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dc.contributor.authorPetchey, Jeffrey
dc.contributor.authorShapiro, P.
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-30T14:13:14Z
dc.date.available2017-01-30T14:13:14Z
dc.date.created2008-11-12T23:33:01Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.citationPetchey, Jeffrey and Shapiro, Perry (2008) Equilibrium in fiscal competition games from the point of view of the dual., School of Economics and Finance Working Paper Series: no. 08:01, Curtin University of Technology, School of Economics and Finance.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/38173
dc.description.abstract

Papers that examine fiscal competition for mobile factors of production commonly employ simultaneous move games between two states and focus on the inefficiency of the equilibria. Most often, the existence of the equilibrium is left unexplored. By examining decision making by governments that make only constrained efficient choices, we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria when there are multiple policy instruments, multiple mobile factors and many different production processes. Convexity of the minimum cost function, "dual" to the factor preferences and production function primitives, is sufficient to ensure the existence of equilibrium. We also find that equilibrium may not exist because of the economies of scale inherent in provision of public goods which benefit mobile factors.

dc.publisherSchool of Economics and Finance, Curtin Business School
dc.subjectcost functions
dc.subjectduality
dc.subjectfiscal competition
dc.subjectpublic goods
dc.subjectexistence
dc.titleEquilibrium in fiscal competition games from the point of view of the dual.
dc.typeWorking Paper
dcterms.source.volume08.01
dcterms.source.monthmay
dcterms.source.seriesSchool of Economics and Finance Working Paper Series
curtin.note

ISSN: 1835-9450

curtin.note

ISBN: 978-1-74067-475-1

curtin.identifierEPR-2917
curtin.accessStatusOpen access
curtin.facultyCurtin Business School
curtin.facultySchool of Economics and Finance


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