Incentives for corporate tax planning and reporting: Empirical evidence from Australia

Taylor, Grantley; Richardson, G.

doi:10.1016/j.jcae.2013.11.003

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Access Status

Open access

Authors

Taylor, Grantley

Richardson, G.

Date

2014

Type

Journal Article

Metadata

Show full item record

Citation

Taylor, Grantley and Richardson, Grant. 2014. Incentives for corporate tax planning and reporting: Empirical evidence from Australia. Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics. 10 (1): pp. 1-15.

Source Title

Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics

DOI

10.1016/j.jcae.2013.11.003

ISSN

1815-5669

Remarks

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in the Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in the Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, Volume 10, Issue 1, April 2014, Pages 1–15. <a href="http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2013.11.003">http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2013.11.003</a>

URI

http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/11420

Collection

Curtin Research Publications

Abstract

This study extends prior research on the willingness of firms to significantly decrease their corporate taxes. It specifically examines the associations between corporate tax avoidance and the reported significant uncertainty of a firm’s tax position, the tax expertise and tax affiliations of its directors, and the performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management personnel. Based on a dataset of 200 publicly listed Australian firms over the 2006–2010 period (1000 firm years), we find that the reported uncertainty of a firm’s tax position, the tax expertise of its directors, and the performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management personnel are significantly positively associated with tax avoidance. Conversely, firms with board members who have at least one tax-related affiliation are significantly negatively associated with tax avoidance.