Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorMadden, Gary
dc.contributor.authorBohlin, Erik
dc.contributor.authorMorey, Aaron
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-30T11:43:33Z
dc.date.available2017-01-30T11:43:33Z
dc.date.created2013-03-05T20:00:30Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationMadden, Gary and Bohlin, Erik and Morey, Aaron. 2012. Entry into 3G Mobile Telecommunications Markets. International Journal of Management and Network Economics 2 (4): pp. 374-391.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/14408
dc.identifier.doi10.1504/IJMNE.2012.051890
dc.description.abstract

National regulatory authorities (NRAs) attempt to encourage participation in spectrum assignments by enhancing entrants’ likelihood of success. The question this study addresses is: can NRA policy tools really affect the probability an entrant wins a 3G spectrum licence? In particular, the econometric analysis allows consideration of whether licence concession or mode of assignment encourages entry. The study finds that auction assignment processes only slightly increase the probability of entry, whilst price and quantity concessions have no impact.

dc.publisherInderscience Publishers
dc.subject3G spectrum assignment
dc.subjectmarket entry
dc.subjectnetwork economics
dc.subjectglobal mobile telephone markets
dc.titleEntry into 3G Mobile Telecommunications Markets
dc.typeJournal Article
dcterms.source.volume2
dcterms.source.number4
dcterms.source.startPage374
dcterms.source.endPage391
dcterms.source.issn1754-2316
dcterms.source.titleInternational Journal of Management and Network Economics
curtin.department
curtin.accessStatusFulltext not available


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record