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dc.contributor.authorFernández Méndez, C.
dc.contributor.authorPathan, Md Shams Tabrize
dc.contributor.authorArrondo García, R.
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-21T07:07:25Z
dc.date.available2019-10-21T07:07:25Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationFernández Méndez, C. and Pathan, S. and Arrondo García, R. 2015. Monitoring capabilities of busy and overlap directors: Evidence from Australia. Pacific Basin Finance Journal. 35 (Part A): pp. 444-469.
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/76643
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.pacfin.2015.05.006
dc.description.abstract

© 2015 Elsevier B.V. We analyze the effects of multiple board directorships (busy directors) and multiple committee memberships of a board (overlap directors) on four board supervisory outcomes: CEO remuneration, external auditor opinion, audit fees and CEO turnover. Using a panel of 684 Australian listed firms from 2001 to 2011, we find that firms with busy directors pay high remunerations to their CEOs, and experience low CEO pay-performance and low CEO turnover-performance sensitivities. Our results also suggest that firms with overlap directors have a lower probability of receiving a qualified audit opinion and are able to negotiate lower payments, both to their CEOs and to the external auditors. These results hold for alternative specifications and proxies. Our results suggest that busy (overlap) directors are detrimental (beneficial) to the monitoring capability of the board and its committees. Finally, our findings suggest that the negative monitoring effect of busy directors are predominantly observed in large firms where over-commitment problems are severe, while the positive monitoring effects of overlap directors are observed in small firms where directorial positions are less time demanding.

dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
dc.subjectSocial Sciences
dc.subjectBusiness, Finance
dc.subjectBusiness & Economics
dc.subjectBoard
dc.subjectExecutive remuneration
dc.subjectBusy directors
dc.subjectOverlap directors
dc.subjectAudit fees
dc.subjectAudit opinion
dc.subjectPay-performance sensitivity
dc.subjectCEO turnover
dc.subjectCEO COMPENSATION
dc.subjectCORPORATE GOVERNANCE
dc.subjectEARNINGS MANAGEMENT
dc.subjectFIRM PERFORMANCE
dc.subjectMULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS
dc.subjectBOARD STRUCTURE
dc.subjectAUDIT SERVICES
dc.subjectTURNOVER
dc.subjectTOP
dc.subjectMARKET
dc.titleMonitoring capabilities of busy and overlap directors: Evidence from Australia
dc.typeJournal Article
dcterms.source.volume35
dcterms.source.startPage444
dcterms.source.endPage469
dcterms.source.issn0927-538X
dcterms.source.titlePacific Basin Finance Journal
dc.date.updated2019-10-21T07:07:25Z
curtin.departmentSchool of Economics, Finance and Property
curtin.accessStatusFulltext not available
curtin.facultyFaculty of Business and Law
curtin.contributor.orcidPathan, Md Shams Tabrize [0000-0001-8171-3501]
curtin.contributor.researcheridPathan, Md Shams Tabrize [A-3837-2012]
dcterms.source.eissn1879-0585
curtin.contributor.scopusauthoridPathan, Md Shams Tabrize [23100726500]


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