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dc.contributor.authorOlita, Toto
dc.contributor.authorSchilizzi, Steve
dc.contributor.authorIftekhar, Sayed
dc.contributor.authorLatacz-Lohmann, Uwe
dc.contributor.authorBoxall, Peter

Different types of uncertainties impact the performance of environmental programs. For example, landholders can be exposed to substantial cost variability when delivering environmental services. Therefore, they may demand additional financial incentives as compensation for undertaking 'risky' conservation projects. In such situations, conservation agencies may have to over-spend public funds to achieve their conservation targets. This research provides insights into the potential benefits of insurance mechanisms that may help alleviate landholders concerns about the uncertainties that exist in conservation tenders. We find that an actuarially fair insurance lowers optimal bids and potentially improves the cost-effectiveness of a conservation tender.

dc.subjectBidding theory
dc.subjectConservation tenders
dc.subjectEmbedded insurance
dc.subjectPublic expenditure
dc.subjectOwn-cost uncertainty
dc.titleInvestigating the potential of insurance as a mechanism to enhance the performance of risky conservation tenders
curtin.departmentSchool of Molecular and Life Sciences (MLS)
curtin.accessStatusIn process
curtin.facultyFaculty of Science and Engineering
curtin.contributor.orcidOlita, Toto [0000-0002-3247-3756]

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