Investigating the potential of insurance as a mechanism to enhance the performance of risky conservation tenders
Different types of uncertainties impact the performance of environmental programs. For example, landholders can be exposed to substantial cost variability when delivering environmental services. Therefore, they may demand additional financial incentives as compensation for undertaking 'risky' conservation projects. In such situations, conservation agencies may have to over-spend public funds to achieve their conservation targets. This research provides insights into the potential benefits of insurance mechanisms that may help alleviate landholders concerns about the uncertainties that exist in conservation tenders. We find that an actuarially fair insurance lowers optimal bids and potentially improves the cost-effectiveness of a conservation tender.
|dc.title||Investigating the potential of insurance as a mechanism to enhance the performance of risky conservation tenders|
|curtin.department||School of Molecular and Life Sciences (MLS)|
|curtin.faculty||Faculty of Science and Engineering|
|curtin.contributor.orcid||Olita, Toto [0000-0002-3247-3756]|
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