftermath of what they believed would be the first existential threat to their nascent state. Within the proposed territorial frame, the possibility of sectarian division was becoming increasingly fixed.

The results of UN Resolution 181 (II) proved far more alarming for the Arab Palestinians than they had anticipated (Black & Morris, 1991). The multi-pronged and long-running Jewish campaign from the end of the 1890s through to 1947 in relation to settlement and usage of land had a significant impact. One of the most effective Israeli tactics was through direct exertion of influence by Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, as well as the utilisation of public opinion. These campaigns, as detailed in Chapter 2, were not only based on external advocacy, but encompassed internally a range of measures, including the placement of kibbutzim in deserts and other strategic areas where their support and re-supply had to be continually managed to ensure that the argument of continuous settlement could be made (Caplan, 2020). As a result, the most productive land in Palestine (as classified by both Great Britain and the UN) was granted to the emergent State of Israel in conjunction with large amounts of desert. The resolution supported the

effective securitization of a referent object by non-military means (Buzan et al., 1998), however it created a long-term vulnerability which would impact a number of sectors. It was one of the major reasons for the creation of the otherwise illogical formation of the partition boundaries. Unlike the reallocation of borders in the Middle East by the Allies at the end of WWI with straight lines, the land designated by the partition was a response to significant manoeuvring.

The Arab League met in December 1947 and stated it would do whatever was required to avert the enactment of UN Resolution 181 (II). Calvocoressi (1996) maintains the plan devised by the UN "whatever its validity [the UN does not have authority to make states], was quickly made irrelevant" (p. 367). The Arab nations surrounding the emergent state did not agree to the partitioning and placed themselves on a war footing. In the lead up to the vote for the ratification of UN Resolution 181 (II), the Arab League called for member states, including Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon to move troops to borders of the embryonic state (Bregman, 2000; Bar-Joseph, 2013). This collective security approach by the Arabs towards Israel was to remain in place for the next two decades until the alliance started to splinter.

The Zionists were more pragmatic in their approach. The political parties within the nascent State of Israel acknowledged the challenges that the Arabs within the proposed borders would create (Byman, 2011). Whilst migration and land purchase were used to dilute the Arab numbers internally, there was also recognition of how this would be perceived internationally.[99] The belief at the time was that concession on this point would serve two purposes. Firstly, it would provide a better springboard from which to negotiate for more/better land and support prior to the partition being ratified; and secondly as Ben-Gurion states:

> for a Jewish state, the question of relations with the neighbouring Arab states is a cardinal issue in the entire foreign policy of the Jewish state and the Arab minority (within the state) constitutes an organic part of this immediate problem. *(Protocols of the Jewish Agency Executive, 1938, p. 394)*

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[99] Avnery (2015) argues that the foundation document of the state deliberately omitted any reference to borders, as the narrative was not consistent with how Ben-Gurion sought to construct the state.

The acknowledgement that Arabs within the nascent Jewish state was not only an issue of minority rights but also one with long-term practical implications for both the identity and the security of the state is therefore evident in the pre-state manoeuvring (Bregman, 2000).

This approach fits within the realist's rational actor assumption whereby states maximise gains and minimise loss. The rational actor model is a key strategic factor in deterrence. This was a psychological process that Israel would use extensively in the decades to come. Public perception amongst Zionist leaders prior to 1948 was that war was a risk to be taken only if there was no alternative. Belini (1998) argues that the attainment of statehood and through that independence from Great Britain through armed conflict became very evident to the Jewish leadership.

The rejection of UN Resolution 181 (II) by the Arab Higher Committee and neighbouring states on behalf of the reconfigured State of Palestine saw an immediate call for an Arab general strike and violence between the Arab and Jewish populations increased. Consistent with McDonald's (as cited in Williams, 2012) assertion, "expectations of appropriate behaviour matter in the construction of threats" (p. 63). In light of the stated positions of regional neighbours, the prospective costs of doing nothing were viewed by the nascent Zionist Council as catastrophic. In the months preceding the British withdrawal,[100] the Arabs cut off supplies and besieged Jewish centres including the Jewish parts of Jerusalem (Bregman, 2000). The negative military security position, accepted in the quest for more land, was forcefully shown. Haganah, the irregular forces that would come to constitute the backbone of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), undertook Operation Nachshon, breaking the Arab siege of Jerusalem. The military implications of holding land would remain secondary to its acquisition for the rest of the case study period for the State of Israel. This continues to have a long-term legacy on the security of Israel, Palestine and the surrounding nations.

On 15 May 1948, Ben-Gurion, Executive Head of the World Zionist Organisation and Chairman of the Jewish Agency, proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel. The voices in the text articulate a clear 'we' and 'other', articulating a process which supports

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[100] The High Commissioner of Palestine, General Sir Alan Cunningham, left Haifa on 14 May 1948 in Euryalus bringing to an end the British mandate over Palestine. (Withdrawal of Forces from Palestine, n.d.).

discursive rhetoric, argumentation and problematizing. The preamble to the Israeli Declaration of Independence (1948) contains within it a statement of historic claim to the land, and evaluative statements on religion and culture. It also clearly articulates a rhetoric of dispossession, the usage of violence, and a right to the land, regardless of the passage of time.

> RETZ-ISRAEL [(Hebrew) - the Land of Israel, Palestine] was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.
>
> After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it and for the restoration in it of their political freedom.

(The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948)

What is not considered in this text are the transactions of ownership over centuries, as well as any other people or community, apart from Jewish.

Securitization, according to Buzan et al. (1998), occurs when an issue arises which threatens existence and requires emergency action to ensure its survival. Israel was extremely lucky that when the embryonic state needed them, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion and Sharett (the Foreign Minister) were capable of filling the role of securitizing actor, nationally, internationally or in both arenas. The process of securitization to ensure the survival of the State of Israel within the first 13 months of its existence will now be addressed through the lens of the Copenhagen School.

3.1   Political Securitization 1947–1949

Political securitization, as outlined in Chapter 1, is about legitimacy (recognition of the state internally and externally) and the ability to provide governance structures ensuring organisation and stability for those within the state. External legitimacy was relatively swift, with the US recognising the State of Israel on the 15 May 1948, the same day the state's establishment was proclaimed and Soviet recognition coming three days later; by April 1949, 53 out of 56 nations, including Great Britain, had extended recognition

(Medding, 1990). This therefore solidified part d) of the Montevideo Convention (1933, Article 1 p. 25), "the capacity to enter into relationships with other states".

At a global level, Cold War interests played a defining role in the securitization of all aspects of Israeli life. Israel was unique in that at its inception it initially had support from both Cold War superpowers, and the changing relationship with these actors impacted not only Israel but also its neighbours (Schindler, 2008). As shown in Chapter 1, at a subsystem level, non-regional subsystems were a key component in the analysis of how Israel was securitized. This level of analysis was appropriate given the impact of the superpower involvement and how Cold War manoeuvring influenced the depth of support given to each of the countries involved.

External legitimacy is essentially recognition by other nations, states or supra-organisational units in relation to both the recognition of the existence and legitimacy of the state, and those who govern it (Skocpol, 1985). The question as to whether the UN had rights to create (or rights of member states to enforce) UN Resolution 181 (II) was never referred to the International Court of Justice. Elaraby (1968) notes that such a referral came close at one meeting of an ad hoc committee which drafted a question, but in a close vote the decision was made not to seek further clarification. Israel's provisional government on declaration of statehood was legitimised through recognition by both major superpowers and a host of other nations. However this required the securitizing actors of the state to play an active role. Uncertainty within the political securitization realm has an infinite number of permutations from motives, biases, perceptions, beliefs and intentions through to allegiances both internal and external. It takes a significantly self-aware politician to understand themselves and their nation in the context of the distortions that have been created to take full advantage in the international arena. The Ross Papers within the Truman Library identify how Weizmann (1983) managed to do this when he convinced US President Harry Truman to reverse his initial position and pledge support for the future Jewish state. The US President's acknowledgement of the State of Israel showed that there had been significant manoeuvring in the pre-state period with the draft text for signature stating "recognition has been requested by the provisional government (May 14, 1948)."

Palestine's status as the 'Holy Land' is a result of its relationship (origination and historical linkage) with a number of major world religions (Fromkin, 2009). Access and ownership of

the land has been the cause of centuries of controversies, crusades and wars involving a majority of the European and Middle Eastern feudal and then modern nations. Moore (1988) argues that the usage of history in relation to Jerusalem as a means to legitimise the acquisition of land, creates significant challenges. Kennedy (2006, p. 5) argues that "warfare has become a legal institution." The conduct of hostilities under the law of international armed conflict is a key component not only of military operations but increasingly as a component of the political and social security agenda. As such it provides an insight into why some 'pure' military criteria, such as the ability to defend territory,[101] were overruled by the Israeli provisional government in the face of the political and social securitization considerations which resulted in the acceptance of the illogical land configuration from a military defensibility perspective under UN Resolution 181 (II).

The UN Security Council on 29 May 1948 established the Truce Commission, which would eventually become the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) - Palestine in response to the conflict. Until his assassination in Jerusalem on 17 June 1948 by the Igrun, UNTSO was led by a UN mediator, Folke Bernadotte. His successor, American Ralph Bunche, endeavoured to formulate new settlement ideas and facilitate the 1948 truces of 11 June to 8 July and 19 July to 14 October, through a succession of armistice agreements with each nation and Israel (Raviv, 1998).

The external legitimacy of the state was also reinforced by the willingness of Transjordan to enter negotiations about the West Bank prior to the attack by the Arab troops (Bar-Joseph, 2016). This discussion resulted in two key determinations which would have long-term impacts in the region. The first saw territorial control of the West Bank (with its significant Muslim population) pass to Transjordan with the agreement of Israel. This created friction in the Arab Alliance due to the further expansion of the Hashemite regime (Parker, 1993). The second was that in return for the West Bank, Transjordan agreed to not send troops into areas designated by UN Resolution 181 (II) as belonging to Israel. This effectively crippled the attack before troops from any of the countries crossed the border. In January 1949, armistice talks between Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon embedded the Israel's legitimacy. Israel's determination to ensure the armistice lines

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[101] As Figure 3.1 shows, the land allocated to the nascent state was in some places only a few kilometres wide which meant that should the state be surrounded, there would be no place that was outside conventional weapon range.

respected the war's cessation, resulted in territorial gains for Israel beyond that which was articulated in the UN partition plan (Hinnebusch, 2015).

The centuries of desire and decades of concerted preparation in the pre-state years ensured that the interim governing council would be well placed in terms of exerting clear direction in ensuring governance for and within the border of the state (Segev, 1998). Israel avoided one of the most common pitfalls that embattled states often encounter. It presented a strong front, externally and internally and did not allow contested legitimacy to open the door to "deep ideological conflict or the politicisation of violence" (Kershaw, 2005, p. 115). Whilst there were issues of internal contest to the legitimacy of the State of Israel, internal negotiations and at times the use of force against its own dissident groups, were accepted as a state-building requirement, ensuring that domestic power plays were subservient to national goals (Ben-Guiron, n.d.).[102] Prior to the declaration of statehood the embryonic government created a number of regulations as part of its transitional plan, most of which would eventually be subsumed into the legislative infrastructure of the new State of Israel.

The strength shown in the forcible inclusion of rival political parties into the new state, both politically and militarily, allowed it to survive the initial hostilities it faced. Meeting another precondition of statehood as articulated in the Montevideo Convention (1933, Article 1 p. 25) "c) government", a 14-person provisional government was established that governed from 14 May 1948 through until 8 March 1949,[103] drawn from across the Jewish political spectrum (Ben-Ami, 2005). The first legislative document after the Declaration of Independence was the Law and Administration Ordinance (1948). This initial ordinance defined the capabilities and structure of the Provisional Government and articulated that unless specifically repealed the laws in effect prior to statehood would remain in effect. This allowed continuity both internally and externally, impacting on all other sectoral securitization elements.

The nascent state of Israel was intended to be democratic, which therefore affected with whom the securitizing actor must justify their action. In this case it was the Jewish people in whom sovereignty is vested. Ben-Gurion effectively continued to hold the role he had

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[102] Igrun was responsible for bombings and the massacre of civilians at Deir Yassin (in conjunction with Lehi). Members were moved into the IDF in 1948 at the start of the War of Independence. It was labelled a terrorist group by the 1946 Zionist Congress. (Jewish Terrorism and Jewish Resistance. 1947, pp. 20–26.)
[103] The governments of Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

held in the pre-state years (O'Balance, 1972). As Prime Minister he became the de facto securitizing agent of the State of Israel. Appeals to the polity are usually driven by shared beliefs, values and behaviours linking the impact and potential outcomes (both positive and negative) with the community. The exclusion of Arab Israelis from voting (or allowing them only de facto representation) kept the audience to the Jewish community. This construction was, Schwedler argues (2006, p. 147) "equally if not more constraining than institutions" in defining the 'we' and 'other'. Additionally, it supports Green's (2017) assertion regarding the manifestation of social inequality preventing identified communities from performing speech acts, creating a position of asymmetric privilege. Point 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance also detailed how existential threats (states of emergency) would be dealt with. It allowed for wide-ranging powers[104] being granted to a minister for a period of three months in relation to the "interests of the defence of the State, public security and the maintenance of supplies and essential services," unless repealed or extended.

Upon the declaration of statehood, the Law and Administration Ordinance provided critical structure for the internal legitimacy and organisational structure of the state. It allowed for the continuation of all previous laws and regulations, unless specifically revoked. The first revocation was listed at point 12, with the legal annotation "Termination of dependence on Britain." Others included Sections 13 to 15 of the Immigration Ordinance (1941) and regulations 102 to 107C of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945), to allow Jews who illegally entered into Mandated Palestine to remain as legal immigrants. It is germane to note that the Defence (Emergency) Regulations (1945) have not been repealed by Israel (Dowty, 1998) and has been renewed on an annual basis since 1948. This legislative legacy from Great Britain is the foundation for significant disenfranchisement of the Palestinian Arabs (Morris, 2001). The actions of the Haganah in the pre-state period and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) after the proclamation of the state were both enshrined in law for both retrospective and future actions as one of the first elements of the legislative process (Miller, 2009).

The imposition of clear governance upon the state was enhanced by the legitimising of a number of previously illegal actions by individuals and groups linked to the pre-state

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[104] Including the ability to alter, suspend or modify any law, and impose or increase taxes or other obligatory payments.

governing structures as well as the actions undertaken by the IDF during the 1947–1948 conflict (Shlaim, 2001). The Area of Jurisdiction and Powers Ordinance, (1948) argued the primacy of Israeli law on any land (including that which was not ceded to Israel) if the Minister of Defence proclaimed it as being held by the IDF. The backdating of the law to 15 May 1948 meant that the spoils of war could be and were claimed by Israel.

There were a number of challenges in relation to internal legitimacy by members of the Yishuv and pre-state paramilitary groups such as Igrun and Lehi (Morris, 2004). The Defence (Emergency) Regulations were utilised to dissolve both groups in the wake of the Deir Yassin massacre discussed in Chapter 2 and after the assassination of Folke Bernadotte whilst he was negotiating the armistice at the end of the 1947–1948 conflict (Caplan, 2020).

Internal legitimacy was solidified further when, on 25 January 1949, the first elections were held for the legislative branch of the Israeli elected government referred to as the Knesset, which had a first term of office of 19 months.[105] The Mapai party led by Ben-Gurion won the largest share of the vote, at 35.7 per cent and won 46 out of a possible 120 seats. The new government showed a diversity of Jewish political views and also gender, with Golda Meir becoming the first Minister of Labour and the first female minister (Raviv, 1998).

Internally and externally, by June 1949 the State of Israel had solidified its legitimacy.[106] The impact of pre-state manoeuvring cannot be underestimated with the nurtured relationships bearing fruit when most needed. Internally the state had provided a governance structure to its people which was accepted and acted upon. Similarly all but three members of the UN recognised the state and even those who disagreed with its creation acknowledged its existence through the process of entering into negotiations with it (Pasachoff & Littleman, 2005).

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[105] The governments of Israel – First government of Israel. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). The presidency of Israel is largely titular and formally came into being in 1949. (Government Services and Information, n.d.).

[106] See also Basaran and Olsson (2018) in relation to the use of international as a form of social distinction and hierarchy.

3.2   Military Securitization 1947–1949

Security and defence have differing meanings across nations. Previous experiences with violence or threats,[107] or possession of scarce resources, would also have an impact on the understanding of what needed to be protected, from whom and what, nationally, a country would be willing to do to feel 'safe' (Donnelley and Steel, 2015). Within the state itself there may be differing expectations from the populace as to the security that is anticipated and should be provided. Within the field of military security the state is the referent object. Realist theory hypothesises that an external military security environment involves two main features: the offensive and defensive capabilities of the combatants and the perception of their skills and objectives. Within an individual's scenario, the challenge then relates to the ability to kill and the capability or desire to do so.

Coleman (2007, p. 210) posits that "violence is … set apart from the state. What the state does is not violence: violence is the other." This is particularly relevant in the pre-state years when the actions of the non-state actors (Arabs within Israel, and Jews within the British Mandate) were deemed to be violent and in need of reprisal, but the actions of the state (Great Britain in Mandated Palestine and then Israel) were not (Shlaim, 2010). Early post-war theorists such as Morgenthau (1960) argued that the decision-making process within the international arena assumes the security of the state is paramount. However these threats were initially assessed in the context of realist theory as discussed in Chapter 1, through the lens of systemic and military capability ratios. Force projection therefore became a key component of the psychological posturing in the lead up to the commencement of the 1947–48 conflict.

As briefly mentioned earlier, the rejection of UN Resolution 181 (II) was then evidenced internally by the call for an Arab general strike, and violent conflict between Arabs and Jews intensified. The Arab League, in seeking to prevent partition by whatever means necessary, would embed a security complex that remains part of the setting of the Middle East. The interdependence of the Arab League was driven simultaneously by the mutual fear and perception of threat that the nascent State of Israel represented (Sperling & Webber, 2016), but also the desire to be the leader of the Pan-Arabian community. The Arab nations surrounding the soon-to-be-created state did not agree to

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[107] Consider the bombing raid on Darwin during World War II juxtaposed against the almost daily bombing of London for many months.

the partitioning and placed themselves on a war footing. In the lead up to the vote the Arab League called for member states, including Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, to move troops to borders of the emergent Jewish state. This quasi-collective security approach by the Arabs towards Israel was to remain in place for the next two decades until the alliance started to splinter.

In the months preceding the British withdrawal, the Arabs cut off supplies and besieged Jewish centres, including the Jewish parts of Jerusalem. The negative military security position, accepted in the quest for more land was forcefully demonstrated in relation to the siege of Jerusalem (Fromkin, 2009). The military implications of holding land would remain secondary to its acquisition for the rest of the case study period for the state of Israel. This continues to have a long-term legacy on the security of Israel, Palestine and the surrounding nations.

Haganah's Plan Dalet was approved for implementation on 10 March 1948. It was the fourth plan[108] for the securitization of the nascent state. The six-week timeframe included multiple individual operations prior to the departure of the British forces (civil and military) from Mandated Palestine (Khalidi, 1988). The plan had two key goals; the first was military securitization in safeguarding the area identified by UN Resolution 181 (II); and the second was protecting horizontal competition within social securitization, ensuring that Jewish areas which remained in the Palestinian zone were also secure. This required an active use of the built environment through the construction of defensive communities providing line of sight support to the military action, which was predicated on the lowest number of Palestinian Arab communities, villages or individuals remaining in the land under Jewish control. It also required control of or the ability to actively monitor neighbouring communities to either provide support, or proactively address possible counter-attacks (Waterman, 2013). This duality of purpose to ensure the security of the state would permeate all parts of the Israeli community.

Military securitization within Buzan et al.'s theory (1998) and within realist theories has two key elements: intimidation and, if required, the ability to follow through with those threats. In April 1948, Palestinian Arabs panicked after the nascent state's paramilitary group Lehi massacred 250 Arab civilians at the village of Deir Yassin near Jerusalem. The

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[108] Dalet is the fourth letter in the Hebrew alphabet.

news of Deir Yassin triggered the flight of a large Arab population across Palestine, especially near areas of current or proposed Jewish settlement (Pappé, 2008; Morris, 2001). As discussed in Chapter 1, securitization can stretch across sectors, and the outcomes of the massacre show the implications of this. Depopulation is articulated within the social securitization framework as the elimination of identity as a component of ensuring state security. The overarching purpose of Plan Dalet was and remains highly contentious, depending upon which view of history you wish to adopt. It was either an act of ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian Arabs or, as Khalidi (1988) asserts, the use of psychological warfare against the Arab population, through the use of discursive speech acts. The introductory text of Plan Delat states:

> The objective of this plan is to gain control of the areas of the Hebrew state and defend its borders. It also aims at gaining control of the areas of Jewish settlement and concentration which are located outside the borders [of the Hebrew state] against regular, semi-regular, and small forces operating from bases outside or inside the state. *(Khalidi, 1988, p. 24)*

The Haganah carried out a series of military actions over a six-week period commencing in early April which produced defensible corridors to the outlying Jewish settlements that had been designated by the UN to be allocated to the Jewish state (Schindler, 2008).

If a failed nascent state does not lay claim to the land it was allocated, and/or does not ensure territorial sovereignty, can the land therefore be argued to be terra nullius? Krasner (2004) and Jackson (1991) argue that a failed state is unable to exert control over its territory and uphold its monopoly of violence. Supporting the premise espoused by colonising powers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the International Court of Justice stated in its advisory opinion on the Western Sahara (1975) "Any land which was unoccupied or unsettled could be acquired as a new territory by a sovereign State, and that the laws of that State would apply in the new territory." Implicit within that context was that it was not claimed by another power, or that power relinquished sovereignty (either tacitly or explicitly) which therefore left it open to claim. If the land is depopulated to ensure maximum political, social and military securitization by the conquering force then it arguably enables a claim to be made under terra nullius.

Territorial integrity through the acquisition of land and a robust defence was therefore to be attained. The societal and military securitization sectoral nexus is further visible

within this plan. Israeli paramilitary organisations had a cohesive force, including an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 European WWII veterans (Morris, 2001), specific objectives, and operated with superior lines of communication. Grossman (2008) articulates a psychological position which veterans and the survivors of the Holocaust had survived: "any natural or learned resistance to killing, any sense of the sanctity of human life, any human emotions, any remorse or compassion at the moment of truth, can all be overcome or overwhelmed with training" (p. 77). A number of historians (Abu Sitta, 2001; Golan, 2001; Morris, 1993; Pappé, 2008) state that at the conclusion of the plan more than half of Palestine's Arab population (nearly 800,000 people) were uprooted, 531 villages and 11 urban neighbourhoods destroyed. The military plan and its subsequent implementation established territorial linkages between the main Jewish population areas and secured the borders of the Israeli state prior to the anticipated invasion by regular Arab forces.

Within the sphere of military securitization there were dramatic developments which changed national identity; progression towards acceptance on the world stage (but not within the Middle East); and socio-cultural developments. Those impacts still endure today. Land – its acquisition and retention – drove all elements of the nascent state. It remains the major factor dominating Israel's relations with surrounding countries in the Middle East and with the wider global community.

Successful military securitization through internal and external balancing (Buzan et al., 1998) has been a key factor in the survival of the State of Israel. Internal balancing looks at internal military decisions and structures that have been put in place to achieve the goal of military security. Offensively, at its foundation Israel was faced with an imbalance of power in relation to the surrounding nations should those nations choose to mobilise all their resources (Parker, 1993). Israel was severely limited in strategic depth, which impacted upon military planning. Tactically its actions were offensive, in that it sought to take the battle to its perceived enemies. Cohen, Eisenstadt, and Bacevich (1998b) assert military tacticians sought an immediate response to any Arab action believing it could "prevent miscalculations of Israeli military capacity, its vital interests or its vulnerability to pressure" (p. 48). There was and remains a direct link between Israel's defensive strategic position and the perceived tactical options available. In 1948 Jews sought to gain and/or solidify the land granted under UN Resolution 181 (II), ensuring not only their

survival but an acknowledged right to the land granted to them through sovereign recognition. Defensively, one of the main premises was that they could not survive a wartime loss of land. Israel's military force did not possess, like others in the region, areas or land which they could fall back into, allowing them to regroup, resupply and reorder for further attack. Land, or the lack of it, is a key factor in all aspects of security of the state. The Jewish people had no option other than attack or fight among their homes. Israel and its Arab neighbours operated counter-intuitively to deterrence theories, in that the mutual deterrence relationship rarely prevented attacks in the face of entrenched grievance or fear (Caplan, 2020). As such, Israel fits clearly into the model of responding to an existential military security threat. The subsequent breaching of the borders by Arab forces allowed the 'fortunes of war' to be solidified into a prima facie but not indefeasible argument for the permanency of that land acquisition today.

As Butterfield (as cited in Grossman, 2008) articulates, battles have a common thread: the requirement of combatants to "reconcile their instinct of self-preservation … in the achievement of some aim, over which other men are ready to kill them" (p. 2). At the end of May 1948, the Haganah became the backbone of the IDF and other militia forces (including Irgun and the Lehi, and women's auxiliaries) were also incorporated into this structure, some voluntarily and others by force. As a result, the IDF comprised approximately 35,000 people. Ben-Eliezer (1998) has argued that the IDF was not only created to implement military securitization functions but also to impact upon the societal securitization discourse. Social securitization is linked with military securitization as Israel, since its inception, mobilised not only its men but its women as well. This securitization dyad still remains within Israel, unique for many decades in allowing its women to have an active presence in front-line roles.

Given the continuation of the existential threats perceived in the pre-state period, the declaration of statehood rendered military service compulsory for all adults over the age of 18.[109] This was articulated in the Defence Army of Israel Ordinance (1948), on 28 May 1948. This position has not substantially changed since the inception of the state. For most Israelis, Horowitz and Kimmerling (1974) assert, involvement in the army was and remains an incentive in and of itself, defining the extent to which an individual is in the 'social-evaluative' system of Israel. It remains a key component of the social contract with

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[109] For males, the service obligation ends at 54, for females at 38. Defence Service Law (1949)

the state (Lieblich, 1989). Linked to the pioneering path set down by the Yishuv, records show that kibbutz members have generally progressed to senior command positions and were more likely than other Jewish nationals to be represented in elite units. Weiss (1997) notes that failure to serve, notably by Israeli Arabs and Orthodox Jews sees their continued marginalisation.

Career military personnel, conscripts and a well-qualified and skilled reserve force allowed almost total enlistment of the country's available residents. Israel almost achieved equality with those nations seeking to attack it. Two or three years' active duty (generally in the army) between the ages of 18 and 27 is seen within contemporary Israeli society as a precursor to acceptance within that society (Pasachoff & Littman, 2005). Failure to render service is viewed as contrary to the social contract with the state and action against those not rendering military service may be taken on both a social and legal basis. Reserve service continues until the member is in their thirties or fifties, depending upon gender.[110] This means that in some cases unit members may have been working and/or fighting beside each other for 30 years (Lieblich, 1989). It allows for unprecedented levels of autonomous action within units and engenders a strong esprit de corps. As a result of this, the command structure and the education levels of soldiers allows for new ideas and methods to flow rapidly and multi-directionally through the chain of command. The need for military parity through the arming of all those over the age of 18 regardless of gender is balanced, however, with the creation of a situation whereby Israel's youth is continually armed. The reverberating strength/vulnerability paradox plays out continually within the Israeli psyche in relation to the retention of the land.

However, military mobilisation did not come without cost and some serious concessions. The leading pre-state rabbinic figure of ultra-orthodox Jewry and functional actor Rabbi Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz, used a speech act to negotiate with Ben-Gurion the granting of deferments to 400 yeshiva students from compulsory military service. The exemption was established to enable the reconstruction of the yeshivas and the Haredi ultra-orthodox Jewish communities, whose membership had been decimated by the Holocaust (Schindler, 2008). The exemption given soon after the state was declared did

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[110] Military service age or obligations (CIA: The World Fact Book, n.d.).

not have a sunset clause[111] and whilst the Haredi numbers have grown exponentially, they are still not seen to be serving in the IDF in proportional numbers.

On 15 May 1948 neighbouring Arab states crossed Israel's borders with a force of approximately 25,000 which grew to roughly 55,000 by October 1948. Smith (2010) notes these troops were largely inexperienced and, with the exception of a Transjordan contingent, were ill-trained. The action was partly in rejection of UN Resolution 181 (II), but also in response to the removal of Arab Palestinians from areas designated for the reconstituted Palestinian State. In contrast to Israel, most of the attacking Middle Eastern states still needed to address sub- and supra-state identities which acted as rivals for their citizens' loyalty.[112] The creation of the states and their ruling elites had not been embedded within those communities. This had flow-on effects impacting on the command and control of military resources and the political legitimisation for the action at home. The rivalries between the Pan-Arabian communities also provided further challenges to the cohesiveness of the force. The Israeli response was swift and detailed, demonstrating superior military tactical analysis with almost double the amount of troops mobilised to respond to the threat.

Waltz (2008) posits that external balancing derives its theoretical structure from the neo-realist theory of balancing. It looks at the alliances formed with other nations to ensure that the appropriate support, either in technical, hardware or physical support, is available in times of need. Power symmetry in regional environments are impacted by the preference and strategies of major powers. Cohen, Eisenstadt, and Bacevich (1998b) note that alliances between nations are a factor in military survival. Uniquely, the USSR (and its allies such as Czechoslovakia) was a key supplier of military hardware to the nascent Jewish state from the end of WWII through to 1948 when this transitioned to Israel's neighbouring states. Israel from that point until the 1950s sought three major allies: the US, France and to a lesser extent the UK. Ben-Gurion's policy was for Israel always to maintain key alliances with major powers including access to military technology and hardware (Rivlin, 2019). This policy was challenged internally as some

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[111] The impact of the Haredi's non-service is now being expressed as a social, economic, political and military threat to the state. Recent elections (2015) within Israel saw parties campaigning to remove the exemption and force integration within the contemporary requirements of citizenship and service in line with all other Jewish nationals.

[112] Internal political rivalries within each state were impacted by tribal allegiances who were simultaneously competing for power within and outside of the imposed hierarchies.

believed that with alliances would come obligations, thereby possibly constraining the ability of Israel to react in the face of certain challenges.

As shown in Chapter 2, the potential for the use of nuclear weapons was already a component of defence planning. The year 1948 saw scientists from the embryonic Weizmann Institute for Science actively exploring the Negev desert for uranium deposits on orders from the Ministry for Defence. The land settled in 1909 and retained by force of will and expenditure of economic, political and military capital was slowly starting to have a positive effect on the state. The opportunity for threat response went beyond exploration. By 1949 the Weizmann Institute of Science eagerly embraced nuclear research by Dr Bergmann, who led the chemistry division. He played an active functional actor role, sending students overseas on government scholarships to study areas such as physics and nuclear engineering (Caplan, 2020). Given the precarious nature of the nascent state, this long-term planning had impacts not only on military securitization but also upon the societal and economic spheres, given the requirement to fund and remove key thinkers from the military combat space when the state had an immediate need.

Figure 3.2   Armistice lines, 1949.

By 1949 armistice agreements were finalised between all neighbouring states that had committed forces, except Iraq (Figure 3.2[113]). Iraq however did withdraw its forces (Black and Morris, 1991). Military defeat traditionally prompts a review, which then has a serious influence on tactical learning. Within the Arab League there was little formal acceptance of this process and the military tactics, both in this and subsequent conflicts across the period of this dissertation, suffered as a result. Palestinian territory at the end of the conflict was limited to the West Bank controlled by Transjordan (and

[113] From "1948 War Maps: Armistice Lines," n.d.

subsequently annexed by it) and Gaza, which was held by the Egyptians. The Holy City of Jerusalem was split between victor and vanquished. The Old City, the Western Wall and the Dome of the Rock remained in Jordanian hands, the remainder was controlled by Israel (Bregman, 2000). As a result, the end of the 1947–48 conflict saw the creation of a geopolitical situation which would create discord for both Palestinian Arabs and Jewish Israelis into the next century. Gorenberg posits that battlefield success contributed to the idolisation of the Israeli military, placing pressure on the societal securitization agenda, making "militant nationalism a pillar of faith" (Gorenberg, 2011, p. 3).

3.3   Societal Securitization 1947–1949

The creation of a new state can be fraught, as there are no lands that are absent of claim.[114] The acquisition of the land, therefore, and its subsequent habitation may see the removal of the identifying marks of previous communities that do not conform to new societal norms.[115] Buzan et al. (1998) articulate that the collective identity has primacy within this sector. The actions of individuals, communities, organisations and the state to retain and embed identity is paramount. This can occur peacefully as part of the evolutionary process through assimilation, or in a hostile sense through either the removal of cultural iconography or the removal of people and structures. The State of Israel, through its use of force, removed people, structures and iconography. In so doing the nascent and then new state utilised almost all of Buzan et al.'s securitization elements.

Contrary to the assertion by Heiler and Layton-Henry (1993) that migrants move from areas of higher political, social and economic insecurity to areas that are perceived as less insecure, the aftermath of WWII saw North American and African Jews as well as concentration camps survivors move to the proposed state knowing, to a greater or lesser extent, that conflict with neighbouring states was imminent. The migration of concentration camp survivors provided Ben-Gurion and Sharret with an extremely effective societal and political securitization weapon. The turning back of the Exodus 1947, a ship which was filled with 4,515 survivors of concentration camps (Smith, 2010), was a critical turning point. As a result, the US and other nations placed considerable

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[114] The writer acknowledges accretion, and that the most recent usage of this methodology by China has resulted in numerous claims about the legality or otherwise of this tactic.

[115] ISIS, in its recent operations in Syria, Iraq and parts of Turkey, showed a very clear desire to remove cultural iconography or structures that do not adhere to its view of what is appropriate.

pressure on both Great Britain and the embryonic UN to recognise the right of the Jewish people to a homeland. Utilising the model proposed by Hirschberger et al. (2016) from an existential threat basis, the issues faced by the Jewish people meet almost all elements of the multi-dimensional existential threat model, as the perception in relation to past victimisation, physical collective annihilation and personal death was clear in the aftermath of WWII.

Constructivism considers the impact on what is perceived as threatening and appropriate responses to that threat through a cultural lens (Buzan et al., 1998). Whilst there had been a more concerted effort in acquiring land in Palestine since the 1890s, the outcomes of WWII acted as a defining point for both Jews and the wider global community. Victimology and its impact on collective identity is both constructed and constructive in relation to the securitization discourse; threat assessment and threat response are interwoven throughout the history of the State of Israel. Volken (1997) views it as a way of linking non-cognate individuals and communities together through both past experience and new threats. This unifying base was particularly useful in assisting in the assimilation of the mass migration seen by the Israelis in the years after the cessation of WWII and also linking the existing Yishuv into that group. Lui and Hilton (2005) posit that faith-based victimology was able to mitigate ethnic and regional differences. While this was not always the case, it was a tool used collectively to engender goodwill and support for new immigrants and for embedding the collective identity of the Jewish state. Mordechai (1998) suggests that an additional factor resulting from Arab refusal of the UN determination was that "it hastened the formation of an esprit de corps and a sense of nationhood amongst its (Jewish) people" (p. 56). Cesari (2014) illustrates whilst the liberal ideal of political secularism should see Judaism as "neutral" this did not occur with discriminatory practices occurring as rights were based on religious affiliation. The perception of being a victim, Rosenberg (2003) suggests, also served as a foundation for agreement and solidarity because the threat related to the community's wellbeing and even to its survival. Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan (kibbutzim leader and military commander) and others would use it through the course of the next 20 years as a means to heighten the need for unity and solidarity. The use of victimisation and the omnipresent existential threat was an active but not conscious use of social securitization theory domestically and to create a bond among Jews internationally. However, the negative consequences of using it as an active form of social construction are still

impacting on the global dynamic up to the present day. Israel and Palestine are still actively dealing with the nation-building tactic used in 1948.

Not all members of government were supporters of Plan Dalet to safeguard the internal legitimacy of the state but which resulted in the disenfranchisement of the Palestinian Arabs. Yishuv members within the Marxist-Zionist MAPAM (United Workers' Party) and the Communist Party (MAKI) were expressing concern in June 1948 about the long-term impact on the state of the proposed action, arguing for Palestinian repatriation. Cohen on behalf of MAPAM warned prophetically that "A state based on national enmity and the rule of one people over another will certainly breed chauvinism and reaction in its internal life" (1948, p. 45). As a speech act it clearly identifies the threat of a 'we' and 'other' approach to state building.

The search for a secure homeland for the Jewish people and Jewish culture were preconditions for the State of Israel and were linked to both societal identity and political legitimacy. As discussed in Chapter 2, there were other options for a national home that would have resulted in far less conflict, however the cultural requirement dictated what land would be deemed acceptable. The more radical proponents argued for a land claim articulated in biblical times in Genesis (15:18) "to your descendants I shall give this land, from the River of Egypt to the great Euphrates River." The Arabs remaining within the borders of the land identified as belonging to the State of Israel were deemed to be a threat.

Whilst the true number of Palestinian Arabs who escaped or were exorcised from the land that became Israel and started the Palestinian refugee problem will never be known, Morris (2004) places it between 600,000 and 760,000. The reasons for the exodus are manifold, including, but not limited to, the military action, expulsion orders by Zionist authorities, the breakdown in Palestinian leadership, and an opposition to living under Jewish law. The territorial dimension to this reverberated throughout the region. It undermined the territorial sovereignty of surrounding Arab states, through the fluidity of their borders and lack of territorial inviolability. More importantly, as Pappé (2011) asserts, it established within the mindset of the international community that the Palestinians had implicitly ceded the territory to Israel. As a process of hegemonic control, the enactment of informal policies created a hostile environment for subjugated groups, which al-Orzza and Hallowell (2016) argue resulted in their disproportionate emigration

and has led to claims of forced mass population transfers. Hegemonic control is seen through the transformation of the population through settlement and migration. Jews who immigrated to the nascent state to displace the now Arab minority would have previously been the recipients of such treatment in Europe prior to and during WWII (Azoulay & Ophir, 2013). The Law and Administration Ordinance clearly showed that while the newly created State of Israel had the ability to co-opt Arab Israeli's, this was not utilised. As such it has reinforced the perception that they are the 'other' inside Israel, and legislation discussed in the coming chapters will elaborate on how this has changed the dynamic of the state.

As a policy instrument, the forced population transfers of the Arab minority within Israel's borders on its declaration of independence was designed to achieve part of a defensive position against an external attack, and to strengthen territorial claims (Morris, 2004). Approval and recognition is a social construct. Successful warfare and violence carried out for self-determination of a group in its own land may be perceived as justified and legitimate by that community. This method does not ensure the end to national or ethnic conflict, and Donnelly and Steele (2019, p. 210) argue that "history does not abide to a linear arc even is the victors construct it." Indeed, it is a violation of human rights and, in the case of Israel's in principle agreement with the United Nations, in relation to the care of minorities within its borders.

This did, however, still leave a large number of Palestinian Arabs and Christians within the original mandate land allocation, and also within the newly acquired territory. Democracy in its most simple form is understood as 'majority rule'. It also contains within it the premise of citizenship, and the ability to influence the decisions of the state. Lustick (1979) argues where there are multiple well established national or ethnic communities whose members disagree on the basic institutions and/or policies a government should pursue, then majority rule as an alternative to continuous conflict can become a mechanism of hegemonic control. The first population census of the State of Israel was held on 8 November 1948 (O'Balance, 1972). This census assisted in determining the actual numbers of Jews, Arabs and refugees living in Israel. The data would be used for many purposes, not least as a threat assessment. The number of Arabs living in Israel at the time of census, was approximately 102,000, of whom 48,000 were refugees (Morris, 2004).

The Israeli government used the societal security issues effectively to mobilise all members of its population in response to the war, which was started on the day after nationhood was declared. Jabotinsky, a key contributor in the formation and leadership of the Haganah linked the personal security of every person in Israel with the security of Israel as a whole (Naor, 1999). The active and calculated inclusion of the Jewish diasporas changed the social securitization platform and became a powerful weapon in the emergent nation, and the wider relationship it had within the region and the globe (Shlaim, 2001). This can be seen most clearly in its relationship with the US. The lack of strategic depth also meant that the society as a whole would be involved in the fight for the survival of the state. Grossman (2008, p. xix) argues that "there are only two kinds of people once the bullets start to fly: warriors and victims;" given the victimology rhetoric and the existential threat, the mobilisation was fully supported by the Jewish community, prepared to make any sacrifice for survival. Jackson and Dexter (2014) argue that violence is viewed as a precursor in the pervasive narratives of threat and victimhood narratives, as will be shown across this dissertation.

History demonstrates that in religious conflict, violence may continue for decades or centuries after treaties are signed and is prone to re-escalate.[116] The probabilities of escalation are linked to integration of the 'other' within the wider community (McGrattan & Hopkins, 2017). History will show a gradual lessening of internal violence, but many, both those who remained and those who left the State of Israel, effectively became squatters in the surrounding states and are still firmly enmeshed in that perception of continual violence. Roe (2005) notes that this incites measures and countermeasures by the affected communities in addressing the perceived threats against them.

3.4   Environmental Securitization 1947–1949

The challenge of insufficient water and resources to the nascent state was discussed in Chapter 2. There had been an active response to that risk through the acquisition of lands and planning for ways that would mitigate the dependency of acquiring these resources from areas outside Jewish control.

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[116] If peace and the normalisation of relationships are unsuccessful, the younger generation, possibly raised with a negative perception about the other group, are likely to contribute to increased hostility. Existence within the borders of the State of Israel for a significant number of Arab Israelis over this period clearly falls within this pattern.

The results of UN Resolution 181 (II) in relation to both land and water had significant impacts on both the Palestinians and the nascent Jewish state. As described in Chapter 2, the most productive lands in Palestine (as classified by both the British and the UN) were granted to the emergent State of Israel. This was one of the most significant reasons for the creation of the otherwise illogical shape of the partition boundaries (Gross, 1990). By the end of the 1947–48 conflict, Israel would hold 95 per cent of these lands. This represented the majority of the land supporting Palestinian citrus and vegetable export production, a significant component of the Arab Palestinian economy (Rivlin, 2019). As discussed in the previous chapter, employment of Arabs to work on any land in control of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) was impossible without breaking lease conditions.

The emergent state had a number of issues to address as a component of environmental security. The access to natural resources, rapidly increasing population and growing economies ensured the civil administration was very conscious of using the land resources cautiously (Barkai, 1983). In an area such as the Middle East this is even more crucial due to limited supply and the increasing threats that fluid borders and jockeying for regional hegemonic control by rival Pan-Arabian states presented.

Integrated approaches are required for land planning and policy, and as discussed in the political securitization sector of this chapter, Israel exerted significant effort in the legislation that covered the access to and use of land within the state. The state utilised the built environment as both an offensive and defensive weapon to pre-empt the movement of individuals and groups (Segal & Weizman, 2002), with consideration of their religious and ethnic divides, and as such changed the face of the nascent State of Israel.[117] The drive to secure water was clearly articulated by Ben-Gurion (n.d.) and it was noted in the Central Zionist Archives that when meeting with the Russian envoy in 1948, he stated "for us water is more important than oil."

When Colonels Husni Zaim and Adib Shishakli, seized power in Damascus in 1949, environmental and social securitization opportunities were available that could have reshaped the region. The importance of both Lake Tiberias and the River Jordan in relation to environmental security was viewed by the Syrians as potentially linked to financial support from the US, provided an accommodation could be reached with Israel.

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[117] This became a long-term national methodology, continuing until the present day with the wall separating the occupied territories and the state boundaries of 1967.

Shlaim (2001) articulates that Zaim's offer to Ben-Gurion was essentially peace in exchange for enduring equitable access to these two water bodies, with the additional sweetener of the resettlement of 300,000 Palestinian refugees. Ben-Gurion (1949) turned him down. Ma'oz (1995) documents the next Syrian government attempt, led by Adib Shishakli, extending the offer by increasing the refugee numbers to 500,000 and simultaneously implementing internal controls within Syria on a fundamentalist group who were anti-Israeli. Ben-Gurion still refused. He would not trade environmental security or land for peace. Land represented the endgame for Ben-Gurion, something that Israel under his leadership would hold on to at any cost (Ben-Gurion, n.d.). As such the choice by Israel provides a clear indication as to the power of environmental security over all other considerations in this context. The risks would be mitigated or managed to ensure retention of the water.

3.5   Economic Securitization 1947–1949

The relationship between finance, trade and production were central to both the creation and survival of the state. Pre-state manoeuvring since the first Zionist Council had created an effective fighting fund. This fund was used to support not only the development of industry, acquisition of land and creation of organisational structures, but it also set within this context the foundation for the long-term financing and financial planning of the state (Rivlin, 2019). Whilst the Arab boycotts of 1946, discussed in Chapter 2, created a challenge in the pre-state period, their impact was not felt after statehood. UN Resolution 181 (II) had far-reaching impacts on the economic progression of both proposed states beyond the allocation of land. Those foundations, however, came at a cost to the individual. The population over this period doubled, and austerity measures such as rationing were implemented to support the economic survival of the state. Senor and Singer (2011) note that the standard of living was "comparable to that of the Americans in the 1800s" (p. 17). However this was seen by the community as a temporary measure to ensure the safety of all.

3.5.1   Land

Land was required to drive the development of the state, and was a critical component of both the Zionist ideology and as an outcome of the war of independence. The new borders

brought with them increased land and opportunities, but also additional risks which would need to be mitigated through the expenditure of funds in terms of labour and material. The land acquired provided not only physical space for the state, but also the previously Palestinian Arab controlled citrus and olive groves and other light industries. This increased Jewish citrus exports, and resulted in a post-war economic increase of national domestic product to 80 per cent by 1948 (Gross, 1990). The challenge is that securing this new land would involve additional expenditure in terms of infrastructure (Including roads, irrigation and electricity), housing (building and construction) and equipment (e.g. farm machinery to support the kibbutzim and weapons).

3.5.2   Labour

The planned Israeli post-war economy reflected the endeavour by Western governments, Gross (1990) argues, to ensure full employment. Zionist ideology considered Jewish immigration as the pre-eminent national priority and the cessation of fighting bought with it the opportunities for increased migration with resultant increases in available labour. Barkai (1983) records the population of Israel in 1949 as 1,059,000, of whom only 310,000 were gainfully employed. Israel, cognisant of the continuing threat by regional neighbours continued conscription into the IDF. Gross (1990) notes by December 1948 this accounted for approximately "15 percent of the Jewish population and at least one-third of its labor force" (p. 72).

3.5.3   Capital

Financially the Jewish Colonial Trust observed that the emergent state commenced 1948 in a reasonable position as a result of the pre-state years and continuing contributions, internally and externally, from across the Jewish community (Segev, 1998). The Israeli lira (pound) commenced trading as the Jewish currency on 17 August 1948. The declaration of statehood saw the Anglo-Palestine Bank transition into the State of Israel's banker, and its role domestically included the issuance of currency and externally on the world stage it had a role in the acquisition of further funding to support the state. The cost of financing the 1947–48 conflict and the rapid migration of Holocaust survivors placed a significant drain on state funds, which it chose to manage through the use of a monetised deficit. Greenberg (as cited in Gross, 1990) posits that the financing of the 1947–48 conflict

represented approximately "60 million Israeli lira (IL), or perhaps 40 percent of domestic product" (p. 73). To respond to these requirements, Israel implemented a severe austerity program (Halevi, n.d., para. 6) including the rationing of basic commodities and imposition of price control, which would remain in place until 1952. The austerity policy was formally presented to the Israeli parliament on 26 April 1949; audience engagement with the economic securitization issues resulted in initial acceptance of the policy, however smuggling and black market access to goods would increase. Gross (1990, p. 73) notes Israel's position in relation to its expulsion by Great Britain in February 1948 from the sterling bloc was one of "almost complete indifference."

3.5.4   Enterprise

An economic union as part of the 'shared' elements was posited as part of the partition plan, a key element of which was to be the oil refinery in Haifa. The refinery at the time was the third largest in the Middle East, representing 7 per cent of world trade in oil.[118] The refinery was British owned and supplied by a number of companies across the Middle East linked to the British government. Bamberg (as cited in Bialer, 1999) states the British government of the time believed that this could be significantly increased, once the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline came into operation.[119] Haifa, according to the partition plan, would be in the Israeli state. The threat this represented to both Great Britain and those using the benzene, kerosene or oil of the new state plan was obvious. Access to and production from the refinery had a lesser immediate impact on France and the US, but within an alliance context, the linkage between states' energy interests was clear (Rivlin, 2019).

As both mandate overseer and having installed a number of ruling families into power in surrounding countries, Great Britain had previously enshrined its dominance through advantageous trade relationships. In the case of the Haifa oil refinery it did not own the oil it refined, but as a result of owning the pipelines, refinery, tankers and distribution networks, Great Britain took its cut at all those points (Ben-Ami, 2005). New ownership of the refinery meant that Israel could seek payment to improve its balance of trade in hard currency or gold, increase the cost of production, or require immediate payment on refinement of the product, or combinations of all of these. The resolution of the 1947–

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[118] The supply went to countries as diverse as the UK (50%), Greece Belgium, Morocco, Turkey and Algeria.

[119] Iraq Petroleum pipelines, tankers from Tripoli and Abadan.

48 conflict will be discussed in Chapter 4. There were a number of small interruptions of service between 1947 and 1948 until, on 14 April 1948, the refinery was shut down as a result of an Arab strike. The result of this would see both nascent states devoid of oil, benzene and kerosene progressively from late April through to June 1948, with no guarantee of resupply through the Haifa refinery. This threat did, however, provide the genesis of a four-point plan that still governs Israeli energy planning. Mulder (2020) asserts that the plan revolves around the acquisition of low-cost energy for domestic consumption with little or no impact on foreign exchange holdings, creation of industries (including petrochemical) that reduce dependence, refining of crude oil, or continued participation in the sale of oil to Europe.

The existential threat in this context was the assurance of supply to the refinery to enable the state to survive. In December 1947, the Yishuv started stockpiling, however payment was required in US dollars which impacted on the nascent state's reserve (Barkai, 1983). As war became more imminent, negotiations with Russia saw the supply of 5,000 tons of benzene and oil. This supply chain was to remain a key lifeline for the State of Israel until 1954. The duality of recognition (US and USSR) allowed access to resources and support from both superpowers.

The need to ensure that Israel would never be vulnerable or defenceless in the face of external threats became the driving force behind the creation of defence industries within Israel. In doing this, it would formally solidify the strength/vulnerability paradox within all aspects of the securitization of the state, defining both the state and its people, through the repetition of narrative and practice influencing actor's thoughts and actions (Vangeli, 2018). The creation of defence industries capable of meeting those challenges became a critical factor in both economic and military securitization. At its foundation, Meron and Jervis (1999) conclude, Israel was faced with an imbalance of power across the sectoral spectrum. Whilst the commencement of the year showed that the state was viable financially, it could not anticipate the amount of expenditure that this war would need. The use of the diaspora was crucial in the arming and economic survival of the state.

3.6   Concluding Comments 1947 – June 1949

The emergence of a democratically constructed state as a result of a gift of land in a hostile environment was never going to be simple. Resisted internally and externally, the threats were obvious and manifold, requiring an active management plan. The legacy of trauma retrained a central position in the discursive narrative surrounding the Jewish people. From both a realist and constructivist perspective, this period saw both threats and the use of force. Territory is linked both to the criteria defining the state, but also the boundaries for the use of force to protect those to whom the state has an obligation. The land held by the State of Israel in January 1949 (Figure 3.2) would define Israel's territorial sovereignty until June 1967. It encompassed an area visibly larger than that designated by UN Resolution 181 (II). Significantly, Jewish state-builders were given defined borders and the nascent government took steps through the use of Plan Dalet and other measures to ensure there was a rough correlation between the land held, its prevailing Jewish identity, and the anticipated needs of the future state.

As shown in this chapter, the practice of state security may cause insecurity for individuals and communities. Israel was severely limited in strategic depth from which to launch either offensive manoeuvres or to fall back and regroup should the tide of battle require reorganisation. Whilst not having strategic depth is traditionally seen as negative within military security, for the 1947-48 conflict, short supply and communication lines, easy access to fresh troops and resources (military hardware from offshore and the nascent defence industries) and a personally invested public, significantly impacted the conduct of the conflict. Deterrence theories focus on denying the enemy[120] opportunity to attack both through the acquisition and comprehensive training of military resources with an implacable resolve to use that force, thereby ensuring that Israel's intentions are never doubted. The actions of Israel, therefore, set the tone for future engagements.

However, it is also in this chapter that the argument for the widening of what needs to be securitized is clearly shown. The interconnected nature of securitised issues reflects the analogy of an unsolved Rubik's Cube®. A widened securitization discourse supports a more diversified assessment of threats to the emergent state, providing a more holistic response with consideration of resources and accommodations. Not all sectors had equal

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[120] For contemporary considerations of the construction of the 'enemy' see Olsson (2019).

weighting, as the immediacy of the threat and the necessary response to counter it influenced the decision-making process. The capability of the state was limited and whilst the threats were individually existential, state resources were constrained and therefore decisions had to be made within that context.

The Israelis had a strong government (by local standards) with an effective political, societal, economic and environmental securitization framework, thereby providing internal legitimacy. The new state on inception enacted, repealed or confirmed a number of laws to ensure both the people and land were protected under Jewish law through the distribution of asymmetric privileges. Waltz (1959) suggested there is utility in the identification of the enemy 'other' as a method of promoting national unity and cohesion. The active use of legislation by the state defined the 'we' and 'other' within the state legislative discourse including the retrospective amendments of Ottoman and British legislative instruments to allow for either the purchase of land or the immigration of Jews into pre-state Palestine, essentially legitimised previously unlawful acts. This process commenced the legitimising framework and identified how legislative language may be used to define 'we' and 'other' in the coming years.

Societal cohesion was through religion, a shared history and past victimisation articulated through a pervasive discursive narrative of mnemonic threat. This allowed the assimilation of Jewish members from across the globe and the creation of a belief in the state and that any sacrifice was required to ensure their survival. In doing so, it started to compose a narrative that would make de-securitization efforts increasingly difficult. More importantly Israel was able to back up its demands with its own monopoly of legitimate violence.

The State of Israel used every political securitization method to ensure retention of what it was given and what its weaponry had obtained. One of the drivers for this was the instability that could ensue if sovereign control was not exercised over its borders. This included the arguably successful attempt to legitimise the taking of land not allocated under UN Resolution 181 (II) or by purchase from the previous landholders up to the war of 1948. The land acquired as a result of these actions was deemed by the wider global community to be de facto acceptance of the international law principle of 'uti possideti' or 'as you possess'. There were no moves then or now under the auspices of the International Court of Justice to force the return to the mandated land holdings.

International legal principles have a long precedent in not allowing succession, thereby rendering additional claims by the Palestinians within those territories moot.

The mnemonic narrative of the existence of imminent existential threats had been established in the pre-state years and continued with the declaration of statehood. As previously discussed, the 1933 Montevideo Convention (Article 1, p. 25) stipulates four criteria for statehood and by the end of 1949, Israel had met all of these. The threats, perceived or actual, impacted on the securitization of all sectors. Buzan et al.'s (1998) method of sectoral analysis allows for a more nuanced approach, thereby enhancing the understanding of what was deemed threatening, why certain decisions were made, and the implications of those choices.

The 1948–49 war ended not in peace but in a UN negotiated armistice. Securitization across all sectors was evident, and in most cases the existential threats were to remain constant for the entire case study period. The next chapter looks at how the responses to both the perceived or real existential threats in the pre-state period were embedded and how this drove the new state's securitization response across all sectors for the period July 1949 – July 1955.

Chapter 4   Building a State: One Law at a Time
(July 1949 – July 1955)

"I still possess the key to my family home in Jaffa. It shall pass to my children and grandchildren till our return."

Khamis Hamid in a refugee camp in Gaza
(Abu Sitta & Palestinian Return Centre, 1998, p. 9)

The previous chapter commenced the longitudinal usage of the Copenhagen school theory and methodology in response to challenges across all sectoral elements. Hostilities prior to and immediately after the Israeli declaration of statehood resulted in the state having to consider each sectoral securitization individually and then within the wider context of state survival. Whilst some sectors had met the criteria to be securitised, they were not progressed as such given the competing priorities of the state. The Rubik's Cube® analogy allows examination of each threat separately, but also considers the interconnectedness of each sector to the position and choices made by the state.

Whilst a ceasefire would be declared and peace negotiated at a later date, the state was now manifestly aware of the existential threats arrayed against it. The repetition of the imminence of that threat and its construction in mnemonic terms linked to Jewish identity commenced a discursive tradition that would impact on all facets of the securitization process. The narrative placed primacy on the Jewish people and 'othered' all those who stood against them particularly overtly hostile neighbours and the members of the international community unwilling to recognise the legitimacy of the state. The legislative approach used by both Great Britain and the embryonic State of Israel in the previous chapter supports the contention of McGowan (2009) who argues that some speech acts cause and constitute acts of oppression. This contention is supported by Langton (1993) who argues that the utterance may enable the enacting of a law which subordinates one community to another and legitimatises discriminatory behaviour towards the targeted community.

This chapter continues the longitudinal study of sectoral challenges encountered by the State of Israel over a six year period, following a similar format as the previous chapters considering the actions within sectoral parameters and then drawing the main arguments together in the conclusion. The difference for the six years that are covered in this chapter was that war was not overt. This was a time of relative military stability, with no serious conflicts. However it was a key period for addressing sectoral securitization issues through diverse state-building activities. The existential threat was portrayed as imminent and securitization across all sectors will be shown to be obvious. As a result of the actions detailed in Chapter 3, the State of Israel had gained additional territory, repulsed a number of neighbouring military forces and encouraged, expelled, threatened or coerced a majority of the Arab Palestinian population to leave.

Regionally, force projection activities by the great powers and the manoeuvrings of the superpowers had a significant impact. The Cold War saw both a solidification of and challenge to superpower hegemony in the Middle East. This occurred on two fronts pertinent to this dissertation: directly between the superpowers and their supporters, and in the relationship each had with Israel. The use of proxies increased the tension between nations supporting opposing superpowers. As proximity heightened threat awareness, the responses that these actions engendered within the Pan-Arabian communities and Israel was then played out within sectoral securitization elements.

4.1   Political Securitization 1949–1955

In this period of relative calm Israel sought to undertake a number of tasks designed to mitigate known existential threats to national identity and citizenship, solidify globally its legitimacy and provide a strong legislative basis for external recognition and internal governance. Bolstering the work of the pre-state period and embedding an organisational structure within all the territory under its control was key to territorial control. The ability to undertake this in the post-war period with limited resources and shifting external alliances was going to be challenging. The position internally was equally fraught but more amenable to change, with the support of actively engaged functional actors who championed particular positions for the advancement of the state as a whole.

4.1.1   External

The superpower interest in the region was, if not accepted, acknowledged as both a support and/or control. From a regional perspective, as discussed in Chapter 3, the power dynamic was changing at the end of the 1947–48 conflict. The constant struggle for influence between the US and the USSR polarised the political life of most countries in the region. Although the two superpowers remained leading actors, the relationship between them and smaller states started to alter.

In a recalibration of great power patronage, Israel moved to a more Western-centric position. The US had no established military alliances in the region and acceptance of Israel provided a force projection position for the US to restrict the USSR in its attempts to control the region (Bregman, 2000). The position was slow to change, and whilst initially US government engagement was limited to recognition and not accompanied by funding, the actions of the diaspora in the US as functional actors and the regional power plays would change this behaviour. This superpower patronage, whilst targeted primarily at Israel, also became a destabilising force within the region. Whilst the USSR was initially supportive of Israel, as described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, in terms of recognition and the sale of fuels and weaponry, the position slowly changed. A large factor in this was the significant sale of weaponry by the USSR to those who advocated the destruction of Israel.

Recognition of the State of Israel by Great Britain only took place after the 1947–48 hostilities moved into the Armistice Agreements of 1949. Oil was the key consideration for this delay. Bialer (1999) asserts the British government hedged its bets on the Israeli declaration of statehood stating "it would be too high a price to pay for the friendship of Israel to jeopardise the Arabs … or Middle East oil" (p. 72). With the armistice came manoeuvring by France and Great Britain with the support, but not active involvement, of the US to solidify Israeli–Egyptian cooperation to ensure oil supplies continued through to Haifa. By the end of 1955, the Israeli Government identified 56 nations who had formalised its legitimacy by recognising the State of Israel.

Further external legitimacy was attained when, in May 1949, Israel was admitted into the UN by the UN General Assembly, on recommendation of the Security Council. Whilst this did not provide an immediate change of behaviour from either the surrounding states or Israel, the acknowledgement further added to the legitimacy of the state.

Stability within the international order, Kissinger (1994) reflected, was a reconciliation between what makes people feel safe and what was considered fair. Defence of system-level referents such as international law and the international society (for example, in relation to human rights) were acknowledged, with Israel ratifying the four 1949 Geneva conventions in 1951.

4.1.1.1   Regional

The situation within the region was more fraught. The 1947–48 conflict did not end in peace but with an armistice (as described in Chapter 3), with a UN presence in the region and a host of Arab Palestinian refugees crossing almost all borders in search of relative safety. The armistice agreement highlighted fraught relationships within the Arab League and internal rivalries and factionalism, which contributed to undermining a regional response to a crisis. Israel was proving to be more adroit at using great power politics, which it had polished whilst in the British mandatory period, to play the Arab states off against one another. The year 1950 saw further challenges to the integrity of the Arab League with Jordan annexing the remainder of the West Bank and eastern parts of Jerusalem. In the same year, Israel declared Jerusalem its capital and moved its government infrastructure into the city.

Egyptian nationalism, as discussed in Chapter 3, was increasing, and Egypt emerged as the largest potential threat to the State of Israel, acting as the functional actor for the Pan-Arabian community. The early 1950s saw the Suez Canal emerging as a flashpoint, and an increasing rhetoric against both Great Britain and its ally Israel. British positioning in relation to a possible withdrawal further encouraged Egyptian overtures to first the US and then, as a result of being denied funding for the Aswan Dam project, to the USSR. Black and Morris (1991, p.130) assert Israeli security services identified in 1954 that a possible withdrawal of British troops from Egypt would represent an additional potential threat to Israel. They had acted as a quasi-buffer between the two states and if this small inhibitor was removed, the Sinai border could become another front that required active defence by Israel. As a clearly identified 'other' within the context of Egyptian securitization, Israel was doubly damned.

Israel's more immediate challenges with Egypt resulted from its actions in the Straits of Tiran in 1953 with the detention of a ship carrying Danish cargo to Israel. The following

year it occurred again with a Greek vessel, and in 1955 Egypt blocked all seagoing import of goods into Israel permanently from that point. This represented a two-fold sectoral threat to Israel. The first in an economic sense was self-evident, in terms of trade and access to goods and materials. Although these two vessels were European their main use was trade with East Africa and Asia. The second political threat is more nuanced, as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's rejection of the Baghdad Pact and participation in an arms deal with Czechoslovakia had multiple push points, Bregman (2000) argues, including linkage with the USSR and the crystallisation of alliances. This then sharply brought into focus the cost of alliances. The Israelis' concerns were two-fold: what impact would this have directly upon them, but also what could be asked of them as a result of their alliances with the US and Great Britain.

The use of victimology ensured this discourse became an intimate part of the shared history among Jews both in Israel and the diaspora, and by the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab League. Existential threat literature clearly references the causal nature of past victimisation. David and Bar-Tal (2009) argue this arises as a component of group cohesion and concerns about the well-being of the collective, constructed through societal interaction. The Jewish community's historic and recent collective memory of conflict and physical collective annihilation was used as a highly mobilising factor. This has significant impacts on how Israel would manage the outcome of the 1947–48 conflict and coming conflicts with its neighbours in the Middle East. This was a coherent strategy that impacted not only on the galvanisation of the population but the management of the conflict, approaches to the peace process and reconciliation. In many cases it served and continues to serve as a factor of continuing conflict and an inhibitor of peacemaking.

4.1.1.2 Détente with West Germany

The Israeli position towards Germany[121] was one of condemnation in all fora as a result of Nazi actions and the Holocaust. As a nascent state, Israel had actively used collective victimisation as a source of moral power, arguing the actions of Germany against the Jewish people as part of the justification for the creation of a Jewish state. Nesbitt-Larking (2019, p. 571) conclude that "political narratives are powerful forces in (de)motivating political agency." However, Buzan et al. (1998) state it is the decisions by

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[121] Both East and West Germany.

speech actors to support and de-escalate real or perceived threats which enable normalisation and the movement of an issue outside of the 'securitized' arena. Merelman (1966) argues that these 'turning point decisions' are a circuit breaker creating significant change in the status quo.

The decision by Ben-Gurion to attempt to reach a détente with the states that instigated such trauma to the Jewish people was fraught. Auerbach (1986) states Ben-Gurion and Sharret (Foreign Minister) utilised active cognitive dissonance strategies both internally and externally across key sectors to ensure the success of Ben-Gurion's speech agent role. As such, timing was critical for both sides. West Germany, re-establishing its relationships within the international community, needed the legitimacy that such an agreement would engender. The key drivers for Ben-Gurion to risk such an approach were grounded in economic securitization, and to a lesser extent political legitimacy. Acceptance of the plan by the Jewish people hinged on the ability of both speech and functional actors to convince the Israeli public and the wider diaspora as the securitizing audience (Buzan et al. 1998) that the money, retrieval of property and the acceptance by the Germans of responsibility for the Holocaust were a requirement for state survival. How that payment of money was viewed was the primary factor in the success or failure of the speech act. Ben-Gurion (1951) needed to avoid the perception that the payment was blood money and change the discourse to highlight that the payments would ensure the rehabilitation of those who had been injured (mentally or physically) as a direct result of the German action. Raviv (1998) emphatically states dissent was loud and visible in both countries. Consistent with Hansen's argument (2012) this achieved two elements of the securitization discourse: making a claim of its significance, and subjecting it to argument and contestation. Within the Knesset during the debate, which ran over three days[122] there was open dissent, with right-wing Herut leader Menachem Begin rallying thousands against the proposal.

Politically, for both Ben-Gurion and the West German Chancellor Dr Konrad Adenauer, this represented a huge threat to their individual agency. The speech actor's legitimacy is key to the success or otherwise of turning point decisions. Waltz (1979) and other system theorists posit that personality and politics provide little in the analysis of state relationships at a systemic level. The normalisation of the relationship with West

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[122] 7–9 January 1952. The decision was passed by a slim majority of 61-50.

Germany is a key example of how personality and politics were crucial both in terms of successful personal agency (Ben-Gurion) and an unsuccessful challenge to that decision (Menachem Begin). Paradoxically the dissent reinforced the legitimacy of the political structure of the state and also, as Merelman (1966) notes, the attainment of expediential legitimacy through the support and passage of the agreement between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany (commonly referred to as the Luxembourg Treaty) signed at Luxembourg, on 10 September 1952.[123] Ben-Gurion's speech recorded in the Knesset (1948-82, p. 897) argued "not to allow the murderers of our people to become its inheritors." This text identifies a clear 'we' and 'other' and additionally links the Holocaust trauma to current threats facing the state. What had been left out was that by this act, Israel was also legitimising West Germany.

4.1.2   Internal

As discussed in Chapter 1, Buzan et al.'s (1998, p. 141) political securitization has at its core the "organisational stability of the social order." Internal control and stability was embedded through a variety of measures including democratic election, legislation and governance infrastructure. External legitimacy requires not only secure borders to define the state, but also control internally of that territory. States "…legitimize their actions with reference to publicly available and acceptable narratives" (Schwedler, 2006, p. 117), which may be focused internally or externally in support of the state.

4.1.2.1   Changing of the Political Guard

January 1949 saw the first properly constituted election take place in the State of Israel. The legislative agenda was far-reaching, seeking to ensure the safety of the Jewish community and the land upon which they sought to live. This enabled not only the security of the individual and groups but also ensured the ability of government systems to function and embed the ideological legitimacy of the state.

Internal political legitimacy began to be embedded through a series of elections that saw MAPAI retain control of the Knesset, but it would gradually start losing ground to Herut.

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[123] On 12 March 1951 the Israeli government submitted its request for US$1 billion from West Germany and US$500 million from East Germany (Honig, 1954).

The 1951 election saw MAPAI returned with a small increased majority.[124] This term of government saw a continuation of land retention as the cornerstone of the Israeli political and legislative direction. The cost of migration in terms of water, food, employment, and infrastructure was growing (Gross, 1990). The first real challenge to the internal political securitization of the state occurred when Ben-Gurion resigned on 6 December 1953 and retired. The Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett then became the second Prime Minister. Under Ben-Gurion's leadership the Prime Minister held two portfolios: Prime Minister and Minister for Defence. Sharett's previous leadership of foreign affairs saw this transition to the roles of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The change would have significant unintended consequences, with the intelligence gathering activities in the Lavon Affair[125] occurring without the knowledge of the Prime Minister (Pasachoff & Littman, 2005). When this became known within Israel, Ben-Gurion returned to the political arena in 1953 as Minister of Defence. Sharett's de-escalation approach in relation to border incursions was seen by the more hard-line members of the Knesset as too moderate. The clash between Ben-Gurion and Sharett over this resulted in Sharett's retirement from political life (Sharett, 1978) and Ben-Gurion's re-election as Prime Minister in 1955.

4.1.2.2   Land Legislation

As discussed in Chapter 1, Lukes (2005) linked power to interests. Control was exerted through a suite of legislation designed to formally acquire and use land in support of the Israeli government's objectives and interests, with particular emphasis on housing, economics and the structural integrity of the state. Legislation acts as an assembly of political decisions that "privilege or prefer certain interests or world views" (Nesbitt-Larkin, 2019, p. 571), resonating with Jewish citizens, and disregarding alternative narratives. By 1949 Abu Sitta (2003) identifies that Israel controlled approximately 78 per cent of Mandatory Palestine, with a land mass of 20.5 million dunams (approximately

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[124] From 46 seats to 47 seats.

[125] Utilisation of 10 Egyptian Jews to spy for Israel in Egypt who when uncovered by the Egyptian government were left to fend for themselves. Two died prior to trial, two were executed and the remainder served long jail terms in Egypt (15 years to life imprisonment). The Israeli government denied that they were working for Israel. Whilst an internal inquiry cleared the Israeli Defence Minister (Lavon) of authorising the spying activity Ben-Gurion was not happy with the outcome. (Israel Military Intelligence, n.d.).

20,500 km²).[126] The nascent State of Palestine could be viewed from this perspective as a 'failed' or 'collapsed' state with an absence of effective central government power and, more importantly, a seriously fragmented territorial authority. This failure in its ability to exert power over the land that it had been granted would change the context of the Palestinian–Israeli discourse for decades.

Two of the most far-reaching suites of laws: the Emergency Regulations (Requisition of Property) Law (1949-50)[127] and Emergency Land Requisition (Regulation) Law (1949), allowed the reclamation of land and property by the state. Initially addressed through the emergency ordinances covered in Chapter 3, they were further codified in the first three Knesset periods,[128] and then amended or added to as required. The legislation has within its text clear links to the political and societal securitization sectors, with Article 3 stating that this was designed to ensure public security and defence and support for and the maintenance of those unable to care for themselves within the context of the Jewish community . It addressed not only the claim to land but also sought to clarify and quantify the rights and obligations of those whose land was acquired by the state. This impacted upon approximately 2 million dunams of land which ultimately came under the control of the Development Authority (and later the Israeli Land Authority). This process placed approximately 30, 000–35,000 Arab landholders in a no-win situation; as Benvenisti (2002) states, whilst technically owning the land, it removed their ability to use or sell it. Hallowell (1943) argues that the possession of property implies a series of dealings between individuals and/or the state. Taylor (2015) explains the loss of a home impacts upon agency and roles within the family and community. In this case the power differential was swayed towards Israel with no recognition of the agency of previous owners. Together they strengthened a number of provisions in the emergency regulations, allowing the government requisition of land. The law was amended in 1952 and 1953. The Land Requisition Regulation (Temporary Provision) Law, (1950) was amended in 1955 to allow a longer retention period by the government of property than that articulated three years earlier. A further (1957) amendment, identifies that any

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[126] Of this land, 8 per cent (approximately 1,650 km²) was privately held by Jews, 6 per cent (approximately 1,300 km²) by Arabs, and the remaining 86 per cent by the State of Israel. (ILA Report, 1992) See also Government of Palestine, (1991b) Supplement to Survey of Palestine (Jerusalem) (Institute of Palestine Studies, Washington, DC).

[127] Replacing the 1948 Emergency Regulations (Requisition of Property) Law.

[128] 1949–1959.

property held after 1956 now reverts to the State of Israel based on the British Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance (1943).

Governance legislation as an institutionally sanctioned practice had a significant impact, not only on the acquisition of land but upon who could use the land at a later point. Initially created in 1948-49 and then updated the following year, the Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands) Law, (1949-50) authorised the Ministry of Agriculture to proclaim lands as 'waste' lands and then to subsume those lands to the state. It allowed the government to warn an owner of the requirement to cultivate it. Failure to do so, or failure to meet the requirements stipulated in either the legislation or the direction of the Minister of Agriculture, resulted in the state taking control of the land.

Possibly the most far-reaching part of the legislative agenda was the Absentee Property Law (1949) which disenfranchised (through the acquisition of land and property by Israel) any person who had left their place of residence between 29 November 1947 and 19 May 1948 if that individual:

> (i)　　was a national or citizen of the Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan, Iraq or the Yemen, or
>
> (ii)　　was in one of these countries or in any part of Palestine outside the area of Israel, or
>
> (iii)　　was a Palestinian citizen and left his ordinary place of residence in Palestine
>
> > (a)　　for a place outside Palestine before the 27th Av, 5708 (1st September, 1948); or
> >
> > (b)　　for a place in Palestine held at the time by forces which sought to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel or which fought against it after its establishment
>
> *(Absentee Property Law, Section 1 (b) (i – iii), 1949)*

Businesses were not immune under this law – if all the owners, partners, or managers met the above conditions, the business was forfeit. One of the challenges that non-Jewish owners of land faced at the time was that, given the military security landscape and other laws being promulgated, once they had left the land, even temporarily, the land could be seized either under the laws discussed in Chapter 3, or those discussed in this chapter.

Non-Jews were in a no win situation. The written and spoken guidance from both the nascent State of Israel and some Muslim leaders urged Palestinians to leave their homes for safety. The discursive rhetoric of death and destruction at the hands of Jewish forces (IDF and militia) should they remain acted as reinforcement (Abu Sitta, 2001; al-Orzza and Hallowell, 2016; Pappé, 2008). The Custodian of Absentee Property undertook a four-year project commencing in 1948 creating an inventory of all 'abandoned' property to enable the resettlement of new migrants. 'Present absentees'[129] were barred from regaining their property because it was categorised as 'absentee property'.[130] Fisk (1980) asserts "70 per cent" of Israeli land may be subject to multiple claims of ownership: one from Arabs under British mandate legislation and the second from Jews under Israeli legislation.

The legislation on the control of and access to land played a major part in the ability of the state to absorb the imminent waves of mass immigration expected from world Jewry. Those arriving in the first Aliyah after the declaration of statehood were primarily Western European: survivors of the concentration camps or those unable to emigrate previously as a result of the halt placed on migration by Great Britain. By 1949, 47 new settlements had been situated in villages that had previously been inhabited by Palestinian Arabs, reinforced by the Homa Umigdal structures discussed in Chapter 2. By 1954, 350 settlements had been created on this type of land (Abu Sitta, 1998; Morris & Black, 2004; Peretz, 1958), with more than a third of Israel's population, including more than a quarter of a million new migrants, living there.

4.2   Societal Securitization 1949–1955

Political and societal securitization are distinct but linked concepts. As discussed in Chapter 2, social securitization concerns identity and how individuals identify themselves as part of a community, not necessarily a nation. Jewish national unity was encouraged through a discursive process linking Jewish history, identification of a common enemy and existential threats.[131] Societal securitization was a primary consideration in the

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[129] The term refers to a Palestinian who left (by force or voluntarily) their home in Palestine before or during the 1947–1948 War of Independence but stayed inside the new borders of the State of Israel. In 1950, 46,000 people were classed in this manner. (Segev, 1998).

[130] Shafrir (1949-1950) outlines in his report as the first Custodian that the construct of the legislative language (ii) could also be applied to Jews, however such action was unintended. Section 28 of the regulation allowed the custodian to exempt anyone capable of managing their property without aiding Israel's enemies. See also Nakkara (1985).

[131] See also Nordin and Öberg. (2015) and Chamayou (2012) for other conceptions of the word enemy.

period. Israel's faith was the basis of its community. The link therefore between the individual, the community and the land that Jewish people believed their faith had claim over was both a physical and emotional one. The ability to exert control over the boundaries of the state moved into the military and political securitization sphere. However the power within these spheres is linked within a democratic polity to the society that is its base.

4.2.1   Détente with Germany

The Luxembourg Treaty[132] with Germany, represented a significant threat to the societal securitization sector. The major existential threat was to vertical competition within Israel as discussed in Chapter 1. The creation of another 'we' and 'other' discourse among Jews who had migrated to Israel could impact on the cohesiveness of the state. In attempting to change the narrative around the restitution money, Ben-Gurion was positing an argument amongst a population where most were either survivors of Germany brutality or had family links to either those who did not survive or who did. Ben-Gurion hinged his appeal to the polity on three key legitimising factors: the refusal of the superpowers or great powers to mediate on behalf of Israel; denial of profit to murderers (as referenced in his speech to the Knesset); and the need to support survivors.[133]

4.2.2   Mass Migration

This period of relative peace identifies actions undertaken by both the state and the diaspora to, according to Buzan et al. (1998, p. 120), "defend 'we' identities." Recognising that horizontal competition, as discussed in Chapter 1, remained a very real possibility, the reaffirmation of the difference between the State of Israel and the nations surrounding it was critical to its survival. This then supported the actions of the political and military securitization processes in the expulsion of the 'other' outside the borders of the state. Jackson and Dexter (2014, p. 2) argue that "demonisation and de-humanisation of an enemy other" is a consistent part of the rhetoric of organised political violence. The new government of Israel also retained the formidable tool of emergency

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[132] The term in common usage is the Luxembourg Treaty, however it is more accurately referred to in UN documentation as No. 2137: ISRAEL and FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY Agreement (with schedule, annexes, exchanges of letters and protocols). Signed in Luxembourg on 10 September 1952 and articulated German restitution to Israel.

[133] Currently in Israel and those yet to arrive.

powers which had been inherited from the British Mandatory Period. Dowty (1998) notes that only the section restricting Jewish immigration was cancelled; the remainder of the powers continue to remain in force up to the present day.

One of the most common threats to societal securitization is migration, Buzan et al., 1998). The first seven months of statehood saw 101,819 Jewish immigrants and within six years (until December 1955) a further 674,142 others arrived (Sherman, 1959). The immediate challenge was not from too many Arabs, but too many Jews. In most cases it was a choice to come, but for some Jewish communities in the Middle East it was emigrate or perish. The war in Palestine had triggered an adverse response against Jews within the region. Across the dissertation period, up to one million Jews from the region moved to Israel, one-third of whom, Shindler (2008) asserts, would arrive before 1951, representing over 56 per cent of the migrant population for this period. Pasachoff and Littman (2005) identify a number of campaigns undertaken by the fledgling Israeli air service to relocate those in need. Defining the community which qualifies for its protection is a critical condition of state sovereignty. The community that Israel sought to enshrine within its borders was a majority Jewish one. Vertical competition was clearly articulated through this faith-centric mantra, allowing for a global linkage of community irrespective of physical location.

Two major pieces of legislation had a significant impact on who could be called an Israeli and what entitlement and duty that entailed to and from the state. Legislatively this enshrined the formal ingathering of exiles that the modern founders of the state sought. The first was the Law of Return (1950) which is non-selective (other than being Jewish) and forms the foundation of the grant of nationality. This legislation is the only one[134] that specifies a Jewish 'other' noting at 2(b) if the individual:

> (1) is engaged in an activity directed against the Jewish people; or
>
> (2) is likely to endanger public health or the security of the State.
>
> *(Law of Return, 2(b) (1) and (2), 1950)*

then they would not be considered eligible. This legislation also legitimised all previous Jewish migration to what was now the State of Israel. All other legislation either 'others' the non-Jewish community or provides the ability to waive the conditions for Jews.

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[134] Other than criminal legisation

Gouldman (1970) notes that this came with all the rights, responsibilities and privileges within Israeli society. The second is the Nationality Law which articulates in Section 2(a) that "every immigrant under the Law of Return (1950) shall become an Israel national." The delineation between who is an Israeli national and who is not became fixed as a result of the construct along religious lines. In doing so it allowed the 'we' to be clearly articulated. Davies and Harre (1999) argue that people who are either included or excluded from that identity then see the world from that viewpoint. The outcome of this legislative agenda created a two-tiered system within the state. Citizens (those who resided in Israel prior to partition if eligible or who chose to migrate afterwards and requested citizenship) and nationals (Jews) who were and remain privileged by the state. The diaspora would (and continues to) effectively bolster and support Israel through war, conflict and times of peace. As such, the structure of Israel's community meets the definition espoused by Buzan et al. (1998, p. 119) as "large self-sufficient identity groups."

Israel's engagement in self-redefinition was an important securitization strategy from a number of sectoral viewpoints as it stabilised its internal identity and provided a more structured and integrated base from which to move forward. The discerning way history is remembered, chronicled or forgotten is well documented (Alexander, 2013; Baker, 2010; Bell, 2010; Donnelley & Steele, 2019; Hopkins, 2014; Mälksoo, 2014). McSweeney (1999) argues that the Copenhagen School's securitization theory seeks to embed notions of society and identity which fail therefore to respond to the fluid, changing and multiple allegiances which occur in reality. Williams (2003) counters this, arguing that the securitization of identity results in negotiability and tractability being challenged, denied or suppressed. Bauder (2008) argues that this then ensures nationality remains a 'strategic concept'. Demography is linked to the security dyad in terms of its founding premise. The State of Israel was founded for and by a persecuted minority. Olesker (2011) argues that demography is not only critical in terms of the state's ethnic makeup but also to the ability to link this through policy and resource apportionment.

New migrants under the Law of Return, however, were part of the securitization efforts of the state. Military and economic imperatives saw most of the new migrants sent to the new border which Hasson (1981) suggests exerted a physical presence on the land, through an active use of the built environment. This solidified the Israelis' physical claim to the land and provided an immediate defence opportunity. Bernstein and Shlomo (1982)

argue that it also provided labour for both agricultural and industrial needs. Many had difficulty adjusting, as the placement of new migrants in this environment resulted in social marginalisation as it separated them from possible pre-existing support networks.

The immigration waves (Aliyah) had a changing profile. Those prior to World War II (WWII) and its immediate aftermath were generally highly educated and skilled. The subsequent Aliyah came from lower socio-economic positions with increased family size and the breadth of ages of these immigrants as well as their health status affected state infrastructure (Pasachoff & Littman, 2005). As a result, the highly skilled and those most in need, including those from European displaced persons camps and survivors of concentration camps, were housed close to or in the large population centres. Gradually, and without UN refugee assistance, the migrants were absorbed into Israeli society. The first census in Israel clearly articulated the 'Babel-esque' problem; whilst the language of the state was Hebrew its inhabitants spoke 20 different European and Asian languages as their primary language.

Housing that was now unoccupied as a result of either the hostilities or the legislative approach of the state assisted in the resolution of the immediate challenges that the influx of migrants posed. Where there were no habitable structures, the Homa Umigdal methodology was deployed, allowing for the security and housing needs to be met. It used the built environment to clearly articulate the overt possession of land and its influence over the surrounding environment. The Development Authority articulated within the Absentees' Property Law, 1950 addressed the acquisition of land by the Jewish National Fund (JNF). Tolkowsky states in the 1950/51 Yearbook (p. 291) it was specifically "to acquire abandoned Arab land on a large scale." The JNF and its successor the Israeli Land Authority (ILA) under their governance structures managed the occupation of land through long leasehold (99-year renewable leases) arrangements to Jewish nationals, not citizens. This provided legitimacy and primacy to this constituency. The ILA Annual report (1992) notes that many leases further specify that any employment opportunities available on state lands be undertaken by Jewish nationals, thereby locking Palestinians out of work on approximately 94 per cent of state land. In doing so, Israel allocated to its nationals almost all available land and associated resources. When some previous residents remained in Palestinian Arab villages, the Custodian of Absentee Property actively used their local knowledge and occasionally allowed them an ongoing role in the new community.

Depopulation, as articulated by Buzan et al. (1998), was also a factor, the Palestinian Arabs were seen as a threat to the Jewish state, both in terms of the size of the population and the societal differences.[135] As a result of Plan Dalet, whilst there was still a residual population they did not represent a substantive overt threat to what Buzan et al. (1998, p. 121) refer to as the "logic of identity" of the Jewish state (Steele, 2005, 2013; Strizel, 2011b; Taylor, 2015). Diplomatically, the resettlement of Arab Palestinians in their present locations would ensure Israel's standing in the international community. Bligh (1998) notes the position of Israel and initially the US and Great Britain, was that Israel was not the cause of the Palestinian refugee problem. The summer of 1949 represented a peak in the Arab refugee problem for Israel. At that time, more than one-third of the Arab Palestinian population was deemed to be a refugee. This figure steadily declined with Arabs living in Israeli either leaving or being granted citizenship. The oversight of refugees until 1966, was through a military administration (including surveillance), which Medding (1990) notes severely limited the refugees in terms of both their economic prospects as well as their freedom of movement.

Ethnic conflicts can have long histories; this can be attributed to existential threat perception (memories, recollections, symbolic collective annihilation) along with residual national/cultural violence contributing to a hostile environment long after the fighting ceases (Baker, 2010; Donnelly 2015; Donnelly & Steel, 2019; Hopf, 2002; Jelin, 2006; Jutila, 2015; McGratton & Hopkins 2017; Sjostedt 2013; Steele 2005). Buzan et al. (1998) posit that the ability of minorities to reproduce their culture can be further diminished by the active use of exclusionary practices by the state. With Jewish-centric national organisations in charge of a majority of Israel's social programs (including education) and having the capacity to exert influence over the disposition of water, power, infrastructure and crucially land, the ability to negatively impact on the Arab-Israeli people and culture was high. Through arrangements such as these, the 'we' and 'other' discourse becomes further embedded.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the non-participation of orthodox Jews (Haredi) in military service became more obvious in the early 1950s, especially in a society where social mobility and military service were linked. This segment of the community was either opting out of service, or formed an increasing cadre of 'hard core' faith-based

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[135] Ford (2001, p.53) argues that this resulted in 'social apartheid, inequitable distribution of public resoiurces and political disenfrancisement." For more information see also Delaney (1998)

officers who were trained in orthodox schools where the linkage of faith and military success/superiority is vested. The discussion then moves to one of military security. A challenge could arise between state law and religious law. The issue of leadership and control with specific Jewish subgroups only wishing to serve with those of the same group creates a schism within the military process, where the mission should be the key determining factor as to the composition of the unit. Gorenberg (2011) articulates the challenge of this dual allegiance – who do they follow, their military or religious commander? This then places elements of doubt in the senior commander's decision-making process as to who has the group's primary allegiance – religion or the state. This in turn has flow-on effects in terms of the organisation of and commitment to security responses. These issues continue to cause challenges within Israel today.

4.2.3   Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law (Punishment) (1950)

The collective memory of the Holocaust, and the desire for justice and/or retribution saw Israel include the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law (Punishment) statute in 1950. Foucault analysis of panopticon integrates the belief of surveillance as an active tool of state power, even if it did not occur extending the Orwellian (1996) concept of fear. "This was perfection of power" (Foucault, 1997a, p. 203) visible but unverifiable. In a clear identification of 'other' this legislation allows for the pursuit of any person who committed crimes against the Jewish people or their property during the Nazi regime, regardless of whether offenders had been dealt with by another jurisdiction. The minimum penalty able to be awarded if a person was found guilty was ten years. It would be under this legislation that the Mossad would commence the tracking of Nazi war criminals and collaborators.

4.3   Economic Securitization 1949–1955

The economic position of the State of Israel, as described in the previous chapter, clearly showed that while existential threats remained and attacks were probable, it was not possible to retain a large full-time defence force. There were significant drains on Israel's resources to actively manage the fallout of the conflict and the large state-building requirements in relation to infrastructure and social services. The period 1950 to 1955, was one which saw the Israeli economy grow by 13 per cent each year (Senor & Singer, 2011).

4.3.1 Land

The reality of mass migration on the scale experienced by Israel was particularly felt in relation to housing, infrastructure and support services. The ability to not only absorb but respond to the corresponding impact on internal domestic output and social costs in terms of health and education, as well as the impact on foreign exchange resources,[136] was significant. Land acquired as a result of UN Resolution 181 (II) or through the outcomes associated with the 1947–48 conflict resulted in more land and housing being available, but at a cost.

This effectively resulted in a change to both the ethno-religious and economic character and usage of land. It provided the state with the opportunity to change the focus from Arab-based agriculture or urbanisation to one linked to a Jewish industrial or rural kibbutzim-type focus. The Custodian of Absentee Property was reported in the Israeli Government Yearbook of 1958 (p. 235) as having claimed "approximately 280,000 groves and plantations, 57,497 dwellings and 10,727 businesses through the use of absentee property legislation." The land was leased to support the development of the state, through agriculturally based industries (vineyards, fruit trees and vegetables) addressing both the domestic and, it was hoped, trade markets.

4.3.2 Labour

Housing was affected by a number of issues, not least the regional dynamic and mass migration. The addition of over 800,000 migrants in a five-year period was recorded in the 1950/51 Israeli Government Yearbook (p. 325), which stated that "numerous spikes in housing issues were experienced with each wave of Aliyah." Flapan (1987) notes that where family resettlement occurred in now vacant villages, the cost to the state was approximately US$1,500. Where there was no accommodation available, the cost on average was US$8,250.

The impact of the Law of Return further enshrined the use of land and economic development processes. Securitization across sectors and supported through legislation drove the location of new housing developments. Decentralisation remained a key component, in a country firmly linked to the military concept of 'seize and hold ground.'

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[136] This was mitigated with the receipt of funds from West Germany.

Residential developments catering for the new immigrants were a strategic priority and required the developer to provide, without compensation, up to 40 per cent of the allocated land for public use (schools, roads, etc.). The placement of these communities was linked into military requirements in relation to the acquisition and retention of both land and territory.

From a mercantilist perspective the actions of the state as articulated in Buzan et al. (1998) follow the precepts of economic nationalism, with the needs of the state dictating both the markets and industry. Israel took this further, placing restrictions on who could work in state-based organisations or on state-owned land.[137] Economically, the justification for restricting access to JNF owned land was calculated to provide maximum support to new Jewish settlers, thereby supporting the national goals. The wages of Palestinian Arabs in Israel, as discussed in the 1950 UN Economic Survey Commission Report on the Middle East (United Nations, 1950), were significantly lower than those of Jewish workers, and therefore this had flow-on effects in terms of labour costs ("UN recommends economic aid to Arab lands", 1950). This decision for wage discrimination was supported by both the JNF and the Histadrut and retained within Israel the privileging of predominantly Western European Jews and the hegemony, both cultural and political, of Labor Zionism.

4.3.3   Capital

Buzan et al. (1998, p. 104) argue that within the economic securitization sphere securitization is most often "in relation to investment." In September 1950 Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency embarked on discussions with the US and other key diaspora memberships about the next three-year economic development plan for Israel. Ben-Gurion was seeking to identify the triggers for a large-scale foreign investment in Israel and how to address the continued large-scale immigration ("Foreign Affairs Committee bill proposing 76,000,000", 1965). The challenges of statehood, additional land and mass migration were significant in the economic sector. The national debt in 1950 was US$168 million and the national deficit was reported at US$476 million annually ("American $100,000,000 loan", 1950). Sherman (1959) notes that reports from the time identify the

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[137] As discussed in Chapter 2, the Yishuv had initially sought to manipulate the cost basis of the work, trying to creating a two-tiered system in the pre-state period.

deficit in relation to goods and services increased from 19 per cent to 31 per cent of gross domestic product between 1949 and 1956. US funds through the US Mutual Security Act (Marshall Plan) were significant, with US$73.5 million released in 1951, with additional funds for refugee resettlement programs. This was in addition to US$23.5 million previously designated as economic aid.

The Luxembourg Treaty represented a bright light in what was a dire situation for the state, as it slowly edged towards recession ("Israel parliament studies economic situation", 1953). Payments totalling US$715 million from 1 April 1953 to 31 March 1966 were allocated to the State of Israel. Of these funds, 30 per cent went to Great Britain for crude oil and the remainder to Germany for purchases of chemicals, metals, and agricultural and industrial products. These goods commenced arriving in 1953 as the state entered its first recession. An additional DM450 million for the rehabilitation of Nazi victims not in Israel was also guaranteed. Importantly Raviv (1998) notes this treaty also did not preclude individual restitution for Nazi victims. Additionally, the direct payment of funds to survivors of the Holocaust brought in much-needed hard currency.

Financially, the banking system was sound, well-managed and well-equipped. There was a high rate of savings and the UN Economic Survey Commission on the Middle East (1950) argues that its strong operating budgetary mechanism meant significant funds were able to be provided in support of both development opportunities and current operating expenses. The Jewish Colonial Trust (Zionism: Jewish Colonial Trust, n.d.) notes that the Anglo-Palestine Bank's banking registration was moved from Great Britain to Israel in 1950, which resulted in the bank being rebranded as the Bank Leumi Le-Israel (National Bank of Israel). The year 1954 saw the creation of the Bank of Israel, and the transition of Bank Leumi into a commercial bank. Then in 1955 the early 18th century Yishuv banking systems ended, with the transition of the Jewish Colonial Trust to a company registered in Israel.

By the end of this period the state identified that over US$1.6 billion was required in investment to support its development. The amount of US private investment had increased to $40 million annually ("American Private Investment", 1962), with over 200 US firms operating in Israel.

4.3.4   Enterprise

By the mid to late 1940s Bialer (1999) states the position in relation to who controlled Middle East oil distribution had changed, with US oil companies now controlling over 40 per cent. Israel's access to oil, benzene and kerosene continued to be unstable and represented a clear threat to the state. In 1949 these products were being imported from a diverse array of countries including Romania, the USSR, and the Panama region. By the end of 1949 the political cost of business with the USSR and Eastern Bloc countries was too great and this conduit was removed from the supply chain. The changing alliances described in the political sector also impacted on resource acquisition. Great Britain and the US became major sources of supply, and the trade was further enhanced by a reduction in price. Additionally, from 1 April 1953, as part of the Luxembourg Treaty, the payments for British oil would be made by Germany. Delays, however, came at a cost both in financial terms and in the imposition of austerity measures on the civilian population.

Export-centric lending was a key component in the development of the agricultural industry over this period, with the Export-Import Bank lending over US$135 million. The funds were to be spent on domestic fertiliser plants, improving irrigation systems and the rehabilitation of the citrus industry ("U.S. Export-import Bank Grants $35,000,000", 1950). The concerns about the citrus industry were not only state-based, but came from the growers themselves, who went on strike to force the implementation of state protectionist policies ("Citrus Fruit Growers Continue Strike", 1950). Free trade was actively encouraged, however the impacts of state-based controls over land and labour required active management and occasional intervention. Irrigation would remain a significant concern, with Ben-Gurion releasing funds in 1951 specifically for this purpose.

The Zionist Organization of America donated equipment and machinery for technical and trade schools to be created across the country ("Z.O.A Sends Equipment", 1952). These ranged in industry type from mechanics, carpentry and electrical through to beauty and sewing needles. This assisted in mitigating the increasing issues of unemployment and allowed for the growth of industries, assisting in both economic development and changing the built environment to reflect its new custodians. With the reduction of transit camps as migrants moved into or established housing towards the end of this period, funding was freed up for reallocation. Initiatives for higher education through the

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Fulbright program and the reciprocal training opportunities between the US and Israel also commenced ("U.S. Extends Fulbright Program", 1962).

This period was one of significant challenge for the state, with a number of areas requiring a significant outlay of funds to address existential threats. Sherman (1959) notes that having commenced statehood with reserves of US$150 million, the drain on these to support conflict, state-building and mass migration was substantial. Whilst the newly acquired land brought with it additional resources, the costs to defend it, support new communities through the provision of infrastructure and housing and the development of industries, severely tested the embryonic state.

4.4   Environmental Securitization 1949–1955

Whilst the scientific agenda, as discussed in Chapter 1, clearly identified the impact of scarcity, it was the political actions of the state that ensured environmental securitization of water within the State of Israel. Political environmental securitization, as articulated by Buzan et al. (1998) includes three main tranches: public awareness; acceptance of responsibility; and the management of issues arising (costs, enforcement, etc.) relative to the securitized issue.

The possession of land has been an issue for the Jewish people for centuries. The State of Israel represents a place that all Jews could call home. The right of return articulated in founding documentation and enshrined in law in 1950 brought with it the challenge of how to care for those who wish to return and where they would be housed both in a temporary and permanent fashion. The acquisition of land and the choices by government to relinquish it are therefore fraught with difficulties.

One of the unstated elements within that discourse was the physiological need for water to sustain life. As Chapter 2 clearly articulated, this had always been a consideration for the nascent government, and its actions in 1947–48 could be seen as a method of addressing this scarcity. The actions of the state in securing additional land as a result of the 1947–48 conflict brought with it opportunities and challenges in relation to the acquisition of water resources. It is here that the management of international cooperation and enforcement in relation to the attainment of national goals engendered the largest environmental securitization discussion. As clearly articulated in the two previous chapters, the lack of water had been acknowledged as an existential threat to the state.

Figure 4.1   Demilitarised zones in and around the River Jordan basin, 1949.

The River Jordan basin represented a particular test in that it was a provider of water for almost all parties in the 1947–48 conflict with the exception of Egypt (Figure 4.1[138]). The armistice agreement in 1949 brokered by the UN created three demilitarised zones (DMZ's); this, as Neff (1994) noted, separated Syria and Israel, defining a space of 172.2 square kilometres. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) oversaw these. A final decision on ownership was only going to be undertaken when a peace settlement was reached, and this did not eventuate. Importantly within the regional context, the armistice did not include water as part of the negotiations. Daoudy (2019) notes that water has been utilised in "both offensive and defensive military strategies" (p. 1347) since the 5th century BC.[139]

The Geneva Convention of 1949 proscribes the removal of resources by occupying powers, but Neff (1994) identifies that the DMZ's represented two scarce resources for Israel: land and water. The actions of the State of Israel were therefore always going to be taken in response to that scarcity. Control of the River Jordan also presented a strategic military consideration as it provided a natural obstacle for both machinery and soldiers. This then places a number of environmental securitization agenda elements articulated by Buzan et al. (1998) in play simultaneously in relation to energy, population, food, and economic and civil strife.

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[138] From "Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission" by Doron 2007.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93Syria_Mixed_Armistice_Commission#/media/File:GolanHistoricalBorders.svg

[139] Lowi M. (1993) provides an ananlysis of the impact of water in riparian state conflict.

Controversially, the UN Economic Survey Commission Report on the Middle East (United Nations, 1950) praised the irrigation system in terms of maximising both the benefit and economical use of a scarce resource. In 1950, the Homa Umigdal construction method[140] was used in the (southern) demilitarised zone at Beit Katzir. As Cheng (1987) articulates, in terms of reasonable foreseeability, the intent of Israel was clear. Kibbutzim members sought to vigorously transform the landscape ensuring access to Lake Tiberias through the digging of irrigation channels. The settlements' construction meant that Arabs in the region were reluctant to enter that area. Commenting later, General Dayan asserted that at least 80 per cent of the incidents on the Syrian border at the time were as a result of deliberate Israeli provocation.

Ben-Gurion released funds in 1950 to assist in the irrigation of the Negev in response to both the scarcity of water and the need to feed and house the waves of Jewish migrants. The National Water Carrier became operational in 1953, its first major pipeline leading from the Syrian/Israeli DMZ south to irrigate the Negev. Mounting pressure would be brought to bear on Israel to cede some of this water back to other riparian partners.[141] There were a total of 14 separate plans to address the access to and usage of the River Jordan across the time period covered by this dissertation.[142] Only one plan will be discussed here, as it linked environmental securitization to military and economic securitization – the Johnson Plan.

The construction of irrigation channels, drainage of the river Jordan and the impact to other riparian states was highly contentious and the US appointed Eric Johnston to mediate the issue. The Johnston Plan, sought to define the riparian rights in relation to the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers between Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon in accordance with customary regional maritime law. The overarching premise was that each nation retained water rights to water flowing within state boundaries, provided there were no downstream consequences as a result of that use.

In 1953 the US linked financial aid, in both loans and grants, with Israeli behaviour within the DMZ's, and in response to Israel's use of the River Jordan to irrigate other parts of

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[140] As discussed in Chapter 2, this was essentially a medieval fort surrounding homes and providing physical protection and psychological force projection.

[141] Chapter 2 discussed the multiple claimants of the water resources in Palestine and those nations that border it.

[142] A list of these plans is contained in Appendix A.

the state. Neff (1994) argues the US sought to convince all participants to agree to the US proposed plan in relation to the allocation of water resources fairly among the nations bordering the basin. Tomeh (1975) noted that although Israel ceased construction of the dams in response to a request from the UN Security Council, the US did not provide funding for a further three years.

Whilst the actions of the UN Security Council and the Johnson Plan ameliorated the impacts of Israel on Syria in relation to the River Jordan, it did not address the impact of Israeli actions on the coastal or Western sub-unit of the Mountain Aquifer. Gaza had riparian rights to both, however the actions of Israel in relation to the construction of wells, and the expanding irrigation systems, had a significant impact. The impact on the community of this loss of water in terms of its lifestyle and economic and environmental well-being is a form of societal cruelty referred to as a loss of "achieved level of civilization" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 75). The early 1950s saw a substantial reduction in high-quality groundwater, which significantly impacted both the Gazan civilian population and the citrus industry.

The new government of Israel had a clear pattern of preparing for future actions. The environmental sector was no different in this regard. One of the environmental challenges across the dissertation period and beyond remains water. The World Resources Institute in 2007 noted that two-thirds of the most water-poor nations per capita in terms of renewable water sources are located in the Middle East. There were finite supplies of underground water within the national border that Israel acquired under UN Resolution 181 (II). That lack of supply posed an immediate challenge to the security of the state which the new borders after the 1947–48 action partially remedied. It would not be enough however to ensure the state's long-term environmental security. The Golan Heights, as well as being militarily significant, holds additional meaning in that it also brings with it the more significant element of access to a water resource through an underground aquifer, and access to further riparian rights in relation to the River Jordan and its tributaries.

4.5   Military Securitization 1949–1955

Theories of deterrence focus on the denial of opportunities to attack through force projection. The use, or the threat of use, of military capabilities that are significantly larger than one's opponents provide a position of relative surety. The more resourced

and capable a nation is, the less likely it is for an attacker to wage war. The strategy requires a firm resolution by those holding political power to take action if threatened. Israeli defence industries continued to develop and supply the IDF, and France remained the principal supplier of military hardware, including planes and munitions.

4.5.1   Outcome of the 1947–1948 Conflict

Violence as a model of behaviour or a culture within society can be assimilated and can be harnessed to achieve a certain aim. Plan Dalet, as discussed in Chapter 3, had articulated the commencement of a process of accelerating violence. The goal was the disruption and dislocation of Arab nationals within areas Israel sought to control.

As a result of the 1947–48 conflict the IDF now had a self-belief validated by success, but that success hinged upon a number of factors including money, the concept of the citizen soldier and the resolution of the state to hold the land it had fought for. Gorenberg (2011) posits that the effect of battlefield success, such as that achieved by the nascent IDF, also contributed, by assigning "sanctity to the state of Israel and its military" thereby adding additional noise to the social/moral security agenda making "militant nationalism a pillar of faith" (p. 3). Some beliefs are so culturally embedded that they are untouched by time. It is here that vulnerability is embedded within the Israeli psyche. The failure previously to retain their land, linked so closely with their faith, has forever altered their acceptance of any peace plan that cedes land they have won back, as many view it as an element of the covenant made with their God.

A split occurred in relation to the use of the military in the early 1950s. Ben-Gurion, Dayan and others had a belief that peace was contingent upon a crushing military defeat of the Arab states (Ben-Gurion, 1974). Sharett as Foreign Minister and others favoured an alternative view, arguing diplomacy and mediation first (including the use of outside mediators such as the UN) and only if that failed utilising the military option. The tension between these two positions continued with the transition of Sharett to the role of Prime Minister. With border incursions by all parties now becoming more common, Dayan argued that they represented:

> our elixir of life ... They help us maintain a high tension among our population and in the army. Without them we will not have a fighting nation, and without the regime of a fighting nation we are lost. *(as cited in Ishi, 1978, p. 1021)*

Not only did the state understand the need to ensure that threat perception by those under its care remained high, but the State of Israel actively leveraged this perception to ensure securitization goals. Functional actors such as Dayan were key to embedding the belief of an imminent threat within the community. As Hammack (2011, p. 22) outlines these are then "sanctioned by the community and rendered acceptable."

Whilst having repelled the regional neighbours, concerns still existed about the military security of the state. The IDF as a functional actor positioned the Arab refugees as a securitization issue. Public perception, was that Arab nations hostile to Israel could use Arab nationals within Israel's borders to assist in possible war-like actions. Ben-Gurion and Dayan, leveraging both the existential threat recently experienced by European Jewry and the recent hostilities, created a commando unit (Unit 101) to conduct reprisals for Arab infractions of the new borders (Kimmerling, 2003). Responses to attacks undertaken by Palestinian refugees were addressed through substantive military response.[143] This military tactic transitioned to one of pre-emptive strikes in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Morris (1993) argues that this, combined with the actions against Jordan (over water) and Egypt were additional precursors to the 1956 Suez Crisis which will be discussed in the next chapter.

4.5.2   Citizen Soldier

The activation of all available members of the Israeli state ensured its ability to defend the state while expanding and solidifying its borders. The creation of a citizen soldier state leveraged concepts linked to past and present victimisation.[144] The 'we' is not as clearly defined in the Defence Service legislation, as in other texts. It hinges on the ability to serve with 'a place of residence' within Israel. The ability to reside in Israel is contingent upon a number of additional criteria, and also allows the Minister to exempt individuals from service, including non-Jews from serving. The Law of Return and the influx of migrants significantly increased who could be called upon to defend the state. As a result of this duality, the citizen soldier, which had initially been a response to the 1947–48 conflict, remains within the current construct of the State of Israel.

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[143] The massacre at Kibia (in the West Bank) in October 1953 in which 69 Palestinians were killed was, as Bregman (2003) notes, a response to the death of a mother and two children at an Israeli village (Yahud).

[144] Chapter 3 identified the criteria for military service, as well as the exemptions.

Articulating the requirements for continued vigilance by the population in relation to territorial integrity, Dayan, acting as a functional actor for the IDF, is quoted in Teveth (1972, p. 240) stating that "the border is a sea of hate and the desire for revenge, hate that is lying in wait for us the day when the calm will dull our readiness." His argument further linked the citizen soldier with the community, arguing that the failure to remain ready to respond to these threats would be the end for the Jewish society.

A mobilisation training program was created to ensure a rapid response to the mobilisation of the IDF Reserve. Economically, however, the effects of the choice to have a small standing defence force and a large reserve had to be managed. Conflicts or recalls had to be limited, as after two weeks the impact of a national mobilisation would be felt in other sectors.

4.5.3 Creation of Mossad: Power Born of Fear and Effectiveness

The Mossad was founded on 2 March 1951 on Ben-Gurion's order, tasked with both intelligence gathering and evaluation illustrating Foucault (1997a) and Bentham (1787) position of governmentality, and surveillance with watching become an active social control. Black and Morris (1991) note that it was an amalgamation of a number of groups, including the Haganah's Shai,[145] and provided an overarching framework for the state in relation to intelligence services, supporting both military and paramilitary concerns. The Mossad's official reporting line was to the Prime Minister, but it functioned within the Foreign Ministry, with operatives given diplomatic titles (Pedahzur, 2010). As such, from its inception it was linked to both the political and military securitization of the state. The uncertainty for enemies of the state never knowing when they were being observed acted as a tool of psychological warfare (Foucault, 1997a). As Mason (2011) proposes the end result was the same, regardless of whether it occurred or not.

The wide use and active myth creation attached to the Mossad in particular is important when viewed in relation to security theories and the security position of Israel. Morgenthau (1960) argues the threat of violence as a result of military/paramilitary action, imprisonment or a death penalty is a fundamental component of politics. The deterrence of potential attackers by the fear of a response, even decades in the future,

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[145] Shai was responsible for counter-espionage activities within Haganah.

either at an individual, organisational or political level, is a crucial element. Intelligence services represent a key component in a state's force projection activities which Efraim (1996) notes rests in both in the ability to gather intelligence and an individual's faith that protection will be forthcoming.

4.5.4   Nuclear Program

Commencing in 1949 a review of the Negev was undertaken to assess whether it could be a domestic source of uranium. By 1950, Cordesman (1996) suggests that low-grade deposits of uranium in recoverable amounts based in phosphate had been found near Beersheba and Sidon, and work commenced using a low-power method of heavy water production. This therefore provided Israel with the ability to produce components necessary to become a nuclear power, on the presumption that it also had the capacity to enrich the natural uranium isotope. The relationship with France provided access to other elements, including the design and construction of the reactor. Both nations sought the acquisition of nuclear power as leverage in the growing Cold War. The Federation of American Scientists (1997) noted that the countries worked jointly on this project, with Israeli scientists working in France on their heavy reactor, and then the French reciprocating in the building of Israel's reactor.

Israel created a secret Atomic Energy Commission in 1952 and Pry (1984) states this was under the auspices of the Defence Ministry. The fundamentals of the nuclear program had now developed to such an extent that it represented a sustainable securitization option, both politically and militarily.

Egypt's President Nasser again barred the Straits of Tiran in 1953 and Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion reacted by ordering the development of an unconventional weapons capability (including chemical, biological and nuclear). The existential threat of the Holocaust drove behaviour; the refrain 'never again' was used as a galvanising element across many sectoral elements, but it was in the nuclear program that it was most powerful. As Cohen (2018) clearly articulated in his interview as part of the Voices of the Manhattan Project, to prevent a recurrence the State of Israel had to be in a position to prevent it: "we must be in position to threaten explicitly, implicitly, to have the capability to do what was done in Hiroshima." It would be only then that there would be a relative feeling of security.

History provides clear evidence that violence and/or sectarian conflict can re-emerge or escalate decades after a conflict ends. In a region that was so clearly identifying the 'other' on all sides, without peace there could be no realistic expectation of a cessation of conflict. The re-emergence of conflict, Shirlow and Murtagh (2006) assert, reinforces the negative perceptions of the 'other' and increases the chance of further hostility.

4.6   Concluding Comments July 1949 – July 1955

Within Israel it was believed the security of the state required an ethnocentric policy mantra that dominated all aspects of life, not only within the territorial borders, but also inclusive of the diaspora. This mantra hinged on religion and land, and their belief of the existential threats they faced. The response to these drivers necessitated sacrifice by the community to ensure the survival of their state.

Longitudinally the choices by the State of Israel were now starting to be seen across all sectors, and vectors of the Rubik's Cube®. Politics leveraged and shaped historic memory, allowing the reframing of the events within a particular discourse. The legislative agenda in relation to land saw a normalisation process in relation to its acquisition and appropriation[146] and the clear composition of 'we' and 'other'. As such legislation clearly acted both as an executive speech act as well as performative practice. The utilisation of the identified legislation clearly articulated how potential speech acts contrary to the will of the political elite were being limited.

Democracy or dictatorship or any variant in between did not significantly impact on whether other states sought strategic alliances with Israel. Linkages to furthering global power or force projection efforts were a more important consideration. This was also a factor for the remaining involvement of great powers (Great Britain and France) within the region. The patronage relationship with these nations transitioned from dependence to interdependence, addressing more complex issues such as the shared or supported use of economic, military and political sectoral goals. The following chapter will show the significant changes that occurred within those relationships.

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[146] Land cycled through respective legislative instruments from abandoned land, to absentee land to Israeli land.

Sectoral securitization threats were clearly identified, including the next round of threats, and the state positioned itself to meet those threats. Sjöstedt (2013, p.144) explicitly notes that the existence of the threat does not 'automatically result in threat construction'. Through strong societal securitization measures, mass migration was managed and supports provided to those most in need. The legislation wove a clear 'we' and 'other' narrative, defining who was entitled to state support. There was a foothold for both economic and military securitization strategies going forward, enabling a variety of responses to possible threats. The economic position significantly benefited from grants and reparations, and militarily the country had a larger pool of people compared to 1948 and a more effective intelligence service, and improved access to military hardware. Politically, the range of governance structures including legislation, ordinances and administrative processes and policies within the state, were shaped by and reflective of the construct of Israel's national identity. This allowed the practice of security to become normalised. The legislative agenda embedded the national vs citizen discourse and espoused the rights and responsibilities to and of the state. The embedding of victimisation and the forceful articulation of the continual existential threat as a result of their beliefs rallied the community but also set them on a path which would make peace difficult. Environmentally, the actions in relation to land and water would continue to be the basis of further threats, either internally or externally. Riparian rights impacted not only environmentally but also on regional and global relationships, and the coming chapter will articulate the continued challenges this would pose.

Egyptian President Nasser's initial closure (in 1953) of the Straits of Tiran had a real and immediate impact on Israel. Whilst the straits were re-opened after a short period, the obstruction of access to the port of Eilat, the only access to the Red Sea had immediate implications for Israel (Laquer & Rubin, 2001). It also provided a clear indication of President Nasser's willingness to use this manoeuvre to achieve Egyptian goals. The interrelated nature of the sectoral existential threats imposed a significant impact on the resources of the state, as it sought to understand their immediacy. The next chapter will continue to analyse the State of Israel longitudinally and deal with the reaction to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, and the impact of immigration, nuclear technology, and the changing regional dynamic. The legislative agenda over this period is more of embedding of practice, with state infrastructure being organised to support the legislative intent.

Chapter 5   Money and Guns (August 1955 – 1962)

"We are a generation of settlers, and without the steel helmet and gun barrel, we shall not be able to plant a tree or build a house."

Moshe Dayan (as cited in Shlaim, 2010, p.101)

The end of the last chapter saw the initial blocking of Israeli cargo through the Straits of Tiran, which was then reopened and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Access to the Straits of Tiran, which expanded into the Suez Canal Crisis, was a key external issue that would dominate the period of 1955 to 1967 for the State of Israel. As the previous chapter has shown, the challenges to the security of Israel continued, and were premised on the perception that existential threats would continue. Wolfers (1952, p. 485) argues that "different nations also have diverse expectations of security." This is key in identifying what the embryonic State of Israel viewed as a threat, and the methods used to combat threats. The extensive legislative and physical methodologies used to define the State of Israel, its people and governance structures across all securitization sectors from independence until 1955 sought to

To recap, this dissertation seeks to ascertain if Buzan et al.'s (1998) securitization theory can be used longitudinally to plot the securitization of the State of Israel between 1947 – 1967 and on a secondary level what does the legislative language used to support securitization tell us about the construction of speech act in defining and then embedding the 'we' and 'other' discourse. This chapter will address the period from 1955 to 1962, a time of upheaval globally, but also one of consolidation for Israel. Economic and military securitization dominated this period for the State of Israel. It was one of significant economic growth and development, with funds coming from new sources; the most contentious of these were the reparations made by West Germany as a response to the Holocaust. These funds allowed a deep and rapid growth and revitalisation of infrastructure, industry and services. The fallout over the blockage of the Suez Canal would create threats and opportunities which were capitalised on by Israel. Waterway access, as discussed in Chapter 2, was based on 17th century principles articulating peaceful passage for foreign ships, both military and civilian. This principle was codified

in relation to the Suez Canal by the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal Convention (1888). The wider impacts of the closure of the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal Crisis will be detailed and outcomes addressed according to sector.

The waterway continues to have a long-term influence on the economic interests of a significant number of the world's communities. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company[147] and blocking of the Suez Canal had many facets. For President Nasser, it represented an overt symbol of Egyptian self-determination. The US was concerned that it represented an increasing alignment between Egypt and the Communist Bloc, which it sought to redress after the Suez Canal Crisis through the Eisenhower Doctrine.[148] The doctrine articulated that US economic and military support was available on request to nations under an overt military threat from communism. France and Great Britain were more threatened by Nasser's action, viewing it as an existential threat to both their influence within the region and their economic security. For Israel, the threat was both financial and military.

British Prime Minister Anthony Eden acted as the global speech actor for the military action seeking to regain control of the Suez Canal. The plan had two main aims: to reassert Western control over the Suez Canal and the removal of President Nasser from office and was driven by increasing anti-colonial, Egyptian nationalistic rhetoric. Ben-Gurion understood the potential advantages to Israel, in terms of reducing the threat that Nasser represented on multiple levels: regionally within Egypt and the wider Pan-Arabian context but also on the global stage in the dilution of his country's relationship with the US. Additionally the action would showcase Israel's ability to act independently without superpower support. The proposed military action would see a three-way invasion to secure the Suez Canal.

The action taken on 29 October 1956 by Israel, France and Great Britain had a number of outcomes across a majority of the securitization sectors, which will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. For Israel, it showed the ability of the Israeli Defence Force

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[147] Created in 1858 to build and manage the Suez Canal. Initially ownership was Franco-Egyptian, transitioning to Franco-British in 1879 through a British buy-out of the Egyptian shareholding. The Suez Canal Company claimed international status under the auspices of the Convention of Constantinople in 1888. (European Business History Association, 2007).
[148] The Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) was "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism."

(IDF), the strength of its political will and the capacity to galvanise the support of the populace to respond to threats to the state. The goal was to ensure Israel's access to the Straits of Tiran, safeguarding the ability to ensure a peaceful passageway for Israeli shipping, crucial to the economic security of the state (Figure 5.1[149]).

Figure 5.1   Israeli advance during the Suez Canal Crisis.

The effective mobilisation of civilian forces, supply lines and communication structures by Israel allowed a rapid response. It vindicated the decision taken in 1949 for the creation of an armed populace through compulsory service. As a result, within six days Israel had achieved its military objective and occupied the Sinai Peninsula. Additionally the action to counter Nasser's closure of the Suez Canal was used to cover the removal of a few remaining Palestinian nationalist bases in the Gaza Strip as well as the actions of the Northern Area Military Commander Yitzhak Rabin (as cited in Bregman, 2000) to remove the remaining Palestinian Arabs outside of Israel's borders in northern Israel. The outcomes for France and Great Britain were less than ideal. Their military actions were not swift enough to achieve the military objectives and were halted due to a ceasefire imposed upon them by both superpowers. The UN resolved overwhelmingly (Resolution 377A Uniting for Peace) to ensure their withdrawal from Egypt by 22 December 1956.[150] Politically, this clearly evidenced the limits of British and French power in the Middle East. It did, however, provide a global demonstration Israel's legitimacy (internally and

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[149] From "The Sinai Campaign (1956)," by Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.
https://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/The-Sinai-Campaign-1956.aspx
[150] Additionally, following the Suez Canal Crisis the UN provided clear guidance to member countries in relation to the expectations on passage with the Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones in 1958.

externally) and the state's propulsion in less than 15 years from nascent state to regional power.

The USSR and USA both placed significant pressure on the State of Israel (including the possible use of nuclear weapons) to ensure its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and to allow the UN to act as peacekeeper and mediator (Bregman, 2000). The Israelis denied the UN force a foothold in Israeli-controlled territory. However, the UN did place a peacekeeping force on the Egyptian side (Herzog, 1982), ensuring a lull in overtly hostile actions by Egypt for a period of 11 years. Prior to its withdrawal from the Sinai,[151] Israeli forces did all within their power to subvert the ability of either the UN or Egypt to provide the Egyptian citizens with stability by systematically destroying or capturing infrastructure across the peninsula. According to Cotterell (1984) this included transport (roads and railroads) and communication lines. Chomsky (1983) adds that included in this was the destruction of homes and villages, the impact of which was felt by Egypt as it had to re-establish its own internal territorial legitimacy, placing a drain on its resources.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the difference between 'strong' and 'weak' states as articulated by Buzan and Wæver (2003) show the level of assimilation between the state and the society. In that context, therefore, as a result of the outcomes of the Suez Crisis it could be argued that Israel now represented a strong modern state legitimised internally and externally. Wars, however, cause both direct and indirect casualties. Whilst wartime consequences for civilians vary, for Arabs within Israel the considerations of losing further land and agency, and the experience of negative economic development, were added signs of their position (or lack thereof) within the state.

5.1   Military Securitization 1955–1962

The primary claim of sovereignty over Israeli territory remained the ability of the state to exert control over its borders and defend the land either granted by the UN or acquired by purchase or conquest. [152] In doing so it meets the Montevideo test for statehood in terms of part b) a defined territory. Legitimacy ultimately allows the lawful use of state-sanctioned violence in defending Israel's territory and its citizens. The ability to undertake

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[151] Israel withdrew in March 1957.

[152] The writer acknowledges that historic and current international law articulates seven methods of attaining sovereignty over territory: Cession, Occupation, Prescription, Operations of nature, Creation, Adjudication and Conquest (Malanczuk1997 pp. 147-152).

a pre-emptive strike against a nation that overtly argued against the existence of the State of Israel, Raviv (1998) argues, was key to managing the social contract between the people and the state. Speech actors, both internally and externally to Israel, opined as to the real or perceived threat that United Arab Republic (UAR) states and their supporters posed to Israel. Coupled with this was the ongoing victimology rhetoric. As such, the threats in this sector were both externally within the region and in relation to intervention from great powers and superpowers; and internally, with threats including internal displacement as well as the impact of hopelessness on the remaining Palestinian Arabs. This two-pronged approach created a self-perpetuating cycle, embedding a continual belief in the imminence of the threat against Israel and the need for the state to act immediately.

This regional threat was not only from nation states and their superpower allies but increasingly from non-state actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood[153] and Fatah.[154] Non-state actors provided a continual asymmetrical threat to the territorial sovereignty of Israel, with incursions over the border and the provision of support (economic and military) to those inside its borders. Whilst notionally non-state actors, they supported nation-states bound by the supra- and sub-state allegiances discussed in Chapter 2. The Muslim Brotherhood intellectuals linked Islam and Arab solidarity with the quest for the Palestinian state and, Mitchell (1993, p. 264) asserts, an "aspirational focus of loyalty and the ultimate desire to restore the Caliphate."

5.1.1   The Citizen Soldier

The determination that the state could not afford a large, standing full-time defence force, but would instead be served with well-trained citizen soldiers, had been vindicated. The Suez Canal Crisis reinforced the knowledge that Israel had the ability to respond swiftly to threats against its interests. Parker (1993) notes whilst its full-time military force was small, Israel's ability to mobilise a comprehensively trained reserve force was exemplary. Additionally the soldiers were supported by equipment fit for purpose, either purchased elsewhere or as a product of Israel's defence industry.

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[153] Founded in 1928.

[154] Fatah was established informally in Kuwait in 1959 by a group of Palestinian refugees headed by Yasser Arafat. It was formally constituted on the day of its first unsuccessful action against Israel, 1 Jan 1965 (Fatah, 2006).

Individual or group funding (analogous to modern crowdsourcing) of military hardware was a unique element of Israel's military securitization strategy after the Czechoslovakian arms deal with Egypt discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, and remained in place until the end of the dissertation period. Bregman (2003) states prices of weapons and weapon systems were published in the newspapers, with individuals and groups encouraged to buy them to show support for the state.[155] With the citizen soldier discourse running parallel to this, the weapons purchased were potentially something that buyers would actually be using, ensuring the immediacy of the appeal and increasing the chances of the advertisements being heeded.

Wiggins and Potter (2007) assert that beliefs, knowledge and approaches to threats are not discrete but created in and through language and text. One of the cleanest articulations of the deliberate use of victimology by the state and the continued emphasis on the immediacy of the existential threat by the Israeli government as a tool to galvanise public support of the military was from Mordechi Bar-On, Dayan's Head of Bureau. Bregman (2000) notes Bar-On's argument that the impact of this approach was two-fold in the creation of a public consensus in relation to security and a willingness to actively participate in the defence of the state.

A challenge to military securitization resulting from a faith-based state is the gravitas religious leaders acting as functional actors are afforded. The state remained the primary referent object, however orthodox clerics started articulating military objectives, thereby exerting functional actor pressure upon the political and military securitization sectors. In overtly faith-based nations, the exhortations of clerics to guide military or secular agendas is not new. As such, their input into military securitization must be dealt with in a manner consistent with the cultural norms. Within Israel, the diversity of views within the Jewish religious leadership from ultra-orthodox through to more liberal clerics impacted on all securitization sectors. This is reflected in their support of political parties within the Knesset, but this did not prevent them from publicly preaching for the recovery of all of 'Eretz Yisrael'.

The military securitization process had now become highly institutionalised within the State of Israel, supported by and linking to the political and social securitizing actors and

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[155] See Mock (2020) for a discussion about Civic Patriotism and Ethnic Nationalism

referent objects. Existential threats, whether real or perceived, remained constant, with opportunistic military interventions disguised as pre-emptive self-defence.[156] Pre-emptive border raids to intercept Palestinians intending to use asymmetrical warfare against Israel is an example of this.[157] The armistice at the end of the Suez Crisis provided a good defensive position with a UN buffering force, but simultaneously reinforced the belief that existential threats remained imminent. The legitimacy of pre-emption based on the closure of the Straits of Tiran and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal was not a noticeable mobilisation of military forces (army, navy, air force) ready to attack, but was still viewed as a causative response to an existential threat. The 1956 action was designed to impede a probable long-range threat from developing into an imminent direct military one.

5.1.2   Nuclear Program

The year 1956 saw the serious embarkation of Israel into the nuclear community, with France agreeing to provide an 18 MW research reactor.[158] A major Israeli concern was the agreement between Egypt and Czechoslovakia in 1955 for the provision of military equipment. The agreement would effectively triple the military strength (once embedded) of Egypt, a nation which actively sought the ending of the State of Israel.[159] One of the lessons for Israel in the aftermath of that action was that it believed possession of a nuclear capability would leave it less vulnerable to allies who had their own political agendas.

The State of Israel leveraged its Suez allies to gain additional support in relation to the nuclear program. A revised agreement was signed on 3 October 1957 between France and Israel. It resulted in a 24 MWt underground reactor being built under French guidance in secret at Dimona in the Negev, outside the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with Great Britain supplying 20 tons of heavy water at a cost of US$1.5 million the following year. The US also contributed under the 1953 Atoms

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[156] This is articulated in UN Charter Article 51 (1945), in which self-defence was addressed as a component of International law in addition to 'necessity and proportionality' under three conditions: 1. only if subject to armed attack; 2. acts of self-defence had to be reported to the Security Council; 3. right to respond would cease as soon as the UN Security Council took action.

[157] Another would be the actions taken in relation to the securing of the DMZs on the Syrian border

[158] Canada set the precedent entering into an agreement in 1955 with India to build a 40 MW CIRUS reactor.

[159] The agreement between France and Israel was held in abeyance during the Suez Canal Crisis.

for Peace program, supporting research at the Soreq reactor. Milhollin (1987) asserts that Norway sold a further 20 tons of heavy water to Israel the following year. France expressed concern in relation to the secrecy of the project in 1960. In a two-pronged carrot and stick approach to gain Israel's acquiescence to reveal the program and submit to inspections, France offered the sale of Mirage fighter jets and threatened to withhold reactor fuel. Israel did not agree, instead negotiating with France to continue the provision of uranium based on Israel's assurance that it would not make atomic weapons and to reveal the location at a later (unspecified) date. In the same year, the US reviewed photographs it had taken two years previously from U-2 spy planes and came to the conclusion that Israel had acquired nuclear capability. Ben-Gurion initially sought to obfuscate, variously claiming the photographed facility was a textile plant or research area. It was only late in 1960 that it was identified by Israel as a 'nuclear' research facility. Finneyspecial (1960) reports that Israel was building the reactor for 'peaceful purposes' ("U.S. hears Israel moves toward A-bomb potential" p. 1). Concerned about the adverse publicity, Great Britain rejected a request from Israel the following year to provide additional heavy water. The fully functioning reactor went operational in 1964.

The nuclear capability of Israel has been a major issue since the first reactor was completed in 1962. Spector (1990, p. 152) posits that "Israel is believed to have produced its first nuclear weapon by the time of the 1967 war." The IDF and the wider state infrastructure have maintained extraordinary levels of secrecy about their nuclear program, while Israel has refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Similarly whilst threats from the US posed challenges to Israel, causing Israel to ultimately agree to US inspections beginning in 1962,[160] Cohen (1995) contends these were limited in scope and the extent of the program remained secret.

The global inability to act to restrain Israel from gaining and then weaponing nuclear technology was telling. Emerging from a fraught base 13 years previously, Israel's actions clearly showed the sophistication and capability of its actors across the political, military and economic securitization sectors. Attainment of nuclear energy was seen as a national achievement. It also created a concern within the international community about the potential use of such weapons within the Middle East and the pushback by other regional nation-states.

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[160] These ceased in 1969.

In an active use of deterrence theory, there is no formal stance on the use of nuclear weaponry, although Israel's statements of massive retaliation in response to biological/chemical warfare leave little doubt about the possibility. Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan now Chief of Staff actively employed psychological warfare theory both on their own people and those whom they saw as a threat. Those who possess nuclear weapons or the ability to construct them create a different level of security threat. The linkage of both chemical and biological warfare with a nuclear option further adds to the moral and ethical concerns in how to prevent attack or the need to use them against the 'other'. The experience of Jews in World War II (WWII) has particular poignancy here. As such, whilst they have the technology, would the social securitization of the state allow the military to use these weapons given the experience of the Holocaust or would the political securitization of the state prevent it?

5.2   Political Securitization 1955–1962

In the case of Israel, as the previous two chapters have shown, the threat assessment from 1947–56 placed the likelihood of an attack by states within the region as high. The Suez Canal Crisis provided both internal and external validation and legitimacy to the state. This was both in relation to its ability to exert power within the region combined with the threat that power posed to others. The active involvement of both superpowers to convince Israel to relinquish the Sinai and the conclusion of overt hostilities gave an indication of both its political and military growth.

The integrity of the land a nation occupies also impacts on what occurs within its borders. As discussed earlier, the Suez Canal Crisis allowed further military actions to ensure the removal of a number of groups to outside the border of the state. This exercise of control restated the premise internally that this was a Jewish state for Jews.

5.2.1   Internal

As discussed in Chapter 1, political securitization, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 14) posit, addresses the "organisational stability of the social order." Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 have shown how, internally, Israel utilised its legislature to enshrine elements that safeguarded the state. The emergency powers inherited upon independence were continued, supporting the position of Balzacq (2005) who argues that institutionalisation of

securitization leads to a normalisation of what were initially extraordinary measures. The legislation further embedded an obvious 'we' and 'other' discourse within Israeli society. As such, Israel remains a significant case study, as politically through this period of nation building the state continued to use this method to ensure and maintain the stability of the state in light of the perceived existential threats as well as demands for expansion.

The elections of 1955 saw further changes in the constitution of the Knesset. The Workers Party of Eretz Yisrael (MAPAI) under Ben-Gurion retained control but Herut, which had so disastrously opposed West German reparations as discussed in the last chapter, made a comeback. It gained 15 seats with a harder line on border incursions, making it the second largest party in the Knesset (Smith, 2010). Herut sought the entirety of British Mandated Palestine as the Jewish state, supported taking a pre-emptive strike against Nasser and vehemently disagreed with the superpower-imposed ceasefire and the UN forces acting as a buffer.

5.2.1.1   Land Legislation

Land ownership and its retention is a key element in the organisational stability of the state. Internally from this perspective one of the remaining major threats was the control of, access to and utilisation of Israeli land. The military actions discussed in the preceding three chapters resulted in a glut of land and improved access to scarce resources (such as water) which was now, under Israeli law, the property of the state. Israel sought to manage these lands through the creation of the Israel Land Administration (ILA) in 1960 who note (Israel Land Administration, 1965) they managed approximately 93 per cent of Israel's land, comprising 19,508 km². Four major pieces of legislation were passed in 1960, all linked to and supporting the work of the ILA to ensure retention of land by and for Israel. This enabled the amalgamation of state and Jewish National Fund (JNF) lands into a centrally managed pool enabling active engagement with national policy and enhancing organisational stability.

The Israeli leveraging of the Ottoman methodology of state ownership, as discussed in Chapter 2, developed into a far more concentrated and structured process. This linked political securitization with societal, military and economic sectors. A suite of laws[161]

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[161] Prescription Law (1958) and the Land (Settlement of Title) Ordinance (1960). The final two pieces of legislation were passed outside the scope of this dissertation in 1969. They were the Land (Settlement of Title) Ordinance (1969) (New version) and the Land Law (1969).

changed the usage of old Ottoman-designated Miri lands allowing the retrospective claiming of farm land by Israel if previous owners could not prove uninterrupted (for a period between 15–25 years) cultivation of the land. Given the conflict that had ensued across the state since 1948, it provided significant challenges to any person whose land fell within scope to prove their claim. Some, however could, and a 1965 Report on Activities of the ILA for 1964/65 articulated the perceived threat to land acquired under both the Prescription and Custodian of Absentee Property legislation, concerned that the land would return to the Palestinian Arabs, particularly in northern Israel. (This was addressed by the military actions of the northern area commander Yitzhak Rabin[162] which occurred concurrently with the Suez response. Rabin is quoted in Bregman (2003) as undertaking the forced removal of 2,000 Palestinian Arabs across the border. Whilst contrary to international law, this action was perceived as marginalising the threat and further embedded control over the land.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the Absentee Property Law resulted in land previously belonging to Palestinians who had left their land in 1948 being identified as 'absentee property'. The legislative agenda created a break in the established patterns of ownership and essentially forced migration.[163] The Absentee Property Law was extended in 1965 to include Ottoman-designated Waqf land. These land holdings belonged to Muslim charities and included places of worship and cemeteries. Custody of this property was given to Israel's Custodian of Absentee Property which operated under the auspices of the ILA. Anderson (1974) clearly articulates the challenge of new states seeking to create and retain territorial boundaries arguing "land is a natural monopoly: it cannot be indefinitely extended only re-divided" (p. 31). The success of the state-building activities across the securitization sectors shown in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 also brought change within the political parties. MAPAI, born out of the socialist pioneering Yishuv and kibbutzim history, moved to a more centrist position. Ben-Gurion (1974) referred to the transition of the state, and the evolution of MAPAI (which would become the Labor Party in 1968). The public to whom MAPAI appealed had now become a more affluent middle class. The new lower-skilled migrants escaping persecution in the Middle East or North

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[162] Rabin would go on to be the fifth Prime Minister of the State of Israel and win a Nobel Peace Prize. After winning a second government term he was assassinated. All of these actions are outside the scope of the period covered by this dissertation.

[163] Nesbitt-Larkin (2019) illustrates the impact of this forced migration identifying that "even after homes are gone keys are kept as symbolic of ownership and occupancy" (p. 273).

Africa, who had once been the key to MAPAI's success, were now supported by Herut, which would transition (outside this dissertation period) into LIKUD. This would see the consolidation of a number of right-wing parties under a single banner.

The settlement of immigrants to ensure control of, access to and usage of the land for state-identified needs continued, and was actively linked to societal securitization. The type of migrant entry, however, forced some temporary changes to the Law of Return, discussed in Chapter 4. In a bid to respond to the wave of highly dependent Middle Eastern and North African Jewry between 1952 and 1954, Dov and Goldscheider (1997) discuss the Israeli government's preference for self-supporting, healthy individuals aged up to age 35, whilst Smooha (2008) notes there needed to be a willingness to work in agriculture for a minimum two years on arrival with support from Israeli relatives.

Another major change in the construct of both major parties and the nation in a wider sense was the number of high-ranking military commanders who transitioned into senior positions within government and industry, which commenced in the early 1960s. To facilitate a young, agile and responsive officer corps, Peri (1993) claims Dayan stipulated the retirement age for this cohort as 45, which saw between 640 and 700 generals and colonels seeking employment elsewhere between 1949 and 1981. These officers were appointed above those with more experience in the actual running of the government and industry. Synergistically having engaged, career military soldiers embedded in leadership positions in government and industry enhanced the citizen soldier discourse but made peace more unlikely. Ethnic conflicts create long-term memories that become part of the national cultural psyche, long after the conflict ends. When that conflict also has a physical manifestation such as territory, the failure to retain or control it provides real implications for community members. Given the social conditioning discussed in previous chapters, groupthink indicated an inability to give up a tangible asset (land) for an intangible peace process, which ultimately could not guarantee the safety of the Jewish people.

5.2.2   External

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Suez Crisis forcefully signalled to Israel the impact of alliance dissonance. Israel was isolated and on its own to face the combined displeasure of the USSR and the US after the retreat of France and Great Britain. This

outcome was part of the argument used by Ben-Gurion to confirm ties with Germany and widen the amount of countries that Israel had access to for either equipment, military technology or resources.

The alliance with Germany, as discussed in Chapter 4, was fraught given Germany's actions against the Jewish people in the prelude to and during WWII. The political agency of Ben-Gurion as a speech actor was a major part of the quasi-acceptance of the relationship, but it came at a cost. The normalisation of diplomatic relations with West Germany between 1955 and 1962 brought much-needed funds to the state, but was in contrast to the apathetic or even antagonistic position of senior MAPAI members articulated in Natan (1969) and within the wider community.[164] The catalyst for this to create further damage to Ben-Gurion's legitimacy as the speech actor, Natan (1969) maintains, was West Germany's 1963 engagement in the Egyptian rocket program. Ben-Gurion was more concerned about how the public unrest within Israel (as a result of the perceived dangers Egyptian rockets represented to towns and villages) would negatively impact on the financial relationship between Israel and West Germany, than the existential threat his people had been conditioned to believe arose from Egyptian access to this technology.

Perceptions of securitizing actors in the Suez Crisis changed, dependent upon time, location and interest. Great Britain placed a larger strategic significance on the Suez Canal than the United States. The US response to Israel's requests for assistance were not positive during the Suez Crisis, as Raviv (1998) articulates, pressuring France and Great Britain to cease their support of Israel, and Israel to accept the ceasefire and withdraw from the Sinai. The 1956 conflict was viewed as a show of support by the US to its traditional Arab allies, the US not wishing to jeopardise access to oil from the Middle East. In 1956, Golda Meir was promoted from Minister for Labour to Foreign Minister, and her management of the portfolio was one of skilful manipulation to ensure the security of the state.

There was a significant change in the dynamic of the international relationship between the superpowers, great powers and Israel, as shown across this dissertation to date. In striving to achieve an external power balance Israel rejected a number of other key

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[164] Golda Meir articulated her opposition to commencing diplomatic relations with West Germany.

powers in Europe for a variety of reasons. The most significant of these was the alliance with Great Britain. This alliance did not have popular support as a result of lingering animosity from the pre-state years, the negative responses after the Declaration of Independence, and the impediments put in place by the Great Britain in relation to munitions for the 1956 war. Tal (1995) also emphasises the continued alliance between Great Britain and a number of Israel's enemies, including Jordan and Egypt. From 1956 through to 1967 France was the main supplier of arms to Israel. The changing relationship between France and Israel was visible, with particular reference to the nuclear issue, through both a political and military securitization lens. It had moved from one of dependence to interdependence. Israel provided a buffer to France as a result of Egypt's attempts to destabilise Algeria, and Israel acted as a conduit for US nuclear computer technology. The nuclear relationship was one of intense cooperation with French and Israeli experts co-located and actively working on progressing their nations' nuclear ambitions. Whilst French scientists helped construct Dimona, Nashif (1996) claimed Israeli patents supported France's knowledge in relation to low-grade uranium enrichment and how to produce heavy water. The attainment of a potential nuclear arsenal was an effective posturing tactic, used by Israel against its enemies. Linking this threat with military victories and a strong relationship with the US it also provided reassurance to the Israeli populace.

5.2.2.1   Pan-Arabian Manoeuvring and the United Arab Republic (UAR)

After the Suez Crisis, the divisions within neighbouring states provided Israel with some much-needed breathing room. Nasser's removal of Anglo-French control of the Suez Canal Company was part of the wider Pan-Arabian move against imperialism. The supra-state identities had remained, and Buzan et al. (1998) note that vertical identity can act in a regionalist manner, pulling individuals and communities into wider identity. However whilst there were numerous functional actors providing a discursive and non-discursive Pan-Arabian rhetoric, integration within the region along Pan-Arabian lines had not been long lasting. Lebanon's position was the most precarious, not only as a result of a civil war but also due to the military incursions by Syria and Israel. Similarly Kuwait was being threatened by Iraq. Seale (1987) states Syria by 1957 was becoming increasingly destabilised, with a coup changing the power structure, and increased economic tensions resulting in a lull in overt state-based aggression towards Israel. Sayegh (1958), writing

at the time, notes Syria initially proposed a merger with Egypt in 1957 to act as a basis for a comprehensive Pan-Arabian unity in response to internal pressures. Nasser, concerned about increasing communist involvement in Syria, demurred. In January 1958 Syria again proposed the merger, and on 1 February 1958 the United Arab Republic (UAR) was formed, with Nasser as its leader. Palmer (1966) notes that Nasser imposed Egyptian policies and procedures upon Syria, replacing senior Syrian military, political and bureaucratic personnel with Egyptians. This ensured that vertical competition as a result of the Syrian dynamic was not possible and a Syrian military coup occurred on 28 September 1961 resulting in the cessation of the merger with Egypt (Smith, 2010). Whilst the UAR name would continue to exist, it reverted to being an Egyptian-only entity until 1963. However, the legacy of bitterness and distrust would continue to be played out.

The regional security complex was starting to stabilise with some surrounding states like Jordan, whilst not moving towards amity, at least commencing more convivial relationships, thereby reducing the security dilemma. Israel's increasing presence and acceptance on the global stage was seen in the support given to Jordanian King Hussein's response to the Arab-nationalist coup supported by military and political figures aligned to the UAR within his country (Oren, 2002) The coup would result in Hussein's distrust of the military within his country, which would have significant consequences in the 1967 conflict. The combination of renewed Western subsidies and Israeli-threatened intervention in response to the Arab threat to Jordan had impacts both internally and externally for both nations. Egypt continued to be overtly hostile to Israel. Non-state actors[165] had a far greater reach, being enabled by a number of Pan-Arabian nations. The Israeli response to the threat these non-state actors represented will be discussed in Chapter 6.

As discussed in Chapter 1, system level referents such as international law are a component of political securitization. Crimes against humanity (including war crimes) fall under the principle of universal jurisdiction. This allows any nation to take action against an alleged or convicted perpetrator anywhere in the world. A number of the Nazi hierarchy sought to evade punishment for their crimes against humanity by living in countries without extradition treaties. Adolf Eichmann, the architect of Hitler's WWII final solution, was abducted by the Mossad from Argentina in 1961 under the Nazi and

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[165] For example, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Nazi Collaborators Law (Punishment) (1950). He was taken to Israel where he was tried on twelve charges in relation to his actions and three others regarding his membership of organisations which the Nuremberg Trials deemed to be criminal. The Holocaust Research Project documents that he was found guilty on 11 December 1961 on all counts and executed in 1962.[166]

Pushed by cultural ideology and history, in addition to current societal and military demands, the ability to provide organisational stability became critical in maintaining the internal integrity of the state. Buzan (1991, p. 118) asserts "the idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organising ideology, and the institutions which express it are the normal targets of political threats." By continually galvanising the 'we' and disenfranchising the 'other' through legislation, Israel survived, ensured its borders and was able to address its obligations to its citizens, at times in spite of the wider global community. However in the institutionalisation of this discourse, de-securitization is significantly more difficult.

5.3   Economic Securitization 1955–1962

Mercantilists and neo-mercantilists, Buzan et al. (1998) contend, identify the state as having primacy articulating the rationales (political and social) for the generation of wealth. The year 1956 saw the commencement of a period of sustained economic growth, guided and shaped by the needs of the state. A lack of serious border incursions, new migrants and an influx of money (from both traditional sources including world Jewry and new sources through the US Marshall Plan and the West German government reparations) ensured the development of the state. These funds provided opportunities for stability in the environmental and political sectors, which Israel capitalised upon. However the choices by the Israeli government as to where the funds were expended caused instability within the societal sector and growth in the military and economic sectors.

5.3.1   Land

The commencement of farming subsidies, as discussed in the previous chapter, were slowly having an impact, but would take decades before reaching parity with pre-state

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[166] For further information on the institutionalization of targetted killings see Pratt, 2019.

levels (Gross, 1990). One area of rejuvenation was the Negev which, as discussed in Chapter 2, had required weekly resupply to ensure that the nascent state could stake a claim to the land. Whilst minor works had commenced in the region, the 1955–65 period saw significant investment of resources as the Negev was identified as the largest area of future settlement (Barkai, 1983). This brought with it environmental securitization issues which will be discussed in detail in the following sector as there was not a significant groundwater source in the area that could be easily used to sustain life.

5.3.2   Labour

Pre-state Jewish organisations and the government from its inception recognised the need to develop and expand the economic base of the state, whether through irrigation, infrastructure to improve agricultural production or the expansion or modernisation of the industrial sectors. They hoped the immediate benefits would be employment and increased production, and also an ability to export products and possibly increase foreign investment.

The Palestine Economic Corporation invested funds in diverse areas from urban housing to plastics industries, ("Palestine Economic Corporation", 1959) both to kick start the economy and employ newly arrived immigrants. These new migrants were moved to a number of areas to ensure active control over the land, as previously discussed. However this took considerable resources, not only in relation to the initial outlay of capital for irrigation, machinery, but because the new migrants by and large had no history of farming (Fromkin, 2009). The natural mistakes as a result of learning a new skill contributed to the wastage of funds.

The cost of labour, however, represented a significant threat to the state, with flow-on effects to the final production cost. Sherman (1959) contends that while the product cost within the textile industry was seen in 1957 as half that of a comparable European product, wages made it twice as expensive when compared with international competitors. The desire to provide a comparable standard of living for all Jews became a significant burden on the state both in the short and medium term.

5.3.3 Capital

One of the side effects of Israel's actions during the Suez Canal Crisis was a freeze in US financial support.[167] US funds which had been allocated to development projects were no longer available, requiring the Israeli government to divert funds from other areas to ensure completion. The Israeli government's assessment was that a reduction of 20 per cent would be possible before a significant impact would be felt by the country ("Freeze on U.S. Economic Assistance", 1957). Given Israel's existential threat assessment, defence and the essentials to sustain life were given precedence ("Knesset Gets Bill on Fuel Conservation", 1957). With the ceasefire in 1956 these funds were then released and resources reallocated.

A constant part of the economic cash flow across the dissertation period were bond sales and blue boxes from the diaspora, which had a significant impact on the state. The 1959 National Economic Conference for Israel in the US celebrated the sale of US$400 million Israeli bonds in eight years, with the 1962 campaign seeking to raise a further $66.5 million ("Seek $400,000,000 Bond Sale", 1959). This illustrates Alexander's (2013) deduction that diaspora consciousness actively created links with Israel. The push-pull considerations of foreign investment were also evidenced in this period, with the first redemption of the Israel Independence Savings Bonds discussed in Chapter 4 falling due for payment in May 1963.

However, the US was not the only major funding source for Israel at this time. The work undertaken by Ben-Gurion, as articulated in this and the previous chapter, in relation to West German reparations for crimes committed against the Jewish people in WWII was also key. Commencing in 1954 the West German government made financial payments to the State of Israel and restitution to individual survivors of European Jewry. Whilst the government-centric reparations ceased in 1965, the payments to individuals continued. The payments to individuals placed further challenges upon the societal securitization of the state given the distribution of funds. The Israeli government used their share of funds for a wide range of state-building activities. Twenty-five per cent of the Israeli economy at this time was funded by capital imports, two-thirds of which did not require repayment. Bond sales, global loans and foreign investment covered almost all the

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[167] And military support was also frozen.

remaining costs. Across the period of this dissertation, Halevi and Klinov-Malul (1968) claim, over US$4 billion dollars was provided as a grant or gift to either the state or individuals within Israel. Buzan et al. (1998) state that the power of a state in the system is contingent upon its comparative economic development.

The Bank of Israel's report in 1957 provided a clear warning in relation to the positioning of Israeli economic policy. Sherman (1959) argued that in this report the state was looking at short-term issues and failing to address the long-term financial stability of the state in response to existential threats raised by functional actors across all the securitization sectors. A stimulus package designed to increase foreign investment in industry could be seen as an example of this. The legislative elements included a tax treaty with the US removing dual taxation of corporate profits, partial sale of government assets in companies to induce private investment, and an expansive 1962 economic policy that touched almost all elements of the state, including the goal of increasing individual savings to one-tenth of the national income.[168] However the policies did not achieve the government's aim ("Washington reports U.S. contribution to Israel's economic development," 1959). The import surplus continued and the overall balance of payments was negative.

5.3.4   Enterprise

The Marshall Plan financial assistance to Israel commenced in 1952. This was in the form of both direct payments (loans or grants) and the increase or commencement of government training resources particularly related to infrastructure, including airports and harbour facilities as well as road and rail networks through to postal services. The funds were accessed to support the creation or development of diverse industries including textiles, paper and grain mills, chemical and fertiliser plants and phosphate and potash industries. Whilst Israel was not the only nation to utilise the Marshall Plan funds in the region, the scope of work indicates a planned and structured approach to managing the economic existential threats, which were at times at odds with the articulated policies.

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[168] The government legislative package included the Capital Investment Encouragement Law (1959), and included the reorganisation of Solel Boneh (construction and engineering company founded by the Histadrut in 1921).

The outlook, however, was not all positive as trade protectionist policies in the nascent European Common Market impacted on the ability of Israel's sale of eggs to member states. Israel sold over 170 million eggs to France, Malta, Spain and Greece. Whilst inevitable for outsiders to the common market arrangements, this impacted both on production and price, with flow-on effects to farmers ("Rise in National Output", 1959). The domestic market was flooded with agricultural goods however a significant gap was emerging between domestic pricing and that of import and export prices. The agricultural protectionist policies, Sherman (1959) notes, according to the Bank of Israel drove increased domestic production at the cost of commercial crops which would improve the balance of payments.

The prominence of oil refining remained a key component of domestic economic income generation. In attempts to restabilise this income stream, in 1957 three new oil tanks were constructed at Eilat and Beer-Sheva. The completion in 1959 of the Eilat-Haifa as well as the Beer-Sheva to Ashdod[169] oil pipelines allowed Israel to recommence supplying Middle East oil to third parties. These were also supported by the creation of a deep-water port at Haifa. Given the threat posed by the Suez Canal closure in terms of access to goods and materials (including fuel to generate electricity) and its continual existential threat possibility, it is unsurprising that over 40 million Israeli pounds was thereafter spent on electricity (generation, transformation and transmission lines.) Simultaneously the Yarkon-Negev pipeline ("US contributions to Israel's Economic Development", 1959) was constructed, which was over 50 per cent financed through Israeli-American funds.

Contrary to Durkheim's (1959) argument that development (industrial and technological) requires and supports more peaceful relationships, the Israeli Defence Industry was born of conflict and its support, growth and utilisation was seen as a key element to the survival of the state. The linkage between military and economic parameters is that the apparatus of war created preconditions in terms of funding and patrimony. Engels (1962, p. 55) argued "always and everywhere it is the economic conditions and instruments of force which help 'force' to victory, and without these, force ceases to be force." The pre-state defence industry had continued to develop across the period of the dissertation and by the mid-1950s, according to Cohen, Eisenstadt, and Bacevich (1998a), was undertaking production and military upgrades capable of supporting domestic military needs.

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[169] Completed in 1957.

The juxtaposition of political, military and economic sectors enabled the embedding of the military-industrial complex within Israeli society. This required investment in personnel, technology and structures. Webber (1968) argued in favour of this further linking of investment to societal securitization, as both economic growth and technological development require defined social action. The active engagement across the sectors ensured access to funds, and whilst significant reliance on foreign income and investment remained a risk, it was one deemed necessary for survival.

The access to reliable shipping was a significant advantage for the state. Internal investment across the dissertation period showed that this was understood by functional and speech actors, who allocated funds accordingly ("Germany provided Israel with industrial equipment", 1959). Over 3 million Israeli pounds was spent on upgrades and expansion to ensure the continued ability to utilise Jaffa, Haifa, and Kishon as maritime ports into the future. New locations supporting the ability to load and unload commercial quantities of goods were also identified through the development of harbor facilities at Eilat and the creation of a deep-water port at Ashdod.

Shipping, oil and the access to markets remained key factors for survival of the state, as the closure of the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Crisis had shown. The emerging industries, upgrades and work programs ensured an employed and effective Jewish populace working to safeguard the survival of the state. Together the two major sources of external funds would help stabilise the financial position of Israel, but the balance of trade figures would remain negative until the end of the dissertation period.

5.4   Environmental Securitization 1955–1962

Figure 5.2   Israeli National Water Carrier

Water remained an ongoing problem for the State of Israel. The need for water has been articulated by speech and functional actors across Chapter 2 to Chapter 4. State actors utilise infrastructure and water "as weapons of domination and legitimacy" (Daoudy, 2019, p. 1351). Ignoring the earlier protests by Jordan, Syria and others, as detailed in Chapter 4, Israel recommenced work in 1956 on enlarging the pipeline diverting water from the River Jordan to the northern section of the Negev desert (Figure 5.2[170]). As McDonald (2013) notes, when a particular argument is endorsed by the polity it acts as a method of legitimisation, empowering some actors and marginalising others. The challenge of migration impacted not only the societal and economic sector but the environmental as well. With little surface water, new sources had to be found to support the state. The most controversial was the creation of the Israeli National Water Carrier which weaponised water and agriculture (Weinthal & Sowers, 2019). Consultation did not occur with either Syria or Jordan who also had riparian rights to the water.[171] As discussed in Chapter 4, there was significant pushback in relation to the building of the pipeline from regional powers (Jordan and Syria) and the US. Israel, however, deemed the lack of water an existential threat, both to its current population and its clearly articulated policy of the ingathering of Jews globally. This, however, was not the only controversial project that would cause external censure. In 1962 the irrigation plan to divert waters from the Tiberias to the Negev at a cost of US$200 million was completed ("Economic Planning Conference", 1962).

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[170] From "Water and Environmental Security in the Middle East," by J. D. Rogers. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-3105-2_25

[171] International riparian rights of states are laid out in international law institutions (International Court of Justice, International Law Commission). These are the Helsinki and Seoul Rules, but they are subordinate to specifically negotiated rights contained in international treaties agreed by states. Israel and Jordan's Peace Treaty is an example.

The global response in relation to the actions of Israel concerning the acquisition of natural resources was made clear in December 1962, through UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII). It confirmed the rights to enduring sovereignty over a state's natural resources, stating at section seven "violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." The resolution also identifies that actions contrary to this resolution impact on the wider international community. Non-binding in nature, the resolution did not stop Israel from using the resources. It could be argued that the failure of the UN to act in relation to the environmental securitization actions of Israel assisted in Israel's belief that the global community would not take action into the future, thereby setting the scene for the Six Day War.

5.5   Societal Securitization 1955–1962

As discussed in Chapter 1, vertical competition as part of an assimilation process was challenging for the state to manage. The IDF's success in the Suez/Sinai conflict of 1956 consolidated its leadership role in Israeli society and provided the post-1948 immigrant generation who engaged Egypt in combat with full membership into the Israeli community. The new waves of migrants, however, had not had a chance to serve and were therefore not fully integrated into the community; this brought with its significant challenges. The Suez Crisis outcome provides support for Durkheim's (1952) argument that war increases collective thoughts and attitudes and stimulates patriotism to create deeper integration with society. The Israeli collective identity was reinforced by the narrative around those who died while in IDF service. Lebel and Ronel (2005) maintain that, in assuming a cultural change role, the dead emphasised unity through service which thereby impacted on the military and societal securitization agendas. In death, the reverence afforded the family of the deceased served in a quasi-functional actor role because it embedded the political securitization discourse and became a method of galvanising the support of the polity.

Whilst there was a risk as a result of mass migration, as articulated in Buzan et al. (1998), diluting the identity of the state, the underlying criteria of Jewish identity held the state together. Ethnic stratification, however, started to divide the Yishuv, the first Aliyah, and Western European Jewry from the Middle Eastern, North African, Eastern European,

Balkan and Asian Jewry. Patterson (1954) argues that of this second contingent, "less that one quarter…had been employed at all before coming to Israel" (p. 311). A strong work ethic was often referred to as the 'religion of labour', occupying a cornerstone position in Israeli society. Care and support for those who do not work, Eisenstadt (1967) professes, is of lower priority. This was further exacerbated by both West German reparations and as a result of the state-building activities required to ensure the retention of land. The one key factor that tied these now very varied groups together was faith. As further legislation in relation to identity was being discussed in the Knesset, Hischler and Eckman (1979, pp. 222–223) contend that Menachem Begin, leader of Herut, posed the question could "one differentiate between religion and national identity?" The Arab-Israelis' lack of rights, therefore, created the democratic majority on which the identity of the Jewish state rested.

5.5.1   The Impact of West German Reparations

Pre-state community members and European Jewry were the dominant subgroup holding a majority of key positions in government and industry. Their history within the community was linked to a key value of Israeli society: the assurance of productive work for all. Initially this was within kibbutzim, as described in Chapter 2, but the growth and development of the state changed this into a more industrial setting, mirroring the development of the Jewish state. Members of this group, Rosenfield and Carmi (1976) claim, now shifted to a more middle- or upper-class position both economically and socially as a result of access to additional goods and services. This resulted in a similar shift in the political position of MAPAI, which predominantly served this constituency. However, contrary to Buzan et al.'s (1998) assertion in relation to vertical competition, the Yishuv and Western European Jewry did not stop seeing themselves as the foundation of the state, impacting on the political choices and societal integration process espoused by MAPAI. From a societal securitization perspective, West German restitution payments posed both threats and opportunities.

5.5.2   The Impact of State Building and Migration

Citizens of liberal democratic states are generally perceived as operating with considerably lower levels of insecurity, as a result of both access to resources and the

rights that living within such a community entail. This was not always the case for immigrants to Israel. As discussed in Chapter 4, Jews from the Aliyah's emanating from Middle Eastern, North African, Eastern European, Balkan and Asian Jewry for this period and the remainder of the dissertation period received fewer of the advantages available to the Yishuv, the first Aliyah, and Western European Jewry. The Israeli government sought an increase of migrants to ensure possession of the land. The 1962 four-year economic plan argued for an increase of 110,000 annually (60 per cent from migration) to reach a population of 2.5 million by 1966 ("Four-year Economic Plan", 1962). The first major riot by Jews in Haifa as a result of migration issues occurred in July 1959 Haifa. Massad (1996) notes that new housing granted to the Aliyah of Polish Jewry whilst previously arrived Moroccan Jewry were living in slum conditions was the trigger for this event (Hoffman, 2000). Migration from Western Europe was slowing and the majority of new arrivals were to come from nations placing significant pressure on their Jewish populations in response to Israel's actions within the region.[172] These groups faced cultural dissonance challenges across the societal spectrum from lower education levels, lack of experience in Jewish nationalism and democracy (and its bureaucratic structures) through to differences in appearance and family size. Most having been forced out, they left behind support networks, funds and resources that would have made integration into Israeli society easier. Simultaneously there were increasing concerns from the Yishuv and those who had migrated prior to statehood, as they were no longer the majority within the state.

Those not in receipt of West German reparations (approximately 50 per cent of new migrants), Wolffsohn (1987) stresses, became a mobile labour force, who were moved to locations that had recently been acquired by the IDF and in need of an occupying populace. This also impacted on environmental and economic securitization sectors with the new settlements requiring expenditure on fortifications, housing, and costs associated with farming such as irrigation, machinery, roads, etc. The state, however, continued the assisted migration for global Jewry who were being persecuted. Operation Yachin was one such effort conducted by the Mossad to assist Moroccan Jews. Between November 1961 and mid-1964 approximately 80,000 arrived by plane and ship. The state continued to give primacy and support to Jewish nationals (albeit at lower levels) which

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[172] Yemen, Iraq, Saudi Arabia.

continued therefore to exclude Israeli Arabs (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 2019) and other minorities remaining within Israel.

In addition to the challenges faced by non-Western European Jewry, Palestinians within Israel also did not assimilate within this period, contrary to Ward's (1914) argument that

> … all larger polities have emerged through violence. Initially the conquered group maintained its intensive dislike of its conquerors but would gradually become coercively assimilated whereby the emergence of shared 'national sentiment' would help unify the polity thus creating the nation-state. *(p. 175)*

The non-assimilation of this cohort was actively assisted by Israel through its legislative process defining 'we' and 'other'. The marginalisation of the Palestinian Arabs within Israel supports Hansen's contention that in relation to speech acts security is "implicated in the production of silence" (2000, p. 306).

5.6 Concluding Comments August 1955 – 1962

This chapter outlined the impact of the interconnectedness of the Copenhagen School methodology on the choices of the state. Given the passage of time, the threats (real or perceived) are seen now with the advantage of hindsight. Those at the time could only respond to the information available to them. Securitization theory used longitudinally provides the ability to consider the long-term impacts of the securitization choices of the State of Israel. Addressing a single sectoral threat had flow-on impacts to other sectors and whilst Buzan et al. (1998) argue that these can be considered in isolation, the Rubik's Cube® analogy highlights how a response to a single sectoral threat may impact on other areas, allowing a more holistic consideration of the consequences of those choices. At the end of this period, the State of Israel had made significant inroads in relation to its environmental, political and military securitization strategies, causing significant apprehension within the region and to a smaller extent globally. This would set the scene for greater hostility across all sectors, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

The legislation enacted across the previous chapters was embedded between 1955 – 1962 enabling practice, in terms of Jewish endeavour whilst simultaneously constraining practice of any 'other'. The legislative agenda supported the actions of the state and

continued a threat rhetoric that acted as a link to past and future threats. The psychological conditioning of the community continued to allow speech acts to be assumed by the wider population of the State of Israel, and audience acceptance was subsumed into the threat discourse.

The creation of a highly securitized state is shown to have reduced the requirement for Buzan et al.'s (1998) formalised speech acts and reinforces Balzacq's (2005) argument as to the normalisation of threat responses within this environment. Politician's utilised language to appeal to the pervasive narratives (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002) of the period, existential threats, immigration and the need to pull together as 'we' or become victim to the 'other'. The agency of the audience increased a little over this period, but not to the extent that significant functional actors were identified outside the governing polity.

The following penultimate chapter addresses the period 1962–67, including the lead-up to the Six Day War, the conduct of hostilities, the choices made and their after-effects within the time-period. The world we live in is still dealing with the decisions made by both state and non-state actors in response to the real or perceived threats that Israel believed it needed to respond to.

Chapter 6   Taking Chances and Lost Opportunities (1962–1967)

"Those that perished in Hitler's gas chambers were the last Jews to die without standing up to defend themselves."

Golda Meir (1967) Speech in New York, 11 Jun

The previous chapter continued the process of longitudinally analysing the securitization of the State of Israel. Methodologically it has shown the response by the state to multiple existential threats across all sectoral securitization elements, and attempts to mitigate that threat and the implications of those choices. Additionally it considered the master narrative of the Jewish people being under threat woven into all parts of the Jewish lifecycle. The legislative language reflected the primacy of 'we' the Jew and provided asymmetric privilege in terms of access to the services of the state including representation (citizenship) resources (ability to purchase of work on land) and to social services (education, health care).

For decades the conflict over the land of Palestine was considered a zero-sum game with both sides claiming the same land and considering the other's claim an existential threat to national survival. Whilst it could be argued that the conflicts were a result of religion and differences in ideology or power, all these elements were predicated on the need for land, and its acquisition and then retention. Crises of this nature, be they human, economic or environmental, are infrequently confined by borders or lines on a map. The relationships between states therefore brought others into the conflict either through the decision to take a side, or to abstain from doing so. This links with Balzacq's (2005) view of securitization being a pragmatic practice in response to a set of circumstances, dependent upon the audience appealed to and the power/agency that both the speech actor and the audience have. The interconnected nature of the relationship across all sectors continued to impact the choices made by the state in relation to the perceived or actual existential threats continues to show the utility of the Rubik's Cube$^{©}$ as a thought experiment.

This chapter will consider the period 1962 to 1967, in which Israel fought its last major battle in relation to overt territorial acquisition, and the impact sectoral threats had on both the decision to go to war and its outcomes. It will continue to consider each securitization issue on a sectorial basis until the 1967 Six Day War. At that point the conflict will be considered before once more separating out to consider the wars outcome on each of the securitization sectors.

6.1   Economic Securitization Prior to the Six Day War

Politically motivated protectionist policies significantly altered the political/geopolitical and strategic cross-cultural landscape. Israel, from its inception, had significant government intervention within its society, as has been evidenced over the preceding six chapters. The geopolitical situation of the state was unique, with resulting impacts on ideas and technology driven by a need to be able, if required, to be completely self-sufficient. The situation, with the resultant restrictions and requirements, had flow-on effects and was impacted by the economic choices of the state.

6.1.1   Land

Land is the key resource in most frontier conflicts. By this time, the legislative agenda of Israel described in Chapter 3 through to Chapter 5 was normalised, thereby moving it outside the securitization discussion. Israeli legislation allowed the transition of previously Palestinian-owned land to the State of Israel. The land was then turned over to Israeli institutions to support the advancement of Israeli nationals. Within that construct Israeli-Arab subsistence agriculture was replaced by Jewish irrigated mass farming aimed at supporting the Israeli domestic market. Resources were secured and utilised to ensure maximum value to the state.

6.1.2   Labour

With the nuclear program at Dimona intensifying, senior managers across all industries were decrying the poaching of staff to support bringing the site online. Oren (2003) notes that migration into Israel was slowing and emigration increasing. The challenge of labour remained, especially within the agricultural sector. Arab-Israelis were prevented from working on Jewish National Fund (JNF) controlled land and continued to be paid at a

lower rate, as discussed in Chapter 2. The majority of blue-collar labour continued to be drawn from Arab-Israelis and Jews from the latter Aliyah periods as discussed in Chapter Five ("Israel to have 3,000,000 Jews in decade", 1962). Within this context, the displaced Arab-Israeli continued to represent a disenfranchised referent object. The lack of Palestinian-centric trade unions made it problematic to defend their social rights. The Jewish-dominated Histadrut, initially discussed in Chapter 2 as a union for both rural and urban workers, only commenced representation of Palestinian citizen workers in 1959. From the individual economic security perspective, the ability to define and improve the human condition remained an existential threat to this element of the Israeli population. Whilst they had made improvements in their advocacy options, few functional actors actively sought to change this position in the period 1962–1967.

6.1.3   Capital

The relative economic strength of Israel, after the influx of funds from the diaspora, the US (through the Marshall Plan and other grants), West Germany (as a result of the reparations) and private organisations, continued to reinforce the power of the state. The manufacturing sector recipients of much of the German equipment and aid had yet to realise its full potential, but the sector was making progress. Lending and investment became normalised between 1962 and 1967 ("Eshkol emphasises economic achievements of Sharett", 1964). As the state's legitimacy was increasingly displayed, this correlated with a willingness of non-state actors such as the World Bank and private organisations to lend funds. Lending through the World Bank increased, with new loans totalling US$15 million, taking the total loans of the state from this actor to $94.5 million since the state's inception ("Loan Negotiations with World Bank", 1962). Private US investment also continued, representing a total of US$25 million since 1925 in diverse industries and infrastructure projects. This expanded in early 1967 to support the Israel Research and Development Corporation, whose goal was the creation of science-related industries ("Economic Corporation Reports", 1967).

The economic cost of Dimona impacted on the ability of the state to respond to other threats. The reactor cost US$130 million (Hersh, 1991), and the increasing cost of the

nuclear program was a source of disagreement within the cabinet.[173] This was however not the only cost. Hersh (1991) a leading writer in this field states the complete missile program was identified in 1967 to cost US$850 million, which exceeded the total Israeli defence budget for that year.

As discussed in Chapter 5, an economic class system existed within Jewish society. This was a result of income from Germany and added to this was the increasing divide between Israeli-Arabs, employed primarily in blue collar roles, and Jews. Members of the Yishuv and Western European Jewry were in the top tier, followed by Eastern European Jewry, all other Jews, and then the Palestinian Arabs. Members of other religious beliefs remained outside the top tier by virtue of their faith (and therefore possession of national status but not citizenship) but depending upon their finances and roles could be found in any of the other classes. Whilst West German reparations to the State of Israel ceased in 1965 and the state entered a period of recession, individual recipients of the West German repatriations continued to receive funding until after the end of this dissertation period. Although the funds had safeguarded the balance of payments, the economic sector remained depressed, reliant on protectionist policies and monopolies to survive.

6.1.4   Enterprise

In 1964, the US and Israel, according to Hersh (1991), negotiated and announced a preliminary agreement to build a nuclear desalination and power plant. Able to produce 200 megawatts of power, it would significantly reduce Israel's reliance on benzene, oil and kerosene, the supply of which was fraught on several levels, as discussed from Chapter 2 onwards. Additionally, the plant would be able to produce a daily 100 million gallons of desalinated water. This would have a substantial impact on the environmental securitization of the state. There were, however, a number of trade-offs, the most significant of which was the linkage of funding (approximately US$60 million) to mandatory International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. The Israelis in mid-1966 chose to delay the program as a result of this condition and ultimately chose not to proceed. Addressing the problem of water from a different angle, in 1965, Senor and Singer (2011)

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[173] The impact of the total nuclear program on the budget in the 1960s was so extreme that Israeli President Ben-Gurion and his Chief of Staff Peres created the Committee of Thirty, a group of high net worth international donors, to covertly support the nuclear weapons program.

note, discussions commenced in relation to commercialisation of drip irrigation methods which had become a standard approach to water usage in the desert kibbutzim.

Economic dependencies including oil, benzene and kerosene discussed in Chapter 2 continued to be exploited by the UK through the inequitable size of the cut taken by the UK, however the relationship between Israel and Iran allowed some consistency in relation to supply. In 1967, as Hersh (1991) states, Tahal (an Israeli government organisation) commenced negotiations with the Shah of Iran to build a 42-inch pipeline to pump Iranian oil to Ashdod and Eilat. The ability to continue defence industry production and actively respond to rival technology supported the economic capability for the mobilisation of the state.

6.2   Societal Securitization Prior to the Six Day War

According to Lamar and Thompson (1981) Israel is the most contemporary example of a frontier society, as demonstrated by the rival groups competing for land. The citizenship discourse initially articulated in Chapter 4 was both inclusionary and exclusionary for those who lived, or sought to live, within the borders of the State of Israel. Vertical and horizontal securitization issues, as articulated by Buzan et al. (1998) and discussed in Chapter 1, continued to impact on Israeli society and tension was evident as a result. Volkan (1997) argues that victimisation of the internal group (and also of others within the region) when not reversed both bonds the community together and provides a lens through which the community views each new perceived or actual threat. The state and the Histadrut utilised and dispensed resources with primacy directed to nationals (Jews) and then to citizens, thereby embedding the hierarchies inherent within the layers of citizenship and nationality. These structures and beliefs could be argued to perpetuate the use of a violent response which is readily available as a first option.

Migration in the early 1960s continued unabated, with the Israeli population trebling to 2.9 million, with the "fifth highest portion of university graduates in the world" (Oren, 2003, p. 16), supporting significant growth and development. As discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, discrimination in relation to migrants, especially those who were uneducated or North African, as well as Palestinian Israelis, continued. The ongoing existence of ethnically distinct subgroups within Israel represented a threat if they became politically organised. By keeping them isolated from power, with no functional

actors directly from that subset, they remained marginalised. The challenge this poses to de-securitization is the linkage with identity. Hansen (2012) notes this reconstitution of identity can shift not only the concept of self, but also the 'other'. The state continued to manage the integration of the new migrants without outside assistance (including food, housing and sourcing of productive work), allowing the 'ingathering of exiles' to continue.

Given the location of the State of Israel and the linkage to faith internally and externally, it is prudent to address the securitization elements related to the 'holy war' concepts. Weber (1963, pp. 86–87) defines a holy war as "a war in the name of God." The 'we' and 'other' discourse was embedded in all sides of the conflict and therefore conflict was becoming inevitable, with perceived securitization threats across all sectors. The accentuation of the differences in religious beliefs with the obvious primacy of one over all others, combined with cultural practices and legislative action, further added to this. The newly created Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which sought the return of the land promised to the Sharif of Mecca as discussed in Chapter 2, stated in its charter that this would be accomplished through the use of commando action. However, whilst there were both perceived and actual threats, the responses were normalised. Reiter (1995) argues that fear drives pre-emptive responses. The continuation of the emergency regulations from the British mandatory period supported a discourse that made the Israeli public more susceptible to acceptance of both threats, and the requirement for pre-emptive action to address it.

The decision-making process linking an instinctual reaction based on earlier conflicts was visible in the preparations for the 1967 war. As such it shows the impact of existential threat concerns linked to Hirschberger et al.'s (2016) model of both past victimisation and imminent physical collective annihilation. As a collective, Israel was powerful politically, militarily, and economically yet there remained a perception of current or potential victimhood. This self-assessment was actively supported by a continuing government rhetoric as a method of societal securitization. The self-identification of 'victim' does not automatically indicate weakness. Externally the international community generally provides aid to the victim, and internally self-identification as a victim acts as a bond in the community eliciting 'we' and 'other' feelings and galvanising the population to take action against the perceived or actual aggressor. In the mid-1960s and immediately prior the Six Day War, the perceived threat of the 'other' was played

out in public within the media in relation to the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Hersh states (1991) that the Israeli press asserted Chinese and Soviet support for Egypt attaining a nuclear capability, and the Egyptian press stated that the Soviets would come to their aid should Israel use its nuclear arsenal. Flapan's argument (as cited in Hersh, 1991, p. 138) in relation to the cyclical nature of the positioning of threats was played out publicly with the increasing tensions pushing it to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

6.3 Environmental Securitization Prior to the Six Day War

Environmental securitization for the State of Israel has centred on the acquisition and retention of territory that provides access to water and other natural resources crucial to survival. The Sykes-Picot agreement placed Lake Tiberias and the main branch of the River Jordan within what would be ceded to Israel.[174] There were, however, as Hof (1999) argues, conditions placed on this grant including a continuation of current usage rights that should be:

> maintained unimpaired . . . and the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon shall have the same sharing and navigation rights on . . . Lake Kinneret [Tiberias] and the River Jordan . . . as the inhabitants of Palestine. *(p. 7)*

In 1962, the UN General Assembly considered the sovereignty of natural resources and General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 14 1962, in a non-binding document, argued at point seven that a violation of a state's riparian rights is in conflict with the intent of the UN Charter, hindering peace and cooperation. Israel has not always accepted UN resolutions, and the conduct of hostilities in the region provides the exception to Frank's (1990) argument that within the international system whilst the "rules usually are not enforced yet they are mostly obeyed" (p. 3).

The lack of water resources and the actions of Israel to secure these has been discussed across this dissertation. Disruption of an ecosystem is seen as an existential threat within the context of environmental securitization. The plan for a National Water Carrier initially articulated in 1944 was realised 20 years later, having been built without consulting riparian partners Jordan (with territorial sovereignty over both banks of the River Jordan)

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[174] As discussed in Chapter 2, consistent with Article 109 of the Treaty of Lucerne

and Syria. Gleick (1993) reports the cost of construction was US$420 million; it commenced the diversion of up to 75 per cent of the River Jordan into Israel in 1964 and included the disruption of the Lake Huleh Marsh ecosystem to support the irrigation of the Negev. This supports Mann's (1993) contention that infrastructural power can be used as a weapon. The drainage of the marshes impacted both sides of the Israeli and Syrian border and represented an existential threat to Syrian ecological security. The Syrian response was to modify the upstream environment of the Hatzbani and Banias tributaries in southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights, diverting water south of Lake Tiberias for storage in the Mukheiba Dam, impacting on the flow of water into the River Jordan. The Israeli response was swift, through coordinated military manoeuvres, including military bombing raids into Syria to destroy the diversionary structures. Oren (2003) states that the Israeli Air Force launched attacks inside Syrian sovereign territory (air space) to destroy the dams and the machinery used to construct them. Israel's justification for the breach of Syrian sovereignty was that the structures infringed on Israel's sovereign riparian rights.

The UN as an organisation of international governance was appealed to by Syria to provide some stability in terms of the relationship and adherence to agreed patterns of behaviour, and to safeguard the ecological and environmental security of the Syrian state. Whilst it sought to have Israel sanctioned in terms of its environmental threat to the riparian rights of itself, Jordan and Lebanon, this action did not prevent Syria from also conducting border incursions or supporting non-state actors to do so.

The inherent instability of the Arab-Israeli conflict across the region was also impacting Israeli environmental securitization in other quarters. Oren (2002) argues that 1964 saw the commencement of asymmetric warfare from Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. This threat to Israel's environmental security was undertaken by a variety of paramilitary organisations (most notably the PLO) seeking to disrupt the flow of water from the northern region to support the Negev, supplied by Syrian weaponry purchased from Russia.

The actions by all parties in the lead-up to the 1967 conflict were inconsistent with the Sykes-Picot agreement.

6.4 Political Securitization Prior to the Six Day War

Legitimacy on the global stage of the State of Israel was now established, and whilst there were nations who did not recognise the state, its acknowledgement by both superpowers, great powers and multinational organisations, including the UN, ensured that this consideration was now normative and outside the bounds of securitization. Oren (2005) notes that President Kennedy's election to power in the US, and the resultant improvement in the US-Israeli relationship, owed a lot to the soft power of the Israeli diaspora. Binder (1964) suggests that the innate instability of the balancing between Middle Eastern states by the commitment or otherwise of superpowers and great powers would end in violence if the vigilance was laissez-faire, or as a result of widespread domestic upheaval.

6.4.1 Regional

As discussed in Chapter 2, Pan-Arabian norms as a result of a common supra-state identity impacted the nations surrounding Israel. The legitimacy of Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan internally required a respect for and acknowledgement of Arab-Islamic norms and causes including advocacy and possible action for the Palestinian Arabs. In respecting that supra-state identity, they also needed to defend their individual sovereignty, at times to the detriment of their regional allies. The threats to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arabian leadership within the region came under this guise and acted as further impetus for conflict. Frazer and Hutchings (2008) argue that the ideological and material outlay required to maintain violence as a default position for political action should not be underestimated. Whilst Israel was not always the initial aggressor, it kept the overt use of force clearly available, readily in the minds of both its citizens and regional neighbours.

6.4.1.1 Creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Asymmetrical Warfare

The activities of non-state actors supported by neighbouring states utilising asymmetrical warfare had an impact on the security of the State of Israel. The Pan-Arabian community

vacillated between realist self-help (seeking accommodations with Israel[175]) and responses to the Arab 'Street' in support of the Palestinian cause. The New York Times announced the first national Palestine National Congress held in Jerusalem and the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in 1964 ("Arabs create organization for recovery of Palestine", 1964). The movement would meet regularly and in 1968 submitted to the UN the Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council July 1–17, 1968 which asserted a Zionist invasion[176] and stated "armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine" (Article 9, The Palestinian National Charter). Jordan was, Smith (2010) notes, almost 60 per cent Palestinian and held the West Bank which, as discussed in Chapter 2, had been allocated as part of the Palestinian state. When the embryonic PLO laid claim to the land and associated revenues, the Jordanians refused permission for the PLO to conduct any activities in Jordan. Fatah, discussed in the previous chapter, supplied by Syria, in mid-1965 commenced successful attacks against Israeli infrastructure, the first of which was in relation to water installations. It too was banned from Jordan, but this did not deter either group from using the country as a base of operations.

6.4.1.2   The United Arab Republic (UAR)

The United Arab Republic (UAR) within the construct of the Pan-Arabian community was intended to provide a unifying ideology, strengthening the ties that the arbitrarily applied borders redrafted after the end of World War II (WWII) had sought to break. Kershaw (2005, p. 115) notes that "territorial losses, disputed territorial claims, and unfulfilled imperialist ambitions" all increase the chances of violent conflict. The previous chapter detailed the UAR's early rise and fall, however with a change of government in Iraq and Syria calls were renewed for the revival of the UAR in 1963. Nasser, as speech actor, articulated the United Arab Republic Manifesto (Laqueur and Rubin, 2001) signed by the Presidents of Syria and Iraq in April 1963 and proclaiming a national duty to liberate Palestine. The rivalry within and between the respective countries did not allow for the inception of a transnational, multi-ethnic superstate at that time, although it laid the necessary groundwork.

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[175] Jordan is the most obvious and enduring of these, but also Anwar Sadat after he becomes President of Egypt outside the period of this dissertation.

[176] Article 6 The Palestinian National Charter

The republic sought interdependency and cooperation by those member states linked to the wider supra-state regional identity, thereby sidelining sects and providing a political and military alliance and a cultural nexus that the Arab 'Street' [177]could readily identify with. Smith (2010) notes that on 7 November 1966 Egypt and Syria signed a mutual defence agreement. Six days later, Israel attacked Jordan in retaliation for the raids by Fatah and the PLO emanating from Jordan (Smith, 2010), resulting in the loss of lives and homes and placing the Jordanian monarchy between two distinct and obdurate groups: the Israelis and the remainder of the UAR.

6.4.2   Internal

The concept of the Jewish state in terms of its national identity and organisational stability had now been realised. The political threats discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 in relation to failing to acquire sufficient support and having contested legitimacy either internally or externally no longer represented an existential threat to the state. If politics is "the shaping of human behaviour for the purposes of governing large groups of people" as articulated by Buzan and Little (1993, p. 35), then the Jewish state had attained a strong, robust government capable of dealing with both internal and external challenges. The stabilisation of institutions and the authority vested in them allowed for both success and failure to be addressed equally. Political units, from orthodox Jewry to the diaspora were welded into a group who, while not always cohesive, strived to achieve a common goal (Schindler, 2008). This is also true for unit level referent objects such as the Palestinian Arabs who remained within Israel, both in terms of their legitimacy or lack thereof and their recognition both as an emerging political force as well as the structures to support them.

6.4.2.1   Another Change of the Guard

In 1963 Ben-Gurion stepped down as Prime Minister,[178] and his continued interest and interference in the post-mortem of the Lavon Affair, discussed in Chapter 5, marginalised his power (Raviv, 1998). He was succeeded by Levi Eshkol, former agriculture and finance minister. Whilst their policies and positions on a number of issues were diametrically

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[177] Protestors in all the allied countries seeking the removal of Israel.

[178] He officially left political life in 1970.

opposite, on the issue of the threat represented by the Israeli–Arab relationship they were in agreement. Upon assuming office Eshkol continued the historic threat rhetoric stating "The danger we face is one of complete destruction" (Ben-Ami, 2005, p.86). Articulating the recurring strength/vulnerability paradox, Eshkol's position was that Israel was "militarily invincible and mortally vulnerable" (Oren, 2003, p. 18). The methodology for attainment of a more stable Israeli-Arab relationship was, Eshkol, Meir and a number of other MAPAI members believed, a more diplomatic one.

In 1965, whilst the authority of the government was not contested there was a significant shift in the internal governance of Israel, evidencing its stability and robust organisational structure, and that securitization within this sphere remained normalised. For a majority of parties, the process articulated in Chapter 4 in relation to the placement of senior military commanders into positions of government and industry power continued. This engendered a disposition for the military mindset to provide their initial cognitive reference point. The Israel Workers List (RAFI) created in 1965 was an offshoot of MAPAI. O'Balance (1990) argues its leadership (Ben-Gurion, Dayan and Peres) were hard-line, pro-nuclear proponents who identified more closely with realism in articulating offensive military action to secure the state. RAFI's inception was, as Yanai (1969) argues, a direct response to the lack of overt actions by Eshkol in relation to the military security of the state.

The third round of elections was held in November 1965, with MAPAI, under Eshkol's leadership, retaining power even after the divisive split. Shlaim (2001) argues that the Israeli public saw this not as an argument about defence and/or the use of a nuclear option, but rather whether the state was to continue to follow traditional volunteerism overtly evident from the pre-state period through to the early 1960s or would transition to an approach that espoused identical requirements for all nationals. Golda Meir retired from politics but was recalled fixing the divisions within MAPAI (Medding, 1990). In the same year Herut, formed by Menachem Begin (initially discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to détente with West Germany), formed a power block called Gahal with the Liberal Party. Whilst both remained individual entities, Herut's leader Menachem Begin became the functional actor for this group. Internally political legitimacy was further shown through the growth and diversity within the political landscape. In the lead up to 1966 and early 1967 Gahal as a functional actor substantiated Buzan et al.'s (1998, p. 146)

argument that governments are "subject to public scrutiny and open to questioning". According to Bar-Zohar (1968) they criticised Prime Minister Eshkol's lack of response to the Egyptian mobilisation in both the Sinai and the blockage of the Straits of Tiran, positing that he had lost control of Israel's security.

6.4.2.2   Arab-Palestinians Within Israel

Democracy and citizenship, as articulated in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, allowed for an increased role in relation to Palestinian Arab advocacy and support. Prior to 1965 their allegiance had been primarily vested in the Labor Party. After 1965, however, this shifted to the Communist Party and later, after this dissertation period, to Palestinian parties (Caplan, 2020). The Arab-Palestinians had begun the process of emerging as a referent object, whose increasing political power, Peled (1992) argues, was used to leverage national political organisations in a manner which the Israeli government could no longer ignore. The challenge to the Arab-Palestinians, however, was that the functional actor for this group still remained within the construct of the overarching polity.[179]

6.4.2.3   Land Legislation

The process of enshrining the acquisition and use of land by the Jewish nationals, established in the previous three chapters, continued over this period. The use of land as discussed in Chapter 2, under force majeure had initially been addressed through the British 1943 Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance. In 1964 this was codified into Israeli legislation as the Acquisition for Public Purposes (Amendment of Provisions) Law. In 1965 the Absentee Property Law, initially discussed in Chapter 4, was extended to Muslim Waqf lands. These lands included Muslim places of worship, cemeteries and religious holdings. The legislation was backdated to incept on 12 December 1948,[180] or later if additional criteria could be met, embedding a practice of disenfranchisement of the 'other' that was now normalised.

The framework of governance and legitimacy was now defined within the borders of the state. The behaviour in relation to the legislative agenda around land and the

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[179] For discussion on Israel and Palestine bi-nationalism options see Raz-Krakotzkin, 2011; Todorova, 2015; Yiftachel, 2016.

[180] Absentee Property Law 5710, s. 4 (a) (i).

organisational units to support it had become normalised internally, thus transitioning it outside of the securitization agenda.

6.5 Military Securitization Prior to the Six Day War

If, as Buzan (1991) argues, a state's role is "protecting the components of the state from outside threat and interference" (p. 100), then the challenges facing the State of Israel from 1962 to 1967 were both real and perceived. The response to these threats had become normative in that Israel's position was clear: it would respond to protect the sovereignty of the state both within and outside the borders of the state. Bregman (2003) states that Israeli military tactics had been further defined after the 1956 conflict. They rested on two key elements: a pre-emptive strike initially by air and the conduct of hostilities progressing to enemy territory.

6.5.1 Regional

The territorial composition of the State of Israel prior to the 1967 conflict was one of long coastlines and land frontiers, a maximum of 14 km wide, bordered by neighbours who espoused existential threats to its continued existence. The position of population centres resulted in Israeli citizens being vulnerable to raids and border conflicts, with no notionally 'safe' area (Hinnebusch, 2015). In a regional securitization setting these distances became key factors in threat assessments conducted by the IDF and to some extent they predetermined responses.

Aerial superiority was acknowledged as needing to be a significant component of Israel's response to regional aggression. This was predicated not only in relation to equipment, but on the ability of crews to conduct rapid turnaround and/or refit. From the early 1960s attempts had been made to acquire a MiG-21, which the USSR had been supplying to Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Black and Morris (1991) assert an Iraqi Jew contacted Jewish officials in Tehran in late 1964 advising of a disgruntled Iraqi MiG pilot who could be inveigled to deliver his plane to Israel for US$1 million and safe passage for his family out of Iraq. On 16 July 1966 it landed in Israel and was then investigated by both US and Israeli officials to determine its offensive and defensive capabilities. This allowed the modification of battlefield planning and preparation by both nations to combat this technology. At the same time, Eshkol had used his negotiation skills to acquire in 1966 A-

4-E Skyhawk tactical fighters. Hersh (1991) states that Eshkol, in discussions with US President Johnson, agreed to defer discussions on the nuclear arsenal at Dimona if the US would agree to provision Israel with offensive weaponry equal to the supply that Egypt was acquiring from the USSR. Given the increasing tensions in the region, the US did not push the issue further.

6.5.1.1   The United Arab Republic and the United Arab Command

Waltz (1972) argues that a state's fate is tied to its response to the actions of other states. In November 1966 the newly invigorated UAR saw a pact signed between Syria and Egypt in relation to both mutual defence and a commitment to the destruction of the State of Israel (Oren, 2003). The two rivals for leadership of the Pan-Arabian community goaded each other into a position where action had to be seen to be taken against the common enemy: Israel. Nasser, while still the speech actor for the Pan-Arabian alliance, was being driven by two main functional actors, Syria and the Arab Street. Oren (2003) states that the Jordanian leadership had sought a private accommodation with Israel, however the need to appease the Jordanian Arab Street saw the Syrian–Egyptian alliance widened to include Jordan. In solidarity, Iraq would also join, and Saudi Arabia promised support. To ensure retention of the leadership of the UAR, Egypt committed the best of its forces to assist supporters in Yemen in their civil war.

President Nasser's sustained bellicose speech acts against the State of Israel articulated from Chapter 3 onwards continued to escalate during 1965 and 1966. Jervis (as cited in Olesker, 2011, p. 383) contends that, consistent with the tenets of neo-realist theory, the security dilemma of one state seeking to stabilise or enhance its security causes instability in other state(s) which ultimately results in instability for both nations. Nordeen and Nicolle (1996) assert that reports dating back to 1965 (from a variety of sources, including the Egyptian Air Force's flying over Dimona), bolstered the perceived threat felt by Egypt. This had flow-on effects to the speech acts articulated by Nasser which increased Israeli concerns. The reactor's presence, O'Balance (1972) states, could hardly be missed as it was buttressed by anti-aircraft missiles which Israel had purchased from the US. Given the social conditioning, numerous indicators of an imminent existential threat could be found in actions within the region. The Egyptian air force's repeated breaches of Israeli air space coincided in May 1967 with the UN withdrawal

from its buffering position in the Sinai and Egypt's move to aggressively re-occupy its territory, temporarily lost in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. On the northern border, continued tension in relation to Syria and Lebanon over water, control over the DMZs and the support and active encouragement of both the PLO and Fatah in their actions against Israel, all further inflamed an already difficult situation.

The United Arab Command was set up immediately before the war, and Pollack (2002) notes that Egyptian commanders were placed in control of all other nations' forces. This last-minute change would have severe impacts on the conduct of hostilities, as would the different national objectives.

6.5.2   The Citizen Soldier

Individual and group funded military hardware, as discussed in Chapter 5, continued across this period, representing a distinctive approach to Israeli securitization and threat management. Bregman (2003, p. 53) asserts that "prices of weaponry systems were published in the daily papers" and the public was encouraged to buy them as a sign of their commitment to the state. As an example of practice, this method of articulating the recurring and imminent nature of the threat, it worked as an effective speech act (Petry, 2016). Israel is also unique in that a commuter war strategy[181] was and remains a part of the militarisation of the Israeli population and a cornerstone of its defence process. The vulnerability and resilience that this engenders within the population is a component of both the military and societal securitization discourse. Whilst Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend (1978) raise concerns about continued re-exposure to war or other military engagements, it remains a key element in both force projection and force response. Additionally, Bandura (1977) argues that this repeated exposure assists in expectation setting of subsequent activities. With the perception of a capable, well-equipped and trained IDF foremost in the mindset of both the civilian and military community, the ability and necessity to respond to threats either internal or external was accepted by the civilian population.

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[181] A commuter war strategy refers to a military force that can be in combat for a day or a short period of time and then return to their homes for the evening (Richard, 2002, p. 602).

6.5.3 The Mossad

The Mossad had a significant intelligence-gathering function in support of the state military and political securitization sectors. The ability to acquire, through a variety of methods, details of strategic or operational value enabled Israel to respond holistically to the threat (Pedahzur, 2010). The utilisation of this capacity was not only against Israel's real or perceived enemies, but also with its allies. Allies were occasionally given access to the information that the Mossad acquired, as demonstrated in relation to the MiG acquisition discussed above. Additionally, Klein (2007) argues that assassinations have three main drivers for a state: deterrence, revenge and prevention. Prevention to stop a hostile act against the sovereignty of a state, its land or its people is obvious. Deterrence is multi-faceted in that it is about persuasion that the risk is not worth the reward and links to Foucault's (1997a) panopticon. Revenge is the clearest articulation of overt state power within this dynamic, and one with which the Mossad is clearly linked. The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) legislation, described in Chapter 4, is reported by Zuroff (2005) as being utilised within this context with the assassination of Nazi collaborator Herbert Cukurs in Uruguay on 23 February 1965.

6.5.4 Nuclear Programme

The time period covered by this chapter could be argued to cover the solidification of Israel's nuclear defence option, as it became both a precursor to and then inhibitor of further serious regional aggression. This, therefore, moves the development stage outside the securitization discourse as it had become normative. Aligned with RAFI, Hersh (1991) states that Bergman resigned as Director of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, in protest at Eshkol's approach to the nuclear option. This interlinking of the impact of sectoral changes provides context to choices made not only by the state, but individuals within the state, to support a particular view.

Contextually the period immediately before and during the Six Day War is important for understanding the willingness to utilise nuclear defence as a military option. Belligerent and bellicose neighbours ensured that the perceived existential threat remained high. However, the use of these weapons was highly securitized in the latter parts of 1966 and in 1967. Peres' continued relationship with France (which had commenced prior to the Suez Canal Crisis) provided ready access to a number of elements that, apart from design,

included the production reactor discussed in Chapter 5, and the ability to utilise spent fuel rods to extract plutonium 239.[182]

Regional tensions arguably were escalated by Israel's possession of nuclear weaponry. Egypt actively sought to leverage its relationship with the USSR prior to and in the aftermath of the 1967 conflict to obtain this weaponry. The US was equally concerned about the program, however Oren (2003) asserts the response from Ben-Gurion to US President Kennedy was that "Israel's nuclear projects were its own sovereign business, its best guarantee against a second Holocaust" (p. 16).

The use of nuclear weapons is in essence seen by Israel as another weapon within its arsenal. This weapon, more than any other, crosses the political, environmental and societal sectors. It is further evidence of the strength/vulnerability paradox within Israeli culture. It generated significantly different approaches internally and externally to the state. Whilst safety and security protocols usually see the operational parts of nuclear weaponry separated, Burrows and Windrem (1994) assert that in May 1967 Israel assembled two nuclear weapons and went to war ten days later.

6.5.5   The Military Prelude to War

On 13 May 1967, the USSR advised Nasser of an imminent attack by massed Israeli forces on the Syrian border. Parker (1993) states that the troops were not there and when the Israeli government offered to take Soviet officials into the area to see for themselves, they refused. The report was accepted by Egypt and read within the context of increasing and ongoing tensions. In discussing the spiral model of pre-emptive hostile actions, Reiter (1995) notes that they are characterised by hostility and fear driven by the anarchic international order and securitizing and functional actors exaggerating the enmity of other states. This hostility and fear supported the Pan-Arabian narrative, both in terms of the threat the 'other' posed but also the mutual defence requirement embedding the 'we'.

The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), in place since the cessation of hostilities at the end of the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, left Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula at Nasser's request on 19 May 1967. This removed the neutral buffer between Israel and Egypt, and

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[182] The first reactor was completed in 1964 or 1965 (Burrows and Windrem,1994; Fromkin, 2009; Hersch, 1991).

Egyptian forces moved to the edge of the Sinai. In protesting the removal of UNEF forces from the Sinai at an address to the UN in New York on 6 June 1967 the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban likened it to "an umbrella that is taken away as soon as it begins to rain" (Statement to the UN Security Council). Eban's speech act met the securitization criteria articulated through Buzan et al. (1998) an existential threat, warranting the setting aside of usual practice, articulated by a speech actor, to a relevant audience who had the ability to take action. This unsuccessful speech act represents a real world example as to the challenges of applying Buzan et al.'s (1998) securitization approach. Eban's speech act was ultimately unsuccessful and pragmatic Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and IDF General Yigal Allon, in recognition of the challenge this posed to Israel's international standing, stated "they will condemn us, and we will survive" (Cohen, 2014). Hinnebusch (2015) contends that the nature of Nasser's speech act ensured a more supportive first strike environment for Israel, as it could argue that it was, or was about to be, the victim of Pan-Arabian aggression.

Figure 6.1   Events leading to the Six day War (25–30 May 1967).

On 22 and 23 May, Egypt once more blocked the Straits of Tiran. Israel argued that this move by Egypt represented 'casus belli' and sought diplomatically to invoke assistance based on the promises extracted from the superpowers and the UN after the Suez Crisis. Hersh argues (1991) that the US Johnson administration placed significant pressure on Eshkol not to attack Egypt. Ultimately, however, no state or non-state actors were willing to come to Israel's aid. Other UAR pact

members and supporters[183] moved their forces towards Israeli borders in support of Egypt over the next five days (Figure 6.1[184]). The Egyptians, assuming an Israeli attack would use established road infrastructure, commenced construction of fortified defences in the Sinai.

Eshkol, with limited military experience, was forced to initiate a national unity government on 1 June in response to the growing threat. Shlaim (2001) notes its 21-member composition represented a wide array of ideological beliefs and seven political parties. The national unity government met again on 4 June 1967 and made the decision to go to war, mobilising Israel's standing and reserve forces.

The IDF leadership concurrently commenced preparation for the imminent battle. As Grossman (2009) notes, the conduct of hostilities in the battlespace is highly scripted, visualised and conditioned. General Yigal Allon is quoted in Morris (2001) as seeking a different outcome to that of the War of Independence, arguing that the state "… MUST NOT cease fighting until we achieve total victory, the territorial fulfillment of the Land of Israel" (p. 321 emphasis in original). As both a politician and IDF general, his ability as a functional actor to influence the position of the government was significant. Reston (1967) opined in The New York Times as to the probability and timeframe for victory: Israel's guess was it would take three to four days, whilst the US and UK put the timeframe at seven to ten days.

6.6   The Six Day War

Real or perceived securitization issues across all sectors remained as discrete or linked elements, triggering Israel's tactical response. Each of the issues discussed within the sectors of this chapter, combined with cross-border raids, a pervasive Pan-Arabian rhetoric, and increased tensions and inaccurate intelligence from the USSR, all hastened a military response (Parker, 1993). The closure of the Straits of Tiran on 22 May 1967, however, represented casus belli (an occasion of war). This direct threat to the economic security of Israel could not be ignored. Most governments have abstained from claiming pre-emptive self-defence. International Law articulates that when resorting to jus ad bellum (right to wage war) the attacker must use proportionality, with the aim of

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[183] Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon

[184] From "Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History. 'The Six-Day Miracle': The 1967 War and How It Changed Israel," by Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, n.d.
https://adst.org/2014/05/the-six-day-miracle-the-1967-arab-israeli-war-and-how-it-changed-israel/

stopping or averting the attack.[185] Israel, concerned about its international reputation, argued that the blockage of the Straits of Tiran was the initiating factor of the conflict.

The conduct of hostilities aligned with Israel's battle plan: an air assault; engagement with its adversaries on ground of Israel's choice; and for it to be resolved swiftly.

6.6.1   Control of the Battlespace: Aerial Assault

Figure 6.2   Israel before the Six Day War.

Operation Focus represented an aerial first strike against all pact signatories on 5 June 1967 (Figure 6.2[186]). Its conduct as an over-the-water flanking manoeuvre under radar and surface-to-air missile range was hugely successful. This was assisted, Bregman (2003) notes, by the Egyptians having turned off their radar system as the senior Egyptian military commanders were undertaking an aerial reconnaissance and did not wish to be fired upon by their troops. Israel's pre-war training resulted in multiple sorties being undertaken by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) with a superior turnaround time[187] (Parker, 1993). The destruction of Egyptian planes and air infrastructure (including runways, radars and refuelling areas) ceded air superiority to Israel over the battlespace with a loss of only 19 planes. Green (1988) argues the aerial security at Dimona remained stringent, resulting in the Israelis shooting down one of their own Mirage fighters during the conflict. After the neutralisation of Egyptian airpower, the IAF undertook similar attacks on Jordan and Syria. The pre-emptive nature of the attacks allowed enemy air assets to be destroyed primarily on the ground and not

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[185] For example, International Criminal Court of Justice (ICJ) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. United States of America) Judgement (Merits) 27 June 1986 [1986] ICJ Rep para 176

[186] From "The Six Day War: Background and Overview" n.d. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-and-overview-six-day-war

[187] Israeli sources report this as a 2:1 ratio (Parker 1993)

in the air (Byman, 2011). This effectively wiped out the air power of all pact nations, allowing a significant shift in the military power dynamic.

6.6.2   To Seize and Hold Ground: The Ground and Naval Phase

The ground assault was in three phases, the first against Egypt, then Jordan and finally Syria. The victor of the military engagement(s) would be the country that could destabilise their opponent and had the greatest control over the infrastructure used to wage war.

6.6.2.1   Egypt

Egyptian battle strategy mirrored that of the USSR with strict and centralised control over all assets and presumed that Israeli forces would utilise similar tactics to their 1956 victory (Bregman 2003). This did not occur, and the use of armour, artillery and infantry supported by the IAF enabled a swift victory in the Sinai. A pre-emptive and incomplete order to withdraw, from the Sinai by Egyptian commanders, notes (Smith, 2010), had significant flow-on effects, with Bregman (2003) noting 10,000 Egyptians died in the retreat compared to 2,000 during the fire fight. By 7 June, Egypt had retreated out of the Sinai leaving a trail of personnel, arms and materials. Israel now controlled the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. Minor naval actions occurred in both Port Said and Alexandria harbours. The Straits of Tiran reopened for shipping under Israeli control on 7 June 1967.

6.6.2.2   Jordan

The Jordanian military's strong prior relationship with Britain[188] showed in the battlespace, from equipment used to the doctrines employed. As Israel was fighting on three fronts, there was parity in relation to force numbers. Pollack (2002) records that Jordan had established, after the 1948 conflict, elaborate fixed defensive positions. This enabled them to hold the high ground surrounding Jerusalem on three sides. Additionally, from Samaria it was approximately 20 kilometres to the ocean which almost cut Israel in half. The major disadvantage Jordan had was that command and control was weak[189] and the imposition of an Egyptian United Arab Commander immediately prior to hostilities commencing.

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[188] Great Britain had withdrawn from Jordan 11 years previously.

[189] Emanating from internal securitization issues as a result of the Jordanian coup noted in Chapter 5.

Bregman (2003) reports that the Israelis did not seek conflict with Jordan, advising King Hussein on 5 June that if the Jordanians did not enter the fight they would not be attacked by Israel. Disinformation is part of the intelligence and/or psychological operations in combat, and generally applied as a tactic against enemies. In the case of Jordan, on 5 June 1967 its ally Egypt reported Egyptian defeat of the IAF, and successful incursions inside Israeli sovereign territory, encouraging Jordan to join the battle (Bregman, 2003). Caught between a desire to safeguard the state, the Arab Street and the regional dynamic, Jordan chose to attack. It had accurately anticipated the Israeli lines of attack, to the north at Janin and towards Jerusalem, however the Jordanian battle assessment required the neutralisation of the IAF from the battlespace (Bar-Joseph, 2016). The result for Jordan was disastrous in the West Bank, but more importantly Jerusalem fell to Israel in one day.

6.6.2.3   Syria

Having goaded Egypt and supported asymmetrical attacks by non-state actors (PLO and Fatah amongst others) against Israel, Syria took only a minor part in the first four days of the battle. Israel had been occupied on the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts and was concerned that the USSR would take action to support Syria. The outcome of the first four days, however, saw Syria refusing to provide air support to Jordan (Bregman, 2003) and increasing concern by the Syrian government and military forces. Oren (2003) notes that Nasser cabled the Syrian president on 8 June advising of the Egyptian defeat and warning that the entire Israeli defence force would be able to attack Syria if it did not accept the ceasefire. When Dayan became aware of this, he personally ordered the attack against Syria without the approval of Eshkol or the cabinet. The action was a rout, leaving Israel with possession of the Golan Heights.

There was no direct involvement by superpowers or great powers during the conduct of

hostilities. Egypt and Syria, Bregman (2003) notes, started to receive significant resupplies from the USSR commencing on 6 June 1967. It is of interest, however, that on the third day of the conflict, the USS Liberty, a US military ship in international waters, was strafed and attacked by Israeli rockets. Hersh (1991) argues that the US Ambassador to Israel urged Washington to downplay the incident, which they did as the Israeli relationship was more important.

Figure 6.3   Israel after the Six Day War.

The conclusion of the conflict re-drew the map of the Middle East. Israel had acquired by force of arms the West

Bank; East Jerusalem; the Gaza Strip; the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights (Figure 6.3[190]). The acquisition of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights resulted in Israel exerting control over all Palestinian water rights.

6.7   Aftermath

In 1945 the UN charter required all countries to "refrain…from the threat or use of force" thereby including undeclared armed conflicts between member nations. UN Resolution 181 (II) articulated the division of land into two states. Whilst the Israelis grasped the opportunity and accepted the risks, the nascent State of Palestine took an alternative route, becoming eventually caught in multi-layered irredentism. The failure of the Arab High Commission as the primary speech actor and regional neighbours (acting as both functional and speech actors), who had not engaged with UNSCOP in relation to the proposed Palestinian State as discussed in Chapter 2 created problems in the region

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[190] From "The Six Day War: Background and Overview". n.d.
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-and-overview-six-day-war

(Caplan, 2020). This was further exacerbated by the territorial loss as a result of the 1948 conflict, and the acquisition of Palestinian territory by Jordan. What then for Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank or Gaza who had no land and no government, and therefore were not eligible for membership into the community of states? After taking in the Palestinian Arabs for twenty years – what responsibility did the defeated nations have to those living or born on their soil?

6.8   Post Six Day War Military Securitization

Israel defeated the Arab forces, capturing the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The new ceasefire lines were easier for Israel to defend as most of them stretched along geographical barriers, for example the River Jordan and the Suez Canal, providing strategic depth. The threat from neighbouring nations and the nascent Palestinian state would remain. The Allon Plan, approved by cabinet on 20 August 1967, consisted of an advanced inverted version of the Homa Umigdal with large military bases surrounded by Israeli settlements in the midst of the previously held Arab cities of Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron (Shalim, 2001). The Arab Summit in September 1967, held in Khartoum, determined the position towards Israel. In one of his last speech acts on the issue, Nasser stated there would be "no recognition of Israel, no peace and no negotiation" (Shlaim, 2001 p. 258). This would result in a strategic shift in the conduct of hostilities, with asymmetrical warfare conducted by non-state actors bolstered by the defeated nations becoming the 'new normal' for Israel.

The Six Day War of 1967 showed the IDF's air superiority, with simultaneous attacks on Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian air bases. The war was fought on Israeli terms: swiftly and on another nation's soil. It resulted in a spectacular land gain, expanding Israel's boundaries. The Golan Heights represented an almost 13,000 km2 plateau previously within Syria, providing a further strategic advantage over Syria and security over water resources. The Sinai Desert and the east bank of the Suez Canal provided both a buffer against Egypt, as well as ensuring that the Straits of Tiran could no longer be closed. Residual conflict between Israel and Egypt continued in October 1967, Bregman (2003) notes, with the Egyptian destruction of an Israeli destroyer and Israeli shelling of oil refineries and tanks. Nuclear defence became further embedded as an option. Hersh

(1991) asserts that in December 1967 General Allon toured the new nuclear missile field under construction near Jerusalem.

Once attained, Israel reshaped both the physical and cultural landscape to transition the newly acquired lands into territory that could be defended. The newly acquired land's previous owners, as with all land acquired by Israel by such means, now faced an uncertain geopolitical scenario in their efforts to re-acquire it.

6.9   Post Six Day War Political Securitization

The balance of power was altered, the map re-drawn and the threats, opportunities and responses for states in the region became more state-centric and less linked to regional alliances.

6.9.1   External

The superpower use of arms as an instrument of power projection and influence in the Middle East was ultimately unsuccessful for the USSR. Israel, with access to initially French arms, and to a lesser extent US military hardware, was also supported by its own defence industries. It was therefore able to respond to the acquired armaments of the surrounding Pan-Arabian states, and after the war concluded then began seeking and gaining increased US weaponry.

The UN renounced Israel's actions, however stopped at U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242 on 22 November 1967, and whilst decrying its activities and calling for the "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict," and "termination of all claims or states of belligerency" took no other action.[191] The commitment to Israel's security relating to the enforcement of free passage through the Suez Canal and Straits of Tiran by members of the 'global community' articulated at the end of the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, was not fulfilled. This reinforced the Israeli belief that they remained isolated within the region. Whilst the relationship with the US would strengthen as a result of Israel's solidification of its status as a strong regional power,

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[191] Israel did not publicly accept this resolution until August 1970. Additionally, whilst completed outside the time of this dissertation, UNSCR 242 would be included in the preamble of two peace treaties that Israel made with its regional neighbours Egypt and Jordan. For information on the counter-insurgency actions by the US in support of the Arab position see Wilford (2017).

there was an increasing strength/vulnerability paradox. Israel had learnt well the lesson of words versus action.

The US began to more closely align itself to Israel as a method of responding to increasing Soviet manoeuvring in the Middle East. Webber (1968, p. 926) argues that "cultural prestige and power prestige are closely associated. Every victorious war enhances the [state's] cultural prestige." Israel had established itself as a regional power without coordinated or concerted US support and had fought the Six Day War without the direct involvement of any other nation and won. However, the war did result in the loss of the long-term relationship with France. Hersh (1991) asserts France delayed sending the shipment of Israeli-purchased Mirage III jets and cancelled all further arms sales, citing President de Gaulle's belief that Israel had been the aggressor in the conflict. The networks of support that Israel has acquired through its relationships and the active use of the diasporas represented, Hinnebusch (2015, p. 29) argues, "virtual strategic depth."

6.9.1.1   The Israeli Offer to Return the Land

Andrews (2014) argues that the process of constructing a successful visionary counter-narrative is contextually situated and links shared fears and desires with the will and desire to make significant change. In return for a guaranteed peace and upon agreement to a number of conditions related to Israel's security, Shlaim (2001) reports that Israel offered, through the US, to give back the land and territories won from both Egypt and Syria during the Six Day War. Five men[192] from across the Israeli political spectrum met on 13 June 1967 in the Prime Minister of Israel's home to discuss what 'peace' meant. This discussion widened on the 16–19 June to include the whole cabinet. The offer was based on the Israelis' perception of their security, articulating different elements for each nation. This position is consistent with the constructionist view of security as an area of contestation and negotiation, where security, national identity and politics collide (Barnett, 1999). Through a unanimous decision of the Israeli cabinet, Shlaim (2001) states the offer to Egypt hinged upon an agreement by them to provide Israel with free navigation rights in relation to the Straits of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal plus the demilitarisation of the Sinai. In return Israel would give up all recently acquired

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[192] Levi Eshkol (Prime Minister), Abba Eban (Foreign Minister), Yigal Allon (cabinet member and IDF general), Moshe Dayan (Defence Minister), and Israel Galilee.

Egyptian territory with the exception of the West Bank. The offer to Syria's was simpler: demilitarisation of the Golan Heights, and surety that Syria would not impact the flow of water to Israel. In return Israel would return all recently acquired Syrian land.

On 21 June 1967, in a meeting between the US Secretary of State and Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, the proposal was supplied to the US. Eban (1977) records that the US responded a few days later, noting that both nations had declined the offer as they required it to be unconditional.

An Arab Summit was held in Khartoum in late August 1967. Nasser, though becoming increasingly marginalised, articulated the political and military securitization speech act referred to as the three noes: "no recognition, no negotiation and no peace". However, Shlaim (2001) claims that this represented a victory internally within the Pan-Arabian community, as it reflected a desire for diplomacy rather than military responses to the loss. Within that framework he argues the phrase was meant to be read as "no direct negotiations, no de jure recognition of Israel, no formal peace treaty." The three noes statement was read by Israel, in the context of the time, as a refusal to find a settlement. As a result, the Israeli cabinet formally rescinded the 16 June offer of land for peace and security. Pedatzur, reporting in Ha'aretz on 12 May 1995, states the offer was cancelled in October 1967. The offer has never been made again, representing a profound lost opportunity for peace.

6.9.1.2   Regional Responses

Regionally, the consequences of losing to Israel was significant, not only in terms of land, but from two other linked elements. The first was a growing awareness that Israel was now a reality with a regional military supremacy. The second was in relation to the Palestinians; they had now lost the little remaining land left from the 1947–48 campaign and their host nations had also lost land which was potentially more important to those nations than the support of the Palestinian cause. Added to the woes of both the defeated nations and the Palestinians was the lack of any physical action from NGOs or super/great powers to return the land to the previous owners.

President Nasser, after initially offering his resignation to the Egyptian people (Laquer & Rubin, 2001) retained power and continued his anti-Israeli rhetoric, arguing Israel had needed US support to win. His position of securitizing actor for the Pan-Arabian alliance

remained, however the UAR ceased being a significant regional entity after the war. Jordan was willing to seek a détente with Israel. It had entered the conflict to appease the Arab Street and to be seen as an equal member of UAC at great cost, not only in land but in the replacement of infrastructure and materials. Jordan's power as a functional actor was as a moderating force at the Khartoum summit. Syria, although losing the Golan Heights, suffered comparatively minor damage. Increased support of pro-Palestinian asymmetric warfare against, predominantly, Israel was a resultant factor. Uncontrolled by the hosting nations except through the granting of aid (weapons, food, sanctuary) these non-state actors would represent a rogue element that would be difficult to control. The war's outcome however, created long-term issues which simultaneously reinforced the legitimacy and robust capacity of the State of Israel and galvanised regional nationalistic responses to Israel.

6.9.2   Internal

The legitimacy of a state is defined in part by its organisational stability and, within a democratic context, the ability to put forward opposing views without fear of retaliation. The protests internally within Israel by members of the Jewish polity that preceded the decision to go to war represent a clear picture as to the robust nature of this element within Israeli political society.

The war's outcome, with the acquisition of land and an increased Arab population, saw significant differences within the political spectrum come to the fore. Eshkol was supportive of the two-state solution, with the West Bank representing the flashpoint, whilst others ranged along the spectrum to 'no deals' and Israeli control over the whole. Shlaim (2001), noted that the discussions revolved primarily around the Palestinian option (political autonomy under Israeli control) or a Jordanian option (restoration of the West Bank to Jordan). In light of the regional position of the three noes, the decision was delayed until outside the period of this dissertation.

6.9.2.1   Changing Political Alliances

The National Religious Party (formerly Mizrahi, now MAFDAL) prior to 1967 was a minor partner within Labor Zionism. With the acquisition of some of the land promised in

biblical times,[193] religious leaders acting as functional actors would argue that the victory was God's will.[194] This saw a number of religious political parties start to move along the political spectrum from moderate to a closer alignment with the more hawkish Likud, seeking the acquisition of all Jewish biblical lands.

The end of the 1967 war saw the de facto but not de jure transition of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Israel, thereby creating a quasi-colonial relationship between Israel and the remaining Palestinian population.[195] This relationship would be the target of both internal and external dissent. As occupied territories within international law, the actions of 1948 in relation to the migration of the population could not be replicated.

6.10   Post Six Day War Economic Securitization

The call-up for service in June 1967 had highlighted critical time considerations. The country could only sustain the mobilisation of all the citizen soldiers for a two-week period without it starting to impact on the Israeli economy. The need for speed was therefore not only a military requirement but an economic one. The impact of France's refusal to provide additional military hardware would see a shift in direction, with Israel now seeking to be self-reliant in respect to weapons production. This necessitated an increased expenditure in the research and development (R&D) associated with all elements, from bullets through to tanks, boats and aircraft (Cohen, Eisenstadt, & Bacevich 1998a).

The war losses in terms of materiel were not substantial and did not place significant strain on the economy. Of greater concern was the cost of an additional four military bases and the infrastructure needed to link them to the pre-1967 borders for support, but also to ensure an equal standard of living for the Israeli settlements around them. The impact of the new boundaries allowed for new economic endeavours (at a cost) to be implemented, however it did not bring with it an immediate increase of opportunities for bilateral trade within the region.

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[193] As discussed in Chapter 3, Genesis 15:18.

[194] Religious leaders as functional actors would transition outside this dissertation period to adopt a position of increasing belligerence within the political sphere in relation to the retention of territory.

[195] Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on Land defines territory as occupied "when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised."

The Six Day War triggered a re-evaluation of the economic securitization of the state, which would eventually lead to an increased role for private capital and a recalibration to a more defence-centric position. This then opened up increased funding from the US, solidifying the strong regional alliance, and saw a transition from a pre-war economic slow-down into a period of economic growth.

6.11   Post Six Day War Societal Securitization

Buzan et al. (1998) argue that a society is delineated by the practices and ideas that identify an individual as part of a group. The construction of the State of Israel was premised upon the determination of the pre-state founders advocating for a Jewish homeland on the land on which the community had initially been established, and providing a safe haven for those whose identity was directly linked to their religion, regardless of ethnicity.

6.11.1   The Jewish Identity Within the State

The outcome of the conflict saw a unification of mandatory Palestine under Israeli control. However, more importantly for the Jewish community, biblically the addition of the West Bank reunited Judea and Samaria. Added to this was the unification of Jerusalem and uninterrupted access to Jewish holy places. Simultaneously this meant that pre-eminent Islamic holy places (for example Temple Mount and the al-Aqsa Mosque) now sat in Israeli-held territory. Whilst Israelis and the diaspora acquired a fresh sense of pride in their state's achievements, the consequences of the war gave birth to a new public discourse and controversy over the future of the captured territories. Kimmerling (2003) argues that the capture of Jordanian-held Jewish places of worship, especially with the culmination of a 2,000-year-old dream in the unification of Jerusalem, strengthened "religious and messianic sentiments, chauvinistic orientation and settlement-drive" (p. 35).

6.11.2   The Arab-Palestinians Within the State of Israel

The frontier concept, initially raised in Chapter 1, remained, with two distinct groups seeking to exert control over the same area, though there was a significant power differential. The actions of the state continued to give primacy to nationals, not citizens

and this then impacted on the ability of the 'other' to ensure the equal growth and development of their community.[196] This reinforces the concept of power discussed in Chapter 1, in relation to the ability to utilise power to diminish the agency of an individual, or group. Internally within Israel, the Arab community had seen limited growth and development. The political movement al-Ard (The Land), initially discussed in Chapter 5 and which had been suppressed in the early 1960s, increasingly agitated for a more equal playing field for Palestinian Arabs.[197] The new land brought with it, Hersh (1991) asserts, an additional one million people who had not sought Israeli rule and did not identify with its population (Reinhart 2005). Depopulation, as discussed in Chapter 1, challenges identity as it targets those who perpetuate it. Whereas the conduct of Israel described in Chapters 3 and 5 gave rise to claims of the use of policies of extermination, given the changed international environment these Palestinian Arabs could not be removed. Occupation allowed the further disenfranchisement of this segment of the community as they were not deemed to be either nationals or citizens and therefore, as discussed in Chapter 4, not able to vote, providing threats to the breakdown of both the Gaza Strip and West Bank societies.

6.12   Post Six Day War Environmental Securitization

The outcome of the 1967 conflict saw a virtual doubling of the water resources of Israel, securing Israel's hydro-strategic position. The occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip resulted in the water resources essentially being subsumed to the State of Israel. The Golan Heights and southern Mount Hebron represented a joining of multiple elements in relation to the River Jordan basin and the Mountain Aquifer. The possession of this watershed ensures environmental security in relation to water for the State of

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[196] The Koenig Report and Tolidano testimony both released after the time period of this dissertation validate the assumptions of differential privilege. For more information see Sa'di (2003).

[197] On 20 June 1968 Shmouel Tolidano Prime Minister advisor on Arab affairs between 1965 and 1977 in reponding to questions by the Committee of Arab Affairs acknowleged that the establishment of Arab political parties or nation-wide organizations was actively discouraged by the State of Israel. The Committee Dealing With Arab Affairs, "Stenographic Protocol: From the Meeting of the Committee Dealing With Arab Affairs, 20.6. 1968," Labor Party Archive, Files, 7-23-68.

Israel. With the possession of Gaza, the coastal and Gaza aquifer was now also controlled by Israel (Figure 6.4[198])[199].

In August 1967, following a similar pattern in relation to the legislation of land, Military Order 92 (Order Regarding Powers in Water-Law Matters) and Military Order 158 (Order Amending the Supervision Over Water Law No. 31, of 1952) transferred authority over water in the West Bank to a nominee of the Commander of IDF forces in the region. This individual was vested with sole power to determine who had access to the water in the occupied territories, and their decisions were not subject to appeal and were classified as secret by Israel.[200] The legislation impacted on the ability of those in the West Bank to rehabilitate wells, and hindered the growth of irrigated agriculture. The West Bank and Gaza Strip infrastructure in relation to water and electricity was linked with Israel's pre-1967 border services, but Azoulay and Ophir (2013) note that other services, including waste management, remained the responsibility of local Palestinian local authorities.

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[198] From "*Water – Special Bulletin: Israeli vs. Palestinian Utilization of 'Shared' Aquifer*," by Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), 2002, p. 3 http://www.passia.org/media/filer_public/04/ab/04ab4abe-8ccd-4d1f-9a64-be081a9e0de1/pdfresizercom-pdf-crop_66-page-001.jpg

[199] Outside the period of this dissertation, but in response to the additional access the Six Day War provided, the State of Israel constructed a number of wells to link into the National Water Carrier to redirect this resource. The impact of this upon Palestinian agriculture (irrigation, planting and harvesting) as a result of disruption to trees and bulldozing soil as well as the reallocation of water has been severe (Levi, 2000).

[200] Military Order 947 in 1981 saw this power transferred to the Israeli Civil Administration.

Map legend:
- Jordan River Basin
- Groundwater divide
- Israeli National Water Carrier
- Syria-Israel Cease Fire Line, 1967

Note: Quantities are in mcm (million cubic meters) per year

LEBANON

Litani River
Hasbani
Dan
Banias
GOLAN HEIGHTS
Upper Jordan River

Eastern Wadis (605) Total flow in Upper Jordan River
Used by Israel (130)
Flow into Tiberias (475)
(80) Hydrological Balance
(65) Diverted to Tiberias by Israel
(160) Used by Syria
Yarmouk River (420) Total Flow
(90) Used by Jordan
(20) Israel transfers to Jordan in summer
(10) Desalinated water

Haifa
Tiberias
Israeli local use (90)
Israeli National Water Carrier (420)
Salty Springs (40)

Mediterranean Sea

Green Line
Jenin
Northern Aquifer
Tulkarem
Western Aquifer
Nablus
WEST BANK
Aquifer
Ramallah
Jerusalem
Green Line
Mountain
Eastern Aquifer
Hebron

Tel Aviv
Coastal Aquifer
Coastal Aquifer

Gaza
GAZA STRIP
Gaza Aquifer

ISRAEL
Beersheba

River Jordan
Lower Jordan River
Zarqa
Jericho
(115) Remaing as Brackish Water

JORDAN

Wadi Wala
Dead Sea
Wadi Mujib

0   20 km

Map: PASSIA, 2002

Utilization of the Shared Surface Waters of the Jordan River Basin - 2002 (mcm per year)

Exploited by Israel	From the Upper Jordan	130
	Diverted from Lake Tabarriya through the National Water Carrier	420
	Used in the Tabarriya Basin area	90
Exploited by Syria	From the Yarmouk River	160
Exploited by Jordan	From the Yarmouk River	90
	From the Zarka River and eastern valleys	200
	Transferred from Israel according to 1994 Peace Treaty (20 mcm from Jordan River and 10 mcm from desalinated water)	30
Exploited by Palestinians	Denied all access or utilization	0

Figure 6.4   Israel and Palestine utilisation of shared aquifers.

6.13   Concluding Comments 1962–1967

This chapter continued the process of assessing Buzan et al.'s work utility longitudinally using the State of Israel as the case study. By the end of 1967 Israel – the settler state and national home for world Jewry – had survived, forcing de facto and eventually de jure recognition of the State of Israel by surrounding states. The choices undertaken by the political elite in the discursive construction of threats drove behaviour internally and externally. In doing so it reiterated an existential threat rhetoric that had been occurring for centuries, the psychological impact of which would ensure that de-securitization efforts would be significantly hampered.

The Six Day War has increasingly been scrutinised by a diverse array of commentators and groups seeking to redefine the Middle East through a particular ontological lens, or understand historical perceptions or drivers surrounding those actions. Perception is a critical component here, in that in attempting to review actions that are now over 50 years old we need to consider them within the context of the time. Revisionist historians[201] within Israel and elsewhere are re-writing the narrative to include some of the views of those whose voices were marginalised at the time. The luxury of hindsight is afforded to us; those responding at the time with incomplete or inaccurate data or beliefs as to the imminence or otherwise of a particular threat were not as fortunate. The choices made across this chapter show the variability of options that my Rubik's Cube® analogy provides. A single choice at the right time, potentially on 22 June 1967, could have changed the global dynamic and re-written the narrative of the Middle East, especially if linked with the subtext of the three noes. However, the choices made now represent the foundation of sustained conflict in the region.

The discursive language used both overtly and covertly in relation to the issues securitised by Israel over this period evidence a systemic conditioning. The Jewish community had been conditioned to accept insecurity through a continual threat and victimisation rhetoric. Discursive practice of being unsupported by the global community despite previous guarantees embedded isolationism and self-reliance further into the Israeli psyche. As such an overt requirements for audience acceptance was not required. The prevalent discourse regarding non-Jews within policy-making circles and in the wider

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[201] See the works of Abu Sitta, 2001; Black and Morris, 1991; Morris, 1993, 2001, 2004; and Pappé 2005, 2008

community showed a clear position of privilege to the Jews and the marginalisation of others, in both the state and the newly occupied territories. Internally the governing structure was rich in options, provided you were Jewish. The practice of illocutionary silencing (Guillaume 2018; Hansen 2000; Huymans 2011; Wilkinson 2007; Williams 2003) was now embedded within the state, ensuring marginalisation of the 'other' as the accepted position and practice within Israel. Bar (2016 p. 2) notes that this process "perpetuated forms of ontological violence that can often slip into corporeal insecurity." Additionally, the state's capacity to respond to asymmetric warfare and the actions and reactions of non-state actors would become a fixed feature in the political, military and societal securitization sectors.

The 1967 conflict had enabled a more defendable border configuration along geographically identifiable elements. The IDF was recognised as a strong, well-tested conventional military force. The defence industries had evolved to such an extent as to enable new weapon and defence infrastructure creation and the replication of weapons sourced from other nations. The decision to have an active reserve force had been vindicated and proved to be effective in responding to multi-pronged security threats. The State of Israel had learned the lessons of history, responded to the threats of the present, and more importantly could now deconstruct the discourse of the international community. This enabled the Israeli leadership to know what would and would not trigger responses, and how far they could trust other nations. The choices the State of Israel made with that knowledge across all the sectors ensured its survival.

The concluding chapter will reflect on the methodology that this dissertation used, and the utility of the Copenhagen School within this context. Additionally, in analysing the 'we' and 'other' narrative, consideration will be given to how legislation may or may not have contributed to positioning the 'other'.

Chapter 7   Moving Forward, Looking Back

A state cannot be created by decree, but by the forces of a people and in the course of generations. Even if all the governments of the world gave us a country, it would only be a gift of words. But if the Jewish people will go build Palestine, the Jewish State will become a reality—a fact.

Chaïm Weizmann (1983, p.301)

This dissertation has sought to ascertain if Buzan et al.'s (1998) securitization theory and methodology could be used longitudinally to plot the securitization of the State of Israel from 1947 to 1967. To recap, the Rubik's Cube® analogy I have applied to Buzan et al.'s (1998) theory offers 43 quintillion options[202] through which a holistic assessment of the choices made by the state could be considered. On a secondary level, what did a corpus of legislative language used to support securitization tell us about the construction of the speech act in defining the 'we' and 'other' discourse?

The Copenhagen School's theory and methodology has not, to my knowledge, been used in this manner. Extensive literature searches show its use from a single sectoral perspective in an established state environment (Bilgin, 2011; Heeg, 2010) or to consider particular issues, such as the construction of a specific element (Hansen, 2012; Langenohl, 2017; McDonald, 2008; Wilkinson, 2007). Lupovici (2014) noted the absence of a detailed securitization critique of any sectoral elements within Israel, and referenced only limited attempts (Coskun, 2010; Olesker, 2011) concerning single elements or sub-elements. Groundbreaking at its inception, usage of the Copenhagen School's theory and methodology over the last 20 years has undergone extensive review and theoretical development. As a result, a variety of issues have emerged, from its construction to its methodological application. This dissertation is an innovative and overdue element of this wider discourse, and identifies, through the case study, both the challenges to and utility of this theory and methodology.

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[202] As discussed in the Introduction.

7.1 Reflection on Method:

The primary research question of this dissertation sought to ascertain if Buzan et al.'s (1998) theory and methodology could be used longitudinally to plot the securitization of the State of Israel from 1947 to 1967. This time period was then broken down into smaller parts to enable the sectoral threats to be identified and the interoperability and inter-reliance in and between different parts of government policy and legislation to be reviewed. The choices made or not made across all five sectors (military, environmental, societal, economic and political), each with its own referent object(s), were then able to be analysed. In doing this, I considered whether securitization was effected through discourse or practice. The interplay in and between sectors and their threats is clearly shown through the Rubik's Cube® analogy. To obtain a completely finished cube, each side has to be addressed while considering a wider whole; so too for the state in considering cross-sectoral dynamics. The secondary research question considered the construction of Israeli legislation that supported the identified securitized events, and whether the language defined and/or embedded the 'we' and 'other' discourse (See Figure 7.1)

Figure 7.1   Methodological approach

The creation of a durable state, capable of both self-determination and self-defence, was contingent upon the integration of Israel's national development across all levels and tiers of government. In answering Lukes' question "How is willing compliance to domination secured?" (2005, p. 10), Balzacq (2005) contends that the collective

understanding of the difficulties faced assists the securitizing actor in gaining the audience's support. This pragmatism creates popular support but also identifies which groups gain benefit from the polity in determinations about what to protect and when.

7.1.1   Sectoral Securitisation

The primary research question considered Buzan et al.'s (1998) five securitization sectors, both individually and whether the linkage between them within a particular time period allowed a more holistic consideration of the choices of the state. The Rubik's Cube® analogy represented a thought experiment, in which the matrix of assessing sectoral challenges is capable of significant change, supporting Buzan et al.'s (1998) argument that sectoral analysis provides an opportunity to view issues from variable perspectives. Perception of threats has remained a critical component within the Israeli securitization narrative.[203] Surrounded by states overtly advocating for the destruction of the State of Israel,[204] perceived threats were equally weighted in the threat assessment. The patterns shown within the Rubik's Cube® are replicated within the unit and sub-unit security discourse through differing real and perceived sectoral threat identification, examination and response.

7.1.1.1   Military

Violence by the state is accepted within the international community as a legitimate action in defence of sovereignty and against aggression (Buzan et al., 1998). The construct of the 'other' within the military securitization discourse, combined with a shared history, supported the 'we' discourse articulated within the Jewish community.

The citizen soldier discourse supports social cohesion, the reinforcement of the imminence of threat and the requirement to do whatever is necessary to ensure state survival. The case study has provided ample evidence of Grossman's (2009, p. xxii) "classical and operant conditioning"[205] in response to the perceived or real threats to the

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[203] The issues of victimisation and collective past annihilation, however, were and remain part of that dialogue.

[204] This includes the support of non-state actors in undertaking actions against Israel.

[205] This refers to the shaping of a desired response to a particular stimulus – in the case of Israel an existential military threat – not only for and by the military but also by the wider community. The process sees the merging of two psychological theories: Pavlov (1904) and Skinner (1938). Classical conditioning references Pavlovian responses which demonstrates the ability to respond in a predictable matter. Operant conditioning, also referred to as instrumental learning, refers to positive and negative reinforcement or punishment.

state. This has enabled the security discourse to be psychologically embedded in Israel, at times at a cost to the psychological health of its citizens and its soldiers.[206]

Israeli military engagements were ideally swift, pre-emptive and occurring outside of the borders of the state. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) became the most capable regional fighting force, enabling a physical presence on the land to which the State of Israel laid claim. Each acquisition of land through purchase, legislation or conquest provided an additional buffer of territory with which to distance high value population centres from potential enemy action or be used to bargain for other concessions. The Israeli use of the built environment harkened back to feudal military encampments, maintaining a physical and psychological claiming of the land, at times prior to it becoming legally owned, whilst simultaneously reinforcing the dynamics of security and insecurity.

The provision of a security environment not contingent upon the will of others to support and protect members of the Jewish community remains an enduring lesson from Jewish history. Israel's nuclear capability acts as both a deterrent to others in relation to attacking Israel and a threat multiplier, in that Israel's potential use of this weapon increases the insecurity in the region. This provides a discursive narrative that influences both internal and external responses.

Given the proclivity of Israel to launch pre-emptive attacks, the nuclear capability brings with it an interesting existential question. Could a people who have been the victims of a physical collective annihilation event, knowing the trauma engendered, pre-emptively launch a similar event on another group?

7.1.1.2   Societal

Social securitization within Israel has been shaped by a variety of forces and circumstances, the most significant of which is religion. The referent object became 'we' the Jewish people (Burke, 2007), regardless of physical location, as the diaspora was, and remains by legislative fiat, eligible for nationality in Israel. Goldstein (2003) notes that

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[206] Grossman (2009) notes that in the 1973 war, psychiatric illness was the cause of nearly one-third of Israeli casualties. Contrary to Hirschberger et al.'s (2016) assertion, the existential threat for Israeli soldiers was not one of the four elements articulated in their existential threat model (as discussed in Chapter 1), but of letting down their comrades. Grossman (2009) notes the Israeli government learnt from the 1973 conflict and in the aftermath of the 1982 conflict with Lebanon it put in place robust psychological support for combatants.

religion "when overlaid on ethnic and territorial conflicts … surfaces as the central and most visible distinction between groups" (p. 204).

Societal insecurity arises when there is a real or perceived threat; McSweeney (1996) explains that societal identity as part of the securitization discussion is fundamental to threats, their perception and the subsequent actions in response to them. Williams (2003) supports this, asserting successful securitization requires defining the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and acceptance of these by the relevant group. The victim rhetoric was used successfully by Israel internally and externally to raise societal securitization issues, coalescing perceptions of injustice and inequality. The impact of this within the Jewish community was to reinforce their resolve, mesh together groups and create a sense of community. It was highly effective in determining the 'we' within the Israeli state and therefore also the 'other'. Throughout this dissertation, the threat that the Palestinian Arabs represented to the social cohesion and sovereignty of the state has been articulated. Wilkinson (2007) argues that this includes socio-political disenfranchisement maintained by rhetoric. This position is supported by Hansen (2000) and Tilly (1991), who note that disenfranchisement creates a subset of marginalised actors who cannot be heard in relation to their insecurity. The case study shows this through a range of behaviours, including denial of access to territory (thereby denying access to resources), denial of access to employment and removing the ability to promote a non-Jewish identity within Israel. Jackson and Dexter (2014) make the following observation about Palestinians, both those external to Israel (including refugees and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)) and those in Israel (including those in the occupied territories):

> low levels of economic development and extreme poverty, political instability and previous conflict, semi-democracy, social and political dominance by one ethnic group, and increasing environmental scarcities are all correlated with a greater risk of civil violence in the empirical literature. *(Jackson & Dexter, 2014, p. 6)*

The case study showed that the method of threat construction and responses to that threat served to define Israeli identity and those who are eligible for the support and protection of the state.

7.1.1.3   Environmental

Environmental securitization has consistently been a motivating factor for the State of Israel. Land acquisition has often been stated or claimed as a goal, but the underlying rationale for its retention, in the face of global pressure and consistent direct and asymmetrical opposition from regional neighbours, has been the resources that it contained. The question of water sharing in the region reinforced an existing regional security complex over the instability of water supplies as a result of Israeli actions in relation to the River Jordan. This collective response to a shared threat or fate is an example of Buzan et al.'s (1998) assertion that threat responses can arise from outside systemic pressure. Environmental security contains within its multiple latent threats that a state would be required to respond to. The case study has shown Israel's attempts to ensure the availability of water and guard against the ability of another entity to interdict supply. Threats to and over water, and its utility as both a target and a tool, shaped future conflicts for all participants.[207]

This sector's threats (particularly relating to water) overrode securitization choices in all other sectors, from the irregular configuration of the state suggested by the UN, to the military and political securitization challenges arising out of the Golan Heights and the Mountain Aquifer. Whilst there were limited speech acts in relation to this element, water represented a key element of the interoperability between sectors.

7.1.1.4   Economic

Israel is a small, complex state, where collectivism results in a symbiotic relationship of ownership, in which public, private, and union sectors coexist (Rivlin, 2000). Buzan et al.'s (1998, p. 96) theory focuses mainly on economic nationalism, privileging "the state over the economy." This structure led to significant political involvement in the economic progression of Israel, supporting a mercantilist view of economic securitization.[208] Given the state's threat perception, Israel operates as an entity that could be self-sufficient if required, and state funding and legislative infrastructure support and maintain that position.

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[207] See Daoudy, 2019; Mann, 1984; McDonald 20xx; Weinthal & Sowers, 2019.

[208] Capitalism's central ideology of de-securitization (Buzan et al., 1998) allowing individuals, companies and states to seek efficiency without consideration as to the relative gains from a position of self-reliance, is contrary to the position adopted by Israel.

The State of Israel over this period was funded through global donations, the transfer of funds and private capital brought into the country by Jews. Internal generation of capital was initially low, and reparations by Germany, bonds, loans and grants such as the Marshall Plan funds provided added capital to the state. Drains on government cash flow were high as a result of war, immigration, resettlements and securitizing moves in multiple sectors. The use of protectionist policies ensuring self-sufficiency within Israel caused additional state-based costs. State survival was contingent upon capital imports, and the creation of new industries capable of supporting domestic needs and generating external income. The ability to create employment or achieve other salient national objectives was the major driving force, not necessarily efficiency. Shortages as a result of monopolistic fuel practices prior to statehood had flow-on effects to internal development and the military securitization of the state.

Supporting arguments that the economic securitization framework does not allow systematic review, response or intervention in the security discourse (Langenohl, 2017), this case study evidenced a financial market impacted by changes within the macro-political environment. Additionally, it showed numerous examples of 'business as usual' but only one economic securitization speech act (by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion) which actively sought audience acquiescence: the securing of restitution from Germany. The détente with West Germany additionally reinforced political and societal securitization.[209]

Israel had a strong, publicly owned military-industrial linkage, where the needs of national defence took priority over the market. The ability of Israel to react and organise a 'war' economy from its inception and carry that endeavour through the next twenty years of its development makes Israel an exceptional case in the intricacies of the economic securitization field. Israel's approach supports Buzan et al.'s (1998) theory of economic dependencies in relation to global markets and simultaneously challenges the negative aspects of self-sufficiency.

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[209] In relation to legitimacy and relationships between nations, and the articulation of who the state needed to care for.

7.1.1.5 Political

The Israeli state was an ideal for centuries, in which Jews across those years were seen as the 'other' within the lands that they inhabited, dispossessed of a homeland. Attainment of that safe haven needed not only strong speech and functional actors, but external global conditions that supported its creation. World War Two (WWII) and the Holocaust provided an overt discourse in relation to the existential threat (physical collective annihilation) faced by the Jews. Active support for the granting of a safe haven was the result, and one the Jews utilised to the fullest extent. Buzan et al. (1998) noted that "states will tend to construct political responses in their own territorial image" (p. 203). Israel's image was one of self-sufficiency and self-determination, embedding legitimacy and authority – a sense of 'we' and 'other'. Israel's actions marginalised non-Jews, impeding and disenfranchising their individual and collective agency. Tilley (2015) notes that the construction of a national identity is the product of "political invention and imagination" (p. 428). This has been an effective tool (Olesker, 2011) but has brought with it longer term consequences, not only for the state but for the region as well. The international political legacy of trauma on both Jews and Arabs continues to impact the global arena.

Political legitimacy was achieved with support of both hegemonic powers (the US and USSR) at the outset of the Cold War. Politics is, as Hansen (2012) asserts, the provision of stability to social relationships, and the Jewish diaspora in the US had a significant influence on the political discourse which continues up to the present.

Regionally, Israel was surrounded by nations who were overtly antagonistic in seeking to deny the legitimacy and sovereignty of Israel over the land articulated under UN Resolution 181 (II). The first Pan-Arabian attack was made a day after the Israeli Declaration of Independence, and further military actions, including the Suez Canal Crisis and the Six Day War, further embedded the 'we' and 'other' discourse between the nations. Unsuccessful speech acts are not addressed in Buzan et al.'s (1998) theory. Prior to the Six Day War, with regional armies massing on Israel's borders, Israeli Foreign Minister Eban delivered an impassioned speech act to the United Nations. It met the criteria articulated under the theory: an existential threat, warranting the setting aside of usual practice, articulated by a speech actor, to a relevant audience who had the ability to take action, yet the UN failed to take action to protect Israel from invasion.

7.1.2   De-Securitization

De-securitization provides challenges, with Hansen (2012) noting that the reconstitution of identity can shift not only the concept of self, but also the 'other'. The actions taken by Israel, its regional neighbours and the global powers of the time across the period covered by this dissertation were seminal in the construction of both Palestinian and Israeli security discourses. De-securitization in an environment where adversaries are so fixated on winning that concessions are regarded as a loss is significantly harder. The legacy issues of Palestine are still impacting all states involved in the initial conflict. The deconstruction of these discourses is fraught, with Wæver (2000, p. 253) articulating three methods, of which the first two ("do not initially securitize an issue" and "do not create a security dilemma") are moot. The third method is to move security issues back within the realm of normative politics. Given the continual renewal of the Emergency Regulations in place since 1948 (Dowty, 1998), de-securitization would require a seismic shift in the position of the State of Israel. As such it serves as a poignant reflection on the persistence of memory and how that impacts on what we believe necessary to make us safe.

7.1.3   Discourse

The adoption of a post-structural intertextuality analysis to consider the securitization of the state through legislation, discourse and practice allows a holistic consideration of the actions of the State of Israel. These actions supported the core premise of the state – land for the Jewish people – and as such were linked to both national identity ('we' the Jewish people) and security. Austin (1962) and Searle (1995) understand language as a social construction; in this light, language makes statements about the world, and these authors examine how words may support action and the ways words are understood by their audience. The intersubjective nature of securitization (Buzan et al., 1998) is linked to interdependence within the security discourse. Buzan (1991) posits that this provides the recognition and authorisation of that speech.

The State of Israel, Olesker (2011) argues, has raised security to legendary proportions, which has allowed its reactions, and the speed of those reactions, to persistent and recurring threats to become institutionalised (Buzan et al., 1998). As the case study has shown, highly securitized states may have limited speech acts, although the methodological framework of analysis still enables the threats to be viewed contextually

within the concept of statehood and securitization. Côté (2016) notes that threats are implied through a social construction and viewed through a lens that informs and is informed by a shared concept about a community's character and existence. The construction of language supports and limits actions, including how the process of securitization is undertaken and legitimised, and how legislation supports this approach. Limiting the process to Waever's (1995) 'speech act', Williams (2003) contends, places linguistic restrictions on contextually analysing the contribution to securitisation. The case study however did not support this position, Israel's' highly securitised environment leveraged an acceptance of mnemonic threats and 'implicitly assumed' (Buzan et al. 1998 p. 27) threats. This is more in line with extant literature which indicates a significant shift away from the requirements of a speech act to engender the cessation of a normative response to threatened issues. This is supported by a number of theorists in the field[210] who argue that speech acts are only one part of the securitization discursive act and variously provide arguments as to whether the word 'security' is uttered, or that a speech act needs to occur in order to be valid or legitimate.

7.1.4   Practice

The methods used by the State of Israel to define and construct its identity were affected by the practices and actions of regional, great power and superpower relationships, as well as non-government entities. The 'we' at the outset was and remained the Jewish people; the 'other' in the context of enemy varied depending upon the situation.

The internal functions of government include law and order, administration, and the care and support of the people who constitute the polity of the state and their dependants. Discourse analysis is customarily a political act, inviting an alternative interpretation of legislation to ascertain meaning and intent. I opted to concentrate on the text of the legislation, and its intent and usage to support the securitization efforts of the State of Israel; this approach was critical to the conceptual underpinnings of this research. Legislation is part of the process of legitimatising[211] the hegemonic power of the state, providing persuasion, an argument for actions, or ideation. As has been shown, discursive speech acts grant the power to produce and distribute opportunities and resources. In

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[210] See Hansen, 2000; McDonald, 2008; Wilkinson, 2007

[211] 'Legitimisation' refers to making something legal or legalised, derived from the Latin word 'legitimus' (for example, lawful, legal). See Lewis and Short (1879).

doing so, legislation acts as a mechanism of control (Hodge & Kress, 1993) expressing symbolic power.[212] Power can legitimise or de-legitimise the actions of individuals, communities or the state. The corpus of legislation selected offered the opportunity to surface discursive intentions supporting the securitization efforts within the respective time periods (chapters). This allowed a focus on intent linked to practice, rather than a search for veiled illocution. Acting as a defined set of power/knowledge instruments (Foucault, 2000), the examined corpus provides an indication of both the explicit and implicit process of 'othering' applied primarily to any individuals or organisation. Only one piece[213] specifically allowed 'othering' of Jews without a waiver, the Law of Return. This knowingly formulated and institutionalised process of Illocutionary silencing prevented non-Jews from accessing legislative protections (including the ability to vote) and they were therefore unable to change their situation without recourse to emigration and/or violence.

Security and insecurity addressed through the use of predictable organisational practices supports Balzacq's (2005) contention that institutionalised responses to long-term existential threats provide a normative and pragmatic approach to securitized issues. Aradau (2004) clearly articulates that access to security is not equal, and this position creates within the process a 'we' and 'other'. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 31) assert that security is defined "among the subjects" of the state, further noting that amity–enmity is a significant dyad within the construction of threats and security interdependence. This position is supported by Browning and McDonald (2011), who add the need to consider both sides (winners and losers) in terms of not only the practice but also the understanding of security. The case study illustrated this in Chapter 6 through the offer by Israel to return land at the end of the Six Day War.

7.2   Why Israel?

Israel could be viewed as an unusually complex and distinctively controversial case study. The state has been written about by countless scholars and dissected in a myriad of ways – so why then was it chosen? Israel was chosen specifically because its passage to statehood was not simple or easy and survival would ultimately be reflected in its ability

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[212] See the discussion on power in Chapter 1 and Bourdieu, 2001; Nye, 2009; and Vangeli, 2018.

[213] Other than criminal legislation over this time period.

to respond to internal and external challenges. The case study showed the incremental learning of the State of Israel, not only about winning and losing, but in the manipulation of power and the understanding of what could, and crucially what could not, be enforced by the UN and its member states. Conceptually, the securitization lessons learned by Israel are useful in considering how legislative language supported securitization efforts and the discourse around 'we' and 'other'.[214]

Sovereignty and identity are linked concepts within a security discourse. Israel is a state that was created with a clear ethno-national character, whose Declaration of Independence[215] provides a clear identification of 'we' and 'other'. A psychological existential threat narrative is woven through that document and subsequent legislative instruments. The population of most nations represents a heterogeneous (in the modern era) group of people from various communities; this was not seen as ideal within Israel. The history of the Jewish people shows an institutionalised long-term process of securitization, which has resulted in standardised procedures and structures in which responses to recurrent threats have been normalised, thereby no longer meeting the criteria for exception. Browning and McDonald (2011, p. 242) argue that missing from the Copenhagen School's theory and methodology is the "recognition of the temporal and spatial specificity of security logics"; specifically, that security is impacted by time, place and issues. The mnemonic or remembering of threats and past events enables a discursive rhetoric to pervade daily Israeli life, reducing the requirement for speech actors to frame a majority of arguments as anything but threats. The Jewish people hold a long view of the potential of existential threats, informed by centuries of being considered the 'other'.

The highly securitized nature of the State of Israel is, however, at odds with the contention by Buzan et al. (1998, p. 208) that this suppresses "civil society and cripples (eventually) the economy". Israel survived and has continued its success as measured through a variety of instruments, including financial measures,[216] educational measures,

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[214] Whilst other new nation-states drawn from areas across the globe, such as South Sudan and Bosnia, could have been chosen, they each represented a settled population on a land that a majority of the population had shared with the relinquishing state. In the case of South Sudan, the choice of secession was relatively peaceful, while Bosnia, the initial product of the implosion of Yugoslavia and the Bosnia and Herzegovinian conflict, did not have to deal with mass migration or continual internal and external conflict.

[215] Formally the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.

[216] in terms of both per capita GDP and entrepreneurialism.

and a number of social utility scales (Senor & Singer, 2011). Israel exemplifies the argument that this version of statehood increases perceived insecurity by neighbouring states in relation to their different ideological construct (Buzan et al., 1998). As stated in the limitations section at the beginning of this dissertation, it was not my intention to take a position as to the legitimacy or otherwise of the state, its legislation, the land it controls or its actions. The case study has shown that the actions taken by Israel were successful to ensure its survival. The comparison to Palestine, which was offered statehood at the same time by UN Resolution 181 (II), is stark.[217]

Israel provides a unique opportunity to assess one nation's securitization in accordance with Buzan et al.'s (1998) model. This case study has sought to address, in accordance with the model's parameters, each of the securitization areas, looking at both the individual factors within each segment and the interconnectivity between the sectors. Israel shows clear stages within its development where interconnectivity and the dissonance of the model is evident. Individual security threats, for example, could not be taken in isolation, each having flow-on effects, as befits a real-world environment. The interconnectivity of each of the securitized areas shows the difficulties faced by analysts using this model. This is probably the biggest concern in the use of the Copenhagen School's theory and methodology. The other major issue is that there is little guidance given to enable scholars to tie each of the securitized areas together in a way that is not based on a subjective assessment.

7.3   Assessment of the Process

A challenge of the Copenhagen School's theory is that it is biased towards success (Wilkinson, 2011). The case study has shown numerous examples of issues meeting the criteria to be securitized, however the choices of the state, as a result of insufficient resources and competing priorities, have meant that these claims were unsuccessful. Some periods covered by this dissertation were rich in elements that fit within the securitization construct, whilst others were not. As a result of the threat and victimology rhetoric, the requirement for speech acts, and audience acceptance was limited once the initial fighting started. The framing of the speech act can be considered through a

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[217] The failure of the Palestinian Arabs to accept limited or temporary statehood in 1947 as a method of buying time for further discussions or negotiations rendered them a non-state actor whose use of force was deemed unlawful in the defence of land to which they laid claim.

number of lenses. Consistent with a number of theorists (Balzacq, 2005; McDonald 2008; Sjöstedt 2013), my research approach was informed by two differing elements: discourse and practice. This process has been successful in considering securitization within Israel. Given the highly securitized nature of the state, institutionalised responses, including the language and logic which surrounded decision-making involving long-term existential threats, became normative. This supports Balzacq's (2005) argument that securitization in many respects was not and is not contingent upon speech acts but is enacted through practice. The legislative agenda clearly links to Austin's (1962) articulation of executive speech acts and the power of these acts over the practice of the state. Additionally, as the case study has shown, the security posture of Israel supports McDonald's (as cited in Williams, 2012) claim that securitised threats "are dealt with in urgency and secrecy, with few actors able to contribute to the debate" (p. 71). Normative responses, however, can impact on the ability to respond to new approaches to de-securitizing issues; for example, the offer to return land at the end of the Six Day War, and the changing logic behind the three noes, as discussed in the previous chapter. Boswell (as cited in Hansen, 2012) argues that when securitization becomes institutionalised to the extent that its articulation is no longer needed, de-securitization is exponentially more difficult and highly contextual (Jansen & Osterhammel, 2017).

This research has shown that the Copenhagen School theory and methodology, whilst flawed, is effective longitudinally, and that the consideration of legislative language provides a clear articulation of a speech act, despite not following the established order, or necessarily being said to and accepted by an audience. I have shown through the dynamism illustrated by the Rubik's Cube® thought experiment that the challenges to the framework articulated above add further support to understanding the impact of the constructed nature of the threats, the audience and the success or otherwise of a securitizing act in the global environment. Each individual sectoral element serves the interest of the state in allowing the discrete securitization components to be considered and evaluated. The response to existential threats, however, cannot be considered in isolation. The impact of the holistic choices made by the state in determining which threat would extinguish life faster has flow-on impacts to other sectors and shows that while an event may meet the criteria of an existential threat, the ability of the state to respond to the threat may be limited. It is here that interconnectivity is most pronounced.

7.4   Future Research

This dissertation has utilised Buzan et al.'s (1998) securitization theory and methodology to map longitudinally the securitization of the State of Israel from 1947 to 1967. On a secondary level it considered a corpus of legislative language used to support securitization and what this told us about the construction of the speech act in defining the 'we' and 'other' discourse.

Future research within the region may consider the manner in which Israel's construction of security may have resulted in a security dilemma from which it cannot escape. Alternatively, research may consider the impact of changing legislation post-1970 which formally increased Palestinian agency and whether practice actually changed to support this. Alternatively, research could be undertaken as to how legislation acted as an illocutionary silencing method. Outside this regional context, it may be useful to consider the utilisation of the analytical approach adopted in this thesis to a state that is not as highly securitized and where there is a wider dissemination of information and a requirement for and expectation of speech acts.

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Appendix A   River Jordan and Basin Development Schemes

Plan	Agency/Organisation/Sponsor
1913 Franhia Plan	Ottoman Empire
1922 Mavromatis Plan	Great Britain
1928 Henriques Report	Great Britain
1935 Palestine Land Development Company	World Zionist Organization
1939 Ionides Survey	Transjordan
1944 Lowdermilk Plan	USA
1946 Survey of Palestine	Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry
1948 Hays-Savage Plan	World Zionist Organization
1950 MacDonald Report	Jordan
1951 All Israel Plan	Israel
1952 Bunger Plan	Jordan/USA
1953 Main Plan	United Nations
1953 Israeli Seven-Year Plan	Israel
1954 Cotton Plan	Israel
1954 Arab Plan	Arab League Technical Committee
1955 Baker-Harza Plan	Jordan
1955 Johnson Plan	USA
1956 Israeli Ten-Year Plan	Israel
1956 Israeli National Water Plan	Israel
1957 Great Yarmouk Project	Jordan
1964 Jordan Headwaters Diversion	Arab League
1991 Integrated Joint Development Plan	Japan (University of Tokyo)
1993 Declaration of Principles: PLO/Israel	Israel and PLO (Annex III, IV)
1994 Treaty of Peace: Jordan/Israel	Jordan and Israel (Article 6, Annex II)

Source: Naff and Matson (1984) and Murakami (1991).

Note: Shaded schemes occurred outside of the dissertation period