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dc.contributor.authorHesamzadeh, M.
dc.contributor.authorHosseinzadeh, N.
dc.contributor.authorWolfs, Peter
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-30T13:12:24Z
dc.date.available2017-01-30T13:12:24Z
dc.date.created2010-02-23T20:01:46Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationHesamzadeh, Mohammad and Hosseinzadeh, Nasser and Wolfs, Peter. 2010. Transmission system augmentation based on the concepts of quantity withheld and monopoly rent for reducing market power. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. 25 (1): pp. 167-180.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/29361
dc.description.abstract

This paper proposes two mathematical structures for considering the market power effect of transmission capacity in transmission augmentation assessment. These mathematical structures use the concepts of monopoly rent and quantity withheld in economics for market power modeling in the assessment process of transmission augmentation. The simultaneous-move and sequential-move games in applied mathematics are used to model the interactions of the transmission network service provider, generating companies, and the market management company in the proposed mathematical structures. The solution concept of Nash equilibria is reformulated as an optimization problem, and the multiple Nash equilibria is tackled through an introduced concept termed worst Nash equilibrium. A numerical solution is developed to solve the proposed mathematical structures. The numerical solution is an island parallel genetic algorithm nested in a standard genetic algorithm. The six-bus Garver's example system and the IEEE 14-bus test system are modified and studied. The results prove the strong mechanism of the developed structures for modeling the market power effect of transmission capacity in the assessment of transmission augmentation.

dc.publisherIEEE
dc.subjectpower transmission economics
dc.subjectpower markets
dc.subjectpower system analysis computing
dc.subjectgame theory
dc.titleTransmission System Augmentation Based on the Concepts of Quantity Withheld and Monopoly Rent for Reducing Market Power
dc.typeJournal Article
dcterms.source.volume25
dcterms.source.number1
dcterms.source.startPage167
dcterms.source.endPage180
dcterms.source.issn08858950
dcterms.source.titleIEEE Transactions on Power Systems
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Copyright © 2009 IEEE This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. In most cases, these works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright holder.

curtin.accessStatusOpen access
curtin.facultyDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering
curtin.facultySchool of Engineering
curtin.facultyFaculty of Science and Engineering


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