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dc.contributor.authorDuong, Lien
dc.contributor.authorEmanuel, D.
dc.contributor.authorTruong, T.
dc.contributor.authorvan Dissen, J.
dc.contributor.editorBalachandran, B.
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-07T01:41:48Z
dc.date.available2019-05-07T01:41:48Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/75436
dc.description.abstract

CEOs are increasingly being granted options as part of their compensation packages. However, despite all of the research conducted on executive compensation, there has been little investigation into the impact of CEO stock option grants on firm performance. In addition, many previous studies have found conflicting results on the impact of equity-based compensation on performance. Our study incorporates the competitive strategy adopted by the firm into its analysis. We document that a firm’s strategy impacts the level of stock options granted to the CEO. We also found that, after controlling for a firm’s competitive strategy, the relationship between CEO stock options and firm performance is stronger than when the sample is considered on a pooled basis.

dc.titleCEO Compensation, Strategy, and Firm Performance
dc.typeConference Paper
dcterms.source.conferenceFinancial Market and Corporate Governance (FMCG) annual conference
dcterms.source.conference-start-date17 Apr 2019
dcterms.source.conferencelocationSydney, Australia
dcterms.source.placeSydney
dc.date.updated2019-05-07T01:41:41Z
curtin.departmentSchool of Accounting
curtin.accessStatusOpen access
curtin.facultyFaculty of Business and Law
dcterms.source.conference-end-date18 Apr 2019


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