State tax and policy competition for mobile capital
dc.contributor.author | Petchey, Jeffrey | |
dc.contributor.author | Shapiro, P. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-30T11:01:39Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-01-30T11:01:39Z | |
dc.date.created | 2009-03-05T00:54:51Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Petchey, Jeffrey D. and Shapiro, Perry. 2002. State tax and policy competition for mobile capital. The Economic Record 78 (241): pp. 175-185. | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/7658 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/1475-4932.00049 | |
dc.description.abstract |
We characterise a model in which states engage in tax and policy competition with one another to attract mobile capital. The mix of policies chosen is shown to depend on the interaction between a desire to exploit capital for the benefit of domestic residents (labour) and a net marginal externality generated by capital. It is also argued that competition between states leads to an inefficient supply and geographical distribution of capital within the domestic economy if capital markets are not fully integrated. | |
dc.publisher | Blackwell Publishing | |
dc.title | State tax and policy competition for mobile capital | |
dc.type | Journal Article | |
dcterms.source.volume | 78 | |
dcterms.source.number | 241 | |
dcterms.source.startPage | 175 | |
dcterms.source.endPage | 185 | |
dcterms.source.issn | 00130249 | |
dcterms.source.title | The Economic Record | |
curtin.note |
Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. | |
curtin.accessStatus | Fulltext not available | |
curtin.faculty | Curtin Business School | |
curtin.faculty | School of Economics and Finance |