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dc.contributor.authorWills-Johnson, Nick
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-30T14:45:06Z
dc.date.available2017-01-30T14:45:06Z
dc.date.created2008-11-12T23:33:01Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.citationWills-Johnson, Nick (2008) Delegation or abrogation: The impossibility of objective social welfare maximisation by government, Centre for Research in Applied Economics Working Paper Series: no. 200804, Curtin University of Technology, School of Economics and Finance.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/40729
dc.description.abstract

A model widely used for decisions which have a public interest element is delegation of parliamentary authority to a bureaucratic agency, within the confines of a legislative framework which directs the relevant agents how social welfare should be maximised within the context of the issue at hand. This is intended to remove the politicisation of decision-making, and allow for an objective approach. However, except in very limited circumstances, it is unlikely that bureaucratic agents will be able to act in this fashion. Using Arrow?s (1950) Impossibility Theorem, this paper outlines why this is the case, and the consequences of delegation.

dc.publisherCentre for Research in Applied Economics, Curtin Business School
dc.titleDelegation or abrogation: The impossibility of objective social welfare maximisation by government
dc.typeWorking Paper
dcterms.source.volume200804
dcterms.source.monthmar
dcterms.source.seriesCentre for Research in Applied Economics Working Paper Series
curtin.identifierEPR-2923
curtin.accessStatusOpen access
curtin.facultyCurtin Business School
curtin.facultySchool of Economics and Finance


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