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dc.contributor.authorFinn, Chris
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-30T13:50:07Z
dc.date.available2017-01-30T13:50:07Z
dc.date.created2014-02-13T20:00:35Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationFinn, Chris. 2013. Extrajudicial Speech and the Prejudgment Rule: A Reply to Bartie and Gava. Adelaide Law Review. 34 (2): pp. 267-281.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/35527
dc.description.abstract

The precise limits of the rule against prejudgment remain to be determined. It has recently been argued that the rule should be extended to prohibit extrajudicial statements on matters of law, as well as those of fact or evidence at issue in a particular matter. It is argued that this suggestion should be resisted, as neither the existing case law nor underlying principle support such an extension. Moreover, there are strong policy reasons for not doing so.

dc.publisherThe University of Adelaide
dc.relation.urihttp://www.adelaide.edu.au/press/journals/law-review/issues/alr-vol-34-2/alr-34-2-ch3.pdf
dc.titleExtrajudicial Speech and the Prejudgment Rule: A Reply to Bartie and Gava
dc.typeJournal Article
dcterms.source.volume34
dcterms.source.number2
dcterms.source.startPage267
dcterms.source.endPage281
dcterms.source.issn0065-1915
dcterms.source.titleAdelaide Law Review
curtin.department
curtin.accessStatusFulltext not available


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