dc.contributor.author	Sauerwald, S.
dc.contributor.author	Van Oosterhout, H.
dc.contributor.author	Van Essen, M.
dc.contributor.author	Peng, Mike
dc.date.accessioned	2017-08-24T02:22:12Z
dc.date.available	2017-08-24T02:22:12Z
dc.date.created	2017-08-23T07:21:46Z
dc.date.issued	2015
dc.identifier.citation	Sauerwald, S. and Van Oosterhout, H. and Van Essen, M. and Peng, M. 2015. Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness, pp. 1025-1030.
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/56051
dc.identifier.doi	10.5465/AMBPP.2015.192
dc.description.abstract	Proxy advisors are information intermediaries that provide voting recommendations to shareholders. Drawing on agency theory and the comparative corporate governance literature, we find that firm internal monitoring mechanisms substitute for proxy advice, and that proxy advice is less influential and has a lower predictive quality in relationship-based corporate governance contexts.
dc.title	Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness
dc.type	Conference Paper
dcterms.source.startPage	1025
dcterms.source.endPage	1030
dcterms.source.title	75th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2015
dcterms.source.series	75th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2015
curtin.department	School of Management
curtin.accessStatus	Fulltext not available

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Proxy advisors as gatekeepers of shareholder dissent: A cross-national investigation of influence and effectiveness