Integrity Agency Funding: The case of Australasian Auditors General

Abstract

There have been calls for greater financial independence for integrity agencies, and this paper seeks to advance understanding of the options available to achieve this by assessing the legislation and issues for Australasian Auditors General. Audit offices are the oldest form of integrity agency and have the most detailed previous consideration of their financial independence. The paper identifies four characteristics: control, transparency, adequacy and certainty and key features for each. Analysis indicates that in four jurisdictions the Executive keeps a tight rein, in three there is a recognition for a significant role for the Parliament and in the remaining two this role is dominant. As there isn’t a consistent approach to funding and there are many differences of detail, the paper develops a checklist of key provisions to inform decisions regarding the funding of audit offices and integrity agencies more generally. The paper observes that an increased role for Parliament in funding can raise new challenges for independence including the tensions between the interests of Government and Opposition MPs and the ability of committees to function effectively.