

## 19 (Draft only)

# The Role of Local Governments in Environmental Globalization

*Takao Yasuo*

---

*The global environmental challenges suggest that a new approach needs to be taken to address a cross-scale and multi-level issue of environmental risk reduction. Environmental problems stretch across scales of geographic space and require action at multiple levels of jurisdictions. But the suggested approaches face difficulties in policy coordination created by the plurality of stakeholders and also attended with organizational complexity. In this context much of the scholarly work to date tends to overlook the role of sub-national governments. Sub-national governments occupy a strategic position to act as intermediate agents to reconnect local action with national policy and turn global strategies into local action for problem-solving. The author argues that policy coordination and leadership is much easier where there are environmental benefit-recipients with real needs at the local level. This chapter sets out to examine how such a framework might be identified to support the future shape of Japan's environmental policy and governance.*

## **Introduction**

What accounts for the transformation of local government's role in environmental policy in Japan? This chapter examines how local government policy has responded to environmental issues as Japan has gone through different phases of environmental problem solving over time, driven by a range of historical events, such as electoral, socioeconomic, scientific and international shifts. The empirical puzzle of Japan's loss of its leading role of ushering in environmental policy innovation on the world stage is used to illustrate the transformation of local governments' role over time. The analysis of this puzzle reveals the multi-layered and complex connections implicated in the internationalization of environmental issues. The author argues that changes in both decision-making arrangements and political coalition-building that

are shaped by differences of domestic–foreign linkages represent different features of environmental policymaking.

In the late 1960s Japanese local authorities were quick to initiate new environmental policies and the national government followed, particularly by enacting or amending fourteen pollution control laws in what became known as the “Environmental Pollution Diet” of 1970, pledging the steepest reduction of environmental pollutants in the world (Broadbent 1998, pp.123-124 and 2002, pp. 312-314). By the early 1970s, Japan was recognized as a pioneering state in the area of national environmental policy innovation, yet in the 1980s the country began to fall behind major OECD countries, such as Germany, in environmental initiatives (Holzinger et al. 2011, Liefferink et al. 2009).

A number of scholars attempted to account for Japan's swiftness and ability to get environmental issues on the agenda in the late 1960s and to take legislative action only for a short period of time. Some scholars argued that the environmental and health impacts of industrial pollution became impossible to ignore and thus concern with it prevailed over pro-development policies in electoral processes (Krauss and Simcock 1980, McKean 1980, 1981, Reed 1981). Others took actor-specific approaches, emphasizing Japan's local protest movements against industrial pollution as an ultimate factor (McKean 1981, Reich 1984). The policy shift was considered to be caused by political pressures that these movements generated as both the electoral threat to the ruling party and the productivity threat to big business grew rapidly (Broadbent 1998, 2005, pp. 114–119). Opposition-controlled localities were also regarded as a continued source of pressure on the national government (Muramatsu 1975, Krauss and Simcock 1980, MacDougall 1980, Steiner 1980, Reed 1981, Foljanty-Jost 1995). Opposition parties in control of local governments were quick to adopt stricter pollution control measures than those applied at the national level. But their labor constituency was reluctant to endorse the high costs of pollution prevention measures (McKean 1981, p. 183) and, once the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) incorporated some of the opposition's popular regulatory measures into its platform, the momentum from local activism waned in the mid-1970s.

Several scholars further joined the debate on why in the 1980s Japan began to lag behind major OECD countries. Foljanty-Jost (2000) argued that the policymaking milieu had structurally changed due to improved air quality and livelihood. Broadbent (1998) emphasized the failure

of Japanese environmental movements to develop nationally networked pressure groups. Japan had a very small and poorly organized network of environmental groups (Schreurs 2002). The waning movements of anti-industrial pollution groups were also seen as a reflection of shifts in public opinion, whereby a minority group of the public felt adversely affected by air pollution (Vogel 1990). Such studies assumed that environmental policy would be formulated and implemented at the domestic level within the Japanese state. The objective in this chapter, however, is to examine how local governments' role in environmental policymaking in Japan changed over time as environmental issues became internationalized.

The following section presents three stages of a periodized role of local governments in Japan's environmental policy: the diffusion of non-industrial pollution in the 1970s, the deployment of market-oriented strategies to environmental protection in the 1980s, and the internationalization of environmental issues in the 1990s. The final section considers the relatively unexplored sub-national participation in international environmental regimes.

### **The 1970s: diffuse, no-point sources of non-industrial pollution**

The “big four” cases of industrial disasters in the 1960s acted as a catalyst for the collapse of the national consensus towards industrialization in post-World War II Japan and for an increase in public awareness of environmental costs. These four cases of industrial pollution, that is, Minamata disease (Methylmercury), Niigata Minamata disease (Methylmercury), *Itai-itai* disease (Cadmium poisoning), and Yokkaichi asthma (Sulfur dioxide), achieved sufficient exposure through legal challenges in the court of Japan and the extensive media coverage.

People who live in an immediate pollutant environment experience the greatest environmental exposure risks and thus demand a greater role in prescribing solutions. By the late 1960s, most Japanese people believed that industrial development must not be allowed at the expense of a healthy living environment (Krauss and Simcock 1980, pp. 187-227; McKean 1980, pp. 228-73; Reed 1981, pp. 253-69). By 1970 popular pressures against industrial pollution created a new base of electoral support for environmental policies and led to devastating losses at local elections for the governing LDP. While local popular pressures did not find a voice at the national level, local governments were relatively open to addressing the demand for improving

the quality of life. Local authorities, the layer of government closest to the people, were quick to respond to popular demands (Krauss and Simcock 1980, pp. 221–222) and local protest movements elected local chief executives from the opposition coalitions in highly urbanized localities where the quality of life was deteriorating. Some local governments developed a compensation scheme for industrial pollution victims, set stricter regulations than those required by national law, began to implement Pollution Countermeasure Agreements (PCAs), which were not required by national law but were concluded between polluter(s) and host local government(s) to enforce pollution control measures.<sup>1</sup> The LDP was seriously concerned about further erosion of electoral support and subsequently attempted to advance environmental policies into an electorally attractive proposition (Muramatsu 1975; Steiner 1980; Broadbent 1998). In the 1970 session of the National Diet, 14 pollution control bills were passed, and nationwide regulations were enforced with respect to air and water pollution, traffic pollution and noise, hazardous material transport, waste disposal and sewage, toxic waste, and natural parks. Equally important, the new regulations held polluters financially responsible and made them pay compensation to their victims under civil law and clarified the jurisdictional division of regulatory powers between national and local governments. All regulatory power over business operators was delegated to municipal governments. This regulatory system did not, however, define any national mandatory emission standards but left regulation and enforcement to local authorities. In the following year, Japan's Environmental Agency, a successor to the Pollution Control Office, was created to coordinate the implementation of these new laws (Broadbent 1998, pp. 123–124, 2002, pp. 312–314).

In the mid-1970s, the focus of environmental protection shifted from identifiable sources of industrial pollution to diffuse, no-point sources of non-industrial pollution. Environmental citizens' movements began to acknowledge that pollution did not necessarily come from a single identifiable source, such as coal-fired power stations or oil refineries. The protection of people's health and the environment required the inclusion of diffuse pollutant sources, such as cars and household appliances. A number of frontrunner cities accepted the shifts that the costs of pollution reduction no longer concentrated on a limited body of polluters and victims in the affected industrial areas but had diffused beyond the parties concerned. They clearly demonstrated their willingness and capability to contribute to a new way of environmental risk reduction. There were several cases, such as those in Toyonaka and Hino Cities, which were reported as citizen-led policymaking for municipal environmental plans. The local initiatives were meant to enhance a civic sense that citizens could make a difference – that is, their sense

of political efficacy – in policymaking. These innovative local communities sought to ensure the informed participation of all stakeholders through information disclosure and environmental impact assessment – specific modes of participatory accountability mechanisms – at the local level. They also structured incentive mechanisms to gain local officials' responsiveness through environmental performance disclosure and environmental policy coordination (Takao 2012). On the other hand, the conventional NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) problem became more salient as was seen in the often-cited “Tokyo garbage war” between Kōtō and Suginami Wards in the early 1970s (McKean 1981, pp. 102-8). Every resident needed waste collection services, but no one wished to live near a waste disposal site (e.g., Aldrich 2008). Local communities had difficulties in building larger coalitions of environmental groups and gaining wider public support. They were unable to display the same level of community solidarity on a wider scale as that which had been a key characteristic of the earlier residents' movements. Japan's environmental policy community was too fragmented and weak to have a concerted, direct voice in national policymaking. Over 3,000 citizens' environmental groups were mobilized yet never grew into a nationally coordinated movement or a national political party like Germany's Greens.

### **The 1980s: market-oriented solution to environmental risk reduction**

During the twin oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, the decreased supply and the price hike of oil triggered a greater concern with energy efficiency rather than showing a genuine concern for environmental degradation. Japanese leaders saw the nation as the inevitable victim of uncontrollable external forces as Japan relied on imports to meet 85 per cent of its energy needs. In 1978 the LDP government extended tax incentives for investment in energy conservation facilities and, just after the second oil crisis in 1979, began to apply the Energy Conservation Law to energy conservation practices. In the 1980s, the LDP government served two primary functions for energy supply/demand management: providing financial incentives to boost energy-saving initiatives and investment, and setting energy efficiency standards for manufacturing facilities, transportation, buildings, houses, and consumer products. On average, in the 1980s, Japan spent 0.10 energy supply per unit of GDP, against the OECD average of 0.15, Britain 0.13, West Germany 0.15, the US 0.19, and China 0.38.<sup>2</sup> The government's regulations to improve the energy efficiency of production were not part of its environmental policy, but rather intended to achieve the goals articulated in industrial policy. Nonetheless, efforts to maximize energy efficiency consequently contributed to emission reductions, so that

Japan's environmental improvements during this period went hand in hand with profit-making and market-oriented solutions (Broadbent, Jeffrey 2005, p. 119).

In the late 1970s, when local protests to environmental pollution significantly declined, progressive local chief executives in major metropolitan areas also departed from the political arena.<sup>3</sup> Nationwide surveys showed a marked decline – from over 20 per cent in 1973 to 9 per cent in 1981 – in the percentage of the public who felt negatively affected by air pollution.<sup>4</sup> Conservative coalition-building thus prevailed in the absence of progressive local governments and an attentive public. In the early 1980s, the issue salience of environmental regulations waned rather abruptly even while improving energy efficiency. In the 1980s, the LDP's share of the popular vote rebounded nationally and locally; its election victories brought back the conservative coalition-building to Japan's environmental politics. Working with LDP's business clients, environmental protection became incorporated into part of industrial policy (IDE 2007). The Keidanren (Japanese association of business organizations) worked with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which sought technological solutions to environmental problems and strengthened energy efficiency to depend less on imported energy (IDE 2007). The national government offered support through low-interest loans and tax relief to facilitate manufacturers' initiatives regarding energy conservation (Ren 2005, pp. 307-10). The output of Japan's pollution-intensive industries as a percentage of non-pollution-intensive sector production halved from nearly 70 per cent in 1975 to 35 per cent in 1989.<sup>5</sup> In short, while progressive local leaders all but disappeared from the political landscape, the conservative industrial coalition took advantage of an opportunity to effectively manage the transformation of pollution-intensive industries in Japan.

### **The 1990s: internationalization of environmental issues**

In the 1970s and 1980s, the formation of Japan's environmental policy was still a domestic-level process occurring within the Japanese state. The oil crises caused unilateral effects on policy formation in terms of international causes and domestic effects, while providing little room for the interaction of domestic and international factors in Japan's environmental policymaking. This policy setting significantly changed in the 1990s; as environmental risks spilled over to other domains in a non-territorial way, environmental policymaking was required to consider spillover effects beyond national boundaries. In the years following the

1992 Rio Earth Summit, Japan, like other countries, was under pressure to adopt operational measures to achieve sustainable development. In December 1993, Japan's National Action Plan for Agenda 21 (action plans to achieve sustainable development) was submitted to the United Nations. One year later, the Basic Environment Plan for Japan was adopted under the direction of the 1993 Basic Environment Law (environmental policy principles and directions).<sup>6</sup> This plan identified the measures to be undertaken by the national and local governments, as well as the roles of individual citizens, social groups and businesses involved in effectively pursuing environmental policies. In 1997 the Japanese government hosted the Kyoto Protocol Climate Conference (COP3) and pledged "internationally acceptable CO<sub>2</sub> reductions" under the perceived pressure arising from being the host country (Schreurs 2002, pp. 186-87). More importantly, the external pressure was globalized in the sense that environmental problems largely required global strategies and global solutions demanded national pledges. In the early 1990s, when Japan introduced new foreign aid guidelines (i.e., ODA Charter of 1992), the country refocused its foreign aid towards "softer" types of aid such as environmental protection, poverty alleviation and social infrastructure. The international agenda for localizing foreign aid provided a favorable basis for local authorities' involvement and helped to promote the role of local governments in international environmental cooperation.<sup>7</sup>

Given the emerging plurality of actors and organizational complexity in environmental governance, international platforms, such as Agenda 21 - Rio Earth Summit of 1992, UN-HABITAT agenda of 1996, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000, Lisbon Treaty of 2007 (Article 307), and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of 2015, provided proof of international recognition for the roles played by sub-national governments in involving both local coordination with national policy and local adaptations to global environmental strategies. In general, sub-national governments have little freedom within a mainstream compliance mechanism based on international rule-making. On the other hand, if these international platforms provide a common direction to pursue the goals yet leave actors involved to adapt to local needs and conditions, then sub-national governments can have a large measure of freedom to do what they choose in the ways of contributing to the goals of the international platforms. In fact, some Japanese local governments already had been working with international counterparts, such as overseas local authorities, domestic/international NGOs, and international organizations, building transnational coalitions and exchanging information to work internationally on global environmental strategies. Most local

environmental officials have experience in international environmental cooperation, such as city-to-city cooperation (e.g., Kitakyushu-Dalian), sectoral networks (e.g., Shiga-United Nations Environmental Programme [UNEP] partnership over environmental lake management), and trans-local networks (e.g., Kitakyushu Initiative Network [KIN] and Yokohama's CITYNET to support North-South and South-South cooperation) (Takao 2014). Agreed in 2015, the strategy of the SDGs was a marked departure from “ruled-based” to “goals-based” systems (Kanie and Biermann 2017, Kanie et al. 2019). The “governance through goals” strategy in the SDGs is assumed to have a multi-stakeholder governance toward greater shared responsibility (e.g., Bexell and Jönsson 2017; Brolan and Smith 2020). Under the agreement of the 2030 Agenda, the participating states pledged to ensure “no one will be left behind,” with the expectation of shared responsibility among all stakeholders, including local and sub-national government structures. As described in the following section, public officials at the local level are potentially resourceful enough to take charge of their actions and consequences.

### **Trans-local leadership in internationalized environmental policy**

The merit of including local governments to take up a decentralized role in achieving the goals of internationalized environmental policy can be presumed based on a number of grounds: (1) local government has a permanent physical infrastructure and multi-tasking jurisdictions; (2) local government provides political access, leverage, and opportunities to civil society groups (e.g., Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary 2005); (3) local government is open to a range of popular interests which are less represented within the corporatist sector at the national level (e.g., Halberstam 2009; Bednar 2014); (4) local government can be pragmatically competent to deal with policy problems and also motivated by its concerns for local experience (Tarrow 1977; Rhodes 1990); (5) local government takes part in transnational coalitions, externally to influence multilateral rule-making or internally to promote cooperation with other sub-national and societal actors (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Kern and Bulkeley 2009; GTLRG 2016); (6) local government has been targeted by the United Nations for promoting its decentralized functions of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations 2015). Local government is thus located in a strategic position to straddle the division between state and society and between the domestic and international.



In the past 20 years, there has been a rapid expansion of the role of local governments in decentralized international cooperation and of the multiple modes and mechanisms of cooperation created (e.g., Hafteck 2003; Bontenbal 2009; Nakamura, Elder, and Mori 2011). Unlike national governments, local governments are not obliged but voluntarily decide whether or not to engage in international cooperation at their discretion. Fiscal capacity is expected to be a significant indicator of local government's engagement in international cooperation, yet plenty of wealthy local authorities eschew any role. Administrative ability is required, yet many competent local authorities and teams likewise decide not to get involved. Local authorities, with their similar physical and social environments in which people live, are not all equally responsive to national policy or global strategies. We thus need to examine factors internal to local actors premised on the view that different motives operate at successive stages of decision-making across local actors. Existing literature on trans-local relations suggest three common sources of motivation: lobbying international institutions for rule-making (Heinelt and Niederhafner 2008), accessing funding opportunities (Pflieger 2014), and involving policy transfer processes (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Kern and Bulkeley 2009). But these types of motivation are most relevant in the context of the European Union, with special emphasis on a considerable level of autonomy to sub-national authorities. Very little research has been conducted to examine more qualitative evidence of localized motives for sub-national level of non-European participation.

In the European Union (EU), the activity of sub-national governments that is prescribed in EU treaties allows direct contact with supranational institutions (e.g., participating in the Committee of the Regions, connecting with the EU commissioners and influencing Members of the European Parliament). Sub-national actors (sub-national governments, socially mobilized groups and businesses) thus try to influence environmental policymaking through the institutionalized channels beyond national borders. To this end, they move across traditional levels of authority for coalition-building with different types of actors who share the same policy goals. Such institutional rules are yet to be seen in Japan. The Japanese government does not formally recognize the legal right of local governments to represent themselves at the international level. However, in the absence of any clear prohibition, a few front-runners' local authorities are willing, capable and have built trans-local networks, which are referred to as local-to-local connections across national boundaries established through local governments, extending with civil society partners and the private sector. Without any familiar ground of institutionalized rules or the right to legitimately represent themselves at the international level,

local governments find through political mobilization a way to move across levels of government and deal directly with overseas counterparts and supranational actors although in a rather *ad hoc* fashion. As of 2015, 47 prefectures, 12 government-ordinance-designated cities (population greater than 500,000), six core cities (population greater than 200,000), and 15 other municipalities had engaged in international environmental cooperation (JMOE 2015), which can be categorized into four patterns of cooperation: city-to-city cooperation, and sectoral, regional, and international networks/coalitions.

The following three cases - Shiga Prefecture's cooperation with the UNEP, Kitakyushu City's promotion of international environmental business, and Yokohama City's commitment and reputation for internationalization - will illustrate how local government is ready, willing, and able to play a key role in internationalized environmental policy.

#### *Shiga Prefecture's cooperation with the UNEP*

The early pioneering effort by Shiga Prefecture makes a good case history of demonstrating a new sphere where its activities are neither confined to a fixed scale of geographic space nor to a rigid hierarchy of territorial jurisdictions. The partnership between Shiga and the UNEP to create the International Lake Environment Committee (ILEC) had become the oldest sectoral network for transnational lake-environmental governance, initiated by a Japanese local government. Lake Biwa is completely located within Shiga prefecture. In the mid-1970s, as the eutrophication of the lake became toxic and a matter of concern for people's health, local knowledge and experience in Japan was not sufficient to cope with the environmental stresses of Lake Biwa.

In the late 1970s, the public health concerns led the prefectural Environmental Bureau to connect with a variety of overseas partners in preparation for drafting a prefectural ordinance on the prevention of eutrophication of Lake Biwa. The activities and lessons of Lake Taupo in New Zealand and Lake Constance in Germany which had displayed the lake environment and water quality similar to Lake Biwa, provided prefectural officials with the process of policy learning about lake environments (Kotani 2006, p. 3). In 1981, with growing momentum to develop Shiga's relationships with overseas counterparts, Governor Takemura Masayoshi planned to work to hold an unprecedented international conference in 1984, bringing together government officials and scientists. This plan unexpectedly became a stepping-stone towards the development of a lake environment policy network in which those actors transnationally

engage in policy innovation and coordination by diffusing ideas and influencing the policy measures adopted (Shiga Prefecture 1988, pp. 329–333; Kira 1990, pp. 223–225, 240–247). At the conference, UNEP Executive Director Mostafa Tolba proposed the creation of an “international Shiga committee” that would serve as a Secretariat for lake environmental monitoring and international conference organization (Kotani 2006, p. 7). Noticeably absent from the initial supporters of the process toward establishing the ILEC was Japan’s national bureaucracy. The driving force behind the process was an emerging like-minded coalition of the prefectural government and the UNEP, which agreed to officially launch the ILEC in February 1986. In this context, the prefectural capability of acting independently was well matched by the UNEP’s necessity of having policy frameworks to support sub-national level action. The overloaded UNEP was determined to meet the need for decentralizing environmental governance functions, in order to pave the way for future environmental problem solving (Kira 1990, p. 242).<sup>8</sup>

Shiga recognized that sub-national action would not suffice in producing a desirable solution without international cooperation and policy learning. But this functional necessity did not automatically drive the prefectural government to engage in international environmental cooperation. Political mobilization was necessary. Shiga’s cooperation with the UNEP was primarily driven by the *ad hoc*, bottom-up political mobilization of sub-national actors. There was no constellation of existing rules by which the prefectural government might decide what to do and evaluate the behavior of others beyond the national boundary. Without any familiar ground for institutionalized rules or the right to legitimately represent itself at the international level, Governor Takemura found a way through political mobilization to move across spheres of authority and deal directly with the supranational actor. In April 1983 an informal channel opened to Shiga when a prefectural official had an opportunity to meet visiting UNEP officials at the Japanese Environmental Agency. The UNEP responded enthusiastically to a transnational lake-environmental network proposed by Shiga, providing a stark contrast to the cold response of the national Environment Agency.

To establish the ILEC, without explicitly challenging the hierarchy of territorial jurisdictions, Shiga was nevertheless able to directly negotiate with the UNEP. Political mobilization allowed the like-minded coalition of Shiga-UNEP to create the ILEC by bypassing the established relations of Japanese central-local relations, yet without completely superseding them. In general, transnational networks steer members towards two primary public goals:

changing the behaviour of nation-states and governing transnational issues. The coalition of Shiga-UNEP was not established to primarily influence sovereign states but rather to enhance governance practices in a form of decentralized cooperation, in which local actors take up a key role. Once formed, however, Shiga had to continually provide support services for lake environmental management, both locally and transnationally. The ILEC, given a Japanese legal status in 1987, sought to exercise discretionary power over its allocated national funds by acting as an independent provider of policy innovation and expertise which the national government had been neither willing to manage nor capable of providing (Shiga Prefecture 1988, pp. 329-32; Kira 1990; *Kyoto Shimbun*, May 10 – 17, 2010).<sup>9</sup>

In recent years, the ILEC has promoted Integrated Lake Basin Management (ILBM) Platform in cooperation with the UNEP, which will contribute to long-term governance through involvement of all stakeholders in the lake basin society. In 2021 the ILEC and the UNEP have updated their cooperation to take joint initiatives for supporting the achievement of SDGs. The ILEC has been driven to take a more integrated approach to coordination between local knowledge and international governance strategies. But it is less capable of ensuring its sustainable financing. The increased capacity of governance functions requires the greater availability of financial resources yet national government's funds are the primary sources of financing for the major projects of environmental risk reduction. The real challenge is how to autonomously interpret and implement their commitments, which the Japanese national government is willing to financially support, into the necessary planning and operational actions.

#### *Kitakyushu City's promotion of international environmental business*

The City of Kitakyushu, once a polluted steel town, is now renowned for having successfully overcome some of Japan's worst environmental problems. The municipal government, with more than 30 years' experience in international development and environmental cooperation, has an exceptionally strong commitment compared other cities. Kitakyushu's experience shows the potential of local governments to play a role in reconnecting local needs with national mandates in global strategies and in facilitating sectoral/intersectoral cooperation in trans-local networks. Kitakyushu developed its own local human capital for both environmental risk-management skills and cleaner production technology (CPT), and desired to utilize and share their accumulated assets with others (City of Kitakyushu 1997, 1998, and 2009). Over the 30 years, Kitakyushu City, with a population of 0.9 million, had the second worst performance on

Financial Capability Index of 0.6 to 0.7 among 20 current ordinance-designated cities.<sup>10</sup> Kitakyushu was neither a wealthy municipality nor a global financial hub that attracts multinational corporations and direct investment. Kitakyushu leaders found a natural business niche: using local environmental expertise to benefit from international cooperation. In other words, they were able to come up with a local strategy for cross-cutting integration of economic benefits and environmental protection. In the late 1980s, Mayor Sueyoshi Kōichi (1987-2007) of Kitakyushu, a former national bureaucrat, identified locally accumulated environmental technologies with great business potential for municipal revitalization. He tenaciously negotiated with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to receive a cost-sharing national subsidy for developing “environmental industry” (Sueyoshi, 2002). He successfully persuaded MITI officials to adopt the Eco-Town policy, implemented since 1997, for supporting the innovation and entrepreneurship of Kitakyushu’s and other localities’ zero emissions strategies. The Kitakyushu Eco-Town became the largest project in Japan, with twenty-nine business facilities, sixteen research institutions, 1,300 employees, and an investment amount of over US\$ 0.6 billion in 2012 (JMOE, 2012). National ministries were responsive to Kitakyushu’s demands for the successful implementation of national policy and tolerated a measure of local flexibility to meet locally specific needs.

National subsidies for the Eco-Town project provided Kitakyushu with the financial support to attract companies that could develop a designated Asian model recycling city. This initiative was taking place through the Kitakyushu Initiative Network (KIN) with 62 cities in 18 countries in 2005, which grew, with the assistance of the Kitakyushu network secretariat of a collaborative research organization, the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), into a web of trans-local networks with 173 cities in 19 countries by 2010.<sup>11</sup> In June 2010 the Kitakyushu Asian Center for Low Carbon Society (KACLCS) was established by the municipal government and, while using funding from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), began joint operations with the Kitakyushu International Techno-cooperation Association (KITA) and the IGES to spread low-carbon societies to other parts of Asia through the creation of environmental businesses.<sup>12</sup> As of 2018, the KACLCS had been involved in 143 projects in 57 cities in Asia, in cooperation with 106 companies in Japan (KACLCS 2021).

Policy diffusion was the consequence of trans-local networks where network participants as transfer agents were closely connected with each other through the flow of people, ideas and

information, irrespective of geographical distance. The pioneering debate on transnational networks identified three key approaches: epistemic communities (Haas, 1990), transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), and transnational social movements (Tarrow, 2001). The focus of these approaches to transnational networks remains on advocacy to influence the behavior of nation-states rather than governance. Others veer from an overtly state-centric analyses to focus on the proliferation of non-state actors and institutions that work at a transnational scale of governance (Lipschutz 1996; Wapner 1996). Yet these approaches have overlooked the critical role of subnational governments in transnational networks. Kitakyushu served as a key node in the KIN network, providing venues for the diffusion of ideas and the movement of individuals.

#### *Yokohama City's commitment and reputation for internationalization*

Yokohama is one of Japan's most urbanized megacities (3.8 million people in 2021), well known for its strong fiscal capacity (Financial Capability Index of 0.97 in 2019)<sup>13</sup> and its transnational social ties, foreign residents and visitors, and its dependence on foreign trade (City of Yokohama, 2021). The city of Yokohama has been renowned as the hub of *kaikoku* (open-door policy) since 1858, when Tokugawa Japan opened the port of Yokohama to foreign trade and permitted foreigners to live there. Yokohama's commitment to *kokusai kōken* (contribution to the international community), which had been translated into policies and practices, has manifested itself in a variety of texts and speeches of city officials.<sup>14</sup> Successive mayoral leadership, supported by strong fiscal capacity, facilitated Yokohama's engagement in international cooperation. No matter who occupied the mayor's office, Yokohama's historical legacy and international orientation motivated it to respond to needs for development assistance and environmental cooperation. According to a 2010 survey on climate change and developmental cooperation, 60 per cent of Yokohama's residents support the city's continuous cooperation to reduce environmental risks in developing countries, even without direct benefits to their own community (IGES 2012, p. 5). Yokohama's residents have a strong commitment to international contribution, due to the city's historical legacies and experience. This public sentiment seems to constrain any leeway for policy-making that would see a lessening of its international contribution and has encouraged successive municipal leaders to continue to support the city as a center of Japan's internationalization. Yokohama's reputation as an international city provided a foundation for shaping a collective self-understanding of normative commitment to international contribution.

In 1987 the Regional Congress of Local Authorities for the Development of Human Settlements in Asia and the Pacific launched a Regional Network of Local Authorities for the Management of Human Settlements (CITYNET) to work together to strengthen cities' capacity for solving major urban problems, such as water supply, sewage, climate adaptation and mitigation, public health, disaster management, and others, through networking between cities in the Asia Pacific (CITYNET 2014). Being a primary promoter, between 1992 and 2013 Yokohama was home to the Secretariat of CITYNET, replacing the Secretariat functions of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). At the beginning of network activities, Yokohama was the only member city from among developed countries and played an intermediary role in facilitating South-South cooperation among local authorities and communities.<sup>15</sup> In the same period of time, the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) was established under the auspices of the United Nations amidst growing concern about the environmental degradation of tropical forests. In 1986 Yokohama successfully won a bid to locate the ITTO headquarters to Yokohama. Despite the considerable burden on the city's finances, Mayor Takahide Hidenobu emphasized Yokohama's reputation with its environmental contribution by stating, "The more important the ITTO becomes, the higher evaluation of the city's contribution will be" (Yokohama City Council 1991). Hosting the CITYNET and the ITTO further enhanced Yokohama's reputation and attracted the offices of other international organizations in the 1990s, such as the World Food Program (WFP) since 1996, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) since 1997. Sub-national levels of participation in international environmental cooperation are facilitated when international norms are congruent with pre-existing local norms and historical experience.<sup>16</sup> Perhaps the most interesting finding is that Yokohama's policy beliefs and practices were not only congruent with the international norm of environmental cooperation, but also this fostered and enhanced the profile and prestige of Yokohama's pre-existing beliefs. Successive mayors of Yokohama have said that the city would develop its "right place in the world."<sup>17</sup>

As local conditions and needs change or policy elites consciously attempt to adopt new ideas in the light of policy experience and new information, the patterns and nature of decentralized international cooperation will also be transformed, accordingly, to meet the new needs or adjust to the new ideas. The different patterns of international cooperation (e.g., policy learning-driven cooperation, international environmental business, and norm-based cooperation) are thus not mutually exclusive over time. This can be seen in Yokohama's new strategy to

promote international cooperation for the benefit of local business. Mayor Hayashi Fumiko (2009-2021) of Yokohama made efforts to promote overseas business development for environmental solutions. Under this initiative, however, the mayor emphasized that business benefits must be considered within the normative realm of Yokohama's commitment to *kokusai kōken*.<sup>18</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Local governments are not uniform entities with different levels of resources, but rather occupy their strategic position to bridge the policy gap among different stakeholders. The potential source of cohesion amid all the fragmentation of governance architectures lies in the internationalized role of local governments since local authorities occupy an intermediary position to straddle the division of state and society and the boundary between domestic and foreign affairs. In Japan, the national government neither directly regulates nor enables local governments to act as an intermediate agent in policy making and implementation. As illustrated in this chapter, some local governments decided to get involved at their discretion and go beyond what was mandated under national law.

Very little research has been conducted to examine more qualitative evidence of localized motives for subnational level of non-European participation in international environmental issues. The three localities chosen in this study provide an example of how sub-national communities are willing and able to produce policy integration, stretching across scales of geographic space and at multiple levels of jurisdictions. One persistent challenge is to understand the factors that still motivate and enable local actors to invest time and political capital in their internationalized role. There are two more direct ultimate factors: (1) motivations [local government's willingness] and (2) enabling factors [local government's capacity].

As compared to some federal systems, such as those of Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland, where sub-national authorities have the right to participate in foreign policymaking in matters concerning their interests, Japan's unitary system does not formally recognize the legal right of subnational authorities to represent themselves at the international level. Unlike subnational collaboration with the European Commission, local level of participation in Japan is not



institutionalized to move independently across different spheres of authority to influence decision-making at the international level. But this is not considered to be an inevitable obstacle. Without any familiar ground of institutionalized rules to legitimately represent itself at the international level, Shiga's initiatives, especially through gubernatorial leadership, found a way, without explicitly challenging the hierarchy of territorial jurisdictions, to directly negotiate with the UNEP in an *ad hoc* fashion. The prefectural capability of acting independently on policy objectives, hardly addressed by the national government, was well matched by the UNEP's necessity of policy frameworks to support sub-national level of action. The prefectural government then sought to fill policy gaps among local action, national policy, and global strategies.

Kitakyushu has developed its cooperative relationship with the national government to utilize its management experience and human capital, which had been formerly unaddressed by national ministries. City officials have had a consistent desire to build its environmental business capacity for revitalizing the local community, including creating a hub of human resource development in Asia. The city's activities have not been simply complementary to already existing national policies, but rather has taken its own initiatives. Kitakyushu used lessons drawn from its historical experience to continue to address and update its stakeholders' prior beliefs and adopt new policy ideas. The municipal government, especially the mayors of Kitakyushu City, has been motivated by possibilities for productive cross-fertilization between local business interests (utility) and sustainability (norms). To this end, the municipal government has skillfully established a connection between hierarchical levels of cooperation (i.e., the delegation of national decision-making competencies to Kitakyushu) and new de-hierarchical spheres of cooperation (i.e., its decision-making competencies shared with societal actors and local business and with overseas counterpart organizations). Kitakyushu demonstrates its potential capacity to avoid conflicts and to find ways to further cooperate on solutions that can work in favor of all the organizations involved.

In the case of Yokohama, norms seem to outweigh both geographical proximity and immediate utility; its reputation as an international city provided a foundation for shaping a collective self-understanding of normative commitment to international contribution. Environmental issues are closely associated with a dimension of cultural tradition and social norms, which affect locals with a locally specific profile. Yokohama adapted its historical tradition and its reputation to international environmental norms to be congruent with the collective expectation

of local communities. In general, sub-national levels of participation in international environmental cooperation are thus facilitated when international norms are better matched with pre-existing local norms and historical experience. Yet a better match between international and domestic norms does not automatically lead to sub-national levels of participation in international environmental cooperation. Sub-national variations in international environmental cooperation could be explained by the ability of local agents to reconstruct foreign norms to ensure a better fit with pre-existing local experience and norms, and to localize the potential of these foreign norms to enhance the reputation of pre-existing local beliefs. Without successive mayors' commitment, progressive proposals for international environmental cooperation, such as hosting the international intercity network programs for the environment, may never have got onto Yokohama's agenda.

The three localities illustrated in this chapter were used as the critical cases to identify the motives and purposes of local governments and analyze the potential capacity of local governments to enhance policy coherence beyond national mandates in global strategies. There is of course variation in political opportunities for local level of participation and public actors' willingness to exploit them. We must therefore continue to search for the preconditions that successfully enable production of policy coherence that facilitates stakeholders to work together. How do different political structures influence the ability of officials to make decisions? What leadership skills are needed to successfully use resources? While shedding light on the answers to these questions, the three cases cannot be seen as a complete examination on their own. To further this agenda, another area for research is to investigate the constitutive capacity regarding how individual local governments jointly generate transnational governance capacity. Further theory and research are also required to understand how the density of trans-local networks, which are shaped by the diffusion of local-to-local connections across national boundaries, will collectively build governance capacity.

## **References**

Aldrich, D. P. (2008) *Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Bednar, J. (2014), “Subsidiarity and robustness: building the adaptive efficiency of federal systems,” In Fleming, J. E. and Levy, J. T. (Eds.), *Federalism and Subsidiarity*, New York: New York University Press, pp. 231–56.
- Betsill, M. and Bulkeley, H. (2004) “Transnational networks and global environmental governance: the cities for climate protection program,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 48 (2), pp. 471-93.
- Bexell, M. and Jönsson, K. (2017) “Responsibility and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals,” *Forum for Development Studies*, 44 (1), pp. 13-29.
- Bingham, L., Nabatchi, T. and O’Leary, R. (2005) “The new governance: practices and processes for stakeholder and citizen participation in the work of government,” *Public Administration Review*, 65 (5), pp. 547-58.
- Bontenbal, M. (2009) “Understanding North-South municipal partnership conditions for capacity development: a Dutch-Peruvian example,” *Habitat International*, 33 (1), pp. 100-5.
- Broadbent, J. (1998) *Environmental Politics in Japan: Networks of Power and Protest*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Broadbent, J. (2002) “Japan’s environmental regime: the political dynamics of change,” In Desai, U. (Ed.), *Environmental Politics and Policy in Industrialized Countries*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 295-355.
- Broadbent, J. (2005), “Japan’s environmental politics: recognition and response processes,” In Imura, H. and Schreurs, M. (Eds.), *Environmental Policy in Japan*, Washington, D.C.: Edward Elgar and the World Bank, pp. 102-34.
- Brolan, C. E., and Smith, L. (2020) “No one left behinds: implementing Sustainable Development Goals in Australia,” Whitlam Institute, June 2020.
- Checkel, J. T. (1999) “Norms, institutions, and national identity in contemporary Europe,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(1), pp. 84-114.
- CITYNET (2014) “About us,” available at: <http://citynet-ap.org/category/about/> (accessed 7 June 2015).
- CITYNET (2021) *2020 Annual Report*, Seoul: CITYNET Secretariat.
- City of Kitakyushu (1997) *Kitakyushushi no kankyō kokusai kyōryoku* [International environmental cooperation by Kitakyushu City], Kitakyushu: Bureau of the Environment.
- City of Kitakyushu (1998) *Kitakyūshū kōgai taisakushi* [Kitakyushu history of pollution control measures], Kitakyushu, Kitakyushu Pollution Countermeasure Section. City of Kitakyushu (2009) “Technical cooperation through distance learning system,” available at:

- [http://www.hilife.or.jp/kankyoushuto\\_zenkokuforum/pdf/kitakyuushuu.pdf](http://www.hilife.or.jp/kankyoushuto_zenkokuforum/pdf/kitakyuushuu.pdf) (accessed 5 January 2020).
- City of Yokohama (2021) “Yokohama-shi no shuna shihyō” [Statistical indexes of Yokohama City], available at:  
<https://www.city.yokohama.lg.jp/city-info/yokohamashi/tokei-chosa/portal/shuyo-shihyo.html#B0F56> (accessed 14 December 2021).
- Foljanty-Jost, G. (1995) *Ökonomie und Ökologie in Japan: Politik zwischen Wachstum und Umweltschutz* [Economics and ecology in Japan: policies between growth and environmental protection], Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
- Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments (GTLRG) (2016) *Roadmap for Localizing the SDGs: Implementing and Monitoring at Subnational Level*, New York: UNDP.
- Haas, P. M. (1990) *Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hafteck, P. (2003) “An introduction to decentralized cooperation: definitions, origins and conceptual mapping,” *Public Administration and Development*, 23 (4), pp. 333-45.
- Halberstam, D. (2009) “Federal powers and the principle of subsidiarity,” In Amar, V. D. and Tushnet, M. V. (Eds.), *Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law*, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 34-47.
- Heinelt, H. and Niederhafner, S. (2008) “Cities and organized interest intermediation in the EU multi-level System,” *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 15 (2), pp. 173– 87.
- Holzinger, K., Knill, C., and Sommerer, T. (2011) “Is there convergence of national environmental policies? an analysis of policy outputs in 24 OECD countries,” *Environmental Politics*, 20 (1), pp. 20–41.
- Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) (2012) “Practical measures to promote Japanese local governments’ environmental collaboration with developing countries with citizens’ support,” *Policy Brief*, 18, pp. 1-12.
- Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) (2007) *Development of Environmental Policy in Japan and Asian Countries*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) (1993) *The Local Agenda 21 initiative: ICLEI guidelines for Local Agenda 21*, Freiburg, ICLE.
- Japan, Environmental Agency (JEA) (1982) *White Paper on the Environment*, Tokyo: Printing Office of the Ministry of Finance.
- Japan, Ministry of the Environment (JMOE) (2012) “Kitakyūshū-shi moderu jigyō”

- [Kitakyushu City model project], available at: <https://www.env.go.jp/recycle/ecotown/> (accessed 5 May 2020).
- Japan, Ministry of the Environment (JMOE) (2015) “Kokusai kankyō kyōryoku no genjō” [The state of international environmental cooperation], available at: <https://www.env.go.jp/council/06earth/y065-02/mat02-2.pdf> (accessed 14 December 2021).
- Kanie, N. and Biermann, F. (Eds.) (2017), *Governing through Goals: Sustainable Development Goals as Governance Innovation*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Kanie, N., Griggs, D., Young, O., Waddell, S., Shrivastava, P., Hass, P. H., Broadgate, W., Gaffney, O., and Kőrösi, C. (2019) “Rules to goals: emergence of new governance strategies for sustainable development,” *Sustainability Science*, 14, pp. 1745-49.
- Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kern, K. and Bulkeley, H. (2009) “Cities, Europeanization and multi-level governance: governing climate change through transnational municipal networks,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47 (2), pp. 309-32.
- Kira, T. (1990) *Chikyū kankyō no naka no Biwako* [Lake Biwa in the global environment], Kyoto, Jinbunshoin.
- Kitakyushu Asian Center for Low Carbon Society (KACLCS) (2021) “Kitakyushu Asian Center for Low Carbon Society: creating a better future for Asia with the initiative of Kitakyushu,” available at <https://asiangreencamp.net/eng/> (accessed 14 December 2021).
- Kotani, H. (2006) “Jidenteki kokusai koshō kankyō linkai ron” [Autobiographical account of the International Lake Environment Committee], Unpublished manuscript, Kusatsu (Japan), ILEC.
- Krauss, E. and Simcock, B.L., (1980) “Citizens’ movements: the growth and impact of environmental protest in Japan,” in Steiner, K., Krauss, E. and Flanagan, S. (Eds.), *Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 187–227.
- Kyoto Shimbun* [Kyoto Newspaper] (2010) “Anohi anotoki; jidai no shōgen” [On that day, at that time; historical witness], 10 to 17 May 2010.
- Learne, G. W. G. (1991) “Environmental contracts: a lesson in democracy from the Japanese,” *U.B.C. Law Review*, 25, pp. 361-85.
- Liefferink, D., Arts, B., Kamstra, J., and Ooijevaar, J., (2009) “Leaders and laggards in environmental policy: a quantitative analysis of domestic policy outputs,” *Journal of European Public Policy*, 16 (5), pp. 677–700.

- Lipschutz, R. D. (1996) *Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance: The Politics of Nature from Place to Planet*, Albany: SUNY Press.
- MacDougall, T.E. (1980) "Political opposition and big cities elections in Japan, 1947-1975," In Steiner, K., Krauss, E. and Flanagan, S. (Eds.), *Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 55–94.
- Mani, M. and Wheeler, D. (1998) "In search of pollution havens? dirty industry in the world economy, 1960-1995," *Journal of Environment and Development*, 7 (3), pp. 215-47.
- McKean, M. (1980) "Political socialization through citizens' movements," In Steiner, K., Krauss, E. and Flanagan, S. (Eds.), *Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 228–73.
- McKean, M. (1981) *Environmental Protest and Citizen Politics in Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Muramatsu, M. (1975) "The impact of economic growth policies on local politics in Japan," *Asian Survey*, 15 (9), pp. 799–816.
- Nakamura, H., Elder, M. and Mori, H. (2011) "The surprising role of local governments in international environmental cooperation: the case of Japanese collaboration with developing countries," *The Journal of Environment and Development*, 20 (3), pp. 219-50.
- Pflieger, G. (2014) "The local politics of Europeanization: a study of French cities' approaches to participation in the CIVITAS Programme," *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 21 (3), pp. 331– 44.
- Reed, S.R. (1981) "Environmental politics: some reflections based on the Japanese case," *Comparative Politics*, 13 (3), pp. 253–269.
- Reich, M. (1984) "Mobilizing for environmental policy in Italy and Japan," *Comparative Politics*, 16 (4), pp. 379–402.
- Ren, Y. (2005) "Japan's environmental management experiences," In Imura, H. and Schreurs, M. (Eds.), *Environmental Policy in Japan*, Washington, D.C.: Edward Elgar and the World Bank, pp. 287- 314.
- Rhodes, R. A. W. (1990) "Policy networks: a British perspective," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 2 (3), pp. 293-317.
- Schreurs, A.M. (2002) *Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany and the United States*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shiga Prefecture (1988) *Kankyō hakusho* [White paper on the environment], Environmental Office, Ōtsu, Shiga Prefecture.
- Steiner, K. (1980) "Progressive local administrations; local public policy and local-national

- Relations,” in Steiner, K., Krauss, E. and Flanagan, S. (Eds.), *Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 317–52.
- Sueyoshi, K. (2002) *Kitakyushu ekotaun: zero emisshon no chōsen* [Kitakyushu Eco-town: challenges to zero emission], Tokyo: Kaizōsha.
- Takao, Y. (2012) “Making climate change policy work at the local level: capacity-building for decentralized policymaking in Japan,” *Pacific Affairs*, 85 (4), pp. 767-88.
- Takao, Y. (2014) “Local levels of participation in Japan’s foreign aid and cooperation: issues arising from decentralized international cooperation,” *Asian Survey*, 54 (3), pp. 540-64.
- Tarrow, S. (1977) *Between Center and Periphery*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tarrow, S. (2001) “Transnational politics: contention and institutions in international politics,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4, pp. 1-20.
- United Nations (2015) “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” A/RES/70/1.
- Vogel, D. (1990) “Environmental policy in Japan and West Germany,” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Newport Beach, CA, March.
- Wapner, P. (1996) *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*, Albany: SUNY Press.
- Yokohama City Council (1991) Yokohama City Council Minutes, 4th plenary session, 13, 20 December 1991.

---

<sup>1</sup> The number of the Pollution Countermeasure Agreements (PCAs) increased rapidly from 30 in 1967 through 854 in 1970 to over 17,841 in 1980 (Learne 1991).

<sup>2</sup> Calculated from *OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics*. Primary energy supply per unit of GDP is based on tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) per thousand 2000 US dollars of GDP calculated using PPPs (purchasing-power-parity).

<sup>3</sup> By the late 1970s, the progressive chief executives were in retreat. In 1978 Asukata Ichio resigned from his position as the popular mayor of Yokohama. Kyoto Governor Ninagawa Torazō (1950-1978) and Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryōkichi (1967-1979) retired in 1978 and 1979 respectively and Osaka Governor Kuroda Ryōichi (1971-1979) was voted out of office in 1979.

<sup>4</sup> These surveys were conducted by Public Relations Office in Prime Minister’s Office in 1971, 1973, 1975, 1979 and 1981 (JEA 1982). Respondents were asked about the pollution problems they had

---

personally experienced in the last five years. The number of environmental protest incidents dramatically dropped in 1974 and local protests remained sporadic throughout the 1980s.

<sup>5</sup> Mani and Wheeler (1998), while drawing on emissions per unit of output, designated as pollution-intensive industries five sectors: iron and steel, nonferrous metals, industrial chemicals, pulp and paper, and metallic mineral products. Using the same pollution-intensity measure, they identified five non-pollution-intensive sectors: textiles, non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, transport equipment, and instruments.

<sup>6</sup> The enactment of the Basic Environmental Law in 1993 was another turning point of Japan's environmental policy. A series of new legislation, such as the Container and Packaging Recycling Law of 1995, the Environmental Impact Assessment Law of 1997, and the Basic Law for Establishing the Recycling-based Society of 2000, reflected an adaptation to a new policy-making environment at the international level.

<sup>7</sup> The 2005 Paris Declaration Aid Effectiveness, signed by all OECD countries, recommended an action for local ownership of foreign aid strategies.

<sup>8</sup> Kotani Hiroya (former official of Shiga Prefecture), Interview by author, May 12, 2010; Nakamura Tatsuya (Department of Environmental Policy, Shiga Prefecture), interview by author, 11 September 2011.

<sup>9</sup> Kotani Hiroya, Interview by author, 12 May 2010.

<sup>10</sup> Financial Capability Index (*zaisei ryoku shisū*) is calculated as the ratio of total financial income to total financial demand.

<sup>11</sup> The Kitakyushu office of the IGES, as a public-interest incorporated foundation since 2012, promotes research cooperation with international organizations, local governments, research institutions, business sectors, non-governmental organizations and citizens.

<sup>12</sup> The KITA was established in 1980 as a non-profit organization under the joint auspices of the Kitakyushu Junior Chamber, the Kitakyushu Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Western Japan Industry Club, in collaboration with Kitakyushu municipal government and Fukuoka prefectural government. Its mission was to contribute to the promotion of international cooperation at the grassroots level by providing training opportunities for technology transfer, research and development and updating of training materials.

<sup>13</sup> *Zaisei ryoku shisū* (financial power index) is calculated as the ratio of total financial income to total financial demand.

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, Mayor Takahide Hidenobu's speech, Yokohama City Council Minutes, regular meeting of the City Council, 2 March 1993; Mayor Nakada Hiroshi's speech, Yokohama City Council Minutes, regular meeting of the City Council, 10 June 2005; Mayor Hayashi Fumiko's speech, Yokohama City Council Minutes, Special Committee on Audit, 28 September 2010.

<sup>15</sup> Interview by author with Bernadia Irawati Tjandradewi, CITYNET, Yokohama, 24 May 2011. As of 2020, the network of cities grew to include 173 municipalities, NGOs, research institutions and for-profit business organizations (CITYNET 2021).

<sup>16</sup> Jeffrey Checkel (1999) argues that the successful diffusion of norms is determined by the degree of "cultural match," that is the degree to which the external norm resonates with the domestic normative environment.



---

<sup>17</sup> See, for example, a speech made by Mayor Nakada Hiroshi at the 2004 ceremony of the U.S.-Japan 150th Anniversary Program, available at: [http://www.ajstokyo.org/150/speech/speech8\\_j.htm](http://www.ajstokyo.org/150/speech/speech8_j.htm) (accessed 7 November 2020).

<sup>18</sup> Interview with Hayashi Fumiko, Mayor of Yokohama, cited in “Shin kōmin renkei saizensen” [On the frontiers of Public Private Partnership] *Nikkei BPnet*, 18 February 2015.