Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorPetchey, Jeffrey Dean
dc.identifier.citationPetchey, Jeffrey Dean. 2009. Decentralized emission standards with tax competition, School of Economics and Finance Working Paper Series, Curtin University of Technology, School of Economics and Finance.

We consider a game between jurisdictions within a national economy. Capital migrates between jurisdictions to satisfy an equal return condition. The total supply of capital to the economy is a non-decreasing function of the national return. This allows us to cater for the case where capital has some home bias and jurisdictions have an incentive to engage in tax competition and set non-zero capital taxes in equilibrium. We then show that this competition does not distort emissions standards and that decentralized provision of environmental policy is locally efficient. Thus, we find no evidence of a race to the bottom or top in emissions standards as a result of tax competition.

dc.publisherSchool of Economics and Finance, Curtin Business School
dc.subjectcapital tax
dc.subjectlocal public goods
dc.titleDecentralized emission standards with tax competition
dc.typeWorking Paper
dcterms.source.seriesSchool of Economics and Finance Working Paper Series
curtin.accessStatusOpen access
curtin.facultyCurtin Business School
curtin.facultySchool of Economics and Finance

Files in this item


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record