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    Intellectual capital performance and cash-based incentive payments for executive directors: impact of remuneration committee and corporate governance features

    172553_48910_38000.pdf (183.4Kb)
    Access Status
    Open access
    Authors
    Van der Zahn, J-L.
    Singh, Inderpal
    Brown, Alistair
    Date
    2005
    Type
    Journal Article
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Citation
    Van der Zahn, J-L.W. Mitchell and Singh, Inderpal and Brown, Alistair. 2005. Intellectual capital performance and cash-based incentive payments for executive directors: impact of remuneration committee and corporate governance features. Corporate Board: role, duties and composition. 1 (3): pp. 29-45.
    Source Title
    Corporate control and ownership
    ISSN
    1727-9232
    School
    School of Accounting
    Remarks

    Copyright © 2005 Virtus InterPress http://www.virtusinterpress.org/

    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/19434
    Collection
    • Curtin Research Publications
    Abstract

    We use a sample of 964 executive directors representing 354 Singapore publicly listed firms to examine linkage between firm performance and cash-based bonus payments. As a pooled OLS regression model may hide different models that characterize subsets of observations we use latent class analysis to further examine the data and to identify more specifically the influence of corporate governance features. Our latent class analysis results indicate that remuneration committees with members having their interests better aligned with shareholders (such as presence of a significant owner) appear more likely to consider the incremental value of tying executive director compensation to intellectual capital performance. Remuneration committees with a lower risk of influence from managerial power were also found to be more likely to support a compensation linkage for executive directors to intellectual capital performance. The influence of the remuneration committee features is evident for both entrepreneurial and traditional firms. Overall, our findings are consistent with both the optimal-contract pricing and managerial power views of executive compensation setting.

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