Extrajudicial Speech and the Prejudgment Rule: A Reply to Bartie and Gava
dc.contributor.author | Finn, Chris | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-30T13:50:07Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-01-30T13:50:07Z | |
dc.date.created | 2014-02-13T20:00:35Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Finn, Chris. 2013. Extrajudicial Speech and the Prejudgment Rule: A Reply to Bartie and Gava. Adelaide Law Review. 34 (2): pp. 267-281. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/35527 | |
dc.description.abstract |
The precise limits of the rule against prejudgment remain to be determined. It has recently been argued that the rule should be extended to prohibit extrajudicial statements on matters of law, as well as those of fact or evidence at issue in a particular matter. It is argued that this suggestion should be resisted, as neither the existing case law nor underlying principle support such an extension. Moreover, there are strong policy reasons for not doing so. | |
dc.publisher | The University of Adelaide | |
dc.relation.uri | http://www.adelaide.edu.au/press/journals/law-review/issues/alr-vol-34-2/alr-34-2-ch3.pdf | |
dc.title | Extrajudicial Speech and the Prejudgment Rule: A Reply to Bartie and Gava | |
dc.type | Journal Article | |
dcterms.source.volume | 34 | |
dcterms.source.number | 2 | |
dcterms.source.startPage | 267 | |
dcterms.source.endPage | 281 | |
dcterms.source.issn | 0065-1915 | |
dcterms.source.title | Adelaide Law Review | |
curtin.department | ||
curtin.accessStatus | Fulltext not available |