CHAPTER TWO: 'The Past is Always New': A Framework for Understanding the Centrality of Social Media to Contemporary Heritage Movements

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Introduction

In a blog published in July 2014, heritage and online media commentator Elanto Wijoyono provided an overview of the formation of contemporary heritage groups in Indonesia. During the 1990s, heritage groups formed around conservation issues in a number of cities, which then formed regional and national networks in the 2000s. The next wave of heritage organizations is different in character, organization, and patterns of activity. From the late 2000s, a number of heritage networks have formed on social media, and have fostered, in Wijoyono's judgement,[1] a more dynamic and creative engagement with heritage online than either the place-based groups or the state. Heritage groups that engage extensively using social media are widespread but little researched (Gregory 2015), although their role in heritage conflicts is strongly evident (Liew, Pang, and Chan 2013). Most of the research on heritage and social media has focused on institutional use of social media and the question of participation, rather than evolving heritage practices within and around social media.

Social media are now broadly recognized as very important to contemporary social movements, most notably the Occupy movement (Thorson et al. 2013; Gaby and Caren 2012) and the Arab Spring (Lim 2012; Srinivasan 2013), although analysts are still debating exactly why and how social media is important and influential (Gerbaudo and Treré 2015; Lim 2014; Padawangi, Marolt, and Douglass 2014). Social movement research on social media has been prolific but has tended to bring old questions to quickly changing cyber-social landscapes

(Gerbaudo and Treré 2015), ignoring the realm of communications and overlapping practices that includes engagement with heritage.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a framework for understanding how social media is changing heritage movements through examining their practices, their networks, and their engagements with heritage. Due to the increasing spread and ubiquity of social media, this chapter therefore addresses a global sea change in how people understand and use heritage. Developing this framework requires two bodies of literature, research on social movements and social media and research on heritage and social media, to be critically interrogated and brought together. We begin this chapter with a critical discussion of research assessing the relationships between social movements and social media. Secondly, I turn to recent heritage research on social media to establish the extent and insights of this research into online heritage movements and practices. The rest of the chapter critically applies the resulting framework to a case study of the heritage movement in Indonesia's shift online through a study of BOL BRUTU, a heritage group that began in 2009 and is continuing its activities eight years later.

Following the definition of social movement used by James M. Jasper (2014), heritage movements are defined here as sustained, intentional efforts to foster or retard changes to and engagement with heritage, primarily outside the normal institutional channels endorsed by authorities (Jasper 2014: 5). An argument that runs throughout this chapter is that we require a broad definition of social, and heritage, movements if we are to capture the groups that contribute to and influence tidal shifts in social engagements and understandings of phenomena like heritage. It is not enough to focus on groups that lobby for political change (including for state preservation of heritage) to the exclusion of groups that open up new popular heritage practices. Hence, following Wijoyono, we argue that BOL BRUTU constitutes a case study that demonstrates how groups engaging with social media are able to shift their members' heritage practices through a dynamic and creative engagement with, in their case,

archaeological sites. The statement of BOL BRUTU co-founder and still one of its most active members, Transpiosa 'Cuk' Riomandha, that 'the past is always new' highlights in BOL BRUTU's unique and fun sensibility that heritage movements create possibilities and potentials, both for group members and for the broader communities and networks they inhabit.

Social Movements and Social Media

Debates about the importance of social movements' use of social media, defined here as digital technologies that allow the creation and sharing of ideas, information, and other forms of expression through virtual networks, have been polarizing in both the mass media and academic journals. Much of this debate hinges on the extent to which social media can be thought to impact political opportunity structures, defined as the dimensions of the political environment that 'provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure' (Tarrow 1994: 85). While one group of observers emphasized how social media augment new forms of participation and organization (Rheingold 2002), the sceptical view is that online activism was superficial and banal and did not increase political opportunities in a meaningful way, leading to terms like 'slacktivism' and 'clictivism'. Research working within this framework has focused on various aspects of the framing of issues (Snow et al. 1986) through social media that render those issues meaningful and shape action. In particular, it has sought to understand the extent to which these frames are shaped by the practices and platforms of social media, and the extent to which they manage to disperse into mainstream media (Lim 2013; Molaei 2015; Weiss 2014). The dominant criteria of success is the achievement of a sizable mass movement that results in either physical protests (Abbott 2013; Lim 2013, 2014; Padawangi, Marolt, and Douglass 2014; Weiss 2014) or democratic debate (Hendriks, Duus, and Ercan 2016).

Using these criteria for success, social movement research has identified a set of characteristics across the use of social media. Case studies have demonstrated that in many

cases social media promotes weak ties (acquaintances and distant friendships, less binding) rather than strong ties (between close friends and family members) (Coretti and Pica 2015; Lim 2013). The structure of social media is comparatively transparent (the actions of other social media observers can be easily observed) and horizontal, but not necessarily democratic (Coretti and Pica 2015). Social media platforms therefore support networks where people access information and can be organized, but are less likely to be strongly committed to a cause. However, this is not always the case (see Srinivasan and Fish (2011) on blogs in Kyrgyzstan) and these networks can also become quickly politicized (see Lim (2012) on Egypt). According to Merlyna Lim (2013: 636), social media needs to 'embrace the principles of the contemporary culture of consumption' to be successful. Lim (2013, 2014) argues that social media communication requires content that can be enjoyed without too much time or deep reflection, that makes use of simplified and sensational stories, and that fits with mainstream narratives. Hence social media privileges short, quick communications and the use of visual media (photographs, memes, videos).

Despite these characteristics, social media still provides digital affordances as it is 'remixed and mixable' and therefore a realm of social identity creation and evolution (Papacharissi 2011: 305). However, such affordances are subject to the hierarchical power structures that make the ethics and decisions of administrators very important to determining the protocols of online communications their social movements use (Coretti and Pica 2015). Differences between technologies allow different interactions, and therefore differences in online participation (Srinivasan 2013). Lorenzo Coretti and Daniele Pica (2015: 963) write that Facebook, BOL BRUTU's preferred social media technology, is 'more than a communication tool [and plays] a vital role in influencing [Italian social movement Popolo Viola's] structure, leadership communication flows and collective identity,' in particular due to the high level of control it grants administrators. Similarly, Carolyn Hendriks et al. (2016) found the Facebook

sites associated with opposed sides in a mining dispute to be highly scripted and policed. Technological affordances are also subject to the techno-materiality of their networks (Lim 2013); they are limited by both geographic location (urban areas are privileged) and economics (class considerations), particularly in developing countries.

Social movements research on social media, while establishing important parameters and insights, are insufficient for analysing heritage movements, or even most use of social media by social movements, due to two issues with this body of work. The first issue is based on a critique from what can broadly be termed cultural approaches to social movements:[2] social movements research has tended towards techno-determinism that derives the logics of political action from the structure of the medium and often do not 'account for the historical and cultural configurations of protest activities that ultimately shape the content and meaning of social media activism' (Gerbaudo and Treré 2015: 870). Gerbaudo and Treré's (2015) critique of social movements research, while aimed at approaches based around resource mobilization theory[3] that privilege material affordances and organizational structures, has implications for the research reviewed here. Their contention (2015: 868) is that processes of collective (and I would add individual) identification remain central to social movements, and that these 'processes of collective identification reflect the technological affordances of social media, the cultural values associated with their use and the prevailing forms of social experience in a digital era.' The identities and practices of these groups, online and offline, are shifted by the interactivity of social media. While scholars like Lim (2013) recognize the importance of these connections,[4] they do not consider the internal dynamics or relationships within the movements, or, in other words, questions of collective identity and identity work as they operate in online-offline environments.

Our second critique of this body of research addresses the ubiquitous and normative judgements of what constitutes success for online social movements, which for many of these

researchers is size, physical protests, and their capacity for their issue frames to move into the mainstream media (Abbott 2013; Lim 2013, 2014; Molaei 2015; Padawangi, Marolt, and Douglass 2014; Weiss 2014). For instance, Meredith Weiss (2014: 104–5) draws a strong distinction between online activism that results in concrete political action and 'online engagement that is too thoughtless or shallow to foment changes in behaviour, let alone identity'. Such a set of criteria and distinction ignores the presence and importance of most online social movement activities and networks and their relationships to political change. Social media is inevitably viewed as ephemeral when judged using these criteria as only a tiny proportion of communications translate into 'real' activism. This perspective ignores Gerbaudo and Treré's (2015) argument that social media is a shift in social movements that affects all of their practices and their collective identities. Furthermore, the line between 'shallow' and 'real' movement practices is impossible to draw and indicates a narrow definition of social movements. Finally, 'weak' ties are still political and can still have political effects including enabling creativity and empowerment. Weiss (2014: 94–5) acknowledges this with regards to LGBTQ movements when she writes that 'these communities would almost certainly be less cohesive and empowered if it were not for new media activism.'

While much of the work reviewed has attempted to understand how online activities can translate to large-scale political activism, there are scholars who have more closely assessed the different networks within broader social movements as well as the relationship between different modes of interaction. Ramesh Srinivasan (2013: 50) makes the judgement that 'the debate on social media and revolutions … tends to lack cultural, social and political context.' Srinivasan (2013) argues that the interfaces between different networks, online and offline, are crucial to understanding events. A broader and more nuanced approach also needs to be brought to what Lim (2014) labels intermodality, or the relationship between digital media and spaces of protest. As space is determined by relationships and is defined by multiplicity

(Massey 2005), online activity can change space in multiple ways, from online representations and discussions, to visits, to political activities, to the locations of servers, computers and satellites. The capacity to move from digital interactions to face-to-face interactions is not essential to social movements, but enhances engagements and enriches the members of a social movement group.

Anna Tsing's (2005) work on environmental movements in Indonesia similarly draws attention to the broader lineages of movements and the importance of location in the contingencies of social movement formation. While the genealogies of movements are important and link to questions of political opportunities and resources, their sustained existence stems from their articulation of the desires and perspectives of their members that arises from the myriad of interactions between members across platforms. For Tsing (2005: 122), studying the 'energizing connections to the world' essential for social movements and their exotic distinctiveness 'models the inextricability of interconnection and location.' They offer opportunities for members to craft themselves simultaneously with other actions, one of which is political activity. Hence the identity work of social movements (Jasper 2015) has a range of implications beyond political activism that may be global in spread and claim, but are always specific and particular in practice. Hence the linked online and offline activities of social movements should not just be researched for their potential to contribute to political action, but because of the ways they make worlds through empowering a multiplicity of particular ways of being in them.

Heritage and Social Media

While digital heritage has been a topic of research interest in heritage studies for some time (Giaccardi 2012; Cameron and Kenderdine 2007; Din and Wu 2015), the focus of most of these studies has been museums' use of digital tools and platforms. Where social media has been a focus of research, it is often examined for the ways the interactions it enables support

'democratic' or public-centred heritage activities, generally administered by large institutions (Taylor and Gibson 2016; Purkis 2016; Aigner 2016; Silberman and Purser 2012). Assessments here divide between research that argues high quality public participation in digital curation of such projects is possible and happening (Purkis 2016; Silberman and Purser 2012); and research that argues the structural and institutional forces behind such projects undermine public engagement and control (Taylor and Gibson 2016; Aigner 2016; Blackburn 2013). Neil Silberman and Margaret Pursar's (2012) book chapter on digital memory communities clearly establishes the stakes and reveals the dichotomy within digital research in heritage studies. They contend (2012: 26) that 'the creative value of digital heritage lies … in its power to stimulate unique, community-based reflection on past, present and future identities,' and that collective memory 'is a prerequisite for collective social action and cohesive, dynamic communities.' The dichotomy is between expert-scripted, individual-oriented, online communication (controlled social media that is not 'mixable' (Papacharissi 2011: 305)) and interactive, community-based, reflective expression about past, present and future identities.

While aware that the stakes of social media are more than its contribution to mass political action as tends to be the case in social movements research, the scripted-interactive dichotomy begins to disintegrate when we turn to social media use that large institutions do not manage. Considering the issues raised in the previous section, a number of factors affect the characteristics of communities of social media users and their use of heritage. These are: the types of communication favoured in social media use; their techno-materiality that places great importance on the role of administrator; and most importantly the social, political and cultural context of online users who are always constrained by political and social structures, or themselves may support undemocratic or chauvinist practices. The majority of online heritage groups curate themselves using the digital affordances online platforms (in particular Facebook

(Gregory 2015; Liew, Pang, and Chan 2013)) make available to them, and their practices vary with their specific backgrounds, purpose and circumstances, as two recent studies make clear.

Kai Khiun Liew, Natalie Pang and Brenda Chan (2013) examine the role of social media in the conservation politics of Singapore, in particular in contests over the conservation of a railway line and cemetery. Liew, Pang and Chan expertly assess the affordances and characteristics of social media (its emphasis on simple, short narratives and slogans) for heritage activism and draw attention to the way that online heritage groups reterritorialize previously neglected and forbidden spaces through the creation of online archives that frame these spaces through alternative historical narratives. They are also aware of the importance of intermodality, both between different online groups[5] and the connections to site visits, new information and protest activities. While making a convincing case for the overall character of contemporary heritage activism, they do not examine internal group dynamics or indeed any individuals involved in the group, instead presenting online heritage activism as a decisive break with 'book' heritage activism despite the presence of the same groups in both categories. Furthermore, the differences between the Facebook groups are not discussed in any detail. There is a need for greater attention to the social and cultural specifics of these groups if we want to explore their appeals to their members and how their members respond.

In contrast to this focus on the structural forces shaping how social media influences heritage politics, Jenny Gregory (2015) focuses her attention on the online interactions of the 'Beautiful buildings and cool places Perth has lost' Facebook group that posts pictures of absent heritage previously located in Perth, Western Australia. Gregory (2015: 42) demonstrates that this group became an 'emotional community' within the broader place-based social movement for conservation in Perth, and generated social networks and trust that could be transformed into political action through sharing information on heritage issues and protests online. Like Liew, Pang and Chan (2013), Gregory's article indicates the importance of the

online archive of audio-visual materials, their relationship to framing heritage issues as well as creating emotional attachments, and information sharing on current heritage conflicts for contemporary heritage practices outside of official institutions and channels. However, Gregory does not consider questions of intermodality apart from the sharing of information online. Additionally, the absence of detailed information on the participants (neither article undertakes a survey of online group members although Gregory gleans what she can from their posts) reduces the capacity of both articles to assess the more intimate relations between group members, heritage politics, and the neglected or absent heritage. Analysis of online-offline heritage movements (most heritage movements today) clearly requires a more robust and thorough analytical framework in order to build on these interesting and useful beginnings.

Background: Infrastructure for and Genealogies of Indonesia's Online-Offline Heritage Movements

Indonesian's use of internet, including social media, has grown remarkably since 2000. The number of people estimated to be using the internet increased from 0.93 per cent in 2000 to 21.98 per cent in 2015.[6] However, in a population estimated to be 252 million in 2014,[7] the number of mobile phone subscriptions was 325 million in the same year (more than the entire population of Indonesia), so internet use is likely to be far greater.[8] Indonesians have adapted quickly to social media use, and are now the fourth largest users of Facebook.[9] The internet has been a tool of political activism since its inception. It was both an avenue for dissenting voices and publications in the last years of the Suharto regime, and students communicated through internet cafes to organize the 1998 protests that forced Suharto to resign (Hill and Sen 2005). Since the advent of free elections in 1999, the internet has been used in ethno-religious conflict in the Moluccas and by the Islamic fundamentalist movement (Lim 2005), and has been used to both pressure politicians to address specific issues, and by politicians to communicate with voters (Lim 2013; Molaei 2015). Hence there is a history of use of social media by political

activists, but the most popular Facebook pages in Indonesia are those of celebrities, indicating that most online use of the internet is not directly linked to political issues. Merlina Lim (2013) differentiates older people's use of social media to maintain their existing networks with younger (under 30) users who pursue different groups, interests, issues and conversations. Nonetheless, social media constitutes a growing set of overlapping networks within which new ideas flow and connections occur.

BOL BRUTU is a product of these overlapping networks. It started with a group of friends from Yogyakarta who travelled around Java looking at the smaller more marginal archaeological sites (temples, graves and old structures). After a trip on 10 October 2009 to Purworejo (where they visited Klenteng Purworejo, a Chinese shrine, and the Church and Cemetery of the Javanese evangelist Kyai Sadrach), they posted photos on Facebook and attracted a large number of comments and interest in their activities. Early in 2010, they formed a Facebook group and called it BOL BRUTU. BOL BRUTU is an acronym for *Gerombolan Pemburu Batu*, which, keeping the playfulness of the Indonesian language, can be translated into English as the Stone Hunters Gang. With increasing followers on Facebook, their activities started to be covered by the mass media including local television, radio, and newspapers. Yogyakarta is a national centre for the arts and education, and their friends were painters, photographers and writers. They began to produce works while at the archaeological sites. The group has continued to organize trips to marginal heritage sites across Indonesia and to record and comment on their and others' journeys using their Facebook page. They have also organized four exhibitions of BOL BRUTU pictures in five locations including Surabaya and Bali. Making use of a fun and creative engagement with heritage, travel, and food, BOL BRUTU has sustained their activities over seven years and now has members residing across Indonesia and overseas.

While social media is a relatively new social practice, the genealogies of social movements in Indonesia have a much longer history. Anna Tsing's (2005) genealogy of nature loving groups in Indonesia identifies four lineages that we consider here as they are relevant to BOL BRUTU. The first lineage, nationalist anti-politics, stems from the Suharto government's response to the politicized youth of the early years of independence that assisted to bring down the Sukarno government in 1965. Following student protests during the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister in 1974, the Suharto regime clamped down hard on student political activities, preventing any form of political activities outside state-controlled activities during short periods before tightly controlled elections (Mackie and MacIntyre 1994). Police monitored the activities of all groups, student or otherwise, from the 1970s until Suharto's resignation in 1998. Heritage during this time became a target of state-development, with the success of the reconstruction of Borobudur leading to investments in other areas and the spread of an archaeological bureaucracy across Indonesia that began with the colonial period. Heritage sites became linked to Suharto's emphasis on national harmony and state-led development as the expertly-managed symbols of a glorious past. While there were limited opportunities for political protest for the duration of the Suharto regime, this changed in 1998 with the opening of the press and free elections. Politics shifted again in 2002 with political and economic decentralization that allowed lower levels of government to appoint their own leaders (Aspinall and Fealy 2003).

Tsing's second lineage is middle-class urban distinction that constitutes nature as an object to be explored, studied and admired in contrast to rural Indonesians who made use of the same resources and locations, raising the issue of the background and location of online heritage groups and how they perceive and use heritage. Tsing's third lineage invokes concerns with space that are apparent in online heritage groups reviewed above: the adventure geographies of nature loving groups, or their relationships to the perceived peripheries they

visit. The final lineage is youthful consumerism, or the use of expensive equipment and the entry of adventure photography into commercial youth culture in Indonesia.

While these four lineages form a guide to our considerations of BOL BRUTU and allow us to use nature loving groups as a point of comparison, archaeology in Indonesia has its own postcolonial lineages that requires examination and brings postcolonial baggage. The archaeological service in Indonesia arose from colonial preoccupations and concerns that have ongoing implications for both the content and management of heritage in Indonesia. Archaeological attention has focused on Hindu and Buddhist archaeological sites driven by a global focus on Greater India that emerged in the colonial research of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and continues to have resonance in the focus of art museums, tourism and UNESCO initiatives (Bloembergen and Eickhoff 2013, 2015). Like the colonial states that preceded them, postcolonial states have continued to use heritage to tie themselves to their populations and have justified their existence through their 'expert' management of internationally recognized heritage sites. Furthermore, the exchange of and assistance with heritage creates postcolonial networks 'of academic and political interdependencies and reciprocal obligations' (Bloembergen and Eickhoff 2015: 95). These uses of heritage broadly fit within Denis Byrne's (2009, 2014) argument for the privileging of Western, rationalist heritage practices in Southeast Asia over the widespread practices of popular religion that bring an alternative set of relationships to heritage. The practices of Javanese spirituality (*Kejawen*) are, widespread (Chambert-Loir and Reid 2002) and have their own set of political affiliations and uses (Pemberton 1994).

Methods

We utilize a case study approach (Baxter 2010) of a single heritage group that makes great use of social media in order to examine the social media use within a heritage movement. Hence, we need to articulate what are specific characteristics and more general phenomena, noting the

importance of cultural specificity (of both this group and their uses of heritage) and spreading interconnections (Tsing 2005: 121–3) that both empower individual members and shape the dynamics of the group. We used a mixed methods approach for this project in order to address three important aspects of groups that utilize social media. First, we examined the cultural, social and political context of the group and their constituents, in particular the genealogies of the group due to the backgrounds of group members, and analysis of broader social and political shifts in Indonesia. Second, we analysed the identity work and dynamics of the group through interviews and survey data that exists across a range of online and offline platforms in a range of locations. Third, we analysed online posts, survey results and interview data to assess the resulting understandings and expressions of heritage that, in the case of this article, are made through social media as a subset of a range of heritage interactions of group members.

Importantly, two of the three authors have been engaged with BOL BRUTU since its inception and one of the authors is a key player in BOL BRUTU's online and offline activities. The process of forming relationships between the international and local authors, and formulating the paper took place over two years, and itself has been a negotiation with reflections and learnings for all authors. The involvement of key BOL BRUTU members in authorship was crucial for there to be sufficient trust for data collection directly from BOL BRUTU members, and it provides the basis for reflections on shifts in group dynamics over time as well as information on site visits over many years. Long term and intimate participation in BOL BRUTU activities and interactions is a central element of our methodology.

We conducted key informant interviews with eight BOL BRUTU members in 2014 and 2016 on BOL BRUTU's history and activities. These interviews were supplemented with emails and follow-up conversations in late 2016. In addition to interviews, we conducted an online survey using Qualtrics software of BOL BRUTU members. The survey questions were in Indonesian and distributed through a link on the BOL BRUTU Facebook page as well as

through the personal contacts of the authors. Of the 100 responses, 13 were excluded due to missing data and one was excluded as their responses indicated they were not a member of BOL BRUTU, leaving a sample of 86 responses. While the number of Facebook members of BOL BRUTU is 1860,[10] the number of members who have posted is 422. Using these members as the sample size, the standard error is 9.44 with a confidence interval of 0.95. The survey data was inputted into SPSS software for statistical analysis. The final source of data is the Facebook posts themselves, analysed for the dynamics of the posting (who are the popular members and the rhythm of use of the site) as well as their content (type of post, topic, and interaction between posts). The Facebook activities were analysed using software developed to analyse Facebook groups.[11]

BOL BRUTU

Political opportunities are important to all social movements, and BOL BRUTU is no exception. The resignation of Suharto in 1998 and reinstatement of the parliamentary system was followed by an explosion in new organizations and groups after the draconian regulations and periodic crackdowns on gatherings of Indonesians (Jones 2013). While the Special Region of Yogyakarta was loosely policed compared to other provinces and special regions, even Yogyakartans found themselves in a new climate of freedom of association that accompanied rapid growth in media organizations and greater political freedoms. For heritage movements, opportunities relate not only to political reform, but also changes in heritage management. While new heritage legislation that encouraged greater public participation was passed in 2010, the implementing legislation at the national level has stalled, although it is being enacted through regulations at lower levels of government. The changing political climate and decentralization has fed into a related ongoing debate within archaeology about public participation in site management,[12] and a direction in 2011 to local caretakers (*juru pelihara*) of smaller archaeological sites to facilitate greater public access (although BOL BRUTU could

already access many of these sites through their personal networks before 2011). While greater opportunities for organization preceded then interacted with the opening up of archaeological sites and the growth of social media, this did not open up access to all sites for BOL BRUTU. BOL BRUTU founding member Cuk Riomandha stated in an interview:[13] 'If we do our activities at sites that are already commercial, like Prambanan, Ratu Boko, Borobudur for instance, we will have problems with the staff.' BOL BRUTU's activities are oriented towards 'marginal' sites.[14]

Our survey of BOL BRUTU participants revealed some interesting characteristics that distinguish them from Tsing's (2005) student-oriented nature loving groups (see Table 2.1). BOL BRUTU members tend to be older, with almost half aged between 31 and 45 and almost 80 per cent aged over 31. Members tend to live in urban areas, with their spread reflecting the group's origins in Yogyakarta (41 per cent). BOL BRUTU members tend to be highly educated with over 75 per cent having a bachelor's degree and 22 per cent a graduate degree. When asked about engagement with BOL BRUTU before and after graduation, there appears to be little change in involvement. Another indication that BOL BRUTU is not a student group is that only five per cent of respondents are students, with many more working in higher education, the private sector, arts and culture, and the media (see Table 2.1). Three quarters of members are Javanese, reflecting the group's origins in Central Java. BOL BRUTU is a community of educated, urban professionals with a diversity of gender and religions.[15]

<INSERT TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE>

Table 2.1: Demographic characteristics of BOL BRUTU members (per cent)

Variables	%
Gender (n=83)	
Male	**63**
Female	**37**
Age (n=82)	
18–30	**22**
31–45	**49**
46–60	**28**
61 and above	**1**
Home Area (n=85)	
Yogyakarta	**41**
Surabaya	**12**
Magelang	**8**
Jakarta	**5**
Sleman	**5**
Other	**29**
Level of Education (n=84)	
SMP	**4**
SMA	**6**
Mahasiswa	**5**
Sarjana S1	**56**
Sarjana S2	**14**
Sarjana S3	
Lain-lain	**7**
Employment (n=80)	

Higher Education	**31**
Private Sector	**21**
Arts and culture sector	**14**
Media	**13**
Civil servant	**6**
Student	**5**
Ethnicity (n=84)	
Javanese	**76**
Religion (n=85)	
Islam	**71**
Catholic	**13**
Protestant	**7**
Hindu	**6**
Buddha	**2**
Other	**1**

BOL BRUTU's founding and still most active members are very clear that BOL BRUTU is not political or engaged in advocacy, although reports of heritage controversies and notices of public debates and events critical of heritage management are often posted on the BOL BRUTU Facebook page.[16] In this sense, they are like Tsing's nature lovers in that their appeal is to an educated urban constituency who is seeking personal fulfilment within an Indonesian cosmopolitanism. The most regular interaction between members is on Facebook, which provides a number of affordances for these interactions that shape engagement with heritage and other members. While Facebook has a flat structure and is transparent in that all group members can see posts, it is shaped by the principles of its administrators, who have a

high degree of control, and still requires identity work from key members in order to generate and retain an ongoing dynamics of interaction. BOL BRUTU has a small group of administrators (approximately ten) who remove posts that constitute advertising, are inappropriate, or too far outside the interests of BOL BRUTU members. However, they rely mostly on the continuous use of the page to draw attention to popular posts and interesting conversations: 'If BOL BRUTU lives, it lives on social media. Where is BOL BRUTU's office? On Facebook.'[17] Site visits, meals, and other BOL BRUTU activities including exhibitions are organized and promoted through social media.

The key to continuous activity on BOL BRUTU's Facebook group is regular posts and the promotion of events. Of the survey respondents in 2016, 59 per cent looked every week and 21 per cent posted a picture in the last month. Posts are responded to with comments and 'likes' (when a Facebook user indicates they like a comment or post by another user). There are a small group of key players who are central to generating and participating in comments and posts through both their popularity and their regular activity. Our survey indicated that 40 per cent looked for the posts of a particular person, and two thirds of those people looked for one player, Cuk Riomandha, while others also looked for Kris Budiman. Cuk and Kris are the two-key people in terms of both posts (Cuk has made the most posts followed by Kris) and comments (Kris followed by Cuk).[18] As administrators and founding members, Cuk, Kris and some other key members[19] undertake the identity work of posting, eliciting posts and commenting, as well as organizing off-line activities. It is also worth noting that the number of posts is declining annually. From an average of 3.9 original posts per day in 2014, this figure reduced to 2.3 in 2015 and 1.2 in 2016. This can be attributed to the use of alternative online platforms like WhatsApp, Messenger and Instagram by long-term members. It is worth noting that other activities have remained regular or, in the case of exhibitions, increased in 2016.

The form of identity work in BOL BRUTU is best understood through a consideration of what attracts and interests members. When asked to provide one word to describe BOL BRUTU, the most popular was 'unique', reflecting the different perspective that BOL BRUTU brought to its engagement with landscapes. The second most popular was '*blusukan*', a Javanese word meaning wayfaring or a rambling walk. Both of these words point to the creative and adventurous approach BOL BRUTU brings to heritage that are evident in their posts and comments. Like other online heritage groups (Gregory 2015; Liew, Pang, and Chan 2013), sharing photographs is central to their online communications (68 per cent (n=80) of respondents interested in pictures compared with 5 per cent in commentary and 10 per cent in all posts), but these photos are not just of heritage sites or artefacts. The most common posts are of marginal pre-Islamic heritage sites, in particular temples and stupas, but also often including selfies and pictures of fellow travellers.

The most popular posts contain an element of wonder or debate about an aspect of heritage. For instance, the most liked post (which was also disliked) was of a reconstructed temple that clearly differentiated old and new materials in a jarring style (see Figure 2.1), followed by a number of opinions about the reconstruction. BOL BRUTU members debated the effect of using cement blocks alongside the original stone, the archaeologist involved, where else it occurred, and if it followed contemporary principles of archaeology. The second most popular post was of a smiling face on a statue of an 'ancestor' in Sri Baduga Museum (see Figure 2.2), with the caption: 'Its nice to realize that our ancestors are friendly, humorous. His life must have been happy.' The posts then turned to simplicity in art, and how this can express happiness.

Popular posts are not just of sites, but also BOL BRUTU activities and events involving popular members. The comments on these posts are also short and entertaining. For instance, a shot of the stout Cuk giving a presentation was quickly followed by the comment 'a true

enlarger', and then 'a large truth teller'.[20] Play and fun here are important to both the identity of the group and their engagement with heritage. Flows of attention are directed online through new posts and conversations with and between key members more likely to draw more people and engagement. The posts themselves are short and entertaining, using Indonesian and Javanese slang, and play off each other. Combining humour with the interest in archaeological sites and activities is important for evoking responses, and exploring a range of perspectives on a site or activity. Facebook affords a group of like-minded people a steady stream of archaeological pictures with entertaining comments from like-minded people.

<INSERT FIG. 2.1 ABOUT HERE>

Figure 2.1: The restoration of a terrace beneath Candi Ijo. Photograph courtesy of Transpiosa Riomandha, 26 March 2016

<INSERT FIG. 2.2 ABOUT HERE>

Figure 2.2: Sculpture of an ancestor. Photograph courtesy of Kris Budiman, 25 January 2016

Intermodality is clearly important to the dynamics of BOL BRUTU. It is most accurate to describe this, and indeed most other, heritage groups as online-offline rather than online. BOL BRUTU began with a trip, and trips remain central to their activities and communications. Trips are arranged using social media, and BOL BRUTU members have journeyed as a group many times around Java as well as to Bali.[21] These are not the same as pilgrimages of Javanese spiritualism where ancestors or powerful beings are approached for interventions (although some BOL BRUTU members are adherents, and others are Hindu and undertake a different set of rituals). BOL BRUTU members typically seek inspiration from visits to archaeological sites

and undertake activities like photography, writing poetry and painting, which is an approach to heritage within a modern Indonesian sensibility (what Hildred Geertz (1963) termed the metropolitan superculture of Indonesia). However, it is important to note that this is not a scientific or strictly rational engagement with sites. BOL BRUTU celebrates feelings and emotional connections across time and space. Enjoying food together is also important to both trips and gatherings, and photographs of meals are also on Facebook, indicating that visceral experiences are recognized and celebrated alongside discussions about archaeology and history. A small, inner group of BOL BRUTU members organized the four exhibitions that used photographs from site visits, and also put together catalogues for sale (see Figure 2.3). The exhibitions had a higher level of participation from respondents (69 per cent) than the trips (53 per cent), although the trips dominate social media posts and discussions. Members of this inner group have also given presentations on issues like the heritage of mosques through recording and researching the use of local and earlier symbols and architecture, Buddhist temples around Yogyakarta, and a study of graves across Indonesia. In addition to BOL BRUTU activities, there is a steady stream of notices of heritage activities posted onto BOL BRUTU's Facebook page.

<INSERT FIG. 2.3 ABOUT HERE>

Figure 2.3: Poster for the exhibition *Bergana Boleh Saja*. Post courtesy of BOL BRUTU and Kris Budiman

Similar to observations of online heritage activity in Singapore (Liew, Pang, and Chan 2013), offline activities and exchanges interact with online photographs and discussions to reterritorialize neglected and forgotten spaces within a contemporary urban sensibility. There are parallels here with Tsing's (2005) nature lovers due to the time urban groups committed to organizing and undertaking trips to often (but not exclusively) rural locations. Similarly, the choices and interactions of the visitors require interrogation. Both groups have a romantic

approach to categories of things (nature and heritage) that have colonial legacies. BOL BRUTU's focus on pre-Islamic heritage is a legacy of colonial archaeology that privileged Greater India over Islamic structures in particular at the time, and still is privileged over Dutch colonial heritage (Bloembergen and Eickhoff 2013). However, they are not following the positivist and object-focused approach that defines official archaeological approaches in Southeast Asia (Byrne 2014) but instead bringing a different cosmopolitan engagement and sensibility to pre-Islamic heritage. Tsing (2005: 13–8) also notes the urban distinctions that nature-lovers made to differentiate themselves from rural village dwellers who resided in the areas they visited. BOL BRUTU's engagement with residents at the archaeological sites they visit are quite different. The site caretakers, who receive a small payment from the state, are treated with great respect and their photographs with BOL BRUTU members often appear on the website.[22] BOL BRUTU members position themselves as a respectful guest in these places, and members will always talk with the caretakers and residents and ask permission before approaching a heritage site. This speaks to the forward-looking cosmopolitanism that heritage opens up for BOL BRUTU members—83 per cent (n=81) of our survey respondents indicated that BOL BRUTU had changed the way they appreciate heritage.

Conclusion

History, and heritage, is indeed the work of 'a thousand different hands' (Samuel 1994: 8), now increasingly using PDAs and computers. I have argued in this chapter that social media is not just a communication tool but through its affordances constitutes a shift in what heritage and heritage groups are and can be. To recognize and understand this shift requires a broad definition of social movements and heritage movements. They are not just groups advocating for change and seeking political outcomes, but groups that construct new consensus and open up new ways of engaging with and understanding heritage. Heritage cannot be separated here from the flows of attention, people and information that social media is entangled with, but is

properly understood as constituted through these flows. Social movements are therefore essential to the ongoing constitution of heritage and not just or primarily because of their political influence. However, as Raphael Samuel (1994: 288–312) also observed, heritage is used in very different ways and for different purposes by conservative and progressive groups, and can quickly switch political poles. In this case, we need to differentiate the dynamics and structures of online social movements that influence all groups, and the specific ways that BOL BRUTU has entwined itself with these structures to become the group it is.

An important structural influence on heritage movements today is the affordances of social media organization. For instance, Facebook has a flat structure, has transparency through its use of posts, directs attention and creates networks through likes and comments, and is strongly hierarchical in the power it gives to administrators. While most social media allows near-constant communication, each platform needs to be examined for the specific affordances it opens up for a group. However, it is not enough to just focus on the platform or online interactions. Understanding heritage groups requires an understanding of the specific social, political and geographical context within which social movements act and interact. Political opportunity structures, including access to and management of heritage, is important to analysis. Analysis should also identify and interrogate the characteristics of group members. Once the context and background of the movement are understood, it is then possible to understand how groups form in concert with social media technologies that allow for self-curation and organization.

There also appear to be a set of similar characteristics between online-offline heritage groups across different cultures and political contexts. Photographs and images appear to be very important for their operation, and their use should constitute a focus of future research on heritage groups. Much like social movements more broadly (Jasper 2014), key people undertake identity work both on social media sites and offline in order to keep members

engaged and interact with non-members for the group. Online engagement in the case of BOL BRUTU was generating posts and comments within an urban cosmopolitan sensibility that opened up fun, new ways of understanding and seeing Indonesia's pre-Islamic heritage. While fun and 'unique' perspectives are essential for BOL BRUTU, heritage groups' use of social media can open up or close engagement with heritage. Cosmopolitan engagement is a characteristic of BOL BRUTU rather than a feature of heritage movements.

Finally, these groups are most effective when they are online-offline, so it is important to pay attention to the full range of their engagements and activities. This broader perspective indicates how engagement with social media can open up flows of information, people and resources, leading to flows of people and resources that shape landscapes. Flows of attention directed through online interactions often translate into the movement of people into peripheral and forgotten sites, beginning new engagements and interactions. Urban-rural interactions generated through these flows are worthy of further attention. Social media also shifts engagements at the sites. It directs attention as well as introducing new practices (for instance, the selfie) and priorities. Social movements research in its current iteration would prioritize offline, political activities. However, offline activities are incomprehensible without recognizing social media; they are parts of the same heritage practice, and they open up both new ways of being in the world and new understandings of heritage. To paraphrase Tsing (2005: 154), the personal force of heritage, and its appearance as an object of reflection, depends on both localization and its cosmopolitan referents. Social media will be a connection between these two poles for the foreseeable future.

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NOTES

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[1] https://elantowow.wordpress.com/2014/07/01/konservasi-pusaka-dalam-genggaman/#more-600

[2] See Jasper's (2014) account of cultural approaches to social movements and its differences to structural accounts.

[3] Beginning with the work of John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977), resource mobilisation theory examines a social movements resources and social movements' ability to use them in order to explain their success.

[4] Lim (2013: 637) writes: 'The social impacts of the internet and social media […] should be understood as a result of the organic interaction between technology and social, political, and cultural structures and relationships'.

[5] Liew, Pang and Chan write (2013: 612): 'the multiplicity of platforms and the multiplication of attention and interests here becomes essential for the re-evaluation of the otherwise neglected sites, giving them history, presence, relevance and future.'

[6] According to Indonesian Bureau of Statistics data compiled by the UN specialized agency for information and communication technologies (ITU) (http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx).

[7] According to the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (https://www.bps.go.id/linkTableDinamis/view/id/960).

[8] According to Indonesian Ministry of Communications data compiled by the UN specialized agency for information and communication technologies (ITU) (http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx).

[9] Indonesian users of Facebook totalled 77 million in May 2016 according to data sourced from Socialbakers.com (https://www.statista.com/statistics/268136/top-15-countries-based-on-number-of-facebook-users/).

[10] This is the number for 10 November 2016 when we closed the survey.

[11] Two analysis tools were used: Sociograph (http://sociograph.io/) and Grytics (https://grytics.com). Both tools enable data to be downloaded to excel where we analysed it.

[12] See Archaeologist Daud Tanudirjo's article in *Inside Indonesia* about this shift in the broader context of the discipline in Indonesia (http://www.insideindonesia.org/shifting-sands).

[13] This interview was with Tod Jones in Yogyakarta on 3 September 2014.

[14] Respondents in interviews used the term 'marginal' which has entered the Indonesian language from English and also reflects the social science background of many of our respondents who have university educations.

[15] While 71 per cent of respondents were Islamic, this reflects the larger proportion of followers of Islam in Indonesia. A more important observation is that there is a mixture of religions.

[16] Interview with BOL BRUTU members on 3 September 2014, Yogyakarta.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Cuk has generated over 7,000 comments on his posts and 11,000 likes, and Kris has generated over 6,000 comments and 3,000 likes.

[19] These are Putu Sutawijaya, Ninuk Retno Raras, Apriadi Ujiarso, Feintje Likawati and Linggar Saputra Wayan. All of these users were assigned a composite score from Sociograph, taking into account activity and other member responses, of over 10,000.

[20] '*Benar-benar pembesar*.' '*Besar-besar pembenar*'. https://www.facebook.com/135387239853364/posts/1088286591230086

[21] Individually, BOL BRUTU members have journeyed to many places including overseas.

[22] This includes a photographic montage of caretakers and residents' portraits set to music by Riomandha to pay respects and acknowledge the local people who care for and guard

historic sites. Riomandha writes that 'They are beloved people for BOL BRUTU' (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BGkHvyHQ4Fw&feature=share).

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