Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness
| dc.contributor.author | Sauerwald, S. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Van Oosterhout, H. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Van Essen, M. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Peng, Mike | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-08-24T02:22:12Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-08-24T02:22:12Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2017-08-23T07:21:46Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Sauerwald, S. and Van Oosterhout, H. and Van Essen, M. and Peng, M. 2015. Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness, pp. 1025-1030. | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/56051 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.5465/AMBPP.2015.192 | |
| dc.description.abstract |
Proxy advisors are information intermediaries that provide voting recommendations to shareholders. Drawing on agency theory and the comparative corporate governance literature, we find that firm internal monitoring mechanisms substitute for proxy advice, and that proxy advice is less influential and has a lower predictive quality in relationship-based corporate governance contexts. | |
| dc.title | Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness | |
| dc.type | Conference Paper | |
| dcterms.source.startPage | 1025 | |
| dcterms.source.endPage | 1030 | |
| dcterms.source.title | 75th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2015 | |
| dcterms.source.series | 75th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2015 | |
| curtin.department | School of Management | |
| curtin.accessStatus | Fulltext not available |
Files in this item
| Files | Size | Format | View |
|---|---|---|---|
|
There are no files associated with this item. |
|||