Intelligence Agencies and the Use of Lethal Force

Abstract

In this paper, I examine the notion that covert action should be part of the intelligence mission and that, in some cases, intelligence agencies are better placed to use lethal force for dealing with certain “in-between” or “grey” areas of conflict than the military. I start out by providing a brief analysis of the conventional perspective for morally justifying the use of lethal force by military combatants in just war theory. I argue that the conventional account for justifying the military use of lethal force in war grants military combatants special permissions for killing enemy combatants. Next I discuss the ways in which changes in modern conflict have created problems for the conventional approach. I demonstrate that the conventional approach alone is insufficient for dealing with these problems. Finally, I examine the claim that these types of problems are better addressed by a distinct intelligence paradigm for using lethal force. It is sometimes argued that one of the missions of intelligence agencies is to conduct covert action on behalf of the state. I dispute this claim and argue that although intelligence agencies have an important role to play, the use of lethal force should remain a distinctly military responsibility.