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dc.contributor.authorPetchey, Jeffrey
dc.contributor.authorShapiro, P.
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-30T11:01:39Z
dc.date.available2017-01-30T11:01:39Z
dc.date.created2009-03-05T00:54:51Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.citationPetchey, Jeffrey D. and Shapiro, Perry. 2002. State tax and policy competition for mobile capital. The Economic Record 78 (241): pp. 175-185.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/7658
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1475-4932.00049
dc.description.abstract

We characterise a model in which states engage in tax and policy competition with one another to attract mobile capital. The mix of policies chosen is shown to depend on the interaction between a desire to exploit capital for the benefit of domestic residents (labour) and a net marginal externality generated by capital. It is also argued that competition between states leads to an inefficient supply and geographical distribution of capital within the domestic economy if capital markets are not fully integrated.

dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing
dc.titleState tax and policy competition for mobile capital
dc.typeJournal Article
dcterms.source.volume78
dcterms.source.number241
dcterms.source.startPage175
dcterms.source.endPage185
dcterms.source.issn00130249
dcterms.source.titleThe Economic Record
curtin.note

Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

curtin.accessStatusFulltext not available
curtin.facultyCurtin Business School
curtin.facultySchool of Economics and Finance


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