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dc.contributor.authorChen, B.
dc.contributor.authorDuong, Lien
dc.contributor.authorTruong, T.
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-07T01:34:10Z
dc.date.available2019-05-07T01:34:10Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationChen, B. and Duong, L. and Truong, T. 2018. The Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring. In Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand (AFAANZ) Annual Conference, 1-3 Jul 2018, Auckland, NZ.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/75435
dc.description.abstract

The “Wall Street Rule” (WSR), a form of monitoring by institutional investors, has been viewed as a “cut-and-run” strategy adopted to express dissatisfaction with a company’s management. In this study, we show that WSR, far from being a passive protest, is in fact a potent weapon to improve corporate governance. We present empirical evidence that WSR is positively associated with board monitoring when the firm is endowed with an outsider-dominated board. This suggests that WSR improves stock price informativeness, providing the board with an additional source of information so that it may monitor the company more effectively.

dc.titleThe Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring
dc.typeConference Paper
dcterms.source.conferenceAccounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand (AFAANZ) Annual Conference
dcterms.source.conference-start-date1 Jul 2018
dcterms.source.conferencelocationAuckland
dcterms.source.placeAuckland
dc.date.updated2019-05-07T01:34:06Z
curtin.departmentSchool of Accounting
curtin.accessStatusOpen access
curtin.facultyFaculty of Business and Law
dcterms.source.conference-end-date3 Jul 2018


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