CEO Power and Audit Quality: Does Monitoring Intensity Matter?
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Fulltext not available
Embargo Lift Date
2024-05-31
Authors
Alyafai, Ayoob
Date
2021Supervisor
Nigar Sultana
Harj Singh
Ross Taplin
Type
Thesis
Award
PhD
Metadata
Show full item recordFaculty
Business and Law
School
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
Collection
Abstract
The thesis examines whether chief executive officers (CEOs) use their power to influence audit quality, proxied by audit fees and the likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion. In addition, this thesis examines the moderating role of internal and external monitoring on the association between CEO power and audit quality to assess whether monitoring intensity can counterbalance CEO power. The findings of this study have several implications for regulators, auditors, investors, and academic researchers.
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