Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorMadden, Gary
dc.contributor.authorBohlin, Erik
dc.contributor.authorTran, Thien
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-30T12:46:49Z
dc.date.available2017-01-30T12:46:49Z
dc.date.created2014-03-10T20:00:40Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationMadden, Gary and Bohlin, Erik and Tran, Thien. 2013. Spectrum Licensing and Flexible Beauty Contest Designs. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics. 84 (3): pp. 309-321.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/25120
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/apce.12016
dc.description.abstract

McMillan’s (1995) ‘flexibility’ proposition suggests a testable hypothesis about beauty contests spectrum assignments. Such flexibility purportedly allows regulators to pursue social welfare (network deployment) goals. A separate argument is that more competitive beauty contests enhance the probability of assignment. The study concludes that regulators do indeed focus on societal (network deployment) welfare goals. Initially, consideration is given in the immediate term where licenses are awarded based on operator aftermarket commitments. Subsequently, spectrum package attributes and financial performance obligations, specified in the tender documents, come into play to support the networks spread more widely through the population in a timely manner. Finally, the econometric results suggest that more competitive beauty contests enhance the probability of assignment.

dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
dc.subject3G spectrum assignment
dc.subjectbeauty contests
dc.subjectmobile telephone markets
dc.titleSpectrum Licensing and Flexible Beauty Contest Designs
dc.typeJournal Article
dcterms.source.volume84
dcterms.source.number3
dcterms.source.startPage309
dcterms.source.endPage321
dcterms.source.issn1370-4788
dcterms.source.titleAnnals of Public and Cooperative Economics
curtin.department
curtin.accessStatusFulltext not available


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record