School of Media, Creative Arts and Social Inquiry

The State as Mujahid:
Jihadist Norms in International Narrative of Saudi Arabia

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Declaration

To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgment has been made.

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Abstract

Violent jihādism has had a long and convoluted history of state sponsorship. Violent jihādism has historically enjoyed state support. There are many reasons for this support, but research has typically focussed on the material benefit the relationship provides to states. Less emphasis has been placed on the ideological motives behind state support of jihādism, even though violent jihādist organisations have benefitted from substantial popular support. Research into norm adoption shows that where norms enjoy substantial popular support, they compete for adoption at higher levels of society, both nationally and internationally. This study contributes to the body of research that examines how states ideologically legitimise and delegitimise violent jihādism and jihādist organisations. Operating in a Critical Constructivism epistemology, this study primarily asks whether jihādist norms are present in the Saudi Arabian national narrative. This study further examines whether those norms can be linked to existing conceptions of jihād as espoused by jihādist organisations, or whether they are more general. Finally, it asks what that means for constructivist theory, and the extent to which Critical Constructivism can account for the presence or absence of those norms in narrative. Saudi Arabia is instrumental in its unique relationship with various regional jihādist organisations, Islamic identity, and position within the Arab community of states. This study adopts a Qualitative Content Analysis strategy to examine Saudi Arabian narrative and the study uses two data sets—statements produced by Saudi Arabian Embassy to the United States, and Saudi narrative delivered to the United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council. This study finds that, consistent with a Critical Constructivism's assertions, Saudi narrative is mobilised to delegitimise several jihādist organisations. Saudi narrative does not contest the practice of violent jihād, but instead only the practices of jihādist organisations, denying the legitimacy of both the actions and the authority of the organisations. Because jihād is a foundational doctrine of Islam, its delegitimisation would undermine the Islamic credentials of Saudi Arabia, both to its population, and potentially to other Islamic states. Instead, Saudi Arabia positions itself as an authority on the practice, especially in relation to those groups that would contest the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia's statehood. This study adds to the body of knowledge describing how norms are adopted and compete for adoption, as well as describing the complex manner in which Saudi Arabia relates to jihādism and jihādist organisations.

Dedication

To my beloved wife, Sarah, for her ongoing understanding and unwavering support, and to our children, Eliza, Evelyn, Terence, Reuben and Matthias.

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If you know your history
Then you would know where you coming from

- Buffalo Soldier, Bob Marley and the Wailers -

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Glossary of Arabic Terms

Author's note: Many words in Arabic, like other languages, are subject to semantic overload, where a word is subject to multiple meanings, complex meanings, or meaning that changes depending on context. Words and phrases in this glossary are presented according to their use in this study.

Ahadith	pl. literally 'talk' or 'discourse', typically refers to third party records of the life, actions and/or words of the prophet Mohammad; sing. hadith
'Ahkām	Arbitration or judgement on a legal principle
Al-Jāhilīyyah	Concerned with the pre-Islamic times, a period of ignorance
Allah	The name of the deity of Islam
Amir al-mu'minin'	Commander of the Faithful
Anfiru	To ward off or scare away
Bay'āt	Allegiance
Bidah	Innovation that does not find its roots in the traditional practices (Sunnah) of the Muslim community
Dabiq	Religious magazine of Islamic State, drawing its name from a village in North West Syria
Dala-il	Dala'il al-Khayrat, a celebrated Islamic religious text
Dar al-Harb	The abode of war, those lands without a peace treaty with Muslims, or where they are unable to practice their religion
Dar al-Islam	The abode of peace, refers to the dominion of Islam
Deen	The Islamic religious way of life
Dhimmi	A non-Muslim subject of the Ottoman Empire, or more generally a non-Muslim living in a Muslims state and required to pay the jizya tax
Emir/Amir	Can refer to a male monarch, prince, commander or leader
Fard	A religious duty
Fard ayn	An individual religious duty
Fard kifaya	A shared responsibility amongst a community
Fiqh	Islamic jurisprudence
Fitna	Civil unrest or civil war, especially against a caliphate
Fuqahā'	pl. Islamic jurists, expert in fiqh
Hadith	Singular form of ahadith
Hajj	The pilgrimage made to Mecca, to the House of Allah
Hakimiyya	The sovereignty that rests with the highest legal authority

Hanafi	One of the four major schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence.
Hanbali	One of the four major schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence.
Haram	Acts that are unlawful
Harb	War, warfare or combat
Hijrah	Migration or emigration
Hujjah	Proof of God
Hudna	A truce or armistice
Ibadat	Worship
'Ijma	Consensus, typically in Islamic law
'Ijtihād (ijtihad)	interpretation of the Islamic law not precisely covered in the Qur'an
'Ikhtilāf	Structured argumentation, disagreement
Jāhilīyyah/Jahili	The period of time prior to the advent of Islam, characterised as the Age of Ignorance
Jihād	To 'struggle'
Jizya	The yearly tax levied against dhimmis
Kanunname	Ottoman book of law, legal code
Kufri	Disbelief in the Islamic religion
Laheya	Taleban Code of Conduct
Madhhab	School of thought within Islamic jurisprudence
Madrasa	School
Makruh	An offensive act
Maliki	One of the four major schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence.
Mandub	Recommended but not binding
Maslaha mursala	A ruling in line with the objectives of Shari'ah, and is generally beneficial, but which is not necessitated by the shari'ah
Mu'amalat	Worldly dealings of individuals with each other
Mubah	Permitted, in a neutral of indifferent manner
Muslaha	From Islamic jurisprudence, meaning to be in line with the common good
Naskh	Replacement, used in the context of one law replacing another
Ouboudiyya	Adoration
Qati	Authenticated and unambiguous, indisputable
Qatiluhum	Wage battle against
Qital	Fighting (though not synonymous with jihād)

Qital al-acda	Fighting the enemy, or more frequently just qital
Quda	Muslim judge who renders decisions according to Shari'ah law, alt. qadai
Qur'ān	Central religious text of Islam, believed to be the revelation of Allah
Sahih	A collection of hadith compiled by Sahih al-Bukhari, alt, Sahih Muslim
Salat	Obligatory Muslim prayers performed five times daily
Shafi'i	One of the four major schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence.
Shahīd	Martyr, or often witness
Shari'ah	The body of Islamic religious law
Takfir	The practice of one Muslim declaring another an unbeliever, excommunication
Takhalluf	To endeavour, to exert
Talfiq	The legal tendency to combine legislation from various madhhabs over fidelity to any specific school
Kktulu	To kill
Ulamā'	Clerics
Ummah	Community, distinct from 'sha'b' meaning nation
Umra	Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, distinct from hajj; umra is non-compulsory and performed at any time
Waqf	Endowment
Wilāyah	An administrative region
Zahiri	A minor school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence

Introduction

Since the inception of the doctrine of jihād, its relationship with the state has been subject to constant change and evolution. Originating in Muhammad's proto-Islamic community, in general terms jihād has primarily been understood as the struggle to promote and maintain the faith. With the growth of the early community, and the subsequent interaction of Islam with surrounding people, jihād rapidly took on a militaristic character, with the Muslim community engaging in defensive warfare. As Islamic polities developed and became more complex, jihād became more institutionalised. This led to the development of a body of Islamic jurisprudence to understand, limit, and regulate the activities of jihād. Today, as the relationship between jihād and the state continues to evolve, it remains the subject of analysis and debate. The conversation is not limited to scholars of Islamic law, but also includes those who would assert their own authority to wage and declare jihād, those who would seek to regulate it, and those seeking to understand.

Militant Islam and the threat of Muslim terrorists have been frequent and recurring since 11 September, 2001 (September 11). The threat and actions of militant Islamic groups such as Al-Qa'ida and Islamic State[1] (ISIS) have featured prominently in media discourse, politics, and in academia. Western media often reduces the actions of jihādis to a Westernised, simplified version of jihād. It is hard to hold the media accountable for their simplification of the complex processes involved in jihādist violence—the responsible, violent individuals and groups also justify their actions in the language of jihād; their organisations are jihādist organisations. Jihād is their raison d'être. Jihādists norms are continually thrust into the public forum—the threat they present is positioned as "a war of attrition with the West" by politicians, and a media that ignores the ideological and strategic differences of groups such as Al-Qa'ida and IS (Novenario, 2016, p. 955).

While September 11 dramatically illustrated the relevance of jihād to an international audience, it was one event in an ongoing history of violence. However, the prominence of the target for a Western audience and subsequent media attention heralded a turn towards jihād research in academia. Terrorism has long been the subject of study. It is unsurprising,

1 Alternately referred to as Daesh, Islamic State (IS), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

as the intent of terrorism is to draw attention to itself. When Al-Qa'ida turned its attention to the West, the West returns this gaze in search of understanding. For the citizens of most Western countries, seldom interacting with or giving thought to organisations like Al-Qa'ida, it is difficult to comprehend how they could be subjected to jihādist violence. The attention paid to jihādism typically has been directed at individuals and/or groups, to those most responsible, and not to the nation-state. Nations are peripheral actors, playing a supporting, but not active, role. When focus is turned to states and to state-sponsored terrorism, the emphasis has been on the material benefit which that support offers. While jihādists are considered to be ideologically motivated, the state is typically assumed to be a rational actor, and its motivations are typically viewed through materialist lenses—realism, structuralism, the principal/agent model. The predominant mode of understanding the relationship between states and jihādist organisations is through analysing the material advantage offered by those organisations (Byman, 2010; Risse, 2000).

However, even to those who focus on the strategic benefit of state-sponsored terrorism, there is an obvious ideological element in the support offered by Islamic countries to these organisations that cannot be disregarded. Byman (2010, p. 4) accounts for state-sponsored terrorism using principal/agent analysis, asserting states delegate violence (a "conditional grant of authority") to ensure "the principal's preferences are acted upon well beyond the duration of the principal's tenure." However, this provisional authority is not limited to maximising influence or material gains. These author asserts that "in several prominent instances… the ideological driver behind the relationship cannot be overstated." Byman cites Iran's support of Hezbollah, Qaddafi's 1970s support of left-wing Palestinians groups, and most notably the Taleban government's support of Al-Qa'ida in the late 1990s and early 2000s. While receiving material support from al-Qa'ida, the Taleban courted the wrath of the United States (US) initially for limited military strikes, and later invasion. Faced with foreign animosity, the Taleban continued to support al-Qa'ida, to further its mission abroad (Byman & Kreps, 2010, pp. 5-6). Byman and Kreps note that "ideology may provide the glue that brings together and strengthens the [principal/agent] relationship" (Byman & Kreps, 2010, p. 7).

This study endeavours to identify an ideological locus for the support nexus between state and jihādist. It focusses on jihādist norms expressed by the state narrative of Saudi Arabia,

a long-time sponsor of jihādist groups. This study examines the national narrative of Saudi Arabia, testing for jihādist norms and, if present, the nature of these norms, linking these norms back to the work of jihādist ideologues and/or organisations if possible. In doing so, it also seeks to interrogate the ability of existing international relations theories, specifically Constructivism, which asserts the nature of the state is formed by social and historical processes, to account for those norms.

While accepting that the material incentives of state-sponsored support of jihādist organisations are substantial and influential, this study looks to Constructivism to provide a complementary explanation for why states might adopt jihādist norms. Constructivism asserts an agent's characteristics are "not natural or inherent features of reality but are instead socially constructed" (Harrison et al., 2015a, p. 35). A widespread ideological support of jihādism could be indicative that the historical state support of jihādism may be more than the action of a rational actor. Indeed, there is widespread support for jihādism in the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding nations that self-identify as Islamic. For example[2]:

- IS has attracted thousands to its membership from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Jordan (Klor, 2016, p. 5)
- 74% of Palestinians supported Hamas' violent campaign in the West Bank (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2016)
- 89% of Palestinians support Hamas firing rockets at Israeli civilians (Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, 2014)
- 24% of Egyptians, 15% of Jordanians, and 29% of Lebanese agree that suicide bombings are sometimes or often justified in the defence of Islam (Pew Research Centre, 2014)

McSweeney (1998b, pp. 137-138) notes though that a state is not a societal group, and doesn't act like one. The same texts that inform the phenomenological identity of individuals and groups may also form and/or affect policy-making elites directly, or through the influence of domestic groups upon them. Just as jihādist literature provides a narrative that precedes social identity, so might policy-making elites adopt a narrative that arises from lower-level

2 Note: it is not the author's intent to give the impression that the West is the target of violent extremists. Victims of violent extremism come from all sides, including but not limited to Islam and, Western cultures.

social identities and jihādist textual narratives. If such is the case, then a norm-tracing methodology could trace the language of policy makers back to what McSweeney calls 'sediment' McSweeney (1998b, p. 138).

This study adopts a critical constructivist approach and epistemology. Differentiating Critical Constructivism from Traditional Constructivism (from which it originated) is problematic as "both boundary drawings are to a significant extent a question of overlapping zones rather than insurmountable differences" (Buzan, 2009, p. 197). Traditional Constructivism is 'traditional' in the sense it asserts that international relations and security studies should primarily be concerned with state behaviour, while Critical Constructivism differentiates itself by analysing the link between policy (and, in particular, security policy) and history and identity, with an emphasis on power relationships. Like Traditional Constructivism, Critical Constructivism is concerned with the manner that states and actors co-evolve and are constituted, yet goes further to focus on identity issues outside of nationalism including, though not limited to, religion, ethnicity, and sexuality. Further, "emphasis is placed on the detailed study of texts to understand the symbolic systems that govern actors' discourses, rather than on an analysis of a large number of cases" (Buzan, 2009, pp. 192, 197; Katzenstein et al., 1998, pp. 676-677). Therefore, it is an appropriate paradigm through which to approach the topic. Wendt asserts that "the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature," and this study seeks to test whether this is the case with jihādist norms by testing the language of state actors. This approach will also speak to Wendt's assertion that the primary causes of group identities (for which he gives religion, culture, language and ethnicity as examples) can influence state policy (Wendt, 2003, pp. 1, 210).

There are several vectors that provide justification for the search for jihādist norms in state narrative. State-sponsored terrorism has declined, yet it remains salient, a useful tool in the war chest of smaller states (Byman, 2007, pp. 23-24; Collins, 2014a; Engel, 2015, p. 154). While there is evidence that state sponsorship provides strategic benefit, insight into the norms expressed in the language of states may show whether that support is purely functional, or whether it might have an ideological element. If jihād in the sense of a struggle against the enemies of Islam is a duty incumbent on all Muslims, then

perhaps it may be seen also to apply to states that declare themselves Islamic, either in the state's character, or as the result of state policy made by individuals.

Language analysis has an established pedigree in the study of jihād and jihādist organisations. Al-Dayel and Anfinson (2017) use language analysis to examine the discursive process that IS uses in *Dabiq* to position itself as a state. The process used is to define state, and then analyse how IS co-opts quotations to assert its state-hood based on three criteria: territoriality, revenue and immigration. Al-Dayel and Anfinson (2017, p. 2) assert (Al-Dayel & Anfinson, 2017, p. 2):

> in a reflexive circulation back onto the media-scape, the "enemies" then utilise their prominence in *Dabiq* as discursive capital for their own political campaigns. Overall, our analysis claims that the knowledge produced about [IS] is implicated within its construction.

Likewise, Cohen et al. (2016) have used a combination of computerised Content Analysis and human qualitative assessment to analyse the difference in language between Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in their ideological justification for 'terrorism'. In doing so, they identified 'schisms' in the ideology "that presumably led to the splintering of [Al-Qa'ida] Iraq and the rise of ISIS". They assert that their politically violent ideology could be 'boiled down' into a set of 19 sub-arguments (Cohen et al., 2016, pp. 1, 15). Likewise, Novenario uses Content Analysis to analyse the competition between Al-Qa'ida and IS. Novenario (2016, p. 953) recognises the 'media as a critical arena of Jihad' and uses Content Analysis to identify differences in the strategic application of jihād propounded by both groups. While it is an empirical analysis, it offers unique insight into the ideology and application of jihād in the two organisations, such as Al-Qa'ida's emphasis on forming mujahideen, and IS's focus on caliphate.

Constructivism has been utilised in other areas of international relations research—Constructivists such as Katzenstein have illustrated the influence of ideational factors on international relations (Ruggie, 1998, p. 865). Such empirical analysis has been used to assess the "impact of ideational factors" in contexts including decolonisation, human rights, and the stabilising effect of multi-lateral norms on international society during periods of rapid change. A case-by-case examination of different norms in different arenas is warranted, as norm adoption does not follow a consistent pattern, and is often uneven, dependent on, and

specific to, domestic and regional conditions (Roxana, 2011, pp. 55-56). A further benefit of this research is in providing a starting point to explain how different conditions in Saudi Arabia determine the extent to which jihādist norms encroach on policy.

0.1 Research Questions

The primary enquiry of this study is to what extent are jihādist norms expressed in the national narrative of Saudi Arabia? Following from that come several secondary questions:

- What are those jihādist norms, and what do they mean?
- And can they be traced to specific jihādist groups, or are they more generalised in nature?

Finally, this study tests Constructivism's assertion that norms travel between societal levels, especially international narrative in the context of jihādist norms. This study provides a mode of reading which is expected to have applications to other nations' narratives, unveiling jihādist norms. While the focus of this study is Saudi Arabia, the analysis offered is not limited to one country, but provides future scholars with a mode of understanding jihād and its relationship to the state. This study contributes to the body of scholarship that focuses on the role of norms in national and transnational politics.

While this study analyses the Saudi Arabian national discourse, this research has implications for the broader international community. Should Saudi narrative show adoption of jihādist norms, that narrative may function to legitimise jihādist activity, as well bolstering the credentials of jihādist organisations.

In asking what jihādist norms may be present in Saudi Arabian narrative, this study recognises that there are a range of constitutive elements that fall under the umbrella of jihād. Jihādist organisations use the doctrine as justification not just for violence, but for a range of activities (such as migration in the cause of jihād), and as an ordering narrative for identifying legitimate and illegitimate actors. That is, jihād is constitutive of identity: jihād is the activity of the righteous against an enemy. Jihād then is asserted to be a principle that contains a constellation of norms which regulate behaviour and constitute an identity.

There are several reasons to use Constructivism as the lens for analysis. Jihād is chiefly an ideological doctrine. While actors may operate in a rationalist paradigm, a rationalist-only account of the actions of those agents will necessarily be incomplete. This study undertakes a 'deep dive' into the role of Constructivism in examining the relationship between the state and jihādism. It seeks to test the explanatory power of Constructivism in this context, as the theory offers unique insights not available to the rationalist analyst. Constructivism emphasises the social construction of knowledge, and asserts that knowledge is neither objective nor universal but, rather, shaped by society and culture. Additionally, it emphasises the role of agents in forming knowledge, so a more complete understanding of the Saudi relationship with jihād necessarily must necessarily incorporate that country's role in the process. Finally, Constructivism highlights the role of power in the construction of knowledge. The dominant social forces that affect the construction of knowledge may not agree with those factors typically examined in empirical, rationalist analysis. Overall, Constructivism offers a context-sensitive and nuanced account of the relationship between states and jihādist organisations. As such, this study will use Qualitative Content Analysis to analyse Saudi narrative, drawn from the Saudi Arabian Embassy to the US, and Saudi Arabian speeches and reports to the United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council.

0.2 Structure

Chapter One provides the foundation for this study. The meaning of jihād is not only contested in the contemporary period, but has also been the subject of continuous change and evolution. Chapter One provides a comprehensive analysis of the term jihād—its historical, legal and discursive development from inception to its current use and abuse. A clear understanding of how the term is used is an essential component of this study, grounding this work in the broader jihādist dialogue. That is, as this study seeks provide an explanation of discovered jihādist norms in context, a westernised conception of jihād is inappropriate. Any explanation must by contextually grounded. For readers unfamiliar with the term, they must first be familiarised with the various traditions surrounding jihād, such that their understanding may be consistent with those employing the term. The chapter critiques assertions about the meaning of jihād which are overly, or solely, reliant on historical and/or legal traditions, and advances the role of social construction in the development of jihād. Most importantly, the chapter helps the

reader identify the key theories, concepts and components of jihād that will be later used for analysis. This chapter seeks to put bounds on the multifaceted idea that jihād presents so that meaningful analysis can be performed.

Where Chapter One establishes the parameters of what norms may rightly be considered within the purview of jihād, Chapter Two explores their specific use. This study adopts as its task the detection of jihādist norms in Saudi Arabian narrative from 2001 to 2019. It should not be left up to the researcher's opinion of what is, and is not jihād. Therefore, this study also adopts the task of linking, where possible, those norms back to jihādist organisations. To ensure that the norms analysed are current representations of jihād, this chapter introduces jihādist norms as expressed by the Taleban, ISIS and Al-Qa'ida from 2001-2019[3]. In this way, later analysis can point to specific examples of expressed jihādist norms. The study could just have equally pointed to the bodies of jurisprudence on the topic, but there are tangible benefits in choosing jihādist organisations. First, the existence of these large organisations points to widespread public recognition of the legitimacy of their claims. It also allows jihādist norms to be traced back to specific organisations. A comprehensive review of the adopted norms of every jihādist group (or even any specific group) is outside this study, so this chapter relies on other peer-reviewed sources, and supports their assertions with primary evidence.

Chapter Three establishes the methodological congruency of this study. Given the normative focus of this study, Chapter Three defines what is meant by 'norms'—what they are and how they behave. The focus is on establishing methodological congruency between the epistemological framework used to conceptualise this study, the subject of the study in jihādist norms, and the methodology (Qualitative Content Analysis of an instrumental case study). The chapter examines the appropriateness of Critical Constructivism, a theoretical framework that emerged from the field of Social Constructivism, as the lens through which this study views jihād. It asserts that this framework is the most appropriate as Critical Constructivism centralises the role of ideas as the object of analysis. The chapter also introduces two normative models—the norm cascade model and Securitization theory—which provide accounts of how norms arise from and traverse society, and which

3 To provide context and clarity, occasionally texts from the 1990s are used to provide contrast.

may provide an account of how norms might be detected at the national level. The chapter finishes by tying these norms-centred models to Qualitative Content Analysis as a method for detecting norms. The themes that united these various elements are that of reality being socially constructed through language and power relations, and knowledge and meaning being created, challenged and maintained through various social contexts.

Chapter Four dives deeply into Qualitative Content Analysis as the methodology adopted for analysis for this case study. This study uses Qualitative Content Analysis of an instrumental case study. This chapter reviews the process of conducting qualitative case study analysis and provides the particular details about how it will be applied. It also describes the case selection logic, data collection procedures, and data analysis process. It finishes with a discussion of trustworthiness.

The findings of the analysis are revealed in Chapter Five. The chapter is divided into three sections, which reflect three rounds of coding. Sections are introduced with a detailed description of what was coded in each round. The data is presented with the appropriate tables and with explanations of what was coded. Each section includes samples of coded text that typifies that which was coded so that meaning is more accurately conveyed, as well as transparency of the coding process. As two corpora of evidence were used, Saudi Embassy documents and United Nations documents, the results for each are presented so that similarities and differences can be explored.

The final chapter, Chapter Six, is a discussion of the findings. It begins with a discussion of whether norms were unveiled in the analysis process. Given the research question exploring the relationship between Saudi norms and those of jihādist organisations, discussion then turns to the relationship between Saudi narrative and those norms expressed by Jihādist organisations enumerated in Chapter Two. The chapter then attempts to answer the question, can Constructivism can account for the existence, or non-existence, of jihādist norms in Saudi narrative?

0.3 English as the Language of Analysis

This study analyses only English texts. While an inter-lingual approach to this topic would be profitable, it does not exclude the relevance of an English-only analysis. Wigen (2015, p. 428) asserts that international dialogue is a largely monolingual affair, blind to the complexity of translation problems. Wigen also asserts that while the UN adopts seven official languages for business *vis-à-vis,* none compete with English from primacy in inter-polity relations where the two states have different lingua franca. He suggests that this reduces the transaction cost of interactions—the material and semantic—and is a symptom of the historical development of international relations (Wigen, 2015, p. 437). The contemporary period is also witness to the rise of English jihādist materials, where jihādist literature is increasingly presented in multi-ethnic formats. Where Chapter Two reviews those jihādist norms expressed by Islamic organisations, it relies both on peer-reviewed sources, and on primary evidence from Jihādist organisations. For this review, translated text are admitted. These primary sources serve to add clarity and nuance to the reader's understanding of jihād. For example, in analysing the ideology of a group such as al-Qa'ida, I will use such resources as *Dabiq*, which "carefully narrates the practical ideology upon which the Islamic State is founded" (Gambhir, 2014, p. 1). These resources will be used to corroborate, and contextualise those peer-reviewed sources.

In looking to the philosophical and strategic norms expressed in jihādist literature, some themes are language independent, such as the role of the Ummah, or the role or martyrdom operations/suicide attacks. That is, these ideas are accessible to those who cannot read jihādist texts in languages such as Arabic. A more complete understanding of jihādist language in both national narrative and as expressed by jihādist organisations would be provided by analysis in the native tongues. This study serves as a launching point for such further research, and further research may service to extend and validate this work. However, given the prevalence of English in the texts analysed and reviewed, and the potential to act as a foundation for further analysis, an English-only analysis is sufficient and significant.

0.4 Case Selection

In the first two decades of the 21st century, ISIS, Al-Qa'ida and the Taleban have played a profound effect on the global order. The September 11 attack on the Twin Towers turned

US attention towards the Middle East and have led to a profound reshaping of the region's geopolitical order, with two protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The consequences of the Iraq War include, but are not limited to, a civil conflict in Iraq between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, the deterioration of US/Turkish relations, and to the rise of Islamic State (Polymeropoulos, 2023). The Afghanistan War ultimately led to a consolidation of power by the Taleban, and undermined the perception of US strength (Maizland, 2021). In counterpoint to the dramatic attacks September 11, orchestrated by Al-Qa'ida and conducted by a few foot-soldiers, ISIS's rise showed the potential of a unifying narrative to mobilise large numbers of fighters. In Afghanistan, the Taleban was ousted, becoming an insurgent group, until it regained power in October 2021.

Saudi Arabia has a special relationship to these three groups. Saudi Arabia is the ideological birthplace of Salafism and its offshoot, Wahhābīsm (the foundation of Al-Qa'ida and ISIS ideology). While Saudi Arabia was formally declared in 1932, its origin dates back to 1744, when tribal leader Muhammad Ibn Saudi (Emir of Dariyah, Saudi Arabia) offered protection to Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-l Wahhāb. Wahhāb believed that Islam had deviated from its original pure expression, and contested the Ottomans, blaming their tolerance for the flourishing of heresy and illicit practices. He and his fighters, the *Ikhwan*, found a home in Dariyah, and the combination of al-Saud leadership and Ikhwan zeal spread Wahhābīsm and Saudi rule to much of the Arabian Peninsula (Burke, 2004, pp. 40-43; Permuy, 2016, p. 9). Wahhābīsm would become the fundamentalist bedrock on which Al-Qa'ida and ISIS would found their ideology. Wahhābīsts consider their movement to be Salafist, both of which assert their practice of Islam follows that of the first three generations of the Islamic community (the *al-Salaf*). The tenets of Wahhābīsm also generally align with those of Islamism, which arose on response and opposition to European colonialism. These ideologies' influence on bin Laden and Al-Qa'ida are undeniable (Shah, 2014).

In recent history, Al-Qa'ida rose to prominence under Osama bin Laden, and has enjoyed strong ties to the Saudi state. Bin Laden, who brought the organisation to notoriety, was born in Saudi Arabia and spent his formative years there. He attended university there under the auspices of Muhammad Qutb (the brother of Sayyid Qutb, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood) and Abdullah Azzam (who convinced bin Laden to travel to Afghanistan and back the Mujahideen there). Historically, there has been affection between the Saudi

royal family and bin Laden's (Shahzad, 2011, p. 74). Likewise, the Saudi state has had strong ties with Wahhābīsm. From Saudi Prince Nayef (1933-2012) was the leader of the anti-Western ulama. Traditionally the Saudi monarchy has acted as an intermediary between a Westernised political class, and a Wahhabi religious establishment. The former looks to the West as a model of economic development, and the latter to the Golden Age of Islam as the appropriate moral and religious model. Radical Islamist groups within Saudi Arabia have been able to leverage soft power, attracting followers through charitable work in local communities. However, this is a community the Saudi state has had trouble controlling. Among the ulama, there are those that consider the Saudi polity as corrupted and influenced by the West (Haynes, 2014, pp. 270-271). In this context, bin Laden's family was wealthy, and enjoyed a close relationship with the royal family. Bin Laden himself was a close friend with Saudi Prince Turki bin Faisal. Bin Laden, however, grew vocally discontent with the growing relationship between Saudi Arabia and the West. This would ultimately lead to bin Laden appearing before King Fahd to request a pardon, however the dispute would prove intractable, even though Prince Turki and Prince Abdullah also tried to settle the dispute. Eventually, bin Laden would depart Saudi Arabia over the disagreement (Shahzad, 2011, p. 74; Soherwordi et al., 2012, p. 350).

Both the Taleban and Afghanistan also have well-documented links to the Saudi state. Saudi Arabia was involved in the Soviet-Afghan War, providing military and financial aid to the Mujahideen. In the 80s it became the second biggest financier of the Mujahideen. In the 1990s, Saudi Arabia supported the Taleban in favour of other political parties, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdurrasul Sayyaf, who condoned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and who criticised the Saudi call for US military aid against Iraq. With Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, it was the only country to recognise the Taleban, and supported them with money and equipment (Steinberg & Woermer, 2013, p. 3). Support for the Taleban is nuanced, though. Saudi recognises there are 'hard core' Taleban adherents, as well as moderates. Saudi Arabia has looked to an Afghanistan which would implement a rule similar with its own—a Sunni government that implements Shari'ah law similar to Saudi Arabia's (Boucek, 2010, p. 46; Mathews, 2010, p. 4).

The connection between the Saudi state and the Taleban will be further examined throughout this study, through explanations of case selection logic, through to analysis of

their representation in Saudi narrative and through the discussion.

0.5 Conclusion

Jihād is a well-researched area. Research into the relationship between states and jihādist organisations has typically been grounded in rationalist approaches, and examined the material benefit offered by association between the two actors. However, there is a dearth of research into state adoption of jihādist norms. There is an absence of research on jihādist norms at the national level. There is a dearth of research on the relationship between state actors and individuals/organisations that approaches the connection through a normative lens. This study helps fill that gap by expanding a body of literature that examines jihādist norm expressed by states. In doing so, the methodology demands expansion and interrogation of analysis of current conceptions of jihād. By using a norm-tracing methodology based on a Critical Constructivist approach there is an opportunity to explore not only the presence of jihādist norms, but whether there may be a link from Saudi narrative to extant jihādist organisations, and in doing so, test the explanatory potential of Critical Constructivism in accounting for the presence or non-presence of jihādist norms. While state sponsorship of violent jihādist groups is well-documented, current explanations are dominated by structural accounts, with the normative aspect being secondary. This research will provide greater clarity on the role that norms play.

Chapter 1: Conceptualisations of Jihād, Subjective Representations

> "The word Jihād has nowhere been used in the Quran to mean war in the sense of launching an offensive. It is *used* rather to mean 'struggle'. The action most consistently called for in the Quran is the exercise of patience."
> - Khan, 2002, p. 4

> "...after surveying the evidence from classical until contemporary times, one must conclude that today's jihad movements are as legitimate as any that have ever existed in classical Islam… In short, although the actions of many of these groups may disgust many Muslims, as far as their conduct of jihad, they fall within the limits set by classical and contemporary Muslim law."
> - Cook, 2005a, p. 16

Jihād is a foundational doctrine in Islam, and has been present since Islam's inception, as evident from it's appearance in the Qur'ān. Even during the life of Mohammed though, the doctrine underwent evolution. At it's inception, jihād was non-confrontational. That is, it was not used in a manner synonymous with violent conflict. However, the doctrine developed rapidly, being used to justify defensive violence as the early Muslims fled to Medina (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, pp. 75-76). Successive generations of Islamic scholars have developed the doctrine in different directions—variously as pertaining to the internal personal struggle against iniquity, the social struggle for justice, and in the sense of violent jihād, both defensively and offensively. The meaning of the word must frequently be discerned from its context as, alone, the word means simply to 'struggle'. In typical use though, it pertains to violent conflict (Hamid, 2015, pp. 70-71). However, such an assertion is inadequate, as the activity of jihād encompasses a variety of practices and norms that seek not only to regulate the behaviour of individuals but that also constitute the identity of individuals. In the modern period, jihād has been used repeatedly to mobilise Muslims to martial action. During decolonisation, the doctrine was used to mobilise almost every anti-colonial movement in the Muslim world (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, p. 97), and it has consistently been mobilised, rallying support since for various causes.

The initial part of this chapter deals with the different applications and interpretations of the word jihād, and outlines the context in which it is used in this study. At its core, jihād is the licit, regulated, and often obligated, use of violence. However, the conditions that warrant and govern its use change not only according to the situation, but to whose formulation of jihād is being accepted. This chapter shows how jihād has changed and developed over time and is part of a continuing conversation, or competition, about what it is, and who has the authority to discern its meaning and use. Use and meaning of jihād has been developed by various legal traditions, competition between government and legal scholars, and in the modern period, by Islamist militants.

As the doctrine of Jihād has evolved, so too have various other doctrines and norms. These include, though aren't limited to:

- where the theological/legal locus of authority lies when declaring jihād
- what role migration plays in the process
- what role martyrdom plays
- who may conduct jihād
- whether those people need permission
- whether it is related to nationalism
- and how it relates to the broader Islamic community.

Given the vast breadth of human activity with which jihād intersects, this chapter also places limits on what typically is considered within the purview of 'jihādist norms'. Given the vast array of jihādist organisations, legal traditions, and over a millennium of scholarship, a complete list is space prohibitive. However, this chapter seeks to establish a core of aspects of jihād that are largely represented in the literature on jihād.

To create a portrait of jihād, this chapter covers the development of jihād from its origins in proto-Islam, and covers the main modes and periods of development relevant to this study. As a preface to the discussion on jihād, this chapter begins with a discussion of Shari'ah, the Islamic law which covers all human activity, including jihād—how it is constructed and evolves. The chapter then focuses more closely on jihād. The development of jihād may be divided into three stages. The first examines the early articulation of jihād under Mohammed

and the proto-Islamic community. The second examines the period post-Mohammed and pre-modernity—a period characterised by the juridical character of its development and its relationship to the Caliphate. The third is the modern period, the most extensive section due to its relevance. This chapter also covers those aspects of jihād that do not fit neatly into the development of jihādist ideology but form part of the current gamut of norms that are included under the umbrella of jihād.

This study asks the questions, to what extent are jihādist norms expressed in the national narrative of Saudi Arabia? And can those norms be traced to specific jihādist organisations, or are they more general in nature? On analysis, should jihādist norms of a general nature be found, the results will point to this chapter to establish that the norms identified are, in fact, jihādist. It is not sufficient to point to norms of nationalism or of migration and assert they are jihādist. The sense in which they are related to jihād is established in this chapter. Further, this chapter establishes how those same utterances in the narrative of jihādist organisations conform to jihādism. In that sense, this chapter establishes the bounds of what will be considered jihādist for the purposes of this study.

It is also important to understand the history of jihād, as contemporary jihādist organisations draw on authoritative Islamic texts and traditions to establish their credentials, as well as the rectitude of their jihād. These sources include the Qu'ran, and variously the ahadith and previous jihādist scholars' work. Therefore, this chapter contextualises the development of jihād in Islamic history and introduces the various aspects of jihād that will later be used to identify and qualify various modern traditions.

As a preface to the discussion on jihād, this chapter begins with a discussion of Shari'ah, the Islamic law which covers all human activity, including jihād—how it is constructed and evolves. With Saudi Arabia as the case study of analysis, this chapter also looks at the development of jihād in Saudi Arabia, with special attention given to regional influences on the development if jihadist doctrine such as the Wahhābīsm, Salafism, and notable ideologues.

1.1 The Role of Shari'ah[4]

Shari'ah law encompasses far more than Western legal law, with all human activity, including jihād, able to be categorised into *fard* (necessary, and a sin to not perform), *mandub* (recommended), *mubah* (neutral), *makruh* (not recommended) and *haram* (sinful). It defines what behaviours are licit and legitimate in Islam. Shari'ah originated in the proto-Islamic community. Prior to the death of Mohammed, the community could receive knowledge of God's will through Mohammed. After the death of Mohammed, man could not know God's mind, so from that point, the *ulamā'* (religious legal scholars) and *fuqahā'* (legal scholars) sought to develop a framework for classifying the various activities of Muslims, including jihād. In this way, God's will could be learnt imperfectly through the *dala-il* (revelation texts that are interpreted by scholars) and *fiqh* (the process of human understanding applied to the shari'ah) (Vikør, 2015, pp. 142-143).

Shari'ah became highly systematised in the centuries following the death of Mohammed, constituting an intersubjective standard of behaviour for the Islamic community. The Sultan, who implemented the code, had limited control over the content of shari'ah, it being defined by the fuqahā' and ulamā'. In the first centuries following Muhammad (extending to approximately 950CE) shari'ah law was initially developed through 'ijtihād—relying on proof indicators from the Qur'ān and the Sunna and transformed into legal principles (*'ahkām*). Later, competing principles would be applied in a method similar to dialecticism, called *'ikhtilāf*. To create a practicable code, should the scholars of a generation come to a consensus (*'ijmā*), the discussion on any particular issue would be considered closed and the decision reached would be considered immutable. It was seldom that agreement could be reached on matters of law, and particularly concerning the concept of jihād. However, this system eventually led to the formulation of four Sunni *madhhabs*[5] (dominant schools of legal thought) of legal interpretation in the 10th century. They are named after the jurists who founded and taught them—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali (Aneela, 2017, p. 11; Philips, 2000, p. 60).

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4 'Shari'ah' in this context should be considered distinct from the contemporary use by radical Islamist groups, who seek to create an Islamic state based on shari'ah law. In classical Sunnism, shari'ah is extremely broad, organised into four schools and involving numerous legal paths. Radical Islamism proposes an ahistorical shari'ah portrayed as a single entity, and declares those outside that law as takfir.

5 There are also schools in other Islamic traditions, including two Shi'ite schools—the Ibadi school and the Zahiri school.

The way shari'ah was implemented changed markedly in the late Ottoman period. Various caliphs had previously attempted to favour one particular madhhab over others. This was met with, and defeated by, opposition from the ulamā'. The reformist Tanzimat period[6] saw an overhaul of the legal code, starting with the Edict of Gülhane (1839). The Ottomans revised and consolidated the *kanunname* (the sultanic code of law), marking a gradual shift of law being the product of a self-appointed class of scholars, to a state formulated code. The first of these laws was the *Khatt-i Sharif*, which asserted that legal principles applied equally to all, regardless of religious background. Likewise, the subsequent *Mecelle-I 'ahkām-i adliye* laws reformed hire and contract law, and to economic law along modern European lines. Concurrently, new courts, lawyers and judges were formed, again along modern lines. This project was completed in Atatürk's reformation of Turkey, which introduced/imported a Westernised law system. The former Ottoman states have generally followed suit, abandoning the 'ijtihād system in favour of a structured European-style legal system based on the authority of the relevant governmental legislative body. While the legal structure put the power to legislate in the hands of the government, this did not necessarily correlate to a similarly rapid social reformation—for example, polygamy is still widely legal in the Arabian Peninsula, and family law still favours males. In this formulation, the economic, administration and criminal law have been Westernised and secularised. Social reform has not necessarily followed suit, or where it has, it has been slow. While these institutions are Westernised, they still facilitate Islamic norms. Thus, while polities in most Muslims countries are currently to be considered secular in structure, Shari'ah values are still relevant and present, with many governments facing demands to implement, or re-implement, aspects of shari'ah (Vikør, 2015, pp. 140-142).

While the ulamā' have traditionally been cognisant of the human interpretive limitations of the fiqh, trying to factor out subjectivity, the contemporary period has seen this position come under attack by reformists. The fiqh distinguishes man's relationship with God (*ibadat*) from man's relationship with each other (*mu'amalat*). It asserts that ibadat, being ordered towards God, and defined by God, is immutable. By contrast, mu'amalat is guided by the principle that God does not wish hardship upon his people. This position is supported by the Qur'ān, "Allah intends for you ease, and He does not want to make things difficult

6 A period of political and legal reform in the Ottoman Empire that stretched from 1839 until the 1876.

for you" (Al-Hilali & Khan, 2:185) [7]. Mu'amalat is ordered towards the social welfare of God's people (muslaha). This being the case, the reformist position is that the rigid rules of the fiqh are unsuited to changing social relationships. According to Vikør (2015, p. 145), "[If] a society changes so that the shari'ah rules that were formulated at one particular point in time no longer fulfil the divine intention of human welfare, then these rules must change so that God's intentions are fulfilled under today's conditions." Further, reformists assert the concept of 'social welfare' does not rely specifically on the texts of revelation, but rather is subject to human rationality, and can be discovered through intellectual efforts. This constitutes a break with the intellectual position of prior centuries that asserted that, although obedience to God's law is the natural state of mankind, and rational enquiry may enable people to understand the universe, rationality is insufficient to understand the mind of God. Thus, it has become increasingly common to use 'Shari'ah' as a term describing the divine law, preserved from human interference, known perfectly only in the mind of God, preserved indisputably in the Qur'ān and Sunna, and differentiated from man-made interpretation. Therefore, the term *shari'ah* has become confused—a rule now derived from the *qati* (indisputable) texts of Islam may be considered by some to be shari'ah, by others not (Vikør, 2015, pp. 144-145).

Reinterpretation and adaption of shari'ah have classically been the province of legal scholars, broadly accepted as the legitimate authorities on such matters. This practice of interpretation, reinterpretation and adaption typically involves the creation and adaption of rules in greater harmony with the Qur'ān and Sunnah, and/or comparing the relative strengths of verses in the Qur'ān or prophetic statement to discern more accurately the intention and will of God and Mohammed. Nineteenth and twentieth-century reformers asserted that ijtihad was not restricted to the ulamā', emphasising the role of rationality over tradition, and drawing history and social order into the activity of legal interpretation[8]. Such reformists gained influence in the twentieth century with the decline of the caliphate and the rise of nationalist legislatures and legislators who, though untrained in the fiqh, sought to legitimise law and policy with traditional Islamic parlance. This was necessary

7 And other similar verses.

8 Typical reformists in this tradition would include Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida Kerr, M. H. (1966). Islamic reform : the political and legal theories of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida. University of California Press .

as, though reform of the legislative framework was rapid, cultural change (especially in the case of family law) was slow. Modern legislatures ignored classical rules of jurisprudence, such as not mixing the dictums of different madhhabs, and increasingly used *talfiq* to justify legislation (drawing on the principle of any madhhab). While there are still many scholars that operate in the classical madhhabs, legislators are not required to conform to their teaching, and ideologues are not bound by a specific legal tradition. There are sufficient differences in shari'ah concerning jihād that ideologues are able to both exploit those differences without exceeding the boundaries of classical jurisprudence, and further, appeal to *maslaha mursala*—the idea that the rule regarding social welfare may be arrived at independent of the explicit text of revelation, coming instead through rational enquiry (Vikør, 2015, pp. 146-148). Therefore, a strictly shari'ah understanding of jihād is not sufficient to expound, explain, nor understand the contemporary use of 'jihād'.

History then, paints a picture of Islamic legal thought in constant development. From the time of Mohammed, the Islamic community has had to deal with competing standards of behaviour. This is represented in competing modes of thought, such as whether rationality is sufficient for discerning Allah's law, or whether contemporary social situations should be considered. It is also seen in development of the operations of the law, the movement of its locus of development and implementation in the ulamā', to its applications in modern codification under the auspices of government, and even in who has the right to consider the strictures of shari'ah.

1.2 Expressions of Jihād

Jihād means 'to exert oneself', 'to struggle', or to 'make an effort'. In the Islamic context, this becomes, 'to struggle for the betterment of Islamic society', pursued through peaceful means, or with violence when necessary. For example, peaceful jihād is described in the Qur'ān which states, "So obey not the disbelievers and fight against them by means of it (the Qur'ān) a great fight" (Al-Hilali & Khan, p. 417 25:52; *The Holy Quran*, 2004 25:52)[9]. Jihād is also categorised into internal and external. Such interpretations come from both the Qur'ān and the ahadith. For example, in the ahadith (Al-Baihaqi and Al-Khateeb in Tawfik, 2015, p. 72):

9 In this verse, a derivative of *jihād* is used, *'jahidhum'*.

> We have returned from the smaller jihād to the bigger jihād… the disciples of Mohammed said to him: what is the greater jihād then he said "Jihād Al-Nafs" which means internal struggle against evil thoughts and human fleshly desires.

In discussions on the nature of jihād, it may rightly be asserted that there are verses that characterise jihād peacefully, or which speak to the internal constitution of Muslims, but these to do not obviate jihād in the sense of violence. That is, due to the overloaded meaning of the term jihād, it is frequently used in other contexts, but it is also used in violent contexts. Further, sources authoritative on the various aspects of jihād are not equally valid or authoritative. Concerning the hadith, their historicity may be classified as strong or weak, and their narrator's authenticity unanimously accepted, non-controversial, controversial, or based on lies (Khan, 2010, p. 7). For example, according to Abu Bakr Al-Jazā'irī[10], the previously mentioned hadith by Al-Baihaqi and Al-Khateeb is a weak hadith (Jazā'irī, 2001, p. 167, Vol. 2; Tawfik, 2015, p. 106). Likewise, Al-Jazā'irī cites the following hadith, "Whoever harms a non-Muslim citizen (of the Islamic State), then I will be his opponent on the Day of Resurrection (*Recorded by AI-Khattib and it is weak*)" (Jazā'irī, 2001, p. 226, Vol 1—emphasis added). Hamid asserts that there is a 'theological deception' on behalf of Muslim extremists who cite these weak hadith to Westerners as evidence of the peace of Islam while using strong hadith to justify violence. However, in citing Al-Jazā'irī, Hamid has failed to contextualise the discussion which begins by stating, "a Muslim may not harm a non-Muslim, who is not fighting against Islam, with respect to his wealth, blood or honour" (Jazā'irī, 2001, p. 226; Tawfik, 2015, p. 106). For Al-Jazā'irī, the weakness of this hadith seems more to be a statement about its historicity, and he supports his claim with an accompanying strong hadith. Nonetheless, more important hadith are considered *sahih* (accurate), especially those written in *Sahih Muslim* (considered by many to be one of the two most authentic tractates) (Tawfik, 2015, p. 107).

External jihād may take several forms. Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (14th Century) asserts there are up to 13 types of jihād, nine of which are non-violent, and asserts violent jihād is only permissible in defence of the Muslim community (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, p. 72). In the contemporary period, Qaradawi (1926-2022) differentiates five categories of jihād: *jihād al-nafs* (spiritual elevation); *jihād al-Shaytan* (the struggle against Satan); the jihād to reform

10 Al-Jazā'irī is a lecturer at the Noble Prophetic Mosque, Saudi Arabia.

society (which is further split into the domains of science, economics, the environment, health and education); *jihād al-lisan* (apologetic and evangelistic jihād); and *qital al-acda* (fighting the enemy, or more frequently just *qital).* It is worth noting that while Qaradawi frequently uses *qital* and *jihād* interchangeably, they are not typically interchangeable—Qaradawi's use is dependent on context. The Qur'ān distinguishes between *harb* ('war'), *qital* (fighting with lethal intent), and jihād ('exertion in the path of God'). While *qital* may occur during *harb*, and *harb* may occur during *jihād*, not all *harb* is *jihād*, and not all *harb* necessitates *qital* (Baroudi, 2014, p. 6; Dayem & Ayub, 2008, p. 72).

The conflation of jihād with violence (in *qital al-acda*) is not unique to Qaradawi, but rather is a widespread practice and the prevailing sense in which the word is used in Islamic literature (as well as by Western media). The four Sunni madhhabs all understand *jihād* in the sense of violence in defence of Islam, and/or the conversion of non-Muslims by holy war. Its association with violence is seen in the names of various violent Islamic groups. For example, the formal name of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq is *Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihād fi Bilad al-Rafidayn*, and one of Al-Qa'ida's less common names is *Qa'idat al-Jihād*. Add to that sample *Jihād Rite* (Australia), *Jama'at al-Jihād al-Islami* (Central Asia), and *Laskar Jihād* (Indonesia) (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, p. 72; Tawfik, 2015, pp. 71-72).

While jihād can be interpreted as an internal struggle, that aspect of jihād is outside the scope of this study. There is one aspect of that internal struggle that intersects with this dissertation, and that is where the internal spiritual struggle intersects with the external physical struggle. Further, those articulations of jihād that are neither internal only, nor violent, will be covered insofar as they are the meaning conveyed by ideologues espousing jihād.

1.3 The Early Historical Articulation of Jihād

Jihād, as formulated in Islam, was not prefigured in the pre-Islamic period. Prior to Mohammed, the Arabian Peninsula housed a fragmented tribal culture, with two dominant groups—settled Arab agriculturalists and nomadic Bedouin. Artefacts of pagan religions predating Islam are found at Awā and at the Ka'ba Shrine in Mecca. The shrine at Awā contains a votive plinth recording the modes of war of the culture, and a dedication of thanks

to the local deity for success on the field of battle; the shrine at Ka'ba has similar artefacts. Archaeological records indicate the warfare of the period could not be characterised as 'Holy War'. Rather, wars were fought for military glory and/or for plunder. The evidence further suggests these groups fought for control of trade routes, and not for the sake of territorial expansion. Kinship took precedence over any political allegiance and there is no evidence of a widespread monopoly of power like in surrounding regions (such as Byzantium) or after the Islamic rise. Instead, the peninsula was in a perpetual state of low-key warfare. By Mohammed's time, conditions favoured the spread of a unified Islam—Byzantium and Persia had fought a prolonged war campaign which culminated in the Byzantine Sassanid War (602AD). In addition, while there had been regionally powerful kingdoms and city-states (such as Mecca), Arabia was undergoing a process of Bedouin-isation, as increased sea trade was making the established Arabian trade routes less profitable, and prolonged tribal infighting had taken a toll on the culture. The decline of the culture and traditionally powerful city-states created a void which Islam was able to fill (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, p. 70; Firestone, 1999, pp. 22-23, 25, 39; Shahid, 2005, p. 25).

It was in this arena that Islam emerged. According to Latham and Christenson (2013, p. 779), Islam brought with it the necessary cultural conditions for organised conquest. Specifically, they identify three transformations: the crystallisation of the populace around Islam; the acceptance of the identity provided by the Ummah and the implicitly antagonistic relationship this created with non-Muslims; and the concept of jihād, which defined and limited Islamic warfare, and created a moral authority and purpose for violent acts.

Before Mohammed, the prevailing wisdom in Arabia (and especially in the ascending Mecca) was that planning, with economic and military power, would elevate the fortune of people and cities. The image associated with the cultural exports was 'related to material culture', with images of winding caravans, and associated with their famed, celebrated and domesticated camels. Mohammed introduced a competing constitutive ontological narrative (or as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) would say, a competing norm). Specifically, Mohammed brought radical monotheism to the largely pagan, religiously fragmented Arabian Peninsula, a region under constant pressure from the Trinitarian Byzantine Empire and the Persian Zoroastrian Empire bordering it. Islam presented a unified theocratic state in place of the fragmented tribal culture. Within that theocratic order, it introduced new

values of devotion to a singular deity, disciplined adherence to religious doctrine, and moral purity. Finally, it introduced a centralised religious authority that exercised legitimate authority over the entire terrestrial sphere (Montgomery Watt, 2005, p. 35).

There are two principal factors that led to the rapid acceptance of proto-Islam. In the words of Montgomery Watts, "No doubt all these men followed Mohammed because they thought the teaching of the Qur'ān was true" (Montgomery Watt, 2005, p. 36). However, there was also obvious material appeal to the teachings of Mohammed as a way to transcend the social and financial hardship present in the culture, and the tribal violence that had arrested the region's development.

Early followers of Islam largely came from three groups—younger sons/brothers who had no inheritance claims, peoples who had fallen from high social rank, and foreigners who did not have the protection of clan membership. For these people, Islam offered security. This membership might be contrasted with the opposition Mohammed received from the merchant class. Then as Islam grew, it offered financial incentives in the form of lower tax rates to those who professed Islam. There was also broad appeal in Mohammed's message of providing a path out of historical violence, outlawing military activity based on material gain, stature, or clan, and replacing clan-based loyalty with loyalty to Islam. Mohammed outlawed retributory killing, had the elegance of one god, one prophet, and one people (compared to the complexity of Trinitarianism), and promised an afterlife for people of rectitude (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, p. 70; Latham & Christenson, 2013, p. 780; Montgomery Watt, 2005, p. 36).

The new Islamic identity was fashioned by the Ummah discourse. The Ummah *alterity* (state of being other)[11] appears in two proto-Islamic formulations—the Qur'ān and the Constitution of Medina. These documents are both constitutive and regulative, identifying both the members of the Ummah and non-Muslims, and regulating the behaviour of the Islamic people[12, 13] by establishing the 'foreign policy' of the nascent Islamic state. In

11 See Critical Constructivism as the Theoretical Framework, Chapter 3.

12 This is not an allusion to the contemporary group known alternately as Islamic State, ISIL, ISIS, or Daesh.

13 See Defining Norms, Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Model.

the Qur'ān, the meaning of Ummah develops over time. In early use, Ummah refers in a general sense to communities. Later, it applied more specifically to the Abrahamic faiths. This articulation of Ummah had several thematic elements, such as that of messengers[14]; Christians and Jews were part of an Ummah as both are understood in the Qur'ān to have received messengers (such as angels and prophets), but to have rejected them. Asserting that Christians and Jews rejected their messengers, the Qur'ān asserts the Islamic Ummah constituted a people conformed to God's will and receptive to his messenger. This community reached its fulfilment as Mohammed reached Medina. As the community's identity became more concretely defined, the meaning of Ummah became more clearly defined: "an ummah which is a fully formed and godly ummah, then, is a moral community which not only hears the Law but upholds and *enforces* it" [emphasis added] (Denny, 1975, pp. 49, 55). According to Denny (1975, p. 69) this can be seen in the final Ummah verse in the Qur'ān: "You have become the best community ever produced for the people, urging what is reputable and restraining from what is disreputable, and believing in Allah" (Qur'ān 3:106).

The Constitution of Medina also illustrates the development of Ummah over time, being an important development in the doctrine's evolution. The Constitution of Medina was a legal treatise drafted by Mohammed to manage the interaction of the multi-religious, multi-clan state. Ummah is used variously in the document to refer to differing tribes. Ummah is used in Article 1 to refer to the Muslim faithful, and then for other groups throughout the document (such as Jews). In the Constitution of Medina, Ummah means something similar to 'tribe' or 'clan', but with religion rather than kinship as the mode of unification. Article 47 asserts that those guilty of an offence are personally culpable for their crime against Allah—a break from kin-based honour systems. The second important aspect of this treatise was that it established a legal protocol for dispute resolution (Article 42) whereby individuals are subject to the religious law, implemented personally by Mohammed. Finally, Article 36 reserves for Mohammed the right to send the Ummah to war. There is conjecture that the Constitution of Medina is evidence that, while at Medina, Mohammed envisaged a new type of community, the Ummah formulation, a homogenous Muslim population under one law (Denny, 1977, pp. 41-42). While the Constitution of Medina has guided the development of

14 In the form of revelation to those peoples by prophets and angels—an agency by which God communicated his plan and warnings to mankind Denny, F. M. (1975). The Meaning of "Ummah" in the Qur'ān. *History of Religions, 15*(1), 34-70. https://doi.org/10.1086/462733 .

the Ummah doctrine and identity, Arjomand asserts there is a lack of 'constitutional history' in the Muslim world, with current debate lacking a historical perspective (Arjomand, 2007; 2009, p. 557).

The Ummah developmental narrative separated peoples into those possessing a moral authority (the Ummah) and everyone else. Based on this, Islamic theorists differentiated between the *Dar al-Islam* (the House of Peace) and the *Dar al-Harb* (the House of War), a geographical projection of the Ummah/unbeliever dichotomy representing those areas governed by Muslims, with a connotation of peace, and those who have rejected Islam and are therefore tacitly in conflict with Muslims. Dar al-Harb is also divided into those who are hostile to Islam, and those not. This dichotomy entered the lexicon of Islam in place of the Ummah ideal. This world view is inherently ordered towards conflict, especially in light of the Islamic mission to make universal Mohammed's teaching (Latham & Christenson, 2013, p. 781).[15]

The Ummah identity is directly represented in jihādist literature, underpinning jihādist Islamic movements, defining membership, and further, regulating behaviour by mobilising support for groups and individuals. For example, Hassan (2008, pp. 158-159) has attempted to measure the degree to which individuals identify with the Ummah identity, creating an 'ummah consciousness index'. Hassan asserts that the Ummah identity allows Muslims to identify with other Muslims who are, "subjected to oppression, violence or oppression by the 'other'". Hassan asserts this (in part) accounts for the intense anti-American and anti-Western sentiment in Muslim countries over the US's pro-Israeli policies, and conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Iraq. This may account for the support that jihādist activities receive from these communities. Hassan (2008, p. 159) notes, though, that the Ummah identity does not provide a catalyst for Muslim unity, citing the endemic violence in many Muslim countries, the plethora of Muslim countries that are often actively hostile to one another, the lack of support for Islamist

15 Besides the Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, Islamic scholarship also recognises other divisions such as the Dar al-'Ahd (alternately called the Dar al-Sulh, meaning House of Conciliation/Treaty). The Qur'ānic basis for this classification is found in Qur'ān 4:90. The Qur'ān states there is no call to action against this group, so they are not included in the subject of jihād, but rather recognised here for the sake of completeness. In the context of Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam, dichotomy then is used in the sense of two contradictory and exclusionary groups.

political parties, and the antagonisms of jihādist groups against political structures and other Muslims.

With the creation of a unified, morally superior Islamic community in the Ummah, an alterity that conceptualised the other in an antagonistic relationship with the Dar al-Islam (Abode of Peace—the Muslim community), the necessary preconditions for jihād were established. In this context, jihād came to be formulated as 'warfare with spiritual significance' (Cook, 2005a, p. 2). During Islam's first ten years (approximately), the use of violence in Islam was prohibited, whether offensively or defensively. Later discourse differentiates between defensive jihād, then defensive war during the 'sacred months', and finally offensive war. Defensive war was first associated with the community who fled to Medina. Coming under an offensive from the major Meccan tribes, Mohammed allowed jihād for the defence of lives and property, a doctrine considered to abrogate the earlier pacifist verses. This was later expanded to also allow jihād during the sacred months (a tradition extending from pre-Islamic times), and finally to permitting offensive jihād, for the purpose of spreading Islam. This development and abrogation process (*naskh*—see below) led many jurists to consider offensive jihād as the culmination of jihādist doctrine, and therefore also a tacit religious obligation. It, therefore, features more prominently than defensive jihād in classical discourse[16] (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, pp. 75-77). This pre-modern articulation of jihād had a number of salient features (Latham & Christenson, 2013, p. 781):

- it expanded the Islamic state by making defensive jihād a social duty for everyone, and offensive jihād the duty of able-bodied men;
- it made it possible for an individual to wipe out their sin in combat, by proving the authenticity of their faith, guaranteeing their instalment in the heavenly afterlife;
- and it united the spiritual struggle of individuals to the Ummah.

Most Islamic jurists from the 8th to 15th century maintained there was an absolute obligation to offensive jihād, with defensive jihād subsumed into that obligation. This is not necessarily

16 The main juridical interpretations of jihād occur in the works of 8th century scholar Muhammad al-Shaybani, 10th century legalist Abu Nasr al-Farabi, the 12th century philosophers Abu al-Hassan al-Mawardi and Abu al-Walid Muhammad Ibn Rushd, and 14th century jurist Taqi al-Din Ibn Tamiyya according to Dayem, M. A., & Ayub, F. (2008). In the Path of Allah: Evolving Intepretations of Juhad and its Modern Challenges. *UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law, 7*, 67-121.

a position borne out through interpretation of the Qur'ān and ahadith, but may rather be a reflection of the thinking of theorists who were influenced by the political and historical realities of the day. This is the period where the bifurcated world view separating the Dar al-Islam (Abode of Peace) from the Dar al-Harb (Abode of War) arose, and with it, an interpretation of the fiqh that asserted the Dar al-Islam must constantly encroach on the Dar al-Harb through offensive jihād to expand the morally superior Islam (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, pp. 79-80). According to Sachedina, "[c]oncrete political situations forced the scholars to be pragmatic and realistic in their formulation of the justifications for undertaking the [jihād]" (Sachedina in Dayem & Ayub, 2008, p. 80). For example, al-Shaybanai and Ibn Rushd served as *quda*—state judges; Caliph Harun al-Rashid dismissed al-Shaybani when he refused to justify the Caliph's attack on Christians within his protectorate, from which point al-Shaybani tempered his opinions.

Another vector through which jihād transformed from defensive violence to offensive violence was through the *naskh*, the principle of legal interpretation that views the Qur'ān as developing chronologically, with apparent contradictions resolved by newer verses abrogating older verses. Such a reading presents early Islam as opposed to violence, but later accepting defensive jihād, and later still, offensive jihād, with the later verses advocating unmitigated violence. There are problems with this approach, chief among them being lack of surety in the chronology when ordering the relevant verses. Further, such a doctrine would be valid only insofar as the principle of naskh is valid. Firestone critiques this from a historical perspective, asserting firstly that it is impossible to establish an exact chronology of the delivery of Qur'ānic verses, and then by citing partisan politics during Mohammed's time, stating (Firestone, 1999, pp. 67-68):

> The Qur'ānic evidence suggests that the Muslim community was not of one mind regarding fighting during the period of Muhammad's leadership. More militant and less-militant factions competed for the support of the Prophet… Militant groups promoting aggressive behaviour toward opponents of Islam eventually won the day.

This is not a claim that history and politics were the origins of the doctrine of offensive jihād, but rather that it existed in a complex, generative relationship (Sachedina in Dayem & Ayub, 2008, pp. 80-81):

> [t]he interaction between the exclusivist idea of Islam being the religion for the entire humanity and the existing predominance of the Muslim empire created the specific juridical-theological language that provided the normative justification to extend the notion of jihād beyond its strictly defensive meaning in the Qur'an to its being an offensive device for the hegemonic expansion of the Muslim empire.

Leading up to the modern era, the Islamic empire(s) experienced stagnation and decline. This was brought about in part by continued conflicts (such as the Mongol invasions), technological advancement by competitors, and in the eighteenth to twentieth centuries, the rise of colonialism. As the empire(s) declined, the nation-state system replaced it/them, the essence of which is captured in the reform of Kemal Atatürk—abolishing the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate, while asserting the legitimacy of the modern system of states and nationalism. In doing so, he also deprecated the jurisprudence of the previous system. As early as the eighteenth century, discourse on jihād was reinvigorated, using language divorced from a state apparatus. During this transitory period, discourse divided, correlated with the emergence of a variety of movements: revivalism[17]; Islamism; and anti-colonialism (and in the contemporary period, anti-neo-colonialism) (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, pp. 93-94, 102), with the anti-colonialist movement often bringing nationalistic rhetoric with it. While the Ummah is an important source of their collective identity, Muslims, like all people, have numerous social identities, such as national and ethnic identities (Hassan, 2008, p. 221).

1.4 The post-Mohammedian Conception of Jihād

Following the death of Mohammed (632AD) the Islamic community continued to characterise religious warfare as jihād, but it wasn't until the 8th and early 9th century that Islam was presented with a systematised conception of jihād from jurists such as Mohammed al-Shaybani (749-805AD) and Abū 'Abdullāh Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shafi'i (767-820AD).

17 Islamic revivalism is an umbrella term for revivalist movements in Islam which have been called for periodically throughout Islamic history. Islamic revivalist movements can vary widely in character, as they typically respond to the issues of the day. There are some hallmarks which are generally present in these movements, however. These typically include a recommitment to the Islamic fundamentals, and of the teachings of the Qur'ān and hadith, the implementation of sharia, and a reshaping of society in accordance with Islamic principles (Ali & Sahib, 2022; Dey, 2008, pp. 25-27).

To them, jihād was a doctrine contextualised by the larger Islamic state (Dar al-Islam), and shaped its relationship with the non-Muslim world. The non-Muslim world represented a military threat to Islam, and identified as subject to a law inferior to the shari'ah, if they conformed to a law at all. The Dar al-Islam was conceived as a single, homogenous unit, united by religion, it being Allah's will that his people were one, and led by a sole leader, the Caliph. In this context, jihād had numerous characteristics (Johnson, 2015, pp. 441-442):

- jihād was a collective duty of the Dar al-Islam, responding to the threat posed by the Dar al-Harb;
- It comprised part of the obligation to spread knowledge of Islam and the rule of Islamic law to the world;
- Legitimate jihād could only be conducted under the authority of the Caliph. It was the Caliph who determined the role of those conducting jihād.

The individual's duty to conduct jihād was recognised, but there was no consensus among contemporary radical Islamists as to the nature of that duty and how it manifested in different contexts. For example, according to al-Shafi'i it was incumbent on able-bodied men of the appropriate age and means to present themselves for martial duty. For men of impecunious circumstance, it was the duty of their family, and of the community at large, to support them. The task of accepting their service still fell to the Caliph, though. Contemporaneous to this development was a tradition formed in the Islamic frontier region between the Rûm and Abassid controlled regions, and the Byzantine Empire. Here, a duty of individuals developed that required all to take up arms—able-bodied men, but also those not usually considered able, and women as well. This is a version of jihād that strips away the fundamental elements of restraint posited by the juristic traditions and, as such, is much closer to modern-day militant Islamism (Johnson, 2011, p. 63). Still, unlike many modern militant Islamists, individuals could not act on their own authority. Rather, in situations where it was untenable to wait for a response from the Caliph, the responsibility fell to the ruling local authority (Johnson, 2011, p. 64). Finally, al-Shafi'i makes very clear the distinction between the fighting class (based on gender, wealth, ability) and the rest of the community; the responsibility for jihād falls to a relative few in the community (significantly different from the position of modern militant Islamists) (Johnson, 2011, p. 69).

A major ideological shift occurred when the Mongol invasion and conquest of Baghdad (1258CE) deposed the Caliphate, making the Islamic homeland subject to foreign rule. Born into these circumstances, Taqī ad-Dīn Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya's (1263–1328) writings on jihād were a response to these conditions. Ibn Taymiyya is an important figure in the contemporary discussion on jihād—Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (from whom the Wahhābī derive their name) was directly inspired by his writing and his work continues to resonate with contemporary radical Islamists (Holt et al., 2005, p. 638). According to Johnston, ibn Taymiyya, "occupies a privileged place as contemporary radical Islamism's preferred historical authority" (Johnson, 2011, p. 65). Several idiosyncrasies characterise ibn Taymiyya's conception of jihād. Firstly, jihād refers to violent warfare, and not to internal spiritual struggle, nor to social works. It is an individual duty incumbent on all Muslims and is morally superior to any other task Muslims can perform—greater than the *hajj* and *umra* (the greater and lesser pilgrimage), and the pillars of Islam, including voluntary salat (ritual prayer five times a day) and fasting. Further, jihād must be waged against any persons who stand in the way of establishing a pure Ummah. Unlike some contemporary militant Islamists though, ibn Tamiyya conforms to earlier scholars when setting the limit on who are legitimate targets of jihād (Johnson, 2011, pp. 65-66).

Ibn Tamiyya wrote in the Hanbali tradition and was considered by many contemporary radical Islamists to represent the final word on jihād; his conception is part of the discussion and evolution of jihād within the Hanbali school. Abū Muhammad 'Alī ibn Ahmad ibn Sa'īd ibn Hazm (994-1064AD) of the Hanbali school wrote on jihād prior to Taymiyya. According to Hazm, jihād is a collective duty should an Islamic community come under martial threat. He does not assert the need for a Caliph or local authority, but rather, contends that individuals and communities may act autonomously. Importantly, individual jihād is not a calling that applies to everyone (fard ayn), but rather duty that may be taken up by the individual (fard kifaya), and should an individual do that, it precludes anyone else responding to the call to jihād. Like Taymiyya (and unlike modern militant Islamists), Hazm qualifies who is and is not a legitimate target for jihād, principles which may not be suspended in the case of individual jihād. Finally, Hazm asserts that when the duty to jihād does not fall on the entire community (such as it would if the community were attacked), it falls to the individual to seek his parents' permission (Johnson, 2011, pp. 66-67).

Similar themes are reflected in other juridical traditions. In the Maliki tradition, Averroes[18] (1126-1198AD) presents the then-prevailing opinions of jihād in his book *al-Bidaya*. He addresses both the conditions for joining jihād, and the damages allowed to be inflicted. Regarding whom might join the jihād, Averroes asserts that while the obligation is on the whole community, once enough people are involved to carry out the jihād, the obligation is cancelled for the rest of the community (because Mohammed never entered battle without leaving some of the community to remain). As to who may join, only able-bodied men of sufficient means, and only where there is parental permission, although where no one else can perform the duty, parental permission may be dispensed with. In this case, jihād as an individual duty is linked to the absence of parentage. Finally, the individuals must be healthy, free males who have the appropriate financial means. In addressing the damages that may be inflicted upon the enemy, Averroes asserts that this may extend to a deprivation of liberty (slavery), damage to his property, and injury to his person (although not killing). During actual combat, only able-bodied, unbelieving males may be slain, except where others (such as women and children) involve themselves in combat. Otherwise, there is general consensus on the prohibition against killing women and children. This position was adhered to by both the previous Hanibalist jurists too (Johnson, 2011, pp. 68-69).

The main themes and point of difference in these traditions is in regard to who the onus for paying for jihād falls to, and who is obliged to conduct jihād. The modern militant Islamist view reflects the *takhalluf* tradition. According to takhalluf, there is no standing army or central authority that provides financial support. This varies according to the different ideologues, with the responsibility resting with various authorities such as the state, the family of the relevant individual, and the individual themself. However, it is a point of commonality that once the duty to wage jihād has been filled, all others are exempt, so that the task falls to relatively few in the community in most circumstances (Johnson, 2011, p. 69).

18 Abū l-Walīd Muhammad Ibn ʿAhmad Ibn Rushd, better known as Averroes, was born in Cordoba, in the Andalusian Caliphate, and died in Marrakesh, Morocco. While known as a philosopher, he was also a *qadi* (judge) in Seville. His book *al-Bidaya* is an example of the *ikhtalif* genre—a legal treatise containing juxtaposed legal positions on topics, and representing the variety of positions popular at the time.

The writings and ideas of the jurists and jurisprudence of the Middle Ages continue to be relevant to, and in, contemporary discussion of jihād. For example, in the Summer 2017 edition of *Inspire*, al-Qa'ida referred to ibn Hazm's book, *Maratib al-Ijma*, asserting the legitimacy of "killing of the adults except the priests, the old men, the blind, the sick people with chronic diseases, the wage-workers, the farmers and whoever who is not fighting before being captured" (Al-Qaeda, 2017). Ironically, this article appears as part of a large series entitled *Rulings on Lone Jihād*, a position not supported by Hazm, and indicative of a legal interpretation radically different from the classical method. Likewise, in a question-and-answer type article regarding the validity of targeting Yemmeni soldiers found in *Inspire*, Saykh Adil al-Abbab appeals to Taymiyya, quoting Taymiyya (Al-Qaeda, 2010b, p. 22):

> Any group that abstains from following the rules of Islam from these people (the Moguls) or others, it becomes mandatory to fight them until they follow the rules of Islam. That is even if they profess that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger and even if they follow some of the rules of Islam.

Again, Shaykh Harith al-Nadari refers to al-Shafi'I writing, "There is nothing wrong in cutting the fruitful trees, sabotaging the buildings and burning that which belong to the enemy's countries" (Al-Qaeda, 2012a, p. 47).

1.5 Jihād in the Modernity

According to Rapoport (2004), the shift to modern modes of terrorism started in the 1880s, and has since been marked by four 'waves', those being the anarchist, the anti-colonial, the New Left wave, and the religious wave (which we are currently in). Rapoport asserts there are conceptual advantages to viewing terrorism as waves. Waves focus on organisations, typically last a generation, and reflect the ongoing nature of terrorism by key actors and organisations, as well as their struggle to inculcate subsequent generations with their values and enthusiasm. As such, focussing on waves moves the analyst's attention from contemporary events to a 'cycle of activity in a given time period' (Rapoport, 2004, pp. 47-48). For this analysis, of particular importance are the anti-colonial and religious terrorism waves.

While the relevance of religious terrorism is evident, the significance of anti-colonialist terrorism is less obvious. The relevant groups in Rapoport's waves typically require a unifying

and legitimising narrative. Anti-colonialist and nationalist movements were based on the same ideological foundation as the American and French Revolution, that a people should have the right to self-governance. The problem implicit in such an assertion is that 'a people' is not defined and, as such, causes recurring conflict even as the principle is broadly accepted. To the question of 'what is a people?' Islam readily answers with a number of identities—the Ummah, the *hijrah*, the members of the Dar al-Islam—and substantiates the claim with a variety of religious/legal texts. Thus, the language of anti-colonialism is permeated with Islamic language. This is consistent with the Islamic world-view, as the conflict between the Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb can be seen in the conflict between nationalist anti-colonial movements and colonising powers. Jihād is represented in both anti-colonial discourse and the fourth wave of religious terrorism—the language of independence movements typically is bolstered by jihādist ideas, or segues with the language of identity in contemporary fourth wave militant Islam. Both will be given due consideration, especially since there are still Islamic secessionist movements (for example, Hamas, Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)) (Kapur & Ganguly, 2012, p. 113; Rapoport, 2004, pp. 49-50).

According to Rapoport, "Islam is at the heart of the [fourth/current] wave," of terrorism[19], citing the shift towards terrorist behaviours in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, the Philippines and Indonesia. Unlike the anti-colonial period, the religious wave has distinctly international features, with a number of consequences. First, this has led to a smaller number of larger groups. Unlike nationalist groups, whose membership is largely coterminous with national boundaries, religious groups have transnational appeal, and the Islamic community is far larger than any national group. Further, Islamic groups have shown larger membership and longevity than their nationalist progenitors, espousing transnational aims. For example, Al-Qa'ida draws members from Arab states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria) and includes in its aims the creation of a singular Islamic state under shari'ah law (Rapoport, 2004, pp. 61-64). Likewise, Islamic State, with the stated aim of creating a new caliphate in an Islamic state under shari'ah law, draws from a transnational pool, including former Soviet republics (8,717 fighters), the Middle East (7,054), and Western Europe (5,778). That support isn't

19 While Rapoport situates Islam at the heart of the current wave, he also points to the terrorism of various non-Islamic groups Rapoport, D. C. (2004). The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism. In A. K. Cronin & J. M. Ludes (Eds.), *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*. Georgetown University Press.

limited to individuals—foreign organisations have also declared their allegiance, such as al-Shabaab satellites in Somalia, and the IS-Khorasan in Uzbekistan (Barrett, 2017, pp. 10-11).

While Rapaport focuses on terrorist groups, this study also includes the ideas of non-terrorist groups and of individuals. The jihādist language adopted by these groups form part of a larger reactionary discourse on the topic of jihād, and this is simultaneously an acknowledgment of the importance of jihādist discourse in terrorist groups to peace studies, and that not all jihādist literature is ordered toward violence. The use of Rapoport's four waves is based on its utility, and the conceptually clean and ordered account it provides (that is, it is a pragmatic decision).

1.5.1 Anti-colonialism and Nationalism

Until the 1930s, though religious language was used in the anti-colonial movement, it was not foundational, and nor did it rely on jihād (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, p. 96). Starting in the 1930s, religious language was increasingly mobilised to create a sentiment of collective obligation to decolonisation. According to Dayem and Ayub (2008, p. 94), "Virtually every anti-colonial movement in the Muslim world employed the doctrine of jihād to mobilize popular support for their respective causes." This included the use of specifically jihādist language by nationalist ideologues, to mobilise individuals and groups, leverage an intersubjective identity, and create a sense of obligation to decolonisation.

With the rapid industrialisation of Western countries in the 18th and 19th centuries, many formerly Arab-controlled lands came under control of European powers. Early resistance to colonisers would fall along religio-political lines, often under the banner of jihād, and was accompanied by the call to the religious duty of *hijrah*. Hijrah, in this context, means the practice of emigrating from the Dar al-Harb to the Dar al-Islam, the basis for which can be found in Qur'ān 4:97 (*The Holy Quran*, 2004 4:97):

> When angels take the souls of those who die in sin against their souls, they say: "In what (plight) Were ye?" They reply: "Weak and oppressed were we in the earth." They say: "Was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to move yourselves away (from evil)?" Such men will find their abode in Hell - What an evil refuge!

According to the fiqh, the duty of hijrah rests on those residing in the Dar al-Harb who are prevented from their religious observances, though it is also recommended for the sake of the strengthening of the Islamic state. The Hanafite fiqh tradition does not accept the obligation of hijrah, asserting that the tradition has been abrogated since the conquest of Mecca, and hijrah is therefore omitted in most of the fiqh. It underwent a resurgence during the colonial period, though, as a tool to consolidate Islamic power in colonised areas. The most prominent examples of the mobilisation of hijrah were the exodus from Tlemcen (1911), the Hijrat Movement in India (1921), and more recently the influx of foreign fighters to IS (Peters, 1979, pp. 39-42; Uberman & Shay, 2016).

Early conceptions of hijrah can be seen in proto-anti-colonial India. Islamic discontent with the British rule of India manifested as a discourse on whether the British administration made India Dar al-Harb or Dar al-Islam. When the Hindu Marathas Dynasty overran India in the eighteenth century, a similar discourse had occurred, the consensus being that India was still Dar al-Islam as the social constitution had not been disturbed. However, while the British occupation had left the Indian social order intact, the *Permanent Settlement* economic reform disrupted the Islamic social order by placing onerous financial burdens on the Islamic landed aristocracy and mosques, an effect exacerbated by the automation of industries historically dominated by the Muslim community (such as textile manufacture). Among those who issued fatwas was Shah Abd al'Aziz in 1803, who declared India Dar al-Harb. Opposition to British rule coalesced in armed resistance in a number of movements, the most important being the Tariqa-i Muhammadi led by Syed Ahmad Barelvi[20] (1786-1831). This movement was both nationalistic (with the purpose of liberating India from un-believers) and revivalist (with the purpose of reform and the elimination of religious innovations (*bidah*)). Syed Ahmad's goal was to liberate India from colonial power; strategically, he sought to establish an Islamic community with its own government in territory inaccessible to the British; thus he called for a hijrah migration, conflating that calling with a call to jihād (Peters, 1979, pp. 44-48).

The use of jihād as a mobilising narrative enjoyed widespread adoption in the 19th Century, being used as a call-to-arms (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, p. 94). For example, in the Urabi Revolt

20 Alternately known as 'Sayyd Ahmad Barelwi'; was leader of the principal resistance movement.

(Egypt, 1879-1882) both sides of the rebellion mobilised jihād narratives to muster and mobilise supporters. In Palestine, Sheik 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam (1822-1935) and his followers, the Qassamiyun, resisted colonial rule as the social and economic condition of Palestinians became dire. The decline was in part due to the unsustainable influx of wealthier Jewish communities under the Balfour Declaration, which al-Qassam declared was an attack on the integrity of the Dar al-Islam. Al-Qassam called for a violent jihād, couching the nationalist struggle in purely religious terms. During the French occupation of Algeria, both the Sultan and 'Abd al-Qadir[21] appealed to Islamic scholars to legitimise their claims, and both levied jihāds against each other. Of particular significance, the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1980) witnessed the successful use of jihād as a mobilising force, alerting Western governments to the potential of Islam to mobilise military activity. In the build-up and duration of the war, the US fostered and trained mujahedin and Wahhābīst religious networks. Their aim, according to Ahmed Rashid, was, "to turn the Afghan jihād into a global war waged by all Muslim states against the Soviet Union, some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 40 Islamic countries joined Afghanistan's fight between 1982 and 1992. Tens of thousands more came to study in Pakistani madrasas. Eventually more than 100,000 foreign Muslim radicals were directly influenced by the Afghan jihād" (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, pp. 94-99; Peters, 1979, pp. 79-80, 83, 112; Rashid, 1999, p. 31). It is also worth noting that during the Soviet-Afghan War, after the US, the Mujahideen's the main source of finance was the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The conflict saw Saudi build its own network among the Afghan opposition. This involvement extended beyond the conflict, though it was scaled back and changed as Saudi political interests changed (Steinberg & Woermer, 2013, p. 3).

In the contemporary period, there are numerous nationalist Islamist organisations and parties espousing jihād, such as Fatah, Hezbollah, and Hamas. According to the Hamas Charter (1988), "There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihād" (Hamas, 2017). Hamas was born out of the Muslim Brotherhood, but departs from the Muslim Brotherhood over what activity constitutes jihād. To Hamas, jihād solely refers to combative martial operations, arguing that Qu'ranic verses that deal with jihād are clear in their meaning. This is a departure from other Muslim Brotherhood movements which maintain that jihād refers to jihād 'of the sword' and 'of the spirit. While Hassan al-Bannah

21 Known also as Abdelkader El Djezairi, Abdelkader ibn Muhieddine, and Emir Abdelkader.

accorded higher value to societal/cultural jihād (such as building schools and charitable organisations), from its inception, Hamas asserted the primary mode of jihād would be violence oriented towards establishing an Islamic state. While a nationalist movement, Hamas presents itself in an alterity where the relationship between self and other is one transcending geographical claims between good and evil (Litvak, 2010, p. 718):

> an unbridgeable dichotomy between two opposing absolutes—as a historical, religious and cultural conflict between faith and unbelief, between the true religion that supersedes all previous religions, that is, Islam, and the abrogated superseded religion, Judaism. It is a war between good, personified by the Muslims representing the party of God (*Hizballah*), and "the party of Satan" (*hizb al-shaytan*) represented by the Jews. Consequently, the conflict is considered as an "existential battle, rather than a dispute over borders" (*ma'rakat wujud wa-la hudud*).

Regarding the role of jihād, Hamas rejects conceptions of Jihād is a spiritual effort, being closer to radical Islamist movements, positing instead that Qur'ān qualifies the meaning of Jihād using terms such as *anfiru* (scare away), *qatiluhum* (wage battle against), and *uktulu* (kill). Further, Hamas asserts that the jihād against Israel is a defensive jihād because Zionist Jews usurped the Palestinian homeland in 1948, and because, since the time of Mohammed, Jews had been waging denigrating wars against Islam. Adopting the ideology of Abdallah Azzam, being a defensive jihād, the obligation falls on every individual, not just those able-bodied, such being the case with offensive jihād. Not only this, but Hamas has accepted the ruling of Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, which elevates jihād to an obligation equal to that of the five pillars, second only to the monotheistic statement of belief, and exceeding the importance of pilgrimage and fasting. Besides Azzam, Hamas frequently quotes Qutb, especially his influential work *Our Struggle Against the Jews* (*ma'arakatuna ma'a al-yahud*), although it rejects tenets of Salafi-Islamism, such as declaring other Muslims *takfir,* and fighting against the US and takfir Arab rulers (Litvak, 2010, pp. 716-719).

For Hamas, jihād is the nexus where the spiritual life of individuals meets a material, oppressive world that is concurrently a spiritual and moral threat to the faithful. Hamas therefore ascribes spiritual value to material jihād. In other words, jihād is infused with a mystical value derived from both Allah (the evidence for which lies in miracles, such as Israeli

planes failing to kill Hamas leaders), and through individuals' perfect acclamations of faith. One aim of jihād is to achieve societal justice; achieving justice requires a constant struggle against a force that perpetually seeks the destruction of Islam. Through this lens, Hamas rejects the assertion that its jihād is a violent expansionist force, pointing to such injustices as the West's mercantilism-derived wars, colonial aspirations, and nuclear arms development. Jihād is therefore the path to peace, rather than the rejection of peace, and a perpetual struggle (Litvak, 2010, pp. 720-721). This othering process encompasses not just the West, but also points to the direct deleterious effect of Judaism on Islam, linking the current conflict to a series of wars that have been waged on Islam. Ahmad Yassin compared the plight of current fighters to the Mahajirun (the companions who accompanied Mohammed in 622AD from Mecca to Medina), but would go on to the victory of Jewish tribes of Nadir. Literature to this effect was distributed in the 1987-1993 Intifada, calling fighters to transform the, "memory of Khaybar into a new bloody battle with the occupier". The slogan, "*Khaybar Khaybar ya yahud, jaysh Muhammad saya'ud" (*Khaybar Khaybar O Jews, the army of Muhammad shall return) is often also used by Hamas (as well as abroad). Finally, while the language and strategy of Hamas targets the state of Israel, it asserts that the current jihād is part of a struggle that unites all Muslims. Litvak asserts this is due to a self-awareness of the limited chance of success (Litvak, 2010, pp. 722-723). According to Sela, change in the parameters of jihād is to be expected as, "Social movements often undergo structural and procedural changes across time, the most important of which is a shift from revolutionary to an institutional, pragmatic model, in search of internal and external recognition" (Sela, 2015, p. 32). As Hamas has gained legitimacy, so too has its position moderated. After its rise to power, Hamas changed position from one of unmitigated violence to becoming willing (at least rhetorically) to accept a truce (*hudna*). Constrained by Hamas' previous ideological commitment to violence, the doctrine of hudna asserts that it is lawful to accept a truce if the enemy is strong and the community weak, thus enabling the community to regain strength. A complimentary solution, Muqawama (resistance) has also been posited. Under this doctrine a long-term war of attrition may be marked by short-term ceasefires (Litvak, 2010, pp. 727-728; Sela, 2015, pp. 32, 42) and is evidenced in the updated Hamas Charter of 2017. The original charter outlines the founding identity and mission of Hamas, and establishes an uncompromising call to violence in the name of Jihād. The 2017 re-release and update of the charter uses less hawkish language and repositions Jews not as targets of violence in and of themselves, but as part of a usurping Zionist group (Articles 7, 13 Hamas, 1988; Articles 16, 23 Hamas, 2017).

Islamic State can be approached as both a nationalistic and Islamist organisation, providing insight into the intersection of nationalist and Islamist organisations. Islamic State can be understood as a modern iteration of nationalism, and an aggressive Sunni community of shared intersubjective identity with a territorial claim. At the height of its power, its claim to sovereignty was based not only on its violent acquisition and protection of territory, but on the provision of a rudimentary political system, replete with a ministerial council and administration, constabulary, tax system, currency and welfare system, and with enough internal cohesion to be independent of outside funding (Barbato et al., 2017, pp. 419, 423-414). For Cronin, Islamic State amounted to "a pseudo-state led by a conventional army" (Cronin, 2015, p. 88). Jabareen highlights the similarities between IS and early 20th-century political parties. Specifically, he points to the conceptions and role of Ummah, caliphate and shari'ah as "'organic concepts shared and deeply espoused by most modern political Islamic organizations." Further, while he notes the role of Ummah in the Islamic State discourse (as an identity that transcends colour, ethnicity, and any other division), Jabareen focusses on IS's territorial ambitions and the assertion of national sovereignty as functions of nationhood (Jabareen, 2015, p. 54). Islamic State aspired, therefore, to nationhood, tacitly recognising the prevailing world order, while asserting the irrelevance of national identity to Islam. This illustrates a grey area, the overlap between nationalistic Islamism and Islamism that rejects nationalism.

Other themes of the decolonisation movement also manifest in the contemporary period. Uberman and Shay assert that in *Dabiq*, Islamic State have 'innovated the concept of Hijrah'. It should be clarified that there is debate about the role of hijrah—of those prominent Jihādist-Salafi scholars who endorse the military establishment of an Islamic state (such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's spiritual mentor, and Abu Qatada al-Filistini), none mobilise hijrah. However, in a survey of literature in *Dabiq*, hijrah forms a core component of IS's call to jihād (Uberman & Shay, 2016, pp. 17-18). According to Islamic State, hijrah does not only include migration from the Dar al-Harb to the Islamic State, but also back to the Dar al-Harb, a type of reverse migration for the sake of jihād. In Edition 3 of *Dabiq* (entitled A Call to Hidjrah), it reads (State, 2014, p. 11):

> As for one who travels to a land outside of Shām [the Islamic State] for jihād on the order of the amīr [the ruler], his journey is an act of obedience which does

> not nullify his hijrah to Shām or his residence within it. This is the case even if he is killed outside of Shām…

The reception of this doctrine is evident—a report by the International Centre for Counter Terrorism at The Hague showed that 30% of foreign fighters in Syria who returned home presented a legitimate security threat. Three of the orchestrators of the 2016 Brussels bombing were returned fighters, and the November 2015 attacks in Paris were the work of Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a returned fighter. Bahrun Naim, who planned the 2016 attack in Jakarta, was a returned fighter, as were two of the plotters in the foiled 2015 attack in Kuala Lumpur (Uberman & Shay, 2016, p. 19; van Ginkel et al., 2016, p. 56).

Not all language which employs these themes is jihādist. For example, groups that typically refer to Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb do not necessarily do so in the context of jihād, or with an accompanying a call to jihād. The Farā'iḍī movement active in India under British colonial rule declared the country to be Dar al-Harb, yet it did not assert that this implied an obligatory jihād. When Meccan Muftis were consulted on the matter, they too declined to posit jihād as an appropriate solution on the basis that equal protection was afforded to Muslims and other religious groups (that is, they were not being actively oppressed on religious grounds). This irenic attitude must be contextualised, though, with the muftis' then-Ottoman rulers enjoying friendly Anglo-Ottoman relations (Peters, 1979, p. 52). While different individuals and groups use the same language, it does not always bring with it a call to jihād. Likewise, those groups that do employ jihādist language, but differ in nature (such as nationalist and trans-nationalist groups) frequently employ different strategies and tactics. Jihādist idioms then can be understood to operate at differing levels—the theological/philosophical, the strategic, and the tactical. As such, different ideations of jihād can share a common philosophy, but differ in terms of strategy and/or tactics (Springer et al., 2009, p. 5).

1.5.2 Revivalism/Reformism (tajdīd)

The rapid reconfiguration of the Arab geopolitical landscape in the 19th and 20th centuries precipitated a reinterpretation of Islam's traditional foundations in the form of *revivalism*. Revivalism's emergence coincided with the rise of nationalism and the nation-state, the end of Islamic empires and the Caliphate, and the rise and fall of colonialism. Revivalist ideas were

affected by Western intervention, but not precipitated by it, as evinced by its proponents—ideologues like Muhammad ibn ʻAbd al- Wahhāb (1703-1792, Arabia) and Shah Wali Allah (1703-1762, India) and Shaykh Ahmad Sirhind (1564-1624). However, the movement was given a sense of urgency with the incursion of European empires in the peninsula—by 1920, only Afghanistan, Anatolia, Central Arabia, Yemen and Iran had resisted Western control. Though the Revivalist (and later Islamism) movement was concurrent with decolonisation, it had only a moderate impact on political elites who maintained strong external political ties and Cold War allegiances. Revivalism had a greater impact on the traditional agrarian and nomadic peoples affected and displaced in the wake of industrialisation and global capitalism. Social hierarchies that had provided loyalty and support were replaced by newer classes. The rapid change and erosion of prior social systems grounds revivalism's assertion that Islam became great due to its reliance on Islam's spiritual principles, and that Islam's decay was brought about by Islam's reliance on the West. In this conception, colonialism and rampant corruption were the fruits of the Islamic failure to adhere to Islamic principles. But while revivalism often took the form of opposition to Western political and cultural hegemony, it also co-opted its intellectual traditions. Choueiri notes that Muslim scholars of the period attached Islamic ideology to the modern labels of rationalism, patriotism, science, democracy, and socialism. Further, Robinson asserts that western influence is detectable in a number of ways in the movement: that is (Choueiri, 1990, p. 87; Dayem & Ayub, 2008, pp. 99-102; Cahen, Claude in Holt et al., 2005, p. 637; Robinson, 2008, pp. 261-262):

- searching to make tradition relevant, though separated from the authority of the past;
- through emphasis on agency in the political process;
- in the transformation of self through intentional activity;
- in the movement from scripturalism to rationalism.

The most prominent of the revivalist movements, Wahhābīsm takes its name from Muhammad ibn ʻAbd al-Wahhāb. A proto-revivalist, al-Wahhāb espoused a near complete rejection of classical fiqh. al-Wahhāb declared himself an intellectual disciple of the fourteenth century scholar Ibn Taymiyya, emphasising especially Ibn Tamiyya's militant teachings. According to al-Wahhāb, Islam had adopted un-Islamic customary practices. Asserting his teaching would liberate Muslims from European colonialism, his radical teaching led eventually to his expulsion from his hometown, whereafter he was adopted by

the tribal leader Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud. al-Wahhāb declared jihād in 1746, enlisting the al-Sa'ud tribe and promising them spoils, and justifying the violence against Muslim apostates, the doctrine whereby those who acted in any way that encroached on the sovereignty of Allah were apostate. Under the pronouncement of jihād by al-Wahhāb, the al Sa'ud tribe radically increased their influence in the Ottoman controlled peninsula (Crooke, 2014; Dayem & Ayub, 2008, pp. 100-101). A forerunner to modern Islamism, Wahhābīsm is still represented in Islamist activity. For example, Islamic State's propaganda magazine *Dabiq* reprinted an article by former CIA Intelligence Officer Michael Scheuer recounting Islamic State's transnational beachheads, stating, "[the Balkans are turning from] nominal believers to being Muslims well-schooled in the war-prone Salafi and Wahhābī doctrines. The Saudi-led effort made the Balkans a bastion of those doctrines, but it is yielding increasing numbers of Balkan Muslims who have become Salafis and Wahhabis" (Scheuer, 2016, p. 57).

Wahhābīsm's call to violent jihād is nuanced. Later, Wahhābīsts would denounce unrestrained violence—Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Rashid Rida (1865-1935) and Mahmud Shaltut (1893-1963) all asserted violent jihād was only permissible as a defensive action, in response to violence against the Muslim community. Shaltut expanded this, condemning Muslims who acted provocatively towards non-Muslims, asserting fighting must cease when the aggression ceased. Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97) likewise was a revivalist, but operated in the context of Afghanistan/British colonialism. Instead of meeting the British colonialism with nationalism, he instead called for a reform of the Ottoman Empire introducing *pan-Islamism* to the lexicon. al-Afghani largely wrote about the greater jihād, but for him, this was in the form of social reforms, justice, domestic development, and other non-violent struggles. Nonetheless, faced with British rule, al-Afghani did endorse violent jihād on at least one occasion (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, p. 101; DeLong-Bas, 2004, pp. 236-237).

1.5.3 Islamism

Islamism is the ideological successor to revivalism. Islamism is neither homogenous or uniform, but rather a nuanced, multifaceted socio-political phenomenon, "[a] debate about modernity, expressed in multiple voices, encompassing varied and conflicting theoretical positions that are meant to have practical, political effects" (Buck-Morss, 2003, p. 43). The

literature is inconsistent regarding the role of jihād within Islamism: according to Esposito and Voll (2000, p. 614) , Islamism does not necessarily carry a jihādist component, but rather there are two visions of Islam in the literature, those being 'conflict' and 'dialogue'. However, according to Dayem and Ayub (2008, p. 103), jihād is "the central tool of realizing [Islamism's] principles". Being concerned with Jihādist norms, Islamism, to the extent that it carries a jihādist component, will be discussed.

Islamism (and Militant Islamism) conform to the historical understanding of the interrelationship between governance and religion. Where Islam has historically shown a plurality, evolution, and development of ideology concerning this relationship, Islamism seeks to dominate "all forms of religious and political life with a particular understanding of the nature of Islam and the meaning of Islamic law" (Johnson, 2015, p. 447).

The foundational ideas of modern Islamism can be found in the thinking of Hassan al-Banna (1906-49), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jamā'at al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn). Al-Banna was influenced by the disintegration of the Caliphate (just four years earlier), escalating socio-economic problems in Egypt, political and social tension under British rule, and the ideological influence of the West. Similarly, in India, Abul ala Maududi founded the Islamic Party (Jamaat-e-Islami). While the particular brand of Islamism espoused by these two individuals is part of a larger conversation, there are a number of common themes that run through their influential discourses (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, pp. 102-103; Kepel, 2004, p. 23):

1. Islam should be the ordering principle of both the state and its religion, with no separation between the two, as Islam provides a holistic way of life.
2. A return to traditional Islam as practiced by Mohammed. They maintained that the Islamic tradition had become corrupted by the cultural baggage of subsequent readers, and this necessitated a return to traditional Islam, an order which could be founded on *ijtihad*—a renewed interpretation based on independent reasoning.
3. A social justice order conformed to Islamic ideals. Groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Party have concerned themselves with the development of professional organisations, schools, charities and social services, with an emphasis on social progress and stability.

4. God as the state sovereign, and Shari'ah as the only legitimate law.
5. Jihād as the mode by which all the above are attained, and not relegated to a secondary concern. They associated the modern social order with al-Jāhilīyyah. Further, while some Islamists reject classical jurisprudence, others use the traditional language of Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam. Jihād is a broadly accepted tenet of many Islamists, but the meaning of jihād is greatly debated (including violent or otherwise).

While neither al-Banna nor Maududi revolutionised the ideology of jihād, they posited it as the *modus operandi* for the work of the Islamist movement. As their ideology developed, Maududi (and later Qutb) would reject nationalistic notions of political Islam (Kepel, 2004, pp. 24-25)

Al-Banna's principle statement of jihād was the aptly named *On Jihād*, wherein he states (Translated by Wendell Charles, 1978, in Dayem & Ayub, 2008, p. 104):

> God ordained jihād for the Muslims not as a tool of oppression or personal ambitions, but rather as a defense for the mission (of spreading Islam), a guarantee of peace, and a means of implementing the Supreme Message, the burden of which the Muslims bear, the Message guiding mankind to truth and justice.

Though he did not personally call the faithful to arms, al-Banna argued for its relevance to Muslims (Translated by Charles Wendell, in Kelsay, 2014, p. 374):

> Today the Muslims… are compelled to humble themselves before non-Muslims, and are ruled by unbelievers. Their lands have been trampled over, and their honour besmirched. Their adversaries are in charge of their affairs, and the rites of their religion have fallen into abeyance within their own domains, to say nothing of their impotence to broadcast the summons (to embrace Islam). Hence it has become an individual obligation, which there is no evading, on every Muslim.

For al-Banna, the then-present historical circumstances provided legitimacy for jihād, a personal duty in that context. It was necessary, and for the purpose of enabling the faithful to continue in its work of calling people to Islam. Where fighting was necessary, Muslims

were called to observe the proprieties established by Mohammed (Kelsay, 2014, p. 374).

While al-Banna positions jihād as pushing back against colonialism, Maududi couches jihād in revolutionary language. He argued for the establishment of a universal Islamic state, asserting that (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, pp. 39-40):

> … the aim of Islam is to bring about universal revolution. Although in the initial stages it is incumbent upon members of the party of Islam to carry out a revolution in the state system of countries to which they belong, … their ultimate objective is no other than to affect a world revolution.

While this language has a distinctly Marxist timbre, Dayem and Ayub (2008, p. 104) assert al-Banna purposively tried to disentangle his rhetoric from Marxist presuppositions. Nonetheless, the revolutionary ideology gives al-Banna's conception its own idiosyncrasy. al-Banna rejects the categorisation of jihād along 'offensive' and 'defensive' grounds. He asserts that it is both, and therefore neither. He asserts these terms only make sense in a national context. Islam is offensive in so far as it "assaults the rule of an opposing ideology," and defensive in that it is constrained by the prevailing political system, and ordered towards capturing state power. It has no geographical land to defend, and assaults the principles of its opponents, and its purpose, "to abolish the government which sustains [those] principles" (al-Banna, in Kelsay, 2014, p. 376).

There are gaps and inconsistencies in the Islamist jihādist discourse of Jihād. It frequently gives a scant account of the practicalities of jihād, being satisfied instead with establishing it as the means by which an end should be achieved. That is, it characterises jihād as an abstract, idealised principle. Also, the expansionist language is frequently uninformed by the preceding centuries of Islamic expansion. This presents a critical challenge to the student of jihād—Maududi's assertion that jihād is defensive, and al-Banna's assertions that 'offensive' and 'defensive' are irrelevant do not fit with the historically expansionist nature of Islam. This problem is exacerbated by those Islamists who point out the historical legal sanction of offensive jihād (Dayem & Ayub, 2008, p. 105). Further, while Islamism asserts that Islam should be the basis first for the domestic, and second the transnational political system, it provides no concrete political or economic model of Islam. It only infrequently calls for the re-establishment of the Caliphate, content to decry the Western state model. According

to Roy, Islamism is "an agent of integration for the social sectors at once produced by, and excluded from, the accelerated modernization of Muslim societies… but this integration into politics has not brought into being a new model of society" (Roy, 1994, pp. 194-195).

1.5.4 Militant Islamism (or Radical Islamism)

Islamic radicalism calls for the emancipation of Islam, a need brought about by the eclipse of Islam by the rise of secular state-system and its social innovations. This can be contrasted with earlier reformist conceptions, which aimed to halt the decline of Islam by mobilising the dynamic nature of Islam. While the latter called for a modernist synthesis of Islam, Militant Islam calls for a reinstatement of essential Islam (although there is no consensus on what that is). If Islamism represents a contemporary approach in which jihād can be understood as a legitimate, necessary act of self-defence or offense, then Militant Islamism recasts jihād as a needed, legitimate offensive action. This understanding of jihād draws generously on classical justifications of the use of armed force. Given these two assertions—the total eclipse of Islam, and the validity of offensive jihād for its reinstatement—Choueiri asserts (Choueiri, 1990, pp. 87-88):

> …the militancy, exclusiveness and atavism of Islamic radicalism represent a creative synthesis of both revivalism and reformism… a violent abrogation of a long line of development, and the last endeavour to rescue the political fortunes of Islam.

While Militant Islamism existed prior to 1970, it was more of an intellectual movement than a political one. Birthed in the rapid social changes of Egypt, Syria, and (to a lesser extent) Iraq, it became more violent, a response to changing social conditions, land reforms, the assertion of nationalism, industrialisation, and the rise of socialism, especially in Nasserist Egypt[22]. The newer state-based regional order expanded, with government and policy filling holes that Islam had once occupied, such as charitable institutions (waqfs) and family courts. Further, the state asserted its authority over religious institutions, including mosques, asserting its monopoly of political power. In this setting, Sayyid Qutb inserted his ideological narrative, contending that no Islamic ideology could demarcate its own space

22 Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein (15 January 1918 – 28 September 1970) presided over Egypt as its second president, from 1954 until his death.

without coming into direct conflict with socialism, nationalism and the state (Choueiri, 1990, pp. 89-91).

While Qutb's writing relies on al-Maududi's ideas, it expands and extends al-Maududi's work and, as such, Qutb's work is rightfully considered the first and most authoritative articulation of Radical Islamism (Choueiri, 1990, pp. 88-89). Like Maududi, Qutb, one of the founders of militant Islam, called also for the founding of an Islamic State, envisaging Islam as a political movement. He rejected the progress of the nationalist movements—he likened post-independence states to the Jāhilīyyah. Like Maududi, Qutb rejected nationalism, using Maududi's rhetoric of sovereignty (Hakimiyya) and adoration (ouboudiyya)—Allah alone has sovereignty and is deserved of adoration. To him, his contemporaries worshipped socialism, the nation, party politics. Unlike Maududi, though, who advocated for gradual change, Qutb instead asserted Islam needed a clean break (Kepel, 2004, p. 26). He would write (Qutb, 1981, p. 35):

> Our aim is to change the Jahili system at its very roots, this system which is fundamentally at variance with Islam and which, with the help of force and oppression, is keeping us from living the sort of life which is demanded by our Creator.

Qutb derided those who promoted defensive-only Jihād, writing (Qutb, 1981, p. 65):

> … [they] think that they have done some good for their religion by depriving it of its method, which is to abolish all injustice from the earth, to bring people to the worship of Allah Almighty alone, and to bring them out of servitude to others into the servants of the Lord.

As one of the founding members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb's ideology was positioned well for transnational impact. During the 1950s, Saudi Arabia was establishing its national education system, a program that coincided with the persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood by Arab nationalists in Egypt. Lacking skilled workers, Saudi Arabia offered refuge to members of the Muslim Brotherhood who took up teaching and professorial positions, thereby exposing a generation of Saudis to the Muslim Brotherhood's leading ideologues, including Qutb. While Qutb's ideas were already being extensively adopted outside Saudi

Arabia, the uptake of Qutb's ideology was slower within Saudi Arabia, being poorly received by Wahhābīsts. While Qutb's formal academic training tended towards literary criticism, his detractors pointed to his lack of formal training in religious scholarship[23] (Ayoob & Kosebalaban, 2009, pp. 48-49).

Qutb's literature and ideas have continued to reverberate and are still part of the foundational ideology of groups such as al-Qa'ida, and are influential in groups like al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya. However, Militant Islam has also experienced ideological progress and evolution since the 1950s. If *Milestones* was the transcending magnum opus of Qutb's time[24], then Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj's is *The Neglected Duty*. Faraj rose to notoriety as the leader of al-Jihād[25], and was pivotal in organising the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. His manifesto finds its voice in *The Neglected Duty*, a paper for al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya. In it, Faraj establishes the most immediate objects of concern—native secularisers who weaken Islam with the secularisation of education and law (Abd al-Salaman al-Faraj in Gregg, 2010, p. 301):

> With regard to the lands of Islam the enemy lives right in the middle of them. The enemy even has got hold of the reins of power, for this enemy is (none other than) these rulers who have (illegally) seized the Leadership of the Muslims. Therefore, waging jihād against them is an individual duty, in addition to the fact that Islamic jihād today requires a drop of sweat from every Muslim. Know that when jihād is an individual duty, there is no (need to) ask permission of (your) parents to leave to wage jihād, as the jurists have said; it is similar to prayer and fasting[26].

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23 In the 1990s, Shaikh Abdullah Abd al-Aziz criticised Qutb for asserting that the Qur'ānic description of God sitting on a throne was a metaphor for his hegemony over creation. Ibn Baz criticised Qutb's characterisation of Moses based off Qutb's reading of the Qur'ān. Shaikh Salih abn Fawzan has proposed that Qutb's opinion of all Muslims being infidels is illegitimate as, not being part of the ulamā', he was unqualified to derive rulings from the Sunna and Qur'ān. Ayoob, M., & Kosebalaban, H. (2009). *Religion and politics in Saudi Arabia : Wahhabism and the state.* Lynne Rienner Publishers.

24 Sayyid Qutb wrote *Milestones* in 1964 while imprisoned under the Gamal Abdel Nasser regime. The book constitutes a call to action to Muslims, mapping a path to recreate the Muslim world along Qur'ānic grounds while casting off jahaliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance). It is an influential literary work in radical Islamist movements.

25 Now called Egyptian Islamic Jihād (EIJ).

26 Faraj would also provide the rationale for Islamification of the *near enemy*. Lewis, B. (2002). *What went wrong? : Western impact and Middle Eastern response.* Oxford

Likewise, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam (a mentor of Osama bin Laden) argued for the necessity of offensive Jihād. He elevates the martyr and the role of martyrdom, writing in *Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations* (Sheikh Abdullah Azzam in Gregg, 2010, p. 301):

> The life of the Muslim ummah is solely dependent on the ink of its scholars and the blood of its martyrs… Indeed those who think that they can change reality, or change societies, without blood, sacrifices and invalids, without pure, innocent souls, then they do not understand the essence of this deen (religion).

Though perhaps not universal, jihād in militant Islamism typically considers jihād to be an obligation upon all faithful individuals regardless of ability or gender, a theme that can be found in *The Neglected Duty*, the *Charter of Hamas*, and the *Declaration on Armed struggle against Jews and Crusaders* [27].

1.6 Other elements of Jihād

The practice of jihād is not fundamentally linked to a specific world-view. Springer, Regens and Edger define ideology as "a set of structured cognitive and affective attitudes that form a belief system for an individual or group" (Springer et al., 2009, p. 5). They assert that jihādist ideology can be evaluated at three levels—the philosophical, the long-term strategy and vision, and the tactical. The philosophical covers the ethical, moral and religious foundations of jihād (which necessarily entails overlap between those categories). The

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University Press., "Fighting the near enemy is more important than fighting the distant enemy. In jihād the blood of the Muslims must flow until victory is achieved. But the question now arises: is this victory for the benefit of an existing Islamic state, or is it for the benefit of the existing infidel regime? And is it a strengthening of the foundations of this regime which deviates from the law of God? These rulers only exploit the opportunity offered to them by foutward appearance of Islam. The struggle of a jihād must be under Muslim auspices and under Muslim leadership... The cause of the existence of imperialism in the lands of Islam lies in these self-same rulers … It is our duty to concentrate on our Islamic cause, which means first and foremost establishing God's law in our own country, and causing the word of God to prevail. There can be no doubt that the first battlefield of the jihād is the extirpation of these infidel leaderships and their replacement by a perfect Islamic order. From this will come release."

27 *The Declaration on Armed Struggle Against Jews and Crusaders* is a manifesto issued by the World Islamic Group' and signed by both Osama bin laden, and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

strategic covers the long-term strategies espoused for achieving a successful jihād. Finally, tactical refers to the specific tactics espoused. As the tactics of individuals are less relevant to state actors, they will provide less insight; however, there is still the opportunity for this taxonomy to provide understanding. For example, recognising a suicide bomber as a martyr would illustrate a religious conception of the act. Further, not all jihād is religious; the goals of some groups and individuals are secular in nature, but are conflated with strategy and tactics. As such, religion is not always the exclusive source of jihādist rhetoric. Also, those espousing jihād aren't always theologians and/or scholars, and the goals of some individual and groups are best understood as secular. Frequently, though, these are, "presented in the context of religious goals" (Springer et al., 2009, pp. 5-7).

To this point, the ideologues discussed have differentiated between offensive and defensive jihād. The terms and discriminations are those used by the ideologues and organisations themselves, and are frequently used narratively to describe relationships that are exclusively dichotomic, that is, the Islamic community opposed to an 'other'. For example, Qutb asserts that Islam is threatened by Western ideas, and that therefore, a violent response is a defensive action. However, this dichotomy poses two non-analogous participants. The terms offensive and defensive only make sense in the context of nations or countries, where the terms are relative to the point of reference. In a context where a party asserts there should be a universal religion to which all humanity must be admitted, and calls for the dismantling of the existing political order, 'offensive' and 'defensive' are not germane terms. Jihad is concurrently offensive and defensive in this context: offensive in opposing conflicting ideology; defensive in those opposing ideologies constrain it. Islam as a religion has no national boundary, but jihad adopts as its purpose the objective of causing their opponent to relinquish their principles, including the abolition of the governments which sustain these principles (Kelsay, 2014, pp. 376-377). Nonetheless, they are the terms used by those parties presenting the ideology. They provide a high degree of utility—when jihādist action is characterised as defensive or offensive, it frequently sets the parameters of what constitutes legitimate action (such as whether the elderly or infirm may be targeted with violence). According to Ali and Rehmann (Ali, 2005, p. 333):

> Some argue [jihād] is essentially defensive in nature, whereas others are inclined to consider it as including an offensive or aggressive element. It is submitted that the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.

1.6.1 Martyrdom

The issue of martyrdom has been entangled with jihād since the time of Mohammed. The fundamental link between jihād and martyrdom can be found in Surah 9:111 which reads[28]:

> Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed. [It is] a true promise [binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur'an. And who is truer to his covenant than Allah? So rejoice in your transaction which you have contracted. And it is that which is the great attainment.

Here, the relationship between martyrdom and entry into paradise takes the form of a contractual arrangement. Such Surah have special significance: being revealed towards the end of Mohammed's ministry, Surah 9:111 has importance in the Islamic legal system (Cook, 2011, pp. 282-283).

In Arabic, the word for martyr is *shahīd*. Within the Qur'ān, shahīd is typically used to mean 'witness'. There is sufficient use of shahīd as a synonym for martyrdom that it has inspired an Islamic martyrology (Cook, 2011, p. 283), and is typified in verses such as at Qur'ān 3:169-170 (Sahih International translation):

> [169]And never think of those who have been killed in the cause of Allah as dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, receiving provision, [170]Rejoicing in what Allah has bestowed upon them of His bounty, and they receive good tidings about those [to be martyred] after them who have not yet joined them - that there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they grieve.

While the concept and role of martyrdom is established in the Qur'ān, successive generations, the hadith and shari'ah have expanded on it. According to the hadith (Ibn al Mubarak in Qutb, 1981, p. 349):

> "We were wondering who is better, you or your brother Hisham." Amr bin al Aas said: "I will tell you about that. I was with my brother Hisham at Yarmuk

28 See also Surah 47:4.

> and we spent our night praying that Allah blesses us with martyrdom. The next day my brother got it but I didn't. So you can then see that he was better than me."

These verses are recited commonly at the funerals of Islamic martyrs, giving the sense of their special status among those who've passed away. Their superior status is also reflected in the celebration that takes place at their funerals, and the prestige that the label 'shahīd' carries (Cook, 2011, p. 283).

The ahadith elaborates on the attributes, merits and rewards of martyrdom, expanding the definition of martyr. Al-Tirmidhi reads (d.892):

> In the sight of God the martyr has six [unique] qualities: He [God] forgives him at the first opportunity, and shows him his place in paradise, he is saved from the torment of the grave, he is safe from the great fright [of the Resurrection], a crown of honor is placed upon his head—one ruby of which is better than the world and all that is in it—he is married to 72 of the *houri*s [women of paradise], and he gains the right to intercede for 70 of his relatives (in Cook, 2011, pp. 283-284).

In Islam, the definition of martyr would later expand to include (but not be limited to) those who die in the cause of Islam: in child-birth; in fire; from pleurisy; by drowning; of stomach upset; from building collapse; and from plague. In Sunni Islam, though, the primary use of the term is in identifying those who die in God-sanctioned violence; this use has had the broadest recognition and greatest reward (Cook, 2011, p. 284).

Modern jihādist ideologues mobilise 'martyrdom' language, linking it to jihād. According to Qutb, "See, may Allah have mercy on you, how the Messenger of Allah made the best of the best of the best of Islam to be Jihād, and then he made the best of Jihād to be Martyrdom" (Qutb, 1981, p. 200).

In the same way that numerous Christian denominations have established hagiographies, so too do jihādist ideologues appeal to past martyrs in their rhetoric. However, unlike organisations such as the Catholic Church, with a central and authoritative body, no single

Islamic institution has the authority to declare an individual's status as martyr. While martyrs have been a fixture[29] throughout Islamic history, few individuals after Mohammed's initial community have received universal recognition (Abou El Fadl, 2017, p. 6; Cook, 2011, p. 286). This is significant, as any appeal to modern martyrs is a legitimising act for ideologues who promote those individuals as martyrs, as broad acceptance of those individuals as martyrs constitutes broad acceptance of their cause.

Not everyone who dies in the path of Islam is a martyr though, and while some ideologues encourage fighters to search for martyrdom, others consider this suicide (prohibited by Islam). For example, in *Wings of Paradise*, Al Qa'ida's Ayman al-Zawahiri discouraged (among other things) an 'expansion in martyrdom-seeking actions' (Ayman al-Zawahiri in Jones, 2014, p. 19).

1.6.2 Hijrah

Hijrah occupies a prominent place in Islam. Just as martyrdom provides one with a special significance, so does emigration in the service of jihād[30], and violent jihād will often accompany a call to emigration. Traditionally, 'hijrah' has been used to describe Mohammed's migration from Mecca to Yathrib (later renamed Medina) to escape persecution. Its typical use in Islamic literature meant moving from the Dar al-Harb to the Dar al-Islam; when Muslims are unable to peaceably practice their religion, it is incumbent on them to migrate to the Dar al-Islam (Uberman & Shay, 2016, p. 7).

Modern ideologues have conflated hijrah with jihād, and innovated the meaning. For example, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (of Islamic State) writes, "I direct my call to all the Muslim youth and men all over the world, and call them to make Hijrah to us to consolidate the pillars of the State of Islam and perform Jihād against the Safavid Rafida" (Jones, 2014, p. 19). In *Dabiq* Issue 2, the foreword reads, "Many readers are probably asking about their obligations towards the Khilāfah right now… The first priority is to perform hijrah from

29 Martyrd om is a near-universal fixture in religion, and this study makes no claim to whether martyrdom has had more or less historical significance in Islam.

30 'Hijrah' is also used to describe Muhammad's migration from Mecca to Yathrib (later renamed Medina). It will not be used in that sense in this study.

wherever you are to the Islamic State, from [Dar al-Harb] to [Dar al-Islam]… Rush to the shade of the Islamic State with your parents, siblings, spouses, and children" (Islamic State, 2014a, p. 3).

Sayyid Qutb situates hijrah in the context of jihād, quoting from the hadith Ahmad, al Tabarani and al Bayhaqi:

> [A man] said, "What is the best of Iman [meaning *faith*]?" The Messenger of Allah said, "Hijrah." He said, "What is Hijrah?" The Messenger of Allah said, "To leave sins behind." He said, "What is the best of Hijrah?" The Messenger of Allah said, "Jihād." He said, "What is the best of Jihād?" The Messenger of Allah said, "the one whose horse is killed and his blood is spilled.

The role of hijrah is linked to jihād by ISIS in *Dabiq* (Islamic State, 2014f, p. 34):

> Hijrah has been a pillar inherent to jihād, particularly in eras void of darul-Islam. Allah's Messenger (sallallahu 'alayhi wa sallam) said, "Hijrah will not cease as long as there is jihād" [Ahmad]. In another narration, he said, "Hijrah will not cease as long as the kuffar are fought" [An-Nisa'i][31].

1.7 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to qualify jihād—what it is and what falls within its purview. A strict definition is impossible—since its inception, the jihād has continually evolved. However, it has done so within definable parameters governed by history, culture, and Islamic jurisprudence. This chapter has also provided the historical, legal and cultural context for its development, and outlined the context in which the debate continues.

A foundational doctrine, violent jihād has existed and developed from the time of the earliest Islamic community. The development of the doctrine maps the experience of a community required to engage violently for its defence and later flourishment. With the death of Mohammed, in the absence of a comprehensive framework, the Islamic community was

31 This is one of the six canonical hadith collections recognised by Sunni Islam. Brown, J. (2007). *The canonization of al-Bukhārī and Muslim : the formation and function of the Sunnī Hadīth Canon*. Brill.

left to rationalise and develop the doctrine, leading to different and competing conceptions. Within fiqh, the madhhabs developed different internally consistent legalistic doctrines based on the received texts of Islam.

While subsequent generations of scholars sought to explore and test the scope of jihād and what was included in its purview, they did so operating in an established, and broadly accepted, framework. The development of the doctrine is much like the development of a baby. Starting as a group of cells, it takes shape. Soon, a defined shape is established. While that child develops and grows, it continues to grow in the earlier set pattern. While the limbs may get bigger, it continues in the shape already defined. So too has jihād developed. The doctrine may grow to accommodate more nuance, but the fundamental shape remains recognisable and consistent. Centuries of discourse have shaped the doctrine of jihād, and pushed the debate further, but within set parameters.

Importantly, since the death of Mohammed, there has never been a consensus on what jihād is. Though the ulamā' have dominated the discussion, and have a strong claim to legitimacy, discourse has never been limited to them. Rather, it has continued to develop as various factions adopt and reject developments. This process has continued into the modern and contemporary periods as Islamic communities have dealt with such issues as colonialism, nationalism, and encroaching non-Muslim values.

Having established a broad pattern of how jihād may be conceptualised, the next chapter looks at the theoretical framework adopted by this study. It establishes a mode for conceptualising this study consistent with the nature and development of jihād, and with the purpose of identifying jihād in the national narrative of Saudi Arabia.

Chapter 2: Profiling Jihādist Organisations

> "Criminal profiling is the writing process in reverse. Writers create characters and project their actions forwards into a timeline. Profilers are left with the aftermath of an offender's behaviour and must extrapolate backwards to establish their characteristics."
> - Stewart Stafford

While Chapter One mapped the expression and definition of jihād in different times and contexts, such an inventory does not identify specifically jihādist norms. For example, a jihādist organisation may state that it is incumbent of Muslims, as part of a call to jihād, to immigrate to a certain locale to wage jihād. Likewise, an imam may call Muslims to make holy pilgrimage to Mecca. While there may be a jihādist call to perform hijrah, it does not follow that all calls to migrate may subsequently be called jihādist. Context matters. For such a calling to be a relevant norm, it must be an already accepted understanding made in the context of jihād.

This chapter seeks to illustrate jihādist norms in specific context, demonstrating how those norms are expressed by jihādist organisations. This is so that when a corresponding norm is discovered in Chapter Five (which examines Saudi rhetoric) it may point back to these norms. This helps ameliorate the claims of subjectivity in the researcher, ensuring norms identified in the next chapter correlate with objective, real-world examples. That is, this chapter shows expressions of jihād as espoused by jihādist organisations. Chapter Five, which analyses Saudi narrative, may then point to these expressions, their similarities and differences, as evidence of jihādist norms.

This chapter enumerates jihādist norms by organisation, and then by category, illustrating where those groups differ and/or agree in their expression of those norms. Different groups may advance different positions on the same topic, and this chapter presents those competing narratives. For example, while the establishment of a caliphate may be a central organising principle to Islamic State, the role of the caliphate may be totally different for the Taleban,

as might be assertions of who belongs to the caliphate, and how people relate to it. In each jihādist organisation, various norms will be qualified in such a manner as to separate it from other groups' expression of similar norms. For example, in the case of pan-Islamism, some Islamist groups reject national boundaries as arbitrary and antithetical to a unified Islamic Ummah, while other groups may be nationally oriented, seeking to establish a local Islamic State. Others may view the establishment of an Islamic state as a stepping stone on the way to the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The purpose of this chapter is to establish a catalogue of specific norms against which Saudi Arabian state rhetoric can be compared, contrasted and measured.

The chapter is divided into three cases—Al-Qa'ida, Islamic State and the Taleban. The same set of jihādist norms are catalogued for each group to enable comparison between the groups. Drawn from Chapter One, the categories are as follows:

- **Offensive or defensive positioning:** This refers to whether the group positions their jihād and/or collective identity as defending the community from outside aggression, or whether it is an offensive jihād, such as for the purpose of spreading Islam. Both positions bear different regulations with regard to jihād in terms of who can wage it, and under what authority.
- **The role of Hijrah:** This refers to whether the organisation encourages migration from the Dar al-Harb to the Dar al-Islam for the purpose of jihād.
- **Martyrdom Operations:** This refers to those norms that regulate martyrdom operations[32]–who may conduct them, the legitimacy of them, and the validity of targets.
- **Nationalist/Pan-Islamic:** This refers to whether the jihād has as its aim, whether short or long term, a national character, or whether it rejects nationalism in favour of an identity based solely on Islam.
- **Caliphate Orientation:** This refers to the role that the establishment of a caliphate plays, and whether its existence precludes jihād
- **The Source of Authority to Jihād:** This refers to where the authority to jihād lies.

32 These are more typically referred to as 'suicide operations'. This study adopts the nomenclature used by jihādist organisations to more accurately represent their presentation.

For example, authority to jihād may be based on a fatwah declared by a mufti, or some other religious authority, or alternately with a caliph, or even on the basis of individual discernment.

- **Who can wage jihād:** This refers to norms regarding who is able to wage jihād. For example, is jihādist activity confined to males? People of appropriate financial means? Or does it extend to the whole community? Is it optional, or a mandatory responsibility incumbent on all?
- **Who are valid operational targets:** This refers to who is and isn't considered a valid operational target for jihād. For example, is violent conflict limited to military targets? Are civilians valid targets?
- **Miscellaneous Constitutive Norms:** This is a category for miscellaneous constitutive norms that may be unique to the jihādist organisation.
- **Miscellaneous Regulative Norms:** This is a category for miscellaneous regulative norms that may be unique to the jihādist organisation.

An exhaustive review of each group and their respective beliefs on these topics is prevented by space limitations. Instead, evidence will be drawn from two sources. Peer reviewed evidence will be examined in each area, supported by primary evidence for verification and to add context and nuance. Besides providing an objective metric to identify jihādist norms against, this chapter also illustrates the competition that is inherent in norms. Each group has its own constitutive and regulative norms with analogues in their counterparts. There is a broad consensus on what constitutes jihād, but practical differences.

2.1 Al-Qa'ida

2.1.1 Offensive or Defensive Positioning

In his 1998 fatwah, bin Laden (1998a) declared there are three 'undisputed facts' undergirding Al-Qa'ida's jihād:

- The United States occupies the land of Islam and oppresses its peoples;
- The death toll of the Crusader-Zionist alliance is over 1 million;
- The aim of the US occupation of the Middle East is to prop up Israel as a state—a state that murders Muslims.

Bin Laden asserts that this alliance is destroying Muslim countries, and that the defence of Muslim countries is a duty that falls on all Muslims (as in a defensive jihād). Bin Laden's fatwah was not targeted at the expulsion of troops from Muslim countries. Rather, his fatwah was a "ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military in any country in which it is possible," and to leave them "defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim". This is based on bin Laden's interpretation of the Qur'anic verse, "fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah" (Aaron, 2008, p. 169). Therefore, while nominally citing defence of Muslim lands as the rationale, bin Laden advocates unlimited hostility against Islam's enemies. In this regard Al-Qa'ida's jihād is rhetorically defensive, while practically offensive. Bin Laden's narrative also differed from contemporaries in scope. For example, bin Laden split with his mentor Sheik Abdullah Azzam over the status of Arab regimes which he'd become disenfranchised from (Mendelsohn, 2009, p. 45). Likewise, bin Laden's focus on the US differed from contemporaries such as al-Khattab[33], who asserted Russia should be the primary target of jihād (Quandt, 2009, pp. 57-58).

In its rivalry with Islamic State, Al-Qa'ida has adopted a defensive stance, though in a strict interpretation of the word. When Islamic State declared the Caliphate in 2014, Al Adnani[34] declared all other jihādist groups null and void (Hamming, 2017, pp. 27-28). Internal discourse in Al-Qa'ida showed a split in opinion on how to deal with Islamic State. Hani Sibai[35] opined that Al-Qa'ida should contest Islamic State, and speak out against ISIS' harmful and deviant behaviour. Abu Qatada al-Filastani and al-Maqdisi both asserted a hierarchy of enemies to be fought, starting with apostates (in this case meaning apostate regimes), Shi'ites, and then Islamic State. As such, they only sanctioned defensive retaliation against Islamic State.

According to Al-Qaeda (2010a, p. 37):

> The basis of the legitimacy of jihād is that it is either to repel/resist aggression

33 The *nom de guerre* of Samir Saleh Abdullah al-Suwailem, leader of the Arab Mujahdeen in the Caucasus

34 Spokesperson for Islamic State and second in charge of Al-Qa'ida.

35 An Al-Qa'ida apologist.

("Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors"—Şūrah al-Baqarah, 190), or to aid those who are weak and oppressed ("And why should ye not fight in the cause of Allah and of those who, being weak, are ill treated (and oppressed)?"—Surah al Nisā', 75), or in defence of the freedom of worshiping ("To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged;—and verily, Allah is most powerful for their aid"—Surah al-Ĥajj, 39). It is not legitimate to declare war because of differences in religion, or in search of spoils of war.

It is apparent then, that the rules of engagement differ with regard to different opponents. This is due to the Islamic character of the Islamic State, as fighting Muslims is a lower priority than fighting non-Muslims.

2.1.2 The Role of Hijrah

Hijrah is represented in Al-Qa'ida's literature. Al-Qa'ida asserts that those living in non-Muslim countries have a moral obligation to migrate to Muslim countries, as well as providing biographical accounts of those who've conducted hijrah in their propaganda literature (Al-Qaeda, 2014, pp. 32, 34, 65). However, Al Qa'ida's call for hijrah differs from that of Islamic State's. According to Chertoff et al. (2020, p. 3), where hijrah is a central part of Islamic State's jihād strategy, stacking its militant core with new migrants, Al-Qa'ida is concerned less with attracting large numbers of recruits, preferring instead to focus on quality. However, according to Al-Qa'ida, the inability to perform hijrah does not excuse the individual from the obligation to individual jihād.

Al Qa'ida further differentiates itself from Islamic State on the point of hijrah by applying less pressure on individuals living in the Dar al-Harb to emigrate, and instead encourages jihād in place. This fits with Al Qa'ida's increased emphasis on attacking the far enemy (Novenario, 2016, p. 961). According to the propaganda magazine *Inspire*, "If you join the ranks of the Muhajireen and Mujahideen, you will be a Soldier of Allāh. But if you carry out a lone Jihād operation amidst the kuffār, you will be an Army of Allāh" (Al-Qaeda, 2014, p. 35).

2.1.3 Martyrdom Operation Norms

Al-Qa'ida has a adopted the use of 'martyrdom operations'—more commonly referred to as 'suicide attacks'. They rationalise martyrdom operations stating, "The martyr who fights and dies in the path of Allāh, undoubtedly has the greatest chance of meeting his Lord as a victor. So what will your excuse be for restraining yourself from Paradise?" (for example, see Al-Qaeda, 2010a, p. 54; 2011, p. 30).

The authority to commit a suicide attack depends on whether Al-Qa'ida has direct oversight of the operative. Through *Inspire* Al-Qa'ida recounts multiple stories of those wishing to perform suicide attacks, but unable to for lack of authorisation. However, in the same publication, those in the West are encouraged to conduct lone attacks, including suicide operations (Al-Qaeda, 2011, p. 30). Additionally, Al-Qa'ida heroises those killed in martyrdom operations (see for example, Al-Qaeda, 2010a, p. 5; 2011, p. 17), and martyrdom in general (see for example, Al-Qaeda, 2010a, p. 30).[36]

Al-Qa'ida's position on martyrdom and suicide attacks has also moderated over time, likely in response to the rise of Islamic State, although as early as 2001 Zawahiri warned against excessive use of violence in *Knights under the Banner of the Prophet*, his memoir. In 2013, Al Zawahiri published another book promoting and defending martyrdom as a tactic, provided limiting clauses in the use of martyrdom operations. Within, he noted the "increase in martyrdom operations has been accompanied by some deviation and exaggeration which must be corrected and admitted to." Al Zawahiri noted that due care to protect innocent lives had not been taken, and the targets chosen and the methods employed had alienated the public (Al Zawahiri in Holbrook, 2015, p. 96). According to Holbrook, his desire was to "present al-Qaeda's approach to jihād as less extreme, and therefore more sustainable, than other approaches on offer."

There is evidence from communiques between Al-Qa'ida strategists of frustration at a misunderstanding of the role of martyrdom and jihād in general. For Al-Qa'ida, jihād and martyrdom are means to an end, that end being a legitimate Islamic state. The frustration

36 Even those who have accidentally killed themselves are considered martyrs, and thus worthy of the title (for example, Al-Qaeda. (2010a). *Inspire* (2 ed.). Al-Qaeda.).

stems from foot soldiers' belief that jihād is the end. Gregg (2010, p. 305) states, "While some foot soldiers treat jihād and suicide operations as the goal of their struggle, they do not reflect the ideological aspirations of the broader Al-Qa'ida movement." This leads soldiers to adopt tactics that detract from the Islamic support of Al-Qa'ida.

2.1.4 Nationalist/Pan-Islamic Norms

In its infancy, Al-Qa'ida exhibited signs of nationalist sentiment. In his manifesto, *Declaration of Jihād Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holiest Sites*, bin Laden (1996a) uses distinctly nationalist language, talking about the injustices caused in Palestine, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to assert that bin Laden's condemnation of American and 'Jewish occupation' expresses a strictly nationalist sentiment. Rather than being nationalist, Al-Qa'ida has a local geographical focus while preaching a pan-Islamist message (Ahmed, 2014, pp. 93, 99). This was illustrated when Mullah Omar (2009) called the Taleban "a robust Islamic and nationalist movement". Al-Zawahiri (in Brown, 2009) responded through Al-Sahab (Al-Qa'ida's media wing), criticising groups that adopt a nationalist approach for "turning jihād into a national cause," adding that "nationalism must be rejected by the ummah, because it is a model which makes jihād subject to the market of political compromises and distracts the ummah from the liberation of Islamic lands and the establishment of the Caliphate."

Al-Qa'ida's major criticisms of the United Nations reflect Al Qa'ida's anti-nationalist sentiment. Al-Qa'ida criticises the United Nations' reinforcement of the national system as illegitimate (Al-Qaeda, 2010a, pp. 33-34). Al-Qa'ida asserts that, unlike other small groups, Islam is the principal victim of the international order (Mendelsohn, 2014, pp. 474-476, 482). According to Al-Qa'ida, the Westphalian system that centralises the role of states is at odds with Islam (Mendelsohn, 2014, p. 474). To Al-Qa'ida, Allah is the sole authority, and the United Nations is anathema to the correct ordering of people, it being a dividing force imposed on people who should not be divided. By extension, those people who support the order that the United Nations endorses reject the teaching of Islam. Al-Qa'ida also rejects the values of the United Nations. Firstly, Al-Qa'ida rejects the United Nations' outright rejection of violence and its advocation of dialogue as the legitimate means to change, asserting that there is a legitimate use of violence. Al-Qa'ida rejects the United Nations'

assertion of the right of the individual to change religion at will, declaring that a change from Islam is apostacy and punishable by death (Al-Qaeda, 2010a, p. 22).

2.1.5 Caliphate Orientation

According to Al-Qaeda (2013, p. 35):

> [Al-Qaeda's] long-term goal, is to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate through Jihād in the cause of Allah and to implement the Shari'ah of Allah in the whole land of Allah, Biidhnillah.

Thus, creation of a caliphate is the primary long-term goal of Al-Qa'ida's jihād—the overthrow of apostate regimes and attacks on the near or far enemy only serve this end (Al-Qaeda, 2010a, p. 2; Lee, 2015). For Al-Qa'ida, the establishment of the Caliphate depends on the eradication of US influence in the Middle East. In an interview with Al Jazeera, bin Laden said (quoted in Gregg, 2010, p. 302):

> ... the time has come for Muslim people to realise… the states of the region do not have their own sovereignty. For our enemies disporting themselves in our seas and on our lands and in our airspace, striking without anyone's permission ... but these other regimes, they no longer have any real power. They are either colluding with America and Britain or have lost the power to do anything against this barefaced occupation.

According to Gregg (2010, p. 303), "Bin Laden's statement suggests that Western powers, specifically the United States, Britain, and Israel, are preventing jihādis from toppling illegitimate regimes; no change can come without attacking this enemy first and compelling its withdrawal." Al-Qa'ida therefore sees its work as the prelude to the creation of a caliphate, but do not imagine that their organisation is the embodiment of the caliphate, and nor do they see their work as directly establishing one. al Zawahiri (2012, p. 2) writes:

> [Al-Qa'ida's work is] to create awareness in the Ummah regarding the threat posed by the Crusader onslaught, clarify the true meaning of Tawheed[37] in the

37 Oneness or unification.

sense that the rule and sovereignty belongs to Allah alone, and stress upon the importance of brotherhood based on Islam and the unity of all Muslims lands. By the permission of Allah, this will serve as a prelude to the establishment of the Caliphate according to the methodology of the Prophet (peace be upon him).

2.1.6 The Source of Authority to Jihād

Al-Qa'ida simultaneously claims to be fighting a defensive jihād, for which the responsibility falls on all Muslims, while claiming the authority to wage jihād comes either from imams or heads of state. According to Al-Qa'ida, "[authorisation] is granted by the Shari'ah to only those who lead the community (actual heads of states)… it is not for a Muslim individual or Muslim group to announce and declare war, or engage in combative jihād, whimsically and on their own" (Al-Qaeda, 2010a, p. 37).

There are relevant exceptions to the rule of requiring authorisation. According to Al-Qa'ida, "The one exception… is in the situation where there is no imam or in the case where it is known that the imam does not promote jihād… as 'obeying the imam is mandatory unless the Imam orders the Muslims to commit a sin, then he should not be obeyed, and preventing Muslims from fighting obligatory jihād is a sin'" (Al-Qaeda, 2010a, p. 37). In Al-Qa'ida's conception, jihād can be conducted while under the auspices of a licit moral authority—their authority. Additionally, individuals can conduct jihād without authority, but only when the individual is unable to attain permission.

Inspire Magazine contains multiple accounts of individuals seeking permission to wage jihād, and being refused permission by the Al-Qa'ida authorities (for example Al-Qaeda, 2011, p. 18). The only permission to wage jihād comes from Al-Qa'ida, and there is no requirement to seek permission from any other authority, as a "child shall march forward without the permission of its parents and the wife without the permission of the husband" (Al-Qaeda, 2014, p. 38; 2016). Notably, this is a break from that Maliki tradition that required parental permission (see Chapter 1).

2.1.7 Who Can Wage Jihād?

Positioned as a defensive jihād, there should be no limit on who may wage jihād, and all are called to the task. According to Al-Qa'ida, their jihād is defensive, and when jihād is defensive, it is the individual responsibility of all Muslims to fight without permission (Lahoud, 2014, p. 780). Nonetheless, Al-Qa'ida curtails who may wage jihād. While Al-Qa'ida rarely deters anyone from fighting jihād based on characteristics such as age, fitness or wealth, though there are examples of individuals being refused permission to join jihād that seem more based on a judgement of their individual fitness (for example see Al-Qaeda, 2011, p. 18), Al-Qa'ida is more critical of who they take into combat than Islamic State (Chertoff et al., 2020, p. 3)

While theoretically women can wage jihād, in practice they are excluded. Abdullah Azzam (in Lahoud, 2014, p. 780), an ideological founder of Al-Qa'ida, notes, "The participation of women in jihād is stated in the Shari'a, but… opening the door [to women to participate in jihād] amounts to a great evil." Yusuf al-'Ayyiri, an ideological leader of Al-Qa'ida and former leader of the Saudi Arabia branch penned a tractate entitled *The Role of Women in the Jihād against Enemies*[38]. In it, he attempts to bring women into jihād. He cites historical examples of women fighting jihād. He stops short of a direct call to women to jihād, instead urging them to support their husbands, even though he states categorically that Al-Qa'ida's jihād is an individual duty (*fard 'ayn*) and more important than seeking parental authority (Cook, 2005b, p. 382). In 2009, the wife of Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Umayma Al-Zawahiri penned a letter to Muslim women. While mentioning the role that women fill as jihādists, she emphasised jihād as being more suited to men. She wrote that women could better serve jihād by supporting their husbands and raising their children with a love of jihād (Peresin & Cervone, 2015, p. 497). Thus, while women in jihād is theoretically possible in Al-Qa'ida's ideology, it is discouraged in the strongest terms. Even so, Al-Qa'ida has used women in martyrdom operations – typically as a last resort, when men are scarce and times are desperate (Peresin & Cervone, 2015, p. 498).

2.1.8 Who/What are Valid Operational Targets?

Under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, Al-Qa'ida's focus was on the far enemy (*al-Adou*

38 In Arabic entitled Dawr al-nisa' fi jihad al-'ada'.

al-Baeed)—the United States and its Western allies. According to Celso (2014, pp. 43-44), Al-Qa'ida's focus on the far enemy is an anomaly compared to other modern jihādist organisations. Bin Laden believed a lack of focus on the far enemy led both to an excessive loss of Muslim lives, and diverted resources away from the more important target—the US (Celso, 2014, p. 38). According to bin Laden (2012), "Even though the internal-enemy is considered to be a greater nonbeliever, the external enemy is more clearly defined as a nonbeliever and is more dangerous in this stage of our life. America is the head of the nonbelievers."

Al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's successor, agreed with the need to target the far enemy. In his *General Guidelines for Jihād* he notes, "The military work firstly targets the head of (international) disbelief, America and its ally Israel, and secondly its local allies that rule our countries" (al Zawahiri, 2012 p. 2). The purpose of this strategy is clear:

> to exhaust [the US] and bleed her to death… [so it] collapses under its own weight as a result of its military, human, and financial losses. Consequently, its grip on our lands will weaken and its allies will begin to fall one after another.

Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri disagreed on where to attack the US. The US was the ideal location for bin Laden, while for Al-Zawahiri, it was more effective to target US resources in Afghanistan and Iraq (Gohel, 2017, p. 56). Al-Zawahiri's leadership saw Al-Qa'ida move its focus to attacks closer to the Middle East.

While Al-Qa'ida asserts there is value in targeting citizens, and its operatives have frequently killed civilians, under Al-Zawahiri's leadership, the primary focus is on apostate regimes. While the target is still the far enemy, under al-Zawahiri, Al-Qa'ida targets its presence in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda (2016, p. 45) notes that civilians are not its primary target, and rationalises their deaths on 9/11 saying, "Civilian targets are not our priority. Take 9/11, we targeted economy and military targets." However, the same article notes that events such as the Boston Marathon Bombing are useful as they raise awareness of "rulers… meddling into our affairs."[39] It additionally notes the guilt and complicity of American citizens due to

39 The Boston Marathon Bombers were not associated with jihādist groups but rather were self-radicalised Seelye, K. Q. (2013). Bombing Suspect Cites Islamic Extremist Beliefs as Motive. *New York Times.*

the enfranchisement as citizens. That is, as citizen's who voted democratically for a hostile government, they share in its complicity. This is made clear in the end caveat which notes:

> When talking of civilian targets we strictly confine our answer to non-Muslim countries i.e. countries whose majority population is not Muslim. And more specifically of countries that are at war with Muslims (America, Israel, UK, France e.t.c.). We do not target nor support the targeting of Muslim civilians in Islamic countries or in Muslim populated areas (Al-Qaeda, 2016, p. 45).

Al-Qaeda (2010a) is able to justify the targeting of civilians based on their complicity with evil, stating "We are not against Americans for just being American; we are against evil, and America as a whole has turned into a nation of evil". Al-Qaeda (2016, p. 45) proposes that targeting civilians is morally justified, as their votes give authority to the leaders who assault Islam, and their death is an equivalent retaliation for the loss of innocent Muslim lives.

Among those in the camp of the far enemy, all people are targets—'civilians, women and children, the elderly or infirm' (Bhatt, 2013, p. 33). Shayk Atiyatalla[40] (in Atiyatallah, 2010, p. 1) explains the reason for this in *Vanguards of Khurasan* magazine saying:

> Know that the infidel's non-belief and disobedience of his Lord and his Great, Exalted, and Almighty Creator is a great crime. He therefore deserves the harshest punishment imaginable. To reject God, His messengers, and His religion is the greatest iniquity and crime on Earth.

Al-Qa'ida asserts there is a hierarchy when choosing targets, and they are prioritised in the following order with the most desirable targets first: important political figures, large strategic economic targets, military bases; media personalities, centralised information centres, places where Jews congregate, the official offices of government institutions, the buildings of security services, and then civilians in general (Al-Qaeda, 2012b, pp. 23-24).

Al-Qa'ida allows attacks on the near enemy, even as its rhetoric emphasises the threat of the far enemy. Comparing the speeches and statements of Al-Qa'ida and ISIS from 2010 to 2017, Tore Refslund (2017, p. 68) notes that Al-Qa'ida emphasises the threat of the 'far

40 Senior Al-Qa'ida ideologue.

enemy' 19 times, compared to 16 for the 'near enemy', and the 'internal-enemy' not at all. This is compared with ISIS, which mentions the 'near enemy' 23 times, the 'far enemy' 12 time and the 'internal-enemy' twice.

In targeting the near enemy, Al-Qa'ida adopts the doctrine espoused by Abdullah Azzam[41] of declaring *takfir* against some Muslims[42]. Classical Islamic jurisprudence asserts jihād is a religious struggle against persecution. Azzam advanced the notion of remote excommunication of Muslims guilty of apostacy, who thereby make themselves non-Muslim, and so become legitimate targets, and in doing so, blurred the line between 'near' and 'far' enemy as regimes considered apostates make themselves (or are declared) targets (Rid, 2010, p. 44). There has been internal disagreement about the merit of killing apostates, as well as the conditions that must be met, and the extent to which it is practiced. Agents such as Zawahiri and Al-Libi have written extensively in support of killing apostates, and the broad scope of people to whom the doctrine applies, though even they objected to the unfettered killings wrought at the behest of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi. These attacks cause Al-Qa'ida to alienate their followers and led to 'debates over the strategic value of indiscriminate tactics' (Celso, 2014, pp. 45-46; Hafez, 2010, pp. 19-44). Still, the goal of Al-Qa'ida's jihād is not simply the expulsion of the US and its allies from the Arabian Peninsula, but the death of anyone not considered *de jure* by Al-Qa'ida.

According to Gohel (2017, pp. 56-57), "following the retreat of the Soviets in the 1980s, al-Zawahiri tried to convince bin Laden… to focus on the need for regime change in the Arab world." However, Bin Laden was focussed on the far enemy. Over half of bin Laden's speeches focussed on the far enemy, with a small percentage dedicated to Arab regime change. When Al-Zawahiri assumed leadership of Al-Qa'ida, his communications focussed far more on the near enemy (although he did not exclude the far enemy).

Al-Qa'ida pulled back from targeting Muslims after several high-profile attacks in Saudi Arabia, though this was not because of any ideological difficulty associated with targeting

41 Osama bin Laden's teacher/mentor.

42 Even so, Azzam had reservations about the killing Muslims in the case of takfir. The permissibility of killing these individuals was pushed more by individuals such as Al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab Zarqawi.

apostates. In a letter from Al-Zawahiri to Zarqawi, Al-Zawahiri noted the moral rectitude of Zarqawi's attacks on Muslims, but admonished him anyway, citing the need to maintain public support (al-Zawahiri, 2005, p. 4). As such, other Muslims are morally licit targets, though practically discouraged.

Al-Qa'ida does not apply takfiri doctrine to all those it considers outside authentic Islam, nor declare them licit targets. Rather, it holds them to the same level of accountability that they hold the US and its allies to. Al-Qa'ida, in response to ideological competition with ISIS, qualified its call to violence. Originally inclined to justify excessive violence, such as with 9/11 or the 2005 London Subway Bombings, the unrestrained attacks of Islamic State led Al-Qa'ida leaders to warn against excessive violence. They warned that such an approach may be extra-legal (Holbrook, 2015, p. 95). The *General Guidelines for Jihād* (al Zawahiri, 2012) advises against targeting:

- Local regimes/forces except where they are parts of American forces, and when doing so, mujahideen must be clear they are fighting against the US and its influence
- Non-Sunni sects, except where they fight against Sunnis
- Christians, Sikhs and Muslims living in Muslim lands
- Those who've not acted aggressively against Islam
- Non-combatant women, children, and the families of combatants
- Peoples where attacks might inadvertently kill Muslims (such as with bombs, or in places like mosques and markets.

Notably, there is no specific prohibition on targeting these groups of people—they are simply undesirable, or less desirable, targets. This stands in contrast with typical Sunnite legal restrictions that prohibit the targeting of many groups including women, children the elderly, the blind, protected groups that are not attacking Muslims (dhimmi), monks, and classes of non-combatants such as slaves, peasants, craftsmen, infidel merchants, non-Muslim travellers, traders, tourists, or any people based solely on their citizenship (Kamolnick, 2013, p. 98).

In *General Guidelines for Jihād* al-Zawahiri (2005, pp. 2-3) explicitly states, "As far as targeting the proxies of America is concerned… the basic principle is to avoid entering in any conflict with them, except in the countries where confronting them becomes inevitable."

2.1.9 Miscellaneous Constitutive Norms

Whether opposing the far enemy abroad or closer to home, Al-Qa'ida's attitude toward the US and her allies have been foundational to Al-Qa'ida's identity. Established during the 90s, this relationship was firmly in place entering the new millennium. A 1996 fatwa called for all Muslims to engage the US and Israel, stating "Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy… the Americans and the Israelis" (bin Laden, 1996). Later, in a 1998 fatwa co-signed by al-Zawahiri (among others) and under the banner of the World Islamic Front, bin Laden (1998b) wrote:

> The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies, civilians and military, is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated… We, with Allah's help, call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.

Bin Laden was of the opinion that a sectarian focus, and attention on the near enemy, had led Al-Qa'ida down a path that killed Muslims indiscriminately, and which diverted resources away from tackling the far enemy—the more dire threat. Bin Laden announced his intention to attack the US in 1996, signalling a pivot away from Qutb and Faraj's condemnation of incumbent Muslim regimes to a new enemy. This focus continued under al Zawahiri who, following the death of bin Laden, appointed AQAP's[43] emir Nasir al-Wuhayshi, Al-Qa'ida's general manager, a move that aided in redirecting Al-Qa'ida's jihād away from its sectarian and near enemy focus (Celso, 2014, pp. 38,44). Under bin Laden and al Zawahiri, it created a narrative where the chief antagonists were primarily the crusader Zionist alliance (the US and her allies) and then the takfir apostate regimes of the Middle East, while the protagonists were the Muslim faithful. However, many within the jihādist community contest the moral legitimacy and tactical wisdom of targeting the West. The majority of jihādists regard the focus on the far enemy as diverting attention

43 Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula.

away from nearer apostate governments, and consider actions such as the destruction of the Twin Towers to be dangerously provocative (Celso, 2015, p. 23; Cottee, 2010, p. 338).

According to Holbrook (2015, p. 95), as ISIS became more influential, in order to differentiate itself Zawahiri began to highlight the more ideational and normative aspects of Al-Qa'ida (compared to the organisational). In the eulogy he presented for bin Laden, he presented Al-Qa'ida as an ideology that militants adhered to rather than an organisation. This policy was developed over proceeding years. In 2013, Zawahiri (in Holbrook, 2015, p. 95), stated, "What we share in terms of faith and jihād rises far above groups," and in 2014 he told As-Sahab[44], "Al-Qaeda is a mission before it is an organisation or group and, in this sense, it is expanding more." According to Zawahiri (in Holbrook, 2015, pp. 99-100):

> [Al-Qa'ida's approach is] to bring together the Ummah and to unify it around the message of unity, and [to] work towards the return of the rightly guided caliphate which is founded on the consultation and agreement of Muslims… We could not join the Ummah together if our vision was a vision [of] absolute power over it, the usurper of its rights, committing aggression towards it, or the overpowering of it.

According to Kfir (2015, pp. 236-237, 246), the core personnel of Al-Qa'ida identify three key complaints, and through that lens, decide who is a 'true' Muslim—truly part of the Ummah. The first is the presence of the West as an anti-spiritual force focussed on materialism, drawing Muslims away from their obligation, and opposed to Islam. Non-Muslims are those persons complicit in the spiritual corruption of the Arabian Peninsula. The second is the occupation of Muslim lands. Finally, there are those people complicit in economic corruption, typically against the Iraqi people. Al-Qa'ida sees itself as an eschatological movement directed at restoring and preserving the Ummah. Those people who are enemies of the Ummah are part of the aforementioned groups, though participation is not via rigorous criteria so much as it is through Al-Qa'ida's subjective judgement. Those who are no longer 'true' Muslims are castigated with the label Takfir. For Salafi-jihādist groups, un-Islamic action is equivalent to un-Islamic belief.

44 Al-Qa'ida's propaganda office.

2.1.10 Miscellaneous Regulative Norms

Al-Qa'ida has produced a large corpus of guides on how to conduct jihād. For those without the opportunity for training, Al-Qa'ida has a media network dedicated to providing it online. Al-Qa'ida has produced literature and movies on such topics as how to make bombs, suicide jackets, and positioning bombs in trucks. In its *Inspire* magazine, Al-Qa'ida runs a series of articles on how to conduct solo attacks using commonly available resources, as well as how to maximise casualties, although only 'citizens' are ever listed as targets. In more general terms, adherents to Al-Qa'ida's philosophy are called on to 'violently destroy the temporal world' (Bhatt, 2013, pp. 30-31). That is, by violent rejection of the temporal world, the perpetrator seeks to bring about a more desirable afterlife.

Al-Qa'ida promotes collective punishment and assigns guilt more broadly than to those directly responsible for crimes. Just as all Americans are complicit in the perceived crimes of their parent state by virtue of their participation in democracy, after the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published numerous cartoons depicting Mohammed, Al-Qa'ida called for the Danish Government to be held to account—by way of retaliation, Al-Qa'ida bombed the Danish embassy in Islamabad (Mendelsohn, 2014, p. 482). Adherents are called to hold any, and all, opposition as equally responsible (Bhatt, 2013, pp. 33-34).

2.2 Islamic State (ISIS)

2.2.1 Offensive or Defensive Positioning

ISIS frames its jihād both defensively and offensively (Robinson, 2017, pp. 172, 178). It positions Shi'ites as the main subject of its jihād and an imminent threat to Sunnis (Bunzel, 2015, p. 10). ISIS posits there is an anti-Sunni coalition composed of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The online magazine *Dabiq*[45] describes the Shi'ite threat, stating, "The precise observer and wise scrutinizer realizes that Shi'ism is the immediate danger and real challenge… The message of history is confirmed by the testimony of current events" (Islamic State, 2016a, p. 41). Besides threatening Sunnis, ISIS also accuses Shiism

45 ISIS' propaganda magazine.

of shirk—idolatry or polytheism—and therefore Shia are legitimate targets of offensive jihād, as it is the holy duty of devout Muslims to wage war against Shi'ite, as well as other religious groups such as Yazidis and Christians (Robinson, 2017, p. 179).

ISIS also opposes nationalism, especially that of Islamic nations in its geographical vicinity. Following its establishment, ISIS adopted a defensive rhetoric, citing opposition from the corrupt, subservient regional governments (Sardarnia & Safizadeh, 2017, p. 1276). According to former ISIS leader Abu Al-Baghdadi, "The rulers of Muslim lands are traitors, unbelievers, sinners, liars, deceivers, and criminals." In 2007 he stated, "[we believe that] fighting them is of greater necessity than fighting the occupying crusader" (Al-Baghdadi in Bunzel, March 2, 2015, p. 10). This constitutes a clear departure from the position of Al-Qa'ida, which has historically emphasised its opposition to the crusader alliance.

While ISIS asserts it is fighting defensively, it also promotes offensive Jihād. In 2007, ISIS leader Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi clarified the scope of ISIS's jihād, stating, "The end to which fighting the unbelievers leads is no idolater (*mushrik*) remaining in the world." He addressed the requirements of offensive jihād specifically in another speech, defining offensive jihād as "going after the apostate unbelievers by attacking [them] in their home territory, in order to make God's word most high and until there is no persecution"[46] (Al-Baghdadi in Bunzel, 2015, p. 10).

2.2.2 The Role of Hijrah

From its inception, ISIS has placed emphasis on the role of hijrah to the caliphate (Novenario, 2016, p. 958), and according to Chertoff et al. (2020, p. 3) the rise of IS marked a new period of jihādism. Unlike Al-Qa'ida, "key ideologues Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi stressed the mass recruitment of fighters, in stark contrast to [Al-Qa'ida's] emphasis on quality." Hijrah is central to ISIS's jihād strategy, stacking its militant core with immigrants (Chertoff et al., 2020, p. 3; Robinson, 2017, p. 182). Robinson asserts that this migration is a religious calling founded on hadith references and language.

46 'Persecution' in the sense meant here is consistent with 'idolatry'. Bunzel, C. (2015). *From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State*. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf.

Typically, hijrah for the purpose of waging jihād is only obligatory for those living in the Dar al-Harb and unable to observe their religious obligations. However, Islamic State (2014d, p. 3) encourages all peoples not under their umbrella to migrate, stating:

> Many readers are probably asking about their obligations towards the Khilafah... The first priority is to perform Hijrah from wherever you are to the Islamic State, from dārul-kufr to dārul-Islām. Rush to the shade of the Islamic State with your parents, siblings, spouses, and children.

With hijrah for the purpose of jihād being incumbent on those Muslims unable to perform their obligations in the Dar al-Harb, ISIS makes the case that 'true believers' are persecuted world-wide, even those in areas traditionally considered the Dar al-Islam, and therefore all Muslims are obligated to travel to its territory (Uberman & Shay, 2016). Specifically, Muslims are encouraged to migrate to ISIS controlled territory as, in addition to Western countries, ISIS vilifies Arab and Muslim countries, implying they are part of the Dar al-Harb. Islamic State (2015b, p. 22) asserts:

> with the revival of Islam's state, Hijrah is to the wilāyāt of the Khilāfah, not to Nusayrī, Rāfidī, Sahwah, or PKK territory, nor to America, Europe, and their tāghūt allies (most Arab and Muslim states especially secular states). Ibnul-Qayyim said that if the laws of Islam are not implemented somewhere, it is not Dārul- Islām.

The call to migrate is not optional, but rather an imperative as "The first priority is to perform hijrah from wherever you are to the Islamic State, from dārul-kufr to dārul-Islām. Rush to perform it as Mūsā ('alayhis-salām) rushed to his Lord, saying, (And I hastened to You, my Lord, that You be pleased) [Tāhā: 84]" (Aggarwal, 2017, p. 6).

Islamic State (2014e, p. 26) also explicitly links hijrah to jihād:

> [Muslim students] should know that their hijrah from dārul-kufr to dārul-Islām and jihād are more obligatory and urgent then spending an unknown number of years studying while exposed to doubts and desires that will destroy their religion and thus end for themselves any possible future of jihād.

Hijrah is obligatory and urgent due to the deleterious moral effect hesitation could cause. According to Islamic State, hijrah is the path to jihād, indeed, the first step towards jihād (Islamic State, 2014e, pp. 27-28). ISIS asserts hijrah is one of the steps for performing jihād, they being migrating to the Dar al-Islam or Caliphate, pledging allegiance to the emir or Caliph, and then training for and performing jihād (Islamic State, 2015e, p. 13).

Unlike other groups (such as Al-Qa'ida), IS does not excuse people from their duty to perform hijrah if it is likely to be dangerous. It asserts that even for those who are unsuccessful in completing their hijrah, the intention of performing hijrah is enough for individuals to gain the rewards of actually performing it (Islamic State, 2015e, p. 4):

> Many of those who attained shahādah[47] fighting the crusaders in their own lands had first taken steps to make hijrah to the lands of jihād. These preparatory steps were enough to demonstrate their sincerity, so they were granted shahādah without facing the difficulties of hijrah.

While individuals are morally compelled to migrate to the Caliphate according to Islamic State, 'returning fighters' are allowed by Islamic State. 'Returning fighters' refers to those jihādists who migrate *away* from the Caliphate, or Dar al-Islam, to the Dar al-Harb for the purposes of conducting jihād. This is an act of 'authorised jihād'. For such individuals, migration is an act of obedience and does not invalidate the good work they have done by conducting hijrah (Islamic State, 2014e, p. 11; Uberman & Shay, 2016, pp. 18-19).

ISIS recognises that there will be circumstances where migration is simply impossible, and states that Muslims who cannot migrate must pledge allegiance to the leader of the Caliphate stating, "if you cannot perform hijrah for whatever extraordinary reason, then try in your location to organise *bay'āt* (pledges of allegiance) to the Khalīfah Ibrāhīm" (Aggarwal, 2017, p. 6; Islamic State, 2014d, p. 3).

2.2.3 Martyrdom Operations

ISIS emphasises martyrdom to new recruits. IS's martyrdom narrative is a powerful

47 A profession of faith.

incentive to new recruits. Robinson (2017, p. 183) and Perry and Long (2016, p. 1) identify two messages in recruiting videos—that new recruits will be part of a new identity grounded in Islamic history, and should they die, they will become martyrs, " leaving a powerful story that recaptures religious history and inspires others." In the 2014 pronouncement *Your Lord is Watchful*, the author notes, "if he is killed, he illuminates the path for those after him and goes on to his Lord as a joyful martyr. He has taught those after him that might, honour, and life are through jihād and being killed, and that humiliation, disgrace, and death are through submission and subservience" (al-Shami, 2014).

In the three years following the establishment of the Caliphate, Islamic State published 15 martyr biographies from a broad range of countries in *Dabiq*[48]. Nanninga (2018, pp. 170-173, 180) identifies four themes in Islamic State's martyrdom narratives: the desire to embrace jihād, the desire to perform hijrah, the fraternal life of the caliphate soldier, and martyrdom. In these formulations, martyrdom forms part of a longer process of preparation for withdrawing from earthly life in preparation for martyrdom, leading to eventual death. In this narrative, ISIS encourages men to act as martyrs, evoking historical symbols, and distinguishes Islamic State fighters from the more passive outsiders.

2.2.4 Nationalist/Pan-Islamic Norms

ISIS believes its role is to establish the Caliphate for the end-of-days encounter to follow (Novenario, 2016, p. 955). ISIS asserts that its caliphate is predicted by prophecy, and uses this assertion to rebuff claims by Al-Qa'ida that it is too extreme (McCants, 2014), and in doing so differentiates itself from Al-Qa'ida and legitimises its actions. It claims it fulfilled this prophecy on June 29, 2010. ISIS asserts anyone purporting to be a true Muslim should reject typical notions of statehood and nationalism, and swear *bayah* – an oath of loyalty—to the Caliphate. ISIS rejects current national boundaries and asserts its own state identity based on historical notions of caliphate, with citizenship grounded in Islamic identity. ISIS is opposed to states and to state borders. According to IS, national borders were established by the 'crusaders' "to divide and disunite the Muslims, and carve up their lands in order to consolidate their control of the region" (Islamic State, 2014e, p. 18). During its expansion, ISIS established four administrative provinces (wilāyah), "to eliminate any remaining traces

48 ISIS propaganda magazine.

of the *kufri,* nationalistic borders from the hearts of the Muslims" (Islamic State, 2014e, p. 18). To this end, it frequently lambasts other nationalist groups such as the Taleban (Islamic State, 2017, p. 42). In ISIS literature, 'nationalist' is used in the pejorative sense to describe other groups and the opponents of Islamic State (such as Al-Qa'ida and the Taleban) (Islamic State, 2015a, pp. 7, 16; 2015d, p. 56; 2015e, p. 9). In this manner, its narrative acts constitutively, concurrently legitimising ISIS's identity, and delegitimising other jihādist groups, as well as nations.

IS's rejection of nationalism is also a rejection of modernism. ISIS identifies the social and cultural changes that led to the decline of the Middle East as coinciding with its colonisation by foreign powers, leading to the decline of Islamic values. Günther and Kaden (2016, p. 136) asserts that to IS, modernisation and colonialism are the same thing. The corollary to this is the idea that the Qu'ran and Hadith provide the ideological basis on which the Islamic world is to be re-established. For this reason, in 2014, Islamic State bulldozed the sand berm separating Iraq and Syria, destroying the separation both literally and figuratively.

ISIS points to its multi-ethnic composition as evidence of the Caliphate's legitimacy, contrasting it with geographic neighbours defined by national identities. According to Islamic State (2014e, pp. 5-6):

> If you were to go to the frontlines of ar-Raqqah, al-Barakah, etc., you would find the soldiers and the commanders to be of different lands: the Jordanian, the Tunisian, the Egyptian, the Somali, the Turk, the Albanian, the Chechen, the Indonesian and so on.

2.2.5 Caliphate Orientation

ISIS is clear about the role the Caliphate plays, declaring itself the embodiment of that Caliphate, and its leader, the Caliph. In June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the union between Jabat al-Nusra and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Islamic State), and declared himself its leader (Gomes & Mikhael, 2018, p. 17). There are regulative religious implications to the existence of a caliphate. According to Islamic State spokesperson Abū Muhammad al-'Adnānī ash-Shāmī in his speech *This Is the Promise of Allah,* with the establishment of a caliphate, other Jihādi groups become illegitimate, and should instead

ally themselves to the Islamic State (Hamming, 2017, p. 33). That is, 'all Muslims must accept the caliphate' (Aggarwal, 2017, p. 6). To Islamic State (2014c, p. 27), "anyone who rebels against its authority inside its territory is considered a renegade, and it is permissible to fight him after establishing the hujjah[49] against him".

Such action is permissible because of the divinely ordained nature of the caliphate—it is not simply a legalistic or political structure, "intended to fulfil a prophecy" (Aggarwal, 2017, p. 6). Instead, according to Islamic State (2014c, p. 34), "There will be prophethood for as long as Allah wills it to be, then He will remove it when He wills. Then there will be Khilafah on the prophetic methodology and it will be for as long as Allah wills, then He will remove it when He wills". Thus, it is necessary for Muslims to unite themselves to the caliphate for spiritual justification. ISIS quotes the hadith in support of this, saying, "if you cannot do any of the above for reasons extremely beyond your control, in shā'allah your intention and belief that the Islamic State is the Khilāfah for all Muslims will be sufficient to save you from the warning mentioned in the hadīth, 'Whoever dies without having bound himself by a bay'ah, dies a death of jāhiliyyah' [Sahīh Muslim]" (Islamic State, 2014d, p. 4).

According to Stern and Berger (2016), the establishment of the caliphate forms part of an important narrative, an eschatological worldview that capitalises on apocalyptic prophecies. Signs of the end times include an extant caliphate, conflict between Sunni and their opponents, the Shi'ite and Kurds, and the capture of Dabiq. When the *New York Times* interviewed Tunisian youth with Islamic State, they found disproportionately that they identified the establishment of the caliphate as an indication of the end times.

The reconstitution of the caliphate is part of a larger narrative that conceptualises a world at war with Islam, with a caliphate that comes to the aid of the Ummah. According to Islamic State, the Ummah has suffered protracted attacks, then been carved up by successive forces: the crusades, the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire, the imposition of the Sykes-Picot borders. In ISIS's narrative, the wars in Iraq and Syria are an extension of this. According

49 'Hujjah' literally means proof, but in use is more nuanced, especially in Islamic jurisprudence and theology. It typically refers to a position that is intellectually sound, such that it cannot be denied, and which is compelling enough that it must be acted upon, or that those acting upon it are justified in doing so.

to Islamic State spokesperson al-Shami (2014, p. 4), the primary victims are the innocent Ummah:

> [America] was not outraged when it saw the horrific scenes of the women and children of the Muslims taking their last breaths with their eyes glazed over due to the chemical weapons of the nusayriyyah.[50]

In this narrative, the wars in Iraq and Syria represent a continuation of oppression (al-Shami (2014):

> Take a lesson from our people in Iraq, for history repeats itself. Indeed, the crusaders began building the Iraqi safavid army by training its core in Jordan, with a few thousand soldiers, as they have decided to do today with regard to Shām.

Islamic State combines this oppression rhetoric with language that conflates the identity of the Ummah with that of Islamic State. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Muhammad al-Adnani describe ISIS in these words respectively (in Ehteshami et al., 2020, p. 93): "As for us, we can only say that your blood is our blood, and your destruction is our destruction," and, "[W]e are from you and you from us." It is in this context that the language of Islamic State presents the Caliphate as the 'bulwark' of Islam (Islamic State, 2016b, p. 4), with statements like (2015d)

> Go forth for jihād and defend your Islam wherever you may be. Allah said, "And what is the matter with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah and for the oppressed among men, women, and children who say, "Our Lord, take us out of this city of oppressive people and appoint for us from Yourself a protector and appoint for us from Yourself a helper"?

According to Ehteshami et al. (2020) this narrative has two implications: first, that ISIS is not the aggressor in the Iraq and Syrian conflicts; second, that the Caliphate is "obliged to raise up to support [the Ummah]" (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Ehteshami et al., 2020, p. 94), supporting the legitimacy of ISIS's jihād.

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50 A minority Shi'ite sect.

Through the caliphate narrative, IS is demonstrating its effort to rule its normative sphere. An individual's legitimacy is contingent upon their connection to the caliphate, and their attitude towards the caliphate will be reflected in their behaviour towards it. Rejection of the caliphate casts competing groups as being *fitna*[51] (subversive), and morally equivalent to polytheists (Aggarwal, 2017, p. 7). IS asserts (Islamic State, 2015b, p. 10):

> Know that it is undeniably a trait of the people of deviance to remain divided without having a single imām. For this reason, Ahlus-Sunnah are called Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamā'ah, meaning they follow the Sunnah and adhere to the Muslim body embodied in the khilāfah and its imām while distancing themselves from the deviant sects and the mutinous parties.

2.2.6 The Source of Authority to Jihād

Following on from Islamic State's assertion of being the embodiment of the divinely ordained caliphate, it presents itself as the sole authority for declaring jihād. This is illustrated in *Dabiq*, which publishes several biographical stories of soldiers seeking permission from authorities within IS. In some cases, this is permission to conduct martyrdom operations, such as in the case of Abū Sulaymān al-Shāmī (Islamic State, 2017, p. 45). Other times, it is permission to fight only, such as in the case of Abū 'Abdullāh al-Brītānī (Islamic State, 2016b, p. 15). These accounts are similar to Al-Qa'ida's, both serving to demonstrate the respective organisations' authority to wage jihād.

Islamic State (2015c, p. 15) argues that while children should respect their parents' wishes, that does not apply in the case of jihād, where jihād is obligatory "on each and every individual". It makes the case that in such situations, children should gently admonish their parents and ignore their wishes. it does not limit this exhortation to parents, but rather expands it to include anyone who opposes IS's viewpoint, such as imams. In this way, Islamic State creates a competition between its own authority and any counter authority in seeking to delegitimise any who don't conform to Islamic State narrative.

51 Rebellion and/or unrest, especially against a rightful ruler.

2.2.7 Who Can Wage Jihād?

There are few restrictions on who can wage jihād, though women are prohibited from conducting jihād, except in rare circumstances. Vale (2019, p. 3) has suggested that Islamic State believes a woman's rightful place is in the home, and where women are given a role, it is often limited to a support role. ISIS sees "the Ummah of ours as a body made of many parts, but the part that works most towards and is most effective in raising a Muslim generation is the part of the nurturing mother" (Islamic State, 2015b, p. 44).

There was, however, a distinct change in policy in October 2017. After years of rejecting the female calls to join in *qital* (fighting) Islamic State acquiesced. Faced with territorial loss and ongoing battlefield defeats, Islamic State called for women to participate openly in jihād. There is debate whether the change was for tactical reason, or represented a change in gender norms.

2.2.8 Who/What are Valid Operational Targets?

ISIS's primary focus is the threat posed by apostate rulers who claim authority over the Ummah. Former ISIS leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi stated, "The rulers of the Muslim lands are traitors, unbelievers, sinners, liars, deceivers and criminals." He argued that, "fighting them [local rulers] is of greater necessity than fighting the occupying crusader" (quoted in Robinson, 2017, p. 178). These apostate actors include the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Suria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Afghanistan[52], as well as jihādist groups such as the Egyptian Brotherhood, Al-Qa'ida and Hamas, and other groups such as the Shi'ite and Kurds (Gomes & Mikhael, 2018, p. 18).

Like other jihādist groups, the aim of ISIS is reversing the status of Islam, which it perceives as occupying a place of submission. The steps to liberation that ISIS identifies differ from Al-Qa'ida, beginning with territorial domination of the Middle East (Gomes & Mikhael, 2018, pp. 17-18). Zarqawi's rhetoric fuses Al-Qa'ida's far enemy rhetoric with the local demographic's mix of grievances, conflating the presence of US forces with the ongoing Sunni/Shiite/Kurd conflicts (Celso, 2015, p. 24). In a 2004 letter from Zarqawi to bin Laden

52 At that point Afghanistan was under the authority of the Islamic Republic government, not the Taleban.

and Al-Zawahiri, Islamic State differentiated itself from Al-Qa'ida, counselling Al-Qa'ida to make the Shi'ite its primary focus, calling Shia 'the most evil of mankind' and 'the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom' (Zarqawi quoted in Ghobadzdeh & Akbarzadeh, 2015, p. 693).

Constitutively, Islamic State holds a far more binary worldview than AQ. IS's enemies also include all those not included in the Islamic State identity. Like other organisations, it identifies crusaders and apostates. However, where other organisations are more lenient to apostates and takfir Muslims, to Islamic State, anyone not under their umbrella is a valid target. While Islamic State differentiates between groups and individuals, it does so to enumerate the differences between their character. 'Crusaders' are those designated as non-Muslim intruders. 'Apostates' are those who are not worthy of being part of the Dar al-Islam through such causes as laxity of faith or religious practice, or departure from the true faith. Apostate regimes are any regime that is not part of the caliphate. While Islamic State narrative differentiates between these identity groups, strategically, by virtue of not being subservient to Islamic State, they are all still legitimate targets of violent attack (Perry & Long, 2016, p. 7).

ISIS has persecuted several minorities relentlessly, including Yazidis, Christians and Shi'ite Muslims, with those killed or dislocated numbering in the hundreds of thousands. For example, in August 2014, thousands of Yazidi men were murdered in Sinjar, with the women raped and/or sold into slavery (Esposito, 2015, pp. 1075-1076; Robinson, 2017, p. 175). To IS, Yazidis are devil worshippers whose continued existence it will need to justify on the day of judgement. Further, it claims that, due to the unique evolution of their religion, Yazidi women and children are fit for enslavement (Islamic State, 2014e, pp. 14-15).

2.3 The Taleban

2.3.1 Offensive or Defensive Positioning

According to Johnson (2013, p. 7), "Although some Western observers have portrayed the Taliban as mindless fanatics, the facts do not support this assertion. The Taliban have proven to be quite sophisticated and are fighting a dynamic and enduring defensive jihād."

The Taleban posits that their jihād is a defensive response to the imposition of colonial rule. According to Mullah Omar, "It should be remembered that we neither attack anyone nor did we occupy anyone's land. We are only engaging in Jihād against those who have indulged in aggression against us" (Mullah Omar in Taliban in the *Khurasan*, 2013, p. 2). The Taleban asserts, "[we] have chosen the path of WAR in order to defend ourselves from your oppression. God Willing, we will continue with this war and you will find us persistent" (Imam Anwar al Awlaki The Taliban, 2013, p. 12)[53].

The Taleban believes that opposition to it is opposition to Allah and the prophet, and is acting against Islam. Those opposers must be violently removed. Violence against infidels is not tactical, but strategic, and tolerance is considered indecisive action. Under the Taleban, it is not simply enough to be violent against those who oppose it. Rather, violence must also be meted out to those who are likely to oppose it, or those who even have the potential to oppose it. This is not simply a strategic deliberation—it is an ideological response. The Taleban asserts such a position is supported in the hadith. For example, they quote the hadith asserting, "My victory is to spread my fears a month in advance" (Sahih Bukhari in Moheq, 2019, pp. 496-497). So, while the Taleban posture is as fighting a defensive war, it advocates the spread of Islam through unrestrained violence that makes belonging to the Ummah peaceful by comparison (Taliban in the Khurasan, 2013, p. 31):

> The purpose of offensive jihād is not to convert the Kuffar to Islam. Converting someone is forbidden in Islam because guidance is in the hands of Allah alone. However, the Kuffar are not allowed to establish a ruling system on earth because the earth belongs to Allah and only his righteous slaves are allowed to inherit it. Hence this is the purpose of offensive jihād – to eliminate all elements that are acting as obstacles for the rest of the people converting to Islam; this is because when the people will see the open system of Islam and the peace that it brings, they will all willingly embrace Islam (History bears witness to this).

While the narrative coming from the Taleban is that of a jihād against all powers that work against the caliphate it embodies, in operational terms, the Taleban's jihād has been targeted

53 The context of this quote does not indicate who the 'your' refers to. It is an article about preparing for a suicide attack.

at regaining power in Afghanistan by way of destabilising the presiding government. Since its ousting in 2001, the Taleban has been fighting to regain power in the country, controlling varying amounts of the country, until it resumed control in 2021.

2.3.2 The Role of Hijrah

The Taleban draws no special attention to the role of hijrah and do not link it to its jihād, and there is a dearth of literature on the role of hijrah in Taleban discourse. In *Azan*, the Taleban's short-lived propaganda magazine (five editions in 2013-2014), hijrah is mentioned in passing numerous times. Typically, these are in the form of interviews of individuals who have performed hijrah, or are generalised calls to hijrah. However, these calls are general in nature, regarding migration to Islamic territory, and not of the same nature as IS's call to migrate to its caliphate to perform jihād. A typical statement reads, "doing an attack in the West is extremely difficult, but if you fall under this category it doesn't relinquish you from the duty of Hijrah to the lands of Jihād," or, "Also my brother, if you intend on making Hijrah, many of the lands of Jihād allow for you to bring your family along with yourself" (Taliban in the Khurasan, 2013, p. 27)[54]. As such, hijrah may best be described as adjacent to jihād for the Taleban.

2.3.3 Martyrdom Operations

The first recorded use of suicide bombing as a tactic in Afghanistan was an Al-Qa'ida attack in 2001. From 2002 to 2005 there were only four attacks in total. The Taleban adopted suicide attacks as a key strategy post-2005. In 2005 the Taleban met with Iraqi insurgents who encouraged the use of suicide bombing and IEDs (which had been useful against US forces in Iraq). After meeting with the Iraqis, that number jumped to 21 in 2005 and stayed high with at 139, 160, 146, 180, 140, and 96 in the years 2006-11. 2006 saw a marked increase in martyrdom operations. This marks an important tactical departure from the Afghani cultural aversion to suicide. Mullar Omar was originally concerned about using suicide bombers due to the risk the practice posed to civilians (Dearing, 2010, p. 1086; Johnson, 2013, pp. 10-12). There is also evidence that women play a role in the process of developing martyrs, encouraging their sons to become martyrs (de Leede, 2014, p. 7).

54 See also Taliban in the Khurasan. (2013). *Azan* (3 ed.). Taliban in Khurasan. and Taliban in the Khurasan. (2014). *Azan* (6 ed.). Taliban in Khurasan.

The Taleban differentiates between suicide and martyrdom. 'Suicide' is the result of such causes as discontentment and isolation. 'Martyrdom operations' are those operations where an operative causes his own death for a valid benefit to Islam as determined by the mujahideen and scholars, and is permissible. This doctrine differs from competing norms, such as that of the ideologically close jihādist organisation Lashkar-e-taiba in that, where the Lashkar are allowed to enter an operation with a high probability of death, the Taleban allows it in the case of certitude. In Taleban propaganda magazine Azam, they claim that support for such operations can be found in a variety of maddhabs. They cite 'scholarly verdicts' from a variety of sources: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali. The conditions which may justify these attacks include: inflicting a large number of casualties; inspiring terror, and demonstration of Islam's strength; and inciting emulation. It is also asserted that the Maliki, Shafi' and Hanbali schools also permit suicide in cases where there is the possibility of large numbers of enemy casualties. They state, "this is why martyrdom operations are allowed because they constitute sacrificing one's life for raising high the Word of Allah, spreading His Religion, terrorizing His enemies and encouraging His slaves (i.e. Muslims) to fight." They state, "it does not matter whether the martyrdom seeker kills himself by his own hands or by the hands of the enemy as long as the intention is valid i.e. to Raise High the Word of Allah and to establish Islam, terrorize the Kuffar etc…" (The Taliban, 2013, pp. 21-24).

2.3.4 Nationalist/Pan-Islamic Norms

The Taleban have expressed mixed signals in relation to their position on nationalism. It has often expressed nationalist language, and in doing so has attracted the ire of Al-Qa'ida (Rid, 2010), such as when Mullah Omar (2009) called the Taleban, "a robust Islamic and nationalist movement," and stated, "assure all countries that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan… will not extend its hand to jeopardize others, as it itself does not allow others to jeopardize us." According to Clancy (2018, p. 6) the Taleban operates at the level of an emerging state actor—that is, supplanting the existing Afghani polity, although it has also been credited as an attempt to distance the Taleban from Al-Qa'ida.

While the Taleban preaches an anti-nationalist identity, it bears the hallmarks of its tribalist origins. The ranks of the Taleban are filled with those who share deep commonalities of

identity—their Pashtun heritage, their attendance at Deobandi[55] madrassas, their shared religious identities, and the mark of Al-Qa'ida's influence on them (Harpviken, 2012, p. 214). The leadership of the Taleban largely comes from the same Pashtun tribal group and Deobandi madrassas near the Afghanistan border with Pakistan. The tribal identity is exacerbated by the Taleban's use of the 'village identity' to mobilise rural Pashtuns to their cause (Ahmed, 2014, p. 88) and it has fostered a Pashtun-style nationalism (Soherwordi et al., 2012, p. 348). While the Taleban looks towards an eventual Islamic caliphate, the immediate goal is achieving regional power (Chertoff et al., 2020, p. 3). Other goals, such as the implementation of Shari'ah, are dependent on gaining power, and so until 2021 the group largely remained tribalistic (Moheq, 2019, p. 497). While analysis varies, the majority consensus is that the Taleban espouses Pashtun nationalism with an Islamic character. The Taleban interpretation of Shari'ah was "deeply influenced by the Pashtun code of conduct called Pashtunwali" (Soherwordi et al., 2012, p. 348). Klein (2009) asserts that the Taleban could equally be called the 'Pashtun Liberation Army' based on their worldview that conceives the Afghan national boundary terminating along tribal grounds demarked by the Pashtun group.

While the Taleban's identity has elements of Pashtun nationalism and Islamism, there is a third factor that characterises their worldview, hostility to outsiders. Ahmed (2014) recounts an altercation between northern Uzbeks and the Taleban. At talks, both Sunni groups offered their midday prayers separately (against the teaching of Islam). On analysis, Ahmed asserts this is due to the influence of Al-Qa'ida, and that its ideological abhorrence to all outsiders was taken up by the Taleban.

The Taleban claims it espouses a purely Islamic identity, uncorrupted by tribalism or nationalism. The Taleban asserts there is a contradiction between nationalism and Islam, and that contradiction has proven a disaster for Islam (Taliban in the Khurasan, 2013, p. 68). Instead, "Allah, The Exalted has not made us slaves of nationalism. Instead, He Has Made us

55 The Deoband movement is a revivalist that originated in the 19th century in the Darul Uloom Madrassa in India. The Deoband movement emerged in response to the perceived threat of cultural and religious domination by India and Western powers, and British colonialism in particular. It is a Sunni Islam movement that adheres to Hanafi school of thought. The movement is characterised by its religious conservativism and rigidly dogmatic ideology (Petrova, 2019).

slaves of Himself and Has united us upon Iman (belief), Taqwa (piety) and Jihād" (Taliban in the Khurasan, 2013, p. 70). The Taleban also denounces notions of group identity that are based around being born in a particular town or territory, or by being part of a specific ethnic group. There is extensive literature denouncing identities that are not founded on, or that are in additional to, the Islamic identity (Taliban in the Khurasan, 2013, pp. 18-22; 2014, pp. 12-15).

The Taleban in Khurasan relies on the Ummah identity as an ordering narrative. Ingram (2015, pp. 572-573) asserts it uses "the nation-state to demonstrate how the kufr (disbelievers) and their human-made constructs have divided the transnational ummah." Strictly, the Taleban are not nationalistic, asserting that the nation-state system was imposed on Islam to destroy the caliphate. National armies came with colonisation, furthering nationalist interests, and supplanting and undermining the call to jihād. More likely, likening Taleban rule to a caliphate legitimises Taleban rule. Writing for the Taleban Qasim asserts (Taliban in the Khurasan, 2013, pp. 23-32):

> After the fall of the Khilafah and the rise of the nation-state, these nationalistic armies were implanted upon the Muslim Ummah – and many of the Muslims were made to believe that Jihād was the duty of these armies and the rest of the Ummah was absolved of this duty. What this meant was that the spirit of Jihād to establish the Rule of Allah faded away from the masses and the scholars, and Islam became restricted to the Masjid and the madrassah.
>
> Among the evils that this secularized system has inflicted upon the Muslim Ummah is the concept of 'countries' or 'nation-states' that have been implemented upon the masses as if they represent the only form of collectivism for the people of the world.
>
> Therefore, there is no concept of 'borders' in Islam. Rather, Islam considers it the duty of the Muslims to spread the message of Islam throughout the earth through the methodology of dawah [preaching] and jihād until there remains none to be worshipped except Allah and the law of Allah pervades throughout the earth.

According to Ahmed (2014, pp. 83, 88, 92), the politico-religious orientations of elite Pashtuns was transformed in the madrassas of Pakistan into religious nationalism. Pashtuns are more rural than urban, and the Taleban leveraged its tribal identity to mobilise people in its cause. Pashtuns fighting for the Taleban fought for ideas related to nationality, while the Taleban fought for ideas related to religion. It should be noted that the Taleban Leadership Council considers the madrassas of Afghanistan as vehicles for jihād (Mullah Akhtar inAggarwal, 2017, p. 9).

2.3.5 Caliphate Orientation

The Taleban tends towards nationalism but claims it is a stepping stone on the path to a global caliphate, asserting that the nation-state system was imposed on Islam to destroy the caliphate. Colonisation expanded the nation-state paradigm and colonial interests, supplanting and undermining the caliphate. The association between the Taleban rule and the caliphate serves to legitimise Taleban rule.

The return of the caliphate is prophetically predicted and of eschatological significance, with the Taleban asserting, "The world today stands at the eve of the return to Khilafah as was destined to happen according to Ahadith of the Messenger of Allah: 'Indeed Allah Gathered and folded the earth for me, and I saw the East of it and the West of it. And the Dominion of my nation will reach that which was folded from it'" (Taliban in the Khurasan, 2013, p. 3). The Taleban claim there are clear indications that the wait for the return of the caliphate is almost over: "The Ummah of Prophet Muhammad has almost passed through these several stages that precede the return of the Khilafah," and, "a change is coming. And the construction of a new world where the Law of Allah - and not the law of the jungle - shall Reign Supreme… The religion of Allah is destined to be victorious and the establishment of the Caliphate is already decreed" (Taliban in the Khurasan, 2013, pp. 10, 16).

Unlike groups like Islamic State, the Taleban asserts a Caliphate cannot be arbitrarily imposed (Taliban in the Khurasan, 2013, p. 29):

> In an Islamic system, every socio-economic institution must refer back to the Divine Source. Even the ruler – the Khalifah – is not to declare his own

> sovereignty and impose his law upon the people… the Khilafah is only a collective impression of mankind – to submit collectively to the Law of Allah.

In the Taleban's conception, the term 'Caliphate' describes a correctly ordered system, a religious polity that meets certain conditions, and not something that can be imposed outright. It is not imposed from the top-down. These conditions are enumerated by Qari Tayyab, Maulana and Imam Mawardi in Taliban in the Khurasan (2014, pp. 30-35):

1. Sovereign authority is given to Allah. In practical terms, this means, "the truthful Prophet or a successor of his (called the Ameer or Khalifah [Caliph]) has been made Allah's Deputy or Governor".
2. Shari'ah is the legal code.
3. The polity must revolve around a *Majlis ash-Shoora*, an Islamic advisory/consultative council that helps guide the Caliph.
4. The Caliphate must cultivate *deen*, meaning the way of life people must live to be in accord with divine law, which encompasses belief, deeds and character.
5. 'Brotherhood among Muslims and peace for all mankind' must be cultivated. This means developing a fraternity among Muslims, and the expansion of the Caliphate to encompass all nations.
6. The people should declare *Bayah*, a pledge of allegiance by the people to the Caliph or emir.
7. Practical obedience. That is, individuals must follow through with their pledge of obedience.

Within that established caliphate, the Caliph has numerous obligations, including to wage jihād against 'those who oppose Islam after being called to it until they accept it or enter into the dimmah[56].'

While other groups reject nationalism, nationalism in itself is not a problem for the Taleban, so long as it is a stepping-stone on the way to the caliphate. This comes with the prophetic assurance that, "The world is watching as the path to Khilafah foretold by Prophet Muhammad is weaving itself forth right under the noses of the Western powers" (Quasim,

56 Dimmah: Surety; an assertion of protection.

Mohammad in Taliban in the Khurasan, 2013, p. 16). Indeed, this sea-change has already started to manifest in Mali, Iraq, Yemen, and Pakistan (*Taliban in the Khurasan*, 2013, pp. 15-16).

In 1994, Mullah Omar adopted the title Amir al-Mu'minin, 'translating roughly to 'commander of the faithful'. This tile is synonymous with that of caliph and carries with it the implication of compulsory obedience for the faithful (Raqib & Barreto, 2013, p. 140). This speaks also to the Taleban conception of to whom authority to wage jihād belongs.

2.3.6 The Source of Authority to Jihād

In similar fashion to ISIS, according to Aggarwal (2017, p. 10) the Taleban claims leadership of the jihād in Afghanistan, of which it is the sole authority:

> The Islamic Emirate insists on the unity of the jihādist ranks in Afghanistan because it is ordered to keep a jihādist rank united and solid in practice, and in this respect God (may He be exalted) orders, 'Indeed, Allah loves those who fight on his path as a rank as if they are a solid structure' (Taliban in Aggarwal, 2017, p. 10).

It does this as part of broader claim by the Taleban to be the most sole embodiment of correct societal order:

> One foundational reason for the blasphemous slaughter under America's leadership in Afghanistan was to end the sole type of Islamic government that was established on the basis of the enlightened teachings of the Sunnis (ahl-e Sunnat wa'l jamā'at) according to the orders of the Quran and Hadith (Taliban in Aggarwal, 2017, p. 10).

2.3.7 Who Can Wage Jihād?

The Taleban has a clear position on the role of women in jihād—that while they may play a supporting role, they are not active participants in violent struggle. The Taleban profess no female martyrs (prior to 2010) and nor do they use children as fighters (Johnson, 2013, pp. 19-20). There are historical incidences of female martyrs in Afghanistan, but not in the

Taleban, which suggests a cultural element distinct to the Taleban, and likely attributable to their Deobandi tribal identity (Dearing, 2010, pp. 1087-1088). According to Dearing, women played a strong supportive role in the jihād against the Soviet forces, but since then they have become increasingly side-lined by the Taleban in jihād. The prohibition against females in jihād has likely come from the tribal origins of the Taleban. Dearing recounts an anecdote where a woman wanted to be a suicide bomber in the Afghan-Soviet war, but was told her brother's duty came first.

According to Johnson and DuPee (2012), children (specifically those without beards) are forbidden from engaging in jihād. However, he asserts this may not be so much out of concern for children as it is a social justice issue: male-on-male sexual activity is frowned upon by the Taleban and has grown to problematic levels such that this may be more concerned with removing youth from adults sleeping quarters.

2.3.8 Who/What are Valid Operational Targets?

The Taleban have tried to fashion its fight in terms of jihād, as an insurgence (Giustozzi, 2014, pp. 285-286, 294). While the Taleban asserts that its conflict is with Western forces, it does not adhere to international principles of valid targets. The Laheya (2010 edition) includes the following stipulations:

- Only the Emir, his deputy of the provincial qazi, can order the killing of a war prisoner
- Torture is not allowed
- Civilian collaborators, employees of private security companies are to be given the death penalty by the district qazi
- There is ambiguity about whether drivers should be killed outright, or whether the execution should be ordered by the district qazi
- Mutilation and kidnapping are forbidden

Tactics permitted in the Taleban jihādist arsenal are expansive, with the Taleban believing that it can use any means to achieve its goal in forming the perfect Islamic state. This is based on the notion that trickery is a legitimate tactic in war (Moheq, 2019, p. 497). Though America is the Taleban's primary target, there many. Under the title *Jihād begins Against*

America, it asserts (Taliban in the Khurasan, 2014, p. 13):

> Ever since the fall of the Khilafah, those who seek its return in the Muslim world have been oppressed by the Tawagheet that rule with an iron fist in the Muslim world. This oppression has had the full support of the US and its allies. In the 1990's, many of the Mujahideen came to the following conclusion: The reestablishment of the Khilafah in the Muslim world is only achievable once America has been degraded to the point when it can no longer meddle in the affairs of Muslims.

It is of note that when, in 2015, the Islamic State Korasan (Islamic State-K) entered the Taleban's geographical arena, the Taleban declared jihād against that group (Weigand, 2017, p. 369).

Unlike the Haqqani Network, the Taleban explicitly rejects kidnapping as a tactic. This is laid down overtly in the *Layeha*, the Taleban's code of conduct (Johnson & DuPee, 2012, p. 82).

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a review of the jihādist practices and beliefs embraced by Al-Qa'ida, Islamic State and the Taleban. As the next chapter provides an analysis of these same norms expressed in Saudi narrative, this chapter provided a metric against which those norms might be compared, searching for similarities and differences.

This chapter recounted the variances between jihādist organisations' positions on the differing aspects of jihād. Where those organisations explicitly and purposively differentiated themselves from each other, it was recounted. Most importantly, this chapter has illustrated and documented that, in all areas covered, there are demonstrable differences in the practice and ideology of the various aspects of jihād. The expressions of jihād reviewed operate both in regulative and constitutive ways, defining appropriate standards of behaviour, and what is prohibited, as well as who belongs to the class of Muslims in good standing, who is outside that group, and what is the relationship between the two.

All the groups assert they are authoritative, to the exclusion of other groups that contradict them, and in the case of Al-Qa'ida and Islamic State, this has caused them to directly address the legitimacy of the authority and actions of each other. This is most pronounced on those norms that speak directly to where the authority to wage jihād lies. In claiming for themselves the moral authority to wage and regulate jihād, these groups delegitimise other groups' moral authority. That is, each group's legitimacy is fundamentally tied to the norms it is advancing. While there is broad consensus on a range of topics, such as the legitimacy and moral rectitude of martyrdom operations, the organisations claim for their own the right to declare what is, and is not, valid. In some areas, there is little commonality, such as who is a valid, or preferable target, for jihād. These findings are especially interesting given the fungible nature of the human assets of the organisation, and speak to the central role that the leader plays in defining the norms of the organisation.

As noted in the introduction, there are a number of constraints that prohibit a more in-depth analysis of the various norms put forward by the various groups, though it will become apparent in the following chapters that there is sufficient detail to draw conclusions when looking at Saudi rhetoric based on commonalities and difference, just as this chapter clearly demonstrated commonality and difference.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Model

> Brian: "Why are women not allowed to go to stonings, Mum?"
>
> Mum: "It's written, that's why!"
>
> -Monty Python, *The Life of Brian*

The previous chapter showed how jihād has been the subject of ongoing discourse, with the doctrine continuously evolving since its birth in the proto-Islamic community. Within that discussion are further conversations about the legitimacy and limits of the various aspects of jihād. The nature of the development of jihād points to its ideational nature. While it has formulations in the Qu'ran, and though some recognise the role of ahadith in the construction of jihād, it is primarily pushed forward by reason, and is the result of broad acceptance that the doctrine has enjoyed in Islam. The ideological nature of jihād calls for a theoretical framework that is suitable for its conception and analysis.

This chapter introduces Critical Constructivism as the paradigm for analysis. Emerging in the 1990s, Social Constructivism is a theoretical approach that emphasises the role of norms, ideas and beliefs in shaping behaviour. Critical Constructivism is an off-shoot of social constructivism, and the two share a common epistemology—that the world can be viewed as a social construction and can be analysed through a linguistic lens. However, Critical Constructivism differs in ways that make it a suitable paradigm for this study. Unlike other Constructivisms that centralise the role of the state as the object of analysis, Critical Constructivism centralises the role of norms. Language is important in Critical Constructivism as the intermediary between the signifier and the signified. In this conception, actors do not choose between priorities (as they may be seen to do in rationalist approaches) but rather, in their decision-making processes, are depicters of the narrative they adopt. Additionally, Critical Constructivism is better suited to analysing identities that are internally constructed (Cho, 2012, pp. 309-311). This is based on several characteristics of Critical Constructivism. First, it recognises that identities are internally constructed and subjective. Further, it challenges essentialism, the belief that identities are inherent and fixed, by emphasising the socially constructed nature of identities. The state in this conception is not an essentialist ontological entity, and the internal workings matter.

Critical Constructivism has other salient characteristics that make it suitable for this study. Critical Constructivism emphasises the importance of textual artefacts, and seeks not to simply describe social processes, but also to understand them. Additionally, it emphasises the role of language in the process of 'othering', and examines the role of power in narrative. It does this by recognising that power does not solely reside in agents, but is also a product of social structures and institutions. It is also relational, being exercised through relationships and interactions. Finally, it recognises that language is not neutral, that it is shaped by power structures, and used to delegitimise other agents. This speaks to the research questions that asks, should norms be found in Saudi national polity narrative, what do they mean?

As this study seeks to identify norms in Saudi narrative, it also addresses what constitutes a norm. After showing the paradigmatic appropriateness of Critical Constructivism, this chapter seeks to identify what a 'norm' is: that is, its roles as constitutive and regulative, defining the limits of group identities, and appropriate standards of behaviour. To do this, the chapter examines norms as expressed in the Norm cascade model, and then Securitisation to discern the unifying characteristic that makes a norm 'jihādist'.

Finally, this chapter examines Qualitative Content Analysis as an appropriate methodology for this study. Most importantly, this chapter shows there is 'methodological congruence' between the different elements that are drawn together herein. That is, the methodology and paradigm are suited both to each other and to the research questions.

3.1 Theoretical Framework and Methodology

It is important to situate a study on norms within a theoretical framework and methodology that adequately conceptualises them. State behaviour is largely the result of the actions of policymakers governed by various interests. Current research into the relationship between jihād and the state largely adopts a rationalist approach, focusing on the utility which jihād and jihādists provide to the state. Rationalism adopts the 'logic of consequentialism', and is concerned with such matters as jihād's material benefit to the state, the role of insurgents as military proxies, and the value provided by using militants as proxies (Risse, 2000, p. 6). For rationalists qualifying 'jihād', demarcating the boundaries of what is jihādist activity is sufficient. However, Risse (2000, p. 5) asserts that actors are not always rational, and that

"collective norms and understandings constitute the social identities of actors and also define the basic rules of the game." So, for a more nuanced understanding of state behaviour, a purely rationalist examination of the relationship between state and jihād is insufficient.

Any examination of norms must build its foundation on an appropriate framework for analysis. It is appropriate for an enquiry into the role of norms to adopt a framework, or frameworks, that centralises norms. Creswell (2018, p. 50) labels this methodological congruence, where questions, theoretical framework and methodology are all interrelated, and form a cohesive whole. According to Creswell (2007, p. 42):

> The process of designing a qualitative study begins not with the methods… but instead with the broad assumptions central to qualitative inquiry, a worldview consistent with it, and in many cases, a theoretical lens that shapes the study.

This study uses norm-centric paradigms for situating the relationship between norms and the state. Social constructivism typically centralises the state. That is, where norms are the subject of analysis, they are typically examined in the context of the state. Critical Constructivism is less preoccupied with the state than it is with is with discourse, endogenously created norms, and latent meaning—the active process of interpretation and construction of reality. Likewise, Finnemore and Sikkink's model of the norm life-cycle (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), and the Copenhagen School's Securitisation (Buzan et al., 1998) define the origins of norms, and their regulative and constitutive nature.

3.2 Critical Constructivism as the Theoretical Framework

Being concerned with norms as expressed in Saudi national narrative, this study adopts Critical Constructivism as a theoretical framework. Constructivism emerged in the late 1980s to 90s as part of the *constructivist turn* that saw International Relations expand its theoretical foundations from rationalist formulations to a framework that more comprehensively acknowledges ideational factors and their influence on human interaction. The end of the Cold War catalysed the emergence of Constructivism as states' identities, previously relatively stable, went through rapid change, and the international community saw the rise of an array of behaviour changing norms, such as democracy, environmentalism and human rights. Collectively, this led to a renewed emphasis on the role of socially

constructed norms in Social Constructivism (usually just Constructivism) (Choi, 2015, p. 113). Constructivism asserts ideational factors (norms) influence human interactions, and therefore a comprehensive analysis of International Relations must therefore also be subject to social analysis. Constructivism emphasises the role of intersubjective beliefs. Irreducible to individual actors or small groups, these shared conceptions determine the identities and interests of actors (Aradau et al., 2014, p. 60). Katzenstein et al. (1998, pp. 679-680) note norms "describe collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity".

According to Katzenstein (1996, p. 5), norms are both:

- *Constitutive*—rules that define the identity of an actor, allowing others to identify group members
- *Regulative*—specifying the proper standards of behaviour.

That is, within Constructivism, norms are not held merely to influence or constrain state behaviour, but instead define and redefine their interests, identities, and standards of behaviour.

In the late 1980s, Social Constructivism fractured into Conventional Constructivism (also called Traditional Constructivism, or simply Constructivism) and Critical Constructivism, based on the work of postmodernists such as Foucault, Derrida and Lyotard. A subset of Constructivism, Critical Constructivism shares with Conventional Constructivism the assumption that the world is a social construction, an artifice, and looks to sociological and linguistic approaches for analysis (Dias, 2013, p. 258). Further, both Conventional Constructivism and Critical Constructivism share several fundamental tenets. Specifically, they both:

- aim to denaturalise the social world—they seek to empirically discover the way that institutions, identities and practices that are commonly accepted as natural are rather the product of social construction and/or human agency;
- assert the existence of intersubjective meaning and reality, and that understanding this is crucial for understanding the world;

- assert that data is contextual, and must be analysed and contextualised in the social environment in which it is gathered to understand its meaning;
- assert that personal, individual agency plays a foundational role in the the construction of ideas;
- and assert that 'self' and 'society' are reflexive, and that 'actors' and 'structures' are mutually constitutive. (Hopf, 1998, p. 182; Weldes, 1998, p. 217)

There are also differences between Conventional and Critical Constructivism, the most important being where norms and the state are situated. Conventional Constructivism centralises the state and focusses on how norms influence state behaviour and create structure. This focus on state reaction to norms provides insight into the interaction between norms, and between norms and the state. For example, one might examine the influence or cascade of competing norms (such as the adoption of the anti-apartheid norm). According to Wiener, though, "Critical Constructivists focus on the meaning of norms as constituted by and constitutive of specific use" (Wiener, 2009, p. 179). Critical Constructivism centralises the role of norms, being more concerned with relations to norms. Critical Constructivism seeks to better understand the way intersubjectivity operates in international relations, identifying vectors to change based on normative structures by elevating the role of the discursive and historical constitution of identity (Buzan, 2009, p. 197). Because it focusses on structures that are 'in-use' it is receptive to the relationship between structural and agent-centred change (Wiener, 2009, p. 179). According to Weldes (1998, pp. 218, 222-223), Critical Constructivism highlights the "socially constructed nature of interests… interests that emerge out of the representations that define for actors the situations and events they face." Conventional and Critical Constructivism share the idea that states are actors (rather than a discursively constituted subject[57]) but Critical Constructivism argues that key conceptions such as security and national interest are discursively constituted. While Conventional Constructivism presupposes a state that precedes and shapes its narrative, under Critical Constructivism, the state and its narrative are co-constituted. Foreign and security narratives are discursively constituted through representations and linguistic elements, and national interests are not objective, but arise from discursive constructions, as

57 Conceptualising the state as a discursively constituted object, or the state and discourse as co-constituting, is more the realm of post-structuralism. Buzan, B. (2009). *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

does the nature of the state. These discursive constructions are not 'just words', but instead create an expectation of behaviour. In this way we can say that narrative construction is performative rather than constative – it creates the national interest, and the rules and expectation of behaviour (Arkan, 2014, p. 27; Buzan, 2009, p. 198).

Within this framework, actors are depicters (not choosers) who create representations of the world. In contrast, rationalistic analysis (such as neoliberalism and neo-realism) typically assumes that rationality is a characteristic of individuals and organisations, and then asks why actors choose a particular narrative. Instead, Critical Constructivism posits other, alternate modes of reasoning, and asserts that these modes are a suitable object for analysis. According to Wiener (2009, p. 179), Critical Constructivism "enhances the understanding of how intersubjectivity plays out in international relations and identifies avenues towards change based on normative structures as entailing meaning that is actually 'in-use'".

Both branches of Constructivism have their differences that are articulated by their respective supporters. According to Conventional Constructivist Katzenstein (1996, p. 2), "security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors." In this theory, "the concept of 'identity'… functions as a critical link between environmental structures and interests" (Katzenstein (1996, p. 59). Alternately, Critical Constructivist Weldes (1999b, p. 10) asserts that "insecurities and the objects that suffer from insecurity are mutually constituted [and are not] ontologically separate things." For example, the co-constitution of state and identity is typified in the discursive construction of the Dar al-Islam/Dar al-Harb dichotomy. The characterisation of the ulamā' of the Dar al-Harb being the 'abode of war' creates an expectation of behaviour that is ordered towards violence. It presupposes two oppositional blocks (the 'abode of peace' and the 'abode of war') and the nature of the order that exists between them ('war'). Likewise, given the all-inclusive nature of shari'ah as covering all human activity, given widespread adoption, it is foreseeable that the caliphate system will arise with the caliph acting as caretaker and with a powerful religious legal class. This does not imply a hierarchical or causative relationship, but rather a dynamic relationship that creates an evolving intersubjective understanding, creating the preconditions for action. "Observed this way, foreign policy appears to be one of these boundary-creating practices that helps produce and reproduce the identity of the state in whose name it operates" (Sahin, 2014, p. 7).

The alternate approaches that Conventional and Critical Constructivists adopt results from ontological and epistemological differences between the traditions. Both Traditional and Critical Constructivists share an intersubjective ontology, and a positivist epistemology, asserting there is an objective reality that scientific method can interrogate (Arkan, 2014, p. 25; Guzzin, 2010, p. 303). According to Dunne et al. (2010, p. 184), "constructivists embrace an intersubjective ontology… but accept an epistemology indebted to positivism, which includes hypothesis testing, causality and explanation." However, Critical Constructivists focus predominantly on language and discourse, and unlike the Traditional Constructivist, do not elevate the state to the principal object of analysis. Critical Constructivism assumes that the key concepts and objects of international relations (such as foreign and security policies) are constructed "through representations (of countries, peoples, etc.) and linguistic elements (nouns, adjectives, metaphors and analogies)" (Arkan, 2014, pp. 25-26; Buzan, 2009, p. 198). The study of the construction of these concepts entails a detailed study of texts to understand systems of meaning and representation. The social world is constructed and constituted by the objective world. Language is the intermediary between that which is being signified and the signifier, and while the material world exists, meaning is created through narrative. According to Arkan (2014, p. 26):

> Instead of linking identities to specific behavioural patterns, [Critical Constructivists] are more concerned with how people come to identify with a certain identity and its associated narratives. They also focus on how agents draw on these identities to justify certain (foreign) policies instead of identifying the effects of these identities.

The principal difference between the two Constructivisms is not their ontological assumptions, but rather the emphasis on the role of language, with Critical Constructivism emphasising language as the "intermediary between the signifier and the signified" (as opposed to the agent's interests) (Arkan, 2014, p. 26).

Cho (2012, p. 301) differentiates between Conventional and Critical Constructivism, asserting:

> both constructivisms should be treated as different analytical frameworks for examining different (internal and external) faces of state identity formation: the

external construction of state identity can be well addressed by Conventional Constructivism, while the internal one by Critical Constructivism.

According to Cho (2012, pp. 309-311), Critical Constructivists see the state as a malleable construction with no essential nature, with ontological foundations that are discursively constructed through ideation of self/other, inclusion and exclusion. Cho goes further, asserting that Conventional and Critical Constructivists differ not only in their epistemology/ontology but in their practical use, such that scholars concerned with the external construction of state identity might better look to Conventional Constructivism, while Critical Constructivism better suits those examining the internal construction. Cho agrees with Hopf's assertion that state identity is the product not just of its identity in world politics, but also of domestic identity politics and social practices (Cho, 2012, p. 310; Hopf, 1998, p. 195). To Critical Constructivists, a comprehensive understanding of how state identity affects policy examines the effect of the many identities, interactions and discourses that occur within the state, not just how interaction between states forms identity. This adds to the case for using Critical Constructivism as the theoretical framework for analysis, with jihādist norms typically arising from internal/endogenous sources. This is demonstrably true in those cases where states identify themselves as 'Islamic'. For example, numerous majority Muslim states' policies directly derive from their Islamic identity. Consequently, there is a range of countries that won't recognise Israeli passports, and a subset of those that won't grant entry to people with evidence of travel to Israel. Concurrently, there is a body of evidence suggesting that these countries regularly engage in trade and unofficial diplomatic relations with Israel, although typically clandestinely through grey markets or third parties (Entous, 2018; Petersburg, 2011; Reuters, 2016).

This idea of appropriate behaviour, grounded in Islamic identity, can be seen in Saudi domestic identity construction. For example, Article 1 of the *Basic Law of Saudi Arabia* establishes the state as a fully sovereign Arab Islamic state and asserts the constitution of the country is the Qu'ran, which governs the law of the state ("Basic Law of Governance," 1992, Article 1). The adjectives 'Arabic' and 'Islamic' define the nature of the state. The state and its nature as 'Islamic' are entangled, and discernment of the state's interests would mean understanding what 'Islamic' means in this context. Further, the intersubjective understanding of 'Islamic' by those agents working on behalf of the state is necessarily elevated to an object of examination to understand the preconditions of action. These examples show the relevance

of Critical Constructivism in understanding how Islamic norms, being both regulative and constitutive, affect narrative construction.

Critical Constructivism emphasises the role of understanding meaning and differentiates it from describing a phenomenon. Tasked with understanding social phenomena, this means understanding the social situation within which the object of enquiry resides. Understanding for the Critical Constructivist means that the act of knowledge production involves (Kincheloe, 2005, pp. 20-21):

- understanding the object of enquiry in the contexts within which it is situated
- clarifying the relationship between the researcher and the object
- and linking textual analysis to the humans, individual and collective, who are responsible for making meaning.

Another difference between Critical and Conventional Constructivism is Critical Constructivism's concern with the process of othering. For the Conventional Constructivist, identity is formed through "interaction with other states [as] they come to see themselves and each other in terms of the subject positions that are constituted by the social structure of international politics" (Rumelili, 2004, p. 31). While Conventional Constructivism asserts that meaning can be either an individual or collective process (or both), for the Critical Constructivist meaning is created through intersubjective processes, and in relation to an objective world, but also through a process of 'othering' (Arkan, 2014, p. 27). The existence of an 'other' is fundamental to narrative identity construction, which requires the existence of an 'other', and is incomplete without it. Arkan (2014, p. 27) asserts that "by focusing on the performative production of identity through foreign policy, Critical Constructivist scholars… distinguish themselves from Conventional Constructivists," and Critical Constructivists "focus on how agents draw on these identities to justify certain (foreign) policies instead of identifying the effects of these identities" (Arkan, 2014, p. 26). In practice, the performative production of identity is enacted in the representational practices that differentiate the self from the other (Rumelili, 2004, pp. 31, 35). These practices produce boundaries that represent the 'other' in terms of difference, inferiority and threat. In normative terms, these representations are constitutive and work to delegitimise the 'other', and to secure the state's identity and existence.

Othering is a performative act that occurs in a context that positions the self relative to an external realm, and therefore the act of creating a social identity is also an act of creating an 'other'. Discourse which recognises or prescribes a community response, creates representations of the other. Those representations have a subject (usually the state), and differentiating the 'other' imbues that state or community, and the 'other', with properties. In Constructivism, there is a fundamental link between how a community responds to outsiders or those not sharing the identity; the existence of a response presupposes the existence of two actors (or states) and orders itself accordingly (Arkan, 2014, p. 27). Critical Constructivism, concerned with norms, attaches importance to the process of othering and its role in the construction of identity. In Critical Constructivism vernacular, this state of difference is known as alterity. According to Fierke (Fierke, 2015, p. 191):

> …identity exists in a relationship, an idea that is often captured in the concept alterity. Identity is a social category that expresses not only the meaning any one actor attributes to the self; self-definitions are also related to definitions the self gives to others and others to the self. Categories are thus intersubjective and defining of a particular community of identity and practice.

Alterity is not otherness for its own sake. The other must take on characteristics that differentiate those inside the state relative to those outside of the state, so the identity of the state might conceptualise the other in such ways as being dangerous or inferior[58]. The process of othering is necessary as it permits actors to communicate, to "socialise and imprint actions with meaning… establishing relations of power and redefining interests" (Dias, 2013, p. 258). Concurrently, discourses reflect hegemonic notions of social reality, making these discourses and the social order co-constitutive.

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58 Peter Campbell asserts that US identity represents US as being under threat from dangerous outsiders. Campbell, D. (1992). *Writing security : United States foreign policy and the politics of identity*. University of Minnesota Press. ; Todorov shows how European settlers in the Americas portrayed the difference of the indigenous as inferiority, and sameness as equality. Todorov, T. (1999). *The conquest of America : the question of the other.* University of Oklahoma Press. Doty examines how the Global North has constructed a reality which portrays the Global South in such a way as to justify imperial practice in Kenya and the Philippines Doty, R. L. (1996). *Imperial encounters : the politics of representation in North-South relations.* University of Minnesota Press.

An example of how this discursive construction of the 'other' operates can be found in the Dar al-Islam/Dar al-Harb division. This division is a natural outgrowth of the assertion that the Islamic community is the Dar al-Islam. This dichotomy developed through post-Mohammedian discourse–the existence of the Dar al-Islam infers the existence of the Dar al-Harb, which was subsequently further divided into hostile and passive non-Muslims. Latham and Christenson (2013, p. 781) assert "with the appearance of Islam came a categorically new social construction that made the goals and interests of Muslims and non-Muslims inherently contradictory and tending toward conflict." That is, the division of the world into the House of Peace and the House of War tends linguistically towards conflict.

That example also points to the process of 'othering', and its role in regulating identity and behaviour. Jihādist ideology and structures created structural antagonisms between the Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb (Latham & Christenson, 2013, p. 781). These identity politics are still extant in the discourse of modern-period jihādists. Constructivist Fierke (2013, pp. 199-200) proposes an interpretation of the War on Terror, writing "Bin Laden, in declaring jihad on all Americans, also constructed identity in negative oppositional terms, articulating a distinction between 'infidel Crusaders' in the West and those who are a part of the Muslim Ummah (community). Not only identities, but the meaning of their actions grew out of this interaction." Fierke argues that in the War on Terror, those parties involved and their actions grew in part out of the identities of the actors involved. This Constructivist interpretation can be compared to traditional rationalist interpretations that struggle to account for the existence and magnitude of influence exerted by al-Qa'ida, Islamic State, and other non-state actors.

This alterity permeates the Islamic worldview (though the process of othering is not unique to Islam). At the national level, it is encoded as the Ummah, the Dar al-Islam, the Dar al-Harb, and the Dar al-'Ahd/Dar al-Suh. At a more personal level, the Qu'ran outlines various relationships such as Muslim/Christian and Muslim/Jew. Also, on the individual level is the relationship between the faithful and the takfir, although Qutb also advocated takfirism – the ex-communication of people and states that had become takfir. Finally, there is the jahiliyyah – those ignorant of Allah's message. Islam encodes this differentiation in various institutions. For example, it requires Muslims to pay the Zakat – a tax and form of almsgiving. In most countries, this is voluntarily or informally applied, though there are

nations that apply it through the tax system. Historically (though not contemporarily at a national level) dhimmi (non-Muslims) have been required to pay the Jizya tax.

Another key occupation of Critical Constructivism is power, and the role of power. This is especially true where power plays an exaggerated role in the process of constitution of identity and the regulation of behaviour (Kincheloe, 2005, p. 3). An emphasis on understanding power relationships sheds light on how those who wield power and influence are able to rhetorically construct or influence systems to the benefit of some, and at the expense of others (Kincheloe, 2005, p. 12). This process is at play when actors use power to assert their legitimacy, to shape and regulate the behaviour of others, to gain an advantage over others, and to use that situation to improve their condition. In the context of jihād and this study, wielding power can mean such various activities as asserting moral legitimacy or illegitimacy, to the power and legitimacy to make life or death decisions at a policy level, or to order violent attacks (Kincheloe, 2005, pp. 21-22). The Critical Constructivist preoccupation with power is a concern with the way in which power shapes collective and individual consciousness (Kincheloe, 2005, pp. 35-36). Power, and the concern of power, regulates narratives and discourse. It creates rules determining what and may not be said, who has authority, who must listen to that authority, whose utterances are authoritative, and whose are not (Kincheloe, 2005, p. 36).

Conventional Constructivists such as Wendt typically give less attention to the internal workings of states to provide an account for the interests and identities of the state. Critical Constructivism rejects this, arguing that (Weldes, 1999a, p. 280):

> meanings that objects, events, and actions have for states are necessarily the meanings they have for those individuals who act in the name of the state. And these state officials do not approach international politics with a blank slate onto which meanings are only written as a result of interactions among states.

Interpretation of these 'objects, events and actions' (that is, their depictions) result in the actor's actions. Though are not readily obvious to the observer, these objects and events can be observed through the behaviours that they lead to, such as the creation of policy, or by speech utterances, and may be viewed through various lenses, such as linguistic presentations and/or the cultural resources to which officials are exposed (Arkan, 2014, p.

27). In this sense, state documentation—used in this study—provides a window into the inner works of the state.

Finally, there is a cultural argument to be made for the appropriateness of Constructivist approaches in the Islamic context. Islam and the West hold radically opposed views of the relationship between religion and national policy. Western politics conceives religion and the state as separate spheres—a tradition that dates back as far as Pope Gelasius I (d. 496AD) who wrote to the Roman Emperor on the separation of their authority along the lines of spiritual and temporal authority. This separation was later reasserted in the Enlightenment period and codified in laws and treatises. There was no similar tradition in the Eastern Roman Empire, nor later in the development of Islamic practice or scholarship. For the West, operating for decades in a predominantly realist paradigm, and much of the time dealing with other Western countries, the Islamic relationship between the state and religion was, and often continues to be, irrelevant or peripherally relevant. However, in the Islamic conception of the world, religion and politics are inseparably linked. Likewise, the Islamic world has often misunderstood the West, considering it variously (and contradictorily) as godless and secular, or as a political extension of an anti-Islam Christian crusade. Rather, in Islam, there is no disjuncture between religion and politics, a tradition received from its earliest communities (Johnson, 2015, p. 445). The shari'ah law is the law of the state.

Zakat is a typical example of how Islamic principles are accepted and/or applied[59]. While in most Muslim-majority countries zakat is a voluntary contribution, in five countries there is a mandatory collection of the zakat – Malaysia, Pakistan, Libya, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In these countries, Zakat is tied to the existing taxation system. The implementation is not consistent though – while Yemen claims its system conforms to classical jurisprudence, the Pakistani system emphasises accumulated wealth, and the Malaysian system collects zakat as a function of income tax. Further, while there is a constitutional provision for the collection of zakat in Pakistan, Sudan and Yemen, only Pakistan makes it a governmental obligation, with Saudi Arabia's *Saudi Basic Law*[60] making zakat collection the state's responsibility (Hasan, 2015, p. 130). So, while in the Western tradition there is a tradition,

59 'Zakat' translates as 'that which purifies', and refers to a tax applied to the Muslim population and distributed to the needy.

60 Which has constitutional status.

often codified, asserting behaviours of the state are separate from those of the individuals, in Islam, the same law governing individuals, governs also the state. Where Conventional Constructivism examines foremost the state, Critical Constructivism, which places more emphasis on the internal constitution of the state, may be more pertinent.

However, there are limitations to the explanatory power of Constructivism. Firstly, while Constructivism concerns itself with ideas, their objective existence and effect, it does not follow the subject of those ideas will match objective reality; Björkdahl (2010, p. 10) states, "many researchers pick and choose their particular version without looking at the particular epistemological and ontological coherence of the end product." Alternately, it may take time for perceptions to change to match reality. For example, in 2003 the Unites States' neoconservative government sold an idea of Iraq to the public that centred on weapons of mass destruction; public perception altered when the weapons failed to materialise (Roskin & Berry, 2012, p. 31). Sometimes the mismatch is of less importance or exists in a more complex arrangement. For example, Onuf criticises Huntington's portrayal of Islam in *Clash of Civilisations* as representing Islam as a homogenous body. Huntington (1993, p. 32) portrays Muslims as "humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and… [unable] to shape their own destiny." However, Lamy et al. (2012, p. 292) note that Islam contains social and theological rifts demarcating distinct groups which may be coterminous or may overlap. Huntington's reductionist model forms part of the foundation of the Alliance of Civilisation (UN Alliance of Civilizations, 2018). The criticism may be partially valid, but also obscures the fact that the Islamic sphere is not homogenous, with various groups adopting attitudes that are variously nationalist, trans-nationalist, pro-American, anti-American, and so on. To account for these problems, theorists such as Onuf accept material reality may mismatch the ideational, but do not separate material reality from the ideation, considering the two to operate complexly (Lawson, 2012b, p. 50).

Koddenbrock criticises Constructivism by comparing it to Marx's notion of concretisation as advanced in *Grundrisse*. That is, Koddenbrock is critical of theories that separate material reality from ideational reality. Koddenbrock (2014, p. 256) proposes that Constructivists favour the ideological, while empiricists favour the material:

> Marx would maintain that [the relationship between the two] takes on a life of its own with real effects on social relations, and that this life is both real and abstract. It is real because it does something to the world; it is abstract because this can only be grasped in thought.

Concretisation is a dialectical, spiral approach whereby the abstract and the real inform the other, and which Koddenbrock claims is of greater utility because it is not just explanatory, but predictive (Koddenbrock, 2014, pp. 252-256). However, it is more useful to view the Constructivism school not as opposing Concretisation, but rather forming one half of the dialogue on which its dialectical approach relies. Like critical theories that contain non-socially constructed elements (essentialist objects such as the state, which aren't ideational), so too do Marx's conceptions, basing his 'complex abstractions' on the 'simplest determinisms'. The difference between Marx's Concretisation and the Social Constructivist is what constitutes constructed truth, and what is 'real' (Marx, 2000, pp. 386-388).

Wendt criticises Constructivism's portrayal of norms as having a powerful influence on state behaviour internationally. According to him, self-interest and coercion govern international politics; the lack of binding structures, such as laws, limit the ability of the international superstructure to exert influence. He points instead to policy elites and their dependence on society. For example, in democratic countries, politicians' careers are dependent on the support of their electoral base. Wendt argues that with a greater dependence on endogenous society (as opposed to international forces), coupled with the more rarefied nature of international society, domestic pressure will affect policy more than international relations (Wendt, 2003, p. 2). This criticism works in favour of this study, though, as it seeks to understand the relationship between endogenous norms and state behaviours.

Finally, Constructivism cannot account for the structure-agent problem. The crux of the problem is two assumptions: that society is a construction of social relationships that govern the interactions of actors; and that actors (such as organisations) of individuals help to create and transform society. The problem then is that, while social behaviours would require an understanding of both individuals and society, there is no clear way of conceptualising that relationship (Harrison et al., 2015b, p. 36; Wendt, 1987, pp. 337-339). Ultimately, as Cho (2012, p. 304) points out, "no single perspective can fully render all the intricacies of

contemporary world politics, and, at some point, all approaches become ambiguous and short of full coherence."

The claim that speech is performative is not the sole province of Critical Constructivism; it is a shared maxim of various theories such as Securitisation and the Copenhagen School of International Security Studies, and of other theories such as critical gender theory and postmodernism. It is worth noting, therefore, that Buzan (2009, pp. 188, 198) considers Traditional and Critical Constructivism a 'widening-deepening perspective' on international security studies (noting though that Critical Constructivism, like Traditional Constructivism, does not engage security explicitly). Writing on the Copenhagen School Balzacq (2010, p. 1) notes:

> …certain statements… do more than merely describe a given reality and, as such, cannot be judged as false or true. Instead, these utterances realize a specific action; they "do" things: they are "performatives" as opposed to 'constatives' that simply report states of affairs and are thus subject to truth and falsity tests.

Weldes (1999a, p. 219) agrees, noting that "foreign policy problems, and especially acute problems, or 'crises,' are political acts, not facts; they are social constructions forged by state officials in the course of producing and reproducing state identity."

Though Critical Constructivism is not at the centre of International Relations, this study finds it a well suited, pragmatic choice for answering the types of questions this study asks to look for norms expressed in both Saudi narrative and by jihādist organisations. Critical Constructivism recognises:

- the central role of norms
- the central role of language
- that identities are socially constructed, and create a critical lens through which to understand those identities
- the role of endogenous norms, and the importance of inward-facing examination of states
- the importance of latent meaning

- the role of personal agency in state behaviour
- the regulative and constitutive nature of norms
- the role of the process of othering
- the role of power
- the role of textual artefacts
- and the importance of explanatory accounts over descriptive.

Critical Constructivism is the primary vehicle through which this study will interpret the interrelationship between ideology, the state and individuals, with wider implications for reading the role of ideology in the region and broader International Relations. It is directly relevant as this study examines norms at the sub-state level, recognising that jihād is a component of the broader Muslim identity narrative[61]. The study adopts jihādist norms as its primary focus, and examines the meaning of jihād espoused by various actors, examining the regulative and constitutive role of jihādist norms. As per the Critical Constructivist bent, it uses textual artefacts as the object of analysis.

In order to better understand the relationship between jihād and state, other researchers have looked into the ways that jihādist groups and the state intersect (researchers such as (Byman & Kreps, 2010; Collins, 2014b; Hoffman, 2017), though this has typically been approached from materialist perspectives. There are tangible benefits for those states that sponsor jihādist organisations: they may act as a force multiplier to destabilise and/or weaken neighbours, be a means of extending power beyond the limits of the military, or allow leverage and/or control over neighbouring populations. This approach may be explained as security maximisation. There are also rational, non-security oriented reasons for sponsoring jihādist organisations, such as to curry support from key domestic groups. Importantly, there are usually ideological reasons (Collins, 2014a, p. 136).

There are many examples where state identity construction and narrative are demonstrably affected by Islamic norms. For example, according to Akbarzade and Barry (2016, pp. 615-616), this is evident in Iranian foreign policy. In their assessment, Iranian policy results

61 This is not to make a generalisation about all Muslims, in all times and everywhere. Rather, this statement applies to the parameters set out in this study. This study looks at Jihādist organisations, countries effected by jihādism, and in regions where there is demonstrable support for jihādism.

from Iranian nationalism, Iranism, Islam, and Shi'ism. In surveying the different ways identity affects policy, including the role of discourse, one of their interviewees, Rasmus Elling, "insists on discussing 'identity talk' rather that identity itself," and addresses the role of religion and language (among other factors). Another interviewee, Ali Ansari, "prefers to distinguish actors rather than intangible orientations… each of whom set a different agenda for how they define Iranian identity." In response to these and other interviewees, the authors state (Akbarzade & Barry, 2016, p. 616):

> Iran's identity discourse affects how the Islamic Republic interacts with other nations and delineates the boundaries in the development of either positive or negative relations…. For these reasons… attention must be given to the ideational factors that have contributed to Iran's framework of action. In analysing each element, constructivism reveals fascinating dynamics in Iran's international relations.

According to Hegghammer (2009, pp. 413-416), the Saudi support for pan-Islamic activism is best viewed as a diversionary tactic on behalf of the government in response to domestic problems. Under King Faisal, through the 1960-70s, the Saudis devoted much prestige and many resources to promoting pan-Islamism. This became problematic for the regime when increased communication and the escalating conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims provided the catalyst for increased mobilisation in the name of jihād. If pan-Islamism was the primary concern of the state, its support for the policy should have been consistent. Instead, "tolerance for pan-Islamist militancy since the 1980s correlate… closely with domestic political challenges to the [Saudi] State." For example, support for the Afghan jihād coincided with a decline in oil prices, high unemployment, and the rise of the Sahwa movement. Likewise, the Bosnian jihād saw a rise in support of pan-Islamic militancy at a time when the internal struggle with the Sahwa movement was at its peak. As the regime asserted its authority over the Sahwa, it became more difficult for fighters to reach foreign fronts. The difference between internal activists and those from abroad is stark: after the Riyadh (1995) and Khobar (1996) bombings, hundreds of individuals were arrested and tortured. Again, after the 1998 missile plot by al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP), security services arrested over 800 individuals. However, in 1998, with the outbreak of the Chechen war, authorities did not interfere with fundraising and recruitment, nor did it interfere with individuals returning from Al-Qa'ida's camps in 2002, detaining them

only for a short time. All this leads Hegghammer to conclude that the harsh crackdowns on internal violence, combined with tolerance towards militancy abroad, created a 'skewed incentive structure', the effects of which became obvious when the 2003 implementation of a zero-tolerance policy was met with a violent response to security forces. According to Hegghammer (2009, p. 414), "Put somewhat crudely, the regime may have promoted pan-Islamism as Saudi Arabia's opium for the people."

Saudi Arabia's governance also has a complex arrangement with the Council of Ulema. The council is the country's highest religious body, with its members appointed by the king and their salaries paid by the government. During former King Abdullah's reign, he decreed that only the council had the authority to issue fatwas. This leads Boucek (2010) to conclude, "Senior Council clearly reflects the state's interests, and it frequently aligns itself with state policies," being often relied on by the king to ratify decisions, and only voices dissent through the use of silence. The Saudi regime has used the council repeatedly to combat domestic dissension. The council has repeatedly stated that killing, bombing, destruction of property and other subversive activities are crimes and deserve punishment under shari'ah (Ansary, 2008, p. 124). Likewise, Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah Al ash-Sheikh, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, has repeatedly condemned the practice of waging jihād without the authorisation of the country's ruler (The Middle East Media Research Institute, 2007), a sentiment echoed by Sheikh Fahad al-Majed, Secretary-General of the Council of Ulema, who writes, "The call for war or peace is an Islamic right given to the ruler, Muslim scholars agree" (Trenwith, 2017).

These studies examine the relationship between norms, identity, authority and the state, and the role of jihād and jihādist norms in narrative formulation. However, they adopt a rationalist framework that centralises the role of the state and looks at the material benefit of adopting jihādism when trying to understand their relationship. However, this study looks to identify evidence of norms being expressed in national narrative, exploring endogenous sources of jihādist norms. Norms are differentiated from ideology, ideology being a top-down imposition of ideas on a population, while norms are the result of a socialisation process. In this study, two frameworks are adopted to account for norms, and qualify what I accept as a norm—the spiral model of norm acceptance put forward by Sikkink, Finnemore and Risse, and the Copenhagen's School's Securitisation model.

3.3 Defining Norms

3.3.1 Socially Constructed Norms

Qualifying norms relies on theories of norm creation and acceptance, such as the norm cascade as advanced by Sikkink, Finnemore and Risse, and the Securitisation Theory of the Copenhagen School. Interrogating whether jihādist norms spread from the grassroots domestic arena to the level of national narrative, the norm cascade model is salient, providing an account of how norms traverse from individuals to society and from the domestic to the international sphere. Other norms are imposed, not socialised, being accepted *prima facie* on the authority of their proponents. Securitisation provides an account of this process, and it is methodologically and epistemologically congruent with Critical Constructivism. Securitisation is also used to explain how norms typically unrelated to security, or which would not otherwise pose an existential threat, become part of jihād. These include norms such as hijrah (migration) and Ummah (the community of the Muslim faithful). Typically, norms are understood as arising from a population in a mutual constitution. However, given the elevated position and prior acceptance of the religious authority of jihādist ideologues, it is the case that their disciples may accept ideas presented by them uncritically. Regardless of their lack of criticality, the norms are adopted, either for the sake of legitimacy and conformity or through belief. In these cases, the utterances of jihādist ideologues are normative, accepted by the audience, constituting the identity of the disciples as those who accept the ideas, and regulative. These utterances may be in such forms as fatwahs, propaganda, and speeches. Unlike the theory of norm cascades, which account for norms developing, evolving and regressing, Securitisation provides an account of how norms can enter a population fully formed and accepted, being descriptive rather than explanatory, and how a range of norms can be subsumed under the umbrella of jihād.

Lawson (2012a, p. 50) describes the role norms play in shaping state behaviour, stating "rules embody certain norms and arise from agreements reached between people (agents or actors) who are in a position to make binding agreements." As politics is a product of human agency, human agency can change it, in principle, as norms establish a shared expectation of appropriate behaviour. This indicates the possibility of norms (in this case, jihādist norms) influencing policy-making elites, should they identify in part or whole with jihādists. Further, should that identity be stronger than the other identity norms they hold, there should be evidence of jihādist norms in their utterances.

This study interrogates the link between norms at the grassroots and the national level. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 895) advance a spiral model of 'norm cascade' as a vector through which norms are adopted at the national level. Specifically, they note the role of norm entrepreneurs who "attempt to convince a critical mass of… norm leaders… to embrace new norms". This model is supported by Panke and Petersohn (2012, p. 722) who argue that norms "not only regulate certain actions in defining appropriate behaviour" but also encourage social actors to accept them as standards for good behaviour, reinforcing the identity of the actors. Constructivists Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, pp. 896-897) claim that, "norms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community." They contend that norm entrepreneurs create or draw attention to issues, through language that "names, interprets and dramatises," them—a process known as framing. However, Finnemore and Sikkink limit the origins of norms to international society (the society of states). According to them individuals require a platform to launch norms into that arena, for example, being able to address the United Nations General Assembly (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 896). Björkdahl (2010, p. 16) expands on the most common origins of norms, adding to the list social practices; processes at both the domestic and international level; supply or demand-driven processes; and evolutionary processes. However, this study specifically looks below the level of international society, to endogenous norms—those that present themselves domestically.

Norms at the sub-national level are propagated by agents. The individuals responsible for constructing national narratives operate in numerous spheres. For example, as a religious authority (a Marjah), Iranian leader Ali Khamenei historically has commanded respect from the broader transnational Shi'ite community. However, Ali Khamenei also acts in his capacity as head of state. Haynes cites Laurence Louër who suggests that as actors strive to formulate political agendas, they interfere less in the politics of other countries (Haynes, 2012, p. 135). Louër also notes the complexity of notions of personal identity operating in religious communities, citing the internal divisions in Iraq's Shi'ite communities. Additionally, Haynes makes the point that religious transnational actors rarely undermine national allegiances in favour of more nebulous notions of religious identity, as to do so undermines traditional ideas of strong leadership. Yet in The Islamic Republic of Iran, religious identity is often mixed into foreign policy issues. Fox and Sandler claim that

the functions of religion are often useful in politics: unifying society, preventing conflict, helping people, and so on. If the government can successfully use religion to define the political universe, then they have a powerful tool. For an individual to disagree with a policy decision is to disagree with a religious precept. Fox and Sandler cite Iran's combination of political power, control of the media and religious education being used to create a regime where all policies, including foreign policy, must follow the established religious norms (Fox & Sandler, 2004, pp. 49-50).

Sikkink and Finnemore provide an outline for norm creation, occurring in a three-stage life-cycle of norm emergence, norm cascade and internalisation, with the actors, their motivation and the mechanism for change differing at each stage (see Table 3-1: Actors, Their Motivations and Driving Mechanics in the Norm Cascade Model) (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 898).

Table 3-1: Actors, Their Motivations and Driving Mechanics in the Norm Cascade Model

	Stage 1 Norm Emergence →	Stage 2 Norm cascade →	Stage 3 Internalisation
Actors	Norm entrepreneurs	States, international organisations, networks	Law, professions, bureaucracy
Motives	Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
Dominant Mechanisms	Persuasion	Socialisation, institutionalisation, demonstration	Habit, institutionalisation

Burgeoning norms enter a competitive arena where new norms compete with existing norms. For a norm to achieve acceptance, it must pass a tipping point where the norm commands the support of an accepting audience. Sikkink and Finnemore do not define the number of actors required (in the form of a per cent), though they speculate that it is roughly one third, and note the quality of the actors is important. To progress the norm, entrepreneurs need the concurrent support of a critical mass of actors at the norm cascade stage to pass the tipping point (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 900-902). Norm cascade is identifiable when norms are accepted without significant pressure domestically. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 904), this is demarcated by international socialisation, which they list

as "diplomatic praise or censure… reinforced by material sanctions and incentives." This includes pressure from international organisations and norm entrepreneurs. To clarify, the norms Sikkink and Finnemore are referring to are those now operating at the international level. They may become enshrined in international laws and treaties, while at the far end of the cascade they become internalised, so widely accepted they are automatically adhered to.

To Finnemore and Sikkink, norm compliance is not necessarily due to the internalised belief in a particular norm. People may adopt norms for material benefit, to conform and/or to confer legitimacy. Panke and Petersohn present this in terms of a normative operational cost. If the cost of norm non-compliance is greater than compliance, it is an incentive to adopt the norm. The corollary is also true (Panke & Petersohn, 2012, pp. 721, 725).

This study also acknowledges a class of norms not covered by the spiral model, norms that are advanced by authorities but are not imposed. These are norms that individuals adopt, though they are not compelled to through violent coercion or legislation. Individuals accept and conform to the behaviours stipulated by those norms, but accept them *prima facie* because they've accepted the authority of the individuals presenting the norm. These are norms that are uncritically accepted because of the status of the authority dictating them, not because they offer legitimacy or the opportunity for conformity, but that enjoy rapid internalisation. These norms are not discursively constructed, but are the result of top-down imposition on jihādist communities (not discursively, but still narratively constructed). The typical social constructivist claim that norms enter a population through agency and are adopted through socialisation is not typical of all norms taken up by the jihādist community. These communities elevate religious leaders through mutual constitution, where they can then impose beliefs and behaviours on the population they lead because of their religious authority and credentials. Those norms' acceptance comes not with the authority of law or consensus, but by an extension of the norm that elevates the proponents of them to their position.

3.3.2 Securitised Norms

As outlined in Chapter One, jihād is not a cohesive, fully formed doctrine appearing in the Qur'ān. Rather, its use in the Qur'ān appears to show its historical development. The earliest

organised attempts at formulating a comprehensive theory of jihād stem from the mid-eighth and ninth century, in hadith compilations that frequently situated the discussion on jihād directly following the Five Pillars of Islam, or as part of standalone compilations on the topic, such as the *Kitab al-jihād* by Abdallah b.al-Mubarak (died 797AD). Jihādist literature's proximity to the centre of early Islam's literature is likely due to the success of early conquests and the doctrine's role in that process (Cook, 2005a, p. 14). During the ninth and tenth centuries, Islamic jurisprudence separated into various madhhabs. Within the madhhabs, compendia of works dealt with questions of jihād. Compendia such as the *Al-Mabsut* deal with the strictures of waging jihād, discussing the validity of tactics, surrender, who might be killed/enslaved. Given the breadth of activity proposed to be jihādist by centuries of discourse on the topic, there must be an ordering principle for discerning what, in the contemporary period, may be considered jihādist. For that, this study looks to securitisation.

This study draws on the work of the Copenhagen School, and specifically Securitisation, to explain the relationship between those various aspects of jihād that are covered in this study. Without a unifying narrative, it is difficult to conflate such various phenomena as migration to the Ummah and suicide bombings/martyrdom attacks as both being fundamental expressions of jihād. Jihādists and/or jihādist organisations propose a disparate range of activity are all expressions of jihād in the cause of the Islam, and Securitisation explains is the process by which that happens.

Securitisation provides a descriptive rather than an explanatory account of norm creation and acceptance and is part of the Copenhagen School, a framework for security analysis advanced by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde in their collective works, most notably in *Security – A new framework for analysis* (Buzan et al., 1998). The Copenhagen School employs a critical method, claiming that words do more than describe reality constatively, but instead are performative, having the potential to realise action (Balzacq, 2010, p. 1). Securitisation argues something (a referent *object*) becomes a security issue (securitised) when presented as an existential threat (a securitising *act*) by an authoritative person or persons (the securitising actor(s)), and when that proposal is accepted by an audience. The performative nature of the utterance is the speech act—it does not simply report information, but rather is an action that does something through the intention of the

securitising actor (Leonard & Kaunert, 2010, p. 57). Threats are varied under securitisation (such as states, individuals, groups, the environment, and technology). In the case of jihād, the threats can be manifold: western values, the apostate, the near enemy, the far enemy. However, in securitisation, 'security' is an ontological constant, defined as the feeling of being secure. When an issue challenges that sense of security, it may be subject to securitisation. Securitisation occurs in three phases (Romaniuk, 2018):

1. The speech act, or the creation of the existential threat
2. The receiving of the speech act by one or more audiences
3. Commencing extraordinary actions to secure the referent object.

Importantly, the securitising actors in jihādist organisations, having the character of religious authorities, exert a high degree of normative pressure to accept their speech acts due to the audience's acceptance of their religious authority before preceding the securitising act.

In the context of jihādist organisations, securitisation is a rhetorical and strategic tool used to legitimise and regulate the actions of jihādists, and to mobilise support from their target audience. Not only does acceptance indicate the tacit acceptance of the authority of the securitising actor, it also legitimises its cause. In practice, a religious authority (such as an emir or small council) typically leads jihādist organisations. According to Semple (2014, p. 8), an emir "is divinely guided… therefore supporters, in submitting to the emir, are obeying God's commands." Therefore, the leader acts in the capacity of a divine mediator. According to Ziring (2003, pp. 205-206, emphasis added):

> The intertwining of God with notions of sovereignty reinforces the autocratic tradition. God's viceregents ensure that God's commands are enacted. They are by the same ordination responsible for protecting His community. *The faithful accept authority unconditionally because to challenge it is to challenge God's message.*

The leaders of jihādist organisations are uniquely positioned, being religious leaders, as securitising actors, and their speech acts derive disproportionate legitimacy as leadership enjoys a position of elevated authority. Ziring (2003, pp. 205-206) shows this tradition of elevating the Caliph dates back to the 7th century. From the establishment of the Ummayad

Caliphate to the modern era, the Caliph remained the autocratic ruler exercising complete theocratic control. Ziring also discusses how, since the abolition of the caliphate in 1923, lesser caliph figures have assumed power, demanding obedience—kings, presidents, figures like the Saudi royal family members, Yasser Arafat, Bhutto and Gadaffi. These figures are lifelong ordained rulers to their followers, who rely on their leadership, rather than on institutions. Frequently such leaders are styled as leading by divine right, with the authority that comes from that appointment, and adopt titles such as *emir* in the case of Emir Mohammad Omar (former leader of the Taleban), or Caliph with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The declarations of such individuals have normative force. For example, given the special place and role that the Caliph plays—that of purifying the faithful from a seat of authority—it is the holder of the seat that defines who belongs to the community. This situation occurs because of the *a priori* recognition of the leader as a Mahdi, a "prophetic figure that will lead all Muslims in battle against the infidel" (Gomes & Mikhael, 2018, p. 18).

The norms that arise from the process of securitisation in the context of these organisations are strongly linked to the jihādist leadership. Typically, norm acceptance is a socialisation process. Given the divine authority asserted as intrinsic to the role of a jihādist leader, these norm entrepreneurs enjoy disproportionate influence in norm construction and/or interpretation. The leadership within Sunni jihādist organisations uses its authority to frame issues as existential threats to Islam and the Muslim community, threats such as the West and Western values, the Shi'ite, neo-colonialism, and apostate rulers. As these threats are accepted by their audiences, jihādist leadership then uses the securitised threat to justify exceptional measures to address that threat. It is noted that the threats that are posited by jihādist organisations aren't always new, and these threats aren't always the subject of renewed securitisation, but may already be well established—as noted in Chapter 1, jihād has a long history of opposition to colonialism, nationalism and corrupt leadership. For many of these organisations and issues, the act of securitisation has previously occurred, and those threat narratives, already accepted, are mobilised in new ways, by new people. New norm entrepreneurs change the emphasis of where the locus of threat is, who is the legitimate authority to tackle that threat, and in what mode. With the threats already established, the norm entrepreneur instead establishes new standards to regulate behaviour and constitute identities.

The Copenhagen School has several characteristics that make it a suitable conceptual fit with critical constructivism. The Copenhagen School was born at the close of the Cold War. Security, no longer the exclusive domain of the state and its military, could take on a variety of forms as conceptions of what constituted security issues were being widened in scope and deepened[62] (Aradau et al., 2014, p. 177; Brown & Ainley, 2005, p. 177). Like Critical Constructivism, Securitisation (and the Copenhagen School) is grounded in linguistic theory. To Wæver, security is a linguistic construction, where speech acts that gain audience approval constitute Securitisation. Like Critical Constructivism, to avoid making the issues solely contingent on language and risking making 'security' fundamentally relativistic, Wæver, Buzan and Wilde asserted the existence of ontological truths, specifically the 'traditional meaning' of security. They conform to more traditional schools' concepts of security, dealing with existential threats that necessitate exceptional means, and usually involving the state (Aradau et al., 2014, p. 178).

Proponents of the Copenhagen School assert securitised threats are intersubjective, and emphasise the process of Securitisation, which involves discursive and political acts. This fits the normative framework of this study, and its reliance on norms as "part of a discursive, socially constructed, intersubjective realm" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 31). While its lack of specificity as to what constitutes an audience has been a criticism levelled at the Copenhagen School (Leonard & Kaunert, 2010, p. 60), this study defines the audience as those self-identifying as belonging to the various jihādist groups examined. This answers Vaughn's assertion that empirical claims are weakened by a lack of specificity about the term, by delineating what an audience is in this context (Vaughn, 2009, p. 273).

Securitisation and the Copenhagen School is subject to critique, and two need addressing. Firstly, Brown and Ainley (2005, p. 177) suggest that the framework allows inappropriate issues to be securitised. They provide examples of the demonisation of migrants to Britain in the early 21st century, and threats to the environment. They raise two issues – firstly that there is no limit to what may be ethically securitised, and secondly, that securitisation of a perceived threat may lead to a disproportionate response. The heart of the criticism is an excess of subjectivity in the process of securitisation. However, this criticism is in itself

62 Widened, in the sense of more issues being securitised, and deepened in the sense of a more thorough investigation of already securitised issues.

subjective. Securitisation does not seek to be a framework for judging the morals or ethics of things that are being securitised, but to rather be an explanatory tool. In this sense, it is descriptive.

McSweeney also critiques Securitisation because it excludes certain referent objects as "it adopts a reified vision of security in which the 'state' and 'society' become the only acceptable collective referents for security" (McSweeney, 1998a, p. 138). In attempting to avoid the self-contradictions of pure post-modernism, Copenhagen School proponents posit society as the only non-individualistic referent apart from the state. McSweeney also criticises the Copenhagen School because it widens the security debate too much—that is, expansion of threats to the level of 'security' provides legitimisation of threats that otherwise may not be accepted, or may allow the state to respond to threats that may not be legitimate 'security' threats (McSweeney 1996, p. 88). This study responds to McSweeney's critiques. Firstly, it agrees with McSweeney's criticism that referent objects are too limited, as it acknowledges that jihādist organisations adopt the same pattern of behaviour, especially in that they consider the Muslim faithful to be an homogenous group somewhat akin to a national identity. Additionally, while McSweeney criticises the widening of what typically is considered a security threat, this study contended that even traditional notions of what are, and are not security threats are only done so by consensus opinion, and therefore tacitly subject to the same rules as are being applied in the Copenhagen School.

Studying the Taleban, Weigand (2017, p. 361) looks at loyalty to jihādists. He posits two reasons individuals accept and obey Islamist authorities: voluntary obedience is founded on legitimacy, while involuntary obedience is founded on coercion. Weigand differentiates instrumental legitimacy and substantive legitimacy, with the first resulting from a rational assessment where individuals weigh the ability of the authority to respond to needs, and the second being "a more abstract normative judgement—a belief in rightfulness which is underpinned by shared values." Weinland's assessment conforms to Sikkink and Finnemore's assertions about norms in manifold ways. Specifically, the commonalities are that these norms create shared expectations of appropriate behaviour; are a means to identify who is in and outside the group; and are accepted by the audience on the grounds of both legitimacy and conformity.

As previously noted, the norm cascade model addresses the way norms are socialised into international society. Focussing on Jihād limits the extent to which this model applies. It is unlikely that Western, non-Muslim majority, democratic nations would see jihādist norms arise in national narrative[63] as jihād speaks directly to Muslim populations, and securitises large sections of the international community, such as apostate Muslim countries and the West. Further, as jihād/jihādists can be anathema to the international order, and jihādist norms are unlikely to manifest globally, they can be considered transgressive. However, it is foreseeable that some jihādist norms could manifest in limited scope, as there are already inter-governmental organisations whose identities share many characteristics that overlap with the identities of jihādists, such as the League of Arab States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

There are established mechanisms by which transgressive norms can be propagated through international society. In a general sense, all norms begin as a transgressive ideology. Jihādist norms are no different. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 897):

> In constructing their frames, norm entrepreneurs face firmly embedded alternative norms and frames that create alternative perceptions of both appropriateness and interest…. New norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest.

Finnemore and Sikkink assert that when a new norm challenges the prevailing order, it does so within a framework of what is deemed appropriate as defined by prior norms. They provide the example of the Suffragettes who refused taxation, broke windows, chained themselves to fences, and performed hunger strikes. In this context, acts of civil disobedience are designed to communicate a message and or frame an issue. Therefore, contesting established norms is a two-part act—performing transgressive acts and reframing those acts in the context of the contesting norms.

In the norm cascade model, all emerging norms are transgressive, in that they challenge

63 While is is unlikely that jihādist norms sholud arise in this context, there may be corollaries such as the Bush Doctrine of unilateralism and pre-emptive preventative war.

prevailing norms. 'Transgressive' is used not in the sense of moral judgement: all emerging and cascading norms challenge the prevailing norms. Even for an established norm, the transgressive label is of limited use. First, a norm that might be entirely appropriate in one sphere (such as an African Union, or Arab League) may be inappropriate in another (such as Western democracies). The culturally relative appropriateness of norms gives rise to the second problem—that labelling any norm as transgressive is subjective. Establishing objective moral truth is beyond this study. This study will adopt (where possible) a value-neutral approach to jihādist norms, viewing them only as one of many competing norms. Weber (2013, p. 520) states, "Neutrality on questions of content [is] considered a clear strength, preserving a notion of 'value-free' social science." This makes Critical Constructivism more appropriate as "the main task of critical constructivism is… to criticise those dominant versions of thinking that claim to be true for all" (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p. 215). Remaining value-neutral on the issue of morality does not extend to being agnostic on whether various norms are ordered more or less towards conflict, though.

Additionally, there is another sense in which norms may be transgressive – that is, in the sense that they oppose state interests. This issue is at the heart of the Rationalist/Constructivist debate. Rationalists argue that the state's interests are fixed and knowable, while Finnemore asserts, "My argument is that norms shape interests… Consequently, the two cannot logically be opposed" (Finnemore, 1996, p. 27). State behaviour is not to be interpreted as the dominance of interests over opposed norms, or as some kind of pragmatic accommodation between the two. Instead, normative belief, as expressed through international society, redefines both social roles (which are learnt/accepted by actors) and state interests. "State interests are defined in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate" (Finnemore, 1996, p. 2). In traditional rationalist models, it is difficult to account for norms that oppose the sovereignty of the state, the state being central. However, there are increasing examples of states surrendering their sovereignty in the face of norms that reconstitute identity. These are typically in the form of inter-governmental organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU). As will be shown, Critical Constructivism provides a more adequate account for the ascendence of norms that transgress national sovereignty.

Norms are foundational to the Constructivist theory of International Relations and are generally expressed as shared expectations of behaviour (Lawson, 2012b, p. 50). There are two parts to this definition: a) that there is a shared expectation; and b) the appropriateness of that behaviour. Many international norms assert an expectation of behaviour but are not prescriptive in terms of behaviour. An example would be the norm against nuclear proliferation. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) codified a norm against the spread of nuclear weapons and the associated technologies. According to the UN, "More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance" (United Nations, 2018). However, since the ratification of the treaty, and despite its widespread acceptance, that is, the 'shared expectation' of behaviour, a multitude of states seeking nuclear potential have challenged the appropriateness of nuclear non-proliferation. A state can pay normative lip-service to a concept, making no regulative changes. So, by accepting that the appropriateness of behaviour is divorced from the shared expectation of behaviour, it is plausible that countries might express jihādist norms in their policy—that there might be a shared expectation of the pragmatic expression of that norm with no correlation in actual behaviour. While this bifurcated approach to defining norms based on expectation and appropriateness may be the case, some theorists use non-conformity to contest Constructivism's validity, using non-conformity as evidence of the subordination of normative explanations of behaviour to Hobbesian explanations. It may be the case that leaders operating in a Hobbesian paradigm display an increased likelihood of violating international norms as, for example, with the United States' unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003. This leads Keller and Shannon to seek to "foster a new wave of Constructivism that engages its ideational ally, political psychology, to understand normative variations at the individual level of decision-makers" (Hook & Jones, 2012, p. 107). Therefore, it is appropriate to analyse not only national policy but also the rhetoric of policy-making elites.

It is also possible that norms may be present in a polity, but in a nascent form. Norms do not emerge fully formed. According to Sikkink and Kirk, norms go through a process—before they achieve ubiquity and internalisation, they first emerge and then cascade. During these steps, they are present, but not entrenched (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Axelrod likewise says, "the existence of [norms is] a matter of degrees" (Axelrod, 1986, p. 1097). While Axelrod's approach differs from Sikking and Kirk, they share common ground in asserting

that, although norms might be ubiquitous, frequently they may not be. Additionally, they may compete. For example, while Shi'a adherents may share a religious/culture identity, often national identity is a more cohesive force. Haynes (2012, p. 133) suggests that the enmity between two ethnic or national groups may have a stronger effect than the effect of transnational Shi'ite solidarity. Haynes points to the 1988 conflict where Iraqi Shi'ites fought against their Iranian counterparts in a war that killed over 500,000. The basic claim is that individuals often identify more strongly with notions of nationalism, or that religious identity has a nationalistic character. Further, Francis Robinson suggests that there is a tendency for Islamic groups to organise nationally, forming political groups that happen to be co-terminus with religious identities (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994, p. 32). The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna, while being a transnational Sunni organisation, also composed the first democratically elected Egyptian government after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Likewise, in Pakistan, Jama'at-i-Islami was established as a trans-national Islamic organisation. Nominally unconcerned with ideas of nationalism—Islam being a universalist religion—it nonetheless has operated as a political party.

3.4 Qualitative Content Analysis and Critical Constructivism

This study adopts a Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) methodology, it being well suited to the research questions and theoretical framework. QCA:

- can be used to identify latent meaning within texts, just as critical constructivism is concerned with latent meaning
- is concerned with norms, the central subject of Critical Constructivism
- uses textual artefacts as the medium of analysis, just as Critical Constructivism
- and borrows techniques from Quantitative Content Analysis techniques because of the methodological appropriateness, the presence of external category sources derived from themes and meaning, and to increase trustworthiness.

Critical Constructivism examines norms as constituted by, and constitutive of, their use. According to Graneheim et al. (2017, p. 29) QCA "focuses on subject and context and… offers opportunities to analyse manifest and descriptive content as well as latent and interpretative content," and is "applicable whether knowledge is believed to be innate, acquired, or socially constructed." According to Priest (2010, pp. 108-109), "qualitative content studies are much

more focussed on latent content, however, and can better take into account subtleties of the structure of arguments and narratives not easily captured by quantitative structures." Priest argues that, unlike methods concerned with being systematically rigorous in procedure and sample, QCA succeeds where message structure and the shared rhetorical resources on which they draw may be more at issue. Adler and Clark (2011, p. 371) agree, asserting that "content analysis is well employed when qualitative social scientists aim for primarily verbal, rather than statistical, analysis of various kinds of communication."

Further, QCA is methodologically appropriate to a Critical Constructivist examination of domestic norms' influence on national identity, as it is (Pashakhanlou, 2017, p. 449):

- predominantly descriptive;
- reductionist—it restricts investigations to themes, concepts or words of interest;
- content to settle for one interpretation where several are possible.

QCA is used to find the latent meaning in texts, the deep structure, through the systematic categorisation of the content of messages into themes and topics. QCA is typically applied to text but is also suitable for other forms of communication, such as visual or verbal (Sheard, 2013, pp. 424-425). It is unobtrusive, requiring only that communication has been made by people. "It makes sense of what is mediated between people-textual matter, symbols, messages, information, mass-media content, and technology-supported social interactions-without perturbing or affecting those who handle that textual matter" (Krippendorff, 2004, p. xiii). Further, it shares ontological commonalities with Critical Constructivism, accepting that "the meaning of communication is not immutable, but that it is constructed in the context of the questions asked of it" (Sheard, 2013, p. 425).

Björkdahl notes that adopted definitions of norms often stem from the philosophical and traditional approaches of the theorist, and identifies four approaches: the rationalist, emphasising behavioural consistency with the intent of normalising international behaviour; the sociological, focussing on the social origins of norms; the normative, adopting a moralistic approach and concerned with the appropriateness of behaviour; and the Constructivist, which conceptualises norms as "a set of intersubjective understandings and collective expectations regarding the proper behaviour of states and other actors in a

context or identity" (Björkdahl, 2010, pp. 13-14). Each of these approaches has corollaries in the study of jihādist norms in Islam—in the importance of the juridical tradition governing jihād (fiqh), in the historical development of the religion, and the application of shari'ah.

Björkdahl offers two approaches for the quantification of norms. First, as norms are often the motivation for political action and patterns of behaviour, the analyst may deduce their existence from the often-present indirect evidence. Second, norms are often discussed before acceptance, as part of the process of synthesising an intersubjective meaning. This communication may leave evidence that may be studied (Björkdahl, 2010, pp. 13-14). This study will look primarily for the second type of evidence. It has examined jihādist literature for the topics that compose and delimit jihādist norms. This study will review the different ways organisations and individuals have expressed jihādist norms and then investigate if these are reflected in the Saudi national narrative.

The various attempts to define norms typically depend on whether norms are best described as the dominant practice or normative belief. For example, the rationalist approach, concerned with consequences, advances norms as being the dominant practice, whereas the sociological approach focusses on pre-existing conditions required for dominant practice. While this paints a picture of two competing ideations of norms, exclusive or opposed, two definitions are concomitant, forming the basis for legitimate behaviour. The actions of international actors gain legitimacy by conforming to dominant practice, and by rationalise these actions by appealing to one or more normative beliefs (Clark, 2007, p. 176). According to Katzenstein (1996, p. 5- emphasis added), norms:

> operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having "constitutive effects" that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity. In other situations, norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already-defined entity. In such instances, norms have "regulative" effects that specify standards of proper behaviour. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behaviour, *or do both*.

This is the point at which the required methodological congruence asserted in the introduction to this chapter becomes evident. Jihād is normative by nature – it is both

regulative and constitutive. QCA is an appropriate methodology for the analysis of norms. Critical Constructivism is eminently suitable as the paradigm for such a study, asserting the importance of endogenous norms, as "security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors" (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 2). Jihādist norms, Critical Constructivism, and the suitability of QCA find their nexus here.

3.5 Conclusion

Researchers increasingly look at the role of norms as both influencing state behaviour in the name of security, and in the act of defining security itself. Such an examination of norms requires a granular understanding of the role and nature of norms. This study adopts a methodologically congruent theoretical framework and methodology. Critical Constructivism centralises the role of norms and looks specifically at their endogenous origins. Additionally, Critical Constructivism has some defining concerns, including the role of othering, and the importance of power.

QCA concerns itself with textual artefacts, and gives attention to their latent meaning. Defining what is and isn't a norm, and what the characteristics of norms are, relies on two other critical frameworks—the norm cascade model advanced by such researchers as Risse, Finnemore and Sikkink, and the Copenhagen School's Securitisation framework. Securisation is important because it explains how disparate norms may all be part of jihādism, and it also emphasises the role of thought leaders in the jihādist community.

The norm cascade model indicates norms compete for ubiquity, and tend towards adoption upwards, from individuals to larger groups and higher levels of society. This chapter portrays a landscape of competing norms fighting existing norms for greater levels of adoption. While this may be viewed at the level of the zeitgeist, accurate analysis seeks the textual artefacts of individuals who lead and represent communities of shared identity and intersubjective understanding. Within that, QCA provides a suitable methodology for identifying those norms vying for acceptance.

Chapter 4: Methodology

> Science is nothing but trained and organised common sense, differing from the latter only as a veteran may differ from a raw recruit: and its methods differ from those of common sense only as far as the guardsman's cut and thrust differ from the manner in which a savage wields his club.
> - Thomas H. Huxley (1825 - 1895)

This study asks the question, to what extent are jihādist norms expressed in the national narrative of Saudi Arabia? From this question come the secondary research questions:

- what are those norms, and what do they mean in context?
- can those norms be linked to specific jihādist groups, or are they more general in nature?
- consistent with the assertions of Critical Constructivism, to what extent do norms traverse societal levels in the context jihādist norms?

Answering these questions requires a comparison between two sources of data that are neither completely homogenous, nor completely heterogenous. The first source is those norms that can be identified as operative in jihādist organisations, and which were identified in Chapter Two. The second source of data is Saudi Arabian narrative, the locus of this study's analysis. In order to answer the research questions, this study uses Qualitative Content Analysis to examine Saudi narrative as expressed internationally by Saudi official organs, the Embassy to the United States and United Nations speeches. These narratives have been selected as they are highly edited and scrutinised, and more likely to constitute the official position of Saudi Arabia. This study will use Qualitative Content Analysis to first analyse Saudi narratives for jihādist norms. The categories for the first round of analysis have been drawn from those norms expressed by the subset of jihādist groups presented in Chapter One, and explored in Chapter Two. This is consistent with the assertion that jihād, being a constellation of norms, is the result of the expression of numerous regulative and

constitutive norms under the banner of jihād. A comparison will then be made between those norms revealed in Saudi Arabian narrative, and those norms already identified in Chapter Two. There are two benefits to this approach. First, linking the norms expressed in Saudi narrative to their expression by jihādist organisations helps assuage claims of subjectivity. Second, it speaks to the research question asking whether expressed norms can be linked to extant organisations. An exhaustive review of the jihādist norms of every relevant group is prohibitive due to the space requirements of this study—each case might itself be the subject of its own dissertation. Therefore, cases have been selected to maximise the likelihood of producing evidence of a linkage, and to thereby inform future research. As norms are, by definition, the beliefs adopted by a large section of society, jihādist organisations have been selected based on their size, and on their relationship to Saudi Arabia. Therefore, this study reviewed the jihādist norms espoused by three organisations: the Taleban, Islamic State, and Al-Qa'ida. This included reviewing the differences and similarities in the norms expressed by these groups. Should jihādist norms be discovered in Saudi narrative, this process of differentiation will provide the opportunity to link such a narrative more closely with a particular expression of norms, or to assert those norms are more general in nature.

The second step is analysing Saudi Arabian narrative to delve for those norms in general terms, and in such a manner that might be linked back to the specific voicings of jihādist organisation. For triangulation, two data sets will be analysed: Saudi Arabian speeches delivered to the UN, and press releases from the Saudi Arabian Embassy to the United States. Using multiple data sets offers a higher degree of validity to results, as the resulting analysis of the two sets can be cross-checked with each other. Should there be disagreement between the results of the two analyses, this too is beneficial as it means results are less likely to be over-inflated in their significance. However, should those findings support each other and demonstrate consistency, the findings should be considered more reliable than would be the case were a single data set used.

The chapter begins by discussing the role of case study analysis and then shows how Qualitative Content Analysis is methodologically congruent with the task of analysing Saudi narratives. Then the chapter presents details of the cases used, the selection logic, the data-collection procedures, and the method of analysis. This includes the foundational process of establishing categories for analysis, and the establishment of a code book from

those categories. Following this, the chapter looks at how this framework for analysis is applied. This is important in establishing trustworthiness as, with the chosen methodology, there is often variation in the application of Qualitative Content Analysis.

This chapter finishes with a discussion of trustworthiness. It discusses the role of establishing process, the importance of transparency, the limitations of the methodology, the intrinsic limitations of analysing language, and methods of strengthening finding within the chosen methodology.

4.1 Case Study Research

This study adopts a case study strategy (based on two population data sets) which, according to Yin (2018, pp. 9-10, 13), is appropriate when the research questions are in the form of *how* or *why*, when the researcher does not have control over behavioural events, and when the focus is on contemporary events. Thomas (2015, p. 21) states, "your case study is defined not so much by the methods you are using to do the study, but the edges you put around the case." Further, a case study should be a bounded system situated in a specific time and space (Creswell, 2018, p. 96; Gerring, 2017, p. 27).

Three cases were used to establish the parameters of the jihādist norms being searched for: the Taleban, Al-Qa'ida and Islamic State. There are practical reasons for limiting the number of cases. First, the multitude of jihādist organisations means the breadth and difference in jihādist expressions expand the scope and definition of jihād prohibitively. Simply put, an exhaustive review of jihādist norms in any sizable sample is space prohibitive. However, there is a case to be made for the small sample size. In multi-case studies, cases may be chosen for their similarity to support the validity of their results. Where finding corroborate each other, concurrence reinforces findings. Cases may also be chosen for their difference in order to show different perspectives on the same issue (Creswell, 2018, p. 99). This is based on an analogous logic, that the cases should assert the replicability of the phenomena being observed by exhibiting the same phenomena, or that should show result differences based on anticipatable reasons (Creswell, 2018, pp. 54-55). The chosen organisations illustrate different norm expressions, but within anticipatable parameters. The groups chosen share a common history, culture and ideology (and often even personnel). However, at the same

time, there are tangible differences in the expression of their jihāds. The similarities between the groups help control for wide swings in jihādist expression. Additionally, the groups were chosen due to being the subject of a large quantity of research, meaning this study can rely on previous research, and provide more trustworthy results. Small sample case studies are critical when samples are unique or revelatory or, when studying phenomena for which there are few existing examples, and they allow the researcher to investigate cases thoroughly, with rich description and analysis of their deep structure to (Sheard, 2013, pp. 180-181).

This study adopts a single case for analysis, Saudi Arabia, for evidence of the expression of jihādist norms in national narrative. According to Yin (2018, p. 24), "Single-case studies can be invaluable when the single-case has any of five characteristics – being a critical, extreme or unusual, common, revelatory, or [a] longitudinal case." The author considers Saudi Arabia to be a critical case for analysis. Saudi Arabia exhibits a number of characteristics that make it an appropriate test for a new area of study, as it is the spiritual home and centre of Islam; it is an Arabic country; and it is the geographical origin of Wahhābīsm and Salafism. Such a choice would be corroborated by Gerring (2004, p. 342) who asserts the importance of "an intensive study of a unit to understand a larger class of (similar) units". Additionally, Saudi Arabia has been less prone to swings in policy position than other countries, being led by institutions less oriented towards rapid change over time (a monarchy) and advised by the appointed Shura Council.

As a case study, Saudi Arabia is instrumental, chosen purposively to explore the research questions, as it shares similarities with other polities in the region on the grounds of religious, historical, cultural and ideological commonality. It represents a critical test of whether jihādist norms are present in national narrative. There is additionally a case to be made to the intrinsic value of Saudi Arabia as a case study. That is, a large number of jihādists describe Saudi Arabia as their land of origin. According to the norm dynamics of Finnemore and Sikkink (see Chapter 3), norm entrepreneurs operating at the level of national and international politics have a platform to expound their ideas. Given that Saudi Arabia is the geographical origin of many jihādists and of Wahhābīsm, and given that Saudi Arabia has been a, "prolific sponsor of international Islamist terrorism", there is a case to be made that is may provide a platform for norm cascade (Clifford, 2014, pp. 2-3).

Often with case study research comes criticism of the reliability, validity and generalisability of results (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 221). Yin acknowledges the limits to which results are generalisable, but counters that case studies provide unique contributions about individuals, and about organisational, social and political phenomena. While generalisations do not extend to populations, they are generalisable to theoretical propositions, allowing us to expand and generalise theories (Yin, 2018, pp. 20-21). This will be true for this study. Where there is evidence of jihādist norms in Saudi discourse, it may only be asserted that it is the case for this instance only. However, should that be the case, it is indicative that similar research on similar cases may be likely to yield results, while pointing towards prospective cases, and additionally opens avenues for further research into other national discourse, and deeper analysis of Saudi Arabian narrative.

4.2 Qualitative Content Analysis

This study adopts a Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) strategy for analysing Saudi Arabian narratives. A qualitative method is appropriate to this study as it seeks to identify meaning within text and will investigate the presence of intersubjective meaning present in the texts of jihādist organisations and Saudi Arabia. While QCA explores meaning with detailed, rather than cursory, explanations (Creswell, 2018, p. 49):

> There is no agreed upon structure for how to design a qualitative study. Although books on qualitative research vary in their suggestions for design, the process is very much shaped by the particular approach adopted by the researcher.

While there is no one-size-fits-all method, Creswell also outlines several method traditions that share common traits, and these are ordered according to research topic and task. This study adopts QCA consistent with the accepted concepts of qualitative research. This study examines the themes present in grass-roots jihādist organisations to establish the parameters of what characterises jihād for the relevant proximal organisations. It then adopts Content Analysis to analyse texts taken from United Nations speeches and the Saudi Arabian Embassy to reveal jihādist themes, including searching for commonalities between Saudi Arabian narrative and the reviewed jihādist organisations for indications of related or similar norms.

It is typical in case study research for the data to be assessed qualitatively (Sheard, 2013, p. 181). According to Priest (2010, p. 111), "It is important to remember that qualitative content studies can follow the basic principles of social science—a systematic approach grounded in the evidence at hand—and are not 'unscientific' just because they are more interpretive than positivistic in their approach." Both Kohlbacher (2006) and Yin (2018, p. 24) assert that the aims of Content Analysis conform to those of case studies, in trying to understand complex social phenomena. That is, "content analysis uses a rule-based and methodologically controlled approach in order to deal with the complexity and gradually reduce it." Kohlbacher argues both are theory-guided. Finally, just as case- study research is oriented towards questions of 'how' and 'why' rather than 'how much' or 'what', so too QCA is ordered towards not just manifest content, but also latent content, integrating context into the project. In this way, it is consistent with the principles of Critical Constructivism.

QCA is a method for interpreting data, performed by examining and coding textual materials. It is reductionist, working on the premise that understanding comes from reducing data to smaller, more basic parts. Historically, early descriptions of the method were quantitative, a word-counting exercise; however, the method has enlarged to integrate a qualitative paradigm focussed on subject and context, and offers the opportunity to analyse not only manifest and descriptive content, but also interpretive and latent content. QCA is a process of systematic, objective and observational coding of texts that allows an analyst to discover patterns and trends in content, yielding underlying meaning and ideas across multiple platforms (Daniel, 2006, p. 25; Elo et al., 2014, p. 1; Graneheim et al., 2017, p. 29). QCA ameliorates the early disadvantages of its quantitative parent, the characteristic focus on word counts and the disregard for the context of texts, as well as a tendency to be reductive in dealing with complex texts. Instead, "qualitative techniques emerge from phenomenological and interpretive paradigms, with the emphasis being on constructivist approaches where there is no clear-cut objectivity or reality" (Berelson, 1952; Kohlbacher, 2006; 2018, p. 620). This makes it a suitable choice for use with the Constructivist paradigm (and particularly the Critical Constructivist paradigm), and for assessing whether norms, being ideological, manifest at the national/international level (Chapter 3). Additionally, Kohlbacher (2006) says that:

> Qualitative Content Analysis preserves the advantages of classical quantitative content analysis, and thus also includes quantitative steps of analysis. These are especially important when trying to generalize results.

Content Analysis shares several elements and characteristics with the related methods of narrative analysis and discourse analysis. Narrative analysis focuses on typically verbal communication such as stories and personal experience, and is therefore unsuited to studying state behaviours, especially those seen through the lens of national rhetoric. Alternatively, discourse analysis seeks to contextualise meaning within communication. It claims agents use language to construct a version of the social world, rather than language being a transparent medium through which people express themselves. It asserts that identity is constituted and reconstituted through discourses and descriptions. All three approaches allow the researcher to study social behaviours unobtrusively, without effecting the behaviours. However, there are also differences, and Content Analysis differs in three fundamental ways: the scope of analysed content, the lack of contextualisation and interpretation, and quantification. Content Analysis has a broader scope in terms of units of analysis as compared to both narrative and discourse analysis. While both narrative and discourse analysis frequently try to interpret and/or contextualise meaning, Content Analysis is well suited to identifying these types of trends (Neuendorf, 2017, p. 222). According to Babbie (2016, p. 296), it is "well suited to the study of communications and to answering the classic question of communications research: Who says what, to whom, why, how, and with what effect?'" Content Analysis is also better suited to the theoretical framework of this dissertation than discourse analysis as Content Analysis does not try to explain the 'why' of content. It is descriptive and not explanatory. Constructivism similarly supposes that meaning is co-constitutive. In this study, jihād is posited as an intersubjective norm—this study seeks to uncover its presence, but cannot indicate causation insofar as norms discovered in national narrative derive from that of jihādist organisations. It may explain identifiable preconditions for actions, but cannot show a causal link.

The process of conducting a qualitative data analysis is not as clearly defined as other methods. Typically, the analytical work of QCA is a two-part process comprising coding and analysis. Data is coded according to categories of content, and with the purpose of making connections that lead to greater understanding. The analyst may first create a coding matrix to classify units of information, and then classifies and organises communication content

into categories. Then the analyst seeks to establish linkages and identify emerging patterns according to the topic, theme and context. This is a reflexive process, rather than serial (Sheard, 2013, pp. 420, 424).

In QCA , the researcher begins the process by determining "what is to be observed as well as how observations are to be recorded and thereafter considered data" (Krippendorff, 2019, p. 102). According to Krippendorff (2019, p. 88), the process of QCA takes place in two main steps, each with its own sub-steps. First is the process of:

- Unitising: defining the relevant units
- Sampling: constructing and relying on a sampling plan
- Recording/coding: the process of coding according to a plan
- and Reducing: the summarisation and simplification of data.

Together, these steps constitute 'data making'—the process of taking raw texts and making it into computable data. Krippendorff (2019, pp. 108-112) lists a number of methods for establishing how units may be categorised. This study replies on categorical distinctions, units that are defined 'by their membership in a class or category—by their having something in common' (Krippendorff, 2019, p. 109). Additionally, while Krippendorf includes sampling as a step, the process of limiting the number of units for analysis to a representative set of units, he also advocates for population testing: that is, rather than analysing a sample, analysing all units. This study has adopted that approach. There are two populations that have been selected: press releases by the Saudi Arabian Embassy to the United States, and speeches made to/in the United Nations to the General Assembly and Security Council.

The second step, 'meaning making', involves:

- Abductive Inference: moving from data to meaning; and
- Narration: the process of conveying.

According to Krippendorff, abductive inference is unique to Content Analysis. It is described as the process of bridging the gap between quantitative and descriptive accounts of text and the meaning residing therein. These inferences must be substantiated by evidence. This

leads to the final step, narration, where the researcher makes their results comprehensible to others. Included in this are acts such as showing the contribution of the research to existing literature and justifying the appropriateness of QCA. These are traditions familiar to social scientists (Krippendorff, 2019, p. 90). Meaning making happens within an explicit context. This context is created/defined by the content analyst, who "specifies the world in which the text can be related to the analyst's research question" Krippendorff (2019, p. 40). This step is foundationally important as it provides rich contextual information, and signals the reader to sensitising concepts.

It is important to note that this process doesn't necessarily happen in linear fashion. The process of 'meaning making', for example, began in the introduction of this study, while the locus of 'data making' in this study happens in Chapters 4 and 5. The process of Content Analysis is shown in Figure 4-1: Conceptual Model of Content Analysis (Wilson, 2021, p. 49). This diagram illustrates the iterative process by which data is converted into meaning in response to a research question. The circular arrows indicate the iterative nature of meaning making as data is reduced to discernible patterns and themes. This process takes place within an explicit context that situates texts, data making, coding, meaning making, and the research questions.

The component steps of Content Analysis are not necessarily linearly applied, and/or the process, tidy in theory, requires variation in procedure due to variation in content. Krippendorff (2019, p. 90) identifies a number of variations that may occur. Frequently, the process of analysis is performed in iterative loops, until the requisite quality is achieved. Alternatively, the process of unitisation may start by classifying documents, and then may change in scope according to data. Context-specific decisions and requisite variation may lead to the addition of steps. As the process must necessarily adapt to such varying demands of the texts chosen, the data-making process, the meaning-making process and the narration of results, Krippendorff (2004, p. 85) notes that "that there is no single "objective" way of flowcharting research designs."



Figure 4-1: Conceptual Model of Content Analysis

This study adopts a deductive (that is, concept-driven) approach, formulating categories according to the parameter for jihādist norms established in Chapter 1, but remains open to information discovered inductively. The study begins with a research question but is open to observations from texts which may build to empirical general observations (Adler & Clark, 2011, p. 372; Graneheim et al., 2017, pp. 248, 251-252). Further, unlike its quantitative sibling, QCA conceptualises the researcher as part of the research process, and the design process supports reflexivity and interaction. This study follows the steps typical of qualitative analysis laid out by Williamson, Given and Scifleet (which correlates with White and Marsh's overview) and follows various analysts, including Althiede, Mayring, and Schrier. Those steps are (Sheard, 2013, pp. 427-430; White & Marsh, 2006, p. 30):

1. Focussing research objectives on communications
2. Establishing the frame for the research
3. Selecting the unit of analysis, sampling and coding
4. Developing content categories
5. Developing protocols for analysis
6. Performing data analysis and preparing the findings.

As such, this study adopts a deductive, *a priori* design. According to Neuendorf (2017), "a priori (that is, before the fact) design is actually a part of the task of meeting the requirement of objectivity–intersubjectivity." Decisions about variables, measurement and coding rules have preceded the analysis. In this sense, the author argues that the approach adopted is hypothetico-deductive, adding to its validity and reliability. Founded on these principles, the task of coding will then operate iteratively as per Krippendorf's process model.

4.3 Case Selection

Seeking to identify jihādist norms in Saudi national narrative and to link those norms to those advanced by jihādist organisations, this study necessarily requires a process of case selection. This includes a review of those organisations' (three cases) expressed norms, and it adopts the narrative of Saudi Arabia as its subject for the main case study analysis.

There are several factors that were considered in the case selection of jihādist organisations, both practically and methodologically. There is no consensus on the number of cases that should be used in case-study research, and case selection is often constrained by pragmatic restrictions such as money, time and expertise (Gerring, 2004, pp. 343-344). Seawright and Gerring (2008, p. 295) point out that these are legitimate factors in case selection, but they must sit alongside methodological considerations. A comprehensive analysis of jihādist norms expressed by any one jihādist organisation would itself be prohibitive, notwithstanding the desire to cover multiple cases. On that basis, a practical reason for choosing these case studies includes the requirement for an existing body of research. Drawing from peer-reviewed sources, the various facets of each organisations' jihād will be enumerated with supporting primary evidence. The purpose of the support of primary evidence is not only illustrative and typifying, but to also convey the sense of those norms being transmitted in the original context.

There is also methodological justification for the cases chosen. Firstly, cases have been purposively chosen because of their relevance and high likelihood of yielding results. There are a number of factors that make these cases likely to yield results, and which may maximise what we can learn within the parameters of this study. Specifically, this includes their size, prominence, geographical proximity, and relationship with the Saudi state. Methodologically, this is a better choice than alternatives such as random sampling, which is less likely to yield results, or may yield results that face criticism because any relationship found may be coincidental. Purposive sampling increases the likelihood that a meaningful, non-coincidental relationship is likely to be related. The methodological reason for including these cases is to fulfil what Gerring (2004, p. 342) maintains is the aim of case selection—the intensive study a case, or cases, 'for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units.' What follows is the selection logic for cases on a case-by-case basis.

4.3.1 Al Qaida

Al-Qa'ida, in the form that gain notoriety after 9/11, was the child of Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. There is disagreement about when bin Laden became radicalised, but Gerges (2011, p. 54) contends the propensity was there from an early age. His ideology evolved over time. For example, in the 1990s, bin Laden vocally opposed the killing of non-combatants, including Americans. However, banished from Saudi Arabia in 1992, he spent four years in Sudan and was exposed to Egyptian Qutb-ian ideas, synthesising the more radical teaching that became embodied in Al-Qa'ida (Ahmed, 2014, p. 94). According to Ahmed, "the marriage of ideas between Egyptian Qutbian radicalism and the ultra- conservative Saudi variety gave birth to Al-Qa'ida." Following 9/11, there were restrictions enacted on Al Qa'ida's funding partners from numerous countries, including Saudi Arabia (Haynes, 2014, p. 304).

Al-Qa'ida's Islamist ideologies emanate from Saudi Wahhābīsm, where the population can be seen as divided between radical hardliners and moderates. There are many people in the general population, as well as the ulamā', who oppose the Saudi royal family as corrupt and in league with the United States (Haynes, 2014, pp. 272-273). While Saudi Arabia, for the period of this analysis, has been following a trajectory of moderation, historically Saudi Arabia has recognized the legitimacy of many hard-line Wahhābītes such as Mullah Omar, founder of the Taliban (Steinberg & Woermer, 2013, p. 3; Ziring, 2003, p. 271).

There is unsubstantiated evidence implicating the Saudi government and royal family in the activities of Al-Qa'ida (and Islamic State). In 2017, diplomatic papers leaked out of the Qatari Embassy in Washington indicated Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman supported Al-Qa'ida in Yemen. The paper also showed Saudi Intelligence Chief Khalid bin Ali al-Humaidan provided funds for Al-Qa'ida to purchase equipment to provide to Islamic State (Fars News Agency, 2017; IFP News, 2017). Osama bin Laden was also a close friend to Saudi Prince Turki bin Faisal (Soherwordi et al., 2012, p. 350).

Traditionally, Al-Qa'ida has been critical of the Saudi government's support of the United States, and United States' troops in Saudi Arabia. In 1992, Al-Qa'ida called for jihād, publishing a fatwah to combat the US presence in the country. In a 1996 fatwah, Al-Qa'ida

criticised Saudi Arabia for hosting United States' troops in the Arabian Peninsula (Gomes & Mikhael, 2018, p. 13). As a result of a campaign of bombings and attacks in the kingdom, lasting from 2003 to 2007, Al-Qa'ida "lost the sympathy of the Saudi public," and diminished Al-Qa'ida's influence in Saudi Arabia. The public support for Al-Qa'ida then started to move from Al-Qa'ida to Islamic State (Haykel, 2016, pp. 74-75).

4.3.2 Islamic State

According to Clapper, "With the uprising against Bashar Al-Assad, many Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, have used the conflict as a proxy war for Sunni vs Shia supremacy by funneling millions of dollars to Wahhabi militant factions to assist in the overthrow." Saudi Arabia began funneling millions of dollars to Wahhābī militants in the region to assist with the overthrow of the regime. In 2012, the director of the Saudi Intelligence Agency, Bandar bin Sultan, formally travelled to Syria, tasked with organising Sunni militants into an opposition movement. This included providing financial support for the al-Nusra Front and Al-Qa'ida in Iraq (Clapper, 2016).

Islamic State operatives have been linked to Saudi Arabia. For example, Mohamed Daleel, who detonated a bomb outside a German music concert on July 24, 2016, was found to have been in contact with Islamic State linked militants by telephones with Saudi Arabian phone numbers (Gambhir, 2016, p. 20), with Saudi Arabia being home to active Islamic State militants (Hubbard, 2016). Such links point to the broad support Islamic State has enjoyed from Saudi Arabian nationals—Saudi Arabia provided the second highest number of Islamic State fighters, around 2,500 (Klor, 2016, p. 5; Sardarnia & Safizadeh, 2017, p. 1279).

4.3.3 Taleban

Historically, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been among the largest sources of funding for the Afghan Taleban (Clinton, 2009, p. 44). Though not immediate neighbours, Saudi Arabia has considered Afghanistan and Pakistan part of the Kingdom's immediate neighbourhood. The Saudi relationship with Afghanistan forms part of a larger, more complex relationship. The Saudi sympathy for Afghanistan is the result not just of ideological closeness but also may be linked to the strategic importance that Afghanistan

holds for Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan being neighbours with Iran and Pakistan.

Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in Pakistani madrassas, believing them to be a natural obstacle to the spread if Shi'ite Islam, educating large numbers of Pakistani and Afghan children. According to Mahendrarajah (2015, pp. 384-385), from 1980, Saudi Arabia exported Wahhābī ideas to Pakistani madrassas, from which came the Taleban. Under that influence, the Taleban became the vehicle to create 'the purest Islamic state in the world' (Mahendrarajah, 2015, p. 383). Mahendrarajah (2015, p. 385) contends, "there was no wholesale importation of Wahhabi doctrines; rather, concepts were borrowed, then adapted and tempered for the Afghan Pashtun political culture". He classifies this as Wahhābī-Deobandi culture.

Saudi Arabia also sponsored mujahid parties, which then became complicit in the spread of Wahhābī ideology, and funded select groups of radicals, chiefly through the Pakistani military. Saudi Arabia was also one of three countries that recognised the Taleban in 1996. Compared to its financial support of jihādist groups, Saudi Arabia's support for Afghan social and economic programs was minuscule. Support for the Taleban from Saudi Arabia began to diminish after 1998, due largely to the support the Taleban provided Al-Qa'ida. Saudi Arabia has consistently maintained relations with the Taleban's various leaders and factions and relations increased again between 2008 and 2010 as the Karzai government sought to reconcile with the Taleban and other factions. During the US occupation of Afghanistan, Taleban financing (besides that coming from drug trafficking) came largely from fundraising in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait (Mathews, 2010, pp. 31-14; Sial, 2015, pp. 6-7; Steinberg & Woermer, 2013). Analysts argue that the Taleban's emergence after 2001 differs significantly from its predecessor—a neo-Taleban whose rhetoric is more in tune with the globalist jihādist message of Al-Qa'ida. While its message is globalist, it is notable that the actions of the Taleban do not correspond to regional and global violence, but remain largely localised in Afghanistan (Harpviken, 2012, p. 223).

Initially grounded in the Deobandi school of thought, with the arrival of Osama bin Laden, the Taleban experienced an ideological shift towards bin Laden's worldview. Bin Laden's writings indicate several influences. While some authors claim his worldview is inspired by Wahhābīsm, Ahmed (2014, p. 94) argues his writings indicate he is much more influenced

by Sayid Qutb and especially ibn Taymiyyah with his call to indiscriminate violence. Ahmed (p .98) asserts, "it can be argued that it was al Qaeda which transformed the belief of Taleban into hatred for anybody who did not follow their beliefs."

Despite globalist rhetoric, the Taleban has not produced large numbers of recruits, and this is due to its focus on local and national issues (Harpviken, 2012, p. 218). During the period of US occupation, the objective of the Taleban's jihād was to overthrow and subsequently govern Afghanistan. From its emergence in 1994 to September 11, the Taleban's official agenda was strictly local/national, seeking to re-establish peace, to disarm the population, and to implement Shari'ah law. There was no reference to a trans-national struggle. In the aftermath of 9/11, this was reinforced, as the Taleban sought to distance itself from the War on Terror. The Taliban changed its messaging to portrayed themselves as God-fearing nationalists instead of religious zealots. At the same time, they reduced emphasis on the Wahhābī religio-political themes, which was felt by many Afghans to be foreign (Harpviken, 2012, p. 222). While the Taleban struggles to escape its Pashtun identity, it does not ideologically oppose any specific ethnic groups, but is opposed instead to Western cultural incursion (Ahmed, 2014, p. 96).

During the period that this study examines (2001-2019), it is notable that the upper echelons of the Taleban were solely Afghan citizens. While other groups swore fealty to Mullah Omar, it is notable that there was no integration with other groups such as the Haqqani Network, The Taleban in Pakistan, or Al-Qa'ida (Harpviken, 2012). However, all these groups consider themselves to be operating under the banner of the one emir (Ahmad, 2013).

The Taleban does not pose a direct strategic threat to neighbouring countries. From 2009, the Taleban maintained it would not disturb the internal security of other states, nor allow any peoples to do so from within Afghan territory. While there is close relationship with Al-Qa'ida, there are no Afghans in Al Qa'ida's leadership apparatus; neither have Al-Qa'ida leaders been on the four regional councils of the Taleban (United Nations Security Council, 2011, pp. § 12-13).

4.3.4 Saudi Arabia

This study takes as it central case Saudi Arabia, and there are both practical and methodological reasons for its case selection. First, it is a moderately large nation, with a population of approximately 35million. Secondly, it has the largest economy of any Arab nation. These factors mean it has a high degree of international engagement, and subsequently there is a large quantity of English-language resources. Though other countries (such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates) have large populations and high GDP, they do not have the same cultural and religious homogeneity as Saudi Arabia. Additionally, there is already a large corpus of research on Saudi Arabia. Methodological reasons also informed the decision of selecting Saudi Arabian narrative for analysis—primarily, it presents a high likelihood of yielding results. That high likelihood is based on the established linked between the state and the jihādist groups chosen. Saudi Arabia rose to international prominence because of its link to the plane hijackers of 9/11, both in terms of their nationality and the relationship between Al-Qa'ida and Saudi Arabia. Subsequently there has been a large amount of research (both academic and non-academic) into the relationship between the Saudi state and jihādist organisations. That there is already an established link between the state and the groups in question indicates a higher likelihood of discovering jihādist norms at a national level. Over the past two decades, Saudi Arabia has been the largest contributor of funds promoting Salafi jihādism (Butt, 2015; Olson, 2010; Walsh, 2010).

Besides the established link between jihādist groups and Saudi Arabia, there were several other factors considered, including:

- The country's ethnic composition, as Saudi Arabia is approximately 90% Arab and 10% African Arab.
- Religious composition, as Sunni Islam accounts for 85-90% of the citizenry and Shi'ite Islam accounts for 10-15%. Despite the large foreign presence in the country, the government restricts religious practice inconsistent with their interpretation of Sunni Islam. Citizenship is only extended to Muslims, and non-Muslim places of worship are disallowed.
- Geographical location, as Saudi Arabia is at the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, and is the geographical origin of both Islam and Wahhābīsm. Unlike Wahhābīsm, Salafism, while tied to authority of the text of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, is not

hostile to competing Islamic juridical traditions.

- The government type: as an absolute monarchy with unelected officials, the norms espoused by officials should be less susceptible to change, and more in line with the opinions of policy-making elites. In addition, Saudi Arabia is guided by Islamic institutions, such as the Shura Council, to provide additional stability of governance over time. This is considered to be important for the purpose of making study results be durable and to travel.
- The legal system, as Saudi Arabia adopts a Shari'ah legal system (with aspects of Egyptian, French and customary law).

4.4 Time Frame

Regarding international policy documentation, this study will focus on content from Saudi Arabia from 2001 to 2019. In 2005, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud ascended to the throne, and the period also encapsulates King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud's reign. The period also includes King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud's reign, which was bisected by 9/11. However, only post-9/11 documents will be considered, given the radical changes it precipitated in the international landscape.

This period also provides some homogeneity to jihādist texts. Rapoport (2004, pp. 61-62) identifies how terrorism comes in waves that may be identified as "a cycle of activity in a given time period… characterised by expansion and contraction phases." According to his model, we are in the Fourth Wave, the religious wave (Rapoport, 2004, pp. 47-48). These waves exhibit an international character, with groups in geographical proximity exhibiting commonalities in both activities and ideological drive. Rapoport acknowledges the agency of organisations but shows they are part of a wave, each having different life cycles. This is tied to the organisational memberships' inability to transmit those qualities that inspired the movement to their ideological children.

The Four Waves model is analytically useful as it creates a simple and conceptually clean narrative (Parker & Sitter, 2015, p. 198). Thus, there are a number of reasons for adopting Rapoport's model:

- First, his conceptualisation of the Fourth Wave conforms directly to the topic of

this dissertation. Specifically, it is the religious wave, with 'Islam at the heart of the wave.'[64]

- We are in this wave.
- It helps to prevent unduly focussing on contemporary events.
- It provides a neat, arbitrary time frame to work within. While he claims the current wave started prior to 2001, this study starts analysis there because of the disruptive and transformative events of 9/11. Nonetheless, the period for analysis resides entirely in the fourth wave.
- There is congruence between the questions presented by this study, and Rapoport's description of these norms being international in character, "driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups' characteristics and mutual relations" (Rapoport, 2004, p. 47).

While Rapoport specifically addresses terrorism, this dissertation will include non-'terrorist' norms – aspects of jihād such as the role of hijrah that aren't violent, but form part of a jihādist framework, or norms about which individuals are not valid targets for violent jihād. That is, jihādist norms discriminate both when violence is permitted, as well as when it is prohibited. Inaction attributed to the strictures of jihād may also be evidence of conformity to jihādist norms. Further, while Rapoport demonstrates the transnational nature of waves, he does so on the grounds that different organisations share commonalities in actions and ideology. This dissertation, being interested in the distinction between competing jihādist norms, will limit the sample of jihādist authorities to those that are geographically and financially proximate to Saudi Arabia.

4.5 Method Overview

4.5.1 Data Collection

Practically, this study first looks for relevant norms espoused by jihādist organisations; thus it is necessary to catalogue those norms first. Jihādist norms, being socially constructed, are the result of an intersubjective understanding—they don't exist apart from jihādist organisations. While there is a large juridical body of literature about what does and does

64 While Rapoport makes this assertion, he also addresses terrorism by other religious groups including Christians, Sikhs, and Jews.

not constitute jihād, this study concerns itself with the normative adoption and expression of jihād—the intersubjective expression and acceptance of jihād. In these terms, the previously enumerated jihādist organisations have a strong claim to legitimate authority on the topic as they are not only recognised by their members as fighting a jihād but also are subject to broader recognition as being jihādist in nature. Saudi Arabia does not typically promote itself as waging a jihād, so the norms present in Saudi narrative cannot be said to be jihādist using its own rhetoric as a metric.

For this study, data was collected from two sources—speeches to the UN, and statements and press releases from the Saudi Embassy to the US. This is consistent with Yin (2018, pp. 110-125) who lists a variety of appropriate sources for case study data: documentation, archival data, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artifacts. Wiener (2009, p. 187) notes that the researcher should use, "'contemporarily produced texts' in order to reconstruct hidden normative meanings," and includes in his examples parliamentary debates, the media, and interview transcriptions. Triangulation is strengthened by using multiple data sources, adding to the credibility of outcomes and interpretations (Sheard, 2013, p. 181).

While Priest (2010, p. 110) maintains that contends representative sampling procedures may not be appropriate in some qualitative social research, the focus being on culturally shared rhetorical resources and latent meaning, a large number of documents in the data sets provides a higher confidence. The data set is also consistent with Priest's (2010, p. 110) assertion that:

> the selection should make sense. The material should be representative – not in the sense that the sample used in the survey is statistically representative of a larger population, but in the sense that the material reflects important cultural values and iconography that are relevant to the study.

Additionally, the sources used are purposively crafted documents intended for consumption by an international audience. They are not 'off-the-cuff' comments taken out of context, but intended accurately to convey meaning to a highly critical audience. The pairing of Content Analysis with purposive, high-level communication ensures the underlying principle of social research remains: that is, it must be systematic and grounded in the available evidence.

4.5.2 Collection Procedures

A full account of the ideology of the myriad of jihādist groups exceeds the constraints of this study. Instead, this study relied on peer-reviewed evidence of, and research on, the norms espoused by jihādist norms in the enumerated categories. Primary evidence is used *a fortiori* to substantiate and corroborate these norms. This is facilitated by the widespread practice of jihādist groups publishing literature in English to encourage young readers to join their cause (Neelamalar & Vivakaran, 2019, p. 457). The adoption of the internet as a means for recruiting and disseminating propaganda means there is a plethora of online primary sources including interviews, news sources, and even organisational outlets, such as the Taleban's 'Zubihallah' spokesperson Twitter account—an account controlled by the Taleban and presented as an actual person espousing Taleban propaganda.

There are many sources of information on Saudi Arabian governmental policy and position such as from the myriad of governmental departments and agencies, news sources, and previous research. Therefore, pragmatic decisions had to be made to keep the data source and type relatively homogenous and consistent, such that it reflects the nation's aggregate position. Data for the publicly espoused position of Saudi Arabia is derived from two sites—the Saudi Arabian Embassy to the United States (https://www.saudiembassy.net/), and the United Nations (specifically, from the UN digital Library, https://digitallibrary.un.org). These sources were selected as they represent a large sample size and represent the official voice of Saudi Arabia to the world. They are not the utterances of any individual, but rather the result of a bureaucratic method, and are highly scrutinised before publication.

The UN Digital Library allows the researcher to define search parameters (such as searching by country, date range, subject). After selecting the appropriate parameters, results are returned in chronological order. Documents are marked with a unique symbol denoting the organ that has issued the document: A – General Assembly, S – Security Council, E – Economic and Social Council, and ST - Secretariat. Additionally, there are specialist organs that may be referenced. There may be a secondary character set that denotes sub-organs, and then the final numbers denote the relevant year and the session. Navigating through the links provides access to PDFs of the relevant documents in several translations, including English – these were the texts used. All the speeches from 2001-2019 were downloaded and imported into NVivo for analysis. The United Nations website data set comprises

all speeches (and continuations) made by the Saudi Arabian delegate to the UN, and downloaded through the United Nations Digital Library (623 documents).

The Saudi Arabian Embassy website (US) has download repositories, with resources categorised. All the official statements and press releases from the period 2001-2019 were saved in PDF format[65] and then imported into NVivo for analysis[66]. The data set comprises all statements (84 documents) and press releases (598 documents) from 2001 to 2019.

4.5.3 Data Analysis Process

The process of analysis was comprised of three general steps. In order to make a valid comparison between Saudi narrative and that of jihādist organisations, a common metric needed to be established. First, a criterion was established for analysis. Jihād by itself is insufficient, it being a collection of practices, a constellation of norms too nebulous for accurate coding. The categories for analysis were drawn from those regulative and constitutive norms that comprise jihād. The expressed norms of jihādist organisations are those enumerated in Chapter 2. This enumeration is supported by both primary sources and academic literature on the received positions of jihādist groups. For example, should the category be 'martyrdom operations', each group's formulation was reviewed for their respective position on such attacks. This review of the literature was reflexive, with categories refined through the process.

Once the process of reviewing the jihādist norms of those groups was complete, a codebook was established for the analysis of Saudi narrative. As noted previously, this codebook was written and re-written in an iterative process. Additionally, while the initial codebook was refined through the repeated process of analysis, so too were additional codes established, as the process of coding reveals patterns and trends from the texts. This codebook can be found in Appendix 1.

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65 The majority of documents on the Saudi Embassy website are in HTML, and unsupported adequately by the content analysis software, NVivo. Therefore, documents were converted to PDF with Microsoft's print to PDF function.

66 NVivo is software designed for qualitative and mixed method research.

As Chapter 2 reviewed jihādist norms adopted by jihādist organisations, the next chapter reports the results of the analysis of Saudi narratives. Chapter 5 – Jihād in Saudi Narratives – will convey the outcomes of the analysis of Saudi texts. Finally, the Discussion section discusses the findings, examining how they answer the research questions, and deals with other relevant aspects of this study (see Figure 4-2: Data Analysis Process).



Figure 4-2: Data Analysis Process

The code book forms the heart of this analysis. The first step in coding was establishing a codebook that would accurately allow jihādist norms to be identified. According to Creswell (2018, p. 50), "Several aspects of a qualitative project may vary from study to study, and from initial discussions, we make preliminary decisions about what will be emphasised." The problem with this claim is that it raises the spectre of subjectivity on the part of the coder. To help ameliorate the potential for selection bias, existing research and jihādist literature provided the themes for category construction. According to Schreier (2014, p. 2), "Qualitative Content Analysis helps with reducing the amount of material. It requires the researcher to focus on selected aspects of meaning, namely those aspects that relate to the overall research question." The process of data analysis starts with defining categories.

The initial themes for coding were drawn from Chapter One and formed the basis for the review of jihādist organisations' norms in Chapter Two. While the chosen headings are representative of a variety of aspects of jihād, an exhaustive account of every aspect of jihād is prohibitive on several grounds, such restrictions on time and space, and their limited applicability. Therefore, only those aspects of jihād most likely to return results and that are represented in jihādist literature were surveyed. Chapter Two reviewed jihādist organisations for the enumerated norms per the research question asking whether identified norms could be traced to relevant jihādist organisations.

The coding categories were applied twice in this study. In the first instance, they were used as broad categories for reviewing how jihādist norms are expressed by the relevant organisations. The results of this review are presented in Chapter Two. The same categories were used to create the initial codes for analysis of Saudi Arabian narrative, with those findings appearing in Chapter Five: Findings. Through the previously described processes of coding and refinement, additional codes and categories were added during the process. Elo et al. (2014) maintains that, to improve trustworthiness, a full account of what was chosen, and why, must be provided. Therefore, the findings chapter also describes the subsequent rounds of coding and the rationale for the codes used.

Chapter One and Two in concert provide the basis for analysis. Chapter One provided the initial categories used for both the review of jihādist organisations' expressed norms, and for the analysis of Saudi Arabian literature (the codebook is enumerated in Appendix 1). For analytical consistency, the review of jihādist organisations was divided according to those categories. Likewise, these categories form the basis for the first round of codes, which is laid out in a similar manner. Though broadly defined by the categories, the codes will be refined through an iterative process. The categories are as follows:

- Offensive or Defensive Positioning: This category covers language that indicates the need for jihād either in a defensive context, or offensive context. For example, should text indicate that there is a sense that Saudi Arabia in its Islamic capacity, or Islam itself, through its identity and/or values, is under attack, that may be coded as a 'defensive' expression. This pertains when an utterance is accompanied by the suggestions that there should be a response. Likewise, text may be coded as

'offensive' should they assert that Islam should be coercively spread.

- The Role of Hijrah: This category covers language that encourages individuals the travel to the Dar al Islam and/or caliphate under a rationale deriving from jihādist positioning.
- Martyrdom Operation Norms: This category covers language that specifically addresses the phenomena of 'martyrdom operations'. It codes the phenomena, not just texts which include that specific term, whether that be 'suicide bombing(s)' or even addressing attacks that do not use those specific terms.[67]
- Nationalist/Pan-Islamic Norms: This category covers language that identifies Saudi attitudes about the role and interaction of both nationalist and pan-Islamic norms. Both norms are covered as, for some jihādist groups, these two norms are considered to be mutually exclusive, as jihād opposes the secularist nationalist norm. For other groups, nationalism does not compete with the Islamic identity, and is not the subject of jihādist ire.
- Caliphate Orientation: This category covers language that makes clear the stance of the organisation on the Caliphate—its role, whether it exists, and the group's position in relationship to it.
- The Source of Authority to Jihād: This category covers language that determines who has the authority to declare jihād and make authoritative statements regarding who may participate.
- Who can wage jihād?: This category covers language regarding who is eligible to wage jihād.
- Who/what are Valid Operational Targets?: This category covers language that determines what are and are not valid targets for jihād. This includes classes of people and individuals, as well as strategic targets such as buildings and supplies.
- Miscellaneous Constitutive Norms: This category covers jihādist language that is relevant, but not covered in other categories that are constitutive in nature, such as determining groups' membership.
- Miscellaneous Regulative Norms: This category codes language that is relevant but

67 This study seeks not to be a word counting exercise. Any text that addresses martyrdom operations is encoded, whether supportive, detractive, or value agnostic. The point is not to establish the Saudi propensity to use a specific term, or terms, of reference; it is not about how Saudi Arabia frames the phenomena. Rather it is about Saudi attitude to the practice of these types of attacks.

not covered in other categories that are regulative in nature, concerned with right and wrong behaviours.

Within the code book, for each established code there is also a code for the inverse corollary. For example, where there is a code for those expressions that indicates the West is antagonistic to Islamic values, there will also be a code for that text which says that the West is categorically not antagonistic of Islam, or that Saudi Arabia has good relations with the West (or its members). For example, Al-Qa'ida claims that the West and Western values stand in opposition to Islam and Islamic values. Just as a reiteration of this position by Saudi Arabia may be counted as conforming to jihādist claims, and a reiteration of the Dar al-Islam/Dar al-Harb dichotomy, so too does the rejection of that position indicate a counter-norm. That is particularly the case should that expression be made in the context of the discussion of jihādist organisations.

Williamson, Given and Scifleet note that there is no correct number of categories to use, but suggest that up to 20 is standard (Sheard, 2013, p. 429). Coding follows the prescriptions set out by Schreier (2014, p. 7). Top-level categories cover one aspect each, and sub-categories will contain mutually exclusive categories. Schreier asserts that all relevant aspects of the material must be covered by a category. It has been noted that an exhaustive account of every aspect of jihād proposed by every organisation would be space prohibitive. However, categories have been chosen such that a non-ambiguous claim can be made not only about jihādist norms but also about their similarity to the covered organisations.

Coding will start with these categories and then go through an iterative process. For example, in examining the strictures around martyrdom operations, an initial search of the text might use the text 'martyr'. Should the related text contain the term 'suicide', this will inform another search and modify the coding frame. Should it become apparent there is latent difference in the manner in which jihādist organisations and Saudi narrative use the word 'martyr', that will develop into separate codes. This process helps ensure the integrity of results. The categories and codes of the norms searched for are not those defined by the researcher, but rather are led by the narrative of both jihādist organisations and Saudi narrative. The iterative process also ensures an appropriate degree of granularity is applied to the analysis of Saudi narrative, such that meaningful data can be identified.

4.5.4 Trustworthiness

QCA is appropriate for the analysis of multi-faceted and sensitive phenomena, but can lead to claims of subjectivity. Further, "there is no single right way to do Content Analysis. Instead, investigators must judge what methods are appropriate for their substantive problems" (Weber, 1990, p. 56). Trustworthiness is established through a clear description of the process, and a thorough discussion of the strengths and limitations of the methodology as it is extremely likely that the methodology precludes a strict causal relationship from being established. Direct mapping of jihādist norms (where available) to extant jihādist literature will help ameliorate claims of subjectivity, and appendices and tables will be used to show the link between data and results (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 112). Because of the qualitative nature of the research, an account of the analytical approach and procedures are given particular attention, as well as a meticulous justification of the data chosen for analysis (Holzscheiter, 2014, p. 159). Further, a granular and differentiating approach will be adopted when defining and differentiating between jihādist groups' normative assertions.

Language analysis has an established pedigree in the study of jihād and jihādist organisations. Besides the previously mentioned studies, language and ideas have traditionally been the subject of constructivist theories and the discursive study of international relations[68], claiming that agents and structure, text and context are co-constitutive (Holzscheiter, 2014, p. 143). Not only is language a tool to provide an insight into the ideational structure of international relations, it can be a tool used by actors to achieve their own, often hidden goals, though it does not necessarily follow that national policy will conform to the language being used (Roshchin, 2017, p. 180; Strauss, 2013, p. 240). That is, there may be a gap between policy rhetoric and practice. Further, while language is constitutive, it also does not necessarily follow that an empirical survey of the data will yield meaningful interpretation. Wigen presents a tri-partite model of how meaning is conveyed: the writer, producing a message; a message; and an interpreter. In Wigen's words:

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68 See, for example: Onuf, N. G. (1989). *World of our making: Rules and rule in social theory and international relations.* Columbia, S.C.,: University of South Carolina Press; Wendt, A. (1999). *Social theory of international politics.* Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press.; Holzscheiter, A. (2014). Between communicative interaction and structures of signification: Discourse theory and analysis in International Relations." *International Studies Perspectives 15*(2): 142-162; and Strauss, C. (2013). How are language constructions constitutive? Strategic uses of conventional discourses about immigration. *Journal of International Relations and Development,* 16(2): 262-293.

> where the culture of the interpreter is very different from that of the writer and his immediate society and audience, the interpretation will almost inevitably be at variance with that of the culture within which it was written. (Wigen, 2015, p. 438)

Writing on analytic rigour, Morse posits research is 'a process of representation', with the objects being either physical or ideological. As such, they fall on a spectrum of permanent physicality to transitory phenomenology. In the case of qualitative research, data is recast from communication (such as written or verbal), and so the primary concern of the researcher should be on the phenomena and the data obtained from it, and secondly on the analytic and presentation technique. Morse asserts a spectrum between hard and soft data, with hard data being concrete and permanent, such as demographic data, and soft data—such as beliefs, cultural values and covert meanings—being latent, unable to be calibrated by external content. Morse further maintains that soft data can be 'hardened', and doing so increases the rigour of the analysis. Strategies for improving the hardness of data include obtaining good data, seeking data saturation, supplementing sources with hard data, and seeking concordance (Morse, 2018, pp. 807-815). Obtaining good data means taking a representative sample and ensuring no areas are omitted or too thinly canvassed. Data acquisition should therefore be a cognitive, deliberate process. Furthermore, special attention should be given to outliers, which should not discarded, but considered rather as negative cases. The most widely used method for data hardening is seeking data saturation – the collection of many similar incidences of the phenomena. Again, this is not achieved through indiscriminate or statistically representative sampling but, in the case of this analysis, means using emerging information to guide the data-selection process. Especially pertinent to this analysis, where jihādism is asserted to be a constellation of norms, concordance between categories and the emerging conceptual scheme contributes to certainty.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has advanced QCA and Case Study strategies as vehicles appropriate for responding to the research questions. They are methodologically congruent with a Critical Constructivist paradigm interested in the meaning conveyed from text. This chapter has also recounted the method of research. It noted that while there are general principles applied in the process of QCA, it is a highly individualised process led often by

the data and the requirements of analysis, and often performed in a repetitive process of refinement.

Importantly, this chapter explained the process by which two different bodies of data are to be compared: one, the norms espoused by self-proclaimed jihādist organisations and the other, as the narrative of Saudi Arabia. While there are similarities, the two sources of data are not completely homogenous, and require differing processes of data-gathering and data-making respectively. Understanding this process explains how the preceding three chapters should be read as being informed by the same categories of analysis, and informing and relating to each other.

Finally, this chapter established the degree to which this study may be trusted. To establish trustworthiness, this study strives where possible, to remove the researcher from the process of analysis. The study draws on extant jihādist literature for developing categories. It relies on an iterative analysis process for discovering emerging themes. It uses population sampling of multiple populations to harden the results. Where the researcher cannot be removed, this study seeks to provide transparency in the decision-making process.

Chapter 5: Jihād in Saudi Narratives

Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken;
Or like stout Cortez when with eagle eyes
He star'd at the Pacific—and all his men
Look'd at each other with a wild surmise—
Silent, upon a peak in Darien.
- John Keats, "On First Looking into Chapman's Homer"

Where Chapter Two reviewed the jihādist norms expressed by the Taleban, Al-Qaida (AQ) and Islamic State (IS), using the same categories, this chapter examines Saudi narratives. It was previously demonstrated that jihādist groups have identifiable and unique positions; this chapter, however, seeks to demonstrate the Saudi position, looking also for correlative expressions of those norms in Saudi narrative as expressed in both the press releases of the Saud Embassy to the United States, and in the narrative Saudi Arabia presents to the UN. The previous chapter also showed that jihādist rhetoric is often an assertion of legitimacy. Likewise, this chapter examines the role of the Saudi narrative in expressing legitimacy.

This chapter is split into three sections that reflect three rounds of analysis through coding. Where the last chapter discussed each group in terms of its response to specified jihādist norms, this chapter speaks directly to the research question, namely to what extent are jihādist norms expressed in the language of international relations? It seeks specific evidence of jihādist norms, in their presence or absence, and as counter-norms. Further, this chapter speaks to the follow-on question: are those norms able to be recognised as being similar to the norms of particular jihādist groups? It seeks to explore overlap between the norms expressed in the previous chapter and those expressed in Saudi narrative. Thus, the first section of this chapter will use the same categories for analysis as those used in the second chapter, to analyse the Saudi narrative.

The chapter then examines Saudi jihādist norms in a more general manner, including

examining Saudi attitudes to the preceding jihādist groups (and any other jihādist groups). Critical Constructivism contends that ideas are not only socially constructed, but shaped by power relations. Norms aren't passive ideas that appear and compete on objective merit, but rather expressions of power as norms regulate and legitimate actors and their behaviour. This section examines how that process is reflected in the Saudi narrative. As the previous chapter saw jihādist organisations competing for legitimacy, so too will this chapter examine how Saudi narrative mobilises Saudis' own claim to legitimacy, as well as addressing the legitimacy of jihādist organisations.

In the third and final section, the chapter examines what Saudi narrative reveals about the Saudi role in the normative process—is Saudi narrative merely a reflection of an internalised attitude, or are the agents active participants in a normative process? If they are active participants, are they aware, and displaying agency? This speaks to the research question, what do the expressed norms mean? 'Meaning', in this usage, refers to the consequences for relevant stakeholders, and speaks to intentionality. This section discusses the Saudi awareness both of its role in the normative process, and as a norm entrepreneur.

These three sections present Saudi Arabia's attitude towards jihādism and jihādist norms, going from the specific to the general. Consistent with a Critical Constructivist epistemology, this chapter examines how the Saudi narrative is also an expression of power in a normatively competitive arena. As previously noted, norms play a role in legitimation and regulation, and this was already shown in the expression of norms in a previous chapter. The legitimising, regulative nature of norms is also apparent in the Saudi narrative, both in terms of language that legitimates the state, and language that delegitimises other jihādist groups.

It is noted that the texts examined here are not theological discourses. Unlike jihādist organisations, which publish propaganda and educational materials for followers and recruitment, the Saudi texts used here are political texts for a political audience. They don't typically address the topics being examined in direct, in-depth theological detail. Where Al-Qa'ida may publish an article justifying martyrdom operations, the Saudi position on such activity must be implied through explicit support or condemnation of such activities. It is not to be expected that statements would express norms in a clear, straight-forward, or

in-depth manner. However, in each case, example texts are provided that show the relevant Saudi position, or lack thereof.

5.1 Included and Excluded Data

In the analysis, only the body of texts was analysed. Other text such as meta-data, subject lines and titles were excluded from analysis. There is no surety that such text passes through the same editorial process as the body copy. This method additionally avoids situations where there is a mis-match between the body copy and editorial content. For example, in the embassy press release entitled *Statement Regarding False Charges that Saudi Royal was Captured with Taleban,* the body copy of the release did not mention the Taleban, instead addressing media reports that Prince Majid bin Abdulaziz had been captured fighting for Al-Qaida (The Saudi US Embassy, 2001e).

During the coding process, many statements were intentionally excluded, erring on the side of caution when coding. For example, one Saudi press release reads, "The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign ministers fully backed Saudi Arabia's actions to fight terrorism and bringing to justice those who commit or sponsor acts of terrorism" (2016b). 'Terrorism' is a term frequently used by Saudi Arabia to refer to jihādism, and 'terrorism' is used twice in this text. However, where this article first refers to terrorism, it means state-sponsored terrorism, which is outside this study's scope. Secondly, when referring to the activity that Iran allegedly supports, it is unclear the term is being used synonymously with jihādism. Only in cases where 'terrorism' or 'extremism' are used synonymously or interchangeably with jihādism or jihādist organisations in a clear, overt manner, were data coded. Where relevant, further commentary is provided in the text to clarify what was, and was not, coded.

5.2 Coding and Counter-norms

While texts that directly expressed, or spoke to, jihādist norms were coded, so too were norms that were the counter-expression of those norms. For example, not only were texts that opposed 'the West' coded, utterances sympathetic to 'the West' were also coded. This reflects the norm cascade model, which proposes that norms exist in a contested environment. Norms having a legitimising nature, and norm contestation being delegitimising, this

approach sought to analyse the normative competition. Should such competition exist, it would illustrate Saudi narrative delegitimising jihādist organisations.

Under each heading is an explanation of what is being encoded. This is typically followed by sample texts that typify the text that was being encoded. This is provided to illustrate where the commonality lies between encoded texts, and to act as supporting evidence. For the sake of brevity, a smaller section than that which was coded may appear. Frequently, the sources of data are listed, whether they originate from embassy or UN documents, to indicate the level of consistency and comparative representation of norms between the data sets. Only the number of texts is provided, not the number of codes. If a text discusses the same topic at length, or returns to a topic, the same code may be used multiple times in that document, and may indicate a higher representation in the data than may actually be the case. For example, if one text focuses on hijrah, returning to the topic over and again, there may be ten codes for that norm. However, if it only occurs once in all the texts, it is not representative of a durable norm being expressed. The number of texts in which a code appears indicates engagement with the topic over a longer period of time, and/or on a wider base, being represented in both the UN and Embassy documents. Additional commentary on the findings is also provided.

Finally, the purpose of this study was not to determine the validity of claims or mediate conflict. If there is a claim against a group, there is no attempt made to determine whether the criticism is valid or true. Nor is any other side of a claim investigated. For example, when Saudi narrative makes claims about the Houthi targeting its borders and damaging schools and hospitals, or using civilians as shields, it is important to note that the veracity of such claims is not the subject of this study and no claim is made either way as to the legitimacy of such claims. Rather, acceptance of that claim is only an assertion that the text contests the legitimacy of the Houthi's actions.

5.3 Section 1: Linking Saudi Arabia to Explicit Expressions of Jihād

This section describes the Saudi position (adoption, rejection or otherwise) on those norms adopted by jihādist organisations enumerated in the previous chapter, or in response to

jihādist organisations' adoption of those norms. This section represents the first round of coding, the task of which was to examine to what extent norms in Saudi narrative correlated with those norms expressed by Al-Quaida , IS and the Taleban. Text was coded according to several conditions. If there was clear support for a norm, it was coded. If there was a clear rejection of a norm, that too was coded as the counter-position, an explicit rejection of that norm. The codes speak to the research question asking whether jihādist norms expressed in Saudi narrative correlated to those expressed by a particular group, as well as the general question of whether jihādist norms are represented in Saudi national narrative. For each of these norms, the number of coded texts is presented. That way, the findings not only express how Saudi narrative frames and responds to these specific issues, they also indicate when Saudi narrative doesn't engage with certain issues.

This section also categorises findings according to the data set—embassy or UN documents—to provide insight as to whether there is consensus and proportional representation between the two data sets. The findings in this section are valuable, primarily illustrating the Saudi position on these jihādist norms, but also indicating how Saudi Arabia relates to its audience. However, they are also useful as they illustrate the level of engagement and consistency within Saudi narrative of the various norms. For example, regarding hijrah, the findings include the Saudi response to ISIS encouraging migration to its Caliphate, as utterances on the topic reveal the position of Saudi Arabia in that normative sphere.

This section addresses the norms enumerated in the previous chapter in the same order for ease of navigation. Where appropriate, the findings in this section may include a discussion of other groups, firstly because utterances may include other groups, either for the sake of comparison or for the sake of expediency. For example, when addressing the Saudi position regarding a group such as ISIS, it may also address the Houthi. Rather than address the Houthi separately, it is expedient and clearer to address the groups together.[69] It also makes sense, given the context of discussing specific norms.

69 Normative engagement with the Houthi arose during the coding process. It was omitted from the previous chapter, as it is a predominantly Shi'ite movement.

5.3.1 Offensive/Defensive Positioning (0)

While Saudi Arabia positions itself defensively, being threatened on several fronts, it does not follow these attacks are attacks against Islam, or the state's Islamic identity. While jihādists frequently claim victimhood, or describe a world in opposition to Islam, Saudi Arabia's defensive claims are typically in response to such issues as:

- international politics, such as the overuse of the UNSC veto power (Al Oyaidi, 2008b)
- the threat of regional conflict, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, spilling into its arena (Al Oyaidi, 2008a)
- the direct threat from regional actors such as Iran (Al Assiri, 2019).

These do not constitute aggression against Saudi Arabia in its capacity as an Islamic people, but as a nation. This point is made explicitly in clear Saudi narrative. For example, in the case of Iran, Saudi Arabia makes it clear on multiple occasions that the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia is not the embodiment of a religious conflict, calling the claim 'completely false' and citing centuries of cooperation, peace and security (Al-Mouallimi, 2019b, p. 31) evidenced by the degree of religious tourism between the nations and "close and longstanding bonds of geography, history and cultural heritage" (Al-Mouallimi, 2011).

When Saudi Arabia has responded to attacks on Islam (such as the portrayal of Muhammad in print and documentaries), it has called for "the necessary laws and legislation that forbid the defamation and disdain of religions and their sacred symbols," as opposed to violent retribution (Abdulaziz, 2012; The Saudi US Embassy, 2012a). This is distinctly different from a call to jihād. It may condone retribution within the bounds of shari'ah. It is a legal response, not a conflict in the sense of jihād.

Statements about attacks on Islam, but not specifically Saudi Arabia, were discounted. For example, Saudi Arabia frequently references the threat posed by Israel's attacks on Islam. For example, "Israeli acts against Islamic sites represent daily aggression against unarmed Palestinians, provoking distress among Muslims all over the world. Israel's grave assaults on the Al-Aqsa Mosque can only have a direct and serious impact on international peace and security" (Al Nafisee, 2009, p. 4). Here the Saudi narrative is describing Israel as a

security threat, attaching the Islamic identity to the Palestinian people, and narrative makes similar statements about Muslims in other regions, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar (Al-Mouallimi, 2019a). The problem is one of delineation: at what point does any group attacking Muslims, with whom Saudi Arabia shares an identity, affect Saudi Arabia? Thus, only an attack on Saudi Arabia directly, in its Islamic character, was admitted to coding.

In that capacity, Saudi Arabia does not position itself defensively or offensively. No claims to the effect that Islamic values, or Saudi Arabia as an Islamic people, were under attack from the West or any other sources were detected, nor that Saudi Arabia should actively spread Islamic values in a jihādist manner. Rather, analysis revealed a strong theme of pro-US sentiment, and of mutual victimhood with the US against jihādists.

5.3.2 Orientation Towards Jihādist Group; Saudi Arabia as the Victim of Jihādism (n=39)

There were 39 documents that expressed a sentiment that Saudi Arabia was the primary target, or a significant target, or the illegitimate target of attacks by jihādist organisations. These expressions are made both in the general sense, that Saudi Arabia is the victim of terrorism, as well as regarding specific jihādist organisations (see Table 5-1: Language Defensively Positioning Saudi Arabia Regarding Jihādists).

Table 5-1: Language Defensively Positioning Saudi Arabia Regarding Jihādists

	UN Documents	Embassy Documents	Total
General Statements	17	8	25
Al-Qa'ida	1	1	2
Islamic State	0	1	1
Taleban	0	0	0
Houthi	8	2	10
Other	1	0	1
Total			39

The word 'terrorist' is used where jihādist organisations aren't explicitly named. Such expressions take the form of:

- "As the party of the world that suffers the most from terrorism, we need to make sure our views on terrorism are heard" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2015a)
- "[King Salman] said that Saudi Arabia has suffered from the scourge of terrorism and that the Kingdom will continue to firmly and decisively fight terrorism" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2015d)
- "We are among the States targeted by terrorism and extremism. We continue to fight terrorists and are determined to find a way to eradicate the grave phenomenon of terrorism" (Al-Jubeir, 2015, p. 26)

After generalised statements, Saudi Arabia claimed victimisation by the Houthi more often than all other groups combined (n=10). Claims against the Houthi all occurred post-2015, mostly in UN documents. While there was an instance of Saudi criticism of the Houthi without reference to Iran (The Saudi US Embassy, 2015b), the remaining references connected the Houthi to Iranian influence, in texts that were vehicles for criticising Iran:

- "Saudi Arabia would like to reiterate its sovereign right to protect its national security and its borders against repeated violations by Houthi militias and their Iranian allies" (Al Saad, 2016, p. 27).
- "The Houthi terrorist militias of Iran continue to launch ballistic missiles manufactured and supplied by Iran towards Saudi cities—there have been 199 such missiles to date" (Al-Jubeir, 2018, p. 31).

Apart from the Houthi, any utterance condemning specific jihādist organisations for targeting Saudi Arabia are minority occurrences, with generalised claims being the norm. A typical example reads, "As the world has witnessed, Saudi Arabia, like the United States, is a main target of Al-Qaeda. Over the past three years, Al-Qaeda has attacked the Kingdom repeatedly" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2005c). Notably, Saudi Arabia links these jihādist groups also to Iran (Al-Mouallimi, 2018d; Almanzlawiy, 2019).

5.3.3 Orientation Towards the West (n=31)

A characterising hallmark of the many jihādist organisations—especially of the previously enumerated groups—is their antagonistic or defensive position towards the United States and the West. Expressions regarding the United States were universally favourable where they appeared (See Table 5-2: Language Situating the United States Positively). Language expressing negative regard for non-US Western countries was not detected.

Table 5-2: Language Situating the United States Positively

	Embassy Documents	UN Documents	Total
General statements of support/solidarity	16	0	16
Statements of solidarity against 'terrorism'	10	1	11
Statements of solidarity against citing specific jihādist organisations	3	1	4
Total	29	2	31

Most texts expressing support for the United States were embassy texts. These texts were separated into two groups: those that discuss 'terrorism' and those that do not. The texts that discuss 'terrorism' are relevant to this study because they contrast Saudi attitudes towards the West with the typical views of jihādists. The texts that do not mention 'terrorism' are only relevant to the study to the extent that they provide insight into Saudi Arabia's position on the topic being discussed.

Typically, pro-US sentiment took forms similar to the following:

- "Our relationship with the United States has been a strong, historic and strategic relationship for more than seven decades," says Ambassador Al-Jubeir. "As a consequence of wise, rational and long-term policies, the two countries were able to build on the relationship and strengthen and broaden it and deepen it to where today, I believe the relationship is in an outstanding position" (2011)
- "HRH Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today emphasized the strength of U.S. Saudi relations, and reiterated that the two countries have been

friends and allies for over 60 years. Prince Saud described the bilateral relationship as "excellent in all fields" (2002h)

- "With regard to the relationship between our two countries: Yes, I believe they will grow stronger and they will grow deeper in all areas, irrespective of who is in the White House," said the foreign minister. "This relationship is very, very solid…This relationship will go on and continue to flourish, as it has over the past eight decades" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2016f)

Those statements that addressed jihādism emphasised the unity of purpose and cooperation between the two countries in opposition to terrorism:

- "Saudi Arabia remains committed to fighting the scourge of terrorism in cooperation with the United States and the world community" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2002c).
- "Ambassador Al-Jubeir and Ambassador Smith emphasized the strength and importance of the Saudi-U.S. relationship, including in areas of counterterrorism, regional security and trade and investment." (The Saudi US Embassy, 2009).

UN texts did not address the quality of the Saudi relationship with the international community. However, they provided accounts of Saudi cooperation with other countries[70]:

- "We have also joined more than 12 international agreements, and, in partnership with the United States and Italy, we are co-chairing the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (Mohammed, 2016, p. 33).

Four texts explicitly referred to jihādist organisations. Two embassy documents directly referenced the allyship between the US and Saudi Arabia in combatting Al-Qa'ida, and a third referenced Al-Qa'ida by addressing September 11. One UN text expressed support of US military incursions in the Middle East, which would have a deleterious effect on 'terrorists such as Da'esh and Al-Nusra Front' (Al-Mouallimi, 2017c).

70 While Saudi Arabia does not frequently reference cooperation with the US/Western countries, it does assert acting in solidarity with the broader international community. See Section 3.

5.3.4 The Role of Hijrah (n=7)

No statements directly supporting jihādist hijrah in the context of jihād were discovered within the corpus of documents analysed. Statements opposing hijrah could be categorised into two types, those addressing hijrah as expounded by jihādists, and those that address the need to restrict jihādist hijrah (see Table 5-3: Language Relating to Hijrah).

Table 5-3: Language Relating to Hijrah

	Embassy Documents	UN Documents	Total
Supporting hijrah	0	0	0
Condemning hijrah directly	1	1	2
Condemning hijrah by way of policy	1	4	5
Total	2	5	7

Policy positions expressed in texts demonstrate a rejection of the hijrah norm. These take the following typifying form:

- "That is why my country has spearheaded efforts to address this issue from a legal perspective and to implement measures to punish those who travel to other countries to participate in terrorist attacks in whatever region" (Al-Mouallimi, 2014d, pp. 1-2; 2017c)
- "The participating states agreed to do their share in the comprehensive strategy against ISIS, including, stopping the flow of foreign fighters through neighboring countries" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2014e).

Saudi narrative also related authoritative, religiously grounded statements on the topic of hijrah:

- "The Grand Mufti warned of the danger of sending the youth to unfamiliar lands, fighting for principles they don't understand, only to become the first victims of arrests. He also urged people not to mislead the young and subject them to great danger under the claims of jihād by sending them abroad. Sheikh Al-As Shaik

emphasized that this issue is of utmost important" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2014h)

- "Many scholars and intellectuals in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia continue to warn against the dangers of distorted ideologies that drive terrorism. The Council of Senior Religious Scholars of the Kingdom recently issued a statement that affirms that travel to areas of sedition and conflict is criminal and anti-Islamic, and therefore prohibited" (Al-Mouallimi, 2016b, p. 31)

Here, the advice carries the weight of religious authority, carrying the risk of moral malfeasance.

5.3.5 Martyrdom Operations (n=11)

While Saudi narrative does use the term 'martyr', it is seldom in the same manner as jihādist organisations. Martyrdom in the context of 'martyrdom operations' (suicide bombings) is exclusively condemned, and never referred to as martyrdom. However, people who die in the cause of Islam, or because of their Islamic identity, or even just for being Muslim, are referred to as martyrs, the subject of tacit legitimation and approval (see Table 5-4: Legitimate and Illegitimate Martyrdom Operations).

Table 5-4: Legitimate and Illegitimate Martyrdom Operations

	Embassy Documents	UN Documents	Total
Illegitimate Martyrdoms/ Suicide Bombings	6	0	6
Legitimate Martyrdoms	1	4	5
Total	7	4	11

There is a rift in the language between Saudi Arabian narrative and that of jihādist organisations, with Saudi narrative using 'suicide bombing' to refer to the same event that jihādist organisations refer to as 'martyrdom operations'. Six texts address Saudi Arabia's response to specific bombings, and express condemnation, such as that which recounts a previous attack by an Iranian national that is condemned as a terrorist act (The Saudi US Embassy, 2016c). Another criticises the claim that Saudi Arabia funds or supports suicide bombers, calling it terrorism (The Saudi US Embassy, 2002e).

While it condemns martyrdom operations, Saudi Arabia also memorialises martyrs in texts. The common thread is that they are Islamic, but it is difficult to discern a universal rule apart from that that defines what constitutes a martyr. Among those listed as martyrs are:

- Benazir Bhutto (The Saudi US Embassy, 2007)
- 2800 Palestinians killed by Israelis, a number that includes children (Al-Mouallimi, 2014b)
- Those who have died in the Syrian civil war, as separate from other innocent victims, although the difference is not stated (Al-Mouallimi, 2013, p. 59)

Rather than just signifying those who've died in martyrdom operations, jihādist organisations examined utilize 'martyrs' for those who have died in the name of Islam, and for those who've died because of their Muslim identity. This is similar to Saudi use; in Saudi narrative, use of the word 'martyr' is disconnected from martyrdom operations, and this is supported by Saudi opposition to it.

5.3.6 Nationalism, Pan-Islamism, and the Ummah identity

The Ummah identity speaks to the collective Muslim faithful. The international system is frequently criticised by jihādist organisations as being at odds with Islam, dividing the Muslim faithful into arbitrary national identities. Saudi Arabia adopts language that both formally and informally links it to other Islamic people and countries. For evidence of language that adopts the Ummah ideology, this study looked for text where Saudi Arabia either directly references the Ummah in a positive or negative manner. Additionally, the study sought text that identified the Saudi identity as part of a larger collective, and text that rejected that identity in the sense it might supersede the Saudi identity. Such contra-Ummah language would include nationalistic language. Therefore, text was coded for nationalist language, and language that asserts Saudi sovereignty, language running contrary to jihādist language that rejects such structures.

The Ummah (n=1) is only addressed/mentioned in one document. A press release quoted King Abdullah, who emphasised the importance of dialogue between Islamic sects, stating, "The goal of the Islamic ummah [community] was to establish the center in order to avoid disunity and division. We are convinced that dialogue among Islamic sects, with God's

grace and help, is the best course of action for all" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2013d). Here the Ummah is not used in aspirational terms, as something to be established or united, but in the sense that it is already extant, and not in conflict with the international system. The context of the address was of building relations between Shī'a and Sunni.

5.3.7 Familial Terms (n=47)

This attitude is supported in the proclivity for Saudi narrative to use familial terms when addressing other nations, usually directed at countries/people with a shared Arabic and/or Islamic identity. Texts often address these peoples in familial terms, such as 'fraternal', 'brethren', 'brotherly' and 'sisterly', or in derivative forms of those words. For example, Shobokshi (2001a, pp. 29-30) describes the Iraqi people as 'brotherly' explicitly due to their shared Arabic identity. Less frequently, there are instances of peoples' address in familial terms based on their shared Islamic identity (such as in Al-Mouallimi (2019b, p. 31)). While countries are often addressed this way due specifically to their Arabic or Islamic identity, at other times the reason for such an honorific is not stated, and it has a taken-for-granted quality. For example, Saudi Arabia stated it, "joined its sisterly countries — the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Republic of Yemen—in the consensus on resolution 72/241, entitled 'A world against violence and violent extremism'" (Ababtain, 2017, p. 29).

While in some cases the reason for listing a people in familial terms is unclear, on all save one occasion, countries addressed in familial terms are either Arabic or Muslim-majority (see Table 5-5: Countries and Peoples Described in Familial Terms). The full list includes Algeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen. When the reason is given, it is more often because of a shared Arabic identity. The notable exception to the rule is when Saudi Arabia's representative to the UN Security Council congratulated new members on their appointment to the group, addressing, "the friendly and brotherly new States members of the Council, namely, Morocco, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Togo and Guatemala" (Al-Mouallimi, 2012, p. 26).

Table 5-5: Countries and Peoples Described in Familial Terms

Statements:	Embassy Documents	UN Documents	Total
Arabic and/or Islamic peoples	9	37	46
Non-Arabic/Islamic peoples	0	1	1
Total	0	1	47

5.3.8 National Identity and Sovereignty (n=16)

There is a theme asserting national sovereignty running through Saudi narrative (see Table 5-6: Assertions of Sovereignty and/or Non-interference[71]). Statements asserting national sovereignty can be further categorised into three themes:

- those that assert only the nation's sovereignty
- those that assert attacks on national identity fuel terrorism
- those that assert counter-terrorism efforts cannot compromise sovereignty

Table 5-6: Assertions of Sovereignty and/or Non-interference

Statements asserting:	Embassy Documents	UN Documents	Total
Saudi Arabia's sovereignty	2	7	9
Counter-terrorism efforts cannot erode sovereignty	2	3	5
Terrorism is problematic as it erodes sovereignty	2	1	3
Total	4	4	17

Statements that establish a distinct Saudi sovereign identity typically took the form of:

- "We're a sovereign country. We have our legal system. We expect people to respect it, just as we respect their legal systems" (Minister Adel Al-Jubeir in The Saudi US Embassy, 2016g)

71 Total sums to more than n-value as some documents can be coded into more than one category

- "The international order that has existed for centuries is based on the principle of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. Commitment to international norms and laws is of the utmost importance and is not up for discussion" (Al-Jubeir, 2018, p. 32).

This language demonstrates a position directly at odds with the jihādist assertion that the national system subverts Islam.

Additionally, Saudi narrative directly links jihādism to sovereignty, advancing the norm of sovereignty:

- "King Abdullah issued a statement expressing the Kingdom's support for the Egyptian people in their struggle against terrorism, extremism and sedition… [he] cautioned that those who interfered in Egypt's internal affairs are 'fanning the fire of sedition and are promoting the terrorism which they call fighting'" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2013b).
- "Terrorism has become a universal phenomenon… Only through a coordinated plan in the context of the United Nations can our common efforts bear fruit, eradicate terrorism, protect the lives of the innocent, maintain the sovereignty of States and the security and stability of the world" (Shobokshi, 2001b, p. 24).

Lastly, there is an emphasis within Saudi narrative on the importance of counter-terrorism efforts respecting countries' national sovereignty. It stresses the necessity of voluntary participation in counter-terrorism activities, and emphasises how these activities must not impinge upon national sovereignty. This shows that the significance of sovereignty is not only important, but holds a higher precedence than the particular features of Saudi sovereignty:

- "In response to a question about the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), Minister Al-Jubeir noted the legislation has undercut the foundation of sovereign immunity, turning 'the international order into the law of the jungle'" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2017).
- "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was a pioneer in urging the international community to fight terrorism… We have called on the international community to adopt a comprehensive plan, in line with international law, to end terrorism while

maintaining the sovereignty, security and stability of all States" (Al-Mouallimi, 2016b, p. 64).

In the narrative intersection of sovereignty and jihādism, there is an express sentiment that sovereignty is of paramount importance, and is in opposition to jihādism.

5.3.9 The Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (n=39)

Saudi Arabia is a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The organisation endeavours to be, "the collective voice of the Muslim world" (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, 2021). Saudi Arabia makes multiple statements both on behalf of, and as a part of, the OIC. This speaks to Saudi Arabia's shared Islamic identity (see Table 5-7: Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Coding).

Table 5-7: Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Coding

Statements:	Embassy Documents	UN Documents	Total
On behalf of the OIC	0	10	10
On behalf of the OIC in the context of Jihādism	0	2	2
In support of the OIC	8	14	22
In support of the OIC in the context of Jihādism	2	3	5
Total	10	19	39

When Saudi Arabia makes a statement in its capacity as a member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), it consistently supports the OIC's position in whatever policy or issue is being addressed. Saudi Arabia also frequently makes statements on behalf of the OIC in the UN too, in which the OIC has a permanent delegation.

Both in its capacity of speaking on behalf of the OIC, and in speaking in concert with the OIC, Saudi Arabia addresses the topic of jihādism. These statements universally reject terrorism, both in general terms, and specifically Islamist terrorism. Typical claims would include:

- "In this context, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation condemns and rejects all attempts to associate Islam or any Islamic country, any race, religion, culture or nationality with terrorism. We stress the importance of the fact that religious war is the misguided refuse of extremists who cannot build or create anything and therefore promote only fanaticism and hatred" (Al-Mouallimi, 2014a, p. 29).
- "[The] Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal held a joint press conference with the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Secretary General Iyad bin Ameen Madani, following the 41st session of the Foreign Ministers Council of the OIC… Prince Saud dismissed accusations made by Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki that the Kingdom supports terrorism, and reaffirmed Saudi Arabia's condemnation of all forms of terrorism, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2014g).

While Saudi Arabia frequently speaks both in its capacity as a member of the OIC, and on behalf of the OIC, it also affirms its sovereignty. According to Abu-Ali (2019, p. 11), Saudi Arabia's:

> foreign policy was based on compliance with its obligations under international law and international instruments and its ongoing and constructive interaction with the international community, *bearing in mind the principle of national sovereignty, through organizations such as the League of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation*. [emphases added]

In that text, Abu-Ali further notes that the same principle held true for the UN and its organs.

While Saudi Arabia acknowledges its common identity with Arab and Islamic countries, it makes the tacit assertion this identity is not inconsistent with its national identity or political sovereignty. The common identity is emphasised both in language (typically expressing familial relations) as well as commonality of purpose (such as the rejection of terrorism); however, the Ummah identity is not well represented.

5.3.10 Caliphate Orientation (n=1)

The caliphate is only mentioned once in all the texts examined, and Saudi narrative does not

address the caliphate[72] in the sense that it is used by groups such as IS. It does not address IS's alleged caliphate, nor speak of a caliphate in teleological terms. The caliphate is only addressed in Al-Mouallimi (2018b, p. 52), discussing the Caliph Abu Bakr As-Siddiq, who lived in the seventh century CE. It is a discussion on the importance of protecting civilians in conflicts and condemning the Israelis for targeting them.

5.3.11 The Source of Authority to Jihād (n=16)

Saudi Arabia does not legitimate the jihād of other organisations explicitly, though it may omit to criticise the actions of jihādist organisations or individuals. However, texts attack the authority of jihādist organisations to declare jihād. These come in two forms—attacks on the legitimacy of those declaring jihād, and Saudi Arabia's own assumed authoritative statements on the topic which run counter to the claims of jihādist groups. The prior is an overt attack on legitimacy, the latter a tacit attack, but both are an attack on the legitimacy of the authority of jihādist organisations to declare jihād. Both direct attacks on the authority if jihādist organisations, and counter narratives/claim were coded (see Table 5-8: Sources of Authority in Jihād). While any attack on the legitimacy of jihādist activity, organisations or individuals constitutes an attack on their authority, only overt proclamations were coded. Statements that authoritatively contest the legitimacy of norms are accepted as authoritative when originating from a religious authority.

Table 5-8: Sources of Authority in Jihād

Statements:	Embassy Documents	UN Documents
Authoritative statements regarding jihādist	11	1
Attacks on the authority of others	6	1

Often a claim for the illegitimacy of an individual or group (such as Osama bin Laden or IS) will be either preceded or proceeded by a more general authoritative claim. For example, in Shobokshi (2001b, pp. 21-22) the Saudi Grand Mufti is quoted claiming the action of the

72 Nor do the texts address the topic of a caliphate, caliph or any aspect of it thereof, or allude to one in the sense of Islamic State's declaration of the caliphate's establishment, or in teleological terms. There is no mention of a caliphate.

9/11 hijackers was illegitimate, sinful. Later in the text, he declares all plane hijackings are 'among the greatest of sins.'

Analysis found that claims against the legitimacy of specific organisations were consistently grounded in the claim that the actions of those groups and/or individuals are un-Islamic. For example:

- "Ambassador Al-Jubeir stated that 'ISIS, and those who promote extremism, radicalism and terrorism, are the enemies of compassion, mercy and humanity. They certainly are the enemy of Islam'" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2014b).
- "Sheikh Al-AsShaikh stated, 'The ideas of extremism, radicalism and terrorism do not belong to Islam in any way, but are the first enemy of Islam, and Muslims are their first victims, as seen in the crimes of the so-called Daash (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda and their affiliated groups'" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2014h).

Authoritative claims about the legitimacy of violent jihādism adopt a broad scope in their approach to tackling perceived illegitimacy of jihādist sources:

- "Shaikh Saleh Al-Ashaikh, Minister of Islamic Affairs, said restrictions have been put in place to prohibit unauthorized persons from making speeches at mosques. The order… warned speakers at mosques against making provocative speeches and inciting people. Al-Ashaikh warned speakers against misusing mosques to make provocative speeches or incite people or exploit mosques by reciting poems in praise of some misguided people" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2002f).
- "Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-AsShaikh, who is also Chairman of the Council of Senior Ulema (religious scholars) and the General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta, called on young people not to follow the devious assertions of jihād by groups whose ideologies contradict Islam" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2014h).

Authoritative statements came from such various sources as Shaikh Saleh Al-Ashaikh (Minister of Islamic Affairs), Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-AsShaikh (Grand Mufti), King Salman, Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, and Shaikh Muhammad bin Abdullah Al-Subail (Imam of the Grand Mosque of Makkah and member of the Council of Senior Islamic Scholars). Texts criticising particular groups were targeted at either Al-Qa'ida and/or Osama bin Laden, or Islamic State only.

5.3.12 Who May Wage Jihād (n=8)

While Saudi Arabia contests repeatedly the legitimacy of the right to wage jihād, it typically does so based on the legitimacy of those organisation's causes. It does not address practicalities such as who may be involved. This is revealing—defensive jihād is incumbent on all Muslims; offensive jihād is incumbent only on certain segments of society. An admittance of any group to take part in jihād would be a legitimising action (see Table 10 Who May/May Not Wage Jihād).

The exception to the rule is the repeated admonition against children being involved in jihād. Several texts criticise the recruitment of youth to extremism, and/or the practice of using child soldiers (see Table 5-9: Who May/May Not Wage Jihād). The two themes appearing are that 'youth' should not be recruited to extremist organisations, and that children should not be used in combat.

Table 5-9: Who May/May Not Wage Jihād

	Embassy Documents	UN Documents	Total
Who may wage jihād	0	0	0
Who may not wage jihād	2	6	8
Total	2	6	8

Those texts that are critical of youth recruitment typically do so on the premise that the justification is misguided or misleading, and therefore illegitimate. For example:

- "The Saudi government is using different forms of communication to send a clear and powerful message to our people, and we are taking serious actions to undermine the strength of those who try to misguide our youth" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2005c).
- "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz today recommitted the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to 'strike with an iron fist' the terror groups that seek to recruit youths to 'extremism and violence,' and pledged efforts to "distance them from masterminds of misleading ideas" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2016j).

Of those texts critical of children engaged in jihādist activity, all link the practice to the Houthi:

- "Of particular note was its work towards the rehabilitation of child soldiers in Yemen who had been forced into battle by Houthi militias" (Al-Mouallimi, 2018e, p. 6).
- The report furthermore confirms the responsibility of the Houthi rebels and their allies in the recruitment of children, children who are being pushed into the flames of the fighting, where hundreds leave their lives, including in the wake of the arbitrary artillery fire that occurs throughout Yemen. Rebel Houthi militias have exploited children" (Al-Mouallimi, 2017a, p. 44).

Saudi Arabia has stated emphatically that the inclusion of minors in any action related to jihādism is not allowed. This prohibition is not limited to participation in combat, but includes also the use of children as scouts, messengers and human shields. Saudi narrative is directed toward the engagement of children, however, the universal rebuke of jihādism implies that any participation of children would be judged as invalid. It is important to note that the condemnation the involvement of children in militaristic activity may stem partially, or completely, from an adherence to norms condemning the use of children in conflicts, or may be born out of the acknowledgement of their enhanced susceptibility in those conditions.

5.3.13 Who are Valid Operational Targets (n=21)

Jihādist organisations are regularly criticised in Saudi narrative for attacking innocent people. Other targets are mentioned less frequently but may fall under the same category of 'innocents' or 'citizens', and be subject to the same legitimising principle (see Table 5-10: Invalid Operational Targets).

Table 5-10: Invalid Operational Targets

Statements:	Embassy Documents	UN Documents	Total
Innocent people	9	1	10
Civilians	0	3	3

Other targets (indiscriminate killing, non-Muslims in Islamic countries, all murder, planes, hospitals, schools, women (in the sense of oppression), food and vital facilities, religious symbols and sites)	3	6	9
Total	12	10	22

While a rule or principle for determining what constitutes a person's innocence is not clearly defined, the context of statements indicates the term means those who do not directly engage in antagonistic behaviour towards Islam or Muslims. For example, in response to the murder of journalist James Foley, Ambassador Al-Jubeir was quoted saying (The Saudi US Embassy, 2014b):

> We cannot stand silent while this immoral collection of terrorists and deviants commit reprehensible acts of violence and murder against the innocent anywhere…. The Kingdom's most senior religious scholars have condemned terrorist groups, including ISIS, Al-Nusra and Al-Qaeda for distorting and violating the teachings of Islam and its prohibition on the killing of the innocent.

Likewise, a year after 9/11, the Saudi Ambassador to the US offered condolences to the US citizenry for those lives lost, and offered (The Saudi US Embassy, 2002g):

> No words can express our feelings of sorrow and loss for the innocents who were taken on that fateful day…. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has repeatedly and unequivocally condemned terrorism and has rejected the acts of Al-Qaeda as a crime against all humanity.

This reading is supported by those statements that condemn attacks on civilians because of their dichotomous differentiation from combatants.

There are numerous other targets and practices that are condemned within Saudi narrative. Often these only appear once in the text. Such targets and practices include: all forms or murder and indiscriminate killing; the killing of non-Muslims residing in Islamic lands; targeting infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, sources of food and vital facilities, and planes; the oppression of women; and the desecration of holy sites and/or symbols. Jihādist organisations are criticised on the grounds of being indiscriminate in their choice of targets.

This includes Al-Qa'ida, for its ideology of asserting "everyone is a target" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2006). Condemnation of targets is not limited to declarations of who and what are, or aren't, valid targets of death and destruction. For example, "violent extremist discourse" is criticised on the basis of "practices [that] run counter to our goal of empowering women and respecting their religious and ideological freedom" (Radwan, 2017, p. 98). Once more, the Houthi are censured for their mistreatment of children (Al-Mouallimi, 2017a, p. 44):

> The recruitment of children, children who are being pushed into the flames of the fighting, where hundreds leave their lives, including in in the wake of the arbitrary artillery fire that occurs throughout Yemen…. They have recruited thousands and used them as human shields. Millions of children are deprived of education. They use civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals and schools, to conceal military equipment.

All these singular cases follow the rule that non-combatants are invalid targets. The clearest enunciation of the principal comes as a quote from Caliph Abu Bakr As-Siddiq (573 – 23 August 634CE) appearing in a speech to the UN. In this speech, Al-Mouallimi (2018b, pp. 52-53) quotes the Caliph who was waging a defensive jihād, but provided guidelines about the validity of targets, stating:

> 'Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate dead bodies. Do not kill a woman, a child or an aged man. Do not cut down fruitful trees. Do not destroy inhabited areas. Do not slaughter any of the enemies' sheep, cows or camels, except for food. Do not burn date palms, nor inundate them. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them alone.' With those eloquent words the caliph of Prophet Mohammed summed up the rules of the protection of civilians.

The speaker then noted that Saudi Arabia applied that rule in its incursions in Syria, implying that Saudi Arabia adopted the same standards of behaviour in its engagements as dictated by Caliph Abu Bakr As-Siddiq, and therefore that the Saudi engagement in the conflict was legitimate according to Islamic standards.

Saudi narrative however, does not provide a blanket prohibition on violence and hostility.

There are multiple occasions (n=5) where narrative indicates violence may be appropriate, and against whom, in response to antagonism against Islam. For example, in response to violence against 'non-Muslims living in Islamic countries or Muslims labelled as infidels'[73], Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-AsShaikh, "[warned] against the danger of attacking Muslims and those (non-Muslims) under Muslim protection" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2013c). Likewise, in response to violent attacks following the release of a movie featuring Mohammed, the same shaikh called the broadcast criminal, and stated Muslims "ought not to allow their anger and revulsion to lead them to go beyond that which has been legislated and towards that which has been forbidden," nor "to lead to transgression against the blood and wealth of the innocent" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2012b). The guiding principle here is that retribution must be halal according to shari'ah, and not target the innocent.

5.4 Section Two: Narratives of Legitimation

This second section represents a second round of coding, developed and performed during and after the first round as a result of familiarity with the texts stemming from the initial round of coding. This section reflects the Saudi narrative position on jihād in a general sense, and jihādist organisations/individuals specifically. While the previous section examined jihādist norms directly, this section also looks at the response to various jihādist groups, both those case studies from previous chapters, and others. In interrogating whether jihādist expressions may be traced to any jihādist groups, it is prudent to examine the umbrella response of the Saudi state to various jihādist organisations. This round of coding arose as it became obvious, in the first round, that narrative on jihādism focussed not on the minutiae of jihādist doctrine, but on the organisations and practice of jihād.

Drawing on the Critical Constructivist occupation with power and legitimacy, this narrative is valuable to understanding the power dynamic that exists between the Saudi government and various jihādist groups. Its value is in revealing the role of the language employed by Saudi Arabia in the legitimation and de-legitimation of various organisations and/ or individuals, as well as revealing blind spots in Saudi Arabia's engagement with jihādist organisations. This section will act as support for claims about whether Saudi Arabia's

73 In response to violent escalation in Syria.

normative engagement with jihād reflects more its engagement with jihādism, or whether it is a vehicle for the legitimation of groups and individuals.

5.4.1 Explicit statements About Al-Qa'ida, Islamic State, and the Taleban (n=91)

Saudi Arabia makes explicit statements about several jihādist organisations. When coding for references to these organisations, the text was categorised as:

- *Critical Statements*: for comments which cast the organisations in a negative light
- *Critical on the Basis of Statements*: for comments that provided a reason from the negativity
- *Ambiguous Statements*: those statements that addressed the organisation, but that conveyed no moral/ethical judgement
- *Supportive Statements* – Those statements that may be construed as supportive or legitimising.

For the Taleban, an additional category was used: *Addressing Afghanistan Jihādism sans Taleban*. This was used where text referenced the then-ongoing war in Afghanistan, directly addressing the conflict and indirectly the Taleban, but without naming the Taleban. These statements typically speak to the legitimacy of those organisations, and speak to the research question asking whether jihādist norms extant in Saudi narrative can be traced to particular groups. Notably, there is a very uneven distribution (see Table 5-11: Statements Critical of Islamic State, Al-Qa'ida, and the Taleban).

Table 5-11: Statements Critical of Islamic State, Al-Qa'ida, and the Taleban

Source	Embassy Documents	UN Documents	Total
Al-Qa'ida	22	12	34
Islamic State	23	30	53
The Taleban	3	1	4

5.4.2 Islamic State and Al-Qa'ida

Condemnation of these groups occurs in a number of forms. Most commonly, the groups are simply labelled as 'extremist' or 'terrorist' (or derivations of those terms). This occurs in two ways, first individually, when they are singled out for criticism. For example, in critiquing Al-Qa'ida specifically, the embassy writes, "In reference to bin Laden's recent taped message, Prince Turki remarked: 'Osama bin Laden does not speak for Muslims. He does not represent Islam. His religion is extremism, and his practice is terror. He leads a cult that is a perversion of a benevolent and peaceful faith'" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2006). Alternatively, these groups or collections of jihādist groups will be listed together. This is more often the case when the subject of the text is terrorism or extremism itself, and the groups are listed as typifying examples. For example (The Saudi US Embassy, 2016h):

> General Asseri said that this Islamic counter-terrorism military endeavor will mobilize Islamic nations against Daesh, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and groups connected to or acting as proxies for these terrorist organizations. "This Muslim 'coalition of the willing,' brought together through Saudi leadership, clearly demonstrates our military and social commitment to counter terrorism," said General Asseri.

Notably, the authors make the point that these groups' actions are inconsistent with the principles of Islam. It is a direct attack on the religious justification that these groups adopt, and speaks not to the general moral rectitude of their actions, but rather their contra-Islamic character.

The texts, not being theological in nature, typically omit an in-depth explanation of the manner in which these groups pervert or deviate from Islam. When a reason is provided, it is frequently for targeting innocents:

- "The Kingdom's most senior religious scholars have condemned terrorist groups for distorting and violating the teachings of Islam and its prohibition on the killing of the innocent. Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-AsShaikh, who is also Chairman of the Council of Senior Ulema (religious scholars) and the General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta, stated, 'The ideas of extremism, radicalism and

terrorism do not belong to Islam in any way, but are the first enemy of Islam, and Muslims are their first victims, as seen in the crimes of the so-called Daash (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda and their affiliated group'" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2014d).

- "Atrocities are being committed on a daily basis against civilians, women in particular, by the Syrian regime, Iranian sectarian militias, the terrorist Hizbullah militia, Houthi militias, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia and elsewhere" (Radwan, 2017).

Often the criticism will be on the unspecified charge of terrorism:

- "The Royal Saudi Air Force participated in military operations over Syria to confront terrorism emanating from Daash (ISIS) and to support the moderate Syrian opposition" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2014f).
- "We announced the creation of an Islamic alliance composed of 34 countries to combat terrorism…. The alliance will be a solid force against terrorist organizations. Moreover, my country is ready to participate in any international effort to eradicate Da'esh and Al-Qaida in Syria and any other country" (Al-Mouallimi, 2016c, p. 28).

In these cases, the terrorist nature of Islamic State and/or Al-Qa'ida is proposed but not justified, and has a taken-for-granted character. Of those documents critical of Al-Qa'ida, eight of 27 singled out Al-Qa'ida, for criticism compared to IS, and 31 out of 53 documents addressed IS solely.

5.4.3 The Taleban

Narrative engagement of the Taleban is here treated separately from that of IS and AQ. Firstly, as noted, IS and Al-Qa'ida are frequently listed together when making a general comment about terrorism or extremism. The Taleban is only once collectively addressed in such a manner. Secondly, unlike Al-Qa'ida and IS, or even groups such as the Houthi and Hezbollah, the Taleban is comparatively under-represented compared to IS and Al-Qa'ida.

In the four instances where Saudi narrative addresses the Taleban, the language is notably less critical of it than of other jihādist organisations. Insofar as it treats the Taleban as a

nation that supports extremism, the language is comparatively softer than it uses for a nation such as Iran. For example (The Saudi US Embassy, 2001b):

> It is to be regretted that the government of the Taleban made use of Afghanistan's special status, not to build up brotherly relations or set up high Islamic values, but to make its land a center to attract and train a number of misguided people of all nationalities… in order to carry out criminal acts that are against every tenet of Shari'ah [Islamic Law] and faith: moreover, Taleban has continued to refuse to hand those criminals over to justice. The Taleban government, after all that has happened and is still happening, continues to use its lands to harbor, arm, and encourage those criminals to go on with their terrorist operations, terrorizing innocent people and spreading fear and destruction throughout the world, causing harm to Islam and besmirching the name of Muslims everywhere. The Taleban government has paid no attention to the calls and pleas of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to stop harboring, training and encouraging criminals.

Here the Taleban's actions are 'regretted', and the people attracted are 'misguided'. The jihādists they harbour, while engaging in 'terrorizing innocent people,' are called criminals twice, and not extremists or terrorists. While their operations are 'terrorist operations', in this formulation, jihādists are 'harbored'. Likewise, commenting on the refusal of the Taleban to hand over Osama bin Ladin, Shaikh Luheidan[74] stated that he "prayed that God grant Afghanistan wise leadership that steers the country away from danger" and that "[true Muslims would] oppose any unjust person who is bent on bloodshed; they do not give shelter to any troublemaker" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2001d). Rather than using condemning, combative language, this is the language of brotherly correction.

In the sole text that actively calls the Taleban a terrorist group, it does so in the context of criticising Iran for supporting terrorism, stating, "Iran was fomenting ethnic conflict in numerous countries, including Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. The Iranian regime was also providing financial and logistical support to the Taliban, Al-Qaida, Hizbullah and other terrorist groups" (Al-Mouallimi, 2018c, p. 7).

74 A member of the Saudi Council of Senior Scholars.

Condemnation of the Taleban differs from that of IS and AQ. Saudi criticism of the Taleban is on the basis of three grounds:

- In an attack on Iran for supporting terrorism and extremism, a press release quoted a US source stating, "Iran supported the Taliban against US forces in Afghanistan" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2016c).
- In a press release stating Saudi Arabia had broken off relations with Afghanistan, a press release stated it was because, "the Taleban made use of Afghanistan's special status… to make its land a centre to attract and train a number of misguided people of all nationalities… in order to carry out criminal acts that are against every tenet of Shariah [Islamic Law] and faith: moreover, Taleban has continued to refuse to hand those criminals over to justice" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2001b).
- On the topic of failing to hand Osama bin Laden over the US, the Taleban was charged with failing, when they should have, "listened to the advice of their neighbors [Saudi Arabia]," by which they could have "avoided such errors" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2001d).

Not only is the language qualitatively different from the 'terrorist' and 'extremist' monikers applied to other groups, for the period that the Taleban were not in power (2001-2021) there is a comparative dearth of writing compared to IS and AQ, as well as compared to other more distant regional actors such as Boko Haram[75].

5.4.4 Other Jihādist Organisations

Saudi narrative addresses several other jihādist organisations (see Table 5-12: Language Critical of Jihādist Organisations by Organisation). Often when these groups are mentioned it is done so in the context of a discussion on 'terrorism' or 'extremism' and used as examples of the types of groups being discussed. For example, the criticism of terrorist group Abu

75 In 2007 the Taleban in Pakistan conducted a martyrdom operation, convincing a 15-year-old boy to assassinate Benazir Bhutto, who had a reputation of being pro-Western. The Saudi Embassy announced that King Abdullah sent a cable of condolence to President of Musharraf, which condemned the suicide attack, and called it un-Islamic (The Saudi US Embassy. (2007). *King Abdullah Sends Cable of Condolences to President Musharraf on Murder of Benazir Bhutto* Dec-27). However, being sent the day of the assassination, it is highly probable that the Saudis were unaware of the perpetrators.

al-Fadl al-Abbas takes place within a broader critique of Iran for recruiting terrorist groups to operate in Syria (Al Saad, 2016, p. 20). The criticism of these groups is not in-depth and typically is of the nature of labelling them as 'extremist' or 'terrorist' organisations.

Table 5-12: Language Critical of Jihādist Organisations by Organisation

Organisation	Embassy Documents	UN Documents	Total
Abul al-Fadl Al-Abbas	0	1	1
Al-Nusra Front	1	8	9
Al-Shabaab	0	2	2
Asaib Ahl Al-Haq	0	1	1
Boko Haram	1	4	5
Fatimid	0	1	1
Hezbollah	6	31	37
Houthi	15	36	51
Jaysh Al-Fatah	0	1	1
Saraya Al-Quds	0	1	1
Takfir wal-Hijra	0	1	1
Zainab	0	1	1

Among the jihādist organisations listed, four organisations are disproportionately represented—Al-Nusra Front, Boko Haram, Hezbollah and Houthi. In these cases, not only do texts criticise these organisations for being extremist, but they also occasionally provide a basis (to a limited extent) for criticism. In the case of Boko Haram, it is that, "[it] targeted anyone and everyone who refuses to adhere to their violent and unfounded ideology… [It] falsely claims affiliation to Islam and seeks to justify [its] criminal acts as being carried out for its cause, have nothing to do with Islam or its principles" (Al-Mouallimi, 2014a, p. 29).

Hezbollah and the Houthi are addressed more often, and more in-depth. Specific criticism against Hezbollah (n=8) is limited to its involvement in Syria, and it is often linked to criticism of Iran for its support of Hezbollah. Such language will typically take the following form:

- "The terrorist group Hizbullah and mercenaries, continued to terrorise and subjugate Syrian civilians" (Al-Mouallimi, 2017b, p. 3).
- "Iran provides the first line of support to Hizbullah — a terrorist group that flaunts its arrogance and dominance in Lebanon, wages war in Syria and perpetrates the most extreme killings, siege and ethnic cleansing" (Al-Mouallimi, 2018d, p. 31).

The Houthi are similarly criticised for reasons including, but not limited to, its involvement in Syria and Yemen, attacks on Saudi Arabia and on US vessels, as well as recruiting children, attacks on schools and hospitals in Saudi Arabia, and looting humanitarian assistance:

- "'Houthi militias have bombed these facilities to generate sympathy for themselves and hostility towards the coalition's forces,' he said" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2015c).
- "The Houthi movement militias had looted much of the humanitarian assistance arriving in Yemen, seized control of numerous ships delivering assistance and mined Yemeni maritime waters (Khashaan, 2018, p. 10)
- "Iran is also providing Houthi militias with logistical support, such as training, recruiting children and sending Iranian military experts to Sana'a. Iranian Houthi militias have looted humanitarian assistance and impeded its delivery to the Yemeni people" (Alsultan, 2018, p. 21).
- "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia condemns the random laying of thousands of mines by the Houthis — in Yemen generally and in Al-Hudaydah specifically — which poses a serious threat to civilians" (Almanzlawiy, 2018, p. 48).

Like Al-Qa'ida and IS, these groups are often criticised for being terrorist and/or extremist, occasionally with justification, but often without. The criticism, as with Al-Qa'ida and IS, has a taken-for-granted aspect.

5.4.5 Jihād, Islam and Extremism (n=37)

Rather than present a complex or comprehensive discussion of what constitutes valid jihād, Saudi narrative instead makes declarations about the legitimacy of jihādist activity. While the Saudi narrative could address jihādism and jihādist groups from various perspectives—that of international norms, laws, and the threat to international stability—the narrative delegitimises them in the context of Islam. There are two main strategies of narrative

delegitimation. The first is by claiming an activity is not in accord with Islamic principles. The second is by rejecting jihādism (typically referred to as 'extremism' or 'terrorism' in these texts[76]) in favour of values that are consistent with Islam (see Table 5-13: Those Characteristics Within, and Without, the Domain of Islam). Often these two strategies will be mobilised in a single statement, such as, "ours is a tolerant and temperate faith and we must conduct ourselves accordingly. There is no room for extremism or compulsion in Islam. In fact, it violates the tenets of our faith and the traditions of our Prophet" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2002a).

Table 5-13: Those Characteristics Within, and Without, the Domain of Islam

Statements:	Embassy Documents	UN Documents	Total
Islam is not the religion of…'	14	20	34
Islam is not...'	6	9	15

These types of statements are either in response to jihādist activity (as regulative statements), or in regards to jihādist organisations (as constitutive statements).

Statements that assert that actions of jihādists aren't within the purview of Islam vary in specificity. For example, in a press release regarding the arrest of individuals recruiting minors, the text reads (The Saudi US Embassy, 2014d):

> King Abdullah stated, "These groups have become an easy tool for the enemies of Islam who use them to terrorize and kill innocent people through the distortion of the holy text and interpretation of Islamic law to serve their ends," and "The ideas of extremism, radicalism and terrorism do not belong to Islam in any way, but are the first enemy of Islam, and Muslims are their first victims, as seen in the crimes of the so-called Daash (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda and their affiliated groups."

76 While Saudi narrative does label a range of activities terrorism, such as the Israeli occupation of Palestinian areas, these were not coded. Only those texts that refer to jihādist activity, individuals and/or organisations.

Likewise, Saudi narrative can focus on individuals. For example, "Like all true Muslims [HRH Prince Majid bin Abdulaziz] regards the activities of Osama bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda as criminal and contrary to the principles of humanity, and the teachings of every faith, in particular that of Islam" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2001e).

Statements disavowing jihādist organisations and/or behaviour will include actions that are alleged contrary to Islam. For example:

- "These cruel acts are rejected by all human principles and religions; moreover, Islam rejects the killing of innocent people" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2001c).
- "Islam prohibits terrorism because God Almighty cannot be but just and He forbids injustice against human beings. God criminalizes oppression and aggression against non-criminals. Killing the innocent is a major sin; it is considered similar to perversion on Earth and destruction of crops and progeny" (Shobokshi, 2001b, p. 23).

There are several specific examples of behaviours that are claimed to be un-Islamic, including but not limited to: compulsion of religion (Al-Mouallimi, 2015; The Saudi US Embassy, 2002a, 2003), aggression against human beings (The Saudi US Embassy, 2005a), the World Trade Centre attacks (The Saudi US Embassy, 2001a), killing the innocent, collective punishment, and the destruction of crops and progeny (Shobokshi, 2001b, p. 23).

As Saudi narrative claims jihādist organisations are illegitimate, their actions being at odds with the teachings of Islam, it also claims that they are illegitimate by failure to assume those virtues that belong to Islam. These statements usually take the form of an assertion that extremist groups cannot be Islamic because they fail to express one or more virtues of Islam. For example:

- "Islam is a faith of peace, security and cooperation among people. All principles of Islam prohibit aggression against human beings. Allah Almighty said in the Holy Qur'an: "Transgress not the limits. Truly, God likes not the transgressors". He also said: "If anyone killed a person not in retaliation of murder, or (and) to spread mischief in the land – it would be as if he killed all mankind, and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of all mankind" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2005a).

- "There is also an attempt to link Islam with some negative phenomena, such as terrorism and fanaticism, forgetting that Islam rejects these anomalies, while it promotes tolerance and cooperation" (Shobokshi, 2001b).
- In the context of accusations of funding for charities being directed towards jihādists, the embassy wrote, "According to Minister Al-Namlah, the tenets of the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah (the Prophet's teachings) have always called for moderation" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2002d).

As with those values and practices condemned by Islam, Saudi narrative also describes a number of virtues that conflict with the practice of jihādists, including but not limited to: tolerance, temperance, moderation, understanding (Abdullah, 2008; The Saudi US Embassy, 2002a, 2002b), peace, security, cooperation (Shobokshi, 2001b; The Saudi US Embassy, 2005a), freedom of religion (Al-Ahmed, 2012a; Al-Mouallimi, 2015) and peaceful coexistence (Al-Mouallimi, 2016b).

It is not simply that jihādists espouse un-Islamic principles, or that they don't espouse Islamic values. The Saudi narrative asserts that the jihādism expressed by these organisations and the values of Islam are mutually exclusive. This is made clear in numerous texts:

- "In a message to the people of Saudi Arabia and all the world's Muslims on the occasion of the Eid Al-Fitr, King Salman urged Muslims to unite and condemned terrorism and extremism, stressing their contradiction to Islam" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2016j).
- In the context of repeated assertion of Islam's tolerance (Al-Mouallimi, 2015; 2016b, p. 63; Shobokshi, 2001b; The Saudi US Embassy, 2002a, 2002b, 2003), Saudi narrative asserts, "Terrorism and crime are the enemies of God and of every religion and civilization. They would not have appeared except for the absence of the principle of tolerance" (Abdullah, 2008, p. 6).
- "Mr. Al-Ahmed (Saudi Arabia) said that his country condemned terrorism irrespective of origin or aim, and had joined in global counter-terrorism efforts. In defining terrorism, it was important to eschew selectivity or double standards. Terrorism could not be connected with any specific religion, society or ethnic group, and its perpetrators did not represent their own societies" (Al-Ahmed, 2010, p. 9).

- "The concerted efforts of the Saudi Arabian Government and people to fight terrorism on all fronts were a natural reaction to a phenomenon entirely alien to their beliefs and culture" (AlFarhan, 2011, p. 5).
- "In this context, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation condemns and rejects all attempts to associate Islam or any Islamic country, any race, religion, culture or nationality with terrorism." (Al-Mouallimi, 2014a, p. 29).

This type of statement portrays Islam as being diametrically opposed to terrorism and extremism. This is seen in language such as 'contradiction to Islam', 'enemies of God and every religion', 'its perpetrators did not represent their societies', and 'alien to their beliefs and culture'. It is the rejection of any attempts to reconcile the actions of jihādists to Islam.

5.4.9 General Statements on Terrorism (n=84)

Saudi Arabia's disavowal of jihādism, labelled terrorism or extremism, in the name if Islam forms part of a general narrative condemning jihādism. While it is useful to examine the specific grounds on which Saudi narrative endorses or opposes jihādist narrative, it should be noted that the opposition to extremism and terrorism in general terms is a consistent theme (see Table 5-14: Texts Critical of 'Terrorism' and 'Extremism').

Table 5-14: Texts Critical of 'Terrorism' and 'Extremism'

	Embassy Documents	UN Documents	Total
Location	36	48	84

The texts analysed included any general statements regarding jihādism that did not fit another category. If a text engaged jihādism or 'terrorism' or 'extremism' (and the context was clearly that of jihādist organisations or individuals) it was coded as such. For example:

- "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia continues to stand solidly against terrorism" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2002b).
- "The people of Saudi Arabia sympathize with all victims of terrorism, and Saudi Arabia will continue to lead efforts to eliminate terrorism worldwide" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2005d).

- International terrorism, in all its manifestations and forms, represents a very dangerous challenge to our international Organization and to the international community at large. It deserves our condemnation which must be resolute, categorical and unequivocal" (Al-Faisal, 2003).
- "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stresses its condemnation of terrorism in all its forms, regardless of the perpetrators" (Alyas, 2015, p. 33).

A corresponding category was created for those statements in support of jihādist organisation, but no text was identified for coding. There were no detected statements in support of jihādism.

5.4.7 Caveats and Hamas

Saudi narrative condemns jihādist organisations, usually labelling them terrorist and/or extremist, and contrasts them with Islam. It also makes claims regarding that which might accidentally be confused with jihād. In several UN texts, in a discussion about terrorism, when the text segues into a discussion about the Arab-Israeli conflict, the author makes efforts to disassociate claims about terrorism from the Palestinian people. For example (Shobokshi, 2001b, p. 22):

> My country's delegation, in its efforts to combat this dangerous phenomenon, supports the convening of an international conference on terrorism…. It should have as one of its main objectives an accurate definition of terrorism that differentiates between terrorism as a dangerous phenomenon posing a threat to the security and stability of the international community and the right of peoples to struggle against and resist occupation, according to international law and the United Nations Charter.

The text goes on to assert, "the Arabs call for avoiding any confusion between terrorism and the right of people to defend their independence, freedom and human rights when they are subject to foreign occupation, dominance and oppression, which are violations of international law and norms of conduct." That is, the fight against occupation and oppression is maintained to be licit under international law, a deviation from Islamic justifications.

Such claims are routine and are often more succinct:

- "Terrorism is a global phenomenon that does not relate to any single nation, religion or race… resistance against foreign occupation is a legitimate act under international instruments and the relevant decisions of the United Nations" (Tayeb, 2002, p. 23).
- "Nor should terrorism be confused with the legitimate struggle of peoples under foreign occupation in exercise of their right to self-determination" (Al-Ahmed, 2010, p. 10).
- "[Saudi Arabia] stressed the importance of distinguishing between terrorism and the right of peoples to self-determination, including their struggle for sovereignty and against foreign occupation" (Al-Ahmed, 2012a, p. 10)
- "[Saudi Arabia] stressed the need for the distinction to be made between criminal acts of terrorism and the struggle of those suffering under foreign occupation who exercised their legitimate right to self-determination, which was enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and other international instruments" (Al-Hafez, 2013, p. 7)

Expressions of the same sentiment exist in other places, but follow the same formula[77]. Saudi narrative also adopts other means to differentiate such activity. Al-Ahmed (2012b, p. 15) asserts, "We cannot remain silent in the face of the very carefully planned out terrorism practised against the Palestinian people, or in the face of accusations that an unarmed people are engaging in terrorist acts." Alternatively, they assert a double standard is being applied: "Israel was the blatant example of repeated attacks on the human rights of Palestinians in the occupied territories. Israel's actions were viewed as self-defence, while the same actions committed by Palestinians were seen as terrorism" (Shobokshi, 2003, p. 11). The logic here is that, by the equivalence of the charges laid against each party, either Israel is a terrorist nation, or Palestine is exonerated. It should be noted that there are multiple occasions where Saudi narrative labels Israel as 'terrorist', but those claims are outside the scope of this study.

77 For example see Al-Mouallimi, A. Y. A. (2014d). The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. In *A/68/PV.97*. documents.un.org: United Nations - Official Document System. and Al-Mouallimi, A. Y. A. (2014a). International Security. In *S/PV.7316*. documents.un.org: United Nations - Official Document System.

This section examined explicit claims about different jihādist organisations and about the treatment of the Palestinian question. The treatment of the Palestinian question arose due to the notable absence of Hamas from the texts. Hamas appears once only in Saudi narrative. The text has neither a positive nor negative connotation, and does not relate in any way to this study, reading, "Israel used the conflict between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority as a pretext not to cooperate" (Al-Mouallimi, 2014c, p. 34).

5.5 Section 3: Saudi Participation in the Normative Process

This section presents findings directly related to the research question, 'what jihādist norms are expressed in Saudi narrative, *and what do they mean*?' This section informs the discussion of what those norms mean, and is best considered as a meta-discussion of how Saudi Arabia engages norms. Specifically, this section speaks to an awareness within Saudi narrative of the norm construction and adoption processes, and the role that Saudi Arabia plays in that process.

Where the previous round of coding addressed language centred on jihādism, this section looks at the nature of Saudi Arabia's purposive normative engagement with jihādism. Previous chapters have discussed the norm cascade and its dependence on norm entrepreneurs, and Critical Constructivism's preoccupation with the relationship between text and power. This section examines Saudi Arabia's role in that process, whether it is a passive or active participant, whether these processes are directed, and whether there are indications that this happens in a power aware manner.

If Saudi Arabia is cognisant of its role in the normative process, and is acting as a norm entrepreneur, legitimating groups and actions, such a rejection has different meaning than it would were it the case that Saudi Arabia was simply moving with the tide of international opinion. Such cognisance also has implications for any groups that Saudi Arabia studiously avoids referring to, such as Hamas. If norms constitute standards of behaviour, if norms regulate legitimate membership to specific groups, the Saudi position, if intentional, signals its stance on the legitimacy of those groups that stand unrepresented in the narrative.

5.5.1 A Complex Understanding of Norms

Saudi Arabian narrative frequently references the role of norms in condemning actions that contravene international norms. In numerous cases, these references are superficial and fail to illustrate a deeper understanding of the role of norms. For example, a statement such as, "The taking of hostages and the assault on other peacekeepers violates all international laws, norms and standards" (Al-Jubier in The Saudi US Embassy, 2014c, p. 32) is not an in-depth exploration of the role of norms, nor is it indication of a fundamental understanding of their role. While the word 'norm' mostly is used in contexts such as this, there is also sufficient evidence to show that Saudi Arabia has a complex understanding of the role of norms in international society, and evidence for this is prevalent in both Saudi Embassy (n=5) and UN documents (n=35).

While less prevalent, it is clear from various texts that use of the term is informed, that the authors understand the role of norms, and that they understand the role of norms in a competitive environment. For example, the Saudi Embassy addresses the norm on the prohibition on chemical weapons, stating, "The international norm against the use of chemical weapons is longstanding and universal. The use of chemical weapons anywhere diminishes the security of people everywhere. Left unchallenged, it increases the risk of further use and proliferation of these weapons." This passage shows that Saudi Arabia has a complex understanding of the role norms play in both creating predictability and order, and of the risk to security posed by their removal (The Saudi US Embassy, 2013a). Saudi Arabia further makes the assertion that an erosion of established norms that regulate the international community damages international relations, asserting that keeping "silent about violations of those norms only erodes the pillars of international diplomacy and does damage to all principles of international relations" (Al-Mouallimi, 2011, p. 2). This can also be seen in Shobokshi (2004, p. 24), where Saudi narrative asserts Israel had undermined international norms in the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin[78]. Regarding the death, Saudi Arabia asserted:

> Today, international relations are in a very grave situation because of the precedence being granted to the logic of force over law, and because of the lack of respect for international norms. This has led to total disregard for the

78 Founder of Hamas.

> norms of justice, to the consecration of the law of the jungle, to the adoption of double standards in political affairs, to the complete distortion of the norms of international law and to utterly strange interpretations of those norms.

Saudi Arabia is not only demonstrably aware of the function of norms, it also acknowledges the practical worth of participating in the normative process. An example of this is seen where Saudi Arabia argues in favour of extending international monetary and trade norms to developing countries on the grounds it would aid successful financial reform (Shobokshi, 2006a, p. 3). More importantly, in the context of counter-terrorism, Saudi Arabia recognises the importance of norm entrepreneurship, explicitly stating, "The success of the global counter-terrorism campaign will depend on our strict adherence to the rules of international law, human rights, norms and humanitarian values, and respect for all religions" (Shobokshi, 2006b, p. 53).

It is important to note that these comments on the role and function of norms may not be entirely correct, or the conclusions that are drawn from these assertions may not be correct. They are included to illustrate how Saudi Arabia conceptualises the instrumentality of norms in a manner that extends beyond a rhetorical device, and speaks to how Saudi Arabia may see or frame jihādist norms, to be discussed in the following chapter.

5.5.2 Narrative Adoption of Norms, and Accedence to Treaties and Conventions (n=32)

The preceding section demonstrated how Saudi Arabia understands that language has an instrumental role in narrative. That is, that it performs a function. This self-aware use of normative language provides context to the role of Saudi agents when employing narratives to engage with elements of jihādism, as well as jihādist groups and individuals. These narratives demonstrate also how Saudi Arabia participates with the normative process on an international level. This is not just indicative of Saudi Arabia's stance, but its role as a pro-active agent in relation to jihādists.

This section coded evidence of where Saudi Arabia engaged international norms regarding jihādists. That is, providing narrative supporting or norms with jihādism as their subject, asserting they were cooperating with programs targeting jihādism, or rejecting international

norms surrounding jihādism. Two types of statements were coded: those related to Saudi accession to international treaties[79], and those that rejected them. The first set codes Saudi Arabia's narrative support of international norms surrounding 'terrorism'. The second indicates support of the policy that derives from acceptance of those norms through organs that aren't directly under the auspices of the UN. Should the two be consistent, it would indicate Saudi acceptance of anti-terrorism norms in a manner consistent with international understandings of the term.

The two types of statements are coded separately to help identify what is being spoken of when the Saudi narrative addresses 'terrorism'. Saudi narratively adopts the same position as the UN on terrorism. That is, it condemns terrorism. However, it is important to ascertain whether Saudi narrative that addresses terrorism is addressing the same phenomena as other UN agents who address terrorism. By coding and comparing these two elements separately, the two sets of data can be checked for consistency. That is, the reported actions of the Saudi state can be checked for consistency with its rhetorical consonance with UN sentiment. Consonance between the two would indicate use of the terminology indicates and intersubjective understanding, and also that Saudi Arabia is positively involved in the normative process.

Saudi Arabia, in addition to the action of acceding to international conventions on anti-terrorism, narratively supports those conventions (n=9). Its support is typically expressed in the context of establishing the kingdom's credentials. For example, in response to 9/11, Saudi Arabia presented a speech to the UN. After denouncing the attacks, it enumerated the many relevant anti-terrorism conventions it had signed, and asserted "that accession to anti-terrorism conventions should be accompanied by sincere and serious intentions to combat this dangerous phenomenon and eradicate it" (Shobokshi, 2001b, p. 22). Later language indicates that Saudi Arabia considered itself an early adopter of such regulations, stating it:

- "[was] among the first signatories of the Arab Convention on the Suppression of

79 According to the UN, ""Accession" is the act whereby a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to become a party to a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states. It has the same legal effect as ratification." The United Nations. (2022). What is the difference between signing, ratification and accession of UN treaties? , 1. https://ask.un.org/faq/14594 .

Terrorism and other similar agreements emanating from the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council. In addition, it has acceded to nine other international antiterrorism conventions and agreements" (Shobokshi, 2005a, p. 18).

- "frequently affirmed its willingness to join in the international efforts to combat and eradicate the causes of terrorism… and among the first to accede to the Arab conventions on combating terrorism and… also acceded to the various international counter-terrorism conventions" (Al-Otaibi, 2008, p. 8)
- "In line with our ongoing and consistent policies against international terrorism and those who commit it, my country was among the first States to accede to the majority of international counter-terrorism conventions" (Alrashidi, 2008, p. 18).

Saudi Arabia frequently also asserts that it is a signatory to either most, or all, international conventions on terrorism (Al-Jumaa, 2006, p. 3; Al-Shubaili, 2004, p. 2; Alrashidi, 2008, p. 18; Shobokshi, 2005b, p. 3; 2006b, p. 53). The cumulative tone of these statements is that of a country fully in support of anti-terrorism conventions, an early and sincere adopter.

Other texts support this position, and speak of Saudi Arabia's attitude towards jihādism as evinced by enthusiastic engagement in agreements and organisations specifically aimed at curtailing the activities of jihādist organisations, as well as an intention to adopt and/or conform to existing international norms. For example:

- "Saudi Arabia has been a consistent proponent of enhancing international cooperation to combat terrorism" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2010).
- "Gen. Asiri emphasized that the coalition will work according to 'international law and standards,' dismissing that any country would take a unilateral decision. 'Sovereignty is respected,' he reiterated" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2016d).

Additionally, Saudi Arabia frequently asserts that other nations should be participants in anti-'terrorism' programs:

- "Our reality today requires us all to come together more than ever to fight the scourge of terrorism and to protect the young generation from being under its fierce attack, which aims to remove it from the logic of the true faith and be driven by

those who are wreaking havoc under the name of religion" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2016i).

- "In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we continue to combat terrorism in all its forms and at all levels. The Council should take decisive positions that reflect the will of the international community so that we can end and eliminate this scourge" (Al-Mouallimi, 2014a, p. 31).
- "We reiterate the importance of our cooperation and participation in international and bilateral efforts to combat terrorism and its financing, as well as to extirpate the roots of this phenomenon, in particular the application of all Security Council resolutions relevant to the fight against terrorism" (Al-Mouallimi, 2016c, p. 27).

Analysis and subsequent coding considered both the narrative response to the action of accession to international conventions as separate from the response to other international actions, and indicated the response was consistent, illustrating an active engagement in the process. Given that Saudi Arabia has, as shown, frequently referred to Islamist groups as terrorist, and given the forum, the anti-terrorist language here is asserted to be language opposed to, among other groups, Islamist groups.

5.5.3 Statements Indicating Domestic Attitudes Towards Jihādism (n=45)

As well as expressing enthusiastic adoption of international norms surrounding jihādism, and of norms towards terrorism in general, Saudi narrative also frequently addresses its domestic attitude towards jihādism. There is evidence that Saudi Arabia views the spheres for normative discussion, policy and anti-terrorist programs as discrete levels. These texts collectively portray a consistent attitude towards jihādism from international level down to domestic (n=45), one of condemnation and regulation of jihādist activity. The reported practical implementation of those policies mirror the attitudes towards jihādism that are expressed at the international level. The specific language used here is consistent, referring to jihādism as terrorism. Besides practical policies discouraging jihādism (such as targeting funding and imposing harsh legal penalties), within these texts we also see the practice of restricting and/or regulating the language of jihād (n=17) both in embassy texts (n=5) and UN texts (n=12). Typical examples include:

- "[The Minister for Islamic Affairs] warned speakers against misusing mosques to make provocative speeches or incite people or exploit mosques by reciting poems in praise of some misguided people. Violators of the order can be subject to severe punishment, including removal from office" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2002f).
- "To combat the spread and appeal of extremist ideologies among the population, the Kingdom has initiated a Counter Radicalization Program. This effort educates at-risk groups about the dangers of violent extremism and provides positive, alternative outlets" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2014a).
- "Taking the immediate and obvious steps of going after the men and the money behind terrorism is simply not enough, which is why the Kingdom has enacted programs to go after the mindset that foments extremism and advocates violence" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2005c).

Again, Saudi Arabia uses its UN platform to establish itself as being on the front line of anti-jihādism:

- "We were among the first countries to combat terrorism in all its intellectual and ideological aspects and to seek to cut off its financial resources. We denounce the attempt by terrorists to attribute their crimes to Islam, the religion of love, peace, moderation and tolerance" (Al-Jubeir, 2015, pp. 21-22).
- "The Mohammed Bin Naif Counselling and Care Centre had developed an interactive approach to rehabilitation that aimed at promoting moderation, uprooting extremism and preventing the spread of deviant ideas" (Aljabr, 2017, p. 9).

The language expresses that, rather than just regulating criminal behaviour, there is a manifest interest in regulating ideas of appropriate behaviour. This discourse posits that there is an appropriate manner of thinking, which the government can regulate and sanction.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter began by examining specific expressions of jihādist norms, searching for norms corresponding with those of the groups in the previous chapter. It is difficult to make the case that there is a similarity between the norms expressed by jihādist organisations

and those found in Saudi literature. While Saudi Arabia strongly identifies with its Islamic identity, it asserts its national sovereignty just as strongly. This is reflected in its rejection not only of foreign interference, but also in its rejection of Islamic groups themselves, which it positions as an ongoing existential threat. Saudi Arabia regularly condemns the actions of jihādist organisations and their choice of targets. It has a positive orientation towards the West. While not directly commenting on the specific norms analysed—UN and embassy documents are not the place for theological exegesis— the language described by these categories is frequently used to delegitimise jihādist actions and organisations. Jihādist organisations are criticised for their choice of targets; hijrah to these organisations is discouraged; talk of caliphates is pointedly ignored.

Of greater significance is the way in which norms are used. That the Taleban is not recognised with the same abundance and tone as other groups is revealing in itself. The same is true of Hamas. Where language is used to legitimise and de-legitimise organisations and their actions, the way in which that is done so is meaningful, and provides insight into the relationship of the Saudi state with these groups. This is both in the context of which groups are discussed, and which are absent from the literature.

Not only does it reveal information about the Saudi state with these groups, it also speaks to the relationship the Saudi state has with the respective audiences of these texts – the broader international community in the case of UN texts, and the US in the case of embassy documents.

These insights are framed by the knowledge that Saudi Arabia is aware of its role in the normative process, and that norms are a tool to regulate behaviours and identities. In this context Saudi narrative doesn't simply provide and insight in the Saudi position with regard to jihādism, but moreover insight into the direction Saudi Arabia is pushing these jihādist organisations, their members, its relationship with these organisations, and its relationship with the international community, all in the context of jihādism. As the next chapter discusses the research question, these topics will be explored in greater depth.

Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion

> The relationship between theory and practice is reciprocal. Theory shapes practice just as much as practice shapes theory. Theory provides a lens through which to view practice and helps us to make sense of what we observe. At the same time, practice is where theory is tested and refined. Without practice, theory becomes abstract and disconnected from the real world. Without theory, practice can be aimless and lacks the ability to understand the significance of our actions. The most effective approach is to use theory and practice in conjunction with each other, allowing for a continual feedback loop that enhances our understanding and ability to make a positive impact on the world.
> - ChatGPT

This study explores the extent to which jihādist norms are present in the international narrative of Saudi Arabia, and asks, if they are, what are those norms? What do they mean? Can they be traced to particular jihādist groups, or are they general in nature? Critical Constructivism has been the lens through which this analysis has been conducted, and in turn, this study examines what implications the results have for Critical Constructivism. To answer these questions, this chapter draws together insights from the previous chapters. Chapter Two profiled the position of several jihādist organisations based on their assertions in a number of areas specific to jihādism. Chapter Five then analysed Saudi narrative in the same categories for engagement with those norms. This chapter focuses on the relationship between those norms expressed in the Saudi narrative and the corollaries expressed in the narrative of jihādist organisations. It discusses both the similarities and difference. Importantly, where there is an absence of an expressed norm, it discusses that too, as it shows how the Saudi narrative defines the parameters of the discussion on jihād.

As the previous chapter showed, the norms expressed by Saudi Arabia don't exist in isolation, but are frequently a response to the actions and norms expressed by jihādist organisations

(as well as other actors). The norms expressed aren't simply jihādist norms (or contra-jihādist norms). Saudi Arabia exists in a normative space which it shares with many heterogenous actors, actors with different concerns, and different relationships with the Saudi state. These include the intended international audience of these texts, jihādist organisations, regional actors, and domestic actors. The Saudi state must maintain its legitimacy with many of these actors, and act in competition with the jihādist groups whose worldview is incompatible with the continuation of the Saudi state. Saudi narrative is a response to jihādist organisations, but also a statement to other parties. Understanding those relationships is intrinsically part of understanding the norms expressed by Saudi Arabia.

To this end, this chapter performs a number of functions. This chapter explores the narrative bond between Saudi Arabia and various jihādist organisations and interest groups, and in so doing, explores also the explanatory power of Critical Constructivism as a theoretical framework. Traditional Social Constructivism, asserts knowledge is constructed rather than discovered. Critical Constructivism however, extends this theory of knowledge creation by incorporating other considerations including: the role of endogenous norms; the role of agency in state behaviour; and the role of power relationships in the development of identity (or identities). It also considers the plurality of relationships that inform normative competition. In order to gain a deeper and more accurate understanding of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and jihādist norms, it is important to know how the power dynamic between Saudi Arabia and jihādist organisations contributes to the creation and protection of Saudi identity. Additional consideration must be afforded to how Saudi Arabia constructs and maintains its identity both domestically and in the international arena. While the data is evidence of how Saudi Arabia manages its identity internationally, it is, at best, indicative of how it manages its identity domestically. The data sets used speak to how Saudi Arabia constructs its identity to an international audience only. While that data may infer what Saudi internal/domestic messaging is, that can't be relied on, or take the place of analysis on domestic messaging. It is indicative only.

This chapter begins with a review of the results of the previous chapter's enumeration of norms, but contextualises them by incorporating the findings of Chapter Two. As Saudi narrative is often reflexive of those norms espoused by jihādist organisations, this chapter links how those norms presented by Saudi narrative relate to those espoused by jihādists.

For example, where jihādist narrative is critical of nationalism, Saudi narrative pushes back against that, de-emphasising the Ummah narrative, and using narratives in a manner that addresses Islamic countries in familial terms. While the previous chapter answered the question of whether jihādist norms are present in the Saudi narrative, this chapter answers what that means, as these norms often are narratively expressed with reference to, or in response to, jihādist organisations.

The chapter then argues that the norms expressed work to delegitimise jihādist organisations—though not jihādism itself. This is fundamental to the Islamic character of the state. Chapter Two examined the role of norms, asserting that norms operate in two modes: regulative and constitutive. They are regulative in that they work to normalise the actions of individuals by specifying proper standards of behaviour. They are constitutive in creating rules that define the identity of an actor and/or members of a group, as well as allowing members of the group to identify those outside the group. This chapter argues that the Saudi narrative is oriented towards the delegitimization of existing groups that challenge the Saudi state: those whose norms challenge it, those whose identities are mutually exclusive from it, and those who pose a violent existential threat.

The final research question is then considered: to what extent does Critical Constructivism explain the presence of jihādist norms in the international narrative of Saudi Arabia? It does this by examining the power-relationships involved, the role of agency in state behaviour, and the identities that are being constructed, maintained and challenged.

Any study is necessarily limited by constraints—constraints of scope, time, space. Additionally, choices about epistemology and methodology necessarily create limits on the scope of research. The remaining sections of this chapter will be devoted to issues arising from the study, starting with a discussion on the limitations of the research, and then discussing the opportunities for future research that arise from that. Then the chapter will discuss the contribution that this study has provided.

6.1 Summary of results

6.1.1 Offensive/Defensive Positioning

While Saudi Arabia adopts a defensive position towards other nations, it is typically not in a manner consistent with the nature of the claims of jihādist organisations. Al-Qa'ida posits the primary enemy of Islam is the West, as the West dominates and oppresses the lands of Islam, killing Muslim people and propping up the illegitimate state of Israel. Islamic State adds to that, claiming that while the West presents a threat to Islam, the more dire threat to Sunni Islam is Shi'ite Islam. The Taleban maintains the enemy is forces that seek to occupy their geographical land, Afghanistan. For Al-Qa'ida and the Taleban, Western countries and values are the main threat to Islam. Islamic State and Al-Qa'ida add local governments under the influence of the West to the list.

The Saudi narrative does not echo these claims; rather, Saudi defensiveness is a response directed at those entities and events which undermine the country's sovereignty, or to the existential threat posed by regional violence (such as nearby civil war) or hostile nations, such as Iran and Israel. Implicit in this worldview is the claim that Saudi Arabia enjoys sovereignty, a position at odds with both Islamic State's and Al-Qa'ida's argument that Saudi Arabia is under the influence of Western governments. When regional actors and events threaten Saudi Arabia, Saudi narrative makes clear it is not an Islamic problem, but a national security problem This is illustrated in the tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, where Saudi Arabia cites the tolerance that the respective nations have shared for centuries. There, Saudi Arabia makes it explicitly clear that the conflict is with the ruling regime stating, "That is not the case at all, especially when it comes to the two main entities responsible for threatening peace and security in the region, namely, Israel and Iran... It is not a matter of historical revenge… but rather basic principles recognised by international law and United Nations resolutions" (Al-Mouallimi, 2019b, pp. 30-31). In the case of Iran, these statements run directly counter to the assertions of Islamic State, that Shia is the largest regional threat to Sunni Islam. Likewise, when condemning the attacks of the Houthi, Saudi Arabia made it clear that it was on the side of the Islamic civilians (Al-Mouallimi, 2016a, 2017a, 2018a; Albishi, 2019; Khashaan, 2018).

In both these situations, the alleged aggressors—Iran and the Houthi respectively—were criticised for targeting innocents. Importantly, it is not entirely clear whether the expression of concern for innocent victims of these aggressors is inspired by genuine concern, or whether the narrative derives from some instrumental desire to delegitimise the aggressors. This is case with all these expressions, as the reader can never know the intention behind the text. It is most likely that the expressed concern derives from a complex multitude of motivations. Whatever the case may be, the claim that the victims of these aggressors are innocents, is a claim they are not legitimate targets for jihād and/or other sources of violence.

The position that these groups target innocents forms part of a larger narrative that challenges jihādist organisations on the basis of the illegitimacy of their targets. There are many peoples that the Saudi narrative claims are invalid. Saudi Arabia also claims that attacks on its people and national identity are illegitimate. There is a theme in the narrative that positions Saudi Arabia defensively in relationship to 'terrorist' groups and includes groups such as Al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State. Several times these texts position Saudi Arabia defensively, the "party of the world that suffers most from terrorism" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2015a). There are two parts to this narrative: first, that Saudi Arabia is the victim; second, that the aggressors are acting illegitimately. This assertion does not come from a reasoned argument or appeal to authority, but is rather linguistic, through the use of labels such as 'extremist' and 'terrorist'. These claims directly address Islamic State, which specifically prioritises local regional governments, and Al-Qa'ida, which traditionally emphasised Western targets under bin Laden, but later increasingly focussed on the near enemy (see Chapter Two).

Chapter Two illustrated how jihādist groups regularly vilify the West, and specifically the US, through 'crusader' narratives. These narratives are often an indirect criticism of Saudi Arabia, on the basis of the close relations between those countries and Saudi Arabia, or through cooperation between them (for example, see Islamic State (2014b, p. 35) in which Saudi Arabia is called apostate and alleged to be working as part of a crusader alliance). Saudi Arabia provides a counter narrative, emphasising Islam's tolerance. In this narrative, the US becomes an ally, albeit not as close as regional allies that share cultural identities. The US is an ally against the illegitimate attacks of 'terrorist' organisations, organisations that are illegitimate through their targeting of 'innocents'. In this narrative, the US is under the protective umbrella of Islam, and terrorist organisations are un-Islamic for not holding

the Islamic value of 'tolerance'. Likewise, Saudi Arabia uses narrative to delegitimise the jihādist criticism of the US, framing it as un-Islamic. This is also inconsistent with the Taleban, which claims victimhood from colonial Western nations.

In the Saudi security narrative, we see Saudi Arabia directly engage defensive norms in both regulative and constitutive ways. Saudi narrative argues the invalidity of the jihādist claim, that Saudi Arabia is complicit with the West, by claiming Saudi Arabia adopts/ presents a true expression of Islam, and pointing towards Islamic tolerance to qualify their relationship with the US. In doing so they also argue that the attacks of these organisations on Saudi Arabia are actually an act of targeting innocents, an approach that seeks to regulate the behaviour of jihādist organisations by contending that the targets they are choosing are invalid. Notably, Saudi Arabia does not criticise jihādist organisations for adopting military targets; such a claim would be much harder to substantiate and allow the opportunity for these organisations to push back against Saudi claims, and for criticism of Saudi Arabia. Additionally, while jihādist groups make clear evaluations of their relationship to operational targets, Saudi narrative is distinct in that is does not make any claims about who may be valid targets. Rather, Saudi Arabia makes claims about the invalidity of targets, usually after the fact, in the form of a response to jihādist groups' attacks. That is, rather than clearly identify which groups victimise Islam, or who are valid targets, their claims are in the form of a response to Islamist organisations, claiming their targets are invalid. Where jihādist organisations claim that Saudi Arabia is apostate, cooperating with the crusaders, the Saudi response is that jihādist organisations target innocents, and are therefore illegitimate, terrorists and extremists, and therefore assistance from the West is a legitimate action. Saudi Arabia also asserts defensive norms with regard to their sovereignty, and attacks on it by other nations, but these do not carry a detectable jihādist tone.

6.1.2 Nationalism, Pan-Islamism, and the Ummah identity

Jihādist narrative posits the current international order defined by the nation-state is incompatible with Islam based on two criteria. First, that nationalism is a Western import imposed on a previously unified Islam. Second, that where the Ummah emphasises loyalty to the Muslim community, and relationship to that community defined by faith, nationalism divides Muslim unity. Analysis did not discover an explicit response or

critique of this claim in Saudi text, however Saudi Arabia narrative does not identify any inconsistency between the two systems. Saudi Arabia identifies itself as both an Islamic and sovereign country (for example, see Al-Mouallimi (2014a, p. 29)). Where jihādist organisations like Al-Qa'ida and Islamic State claim mutual exclusion between the current system of nations-states, and that of an order based on Islamic religious identity, Saudi narrative implicitly rejects a narrative of mutual exclusion between Islamic identity and nationhood. Instead, it emphasises the importance of the sovereignty of the Saudi state, of other states, and of the principle of sovereignty.

Further, Saudi Arabia makes no claim as to whether the prevailing nations-state order is of Western construction. Unlike jihādist organisations that assert the Ummah stands in opposition to the national order constructed by the West, the Saudi narrative implies the ordering exists without conflict within the broader Islamic community. Far from object to it, it fiercely protects its sovereignty, and narratively respects and supports the sovereignty of other nations. Sovereignty and nationalism are strongly represented themes in the Saudi narrative and are a tacit rejection of a jihādist worldview that sees the Ummah in opposition to the nation-state system. Interestingly, Saudi narrative does not reject the Ummah narrative, nor mobilise the language of 'Ummah'.

The narrative that Saudi Arabia mobilises contests the jihādist narrative that positions the Ummah in opposition to nationalism. For those jihādist organisations, the constitutive norm that defines membership to Islam is the Islamic identity of the individual. Additionally, they reject any other ordering principle as being compatible with Islam as it would artificially divide the body of the faithful. Those that adopt such principles are not true members of Islam. In regulative terms, members of the groups are called to oppose the nationalism that artificially divides the people. In contrast, Saudi narrative asserts that there can be more than one constitutive norm that acts on individuals. Having a national identity does not conflict with having a Muslim identity. Likewise, there is frequent mention of the Arabic identity, which traverses borders and is not in conflict with a national identity. In the Saudi characterisation, the Islamic character of individuals and entities informs their behaviour and does not exclude other identities so long as they don't contradict Islam. For example, Bin Jadid (2019, p. 7) addresses the Saudi response to refugees entering the country, and asserts the, "Government's

response was informed by Islamic principles and precepts, which enjoined love, peace and fraternity and required the believer to help the needy." The author goes on to note how the governmental commitment to humanitarian aid and development assistance was also, "Guided by its role as an Islamic country." The Saudi position indicates that individuals and identities have alternate identities guided by their Islamic character.

This appears to be consistent with the Taleban's position. However, while the Taleban also expresses a nationalist ordering principle, it is fundamentally different from Saudi Arabia's expression. Where the Taleban uses the Ummah as an ordering principle, Saudi Arabia shows very little evidence of doing the same. The Taleban mobilises Ummah as an Islamic narrative that rejects Western influence. Rather than use the uniquely Islamic narrative, Saudi adopts a national identity and overlays Islamic values onto that—Islamic nationalism—and operates in that mode with other Islamic countries. While a similar sense of Islamic nationalism was not identified in the Taleban's narrative, the literature was only reviewed for jihādist norms. It was discovered in Saudi norms where it is presented as a constitutive identity, and operates as a counter-narrative to the Islam-only narrative. In the case of the Taleban, this is not indicative of Saudi entering a competing norm against the Taleban's narrative.

The Ummah narrative evolved prior to the advent of the modern state system. It is mobilised in various capacities as an ordering narrative to legitimise the membership of the group espousing it. At one extreme jihādist organisations can use it to assert that fealty to anyone except that organisation goes against Islamic values. At the other, it is seen as one of many identities that people may belong to non-exclusively (see Figure 6-1: The Degree to Which the Ummah Narrative is Mutually Exclusive). While Saudi Arabia doesn't discard the Ummah identity, due to its mobilisation by jihādist organisations, Saudi narrative may de-emphasise that narrative by not engaging it, opting instead for the more doctrinally agnostic identity of 'Islamic'.



Figure 6-1: The Degree to Which the Ummah Narrative is Mutually Exclusive

6.1.3 Hijrah

All three profiled jihādist organisations incorporate hijrah into jihād in varying capacities. Islamic State argues it is incumbent on all Muslims to travel to the caliphate; with Al-Qa'ida supports more limited hijrah for promising individuals; the Taleban conflates it with jihād, though not with the same level of enthusiasm, and not as a main pillar of its campaign. For all three, it constitutes a regulative norm. Saudi narrative directly counters this messaging and discourages hijrah. Saudi narrative dissuades youth specifically from participation in the practice, calling it 'dangerous', and part of a 'distorted ideology' (Al-Mouallimi, 2016b, p. 31). In this sense, it presents a counter-norm, and seeks to regulate the behaviour of Muslims.

There are two interesting points to make regarding the Saudi engagement with the hijrah norm. First, Saudi narrative signals to other nations that it rejects hijrah to jihādist groups at a policy/legal level (for example (Al-Mouallimi, 2014d, pp. 1-2; 2017c)). Given the target audience for the data sets chosen would not foreseeably include individuals at risk of radicalisation in the direction of jihādism, the provision of an account of Saudi Arabia's actions to dissuade hijrah is targeted at an international audience of policy makers. Therefore, given that these entities are also likely not at risk of radicalisation, expression of these norms is not instructive, but is more likely an attempt to show legitimacy—to show Saudi Arabia's credentials in combating jihādism. As Katzenstein (1996, p. 5) points out, norm adoption allows define the identity of an actor, allowing it to be identified as part of a group. Signalling in this manner identifies Saudi Arabia as belonging to the international community in combating jihādist/terrorist norms.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia mobilises the religious language of Islamic authorities in condemnation of the practice. Specifically, they use such language as, 'misleading', 'anti-Islamic' and 'prohibited'. These statements come from such authorities as the Grand Mufti, and the Council of Senior Scholars. As the anti-hijrah signalling indicates Saudi Arabia is an active part of the international community, so too does the adoption of Islamic rationale indicate it is part of the Islamic community. It is an indication that, while Saudi Arabia objects to hijrah, it does so not in opposition to Islamic norms, but rather as a champion of them. The implication is that those who encourage hijrah are not espousing Islamic teaching consistent with the teachings of religious authorities.

6.1.4 Martyrdom Operations

Saudi Arabia narratively condemns martyrdom operations, adopting a parlance typically associated with anti-terrorist norms. It mobilises a narrative whereby the victims of attacks are 'innocent', a theme that permeates Saudi narrative. It attacks the legitimacy of the attacks on the grounds that they are suicidal, with suicide being prohibited in Islam.

The targeting of innocent lives is a theme that permeates much Saudi literature, and is the basis of the claim that some jihādist organisations are extremist/terrorist organisations. In the Saudi formulation, the operational targets of suicide attacks are labelled with terms such as 'victim' and 'innocent'. The perpetrators of these attacks are charged, for example, labelled as "monsters shedding innocent blood" (see (The Saudi US Embassy, 2005b, 2016a, 2016c). Additionally, the language describing attacks has a qualitative character, using terms such as 'attack' and 'murder', as in "The government of Saudi Arabia condemns the bombings in Jordan as a vicious crime carried out by murderers" (The Saudi US Embassy, 2005b).

Use of the word 'murder' points towards the other mode of criticism. There is an implicit linguistic criticism of the legitimacy of the mode of attack. While jihādist organisations make the distinction between suicide and martyrdom operations, Saudi narrative makes no such distinction, and maligns the practice, labelling all such attacks 'suicide attacks', and 'terrorism'. Jihādist use of the term 'martyrdom operation' is an intentional linguistic

strategy which separates the intent of the attack from the action[80]. The Saudi counter-narrative implicitly claims the nature is inseparable by labelling the attacks 'suicide attacks' (for examples see (The Saudi US Embassy, 2002e, 2016e). Other language and labels delegitimise the actions and members of these groups by differentiating their attacks from legitimate military attacks. Such language includes terms such as 'evil killers' (The Saudi US Embassy, 2007) and 'terrorist attacks' (The Saudi US Embassy, 2016c).

While Saudi narrative universally expresses condemnation of what it labels suicide attacks, it does adopt the same practice as jihādist organisations in labelling deceased Muslims as martyrs, showing a martyrdom eschatology. Like jihādist organisations, it labels groups like the Palestinians 'martyrs'.

6.1.5 Caliphate Orientation

Discussion of the Caliphate is absent from Saudi Arabia's narrative, both in the UN and embassy texts. This stands at odds with Al-Qa'ida, which sees the creation of a Caliphate as the primary long-term goal of the organisation, and dictates the necessity of removing US influence from the Middle East. Likewise, the re-establishment of the Caliphate is essential to the messaging of Islamic State, which sees itself as the embodiment of the Caliphate, using that identity to assert its authority. For the Taleban, the establishment of the emirate is a stepping stone on the path to a Caliphate. This study makes no claim as to why Saudi Arabia would choose not to engage the Caliphate narrative. It may simply be that it is not appropriate for the audience that the analysed data sets address, that such a discussion does not reasonably intersect with those topics discussed. It may not be an appropriate phrase, given that the intended audience may not be familiar with it (though that does not prevent jihādist organisations from using it) or it may be that, as seen in other uses, the Caliphate holds eschatological significance. However, Saudi avoidance of entering discourse in this area could be interpreted as removing this narrative as grounds for debate, as it may inadvertently increase the legitimacy of those organisations that use it, by providing them with the opportunity to respond.

80 The nature of this claim is similar to the doctrine of 'dual effect', an ethics concept used in moral reasoning that distinguishes between the positive effects of an action and its negative side effects. It maintains that, in moral decision making, when an action has two effects (an intended good effect good effect and an unintended and foreseen bad effect) it is morally permissible to pursue the action where the good effect outweighs the bad effect, and when the intention is to achieve the good end.

6.1.6 Source of Authority

Saudi Arabia does not claim to be conducting jihād. As such it does not make authoritative claims about jihād in the manner jihādist organisations do. Instead, it counters the authoritative claims of others, and does so through three methods:

- by the implicit rejection of their jihād, typically in Islamic terms
- by the language it associates purposively with those groups
- and by elevating other authoritative voices with counter-narratives.

Al-Qa'ida, Islamic State and the Taleban all claim authority in their respective jihāds. For Al-Qa'ida, that moral authority resides in the organisation, but no specific individual. Al-Qa'ida makes the point that actors should only act without a clear mandate from an authoritative source in the absence of an imam. Likewise, within Islamic State, authority lies in the organisation, though being a defensive jihād, there is an obligation on all Muslim faithful to engage the enemy, even without authorisation. Further, asserting he is a caliph, the leader has a special authority vested in his position. For the Emirate of Afghanistan, authority lies with the *Amir al-mu'minin'*, the Commander of the Faithful. These authorities are tacitly contested by a Saudi narrative that critiques these organisations and their actions by claiming they are illicit on a variety of grounds. Any claims that contest the legitimacy of actions undermine the authority of the authorising people. For example, it has already been noted that Saudi Arabia provides counter claims against Islamic State and Al-Qa'ida on the grounds that their targets are illegitimate, their call to hijrah is misguided, and that they illegitimately target innocents. It doesn't discount the principle of jihād, but maintains the grounds for contestation are found within Islamic principles, principles such as tolerance and the protection of innocent life.

Saudi Arabia also delegitimises these groups through labelling. Where jihād is a legitimate pursuit in Islam, 'warfare with spiritual significance' (Cook, 2005a, p. 2), Saudi Arabia strips these groups of their Islamic credentials through labels such as 'terrorist', 'extremist', 'murderers' and 'criminal', and through claiming that their actions are not Islamic. The spiritual and militaristic virtue of their martyrdoms is stripped away under the label 'suicide attack', with suicide being forbidden in Islam. Such criticisms occur within the Islamic ideological framework (as opposed to other metrics, such as the international law, or other

moral/ethical systems). They are critiques of the credentials of the actions of jihādists, or of their authors.

Finally, Saudi Arabia elevates the voices of its own authorities, providing their names and direct statements addressing the claims of jihādists. These authoritative voices counter the claims of jihādist organisations, and where their message runs contrary to the narratives of jihādists, they create normative competition. They attempt to regulate the behaviours of those receiving the message, and contest the legitimacy of the counter-claimants. It is worth noting though these norms, while contested, are being constructed and reconstructed in a sphere separate from that in which jihādist groups typically deliver their message. That is, jihādist organisations don't typically address the US via its embassy, or directly address the UN. The Saudi counter-narratives that appear here are a recounting of narratives delivered in other spheres, a recounting that signals to the respective audiences.

6.1.7 Who Can Wage Jihād

Saudi narrative does not attempt to regulate who may participate in jihādist activity, except to discourage youth from participation, and to condemn the use of children in jihādism. This position reflects the Taleban's position (as well as many others in the international community), which limits child involvement in jihād. The motivation is likely different as the Taleban prohibition on child involvement in jihād arose because of the prevalence of immoral sexual relationships between men and children. The Saudi position expressed in international texts may not be solely, or at all, about whether it is appropriate to involve children in jihād according to shari'ah law so much as an expression of the international norm against children being involved in militant activity, or an attempt to be associated with that norm. It might also be a reflection of the greater proclivity of youth to be attracted or coerced into jihādist activity.

While the Saudi narrative does not dictate who may and may not conduct jihād, it labels the adherents of undesirable jihādist organisations terrorists and extremists. Saudi narrative does not differentiate between the legitimate adherents of jihādist organisations, and non-legitimate. If there are legitimate adherents, they are not identified, so the label can be said to be applied to all. Rather, if the narrative is critical of a jihādist organisation, then all

those active are labelled 'terrorists'. Rather than discuss the minutiae of who may rightly be involved in the activity of jihād, Saudi narrative instead delegitimises the whole activity of these organisation under the banner of extremism. In that narrative, no participant (the constitutive element of the norm) is valid, and their desire to enter jihād illicit (the regulative element). So, Saudi narrative prohibits all participation in the activities of those groups it condemns, but make special note of youth and children.

6.1.8 Valid Operational targets

Al-Qa'ida, Islamic State and the Taleban put few limits on operational targets. That is, the rule that defines who may be a valid operational target extends to any US citizen and anyone peripherally connected with the US or the crusader alliance. Islamic State extends targets to include anyone not inside its identity—those outside Islamic State are valid targets.

Abstaining from the debate of who may be legitimately targeted, Saudi Arabia claims a range of targets are invalid, and does so by criticising the operational targets chosen by jihādists. That list includes those that are the target of indiscriminate killing, non-Muslims living peacefully in Islamic countries, hospitals, and a range of others. Typically, it makes these assertions under the umbrella claim that jihādist organisations are targeting 'innocents' (or variations thereof), and that such activity is un-Islamic. The majority of statements are non-specific, part of a broader, consistent strategy of discrediting all targets chosen by these organisations by labelling them as illegitimate, and in doing so, discrediting the authorities behind them. When being specific, the narrative often references Islamic authoritative texts and authorities (such as (Al-Mouallimi, 2018b, p. 52)) to substantiate claims, and provide a counter-claim of legitimate authority. Especially in the cases of attacks on the Saudi state, such attacks are met with labels such as 'terrorism', and 'extremist'. The innocence of targets in these cases is implied, as is their invalidity.

There is no evident outline or formulation of a universal rule that defines innocence in the Saudi conception. It is not at all clear that this is the purpose, though, and may be intentional. By undermining the validity of the targets chosen by jihādist groups, the narrative has the effect of seeking to regulate the behaviour of jihādists, and undermine the credentials of those passing the order. It is noted though, that Saudi Arabia does condone acts of violence

by self-identified jihādist organisations. The lack of a clear statement about what a constitutes valid operational targets means there is no argument that can be engaged.

6.1.9 Two General Themes

There are two general themes that arise from the text:

- The individuals who run these organisations are illegitimate, labelled 'terrorist', 'extremist', 'murderers', 'criminals'
- The actions of these groups are illegitimate.

These general claims do not enjoy a high degree of clarification, or substantiation. While they are supported by evidence from Islamic authorities and texts, they are general, and have a taken-for-granted quality. Additionally, there is an element of circular reasoning applied to the delegitimisation of jihādist groups and their leaders and of their actions (see Figure 6-2: The Circular Reasoning of Delegitimising Jihādists and their Actions): jihādist organisations target innocent people; therefore there is reason to doubt their credentials. Also, they are not jihādists, but terrorists and extremists; therefore, their orders are intrinsically misguided, delegitimising the choice of targets. These themes are an unveiled critique of the membership and actions of these organisations with the dual action of attacking the regulative and constitutive claims of their adherents. However, some organisations that are simply left unaddressed, whether because they don't meet the criteria, or for some other reason.



Figure 6-2: The Circular Reasoning of Delegitimising Jihādists and their Actions

6.2 Negative Norm Engagement and Delegitimising Narratives

The primary research question was to what extent jihādist norms are present in Saudi

narrative, and whether they can be traced to a particular group. It is difficult to make the case that jihādist norms are present in the data sets examined, in the same sense jihādist norms exist in the literature of organisations such as Al-Qa'ida, Islamic State and the Taleban. While Saudi Arabia presents itself as a country with an Islamic identity, expressions of conflict tend away from jihādist norms. For example, insofar as it maintains itself as being under threat, Saudi Arabia clearly claims those that threaten it are regional, and unrelated to its Islamic identity. This is supported by its adherence to the claim that Islam is a tolerant religion, and the source of its good relations with neighbours abroad. When it criticises Iran, it separates the action of the state from the Muslim people, with whom it explains Saudi Arabia has good relations.

While an analysis of all jihādist organisations is size and time prohibitive in this study, it is clear that Saudi Arabia distances itself rhetorically from numerous jihādist organisations including Al-Qa'ida and Islamic State, as well as others. With further research, other organisations may be added to this list. This is more likely given that the networks of groups such as Lashkar et-Tayyba overlap with other organisations (the Taleban in this case—see Tankel (2011, pp. 15, 22)). The fungible nature of many of the scholars and agents of jihādist organisations means the similarities between jihādist groups often exceed their differences. Saudi Arabia narratively contests the legitimacy of the jihādist credentials of those organisations enumerated in Chapter Two and of others, providing counter-narratives from religious authorities, and contesting their actions. However, while Saudi narrative contests the legitimacy of jihādist organisations, it does not contest the concept of jihād. What can be argued is that Saudi Arabia does engage jihād and jihādist groups normatively, but this analysis has returned no evidence of jihādist norms in Saudi narrative.

Saudi Arabia delegitimises jihādist organisations without recourse to in-depth discussion of what jihād means, not by a discussion about what constitutes legitimate jihād, but rather through the claims that jihādist organisations aren't doctrinally correct in the practical and theological application of jihād. It does so through a range of tactics. These include non-specific criticism of jihādist action, providing jihādist counter narratives, appeals to authority, and non-engagement with certain topics.

Saudi narrative avoids specificity when condemning jihādists. That is, they will make a claim

that an action performed by jihādists is not licit, but leave the claim unqualified and/or unsubstantiated. For example, Saudi narrative frequently is critical of jihādist organisations for targeting 'innocents'. However, no definitive claim is made about what separates an innocent from the guilty. No list is provided, no universal rule is given. However, it is notable that jihādist organisations are not criticised for engaging with military targets. Saudi narrative doesn't claim that all operational targets are invalid, only innocents. It recognises that some targets are valid and licit. Saudi Arabia adopts the religious principle that innocent lives are invalid operational targets, and avoids discussion about targets that may be ambiguous, avoiding the opportunity for a counterclaim that some actions of these organisations are legitimate. Jihādist organisations are criticised for targeting innocents rather than all people, criticised for recruiting youth instead of discouraging all people from violence. In this way the argument is being made in more sure terms, and in terms set by Saudi narrative.

The narrative is one of delegitimising groups and individuals. Often, the task of delegitimating is done through, and appeals to, the values of Islam, and within the framework of jihād. However, often it is the result of linguistic devices. Illicit groups are not described simply 'misguided', but rather they described as terrorists and extremists, targeting innocent people, including Saudi Arabia. These labels and claims aren't justified, but rather have a taken-for-granted quality. The existence of their narrative is at odds with Islam. In turn, some groups (Hamas and the Taleban of note) are licit, do not accrue the same labels, or are not discussed at all (this is consistent with the prescriptions of Critical Constructivism – see Chapter 3). Jihādist groups aren't criticised for conducting jihād—they are criticised for conducting it incorrectly, and in a manner at odds with Islam. The narrative does not articulate what jihādist groups do effectively or well because that would be a legitimating action. Again, jihād is not the target of these narrative strategies. The word is not applied to these people and groups because doing so risks alienating Muslims, for whom Jihād is a fundamental duty. Additionally, the word jihād is semantically overloaded. Muslims are called to the *greater jihād*, the personal struggle to live a good life, so avoiding any discussion on jihād may have practical reasons. That is, to address jihād directly may risk being drawn into an extended debate that would force the state to clarify its position. The lack of specificity surrounding jihād allows the state to narratively condemn jihādists without providing specific reasons.

Saudi narrative often provides counter narratives. Importantly, these claims are substantiated with reference to Islamic values. Where these norms compete with those of jihādist organisations, the audience is already convicted that an Islamic framework is appropriate, so the contest for legitimacy is not about the worldview of its proponents, but rather a question of the rectitude of the assertions, and/or actions of its proponents. For example, the jihādist claim that Western values threaten Islam and/or Muslims is met with the counterclaim that Islam promotes tolerance, as is the claim that Western targets are operationally valid.

Saudi narrative avoids contesting certain norms. For example, the Saudi narrative does not engage such topics as the Ummah and the caliphate. It is difficult to determine the reason without further analysis, but given that other rhetoric does not condemn the legitimacy of jihād, it could be that there is agreement on these topics, and therefore it is not a valid vector for criticism. That is, the concepts of Ummah and the caliphate are foundational to Islam. Any debate around those topics allows for jihādist organisations to argue they have a legitimate claim. By accepting that Ummah and the caliphate are Islamic tenets, but declining to enter into a public discourse about them, Saudi Arabia prevents these organisations from asserting their legitimacy. Additionally, discussion of these points may provide confirmation of their importance, and avoidance of the topic allows Saudi Arabia to set the narrative in the locations of these texts. At the same time, Saudi narrative is consistent with the Ummah narrative, supporting a strongly fraternal view of Arabic and Muslim relations.

Given that Saudi narrative delegitimises organisations, and not all violent jihād (or even all violence), it can be shown that Saudi narrative creates a narrative of illegitimate violence. The corollary, legitimate violence, is also evident, but not overtly. There are two ways in which Saudi Arabia legitimates violence. The first is tacit approval of jihādist organisations. The two presented examples are Hamas and the Taleban, but a more rigorous examination of the regionally active groups may present more cases. Additionally, Saudi Arabia makes explicit cases for violence. For example, in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Palestinian territories, Tayeb (2002, p. 24) noted, "Occupation by foreign forces is the worst form of terrorism and should be eliminated just like other forms of terrorism… resistance against foreign occupation is a legitimate act under international instruments and the relevant decisions of the United Nations."

These results raise the question of why some groups are the subject of delegitimising narrative, while others aren't. A possible answer may be found while addressing the research task of testing the role of constructivism in examining how norms traverse between societal levels.

6.3 On the Explanatory Power of Constructivism

One of the purposes of this study was to test the constructivist claim that norms travel between societal levels. Specifically, this study used a critical constructivist epistemology to examine jihādist norms. There are a number of salient points that both traditional constructivism and Critical Constructivism advance that may help to understand the way in which Saudi narratives of jihād butt against those of jihādist organisations. Both traditional and Critical Constructivism argue that norms are constructed rather than discovered, both acknowledge the importance of culture and social context in shaping norms, and both emphasise the role of language and discourse. Critical Constructivism departs from Traditional Constructivisms by placing greater emphasis on the role of power relationships in the development of identities, emphasising the role of agency, acknowledging the role of multiple, competing norms and looking towards endogenous influences.

Saudi Arabia operates in multiple social spheres. These include the international society of nations, the Muslim and Arabic spheres, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, as well as in its capacity as a nation-state. Members of these groups often have different and competing interests (see Figure 6-3: Interests Expressed in Differing Spheres of Identity). For Saudi Arabia, adopting any of these competing interests may act as a delegitimising influence in other spheres. For example, an outright rejection of jihād risks the legitimacy of the government domestically in other Islamic, and Muslim majority nations. Yet a failure to reject jihād risks alienating international partners. Saudi Arabia's legitimacy rest on the adoptions of an Islamic identity and ordering principles in such a manner as to allow it also to adopt norms like nationalism and sovereignty. While Saudi Arabia pushes back normatively against jihādist organisations that challenge the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia, it is necessary for the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia that its response to jihādist organisations linguistically navigates these conflicting interests.



Figure 6-3: Interests Expressed in Differing Spheres of Identity

Several jihādist organisations hold the belief that the modern nation-state system stands in ideological and practical opposition to the establishment of a societal order based on the Muslim identity. This is true for Al-Qa'ida, and for the Islamic State. These organisations directly challenge the prevailing order, mobilising the same Islamic ordering identity that Saudi Arabia adopts when it calls itself an Islamic country. Specifically, they claim that the current nationalist order in the Middle East was, and continues to be, imposed by the West in cooperation with the ruling elite. They make the eschatological claim that the Caliphate is the prophesied fulfilment of Islam, a fulfilment contingent on dismantling the current order. This narrative competes with the Saudi narrative of sovereignty, and shares with Saudi Arabia the foundational Islamic identity. This is problematic. Saudi Arabia legitimises Islam, asserting it to be the correct identity for humanity to adopt, which in turn legitimises the Islamic identity of jihādist organisations. Those groups then use that legitimacy and identity to undermine the Islamic state of Saudi Arabia, criticising its Islamic character. The normative competition occurs where groups whose constitutions are mutually exclusive claim their legitimacy.

Normative competition occurs in the assertion of legitimacy in the authentic expression of Islam. Saudi narrative does not de-legitimate jihād, which would undermine its Islamic credentials, but rather contends that some jihādist organisations stray from legitimate jihād, labelling them 'terrorist' and 'extremist'. When Saudi Arabia makes claims about

the legitimacy of the actions of jihādists, it mobilises language that is far removed from jihād. It is not a debate about the legitimacy of jihād, but rather an assertion that jihādist organisations are not expressing true jihād. For example, Saudi narrative criticises the targeting of innocents, but does not contest the right of militant groups to engage the martial forces of other countries. Saudi rhetoric is not a rejection of jihādism, but rather a statement that those who act in its name are doing so erroneously, in a manner not only inconsistent with Islam, but one antithetical to it. Saudi narrative avoids concrete questions of what constitutes correct jihād. The data sets analysed may not be representative of the appropriate forum for that discussion. However, the lack of specificity is also consistent with a narrative concerned less with providing a real discussion about the merit of one's jihād, and more concerned with delegitimising the other.

The search for legitimacy explains why Saudi narrative mobilises Islamic norms such as tolerance and protection of the innocent. The Saudi method of delegitimising jihādists relies on the Saudi narrative being authoritative and authentically Islam. Criticising jihādist organisations on their Islamic identity risks alienating the Saudi population and other Islamic countries. It risks flow-on effects, such as challenges to the legitimacy of the Shari'ah law of Saudi Arabia, its religious authorities—the whole Islamic foundation/identity of the country. This means any response to jihādist organisations must be consistent with Islamic principles. Thus, the Saudi narrative elevates tolerance, and the voices of its own imams. Saudi narrative asserts that martyrdom operations are simply suicides, while celebrating other martyrs—individuals who die in the cause of Islam, but who aren't attached to anti-state Islamic groups, who don't die in offensive violent circumstances. When Saudi Arabia involves itself in conflict, it makes clear that such engagement is consistent with the principles of Islam.

The Saudi response to Hamas and the Taleban also is explained by Critical Constructivism. These two groups are nationalist in character—Hamas has been the defacto governing body in the Palestinian territory of the Gaza Strip since 2007, and the Taleban is nationalist too. These two organisations do not challenge the legitimacy of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, their strongly nationalist identity helps legitimise Saudi Arabia's own adoption of nationalist norms. Additionally, supporting these organisations' struggle for recognition and establishment may contribute regionally and domestically to establishing the state's credentials. That is, rather than being seen as anti-jihādist, a soft response to these organisations may shore up

support against claims that Saudi Arabia is anti-jihādist. Such critiques can be met with the counterclaims that Saudi Arabia does not unmitigatedly oppose jihād. This may be the topic of further study.

However, giving limited support to some jihādist organisations also creates a problem for Saudi Arabia, as doing so contravenes the international norms against terrorism enshrined in documents such as the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997). Evidence indicates that Saudi Arabia adopts the language of the international community in condemning undesirable jihādist organisations, bolstering the international legitimacy of Saudi Arabia; Saudi Arabia makes a point of how many international conventions against terrorism it is party to. Concurrently, Saudi narrative either avoids addressing organisations (like the Taleban or Hamas), or providing a narrative that is distinct from jihādist narratives. In this narrative, the Palestinian people (because Hamas is never named) are fighting against an occupying force, a fight by an Islamic people supported by Saudi Arabia, but not in jihādist terms. They state, "Occupation by foreign forces is the worst form of terrorism and should be eliminated just like other forms of terrorism… resistance against foreign occupation is a legitimate act under international instruments and the relevant decisions of the United Nations" (Tayeb, 2002, p. 24). Like the countries addressed by Sauid Arabia in familial terms, the Palestinians are also addressed in familial terms, and asserted to be engaging in a legitimate fight according to the strictures of Islam. The Saudi adoption of the cause of groups like Hamas and the Taleban, which hold jihādist views that aren't dependent on the eradication of the nation-state, could serve to increase the Saudi claim to legitimacy with Islamic communities.

To be clear, the results shown are consistent with a Critical Constructivist epistemology, though this is not an assertion of causation. Rather, it is most likely that a range of forces are at play and the material facts may fit other political theories. However, the findings of the analysis are consistent with a Critical Constructivist epistemology. While we don't see jihādist norms in the language of Saudi Arabia, their absence is explained by the power differences between the Saudi State and jihādist organisations, where the legitimacy of one decreases the legitimacy of other; the language of the parties is indicative of parties attempting to regulate and control the normative sphere.

The Saudi situation is one of complex integration into a number of social spheres—the UN, regional organisations such as the OIC, the regional Muslim and Arabic populations and countries, and the government with its population. Additionally, each of these groups interacts with the others in various capacities. Most importantly, some of these intersect with Jihādist organisations, such as the general Arabic and Muslim population. Saudi Arabia constructs a complex narrative that maximises its legitimacy in these spheres, while trying not to reduce its legitimacy in others. For the general population, sympathy for jihādist organisations is born of shared values, and the values expressed by these groups may be complex. They could be values of anti-westernism, nationalism, anti-nationalism, and shared identity. Saudi Arabia's voice seeks to co-opt those individuals and delegitimise jihādist groups based on foundational Islamic values. For regional groupings, Saudi Arabia uses a fusion of its Islamic identity and national identity to show shared values and reinforce its own sovereignty. Internationally, Saudi Arabia asserts jihādist organisations are terrorists, extremists and criminals to establish its anti-terrorism credentials.

6.4 Agreement Between Data Sets

Two population data sets were analysed. The analysis of each code was done concurrently to avoid shifts in interpretation during coding. While there was variation in the strength of norms expressed (n-values), there is consistency between the two sets with regard to the expression of norms. For example, while pro-US sentiment is expressed strongly in the embassy texts, and weakly in the UN texts, the norms expressed don't contradict each other. Rather, it is simply a difference in signal strength. However, there are pronounced differences in the locations where norms are signalled. For example, the pro-US positioning is more pronounced in the embassy texts, while it is absent in UN texts. This reflects the audience being addressed by these texts, and their communicative purpose in those locations. That is, comments about the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia are rightly located in the embassy texts. So, while there isn't a strong pro-US sentiment in UN texts, neither is there an anti-US or anti-Western sentiment. However, that messages are tailored to their respective audience gives rise to a question of whether there might be norms that are present in other locations that are not represented in these data sets. For example, there isn't a strong anti-Taleban sentiment to be found in either data sets. It is foreseeable that there might be stronger messaging on another platform where such a message would be more acceptable. Or perhaps there may be contradictory norms in texts intended for audiences more receptive to that messaging.

There may be practical reasons for discrepancy between types of text being delivered in the two data sets. For example, statements on behalf of OIC are universally found in the UN texts, where Saudi Arabia occasionally speaks on behalf of the organisation. Statements in support of the OIC are found to be more evenly distributed though. Some discrepancies are harder to explain. An unusual finding, authoritative statements about jihād and against the authority of others, are found largely in US documents. This may be due to the practical nature of the forum into which these texts are delivered. Embassy texts are often in the form of reportage, allowing statements from individuals to be recounted.

While it is foreseeable that Saudi Arabian text may assert norms that run contrary to those presented here, it is considered unlikely. Firstly, it is not the nature of norms to be expressed without a degree of internal consistency. Norms are an expression of intersubjective understanding. Themes and patterns and consistent messaging arise specifically due to the widespread intersubjective understandings of the policy-making elite that broadcast messages. Expression, in the sense of formal documents like those examined, is the product of an elite. Consistency in these data sets would increase the likelihood of consistency in other areas. Additionally, while it is possible that contrary norms may be expressed in official governmental narrative, any such expression would undermine the legitimacy of the Saudi ruling elite. These documents being in the public domain, like these data sets, would open the Saudi government up to criticisms of inconsistency. A hermeneutic of consistency would be highly desirable for those responsible for messaging.

6.5 Research Limitations

Powner (2015, p. 219) makes the point that all studies have their limitations, with most of those being based on either the research design or evidence analysed. This study is no different, and what follows is the most significant limitations. Qualitative research has intrinsic limitations due to the researcher being instrumental in the process of data collection and analysis (Krippendorff, 2019, pp. 24-25). Human error and bias can cause data to be overlooked and differences in interpretation. In this study, the doctoral candidate was the sole coder. This is problematic as the coder may interpret data in a biased manner, and this problem is further exacerbated by the risk of changes in coding and interpretation. To mitigate against the risk of bias in coding, excerpts have been

provided, which allow reviewers to compare the evidence presented with the researcher's interpretation.

Bias can manifest in other areas, however, such as the sites of data collection. While the research looked for evidence of jihādist norms in national narrative, the researcher was limited to English language sites for data collection, these being ethnically and linguistically alien to Saudi Arabia. At most, the findings of this study are limited only to the data sets analysed. The sites analysed may not represent sites where jihādist norms are expressed, and a different data set might yield different results. However, as previously noted, there is already consistency within the two data sets analysed, and inconsistency on the part of Saudi Arabia would undermine Saudi messaging.

The study limited itself to one theory of international relations. This was intentional, the purpose of which was to explore the explanatory power of Constructivism through its application to a specific context in the form of a case study. Numerous social science scholars have called for analysis that approaches problems inter-paradigmatically, citing the insufficiency of using select theories when trying to establish causal mechanisms (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010, p. 412). According to Waltz (1959, p. 230), "The prescriptions directly derived from a single image [or mode of analysis] are incomplete because they are based upon partial analysis. The partial quality of each image sets up a tension that drives one toward inclusion of the others… One is led to search for the inclusive nexus of causes." While providing insight into Constructivism's role, only considering one political theory and epistemological framework necessarily limits the reliability of the study, especially as a tool for understanding comprehensively the actions of Saudi Arabia, and for asserting the preconditions for action. While this research may contribute to understanding the preconditions for actions in Saudi Arabia, for real-world applicability, it must form part of a broader framework of understanding, in particular, one that links the rhetoric of Saudi Arabia to actions.

Finally, as a case study, this study is limited in its generalisability (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 219). Strategic choice was applied to the selection of the case, such that it shared commonality with other regional actors, that it had sufficient political clout to have regional impact, and that it had characteristics that meant it would bear measurable results. Such factors

contribute to the generalisability of the case study. Even so, care needs to be taken. Saudi Arabia's circumstance is unique—each country has its own history, culture, legal system. No single case study would produce results that could be universalised, even regionally. Rather, the findings only indicate that a similar analysis and framework may produce similar fruit in the study of other regional actors. However, in doing so It provides a model for comparison. Where the findings may have policy implications, they should be limited to Saudi Arabia.

It is worth noting that the study employed two data sets. The texts analysed were intended for different audiences, though they bear similarities. This study has claimed there are normative and instrumental gains for Saudi Arabia through its complex integrations into various social spheres. However, it has not looked at how messaging in those other spheres operates, except to express that it would be deleterious to Saudi interests for the expression of norms to differ in different locations. The purpose of using two sets of data was not to show difference, but rather to provide a comparison between the sets, such that, should these results match, they might strengthen and corroborate each other. Triangulation is strengthened by using multiple data sources, adding to the credibility of outcomes and interpretations (Sheard, 2013, p. 181).

6.6 Contribution

In an attempt to broaden the literature about the intersection between Saudi national narrative and jihādism, this study provides major contributions to both the understanding of Saudi politics, and to Constructivist theory. It has established a mode by which Saudi Arabia de-legitimises jihādist organisations, while maintaining its Islamic credentials. It has established the parameters of that message—not as a rejection of jihād, but rather as an appeal to Islamic norms to assert that the activities of those organisations that purport to be jihādist aren't actually so. Perhaps most important are those relationships that are marked by a lack of discourse.

With regard to the role of Critical Constructivism, a straightforward analysis of national language is insufficient to uncover states' complex relationships. Specifically, in Saudi Arabia's case, the state is able to exhibit the hallmarks of anti-terrorist norms, both rhetorically and in the practice of accession to international conventions, while purposively

excluding some jihādist groups. This study has shown how Saudi Arabia has been able to craft its narrative to be appropriate for audiences of seemingly conflicting identities and interests while maintaining its own legitimacy, and while delegitimising jihādist organisations—a complex task. Saudi Arabia does this by presenting itself as an Islamic authority, and using Islamic norms to delegitimise those undesirable groups which rely on the same underlying foundation for legitimacy.

Saudi Arabia doesn't contest jihād. Rather, it uses the language of Islam to delegitimise groups. It has been shown to be circumspect with regard to some jihādist groups, and in doing so opens an avenue by which they might be said to support jihād. However, in doing so, it fails to close that avenue of rationalisation for jihādist groups, and provides a gap in which jihādist groups can operate. In terms of Saudi Arabian anti-terrorist policy, this study indicates that the framework within which the Saudi state operates, where it works ideologically against jihādism, and how differs from Western conceptions, these not being based on Islamic principles, though perhaps being pragmatically similar.

Additionally, this study expands the body of practical knowledge of norm construction and competition, showing a number of interesting phenomena. First, it illustrates purposive engagement in norm construction in a unique context, with Saudi Arabia actively engaged in the process of defining and delegitimising jihādist groups. This demonstrates how a country can narratively navigate the complexities of being involved in normative competition in multiple spheres, where international society, the regional groups, and the domestic population have different and seemingly conflicting rules of constitution and standards of behaviour for the state. It also raises the question of what norm adoption means. According to a typical definition of norms, Saudi Arabia adopts anti-terrorism norms:

- Saudi Arabia adopts the shared expectations and rules of behaviour that are widely accepted within international society, as evident in its language and adoption of international conventions
- Saudi Arabia shares an intersubjective understanding of what is desirable and appropriate
- Saudi Arabia asserts these norms guide their actions and decisions.

However, although Saudi Arabia is a willing and active adopter of international norms against terrorism, it does so from an Islamic position, and it is reasonable to assert that non-Islamic countries come from an entirely different place, that the norms they are adopting, while similar in outcome, derive from a different meaning. Saudi Arabia justifies its opposition to jihādist groups as a rejection of extremism, and claims that international security, the protection of the innocent, and eliminating terrorism are fundamentally related (Shobokshi, 2001b, p. 24). However, Saudi Arabia ties its rejection of jihādism to Islamic values, and opposes not jihādism, but rather the incorrect application of jihād. Especially, it gives insight into Saudi Arabia's role in the Palestinian conflict as an ally, as a legitimising agent in a longstanding, violent conflict. This illustrates a situation where Saudi Arabia appears to adopt an anti-terrorist norm, but is not ideologically required (by its own standard) to delegitimatise violence. It is party to the appropriate conventions, and critical of many jihādist organisations. Facing outwardly Saudi Arabia appears to share an intersubjective understanding of that anti-terrorism with the international community. Nonetheless, its anti-terrorist norm is informed by Islamic values when it is critical of jihādist organisations.

However, while it may appear undesirable that Saudi Arabia does not adopt anti-terrorism norms in the same manner as other nations, this study has contributed key understandings about how power dynamics operate in the context of Constructivism to maintain the status quo, in this context, extending anti-terrorism norms into a region that is often accepting of jihādism. It confirms the value of incorporating the analysis of power relationships in Constructivist research, and points to potential strategies in combatting extremism.

6.7 Suggestions for Future Research

This study opens ample opportunities and directions for future research in the areas of Saudi policy and for constructivist research. Firstly, working within the parameters of this research, further validation of the results could be achieved through the use of other coders/inter-coders and inter-coder reliability checks. Another way to broaden the research and add richer detail could be by looking at aspects such as change over time, or additional data sets. This is especially true for domestically facing data sets, to find whether signalling is consistent or different from those with different values and identities. This is especially the case for Arabic-language data sets. A third avenue would be to look beyond the jihādist

groups examined, especially for evidence of non-engagement from the Saudi state. In assessing how Saudi Arabia has dealt with the named jihādist organisations, it established a range of other groups that Saudi Arabia delegitimises, but more importantly, that there are groups it does not de-legitimise—the Taleban and Hamas. This study has shown the importance of understanding the relationship between Saudi Arabia and these groups, and opens the possibility that other countries may approach these groups in a similar manner, and that Saudi Arabia may approach other groups in a similar manner.

That Saudi Arabia adopts an anti-terrorist norm interpreted through the lens of Islam opens the door to exploration of other similar norms that may seem universally accepted, are acted upon in the same way by various bodies, but that are supported by different foundations. This raises questions of other norms that seem to enjoy near universal acceptance, but are not interpreted the same way by constituent members of the international society. Saudi Arabia's anti-terrorism narrative accommodates the idea that there are jihādist organisations that morally upright. This raises questions of whether other countries adopt similar strategies, and if so, what does that mean for international security? There is also scope for expansion of this research outside the scope of Saudi politics. Given that Saudi Arabia couches its response to violent Islam within Islamic norms, and guided by issues of national identity and legitimacy, research into regional partners that share commonalities, future studies could look at the whether other Islamic nations adopt a similar response, and question what that means for international anti-terrorism norms.

Finally, this study could also open up avenues for further research in the area of Constructivism and/or Critical Constructivism. Critical Constructivism differentiates itself from constructivism in a variety of areas, adding dimensionality. This study highlighted the importance of accounting for the role of power in relationships. It demonstrated the importance of the explanatory power of Critical Constructivism and encourages its consideration in other areas of Constructivist research, and helps join Constructivism to other international relations theories that already incorporate power in their calculations, notably rationalist theories such as realism and neo-liberalism. While this study asserts that a power relationship exists between the Saudi state and jihādist groups, there is potential too for additional research to examine the extent to which the (de)legitimising effect of Saudi narrative effects these groups.

Conclusion

This study sought to identify jihādist norms in Saudi national narrative, a foreseeable occurrence according to the received model of norm cascade. It found that Saudi narrative encounters jihādist norms in the space where Saudi Arabia and jihādist organisations compete for legitimacy. Occupying the same normative space, often vying for the legitimatising support of the same people, both groups attempt to set the parameters for normative competition. This chapter has shown how Saudi Arabia uses a variety of tools to forge a delegitimising narrative targeting numerous jihādist organisations. To maintain the integrity and legitimacy of its Islamic identity, Saudi Arabia uses the languages and principles of Islam when critiquing the actions and doctrines of jihādist organisations. The language itself describes these organisations in delegitimating terms—extremists and terrorists—while discrediting martyrdom operations with the derogatory term 'suicide bombings'. While this language is designed to delegitimise these organisations in the eyes of Muslims, this messaging is intended for an international audience, for the UN, for the US. This demonstrates the complexity of Saudi messaging: that it must be acceptable for regional partners, the domestic audience, and for the broader international society.

In the domestic sphere, Saudi Arabia adopts a Muslim identity. It implements a shari'ah legal code, and must adhere to Islamic principles. That means it can't narratively condemn jihād, though neither can it publically foster jihādist groups that provide existential threats to its existence. Groups such as Al-Qa'ida and Islamic State threaten the Saudi state both narratively, and with the constant, and very real, threat of violence. Saudi Arabia must contest the legitimacy of these groups while not contesting legitimate jihād, a doctrine foundational to Islam. Saudi Arabia, in defending its legitimacy, its right to exist, weaves a narrative that must appeal to numerous, disparate audiences, often with conflicting values. The complex narrative Saudi Arabia weaves allows it to integrate into various spheres. The linguistic devices Saudi Arabia employs to do this includes non-specific criticism of jihādist action, providing jihādist counter narratives, appeals to authority, and non-engagement with certain topics.

However, this method, its reliance on Islamic norms, and its acceptance of jihād, raises issues. Most importantly, while Saudi Arabia trumpets its adoption of anti-terrorism conventions and adherence to anti-extremist norms, its meaning is likely not aligned with international

sentiment. That is, Saudi Arabia does not reject jihādism, but rather only asserts that the expression of several organisations that purport to be jihādist are not actually jihādist. Further, the application of Saudi Arabia's anti-terror narrative is not equally applied, illustrated here by the Saudi treatment of the Taleban and Hamas in the texts. It could be the case that Saudi Arabia establishes its credentials by supporting jihādist groups that don't present an existential threat.

The inequality of application of the anti-terrorism norm espoused by Saudi Arabia can be explained through the lens of Critical Constructivism. In fact, so can the manner in which it has been crafted to be sufficient for such diverse audiences as the US and Saudi Muslims of anti-Western inclinations. Critical Constructivism can explain why Saudi narrative has the form that it does. Unlikely to be the sole explanatory principle, it nevertheless is suitable for understanding those norms that are expressed. In doing so, it reveals the complexity of Saudi narrative, the complexity of the expressed norms in the maintenance of a multitude of relationships, often at odds with each other. It has contributed to the field of critical constructivist theory, and the body of knowledge describing Saudi politics.

While Constructivist theory contends that norms arise out of a population and compete for adoption, such a succinct assertion fails to transmit the messiness or complexity of that process. That process, still unravelling and presented here, is far more complex. Saudi Arabia constantly juggles competing interests and identities as it operates in multiple spheres. Norms establish standards of legitimacy. As such, Saudi narrative expression must maintain the country's legitimacy in all these spheres where there are competing ideas of what makes a government legitimate.

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Appendix A: Content Analysis Codebook

Legend:

Coding Round

1. **Coding Category (Organisational structure only)**
   Code Name
   Code Description

1.1 **Coding Subcategory (Organisational structure only)**
   Code Name
   Code Description

Codebook:

CODING ROUND ONE: JIHĀDIST NORMS

1. **Offensive/Defensive Positioning**
   Defensive Positioning Statements
   Statements that characterise Saudi Arabia' security as being threatened on the basis of its Islamic character by regional and state actors

   Offensive Positioning Statements
   Statements that characterise Saudi Arabia as hostilely engaging an enemy on the basis of its Islamic character

1.1. **Defensive Positioning Against Jihādist Organisations Statements**
   Defensive Positioning against Al-Qa'ida
   Statements that characterise Saudi Arabia as being threatened by Al-Qa'ida

   Defensive Positioning against Islamic State
   Statements that characterise Saudi Arabia as being threatened by Islamic State

   Defensive Positioning against the Taleban
   Statements that characterise Saudi Arabia as being threatened by the Taleban

   Defensive Positioning against the Houthi
   Statements that characterise Saudi Arabia as being threatened by the Houthi

   Defensive Positioning against other Jihādist Organisations
   Statements that characterise Saudi Arabia as being threatened by other, specific, jihādist organisations

   Defensive Positioning against Jihādist Organisation(s)
   Statements that characterise Saudi Arabia as being threatened by jihādist organisations in general, without reference to specific organisations

2. **Orientation towards the West**
   Support/solidarity with the West
   Statements that indicate positive relations with Western nations

   Support/solidarity with the West against jihādist organisations

Statements that indicate solidarity with Western nations in concert against jihādist organisations

Statements of opposition to the West
Statements that indicate negative relations with Western nations

3. The Role of Hijrah
Statements supporting Hijrah
Statements that support the practice of migration to conduct jihād

Statements opposing hijrah
Statements condemning the practice of migration for jihad

Policy Statements opposing hijrah
Statement about policies aimed at curtailing migration to conduct jihād

4. Orientation towards Martyrdom Operations
Illegitimate Martyrdom/Suicide Bombings
Statements condemning martyrdom operations/suicide bombing

Legitimate Martyrdom/Suicide Bombings
Statements condoning martyrdom operations/suicide bombing

General Martyr Statements
Statements about martyrs

5. Nationalism, Pan-Islamism, and the Ummah Identity
Nations referred to in familial terms
Statements where other nations are referred to in familial terms such as 'sisterly' or 'brotherly'

Statements supporting national sovereignty/Saudi national identity
Statements asserting the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia and/or supportive of the sovereign national order

Statements condemning nationalism and sovereignty
Statements asserting the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia and/or supportive nationalism and/or sovereignty

5.1. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
On behalf of the OIC
Statements by Saudi Arabia on behalf of the OIC

On behalf of the OIC in the context of jihādism
Statements concerning jihādism made by Saudi Arabia on behalf of the OIC

In support of the OIC
Statements by Saudi Arabia in support of, or acting in concert with, the OIC

In support of the OIC in the context of jihādism

Statements concerning jihādism by Saudi Arabia in support of, or acting in concert with, the OIC

6. Caliphate Statements
Statements regarding a/the Caliphate
Statements regarding a/the caliphate

7. The Source of Authority to wage and/or declare jihād
Authoritative statements on the legitimacy of waging jihād
Statements about jihād that assume or assert authority on the topic

Statements on the authority of others making claims about jihād
Statements regarding the legitimacy of jihādist actors

8. Who may wage jihād
Who may wage jihād
Statements regarding who may legitimately wage jihād

Who may not wage jihād
Statements declaring the illegitimacy of classes of individuals to wage jihād

9. Valid Operational Targets
Valid operational targets
Which individuals or classes of people are legitimate targets of jihād

9.1 Invalid Operational Targets
Invalidity of innocents
Statements declaring innocent people may not be the target of jihād

Invalidity of civilians
Statements declaring civilians may not be the target of jihād

Invalidity of other targets
All other statements of what are illicit operational targets of jihād

CODING ROUND TWO: NARRATIVES OF LEGITIMISATION

10. Explicit Statements about Al-Qa'ida, Islamic State, and the Taleban
Explicit statements about Al-Qa'ida
Statements directly addressing Al-Qa'ida

Explicit statements about Islamic State
Statements directly addressing Islamic State

Explicit statements about the Taleban
Statements directly addressing the Taleban

11. Statements about other jihādist organisations
Explicit statements about Abul al-Fadl Al-Abbas
Statements directly addressing Abul al-Fadl Al-Abbas

Explicit statements about Al-Nusra Front
Statements directly addressing Al-Nusra Front

Explicit statements about Al-Shabaab
Statements directly addressing Al-Shabaab

Explicit statements about Asaib Ahl Al-Haq
Statements directly addressing Asaib Ahl Al-Haq

Explicit statements about Boko Haram
Statements directly addressing Boko Haram

Explicit statements about Fatimid
Statements directly addressing Fatimid

Explicit statements about Hezbollah
Statements directly addressing Hezbollah

Explicit statements about the Houthi
Statements directly addressing the Houthi

Explicit statements about Jaysh Al-Fatah
Statements directly addressing Jaysh Al-Fatah

Explicit statements about Saraya Al-Quds
Statements directly addressing Saraya Al-Quds

Explicit statements about Takfir wal-Hijra
Statements directly addressing Takfir wal-Hijra

Explicit statements about Zainab
Statements directly addressing Zainab

13. Jihād, Islam and Extremism
Islam is the not the religion of…
Authoritative statements on the nature of jihād in relation to Islam

Islam is …
Authoritative statements on the nature of jihād in relation to Islam

14. General Statements about jihādism
General Statements on terrorism
This category codes general statements about jihādism referred to in terms such as terrorism or extremism, that are authoritative pronouncements, but do not neatly fit other categories

CODING ROUND THREE: PARTICIPATION IN THE NORMATIVE PROCESS

Complex norm understanding
These are statements where Saudi narrative illustrates a complex understanding of the development and adoption of norms, and of Saudi Arabia's role in that process

Narrative Adoption of Norms, and Accedence to Treaties and Conventions
These are statements that illustrate Saudi Arabia engaging in the processes of norms contestation and development

Domestic Attitudes Towards Jihādism
Statements that indicate the Saudi domestic attitude towards jihadism