How do political connections cause SOEs and non-SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China
|dc.identifier.citation||Liu, Q. and Luo, T. and Tian, G. 2017. How do political connections cause SOEs and non-SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China. Accounting and Finance.|
© 2017 AFAANZ. This study examines the impact that political connections have on Mergers and Acquisitions (M & A) performance and the decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that political connections destroy (create) value in SOEs (non-SOEs). Our findings show that connected SOEs are more likely to acquire local targets, especially when the local unemployment rate is high and when the firms are controlled by the local government, and they are less likely to conduct vertical mergers. M & A decisions of connected non-SOEs are less influenced by the government; instead, political connections in non-SOEs help bidders to integrate vertically and obtain external financing support.
|dc.publisher||Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Asia|
|dc.title||How do political connections cause SOEs and non-SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China|
|dcterms.source.title||Accounting and Finance|
|curtin.department||Department of Finance and Banking|
|curtin.accessStatus||Fulltext not available|
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