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dc.contributor.authorAlyafai, Ayoob
dc.contributor.supervisorNigar Sultanaen_US
dc.contributor.supervisorHarj Singhen_US
dc.contributor.supervisorRoss Taplinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-03T03:50:28Z
dc.date.available2022-06-03T03:50:28Z
dc.date.issued2021en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/88693
dc.description.abstract

The thesis examines whether chief executive officers (CEOs) use their power to influence audit quality, proxied by audit fees and the likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion. In addition, this thesis examines the moderating role of internal and external monitoring on the association between CEO power and audit quality to assess whether monitoring intensity can counterbalance CEO power. The findings of this study have several implications for regulators, auditors, investors, and academic researchers.

en_US
dc.publisherCurtin Universityen_US
dc.titleCEO Power and Audit Quality: Does Monitoring Intensity Matter?en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dcterms.educationLevelPhDen_US
curtin.departmentSchool of Accounting, Economics and Financeen_US
curtin.accessStatusOpen accessen_US
curtin.facultyBusiness and Lawen_US


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