The Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring
dc.contributor.author | Chen, B. | |
dc.contributor.author | Duong, Lien | |
dc.contributor.author | Truong, T. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-05-07T01:43:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-05-07T01:43:36Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Chen, B. and Duong, L. and Truong, T. 2018. The Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring. In Financial Market and Corporate Governance (FMCG) annual conference, 5-7 Apr 2018, Melbourne, Australia. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/75437 | |
dc.description.abstract |
The “Wall Street Rule” (WSR), a form of monitoring by institutional investors, has been viewed as a “cut-and-run” strategy adopted to express dissatisfaction with a company’s management. In this study, we show that WSR, far from being a passive protest, is in fact a potent weapon to improve corporate governance. We present empirical evidence that WSR is positively associated with board monitoring when the firm is endowed with an outsider-dominated board. This suggests that WSR improves stock price informativeness, providing the board with an additional source of information so that it may monitor the company more effectively. | |
dc.title | The Wall Street Rule and its Impact on Board Monitoring | |
dc.type | Conference Paper | |
dcterms.source.conference | Financial Market and Corporate Governance (FMCG) annual conference | |
dcterms.source.conference-start-date | 5 Apr 2018 | |
dcterms.source.conferencelocation | Melbourne | |
dcterms.source.place | Melbourne | |
dc.date.updated | 2019-05-07T01:43:32Z | |
curtin.department | School of Accounting | |
curtin.accessStatus | Open access | |
curtin.faculty | Faculty of Business and Law | |
curtin.contributor.orcid | Duong, Thi Hong [0000-0003-0308-2200] | |
curtin.contributor.researcherid | Duong, Thi Hong [M-7254-2017] | |
dcterms.source.conference-end-date | 7 Apr 2018 | |
curtin.contributor.scopusauthorid | Duong, Thi Hong [55347126200] |