Russia and the South China Sea

Abstract

Despite being a distant external power, Russia has a long history of involvement in the South China Sea (SCS) strategic affairs, which has been marked by periods of limited-scale interactions, and times of active and direct engagement supported by a physical presence in the area. For Moscow, the SCS was and remains an arena of both great power competition, as well as a strategic transit route and a strategic enabler to interact with regional partners and clients. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has been progressively reasserting its place in the Indo-Pacific, a progress, which was accelerated after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This also saw a progression of bilateral strategic ties with China to a near allied status paralleled with a more active engagement with Southeast Asia. For many years, Russia has tried to play a fine balancing act of non-involvement in the SCS dilemma, resorting at best to articulating points that the dispute resolution should be limited to only parties involved, and opposing any external interference. By doing that Moscow positioned itself as an independent player with a balanced view on the dispute. The war in Ukraine may become a key determinant in Russia’s future approaches to the SCS. Anti-Russian sanctions and the state of a near open confrontation with the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization drive Moscow to prioritize economic and political links with Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, also by means of maritime trade. With Southeast and South Asia becoming Russia’s vital consumers of some core goods and commodities, the security of key connecting sea lines of communication (SLOC), including those that transit through the SCS, is becoming a matter of strategic concern for Moscow.