Auction design and the success of national 3G spectrum assignments
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This study empirically examines a sample of national wireless spectrum assignments for the period 2000-2007 to identify the sources of revenue variations. An econometric model that recognises the censored nature of the sample relates per capita winning bid (per Mhz) values to auction design variables (license award process), national and mobile market conditions, spectrum package attributes and post-award obligations identified from national regulatory authority tender documents. The analysis reveals that only some auction design variables independently impact on realized 3G spectrum auction revenue in a manner consistent with auction theory.
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Madden, Gary; Suenaga, Hiroaki (2016)This article examined the empirical relationship between prices paid for national 3G wireless licenses when spectrums were sold by auction. The reduced-form modelling approach was based on the premise that auction design ...
Madden, Gary; Saglam, I.; Hussain, I. (2015)This study examines a sample of 93 national 3G spectrum auctions for the period 2000–2011 to identify the sources of substantial revenue variations. An implied reduced-form econometric model that recognises the censored ...
Madden, Gary; Morey, Aaron (2013)Globally, most nations assign radio spectrum to provide 3G mobile services during the period 1999-2007. While there is consensus among most economists that auctions are the preferred assignment mechanism, the assignment ...